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A Comparative Study on Post-Cold War and Post 9/11 US

Democracy Promotion

탈냉전과 포스트-9/11 시대의 민주주의 원조에 관한 비교연구

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A Comprehensive Study on Post-Cold War and Post 9/11 United States Democracy Promotion

탈냉전과 포스트-9/11 시대의 민주주의 원조에 관한 비교연구

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이 논문을 국제협력학 석사 학위논문으로 제출함

2014 년 8 월

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Abstract

This study aims to identify the reasons why the US uses democracy promotion as a core aspect of foreign policy. This paper outlines the progression in democracy promotion and support made by the United States after the Cold War and the incidents of 9/11. Two critical conjunctions outline the basis for US foreign policy in terms democracy promotion, support, and aid. The conjunctions are the collapse of the Soviet Union making way for the post-Cold War era of democratization and the events of September 11, 2001 when the US pivoted to fight terrorism with democracy promotion in key areas of the Middle East. Both eras share common interests: promoting western liberal democracy abroad and to protect national interest. There are critical differences with each era. With a dramatic change in leadership paired with the events of September 11, the US has fallen back to their realist outlook on international relations with an emphasis on democracy support. By doing so, the US spends large amounts from both the budgets of USAID and department of defense to create security domestically and to improve living conditions abroad. By using democratic realism to analyze the past 25 years of US foreign policy, an understanding of current US policy can be explained.

Keywords: *Democracy Promotion, the Middle East, US Foreign Policy, Democracy Aid and Support*

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1. Introduction

The United States has used a form of democracy promotion as a foreign policy since the 1900's through various support mechanisms. In the 1920's and 30's, the US saw its first direct action in Central America to support democratic states. Although at this point the US had no real interest in democracy support and wouldn't continue such a program until after World War II, to support democratic or transitional countries to fight against fascism and tyrannies of the world. After the war, the US continued to support the idea that democracy helps create strong development practices and policies which fit in US interest. America slowly changed its perspectives after the 60's and 70's to help combat the advancement of communism and socialism being spread by the power of the Soviet Union. According to Thomas Carothers (2003), since the 70's, democracy has been a critical evolution of US foreign policy. As the US overcame the cold war, and continued to transform their policy. George Bush Sr. and Bill Clinton saw democracy promotion as a key development in US foreign policy that could help produce better relations and a safer international community and at the same time, help promote human rights and humanitarian issues. After September 11, 2001, another critical junction occurred which shifted, not only the area which the US pressured democracy assistance, but the type of democracy assistance the US chose to use.

This is an important topic to be discussed because this could affect the way many countries develop. The US is, after all, the leading country in Official Development Aid

(ODA) and after the Cold War, was considered the leading and most influential hegemonic power. The US focuses on development in many different areas, not just democracy support. It is arguable that a developmental state is more useful than using democracy, which could hinder rapid development by not allowing the government to make critical decisions required for rapid development. At the same time, it's arguable to say that democracy helps breed transparency and fair-trading with neighboring countries to allow for quicker improvement of the economy. Both democracies and non-democracies have been successful in developing, and both have seen failure. Democracy has been proven to not be the only way to for a nation to develop.

Even within the subject of democracy promotion as a development mechanism has seen both successes and failures with under the US. This paper seeks to investigate not only the intention of US foreign policy, but why democracy promotion could be considered a success or failure during the post-Cold War era and post 9/11 era. There have been dramatic regional shifts in focus for US democracy assistance from Western Europe in the early 90's to the Middle East after 9/11. By comparing the developing landscape of countries such as Serbia, Kosovo, and Haiti with Middle Eastern countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the differences to approach, outcomes, and cost can be compared. The results of this comparison could potentially distinguish the potential success to other countries which could fit the criteria for democratic development and how the US could act within these countries in terms of support. The stark differences between the two periods and regions could have the

potential to change how US democracy assistance and aid is defined and how it can be utilized in the future.

An initial challenge is defining what democracy assistance means and how the US intends to utilize the outcomes of democracy promotion. Defining democracy promotion by the US can be a challenging undertaking. Democracy assistance has been called many different terms over the years since its original conception. It's been referred to as democracy promotion, democracy aid, democracy support and a few others. What really needs clarification is what will be used in this study, which is democracy promotion. Thomas Carothers distinguishes between two main terms in democracy assistance: promotion vs. support. Democracy support suggests that there are strictly non-violent assistance towards democracy support. In this scenario, many of the countries may already have a grassroots movement or a bottom up progression towards democracy, and support can be provided through various means to ensure the success of this movement. With democracy promotion, both force and peaceful means are used to support developing democracies abroad. This can be considered as a more aggressive take on democracy promotion because the nation receiving the support may not have had previous interest in democracy prior to assistance or intervention. For the purpose of the study, democracy promotion will be used to define the style of democracy assistance made by the US.

Defining democracy assistance further follows the logic that countries that are politically democratic will benefit by developing at a more rapid rate. America usually

imposes a western liberal form democracy when establishing or promoting democracy in developing nations that focuses on good governance and free markets. The US used to focus heavily on transitional countries, or countries that are in an authoritarian regime which may be in the middle of a transfer of power, or countries that are simply out growing their current government through development. In some situations, the US has gone as far as using military force to impose democratic rule in transitional countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan which will be discussed later in this paper. Some countries have rejected America's attempt at democracy assistance and will seek out election observers to obtain legitimacy. Traits such as these can be seen with some of the Asian values in South Korea and other countries in Southeast Asia. With American influences and the democratic peace theory, some nations see democracy as a highly desirable form of government, while others seem to fail to see the need for democracy for development.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Waves of Democracy

Samuel Huntington describes the progression of democracy in his book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991). In his writing, he describes that democracy progression has had three distinctive waves of global influence with each wave having its own unique identity and circumstance to its on bringing. The first wave began in the early 19th century with the expansion of voting rights to most men in the US. During this time, there is a small surge of democratization around the world. This stage was is considerably less influential than the other stages, the following stages will be covered in more detail beginning with the second wave. The second wave gained more traction with dramatic changes of world order at the end of WWII. Finally, the third wave, which is the most recent, began in the mid to late 70's and gained momentum in the follow decades. A more detailed look into the waves is as follows:

1. The Second Wave of democracy

The second wave of democracy can be seen as pivotal point in global democracy expansion with the occupation of Allied forces in various countries (Huntington, 1991), even though modern development goals and progress are now taking place after or during the third wave of democracy. Throughout the 40's and 50's, the world began to see its first large shift

to democracy due to the end of the war. One major problem was the Soviet bloc; where communism influenced neighboring states and where the Soviet Russia was attempting to expand its influence. At the same time, the US policy of containment wasn't restricted to only democratic states, thus allowing the US to cooperate with non-democratic governments to help contain soviet influence.

According to Huntington (1991), this was also the beginning of the end of Western colonial rule. Many states were going through different transitions of power and many of them had no real investment in democratic institutions. If only the west had properly designed an exit strategy to help improve local governments, the second wave of democracy would possibly been more of an impact than its actual outcome. There were many new states popping up around the globe that helped develop into a democracy early on. Unfortunately, democratic influence wouldn't last too long and a new age of authoritarian rule would begin for a lot of states such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

2. The third wave of democracy

By the time the 1970s rolled around, democracy as an ideology has been used to persuade countries to resist against communism and to promote good governance. This started to mark the beginning of the third wave of democracy. An important idea in democracy promotion is found within Samuel Huntington's third wave of democracy. The third wave of democracy had a domino effect starting in the 1970's where countries were

becoming democracies quicker than ever. The first pivotal case was Portugal in 1974 when their dictatorship fell to democracy. Over the next fifteen years following Portugal democratization, thirty authoritarian states will be replaced by democracies in Europe alone. After the democratization movement gained momentum in Europe, it began to pick up in the Latin America in the early 1980's and it slowly traveled to Asia by the end of the 1980's. By 1990, the world was experiencing more democratic conversion and cooperation than ever before. The fall of the Soviet Union only helped ease the spread of democracy to the reaches of Eastern Europe to previous communist states.

This is where we begin to see the US find an interest in democracy promotion starting with Ronald Reagan. Starting in the 1980's with the Reagan administration, we can begin to see the beginnings of Democracy Assistance to help transition countries from an autocratic state, to a more stable democratic one. Reagan pressured democracy assistance institutions in South and Central America in 1985 to assist democracy promotion in that region. Most of USAID's democracy assistance budget went to South and Central America as well. Although the budget was considerably small at that time when it would eventually form into something larger in the 90's, as well as expand into other regions such as Eastern Europe due to the end of the Cold War.

Although America has historically assisted countries towards a peaceful transition to democracy, not all of the situations have been a complete success. The US would claim that democracy and good governance go hand-in-hand with one another and good development

comes with strong democratic values. This isn't always the case, with America still assisting non-democratic countries and with a few policies where the US seems less interested in democracy building but more in regime support. The US would continue this non democratic regime support until George W. Bush will be conflicted in deciding whether or not to support authoritarian regimes during the War on Terror.

Understanding the third wave of democracy plays a crucial role in understanding the abilities of modern day democratic states in terms of transitioning from autocratic states to democratic ones. The cases in the third wave should be closely analyzed to value what was beneficial in helping those states develop.

3. Third Wave and Beyond

Although democracy assistance has not always been directly paired with aid, the idea of using both aid and democracy individually for political gains is attributed long before 1990. It wasn't until after 1990 where Western Governments started to actively support democracy aid as a core component to developing nations. Prior to 1990, aid was almost exclusively focused on socio-economic development (Snider, 2010, pg 4). Exposing foreign countries to aid and US democracy seemed like a natural course of action, especially with a new found idealism in the 1990's. The idea is that democracies do not fight one another, have better trade relations, and better institutional communications. Essentially, this idea was following the democratic peace theory. The democratic peace theory also supports the idea peace itself;

stating that countries that are involved through common diplomatic relations, trade, and hold similar values will be less aggressive to one another to protect their shared interests.

Contradicting examples seem to be prevalent today, such as the idea of developmental states vs. democracy promotion through democracy aid and development before economic and institutional development. Some wonder if democracy promotion is more of beneficial to achieving economic development in the first place.¹ Many countries seem to come into development without democracy or when the US openly supports non democratic regimes. China, Japan, and South Korea all achieved economic stability and development through non-democratic ways by developing through an authoritarian style developmental state. After WWII and the Korean War respectively, Japanese and Korean leaders developed policies to help various industries overcome hardships of development through entering a developmental state, and had much internal social pressure to succeed. China has had a gradual development over the past 30 years that focuses on societal, economic, and political reform which never democratized like Korea and Japan did. In similar ways, they too went into a developmental like state by focusing on state led intervention and economic reform, but never transitioned to a western style democracy.

In Eastern Europe in the late 70's through the early 90's we begin to see an explosion of successful western supported democratic transitions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, all with similar but still unique situations in democracy assisted programs. Then

¹ Burnell, P. (2007). Does international democracy promotion work?. Bonn: DIE.

we have a complete different style of political and economic democratization in Middle Eastern countries, such as Iraq, which were forcefully pressured into democracies, where they are still struggling to gain any form of stability. There are also countries such as the Philippines, which has had a lot of democratic pressure to succeed, but has suffered multiple political failures.

2.2 Aiding Democracy Abroad

Development through democracy has not always been a major objective in development policy, but has been used since the 1960's.² Development, as an idea, was created fairly recently after World War II to help rebuild Europe after the destruction. The US decided that investing in foreign countries could improve post war diplomacy and economies. In other words, investing in post war development went beyond helping people that are in need of assistance. The idea of aid for development began in the 1950s and 60s, but wouldn't become a core aspect of US foreign policy until much later. It wasn't until Kennedy decided that America could help break developing nations out of poverty, that modernization theory was being used to promote growth in foreign countries.

During this time, modernization theory influenced early development policies towards the idea that all countries develop in the same way. Early US assistance focused on

² Carothers, T. (2003). *Aiding Democracy Abroad*. 3rd Ed. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ch.2

what they thought worked for every country. Even with modernization theory, developmental assistance was not used to target democracy growth, but still encountered it with encouragement from local and governmental institutions. Eventually when the Cold War began, the US started to take on different roles with developing nations. Soviet Marxist propaganda was shown to be a catalyst for the need to spread democratic ideology. Although, still not aid oriented, democracy promotion started to become popular to gain allies against the Soviet Union. In the end, the US government still ended up promoting democracy in some regions while at the same time supported authoritarian regimes that were key anti-communist areas. The US was still willing to cooperate with non-democratic countries as means to gain politically.

The 1980s brought on a major change to how the US approached democracy assistance in Asia. The Philippines were a major case where support for the US started to deteriorate. President Reagan was a longtime ally and supporter of Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippines authoritarian dictator, but started to see that he has worn out his welcome. Marcos became a problem when he was not allowed to run a third term in office, which made him take action against his own government. After limiting the abilities of the Philippine government by calling martial law over widespread civil disobedience, many became critical of his actions in office. At this point many believed he was abusing the treasury and using government funds for himself. Reagan saw this and started to pressure the idea of democracy in the region. President Reagan decided to send two delegations to the Philippines to look

over the 1986 elections to ensure a smooth democratic success. Not only were there two delegations, but the US also decided to send aid directly to support democratic transitions. This would mark the beginning of direct funding for democratic observations and democracy aid in general.

This had America focusing on transitional countries after the incident in the Philippines. The US pressured South Korea in the late 1980s to have a smooth transition to democracy. After their democratic successes in Asia, they still ignored a lot of nondemocratic activities. The US kept close relations to non-democratic anticommunist nations, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, and didn't pressure any major democratic change.

The early 90s were a shifting point for democracy aid with the end of the cold war. This new era opened up the world to democracy and democracy aid programs were becoming more established. There was a global trend of democratization. These new aid programs pushed to promote US democracy in more than just transitional countries but also previous communist countries that the US had little access to before the cold war ended. A single style model consisting of a "one true path" to democracy is used to promote programs in different countries. This also began the idea of "peaceful democracy" where democracies are far more peaceful to one another than under other types of government. The peaceful democracy theory fueled a lot of the rationale behind the US embracing democracy aid as well as the successes it had in the 1980s. Although peaceful democracy is still possibly more

debated today than it ever has before stating democracies still engage in conflict or provoke conflict.

By the 1990s, there were already quite a few Asian countries that were considered a democracy or in transition to becoming a full democracy. Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan were a few of the main developed or developing countries that were successful in their transitions of becoming fully democratic by the 1990s. The Four Asian Tigers of South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan managed extremely high growth rates by this time. Their industrialization has set standards for other developing Asian countries to strive for. This helped the focus of Asian development to more economic goals above other development goals. Asia's strengths lie within its human capital and industrialization, which worried the US that they might possibly focus purely on economic development. This didn't end up being the case; the US ended up funding large programs for many countries across Asia that still exist today.

As it currently stands, many democratic aid programs are still affecting different regions of Asia, and more recently the Middle East. Up until the late 90s, very little interest has been put into the Middle East in regards to democracy aid. In the 1980s there was a lot of financial support for pro US authoritarian regimes. It wasn't until very recent years where the US has taken a different approach to the democratization of the Middle East. First, with the Iraq war, the US hoped to liberate Iraq from an Authoritarian ruler and instill a democratic regime. This new approach of aggressive liberation has been met with criticism.

A report from USAID put it well, “During the Cold War and the current war on terrorism, efforts to foster democracy have been inconsistent or have clashed with other strategic goals, but the U.S. commitment to the growth of democracy abroad has been repeatedly expressed.”³

At this point we can try to analyze democracy as an ideology and what a country has to gain from it. For one, a democracy could potentially enter the world system through diplomacy and modernization through policy created by democracy, but that doesn’t happen overnight. Who says a country can’t accomplish this without becoming a democracy? Asian countries in particular have been good at becoming powerful economic and political figures in the world system without democracy. South Korea developed before becoming fully democratic, but eventually became a democracy with a peaceful transition. China and India both came into economic wealth and stability through other means than democracy. They might be an exception due to the sheer size of the population of each country, but they developed away from democracy nevertheless.

When discussing democracy promotion, assistance, and aid Thomas Carothers is the top scholar in the field. Carothers is considered an expert in democracy support and US foreign policy.⁴ He is currently serving as the vice president of studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He’s created democracy assistance programs and has

³ National Research Council. *Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2008..

⁴ Thomas Carothers Bio. (2014, January 1). . Retrieved May 9, 2014, from <http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=9>

worked extensively in the field as well as researching and publishing a magnitude of books. Carothers has been an immensely great resource to study for the topic of democracy promotion, especially with his essays on the subject.

Carothers' *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion* (2004) helps paint a modern picture the third wave of democracy and beyond by categorizing essays by topic. *Critical Mission*, follows the changes the US makes throughout the different presidential administrations and by the different event happening in the world. Some of these essays focus on the structure of developmental aid and observing political transformation of transitional countries. These essays help create a large picture of the inner workings of the democracy aid "industry" and help us understand what direction the industry is heading in.

Early in the work of *Aiding Democracy Abroad* and *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion*, Carothers dissects how the US became the democracy promoter it is today. Previously, the US only concerned itself in social and economic productivity when it came to foreign aid, now it uses democracy promotion as one of its biggest foreign policies.⁵ As the US adapts to the post-Cold War era, we can see that there is a dramatic shift towards more democracy building. This shift from Cold War politics laid the foundation of modern US politics in defensive and offensive realism democratic realism.⁶ From Cold war power

⁵Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. (2010). Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center.

⁶ Charles Krauthammer describes four main schools of foreign policy with Isolationism, liberal internationalism, realism, and democratic realism.

balancing in strategic defense to aggression in fighting terrorism and the invasion of non-democratic nations.

Carothers not only views things from a political perspective, but looks closely at the functionality of aid through democracy promotion. Examining USAID expenditure on democracy assistance is important to understand the shift of US politics. Carothers describes the increase in USAID political spending as critical importance. Not only is there a surge in US political rhetoric and policy interest, but there is clear reaction on spending in democracy aid sectors.

When using democratic assistance and aid, there are three essential sectors of investment. The first area that needs attention is support to the government. This may seem almost obvious, but if a non-democratic government is transitioning to democracy, it can be extremely vulnerable depending on how it is transitioning (Huntington, 1991). Leadership legitimacy is an important for future democratic progression. If there is a weak government, there may be a lack of confidence in the future of democracy. The next area which requires support is state building institutions. If there is a lack of state institutions, democracy could face multiple problems. This could come in form of core institution support to help breed transparency and election observations. Supporting financial institutions could also help bring the core development resources to the transitioning country. Lastly, the civil society needs to be pressured to grow. If there is little or no support from the civil society, it will be difficult to achieve substantial election results. Like in Benedict Anderson's (1982) *Imagined*

Communities, it is crucial to develop a society which gives legitimacy to the democratic process and leaders. Without this development, there is a chance that the democratic transition may meet some difficulties. This idea of democracy support coincides with USAID's democracy categories which are rule of law, governance, civil society, and elections and political processes. These are more or less the same aspects Carothers pressures for proper state development and adding a unique category focusing on the election process, which also happens to consume the least amount of the budget.

2.3 Democratic Realism

Democratic realism is a rather new form of realism that was not widely studied until the early 2000's when it was introduced by Charles Krauthammer (2004) to analyze why the US uses democracy promotion as core aspect of foreign policy. By the end of the Cold War, the US had become the world's unipolar power and there were dramatic changes being made with the US' perspectives on foreign policy. The US was actively using internationalism as a form of international cooperation and was beginning to be involved in more international interventions such as Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia where they used international institutions and worked with the international society to work towards their domestic goals. By the time George W. Bush took office, there were clear shifts in his policy concerning democracy promotion, especially in the key interest areas.

Krauthammer accepts realism as the main foreign policy of America which is the fundamental core to democratic realism. Foreign affairs, According to Krauthammer (2004), are based from for main designs of US policy. First, US Foreign policy was based on isolationism early on and took pride in their internal affairs presiding over affairs with other nations. With avoiding taking part in the international system, the US was able to develop strong domestic policies with local expansion. After the world wars, the US began taking part in international affairs and international expansion, but continues to be protected by two oceans. It's difficult to argue that the US is still an isolationist nation with the strengths of globalization and technology, but isolationism defines the roots of America and how the US has changed to become more international.

Secondly, by the end of the Cold War, the US accepted liberal internationalism as their main foreign policy. This lead them to four major conflicts throughout the 1990's in the name humanitarianism. The claim by the US was that there was little national interest in these conflicts and that they were involved strictly because of humanitarian reasons. This was a time where the US sought legitimacy and support from other world power when deciding on their actions. What it comes down to, Krauthammer argues, is that this neglects state interest which leads to the America's main political school of thought, which is realism.

This third school of thought was revitalized through the Bush administration where security in anarchy and stability in domestic society are the main national interests. Krauthammer states, 'In the unipolar world we inhabit, what stability we do enjoy today is

owed to the overwhelming power and deterrent threat of the United States.” (Krauthammer, 2004) This idea that a unipolar power is maintaining world order may be an extreme in this world today; the point is that there is less fighting when there is larger foe willing to pressure international goals.

The fourth aspect of American policy is what Krauthammer supports the most: democratic globalism. By using democratic globalism, the US understands the ‘utility’ that democracy can have on other countries and the how it can serve the interests of the US. Democracy can deliver global security and safety. Other democratic globalists will be more willing to form meaningful alliances and participate in cooperation. This can also breed stable relationships with different countries. By using democratic globalism, it breathes new life into geopolitical goals. A democratic realist state now can control what area serve the most interest with their states goals.

Although there can be many criticism directed at democratic realism, it can an efficient way to comprehend American global politics after 9/11. In the case studies in the following sections, we will be able to see a dramatic change in how the US handles its foreign affairs after 9/11 which can be described with the transitioning to a more democratic realism pursuit in international relations. When a threat such as Islamic extremism exists, the US will be willing to safeguard its interests and evaluate the best strategy as possible to this new growing power through democracy promotion.

3. Research Questions and Hypothesis

3.1 Hypothesis

The US uses strategic interests in the locations it decides to promote democracy to protect national interests and create security.

3.2 Research Questions

1. Has democracy promotion become more or less effective as a US foreign policy since the critical events of 9/11?

This question is quintessential to ask about the progress of what aid has accomplished since September 11th, 2001. Has it become more or less effective since the dramatic changes in US foreign policy? Has the third wave of democracy have a bigger impact on the democratization in the Middle East and the rest of the world rather than US foreign policy? These questions will have to be scrutinized through researching similar democracy aid, support, and promotion in the early 1990's and contrasted to democracy aid, support, and promotion in the Middle East after the events of 9/11

2. A follow up question could ask: Has use democracy aid mechanisms changed since the Cold War during the third wave?

This question could help analyze if the aid efforts are worth the amount of expenditure western nations are investing in programs and foreign policy which panders to democracy promotion. This can essentially question if democracy aid is a reasonable source of benefits for both the agent and donor. Utilizing American values and understanding aid mechanisms could help uncover true intentions of democracy aid and promotion. By examining these questions, discovering costs and value of the aid is also essential to measuring the cost effectiveness of democracy promotion.

4. Methodology

Due to the nature of this study, a qualitative approach will be used to analyze different perspectives on democracy promotion and assistance. By using literature from both primary and secondary source materials, this paper will focus on using empirical and theoretical ideas contributing to the study of democracy aid, promotion, and assistance. First and foremost, primary resources were researched extensively in data bases from governments, government organizations, and associated institution publications. Most of these sources were obtained by consulting the respective source websites or publications. Primary sources include government issued white papers, statistical data, media interviews, and state addresses. Also, the World Bank ASAIID and International Idea supplied much of the empirical data on development and voting participation in different regions. Consulting empirical data through sources such as the World Bank and USAID will be beneficial to understanding the consequences that US democracy support has had in relation to trade and costs of such a policy. Understanding and interpreting US policy on the matter is quintessential to developing connections and ideas through this methodology. To help analyze and scrutinize the primary sources, secondary sources help provide context and historical information as well as supplying theoretical information. Secondary sources will include studies on the subject and proposed theoretical framework to help analyze the primary sources to formulate logical conclusions. Looking through experts in the field of

democracy promotion was essential to finding work that has already been done in this field. To utilize these sources, an analytical frame work of democratic realism will be used to describe the motivation and actions taken by the US. Although democratic realism is a newer version subdivision of realism, it has been developed by expanding the already well accepted views of neo-realism. By analyzing related research done in democracy promotion and democratic realism, a clear and decisive result can be concluded.

5. Case Studies in US Democracy Promotion and Assistance

5.1 Case Study 1: Post-Cold War Democracy Policy

It is generally accepted that the year the Cold War ended was 1991 and during that period, there was an increase in USAID funding for democracy assistance. It is generally considered that during the post-Cold War period, there were three general areas on which the USAID focused upon; which are Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. The US shared little interest in the Middle East in terms of democracy promotion and was still supplying weapons and support to authoritarian rulers at this point. South America had previously experienced a surge of democratic support during the past 10-15 years, and had already gone through major transitions and was of little interest for USAID spending. During this time, the George Bush began defining the US' future policy on democracy promotion and after the fall of the Berlin wall, the US began employing a carrot and stick policy of "democracy differentiation."⁷ In this policy, Bush tried to give incentives for countries to lean towards democratic policies by granting or renewing their most favored nation (MFN) status. Not only was Bush pressuring democratization, but also for free market reforms. There were still pressures for strict economic support in the name of development at this point. Once Clinton came into office, there was initially little change from Bush's policy. Democracy and free market promotion

⁷ Carothers, T. (2004). *Critical mission: essays on democracy promotion*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 23

were top priorities. Clinton even focused on the same regions on which Bush did South America, Eastern Europe and Africa.

Between 1991 and 1999, USAID spending on democracy promotion and assistance exploded from \$165 million annually to \$635 million by 1999 according to Carothers (2009). By 1999, Eastern Europe and previous Soviet Countries were receiving the most with \$288 million in 1999 alone. Africa was receiving \$123 million and Asia was receiving \$111 million by 1999 as well. An issue arises trying to get raw data and on the programs which were receiving direct democracy assistance funding. Following the money trail can almost be almost impossible by simply looking at the USAID spending reports due to the sheer amount of programs and institutions involved. Although reports of US spending on democracy promotion is considered to be around \$635 million, it's difficult to know for sure where that money is spent because it is usually classified under government support in USAID's budget. For this reason, it is essential to understand the US foreign policy intention in the areas in which they were supporting with government support. We can analyze what the US has done and what they intended to accomplish in these dedicated areas in which they invested the most time and money.

By focusing on post-Cold War policy, this paper can look at two regions during this period and see one case of successful democracy promotion and one case where democracy promotion could be considered a failure. Haiti will be the first case of success with using

military intervention and democracy programs and the failure case will be described with former Yugoslavia.

5.1.1 Haiti and the Use of Military Intervention

Haiti was a crucial state for the US to have a positive democratic relationship with. During the early 1990's, the US was experiencing an influx of Haitian refugees and were forced to be sensitive to who would take power in Haiti. The previous elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, suffered a coup d'état, even though the Haitian people showed strong support for his presidency. The US didn't want to risk having him in out of office for long in fear they would lose a new democratic neighbor, but didn't want to be the one to use military intervention to restore original order. The US was stuck in a tough decision, military intervention did not look good in terms of democracy support; the US didn't want the image of being an invasive country just to promote their democratic agenda.

Aristide was not in office for long when the coup d'état occurred. Haiti had shown signs that it was ready for a legitimate democratic government and had been struggling to maintain a democratic leader in office for the past ten years. The Haitian government had been in a vulnerable state since the previous election ended in a coup d'état as well. The 1990 election of Aristide was seen to be different because he was well liked in Haiti and there was immense public support for his leadership. Unfortunately, due to the weakened state of

government, his legitimate time in office was cut short by the CIA supported coup.⁸ The CIA supposedly supported a new regime under the control of the Army general which supported drug trafficking to the US. It wasn't until the Clinton administration where the US began efforts to change major drug policies that would make the CIA supported coup d'état look foolish.

By 1994, the army general had illegitimate control over Haiti since 1991. At this point, the US had been strengthening their policies and was getting serious with democracy promotion. Clinton took it as an opportunity to take a firm stance against authoritarianism and possibly invade Haiti with military personnel to return the legitimate president, Aristide, to power. The following events would be huge for democracy promotion for US policy. Never before has there been a successful military intervention campaign to uphold democratic values, and this would also be the first attempt to garnish support from the UN in the name of US policy towards democratic support.^{9,10} This new way of thinking will help set precedence in the way the US will use the international system for democratic support.

Although the US was developing a taste for democracy support during this time, this was not the only use of military intervention during for support of stability in certain regions.

⁸<http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BER402A.html>

⁹ An argument could be made that the US used the UN for support of democratic values in the invasion of Korea at the beginning of the Korean War. The reason I don't acknowledge this as a democratic reasons is because Democracy was not the main objective, the main objective was containment of communist powers.

¹⁰ UN Security Council, Resolution 940 (1994) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3413th meeting, on 31 July 1994, 31 July 1994, S/RES/940 (1994), available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f15f63.html> [accessed 21 May 2014]

In this same period, there were joint military interventions being set in place with UNSOM II.¹¹ When discussing military interventions with the US and UN, Somalia is a crucial case. In Somalia, there was in similar pursuit of stability in Authoritarian regimes during the Battle of Mogadishu and overall humanitarian relief for the people of Somalia. Although this mission was considered a great failure in military intervention, it showed how the US was willing to use force, at the time, to support what they considered to be worthy effort of western support.

In the case of Haiti, the US was worried about the failures of Somalia, and was worried to be perceived as a world police for pursuing more military interventions; it was vital for Haiti's transition back to democracy to be as peaceful as possible. The first step was made by the UN to create an arms and oil embargo to place nonviolent pressure on Haiti. The US and UN also applied sanctions to Haiti until they were willing to cooperate. This essentially brought the military leaders to begin negotiations. By 1993, the military leaders of Haiti had signed a treaty that outlined the 10 steps that needed to be taken to return the power to the rightful president. By 1994, they still had not exchanged power to which the US tightened their sanctions further. Half way through 1994, the UN approved the "Operation Uphold Democracy" which allowed the US to use any means necessary to restore the constitutional president in power.

¹¹ UN Security Council, Resolution 794 (1992) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3145th meeting, on 3rd of December 1992. S/RES/794 (1992), available at: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/794\(1992\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/794(1992))

Before there were any boots on the ground, Clinton sent a diplomatic party to negotiate, but it was considered unsuccessful. Clinton went through with Operation Uphold Democracy and was under the mission of fostering democratic institutions; additionally the goal was also intended to reduce the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States. In the end, the operation was hugely successful in restoring the rightful democracy and establishing democracy institutions. Illegal immigration also decreased after the operation. With the success of this international conflict, the US began to put their role in the international community into perspective. On the one hand, they had the power and ability to influence international situations completely on their own. In the other hand, the US could potentially gain more international support with their action by using the UN and other international institution to their benefit. Thus the beginning of the role in the international community was set in stone for the next ten years as an international humanitarian supporter.

By the end of the coup and by the time the legitimate leaders returned to office, there were still high degree of democracy support and transparency being upheld in Haiti. The US continues local plans to help continue the grassroots desire of democracy. Unfortunately, Haiti will fall short of their democracy dreams when conflict occurs by the 2000's. This will be discussed further in the analysis section.

5.1.2 Former Yugoslavia – Serbia and Kosovo

The area of former Yugoslavia received some of the most USAID funding throughout the 1990's in terms of democracy support. The focus on Eastern Europe may have been an automatic realist response to the end of the Cold War, but could also have been considered a humanitarian response to rebuilding a positive government. In the 1980's, Reagan outlined in a National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) that it would be in the interest of the US to dismantle the communist regimes in Yugoslavia early on.¹² He focused on keeping a positive relationship with Yugoslavia and that they could benefit one another through cooperation. This was an early reach out towards the liberation of Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union. The thought of democracy was not a priority yet, but would be in the future. At this time, the US began to reconnect with governments and people in Eastern European states after the while the Cold War began to cool down. These states such as Georgia, Ukraine, Serbia (former Yugoslavia) were all under the Soviet bloc during the Cold War and were "off limits" in terms of diplomacy or foreign relations since they were communist territory. Once the iron curtain began to fall in the 1990's, the US was quick to develop democratic institutions to help serve the area.

The Eastern European countries would experience dramatic ups and downs for the next twenty years in terms of political stability and democracy leadership. Shifting suddenly from Soviet communism to democracy would be no easy task for the US, but it would be a prime area in which it would be best received. The US learned from East Asian and South

¹² Found in U.S. Policy Toward Yugoslavia (NSC-NSDD-133)

American countries in the 80's that transitional countries are the most receptive to democratization, but are extremely vulnerable to political decay and collapse, coup d'état, being invaded by another country, or seeing an economic crisis due to weakened state during the actual transition period.¹³

Yugoslavia had experienced being a vulnerable state during political transitioning. Yugoslavia was invaded by Axis powers in 1944 and became a recognized communist nation by 1946. Since becoming a communist nation, Yugoslavia faced many different transitions, political reorganizations, and remapping of their borders. First, Yugoslavia was broken up into six Socialist Republics and two Socialist Autonomous Provinces which were all controlled at a central state. By the 1980's, due to political conflict, the decreasing power of the Soviet Union, and civil and social unrest due to ethnic differences, Yugoslavia was quickly falling into conflict. Eventually, when Yugoslavia was broken up along its republic borders allowing for the creation of independent states, was when ethnic divides began to form. This period is known as the Yugoslav Wars, which began in 1991 with the 10 day war. By 1992, the US began recognizing three of the independent republics as states and more would come in the next few years. During this transitional time is when the US and USAID jumped on the opportunity to influence the region with democratic support with institution building and aid relief.

¹³ See Samuel Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968)

During this time in the early 1990s, Bush was making some crucial decisions on how to support the region. Yugoslavia was breaking apart and there would be no support from their previous communist allies. This would start the Yugoslav wars which were fueled by ethnic tensions that would last for almost 10 years. Following the 10 years' war period, former Yugoslavia would experience the most USAID support programs to help build civil society which was absent during the Yugoslav wars. Essentially, beginning with the Bush administration, was a push for was acknowledging each unique nation in the area and begin western influence by providing USAID and legitimacy through acknowledgement. This also gave support to the UN in their efforts to bring the former Yugoslavia region to stability through legitimizing countries within the region.

Former Yugoslavia was becoming a unique case in a few ways. For one, it was one of the earlier attempts by the US to use a revised policy on democracy promotion to ex-communist nations. Secondly, they began to invest diplomacy in the region to reduce the amount of conflict caused by ethnic tensions. Thirdly, their focus within the country no longer only focused on economic and government institutions, but was also focused on building civil societies. Even after the 90's, the US continued to build civil society projects until 2007 by investing in programs such as Community Revitalization through Democratic (CRD) Action in Serbia and Montenegro that focused on community mobilization initiative and evolved to emphasize economic development.

By empowering the civil society, they were able to micromanage the developing economy and were able to also manage their politics from the bottom up. The US attempt to promote this with the intention of seeing a stable government through the actions of the individuals. The US was met with unprecedented results and, unfortunately, the process encountered a magnitude of issues. For one, jump starting the civil society with cooperation incentives was not matched with sustainability. USAID had developed initial plans for the increased development of communities and political structures, but was not entirely prepared to support these developments after they were started. The continuation of funding was needed to sustain these projects, and as US policy was shifting towards the Middle East at this point, leaving the now broken up Yugoslavia to manage their politics almost independently.

Even with the extensive help of USAID in the 1990's, democracy programs, and other forms of international assistance, former Yugoslavia struggled to maintain a functioning well received government in its respected territories and conflict continued in many of the regions, including Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or what many know as Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia and Montenegro would see turmoil throughout the 1990's and 2000's. One major incident within Serbia was the Kosovo war, which was part of a major ethnic struggle. During this period there was a considerable call to action against the atrocities happening within Kosovo, and was considered the first humanitarian war by the

New York Times.¹⁴ Kosovo suffered ethnic violence from Serbian law enforcement to the extent where the US began sending diplomats to negotiate with Serbian leaders. Although the US had no intention on fighting a war in Kosovo alone, they decided it would be in the best interest to gain support from Europe and international institutions such as NATO. When NATO stepped in to aid Kosovo, they began bombings to pressure the Serbian president into leaving Kosovo alone. The mission from NATO was clear, they intended to accomplish three things: (1) to dismantle Yugoslavia's competing socialist economic system, (2) to gain control of valuable mineral resources, and (3) to command the site of a future energy distribution network (Stone, 2005). The support given by the US was out of participating in the international society; internationalism was a big aspect of us foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. As mentioned before, the US had intervened in Haiti and Somalia prior to this incident and was actively sought out UN and NATO support. In Kosovo, the US intended to solve the issues with diplomacy to end the ethnic conflicts.

The relevance of the Kosovo War in terms of democracy is varied. With the help of NATO and the pressures of the US, Kosovo was able to separate themselves even when suffering a boycott from Serbia. By the first official elections in 1999, Kosovo had a fair turnout in elections. With the help and oversight of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Kosovo was able to achieve reliable results. By 2009, there were claims that elections have not progressed as well as they should with relatively low voter turnout.

¹⁴ Video can be found here:
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/world/20071209_KOSOVO_FEATURE/

As time progresses, various organizations are still pressing for a true democratic nation. As far as Serbia is concerned, there are elections still being held every four years. Corruption has been becoming less prevalent in politics, which is a welcoming change of pace. Serbia frequently experiences over 50% voter turnout, which is relatively high for the region. As more time passes from the Kosovo War and Yugoslav Wars, it seems like more interest in gaining with liberal democracy in the region.

In the end, what the US accomplished (or didn't) in the Former Yugoslavia region was the beginning of a new democracy oriented policy where some key lessons were learned. A focus on civil society is needed to retain stability in a region which has a major conflict. Additionally, the US found that getting these new post-Soviet states to cooperate with the international community is of beneficial to the US. Friendly neighbors breed friendly trade relations. By looking at the incident in Kosovo, there were also clear incentives for the US to not take action in Kosovo due to the lack of incentives. It did not provide the US with a high level of returns. It did not provide additional safety to the US, nor did it improve their ability to exert control over the region. Due to the low incentives of the US to intervene, the US pressured to use more international institutions for support instead.

5.2 Case Study 2: Post 9/11 Democracy Policy and the Shift to the Middle East

The Middle East had seen varying attention from the US over the last fifty years. US Cold War policies were not so much interested in promoting democracy, but were more interested supporting Israel and liberal markets (Sid-Ahmed, 1996). Opening up markets was seen as a key to the Middle East and to receive support. The Soviet Union supported a lot of the Arab world which could have been considered a threat in relation to communism containment. It's good to note that during this time, the US was still using realism and more specifically defensive realism to contain communism and to stop the spread of it further into US friendly states. This period served to be a learning period for the US in terms of the importance of the Middle East. The Gulf War served as a window to the resources and market possibilities in the region. In the early 1990's there began early signs of Islam fundamentalism growing ever so slightly by smaller grass roots movements with the rise Jihad activists. These activists and Islam fundamentalism was something that the US did not understand at the time.

September 11, 2001 is one of the most impacting dates in recent US history. The attack on the financial center and pentagon changed US foreign policy forever. US culture was left in shock and awe. It was an unbelievable event that the US is continually affected by today. This is the second critical conjunction that defines Modern US policy. The attacks took Americans completely surprise; no one ever expected an attack on American soil. After the attacks on 9/11, the US has entered numerous wars, invaded countries, and has reinvented their own transportation security procedures. Having such a quick and dramatic response to

the attacks has left Americans feeling the effects of the attacks today. Not only do Americans feel the effects, but many countries abroad have also felt the recoil from around the world.

Shortly after the attacks, George W. Bush reacted quickly by authorizing direct control over military force to use against any acting body which was involved in the attacks through the famous 60 word joint resolution act,

“That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” (Bush 2001)¹⁵

By allowing the Bush administration to control the military directly, it was a gateway to the war on terror for the next twelve years. There was a clear shift in US foreign policy after the 9/11 attacks towards Middle Eastern politics. This shift will result in trillions of dollars in debt, thousands of deaths of soldiers from both sides, and multiple countries which need direct developmental assistance. Bush had set out a challenging goal: to end terror from the Middle East and to introduce western style democracy to the region.

¹⁵ This was given on Sept. 18th 2001, where both senate and congress would pass the act.

Democracy, at this stage, was an idealist approach to revolutionize the Middle East for better cooperation with the west and to bring an end to terrorism. Although the idea was there, the mechanisms, institutes, and social support were missing. At this point, it was regarded that bush was going to ax all democracy assistance programs which Clinton and Bush Sr. had developed. On the contrary, over the next two terms, Bush will seek out funding and attempt to revitalize support for a democratic Middle East. There is major conflict in within Bush's own policy. Previously, the US has worked alongside authoritarian or autocratic states to obtain US foreign policy goals.

Fighting terror and promoting democracy became the overall theme for the Bush administration. Carothers (2003) points out that Bush has a bit of an identity crisis with trying to identify himself as "Bush the realist" or "Bush the Neo-Reaganite"; where the Bush the realist desired to form alliances with friendly tyrants or authoritarian leaders, and the ladder which pursues a strong democracy promotion crusade. This conflict of interest can be seen with the initial goals in Afghanistan and Iraq: to bring an end to terrorism and to promote democracy in the Middle East. The general idea is that once Afghanistan and Iraq reach a stable democracy through the help of the US, other surrounding nations will follow.

"Bush the Realist" still held on to support various non-democratic factions after 9/11 in places such as Indonesia, Morocco, and Egypt. Although places like Egypt were having elections and were trying to be defined as a democracy, in function its elections were poorly monitored and poor election practices ignored by the US. Morocco shared similar traits to

Egypt with their treatment from the US. The US also continued to support “shaky” Southeast Asian regimes through military support which was known to be guilty of human rights violations. Bush still held on to realist ideals when negotiating and forming allies with non-democratic nations for defensive and intelligence purposes. The fact that Bush still willing cooperated and formed allies with non-democratic states aligns itself with traditional US motives in foreign affairs. Most actions by the US post WWII was done in their own self-interest, a very realist sentiment.

With this traditional American realism, Bush began to set changes in foreign policy that acknowledges cooperation with tyrants and authoritarian leaders are not as valuable as they once were in during the cold war. Islamic extremism was the new enemy of the state, so finding the root cause of Islam extremists was a fundamental goal for the Bush administration. Following advice from many post-Cold War scholars, Bush started pursuing democracy as a major export of US foreign policy and a way to disrupt the core of Islamic extremism. By going on a democracy crusade and converting non cooperative states to democratic states, it gave the US a bigger opportunity to spread values which yield the greatest outcome for the US. By halting the further development into terrorism abroad, Bush hoped to achieve these cooperative goals, and securing US interests at the same time.

To increase cooperation and end the terrorist threat abroad, Bush began dedicating large amounts of resources to democracy promotion during the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although there were other reasons for being there, such as the search for weapons of mass

destruction (WMDs), this gave Bush the opportunity to spread the idea of democracy using third wave of development theory during the rebuilding of the country. Bush took the stance of Samuel Huntington with the idea that one of the most efficient ways to retain political stability and fight political decay is to create and support a completely replacement government in place of the previous autocratic one. This surge of idealism in democracy builds the “Bush the Neo-Reaganite” image. The problem with Bush’s thinking was apparent, his policy would be a contradiction where democracy promotion is considered a core value of US foreign policy and where supporting anti-democratic regimes would be the norm. On top of that, aid and promotion would be focused disproportionately. Carothers states,

“The clashing imperatives of the war on terrorism with respect to US democracy promotion have led to a split presidential personality and contradictory policies - decreasing interest in some countries and suddenly increasing interest one region, the Middle East.”

Carothers (2003) is less positive about the US' ability to change the general feelings the Middle East has towards western democracy. During the initial policy planning towards the Middle East, Carothers feared that pressuring democracy through an armed invasion will not help Middle Eastern public opinion for western politics and may become even less receptive towards the idea of democracy than ever before. This was a sensitive problem to be

in; almost another carrot or stick situation where the stick would be forced democratization through military intervention and the carrot being western aid and institutional incentives.

The pressure become too much and Bush went through with the plan of strategic invasion in key terrorist baring states. There were more worries than just opinions of western democracy at stake, though. The US has attempted armed intervention to topple dictatorships before, such as Grenada, Panama, and Haiti - all with mixed results.¹⁶ With Haiti, the mission was successful, but after a few years, the government became unstable once again. Most countries either reverted back to previous behavior, or they returned to a similar regime they had before.

The overall democracy crusade in the Middle East waged on with high financial costs as well as the cost of human lives. The cost of the war is at awe inspiring expenditure with the total death count in Afghanistan standing at 2,319 for the US alone and over 18,000 civilians.¹⁷¹⁸ Of the President's \$2.8 billion assistance request for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, USAID implemented \$1.8 billion for economic assistance. USAID continues to work closely with inter agency partners to help with the allocation of funds and program support. USAID continually works with the State and Defense departments, to move toward

¹⁶ Thomas Carothers, *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy promotion* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington DC), 2004, pg. 70

¹⁷ iCasualties | Operation Enduring Freedom | Afghanistan. (n.d.). iCasualties | Operation Enduring Freedom | Afghanistan. Retrieved May 9, 2014, from <http://icasualties.org/oef/>

¹⁸ Afghan Civilians | Costs of War. (n.d.). *Afghan Civilians | Costs of War*. Retrieved May 9, 2014, from <http://costsofwar.org/article/afghan-civilians>

long-term stability, promote economic growth, and support democratic reforms, including the rights of women.

As Obama pressures a continued support for Bush still policy in the Middle East, there has been little change since the change in administration. Outlined in the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (2010), the Obama administration outlines what they would like to change in terms of Aid and international support. It describes how increasing efficiency of aid delivery is essential for the US, but there shows little signs to change the current policy towards the way the US approaches the Middle East.

5.2.1 Afghanistan

When researching the war and aid support in Afghanistan, there are some fundamental flaws in the data. First off, the amount of money devoted to Afghanistan democracy promotion is a little unclear due to the differences in funding base. On one hand, we have military intervention with a specific mission of ending terrorism and promoting liberalized democracy. This is funded through the department of defense (DOD). On the other hand, we have funding going through USAID being focused on specific areas and institutions. This collective investment was astronomically huge; Bush was putting a lot on the line when beginning the Global War on Terror (GWOT). There is however an abundance of development statistics which will be covered in the analysis, for now this section will cover background on Afghanistan.

After 9/11, the initial invasion of Afghanistan was under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which was the initiative to combat Al-Qaeda. OEF was initiated in six regions including Afghanistan, Philippines, the Horn of Africa¹⁹, Pankisi Gorge²⁰, Trans-Sahara²¹, and Caribbean and Central America. The operation had little to nothing to do with democracy promotion, that wouldn't come until later in Bush's policy creation. In terms of security, OEF was a response to the external threats against America made by terrorists. This was strictly an act against stopping terrorism, not nation building.

It wasn't until after OEF began was when Bush started to consider democracy as a core part of US foreign policy. In the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, Bush suggests that defending and expanding democracies and freedoms around the world is extremely important. Having this as a value in security is already showing signs of transgression to democracy support Bush will pressure in the upcoming years. Democracy has remained as a core national security goal throughout today, even with Obama. This point is crucial to understand where the George Bush Sr. and Clinton shared many of the same issues concerning democracy aid, and George Bush Jr. and Obama share similar stances on democracy promotion.

As OEF progressed, the Taliban were ousted from the government of Afghanistan. After the removal of the Taliban, general elections needed to take place to retain order over

¹⁹ Operation Enduring Freedom in the Horn of Africa notation is generally used although most resources went to Somalia

²⁰ Operation Enduring Freedom – Pankisi Gorge was concentrated on the conflict waging in Georgia

²¹ Located in African countries of Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, and Morocco.

the general populations in Afghanistan by 2004. Many wanted to re-elect the previous king, Zohar Shah, as head of state only to continue until the official election could be held, but he was not end up running in the preliminary elections. This early election debate brought the entire election process into criticism in terms of legitimacy. There was fear amongst Afghans that if they couldn't even choose a most favored candidate, then they found it difficult to support the process. There was a lingering fear that the new elected government would just be US puppets to work for US goals, not Afghanistan's. This was one of the first democratic challenges the US faced.

The elections rolled around in 2004 and Hamid Karzai won with over 50% of the vote. The UN oversaw the election to ensure that it proceeded adequately. During this time Afghanistan began to see some serious reform. After 2004, Afghanistan GDP had its fluctuation, but it generally remained higher than it was in 2003 ever since the elections.²² At this point in time, the US and NATO forces were still struggling with the Taliban insurgents and there seemed to be no end in sight for the fighting. It wasn't until the next elections that showed some major issues in the voting process and the lack of a legitimate vote.

Where the first election was arguably legitimate, the second election suffered fraud, bad turn out, and lack of transparency. Throughout the election process, there was dramatically lower voter turnout rate as well. Even though there was an independent commission involved, there were many mistakes made including a failed run-off between the

²² Data can be seen at the following link:
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/AF-8s-IQ-ZQ?display=graph>

top two candidates. This incident has let a bad taste in the mouths of many Afghanis with many of which are questioning the purpose of the election at all. This is a new election year this year, and Hamid Karzai cannot run again. This will allow for a completely new administration and hopefully will foster in a new age of better elections.

As for war in Afghanistan, Obama even increased troop presence after taking office. Under the Obama administration, Osama Bin Laden had been found and killed by US troops in Pakistan. Unfortunately, Al-Qaeda does not have a single centralized leader and the fighting was predicted to continue under new leadership. Currently there are plans underway for withdrawal of all troops by 2014. Although there are plans in action to remove all US and NATO troops by the end of 2014, the US will continually provide democratic support and ODA to Afghanistan.

Quantifying the spending Afghanistan can be tricky, there is little information on how many resources are being directly spent in Afghanistan for democracy development. USAID supply more recent year's results and spending on democracy and governance. In 2011, USAID spent \$602.6 million on democracy development and governance.²³ In 2012, USAID spent a huge sum of \$1,028.6 million in Afghanistan in programs for democracy and governance. This shows that the need for democracy support is still extremely high and that the US still had not achieved their goals. During the same time period we can see that the US is spending dramatically less in Iraq for similar support. Unfortunately, Afghanistan has not

²³ Data retrieved from USAID website: <http://www.usaid.gov/>

yet seen the stability and productivity that was achieved in recent years in Iraq. This failure to show results is problematic due to the sheer amount that is being spent in Afghanistan and in the Middle East region as a whole.

5.2.2 Iraq

The Iraq war began in 2003 and continued until 2011. Originally under the pretense of searching for weapons of mass destruction (WMD's), the US changed their stance on their Iraqi policy quickly. With Bush's strong determination of democratization in the Iraq, he began to propose the idea of a domino effect to democratization in Arab states. Quite a few authors thought the idea of a domino effect of democratization in pretty outlandish and far too idealist to be successful (Ottaway, Carothers, Hawthorne, Brumberg 2002). With the military in his control, the invasion began in the spring of 2003. Over the next eight years, Iraq will see a change in power, new elections, the removal and rebuilding of a police force and military, experience insurgency resistance, and develop in a way which has never been seen before to a new form of policy in the region.

For a war with many criticisms and complexities, it can be summarized fairly easily. The US had a clear main mission: "...to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end

Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people."²⁴ The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq had more descriptive goals where they wanted to have:

- a constitution drafted and approved by Iraqis
- institutions and processes to conduct free and fair elections
- measures to improve the effectiveness of elected officials and strengthening local government systems
- effective and fair justice systems
- respect for the rule of law and human rights
- creation of a vibrant civil society²⁵

The initial phases of the invasion was some of the most traditional warfare; basic invasion with the use of force that included bombings done by the air and sea. There were many countries involved, but the US help the most forces by far. Some of the most violent parts of the war happened at the beginning. When the US invaded, there was resistance from the Iraqi military which was under control of Saddam Hussein. This initial phase was a brief and swift period of traditional war between Iraq and the US and its allies. The US was able to quickly dismantle Iraqi defenses and establish control over the capital of Baghdad. After

²⁴ This statement was made by a radio address to the American people by George W Bush in the initial stages of the war.

²⁵ Quoted from an official review paper of the time spent in Iraq published by the US Special Inspector General

the initial phase, the US was confronted by insurgency resistance where the remainder of the violence would occur up to 2007 when the fighting began to decline.

During the US occupation of Iraq, the country saw dramatic changes. First, there was a dramatic regime change within Iraq when the US removed Saddam Hussein from power. This caused a direct impact in Iraq and completely disrupted political order.

“In 2003, prewar planners anticipated a rapid transfer of power to a new Iraqi government after Saddam’s removal, with a hoped-for minimal disruption in government services. This calculation proved off the mark. Postwar looting and the exodus of government bureaucrats from public service—both voluntary and involuntary—caused a complete collapse in governance capacities. The country’s broken system required a virtually complete reconstruction, literally and figuratively.” (2013)

During that time, the economy fell into shambles. Iraq is heavily dependent on their oil exportation and production to be a profitable country. During the period of invasion, their ability to export and function economically decreased dramatically. The invasion was also disruptive towards schools and other major political institutions. Iraq was left in ruins. The US at this point had a lot of work cut out for them over the next years of the war. It would take endless man hours and financial support to turn the country around.

The US focused on a few different aspects of nation building when attempting to revive Iraq. First off, Iraq needed a new constitution which favored democracy and would allow for general elections. Secondly, general elections needed to take place in order to build a legitimate government in Iraq. Garnishing public support for democracy in a war torn

country with a poor history of democracy is not an easy task, especially when there are many different ethnic subgroups with Iraq. Lastly, Iraq needed to focus on building their economy. Oil remained the largest export of Iraq which made up 99% of government revenue.²⁶ Unfortunately, this is not a good form of income because it creates few jobs and there are high chances the money will not be used effectively due to being a “resource trap” in terms of development.²⁷ In 2004, 25% of the population was unemployed and wouldn’t see a dramatic increase until the US was able to bring some stability to the country (see fig. 1). The unemployment rates would eventually begin to drop after Nouri al-Maliki was elected into office.

Development in Iraq had severe ups and downs during the US occupation. After the 2003 invasion, Iraq suffered a severe drop in education. Literacy rates plummeted and wouldn’t recover until there were recovery program put in place (see fig. 2)²⁸. By 2010, with the help of US, high levels of aid, and time spent rebuilding the country, the literacy and education rates would dramatically improve.

²⁶ According to UNDP, 99% of government revenue came from oil, but only 1% of the Iraqi population was employed in that sector. <http://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/countryinfo/>

²⁷ If you want to know more about the traps of development, consult Paul Colliers *Bottom Billion*.

²⁸ Data based on CIA world fact book publications.

Fig.1





Fig.2



In Iraq, it was difficult to see how much USAID initially spent on democracy development. Recently found on their website is the amount that was spent in 2011 and 2012 on democracy and government spending. IN 2011, USAID spent \$229.5 million on democracy and governance in Iraq and in 2012 they spent less at \$148.4 million. This decrease in spending signifies a shift to a more stable Iraq. By the time the US withdrew its troops in 2011, Iraq had come a long way in terms of development, but still had a long way to go.

In a review of Iraq done by the US Special Inspector General of Iraq Reconstruction (2013), Iraq appeared to have improved greatly and the action done by the US is viewed as a success internally. The expenditure was justified by the outcomes of democracy and reconstruction of key sectors of government, economic institutions, building civil society, and providing security. America views Iraq as a success from the aspect that it could help a region develop all the while securing their interests.

6. Analysis

This analysis covers two essential questions. The first part of the analysis will address the whether democracy promotion has become more or less effective as a US policy since the Cold War. More specifically, I will focus on whether the mechanisms used have made an impact on the two different regions by comparing election outcomes and different economic and social indicators. The second part of this analysis will cover how aid effectiveness has not changed throughout the third wave, but the reasons why the US uses democracy promotion has. This idea will describe the transition period after the Cold War and 9/11.

6.1 Part 1

The US has had a clear shift in foreign policy concerning democracy promotion throughout the third wave. It has been a perspective that is constantly changing, but retains certain core elements such as democracy through government support and liberalization of the market. We can see that the US began their modern democracy support in the 1980's, but changed the type of their support after the Cold War. The Majority of democracy aid went towards Eastern European countries and Africa immediately after the Cold War. This was not only a regional shift, but it aligned the US with the idea of supporting transitional

countries or countries which needed humanitarian assistance rather than toppling governments. This is important to consider because the US has now taken place a the unipolar power in the world once the Soviet Union began to fall. Haiti was one of the first cases where the main priority was to topple the acting government to replace it with a legitimate one due to humanitarian issues concerning democracy. Haiti could also have still been considered a transitioning country that needed support due to the new elections. In the end, it was US and UN military intervention which helped Haiti get back on track with their democratic movements.

Once the Yugoslavia Wars broke out and began receiving international interest, the US began to keep an eye on the ethnic conflicts which were beginning to take place in the region. When the US stepped in during the Kosovo war, it was for humanitarian reasons. The US may have had interest in the region, but they were not as clear and straight forward with their objective other than willing to support out of humanitarian reasons. There was no threat towards the US from Kosovo or Serbia at the time, but the US defended their actions through the international community. With support from the UN and NATO, they were able to defuse the situation and maintain security in Kosovo. After Clinton's impeachment and Bush's election towards the end of the conflict, things began to change through the perspective of the US on how they interact with Global affairs, especially with how they confront their international interests.


Over time, there is a clear shift in regions after 9/11 that marks the end of the transitional country era. Before 9/11, most democracy support went to transitional countries, but now Bush and Obama have been more assertive in democratic expansion regardless of the state of the government. Although there was an apparent increase in interest in the Middle East before 9/11, it wasn't until after the attacks that the US took direct action towards confronting the terrorism being fostered in the Middle East. Once Bush retained a position in office, the US shifted back towards realism as the main school of thought for international relations. The US could justify itself to invade Afghanistan and Iraq due to the external threat to the US. Afghanistan was a direct response to Islamic extremism which was developing in the Middle East due to the Al-Qaeda attack on the US trade tower in 9/11. US intelligence pinned the location of terrorist groups within Afghanistan including Osama Bin Laden. This justification also inspired the democratic movement because it was believed that the country would start to become resistant to terrorist or extremist groups. This pivot to Afghanistan was protecting local security within American, as the War on Terror was the largest threat to US security since the Soviets in the Cold War.

In Iraq, they experienced yet another perceived external threat: WMDs. Although Saddam was once considered a US ally, the threat began when he began to develop and stockpile WMDs. With the initial invasion of Iraq, democracy was used as a mechanism itself, like in Afghanistan, to help develop anti-terrorist incentives and to rebuild the destroyed government. By replacing the government with a liberal democracy, it was

expected that Iraq could develop more efficiently and would cause the end to extremism in the region. There was also the idealist incentive that maybe with the fall of Iraq and building of democracy, that other Middle Eastern states would follow that formula. This was only pipe-dream, and did not really see a true realization in the region.

Unfortunately, when Bush invaded Afghanistan, there was little incentive for regime change internally because of the traditional authoritarian regimes the nation was used to. Many people even wanted to re-elect the previous king as president. As Bush invaded Iraq, again, there are few incentives from the civil society to embrace the democratic change. These are some of the main growing pains of the US policy of democracy promotion. Transitional countries were used to being the main target of democracy assistance, but are now being over looked by key strategic regions by the US. It is quite clear where the ODA is going from the US to Afghanistan in astronomical amounts, as seen here from aid spending from the US:

United States - ODA by recipient and sector, USD million



Retrieved from OECD

The US is investing in over \$6 billion dollars in Afghanistan in aid alone. There has been feeling of mixed results and outcomes of such a large aid investment. In 2006, Donald Rumsfeld had an optimistic look on the entire Middle East situation by stating,

“Progress is being made. Afghanistan has gone from a country where the government protected terrorists and imprisoned women, to one that imprisons terrorists and protects women. Iraq has gone from Saddam's mass graves to mass participation in democratic elections. A recent survey showed that a large and growing number of Muslims believe that free systems can work in their country.”

Rightfully so, Rumsfeld had a good point: things were improving in terms of safety, life expectancy, literacy rate, and GDP growth (see fig.3, 4, and 5)²⁹, but this all came at an extremely high cost of two major wars, death of many civilians and troops, and long term investment in the area which is becoming more costly every day. The next question would be,

²⁹ Data retrieved from CIA world fact book.

are these incentives a good judge of the success of US born liberal democracy in Afghanistan?
His points are mostly focused on social factors and not economic indicators. Social factors are extremely important to take into consideration when analyzing the success of development, but these indicators leave out many aspects that should be taken into consideration. For example, how is the infrastructure being improved for the longevity of these improvements? What's the Economic forecast of development going to amount to? What are the safety and defense factors involved with the amount of defense spending in Afghanistan?

Fig. 3



Fig. 4




Fig. 5



This paper initially questioned whether or not aid effectiveness has improved since 9/11. Based on the expenditure on the Afghanistan and Iraq war, one could conclude no. There are clear issues with this statement. First, the expenditure for the Iraq war was reaching, on average, \$15 million a day during the eight year occupation. The peak of

spending happened during the election years where expenditure reached over \$25 million a day (See Fig. 6). For one, there is a clear change from supporting transactional countries to supporting strategic countries, which could account for the amount of money spent on these individual countries. Unfortunately, this is not able to quantify outcomes of aid usage, these are just spending statistics. It would be wise to compare the regions with all of the case studies in terms of election results and it's interesting what is found.

Not only have outcomes been varied between Iraq and Afghanistan, but outcomes between the Middle East and Haiti, Serbia, and Kosovo have been quite different as well in terms of voter turnout in elections and the longevity of these democracies. For example, according to the Idea Institute, there are very mixed results when considering the longevity of a strong democratic election turnout. In Haiti (as seen in chart 1), there was a strong sense of democracy before the coup. During the coup, and directly after, democratic voting went into a brief decline, and eventually was brought back up in the late 90's with the help and support of the US. As Haiti progressed into the 2000's, there was the beginning of a decline in democratic voters in both the parliamentary elections and presidential elections. In 2000, between 60 and 70% of the voting age population (VAP) participated in elections, by 2011 it had gone down to almost 20%. Democracy was never extremely strong, nor had it lasted in Haiti.

Chart 1

Haiti Election results						
Presidential						
Year	Voter Turn-out	Total vote	Registration	VAP Turn-out	Voting age population	Population
2011	22.36%	1,053,733	4,712,693	18.93%	5,565,559	9,719,932
2006	59.26%	2,093,947	3,533,430	47.77%	4,383,262	8,282,968
2000	78.29%	2,871,572	3,668,049	68.25%	4,207,329	7,841,574
1995		994,599		28.84%	3,448,320	7,184,000
1990	50.16%	1,640,729	3,271,155	53.82%	3,048,420	6,486,000
1988		1,063,537		36.28%	2,931,860	6,238,000
Parliamentary						
Year	Voter Turn-out	Total vote	Registration	VAP Turn-out	Voting age population	Population
2011					5,565,559	9,719,932
2006	28.31%	1,000,314	3,533,430	22.82%	4,383,262	8,282,968
2000	59.99%	2,547,000	4,245,384	60.54%	4,207,329	7,841,574
1995	31.09%	1,140,523	3,668,049	33.07%	3,448,320	7,184,000
1990	50.16%	1,640,729	3,271,155	52.69%	3,113,750	6,625,000

In Eastern Europe Serbia and Kosovo (Chart 2 and 3) experienced varying results when it comes to election participation. Since Kosovo's first parliamentary elections in 2004, their VAP has steadily gone up to about 60%. In Serbia, it has been a rocky road to election success. Immediately after (and somewhat during) the Cold War, the US began democratic pressure to the region of Serbia. Unfortunately, it wasn't until after Slobodan Milošević left office that democracy could really begin to get a foot hold in politics. A new parliament and constitution was in order for Serbia after Milošević, which began parliamentary elections.

Serbia has seen swing of VAP, but it the participation is always above 50%, with the highest participation year being 2008 with both parliamentary and presidential elections being above 70%.

Chart 2

Serbia Election Participation						
Presidential						
Year	Voter Turn-out	Total vote	Registration	VAP Turn-out	Voting age population	Population
2012	46.26%	3,132,679	6,771,479	54.10%	5,790,302	7,276,604
2008	68.12%	4,580,428	6,723,762	77.61%	5,901,990	7,334,935
Parliamentary						
Year	Voter Turn-out	Total vote	Registration	VAP Turn-out	Voting age population	Population
2012	57.77%	3,911,136	6,770,013	67.55%	5,790,302	7,276,604
2008	61.35%	4,141,176	6,749,688	70.17%	5,901,990	7,334,935
2007	60.57%	4,029,286	6,652,105	68.19%	5,908,864	7,381,579

Chart 3

Kosovo Election Participation						
Parliamentary						
Year	Voter Turn-out	Total vote	Registration	VAP Turn-out	Voting age population	Population
2010	45.62%	743,892	1,630,636	61.31%	1,213,399	1,815,048
2007	43.23%	628,630	1,454,174	55.89%	1,124,763	2,126,000
2004	49.52%	699,519	1,412,680	65.28%	1,071,500	2,041,000

When looking focusing on the Middle East once again, we can see dramatic ups and down with VAP. Coming from a nondemocratic state to sudden elections was a major triumph for the US from producing extremely high election participation. The US was able to get almost 70% of the VAP to participate in the presidential election in Afghanistan in 2004 (Chart 4). The real problem is the longevity of high election participation. By the 2009 elections, participation had dropped from 67.5% to 35%, and almost 50% decrease in voter participation. There were even more registered voters in 2009 over 2004, but less than half voted the second time. The mechanisms to raise participation worked well for the first elections, but fell apart by the time the second elections rolled around.

Chart 4

Afghanistan Voter Participation						
Presidential						
Year	Voter Turn-out	Total vote	Registration	VAP Turn-out	Voting age population	Population
2009	38.80%	4,823,090	12,430,644	35.06%	13,757,508	28,483,631
2004	83.66%	8,128,940	9,716,413	67.54%	12,035,602	25,697,635
Parliamentary						
Year	Voter Turn-out	Total vote	Registration	VAP Turn-out	Voting age population	Population
2010	45.83%	4,216,594	9,200,000	29.71%	14,191,908	29,120,727
2005	49.37%	6,406,615	12,977,336	51.71%	12,389,532	26,334,702

In Iraq, we can see something similar to Afghanistan (Chart 5). There are still high amounts of voter registration, but the voter turnout is severely lacking from previous elections. This decline could potentially lead to an unstable democracy, more so than Iraq already is. Unfortunately, the Iraq data is for more incomplete than the other case study countries. Finding election statistics proved to be difficult with Iraq, with conflicting reports. One thing is for certain, the amount of subgroups in Iraq make it difficult to maintain a group decision. This weakens the legitimacy in which the government can hold elections. Also, with the US withdrawn from Iraq, there is less enforcement for stable and fair elections.

Chart 5

<u>Iraq Voter Participation</u>						
Parliamentary						
Year	Voter Turn-out	Total vote	Registration	VAP Turn-out	Voting age population	Population
2010	64%		18,892,000		16,438,836	29,671,605
2005	79.63%	12,396,631	15,568,702	89.22%	13,894,186	26,076,088

If Rumsfeld's indicators are confronted, Afghanistan, in the categories of life expectancy and GDP growth (see fig. 6 and 7), shows unclear results as there was in Iraq. These mixed results show the interest the US has in the region, but could be one of the main

reasons why the US has remained in Afghanistan for so long. The main issue remains in how to describe the efficiency in democracy promotion in the Middle East.

Fig. 6




Fig. 7



Fig. 8



Secondly, it's difficult to tell if the current democratic endeavor by the US will have a lasting effect. It's easy to analyze the Haiti and Eastern Europe countries because it has been years since the US first initially sent democracy assistance to those areas. In Haiti, there was a relapse to poor behavior by the end of the 90's where there was a political conflict developing with in the presiding powers. Within Serbia and Kosovo, there is still resentment by Serbians towards the region of Kosovo. Although the area has seen development, the local issues are still having problems and may require international support. It would be extremely valuable to return to this study after the sane amount of time has passed in the Middle East to be able to analyze the longevity of the regime.

Thirdly, there is one constant over the past 20 years, which is the support given to Africa and Asia. The two regions have always been a target of development aid and

democracy aid, but each area has seen less resources and mainstream attention than other regions for various regions. Rest assured, the US isn't bound to abandon aid programs which don't serve a direct purpose of US foreign policy. Aid can still be an effective way for the US to spread a positive influence through democracy whether they are a threat or not. Since they are not a security concern for the US, they will most likely receive not experience military intervention or forced regime change.

6.2 Part 2

This section focuses on what has changed and what hasn't changed in mechanisms for democracy support and promotion. In the US published *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (2010), effectiveness and efficiency is stressed for future plans of USAID and the state department during the Obama administration. They hope to increase the productivity within their key goals and US strategies. This paper is a great way to examine effectiveness in the US in both post-Cold War times and after 9/11.

The US has had a magnitude of different approaches to democracy promotion before the cold war that have continued to change slightly over time. The main idea to come away from this part of the study is that Aid effectiveness has not changed throughout the third wave, but the reasons why the US uses democracy promotion and how the US uses aid mechanisms have. This section will outline how the use of democratic realism after 9/11

changed the way the US saw democracy promotion and how they went about using it in their foreign policy through different mechanisms.

There are mechanisms which remain a constant in the way the US has approached democracy support or promotion such as military intervention, institutional support, and diplomacy, and support for transitional states, but there have also been changes to these formulas (See chart 1). First, military intervention has been a key mechanism to help support governments in transitioning countries. In all case studies in this paper, military intervention was used in some form. The strength of the military of the US is seconded by none, which helps the confidence on their military pursuits. The way the US has used their military strength, on the other hand, has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. With Haiti and Kosovo, the US used military to support NATO and international interest. The US at the time had a massive focus on human rights, which led to support of these international conflicts. After 9/11, the US shifted its military use towards more self-interest. The invasion of Afghanistan began with the terrorist attacks on the world trade center which caused a chain reaction to begin the war on terror to protect American security. This led to a direct action where the US was willing to go to war even without much international support. This realist response may not have happened before Bush held office. We can also see this behavior in Iraq towards WMD's. Even with the amount of international criticism, the US was determined to pursue the Iraq campaign.

Chart 6

Mechanism which remain constant	Mechanisms Affected by Change or New Mechanisms
Military intervention with the use of force	Military intervention no longer needs approval of senate or congress. Less pressure to obtain international support
Democracy promotion focused on transitional states: states that have desire to transition to democracies receive priority	Transitional states are still considered helpful, but more direct action to countries which still currently support authoritarian regimes
Institutionalism	Focus on the Civil society

Another dramatic shift is the one from strictly supporting transitional states with democracy aid to promoting democracy in states which have a low desire to change. In Afghanistan for instance, the US began pressuring election immediately, but there was hardly any support for a new presidency at first. When the US began to build a provisional

government, many of the voters wanted to reelect King Zahir Shah which had already help office for many years. This reluctance to change is not being anti-democratic, but a sign that a country may not be prepared or have the desire to democratize just yet. If they lack a democratic value, the legitimacy in which that power is given may not hold water. In the first Iraqi election, the different ethnic groups all had major conflicts between who to elect. It's very difficult to elect a single candidate when there is a lack of consensus amongst the general population. Even though the US is faced with these issues, they still are pressuring democracy in regions that may not have an initial interest in reform, a process which would not have occurred before 9/11.

Lastly, there is a new focus on the civil society support. This support may come from a reaction of the lack of interest from the US pressured democracy. By building a strong sense of democracy in the civil society, it may be possible to influence their interest in democracy. By creating a civil society which has been influenced by democracy, it can help build better participation and understanding of democratic process and its benefits.

Right after the Cold War the US began using the idea of internationalism to participate in the international society. There were grand ideas that with the US being the unipolar actor in the world system, they could now devote resources to the development of poor nations. During this time the US main goals in development were directly linked to democracy, even though it was the third wave and the US still had a few programs which were going in that direction. This was still a prime period of the third wave democracy

building and the of the main US mechanism of development was focusing on democratically transitioning state to help build strength in their government. By focusing on countries which already had rich civil society support for democratization was more capable of democratizing and accepting the institutions required for a successful democracy.

7. Conclusion

The analysis draws upon two conclusions; first that the US has changed their mainstream foreign policy towards democracy promotion to better fit American goals and security. And secondly, that the effectiveness of aid has not changed, by the incentives to where the US delivers aid and how mechanisms are used has changed dramatically since 9/11. This paper outlined some of the leading theories in US democracy promotion and results of certain key cases in US democracy promotion. Former Yugoslavia, including Serbia and Kosovo, and Haiti serve as prime examples of modern post-Cold War democracy promotion. These regions were the some of the first regions to receive a completely revised policy by the Bush and Clinton administrations where military intervention is used to promote western ideals such as human rights and democratic values. With the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, we can see a completely revised policy which focuses on the global war on terror and security for the US. This could be interpreted as a strong realist response by the US which seized the opportunity to utilize democracy as a tool.

New American democracy promotion in the form of democratic realism may have longer lasting effects than early post-Cold War transition, but it is too early to tell. Effectiveness can be judged by the lasting effect of changes in the government and people, unfortunately it is difficult to tell how long the democracy will last in Iraq or Afghanistan. The US has learned some key lessons in the Middle East; democracy promotion is expensive

to create and maintain. The US has strong incentives to keep its current policy of maintaining and supporting new, existing and transitioning democracies. By using democratic realism, the US is able to focus on its core strategies by keeping its interests safe and by influencing the region and maintaining a pro American legislation in power. The US is continuing to use this policy with its aid allocation in the Middle East, especially Afghanistan to maintain their investment in the region.

The limitations of this paper are clear, there are a small scope of countries which were analyzed, Obama policy (although similar to Bush strategy) was mostly absent from much of the analysis, lack of data, and it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of aid programs, especially with the most recent ones. Although the US has claimed Iraq as a victory, it is difficult to say they are winning in the global war on terror. Their expenditure is beyond comparison with any other US endeavor as of now and there seems to be no end in sight. In the future, the US will need to maintain the democracies they create and will have difficulty creating independent countries which can support themselves. As the US continues to support democratic realism as their main school of thought, the global war on terror will continue in the far reaches of developing countries where they will continue to create and support democratic institutions.

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9. Korean Abstract

초록

이 연구는 미국 외교 정책이 민주주의 원조를 중요하게 다루는 이유를 파악하는 것을 목표로 하고있다. 이 논문은 탈냉전 그리고 포스트-9 / 11 이후 미국에 의한 민주주의 원조와 지원 진행 상황을 다룬다. 서로 관련된 두 가지 사건이 민주주의 원조와 지원에 관한 미국 외교정책의 기초가 된다. 위 두 가지 사건은 탈냉전시대의 민주주의를 촉진하게 된 소련의 붕괴, 그리고 미국이 중동의 주요 국가에서 민주주의의 조장을 통해 테러리즘에 대항하도록 했던 9/11 이다. 두 시기는 해외에서의 서부적 자유 민주주의의 장려 그리고 자국의 이익 보호라는 공통의 이해관계를 가진다.

리더쉽의 극적인 변화와 9/11 사건이 합쳐져 미국은 민주주의 원조에 중점을 둔 국제 관계를 현실적으로 바라보게 되었다. 그리하여 미국은 국가 내 보안과 해외에서의 생활조건 개선을 위해 USAID 와 국방부에 많은 예산을 사용하게 된다. 민주 현실주의를 사용하여 지난 25 년간의 미국 외교정책을 분석함으로써, 현재의 미국의 정책을 이해하고 설명할 수 있다.