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국제학석사학위논문

The State as an Emotional Actor

Rethinking Soft Power through Emotions

감정적 행위자로서의 국가
감정을 통해 살펴본 소프트파워 재조명

2014년 8월

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Max Nurnus

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Rethinking Soft Power through Emotions

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
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Abstract

The State as an Emotional Actor

Rethinking Soft Power through Emotions

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This thesis aims to rethink and improve Joseph Nye's concept of soft power. This is done by characterizing the state as an emotional actor and by introducing emotions as the underlying mechanism that leads to a change in preferences of the target of soft power. For this purpose, a first step introduces the existing literature on soft power that elaborates on the concept, criticizes it and connects it to practical politics. Secondly, the flaws of Nye's conception of soft power - some of which this thesis aims to solve - are introduced: the vague definition of how soft power works; the limitations it imposes on how soft power changes preferences; and the unnecessary restriction of soft power to a positive influence. The solution introduced here is to characterize international actors as prone to influences on their beliefs by emotions. This is done in three steps: by showing that this characterization is prevalent in the existing scholarship on international relations; that psychology knows a variety of ways in which emotions influence beliefs; and that approaches such as Intergroup Emotions Theory can

explain how emotions work on a collective level. To illustrate how soft power can work through emotions, two historical cases with different emotions at work are outlined and related to the theoretical concepts introduced before.

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Keywords: Power, Soft Power, Emotions, State Theory

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1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH	6
2.1. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	7
2.2. REFINEMENTS AND EXTENSIONS	8
2.3. CRITICISM AND REVISIONS	10
2.4. SOFT POWER AND EMOTION	12
3. THE FLAWS OF JOSEPH NYE’S SOFT POWER CONCEPT	14
3.1. THE DEFINITION OF ATTRACTION	14
3.2. CHANGE IN PREFERENCES	15
3.3. POSITIVE LIMITATION	17
4. RETHINKING SOFT POWER - RESEARCH DESIGN.....	22
5. THE STATE AS AN EMOTIONAL ACTOR	29
5.1. THE EMOTIONAL ACTORS IN POLITICAL REALISM	30
5.2. THE EMOTIONAL ACTOR IN SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM.....	32
5.3. THE EMOTIONAL ACTOR IN LIBERALISM	34
5.4. EMOTIONS AND BELIEFS	35
5.5. COLLECTIVE EMOTIONS	39
5.6. SOFT POWER AND COLLECTIVE EMOTIONS	42
6. CASE STUDIES.....	46
6.1. NEGATIVE EMOTIONS AND THE AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM SOMALIA IN 1993	46
6.2. POSITIVE EMOTIONS AND WILLY BRANDT’S VISIT TO WARSAW IN 1970.....	55
7. CONCLUSION	60
REFERENCES	65

1. Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to improve Joseph Nye's concept of soft power. It aims to do so by introducing the effects of emotions on beliefs and preferences as an explanatory factor. This is done by characterizing the state as an emotional actor in international relations. Guiding assumption is that analytical ambiguities and limitations of the original soft power concept can thereby be alleviated.

The pivot of Nye's framework is the notion that power, on the one hand, can take the form of coercion and inducements, of carrots and sticks, and thereby of hard power. In the political realm, this usually encompasses the use of military and economic resources. On the other hand, power can also lie in “the ability to shape the preferences of others” and in “getting others to want what you want” (Nye, 2004: 5). This constitutes soft power, and it works through the mechanism of attraction. As Nye argues, attraction can result from the culture of a country, the enactment of political values and a foreign policy that is seen as legitimate.

This conceptual reliance of soft power on attraction brings about several problems. Firstly, the absence of any clear definition of attraction and its workings leads to ambiguities. It is not evident what exactly attraction is and how the underlying mechanism works. Secondly, it imposes questionable limitations on the scope of soft power as a concept. According to Nye, a change of preferences can only come about through projecting a positive image and thereby result in imitation or association. This leaves out the possibility of shaping the preferences of others beyond imitation or association and through non-positive means, for example through provocation or repulsion.

As a consequence of these problems, Nye's conception is of limited use for understanding events that – by definition – constitute an exertion of soft power. Neither can it precisely explain how attraction changes preferences, nor is it able to grasp events that include a change of preferences which did not come about through attraction and did not result in imitation. This thesis therefore aims to clarify the conceptual foundations and to expand the explanatory scope of Nye's soft power conception. In the sense of Hellman, it attempts to correct a "theory defect" (see Hellman, 2004). For this purpose, the effects of emotions on beliefs and preferences are proposed as an alternative to the mechanism of attraction, and the notion of the state as an emotional actor as an alternative to the common perception of the state.

1.1. Relevance

The relevance of this project originates, firstly, from the importance of the soft power concept for academic analysis as well as policymaking – and therefore from the implications of a flawed understanding of soft power. In the field of political science, Nye's concept enjoys great popularity and wide-ranging employment. For the year 2012 alone Google Scholar lists some 6.740 papers with "soft power" in their title. For the 2004 book of the same name by Nye, the same site currently references about 3.000 articles and books that cite it. In a similar vein, Amazon.com lists more than 20 books for the year 2012 under the label of soft power, for example on "China's Soft Power and International Relations", on "Japan and China as Charm Rivals" and "US Cultural Diplomacy and Archaeology".

Beyond the academic realm, and as Gallarotti puts it, have "few scholarly concepts [...] transcended the ivory towers of academia as vigorously as the concept of soft power" (2011: 2). It has become part of the public as well as political discourse and thereby a synonym for non-

military power. The former Chinese President Hu Jintao therefore called upon his people to “enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country” (CPC, 2007); the Russian government describes soft power as “an integral component of modern international politics” (in NYT, 2013); and the former American Secretary of Defense Robert Gates declared before US Congress that “I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use soft power” (DoD, 2007). This prevalence of and the reliance on this concept in academic as well as policy circles make the prospect of a theory defect problematic. For one, this thesis therefore aims at contributing to the enhancement of an important theoretical framework.

Secondly, the relevance of this thesis arises from its effort to advance the integration of emotions as an important factor into existing frameworks of international relations scholarship. In the words of Elster: “Emotions are a neglected topic, and the neglect of economists is second to none”; they have “totally neglected the most important aspect of their subject matter” (1996: 1386). The same might well be true for the discipline of international relations; Jervis labeled the past disregard of emotions hence a “major blunder” (Balzacq/Jervis, 2004: 564f.). This is starting to change, in part due to recent results in neurosciences according to which emotion plays a central role for human perception, thinking and decision making. The work of a growing number of scholars can therefore be seen as part of an “emotional turn” (Wolf, 2012: 606) with the guiding insight that “emotions are ‘absolutely central’ to world politics” (Bleiker/Hutchison, 2008: 116) – or at least important enough to warrant more attention than given to them in the past.

This growing relevance of emotion goes back to a newly-found emphasis of human nature in political science. As Lebow states in his cultural theory of international: humans are “emo-

tional beings, not computers” (Lebow, 2009: 514), and hence emotions are part of human politics. From a psychological perspective, this is illustrated with insights such as that emotion provides “the foundation for swift and accurate decision making” (McDermott, 2004: 691) as it “is, inescapably, an essential component of rationality” (Ibid.: 700). Against this backdrop, a variety of political scientists have illustrated the relevance of emotions for understanding international politics. Examples are recent papers on the effects of humiliation (see Fattah/Fierke, 2009; Saurette, 2006), of anger (see Hall, 2011) and the lust for revenge (see Löwenheim/Heimann, 2008), as well as on the relevance of emotions for trust (see Michel, 2012) and moral judgments (see Prinz, 2006). Beyond that, emotions are of special relevance in the context of soft power due to their power over beliefs. As will be elaborated on later, they can create beliefs where there were none before, and can change, strengthen or respectively weaken existing beliefs (see Frijda/Mesquita, 2000: 45).

The relevance of this thesis therefore originates, for one, from the importance of soft power as an analytical tool as well as a practical instrument; and, secondly, from the relevance as well as the neglect of emotions in the context of international relations. The assumption is that this incorporation of emotions can help to fix the perceived theory defect, and thereby make a contribution to a better understanding of both soft power and emotions. As the literature review will illustrate, this has been attempted by several other authors, but usually without addressing the underlying problems of attraction as the mechanism fueling soft power.

1.2. Structure

In a first step, chapter 2 will give an overview of past research on soft power and the ongoing debates in this context. Special attention will be paid to previous attempts at rethinking the

original concept of Nye and the connections made between soft power and emotions. Chapter 3 will elaborate on the ambiguities and limitations of Nye's concept that constitute the initially mentioned theory defect – and how they prevent the concept from grasping a historical case that, by definition, entails soft power. On this basis, chapter 4 will outline the analytical framework of this thesis, the research question as well as the terminology, and the eclectic approach for improving on the mentioned weaknesses of Nye's concept. The actual analysis will encompass chapter 5 and include the characterization of the state as an emotional actor and the effects of emotions on beliefs, especially in the context of collective actors. In chapter 6 this will be elaborated on through two case studies that draw from a variety of sources to illustrate the emotional foundations of soft power exertions. Chapter 7 will summarize the findings of this thesis with a conclusion.

2. Literature Review of Previous Research

Focal point in the existing literature on soft power are the writings of Nye. The concept of soft power first came up in his 1990 book “Bound to Lead” and in the concept of a changing nature of world politics. As he argues, “various trends today are making co-optive behavior and soft power resources more important” (Nye, 1990: 188), to which he counts cultural and ideological factors as well as international institutions. More than a decade later, he subsequently refined the concept in his 2004 book “Soft Power”. Nye defines power as “the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants” (Nye: 2004: 2), and soft power as the ability to shape others’ preferences. This exertion of soft power rests on the mechanism of attraction, on “leading by example and attracting others to do what you want” (Ibid.: 5). It can originate from three sources: the culture of a country, the enactment of its political values and a foreign policy that is seen as legitimate.

Later on, Nye added further elements to this definition. In “The Powers to Lead” he listed emotional intelligence, communication capabilities and a clear vision as necessary skills for the development of soft power (Nye, 2008: 69ff.). Similar to this, he spoke of the capability to persuade and to frame the agenda as ingredients in “The Future of Power”. Also in this book, he shifted attention to the term of smart power to describe the effective combination of hard and soft power (see Nye: 2011: xiv). This concept was translated into policy advice when Nye co-chaired a commission on smart power together with Richard Armitage in 2007. It concludes that “America’s image and influence are in decline” and that it “must become a smarter power by once again investing in the global good” (CSIS, 2007: 1).

Around this core concept, a wide range of other authors have contributed to the literature on soft power. This vast corpus can be roughly divided into three, at times overlapping categories: (1) analysis of countries' soft power and policy recommendations; (2) refinements and extensions of Nye's conception of soft power; and (3) critical examinations and revisions of this initial framework. Beyond these strands, some authors have drawn connections between emotions and their role in the exertion of soft power.

2.1. Analysis and Recommendations

The initial work on the concept has spawned a vast literature that analyzes the soft power of specific international actors in one way or another and, in many cases, gives policy recommendations. Nye himself pioneered this strand with his comprehensive analysis of the American resources of soft power, particularly in the areas of culture and policies in his 2004 book. Furthermore, he compared the United States in this regard to other actors and gave policy recommendations, first and foremost under the label of smart power (see Nye, 2004). Since then, he has continued in this field, for example by urging Americans to combine hard and soft resources into "strategies for power *with* rather than *over* other nations" (Nye, 2011: xvii; emphasis by author). In a similar vein, a variety of authors scrutinized other actors through the soft power lens, for example the European Union (see Matlary, 2006; Giegerich/Wallace, 2007; Manners/Diez, 2007), Japan (see Otmazgin, 2006; Lam, 2007) and Russia (see Tsygankov, 2006; Popescu, 2006). Beyond that, there have been ongoing attempts at soft power ratings encompassing a wide range of factors and states (see Monocle, 2012).

Apart from the United States, this descriptive and propositional employment of soft power is especially popular with a focus on China, as a large number of articles and books illustrate

(see Lai/Lu, 2012; Nye, 2005; Kurlantzick, 2007; Gill & Huang, 2006; Paradise, 2009). The extent of this interest has sparked meta-observations on the course of the debates within China, for example by Glaser and Murphy (2009) who outline two distinct waves. Another Asian country in which soft power has attracted extensive attention is South Korea, first and foremost with an eye on the so-called Korean wave of music and television exports as well as their cultural influence in Asia (see Jang/Paik, 2012; Hayashi/Lee, 2007).

2.2. Refinements and Extensions

Building up on Nye's work, several authors have attempted to refine the concept. Gallarotti, for example, elaborates on the sources of soft power both on the international as well as the domestic level. On the former, he locates them in an adherence to rules and norms, in multi-lateral policies and an orientation on the common good, and in economic openness. In the domestic realm, he sees soft power originating both from politics and culture, and in general from the "pervasive principles of political liberalism at work" (Gallarotti, 2011: 22). In a similar vein, Vuving speaks of three specific sources of attraction: benignity in the interactions with other actors, brilliance in performing certain tasks, and beauty in the enactment of ideals, values and visions (see Vuving, 2009: 8f.). Beyond that, he distinguishes between power resources and power currencies, the later one being specific properties of resources and actions that enable these to generate power (Ibid.: 4f.).

Other authors have located the notion of soft power within existing frameworks of power. One point of reference is the debate surrounding Bachrach/Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974). While the former distinguished two faces of power, the latter added a third dimension: the first one expresses the capability to prevail in conflict situations, the second one the capability

to set the agenda, and the third one the capability to shape other actors' beliefs and preferences (see *Ibid.*: 22f.). Realist approaches to international relations focus on the first face; the second and the third face can be put into connection with soft power, as for example Bilgin and Elis (2008: 13ff.) and Baldwin (2013: 276f.) elaborate on. In a similar vein, soft power has been situated in Duvall and Barnett's framework encompassing compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. Lee perceives soft power as a process of socialization and thereby productive power (see 2011b: 41); on the other hand, Hayden applies a broader interpretation and excludes only compulsory power (see 2012: 34). Another example is the re-framing of soft power in terms of Foucault's understanding of power and thereby with a focus on a relational and strategic dimension, as has been done by Lock (2010). Also in this category lies Gallarotti's description of soft power as a meta-power that shapes social structures and thereby equals agenda setting (see 2011: 12f.) .

Beyond these additions to Nye's initial work, there are a variety of debates going on, especially regarding the relationship of soft power to other concepts. In the context of balance of power theory, scholars such as Pape distinguish between hard and soft balancing, the latter for example through "territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling" (2005: 36), and especially against American predominance (see Paul, 2005). In contrast, Brooks and Wohlforth call this argument analytically flawed and see no empirical evidence supporting it (see 2005: 107). Another debate continues around the relationship between hard and soft power. Similar to Nye, Gallarotti argues that the importance of soft power relative to hard power is rising in contemporary international affairs, that the two are therefore distinct, and that states have to shift the emphasis of their power strategies (see 2010: 39f.). Mattern, on the other hand, makes the argument that soft power "is not so soft" (2005: 596) as

it intrinsically relies on communicative coercion, and thereby on a mechanism that Nye connects to hard power. In a similar vein, Cooper concludes that “Soft power is the velvet glove, but behind it there is always the iron fist” (2004: 179), and Womack questions whether soft power is nothing but a convenient facade for hard power (see 2010: 65).

2.3. Criticism and Revisions

Especially in the context of the latter debate, authors express criticism towards the idea of soft power. A range of Realist scholars reject its analytical utility, as in the case of Fergusson who perceives it as “too soft” (2003) to further a country’s interest and emphasizes the value of hard power. Other voices caution – especially with the experiences of the last decade in mind - that the United States need to abandon the belief in soft power in order to secure their own position in world politics (see Layne: 2010: 73; Gelb, 2011: 72). Beyond that, Ying speaks of the concept as “ethnocentric and condescending” (2010: 13) as it implies the belief in the superiority and universal applicability of American culture and values. This critical attitude towards the imperialist tendencies of soft power is also voiced by Joffe who speaks of a “curse of soft power” as too much of it “twists minds in resentment and rage” (2006).

In the context of these critical writings, special attention has been given to the mechanism of attraction. Similar to the approach taken here, Hall proposes to disregard it altogether as “Nye’s writings present attraction as a psychological mechanism, but the psychology behind it is missing” (Hall, 2010: 206). He criticizes an unclear linkage between attraction and changes in foreign policy, and questions whether attraction leads others states to ‘want what you want’, and thereby to imitate, or to ‘want what you want them to want’, and thereby to have their actual preferences shaped (see Ibid.: 203). Beyond that, he asks if attraction is in

fact the cause for a change in behavior or merely an outcome of the same process that might well be driven by other, unknown factors. Similar to this, Womack accuses Nye of confusing attraction, attention and persuasion as well as of merely cataloguing “world patterns of attention” (2010: 66) with his concept. Beyond that, some authors caution that it is “questionable whether attraction power works at the nation level” (Ying: 2010: 12; see also Layne, 2010: 53) as the mechanism ascribes human psychology to states.

Against the backdrop of ongoing debates and criticism, several authors attempted to rethink and thereby improve soft power. Hall’s approach takes the path of purging the concept from its reliance on attraction. He proposes to replace it with institutional power, reputational power and representational power (see Hall, 2010: 208f.) as possible alternatives, all of which work through distinct mechanisms. For this purpose he combines the approaches of existing frameworks on the workings of power, for example by Barnett/Duvall, Schelling and Mattern. At the same time, he mentions the possibility of a “more thorough explication of the psychological underpinnings of attraction” (Ibid.: 207) – a pathway he does not choose for his paper, but that this thesis will attempt to pursue.

Another approach was outlined by Lee in order to clarify the relationship between soft and hard power as well as the corresponding resources. He defines soft power as any power that relies on soft resources, and thereby diverges from Nye’s reliance on the nature of the power as the defining factor (see Lee, 2009a: 6ff.). Beyond that, Lee emphasizes that resources do not necessarily result in the exertion of power and how a country can follow different strategies in order to exploits its soft resources. This process is detailed through cognitive processes:

in the short term, new ways of thinking, attractiveness or fear are created; in the long term, these can turn into institutions, habits and patterns of reasoning (Ibid.: 8).

2.4. Soft Power and Emotion

In the context of research on Nye's initial framework, only few connections have been made between soft power and emotions. Nye himself does not mention the word in 2004's "Soft Power", but emphasizes it repeatedly in "The Powers to Lead". He lists, on par with communication capabilities and the exertion of a vision, emotional intelligence as one of the three important skills for the acquisition of soft power (Nye, 2008: 69f.). Similar to the ancient concepts of charisma and rhetoric, it can "inspire followers through the careful management of emotion" (Ibid.: 92) and "create an emotional attraction for followers" (Ibid.: 55). He speaks of different degrees of "emotional appeal" (Ibid.: 142), some of which come close to psychological manipulation as they keep the target from reasoning clearly and stupefy it. In the framework of Nye, emotion can therefore cause attraction (in combination with a potential change of preferences), and the skill of emotional intelligence paves the ground for this.

At the same time, Nye applies this exclusively on the individual level and illustrates it with various American Presidents as examples; different from the overarching concept of soft power, these emotional processes are not applied on the level of societies or national states. The importance of this distinction between various levels of analysis is emphasized by Ying who argues that decision making on the state level is far more complicated and institutionalized than on the level of the individual. It "leaves little room for emotional elements" (Ying, 2008: 12) and hence confines the relevance of emotional intelligence to the realm of interpersonal relationships. Nye does not explicitly agree with this, but speaks about leadership

only on the level of “organization, group or network” (Nye, 2008: 52). Prior writing on the intersection of soft power and emotion has thereby been confined to the levels of individuals and possibly societies, but has not explicitly taken international politics into consideration.

One noteworthy exception is, to some extent, the afore-mentioned framework of Lee. Firstly, because he explicitly lists the effect of emotions as one way of changing recipients’ beliefs and preferences. Secondly, because these emotions go beyond attractiveness and also include fear, whereby soft power is not restricted towards a positive influence anymore (see Lee, 2009a: 8). At the same time, this attempt at rethinking soft power does not address the exact nature of emotional processes as work (and, especially, their relationship with cognition), as cautioned by Hall, nor does it elaborate on how psychological phenomena can be translated onto the state level, as Ying questions.

Against this backdrop of previous research, this thesis can be located in the third category of literature that criticizes and partially revises Nye’s concept. Similar to other authors, it focuses on the mechanism of attraction and its shortcomings. With an eye on other attempts to rethink soft power, it therefore aims to follow up on the proposals by Hall and Lee and to further explore the psychological and emotional dimension of soft power. Hence, the following analysis will try to add to the existing literature by conceptualizing the state as an emotional actor and how emotions can influence its beliefs.

3. The Flaws of Joseph Nye's Soft Power Concept

As has been outlined by other authors, the soft power concept by Joseph Nye suffers from various flaws that impede on its utility for academic analysis and practical applicability. The ones of relevance for this thesis center on the mechanism of attraction and riddle the concept with ambiguities and a limited scope, as will be shown later on. Beyond that, a concrete example will be given to illustrate this theory defect further. The analysis in the following chapters will build upon these flaws and elaborate on how the introduction of emotion into the soft power concept can improve on them.

3.1. The Definition of Attraction

The first problem centers on the absence of any clear definition for the central mechanism in the concept of soft power, that is: attraction. According to Nye, it is one out of three general behaviors that change the preferences of others, next to inducements and threats, both of which constitute hard power (see Nye, 2004: 5). Regardless of this pivotal relevance of attraction for the concept of soft power, an explicit definition is not given; it is only put into relation to other terms. Soft power is created from culture, political values or policies (or any combination of these), and is therefore described on eye-level with terms such as seduction, popularity and leadership by example (Ibid.: 5, 9). According to Nye's writings on leadership, it furthermore rests on various skills, first and foremost emotional intelligence, effective communication and the exertion of a vision (see Nye, 2008: 83). In the target, soft power accordingly evokes feelings such as love, duty and the willingness to imitate (see Nye, 2004: 5, 7, 15) – and thereby attraction as well as a change in preferences.

Closely connected to this is the absence of any clear explanation of the causal linkage between attraction and a change of preferences. Nye writes on the topic that observable outcomes of soft power are less common than a “general influence” and a “diffuse effect” (Ibid.: 16). It is this context in which authors like Hall accuse the soft power concept of lacking any psychological depth and thereby being open to vague interpretations (see Hall, 2010: 206). Hence, Nye ascribes to what is known as folk psychology and thereby common-sense assumptions about human behavior, which is certainly of use in everyday life and not necessarily wrong, but in this case without clear elaboration and explicit scientific backing (see Baker, 1997: 317f.). Implicitly, attraction is thereby understood as a vague bundle of positive emotions that result in a desire for association, company and imitation. Accordingly, Nye assumes the target of soft power to adjust its preferences in order to fulfill these desires.

The first problem of Nye’s concept is therefore that he fails to provide an adequate understanding of what attraction is and how it shapes preferences. One goal of this thesis is hence to provide elaboration on how precisely preferences can be changed; for this purpose the known effects of emotions on beliefs and preferences will be employed.

3.2. Change in Preferences

A second problem of Nye’s concept concerns the precise nature of the change soft power can bring about in preferences. He defines this process as “getting others to want the outcomes that you want” (Nye, 2004: 5) and as “the attraction that persuades us to go along with others’ purposes” (Ibid.: 7). Accordingly, this leads to imitation “in the sense of preferred outcomes” (Ibid.: 15) as Nye emphasizes through the repeated use of the term. This goes along with his explicit portrayal of soft power as the second face of power, with which he refers to the afore-

mentioned framework by Bachrach/Baratz (see *Ibid.*: 150). They argue that power is not only about who rules through decision making, and thereby similar to hard power. Instead, they speak of a second face of power which expresses the capability of establishing “the myths and established political procedures and rules of the game” that “limit decision making” (Bachrach/Baratz, 1962: 952). Power, in this sense, sets the agenda and delineates the discourse, thereby shaping certain interests and preferences.

But when Nye defines soft power as co-optation and refers to it as the second face of power, he unnecessarily limits the scope of his own concept. As Lukes points out, the ability to shape preferences goes beyond agenda setting and discourse delineation as this implies a clash of preferences. As he argues, this “is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place” (Lukes, 1974: 27). Soft power therefore rather corresponds to the third face of power and the ability “to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have” (*Ibid.*: 28; see Cooper, 2004: 289). With this in mind, and against the backdrop of soft power resulting in a change in preferences, Nye’s concept of this very process seems too narrow. Soft power, then, is not merely about evoking imitation of given preferences, but beyond that about changing preferences in a more general way. Hall emphasizes this when he compares Nye’s idea about soft power to making other actors ‘want what you want’ – while there is the unmentioned possibility of making them ‘want what you want them to want’ (see Hall, 2010: 203).

In other words: Nye’s conception does not include the possibility that actor A might not want to change actor B’s preferences to confirm with his own, but with a different goal. A second problem of Nye’s concept is therefore that – measured against the very basics of soft power –

he defines the notion of a change in preferences as too narrow. This thesis therefore aims to show that preferences can be changed in a broader way, e.g. via emotions.

3.3. Positive Limitation

A third problem of Nye's concept is the supposition that a change in preferences can only come about through a positive influence. His examples therefore refer to "positive images of one's country" (Nye, 2004: 105) and to "selling a positive image" (Ibid.: 107), and in his 2009 book he postulates that soft power "relies on positive attraction in the sense of 'alluring'" (Nye, 2009: 92). While this certainly can lead to a change in preferences – which is the very definition of soft power – it once again is a very narrow conception. After all, it is easy to imagine how the evocation of fear or the provocation of rage can have a similar effect, albeit with a negative instead of a positive influence. With this in mind, attraction imposes a positive limitation on the concept of soft power, while negative mechanisms are left out. The afore-mentioned framework of Lee takes this partially into account through its emphasis on cognitive processes and lists positive as well as negative emotions as the potential cause for changes in beliefs and preferences (see Lee, 2009a: 8).

Curiously, Nye does in fact take this into consideration when he speaks of repulsion and revulsion as possible outcomes of attempts to generate attraction (see Ibid.: 93, 95). Yet he treats these as unwelcome effects, not taking into account that they can equally result in a desired change of preferences. In the context of Bachrach/Baratz's second face of power, and thereby for the purpose of agenda setting and cooptation, this makes sense; but once the third face of power by Lukes and thereby a true change of preferences are taken into account, repulsion

and revulsion can in fact be part of soft power. With this in mind, the actual playing field of soft power is larger than Nye conceives.

As has to be emphasized at this point, the evocation of negative emotions is not the same as coercion – which Nye explicitly labels as a form of hard power (see 2006b). Coercion is generally defined as making others do what you want by using force or threatening the use of it (see Oxford Dictionaries, 2014). This can involve the threat of torture on the individual level as well as the threat of bomb strikes on the inter-state level. Negative emotions play an obvious role in this context, first and foremost the fear evoked in the target of threats. But while soft power changes the preferences of the target, this is not the case for coercion; it merely forces the target to behave in a certain way as the alternative is usually not acceptable due to a sense of self-preservation. In other words, coercion does not truly change preferences; it does so only as “the victim’s desire or motive to avoid the penalty with which he is threatened is [...] so powerful that he cannot prevent it from leading him to submit to the threat” (Frankfurt, 1988: 39). A short example can illustrate this point:

If a mugger threatens his victim with a gun and demands her (or, of course, his) wallet, this is certainly coercion. The victim will yield to the demand due to the fear of facing the consequences of the threat; there is no choice to make. This changes her situational preference; it does not affect her underlying preference of keeping the wallet and thereby does not exemplify soft power. If, on the other hand, the mugger has no way of posing a serious threat to the target and yet manages to evoke enough fear for the victim to yield the wallet, this is a case of soft power. In this case, the actual preference of the target was changed – and, after all, the victim had a choice and could have possibly run away (which she does not have, at least for

the sake of this argument, when threatened with a gun). This constitutes obviously a fine line as both processes can evolve negative emotions such as fear. But coercion relies on changing behavior by not offering a choice while soft power relies on changing behavior in a situation when other choices would be available.

A third flaw of soft power targeted by this thesis is therefore its limitation to positive effects that cause a change in preferences. Against this backdrop, the following chapters (and especially one of the case studies) will show how the introduction of negative emotions can hence expand the scope of soft power.

Case - The Ems Dispatch

While the first flaw of soft power has been well-elaborated on by other authors, the second and the third point regarding the change of preferences as well as the positive limitation can be illustrated with the example of the Ems Dispatch in 1870. At the time, the territory of today's Germany was occupied by a multitude of small states, the biggest one of which was Prussia. During the summer of 1870, its chancellor Otto von Bismarck plotted their unification under Prussian leadership - and through a ploy that "ranks with the political masterstrokes of the ages" (Kolkey, 1995: 132). Bismarck saw the chance for stirring up nationalist sentiments when a dispute with France about the succession to the Spanish throne arose. A diplomatic solution for the dispute was sought in the health resort of Bad Ems where a conversation of the Prussian king with the French ambassador ended in dispute. A report of the meeting was transmitted to Bismarck in Berlin, who shortened it to the effect that the king's behavior was seen as offensive to the French diplomat. This so-called Ems Dispatch was then distributed to the press and widely publicized (see Wawro, 2005: 35f.).

Bismarck's intent was clear: to play on the French "overweening and touchiness" and to provide a "red rag to taunt the Gallic bull" (in *Ibid.*: 37), as the chancellor himself described it. According to his calculation, and in the tense political context of the European continent at that time, this would prove the last straw and provoke a French attack on Prussia - which would in turn unite the German states against a common enemy. And indeed: the French government saw the "public opinion enraged" (Kolkey, 1995: 133), "war fever mounting" (Wawro, 2005: 38) and a "rising crescendo of public excitement" (Wetzell, 2003: 161). At the same time, an impending attack on the "seemingly innocent Prussia" led to a "firestorm of angry anti-French public opinion" (Kolkey, 1995: 134f.) in the German states. The outcome was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 that was declared by France but overwhelmingly won by Prussia and its allies. It resulted in the fall of the French Empire and the formation of a unified German Empire, and thereby in a major shift of power in Europe.

From an analytical perspective, Bismarck was exercising power in this situation as he influenced the behavior of the French as well as the German public in order to get to an outcome of his desire. To follow up with Nye, the Ems Dispatch does certainly not represent hard power as the Prussian chancellor was neither employing economic nor military means, neither inducements nor threats, neither carrots nor sticks. The obvious alternative to analytically frame this case is therefore soft power as Bismarck was able to change the preferences of both the French as well as the German public. At the same time, there was obviously no "positive attraction" (Nye, 2009: 92) at work. The case of the Ems Dispatch is an example for soft power that includes both a change of preferences without imitation as well as a change of preference through negative emotions, through the evocation of anger and the lust for revenge. It thereby illustrates a historical episode that equals the exertion of soft power and yet cannot

be analytically comprehended by Nye's concept. As this thesis argues, the introduction of emotions instead of attraction as the analytical focus can solve this problem.

4. Rethinking Soft Power - Research Design

4.1. Research Question & Terminology

As has been outlined, the guiding assumption of this thesis is that the concept of soft power can be improved through the integration of emotions as the explanatory factor. Hence, it does not explicitly aim at providing a novel theory of power but leaves the foundations of Nye's framework intact. These are: firstly, the idea that actor A can possess and employ power beyond military and economic, coercive and inductive means; and secondly, the idea that the employment of this power results in a change of preferences on the side of actor B. The focal point of this thesis is hence what takes place in-between actor A and actor B, and therefore the process of exerting soft power. With this in mind, the research question is:

How can the incorporation of emotions and their influence on beliefs improve the analytical framework of soft power?

For the process of seeking an answer, the central term is **soft power**. If not stated otherwise, it refers on the following pages to the theory by Joseph Nye as most comprehensively presented in his 2004 book "Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics". While there are competing ideas about soft power, for example by Lee (2009) and Hall (2010), they build on the work of Nye as the intellectual father of the concept. Beyond that, he is the eminent voice in policy debates on the topic, as his prominent writings on the soft power of China and Russia (see Foreign Policy, 2013), on soft power in the information age (see CNN, 2011), on American soft power in the 21st century (see Washington Post, 2013) and even on the soft power of Britain's new heir to the throne (see FT, 2013) show. It is therefore reasonable to limit the specific definition and scope of soft power to his usage of the term.

The second term in the focus of this paper is **emotions**. The academic literature contains a wide range of concepts and elements under the term, which is why authors such as Dixon speak of emotion as a “keyword in crisis [...] from a definitional and conceptual point of view” (Dixon, 2012: 338). In the most general sense, and according to the functional perspective of Frijda, emotions are “the manifestations of the individual’s concern satisfaction system” and “express the individual’s concerns and the satisfaction state of these concerns” (Frijda, 1986: 478). Hence, they describe a set of mechanisms of an organism that work towards the satisfaction of concerns. These mechanisms evaluate external stimuli in regard to given preferences and turn them into physiological rewards or punishments. Furthermore, they “dictate action accordingly” and give “control precedence for these actions” (Ibid.: 473). In line with this definition, emotions therefore equal action tendencies and therefore states of readiness to “establish, maintain, or disrupt a relationship with the environment” (Ibid.: 71).

In the context of emotion research in psychology, this concept has become the foundation for various popular approaches under the label of appraisal theories. Their cornerstone is the afore-given assumption that emotions are “adaptive responses which reflect appraisals of features of the environment that are significant for the organism’s well-being” (Moors et al., 2013: 119). An appraisal in this context is therefore a process that evaluates external stimuli for one’s well-being and concerns. As appraisals in individuals can depend on physical, psychological, personal and cultural factors, the same situation can cause different emotions for different people. Hence, two identical situations can lead to different appraisals, but two identical appraisals lead to identical emotions (see Ibid.: 121). From an evolutionary perspective, emotions therefore serve as a “superordinate program whose function is to direct the activities and interactions of the subprograms” (Cosmides/Tooby, 2000: 118) that span a wide range

from perception and attention to the creation of memories and to physiological reactions such as reflexes. In short: emotions are a mechanism that helps an organism to survive by coordinating its behavior towards the environment.

The literature on the topic contains several other hallmarks of emotions. They “are characterized by hormonal changes and by changes in the autonomic nervous system” (Elster, 1998: 49) and consecutively lead to physiological expressions; they can be located in their valence on a pleasure-pain scale and “are about something” (Ibid.: 50). Especially this last point is of relevance to distinguish emotions from the closely related concept of moods. Emotions, on the one hand, are seen as “intense, short-lived, and usually have a definite cause and clear cognitive content” (Forgas, 1992: 230). Moods, on the other hand, are of “low intensity, diffuse, and relatively enduring emotional states without a salient antecedent cause” (Ibid.). Beyond this, the overarching term encompassing both emotions as well as moods is affect.

This leaves the question which emotions there actually are. A common answer relies on the assumption that there are several basic emotions that are usually arranged in opposing pairs and constitute the foundation for all other states of arousal. In this sense, Aristotle in “Rhetoric” defines a total of sixteen emotions, of which, for example, anger opposes calmness and fear opposes confidence (Aristotle, 2010: 60ff.). A contemporary attempt at cataloguing is Plutchik’s graphic wheel of emotions which defines their basic forms as “adaptive devices in the struggle for individual survival” (see 1990: 56.). On this basis, he defines four opposing pairs, such as joy and sadness, and combinations of these that result in a variety of feelings (see Ibid.: 60ff.). In the context of this thesis, the vocabulary of these lists will obviously be

employed, but the actual number, definition and relationship of specific emotional states is of minor relevance.

Of ongoing controversy is the meaning of cognition for emotion. According to the definition by Frijda as well as appraisal theory, cognition gives access to external stimuli and is therefore a necessary precedent for emotion. As other authors caution with reference to more recent scientific findings, this might only be true if one understands cognition as a process that is not necessarily conscious. In other words: “unconscious evaluations are far more active, and hence far more important, than conscious cognitive processing” (Marcus, 2000: 231) for the creation of emotions. As Marcus argues, it might therefore be beneficial in this context to equate cognition not only with conscious cognition and thinking but beyond that also with unconscious processes (see *Ibid.*: 224). Against this backdrop, Mercer proposes to label the physiological emotional experience as actual emotion and the conscious awareness of this experience as feeling (see Mercer, 2013: 225). This thesis will follow these proposals and defines emotions as a process of which their subject is not necessarily aware.

A third term employed by this thesis is the one of **beliefs**. Simple definitions outline a belief as “a proposition that a person considers to be true” (Frijda/Mesquita, 2000: 45) and that usually goes beyond the observable facts. It involves uncertainty, while knowledge in contrast to this implies certainty, is perceived as free from personal judgment and of constant truth (see Mercer, 2010: 3). Ascribing to a belief therefore entails a certain risk and in many cases “involves certainty beyond evidence” (*Ibid.*: 8). Furthermore, this personal and subjective investment into beliefs goes hand in hand with a readiness to act according to them (see Frijda/Mesquita, 2000: 46), for example when it comes to beliefs about right and wrong.

In the context of this thesis, the relationship between beliefs and preferences is of additional relevance. Emotion research usually focuses on beliefs; soft power talks in terms of preferences. While beliefs are assumptions about reality, preferences are “expressions of values” (see Grüne-Yanoff/Hansson, 2009: 163), may they be about good and bad in absolute terms, or about better and worse in relative terms. Both concepts describe states of the mind that are obviously related to each other, and a change in one of them usually goes hand in hand with a change in the other one. Beliefs fuel preferences with emotion; preferences shape beliefs through wishful thinking (Ibid.: 160). This close relationship is expressed in the writings of Nye: he describes the outcome of soft power both as a change of preferences as well as a change of values, the latter first and foremost by defining culture as a “set of values and practices that create meaning for a society” (Nye, 2004: 11). For the purpose of this thesis it is therefore reasonable to treat beliefs and preferences as interwoven enough to constitute one single analytical category, though they are in fact not.

4.2. Methodology

An answer to the research question will be sought via a theoretical route; the core approach is the combination and integration of several established concepts in order to solve the perceived theory defect. From the field of political science, this encompasses primarily the soft power concept of Nye. From the field of psychology, the research on emotions by Frijda (and others) will be employed as well as the works on Intergroup Emotions Theory by Mackie, Smith and others. This approach falls in line with the idea of analytical eclecticism and thereby the “multiplicity of connections between different mechanisms and logics normally analyzed in isolation in separate research traditions” (Sil/Katzenstein: 2010: 18). While Sil and Katzenstein

primarily refer to building bridges between the three major paradigms in the field of international relations, that is: realism, liberalism and constructivism, eclecticism can also work on a higher level. This thesis therefore takes “the form of efforts to translate or combine concepts and processes originally posited within very different kinds of scholarly projects in the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities” (Ibid.: 37).

Against this backdrop, the hallmarks of eclectic scholarship as stated by Sil and Katzenstein (see Ibid.: 19) correspond to the goals of this thesis. For one, it aims at acknowledging the complexity of reality by abandoning the overtly simplifying mechanism of attraction in the context of soft power. Secondly, it employs concepts and logics from various fields such as political science and psychology. And thirdly, it aims to provide “useful insights that can enrich policy debates and normative discussions beyond the academe” (Ibid.: 22). In this sense, the goal is not to add on top of the vast pile of writing on the application of soft power, but to provide a unique perspective on the theoretical underlying. After all, and as Joseph Nye himself stated, the “danger is that academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less” (Washington Post, 2009).

The case studies following up on the theoretical part of this thesis will qualitatively analyze two historical cases of the exertion of soft power and the emotions involved. As emotions can, especially when looking at collective actors such as states, hardly be directly measured, these case studies will rely on the triangulation of different sources (see Flick, 2004: 179). The underlying assumption is that a multiplicity of perspectives on the same historical moments allows obtaining a reliable picture of the emotions involved. The sources employed will en-

compass official documents by governments and agencies, the memoirs of politicians and opinion surveys, newspaper reports and academic works.

5. The State as an emotional actor

The center point of rethinking soft power is the re-characterization of the actors involved – and thereby primarily the state - as emotional actors. In this context, two things have to be emphasized. For one, the range of actors considered as emotional actors encompasses all actors that can actively employ or be passively influenced by soft power. It includes both individual human beings as well as – and this is less intuitive – collective actors such as organizations, companies or even nation states. As Nye emphasizes, his concept is not bound to a certain range of actors that are considered as relevant in international politics, as for example Realism postulates with its focus on nation states. “There is no contradiction between realism and soft power. [...] It is simply a form of power, one way of getting desired outcomes” (Nye, 2008: 82). Just as the concept of soft power is applicable to each and every social actor, so does this re-characterization as an emotional actor encompass all of them. At the same time, the following case studies place special emphasis on the nation state as it is generally considered the most important actor on the global stage.

Secondly, the notion of an emotional actor does not stand in opposition to that of a rational actor or propose that emotion is more important for decision making than rationality. It rather promotes a different perspective on international politics - one that takes into account a facet of all human interaction that has so far been neglected and aims to provide a corrective to the prevalent idea of a rational actor. This reflects the ongoing debates on the precise relationship between emotions and rationality. While there is a wide rejection of the common assumption that emotions do in principal interfere with rationality, the precise connection between the two is disputed. De Sousa therefore concludes that emotions “do play an important role both in

determining and in undermining rational thought and action, particularly in a social context” (2014). A variety of other philosophical and experimental accounts support this view (see Damasio, 2005, 2010; Elster, 1996; Haidt, 2001).

With this in mind, the re-characterization of social actors as emotional actors rests on two cornerstones. One is the assumption that these actors do experience emotions; the other, that these emotions influence the beliefs, preferences and behavior of the respective actor. To explain the validity of these two assumptions, two routes will be taken. First, it will be shown that the notion of an emotional actor is not only common in human psychology but also in the various paradigms of International Relations. The re-characterization of actors as emotional hence does not clash with the established wisdom but rather emphasizes one of its implicit and neglected assumptions. Secondly, a possible theoretical approach to how emotions occur in collective actors and how they shape collective action will be outlined in order to enable an explanation of how soft power works through emotion.

5.1. The Emotional Actors in Political Realism

Arguably the most influential approach to International Relations is the Realist tradition with the idea of the state as a unitary, even human-like actor. The history of classical Realism illustrates this: the famous cover of Hobbes’ “Leviathan” shows the state as a towering giant with crown, sword and crosier, equal to “an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural” (Hobbes, 1651). For Nietzsche, the state is “the coldest of all cold monsters” (see 1999: 54). And Morgenthau stated as the first principle of political Realism that “politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (see 1968: 4). For Morgenthau, and first and foremost through nationalism, this human nature

translates into the nature of nation states. These are ascribed human-like qualities and seen as driven by fear and a lust for power, and therefore as aggressive. In this classical Realist line of thinking, states hence have anthropomorphic qualities, among them emotions that shape their thinking and behavior.

Surprisingly, this characterization of states as emotional actors can also be located in Waltz' structural realism. His theory treats states as unitary, but gives only little credit to human nature and emphasizes structural determinants to explain their behavior. In reaction to Waltz' writings, the argument has been made that structural realism still relies on classical realist assumptions about human nature in order to explain states' interests and preferences (see Parizek, 2008; Freyberg-Inan, 2006: 258ff.; Johnson, 1993: 208f.). Crawford therefore concludes that both classical and structural Realist thinking goes together with the implicit role of human nature "as the rock bottom of world politics" (Crawford, 2009: 276). It follows that states are not all that different from human beings, and that this "leads them into conflict, for the same reasons it does individuals" (Freyberg-Inan, 2003: 95). From both a classical as well as a structural Realist point of view, it therefore seems reasonable to perceive the state as an emotional actor, although "biased in favor of divisive, competitive, and destructive aspects of human psychology" (Ibid.: 109).

And yet it has to be emphasized that some Realist scholars themselves label this foundational assumption of their own tradition as a metaphor which "should not be taken literally" as "the state does not really exist" (Gilpin, 1986: 318f.). But as Ringmar argues, this does not impede on the usefulness of the metaphor. It is rather the only way to effectively talk about the nation state as no other, better suited language is available. According to Ringmar's line of thought,

the metaphor of the nation state as an emotional actor is thereby “rock-bottom” as to ask “for something more fundamental is to ask for too much, but also to ask for more than we need” (Ringmar: 1996: 451). The names we give to and the stories we tell about abstract concepts such as the nation state are of validity as they “support, or undermine, a certain perspective on the world and hence also a certain distribution of power” (Ibid.: 454). From a Realist perspective, and even though some criticize this analytical sleight of hand, the state is hence treated as an emotional actor not only out of convenience, but also for the lack of a better alternative and as this terminology mirrors human thinking about the state.

5.2. The Emotional Actor in Social Constructivism

A notably more explicit position on the state as an emotional actor is taken by some constructivist approaches. Wendt, in his writings on social constructivism, treats the state as a unitary actor, and as one with “anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs and intentionality” (Wendt, 1999: 197). His argument in favor of perceiving the state as unitary centers on the fact that its actions cannot be reduced to the actions of individuals. States are, accordingly, more than the sum of their parts and “are people too” (Ibid.: 215). They show corporate agency as well as internal structures for the institutionalization and authorization of decision making. He even goes so far as to cautiously compare the state to seemingly far-fetched concepts: to organisms in that they show signs of individuality, organization, homeostasis, autonomy and - to a limited extent - even genetic reproduction (see Wendt, 2004: 307); to

superorganisms like bee hives and ant colonies that show signs of swarm intelligence (see *Ibid.*: 311); and to the idea of a collective consciousness¹.

This anthropomorphic perception of the state implies the applicability of emotions to states. Similar to Frijda's above-given definition of emotions, Wendt treats them as a mechanism of human nature that ensures the satisfaction of needs and concerns (see Wendt, 1997: 132). He does not explicitly attribute this quality to states but emphasizes that, if we perceive the state as a person with some sort of consciousness, emotions would be an important factor for understanding it (see Wendt, 2004: 305). As he speculates, emotional conditions of states such as anger or humiliation might possibly be "a useful fiction to describe the aggregate emotional states of individuals" (*Ibid.*: 313).

This use of metaphors resembles the afore-mentioned narrative perspective of Ringmar according to which the ways we talk and think about states do constitute them. With this in mind, the very fact that we talk about states as if they were persons and as if they have emotions in both common speech and academic discourse would possibly help constitute them as anthropomorphic actors with human qualities, among them emotions. If, for example, we talk of China as angry and of the United States as humiliated, this shapes the way we think about them, how we act towards them and what idea of the state as an actor we have.

¹ Wendt's attempt to personify the state invites debate for obvious reasons. Jackson, for example, agrees with the conclusion but tries to reach it by focusing in how actors are socially constructed (see Jackson, 2004). Wight criticized that the notion of the state as a person loses sight of human agency and does little to help our understanding of power structures (see Wight, 2004). In a similar vein, Neumann speaks out against Wendt's assertion as it constrains any attempt to understand contemporary politics in its many dimensions beyond the state level (see Neumann, 2004).

5.3. The Emotional Actor in Liberalism

The perspective of liberal international relations theory focuses on the complex interplay of domestic and transnational actors that determines the interests and actions of nation states (see Moravcsik, 2008: 236f.). This approach also underlies foreign policy analysis and the in-depth investigation of political leaders and processes. Especially the latter field focuses on the psychological setup of humans “programmed as they are with emotions and unconscious motives as well as with cognitive abilities” (Janis/Mann, 1977: 45). Examples for the analysis of individuals as emotional actors include Bill Clinton and the emotional effect the violence between and the divorce of his parents had on his leadership style (see Post, 2005: 285), Adolf Hitler with his “emotionality that was given such free rein as to appear out of control” (Rees, 2014: 173) as well as Saddam Hussein who has been portrayed as emotionally traumatized since childhood (see Post, 1990).

The same has been done for groups of individuals, such as the Israeli public and its emotional response to threats as well as attacks during the first Gulf War (see Arian/Gordon, 1993: 227ff.). As has to be noted, this recognition of actors as emotional is more developed in the Liberal tradition than is generally the case for Realist and Constructivist approaches. While the latter do implicitly acknowledge the relevance of emotions, they give little guidance on how to actually analysis them. Subsequently, most detailed studies founded on the concept of emotional actors can be found in the Liberal realm of International Relations. This thesis will follow up on this as the Liberal focus on groups of individuals provides an obvious access point to analysis emotions. Realism and Constructivism, on the other hand, make it comparatively harder to grasp emotions as they generally perceive the state as a unitary actor that is

more than the sum of the individuals within it. Neither paradigm gives any guidance for how to analyze the emotions in this “more than”.

The given examples from the Realist, Constructivist and Liberal camp in International Relations theory do by no means constitute a theory of emotional actors. But they emphasize how parts of the academic literature implicitly or explicitly treat international actors as such. For both classical and structural Realism as well as for some social constructivists such as Wendt, the state is a unitary actor with human nature ticking inside. Emotions are thereby seen as part of the equation, although for Realists with a bias to negative sensations such as fear, and are of a rather speculative kind for Wendt. Liberals focus on human beings as the driving force in politics, which makes emotions inevitably part of political processes. In summary, the emotional actor is hence a well-established but a little talked about and so far quite vague reality of International Relations scholarship.

5.4. Emotions and Beliefs

While it has thereby been shown that it is a well established assumption in International Relations theory *that* emotions matter, the question remains *how* they matter. After all, many scholars (including Joseph Nye in his writings on soft power) speak of emotions as a factor in international politics but do so without much psychological backing. Of special relevance in the context of soft power is the relationship between emotions and both beliefs and preferences. With an eye on the individual human being, psychology has a large number of answers, some of which stand in conflict with each other. On this basis, the focal insight about the relationship between emotions and beliefs is that the former “influence thinking in general, and not only beliefs. They do so by motivating thought as well as by influencing information

selection” (Frijda/Mesquita, 2000: 46). With the appraisal perspective in mind, this is an evolutionary adaptive mechanism of organisms that ensure their wellbeing by influencing the behavior towards the environment.

A first question of importance is hence the relationship between emotions and cognition - especially because a number of political scientists have dealt with the latter, for example Jervis (1976) in his works on perception and Lee (2009) for his soft power framework. These approaches usually do not take into account the common psychological-academic perspective according to which emotions do not equal cognition but also – and more importantly - influence it². The two concepts are usually linked to different regions in the brain and “the connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems are stronger than the connections from the cognitive to the emotional systems” (LeDoux, 1996: 19). As a result, emotions direct attention and can result in cognitive tunnel vision that gives special attention to objects and events that are of relevance for existing concerns (see Clore/Gasper, 2000: 35). At the same time, the afore-mentioned appraisal perspective emphasizes that emotions, at least in some situations, rely on cognition as they help to evaluate external stimuli in relationship to the well-being of the organism.

Emotions are furthermore founded on existing beliefs, while they can also – and most importantly in the context of this thesis - influence them. The literature on the topic hence speaks of an emotion-belief spiral (see Frijda/Mesquita, 2000: 49; Blanchette, 2013: 8; Phelps, 2006: 46). It includes emotions motivating the formation and change of beliefs; emotions influenc-

² There is considerable debate in the fields of psychology and neuroscience on the precise distinction between emotion and cognition. Some scholars criticize the view that emotion and cognition can be linked to different brain regions (see Pessoa, 2008) while others focus on the complex integration of these processes that makes a separation difficult (see Gray, 2001; Duncan/Barrett, 2007).

ing the cognitive processes that lead to the formation and change of beliefs; and emotions serving as information in their own right that influences beliefs (see Berenbaum/Boden, 2013, 67). These processes can unconsciously lead to the search for beliefs that correspond with feelings, which is why one article on the topic is titled “Feeling is believing” (Clare/Gasper, 2000: 10). Emotions also shape judgment as they are seen as intrinsically valid: “One can argue with logic, but not with feeling” (Ibid.: 39).

Mercer illustrates these effects of emotions on beliefs with several examples (see 2010: 6f.). Trust – or rather the belief in the trustworthiness of another actor - relies on feelings of warmth between organisms, and if these feelings are artificially created through the regulation of hormone levels, this does have a significant effect on the emergence of trust. Other beliefs are strengthened through emotions, for example the belief in the existence of a god that gets fostered through emotional experiences. In the context of religiosity, and in coherence with the appraisal approach, other scholars have concluded that “people adopt religious beliefs that fit with their emotional needs” (Thagard, 2005: 58). As has been elaborated on before, these processes can take place consciously as well as unconsciously and ultimately help the human organism to regulate its behavior towards the environment.

Most beliefs evoked by emotions are strong but of temporary nature, for example the negative ideas about those who evoke anger in us. When emotions result in permanent beliefs, these are labeled as sentiments towards a certain object³. Usually they come about through the anticipation of certain emotions in connection with this object, for example through social pres-

³ It would therefore be appropriate to always speak of beliefs *and* sentiments in relationship to emotions. As political science usually does not employ this distinction, the term belief is here used for both concepts.

sure or out of the personal utility gained from holding a certain belief (Frijda/Mesquita, 2000:: 53ff.). In accordance with the appraisal perspective, the central determinant for the strength of beliefs and sentiments is their relevance for concerns of subjective value, may they be of a personal nature, about social issues or values (Ibid.: 61).

One (in-)famous example illustrating this connection between emotions and beliefs can be found in the lead-up to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Policy Makers in Washington, D.C. assumed the regime of Saddam Hussein to be in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – an assessment that went counter to all available evidence but eventually led the United States into war. As several accounts of the events stress, the inner circle surrounding President Bush and its cognitive processes were affected by “emotional and cognitive predispositions” (Lieberfeld, 2005: 15; see Woodward, 2004: 47), first and foremost the fear of hostile forces acquiring WMDs and inflicting another devastating attack on the United States after 9/11⁴. This was expressed clearly in what came to be known as the One Percent Doctrine of Vice-President Cheney: If there is a 1% chance of hostile forces acquiring a nuclear weapon, the United States have to respond as if facing certainty (see Suskind, 2006: 62).

This emotional stance shaped the cognitive processes and beliefs of the American government and intelligence services. They interpreted information, saw threats and drew conclusions in ways that were consistent with the prevalent fear within the policy circles of the United States and other states (see Wastell, 2010: 455; Adams, 2012) – but not necessarily consistent with

⁴ The connection between 9/11, the fear of further attacks and Iraq posing a threat is well illustrated through a meeting of Bush and his advisers on September 26th 2001. He instructed Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to outline plans to invade Iraq as – in the words of Peter Baker – “it no longer seemed reasonable to Bush or Cheney to leave in power an openly hostile enemy of the United States who might have chemical, biological, or even possibly nuclear weapons that he could use himself or potentially pass along to terrorists” (2013: 177).

the available evidence regarding WMDs in Iraq. Out of these circumstances grew an infamous White House press conference one year prior to the invasion during which Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was asked by journalists for evidence for the asserted existence of WMDs in Iraq. He first labeled them as potentially “unknown unknowns” and later on continued with the phrase that an “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” (Morris, 2014). Against this backdrop it is to assume that the emotional predisposition at the time had significant influence on cognitive processes in American policy making circles, on the judgment of information and eventually on the formation of beliefs about WMDs in Iraq.

5.5. Collective Emotions

This example of the lead-up to the Iraq War illustrates how emotions can affect the thinking of a group of people. At the same time, the afore-mentioned insights from psychology were developed for individual human beings. This gap between the individual and the collective level has therefore to be bridged in order to connect psychological insights with soft power – that, after all, usually aims at collective actors. In the context of International Relations, this has been attempted several times in the last couple of years, for example by Hall who employed role to theorize about the effects of anger (2011: 531ff.). Another approach was taken by Sasley (2011) via Intergroup Emotions Theory, which will be taken up here in order to elaborate on how emotions work on the collective level.

Intergroup Emotions Theory was developed over the last two decades on basis of two other concepts. One is Social Identity Theory (SIT) with the guiding insight that individuals possess a social identity beyond their self-perception as an individual. It is defined as “that part of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership to a social

group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership” (Tajfel, 1981: 255). The belonging to this group thereby becomes part of the individual’s identity and is primarily constituted through a clear distinction between ingroup on the one hand, and outgroup on the other hand. Interactions between individuals hence take place on a spectrum between interpersonal and intergroup interactions, for the latter of which individuals act purely as group representatives (for example as soccer fans of one club facing the fans of another club) The scope of these groups can vary from small face-to-face interactions to large collectives based on nationality, ethnicity or other factors (see Hornsey, 2008: 206ff.).

The second foundational concept is Self-Categorization Theory (SCT). It elaborates on SIT by introducing additional differentiations between multiple social identities as well as the concept of depersonalization. Through this process group members “see themselves and other category members less as individuals and more as interchangeable exemplars of the group prototype” (Ibid.: 208). This self-categorization does, of course, not replace the individual identity in every situation but only when triggered by specific circumstances connected to it. When this is the case, the social identity can induce its bearers with specific emotions, cognitions and action tendencies. In other words: events that have little or no apparent relevance for the individual can still result in emotional and behavioral change if the individual perceives the events as relevant for the group it belongs to (see Yzerbyt et al., 2004: 75). One easy-to-grasp example are, once again, the reactions of soccer fans: while the events on the pitch have little to no relevance for their own well-being, they get highly emotional as the group they consider themselves part of is affected.

Against this backdrop, Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) focuses on the existence and effects of emotions in group settings. Its central assumption is that “intergroup behavior is driven by emotions, but emotions of a uniquely social kind” (Mackie et al., 2008: 1867). These emotions arise through the self-categorization of individuals as a member of a specific group; this belonging to a group can result in emotions vastly different from those the individual on its own would experience. They converge to general emotional profiles of specific groups – for example a Chinese profile of emotions - and their intensity varies with the extent to which an individual identifies with the group (see Smith et al, 2007: 433). In accordance with the appraisal perspective, these emotions serve a functional role for groups and influence their “arousal, perception, information processing, judgment, and decision making” (Mackie et al., 2008: 1873). Beyond that, group members even experience physical signs of emotions.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that the afore-mentioned effects of emotions on individual beliefs and behavior also apply on a collective level. As individuals perceive a group as part of their identity, their emotional experiences converge. In the aftermath of 9/11 the American people rallied behind their government regardless of the fact that the overwhelming majority of them was not directly affected by the terrorist attacks. The - at least in part - fear-driven decision making of President Bush resulted in approval ratings of up to 90% in September 2001 – the highest ratings of any American President (see Gallup, 2009). Yet it is important to refrain from generalizations in this context of international politics: the conditions under which individuals consider themselves as group members can vary just as much as the degree of identification with a group; the specific role of decision makers has to be taken into consideration just as the linkage to public attitudes and elite opinion is of relevance (see Sasley, 2011: 465ff.).

5.6. Soft Power and Collective Emotions

The theoretical assumptions and the experimental backing of Intergroup Emotions Theory provide an explanation for how soft power can work on a collective level and through emotions. This model assumes that a (either individual or collective) actor B consists of individuals that perceive their group- membership to B as part of their identity. In the process of exerting soft power, actor A is subsequently able to evoke group emotions in B without employing coercion or inducements. If strong enough, these emotions can change the cognition, the beliefs and preferences, and ultimately the group behavior of B. The interactions of the various concepts at work can be conceptualized as in Figure 1. The colored area marks the exertion of soft power and thereby the psychological processes happening between actors A and B.




Figure 1: Soft Power and IET. Adapted from Mackie et al. (2009: 286) and Sasley (2011: 465)

Whether and to what extent the actions of A result in a change of beliefs and behavior on the side of B depends on various determinants. The literature on emotions emphasizes the relevance of the evoked emotions for concerns as well as the intensity of these emotions, which is primarily a function of the number of concerns affected. Beyond that, the positive or negative anticipation of emotions can result in changes of beliefs (see Frijda/Mesquita, 2000: 61ff.).

The research in the field of IET furthermore stresses that the degree to which individuals identify with a group and the number of individuals with a high degree of identification determine to what extent the group experiences emotions (see Smith et al, 2007: 432).

Once again, the lead-up to the Second Gulf War and the assumption of nuclear weapons in Iraq against all evidence illustrates these connections. The American state was obviously an integral part of the group identity of policy makers around President Bush. The prevailing fear of nuclear weapons furthermore was of relevance for several of their prime concerns: the national security of the United States, the political survival of a government that was not able to prevent 9/11, but also the personal security of the inner circle – after all, Washington, D.C. was on the target list of hostile forces. President Bush recalls “America’s most senior officials praying for lab mice to stay upright” (Bush, 2010: 153) after it emerged that he and his advisors might have been exposed to a biological weapon in October 2001. And as John McLaughlin, then the deputy director of the CIA, is quoted: “There was a pervasive feeling that 9/11 was not the end of the story” (in: Baker, 2013: 211). The American top-policy makers were therefore highly invested in their group identity and saw several of their immediate concerns affected by the situation.

These relationships between emotions and beliefs have several implications for the effective exertion of soft power. For one, the actions that are intended to evoke emotions and change beliefs have to aim at the right target. In order for emotions to translate into a change of beliefs, the individual target has to show a high level of identification with the group that is supposed to be affected. Secondly, in-depth knowledge of the target is necessary to target specific concerns that enable emotions to change beliefs – especially when the concerns in

question are not of a basic nature such as survival and well-being. Thirdly, actions should aim at a high level of emotional intensity which makes a ‘shock and awe’ approach to emotions possibly more effective than a ‘slow and steady’ approach.

This skill necessary for the effective exertion of soft power via emotions can be found in the popular concept of emotional intelligence⁵. While initial definitions of the concept focused on the general awareness of emotions as well as the ability to regulate them in one-self as well as others (see Mayer/Salovey, 1997: 46), later approaches emphasize a social and leadership component. This perspective was popularized by Goleman in various books (to which Nye refers when he talks about the skills necessary for exerting soft power). His conception comprises five domains of emotional intelligence, two of which explicitly refer to empathy and the skill of recognizing emotions in others as well as well as the ability to handle relationships by managing the emotions of others. “People who excel in these skills do well at anything that relies on interacting smoothly with others; they are social stars” (Goleman, 2009: 44).

Yet this matter of emotional intelligence in connection with soft power is more complex than can be elaborated on here. For one, emotional intelligence does not necessarily result in soft power on the field of international politics. George W. Bush had been attributed “a stratospheric EQ” (in: Klein, 2004) and described as free from any emotional impairments (see Greenstein, 2009: 229), and yet his presidency is remembered as harmful for American soft power. Secondly, emotional intelligence is not necessarily prevalent across the board and in all domains a person acts within. This is illustrated by another American President, Bill Clin-

⁵ From the start, the notion of emotional intelligence was developed as a complement to the traditional and established idea of intelligence that is expressed as the IQ of a person. The literature therefore refers to the EQ of a person as a measurement for his or her emotional intelligence (see Goleman, 2009).

ton: while he was considered emotionally intelligent in the way he connected with the public during his election campaigns, he was apparently unable to intelligently manage his emotions as well as those of others and the public when it came to romantic encounters (see Matthews/Zeidner/Roberts, 2004: 536).

In conclusion, taking the perspective of collective emotions on soft power solves several of the problems that plague Nye's original conception. Firstly, it specifies the precise working of soft power beyond a vague influence on the target and provides linkages to a plentitude of psychological research on emotions and beliefs. Secondly, it opens the field for a change of beliefs and preferences through a negative influence on the target that goes beyond the strictly positive attraction proposed by Nye. And thirdly, it incorporates the possibility of soft power changing the preferences of the target without aligning them with those of the exerting actor. As the following two case studies illustrate, this perspective can widen the understanding of soft power and make the concept useful for analyzing situations that Nye's conception does not take into account.

6. Case Studies

6.1. Negative Emotions and the American withdrawal from Somalia in 1993

A. Historical Overview

The first case illustrating the re-conceptualization of soft power through the introduction of emotions centers on the events in October 1993 leading to the withdrawal of American military troops from Somalia. From the perspective of Nye's conception of soft power, the developments in question do not constitute an exertion of soft power. In contrast to that, the understanding of soft power outlined here perceives them as an example for soft power based on negative emotions and without attraction as the underlying mechanism.

In 1991, the Somali government fell and a variety of groups engaged in a violent struggle for power. The resulting civil war brought about one million refugees and threatened several million more with starvation and diseases. In response, the United Nations brokered a ceasefire agreement and established the UNOSOM I peacekeeping mission in order to monitor the distribution of aid. As this arrangement proved ineffective, the UN Security Council via Resolution 794 established the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in December 1992. Its mission was "to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations" through "all necessary means" (UN, 1992) and under leadership of the United States. In March 1993, Resolution 814 transferred this task to the UNOSOM II mission with 24 participating countries and some 22.000 United Nations troops (see UN, 2003).

Over the course of the following summer the battles between the troops and local insurgents intensified. In response, Resolution 837 authorized a more aggressive approach by UNOSOM II (see UN, 1993); a new mission goal was the capture of Mohamed Farrah Aideed, the head of an armed insurgent group that actively fought the United Nations presence. On October 3rd, American Special Forces set out in an armed convoy and multiple helicopters to capture several of Aideeds lieutenants in one of the slums of the capital Mogadishu. While they were able to detain 24 insurgents, the mission ended in disaster as the troops encountered multiple ambushes. Two helicopters were shot down with rocket launchers and their crew members stranded in hostile territory; the convoy was attacked with heavy weapons and despite reinforcements the ensuing battle lasted until the next day (CMH, 2003: 11ff.).

By the morning of October 4th, the American death count stood at 18 with another 79 soldiers wounded; one of the helicopter pilots was taken hostage. The estimates for casualties on the Somali side range between 500 and 1.500 deaths (see Ibid.: 13).

On American television the events were reported live by CNN (and various other channels) “including video of stripped, dead American military personnel being hit with sticks and dragged by ropes through Mogadishu’s streets” (Rutherford, 2008: 162). Two weeks later, the cover of the TIME magazine showed the heavily bruised face of Michael Durant, the American soldier kept hostage in Mogadishu (see Time, 1993). The events on the ground and their media coverage subsequently shocked the United States and evoked an emotional response that ultimately became a catalyst for an American troop withdrawal. As the after-report of the American Army states, this so-called Battle of Mogadishu became a “turning point for UN

operations in Somalia” (CMH, 2003: 102). To illustrate this process, the emotional effect of the events on the public, the legislative and the executive branch will be analyzed.

In the public perception, the initial shock about the events was followed by predominantly two emotions: frustration and anger. Firstly, the media pictures caused a “national sense of frustration and defeat” (Cousineau, 2010: 263) as well as a “powerful image of military humiliation and failure” (Ibid.: 276). What had initially been imagined as a noble intervention to save the weak and poor⁶ had turned into an embarrassing mortification of the world’s predominant military power by a disorganized, ill-equipped group of insurgents. Secondly, these sentiments translated into anger towards both Somalis and the American government. The presumed beneficiaries of the American effort were seen as ungrateful and hence unworthy (see Mills, 2008: 40; Johnson/Tierney, 2006: 64). Towards their own representatives, the public was “bewildered as to why American soldiers were dying on an ostensibly humanitarian mission” (Rutherford, 2008: 162). The administration surrounding President Clinton was accused of intentionally misrepresenting a military struggle as an aid campaign and seen as partly responsible for the disaster on October 3rd/4th (see Cousineau, 2010: 276 & 523).

Opinions polls reflect the impact of these emotions. While public support for the mission stood at 80% at the beginning of the year, this number dropped to 34% in the days after the events in Mogadishu (see Klarevas, 2000: 534)⁷. At this point, up to 80% of the American

⁶ The lofty ideals of the mission can be seen in the speech with which President Bush announced the American intervention. “Our mission is humanitarian” and “a mission that can ease suffering and save lives”. “We’re able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act” (Bush, 1992).

⁷ It has to be emphasized that public support was dropping already before the events in early October 1993. This has been interpreted as a reaction to the changing nature of the mission that developed from humanitarian support to a military campaign (see Logan, 1996: 167). Beyond that, the

public spoke out for a swift withdrawal even if this would potentially cause humanitarian problems to resurface (Ibid.: 537). This disapproval was voiced through thousands of phone calls of angry citizens to their representatives in Washington, which in turn resulted in a “congressional stampede to leave Somalia” (Foyle, 1999: 221). One Senator commented that “If we had a vote today, we'd be out today” – with the only obstacle being the American hostages in Mogadishu (see NYT, 1993). It is therefore reasonable to assume that Congress as a whole experienced a similar combination of shock, frustration and anger as the public (although the worry about their public standing certainly also influenced congressmen).

Another target of the shift in public opinion was President Clinton. The approval rating for his handling of the American intervention in Somalia dropped from 79% in winter 1992 to a lowest score of 26% right after the events in Mogadishu (see Klarevas, 2000: 532). Beyond the public pressure he personally also faced frustration and anger. As he recalls in his autobiography, the events “marked one of the darkest days of my presidency” and “haunted me” (Clinton, 2004: 552). Furthermore, it is reported that he reacted to initial reports with “his face reddening, his voice rising, and his fist pounding his thigh” referring to the insurgents as “these fuckers” and “these two-bit pricks” (Stephanopoulos, 1999: 214).

On October 7th, three days after the initial events, Clinton announced a new policy in an address to the nation. Additional troops and armor were to be sent to Somalia, first and foremost to ensure the safety of the force, and the following March was set as a final withdrawal date (see Clinton, 1993). At this point the mission has taken on a defensive character and was to continue without further ambition. Several other nations and consecutively the Security

Battle of Mogadishu and the subsequent media coverage resulted in a significant additional drop in public support.

Council of the United Nations followed this step and by March 1995 the UNOSOM II mission had come to an end.

B. Emotions, Soft Power and Intentionality

While the resentment of the mission within the American public had been growing and talks of withdrawal been going on even before October 1993, the events in Mogadishu ignited the change in policy. As a variety of analyses argue, the “emotional public reaction” (Foyle, 1999: 220) put enormous pressure on Congress which subsequently forced the White House to abandon the United Nations effort in Somalia (see CMH, 2003: 43; Cousineau, 2010: 267, 276; Logan, 1996: 156). Summed up: “The culmination of congressional opposition and low public opinion polls undoubtedly pressured Clinton into an early withdrawal” (McSweeney, 2011). This outcome is not exclusively attributed to the actual events in Somalia, but also to the media coverage that has repeatedly been accused of over-simplification, sensationalism and an emphasis on emotional impact. The political response in the White House has therefore been described as “driven by media images and the emotions they can generate, rather than by careful analysis” (Logan, 1996: 173).

Against this backdrop, it is obvious that emotions such as frustration and anger in the public, the legislative as well as the executive branches significantly contributed to the American withdrawal from Somalia. To connect this observation back to the above-mentioned vocabulary of IET: the emotions were evoked in individuals that were by no means directly affected by the events on the ground but considered themselves as part of the same group, which is the American nation. In case of President Clinton and the Congressmen, this self-perception is obvious as they are the very representatives of this group. The public reaction driving the

events was in part ignited by the immediate presence of the events in the media. Television images showed the humiliation and killing of countrymen belonging to the in-group, while members of the out-group asserted their dominance in the streets of Mogadishu.

According to the appraisal perspective, the emotions at play evaluated external stimuli for the group's well-being and concerns – and lead to a change in cognition, beliefs and preferences. Even before the events in October, the public had expressed discontent about how the mission changed from humanitarian assistance to peace- and nation building. The emotions evoked by the Battle of Mogadishu drove home this point: the nation paid significantly more attention to the negative aspects of its involvement in Somalia and concluded that it had no business there anymore. As one journalist is quoted, what America saw on television and the emotions that followed “brought home to everybody in this country that something was wrong with the American policy” (Sharkey, 1993).

This reaction can be seen as an outcome of the emotional intensity of the events that was created by the immediate and graphic media coverage. Had this not been the case, it is reasonable to assume that the events on October 3rd would have had less effect on American emotions, beliefs and subsequently foreign policy (see Logan, 1996: 174f.). The emotions are furthermore an outcome of the relevance of the events for concerns central to an America that had just emerged victorious from the Cold War. The pictures on CNN and the TIME cover proved not only coverage of gruesome events; they became “a symbol of American power being dragged through the Third World, unable to master the new challenges of the post-Cold War era” (Kalb, 1994: 67). In other words: the United States were hit at a weak spot.

Beyond the creation of short-term emotions, the events also resulted in longer-lasting sentiments that influenced American foreign policy. The subsequent hesitance to engage in humanitarian efforts with military means was coined as the “Mogadishu Effect” that subsequently was seen as partly responsible for American (and global) inaction towards the genocide in Rwanda (see Münkler, 2004: 26; MacFarlane/Khong, 2006: 135).

Still the question remains whether the evocation of these emotions and their effect on the beliefs, preferences and role conception of the United States qualify as soft power. On paper, Aideed and his troops had employed hard resources to inflict damage on the American troops. Judging from the outcome, they clearly lost the Battle for Mogadishu as they suffered about 1.000 casualties. The damage in human life and equipment on the American side stood much lower and was of little significance for the over-arching United Nations mission. An evaluation of the events in an internal Al Qaeda letter that was found by American troops supports the notion that “the Americans were not defeated militarily in Somalia. Effective human and economic losses were not inflicted on them” (CTC, 2002: 12). In the terminology of Nye, the insurgents’ hard power effort was a clear failure as they had neither the carrots nor the sticks to win this conflict.

Instead, the victory that led to the American withdrawal was footed on soft power and the ability to change the American preferences. It came about through the deployment of hard resources the subsequently resulted in an emotional reaction. This observation led Kofi Annan to the nonchalant observation that “the most powerful and well-equipped military in the world had become the weakest link in peacekeeping” (in Rutherford, 2008: 165). And as Cousineau concludes, the conflict “was immediately lost in Washington by bureaucrats and

politicians, not in the streets of Mogadishu by soldiers under fire” (2010: 268). Aided thereby lost the battle but won the war, and he did so by changing American preferences through the evocation of emotions, not by forcing the United States into submission via hard power.

It is obvious that this could have been an unintended, accidental outcome. Yet this is unlikely. Aided reportedly explained in a conversation with American Ambassador to Somalia: “We have studied Vietnam and Lebanon and know how to get rid of Americans, by killing them so that the public opinion will put an end to things” (in: Blechman/Wittes, 1999: 5). Other sources, too, attest Aided great skill in making the most of his limited resources by creating powerful images for the global media. As one article put it, this effort aimed at “the one center of gravity that would alter the conflict – the American public” (Chun, 2012). Against this backdrop, it is apparent that Aided was well aware of the soft power he was wielding, even though he is unlikely to have ever used the term.

One might argue that Aided did, in fact, not exert soft power through negative emotions but rather through coercion with military means – and hence hard power (as has been contrasted in chapter 3). In this case, the United States would have withdrawn from Somalia as the one and only other choice would have been to suffer more deadly attacks. This argument is not convincing as there were certainly other options available to the American decision makers, for example a troop surge to provide enhanced security, new operational protocols that would aim to kill instead of capture the insurgency leaders or a less offensive approach in dealing with the situation in Somalia. Coercion is about changing behavior by taking away choice, not by changing preferences; but in this case the United States had plenty of choice left but saw

their preferences changed. The negative emotions at work here therefore constitute an exertion of soft power, not of coercion.

The Battle for Mogadishu can therefore be seen as an example for the intentional evocation of emotions in order to change preferences – and hence as an example for soft power. As has to be noted, this assessment rests on a rethinking of the soft power concept of Nye. According to his original approach, Aideed and his troops might have changed preferences, but as they did not do so via the means of attraction (or any other positive influence), they did not exert soft power. The concept presented in this thesis employs emotions as the mechanism fueling soft power. As the example illustrates, this helps to tackle the three weaknesses of Nye's conception that were introduced in Chapter 3.

First and foremost, it shows that soft power does not have to be limited to a positive attraction as its mechanism. A change in preferences can be caused through a variety of emotions, among them negative ones such as shock, frustration and anger as in the Mogadishu case. Secondly, the example illustrates that soft power is not necessarily about “getting others to want what you want”. Aideed, after all, was not able to attract the United States to his ideals and goals. Instead he was able to get them “to want what he wants them to want” – which was a withdrawal from Somalia. And thirdly, the case study shows that emotions provide greater insight in the precise workings of soft power than the simple notion of attraction. Breaking down the process into the more tangible terminology of emotions and connecting this to a theoretical instrument such as IET makes it possible to analyze societal and political sources through a more precise lens.

6.2. Positive Emotions and Willy Brandt's Visit to Warsaw in 1970

A. Historical Overview

The second case focuses on the visit of the German chancellor Willy Brandt to the Polish capital of Warsaw in December 1970. From the perspective of Nye's framework, it represents a classical example for the exertion of soft power via attraction. In comparison, the here-advocated focus on the emotional dimension of the events allows an explanation beyond the vague notion of attraction and showcases how emotions can have a subliminal influence over lengthy periods of time.

The events surrounding Brandt took place against the backdrop of the West German Ostpolitik that aimed at a normalization of relations with the countries in Eastern Europe. Of special relevance in this context was Poland that, together with Israel, lay in the focus of German attempts at reconciliation. Brandt therefore announced that Germany "shall not attain real accommodation until peace, cooperation, reconciliation, and – yes, I hope one day – friendship as well prevail" (in Gardner Feldman, 2012: 34). In order to formalize their ties, the prime ministers of both countries met in December 1970 in Warsaw to sign what came to be known as the Treaty of Warsaw. In it, they reconfirmed the common border along the Oder-Neisse line, committed themselves to peaceful relations and relinquished all claims against each other (see Turk, 1999: 158f.).

After the ceremony, Brandt visited a monument commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. At the same spot, Jewish prisoners in 1943 had started an armed rebellion against their deportation to one of the death camps of Nazi Germany. The revolt was eventually crushed after

several weeks; some 13.000 Jews died in the process. In front of several hundred bystanders Brandt put down a wreath, straightened the ribbon attached to it – and to the surprise of everybody present knelt down on the wet pavement where he remained in silence for about one minute. As Brandt wrote later, the gesture was spontaneous (see Brandt, 1989: 214); observers initially thought he fell or lost consciousness (see Spiegel, 1970a: 29). The event was all the more noteworthy as the chancellor himself took no active part in Holocaust. He had left Germany in 1940 and supported the resistance in exile.

The event was interpreted as a public confession and acceptance of German guilt for the events during the Nazi governance. It brought Brandt as a person enormous respect, helped Germany to develop “a new political identity recognized by its neighbors” and “gave way to reconciliation between Germany, the nation of perpetrators, and the nations of the victims” (Giesen, 2004: 132). A few weeks later, the American TIME magazine named Brandt as the Person of the Year. The year after he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize; the speech during the award ceremony explicitly referred to his gesture in Warsaw and labeled him as “the great Peace and Reconciliation Chancellor of Germany” (Nobel Foundation, 1971). In proximity to the monument in Warsaw, another memorial was erected in 2000 that shows the German chancellor on his knees; the area around has been named Willy Brandt Plaza.

B. Emotions, Soft Power and Intentionality

As the argument goes, the effect of Brandt’s gesture can be best be understood by focusing on the emotions it evoked. The emotional dimension of the moment as well as its significance can be seen in the coverage of international newspapers, many of which featured a photo of Brandt on their front page. The New York Times called it a “touching incident” (NYT, 1970);

the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* in Germany spoke of a “simple human gesture that shocked everyone” (in: Kießling, 2005: 218; translation by author); and *Le Monde* in France described the Polish nation as “deeply touched” (*Le Monde*, 1970; translation by author). In retrospect, the event has therefore been counted among the big gestures in world politics, as one that moved the world (see Brechenmacher/Wolffsohn, 2010: 6; Sontheimer, 2010).

According to historians, Brandt thereby emotionally captured the Polish nation that felt understood by – of all people – a German politician who was willing to humiliate himself for what his countrymen had done (see Bender, 1995: 182). Even survivors of the Warsaw Ghetto were captivated: one recounted a sense of inner gratification (see KAS, 2010: 2) and Marek Edelman, leader of the uprising in the ghetto, described the gesture as shocking and significant (see Welt, 2009). From a psychological vantage point, these reactions point to the emotional process fueling reconciliation through which “shame and anger that often lead to aggression or a desire for revenge are superseded by [...] empathy and desire for affiliation” (Long/Brecke, 2003: 2). While Brandt’s gesture did not necessarily accomplish this, it is reasonable to assume that it at least opened an emotional pathway for it to happen.

The effect of these emotions can be seen in national polls conducted on beliefs in the population at the time (although this can certainly also be traced back to the political developments of the time). Over the period from 1969 to 1975, the percentage of Polish who perceived Germany and its citizens as a threat sunk from 52% to 13%; the percentage of those who saw a potential for armed conflict from 86% to 28% (see Bachmann, 2013: 269f.). This development came about to significant extent through Brandt’s gesture and the emotions it evoked, not through the previous announcements by politicians of essentially the same content, as

Giesen emphasizes (see 2004: 132). The process leading to a change of beliefs hence took place “more on an emotional than a political level” (Kruse, 2006: 21; translation by author).

It is important to emphasize the long-term perspective on the development of emotions and changes in beliefs as the immediate reactions to Brandt’s gesture were restrained. In Poland, the government initially did not comment on the events and tried to censor media reports as the notion of German repentance did not fit its political ideology (see *Volksstimme*, 2010). A similar delay in the concrete effect of the emotions can be seen in Germany. The week after the events, the *Spiegel* magazine asked in its cover story whether the kneeling by Brandt was the right thing to do (see *Spiegel*, 1970b) and quoted opinion polls according to which only 41% of Germans perceived the gesture as appropriate; 48% saw it as disproportionate. This critical attitude is long gone and has made space for the recognition of the events as one of the prime moments of Brandt’s time in office and German efforts at reconciliation.

These reactions illustrate that Brandt’s gesture evoked emotions that contributed especially in Poland and over the long run to a change in beliefs. He was therefore able to exert soft power via the means of emotions. With an eye on IET, the group in question compromises the Polish nation – although this has been called into question as the public reportedly took less notice of the events in Warsaw than generally assumed. An alternative interpretation is therefore that it was the intelligentsia in the Polish capital that experienced emotions which subsequently promoted reconciliation (see BPB, 2010). This reaction might have been caused primarily by the concern relevance as many members of the Polish elites had experienced the events that Brandt asked forgiveness for.

It remains the question whether this exertion of soft power was intentional or came about by accident. As mentioned before, Brandt explained his gesture as unplanned. Walter Scheel, then the foreign minister of West Germany, supported this account (see Solinger Tageblatt, 2010). While these accounts have never been proven wrong, it has been noted that the chancellor wanted to explicitly make a trip to the memorial and had mentioned the importance of public gestures for his Ostpolitik before (see Brechenmacher/Wolffsohn, 2010: 20, 23, 160f.). This fits with the personal memories of Scheel: “One of Willy Brandt’s skills I valued very much was his ability to emotionally connect with people and to use signs that are universally understood. I never saw a politician comparable to him” (Solinger Tageblatt, 2010; translation by author). It can hence be assumed that Brandt’s gesture and its exertion of soft power were intentional and not accidental, even though neither he nor any of his advisors had planned it.

With all this in mind, the events of December 1970 represent a straightforward case of soft power as conceptualized by Nye. The gesture of Brandt had a positive influence on the Polish and initiated a change in their beliefs towards his preference: reconciliation. In other words: he made them want what he wanted. Beyond that, the emotional perspective emphasizes the mechanism through which the soft power – at least partially - worked in this case. As has been elaborated on, the emotional component transcended the political developments and had an effect that over time influenced the beliefs and preferences in Poland. This goes beyond the nondescript analysis that Nye’s vague notion of attractiveness allows.

7. Conclusion

The cases of the American withdrawal from Somalia and Willy Brandt's gesture in Warsaw illustrate how the incorporation of emotions can enhance our understanding of soft power. As has been mentioned before, this does not aim to replace the concept initially developed by Nye; it merely provides a different perspective on events that cannot be classified as an exertion of hard power. There are certainly examples of soft power that do not stand in any relationship to emotions, such as persuasion through logical arguments. Yet, and especially with an eye on the problems of Nye's conception that were outlined in Chapter 3, the emotional vantage point can contribute to the understanding of soft power in several ways.

For one, it provides elaboration on what attraction is and how it works. Nye adheres to folk psychology in his writings and relates to the common sense of the reader – which is certainly not wrong but too vague to be of much analytical use. A focus on emotions solves this problem as psychological approaches like Intergroup Emotions Theory and emotions' effects on beliefs provide a framework for understanding the precise working of soft power. Exerting soft power thereby requires skills that are part of what has been conceptualized as Emotional Intelligence. From an academic perspective, this enables a more precise analysis of the occurrences and workings of soft power; in practice this can help to design and evaluate policies that aim at exerting soft power.

Secondly, this thesis outlines a way of extending the notion of soft power beyond a positive influence. The original definition of the concept – making others want what you want – does not prescribe how this change in preferences comes about; yet Nye confines this mechanism to a positive influence through attraction. By instead focusing on emotions and their whole

range, this unnecessary restriction can be overcome. After all, a change in preferences can result both from positive as well as negative influences, for example fear, anger and humiliation. Taking this into account, the analytical and explanatory scope of the soft power concept is expanded without being further watered down.

Thirdly, an emotional perspective on soft power emphasizes that it is not necessarily about making someone agree to one's own preferences, but also about merely influencing someone to act in a certain way. In the case of the American withdrawal from Somalia, the United States did therefore not acquire the same preferences as Aided but was still influenced in their behavior. He did not "make them want what he wants" but was rather able to "make them want what he wants them to want" – in this case a retreat from his country. This introduces an important distinction to the soft power concept as it comprises both actual attraction as well as manipulation. Emotions can lead to both outcomes, but are certainly not the only explanation possible.

The three case studies illustrate these points. They show how a focus on emotions can provide a more precise interpretation of the role soft power played in the events – and that soft power can comprise a wider range of events than Nye's conception assumes. Beyond that, there are several implications to be drawn and questions to be asked.

Firstly: for the simple fact that all politics is human interaction, emotions are inescapably a factor in international politics. Actors and their beliefs are influenced by them just as every action has the potential to evoke them. In accordance with the notion of Emotional Intelligence, it is therefore an important skill to recognize and regulate emotions in one-self and especially in others. Effective policy making should take this into account, especially when it

aims to exert soft power. Furthermore, taking into account this form of soft power can open up pathways towards influencing others that cannot be accessed through other faces of soft power. The example of Willy Brandt in Warsaw illustrates this: his gesture achieved what a multitude of political announcements and speeches beforehand were not able to evoke.

Secondly, the effective exertion of soft power through emotions requires knowledge and skill. In order to influence beliefs, emotions have to be linked to concerns in the target; it is therefore important to gain insight into what is of relevance for the target. While there are certainly universal concerns such as survival, it is reasonable to assume that many of them are target-specific and require some understanding. The example of Bismarck and the Ems Dispatch illustrates how this knowledge can be employed in order to influence another actor. He was able to target the right concerns in both the French and the German people that ultimately led them to change their preferences according to his plan. Exerting soft power also requires the ability to reach the target, and as both the cases of Aided and Brandt show, this often comes in the form of an effective use of the media. With an eye on the examples it is hence to assume that the best – and maybe the only – way of evoking emotions on a national level leads through mass media.

Thirdly, it has to be taken into account for the evocation of emotions that their effect also relies on their intensity. It might therefore be more effective to aim for one high-intensity action towards the target than a larger number of low-intensity events. From the perspective of Aided it was therefore more impactful to shock the United States with pictures of dead soldiers on television than through continuous attacks on American soldiers over a long period of time. The same can be said for Willy Brandt who evoked with a gesture that took barely

a minute more than other politicians can with speeches over months or even years. What plays into this is the element of surprise. If an emotion comes without anticipation, this certainly can add to the intensity; apart from that, soft power is less effective if the target has time to recognize it as such and subsequently to feel manipulated.

Lastly, emotions stand in connection to symbols, the meanings of which can be highly subjective. Emotion can bypass our sense of objectivity and influence cognition, which is why specific events can have a significantly different impact on different actors once they acquire symbolic meaning. The destruction of two helicopters and the humiliation of American soldiers were militarily far less significant than symbolically; the same is true for the gesture of Brandt in Warsaw that acquired its meaning towards the Polish through its symbolic value. These implied meanings can be employed to evoke emotions, but they can also be obstacles to the exertion of soft power if not taken into account. To build soft power on the basis of symbols, it is therefore – and as has been emphasized before - of importance to know both the target as well as the pathways of reaching it, first and foremost through the media.

Taken together, these considerations point at the opportunities and challenges of using emotions to understand and exert soft power. They also bring up question regarding the established wisdom on soft power. It has long been argued that American movies, Korean music and French wine are soft power resources and result in a positive attraction towards these countries. This could certainly be true if these products evoke emotions that get associated with these countries. On the other hand, it is also imaginable that the relatively low emotional intensity and the low relevance for concerns can hardly bring about a change in beliefs. If one goes along with the latter argumentation, this might explain how American culture can be

popular even in places where the nation as a political actor is met with suspicion or open opposition. In order to actually result in an exertion of soft power, emotions would therefore have to go beyond a certain threshold in intensity and concern relevance.

With these additional considerations in mind, the linkage of soft power and emotions comes with a variety of anchor points for further research. The integration of psychological concepts such as Intergroup Emotions theory and of insights into the connection between emotions and beliefs can furthermore be valuable for International Relations in general.

In any case: the conclusion of this thesis is that soft power as an analytical tool can profit from the integration of emotions as an underlying mechanism. This rethinking of Joseph Nye's concept solves several of its intrinsic problems and broadens its unnecessarily limited scope. As a result, an emotional perspective on soft power can be of value both for understanding and making policy. Yet it has to be emphasized that, especially for the latter purpose, emotions, their evocation and effects provide considerable challenges. None of the emotional actors in the case studies presented here could have been able to predict the precise consequences of their actions. Emotions are anything but straightforward, and yet they demand more attention in the scientific community and by policy makers.

Willy Brandt illustrates this messiness. He is remembered for his soft power and the emotions it was able to unleash, yet his family describes him as an awkward and withdrawn personality. As his wife joked, it would probably take her a tear gas bomb to evoke any emotions in her husband (see Tagesspiegel, 2013).

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Abstract

감정적 행위자로서의 국가

감정을 통해 살펴본 소프트파워 재조명

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본 논문은 조지프 나이(Joseph Nye)의 소프트파워 개념을 재고하고 보다 발전시키는 데에 그 목적을 둔다. 이는 국가를 감정적 행위자로 특징짓고 감성을 기본 메커니즘으로 설정함에 따라 소프트파워의 표적에 대한 선호변화로 이어지기 때문이다. 이러한 목적으로, 먼저 소프트파워 개념에 대해 상술한 기존연구를 제시 및 비판하며, 실제정치와 결부시키고자 한다. 다음으로, 본 논문에서 해결하고자 목표하는 조지프 나이식의 소프트파워 이해에 대한 결점, 가령, 소프트파워의 작동방식에 대한 모호한 정의, 소프트파워가 선호를 변화시키는 것에 대해 부과된 제약, 소프트파워의 긍정적 영향력에 대한 불필요한 규제 등을 소개한다. 이에 대한 해결책으로 국제적

행위자를 감정에 의한 믿음으로부터 영향 받기 쉬운 행위자로 특징짓는 것을 제시하며, 이는 세 단계로 이루어진다. 먼저, 특징화가 기존 국제관계 학문분야에서 성행하고 있음을 보이고, 다음으로 감정이 믿음에 영향을 미치는 다양한 방법에 대한 심리학적 연구를 나타내며, 마지막으로 Intergroup Emotions Theory 와 같은 접근법으로 감정이 집단적 수준에서 어떻게 기능하는지에 대한 설명으로 이어진다. 소프트파워가 감정을 통해 어떻게 기능하는지를 실증하기 위해, 기존의 이론적 개념과 연관 지어 두 가지의 다른 감정이 나타난 역사적 사례를 분석한다.

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Keywords: 힘, 소프트파워, 감정, 국가이론

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