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국제학석사학위논문

**An Analysis of U.S. Bureaucracy in
Democracy Promotion Efforts:
Case of Haiti**

아이티 사례를 통한 미국 행정부의 민주주의 촉진 역할 분석

2015년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제협력전공

최 병 헌

**An Analysis of U.S. Bureaucracy in
Democracy Promotion Efforts:
Case of Haiti**

Thesis by

Byung Hun Choi

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In Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of International Studies

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Abstract

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The rise in globalization has brought many effects both benefits as well as challenges. With regards to challenges, the focus has been on how to improve institution to address global problems that have gone beyond state boundaries. While improving institutional mechanisms seems to be one of the core ideals to address global challenges, there is always a question of how to do that. In dealing with the question of how, this is where democracy could come in. The debate always rages on whether democracy is good or necessary for a particular country. Still, it can be argued that democracy could serve as a vital roadmap to ensure effective institutional capacity that will cater to ownership and participation by the public. Such needs are particularly emphasized for fragile states or post-conflicts countries where there has to be stable institutions. In normative terms, it may be easy to assume how to implement or advance such goals, yet in practical terms that may not so be the case. Looking at such needs lead to the possibility of democracy as one of the implementation tools or mechanism. Still the question has been raised as to whether effort to promote democracy is indeed necessary, amid the criticism of the U.S. democracy promotion efforts as highly bureaucratized and politicized. Up to this point there have been calls to reform democracy promotion effort arrangements of the United States. Previous literature has mostly dealt with an analysis of individual U.S. presidents' administration stance on democracy promotion as a whole. To understand what drives the democracy promotion, the focus of this research is

not on individual U.S. president, but analysis at an organizational level that includes major agencies of the United States, which include State Department, Department of Defense, and USAID, revisiting the bureaucratic side of the U.S. democracy aid. Major U.S. agencies have undertaken U.S. foreign assistance, with democracy or related elements to democracy as a direct target as well as indirect target, in a manner that often is overlap and in an incoherent manner. The goal of this bureaucratic analysis is determining driving force behind the organizations in democracy promotion efforts, particularly pertaining to post-conflict/fragile states. Based on analysis of what drives U.S. democracy promotion efforts, the main focus of this thesis is to look at why such efforts often have not led to successful efforts. The case study of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti illustrates important role of National Security Council (NSC) as a control tower for interagency/interdepartmental coordination in overseas assistance efforts.

KEYWORDS: Democracy promotion, U.S. foreign assistance, Department of State, Department of Defense, USAID, Haiti, National Security Council

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List of Tables and Figures

Table 1.....	pg. 14
Table 2.....	pg. 99
Table 3.....	pg. 99
Fig 1.....	pg. 57
Fig 2.....	pg. 57
Fig 3.....	pg. 96

Table of Contents

Abstract

List of tables and figures

1. Introduction.....	1
2. Review of Literature.....	6
2.1. Huntington’s the <i>Third Wave of Democratization</i>	6
2.2. Carother’s <i>Aiding Democracy Abroad</i>	13
2.3. Political Approach and Developmental Approach.....	26
2.4. Richard E. Neustadt’s <i>Presidential Power</i>	31
2.5. Three Models by Graham Allison.....	32
3. Analytical Framework.....	35
3.1. Relevance.....	35
3.2. Underlying interests behind U.S. foreign assistance.....	36
3.3. Objectives of assistance.....	38
3.4. Rational-Choice Institutionalism.....	44
3.5. Research Question.....	53
4. Organizational Structure of U.S. foreign aid policy.....	54
4.1. Overview.....	54
4.2. Department of State.....	55
4.3. Department of Defense.....	61
4.4. USAID.....	68
4.5. Organizational Relationships: USAID-DoD.....	78
4.6. Organizational Relationships: DoS-DoD.....	81
4.7. Millennium Challenge Corporation.....	82
4.8. National Security Council.....	91
5. Case Study.....	95
5.1. Haiti.....	95
5.1.1. Overview.....	95

5.1.2. Operation Uphold Democracy.....	99
5.1.3. Department of Defense.....	102
5.1.4. Department State.....	103
5.1.5. USAID.....	104
6. Conclusion.....	105
6.1. Implications.....	105
6.2. Conclusion.....	111

References

Abstract in Korean

Acknowledgements

1. Introduction

Globalization has given the world with various benefits that often times can be taken for granted. Many benefits include efficiency in terms of transportation, leading to saving time and monetary costs. Free movements have allowed movement of not only material goods, but also free flowing of ideas. Although globalization may have given benefits for many people in the world today, still it is not without shortfalls. It has to be recognized that with benefits, there are wide-range of challenges and problems at a global level. Each state and non-state actors, both individuals and organizations as a whole, as well as international organizations, are faced with the question of how to address such problems. Still it is not easy to implement solutions to address and deal with issues. With progressively changing global atmosphere thanks to globalization has also accompanied with it growing challenges. These problems and challenge vary, and they include poverty reduction, climate change, terrorism, and human trafficking. The problems are no longer confined to the territorial boundaries of the state, but rather are goes over beyond the state territories in a transnational and global manner. To address such problems, many stakeholders have taken up initiatives to address the challenges and problems. As an example of initiatives taken to deal with the issue of poverty reduction, the United Nation's High Level Panel Report on Post-2015 Development Agenda states the 10th universal goal as ensuing effective governance and institutions (UN, 2013). The word effective could have different meanings, but there is one word that should not be left out: democracy.

While governance is to be regarded as an important element in addressing poverty reduction in the context of development agenda, governance is an element that is emphasized throughout and each initiative to address challenges. As matter of fact, governance should be seen as a key, fundamental element that acts as a catalyst to address various challenges. This can be true when it can be taken into account that a success of an action depends upon how the governance mechanisms are used to carry out an actions. In other words it really comes down to how the tools are used to ensure smooth process and implementation of initiatives to address global challenges that vary from poverty reduction to climate change. In that sense, it can be said that these various challenges cannot be seen as a separate entities that are isolated from each other. Thanks to globalization, the challenges are no longer single-issue problems, but rather a problem that is to be addressed in a cross-cutting manner. For example poverty reduction cannot be addressed as a single issue problem. The issue of climate change, poverty reduction, terrorism, all goes hand in hand, and must be solved in a cross-cutting manner. If there is a key element to facilitate for addressing the challenges in a cross-cutting manner, governance cannot be ignored. So the underlying question behind these cross-cutting issues is what role governance can play in addressing these challenges. At the same time it has to be noted that it is not an easy task to implement a governance mechanism that can address the global issues and challenges that are cross-cutting.

One could argue that it does not matter what kind of regime type a country takes as long as they have good governance. In one instance, it could be said

that authoritarianism could work effective if the governance setting is effective and is regarded as good governance. Among the governance mechanisms, democratic governance should be highlighted with importance. Although specific type of a regime may not have too much importance, it is nevertheless important to regard democratic governance as ideal form of a governance system. There are many reasons why democratic governance is ideal. One key, fundamental reason why democratic governance is ideal is that it fosters accountability, ensuring that stakeholders such as citizens who are affected by actions of agents, such as political leader are guaranteed responsibility for the actions. With accountability also comes in transparency, preventing actions that is regarded as corrupt. In addition, it ensures participation by all the members of stakeholders. This includes not just those belonging to the majority group, but also those who regarded to be in the minority group. Further there is also a form of responsiveness and information sharing among the stakeholders, helping to ensure accountability among citizens and representatives alike.

Although it is quite debatable as to whether democracy is an ultimate solution, it can be argued that democracy could serve as a vital roadmap to ensure effective institutional capacity that will cater to ownership and participation by the public. Such needs are particularly emphasized for fragile states or post-conflicts countries where there has to be stable institutions. Not only those fragile state, other states such as newly created democracies, could benefit from using democracy as a platform for the governance structure of their country. In normative terms, it may be easy to assume how to implement or advance such

goals, yet in practical terms that may not so be the case.

To ensure democracy is instituted in a right way, capacity must be built for the country to ensure smooth facilitation of democratization. Yet capacity building in such manner may not be easy, as lack of knowledge does hinder a country to be built with necessary capacity. Whether outside influence can have an effective impact is debatable, but it still has to be recognized that some sort of a knowledge sharing must occur. In that sense, there has to be one country or group of countries that takes the lead in sharing the knowledge about their system to others who lack such knowledge. Such aspect is important because it allows a country or group of countries to take a lead in sharing their own lessons and experiences. This can be done regardless of whether the experiences were successful or not. Certainly if the lessons and experiences were successful, then it would be a worthwhile to share the knowledge to other countries. At the same time, shortcomings and failures would also serve as lessons for others to follow. So both ways, whether success or failure, could serve as a vital tool to shared experiences.

In the area of democracy, there is no other actor that can best share their knowledge about democracy than the United States. This is so due to the fact that the U.S. could offer their experiences and lessons on democracy. While it could offer up an experience of what it has done, it could also give lessons on the failures and challenges they faced with democracy. Such experiences and lessons may not necessarily transform one country, but nevertheless can offer vital tool necessary to be used to share knowledge.

Looking at such needs lead to the possibility of democracy or democratic governance as one of the implementation tools or mechanism. Still the question has been raised as to whether democracy promotion effort is indeed necessary, amid the criticism of the U.S. democracy promotion efforts as highly bureaucratized and politicized. In addition, one could argue that U.S. democracy promotion efforts may as well be a simple tool to spread American way of life. Up to this point there have been calls to reform democracy promotion effort arrangements of the United States. Still, despite the fact that there are problems in the American democracy and the democracy promotion efforts, experiences of the United States can offer a vital lessons for the countries that are yet to enjoy complete democracy, regardless of whether American experiences of democracy is successes or failure. If successful, successful aspect can be used to share the knowledge and lessons. If it is regarded as failure and full of disadvantages, its shortfalls can be used as lesson to improve and make it better for those countries at a learning curve. Such lessons are vital in putting democracy at a core of governance. They key should be on not only looking at an individual actors, but other stakeholders at an organizational level. It would be worthwhile to understand how the organizational dynamics work in addressing a common objective that is democracy promotion. This is important because individuals are not only the elements that differ in terms of what drives them, but various different organizations themselves differ in terms of motivation and objective that drives them. Such dynamics cannot be explained in a single terms, as there are complex processes, as well as different factors that

shape their motivations behind their actions. Looking at organizational level is important in a sense that individuals do not do all the work, but rather organizations also take part in the work in particularly making decision to enact an action as well as ensuring smooth implementation of such actions. To understand clearly about interests of an organization, then is to look at what actions each organizations have undertaken to carry out a particular objective or tasks. Thus, it is necessary to revisit the bureaucratic side of the U.S. democracy promotion, analyzing key, major actors that are involved in the process.

Based on such underlying background, the research seeks to explore the reasons why efforts to promote democracy has not yielded significant results.

2. Review of Literature

2.1. Huntington's the Third Wave of Democratization

The notion of democracy goes back as back to Greeks, but three ways to approach the democracy appeared in the mid-twentieth century. Based on that approaches, democracy can be regarded as such.” As a form of government, democracy has been defined in terms of source of authority for government, purposes served by government, and procedures for constituting government.” (Huntington, 1991) Pointing to the short falls of such approach, Joseph Schumpeter in 1942 came up with a revised version of the definition of democracy under what he called “another theory of democracy”: “democratic method, is that institutional arrangements at political decisions in which

individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." This is mostly a procedural definition that has carried on with significance with ever since, becoming something more of a common sense.

Huntington (1991) does give out his own points regarding the definition of democracy. He points out the defining democracy in terms of electoral democracy is only at minimum and that there must be other words that define democracy in more ideal terms. As a second point, he notes that political leadership may be chose through the democratic process. Whether such leadership will fully make implementation of exercising power would remain to be seen. This is due to the fact that it is possible that the leadership may not be able to exercise power, due to power-sharing arrangements with others, or simply because the leadership is simply a façade or puppet for other dominant groups. Thirdly, he points out the need to address the issue of the stability or the fragility of a regime, raising the question of whether a non-democratic or a democratic country has a stable system or not. The fourth issue he raises is the issue of is democracy-non democracy variables of dichotomous or variables of continuous. And finally, he points out that there is little that puts the non-democratic countries in one common characteristic, as rather there are varying and differing forms of types and characteristics of non-democracies.

There are several of democratization processes, as they include transformation, trans placement, and replacement. At a transformation process, the authoritarian leadership takes charge and changes their regime into a system of democracy. Under transformations, there were five major phases hat occurs,

were the phase begins with where emerging of leadership that find it necessary to reform towards democracy, coming of power, failing to liberalizer, repressing the standpatter, and cooptation of opposition. Replacement is a different type of a transformation in which democratization occurs as a result of weak regime being overthrown by stronger opposition or standpatter. As compared to transformation and replacement, in transplacement, democratization occurs through cooperation between the ruling government and the opposition, where negotiations between the two parties occur, acknowledging that the each party cannot unilaterally decide the future of the political systems (Huntington, 1991).

Aside from the democracy promotion efforts by the United States, countries of the European Union, and the Vatican, there other factors those lie behind the democratization. One factor is largely an internal factor, in which authoritarianism regimes have begun to lose legitimacy, especially during the period due to popularity of the democratic values during the period, compounded by poor performances by the regime militarily and economically, especially in the midst of rising oil prices. As discussed by Huntington, maintaining legitimacy is utmost difficult for especially authoritarian regimes, as the authoritarian regimes have difficult renewing themselves, whereas democratic regimes can undertake renewal mechanisms through elections. Another difficulty was also that even if the regime kept its promises, it was still possible that it would be undermined, as there was no point of supporting a regime that has already achieved its objectives and lacks new objectives. Second factor is the global is the increase in the growth of the global economy lead to

the rise of urban middle class with increased living standards. The shift of the Catholic Church from supporting status quo to supporting anti-authoritarianism and reform in terms of social, economic and political sectors. Furthermore, demonstration effects, or what is known as “snowballing”, or something that causes contagious effect also played a large factor, especially at a regional level. Under this effect, one country’s success at democratization at leads neighboring or nearby countries to be ponders democratization, either as a solution to their problems which may seem similar to the country that had already been democratized. In addressing the “snowballing effects” Huntington gives out three propositions. First he attributes the success of the third waves of democratization to the globalization of communication and transportation system that allowed people to communicate with each other transnationally. The second proposition was that countries that were closest to each other enjoyed huge impact of “snowballing effects.” As for the third proposition, Huntington points out the importance of changes in time period over the causes of democratization in relative terms.

What is known as “third wave” of democratization started in Portugal when the military coup overthrew the authoritarian regime in 1974. This led to serious of countries transitioning from authoritarian to democratic regimes, starting with regimes in Latin America. By 1980s it would towards Eastern Europe, and by 1990, it would spread towards sub-Saharan Africa, the leaders in the continent gave way to demands for multiparty elections. Although such measures are regarded as at best minimal approach, those regimes recognized as regimes that

are less repressive. Particularly for sub-Saharan Africa, the aid was helpful playing the role of a catalyst for democracy promotions, as it was used both as an incentive mechanism for reforms as well as a financing for activities such as electoral monitoring and technical assistance. Aid that was used to promote democracy financed elections through voter registration, procedures campaigning, voting, votes counting. Not only has that it involved enhancing civil society that is involved in human rights and civic education. Furthermore, the aid also involves assisting to draft a working constitution, enhancing political parties, and training media personnel (Lancaster, 2006).

During the Cold War period, the main objective behind the U.S. aid was to promote democracy as a way to contain communism. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 paved way for the aid design, but much of the aid disbursed by the USAID reflected on the security interest rather than the long term development. Post-Cold War (Lancaster, 2006). The U.S. would attempt to make an alignment with other countries that distribute ODA, focusing on long term development and democracy.

During the third wave of democratization there were different ways of which the United States made promotion of democracy. One way was done at an individual level, through government officials including the presidents, and secretaries of states making individual statements making promoting democratization at a certain country or region. At the same time there were also organizations involved in these efforts, and they include U.S. Information Agency and Voice of America. Economic tools are also another way, as the U.S

government can choose to put sanction economically through suspensions of U.S. foreign aid, trade, or investments. The U.S could also choose to vote against or abstain in the vote to allow disbursing of loans at multilateral development banks. Diplomacy is another key tool, as U.S. Ambassadors and other officials from State Department play important role. Material assistance to democrats at a recipient country also took place as a tool, with agencies such as CIA, and NED. Military action through DoD was conducted to fight allow those government receiving assistance to fight off anti-government rebels and preventing military coups from the rebel forces. Diplomacy also took place at a multilateral level, particularly pressuring the United Nations to address the countries that violated human rights norms.

The U.S democracy promotion is said to have played an impactful, significant role during the third wave. During the President Carter administration, although the central focus was on human rights, it was nevertheless put both human rights and democracy as an important international agenda. Through the leadership of Carter administration, the human rights policy by the United States put the issue of human rights to be discussed at a global level. Reagan administration is known for so-called the “Project Democracy, creation of National Endowment for Democracy, as well as individual speeches by President Reagan himself. With a mix of diplomatic mediation and promotion of cooperation, the U.S. ensured that that democracy was center of the international agenda during the 1980s. Looking at the U.S. impact during that period, based on the statements by both the leaders of

democracies, as well as from the authoritarianism regimes, it can be said that U.S. role in democracy promotion did have some sort of an impact. While democratic leaders, particularly from Latin America countries such as Ecuador and Uruguay, on their respective statements, welcomed and appreciated the role of the U.S. in supporting democratization of their countries and regarded the outside help from the U.S. as having an influential role. At the same the leaders of authoritarian countries expressed opposite opinion, as leaders from countries such as Brazil, China, and Soviet Union, expressed that U.S. actions were unduly unwanted interference of the internal affairs of a country (Huntington, 1991).

The United States played an important role as an outside actor in promoting democracy along with other influential actors that include Vatican City, European countries, and the Soviet Union. It is said that the external actors may well prove to play a decisive factor in democratization of the country. The role of external actors can lead to two scenarios. One scenario is helping to progress democratization of a country, while another scenario slowing down the progress of the democratization and further leads to relapse of the democracy and into authoritarianism. Much of this depends on the impact of the economic and social development. Huntington points out that a country's democratization and third wave of democratization can be attributed to the influential role played by the outside countries. Huntington (1991), although stating that U.S. role in third wave of democratization cannot be explained in definite terms, he does say that U.S. assistance, whether diplomatically, economically, or military, has played

key role in democratization. At the same time, he does point out that Vatican's efforts for democracy promotion would have been more enhanced if it worked together with the U.S. in the process.

2.2. Carother's *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*

The democracy assistance is mainly based on a directly or indirectly targeting assistance in various forms including technical assistance, much of which deal with political institutions. Under a democracy template, through its core strategy, the U.S. has two ways of which the democracy assistance can be targeted towards to a recipient. One deals with the supply side of the democracy assistance. One is through a top down approach targeting state institutions, so that institution-building occurs. There are five elements of which this occurs: 1) Constitutional assistance 2) aiding rule of law 3) enhancing legislature 4) developing local government 5) civil military relations.

Sector	Sector Goal	Type of an aid
Electoral	Free Elections	Electoral aid, political party building
State Institutions (Top-Down)	Democratic Constitution Independent judiciary Representative legislature Responsive local government Pro-democratic military	Constitutional assistance, Rule of law aid, Strengthening of legislature, Local government development, Civil-military relations
Civil Society (Bottom Up)	Active Advocacy NGOs Politically educated citizens Independent media Strong unions	NGO building Civic education Media strengthening Union building

Table 1. “The Democracy Template” Adopted from Carothers. (1999). *Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve.*

Reforming judiciary includes rewriting criminal, civil, and commercial laws, as well as upgrading the legal profession and increasing legal access and advocacy. Making improvements for legislative branch includes building the

capacities of legislators and the staff that supports them, as well as strengthening the legislative infrastructure. Assisting the legislative branch also include support for NGOs and media to bolster transparency and accountability. Assistance at a local government level includes getting the recipient country to undertake decentralization policy. It also includes training local government officials to ensure capacity to undertake service delivery, budgeting and accounting, mobilize resources and reach out to citizens, as well as supporting development of local government infrastructure. Assisting the local government also includes increasing citizen input, which includes training local-level advocacy NGOs to work with local government (Carothers, 1999).

In terms of addressing demand side of the democracy assistance there are four key elements that need focusing 1) enhancing NGOs 2) Civic Educations 3) Supporting media 4) Support for labor unions.

Aside from top-down approach, there is also a bottom-up approach, which is targeting the civil society so that there is an indirect impact on state actors and state institutions. While targeting state institutions may not necessarily have given positive outcome, bottom-up approach through the use of the civil society has appeared to have yielded relatively better outcomes of moving from the stage of post-elections to the consolidation of democracy. Through bottom-approach, the aid is targeted towards the CSOs and NGOs. It can be targeted in various ways, which include targeting NGO building, civic education, strengthening media, as well as construction of the union. Based on study by Carothers (1999) on USAID's aid for promoting democracy, it can be said that

bottom-up approach have yielded better outcomes relative to the top-down approach of targeting aid to state institutions.. Still there are some issues and obstacles that need to be addressed.

Carothers (1999) talks about promoting democracy through use of aid or other forms of assistance that can be traced back as early as 1920s and 1930s. Starting that time period, the United States played a main actor's role in democracy promotion. Around the time period of Second World War, major forms of assistances included aiding militarily. While during the Second World War the focus of democracy aid was on anti-fascism, throughout Cold War era United States' main motivation of promoting democracy mainly centered on fighting the spread of Soviet-led Communism. The then U.S presidents Woodrow Wilson, Kennedy, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton embraced different motivations and ideals in terms of democracy promotion which were relevant and appropriate to the context of that time period. Some of the few factors that led to promoting democracy during the post-Cold War era included so-called the third wave of democratization, fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as democratic openings in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

One drawback to the U.S policy on promoting democracy, as noted by Carothers (1999), was that there was a lack of policy consistency, as each different administration sometimes had contradictory policy goals due to prioritizing commercial, political/security, or human rights interests at the expense of democracy. Such interests have often led each administration to sometimes support regimes that were authoritarian, which is contradictory to the

initial focus of democracy. Yet looking at the contradiction, one could also make an argument that democracy promotion efforts took place in order to further interest of a particular country. For example, the United States can be said to have engaged in democracy promotion efforts according to the guidelines of their foreign policy which reflects its national interest, whether it is humanitarian or security considerations.

By the time the Berlin Wall collapsed signaling the end of Cold War, one could have argued that U.S. democracy promotion, let alone democracy promotion itself would end as well. Looking at the historical background, it could be said that the U.S. was the only actor involved in promotion of democracy. Yet that would be not so. As far as the U.S. effort went, the democracy promotion would continue on, while similar efforts, although the word itself may be worded differently.

For the U.S. the priorities in promoting democracy did not go away, as more practical reasons rather than ideological ones influenced the Clinton and Bush administration post-Cold War era to continue on with spreading to other parts of the world. Such activities were reinforced by the Democratic Peace Theory, in which underlined the importance of democracy in ensuring peace and partnerships in the world. In addition it seems too simplistic to say that only the United States is the only country that engages in promoting of democracy. In terms of aid or assistances, there are other countries and multilateral organizations that engage in conducting of democracy promotion. Although such organizations do not use the word 'democracy' directly for fear of backlash,

they integrate some form of democracy, whether through notions good governance, or democratic governance to the foreign assistance package. Notable organizations include the United Nations and the European Union, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Council of Europe. The Bretton Woods Institution World Bank and IMF are known for their emphasis of good governance as part of aid conditionality.

In order to promote democracy there are various measure that can be used. They range from military, economic, and diplomatic measures, while the use of aid is one of the important measures to promote democracy (Carothers, 1999). By the end of late 1980s the wide range-use of democracy aid by the United States peaked. Still questions remain over whether it has place in the aid industry, where the paradigm shift has been focusing on the aid effectiveness in terms of its contribution to economic growth, development, and poverty reduction. The notion of good governance, in a sense that it focuses on institutions and policies, can be somewhat related to democracy, but good governance is a term widely used by the Bretton Woods Institutions of World Bank and IMF to focus on economic governance. Still, democracy can be used as aid conditionality by the donor countries to countries that are the recipients of the aid. At the moment, there may need to be some sort of paradigm shift in terms of thinking about democracy aid's relevance.

Under a political approach aid to promote democracy can be directed and targeted through two processes: One which is a top-down approach targeting elections, state institutions such as judiciary, and the second which is the

bottom-up approach targeting civil society, such as funding the NGOs, civic activities, trade unions, and media organizations. The process of assisting in the electoral process is a straightforward activity, while what happens after elections is somewhat complex.

In terms of a top-down approach, aid is targeted towards democratic constitution, judiciary and other quasi-judiciary organizations, strengthening the legislative branch, local government, and military that is pro-democracy. As discussed by Carothers (1999), reforming judiciary can take place through retraining prosecutors, improving police and prison system, as well as introducing alternative dispute resolution. Reforming judiciary includes rewriting criminal, civil, and commercial laws, as well as upgrading the legal profession and increasing legal access and advocacy. Making improvements for legislative branch includes building the capacities of legislators and the staff that supports them, as well as strengthening the legislative infrastructure. Assisting the legislative branch also include support for NGOs and media to bolster transparency and accountability. Assistance at a local government level includes getting the recipient country to undertake decentralization policy. It also includes training local government officials to ensure capacity to undertake service delivery, budgeting and accounting, mobilize resources and reach out to citizens, as well as supporting development of local government infrastructure. Assisting the local government also includes increasing citizen input, which includes training local-level advocacy NGOs to work with local government.

Aside from top-down approach, there is also a bottom-up approach, which is

targeting the civil society so that there is an indirect impact on state actors and state institutions. While targeting state institutions may not necessarily have given positive outcome, bottom-up approach through the use of the civil society has appeared to have yielded relatively better outcomes of moving from the stage of post-elections to the consolidation of democracy. Through bottom-up approach, the aid is targeted towards the CSOs and NGOs. It can be targeted in various ways, which include targeting NGO building, civic education, strengthening media, as well as construction of the union. Based on Carothers (1999) study on USAID's aid for promoting democracy, it can be said that bottom-up approach have yielded better outcomes relative to the top-down approach of targeting aid to state institutions without difficulties. Still there are some issues and obstacles that need to be addressed.

For the U.S, large chunks of the aid went to the strengthening of the institutions, including the judiciary, legislative, and the executive. One of the problems of the top-down approach instituted by the USAID, as noted by Carothers, was that political system was not taken into consideration. American practitioners simply took the U.S. political system of federalism and structures involving separation of powers, checks and balances, and judicial review, and simply assumed that recipient countries will be able to transfer and apply the U.S. system. In practice, that was not to be the case even if it was attempted with enormous efforts. This is due to the fact that not all democracies share the features of the American political system. There are other political systems that embody democracy that are not in a way same as the U.S. For example, the U.K.

operates under the system of parliamentary structure. So despite many attempts, for some recipient countries it may have been difficult to ensure democratic reforms by the U.S., simply because American democracy based on its political system is not appropriate for that particular recipient country's political system due to differences in political structure.

Experiences by the USAID in countries such as Guatemala, Nepal, Romania, and Zambia point to the difficulties and drawbacks of using a top-down approach due to structural barriers and impediments such as power and interest. Through top-down approach, the U.S particularly through USAID had a confidence that fixing institutions was viable as those targets were tangible, large, and visible. Despite such optimism, Carothers point out that the results were rather disappointing, as they failed to achieve and realize the goals. Such failure to realize the goals can be attributed to the characteristics state institution that is corrupt, inefficient, undertaking functions poorly, and receives little respect.

One primary problem the USAID practitioners and others faced and could not overcome was the fact that it was not easy to change state institutions due to the subculture and resistance to change in various parts of state institutions (Carothers, 1999). Whether they are members of police force, prosecutors, government bureaucrats, or military, any reforms that were proposed were seen as going against their interests and values. This is very much a power-politics issues, as any conditionality imposed on the recipient countries to push forward democratic reforms will be would have been regarded by the politicians and

bureaucrats as a loss of power. Such losses include loss of extra income from corrupt activities as well as loss of protected and insular situations. Furthermore, accepting foreign aid would mean that they will have to be accountable to the foreign donor countries, whereas previously they were only accountable to their constituents (external accountability) and other political leaders or bureaucrats, despite the doubt about whether such accountability was ever enforced. Accepting foreign aid with a condition of ensuring democratic reforms may be resisted by the political leaders and bureaucrat because it would mean giving up power and be subject to more external accountability. As a result, due to such a strong subculture leading to the strong resistance by the political leaders of the recipient countries, it can be difficult to impose any reforms based on the democratic agenda (Carothers, 1999).

Still even if the members of the state institutions were to be willing to accept reforms as part of conditions, there is possibility that they were doing for their own personal gains and benefits, not for the sake of ensuring democratic reforms, leading to a countervailing agendas. Carothers (1999) cites an example of where the Danish government sponsored a program in which Nepalese parliamentarians were invited to take a tour of legislature of Copenhagen. For many aid providing practitioners, such programs may seem to give a message to the recipients that this is the right model of democracy that they should be following. However, in the eyes of those touring the city, what was important was the lavishly decorated offices and cars, items and benefits that are mostly material and only apply for their own personal gains. As a result, once they have

returned to their country, their goal would be to pursue more of such material gains, like an expensive house or cars, even if they may have to steal to achieve certain gains. As a result, the whether aid used in such program is may not be effective at all, because the intended goal of sharing knowledge about what constitutes proper democracy has not been achieved. Such issues also raise the issue of fungibility, as the funds earmarked for constructing democratic institutions may be used for the purchase of material goods such as expensive cars and houses, and while the political leaders and bureaucrats could still claim that they were being used to achieve democratic reforms in the country.

Although certain subcultures embedded in the institutions may be difficult or impossible to overcome, there can be still efforts to overcome such environmental or structural impediments. One was is to cut back on optimistic goals and extend the minimum time period to several decades, rather than having at ten years or so. Another is to design methods to accommodate more participation by the bureaucrats and members of the state institutions, thus allowing them to have more ownership in terms of designing what kind of reforms that are needed (Carothers, 1999). This would lead to recipients taking charge of their reforms, rather than relying on outside experts to impose conditions of reforms without proper knowledge of the context of the recipient country's political and economic environment. Having a recipient take charge of their democratic agenda would also lead to possibility of being able to be accountable with each other.

In terms of the bottom-up approach through targeting the CSOs and NGOs,

one of the obstacles is the issue of what kind of NGOs and CSOs should the aid be targeted towards (Carothers, 1999). During the democratization process, especially after the opening/electoral process has taken place, it is highly likely that there will be many NGOs and CSOs that will rise up and there will be increase in numbers. As a result, donor agencies will face a problem of what kind of criteria must be used to select to target aid, as not all NGOs are so-called the democracy NGOs, but there are also development NGO groups. Development NGO groups has roots from the 1970s when human needs approach appeared and made emphasis on participatory development, community development, and local development. Some of the aid flows were channeled through both the local NGOs and the international NGOs. Although development NGOs and democracy NGOs were treated as separate domains initially, as time would pass on it would intersect. Such intersection of the development NGOs and democracy NGOs would lead to the challenging question of under what criteria or standards will be used to differentiate and prioritize aid flows between development NGOs and development NGOs.

Another problem that needs to be taken into consideration is the issue of NGO boom, as there has been increase of NGOs since the early 1990s. Such increase in numbers of NGOs, particularly in terms of their utility to promote democracy, raises the question of accountability. Carothers (1999) do point out that there were some negative aspects behind the NGO boom, such as corruption by and within the NGOs being a primary example. An example of NGOs corruption would be fabricating expense reports with fake employees on the

books, and take advantage of the funding environment. Lack of transparency, particularly in external terms, means that NGOs could raise the amount of money they would like to raise and spend it on wherever it pleases them. This would result in the public image problem of the NGOs, as resentments by the public would grow. For the public, NGOs could be seen as overpaid, arrogant, and self-interested. Still, the issue of accountability is problematic under such circumstances as it can be debatable as to whether NGOs should be accountable to the public, as one side of argument could argue that it is not so the case as of now.

Another factor that has contributed to the problem of NGO accountability in this context is the donor's reluctance to ensure more accountability due to the sense of solidarity they would like to keep. When the donor agency, particularly the Danish government as discussed by Carothers (1999), found that funds were misused, it was decided that for that particular NGO, actions would be closely watched and scrutinized. Whether such more scrutiny will occur or not brings the debate of NGO accountability. In certain circumstances, donor agencies may be able to scrutinize the actions of an NGO. Still, under other circumstances, that may not be so be the case, as even an scrutiny from the domestic government may be seen as infringing upon the freedom of CSOs and NGOs. Attempts to ensure that the local NGOs are accountable to the donor agencies may have negative implications, as it may be seen as unnecessary interference by foreign countries, which can be reflected negatively by the recipient government. The issue of fungibility can also occur for the CSOs and NGOs, as

some of the funds earmarked for certain purposes could be used for purposes other than what the donor intended. Moreover it is possible that the funds may have been misused, such as inappropriately or for personal benefits. Despite the efforts to scrutinize, donor agencies may still have trouble tracing down if the funds were misused as there is not a proper accountability mechanism to ensure transparency and enforceability of the right use of funds. (Carothers, 1996)

2.3. Political Approach and Developmental Approach by Carothers

When discussing democracy assistance, one can differentiate between political approach and developmental approach. These two approaches may seem similar in one sense, but these two approaches are quite different. As thoroughly explained by Carothers (2009), the fact that the countries and organizations are thinking in terms of different approaches illustrates efforts made to deal with need to address the changing global landscape. Political approach mainly deals with mainly electoral democracy that emphasizes competitive elections that ensures citizens with enough political and civil rights so that they could participate in a democratic process. In addition to the elections element, there are other elements, which are most institutional, that the political approach focuses on. They include branches of government that include the judiciary, the legislature, and media. Under the political approach, the democratization process is a struggle between democratic forces and non-democratic forces as part of the process of breakthrough, reversals, crises, and resolutions. Since political institutions are important in democracy promotion in

terms of political approach, the main objective of those engaging in democracy promotion activities is to give support to the actors themselves. Following are the main actors: political parties, organizations, politicians themselves, or NGOs with political affiliation. It can also indirectly engage in democracy promotion through assisting key institutions such as electoral commission, judiciary, or media. This process takes place in such a way that is typically a top-down approach to democracy. The goal for such assistance is to ensure that democratic actors have the equal chance of succeeding in a country and balancing the power of nondemocratic forces in the country. In authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries, advocate of democracy from outside of the country may assist civic groups in the country to mobilize for wider participation by the citizenship. Although such scenario seems too controversial as it seems to be infringement or interference on the internal affairs of the country, such practices do not always take place. Rather in other countries, it is used to emphasis enhancing the relationship between the democratic and non-democratic forces. The key goal in that context is to ensure that the country gets back on its feet in terms of having a working electoral commission, widely participating civil society, as well as other activities that will have democratic politics running in a stable manner. Such goal is indeed important in post-conflict or fragile states because it allows reconstruction of political institutions.

Whereas the political approach focuses on political actors and institutions, the development approach focuses on the impact of democracy on the longer social and economic development. It is based on the rationale that democratic

governance, which includes notions of transparency, accountability, and responsiveness, has a positive impact on sustainable development. Democracy is regarded as means rather than the ends that have an impact of sustainable, long-term development goals of a country. In the context of the developmental approach, as democracy and socioeconomic development mutually reinforces each other, as democratic governance impacts development while development can impact democratic process of a country. Democracy assistance through developmental approach occurs through indirect method, based on putting emphasis on social and economic development. Development approach also focuses on political institutions, in the context of constructing capacity of state and good governance in a technically manner (Carothers, 2009). Rather than confronting the recipient government, the goal is to form some sort of a partnership, which is why there is an emphasis on development at a local level. Also emphasized is the human rights aspect, something that is inked to the universal principles.

The developmental approach allows for a change that occurs at an incremental and gradual level as well as allowing it to be conducted in a long-term, sustainable manner (Carothers, 2009). In addition, the development approach also allows for not just looking at opportunities for political reform, but also reform in terms of socioeconomic development. Although political approach is regarded as conducted at a short-term time period and may be criticized as causing confrontation with recipient governments. The confrontation aspect still can be regarded as an inevitable aspect in democracy

promotion and illustrates that there is some sort of influence of democracy promotion. Whether it is political or developmental approach, the question lingers over the likelihood of having an impact. For political approach, the question is raised as to whether political competition always leads to strong representation of citizens in the political system, which may not always be the case. Having an electoral democracy does not always guarantee that citizens will participate and be represented in an inclusive manner. For development approach, the question lingers over reforms in terms of socioeconomic development will translate to having a real impact in the political system. In both approaches such issues can be debatable.

Still, Carothers (2009) does not regard one approach as better than the other. He makes the point that country context must be taken into account. This means in reality, whether one approach best fits depends upon the local context of the recipient country. Whether the approach is political or developmental, there is no denying that each approach must be tailored to fit the local context and local needs. Certainly local actors, whether they are politicians or citizens, must have complete ownership and empowerment to steer the direction of their country, as initiatives from outside can only be limited. Thus, whether one approach has more impact than the other really depends upon how certain approach is tailored towards a certain context and how it fits the local context. How that will be measured remains to be seen, but still as Carothers noted, ensuring reflection of local needs is the important place to start.

One way to incorporate local context is to apply democratic governance at a

regional and local level, while at the same time it is connected to the overall national objectives of a country (Diamond, 2008). Putting initiatives at a local level ensures citizens to experience immediate impact of government actions, activities ranging from provision of services to justice administration, although democratic governance initiatives, such as projects, cannot be conducted to every local government. In addition the role of actors, including think tanks, NGOs, and mass media, is also important in this aspect. For example, the USAID, when focusing on strategies related to local government, which allows more citizen participation as well as enhancing accountability of the local government by the citizens. To ensure that the recipient government is able to carry out such initiatives, there must be enough resources and capacity available for the government. This is why capacity building or capacity development is important, as it helps in preparing the officials at a local government to govern with accountability from both the citizens and the national government, so that they would be ready to receive the resources and authority from the national government. Thus, it is important the top-down approach and bottom-up approach does not only work by them, but work together, mutually reinforcing each other. While top-down approach focuses on the decentralization of government structure, bottom up focuses on the enhancement of local governance. As a result the question should not be about whether political or developmental approach has impact, but whether other elements such as local context are taken into account. Efforts such as decentralization must be carried out to ensure that autonomy and accountability systems are enhanced and that

empowerment for the citizens and not the elites occur.

2.4. Richard E. Neustadt's *Presidential Power*.

Richard Neustadt work deals with the analysis of governmental/bureaucratic decision making. The model discussed by Richard Neustadt has five characteristics in terms of analysis of governmental action as a result of politics. They include: institution that are separated sharing power, power of persuasion, bargaining based on the process of bargaining, and international relations as related to inter-departmental relationships. (Allison, 1999)

Institutions are created as separated and share power based on the constitutions, U.S. tradition of politics, practice of government, democratic theory. As a result of government participants having independent bases, the power such as having effective influence on outcome is shared. Power is shared because each government participant have separate responsibilities. Not all government officials are bound by the command of the president, as the presidents' preferences are measured against responsibilities of governmental officials.

While, presidents, in terms of statutory and formality, are chief, they cannot always guarantee that they will always persuade other officials. Rather an individual president must use his bargaining advantages, which include reputation and prestige, to convince the officials that his wants eventually equal to the interest of the officials themselves. Advantages of bargaining through reputation and prestige is by only means in persuading the officials, and such

persuasion is done through the processes, while how much impact on the outcome can president make does play an important factor. (Allison, 1999)

2.5. Three models by Graham Allison

As discussed in *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Allison (1969) uses the Cuban Missile Crisis as an historic episode to articulate and investigate a few core hypotheses, namely:

1. Analysts think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the content of their thought.
2. Most analysts explain the behavior of national governments in terms of various forms of one basic conceptual model – the Rational Policy Model (assuming purposeful acts of unified national governments). (Model I)
3. Two alternative conceptual models – the Organizational Process Model (Model II) and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III)– provide a base for improved explanation and prediction.

Model I views states as black boxes and sees the acts of those states as the consequences of innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organizations. In this model, acts and choices are really outputs. Model II looks to organizations and the “patterns of organizational behavior” within the government. Model III sees actions as outcomes “of various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national government.” Allison (1969) then uses the Cuban

Missile Crisis to illustrate each of these three models.

Under the Rational Policy Paradigm, the basic unit of analysis is policy as a national choice. There is one national actor – a “rational unitary decision maker.” Action “is chosen in response to the strategic problem the nation faces.” The primary inference of this model is that “if a nation performed a particular action, that nation must have had ends towards which the action constituted an optimal means.” The conclusions he draws from this model are that (i) a stable nuclear balance reduces the likelihood of nuclear attack and that (ii) a stable nuclear balance increases the probability of a limited war. Allison then uses this model to illustrate how the blockade of Cuba was “the United States’ only real option.”

Allison (1969) next turns to the Organizational Process model, under which “government consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own.” Each organization addresses a different set of problems largely independently. Coordination of these organizations is achieved through the use of standard operating procedures (SOPs). In this model, policy is seen as the output of organizational processes and behavior is “determined by previously established procedures.” Each organization’s “operational goals emerge as a set of constraints defining acceptable performance.” When confronted with a new situation, these organizations engage in a search for a solution among existing routines, allowing routines to evolve, “assimilating new situations.” The primary inference from this model is that “if a nation performs an action today, its organizational components must yesterday have been performing an action only

marginally different from this action.” SOPs, therefore are not “far sighted” or “flexible” solutions. Again, Allison looks at the blockade of Cuba, this time through the Organizational Process model.

Allison (1969) finally considers the Bureaucratic Politics model. This model sees the leaders of organizations as a player in his own right “in a central, competitive game.” In this model, policy is apolitical outcome, resulting from “compromise, coalition, competition, and confusion among government officials who see different faces of an issue.” Here, the individual’s position in the government is key – “positions define what players both may and must do.” Games are played amongst individuals to determine outcomes, based on bargaining advantages, skill and will, and other players’ perceptions. Under this model, “important government decisions or actions emerge as collages composed of individual acts, outcomes of minor and major games and foul-ups.... Understanding this outcome requires that it be disaggregated.” The dominant inference then is that “if a nation performed an action, that action was the outcome “of bargaining among individuals and groups within the government.

3. Analytical Framework

3.1. Relevance

Although much of the U.S democracy promotion efforts have to do with various actors and organizations involved, most of the previous deals with the individual analysis, focusing on particular presidency in a particular time period, such as Bush administration or Clinton administration. In the past main focus was on individual presidencies at particular given period. It illustrated how each individuals ideologies or plan of actions impacted how the United States carried out democracy promotion efforts. Such analysis is clearly on individual level of analysis. The focus in accomplishment of each presidency at a given period, although may serve as an important analysis, does not take into account other organizations within the administration that conducts its activities. Nevertheless, based on the analysis of the individual presidents, it could help for the analysis at a broader, organizational, and bureaucratic level. The analysis used for individuals, in this case the presidents, could be used as a starting point for analysis of bureaucratic level. In addition, individual actors could be seen as having impact what actions each bureaucratic organizations. What individuals do could indeed affect the bureaucratic actions. This point is indeed emphasized by Allison (1969) who point out that individuals, particular presidents, alone cannot determine policy outcome, but rather there is a process through bureaucratic bargaining that determines outcome of policy. The purpose of this thesis is analysis of the bureaucracy that conducts democracy promotion activities, going specifically into dynamics that carry those organizations and

how they affect the overall U.S. democracy promotion efforts. Such analysis is important especially given the fact that there have been calls for making revisions to the way USAID conducts its democracy promotion efforts (Carothers, 2008). Not only that, there has been continual criticism regarding democracy promotion efforts as simply promoting American way of life, and there is nothing substantive to learn from. Furthermore, others have called democracy promotion as outdated and behind current paradigm of International Relations. Such calls does raise the question whether USAID as an implementing agency has not been able to carry its work in an appropriate manner, or if there lacks policy coherence between USAID and the State Department. Although democracy promotion may not be a priority agenda in the world today, it may serve as an important platform for countries, particularly post-conflict and fragile states in terms of establishment of stable, political institutions and participatory citizens.

3.2. Underlying interests behind U.S. foreign assistance

U.S foreign assistance can be categorized in different types of interests, and this is thoroughly discussed by Carol Lancaster (2006). These interests include security interest, humanitarian interests, and commercial. Although those interests may seem to be operating in a single-by-single case, it could be possible that each of interests reinforce each other. National security interest, which is among the dominant interest, has been the predominant theme of U.S. assistance programs. From a beginning in rebuilding Europe after World War II

and under the Marshall Plan (1948-1951) and through the Cold War, U.S. aid programs were regarded as utilized as a tool to serve as a buffer against communism and secure U.S. base in a fight against Soviet Union's communism. After the Cold War, the focus of U.S. foreign aid shifted away from global anti-communism. Right after the Cold War, the focus was more on other issues including, Middle East peace initiatives, the transition to democracy of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries, and fight against drug production and trafficking originating from Andes.

With the end one era, the security interest that defined the period of Cold War seemed to be on the decline. Such scenario, however, with 2011 September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, policymakers frequently have cast foreign assistance as a tool in the global war on terrorism, as large amounts of aid were spent on allied countries in the fight against global terrorism. Also huge amount were also spent on reconstruction efforts that took place in in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, both Bush and Obama Administration took global development as a key policy goal for achieving U.S. national security objective.

In terms of commercial interests, foreign assistance has been used to ensure promotion of U.S. promote U.S. exports by creating new customers for U.S. products or making initiatives that would improve the economic environment for smooth U.S. competition.

In terms of humanitarian concerns, U.S. gives foreign to drive both short-term assistance in response to crisis and disaster. In addition it also includes long-term development assistance aimed at reducing poverty, hunger, and other forms

of human suffering brought on by more systemic problems. This is the least contested area by both the policymakers and the public in giving U.S foreign aid for humanitarian efforts.

3.3. Objectives of assistance

The objectives of aid presumed to fit those of the U.S interests. When aid objectives are mentioned, following are regarded as U.S. objectives in foreign aid:

- promoting economic growth and reducing poverty,
- improving governance,
- addressing population growth,
- expanding access to basic education and health care,
- protecting the environment,
- promoting stability in conflict regions, protecting human rights,
- promoting trade,
- curbing weapons proliferation,
- Strengthening allies, and addressing drug production and trafficking.

Whether the United States has been meeting these objectives is yet to be identified. Yet it is acknowledged that the ultimate goal in meeting these objectives is to ensure national security of the United States, which would ensure favorable economic and trade environment, and send a clear image of the humanitarianism of American people.

In one sense, it may be logical to say that different types of aid supports

different types of objective outlined. However it is not as straightforward as it sounds. Instead, it is more that there is an overlap between different aid interests and objectives. For example, U.S not only has bilateral aid to channel assistance, but can also use multilateral aid to channel the same objectives as bilateral development assistance, military assistance, economic aid including rule of law and police training as well as programs to assist with country development. Those kind of support may ultimately lead to the U.S. political objectives in areas such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet at the same it may also be regarded assistance having a purpose of promoting democracy. In fact these objectives can serve multiple purposes, including promoting of democracy, both directly and indirectly. Military assistance and alternative development programs are integrated elements of American counter-narcotics efforts in Latin America and elsewhere. Such multiple purpose-nature of U.S. assistance depends on how it is designed. Project aimed to target HIV/AIDS problems in children, may have other effects as well. These other effects include promoting grass roots local governance, and promoting democracy. In addition such project would also serve U.S. humanitarian objectives. Economic programs, such as micro financing may focus on the primary goal of enhancing local economics, while serving the humanitarian objectives of proving food and education to the children living in the communities. Water and sanitation improvements both mitigate health threats and stimulate economic growth by saving time previously devoted to water collection, raising school attendance for girls, and facilitating tourism, among other effects.

In an effort to rationalize the assistance program more clearly, the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) at the State Department developed a framework in 2006 that organizes bilateral U.S. foreign aid, or at least that are under the auspices of the State Department and/or USAID around five strategic objectives, each of which includes a number of program sectors. (State Department) This framework deals with objectives of foreign assistance that the United States undertake that is channeled through State Department of the U.S. and USAID. Following are five objectives listed out by the State Department/USAID: Peace and Security; Investing in People; Governing Justly and Democratically; Economic Growth; and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)

There are six programs that make up peace and security objectives of the framework set up by the U.S. State Department/USAID: counter-terrorism; combating weapons of mass destruction; stabilization operations and security sector reform; counter narcotics; transnational crime; and conflict mitigation and reconciliation. These types of programs have been promoted by both Bush and Obama Administrations as essential to the war on terrorism and building stability in failing states that may become permissive environments for terrorism. For year 2010, the Peace and Security objective was funded at \$10.4 billion, up 42% from \$7.3 billion in 2006. Major portions of these funds were allocated to Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Jordan. This excludes the amount of funding went towards Department of Defense in training and equipping security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. If those numbers were to be including, it would have been additionally \$10.2 billion in the 2010 financial year.

Three programs also includes investing in people, and they include health, education, and social services and protection for vulnerable people. For year 2010, the objective was funded at \$10.9 billion, double the amount provided in year 2006. Most of the funding, 83%, falls in the health program area, particularly those programs addressing HIV/AIDS, which, at \$5.7 billion. HIV/AIDS accounts more than half of the funding for the objective. Health programs also include funds for combating avian influenza, tuberculosis, and malaria. A significant portion of health funds are provided for maternal and child health, family planning and reproductive health programs. Investing in people also encompasses most non-agricultural water and sanitation assistance efforts. The objective further includes education programs with the majority of funds focusing on basic education needs, especially in Africa, but increasingly in south and central Asia and the Middle East.

The objective includes a number of program areas related to promoting the rule of law and human rights, good governance, political competition, and civil society. The two largest components for year 2010 were the rule of law and good governance. The program targeted strengthening government institutions in terms of performance and accountability, through judiciary, police, as well as combating corruption and giving electoral support. Funding levels have grown significantly in recent years; the objective totaled \$3.6 billion in the year of 2010, more than double the amount provided in 2006. Two-thirds of this aid in FY2010 went to five countries of special political or strategic interest—Afghanistan (40% alone), Iraq, Mexico, Pakistan, and Haiti.

The Economic Growth objective, amounting to \$5.2 billion in the year 2010, a 51% increase since year 2006, includes a wide range of program areas that target economic growth in developing countries. Agriculture programs focus on reducing poverty and hunger, trade-promotion opportunities for farmers, and sound environmental management practices for sustainable agriculture. Private sector development programs include support for business associations and microfinance services. Programs for managing natural resources and protecting the global environment focus on conserving biological diversity; improving the management of land, water, and forests; promoting environmentally sound urban development; encouraging clean and efficient energy production and use; and reducing the threat of global climate change while strengthening sustainable economic growth. Were the DFA framework to encompass all foreign aid, regardless of funding source, the economic growth objective would likely include most of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, adding perhaps another \$1.0 billion in year 2010, and much of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), the latter funded by DOD at roughly \$1.2 billion in year 2010.

Humanitarian assistance responds to both natural and man-made disasters as well as problems resulting from conflict associated with failed or failing states. Responses include protection and assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons and provision of emergency food aid. Programs generally address unanticipated situations and are not integrated into long-term development strategies. In 2010, humanitarian programs were funded at roughly \$5.0 billion, which is double of the amount

As illustrated there are different various interests behind U.S. foreign aid. It can have political/security, commercial, humanitarian interests. U.S. foreign interests and objectives may differently categorize according to those categories. In addition not all U.S. foreign aid numbers are included in the numbers, as this only deals with number from State Department/USAID, and excludes numbers from Department of Defense and Millennium Challenge Corporation, MCC. In line with these motivations, the question is raised as where the democracy fits in, in terms of whether it fits in as a security interest, commercial, or humanitarian. Even the foreign objectives can serve multiple interests. Much of this depends how the initiatives, such as projects in a program is designed. In that sense, one objective could serve multiple interests. One initiative of an objective could serve not just a single objective, but also other objectives such as economic and humanitarian. This is partly attributed to the fact that the purpose or objective of democracy promotion is not explicated stated. Still democracy promotion cannot be ignored. Although it may be mentioned as explicit ends, democracy must still be regarded as an important element when trying to incorporate political, commercial, and humanitarian interests. In each of the interests and objectives, democracy is regarded as an important aspect, and it is one of the targets to achieve the objectives of its interests. In that sense, it can be said that democracy at least implicitly is regarded as foundational goals, regardless of the ambiguity of what interests drive the effort to promote democracy.

3.4. Rational-choice Institutionalism

When attempting to understand dynamics behind organizational behavior, it is helpful to look at rational-choice institutionalism. Rational-choice institutionalism is one of the new institutional approaches, taking up the basis of economic rationale. Under this theoretical approach, actors are said to maximize their utility, yet their actions are limited by so-called the rule-based constraints. Based on the neo-classical economics' principal-agent model, this theoretical approach provides a basis as to which actors' base their decision through set of preferences based on the existing constraints. Although this theoretical approach is an important useful tool, there is a criticism that rational-choice institutionalism is a overly simplistic and economist in nature. Still, it is helpful to use it when analyzing organizational behavior and structure. It is something that can also use to explain political behavior.

Theory such as rational-choice approach mostly has its roots in economics, and this has led to a claim by economists as using economics to approach politics, which one could agree in a sense that it is widely used in the field of economics. In a sense that rational-choice theory has been seen as success in analyzing in understanding marketing, this has led to apply the theory to sociology and political science. Much of the rational-choice takes up an economic approach to analysis. Rational-choice takes up a narrow definition of taking an action to balance costs against benefits that will lead to maximization of personal benefits. It refers to patterns of choices that individuals or groups of individuals made, based on measurement of costs and benefits that would lead

to maximum output. In the early days of neoclassical economics, happiness was presumed to be the element to be maximized. By twentieth century, maximization of happiness was seen as too narrow. Rather, the presumption is now how individuals' makes choice to take an action that is best for them, instead of narrowing down to only happiness.

One element that exists in rational-choice theory is existence of set of preferences. As humans, individuals have set of preferences, or in other terms, wants. These preferences or wants include material wants and protection from harm. Such preferences are needed as basis for human protection and survival. Preferences also include other elements as well. They can include religious and moral values, ideological beliefs, altruism, as well as sharing common culture with a family, clan, or a community. It is understood that there is no reason to know why individuals have certain preferences. This means that there is no way to know why certain individual have certain preferences, or wants over others. It could be also that individuals have certain preferences because there are no other choice choices or alternatives. In that sense preferences are regarded as what is seen as a given in a particular situation. With preferences come with it the people who are self-interested. This means that people who have certain preferences, are acting within their self-interest. When the world self-interest is taken, it should not be mistaken with the world selfishness. The word self-interest does not necessary mean that individual or group of individuals are selfish. Rather self-interest is used to refer to the reflection of pursuit of elements that people regard as important to them, which include preferences,

which include both material and immaterial elements (Shepsale, 2007).

Preferences, which include both material and immaterial elements, can be regarded as constituting interior environment. In addition to this interior environment is the external environment (Shepsale, 2007). External environment is largely characterized of uncertainty over how things work, about other people's preferences, and over events that an individual has no control over. In order to achieve a certain outcome for their preferences, individuals or group of individuals have to select a tool or an instrument that would lead to a certain outcome that is preferred the most. At the same time, such selection of tool or instrument is not easy, as there is an uncertainty over whether it will actually lead to the preferred outcome. Such uncertainty arises because individuals do not fully understand workings of the world and that there is also a random event in which they did not anticipate as to occur. Individual or individual groups only has certain amount of knowledge, while at the same time they must use whatever is available to them. In that sense, beliefs play a key role in ensuring proper outcomes. If an individual or group of individuals acts according to preferences, they are said to act based on instrumental rationality (Shepsale, 2007).

Beliefs are also another element that makes up an important role in rational choice theory. Belief is necessary not considered to be constant, as it can change over time, although it is factor that does define an individuals or groups of individuals. Such changes do occur as a result of learning experience. As result of learning experience, individuals may have change of beliefs about what

and how the world works. Learning experience may result in individuals changing opinions that they used to have previously. Such changes of opinion can be related to experiences that include elements of uncertainty particularly in terms of environmental effects. Combining the beliefs and preferences eventually results in rational individuals, acting consistently based on various learning experiences.

One aspect that needs to be recognized about beliefs and preferences used in a rational-choice context is that it is highly individualistic context. In that sense, it is more of analysis at an individual level. Nevertheless such analysis can be helpful in that, individual level of analysis could directly affect organizational level of analysis. Such analysis could be also helpful in organizational analysis in that analytical framework could be transferred and extended to the analysis at a state and organizational level.

Under rational-choice institutionalism, general elements of institutional analysis are context, action arena, incentives, interactions, outcomes, and evaluations that affect both outcomes and interactions. The context is known as to provide for initial conditions that structure the efforts to achieve outcomes, where actors within that context identify an action arena and its incentives. After identifying an action arena and its incentives, actors interact and generate outcomes. In order to examine the outcomes, one or more criteria for evaluation are applied.

Institutions are defined as not just organizations, but also rules and individuals use within and across boundaries of organizations (Shepsale, 2007).

The central focus underlying the definition of institution is the notion that there are humanly designed constraints. The constraints also include shared rules. These shared rules are known as shared understandings among the actors that offer prescriptions regarding what actions are required, prohibited, or permitted. Rules also establish the position of the rule enforcers, who have a power to coerce. They discuss how rule enforcement can be different between democratic society and in authoritarian society, where the former it may occur through so-called agreed-upon procedure, while the latter it simply occurs in an arbitrary way. There are four sets variables that characterize actors in a given situation. These four variables include, the resources such as time, energy, and finances that an actor bring to a situation, the internal values that actors assign to actions and outcomes (such as pride and shame), the way actors acquire, process, retain, and use knowledge and information, and lastly, the processes actors use to select particular course of actions.

Institutions, such as executives, legislatures, bureaucracies, whether they are within the public sphere, or part of private sector, play in important role as place of authority and resources to address the deal with the problems that occur constantly in a recurring manner. In discussing institutions, there are four elements that need to be recognized. These four elements include division of labor and regular procedure, specialization of labor, jurisdictions, and delegation and monitoring.

In terms of division of labor and regular procedure, there are different roles that actors have in an institutional context while there is also a procedure

that have to be followed. Such procedures and division of roles is important because it ensures order, while at the same time it allows efficiency to be enhanced. In addition to bringing order, it also allows participant to have a clear plan on what they would want to do and say, including how to participate in a what kind of particular sequence. Such plan is linked with empowerment of the participants. Such participants prevent arbitrary action by the leadership, and holding leadership accountable for their actions. Both procedures and division of labor ensures such accountability. The division of labor and procedures themselves are not arbitrary as they are part of constitutions, bylaws, and standing rules. At the same time, changes could be made to such division of labor and procedures, with examples being amendment of procedures, which can be done for a temporary time being or permanently. It can also be suspended for a short period of time, if there necessitates such actions (Shepsale, 2007).

Institutions are made up with actors are different from each other in terms of preferences and interests. Due to such differences, labor specialization occurs. Labor specialization is important in that allowing each actors to perform different things ensure maximum return on human of its members. At the same time it has to be recognized that not all institutions specialize in a labor, as some of them are regarded as generalist in nature. Still general institution may transform to a specialized institution. One major advantage behind specialization is that there is a level of expertise by each participant and this leads to each participants having an incentive to continue develop their level of expertise so to not fall behind others.

With expertise comes incentive, and with that expertise comes with jurisdictions that ensure facilitation of activities. Various institutions are organized into different divisions. In that sense, it leads to arrangement of jurisdictions, with its own specialization set up. Some of the specialization and jurisdiction occurs because of the outside environments and pressure from inside their own jurisdictions as well. To ensure that they are not being pushed around, participating members must have certain level of jurisdictions to ensure that their interests are preserved. Thus, institutional jurisdiction balances pressures from external environment from internal interests.

Although jurisdictions have its own advantages in that it allows specialization, it has to be acknowledged that it cannot always act to serve collective interests (Shepsale, 2007). This is particularly important when taking into account the possibility that if an actor did whatever it wanted to do under its own jurisdiction. This is particularly true especially in situations where there are no restraints being made to an actor or set of actors. In that sense although jurisdiction may have an advantage of dividing up labor and specializing labor, the disadvantage is that it necessary won't be accomplishing the collective goals it set out to do. This is where monitoring comes in whereby through delegation and decentralization, monitoring ensure that an acting agent does not act to pursue private agenda, but rather ensure that actions benefit for the collective public good. Such decentralization allows for specialization of labor, because all the resources are devoted towards those who specialize it. In addition such specialization allows for the participants to have an incentive to maximize their

output. The decentralization and delegation is facilitated by principal-agent model, whereby a participant acting as a delegator, acting as a principal, selects the delegate acting as a agent. An agent is given an authority that is entrusted by the principal, and is accountable to the principal for the actions and decisions it makes.

Thus, institutions are consisted by division of labor, specialization of activities, as well as grouping participants into jurisdictions. In addition to these elements, there are elements of delegation, monitoring, as well as incentives that facilitate for maximization of output. Institution can be described as governance structure, allowing mixture of individual desires and organizational interests as a whole. In this process, institutions may transform time after time, evolving from one set of characteristics to another.

Under the rational-choice institutional model, there are assumptions that actors have preferences that are complete and well-ordered, information that is complete, computational capability without limitations, and that the actors maximize the net value of expected returns to them. These assumptions are regarded as useful for analyzing situation where there is considerable competition and that individuals are seen as short sighted and competitive (Gibson et al, 2007).

Rational-choice institutionalism is a helpful guideline in understanding how each bureaucratic agency pursue its interests, which may necessary not be only for the sake of collective action, but for the each agencies' own interest. It forms a foundation for understanding dynamics behind the process of how the

each bureaucratic organizations work to reach outcomes and objectives.

Government organization impact how the aid money is allocated. Carol Lancaster presents two propositions. As part of the first proposition, she present government agencies as acting on their rights to pursue their interest, working under the executive branch of government, but also with private interest groups, foreign government agencies, INGOs, and interests groups. Her second proposition is that whether an agency will have an impactful influence on an agenda depends upon whether that agency is a single unified, and located at the high ends of a bureaucratic ladder. In the case of the United States, Lancaster notes that there was indeed resistance in mid-1990s of putting USAID under Department of State. She points out that it was possible that the USAID's goal of long term-sustainable development would be undermined by the State Department's diplomatic minded mission and values.

What drives the U.S. diplomacy is based on security interest of ensuring the preservation of the world peace and protection of the American values and life for its citizens. Yet at the same time it has to be regarded U.S. foreign policy is not all about enhancing its own security interests, but expanding upon the humanitarian values, which may well grow thanks to globalizations. Lancaster notes of four key values of U.S. diplomacy. One is providing humanitarian relief, while the second value refers to promotion of development and poverty reduction, third being the improvement of quality of life, while the fourth value address assisting for democracy and human rights expansion around world. Human Rights and democracy is regarded as important because it is a value that

is shared by the American, not for the sake of interest rooted in political and security considerations, but also taking the humanitarian consideration as well. At the same time promotion of democracy may continue on, although it may not be an aid spending priority (Lancaster, 2006).

When attempting to figure out what is U.S interest in democracy promotions, it is important to regard to U.S interests in foreign aid and diplomacy, as well as objective goals behind. Although it may be difficult to ascertain explicit objectives of democracy promotion, looking at U.S. interests in foreign aid is nevertheless good starting point to look at U.S. interest in democracy promotion.

3.5. Research question

The collapse of the Cold War era in 1990s, signaled the end of the security-based assistance, and focuses more on ensuring humanitarian-based interests, with addressing other issues such as peacemaking and transnational problems at the focus on the aid assistance (Lancaster, 2006).

Looking at the literature review and major actors of the U.S. democracy promotion efforts, following research questions are raised based on assumptions that internal bureaucratic dynamics can be a contributing factor to the perception that it needs reform.

1. Why have U.S. efforts to promote democracy mainly regarded as needing for reform?

4. Organizational structure of U.S. foreign aid policy

4.1. Overview

When looking at the U.S. foreign policy in terms of assistance to promote democracy, it is important to look at foreign assistance structure. There is a criticism of fragmentation with expansion of organizations such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) in the State Department. Various departments and agencies take part in aid assistances, with each having their own objectives. In that sense the foreign aid architecture of the U.S can be seen as largely decentralized. Furthermore, both the Department of Defense (DOD) and Treasury expanded their authority and their total share of foreign assistance. Between its inception in FY 2003 and the end of FY 2008, the MCC has entered into compact agreements worth \$6.3 billion. During the same period, threshold programs administered by USAID reached \$440 million. OGAC is responsible for administering the PEPFAR, the single largest foreign assistance program. Funding for PEPFAR through the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) account is expected to reach almost \$4.8 billion in FY 2009. Other new programs and entities at the State Department include the Democracy and Human Rights Fund, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).

4.2. Department of State

We look forward to working with all who embrace genuine and inclusive democracy. What we will oppose is an attempt by any group to restrict the rights of others, and to hold power through coercion and not consent. Because democracy depends not only on elections, but also strong and accountable institutions, and the respect for the rights of minorities.”- U.S. President Obama (State Department)

The Department of State has various bureaus and programs that are included as initiatives for democracy promotion.

The bureau under the Department of State responsible for overseeing the democracy promotion of the United States is the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (Department of State, 2014). In addition to promoting democracy, this particular bureau undertakes addressing human rights, religious freedom, and advancing labor rights. The general goal of the bureau is to ensure that democracy is promoted not in a sense that it is unilaterally pursued by the United States, but in a sense that peace is secured globally, allowing the United States pursue its interests. Based on the general goals, the bureau has outlined four specific goals which include democracy promotions used as a way to ensure security in the world, ensure assistance of democracies that is newly formed, helping the democracy advocates, and naming and shaming regimes that does not adhere to the principle of allowing its citizens right to elect their leaders. The bureau is vested with the responsibility of being in-charge of Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF). HRDF is a fund established in

1998 to be used in areas of democratization and human rights. Parts of the HRDF funds are used by the DRL in order to finance conducting of democracy promotion which includes but not limited to monitoring of elections and development of parliament systems.

As a “venture capital” fund for democracy and human rights, the HRDF ensures rapid response by the U.S. in cases where there is a crisis in democratization and human rights. The programs supported by the HRDF ensure that democracy activists are guaranteed support while human rights abuses are being minimized. In addition to DRL has received funds from other government branches agencies, including from Congress and other Bureaus belonging to the state department. Examples include Congressional Supplemental appropriation, Congressional earmarks, Economic Support Funds (ESF), Partnership to Eliminate Sweatshop Production (PESP) funds, Support for Eastern Europe Democracy (SEED) fund, and funds for programs in Iraq. By FY 2010, DRL appropriated \$207 million, although that number is lower than what was appropriated in the year 2007 (\$320 million). Currently, Iraq has the largest share of the programming with the appropriation covering about 48% of the whole programming budget.




Figure. 1: Amount of Foreign Assistance Outflow from DRL bureau, State Department (U.S. State Department)




Figure 2. Regional Allocation for the funding from DRL (United States Department of State)

In addition to these activities, the Bureau is responsible for putting together the report known as Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, which is report put together through duration of a month-long period to describe human right situation in various countries located in the world. It also compiles the human rights record of the United States in the world, through a report known as Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record. This report addresses question of whether and how the United States has played a role in a given country's progress in promoting democracy and human rights. It is largely looking at the way the U.S missions and embassies have conducted its aid assistance, diplomacy at a bilateral and multilateral level.

One notable initiative by the State Department is the U.S-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) (U.S. State Department). The work of the MEPI can be categorized into four themes, which are economic, political, education and women. Through economic support, MEPI supports projects related to entrepreneurship and expansion of private sectors to ensure that economic growth does occur. Such activities are seen as important foundation for a democratic society. Through the theme of political, MEPI emphasizes respect of democratic governance, rule of law, political participation, freedom of the press, and citizen engagement. MEPI plays a role of inviting youths, lawmakers, and professionals from the region so that they could learn about democracy. Furthermore, through grants, its initiatives work to supports civil society organizations, CSOs, in order for them to have an impact on the local community. In terms of education, the emphasis is placed on youth, who are

seen as important agents to be catalysts for change. MEPI offers education opportunities for the youth in order for them to be competitive economically and contribute to the democratic process. And finally, but not least, the theme of women deals with working towards empowering women in terms of increasing opportunities for them in terms of participation in politics and economics.

While the MEPI can be seen as a bilateral effort, the State Department engages in a similar initiative at a multilateral level through Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA). The BMENA's main goal is to ensure that liberalization of political and economic sector occur in Muslim countries. BMENA was rooted in the declaration "Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa," by the members of the G-8 nations on June 9th 2004. This declaration was followed by the first meeting, which was called "Forum for the Future," in that took place in Rabat, Morocco in December 2004. This meeting resulted in the commitment of G8 countries as well as foreign ministers and finance ministers in the region of around \$60 million to create a fund for regional development located at International Finance Corporation (IFC). Such fund will have a goal of making a provision of technical support and financial assistance to small private enterprises. United States as a participant of the forum made a commitment of \$15 million for two years. The second important outcome of the forum was creation of a dialogue mechanism that would allow CSOs to talk with the regional government regarding the topic of reform. And finally, the third commitment deal with creation of Microfinance Training Center to assist

NGOs giving micro financing to those with ambitions of entrepreneurship but cannot get a loan from the commercial banks. Currently there are about twenty three regional members participating in BMENA (U.S. State Department).

Diplomatically, one notable initiatives by the State Department is the Community of Democracies, which was initiated with the then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, working together with Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prof. Bronislaw Geremek. The COD officially came into existence in June 2000 during a ministerial conference with representatives coming from 106 countries, through the outcome document “Toward a Community of Democracies” (Community of Democracies). The main commitment of the delegation was to ensure that the democratic values were respected through implementation of actions. The COD is a coalition of states at an intergovernmental level that attempts to bring together governments, CSOs, and private sector with a one goal of ensuring that the democratic rules, norms, and institutions are respected.

There are other major bureaus in the State Department, in conjunction with the DRL bureau that conducts democracy promotion activities, in addition to the bureau of DRL. They include Special Coordinator for Assistance to Europe and Eurasia under the Bureau for European and Eurasian Affairs, as well as Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs plays a role of influencing political development through the use of educational exchanges and scholarship programs.

Through the use of these bureaus, the State Department uses both diplomacy

in bilateral and multilateral context and the foreign assistance programs. Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report 2013 addresses key areas in which the State Department, in conjunction with other government departments, have worked to strengthen and achieve. These key areas include: strengthening institutions and civil society, electoral and political process, economic freedom, freedom of press, rule of law, ensuring rights of women, the disabled, and human rights compliance to international norms.

At a multilateral level, the U.S works with multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Program, and it also cooperates with the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth, and the African Union. Also the U.S. works with treaties and norms, with example being Universal Declaration Human Rights.

4.3. Department of Defense (DoD)

There is no other proper agency than DoD that offers training in democratic values as a military organization. It provides education to both military and civilian defense officials through two renowned program International Military Education Training (IMET) and Military-to-Military Contacts Program (MMCP).

International Military Education Training (IMET) is a grant providing program that provides education for international military personnel. Through IMET the DoD ensures that not only the military capability is built, but also institutional capacity through exposure of U.S democratic institutions, human

rights, and civilian control of military. The course offered entails how to manage military, civil-military relations, as well as exposure to human rights (U.S. Department of Defense). The IMET gives an exposure how civilian take responsibility of managing military organizations. Elements of U.S democracy, such as judicial system, freedom of speech, issues related equality are being taught. Through such actions, the main goal is to foster stability in regional terms, provision of increasing military capability, and maintenance of democratic values within the military and civilian personnel. The IMET is funded by the U.S. State Department and is coordinated jointly by Department of State and Defense. The benefits of IMET are not only restricted increased personal relationship between the U.S military officials and the foreign military officials through close contract, but also enhance military cooperation. Such enhancing of cooperation is possible as military officials coming from outside the U.S. are given understanding of the elements of the U.S. military, such as the military doctrine and the U.S military operations, allowing for closer interaction, sharing of information, as well as planning and conducting exercises in a joint manner.

Whereas IMET is a type of some formal training. MMCP is a type of program that reaches out to the select countries, and ensures that they are familiar with the structure of U.S. military. (U.S. Department of Defense). MMCP has a main objective of engaging in dialogue with defense ministries of select countries so that those countries could play a role of supporting democratic values, rule of law, and upholding constitution. The MMCP contains Military Liaison Team

(MLT) in a particular select country that makes a determination of what that country needs, as well as Traveling Contact Teams (TCTc) that gives provision of an expertise in a functional needs determined by the MLT and the select country. Thus MMCP is a tool used to identify what the needs of a particular country is, influences state institutions at a short term time period. Like the coordination process for the IMET, the MMCP is coordinated through the Department of State.

One way the DoD works to promote democracy is engaging in institution-building efforts particularly in the post-conflict and fragile states. This particularly true during 2001-2010, when United States, during the Bush administration was engaged highly in Iraq, Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan. During that time period the DoD accounted for about 20 percent of the total U.S. ODA with an increase in non-ODA flows which include increasing military capacity of foreign forces (Patrick and Brown, 2007). Although such increase in terms of ODA amounts and non-ODA assistance may have coincided with the War on Terror, it is still noted that the DoD has expanded its scope of roles that would otherwise have been taken on by the State Department and the USAID. Such actions were recognized by the OECD DAC in its peer review that DoD's role in ODA has been increasing.

There are mechanisms in which the DoD can use at their disposal. Thought they may not be necessarily directly linked to the democracy promotion efforts, it nonetheless play a role in promoting democracy, while it has to be noted that the development is one of the important pillars of the U.S. foreign policy, with

DoD having an important role in reconstruction and emergency response program. Important initiatives include Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which involves addressing post-conflict Iraq and Afghanistan in dealing with humanitarian and reconstruction needs. CERP funds were allocated to focus on the military efforts to restore, normalize and stabilize operations of infrastructure ranging from sanitation to school buildings. Another initiative include Provincial Reconstruction Team, which consist of short-term projects with a main goal and mandate to enhancing security of the local area, coordinating reconstruction, and increasing supporting the role of the central government. Contribution was made towards disarming militia groups, road construction, electoral support, and equipping the police forces with appropriate training (Patrick and Brown, 2007).

Although the PRTs initially was started in Afghanistan, similar PRT initiatives took hold in Iraq, with the increased scope of mandate as compared to PRT in Afghanistan, to include areas such as reconciliation promotion and fostering of growth economically and capacity development. Besides reconstruction and nation-building efforts, DoD has put effort in three other areas, which include interdicting and counter drug activities, giving humanitarian assistance, as well as global HIV/AIDS prevention. The main focus of the counter-drug activities is dealing with security threats in relation to production and trafficking of drugs, and includes conducting technical assistance, training, and setting up infrastructure to carry out their main focus. In the FY 2005-2006, about \$500 million-\$900 million have been spent set aside for DoD (U.S. Department of

Defense). In terms of humanitarian assistance, DoD has been involved not only in areas that are torn by conflict, but also in dealing with response to emergency situation arising from humanitarian problems caused by natural disaster. The Pentagon has Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account, which ensure that the U.S military is deployed at a non-combatant level to provide for essentials items such as food, shelter, and health services after the disaster or the conflict has occurred (Melia, 2005). Main goal of the HIV/ AIDS prevention is to ensure reduction in numbers of the military personnel infected with HIV/AIDS by giving resources to train and setting up a capacity for prevention through education campaigns and handing HIV test kits.

Aside from what is considered to be the scope of ODA, there are other aid activities that the DoD particularly taking into context War on Terrorism. On basis of War on Terrorism, much of the focus is on the building capacity of foreign governments to secure against the threat of terrorism (Patrick and Brown, 2007). DoD's scope of action in this area did not restrict to the military force capacity of foreign governments, but also enhancing local infrastructure and governance, looking for ways to improve the quality of life. Particularly during the Bush administration, there are various initiatives in relation to the capacity building. They include Section 1206 Funds, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), US. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and Building Global Partnership Act.

Derived from the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA, the Section 1206 allows Pentagon to use up to \$300 million for its operation any

time during the calendar year to help enhancing the capacity of partner countries in counter terrorism efforts in those countries. CJTF-HOA is one of the initiatives of the DoD's efforts to counter the threats of terrorism, as there are other sub-regions in Africa that undertakes similar initiatives. CJTF was created under the rationale that giving economic and social opportunities to African governments will eventually lead to winning over the opinions of the citizen population in that continent. Aside from the CJTF, there were two other major CT programs based in Africa, one in North Africa region and one in East Africa. It is important to note that these initiatives were done not only through the DoD, but working alongside with the State Department and USAID especially in provision of goods such as hospitals and schools. In the end the main intended outcome would be to have those countries discredit terrorist groups and establishment of bilateral relations with U.S. military (Patrick and Brown, 2007).

AFRICOM is an effort to ensure that the different commands that are involved in the continent of Africa, and includes staff coming from outside of the DoD (Patrick and Brown, 2007). The target of the AFRICOM is to root out extremism, terrorism, and violent actions before they come to a point of crisis. The main objective lies in focusing on African countries to prevent and deter the growth of possible terrorists, through working together to ensure stability in the region, and thereby preventing the rise of terrorist groups in the region. The specific goals for AFRICOM includes strengthening of fragile state, establishing democratic governance, and economic development, thereby securing access to the continent and protecting areas/sectors vital to the U.S. interests.

Building Global Partnerships Act refers to proposing changes to current laws to ensure that DoD play an expanded role to provide the foreign assistance (Patrick and Brown, 2007). The legislative changes would come from laws regarding DoD and Foreign Assistance of the U.S. Code. The BGP would allow U.S. Combatant Commanders to be flexible and use the DoD funds directly to build capacity for domestic security forces, as well as use it to address the humanitarian and reconstruction demands where there in the regions of natural disasters or conflict.

Public funding by the DoD regarding democracy promotion was roughly \$500 million per year around 2000. This funding which was disbursed through the USAID would eventually be increased to about \$1 Billion by FY 2004, with not taking into account the spending in Iraq and Afghanistan. When Iraq and Afghanistan spending is added by FY 2005, about \$2 billion has been committed toward spending for democracy promotion. The figure, however, may only be estimate, as it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of the funding, due to such decentralized nature of democracy promotion activities (Melia, 2005). Also compounding to the problem is the lack of exact definition of what activities constitute democracy promotion, as no consensus has reached by the policy makers regarding that matter.

4.4. USAID

USAID is the premier agency in the United States dealing with development in the context of humanitarian and economic growth for the developing countries. Its formation was started by the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act by the Congress to take upon the action of conducting foreign assistance. After officially becoming the law, USAID became an official institution under the presidency of John F. Kennedy. John F. Kennedy's speech underlines the intention of moral and humanitarian work of the USAID, as he states.

There is no escaping our obligations: our moral obligations as a wise leader and good neighbor in the interdependent community of free nations – our economic obligations as the wealthiest people in a world of largely poor people, as a nation no longer dependent upon the loans from abroad that once helped us develop our own economy – and our political obligations as the single largest counter to the adversaries of freedom." (USAID, 2014)

The democracy promotion aspect of the USAID is conducted in two ways. One way is having an office dealing with democracy promotion, which is called the DRG office. Another way is emphasizing democracy particularly in the context of governance as it is regarded as playing a key for long-term sustainable development. Decade by decade throughout history there was an evaluation of the focus of the USAID. Until the 1990s, the main focus of the USAID in development field dealt with focusing on basic needs of humans, which includes ensuring aspects such as food, health, education, health, and development of human resources. Before the 1990s, also emphasized was the

focus on establishing free market systems in developing countries so that they would have stabilization of currency and financial systems. By 1990s, Berlin Wall fell and the USAID's main focus was on sustainable development and to ensure that the developing countries, particularly those that are transitioning countries would establish democratic system that includes market-based economic systems (USAID, 2014). By the 2000s, the United State was at the forefront of War on Terrorism at Iraq and Afghanistan. USAID played a role in this to ensure the expansion of democratic and free market systems while also ensuring the enhancement of quality of life of the people.

Just like the DoS and DoD, USAID has a long-term goal of ensuring stabilization in post-conflict regions in the world, as well as enhancement of economic and social development at a global level. The main sectors include agriculture and food security, economic growth and trade, education, environment and global climate change, gender equality and empowerment of women, global health, water and sanitation, working in crises and conflict. In these areas the main emphasis is the promotion of development and modernization and expansion of infrastructure.

Along with these sectors include the democracy, human rights and governance programmes, known as DRG. As stated by the DRG section in the USAID website following are as stated for the focus of the DRG:

Supporting more legitimate, inclusive and effective governments, so that they are responsive to the needs of their people;

Helping countries transition to democracy and strengthen democratic

institutions, capitalizing on critical moments to expand freedom and opportunity; and

Promoting inclusive development, so that women, minorities and vulnerable populations benefit from growth, opportunity and the expansion of rights (USAID, 2014).

At the heart of DRG Programme is the Center for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, which undertake evidence-based research, to undertake measurements and evaluation of practices of promoting democracy, human rights, and governance. There are four main objectives behind the DRG Strategic Framework, and they include promotion of participatory government processes and institutions, fostering of accountability, promotion of universal human rights norm, integrating DRG aspects into the USAID's development agenda. As explained by its Strategy paper DRG strategy, emphasis placed on democratic governance, along the lines of respect for human rights. For USAID those elements are regarded as important, same emphasis is placed on sustainable development in a long term in the context of global social and economic development. Democratic institutions are seen as important element to ensuring the gains from development are sustained, thus large emphasis is placed on the framework DRG. To realize its goals, USAID's attempts to makes its objectives consistent in line with the principles both found in the United States, underlined by the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), National Security Strategy, (NSS), and Presidential Policy Directives on Global Development. At the same time international principles are also taken

into account as well, and they include Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (USAID, 2014).

Although DRG department seems to undertake important role in democracy promotion, within the USAID, there is another department that conducts activities of promoting democracy. It is known as Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, located under the Office of Transition Initiatives. Rather than focusing on long-term goals like the DRG, the OTI's main emphasis is on short and quick response to give funding and support initiatives in post-conflict areas (USAID, 2014). Its main focus is to paving way for long-term political development in post-conflict countries that are going transition by programmes to catalyze transition to democracy. While DRG's main focus seems to complement the overall global social and economic development, OTI's role of conducting promotion of democracy takes place under the realms of aiding regions going through the transition from conflict or authoritarianism to democracy. Although the DRG and OTI may be having similar objectives and policy goals, the approaches taken by these two departments may be different. While the former deals with putting in the aspect of democracy in sectors dealing with socio-economic development, the latter is putting together quick action to ensure smooth transition of democracy. While the DRG Programme is housed under the Center for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, the OTI initiatives are separately houses a Bureau of democracy, conflict and humanitarian assistance.

Still, apart from the role of these two offices under the USAID democracy there other offices that deals with the issue of democracy and humanitarian assistance. Although it may seem that such separation of offices allows for putting in the framework of promoting democracy in various department, but the question is raised as to who is technically in-charge of handling promotion of democracy efforts, despite the fact that there is a common theme of emphasizing democratic governance within each of the offices. The direction and approaches on implementation may differ, but the fact is that the issues of decentralization, which indeed has been continually raised, cannot be ignored. Due to the nature of the USAID, the decision making process takes place at a decentralized level, differing with each offices and missions overseas in terms of implementation of promoting of democracy.

Democracy is center of the guiding principles that drive how the USAID implements its foreign assistance. One of the criteria used to whether to disburse aid assistance is connecting it to whether the recipient country is has demonstrated that there is a political will to undertake reforms and good governance. Rewards and punishments will be based on whether a recipient country is willing to make changes in terms of political and economic reforms. This includes making efforts to fight corruption and enhancing rule of law. In return, the U.S. government would reward those making such efforts through debt relief, foreign investments, and as well as liberalization of trade. If the commitment to reform is made by the recipient countries, the USAID undertakes punishment such as selectively suspending foreign aids. Indirectly,

the U.S. government could and has used its voting power in World Bank and other multilateral development banks to pressure to stop financing governments that characterized with corruption and wasteful. Rather than placing conditionality, the proposed action by USAID is to go with selectivity, selecting only those that are performing with impact and stop assisting those that do not abide by demands for good governance. Furthermore, the U.S. government could coordinate with other bilateral donor countries to pressure the countries to open up for democratic governance. For USAID promotion of democracy does play an important role in ensuring sustainable development so that democracy and better governance could be achieved. Such action could be achieved through enhancing civil society organizations that include NGOs, interest groups, and social movements (USAID, 2002).

The rationale behind promotion of democracy is that it is good for governance, in which the good governance in turn plays a key role in eradication of poverty and promotion of development (USAID, 2002). Due to the fact that governance is linked the way the state handles public resources, it is important to ensure democratic governance. For USAID the concept of democracy and good governance is regarded as a mutually reinforcing for the good of advancing public good. The process and institution of the public functions and operates in a designated setting and in a smooth manner. Bad governance may lead to consequences that reach not only at regional level but at a global level. A country with a corrupt government may well be mired in dire poverty, while the deficit that does not go away may prevent potential investment to come to the

country. If the state lacks a capacity to deal with social issues, it may lead to criminal acts that includes but not limited to terrorism, piracy, kidnapping, and money laundering. The objective of the U.S. government, including USAID, is not simply push for advancement or just promotes democracy, but instead focusing on making changes that has an impact at an institutional level.

Main areas that USAID focuses to prioritize include addressing corruption, accountability, and rule of law, enhancing political parties, use of NGOs including interest groups in strengthening of democracy, and working to more professionalize the capacity of states. Such main priorities come from enhancement of links at an intergovernmental agency level, through between sectors, and through going through time period of long term (USAID, 2002). Even so, the context of the recipient country must be taken into account, as different countries have different set of characteristics. Some countries that are successful in terms of being an electoral democracy may still have difficulties with corruption, inefficiency at a judicial level, abuse of human rights, and domination of one-party politics.

As part of its democracy promotion efforts, the U.S. in part of the Open Government Partnership, OGP, this is a promotion of enhancing governance, transparency, and fighting corruption, and citizen empowerment. Through OGP, the USAID has initiated partnerships with U.K. Department for International Development (DFID), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), AND Omidyar Network to form what is known as Grand Challenge for Development Making All Voices Count (MAVC) (USAID, 2013). This

partnership entails supporting solutions enhancing greater participations by the citizens affecting the goal of more democratic and effective governance.

Therefore, USAID advocates for a strategy that is not only applies to them, but a kind of a strategy that incorporate other agencies, such as Department of State and USAID. It also involves donors working with one another, learning from each other's experiences. At the same time, the goal must be sustainability of democracy promotion efforts, while patience for a long-term period is also the necessary key ingredient to see the possible success.

USAID, through DRG and OTI, is regarded as big players in promoting democracy around the world, with a funding size of \$1.3 billion in DRG programs. In the 2006 financial year \$1.448 billion was earmarked for DRG efforts in USAID (USAID, 2014).

Between these agencies the problems that the U.S faces in promoting democracy through democratic governances has to do with lack of policy coherence and consistency at a broader U.S. foreign policy. If USAID has a certain objectives related to democratic governance, there has to some sort of a coherence and consistency with the objectives of other actors that represent U.S foreign policy. There are various agencies that represent U.S foreign policy, including the State Department, National Security Council, the Defense Department, as well as other agencies. It is important that no mixed or contradictory messages are sent towards a certain country; as such actions may lead to perceptions of ambiguity about the objectives. Putting such needs into practice is indeed difficult. Particularly after 9-11 terrorist attacks, there is a

difficulty behind ensuring policy coherence and consistency, as the priorities may be different for each agencies. Not only that each agencies may have objectives that may be contradictory to each other or may have objectives that are in tension with each other. A clear example of the tension was after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as there was tension within the U.S. foreign policy architecture on whether to prioritize democracy or cooperation for war on terror. Although it can be said that countries with democratic governance is an essential factor to enhance U.S. strategy on War on Terrorism, such scenario is indeed a difficult and complex issue to deal with. If the objective is to continue on with democratic governance, then efforts must be made to continue to pursue those objectives, while at the same time approaching it in a realistic manner possible (Diamond, 2008).

In general when looking at the difference between State Department and DoD, there is countervailing interests where human rights and democracy is focus of the State Department, while the goal of DoD is on the ensuring access for military forces and less on the host government's politics (Carothers, 1999). Before 9/11, U.S. did have friendly relations with the autocratic regimes for securing economic and security interests, but after 9/11 those priorities changed as it was believed that those were indeed breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism. Also another question is raised where democracy promotion is used as a merely a tool or an instrument to achieve the ends of the policy goals for the DoS and the USAID, even though those differences may differ.

The whole of the U.S aid system lacks a centralized command center (Melia,

2007). State Department disburses aid consistent with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. USAID focuses on the humanitarian aspects of development, including disaster relief, combating diseases, and addressing extreme poverty. DoD takes leadership role in dealing military assistance during conflict and post-conflict regions where stabilization and reconstruction is needed in a country. Treasury Department deals with programs associated with international financial institutions such as IMF and WB. Issues related with food aid is linked to the Agriculture Department, while trade and private investment as overseen by the Commerce Department.

Bush Administration during the 2001 signaled the beginning of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, MCC. MCC is characterized as having an ownership by the recipients, autonomy in programmes, and eligibility on the grounds of performance, and transparency and evaluation. In addition to those, there was a program in fighting of HIV/AIDS. Yet after 9/11 attacks, security interests would emerge. It is thought that the terrorism may be product of extreme development causing a societal unrest and instability that includes resentment towards the U.S. or other Western countries. There was an increase in ODA, particularly in military assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan post-9/11, reinforcing the notion that there was large security interest behind U.S actions (Hook, 2008)

An example is 1990s in Africa, where the United States sought and demanded countries in the continent of Africa to open up for multiparty elections to further democracy in sub-Saharan region of Africa (Melia, 2005). Funds for elections

monitoring, enhancing rule of law, civil society support were allocated. Both the State Department and the USAID created offices that dealt with the democracy. Under Clinton Administration, the values behind Democratic Peace Theory, in which democratic states do not go into war with another was echoed. For development approach, democracy is a precondition for long term sustainable development enhanced by transparency, accountability preventing mismanagement due to corruption as well conflict.

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4.5. Organizational Relationships: USAID-DoD

The office within the USAID that is responsible of coordinating cooperation activities with the Department of Defense is the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation, CMC. It is a main point of contact with the DoD. This office was created in response to the recommendations of the National Security Strategy, NSS, which calls for development be established as a strong pillar along with diplomacy and defense so that core goal of accomplishing national security could be achieved. NSS also recognizes the need for cooperation between the

DoD and other civilian governmental agencies such as the Department of State and USAID in response to the challenges of 21st century, among them which include terrorism and extremism. The Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy, drafted by the USAID, establishes foundational guidelines with regards to how USAID cooperates with the US DoD. The areas that are covered include joint planning, assessment, evaluation, training, implementation, and strategic communication. The cooperation between the USAID and DoD is implemented in such a way that they apply to operating fields particularly in fragile and post-conflict regions.

Various principles guide the way USAID conducts its activities in cooperation with DoD. The first principle is on the basis that USAID resources will not be diverted from its development purposes, meaning that although they might work together with DoD, their central mission of adhering to development will always be maintained. The second principle deals with maintaining and working with DoD based on its expertise of maintaining the support of local people as well as hiring Foreign Service Nationals (FSN). The cooperation between the USAID and DoD would take place based on different contexts and will address the need to ensure the reduction of lack of balancing between the DoD and USAID in post-conflict and fragile states. USAID, in the context of its cooperation with DoD, would seek to have improvements in terms of having a readiness to ensure smooth coordination.

An example of the cooperation between the USAID and the DoD includes placing DoD's Military Liaison Representatives in USAID and having USAID

Senior Development Advisors be located in combatant commands COCOMs and Joint Staff. Most often the USAID conducts activities related to approving and advising on funds for humanitarian and civic actions.

When discussion of USAID-DoD cooperation is made, it can be said that significant progress were made in terms of stabilization operations, training of USAID and DoD personnel in joint operations, and coordinating humanitarian intervention.

DoD's role in terms of its cooperation with the USAID is outlined in the in the DOOD 3000.05, in which central focus is on cooperating with other U.S agencies in terms of:

- (1) Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former belligerents into civil society.
- (2) Rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces.
- (3) Strengthening governance and the rule of law.
- (4) Fostering economic stability and development.

Under the DOOD 3000.05, the DoD has a directive to carry out the reconstruction and stabilization operations when other U.S. agencies lack capacity to conducts those activities.

The cooperative relationship between the DoD and USAID is also emphasized in the Framework for U.S. Foreign Assistance where it states that success of international development is dependent upon the cooperation between military branch of government agency, DoD, and non-military branch of government agency, USAID. The Framework for U.S. Foreign Assistance

operates on the rationale that development and security is interdependent with each other, as development assistance cannot occur smoothly without the necessary security, while without development assistance, security cannot be guaranteed without development assistance. For DoD, USAID's role is vital, especially in terms of offering expertise in local institution capacity building in contributing to the stability and reconstruction of a country.

The DoD and USAID cooperation efforts are reflected in the The Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24), Guidance for the Employment of the Force, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the regional Theater Security Cooperation plans.

4.6. Organizational Relationships: Department of State-Department of Defense

The cooperation between the DoD and the Department of State is underlined by the National Security Presidential Directive 44, which gives out the role of the Secretary of State as responsible for coordinating, planning, and implementing reconstruction and stabilizations assistance for fragile and post-conflict regions. In addition, the Secretary of State has a responsibility to coordinate with Secretary of Defense to ensure that there is harmony. Although such guidelines do exist, exchanges and cooperation rarely occurs between these two agencies, but such lack of coordination and cooperation has gone unnoticed.

The bureau under the Department of State that connects between The State Department and the Department of Defense is the Political-Military Affairs bureau. To address the issue to improve interagency coordination, Department of State and Department of Defense in January 2012, under the leadership of Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, signed a memorandum of understanding that increases number of personnel exchanged between agencies. Such cooperation between the State Department and the DoD is driven by the Office of the Coordinator for the Foreign Policy Advisors, POLADs, in which Foreign Service Officers from the State Department link military commands and the State Departments, advising on foreign policy, and ensuring that the activities of DoD and the State Department are aligned with each other.

4.7. Millennium Challenge Corporation

In January 2004, the U.S. established a government agency to address the problems that the poorest countries in the world face, known as Millennium Challenge Corporation, MCC. This agency, largely an initiative by the Bush Administration, was created due to the criticisms that the aid agencies of the United States were not making a fruitful impact. The establishment of the MCC took place under the notion that the allocation of foreign assistance funds must be based on commitment for policies that are democratic. (Millenium Challenge Corporation). The MCC began with the Congressional approval known as Millennium Challenge Act of 2003. Since then, it has become known as MCC

which is the name of the main independent entity. The main mission for MCC is poverty reduction through economic growth. MCC's main driving force of core principles, as it will be illustrated throughout the processes, include sound policies, ownership by the recipient countries, and accountability. MCC is not just an innovative approach based on the lessons learned from the actors involved in democracy assistance. Furthermore, MCC operates under the presumption that domestic institutions indeed have impact on economic growth that contributes to poverty eradication. The question raised as to what is it and how different is the MCC from other U.S aid agencies. There are various elements that make MCC different from other U.S aid practice. First of all, MCC is a process based on competitiveness, rewarding recipient countries, based on objective indicators on country performance. Main goal for MCC is poverty reduction through economic growth approach without going through cross-sectorial approach. MCC's programs simply do not directly give the funds or technical assistances to the recipients; rather, recipient countries are responsible for developing their programs based on participation by several actors including civil society. In addition the responsibility of implementation of programs funded by MCC, such as Compact Programs, falls in the hands of the recipient countries enhancing local ownership and participation. The maximum time period of programs such as Compact Programs is a five year period. Furthermore, MCC programs puts emphasis on public transparency.

What is also different about MCC is that it was created as an innovative structure outside of the existing U.S. foreign aid and policy set up, removing

itself from potential bureaucratic interference that may possibly hinder effective management. Whether MCC's independence from other organizations is really effective or not can be debatable. This is largely due to the fact there were criticisms that actually putting MCC as an independent entity hindered effective management as it further contributed to the fragmentation of U.S. foreign aid and policy system. Whether MCC contributes to effective management, or more fragmentation to foreign aid and policy system, regardless it is innovative approach to aid practices based on lessons from the past approaches.

MCC is managed by Board of Directors, made up of nine-members which consists of Secretary of State as the Chair of the Board, Secretary of the Treasury as Vice Chair of the Board, U.S. Trade Representative from Office of the United States Trade Representative, USAID Administrator, CEO of the MCC, and four members who come from the private sector (MCC). This management set up clearly illustrates a collaborative set up where the agency is not run as single bureaucracies, but by different members of stakeholders. This collaborative set up indeed shows a great promise as it does not promote one agenda from a single bureaucracy's perspective, but gathers various perspectives based on collaboration between the diverse members of Board of Directors.

MCC supports developing countries through utilization of two programs: compact and threshold programs. Compacts are large-size grants that cover a period of 5 years. It is provided to countries that pass the MCC eligibility criteria based on various indicators. The funds from compacts are targeted for specific programs in a country with a goal of economic growth for poverty

reduction. In contrast to compacts, threshold programs are provided for a shorter-time period at a smaller-size. Main goal of threshold programs is to improve the policy performances of a country. Since its inception MCC has approved over 8.4 billion dollars in both compacts and threshold programs combined. In the process various sectors in a country were targeted which include: agriculture, transportation, health, finance, education, and public administration.

The pool of possible candidate countries is limited by the authorizing statute to those falling under the threshold for the World Bank's classification for upper-middle income countries. For FY2014, this limit is a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of \$4,085. As a result, the pool of possible candidates is 83 countries for FY2014. Apart from the necessity to be under the income ceiling, income level status—in particular, the division of candidate countries between lower-income and lower-middle income—is important in both the financing and competitive selection processes and, since FY2012, has been treated differently in each case.

MCC provides assistance to developing nations through a competitive selection process, judged by country performance in three areas which include ruling justly through promoting good governance, fighting corruption, respecting human rights, and adhering to the rule of law, investing in people by providing adequate health care, education, and other opportunities promoting an educated and healthy population as well as supporting for economic freedom through fostering enterprise and entrepreneurship and promoting open markets

and sustainable budgets. Country selection is based largely, but not exclusively, on a nation's record, measured by performance indicators related to these three categories, or "baskets." Indicators may be a straightforward single measure of a country's rate of inflation—one reflection of good economic policies—or may be a combination of data points forming an index of surveys and expert opinions on the quality of public service, civil servant competency, a government's ability to plan and implement sound policies, which together "measure" government effectiveness. MCC is constrained somewhat in measuring performance by the public availability of appropriate, comparable, and consistent data on every country. The choice of criteria on which to base the eligibility of countries for MCC programs is one of the most important elements in MCC operations. They are a key statement of MCC development priorities as they ultimately determine which countries will receive U.S. assistance. Perhaps of equal significance, raising indicator scores has become a prominent objective of some developing countries in what former CEO Danilovich called the "MCC effect."¹² Countries seeking eligibility are said to be moving on their own to enact reforms and take measures to improve performance scores that would enable them to meet MCC criteria. Pursuant to reporting requirements set in the MCC legislation, each year the Corporation sends to Congress an overview of the criteria and methodology that would be used to determine the eligibility of the candidate countries in that fiscal year.¹³ The criteria have been altered and For most performance indicators, each country is judged against its peers in its income group, requiring a score just above the median to pass that indicator. For some indicators there is

an absolute threshold that must be met in order to pass the indicator. The absolute threshold indicators include an “inflation rate” under 15%, “political rights” requiring a score above 17, “civil liberties” requiring a score above 25, and, for lower-middle-income countries only, “immunization coverage” of above 90.

One key, fundamental aspect about MCC is that not only it aims for poverty reduction; it sees democracy promotion going hand-in-hand with economic growth. While it does respect recipient domestic institutions, it seeks to promote democratic governance through incentive for reform. In fact, democracy one of the major activities pursued by MCC. In addition, democratic institution is seen as important elements for sustainability, local ownership, and economic growth. The importance role of democratic institution is reflected in the selection process of countries eligible for compacts and threshold grants. The indicators used to measure democratic standing include political rights, civil liberties, voice, and accountability, and are derived from organizations such as Freedom House and World Bank Institute. Using the indicators for democratic standing to determine grant eligibility shows the broad picture of MCC’s mission to give incentives to countries that make effort to abide to democracy, through commitment to reforms. MCC’s mission for democracy is also reflected in emphasis on empowering local government institutions. Such empowerment of local government indirectly enhances democratic institutions, leading to the legitimacy of such institutions. Respecting local democratic institutions not only enhances legitimacy, but also the democratic process itself, further enhancing

participation and empowerment (MCC). So in that sense, MCC achieves its mission for promoting democracy using two tools, through giving incentives for countries to commit to democracy while respecting domestic institutions. Furthermore throughout major processes, including consultative and implementation process, various actors from civil society, private sector, and political sectors take part in the consultative and implementation process. Also any programs as related to compact programs must be accountable to the domestic laws of the country, domestic budget, and the national legislatures. In that sense, the Compact programs must be conducted within the boundaries of the domestic regulations. This reinforces the legitimacy aspect of the domestic politics. In addition monitoring and evaluation also takes place as well. This ensures not only accountability in the process, but illustrates that the whole process is participatory, empowering, and giving ownership actors who are involved in the process.

The work done by MCC is in stark contrast to the work done by the USAID or other democracy promotion actors. Unlike USAID or other actors that provide direct technical assistance and aid to particular sectors, MCC uses Compact programs for the recipient countries to formulate their own programs and policies, relying on the already existing institutions and stakeholders from various sectors. Rather than bringing in outside materials or ideas in building the capacity, MCC's Compact programs lets the actors' recipient countries to act to meet the eligibility requirements of the MCC Compact programs. Even if the country does not qualify for the Compact programs, it can make an effort

through Threshold Program, which also emphasizes giving incentive to countries that commits to democratic principles. The focus of Threshold Programs is on the governance reforms, mainly including policies reforms that goes in line with democratic principles. Directly, focusing on Threshold Programs allows recipient countries to improve the status of eligibility of Compact Programs. While all these actions does contrast with initiatives taken by other actors, it seeks to compliment and support the work done by the Department of State, USAID, as well as other actors involved at a multilateral level. For MCC, democracy promotion is not an explicit goal, but serves as a vital tool to catalyze recipient countries' commitment for democratic credentials (MCC, 2014).

The democratic governance indicators are combined with other indicators of economic growth as well as other development indicators such as reducing child mortality and enhancing sustainable development. Ruling justly is one major indicator used to measure the democratic government.

In terms of ruling justly following are elements used to measure democratic governance: demonstration of country's promotion political pluralism, equality, and the rule of law; respecting human and civil rights; protecting private property rights; encouraging transparency and accountability of government; and combating corruption. To measure civil liberties Independent experts rate countries on freedom of expression; association and organizational rights; rule of law and human rights; and personal autonomy and economic rights, among other things. For political rights experts rate countries on the prevalence of free

and fair elections of officials with real power; the ability of citizens to form political parties that may compete fairly in elections; freedom from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies and economic oligarchies; and the political rights of minority groups, among other things. To measure freedom of information, experts measure the legal and practical steps taken by a government to enable or allow information to move freely through society; this includes measures of press freedom, national freedom of information laws, and the extent to which a country is filtering internet content or tools.

To measure government effectiveness there is an index of surveys and expert assessments to rate countries on the quality of public service provision; civil servants' competency and independence from political pressures; and the government's ability to plan and implement sound policies, among other things. For rule of law, index of surveys and expert assessments rate countries on the extent to which the public has confidence in and abides by the rules of society; the incidence and impact of violent and nonviolent crime; the effectiveness, independence, and predictability of the judiciary; the protection of property rights; and the enforceability of contracts, among other things. In terms of control of corruption countries are rated on "grand corruption" in the political arena; the frequency of petty corruption; the effects of corruption on the business environment; and the tendency of elites to engage in "state capture," among other things (World Bank Governance Indicators/Freedom House).

4.8. National Security Council (NSC)

National Security Council (NSC), located in the President's Executive Office, was established in 1947 under the National Security Act of 1947, revised through National Security Amendments of 1949, in which during the same year the NSC was positioned under the Executive Office of the President. The NSC has following functions: to give advice and assistance to the president on issues related to U.S. security and foreign policies, ensuring coordination of U.S. security and foreign policies. It is composed of the President, who is the chair, Vice-President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Director of National Intelligence plays a role of military advisor and intelligence advisor respectively. In addition heads of other government departments and agencies can attend the NSC meeting, as well as Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (U.S. State Department)

As stated by the function, the NSC's creation came out of the need to ensure cooperation and coordination between government departments and agencies in meeting U.S national security goals.

As stated by the function, the NSC's creation came out of the need to ensure cooperation and coordination between government departments and agencies in meeting U.S national security goals. Such formal function and organization of NSC did not exist prior to World War II as challenges posed by presidents were only restricted to domestic matters and they sought advisory support through

informal channels. By World War II, the need for more formalized, and structured organization that would take in the consideration of other complex factors including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and morale. In response to the changing international environment that made it necessary the creation of a tool that would allow appropriate analysis of such environment. New transnational issues including terrorism and drug trafficking have required the departments and agencies dealing with national security and foreign policy to coordinate with each other.

Although the main actor that deals with coordinating government policies is mainly undertaken by the executive branch, Congress also is involved as it is involved funding aspects. Historically up until twentieth century the role of policy coordination fell solely under the responsibility of the President. This is rooted in the U.S Constitution, designating the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces as well as having broad powers to exercise in foreign affair matter under Article II Section 2. Based on that Constitutional base, President, along with the help from his cabinet, could undertake an action of coordination.

Things changed by the 1st World War, as the complexities involving the war made it necessary for coordination at domestic and international level, which is insufficient by the presidential action alone. In 1916 saw the creation of the Council of National Defense under the Army Appropriation Act of 1916. The Council of National Defense, which was ceased to exist by 1921, mainly dealt with the ensuring coordination in mobilizing economic resources. In 1940,

under the precedent of Army Appropriation Act of 1916, National Defense Advisory Council was created to address the issue of economic mobilization (The White House).

By 1938 there was a need a tool to ensure coordination between departments to take into complex factors that president alone cannot address it by himself. After various proposals, the Standing Liaison Committee was created for liaison and coordination activities between the branches of government. It was composed of Under Secretary of State, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Standing Liaison Committee played was another early key mechanism created to foster coordination between departments as well as exchange of information. In addition to the Standing Liaison Committee there was an informal meeting held weekly between Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Frank Knox, and Cordell Hull. So by 1940 there were both formal and informal mechanisms in which to address the interdepartmental coordination. In addition such informal weekly meeting would evolve into formal coordinating body, such as State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). The SWNCC composed of assistant secretaries in each department. The role of SWNCC members was to give support “on politico-military matters and [in] coordinating the views of the three departments on matters in which all have a common interest, particularly those involving foreign policy and relations with foreign nations....”

1947 saw the creation of National Security Council, to address the demands of the ever growing complexity of various factors related to war. It was created

through National Security Act, under the provision stated in the Section 101 of Title I known as Coordination for National Security.

Following are purposes stipulated by the National Security Act:

“(a)The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”

“(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council.”

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection there with; and

(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith. . . .

(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require” (Best Jr, 2011)

During the early stages of the NSC, Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, as well as the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. In addition to setting up of NSC, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, was also established. The establishment of NSC signaled beginning of a formal coordination of diplomatic, military, and further economic issues in dealing with U.S. National Security and foreign policy.

5. Case Study

5.1. Haiti

5.1.1. Overview

When discussing Haiti, the vital fact, as noted by Howard Wiarda (1997) is that basically Haiti does not have a firm, holding political institution at a national level that could allow democracy to function properly. Such dire conditions at an institutional level that the Haiti faces is reflected by various statistics indicating the level of poverty in the country, with regards to its position as a LDC that earns per capital income of less the \$200. In addition to per capital income, Haiti lack natural resources and manufacturing industry base of which can support the economy base. There have been practically no investments from foreign companies, largely due to the U.S. embargo that took place from 1991 to 1994. Such economics status of Haiti gives a doubt for the possibility of democracy. In addition, the economic status is not helped by the historical fact that Haiti never had a democracy as a regime. This is further

compounded by lack of competitive and pluralist political parties, as well as lack of government institutions, parliament, or the bureaucracy in line with the democratic principles. Furthermore there were no foundation of civil society organizations and interest groups. Such problems can be attributed to the period of dictatorships, including military dictatorships that have led to the prevention of foreign investment and foundations of democracy to be set up.




Figure 3. Indicators on Haiti’s Ruling Justly (MCC)

This figure is the indicator released by Millennium Challenge Corporation (2013). The indicators released by the Millennium Challenge Corporation illustrate the state of democratic governance in Haiti. Although Political Rights

and Freedom of Information show positive trends, Haiti performs below the median, thus does not meet to the required standards. The elements which do not meet the standards include civil liberties, government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption. The particular are that performs poorly is government effectiveness, control of corruption, and rule of law. This indicator shows how much Haiti is behind in terms of democratic governance. This is illustrated by scores that are below zero.

Although many of the interests is related to humanitarianism, U.S interest towards Haiti could be also be strategically oriented towards ensuring security in the region. The question is raised as to what importance Haiti offers to the United States, in terms of strategy. The answer is that it has to be noted that While Haiti, in the view of the United States may be regarded as having importance in terms of geography, as it can serve as a hub to connect Latin America and Caribbean Communities. This aspect makes it an ideal partner in terms of trade. Also, Haiti could serve as a vital place to help the U.S. in combatting drug trafficking. Yet such potentials are not realized, as Haiti, which is seen as a fragile states, lacks proper institutions in place that are in line with democracy. Further, periods of dictatorships have warded off foreign investment. Such problems have halted potential synergy arising from the partnership between the U.S. and Haiti.

One of the big weaknesses in Haiti is the lack of firm political institution, meaning that before a democratic institution has to be created, there has to be some sort of a concrete political institution (Wiarda, 1997). In addition to lack of

firm institutions, Haiti also lacks a kind of political culture needed to establish firm democracy. About 70 percent are rural, and about same percentage of population suffer from illiteracy. As a result such number of population lacks a capacity to be educated in how to run a democratic government. Although there are those in urban areas who are trained and educated to have capacity in democratic government, they are more or less familiar with the French style of democracy, rather than American-liberalist democracy, that bases on pluralist.

The division between urban and rural areas in Haiti plays a big role. In the rural, country side area, the population is mostly are made up of Africans who are poor. In the urban area, particularly in the capital Port-au-Prince, the population is mostly made up of wealth, mulattos, who are the elites in the area. While both Duvalier and Aristide's supporters are mostly from the poor in the rural area, those who were elitists and opposed Duvalier and Aristide supported the military government. Such actions illustrate the division not just between rich and poor but between those who live in rural area and urban area. Without middle class to balance the deep division has not made it helpful to foster a environment inducible for democracy (Wiarda, 1997).

5.1.2. Operation Uphold Democracy

Country/Year	1992	1993	1994	1995	1992-1995
Haiti	79.7	130.4	530.8	875.8	1,616.7
Fmr Yugoslavia	126.7	408.7	959.0	692.5	2,186.9
Rwanda	22.1	24.8	261.4	265.4	573.7
Somalia	92.9	1,124.8	913.3	92.1	2,223.1
TOTAL	321.4	1,688.7	2,664.5	1,925.8	6,600.4

Table 2. Amount of funding for peace keeping operations from 1992-1995.

In millions of U.S Dollars

From U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Agency/Year	1992	1993	1994	1995	1992-1995
Defense	9.3	2.8	372.1	568.7	952.9
State	2.7	15.2	18.1	78.6	114.6
UNMIH Contribution	0.0	0.0	0.5	51.9	52.4
USAID	66.0	111.6	123.9	187.6	489.1
Other	1.7	0.8	16.7	40.9	60.1
TOTAL	79.7	130.4	530.8	875.8	1,616.7

Table 3. Costs of Peacekeeping Operations by in Haiti by Agencies.

In millions of U.S. dollars

From U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)

One major instance of effort taken to aid Haiti and promote democracy in the country is the 1990s. In December 1990, Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected to the presidency in the general election. Just less than a year into his victory by September 1991 under coup d'état, led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, Aristide was removed from his office. The coup was met with response at a multilateral level, where the United Nations Security Council then passes a resolution pressuring the military junta to give up its powers. Various measures included economic and diplomatic pressures, such as ban on petroleum sales as well imposing naval blockade on Haiti. The U.S. administration focused on two track strategy of planning for intervening militarily and to end to coerce Lt. General Cedras to give up power.

On July 31st, the UN Security Council passed the resolution 940 authorizing use of “all necessary force” to restore democratic leadership in Haiti. This resolution ultimately gave permission to send military forces to restore democracy. Multinational military forces would make allow democratically elected Aristide to return to his position as a president of the country. To ensure that the military forces entered the country without physical conflict, the negotiating team headed by former President Jimmy Carter, the then-retired General Colin Power, and former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Senator Sam Nunn. The negotiating team successfully ensured that the Lt. Gen Cedras gave up his power

The numbers of forces arrived in Haiti were numbered to be around 21,000

would arrive in the country. Aristide, along with those who were exiled with him, returned to the country in October 15th, 1994 (Hill, 2011). In addition to ensuring that the restoration of Aristide regime took place peacefully, there were other activities that the U.S. led multinational forces undertook:

- Ensuring standing up of a fragile government of Haiti
- Secure a safe environment
- Initiation of weapons buy-back program
- Eliminate arms caches
- Restoring of electricity and communications infrastructure
- Starting of training of police

Aside from military efforts, United States was among the major key actor that provided democracy assistance to Haiti. The main assistance undertaken by the United States for Haiti is known as the Democracy Enhancement Project, which was first authorized in May 1991. The main major goal of the Democracy Enhancement Project was to ensure democracy in Haiti that had stability and accountability (Hill, 2011) The main targets that were used in the Democracy Enhancement Project included enhancing institutions and groups, including legislatures, political parties, local governments, and civil society. The assistance is done through directly targeting those various elements of political institutions. These reflected the three strategies pursued by USAID. One strategy is focusing on the civil society, parliament, elections, local government, and justice administration.

The Democracy Enhancement Project did not entail only a single strategy, but two other strategies. The second strategy focused on ensuring a viable environment for investment and education. While the first strategy focused on political institutions, the second strategy dealt outside environment that would foster growth in the country, particularly economic terms. Furthermore the third strategy dealt with ensuring welfare of the citizens. The main focus was eradicating of child malnutrition. This was done through distribution of food, and strengthening health and fertility.

From 1990 to 2003, about \$4 billion in aid went into Haiti at a bilateral and multilateral level. The United States contributed about \$1.3 billion from 1990 to 2005 (Buss and Gardner, 2008).

5.1.3. Department of Defense

From fiscal years 1992 through 1995, the Department of Defense's (DOD) incremental costs of \$952.9 million were for the multinational force, UNMIH, and related U.N. Resolutions. Following U.N. resolutions authorizing an international embargo on Haiti in 1993, DOD helped enforce the embargo and supported migrant processing operations at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although initially the DoD did support using military force in Haiti, by the spring of 1994, it started to explore possibilities of a scenario of using force if the military did not vacate the power. The department gathered information regarding lessons learned from operations in Grenada, Panama, and Somalia. Based on the information gathering, the then Secretary of Defense

Perry saw the need for involvement at an early planning stage, and made instructions to make preparation interagency planning.

By July 31st 1994 when the UN Security Council made authorization to use necessary means to ensure Aristide was restored to his position, U.S. government created inter-agency working groups.

U.S. entered Port-au Prince, Haiti on September 19, 1994 without facing resistance. Although there were few incidents of violence and hostilities, peace in the country eventually returned. The number of U.S. forces in Haiti was reduced by the time Aristide returned to Haiti. During the execution of Operation Uphold Democracy, DOD continued enforcing the embargo and following the landing on Haiti, established and maintained civic order, searched for and seized weapons, conducted civil affairs programs, trained troops from other nations in peacekeeping duties, repaired roads, and coordinated the return of about 14,000 Haitians from the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. The command of Haiti operation would be handed over to the United Nations by January 1999 (Hayes, 1996).

5.1.4. Department of State

The State Department reported costs of \$114.6 million during fiscal years 1992 through 1995, including the U.S. assessment for UNMIH (\$52.4 million). An estimated \$16 million was used to assist Haitian victims and refugees and provide grants to private voluntary organizations for distribution in Haiti. The State Department also provided support to multinational force contingents that

could not be provided through section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act (GAO, 1996)

5.1.5. USAID

Although USAID is regarded as an implementing agency for the State Department, as stated by the GAO report, it undertook action as a separate entity. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) suspended its assistance programs to Haiti after the September 1991 coup, but on November 10, 1991, it reactivated the feeding programs and health services through private voluntary organizations. During the preparation stage, USAID made plans for assisting with democratic forces and helping with training police force. USAID also helped fund the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program to train the Haitian police force and provided funding for the joint Organization of American States/United Nations International Civilian Mission in Haiti which monitors human rights issues (GAO).

6. Conclusion

6.1. Implications

The whole of the U.S aid system lacks a centralized command center. State Department disburses aid consistent with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. USAID focuses on the humanitarian aspects of development, including disaster relief, combating diseases, and addressing extreme poverty. DoD takes leadership role in dealing military assistance during conflict and post-conflict regions where stabilization and reconstruction is needed in a country. Treasury Department deals with programs associated with international financial institutions such as IMF and WB. Issues related with food aid is linked to the Agriculture Department, while trade and private investment as overseen by the Commerce Department.

Bush Administration during the 2001 signaled the beginning of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, MCC. MCC is characterized as having an ownership by the recipients, autonomy in programmes, and eligibility on the grounds of performance, and transparency and evaluation. In addition to those, there was a program in fighting of HIV/AIDS. Yet after 9/11 attacks, security interests would emerge. It is thought that the terrorism may be product of extreme development causing a societal unrest and instability that includes resentment towards the U.S. or other Western countries. There was an increase in ODA, particularly in military assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan post-9/11, reinforcing the notion that there was large security interest behind U.S actions (Hook, 2008)

An example is 1990s in Africa, where the United States sought and demanded countries in the continent of Africa to open up for multiparty elections to further democracy in sub-Saharan region of Africa. Funds for elections monitoring, enhancing rule of law, civil society support were allocated. Both the State Department and the USAID created offices that dealt with the democracy. Under Clinton Administration, the values behind Democratic Peace Theory, in which democratic states do not go into war with another was echoed. For development approach, democracy is a precondition for long term sustainable development enhanced by transparency, accountability preventing mismanagement due to corruption as well conflict.

Government organization impact how the aid money is allocated. Carol Lancaster presents two propositions. As part of the first proposition, she presents government agencies as acting on their rights to pursue their interest, working under the executive branch of government, but also with private interest groups, foreign government agencies, INGOs, and interest groups. Her second proposition is that whether an agency will have an impactful influence on an agenda depends upon whether that agency is a single unified, and located at the high ends of a bureaucratic ladder. In the case of the United States, Lancaster notes that there was indeed resistance in mid-1990s of putting USAID under Department of State. She points out that it was possible that the USAID's goal of long term-sustainable development would be undermined by the State Department's diplomatic minded mission and values.

What drives the U.S. diplomacy is based on security interest of ensuring the

preservation of the world peace and protection of the American values and life for its citizens. Yet at the same time it has to be regarded U.S. foreign policy is not all about enhancing its own security interests, but expanding upon the humanitarian values, which may well grow thanks to globalizations. Lancaster notes of four key values of U.S. diplomacy. One is providing humanitarian relief, while the second value refers to promotion of development and poverty reduction, third being the improvement of quality of life, while the fourth value address assisting for democracy and human rights expansion around world. Human Rights and democracy is regarded as important because it is a value that is shared by the American, not for the sake of interest rooted in political and security considerations, but also taking the humanitarian consideration as well. At the same time promotion of democracy may continue on, although it may not be an aid spending priority (Lancaster, 2006).

Carol Lancaster (2006) notes of poor organizations and fragmentation of the U.S. agencies in dispensing aid. Aside from the USAID, there are other agencies that work as a bilateral agency which include the Peace Corps, Inter American Foundations, and the African Development Foundation. Furthermore U.S. is a member of various multilateral agencies and development banks

The collapse of the Cold War era in 1990s, signaled the end of the security-based assistance, and focuses more on ensuring humanitarian-based interests, with addressing other issues such as peacemaking and transnational problems at the focus on the aid assistance.

In general when looking at the difference between State Department and DoD,

there is countervailing interests where human rights and democracy is focus of the State Department, while the goal of DoD is on the ensuring access for military forces and less on the host government's politics. Before 9/11, U.S. did have friendly relations with the autocratic regimes for securing economic and security interests, but after 9/11 those priorities changed it was believed that those were indeed breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism.

Although some sort of interagency coordination has been achieved, particularly for the State Department and USAID, there are other agencies that received funds yet it is much unknown who makes coordination for those agencies. Other agencies that receive funds as part of foreign assistance are Department of Defense, Treasury, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Labor Departments, Millennium Challenge Corporation, U.S Trade and Development Agency, Peace Corps, and all other agencies. While there is a problem of coordination there is also issue about lack of information out there about the actions and the role of other agencies.

The lack of coordination, however, is not only restricted the post-conflict and areas of fragile state. Rather it stems from the fact that the democracy promotion by the United State itself is decentralized, without having a single authority that coordinates inter and even intra-agency efforts. There are various possibilities as to why such happens and they include unique environment such as in post-conflict regions or division of labor and differences in expertise possessed by each agencies. The kind of cooperation that occurs between the U.S agencies and other donors is usually restricted to situations that need fast response to

emergency situation, rather than looking at ways to coordinate and cooperate at a long term.

The issue of decentralization has various implications. Certainly as a result of inconsistent policies, it poses problems for NGO contractors who have to conduct implementation efforts, especially when it involves the question of whether the funding will be available or not (Melia, 2007). Yet, that would not seem to be the only problem. Such decentralization would seem to raise the question of whether it would lead to ambiguous motivation and e whole DRG efforts are looked at. In addition if indeed this is the lack of coordination within the USAID itself, it may pose a problem in terms of coordinating actions with other actors involved in the democracy promotion, which include private organizations as well as governmental agencies including the State Department and the Department of Defense. Inconsistencies in the how the USAID approaches the democracy promotion efforts, how humanitarian they may be, may lead to frustration and inter-agency conflicts especially at the implementation stage. This is compounded by the fact that large governmental agencies have different priorities, with State Department focusing on diplomacy while Department of Defense main priorities would be enhancing U.S interests through military security. Particularly in the point of view of the DoD, lack of expertise and resources is seen one of the reasons why DoD has difficulties transferring to civilian agencies in the reconstruction efforts in the post-conflict areas; decentralized decision making level at the USAID only adds to such negative perception.

Lancaster (2006) notes of poor organizations and fragmentation of the U.S. agencies in dispensing aid. Aside from the USAID, there are other agencies that work as a bilateral agency which include the Peace Corps, Inter American Foundations, and the African Development Foundation. Furthermore U.S. is a member of various multilateral agencies and development banks.

There were various reasons why the Operation Uphold Democracy was regarded as success. One key reason is the fact that they had clear goals of getting the military leadership away from the power, ensure that President Aristide returned, and that responsibility was turned over to United Nations, without cost of too much casualties. The second reason why it was successful had to do with how well the planning took place by each individual agencies, through interagency coordination. The third reason had to do with the success of Carter mission in ensuring that General Cedras would step down.

In the context of Haiti's Operation Uphold Democracy, U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) on September 12, 1994, chaired an inter-agency meeting to coordinate activities of various agencies involved in operation. This meeting highlighted lack of focus on the core issues needed to be dealt with regards to Haiti as well as need for the more coordination to be done. The problem was addressed when the NSC representative was brought in to chair a similar meeting, clearing up the confusion and lack of focus. Such coordination was crucial in that it contributed to the success of Operation Uphold Democracy in terms of how individual agencies planned their actions, and how they were able to transfer the role to the UN, and how they exited from the Haiti operation.

Although this is one of the instances how NSC worked to ensure there was a coordination, it does illustrate the important role the NSC play as a control tower in coordinating efforts between each departments, especially at a large-scale operation.

6.2. Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be said that fragmentation could be a factor to some of the reforms in U.S. foreign assistance, but at the same time something that can be enhanced for realizing comparative advantage of the United States. This is ultimately the result of the process of the bureaucratic politics of the decision making. For State Department and the DoD, with the ultimate goal being the security of the United States, this leads to the lack of coherence with the USAID, which is an implementation agency for the State Department's mission, which are not only limited to democracy promotion. The issue is not a matter of manipulation or cooption, but ensuring that the activities do not overlap and that they are not undertaken in a fragmented manner. More ways could be explored in terms of how to connect different activities of USAID, State, and DoD, and ensure that they are not fragmented.

Implications found in the case of Haiti cannot be generalized as a single characteristic, but it could be seen as one of the examples of how NSC could coordinate assistance activities which involve multiple U.S governmental agencies. Although NSC may not be a one-size fits all type of a coordination mechanism, it nevertheless plays a key, crucial role in coordination of

departments and agencies that are otherwise fragmented. The role of NSC in coordinating U.S. foreign assistance efforts is crucial, as the focus of NSC no longer is restricted to security issues, but also cyber security, transnational issues related to security, as well as broader international economic issues.

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Abstract in Korean

국 문 초 록

성명: 최병헌

학과 및 전공: 국제학과 국제협력전공

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본 논문은 민주주의 촉진에 있어서 각 미국 행정부의 역할이 무엇인지 연구하였다. 미국의 민주주의 촉진을 분석한 많은 기존 연구가 있었지만, 이들은 각 미국 대통령 개인이 추구해왔던 정책 목표를 다루고 있으며, 각각 예하 행정부를 비롯한 정부 기관들의 영향 및 역할은 주목하지 못하였다. 본 연구는 미국 대외원조 관점에서, 미국의 민주주의 촉진에 있어서 각 미국 주요 행정부 기관간의 역학관계를 분석하고 이해하고자 한다.

본 논문은 미국의 주요 세 개 행정부/기관의 민주주의 촉진 관련하여 의사 결정을 비롯한 역할 분석, 이 세 개 행정부의 역할과 역학관계를 분석 한다. 특히 본 논문은 Allison 의 관료정치모델 (Bureaucratic Politics Model)를

차용하여, 미국의 민주주의 촉진에 있어서 각 행정부 기관에 합의가 결정권에 있어서 중요한 역할 수행함을 제시한다.

본 논문은 미국의 민주주의 촉진에 있어서 90년대 미국이 아이티에서 실시한 Operation Uphold Democracy 를 각 행정부의 역학관계를 보여준 대표적인 사례로 연구를 하였다. 특히 미국의 국방부 (Department of Defense), 국무부 (Department of State), 국제 개발처 (USAID)의 다양한 목표와 과정을 컨트롤 타워처럼 조정할 수 있는 기관으로 미국 백악관에 속해 있는 국가안전보장회의 (National Security Council)를 제시한다.

핵심어: 민주주의 촉진, 미국대외원조, 미국 국무부, 미국 국방 부, 미국 국제개발처, 아이티, 국가안전보장회의

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