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Master's Thesis

More Than Just a Game:
The Politics of Domestic and International Sport in North
Korea

February 2015

Master of International Studies
Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University
Seoul, Korea

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More Than Just a Game:
The Politics of Domestic and International Sport in North
Korea

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The Politics of Domestic and International Sport in North
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
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
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**More Than Just a Game:
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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has become a member of an eclectic group of states, resisting the push towards liberal democracy that has swept the world in the past 20 years or so, while also living up to its nickname of the 'Hermit Kingdom'. The division of the Korean Peninsula has created an inward turning, offensive pariah with North Korea, in comparison to the booming, capitalist and outreaching South Korea. The caustic rhetoric, nuclear tests, border hostilities and negotiation deadlocks characterize North Korea as a state unlike others, and it is clear that they are treated as such. States such as North Korea are not easy to understand in a conventional way, therefore, this paper analyzes North Korea through the means of sport. The purpose of this study is to examine the modern history of North Korean sport, North Korea's domestic and international sport policies thoroughly and identify the political utilization it attains and pinpoint the convergence of both domestic and international sport. Furthermore, International sporting events are analyzed by means of game theory, testing the event for participatory, cooperative and engaging properties in the event of North Korea's participation or not. This paper presents North Korea use of sport as a tool for domestic stability and indoctrination while also as a mechanism for dialogue and an exceptional means to make progress in terms of cooperation and engagement, especially with South Korea.

Keywords: North Korea; Sport; Politics; Olympic Games; Asian Games; FIFA World Cup.

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ACCRONOYMS AND ABBRREVIATIONS

DPRK:	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
ROK:	Republic of Korea
SK:	South Korea
NK:	North Korea
UNESCO:	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Culture Organization
INGO:	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOC:	International Olympic Committee
IAAF:	International Association of Athletic Federations
FIFA:	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
UN:	United Nations
KOC:	Korean Olympic Committee
OCA:	Olympic Committee of Asia
NBA	National Basketball Association
KCNA:	Korean Central News Agency
BBC:	British Broadcasting Company
AP:	Associated Press
US:	United States of America
UEFA:	Union of European Football Associations

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Although, at face value, the merits of sport can be found in fair play, healthy competition and traversing the line between victory and defeat, sport is more than just a ball game. Indeed, sport is utilized in states across the world, both domestically and internationally for the benefit of such state, in manifestations such as nationalism, prestige, obedience, and general wellbeing amongst others. In this regard, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly known as North Korea¹, is no different to any other state. The utilization of sport in North Korea starts at grassroots level domestically, by means of indoctrination, mass mobilization, and militaristic purposes. This serves as a foundation and platform for the further utilization of sport for political purposes. It is certainly true that international sport is an area in which North Korea are a regular participant. The potential influence of international sport regarding the politics and general sentiment between states is commonly agreed. In the current era of nuclear tests, power consolidation and caustic rhetoric coming from Pyongyang, international sport may be a useful tool in acting as a vehicle to move from deadlock to meaningful cooperation and engagement.

¹ North Korea is known officially as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). For the purpose of this paper, North Korea will be used as the primary title, with the DPRK being used in the instance of it within quoted material.

In certain ways, North Korea lives up to its name as an isolated state. The inward turning regime of Pyongyang remains in exile from most meaningful platforms of progress, and in the current political environment, the past Six-Party Talks² and South Korea's Sunshine Policy³ towards North Korea are all but a distance memory. North Korea is mostly in the news for the wrong reasons, while the opportunities for relationship building with Seoul have all but been eliminated. The Kungang Mountain incident, Cheonan submarine sinking and their third nuclear test amongst others, leave only a few North Korean politicized defectors in South Korea as a means of exchange between the peoples of the diverged Korea. The absence of any interactions is slowly chipping away at the sentiment of reunification, at least in South Korea, which this author classes as a vital ingredient in the possibility of a peaceful coexistence between Pyongyang and Seoul.

This paper will explore the possibility of international sport, in particular the participation in international sporting events, playing a role in the cooperation and engagement of North Korea with other states and if it is plausible for international sport to act as an intermediary in a contributory manner regarding Pyongyang's international relations.

2 The six-party talks were a series of multilateral negotiations held intermittently from 2003 to 2007, between China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States for the purpose of dismantling North Korea's nuclear program.

3 The Sunshine Policy was the foreign policy of South Korea towards North Korea from 1998 until 2007.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

The interaction between sport and politics stirs ample debate. The debate centers on the relationship between politics and sport and to what extent should government be involved in sport. Politics in domestic sport concerns the use of power reflecting a definition of politics. However, a distinction between the public and private spheres may exist, with politics present at times of disagreement (Ponton and Gill, 1993; Houlihan, 2000). Politics is present in any organization within a state, including that of domestic sports organizations. Additionally, Hoberman stated “Sport is a latently political issue in any society, since the cultural themes which inhere in a sport culture are potentially ideological in a political sense” (Hoberman, 1984: 20).

Given the policy statements in public expenditure decisions, many governments state the cultural centrality of sport would seem to be clearly established. Among social scientists, there are those who argue that support is an integral and even defining element of the culture of the community. For example, Hannerz argues that sport, hasn't collectively sustained symbolic structure, is that how are the metaphor, which reveals the most deep-seated values of culture. Hannerz attempted to this aggregate culture using the notion of cultural flows, which are that of cultural commodities in the marketplace, the actions of

this base in the political sphere and the habitual perspectives and dispositions that define everyday life (Houlihan, 1997).

The influence of politics on sport is particularly evident today in relation to foreign policy, where sporting success is seen as a measure of national vitality and prestige; it can therefore serve as an unobtrusive form of propaganda. As a result, 'international competitive sport has become an arena for ideologies, mirroring the same tensions as are seen throughout the world on the purely political plane'. UNESCO drew attention to this in the mid-1950s, highlighting the increasing 'politicization' of international sport, which had developed to the extent that 'the Olympic Games were then regarded by many as merely a testing ground for the two great political units' the United States & Soviet Union (Riordan, 1974).

As an entity, international sport is recognized as being a contributor to the dynamics of international relations, both politically and culturally. Additionally, the ever changing characteristics of international sport can somewhat reflect that of general developments in international relations and visa-versa. Although international sport can be viewed as being in a Hobbesian 'state of war' in terms of the nature of state competition, ongoing debates still examine the implications of globalization, the policy-making impact of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), the influence transnational movements have on sovereignty and the shifting relationship between identity and place, are notable issues which have substance to be considered through the medium of international sport (Levermore, Budd, 2004).

Traditionally, studies on sport and politics have presented a number of developing functions of sport that may act as agents of realization of political objectives. The earlier work of Kanin, Hoberman, and Espy emphasizes the argument of 'sport being a political tool' and that modern sports may be ideologically loaded (Beacom, 2000). Similarly in contemporary writing, Hill mentions that 'international sport needs the interest and support of politicians, but not their interference'. Indeed, it has been claimed that until the most recent decades, sport and politics have been independent of each other (McFarlane, 1986), although it is argued that this view ignores is the long-term, structural relationship that exists between sport and political agencies at the local, regional and international levels (Polley, 1998).

From a different perspective, Houlihan refers to the interlocking features of politics and sport at a number of levels. He identifies some areas ripe for discussion including sport as a vehicle for diplomacy. Houlihan explicitly enhances his analytical framework by presenting International Relations theory as a tangible asset in plotting the relationship between international politics and sport. He provides a holistic synopsis of international relations perspectives on significant issues relating to international sport within the respective theories. Houlihan groups International Relations theories under three banners, which are those of 'Pluralism', 'Realism' and 'Globalism'. (Houlihan, 2005)

Following the 'Pluralist' convention, Houlihan makes a common argument that power is not effectively held or wielded by an elite but is distributed among politically active citizens and a number of elite groups, organizations and institutions. Therefore, policy is

essentially the outcome of interactions between different interest groups. The Pluralist perspective, which presents international relations as driven by a complex of relationships between a diverse interest groupings, is reflected in arguments concerning the influence of the sports organizations in the international arena. Sports organizations emulating INGOs demonstrate the capability of influence on decision-making at a governmental level. However, Houlihan reiterates that apart from a few sports organizations, notably, the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) and perhaps the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) have the strength and depth of resources to be influential in their dealings with governments. The ascent of sport in political agendas, both domestically and internationally, have embedded environments in which sports organizations can perhaps have a more active role in national policymaking and implementation. However, notable examples of these occurrences are not forthcoming, thus weakening the pluralistic perspective described for the time being.

Realist interpretations of international sport provide a basis for an alternative interpretation. Taking the Pluralist perspective as a contending theory, the Realist perspective would certainly not refute the influence that sports organizations wield in particular circumstances. Still, with regards to the 'international system', the state remains a unitary actor, with the interests of such state continuing to dominate. Theoretically, a realist would require the state to impose limitations on the activities of a sports INGO. The Realist evaluation regarding the authority of international non-state actors is that they don't have an independent standing in practice, as they consist of state

representatives, which will ultimately set the agenda of these organizations and determine their direction.

Maguire navigates the concept of globalization in terms of tension between homogenization and differentiation, which is said to illustrate the 'global process'. Maguire utilizes Eichberg's argument regarding the significance of localized responses to globalization and their manifestation in the revival of traditional domestic sports (Maguire, 1999). Conversely, Scholte, makes note of the differences between the 'global' and the 'international', and identifies the increasing connections between subtle 'national domains' which results from internationalization, contrasting with globalization, which contests the subtle manner of these domains through a 'web of trans-border networks'. The 'distance-less and instantaneous' manner of the global environment, therefore transcends traditional concepts of territory and confronts the traditional notion of nation-state sovereignty (Scholte, 1997).

Indeed, Scholte questions the assumption that if traditional notions of sovereignty have been transcended, it does not necessarily denote an automatic deterioration of the role and significance of the state, which is particularly notable for sports INGOs. Houlihan focuses on the role of these sports INGOs as actors in their own right within the international arena. Houlihan places these wide range theories under a general heading of 'Globalism'; in which emphasis is on the 'international system' where individual states or transnational actors are constrained.

The challenges faced by the 'Three Paradigm' approach within International Relations are significant. The precincts of Houlihan's professed 'Realist', 'Pluralist' and 'Globalist' perspectives have blurred and a new agenda is developing. For the purpose of this paper, the Pluralist, Realist, and Globalist paradigms provide a useful and noteworthy starting point for the understanding of North Korea's participation in international sport. Although international relations theories can assist in plotting the importance of sport in society, conversely, developments in the realm of international sport can give deep understandings of the nature of the international society. The nature of politicians and diplomat's activities in international sport reflect the status quo of diplomacy and international politics in the present era. Looking at how international sports institutions have evolved provides important insights concerned with understanding the political environment of a certain state or states, which traditional state-centric paradigms fail to explain. As the scope and traits of connections between and across states have developed, this has increased the range and complications of diplomatic roles. Supporting the role of non-state actors, Watson indicates that the general agreement that diplomacy is progressively becoming not just about dialog between states, but also includes non-state actors as significant (Watson, 1982).

Giving non-state actors significance, a number of international sports organizations can be considered to have semi-diplomatic status with differing degrees of success concerning diplomatic engagement. When looking at the IOC, it is clearly a success in terms of its diplomatic exploits. Apart from some difficulties in the early years of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), internationalist ambitions have once again become integral to

the Olympic movement's philosophy. When considering the flying of the Olympic flag as an indication of the sovereignty exercised for the duration of the Games proper, it reverberates the statement of the IOC being the premier sports INGO as a non-state actor (Christensen, 2006).

A notable event in the IOC's cementing of its semi-diplomatic position was the revival of its 'Olympic truce' within the Olympic Movement. This project was re-launched in 1992 in the aftermath of the partial break-up of the Yugoslavian state and before the impending Barcelona Olympic Games⁴. The objective of such Olympic trust was to 'defend the interests of the athletes, protect the Olympic games and consolidate the unity of the Olympic movement'. This created a possible conflict with the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 757 (1992)⁵, in which sport was included as an area of the UN sanctions policy. Nonetheless, a compromise was reached between the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee and the IOC's request that the Yugoslavian athletes be allowed to participate in the Barcelona. Following the 1992 Olympic games, support for the continuation of the 'Olympic truce' was forthcoming from the UN General

4 IOC launched an Appeal for the observance of the Olympic Truce and negotiated with the United Nations to facilitate athletes of the former Republic of Yugoslavia to participate in the Games of the XXIII Olympiad in Barcelona.

5 The first Olympic Truce project was launched in 1991, following the break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the creation of the United Nations (UN) Security Council Sanctions Committee against this country, as a result of which, in 1992, its Resolution 757 included "sport" as a sanctioned element for the first time.

Assembly (1993)⁶ and this was significant in terms of realist arguments concerning the collaboration between INGOs with a view of influencing international relations between states.

⁶ 1994 was proclaimed the International Year of Sport and the Olympic Ideal following a General Assembly Resolution (48/10) adopted on 25 October 1993, which acknowledged the role of the Olympic Movement as building a peaceful and better world by educating the youth of the world through sport and culture.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Significance of the Research

The author decided to conduct research on this topic after curiously reading an article related to North Korea's participation in football's 19th Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup, which was held in South Africa in 2010. North Korea had qualified and was placed in a difficult group consisting of the established football states of Portugal, Brazil and the Ivory Coast. After a valiant performance against Brazil, North Korea suffered heavy defeats in their remaining two games. The coach of North Korean team, Kim Jong-Hun, and the majority of the squad were invited to a public criticism session to account for their poor performance⁷, as is normal in all aspects of North Korean society. International media widely reported the coach as having been sentenced to hard labor on his return to North Korea. A request was made by FIFA for clarification on Coach Kim's safety and was answered by North Korean Football Association with assurances regarding the safety and status of Kim Jong-Hun. It was later

⁷ "FIFA to Probe Reports of Punishment of North Korean Players and Coach." *CNN*. N.p., 12 Aug. 2010. Web. 15 Nov. 2014.

discovered that Kim Jong-Hun had returned to his position as coach of his former team, 4.25 Sports Club, but this author found it astonishing as to how North Korea could be accountable to a Sport INGO considering its record and rhetoric in other areas of international relations. It produces the question of why North Korea values its participation in international sport as much as they do and if this value could translate into an area of cooperation and participation that transcends traditional political approaches?

3.2. Research Questions

This paper presents a number of research questions, which will form the basis of this paper. The main research question is that of:

What is the extent of North Korea's use of sport for political purposes?

Concurrently, the paper will also attempt to answer two further sub-research questions, which are that of:

What are the domestic and international implications of North Korea's use of sport for political purposes?

And

What is the level of participatory, cooperative and engaging properties that North Korea's international sport policy brings or does not bring?

3.3. Methodology

This thesis is organized into eight chapters. The first chapter is composed of the introduction of the study. The second chapter will introduce the literature review available and categorizes the importance of this research. The fourth chapter is designed to provide the modern historical background of sport in North Korea for the understanding of the domestic and international aspects of North Korean sport, which is laid out in the fifth and sixth chapter. The seventh chapter; utilizes game theory to put forward an analysis of the participation, cooperation and engagement of North Korea through the means of an international sporting event. The last chapter provides a summary of the extensive analysis provided and the policy implications of such.

This thesis employs a qualitative descriptive method in its approach to the research questions. The resources that this paper utilized are a diverse range of materials that represent the multifaceted properties of the author's thesis. Firstly, this relied on a fundamental foundation in the international relations of sport at large, while concurrently building upon the existing scholarly work on the subject of sport in North Korea. The 'History of Modern North Korean Sport' (Chapter 3) also utilizes existing historical literature to capture the essence of what is to be examined in the paper. Within the 'North Korean Domestic and International Sport' sections (Chapter 4 & 5), a range of resources are used, including that of official articles as published by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), a primary resource from the mouthpiece of the North Korean regime. Furthermore, international media outlets are also utilized, as is the author's own time in North Korea. Chapter 6 uses simple Nash equilibrium game theory to examine the

research undertaken throughout chapters two to five, and ultimately plotting the participatory, cooperative and engaging properties of North Korean sport.

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORY OF MODERN SPORT IN NORTH KOREA

4.1. Introduction

The following section will introduce the modern history of North Korean sport. This section will be conducted through the means of separating the modern history of North Korean sport into a number of periods related to the environment and experiences of the time. Although sport has been omnipresent throughout Korean history, for the purpose of an analytical approach only the most relevant history will be discussed. The first period will introduce the period of Japanese occupation to state formation, with the second period looking at North Korea's strive for legitimacy. The third and fourth period will introduce the era of dialogue and exchange in the 1980s and 1990s respectively, while the fifth and sixth period will conclude with South Korea's sunshine policy of the 2000s and the most recent events of note in 2010s.

4.2. 1910s - 1950s: Occupation to Formation

In the years 1910 - 1945, the Japanese Empire occupied Korea. This occupation was the end result of a process beginning with the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1876, and finally led to the official annexation in 1910⁸. This annexation brought an end to the Joseon Dynasty

⁸ The 1910 Japan–Korea Annexation Treaty, was made by representatives of the Empire of Japan and the Korean Empire on August 22, 1910. In this treaty, Japan formally annexed Korea.

and with Korea becoming an integral part of Japan, the Korean Peninsula was altered in irreversible ways. Although Japanese rule ended in 1945, that period was the foundations for the nationalism that proliferated within the Korean people (Ok, 2007).

During the Japanese occupation, Korean society toyed with the idea of Western ideals being a means of necessary change in lieu of the situation at the time. The increasingly nationalistic Korea challenged the ‘Japanization’ of the nation by such means as Western religious activities, modern education and physical activities, especially through the means of sport. These activities developed solidarity within Korean society, promoted and sustained patriotism, in the face of Japanese occupation. Paradoxically, the Japanese saw significance in using physical activities in their adaptation plans to assimilate Korean society, but soon recognized that modern sport was in fact shaping and promoting an independence sentiment among Koreans.

The epitome of Korean sport nationalism and the most revered contemporary sport hero is Son Gi Jeong, gold medalist in the marathon at the 1936 Berlin Olympics – who was compelled to compete under a Japanese name and with a Japanese flag on his tracksuit, and to stand on the dais with the Japanese anthem playing in his honour⁹. The image of his admired accomplishment was further bolstered by the editors of the Korean newspaper Dong- A Ilbo, who had deliberately effaced the Japanese flag from Son’s tracksuit in the photograph of him wearing the laurel wreath. As one Korean coach said to

9 "국민체육진흥공단." 서울올림픽기념관. KOC, n.d. Web. 27 Oct. 2014.

his players before a match against a Japanese opponent, ‘you are not just playing football. You are fighting for the independence of the Korean people’ (Horne, 2002). The Japanese occupation instilled nationalism within Koreans, which still reverberates within both North and South Korea in the present era, and it is this manifestation of such through sport that stands out in postcolonial discourse.

Following the establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the subsequent Korean War (1950-1953), dialog was not forthcoming related to sport. Direct talks were never had between both the ROK and DPRK during the 1950s, however, efforts were forthcoming in the pursuit of IOC membership from both sides in order to obtain recognition from other states (Bridges, 2007).

North Korea had been participating in sporting events within the communist community, due to the fact that the IOC had recognized the ROK as the official Korean Olympic team, rejecting the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” in favor of “North Korea” as the official name of the communist state (Jung, 2001; Lee, 2000). South–North dialogues were practically impossible at this time, with the main purpose of sport was to acquire international recognition and legitimacy of being the orthodox government on the Korean Peninsula.

The participation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) at the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games, albeit within a unified German team, gave the North Korea the legitimacy to lobby for recognition as an IOC member (Lee, 2009). North Korea

eventually obtained IOC membership at the 54th IOC General Meeting, held in Sofia, Bulgaria during 1957, later proposing a joint Korean team for the 17th Summer Olympic Games, to be held in Rome during 1960¹⁰. However, South Korea had little interest in cooperating due the North Korea's perceived supremacy as compared to South Korea's economic woes at the time.

4.3. 1960s – 1970s: Legitimacy

The IOC initiated bilateral talks between both South and North Korea in 1962, aimed at creating a unified team for the Olympic Games of Tokyo in 1964, the first attempt of which was made in Lausanne, Switzerland during 1963. An agreement in principal was made to form a unified team, with the traditional Korean folk song “Arirang” as its anthem. However, a unified team was unattainable (Bridges, 2007). The DPRK competed as North Korea at the 1964 Innsbruck Winter Olympics. It was the first time that the nation was represented at any Olympic Games¹¹. Han Pil-Hwa is the first Winter Olympic medalist in both Koreas before South Korean won the first medals in 1992 starting with Kim Ki-Hoon¹².

10 The Official Report Of The Organizing Committee. (n.d.): n. pag. IOC. Web. 12 Nov. 2014, <http://library.la84.org/6oic/OfficialReports/1964/or1964v1pt1.pdf>.

11 "Innsbruck 1964." Olympic.org. IOC, n.d. Web. 12 Nov. 2014.

12 "Republic of Korea, Korean Olympic Committee." Republic of Korea, Korean Olympic Committee, National Olympic Committee. KOC, n.d. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <<http://www.olympic.org/republic-of-korea>>.

1966 saw North Korea's football team qualify for the FIFA World Cup in England. Although losing to the Soviet Union (3-0) and drawing with Chile, North Korea defeated Italy with a famous victory in Middlesbrough. After advancing to the quarterfinals, the North Korea faced Eusebio's Portugal. Although North Korea raced into a 3-0 lead, Portugal eventually won 5-3 and sent them back to Pyongyang legends nonetheless¹³.

From a domestic perspective, North Korea declared a new political doctrine, that of Juche ideology late in the 1960s¹⁴. This ideology manipulated sport as a tool of political propaganda that emphasized self-reliance and called for the unity amongst the people under the North Korean regime's leadership (Lee, 2000).

North Korea's first Summer Olympics Games appearance was in the 1972 Munich Summer Olympics, winning five medals, including one gold. Despite a temporary respite during the early 1970s, proposals were made during the July 4th Joint Communiqué in 1974. Attempts were made to enter a unified Korean team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championships, being held in Pyongyang, subsequently failing once again. System supremacy continued to dominate the context of sports dialogs, utilized as a vessel of political propaganda to defeat the other.

13 "1966 FIFA World Cup England™." FIFA.com. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Nov. 2014.
<<http://www.fifa.com/tournaments/archive/worldcup/england1966/index.html>>.

14 Juche is a political thesis formed by the former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, which states that the Korean masses are the masters of the country's development. From the 1950s to the 1970s, Kim and other party theorists developed the Juche Idea into a set of principles that the government uses to justify its policy decisions. Among these are political independence, military independence, and economic self-sufficiency.

4.4. 1980s: Decade of Dialogue

The early 1980s were marked by three inter-Korean governmental meetings for the purpose of discussing the possibility of a unified Korean team participating at the 1984 Olympic games, to be held in Los Angeles, and the 1986 Asian Games, in Seoul. South–North dialogs of this period were gloomy. From 1980 to 1987, South and North held dialogs 31 times, among which seven concerned socio-cultural exchanges, a relatively large portion compared with other periods (Jung, 2013). The efforts of such were subsequently fruitless, with an additional four governmental meetings (1985 - 1987) also proving to be unsuccessful in reaching an understanding of the proposal co-hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games¹⁵

The IOC agreed in principal to relax its own rules on the location of the Olympics being in one state to offer North Korea the opportunity of being involved in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games (Merkel, 2011). North Korea was subsequently offered the opportunity to host three sports (ladies volleyball, table tennis and archery) and partial hosting of at least two sports (soccer and cycling), but this did not meet the demands of North Korea. The demand of eight complete sports (judo, wrestling, gymnastics and soccer amongst others) and separate opening and closing ceremonies was something that was not plausible from the outset, and most probably a publicity event. However, at the end of 1987 North Korea suggested direct talks with South Korea, also suggesting an inter-

¹⁵ "Sport and Politics on the Korean Peninsula - North Korea and the 1988 Seoul Olympics." Wilson Center. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/sport-and-politics-the-korean-peninsula-north-korea-and-the-1988-seoul-olympics>>.

Korean Olympic team, on the condition of appropriate democratic political change in the South Korea. These efforts proved again to be fruitless.

North Korea subsequently did not even participate in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, and attempted to destabilize South Korea prior to the event with the bombing of a Baghdad to Seoul aircraft¹⁶. South Korea's hosting of the Olympic Games was perceived as a serious threat to North Korea, as it perceived it as proof of system supremacy of the South. The regime of Chun Do Hwan invested an abundance of energy and resources holding large sporting event, leading some to refer to South Korea as the 'Event Republic' or Olympic Republic' (Jung, 2010). Sport had never played such an important role in Korean history than that the Olympic Games being hosted in Seoul, and was perceived as a serious threat to North Korea in highlighting the system supremacy of the South Korea. It is argued that the Seoul Olympic Games marked the end of the inter-Korean competition for international recognition and legitimacy (Cha, 2009) that had been a cornerstone of both North Korea and South Korea's involvement in international sport for since their establishment.

During December 1988, in the aftermath of the successful Seoul Olympic Games, a letter was sent by North Korea to the President of the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC), Kim Jong Ha, asking to hold a sport dialogue with the purpose of forming an inter-Korean team for the upcoming Asian Games, to be held in being during September 1990. The

¹⁶ Korean Air Flight 858 was a scheduled international passenger flight between Baghdad, Iraq and Seoul, South Korea. On 29 November 1987, the aircraft flying that route exploded in mid-air upon the detonation of a bomb planted inside an overhead storage bin in the airplane's passenger cabin by North Korean agents.

South Korea accepted the offer, while also agreeing to hold a South–North unification football goodwill game, a reincarnation of the Seoul-Pyongyang football games, which contributed to the spirit of the Korean people during Japanese occupation (Jung, 2013).

4.5. 1990s: Exchange Era

The early 1990s was a golden age in terms of progress regarding inter-Korean athletic exchanges. Initially, representatives of North Korea and South Korea agreed to form a single cheering squad for the Asian Games in Beijing during 1990. Following that progress, a South-North unification soccer match was held in Seoul and Pyongyang respectively in October 1990. The two events marked the first direct athletic exchange between the two Koreas since the Korean division.

A unified Korean flag, meant to symbolize reconciliation and unity of the Korean peninsula, made its inaugural appearance at the 41st World Table Tennis Championships and at the World Junior Soccer Championship in April and June 1991 respectively (Lee, 2000). Although great progress was made in breaking the deadlock, the defection of the DPRK judo player, Lee Chang-Soo during the same year tarnished the progress made and was a setback for progress between the North and South Korea¹⁷. However, the positive aspects of these events set a precedent for future progress and overcame the first hurdle of

17 "Olympics-Revenge Burns for Former North Korean Judoka." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 01 Mar. 2012. Web. 26 Oct. 2014. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/olympics-korea-idUSL4E8E115V20120301>>.

initial agreements, which have become the benchmark for the upcoming cases.

Further examples of progress through sport during this period include that of the football between labor unions from both North and South Korea, and unification basketball matches held in Pyongyang and Seoul¹⁸. The electing of Kim Dae-Jung as president of South Korea was instrumental in many of the positive relations between Seoul and Pyongyang. The “sunshine policy” approach to North Korea advocated inter-Korean exchanges, especially through the means sport. Furthermore, President Kim Dae-Jung’s policies created the environment that allowed corporations such as Hyundai to construct a 12,335-seat gymnasium in Pyongyang through their Asan Foundation in September 1999¹⁹.

4.6. 2000s: Sun is Shining

The year 2000 saw the historic inter-Korean summit and the start of a significant amount of meaningful progress in sports exchanges. Kim Jong-Il and Kim Dae-Jung agreed to build towards reunification while peacefully coexisting and cooperating. Sport exchanges between the DPRK and ROK became active in the years following the summit during the presidencies of Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, which included support from

18 "Inter-Korean Reunification Basketball Games Held in Pyongyang." *KCNA*. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/114th_issue/99100606.htm>.

19 "Construction Begins in NK for First Inter-Korea Gymnasium." *The Chosun Ilbo*. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Nov. 2014. <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/1999/09/29/1999092961274.html>.

corporations such as Hyundai, Wooinbang Communications and Samsung for such exchanges²⁰. Additionally, at the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympic Games, 2004 Athens Summer Olympic Games, 2006 Torino Winter Olympic Games, as well as the 2002 Busan Asian Games, the 2003 Aomori Winter Games and the 2003 Daegu Summer Universiade; players from both nations marched behind the unified Korean flag wearing identical uniforms (Merkel, 2008). Furthermore, the Inter-Korean unification football match and a taekwondo demonstration team's excursion exchanges in Pyongyang and Seoul during 2002 were also notable. These events were quite pivotal in creating a sentiment that reached across both North and South Korea. Although, as evident in the failure to co-host 2002 World Cup Games, it is clear that the sports exchange programs at the time were still dependent on, or subject to political rivalries.

The 2002 Busan Asian Games epitomizes the positive inter-Korean exchange programs and was the most significant of all the events in which North and South Korea participated together. The North Korea's participation in the Games increased the prospects of more effective exchanges with the ROK, but a subsequent 2003 North Korean nuclear crisis cooled relations between the two states. Once again, the North and South Korea agreed to send an inter-Korean team to the 2006 Doha Asian Games, after working-level negotiations between sports officials from both states, while also agreeing to similar in relation to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Several meetings followed in

20 "The Government of the People's Policy on Inter-Korean Exchanges and the Current Situation." N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Sept. 2014. <<http://fas.org/news/skorea/1999/990413-current.htm>>.

Kaesong, North Korea during 2005 and 2006, regarding the specifics of the inter-Korean team such as to discuss the flag, anthem and training methods to be used and reached a basic agreement. Additionally, Sheikh Ahmad al Sabah, the president of the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA), announced “If South and North Korea would send a unified team to Asian Games, OCA would help with all possible methods”. In November 2006, in the immediate aftermath of North Korea’s surprising nuclear test, which raised tensions considerably on the Korean peninsula, the only dialog that continued focused upon sporting issues (Merkel, 2003). The inauguration of Lee Myung Bak as president of the South Korea saw a new North Korea policy appear and the relations between the two states reached deadlock and events such as the shooting dead of a South Korean tourist at the Kumgang Mountain Resort in 2008 did little to encourage the new administration to promote any cultural relations, including sport exchanges²¹. Another disappointment and political setback in the immediate aftermath of the Beijing Olympics was the cancelation of the World Cup qualifier between North and South Korea²². The match was scheduled to be played in Pyongyang in September 2008. FIFA moved the game to Shanghai as the North had indicated that it would not be prepared to play the anthem and fly the flag of South Korea. In North Korea, none of this political wrestling – only the result, a goalless draw – was reported in the state- controlled national media. Their focus was upon the

21 In July 2008, Park Wang Ja, a 53-year-old South Korean tourist, was shot twice and killed when she entered a military area, according to the North Korean government. The South Korean request for a joint inquiry was denied.

22 "North & South Korea in Stalemate." BBC News. BBC, 26 Mar. 2008. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/internationals/7315114.stm>>.

September 9th celebrations and thus on the country's achievements over the previous six decades. There was also no mention of Kim Jong Il's absence from the traditional military and people's parade that formed one of the highlights of this important anniversary.

4.7. 2010s: New Beginning, Same Difference

The 2010s has differed to previous decades concerning North Korean sports in the fact that most notable occurrences are not related to inter-Korean cooperation. The 2010 FIFA World Cup, hosted by South Africa, contained a North Korean team that qualified for the first time since the states famous World Cup campaign of 1966. Although, the first game against the well established Brazilian national team was promising despite a 2-1 loss, the subsequent games against Portugal (7-0) and Cote d'Ivoire (3-0) were considered an embarrassment from a North Korean perspective. The 2012 London Olympic Games proved to be a fruitful period for North Korea in terms of medals, equaling their best haul at Barcelona 1992 of four gold medals. However, a notable incident during the London games was that of a technical blunder, which placed the South Korean flag in place of the North Korean flag on the Hampden Park stadium screens during a preliminary women's football match, and led to embarrassment and anger from North Korean Olympic officials²³.

23 "London 2012: North Koreans Walk off after Flag Row." *BBC News*. BBC, 25 July 2012. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-18991619>>.

Additionally, during the 2010s, people-to-people diplomacy through sport appeared in a peculiar fashion. A former National Basketball Association (NBA) player, Dennis Rodman, formed an unlikely friendship with the leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un²⁴. A number of sport exchanges were organized and successfully hosted. However, the erratic behavior of Rodman following his initial trip to North Korea indicates that nothing tangible was achieved by his endeavors politically, despite his 'basketball diplomacy' mantra²⁵.

Perhaps the most pivotal period in the 2010s to date, concerning sport of North Korea is that of the 2014 Incheon Asian Games. North Korea participated on South Korean soil for the first time since the 2002 Busan Asian Games. The build up to the Incheon Games was littered with speculation as to the specifics of the North Korea's participation such as the presence of cheering squads, South and North Korea's sharing of participation costs and the flying of the North Korean flag at official venues and in the host city of Incheon. North Korea successfully participated in the Incheon Games without any notable incidents, breaking into the upper half of the medals table, with 36 medals in total and

24 "Dennis Rodman: 'I Love Kim Jong Un'" The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, n.d. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/news/dennis-rodman-i-love-kim-jong-un-9042091.html>>.

25 "Dennis Rodman Defends North Korean 'Basketball Diplomacy'" NPR. NPR, n.d. Web. 27 Sept. 2014. <<http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/01/07/260440502/dennis-rodman-defends-north-korean-basketball-diplomacy>>.

three North Korean weightlifters setting new world records at the games²⁶ . A major surprise came before the closing ceremony of the Games with the visit of three of the most senior North Korean officials to Incheon, led by Hwang Pyong So, considered to be No. 2 in North Korea's hierarchy, having some of the highest level talks to be held in the past five years²⁷ .

26 "DPRK Sportswomen Win Gold Medals in Weightlifting and Gymnastic Events of 17th Asian Games." KCNA. Web. 17 Nov. 2014, <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201409/news26/20140926-01ee.html>>.

27 "Hwang Pyong So Leaves to Participate in Asian Games." KCNA. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Nov. 2014. <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201410/news04/20141004-01ee.html>>.

CHAPTER FIVE

ASPECTS OF NORTH KOREAN DOMESTIC SPORT

Domestic sport in North Korea is a multifaceted arena that encompasses many aspects of life in the state. The North Korean regime have instilled its own customized approach to sport across all areas, from grassroots level up to the elite athletes who will represent North Korea on the international stage. Domestic sport is politically utilized for many reasons in North Korea, and this has its foundations domestically. The ideological preference of North Korea, most notably Juche, gives a unique culture within sport that is unlike another in the world. The characteristics of North Korean sport are complex, and in order to understand them better one must first explore sport domestically, which provides a foundation for sport at large in North Korea. The following section will explore notable aspects of North Korean domestic sport.

Juche ideology was introduced in the 1960 as North Korea's new political doctrine, as a response to the animosity between the Soviet Union and China and the Cultural Revolution in the latter. The introduction of Juche ideology began in earnest to shape the main characteristics of North Korean sport as means of political propaganda, that bolstered self-reliance and unified the people under the guidance of the North Korean regime. (Lee, 2000). North Korea established their push for the development of sport in

order to mobilize the masses, through the means of subordinating individuals into the collective of Juche ideology. Additionally, outdoor activity was heavily promoted by the North Korean regime, especially to young citizens, with historical pilgrimages, and enactments of heroic achievements of the state (Lee, 2009). Juche ideology combines staunch nationalism with traditional socialism and consists of five main principals: being a master in ideology, political independence, economic self-sufficiency, self-reliance in national defense, and autonomy in diplomacy (Kim, 1994).

Sport became a major tool for the North Korean regime in the consolidation of Juche ideology and continues to be in the current era. From the perspective of the North Korean regime, there are a number of ways in which they utilize sport for the purpose of its own ideological benefits. The aim to push North Korea to becoming a sports power on the level of their peers worldwide is an important component of the efforts to boost state capabilities and to demonstrate “indomitable spirit and dignity of Songun”²⁸, its military-first policy. This identifies the clear approach the North Korean regime took in fortifying its military through sport, in order to boost nationalistic pride through the medium of Juche. Furthermore, the North Korean regime developed physical culture and sports to become a popular movement with the hope of readying North Korean citizens for labor and defense purposes. The developing of sport through the means of mass mobilization assisted in the rebuilding of the state in the aftermath of the Korean War, and throughout

28 "Sports." KCNA. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Oct. 2014.
<<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201212/news07/20121207-06ee.html>>.

its history. This fact gives resilience to the alignment of Juche and sport in the success that it has achieved.

The North Korean regime inaugurated the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission in order to holistically direct sport within North Korea²⁹. The scope of this work includes making sport a daily part of life, the continued mass mobilization of sport, developing world class sports science and technology, long term training programs, procurement of sporting supplies, vitalizing the domestic sports arena, while improving the training of international athletes and teams. The commission consisted of a chairperson, vice chairperson, secretary general and general members. It is notable in highlighting the importance of this commission that Jang Song Thaek, the now deceased uncle of Kim Jong Un, was its chairperson before his execution in December 2013. Leading officials from various government departments and sports institutes populate the commission and are organized throughout the provinces, cities, counties and military facilities. It is the expectation of the North Korean regime that sports will strengthen Songun, through displaying dignity, demonstrating the achievements of the North Korean state to the world and consolidating North Korea as functioning socialist state.

The push to develop sport through Juche indoctrinate has encompassed all aspects of North Korean society, and the North Korean regime attribute the successes of North Korean athletes in international competitions to this. The KCNA reported on more than

29 "Report on Enlarged Meeting of Political Bureau of WPK Central Committee." KCNA. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Nov. 2014. <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201211/news04/20121104-04ee.html>>.

40 tournaments encompassing various sports such as “the eleventh grand bull prize national ssirum contest and other competitions”, while also highlighting the achievements of North Korean athletes winning “390 medals including 164 gold medals in over 70 international games” The ultimate goal of the North Korean regime is to support the original intentions of former President Kim Il Sung in realizing the advancement of Juche, and with North Korea’s recent sporting achievements it seems to be successful, at least from a propaganda perspective. The North Korean regime has also improved and developed sporting facilities under the umbrella of Juche. Venues such as the Pyongyang Indoor Stadium, Pyongyang International Football School and a sports village in Chongchun Street were developed for the purpose of recreation and to support the improvement of sport in North Korea. Furthermore, various gymnasiums, stadiums, and sporting parks were built statewide while the Masik ski resort and Mirim Riding Club were developed to add new dimensions to North Korea’s sporting repertoire³⁰ .

Sport and physical activity give the North Korean regime an outlet to build their own Cultural Revolution and provide answers to the issues that the state faces in its development of its ultimate socialist idea. Sport in North Korea has gradually become holistically consistent with Juche-oriented principles. The KCNA reported that the Juche based physical culture has made “easeless leaping progress on the principle of thoroughly

30 "DPRK's Signal Successes in Its Drive to Emerge Sports Power." KCNA. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Nov. 2014. <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201312/news25/20131225-15ee.html>>.

defending, embodying and developing the President's idea and exploits on sports”³¹. Although success has been forthcoming in indoctrinating Juche ideology into the realm of sport, the North Korean regime is ceaseless in strengthening its presence in all aspects of North Korean sport. In a meeting of active sportspersons, the KCNA reported that “priority efforts on the development of events that serve as icons of the North Korea”, while they underlined the requirement of increasing “the interest of the whole society and state in football”³². It is apparent that the push to further integrate Juche into North Korean sport will continue.

North Korea’s relationship with sport and Juche is interlocked and it is certain that they both provide unique inputs to each other respectively. Sport has properties the North Korean regime need in steering its citizens towards socialism through its own guise. The domestic achievements that North Korea highlights are lauded by the regime as successes of the system. This demonstrates the dignity of the North Korean state while honoring Juche principals. However, this success and achievement can be finally traced back to the Kim dynasty and although there are tangible successes of sport through Juche, it is not clear if the purpose of Juche in sport is only serving regime survival. Nevertheless, it continues to operate and produce athletes that utilize the sports infrastructure that has been put in place to eventually represent North Korea on the international stage. The

31 "40th Anniversary of Kim Il Sung's Work Marked." KCNA. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Aug. 2014. <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200911/news03/20091103-13ee.html>>.

32 "Meeting of Active Sportspersons of Songun Held." KCNA. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Sept. 2014. <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201103/news30/20110330-38ee.html>>.

conveyor belt like approach to sport and its “Masik Speed”³³ ideological banner, have become metaphors of modern North Korea and serve to inspire the North Korean citizens to follow suit. The connection between Juche and sport in North Korea allow this inspiration to flourish and consolidate its position in North Korean society.

An event that epitomizes North Korea’s use of sport for prominent political statements is that of the Arirang Mass Games. North Korea has periodically held festivals in the same manner since the 1950s, in the same guise as other mass games such as Spartakiad in the Former Czechoslovakia and other mass gymnastic displays in previous communist states such as Romania and Yugoslavia³⁴. Since the early 2000s, an increase has occurred in the grandeur that was witnessed in the festival and has attracted international attention, as well as inquisitive tourists, drawn to an enigma of great proportions. Named after a folk story of intangible cultural heritage in both halves of the Korean Peninsula, it draws on the mobilization of the states’ young people through submissive and meticulous training to produce a spectacle that has been described as “the greatest show on earth”³⁵. The most recent Arirang Mass Games was held from August to September 2013, with an unspecified hiatus taken from 2014. It remains to be seen if the games return but it is

33 "Korean People Create Great Speed of Era in Socialist Construction." KCNA. N.p., n.d. Web. 11 July 2014. <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201312/news13/20131213-10ee.html>>.

34 Spartakiad initially was the name of an international sports event, which ceased taking place after 1937. Later Spartakiads were organized as national sport events of the Eastern bloc countries.

35 "The Greatest Propaganda Show on Earth." The Guardian. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Sept. 2014. <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/03/northkorea4>>.

expected that in 2015, the 70th anniversary of independence from Japan's colonial rule and the foundation of the Korean Workers' Party will feature some form of mass games.

Participation in this event is mandatory for the privileged set that call Pyongyang home, through the educational institutions within the vicinity of the capital. A solid objective of the games is the political socialization of North Korean citizens through a means of “physiological and psychological indoctrination” (Merkel, 2013). The exhausting regimented routine replenishes the North Korean Juche philosophy in the young participants, instilling a unified collective rapport with the North Korean state and its comrades, in the place of individualism. The vast scale and almost minute attention to detail presents a opportunity for North Korean socialist values to be highlighted and reflected in the manner the regime in Pyongyang wishes itself to be perceived, while additionally, the games have a supplementary purpose of providing a platform for inter-Korean sentiment, through the prominent reoccurring theme of reunification with the Arirang Mass Games.

The origins of the Arirang Mass Games can be traced back to the 1930s in the revolutionary anti-Japanese work of Kim Il Sung, the deceased but eternal leader of North Korea, named Flower Gymnastics³⁶. Its most recent incarnation portrays the ideological history of the North Korean state from the aforementioned revolutionary struggle up to

³⁶ The Mass Games organizers state that 'Juche orientated mass gymnastics of Korea originated from Flower Gymnastics, a work by President Kim Il Sung created in 1930, the early days of his anti Japanese revolutionary struggles'.


the present day's celebration of the achievement of the Kim Dynasty. The manner in which the games are executed are described by Kim Jong Il, as being a mix of comprehensive physical exercise with a combination of high ideological content, artistic quality and gymnastic skills (Merkel, 2010; Kim Song Mo, 2002). The demonstration of a distinctive and successful self-fashioned political system, consolidation of a distinct collective identity, and the legitimation of the dynastic trilogy of Kim Il Sung, Jong Il and Jong Un, as the unquestioned rulers of North Korea.

The Arirang Mass Games, as witnessed by the author in its most recent form during September 2012, takes place in the North Korean Capital, Pyongyang, within the Rungrado May Day Stadium, the largest in the world with a capacity of 150,000, sitting on an island on Pyongyang's Taedong River (Figure 1). The sheer scale of the location is akin to a fortified citadel, with the stadium at its focal point. Within the games itself, there are three distinguishing components of the spectacle. Firstly, a floorshow choreographed sequences and routines are performed by tens of thousands of participants, ranging from gymnasts; equipped with flags, balls, streamers and ropes, to acrobats; utilizing ladders, spring boards, trampolines and improvised trapezes to great effect. Also featuring is a copious amount of military personnel, indoctrinated children and taekwondo masters. Secondly, a giant mosaic is positioned in the section of the stadium directly opposite to the viewing section. More than 20,000 participants, mostly all school children between the ages of 13 – 15, are tasked with executing what can only be described as the world's largest human television. Books of more than 170 pages are held by each participant, which contains colored cards that when opened and changed in unison act as animated

North Korean propaganda in the form of historical events, architecture, modern achievements and recurring references to the Kim dynasty. The participants are separated into sections within the mosaic according to their Pyongyang school district, with schools in districts such as Mangyongdae, Ryokpo, Songyo and Moranbong represented (Appendix 1), which can be viewed through their collective card opening in the warm up period before the initial performance. Thirdly, the acoustical input provides the final link between all aspects of the performance, with the music representative of the traditional Korean folk variety.

The competition to be a participant in this event is highly competitive, and the chosen few must go through a strenuous training program long before the commencement of the performances. The students' chosen are exempt from school classes in conflict with their rigorous mass games daily schedule. It has been reported that students' ability to meet university entry requirements has suffered due to their participation in the games, a disadvantage addressed by the North Korean education authority by awarding extra points in compensation for missing out on school due to the games (Merkel 2013). This fact highlights the importance placed on the participation of students in the games, as it is clear that the weight of ideological indoctrination is much greater than that of vocational skills in their formidable years of education.

Figure 1: Arirang Mass Games Stadium Plan



Source: Koryo Group

The end product of the scrupulous planning, organizing and execution is a colorful, entertaining and awe-inspiring canvas of sound, acrobatics and kaleidoscopic pyrotechnics in the shadow of the central theme of all things Juche, Kim and North Korea. The games itself are only comparable to a performance of the magnitude of an Olympic Games opening ceremony, which further exemplifies the scale of its undertaking – it usually has run consecutively each night for two months, as opposed to a once off Olympic opening ceremony, every four years. Although it can be classed as no more than

a projection of the North Korean regime's apparent achievements through propagandist use of their citizens, the games have a much deeper use than just singularly propaganda.

The rationale of the games at local level is to instill a communistic trait within the youth of Pyongyang at their impressionable stage, in order to promote commitment to the collective cause of the North Korean regime through its citizens. This is achieved through a combination of physiological and psychological indoctrination during many months of instruction, continuously highlighting the ideological undertone of North Korean society, which upholds the promotion of collectivity, above all else. Kim Jong Il reiterated this point in 1997 when he mentioned "Pupils should be encouraged to participate in mass gymnastic performances [...] they are very effective both in educating pupils in the collectivist spirit and in building up their strength and improving their artistic skills" (Merkel, 2010; Kim Jong Il, 1997).

Although it evident that the life cycle of a performer in the games is strenuous to the point of oppression, it is a highly sought after accolade in the minds of Pyongyangites due to the competitive recruitment process in place. It is only the most talented that are instructed to join the training for the games. The image of a vast number of individuals operating with collective precision and perfection resonates the Juche mantra through spectacular means tasked with inspiring the populace to mimic such submission to their ideology on an everyday basis. The popularity of these games domestically is quite

strong, with estimates in excess of 20 million attending in the years up to 2013³⁷. It was not a rare occurrence for the show to be extended due to the popular demand for tickets by citizens. Kim Jong Il remarked, “by giving frequent gymnastic performances of this type, pupils will contribute greatly to educating the working people and enhancing the prestige of the country abroad” (Merkel, 2010; Kim Jong Il, 1997).

Although the Arirang Mass Games have an underlying domestic importance, as mentioned by Kim Jong Il, the prestige of the games is an important projection of North Korea’s image abroad. The initial Arirang festival in 2002 served to rival the co-hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup by Japan and South Korea. However, it served as a distant response, with little foreigners attending. However, from the 2005 season, an increasing number of foreigners were invited including “official delegations from China, Russia and Cuba” (Merkel, 2010; Cho and Faiol, 2005).

Additionally, citizens of the United States gained entry to North Korea for the purpose of viewing the games, often at highly inflated prices of between 80 – 300 Euros each³⁸, with South Korean citizens also given a short-lived permission in 2005 to fly directly from Incheon to Pyongyang and attend the games. This open invite gives an impression of the ‘invitation diplomacy’ that Kim Jong Il revived, used by his father and predecessor to project North Korea as a strong and stable state under the control of a capable and

37 "Pyongyang's Arirang Festival: Eye Candy for the Masses." The Diplomat. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Sept. 2014. <<http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/pyongyangs-arirang-festival-eye-candy-for-the-masses/>>.

38 "Uri Tours: Your Guide to the DPRK." Arirang Mass Games Performance Pricing. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Oct. 2014. <<http://uritours.com/dprk/entry/arirang-mass-games>>.

popular leader. This message is quite important domestically but reverberates internationally simultaneously in the presence of foreign spectators.

The Arirang Mass Games have also been fulfilling Kim Jong Il's goal of promoting the state abroad in the manner of the notable guests who have attended. In October 2000, the former United States Secretary of State in the Clinton Administration, Madeline Albright paid a visit to Pyongyang. Included in the itinerary was a gymnastic performance, in the same guise as the Arirang Mass Games, titled 'The Invincible Worker's Party'³⁹. Furthermore, 2007 saw Roh Moo Hyun, South Korean President at the time, attending the games, albeit with an ideologically modified version in respect of the South Korean president's visit⁴⁰.

The impressive backdrop comprised of 20,000 participants communicates various messages that highlight North Korea's political stance, achievements, and rallying calls for solidarity and encouragements for the future. Messages such as appear. In addition, the floorshow contributes greatly to the overall show, esthetically complementing the message transmitted by the giant mosaic through the intersecting of art, Korean culture and physiological primes. The division and reunification of the Korean peninsula are also a common theme throughout the display within the games. A notable highlight is that of the floor gymnasts converging to complete a unified representation of the Korean

39 "[Outlook]More than a Game." -INSIDE Korea JoongAng Daily. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Aug. 2014. <<http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2880987>>.

40 "Roh Moo Hyun Appreciates "Arirang"" Past News. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 June 2014. <<http://www.kena.co.jp/item/2007/200710/news10/04.htm>>.

Peninsula, under the mosaic backdrop of ‘one land’ (Appendix 2), while conversely presenting a view of the military capabilities of the state in another section of the performance.

Table 1: Arirang Mass Games Schedule

Prelude	Arirang
Act 1	Arirang Nation
Scene 1	Crossing the Tumen River
Scene 2	Star of Korea
Scene 3	My Homeland
Scene 4	Our Arms
Finale	Arirang of Prosperity
Act 2	Arirang of Army Centered Policy
Scene 1	Oh, Shining Moon of my Country
Scene 2	Laughing Heartily
Scene 3	Drumbeats in my Country
Scene 4	People’s Army
Act 3	Arirang Rainbow
Scene 1	Isonnam Waterfall
Scene 2	People’s Land Bliss
Scene 3	Single-Hearted Loyalty
Act 4	Arirang of Reunification

Source: (Lee, Bairner, 2009)

The final stages of the Arirang Mass Games were optimistic about the future. It reiterates that the ‘Great Leader (Kim Il Sung) and General (Kim Jong Il) are ‘the everlasting sun of Juche ideology’ (Appendix 4), while attributing a bright future for new generations to

the deceased former leaders (Appendix 5). Indeed, the future was highlighted throughout the performance with a notable mosaic being that of ‘Love future generations, love the future’ (Appendix 6). It was inferred during the Arirang Mass Games that the best is yet to come for North Korea.

The last act, titled ‘Arirang of a thriving nation’, celebrated attainable peace and prosperity through the reunification and reconciliation of the two Koreas. The 2012 edition attended by the author was significant for two reasons. Firstly, the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth was earmarked as the year when North Korea would emerge as a prosperous nation, as was advocated throughout the previous games⁴¹. Secondly, in the wake of Kim Jong Il’s death during the previous winter, Kim Jong Un emerged as the new young leader of the North Korean state. This was highlighted periodically throughout the games.

The Arirang Mass Games is an integral component of North Korea's domestic policy, with sedimentary effects on the projection of their foreign policy. The games are a dynamic tool for the North Korean regime as a means of indoctrinating young citizens with the Juche ideology that will be a cornerstone of their lives, while showcasing the resulting devotion and submission of the participants. This highlights the domestic achievements of the regime through the abstract representation of the support of all citizens through the games. Furthermore, it allows North Korea to present its stance of

41 "Seminar on Arirang Held." KCNA. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Nov. 2014.
<<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200209/news09/30.htm>>.

Korean reunification through a theatrical representation, more animated and ideological than any high-level meeting between the Koreas could be. From a foreign policy perspective, the opportunity to utilize the 'invitation diplomacy' that Kim Il Sung favored is a prospect that is too valuable to miss. The few tourists who enter North Korea annually somewhat become de facto ambassadors of the country, in the fact that they will offer their account of the time spent in North Korea to curious 'outsiders'. From the North Korean perspective, it is quite important that they are treated to excursions that will instill positive memories in the minds of these tourists, with the hope that a gradual normalization of sentiment towards the state can occur, despite sporadic nuclear tests and caustic political rhetoric.

A notable mention must be made to the Chinese tourists, whom the author traveled with as part of a group to North Korea. The Chinese unsurprisingly get preferential treatment from the North Korean government at heavily discounted tour prices, in comparisons with their western counterparts. Within the Arirang Mass Games, a section is dedicated to the relationship between China and North Korea and strong support of the Communist Party. As one montage strongly presented, 'Without the Communist Party, there is no new China' (Appendix 7). This is significant as it exemplifies North Korea's commitment to their greatest ally through, above all, flattery of the Chinese Communist Party.

At face value, the Arirang Mass Games are, as they appear, a lavishly excessive extravaganza of propaganda not representing the holistic truths of the country. However, from the perspective of the North Korean government, they hold symbolic importance.

The consolidation of Kim Jong Un's power, fortified by the cult of his predecessors Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung, is a key goal of the games. Additionally, the games give the North Korean government the opportunity of launching an international charm offensive through its 'invitation diplomacy'. Furthermore, the games demonstrate transparency to the outside world; with the hope that North Korea's brand of socialism will inspire people across the globe. Finally, the most tangible of all reasoning for the presence of the Arirang Mass Games is the desire of the North Korea regime to obtain hard currency from Western and Chinese tourists. Although this is most likely true, the amount of revenue generated is not significant enough for the games to be highlighted as a cash earner for the regime.

North Korea's domestic sport is well integrated into the political ideology of the North Korean regime. The mass mobilization and indoctrination of the citizens had had an enormous effect on the characteristics of North Korean sport while the regime recognizes that it continues to be an effective tool of political utilization. However, it must also be reiterated that although North Korea is a state on the fringes of world geopolitics, it is still a state in itself with 23 million citizens. It is quite possible that a significant number of these citizens enjoy sport in some form and use it for their own recreation. In many contexts, it is impossible to classify North Korea as a 'normal country', but in the context of domestic sport, it may be one of the few ways to look at North Korea in the same manner as other states.

CHAPTER SIX

ASPECTS OF NORTH KOREAN INTERNATIONAL SPORT

6.1. Introduction

North Korea is well recognized as being a reclusive state. Its inward focused policies, such as those within Juche ideology, reinforces their political solitary confinement, which trickles down to many aspects of North Korean society. This coupled with its testing relationship with the ‘West’; its perceived membership in the “Axis of evil”⁴²; and the sanctions imposed as a result of the latter, further exemplifies its description as a ‘hermit kingdom’⁴³. However, North Korea’s international outreach is not as limited as mainstream media portrays, and international sport is an exemplary area in which North Korea consistently participate, and thus interact within the international realm.

Sports events organized by international non-government organizations (Sport INGOs) such as FIFA, the IOC and the IAAF, are populated by members states in numbers only

42 U.S. President George W. Bush used the term ‘Axis of evil’ in his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002 to describe governments that he accused of helping terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction, such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

43 Hermit kingdom is a term applied to any country, organization or society, which willfully walls itself off, either metaphorically or physically, from the rest of the world. Notably used by current mass media to describe North Korea.

comparable to membership of the United Nations⁴⁴. The array of events under the umbrella of international sport gives North Korea periodical opportunities to participate, compete and interact with their international peers. This opportunity has long been recognized by Pyongyang, with Kim Il Sung's past assertion that "DPRK athletes should prove successful in international tournaments to display the dignity of the country", highlighting the prestige of the state and complimenting its socialist ideology⁴⁵.

According to the regime, North Korea's participation in international sports is essentially about "glorify[ing] the honor of the country at international games and bring[ing] national pride and self-confidence to the people", while also [...] represent[ing] the stamina of the fighting service personnel and people of the country"⁴⁶. This statement is likely to be an accurate representation of international sports participation in a similar way that many states attach nationalism to sport, albeit with a heavy load of political ideology attached. However, there are ample opportunities for North Korea to utilize international sport, in ways other than simply just domestic purposes.

In the past 20 years, North Korean athletes have won approximately 1400 medals in international competitions, ranging from the pinnacle of international sport, such as the Olympic games, to secondary events such as the World Junior Weightlifting

44 FIFA has 209 members, the IOC has 105 active members, and the IAAF has 212 members, while the United Nations has 193 members.

45 DPRK's Sports Achievements for Past 20 Years, 28th October 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201407/news10/20140710-23ee.html>

46 Kim Jong Un Goes Round Sports Village in Chongchun Street, 28th October 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201303/news08/20130308-20ee.html>

Championships⁴⁷. International sport is a multi-faceted arena and this is mirrored in the opportunities it produces for North Korea. Clear opportunities in major events have passed by without utilization while less important events have produced useful opportunities for improved relations with other states, from a North Korean perspective. This often-incalculable result occasionally dispels the idea that international sport is important to North Korea on a continual basis; however, the merit is IN the reoccurring opportunity itself, as it allows the renewal of North Korea's interaction within the international realm, far removed from traditional politics, at least in theory.

The following sub-sections will analyze North Korea's participation in international sport through the means of past participation, successes and failures, and future opportunities. For the purpose of a holistically accurate view of international sport from a North Korean perspective, the sub-sections represent a division of the array of international sport events North Korea participate within, classified by this author as the Olympic Games, Asian Games, FIFA World Cup, miscellaneous sport events, and inter-Korean exchanges. Although this is a loose dichotomy of international sport, it is hoped by the author that it could act as a guide in understanding North Korea's traverses within international sporting events. Furthermore, each subsection will identify what the event brings and does not bring to North Korea, from a political perspective, as well as highlighting previous notable events.

47 DPRK's Sports Achievements for Past 20 Years, 28th October 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201407/news10/20140710-23ee.html>.

6.2. The Olympic Games

The Olympic Games are the epitome of sport being truly international and North Korea subscribe to this sentiment. The Olympic movement's summer and winter games bring together states from across the world through the athletes that represent the best in their respective sports. Although the size of a state's amount of representatives depends on the amount of qualified athletes, every state has the opportunity and incentive to participate in these games. From a sporting perspective, the prestige, pride and nationalism that are gained from a successful event are immeasurable in capturing the hearts and minds of a state's citizens.

The Olympic Games have long been a vehicle of direct and indirect political battles, due its popularity across the world. This has varied from the system supremacy battle between the Soviet Union and United States during the Cold War, to the subsequent showcasing of a state's newfound independence, as the former Soviet states did in the Barcelona summer games of 1992⁴⁸, to the massacring of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists on the tarmac of Munich Airport in 1972⁴⁹. The aforementioned examples are quite polar extremes, but essentially, the Olympic games as an entity has become so important

48 As the Soviet Union had been dissolved in 1991, the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania sent their own teams for the first time since 1936. The other Soviet republics competed under the name Unified Team.

49 The Munich massacre was an attack during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, West Germany, on eleven Israeli Olympic team members, who were taken hostage and eventually killed, along with a German police officer, by the Palestinian group Black September.

internationally that states recognize the political power of it and continue to utilize it in certain manners. North Korea is no different to any other state in this respect.

Firstly, the Olympic Games offer North Korea an opportunity every four years to showcase their sporting prestige on the international stage in sports such as judo, weightlifting and shooting, while having reciprocal value for domestic propaganda and nationalist sentiment. The KCNA alluded to the notable success of Judoist Kye Sun Hui, who defeated a “Japanese rival” to win the gold medal at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games⁵⁰, “thus flying the DPRK flag in the United States to delight the people in the homeland”⁵¹, while news of North Korea’s win of medals in the first two days of the 2012 London Olympics “delighted local people”⁵². Internationally, Pyongyang have referred to their athletes’ media exposure at the London Olympics as within the “limelight of world media”, citing Reuters, BBC, AP and Xinhua as reporting favorably regarding their successes in the games⁵³. The benefits that success in international sport brings is allowing North Korea to gain the ability to highlight the success of an individual athlete as a success of the country, or more accurately a success of the country’s political system.

This benefit is shared amongst the vast majority of competing states, in terms of the

50 Thrice World Judo Champion Returns Home, 14th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200509/news09/19.htm>.

51 DPRK’s Sports Achievements for Past 20 Years, 28th October 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201407/news10/20140710-23ee.html>.

52 Local People Delightful at DPRK, Successes in Olympiad, 14th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201207/news30/20120730-31ee.html>.

53 DPRK’s Olympic Athletes in Limelight of World Media, 14th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201208/news01/20120801-31ee.html>.

nationalist sentiment it induces, however, the difference between North Korea and most states is that nationalist sentiment is directly connected to the regime and its ideology rather than being proud of simply being North Korean through the specific success. The domestic propaganda value attached to sporting success is clearly evident from a North Korean perspective in the endorsement of the regime by an upstanding athlete who is admired by their compatriots, while also demonstrating North Korea's devotion to its leader on a global stage.

Secondly, it offers North Korea an international event with non-partisan principals, giving them the opportunity of an equal footing with their rivals, at least in principal. The North Korean regime is a bastion of caustic rhetoric but also acknowledges and adheres to the "Olympic idea of peace and friendship"⁵⁴. This is an important aspect of North Korea image of the Olympic Games, as it creates a platform for cooperation and engagement through their participation. The absence of a political context from the outset is important in solidifying this cooperation and engagement, and the Olympic Games bring this. North Korea also often promote the principals of the Olympic Games through the KCNA, referring to it as "the sacred festival of humankind desirous of promoting friendship and unity"⁵⁵, while "materializing the noble idea of peace, friendship and progress and disseminating the Olympic spirit to the five continents representing the desire of mankind

54 Vice-Chairman of Olympic Committee Refers to Preparations for Asian Games, 14th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201408/news29/20140829-01ee.html>.

55 S. Korean Authorities Accused of Hurting Compatriots in London Olympics, 14th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201208/news12/20120812-09ee.html>.

to create happiness”⁵⁶. Although it is quite possible that North Korea genuinely believes in the principals of the Olympic Games, there is also an element of evidence that these principals are used by North Korea to deflect negative attention, especially within the media. During the London Olympics, The Brisbane Metro, an Australian publication, purposely renamed North Korea as “Naughty Korea”⁵⁷, when carrying news of the medal standings. North Korea furiously replied with an article through the KCNA, stating the occurrence was “a bullying act little short of insulting the Olympic spirit of solidarity, friendship and progress and politicizing sports”⁵⁸. This defensive response highlights North Korea’s commitment to keeping the Olympic Games a non-partisan event, at least in terms of North Korea themselves. The legitimacy the Olympic Games brings allows North Korea to gain equality amongst their counterpart states, that is otherwise near impossible in the current political environment, and this factor is a cornerstone of North Korea’s rationality regarding participation in the Olympic Games.

Finally, an event such as the Olympic Games, gives the unique opportunity for participation with a sporting narrative while subconsciously embedding the political undertones of state rivalries on a global scale. The KCNA describing North Korea trouncing their rivals such as Japan and South Korea addresses the sporting narrative as

⁵⁶Torch Relay for 29th Olympic Games Held, 14th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2008/200804/news04/29.htm>.

⁵⁷Olympics 2012: North Korea attacks paper which called nation 'naughty', 14th November 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2012/aug/08/london-2012-north-korea-naughty>.

⁵⁸Naughty Brisbane Metro Challenges Olympic Spirit: KCNA Commentary, 14th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201208/news07/20120807-19ee.html>.

well as the one-upmanship that victory over a rival in sport brings. In summarizing selected Olympic victories from the past, the KCNA alluded to the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, when boxer Ku Yong Jo was victorious over “the U.S. adversary” by way of knockout⁵⁹. Although there is ample evidence of this being a component of North Korea media’s Olympic Games coverage, its value to the regime as a tool to belittle its rivals through one-upmanship is marginal. These Olympic victories in the current post Cold War era allow a slight dig at their rivals, but the dig does not go beyond the realm of sport.

Although it is identified that the Olympic Games is a vehicle for North Korean political utilization, there are certain aspects that cannot be assured for North Korea. Firstly, North Korea is not an important actor within the Olympic Games and treated the same as states of its stature within a sporting context. States such as China, the United States and Russia vastly outnumber most, in terms of participants and medals, and dwarf the achievements and influence of other states. North Korea’s legitimacy in the Olympic Games comes with their sporting performance and unlike the political arena, where they utilize nuclear weapons for legitimacy; this is not possible in the Olympic Games. Nevertheless, North Korea accepts the supremacy of other states to a certain extent by applauding their own relative gains in the medal tables. In the aftermath of the 2012 London Olympics, the KCNA reported a North Korean citizen as stating “It was so ridiculous for Western media

⁵⁹ Olympic Gold Medalists of DPRK, 14th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2008/200808/news08/01.htm>.

to guess that the DPRK would snatch only one silver medal at the London Olympiad⁶⁰. North Korea went on to capture four gold and two bronze medals, equaling their best performance (See Table 2).

Table 2. North Korean Olympic Summer Games Medal Table

Games	Gold Medal	Silver Medal	Bronze Medal	Total
1972 Munich	1	1	3	5
1976 Montreal	1	1	0	2
1980 Moscow	0	3	2	5
1984 Los Angeles	<i>Boycotted</i>			
1988 Seoul	<i>Boycotted</i>			
1992 Barcelona	4	0	5	9
1996 Atlanta	2	1	2	5
2000 Sydney	0	1	3	4
2004 Athens	0	4	1	5
2008 Beijing	2	1	3	6
2012 London	4	0	2	6
Total	14	12	21	47

Source: IOC

Secondly, the Olympic Games is a global event, that is hosted on continents across the world, therefore North Korea is not guaranteed that their own agenda will gain any prominence within the specific games. The East Asian region has been particularly lucky to have hosted five chapters of the Games within their winter and summer manifestations (see Figure. 1 & 2), and will host the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang,

⁶⁰ DPRK Wins Three Weightlifting Gold Medals in Olympic Games, 14th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201208/news02/20120802-26ee.html>.

South Korea and the 2020 summer Olympic games in Tokyo, Japan. However, the rotation of the games to different locations across the world will make it difficult for it to return to East Asia for a number of decades following the mentioned upcoming games. This presents two notable pieces of information for North Korea; that the games that follow Tokyo may not be as useful for political utilization as they most likely will not be located in the East Asian political hotbed for the foreseeable future, and that North Korea must politically utilize the opportunity of the Olympic Games being hosted in Pyeongchang and Tokyo to gain cooperation and engagement with their adversaries.

Table 3. North Korean Olympic Winter Games Medal Table

Games	Gold Medal	Silver Medal	Bronze Medal	Total
1964 Innsbruck	0	1	0	1
1968 Grenoble	<i>Did Not Participate</i>			
1972 Sapporo	0	0	0	0
1976 Innsbruck	<i>Did Not Participate</i>			
1980 Lake Placid	<i>Did Not Participate</i>			
1984 Sarajevo	0	0	0	0
1988 Calgary	0	0	0	0
1992 Albertville	0	0	1	1
1994 Lillehammer	<i>Did Not Participate</i>			
1998 Nagano	0	0	0	0
2002 Salt Lake City	<i>Did Not Participate</i>			
2006 Torino	0	0	0	0
2010 Vancouver	0	0	0	0
2014 Sochi	<i>Did Not Participate</i>			
Total	0	1	1	2

Source: IOC

The Olympic Games are a vastly important event from North Korean international sporting and political perspective. Historically, it assisted the North Korean regime in gaining legitimacy, exposure and contact with the world outside of Pyongyang. There are a number of notable events, as outlined in Chapter Four, that have solidified the importance of the Olympic Games to North Korean politics. Occurrences such as the 2000 and 2004 Olympic Games unified Korean teams⁶¹ demonstrate the potential power that the IOC can bring to accentuate particular political policies or standpoints, and this is recognized by the North Korean regime

6.3. The Asian Games

The Asian Games, also referred to as the Asiad, is a multisport event hosted every four years for the states of the continent of Asia. The games are recognized by the IOC as being the official multisport event of the Asia region, essentially a regional version of the Olympic games. The Asian games are the world's second largest multisport event, after the Olympic games themselves⁶². The origins of the Asian Games can be traced back to a competition known as the Far Eastern Games, first hosted in Manila in 1913. Ten subsequent games were successfully organized, however, the games and organization committee were ultimately discontinued due to the political animosity between certain states, most notably China and Japan. In the aftermath of World War Two, a new

61 Both North Korea and South Korea marched together in the Parade of Nations at the Opening and Closing Ceremonies under the Korean Unification Flag, a white flag showing the united Korean peninsula in blue.

62 OCA History, 10th November 2014, <http://www.ocasia.org/Council/History.aspx>.

competition emerged through newly independent states' desire to strengthen mutual understanding, culminating in the 1949 inauguration of the Asian Athletic Federation, with the first games being held in New Delhi, India in 1951. The Asian Games had the desire to become an entity that highlighted Asian unity in the face of its historical misfortunes, but it was not without its major challenges, ranging from Indonesia's refusal to allow the participation of Israel and China in the 1962 Games, Taiwan's ambiguous status, and the subsequent exclusion of Israel in 1981. These political struggles exemplify the concentration of hostility that a regional event such as the Asian Games can bring, in some way due to the reduced importance of the event in comparison to the Olympic games, while also highlighting the opportunities for cooperation and engagement that participation brings.

The Asian Games have become an important event for North Korea from a political viewpoint in a number of areas. Firstly, the Asian Games is an international event that offers a non-partisan platform for participation, cooperation, and engagement, a watered down version of the Olympic Games. Although it was previously demonstrated that the Asian Games has had a turbulent history of animosity, the norms of the event have reemerged as being that of being first and foremost under the principal of sport, most notably sportsmanship and mutual respect. These norms allow the pretext of a non-partisan event while reserving the right of rivalry and political hostility when it suits North Korea. In the case of the most recent Asian Games, held in Incheon, South Korea during 2014, North Korea's wish to send a cheerleading squad to the games did not

materialize due to disagreements over the payment of expenses related to the squad⁶³. Furthermore, North Korea reiterated its non-partisan belief that the “cross-border popularity of its cheerleading squad could help ease tensions between the nations”⁶⁴, South Korean officials rejected this utterance as “[...] no less than the first contingent for propaganda against the South rather than envoys for inter-Korean reconciliation”⁶⁵. Although it is possible that both North and South Korea’s perception of the cheerleader’s purpose at the Incheon Asian Games can be possible concurrently, the opportunity for North Korea to reiterate its stance that the Asian Games are a platform beyond the traditional political games played by themselves and their adversaries, thus allowing them to initiate cooperation and engagement through their participation, under the non-partisan umbrella of the modern Asian Games.

North Korea’s participation in the Busan Asian Games in 2002 is a firm example of a non-partisan use of the Asian Games for the betterment of relations between the two Koreas. More notably, the North’s participation in the Busan Games contributed to the cultural integration of North and South Koreans while also diversifying the programs of exchange. Additionally, an interesting point regarding the Busan Games is that cooperation and engagement were not a result of political concessions, but of continual

63 S. Korea to Blame for DPRK Cheerleading Squad's Loss of Opportunity to Participate in Asian Games, 15th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201409/news01/20140901-08ee.html>.

64 North Korea's cheerleaders cause war of words with South, 15th November 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/11076897/North-Koreas-cheerleaders-cause-war-of-words-with-South.html>.

65 Pyongyang refuses to send cheerleaders to Incheon, 15th November 2014, <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2994278>.

communication and negotiations between the governments of South and North Korea, demonstrating the effectiveness of a non-partisan event such as the Asian Games can bring. Ultimately, players' participation in the 17th Asian Games offers an important occasion in improving the relations between the north and the south and removing distrust between them, he said, stressing the need for the sportspersons of the DPRK to positively contribute to promoting the reconciliation and unity of fellow Koreans through the Games.

Secondly, although the Asian Games is a non-partisan event, it is unavoidable for the narrative to be without strong political undertones due to the higher occurrence of North Korea in contention with their rivals, particularly South Korea and Japan, and this can be utilized by North Korea when the opportunity presents itself. The fact that the Asian Games are a regional event gives the probability of a higher amount of contact between states such as North Korea, South Korea, China, and Japan. This contact can manifest itself through cooperation and engagement but can conversely be that of a rivalry and political rhetoric. In discussing the potential benefits of the Incheon Asian Games, the KCNA quoted a North Korean official as stating “the South Korean authorities should neither miss the golden opportunity for mending the north-south relations nor cast doubt as to the sincere will of the DPRK to take part in the games to contribute to national reconciliation and unity⁶⁶, while also concurrently described an event to mark the anniversary of the Korean War’s Incheon landings as “[...] an indelible stain on the

⁶⁶ DPRK Spokesman Urges S. Korean Authorities Not to Miss Opportunity for Improving North-South Relations, 15th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201407/news23/20140723-19ee.html>.

history of Asian games as they kicked off saber-rattling to reenact the past Korean War”⁶⁷ These statements demonstrates North Korea’s willingness to politicize the Asian Games, when it is apparent that they are unable to receive the maximum benefits from the non-partisan attributes of the event.

Finally, the Asian Games is arena of great opportunity for North Korea to present its sporting prestige on the Asian stage. North Korea’s increased chances of sporting success due to the diminished pool of competitors, in comparison with the Olympic Games, is an opportunity to highlight victories in the Asian Games as victories of their political regime. North Korea’s past victories in the Asian Games have provided a respectable 412 medals since their first appearance in 1974 (Figure 3 & 4.) and have provided the North Korean regime with victories of great value. Although Olympic medals carry much more prestige than those of the Asian Games, the very fact that the Asian Games is a constant arena in which North Korea can be among the elite of competing states allows a steady flow of achievements that can be utilized for propaganda by the North Korean regime, through the KCNA. This propaganda has many uses in a domestic sense and is used to reiterate certain aspects of North Korea in a positive light.

⁶⁷ Rodong Sinmun Denounces S. Korean Warmongers for Their Projected Anti-DPRK Campaign, Accessed 17th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201409/news23/20140923-11ee.html>.

Table 4. North Korean Asian Games Medal Table

Games	Gold Medal	Silver Medal	Bronze Medal	Total
1974 Tehran	15	14	17	46
1978 Bangkok	15	13	15	43
1982 New Delhi	17	19	20	56
1986 Seoul	<i>Did Not Participate</i>			
1990 Beijing	12	31	39	82
1994 Hiroshima	<i>Did Not Participate</i>			
1998 Bangkok	7	14	12	33
2002 Busan	9	11	13	33
2006 Doha	6	9	16	31
2010 Guangzhou	6	10	20	36
2014 Incheon	11	11	14	36
Total	98	132	166	396

Source: OCA

During the 2014 Incheon Asian Games, the KCNA reported a citizen, Tong Tae San, as attributing an increase in productivity at a construction site to the “looks of our sportspersons raising the DPRK flag with playing of national anthem at the games [...]”, thus encouraging them to work harder⁶⁸. Additionally, the successes of the North Korean competitors at the Incheon Asian Games were emphasized as having put North Koreans “into tumult of joy, greatly inspiring them in their efforts to build a highly civilized nation under the guidance of supreme leader Kim Jong Un”⁶⁹. The Incheon Asian Games even gave the opportunity to underline the gender discourse that exists in North Korea through the victories of female competitors. In describing the wife of a citizen’s reaction to female

68 Pyongyang in Ecstasy of Joy at Asian Games News, 19th October 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201409/news29/20140929-19ee.html>.

69 DPRK Displays Its Sports Power at 17th Asiad, 19th October 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201410/news08/20141008-20ee.html>.

success during the Incheon Asian Games, the KCNA reported her as declaring, “[...] women are better than men”⁷⁰. These subtle attachments of apparent domestic life in North Korea and the sporting successes abroad demonstrate the power of the Asian Games in respect of propaganda, underlined by the vast quantity of articles produced by the KCNA, in comparison with the Olympic Games or FIFA World Cup.

Table 5. North Korean Asian Winter Games Medal Table

Games	Gold Medal	Silver Medal	Bronze Medal	Total
1986 Sapporo	1	2	5	8
1990 Sapporo	0	1	4	5
1996 Harbin	<i>Did Not Participate</i>			
1999 Gangwon	<i>Did Not Participate</i>			
2003 Aomori	0	1	1	2
2007 Changchun	<i>Did Not Participate</i>			
2011 Astana/Almaty	0	0	1	1
Total	1	4	11	16

Source: OCA

Despite the positive aspects of the Asian Games for North Korea, there are a number of political limitations that exist regarding the event. Firstly, although the Asian Games have importance within Asia and acts as an Olympic Games rehearsal in certain sports, essentially, it is not a globally acclaimed event. From a North Korean perspective, the Asian Games carries acclaim within North Korea for use amongst the general public, but the victories are not widely recognized as prestigious, rather an athlete’s performance in the Olympic Games is used as a litmus test of achievement. This limits North Korea’s

⁷⁰ Pyongyang in Ecstasy of Joy at Asian Games News, 19th October 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201409/news29/20140929-19ee.html>.

ability to achieve maximum value from the victories that ensue within an Asian Games event. Secondly, the Asian Games is not an event that North Korea could conceivably host, despite its eligibility. The Asian Games is an event that does not have the same stringent hosting stipulations as an Olympic Games event has, with the IOC requiring a global city such as London, Beijing, Rio de Janeiro or Tokyo, amongst other prerequisites. The summer and winter editions of the Asian Games have both been hosted in regional cities, as well as global cities on the Asian continent (Figure 3 & 4). This points to the Asian Games being an event that offers an opportunity to cities that would not meet the requirements of the IOC for an Olympic Games event, but could put the infrastructure in place to host an Asian Games, and Pyongyang in theory could be one of these cities. Pyongyang is a city with a population of approximately 3.255 million⁷¹, with a significant sports facility infrastructure, that in a sporting sense could feasibly host an Asian Games event, however, the political environment of the region would remove any credible chance of this becoming reality. The underlying external issues of North Korea's nuclear program, the status of Japanese abductees and existing sanctions would place an uncontrollable amount of stress on the credibility of a bid from Pyongyang, thus making this possibility highly unlikely.

The Asian Games, despite its regional status is perhaps holistically more significant for North Korea than the Olympic games. The combination of a non-partisan event that

71 DPRK 2008 Population Census, National Report Central Bureau of Statistics Pyongyang, DPR Korea 2009, 20th November 2014, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/2010_PHC/North_Korea/Final%20national%20census%20report.pdf.

allows North Korea to enjoy a high level of sporting success, while directly competing with many of their political rivals, with the added opportunity to politicize the event if deemed favorable, is an amalgamation of the fundamental political purposes of international sport for North Korea. These factors greatly outweigh the non-complementary aspects of participation in the Asian Games.

6.4. The FIFA World Cup

The FIFA World Cup is an international football competition contested by the 209 member states of FIFA⁷², with the culminating event held every four years to decide the champion from a final pool of 32 states. The FIFA World Cup is the most watched sporting event in the world, with viewership in excess of the Olympic Games⁷³. The most recent event was held in Brazil during the summer of 2014, with Germany becoming champions for the fourth time⁷⁴. The FIFA World Cup has been held since 1930, with North Korea participating in the 1966 and 2010 editions, held in England and South Africa respectively (Figure 5.).

The FIFA World Cup is an attractive event to compete in due to the exclusivity of the select states that qualify for the final tournament, while also being the pinnacle of the world's most far-reaching game. The FIFA World Cup is hosted every four years and offers North Korea a number of benefits, should they qualify for the final tournament.

Firstly, the FIFA World Cup is recognized as being the premier event in World sport, and

72 Associations, 12th October 2014, <http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/associations.html>.

73 Facts and figures, 12th October 2014, <http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/worldcup/>.

74 FIFA World Cup Overview, 12th October 2014, <http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=255959/match=300186501/>.

this is no different from a North Korean perspective. The value attached to an event as high profile as the FIFA World Cup is quite significant in supporting the prestige of North Korea. North Korea experienced this prestige during the two previous editions in which they qualified.

Table 6. North Korea’s FIFA World Cup Participation

Year	Round
1930 -1962	<i>Did Not Enter</i>
1966 England	Quarter Finals
1970 Mexico	<i>Did Not Participate</i>
1974 West Germany	<i>Did Not Participate</i>
1978 Argentina	<i>Withdrew</i>
1982 Spain	<i>Did Not Qualify</i>
1986 Mexico	<i>Did Not Qualify</i>
1990 Italy	<i>Did Not Qualify</i>
1994 United States	<i>Did Not Qualify</i>
1998 France	<i>Did Not Enter</i>
2002 Japan/ South Korea	<i>Did Not Enter</i>
2006 Germany	<i>Did Not Qualify</i>
2010 South Africa	Round 1: Group Stage
2014 Brazil	<i>Did Not Qualify</i>

Source: FIFA

During the 1966 World Cup held in England, North Korea was the surprise package of the event by securing a famous victory over the strongly fancied Italian team. North Korea reached the quarterfinals, in a victory that the KCNA have described as “striking the world with wonder”⁷⁵. This success was a milestone in North Korean football and a first for an Asian state amongst football’s traditional strongholds of Europe and South

75 DPRK Directs Much Effort to Football Development, 11th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201105/news31/20110531-22ee.html>.

America. The North Korean regime has referred to certain players of 1966 as being of “high reputation”⁷⁶, and this set a strong precedent for future North Korean football teams. However, it took 44 years before could they qualify for the tournament again. Within the 2010 event, North Korea put in a valiant performance against Brazil, losing 2-1, before beaten comprehensively by Portugal and Ivory Coast, 8-0 and 3-0 respectively. The KCNA were quite active in promoting the qualification and preparation for the event^{77 78}, but coverage was not as forthcoming in the aftermath of the Portugal defeat. The KCNA reported that citizens were “expecting that the national team will score good results in the tournament”⁷⁹ according to North Korea’s performance against Brazil, but this was not the ultimate case.

The two events that North Korea participated in showed the value of prestige that the North Korean regime bestows on the FIFA World Cup in both the embracing and discarding of the performances of the football team. This identifies that football in North Korea is popular enough to allow a victory at a FIFA World Cup event to maintain significance domestically for propaganda purposes, while internationally showing that North Korea being successful in the FIFA World Cup is a projection of its political ideology. Taking this into consideration, the reason for North Korea’s withdrawal from

76 Pak Tu Ik, soccer expert, 11th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1997/9702/news2/03.htm>.

77 DPRK Acquires Qualification for World Cup, 11th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200906/news18/20090618-18ee.html>.

78 DPRK Football Team Leaves for World Cup, 11th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201005/news08/20100508-12ee.html>.

79 Expectations Reposed in Korean Football Team, 11th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201006/news17/20100617-13ee.html>.

the FIFA World Cup qualification tournament between 1996 and 2004 seems to point towards a rationality regarding the lack of success that may be forthcoming.

Secondly, the FIFA World Cup is an event of the sport that is arguably the most popular in North Korea, both in a recreational and spectator sense. Football is perhaps the most popular sport in North Korea with approximately 502,912 registered and unregistered football players⁸⁰. Football reaches many aspects of society within North Korea and it is a hallmark of enjoyment for North Koreans. The KCNA reported that there is a “long history of playing football”⁸¹ in North Korea, with its enthusiasm not waning as of yet, demonstrated by the sports schools such as the Pyongyang International Football School⁸² that were “set up to train children to be reserve footballers and groups of football players formed in those schools to give them systematic education and training”⁸³. It’s youth and women’s international teams also enjoy support and popularity, with the KCNA often reporting on victory in their successes gained overseas^{84 85}. The continued growth in the popularity of North Korean football is also

80 FIFA DPRK Country Information, 13th November 2014,
<http://www.fifa.com/associations/association=prk/countryInfo.html>.

81 Long Tradition of Korean Football, 13th November 2014,
<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201202/news24/20120224-37ee.html>.

82 Pyongyang Int'l Football School, 12th November 2014,
<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201308/news09/20130809-12ee.html>.

83 Koreans' Football Enthusiasm Reported by Russian and French Media, 12th November 2014,
<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201406/news29/20140629-07ee.html>.

84 DPRK Women's Football Team Is Strongest in East Asia: FIFA, 12th November 2014,
<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201311/news11/20131111-23ee.html>.

underlined by the numerous FIFA coaching courses operated in North Korea⁸⁶⁸⁷. This highlights that the popularity of football is leading it to being nourished by coaching of a FIFA standard. Furthermore, the popularity of football in North Korea is not just limited to that of events in which North Korea participates. The 2014 FIFA World Cup highlighted North Korea's affinity for football, and particularly the FIFA World Cup, with the issuance of special edition postage stamps commemorating the Brazil's hosting of the tournament⁸⁸. This came even when North Korea were eliminated from competing in the final event during the qualifying stages. The high regard that North Korea has for the FIFA World Cup is also highly visible through its analysis of certain results during the Brazil event as reported by the KCNA. A Pyongyang resident was quoted as stating he was "closely following the result of every match"⁸⁹. These occurrences identify the North Korean regime as having respect for the FIFA World Cup, through putting infrastructure in place for future success while reiterating the importance of the event by allowing it to enter public discourse. It is certain that the North Korean regime and the

85 DPRK Directs Much Effort to Football Development, 12th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201105/news31/20110531-22ee.html>.

86 FIFA Goal Keeper Coaching Course Given in DPRK, 12th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201409/news19/20140919-20ee.html>.

87 FIFA Women's Football Coaching Course Held in DPRK, 12th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201409/news06/20140906-22ee.html>.

88 New Stamps Issued in DPRK, 12th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201406/news18/20140618-17ee.html>.

89 DPRK Football Fans Regard Spanish "Tiki-Taka" as Worn-out, 12th November 2014, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201406/news20/20140620-21ee.html>.

North Korean public would relish the future opportunity to compete at their most popular sport's premier event.

Although the FIFA World Cup is an event in which North Korea show immense respect towards, it is quite limited in certain areas for the use of political utilization. Firstly, the FIFA World Cup is an event in which North Korea have not been able to qualify for quite often. Although the North Korean regime is investing in football for the purpose of having a more stable return on FIFA World Cup qualification, the competitive nature of the event removes the consistency of participation that an Asian or Olympic Games brings. Secondly, the opportunity to contend with their direct rivals is reliant on themselves and their rivals qualifying and based on pure chance in getting drawn together in the event schedule. Although Japan and South Korea have regularly qualified for the FIFA World Cup in the past number of decades, the hypothetical permutations and event regulations suggest that it would be very slim odds that North Korea would meet in a FIFA World Cup without reaching the latter stages of the competition, along with one of their rivals. This outlines a very clear limitation from a North Korean political perspective, in the fact that occasions that come at ease within the Asian Games, and to a certain extent in the Olympic Games, would be mostly out of reach in the FIFA World Cup. Finally, the FIFA World Cup is an event that North Korea cannot conceivably win. Although it is theoretically possible for North Korea to be victorious, only a select few states have actually won the FIFA World Cup outright⁹⁰. The enthusiasm for both

⁹⁰ In the 20 FIFA World Cup events held, 77 states have appeared at least once. Of these, 12 have made it to the final match, and eight states have won the FIFA World Cup.

domestic and international football in North Korea would attest this fact to the North Korean regime and people and even the most delusional could not consider this idea realistically plausible. However, if North Korea were to win the FIFA World Cup, beating their rivals along the way, it would most definitely be the most significant moment for North Korean sport, both in terms of nationalism and political utilization.

The FIFA World Cup has the potential to be a very important event for North Korean political utilization, but as of yet its only appearance of note in the event was nearly 50 years ago in 1966. The standard of football across Asia has increased exponentially, and this is no different in North Korea. It is recognized by this author that the best the North Korean regime could hope for would be a regular future appearance in the event, a feat that the vast majority of FIFA members could not achieve, and on current trends, this is a possibility for North Korea.

6.5. Miscellaneous International Sporting Events

The fourth area of international sport from a North Korean political perspective, that this section will discuss, is that of miscellaneous sporting events. Miscellaneous sporting events encompass all official international events besides the Olympic Games, Asian Games and FIFA World Cup, as described in the previous subsections. The rationality of this classification is not that of other international events are unimportant in comparison with the aforementioned three; rather the Olympic Games, Asian Games and FIFA World Cup offer unique political utilization opportunities for North Korea. The international

sporting events represented in this subsection generally share the same positive and negative aspects, and for ease of analysis are classified together.

Firstly, they offer a secondary international sporting event that is a non-partisan platform. This aspect is quite similar to that in the Olympic Games, Asian Games, and FIFA World Cup, but on a much-reduced scale. Events in sports such as weightlifting, shooting and taekwondo provide North Korea with an event that allow athletes, coaches and officials interact with their international peers from states worldwide. The possibilities of political utilization within these tournaments is on a circumstantial, case by case basis, depending on the particular details, however, it is unusual that these events would lead to tangible high level political utilization. Additionally, although these secondary events are lower down in the hierarchy of international sport, they bring states together nonetheless. The possibility of political utilization for the North Korean regime is significant, even though it is not on a large-scale level.

Secondly, it allows North Korea to develop its specific sports for future successes in larger events while demonstrating its prestige in the volume of medals these miscellaneous international sporting events bring. North Korea has been making great progress in certain areas within international sport for the past number of years. The cumulative experience that participation in these events brings gives North Korean athletes an education on what is required to succeed internationally. The KCNA often reports on the on these miscellaneous international sporting events, offering the successful Under-17 North Korean girls football team the advice of “intensify the training

with higher goals and thus register spectacular results in international matches”⁹¹. The higher standard of performance gives North Korea the opportunity to consolidate their status within certain sports and ensure that athletes, who will become participants at the future Olympic Games, Asian Games and even FIFA World Cup events, will be in a strong position to successfully represent North Korea, while providing an array of political utilization opportunities, as outlined in the previous subsections.

Finally, it is an arena for North Korea to quietly politically utilize sport. North Korea’s participation in high profile events, such as the Olympic Games, often highlights other aspects of North Korea in the media, particularly human rights. A high profile sporting event is an opportunity for the media to highlight discrepancies regarding North Korea, and this something that the North Korean regime would wish to avoid. However, these instances are unavoidable but are not regularly experienced in the miscellaneous international sporting events, due to the limited profile of the event from an international perspective. The lack of a contentious environment allows North Korea to focus on the event itself and the possible political utilization that participation can bring.

Conversely, there are a number of limitations that restrict the political utilization of miscellaneous international sporting events. Firstly, they do not bring the chance of high political utilization for North Korea. The possibilities within a secondary international sporting event are limited as despite the sport being important within the realm of sport, it

91 "Reception Given in Honor of DPRK Girls Football Team." KCNA. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Nov. 2014. <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2008/200811/news24/20081122-09ee.html>>.

may not be important politically without a significant medal haul. This is evident in North Korea's success in weightlifting, as North Korea has been among the elite in recent years, but this has not transpired to be anything but propaganda material. Secondly, they are not events that are consistently useful for domestic, nationalist and propagandist use. The direct political utilization of these events depends on the continued success of the athletes participating. Although North Korea has been somewhat successful in the realm of international sport, they are still not in a position to maintain this success in the vast majority of sports they participate in. This fact removes the direct political utilization of participation in these events. Finally, miscellaneous international sporting events have a narrative that is predominantly sporting with little political undertones organically present. North Korea is welcomed into each event from a sporting perspective, but many of these events are not as politicized as the Olympic Games. This limits the opportunity for political utilization, as there is no tangible mechanism to do so.

6.6. Inter-Korean Sporting Exchanges

The final subsection in the international sport chapter outlines inter-Korean sporting exchanges and their scope within North Korean political utilization. Although inter-Korean sporting exchanges are not covered by international sport itself, the events are important for the future of the Korean peninsula. Inter-Korean sporting exchanges may not have the properties that the North Korean regime so deeply want, but do offer a number of distinct factors for better or worse.

Firstly, inter-Korean sporting exchanges are events that offer a direct, artificially created platform for participation, cooperation, and engagement. While, international sporting events offer an opportunity to firstly participate, with the opportunity of cooperation and engagement coming thereafter, inter-Korean sport exchanges mostly sees the participation, cooperation and engagement occur simultaneously. This artificially created platform allows for certain benefits in terms of peace and prosperity between the two Koreas, however, it removes North Korea's ability to utilize international sport for political leverage on the Korean peninsula as the two states would have already embraced cooperation and engagement in the inter-Korean sporting exchange. Essentially, the more engagement that occurs between North and South Korea as a result of sports exchanges, the fewer opportunities North Korea will have to politically utilize international sport. From the perspective of peace on the Korean Peninsula, this would be a positive outcome. However, the likelihood of the North Korean regime embracing inter-Korean sporting events once again is unlikely at this time as the loss of political utilization leverage could be futile.

Secondly, inter-Korean sporting exchanges are events where the narrative is primarily politicized for the purpose of inter-Korean relations with sporting undertones. Inter-Korean sporting exchange happens on the premise of contributing directly to the betterment of inter-Korean relations. From the perspective of the North Korean regime, inter-Korean sporting exchanges removes political ambiguity and presents an urgent need for tangibility in what comes from engagement. In terms of inter-Korean relations, this would be a positive outcome. However, it is highly unlikely that North Korea would offer

something tangible, as doing so would remove the benefits of sport for political utilization. North Korea's willingness to engage constructively with the South in discussing sports matters was compromised by two unfortunate events that caused a severe deterioration of their political relationship. South Korea's previous president, Lee Myung Bak (2008 – 2013), took a much tougher line than his liberal predecessors Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Dae Jung. In fact, he abandoned their successful 'Sunshine Policy', which focused on rapprochement and engagement, and replaced it with his 'Vision 3000', which linked economic aid and political cooperation to the denuclearization of the North. Additionally, the death of a South Korean tourist in 2008 was equally significant. A North Korean soldier shot a 53-year-old woman after she wandered into a fenced-off military area near the Mount Geumgang resort, a popular tourist destination and symbol of cross-border reconciliation that had been made accessible to South Koreans in 1998. Considering inter-Korean sporting exchanges are political with sporting undertones, events such as these create an inhospitable environment for these sporting exchanges that asphyxiates any opportunity for progress.

Thirdly, inter-Korean sporting events contain a high level of sentimental value that underlines the desire to reunify the Korean peninsula. The essential premise of inter-Korean sporting events is that it is to represent the coming together of Korean athletes to symbolize the intent of both North and South Korea's commitment to reunification, while strengthening the general public's sentiment for such reunification (at least in the South). It is certain that these inter-Korean sporting exchanges could positively contribute to the move towards an eventual reunification on the Korean Peninsula, and this is the very

reason why these sporting exchanges do not feature regularly. The North Korean regime is under the calculated impression that making too much progress within inter-Korean relations removes the effectiveness of certain areas of political utilization, including sport. Inter-Korean sporting exchanges will possibly reemerge in the coming years, at a time when the politics of South Korea matches the desires of the North Korean regime.

Inter-Korean sporting exchanges also have clear limitations, in comparison with international sporting events. Firstly, inter-Korean sporting events are not international events that offer a non-partisan platform. The commitment to an inter-Korean sporting exchange is a quasi-commitment to progress from a North Korean regime perspective. Within international sport, the opportunity is constantly open depending on how far both North and South Korea wish to take such opportunity. Secondly, inter-Korean sporting exchanges lack an organic route to participation, cooperation, and engagement. The artificial approach by the means of sporting exchanges is only effective when both parties have clear intentions about a desired outcome of such. The expectation of a positive outcome is present from the outset within sporting exchanges, whereas within international sporting events it is a culmination of trust through participation, cooperation and ultimately engagement. Finally, inter-Korean international sporting events are not without a preexisting political context. Inter-Korean sporting events are clearly about traditional politics and this does not suit the desires of the North Korean regime at most times. The idea that international sport is an outlet for North Korea to move through the gears of participation, cooperation and engagement as they deem appropriate, places inter-Korean sporting exchanges as an all or nothing exercise. This is uncomfortable for

the North Korean regime due to their commitment issues. Essentially, inter-Korean sporting exchanges are the opposite of the Olympic Games, Asian Games and FIFA World Cup, in the fact that politics are first on the agenda and sport is secondary, while the option of credibly abstaining from engagement is withheld from the North Korean regime.

Inter-Korean sporting exchanges are important. When they are held, they keep the issue of reunification in the public discourse without the need to engage in complex and difficult political negotiations. For both Korean states, the world of inter-Korean sporting exchanges provide a multi-layered network for contact and dialogue which could frequently be used to send diplomatic signals, test foreign policies, maintain and reinforce a pan-Korean sense of belonging. However, this is not a primary concern of the North Korean regime at this moment. The North Korean regime will follow a plan of action that will ensure its own survival and relative gain. This author believes that in the current political environment, international sporting events provide the North Korean regime with more relative gains than inter-Korean sporting exchanges could.

CHAPTER SEVEN

GAME THEORY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PARTICIPATORY, COOPERATIVE AND ENGAGING PROPERTIES OF NORTH KOREAN SPORT

7.1 Introduction

In looking at North Korean sport, it is evident that there is a clear domestic foundation of sport, incorporating exercise, militaristic needs, mass mobilization, political indoctrination and general enjoyment. The roles played in each of the mentioned areas makes it quite tangible that there are visible contributions to the betterment of the North Korean state, at least in the eyes of the regime. However, in terms of international sport, the ununiformed extent of North Korea's participation in periodical international sporting events presents an occurrence that may not be always comprehensible regarding the political utilization of international sport through an international sport event.

Unsurprisingly, there is an element of truth in that North Korea's participation in international sport is just as it seems, participation through competing with their international peers for the purpose of prestige, glory and victory. However, although this is most likely true, when looking at the underlying political utilization in North Korea's domestic sport, this author identifies, that it is not unconceivable that sport could also be utilized internationally. International sporting events give North Korea the opportunity to

address their international peers in certain ways, most notably South Korea, Japan and the United States.

Participation, cooperation, and engagement are generally broad terms that can encompass a number of different parameters depending on the context of their use. For the purpose of this research, participation, cooperation and engagement have been clearly defined as to what they represent within the context of international sport from a North Korean perspective. Participation refers to the offering and acceptance of an invitation to take part in an international sporting event and active sporting involvement thereafter. Participation can only be achieved when a consensus is reached between both the states. These consensuses are often in place by default but occasionally become unstable due to an unfavorable political environment. Essentially, participation is the agreement and act of competing in the event. Cooperation is inclusive of the non-sporting collaboration that occurs between two states within an international sporting event. Non-sporting cooperation refers to the taking of opportunities by states to interact with one another, although not necessary by the parameters of the international sporting event itself. Examples of this cooperation could range from the provision of financial assistance, forming a joint team or sharing training or administrative facilities. Cooperation in the context of an international sporting event is based on the desires of each state and must reach a final consensus for the cooperation to become tangible. Finally, engagement is the ultimate destination within an international sporting event from a political perspective. Engagement refers to the opening up of channels by states to explore the possibility of further political interaction outside of the perimeters of the international sporting event.

Engagement follows after the successful traversing of participation and cooperation, with it not being possible in the absence of either one of these. Engagement is the point when the international sporting event creates political encounters that then detach from the event itself. Essentially, engagement is the point of which politics takes over and creates certain positive environs for meaningful political progress.

This section will focus on international sport through the means of an international event, which will be referred to as 'x' event. The 'x' event encompasses an international sporting event of Olympic Games, Asian Games or FIFA World Cup caliber, in the fact that it is of great size and significance internationally. The 'x' event will be examined in three stages, from participation, cooperation and engagement. The participation stage refers to the decision of North Korea's participation in 'x' event by the particular event's governing body, most often a Sport INGO. Secondly, the cooperation stage relates to the cooperation between North Korea and another state within 'x' event in areas relating to the event itself. Finally, the stage of engagement refers to the prospect of North Korea engaging with another state as a result of 'x' event.

The stages of cooperation and participation between North Korea and another state will place South Korea as the opposing player due to the significance of inter-Korean relations in sport, as opposed to with other nations. The method of examining these three games will be that of game theory, utilizing a simple 2x2 game for the participation stage⁹², a

⁹² 2x2 games are usually represented by a matrix, which shows the players, strategies, and payoffs. More generally it can be represented by any function that associates a payoff for each player with every possible combination of actions.

stag hunt game for the cooperation stage⁹³ and finally a battle of the sexes game for the participation stage⁹⁴. It is expected that each of the stages will identify the options that North Korea have within an international sport event, while also examining the path North Korea has previously taken in an attempt to frame North Korea's future participation in international sporting events and the political utilization it entails.

93 The stag hunt is a game that describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. Other names for it or its variants include "assurance game", "coordination game", and "trust dilemma".

94 Battle of the sexes is a two-player coordination game. In this game the players want to cooperate with each other, but they disagree about the best outcome for the game.

7.2. Game I: North Korea's Participation in 'x' Sporting Event

Game Type: Simple 2x2 Game, **Players:** North Korea, Sport INGO

7.21 Introduction

The author will first analyze the acceptance or declining of participation in 'x' event in an international sporting context. The strategic choices of the players, consisting of North Korea and a Sport INGO, will be explored to find the most preferential combinations from each perspective. This first game will be explained through the framework of a simple 2×2 game.

7.21 Assumptions

A Sport INGO is organizing 'x' event. The organizing Sport INGO retains a level of sovereignty over the event that is being held, and retains the right in principal to make a decision on which states can participate or not. North Korea is a state that is eligible to participate and also retain the right to make a decision regarding participation. In regards to the 'x' event being organized, a decision by both the Sport INGO and North Korea regarding their acceptance or declining of participation in 'x' event must be made. The legitimacy of the decisions of both the Sport INGO and North Korea are dependent on the context in which they are made within.

7.23 Payoffs

The strategic choice of North Korea's participation in 'x' sporting event can be interpreted as having the order of preference $AA > DD > AD > DA$ (Sport INGO) and $AA > AD > DA > DD$ (North Korea), where A means accepting participation in 'x' sporting event and D declining participation in 'x' sporting event. It is evident that both North Korea and the Sport INGO prefer the participation of North Korea in 'x' sporting event.

In the case of the Sport INGO, the participation of North Korea in 'x' sporting event is not something that can produce significant negative effects; therefore, accepting participation (A) is the rational choice (Table 7) . The chief responsibility of a sport INGO, such as the IOC, is the organization and coordination of a particular sport(s) at an international level. The members of such Sport INGO consist of nation states that, although political entities, congregate at an event through their respective athletes, officials and fans. The purpose of the event is competition devoid of political undertones through sport. This is naturally not always the case, but as seen in the IOC's 'Olympic Truce' declaration⁹⁵, regardless of the polarization that occasionally occurs, a Sports INGO should make strong efforts to promote harmony between states within an event to maintain the pivotal non-partisan characteristic of the Sport INGO.

⁹⁵ "International Relations Commission | IOC Commissions | Olympic.org."Olympic Truce. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Nov. 2014. <<http://www.olympic.org/content/the-ioc/commissions/international-relations-/olympic-truce/>>.

Table 7. Game Tree for NK's Participation in 'x' Sporting Event (Sport INGO)*

Sport INGO Choice:	A (Accept)		D (Decline)	
NK Choice:	A	D	A	D
Result:	AA	AD	DA	DD
Justification:	Advantage(s):			
	Sport INGO maintains their non-partisan position; promotes peaceful interaction of states in the process.	Maintains credibility. Sport INGO is not the initiator of NK's non-participation, non-partisan position upheld.	Keep direct confrontation between NK and hostile states out of the event.	Issue does not exist as desire of both is met.
	Disadvantage(s):			
	Utilization of the event for political purposes by NK a possibility. Meeting between NK and hostile states may cause conflict within event.	NK's decline of participation may indirectly politicize the event, undermining the underlying purpose of the event.	Sport INGO appears as an organization hypocritical in its politicization of the event. Loses credibility and non-partisan status.	Sport INGOs international reach slightly lessened by NK's decline of participation.
Preference Order:	1	3	4	2

* *NK = North Korea*

If North Korea also accepts participation (AA), it ultimately supports the Sports INGO's goal of participation without a political undertone, as North Korea in principal consents to the charters of the sports INGO in their acceptance of participation. This is the most preferential combination from the Sport INGO's perspective. In the case of North Korea

declining to participate after an initial acceptance by the Sports INGO (AD), the Sports INGO maintains their credibility as a non-partisan actor as it was not the instigator of North Korea's non-participation. This is supported by their acceptance of North Korea's participation that was ultimately rejected. However, North Korea's decline of participation has the potential to indirectly politicize the event, undermining the primary purpose of the event, competing through sport. Although the Sport INGO maintains their rational choice (A), the fact that the combination of AD has possible negative effects relegates it to the third most preferential combination.

In the event of the Sport INGO declining North Korea's participation in 'x' sporting event (D), it will not produce any tangible advantages for the sport INGO. Therefore, it is apparent that it is not the primary rational choice of the Sport INGO. In the occurrence of a Sport INGO declining and North Korean acceptance of participation (DA), the advantages gained by the Sport INGO are that of eliminating direct confrontation between hostile states and North Korea, by excluding North Korea. Sport INGOs have occasionally taken geopolitical issues into their realm of decision-making, a notable example being that of UEFA's decision to separate the states of Georgia and Russia; Armenia and Azerbaijan; and Spain and Gibraltar in the qualification competition for the 2016 European Football Championships due to hostilities⁹⁶. However, the disadvantages far outweigh the benefits of this form of politicization by a Sport INGO. Considering a

96 "Pots Announced for EURO Qualifying Draw." UEFA.com. N.p., 24 Jan. 2014. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <<http://www.uefa.com/uefaeuro/finals/news/newsid=2036613.html>>.

Sport INGO is generally a non-partisan entity, taking a political stance on a certain issue removes the credibility from this non-partisan status due to the hypocritical conflict of interests that occurs. For these reasons, DA is the least preferential combination from a Sport INGO's perspective.

In the case of both the Sport INGO and North Korea declining participation (DD), it would not have a significant affect on the Sport INGO since North Korea's declining cancels out the negative effect that is experienced with a DA combination. However, the only clear advantage of the combination DD is that of the status quo being maintained. A minor disadvantage to a Sport INGO in the combination DD would be that of its international reach being slightly reduced due to North Korea's decline of participation. Taking both the advantages and disadvantages of the combination DD from a sport INGO perspective, it is placed the second most preferential combination, although quite far behind the first preference of AA.

In examining North Korea's rational preferences ($AA > DD > AD > DA$), it is identified that accepting participation (A) is the direction North Korea must follow (Table 8). The combination of both North Korea and a Sports INGO accepting participation (AA) is the most preferential option for North Korea. This combination provides North Korea with the opportunity to participate in an international sport event, which can be utilized for nationalist and propaganda purposes directly related to the performance of the North Korean athletes. Furthermore, although not a certainty from the outset of participation, it presents the opportunity of cooperation and engagement with South Korea. The

disadvantage of this combination for North Korea is that they must adhere to the regulations of the Sports INGO in order to participate in the event and future events. This is a viable trade-off for North Korea, as the importance of participating in the event, offsets the unusual occurrence of North Korea adhering to the rules of a Sports INGO. The presence of a trade off is confirmed by North Korea's response to FIFA's request of information regarding the welfare of their coach, Kim Jong Hun in the aftermath of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa⁹⁷. North Korea's clarification of the coach's status identifies their willingness to follow the rules of an important Sport INGO, in order to continue participation. In sum, AA is by far the most preferential combination for North Korea.

97 "FIFA Statement on Mr Kim Jong Hun." FIFA.com. N.p., 25 Aug. 2010. Web. 12 Sept. 2014. <<http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/footballgovernance/news/newsid=1289561/index.html>>.

Table 8. Game Tree for NK's Participation in 'x' Sporting Event (NK)

NK Choice:		A (Accept)		D (Decline)	
Sport Choice:	INGO	A	D	A	D
Result:		AA	AD	DA	DD
Justification:	Advantage(s):				
	NK have opportunity for cooperation, engagement with SK. Visibly committed to participation in international sport.	NK appears as victim of Sport INGOs political agenda. Diverts attention towards sabotage of cooperation and engagement between SK & NK.	Possible use of sport as a symbol of political discontent.	Issue does not exist as desire of both is met.	
	Disadvantage(s):				
	NK must adhere to rules and regulations of Sport INGO in order to participate.	No chance of moving to next level of cooperation, engagement. Limits NKs use of international sport for political use.	No chance of moving to next level of cooperation, engagement. Limits NKs use of international sport for political use.	No chance of moving to next level of cooperation, engagement. Limits NKs use of international sport for political use.	
Preference Order:	1	2	3	4	

* NK = North Korea

The combination of a North Korean acceptance and Sport INGO decline of participation (AD) is the second most preferential choice from North Korea's perspective. Although North Korea is ultimately denied the opportunity to participate in the event, the resulting combination may give North Korea the appearance of being a victim of the politicization of sport. The most plausible reasons for North Korea's exclusion from an event is that of

political reasons or a failure to adhere to the rules of the organization. North Korea's willingness to participate already gives a agreement of adhering to the rules and regulations of the organization and event in principal, therefore any claims from the sport INGO that the reasons for their decline of North Korea's participation could be tainted by doubts concerning the level of political influence within the decision. Ultimately, possible cooperation and engagement with South Korea are completely removed, as well as any nationalistic or propagandist advantages, leaving North Korea with much less than their first preference.

If the combination of the decline of participation of both North Korea and the Sport INGO (DD) there are no advantages as no conflict occurs. North Korea and the Sport INGO may have different reasons for their decline decision, but their similar stance removes the need for a strong rebuttal to justify their decision. If a result of a North Korean decline and a Sport INGO acceptance (DA) is forthcoming, it is viewed as being the fourth preferential choice of North Korea. The advantages for North Korea in such combination are limited to the possible use of their declining of participation as a symbol of political discontent. However, when one compares that solitary advantage with the loss of the chance of cooperation and engagement, as well as propagandist and nationalist uses, it is clear why this combination is the worse possible choice for North Korea.

The decline of participation by North Korea in 'x' event can only be conceived to be possible in minor events, or events where North Korea are not competitively strong at the particular sports, which would give minimal propaganda and nationalist utilization.

Although a decline of participation has happened on numerous occasions in the past, it is inconceivable that North Korea would decline participation to an event of the caliber of the Summer Olympics Games or FIFA World Cup in the present environment. The boycotts of 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow and 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, led by the United States and Soviet Union respectively, can be viewed as power in numbers⁹⁸, removing the legitimacy of the games by a significant amount of states declining to participate. North Korea's decline of participation in any major event would be newsworthy at least but would not cause huge shockwaves in the sporting world. Therefore, North Korea are much better off participating in 'x' event than not, in any situation.

7.24 *Interpreting Results*

The author examined the question of North Korea's participation in 'x' event from the perspective of a Sport INGO and North Korea. To achieve this, the author adopted the simple 2×2 game and analyzed the strategic choice structure of the two Koreas. The payout figures represent the preference by applying the highest number to higher preference, for example, 4 represents the first preference. Figure 2 outlines the payoffs ensuing from the preferences of North Korea and the Sport INGO.

⁹⁸ The 1980 Summer Olympics boycott of the Moscow Olympics was one part of a number of actions initiated by the United States to protest the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. The boycott of the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles was a follow-up to the U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. The boycott involved 14 Eastern Bloc countries and allies, led by the Soviet Union.

Figure 2. Payoffs for Game I: NK's Participation in 'x' Sporting Event

		North Korea (NK)	
		Accept (A)	Decline (D)
Sport INGO	Accept (A)	4,4	2,3
	Decline (D)	1,2	3,1

The preference of accepting participation of North Korea and Sport INGO (AA), gives a payoff of four for each player. This payoff represents the win-win nature of the combination, which both North Korea and the Sport INGO find themselves in. The second most preferable combinations for North Korea and the Sport INGO are Accept – Decline (AD) and Decline – Decline (DD) respectively, with a payoff of three each. The third preference of each player is that of Accept – Decline (AD) for both the Sport INGO and North Korea, giving a payout of two for each player. Finally, the fourth preferences of both North Korea and the Sport INGO is that of Decline – Decline (DD) and Decline – Accept (DA) respectively, giving a payout of one each.

7.3 Game II: Cooperation or Non-Cooperation between North Korea and South Korea in ‘x’ Sporting Event

7.31 Introduction

Game Type: ‘Stag Hunt’ social cooperation game, **Players:** South Korea, North Korea

The author will analyze the cooperation or non-cooperation between North Korea and South Korea in ‘x’ event. The strategic choices of the players, consisting of North Korea and South Korea, will be explored to find the most preferential combinations from each perspective. This second game will be explained through the framework of a ‘Stag Hunt’ social cooperation game.

7.32 Assumptions

‘x’ event is being hosted by (a) South Korea; or (b) another state. Both the North and South Korea have the opportunity to cooperate with each other based on the desires of each other in terms of cooperation, each of North and South Korea are aware of the each other’s desired level of cooperation. Although, both North and South Korea have differing ideas of the level of cooperation that is desired, both have a ‘bottom line’ or a base level of acceptable cooperation that is the baseline of cooperation within the negotiations of such.

7.33 Payoffs

The strategic choice of cooperation or non-cooperation between North Korea and South Korea in 'x' sporting event can be interpreted as having the order of preference $CC > CN > NC > NN$ (North Korea) and $CC > CN > NC > NN$ (South Korea), where C is cooperation in 'x' sporting event and N is non-cooperation in 'x' sporting event. In looking at both South Korea and North Korea's preferences, it is clear that cooperation (C) is the best course of action available to South Korea. Although it is quite evident that there are many outstanding issues that have remained since the division of the Korean peninsula, however it is the goal of both states to eventually reunify, albeit in different respective manners.

The opportunity of cooperation on any level is one that is always welcomed by both sides but dictated by the political environment of any particular time. In looking at the level of cooperation within sport during the South Korean Sunshine Policy era of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's presidencies, it can be viewed as a period of immense progress. This is in contrast to Presidents Lee Myung Bak and Park Guen Hye's eras, where a much more hardline approach to North Korea was taken, however cooperation within sport was still evident to an extent at the 2014 Incheon Asian Games. In comparing the two eras within the political context of that time, it is evident that cooperation is constantly desired by South Korea and can overcome political contexts to a certain extent.

From a North Korean perspective, its self-reliance and trait of turning inwards may be cornerstones of the states existence; yet it occasionally needs to look outwards towards its

neighbor, South Korea, and the international community at large. In a certain sense, sport is a vehicle of cooperation for North Korea, as it allows them to reach out politically in a non-threatening or binding manner. Cooperation within sport, or more specifically in a sporting event, may not have the clout to provide tangible reconciliatory results on an immediate basis, but it allows both players to get comfortable with the move to the next steps towards an improved relationship.

In the case of North Korea, cooperation (C) is the best course of action. The combination, between both South Korea and North Korea choosing cooperation (CC), is the first preferential option. The cooperation of North Korea and South Korea in 'x' event is subjective in manner and can vary in terms of the amount of cooperation that ensues, however, the most important point is that cooperation happens at all. The level of cooperation that North Korea could expect in the case of 'x' event being held in South Korea, ranges from the provision of financial assistance within 'x' event, the permission of cheering teams to enter South Korea, special landing permissions within South Korea and the allowing of the North Korean flag within the event venues. In the case of events in a third party state, the negotiation of a unified team, the using of the inter-Korean flag at the events or marching together at the opening and closing ceremonies.

Table 9. Game Tree for Cooperation or Non-Cooperation between North Korea and South Korea in ‘x’ Sporting Event (NK)

NK Choice:	C (Cooperation)		N (Non-Cooperation)	
SK Choice:	C	N	C	N
Result:	CC	CN	NC	NN
Justification:	Advantage(s):			
	NK gains an opportunity to cooperate with SK without a direct political context. Presents the opportunity of progress and engagement through ‘x’ event.	Demonstrates the willingness NK have in using ‘x’ event as a means of reaching out to SK and cooperate, regardless of SK’s subsequent non-cooperation.	No visible advantages for NK in this scenario.	Status quo is maintained. Both SK and NK agree on non-cooperation, therefore difficult to scapegoat SK as the main instigator of the non-cooperation in ‘x’ event.
	Disadvantage(s):			
	No clear disadvantages for NK through cooperation with SK in the context of ‘x’ event. However, NK would be expected to follow through with their agreements within the terms of cooperation between SK and NK.	The opportunity of utilizing ‘x’ event for cooperation and possible subsequent engagement is lost.	Confirms the narrative that NK has little will to cooperate with NK in ‘x’ event for the purpose of reconciliation and reunification.	Opportunity of cooperation at ‘x’ event is lost. Further engagement and reconciliation within ‘x’ event highly unlikely.
Preference Order:	1	2	4	3

The aforementioned forms of cooperation may seem insignificant in the grand scheme of political concessions that North Korea ultimately seek, but this cooperation through a sporting event is a huge step towards shaping a positive environment for further engagement at a later stage. The lack of a political context attached to these forms of cooperation gives sporting events a resilience that can withstand a dip in relations between the two states. A sporting event may not bring South Korea back to North Korea's table of engagement; however, it at least brings them to the room where the negotiation table lies.

There are no visible disadvantages for North Korea in the cooperation with South Korea in 'x' event. Although North Korea would be forced to adhere to certain rules and guidelines within the premise of the cooperation agreed, it is expected that North Korea are willing to accept these concessions in order to achieve cooperation with South Korea within 'x' event. It is evident that during the 2014 Incheon Asian Games, a level of cooperation was reached, but the initial agreement of allowing a North Korean cheerleading team to attend the games was disrupted by what North Korea described as a "stumbling block with a sinister political purpose"⁹⁹ with North Korea cited the disagreement over who would fund the visit of the cheering squad as the main issue. Ultimately the cheerleading team did not attend the Incheon Games, but North Korea did participate, cooperation to a certain extent and used this as a springboard to engagement.

⁹⁹ "Ulji Freedom Guardian Joint Military Exercises under Fire." KCNA. N.p., n.d. Web. 18 Sept. 2014. <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201407/news21/20140721-08ee.html>>.

This highlights the preferential choice of cooperation that North Korea will make in all but the most unforeseen circumstances.

In the event of North Korean cooperation and South Korean non-cooperation (CN), a major disadvantage is ultimately losing the opportunity of cooperation with South Korea and possible engagement despite their intentions of cooperation. Although North Korea's participation would still be possible without cooperation, the absence of tangible progress through cooperating with South Korea, creates a difficult environment for further developments within that particular event. As North Korea commented in the months leading up to the Incheon Asian Games; sending players and cheerleaders to Incheon was "a patriotic measure to mend the north-south relations and open up the way for national reconciliation and unity"¹⁰⁰. If South Korea ultimately rejected the prospects of cooperation with North Korea in 'x' event, the face keeping desire of North Korea may be too strong to attempt further progress under the circumstances.

Although the opportunity of cooperation disappears with a South Korean non-cooperation stance, North Korea still has advantages to be gained in this instance, making this combination (CN) the second most preferential option for North Korea. This combination demonstrates the willingness that North Korea have in promoting cooperation with 'x' event as a means of reaching out to South Korea, despite South Korea's subsequent non-cooperation. Again, looking at the issue of the cheerleading squad that was subsequently not sent to the Incheon Games, North Korea intended to use squad for "mending north-

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 99.

south ties”¹⁰¹ but cooperation was not exactly forthcoming from a North Korean perspective due to “south Korean floated fictions” regarding the purpose of the squad, such as a “political operative group” and a “squad to spark conflict in south Korea”¹⁰². In this sub-case of the Incheon Asian Games, cooperation was forthcoming from the North Koreans, but not from South Korea. This resulted in the narrative that North Korea’s willingness for cooperation with South Korea in the Incheon Asian Games was sabotaged by South Korea’s “criminal action”¹⁰³, thus giving substance to North Korea and detracting from South Korea in terms of cooperative intentions.

In the occurrence of a non-cooperation of both North Korea and South Korea (CC), it is clear that both states have no interest in cooperating with each other, therefore the status quo is maintained and nothing happens. From a North Korean perspective, unanimous non-cooperation provides no advantages in terms of utilizing the non-cooperation for political purposes. North Korea have often portrayed South Korea as the main instigator of failures related to progress and cooperation, but in the case of North Korea rejecting cooperation too, it would be difficult to classify themselves as the scapegoat. Conclusively, the main disadvantage, in this case, is that cooperation and subsequent

101 "CPRK Spokesman Urges S. Korean Authorities Not to Miss Opportunity for Improving North-South Relations." KCNA. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Oct. 2014. <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201407/news23/20140723-19ee.html>>.

102 "S. Korean Authorities Accused of Blocking Even Sports and Cultural Exchange." KCNA. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Aug. 2014. <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201409/news03/20140903-10ee.html>>.

103 "Rodong Sinmun Holds S. Korean Authorities Chiefly Accountable for Bedeviled Inter-Korean Relations." N.p., n.d. Web. 11 Aug. 2014. <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201408/news09/20140809-05ee.html>>.

engagement in 'x' event are highly unlikely. The environment of unanimous rejection may allow both North Korea and South Korea to break free of being the unitary culprit. However, it also removes possible progress from the occasion.

In the case of North Korea deciding upon non-cooperation and South Korea open to cooperation (NC), there are no visible benefits for North Korea. North Korea's rejection of South Korea's willingness to cooperate presents the narrative that North Korea are not in favor of progressing toward improved relations as has been officially stated numerous times before. Additionally, there are little tangible benefits that can be utilized domestically for the purpose of propaganda; therefore Pyongyang must be creative in its explanations. The line of progression towards reconciliation and engagement within 'x' event is severed by North Korea, while identifying North Korea as the culprit of such. As demonstrated, the combination of North Korean non-cooperation, South Korean cooperation (NC) is the fourth and lowest preference in this game.

In similar fashion to North Korea, cooperation (C) is the best course of action for South Korea, with the combination of both South Korea and North Korea choosing cooperation (CC) the first preferential option. The cooperation between North Korea and South Korea in 'x' event is subjective in manner and can vary in terms of the amount of cooperation that ensues, however, the most important point is that cooperation happens at all. As with North Korea, the level of cooperation ensuing is the guideline in terms how significant or not this cooperation is. In the case of South Korea hosting 'x' event, North Korea would expect South Korea to financially support their cooperation in the event possibly due to

the financial disparity between the two states, as well North Korea being the relative visiting family down south. Although South Korea have a fund specially designed to provide for inter-Korean purposes¹⁰⁴, what they provide is discretionary and depends on the political context and environment at the time. This allows South Korea to be the main driver of cooperation in terms of the level attainable.

In a certain sense, providing North Korea with grants to enable them to cooperate at 'x' event identifies South Korea as having strong will to drive progression between the two Koreas with their endeavors. This is a very useful political tool, demonstrating the government's commitment towards reconciliation with North Korea through tangible means. However, although this is the best course of action for South Korea, there are certain disadvantages that may emerge. The provision of assistance to North Korea is established in areas other than sport, but without demonstrated progress in the subsequent period after assistance it can be used as a criticism against South Korea. The fact that South Korea must play the perpetual donor leaves the government politically vulnerable in the event of an unfavorable conclusion. Additionally, the results experienced in the opening up to cooperation with North Korea affects the future levels of cooperation, both positive and negatively, according to North Korea's response.

104 Brian Fowler and Eunkyung Seo. "South Korea Plans \$50 Billion Fund to Pay for Unification With the North." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, 01 Nov. 2011. Web. 11 Nov. 2014.
<<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-31/s-korea-plans-50b-fund-for-reunification.html>>.

Table 10. Game Tree for Cooperation or Non-Cooperation in ‘x’ Sporting Event between North Korea and South Korea (SK)

SK Choice:	C (Cooperation)		N (Non-Cooperation)	
NK Choice:	C	N	C	N
Result:	CC	CN	NC	NN
Justification:	Advantage(s):			
	SK gains an opportunity to cooperate with NK without a direct political context. Presents the opportunity of progress and engagement through ‘x’ event.	Demonstrates the willingness SK have in using ‘x’ event as a means of reaching out to NK and cooperate, regardless of NK’s subsequent non-cooperation.	No visible advantages for SK in this scenario.	Status quo is maintained. Both SK and NK agree on non-cooperation, therefore difficult to scapegoat SK as the main instigator of the non-cooperation in ‘x’ event.
	Disadvantage(s):			
	No clear disadvantages for SK through cooperation with NK in the context of ‘x’ event.	The opportunity of utilizing ‘x’ event for cooperation and possible subsequent engagement is lost.	Presents the narrative that SK has little will to cooperate with NK in ‘x’ event for the purpose of reconciliation and reunification.	Opportunity of cooperation at ‘x’ event is lost. Further engagement and reconciliation within ‘x’ event highly unlikely.
Preference Order:	1	2	4	3

Within the combination of South Korean cooperation and North Korean non-cooperation (CN), South Korea can find their second most preferential combination. Despite the disadvantage that the opportunity to utilize ‘x’ event for cooperation is lost due to North

Korea's non-cooperation stance, there are still peripheral advantages to gain in South Korea's perspective. Politically speaking, South Korea's resolve has been continually tested by North Korea's erratic behavior in terms of negotiations, cooperation, and general relations. Periods, when inter-Korean relations from a South Korean perspective were strained, have occurred regularly, and often merited a retreatment from cooperation. Sport is an effective area that can begin to improve waning relationships and this is true in the case of South Korea. However, in the event that North Korea are not willing to cooperate with South Korea, the symbolic offering of cooperation by South Korea presents the current stance of South Korea regarding progression within inter-Korean relations. The willingness narrative of South Korea, in contrast to North Korea's dismissal, presents South Korea as the drivers of progress, halted by the drawbridge of North Korea's disdain.

The combination of a South Korean and North Korean non-cooperation preference (NN) provides nothing notable to South Korea and is the third preferential choice of South Korea. Although the status quo is maintained and each side is similar in favoring non-cooperation, the opportunity presented to South Korea for the utilization of 'x' event for cooperation and further engagement is lost. The events in which South Korea have hosted in the past have always had a foundation of being a catalyst for peace on the Korean Peninsula, evident in the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games and the upcoming 2018

Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games¹⁰⁵. Without the utilization of 'x' event for cooperation with North Korea, a key cornerstone of South Korea's purpose of sport itself is missing.

In terms of South Korea choosing a non-cooperation preference and North Korea opting for cooperation (NC), there are no benefits for South Korea as any advantageous possibilities are removed with the rejection of cooperation by South Korea, thus being the fourth and lowest preference in this game for South Korea. South Korea will also give North Korea the tangible benefits of enabling the utilization of South Korea's rejection for the purpose of domestic propaganda. Additionally, the line of progression towards reconciliation and engagement within 'x' event is severed by South Korea while identifying South Korea as the culprit of such.

7.34 Interpretation of Results

After examining both North Korea and South Korea's combinations, it is evident that they have the same preference choices ($CC > CN > NC > NN$). According to each preference, there are different payoffs, which represent the level of relative loss and gain of both players, which is identified in Figure 2. The preference of cooperation of North Korea and cooperation of South Korea (CC), gives a payoff of 2 for each player. This

¹⁰⁵ Sang-hun, Choe. "Twice-Rejected S. Korean Town Lands 2018 Winter Games." The New York Times. The New York Times, 08 July 2011. Web. 27 Nov. 2014.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/sports/olympics/08iht-oly08.html?_r=0>.

payoff represents the win-win nature of the combination, which both North Korea and South Korea find themselves in. The second most preferable combination for both North Korea and South Korea is cooperation – non-cooperation (NC). This result is a mirrored version of each respective payoff, therefore, a payoff of 1 for the cooperating player and -1 for the non-cooperating player respectively.

Figure 3. Payoffs for Game II: Cooperation or Non-Cooperation in ‘x’ Sporting Event between North Korea and South Korea (SK)

		North Korea (NK)	
		Cooperation	Non-Cooperation
South Korea (SK)	Cooperation	2,2	-1,1
	Non-Cooperation	1,-1	0,0

This represents the relative gains and loss each player would obtain, being less than 2 for both the cooperator and non-cooperator, but far better off for the cooperator by a margin of 2. The third most preferential combination for both North Korea and South Korea is that of a non-cooperation, non-cooperation combination (NN), giving a payoff of 0,0. This combination does not give any advantages or disadvantages to both players as the result of non-cooperation is unanimous. Finally, the fourth and final preference is that of non-cooperation, cooperation (NC) for both players. This is the worst possible outcome

for both North Korea and South Korea as explained above. This provides a payoff of $-1, 1$, therefore, puts the non-cooperating player severely disadvantaged compared to the opposing player.

7.4. Game III: SK Engagement Agenda or NK Engagement Agenda in ‘x’ Sporting Event between NK and SK

7.41 Introduction

Game Type: Battle of the Sexes, **Players:** South Korea, North Korea

The author will analyze the selecting of North Korea or South Korea’s engagement agenda or in ‘x’ event in an international sporting context. The strategic choices of the players, consisting of North Korea and South Korea, will be explored to find the most preferential combinations from each perspective. This game will be explained through the framework of a ‘Battle of the Sexes’ two-player coordination game.

7.42 Assumptions

North and South Korean officials are present at ‘x’ event and want to engage in further talks at a later period. There are two agendas: South Korea’s agenda and North Korea’s agenda. South Korea and North Korea want to bring their respective agenda to the table. The agenda of each of the North and South Korea are in direct conflict with each other, as the respective players are disinterested discussing the opposite’s agenda. Both South Korea and North Korea’s agenda is equal within the game as each agenda represents the desire of each player. As in the ‘Battle of the Sexes’ game, there is a certain limitation on communication and in the case of this game; a player’s level of willingness to compromise is not communicated to the opposing player. The information known by both players at the outset of the game is simply that of the agenda of the opposing player.

They both deeply want engagement but on the terms of their own respective agenda. If they end up choosing different agendas, the engagement will not happen or will happen but submission to each other's agenda will cancel out the relative gains to be won (0,0) and will both gain nothing. Although South Korea or North Korea may not wish to discuss the opposing agenda, one of South Korea or North Korea may give the concession of accepting the other's agenda for engagement in order to gain the prospect of further progress and bring their own agenda to the table in a secondary manner. If either North Korea or South Korea chooses to engage on the terms of the others agenda, they will gain at least the objective of engagement. (2,1) (1,2).

The point of interest that this game entails is the occurrence or absence of engagement during and after 'x' event. Although, through participation, cooperation and engagement it is hoped that tangible progress in the reconciliation of the ROK and DPRK is attained, this game intends on examining the process of reaching the point of engagement.

Of course, engagement that ensues is not limited to one agenda but it is assumed that each player has a flagship agenda for which they would like to push in order to gain the maximum benefits. Naturally, this engagement is an occurrence that comes about due to 'x' event taking place, where the event is the primary purpose of attention. The time constraint allows for engagement of a limited nature, therefore agendas will be shaped by this constraint. In other words, South Korea is not going to remove all US soldiers and North Korea are not going to give up all nuclear arms within the engagement at an Asian Games or Olympic Games. The relative gains and losses are dictated by the choices each of the players makes in the lead up to the possible engagement.

7.43 Payoffs

The strategic choice of North Korea's engagement agenda or South Korea's engagement agenda in 'x' sporting event can be interpreted as having the order of preference $JJ > HH > HJ, JH$ (North Korea) and $HH > JJ > HJ, JH$ (South Korea), where J is North Korea's engagement agenda in 'x' sporting event and H is South Korea's engagement agenda in 'x' sporting event. In looking at both South Korea and North Korea's preferences, it is clear that unanimously securing their own engagement agenda (JJ, HH) is the best course of action. Nonetheless, although both players wish to secure their own agenda, engagement is the main goal of this exercise. As a premise of the 'battle of the sexes' game, North Korea and South Korea both are similar to that of a couple in the context of engagement. Although they have their differences and underlying issues, they genuinely view engagement as being positive, above all. In this sense, before the subsequent jostling of agenda supremacy comes a unanimous agreement of engagement as nothing but a positive exercise for both players.

Table 11. Game Tree for SK Engagement Agenda or NK Engagement Agenda in ‘x’ Sporting Event between North Korea and South Korea (NK)

NK Choice:	J (NK’s Engagement Agenda)		H (SK’s Engagement Agenda)	
SK Choice:	J	H	J	H
Result:	JJ	JH	HJ	HH
Justification:	Advantage(s):			
	NK has succeeded in pushing their flagship agenda for engagement, receiving the most relative gains.	No relative gains as both SK and NK opt to choose their own flagship agenda respectively.	No relative gains as both SK and NK opt to choose each other’s flagship agenda respectively.	NK have marginal gains due to the ability to bring certain secondary issues into the engagement.
	Disadvantage(s):			
	Although NK have received the most relative gains, SK still have marginal gains due to the ability to bring certain secondary issues into the engagement.	In choosing their own flagship agenda for engagement; with SK also choosing their own flagship agenda, there is a deadlock. NK don’t lose anything, however, they also do not gain anything in this instance.	In choosing each other’s flagship agendas for engagement, NK don’t lose anything if the engagement happens or not. However, they also do not gain anything in each instance due to both players’ flagship agendas cancelling one another’s out.	SK has succeeded in NK accepting their flagship agenda for engagement, giving SK the most relative gains at the expense of NK.
Preference Order:	1	3	3	2

In looking at North Korea’s preferences within the game of South Korean engagement agenda or North Korean engagement agenda in ‘x’ sporting event between North Korea and South Korea, we can see the combinations; $JJ > HH > HJ, JH$ as clearly being

preferential in North Korea's idea of engagement. In the event of a combination of a North Korean engagement agenda choice by both South Korea and North Korea (JJ), North Korea would have succeeded in pushing their flagship agenda, thus receiving the most relative gains. However, North Korea has not received any concessions, just the agreement on the engagement of the agenda. In this sense, although South Korea agree to accept North Korea's agenda, and subsequently give North Korea the relative gains within the engagement, South Korea also receive marginal gains in firstly, the actual securing of engagement that they perpetually desire and secondly, in the ability of pushing their own agenda in a secondary manner. This has the possibility of being a slight disadvantage to North Korea, but they are still gaining more than they would lose.

The combination, of both North Korea and South Korea choosing South Korea's engagement agenda (HH), provides North Korea with their second preferential choice. Although North Korea come to table already giving South Korea the upper hand and relative gains within the engagement, North Korea also receive marginal gains with the actual securing of engagement that they perpetually desire and the ability of pushing their own agenda in a secondary manner. North Korea may experience the disadvantage of having to be attentive to South Korea's agenda more so than their own secondary agenda, although the marginal gains that could be possibly achieved compensate for this possibility.

In the case of North Korea and South Korea choosing their own respective engagement agendas (JH), North Korea receives no relative gains due to there being a deadlock. Of course, it is possible that they can go ahead with the engagement, but the respective

acceptance of each agenda creates a cancelling out of each of the gains they would receive in the case of the engagement. For example, North Korea may want to push the flagship agenda of the halting of joint US-ROK military exercises in the Yellow Sea¹⁰⁶ while South Korea may propose their flagship agenda of cross-border family reunions¹⁰⁷. Even if both decide to follow through with the engagement nothing is gained when looked at in a holistic manner as each side is giving submissions that are equal in relative losses.

Again, in the case of North Korea and South Korea choosing each other's respective engagement agendas (HJ), North Korea receives no relative gains due to there being deadlock. In other words, both North Korea and South Korea are simultaneously forthcoming in the acceptance of each other's flagship agenda. Although the engagement can happen and both agendas are on the table of discussion and it is possible that both players could succeed in making relative gains following engagement, in the realm of the mechanism of engagement itself, North Korea do not receive any gains from this combination, nor do they lose anything. For this reason, both HJ and JH are considered to be equal in terms of preference, and represent the third choice of North Korea.

106 Joint US-ROK Military drills in the Yellow sea occasionally take place, utilizing approximately 10 ships and submarines, 8,000 service members and an assortment of aircraft are participating in the Yellow Sea exercise.

107 Seoul and Pyongyang have previously held and negotiated the reunions of family members separated since the Korean war.

Table 12. Game Tree for SK Engagement Agenda or NK Engagement Agenda in ‘x’ Sporting Event between North Korea and South Korea (SK)

SK Choice:	J (NK’s Engagement Agenda)		H (SK’s Engagement Agenda)	
NK Choice:	J	H	J	H
Result:	JJ	JH	HJ	HH
Justification:	Advantage(s):			
	SK has marginal gains due to the ability to bring certain secondary issues into the engagement.	No relative gains as both SK and NK opt to choose each other’s flagship agenda respectively.	No relative gains as both SK and NK opt to choose their own flagship agenda respectively.	SK has succeeded in pushing their flagship agenda for engagement, receiving the most relative gains.
	Disadvantage(s):			
	NK has succeeded in SK accepting their flagship agenda for engagement, giving NK the most relative gains at the expense of SK.	In choosing each other’s flagship agendas for engagement, SK doesn’t lose anything if the engagement happens or not. However, they also do not gain anything in each instance due to both players’ flagship agendas cancelling one another’s out.	In choosing their own flagship agenda for engagement with NK also choosing their own flagship agenda, there is a deadlock. SK don’t lose anything, however, they also do not gain anything in this instance.	Although SK have received the most relative gains, NK still have marginal gains due to the ability to bring certain secondary issues into the engagement.
Preference Order:	2	3	3	1

In the case of South Korea's preferences within the game of South Korean engagement agenda or North Korean engagement agenda in 'x' sporting event, we can see the combinations; $HH > JJ > HJ$, JH as clearly being preferential in South Korea's idea of engagement. In the event of a combination of a South Korean engagement agenda choice by both South Korea and North Korea, South Korea would have succeeded in pushing their flagship agenda, thus receiving the most relative gains. However, South Korea has not received any concessions, just the agreement on the engagement of the agenda. In this sense, although North Korea agree to accept South Korea's agenda, and subsequently give South Korea the relative gains within the engagement, North Korea also receive marginal gains in firstly, the actual securing of engagement that they perpetually desire and secondly, in the ability of pushing their own agenda in a secondary manner. This has the possibility of being a slight disadvantage to South Korea, but they are still gaining more than they would lose.

In a similar fashion to South Korea, the combination, of both North Korea and South Korea, choosing North Korea's engagement agenda (JJ), provides South Korea with their second preferential choice. Although South Korea engage while already giving North Korea the relative gains within, North Korea also receive marginal gains with the actual securing of engagement that they desire and the ability of pushing their own agenda in a secondary manner. Although South Korea are generally forthcoming in their submissions to North Korea in the name of progress, they may experience the disadvantage of having to be attentive to North Korea's agenda more so than their own secondary agenda, although the marginal gains that could be possibly achieved compensate for this

possibility. In the case of South Korea and North Korea choosing their own respective engagement agendas (HJ), South Korea receives no relative gains due to there being a deadlock. Of course, it is possible that they can go ahead with the engagement, but the respective acceptance of each agenda creates a cancelling out of each of the gains they would receive in the case of the engagement as the example above described. Even if both decide to follow through with the engagement nothing is gained when looked at in a holistic manner as each side is giving submissions that are equal in relative losses.

Similar to North Korea, the case of South Korea and North Korea choosing each other's respective engagement agendas (JH), South Korea receives no relative gains due to there being a deadlock. In other words, both South Korea and North Korea are simultaneously forthcoming in the acceptance of each other's flagship agenda. Although the engagement can happen and both agendas are on the table of discussion and it is possible that both players could succeed in making relative gains following engagement, in the realm of the mechanism of engagement itself, South Korea do not receive any gains from this combination, nor do they lose anything. For this reason, both HJ and JH are considered to be equal in terms of preference, and represent the third choice of South Korea.

7.44 Interpretation of Results

After examining both North Korea and South Korea's combinations, the preferences $JJ > HH > HJ$, JH (North Korea) and $HH > JJ > HJ$, JH (South Korea) are forthcoming. According to each preference, there are different payoffs that represent the level of relative loss and gain of both players, which is identified in Figure 3.

Figure 4. Payoffs for Game III: SK Engagement Agenda or NK Engagement Agenda in 'x' Sporting Event between North Korea and South Korea

		North Korea (NK)	
		SK Engagement Agenda	NK Engagement Agenda
South Korea (SK)	SK Engagement Agenda	2,1	0,0
	NK Engagement Agenda	0,0	2,1

As mentioned, it is clear that unanimously securing their own engagement agenda (JJ, HH) is the best course of action, although both players wish to secure their own agenda, engagement is the main goal of this exercise. The simple explanation of the payouts of this game is that a player receives relative (2), marginal (1) or no gains (0). Naturally, it is in the best interest of players to have their own agenda accepted, however that is not always the most possible option.

7.5. Analysis of Game Theory Results

Although there are a large number of combinations and options for all players, a positive approach of a player can lead to relative gains, or marginal gains at worse. This highlights North Korea's commitment to international sporting events as they can gain something within them, while on the occasions where marginal gains are not as high as desired, they have an opt out facility. As the sporting INGO will mostly promote participation, North Korea has the luxury of accepting the participation stage as an automatic regular occurrence.

Nuclear tests, the threat of attack and border skirmishes have not waned the support of sport INGOs for peace and reconciliation, but North Korea's relationship with South Korea is more testing. This is highlighted in the results of game two and game three. The complex affairs between the two Koreas dictate the outcome of any cooperation or engagement with each other, but if the political environment is suitable, thriving progress is highly possible. It is clear that although the rewards that cooperation and engagement through the means of an international sporting event could bring are immense, however, it can also be used as a tool to punish the other player. The North and South Korean governments are fully aware of the power that an international sporting event holds, and artificially holding back opportunities of progress as a direct result of certain actions allows the opposite player to become a victim.

Both North and South Korea ideally want to cooperate and engage with each other through any means possible. The issue of why the two states decide not to cooperate and

engage each other lies in the relative and marginal gains that the states will receive after such. Both states are ready to accept marginal gains as long as they are certain what the relative gains given will entail for the future political environment. Unfortunately, it is most often impossible to judge from the perspective of the opposite player. The paranoia that ensues from the possibility of giving more than the other player deserves often makes North and South Korea retreat back to a more manageable level of cooperation and engagement. Within international sporting events, this fact often directs the rationality of choice.


Essentially, from the perspective of reconciliation and reunification, cooperation and engagement are good for both North and South Korea. The positive combinations outlined within the games have the power to achieve both reconciliation and assist in the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, but this is often not the rational choice from a political perspective. North Korea's regime is instinctively in perpetual survival mode and anything that assists in this survival is deemed worthy of use. International sporting events are often true of this, but its political utilization for the purpose of anything more than solidifying the regime remains to be seen.

7.6. Game Theory Conclusion

In looking at the results of the three games in the previous sub sections, there are two general findings that are essential to this research. Firstly, it is certain that each of participation, cooperation and engagement are tightly connected and interdependent on each other, in the context of an international sporting event. Participation, cooperation

and engagement have been looked upon in the past as single entities that occur independent of each other due to situational circumstances. Although this statement is true to a certain extent, it is only factual to the point of its circumstantial attributes. Participation contributes to cooperation, as cooperation does to engagement. The successes within one stage can greatly contribute or hamper another stage. This is identified by participation, cooperation and engagement being both supplementary and reciprocal (Figure 5.)

Figure 5. Evolution of Participation, Cooperation and Engagement in North Korea's Political Utilization of International Sport.



Secondly, the context of an international sporting event is dependent on a number of key variables. Although the power of international sport has been highlighted throughout this thesis, it does not have the power to magically create an environment that immediately harbor peace, prosperity and perpetual goodwill. There are occasions when these are all possible, depending on the presence of a number of variables. The extent of these variables is most definitely complex and beyond the scope of this thesis, however, from a North Korean political utilization perspective, there are a number of key variables (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Effectiveness of North Korea’s Political Utilization in International



The first variable is that of the international sporting event that North Korea are participating in will dictate how much North Korea can politically utilize the event, and thus experience cooperation and engagement. The author has come to the conclusion that currently the Asian Games is the event that carries the most opportunity of political utilization due reasons outlined in chapter five, closely followed by the Olympic Games, FIFA World Cup and miscellaneous international sporting events.

Secondly, the location of the event is absolutely vital in North Korea's ability to politically utilize an international sporting event. The North Korean regime tries to 'keep face' as much as possible and this is no different in international sport. North Korea needs a reason and a valid opportunity to politically utilize an event, and either their regional neighbors or adversaries hosting a games allows the political issues between them to be highlighted at an enhanced level. An international sporting event hosted by a third party state may present the opportunities that are found within events in South Korea, Japan, China or the United States, but they remain without the centrality or emotional connectivity.

The final variable is that of political environment. It is clear that North – South Korean relations have had varying characteristics in the past number of decades. From the Sunshine Policy period to the current icy era, the political environment dictates what can and cannot happen at any given time, and this no different in sport. Periods of positivity, as seen with the Presidencies of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, allow for more cooperation and engagement, while a negative political environment, such as that of the

Park Guen Hye era, treats each encounter with suspicion. The political utilization that North Korea can enact is very much connected to the political environment and has the power to dictate North Korea's approach to a international sporting event, form a political perspective.

CHAPTER EIGHT


CONCLUSION

As identified in this thesis, North Korean sport is neither insignificant nor straightforward. The author has made certain assumption and statements based on previous occurrences and North Korean's official policies, but given the erratic nature of North Korea's regime, these hypotheses can be dispelled rapidly. Nevertheless, there are clear reoccurring patterns that the author identified during this research and a holistic conceptualization of North Korean sport was constructed without much difficulty or ambiguity. North Korean sport can be viewed a podium, akin to that at a sporting event. Within North Korean sport, there are bronze, silver and gold levels of political utilization.

The bronze level represents the policies that characterize North Korean domestic sport such as Juche based ideology and mass mobilization. This serves as the foundation of North Korean sport and without having those policies in place, further success is not possible. Secondly, the silver level represents the participation and possible cooperation of North Korea in international sport. This level has two main components, one being North Korea's decision to participate in an international sporting event and the other being the possible cooperation that ensues from such participation. Cooperation is not guaranteed from participation, but it is possible given the right conditions. However, without cooperation it is impossible for the gold level to be realized, as cooperation is a

prerequisite of such. Finally, the gold level occurs as the ultimate achievement of political utilization within an international sporting event. Once engagement is initiated, it then becomes a political issue and moves out of realm of international sport. The gold level of political utilization is the maximum an international sporting event can produce in terms of political utilization.

Figure 7. Conceptualization of North Korea’s Political Utilization of Sport



North Korea’s participation in international sport is consistently apparent in the research conducted for this paper. It is quite evident that regardless of the political environment, North Korea are always willing to participate in at least a few international sports events at any given time. This participation has a clear political agenda and national interests support this strategic involvement in the international sports arena. This agenda has the

objective of fostering an alternative discourse, gaining international recognition and generating a positive reputation. It has also been identified in this paper how international sports events have often provided a forum for the emotional, sentimental and symbolic celebration of Korean unity and reunification.

To answer the main research question 'What is the extent of North Korea's use of sport for political purposes?' this paper provides a number of answers to such. In terms of using it to internationally reach out its participation is very significant. In the current political environment, international sport may be the only means to make progress in terms of cooperation and engagement. As international sport is dictated by the organizations that govern them, it has the potential to be a politically neutral arena for progress, far removed from the endless rhetoric that has hampered political progress in the past. In a certain sense, it is best understood in realist terms. North Korea reacts to the globalization of sport in a strategic and multidimensional manner, which resembles a pragmatic balancing act. It rejects and vehemently resists this process, tolerates the mediated consumption of some non-threatening elements, and also assumes the international sports stage in the name of the states' national interests. Simply speaking, if the participation is good for the state they will be first at the starting line.

The first sub research question of: 'Can international sport participation act as an 'What are the domestic and international implications of North Korea's use of sport for political purposes?' is one that must be considered in relative terms. The term vehicle of dialog had been intentionally left ambiguous as to not make any sweeping claims as to what

sport can achieve in the stages following cooperation and engagement. Sport alone is one of a number of factors that can act as a contributory mechanism for dialog but cannot achieve absolute change in a unitary manner. What is not ambiguous is that of its significant contribution. The very task, of bringing athletes from the North Korea through grassroots level to international events is a non-threatening means of progress when compared with other political interactions. International sport is a continuous safe haven for which North and South Korea can find refuge when it is deemed appropriate for cooperation and engagement. Taking this fact into consideration, international sport cannot be underestimated in its ability to be a ‘mechanism of dialog’ in North Korea.

Finally, the second sub research question asked: ‘What is the level of participatory, cooperative and engaging properties that North Korea’s international sport policy bring or does not bring?’ The author concludes that international sport may not directly bring participation, cooperation, and engagement, but it brings the opportunity of such. At this moment, the aforementioned proprieties are probably the single most realistic means of reconciliation and keeping reunification at the forefront of sentiment in South Korea. The flag of the unified Korean Peninsula, created for the purpose of the various inter-Korean teams over the past 25 years, transcends sovereignty for the purpose of sport in putting aside each ideology for the purpose of participation and exchange at a sporting level. International sporting events between North and South Korea are a force that has achieved more sustainable progress than political mediation could attempt to, considering the diverging ideologies.

In concluding the research of this thesis, there are a number of policy recommendations that the author will make in relation to the South Korean government on the possibilities of cooperation and engagement with North Korea through the medium of sport. In a paper published in 2002, Choi Dae Seok made certain policy recommendations (Choi, 2002). 13 years later, although the political environment has changed, the power of sport has not. Although the current South Korean administration of President Park Guen Hye takes a hardline approach to relations with Pyongyang, the author will present clear and concise recommendations that build on those of Choi's, and have a strong possibility of improving relations between the two Koreas, while opening up channels of engagement that will eventually normalize certain aspects of inter-Korean negotiations.

Firstly, the South Korean government should recognize the merits that cooperation and engagement with North Korea through sport brings, and utilize every opportunity of such. Cooperation and engagement through sport can provide South Korea with very periodical opportunities to cooperate and engage with North Korea. The South Korean must recognize that although absolute gains cannot be guaranteed on every occasion, the drafting of a clear consensus regarding cooperation and engagement through sport should be made in order to maximize the chance of improved relations. It is clear from this research that North Korea have clearly outlined their political use of sport and the South Korean government must take advantage of this opportunity on a larger scale.

Secondly, the South Korean government should view the financial support of North Korean's participation in certain international sporting events as a contribution to

reunification. South Korea has occasionally provided financial support to North Korean athletes participating in events hosted in South Korea, most notably the 2002 Busan Asian Games. The support for this has decreased in the past decade and North Korea paid for the majority of their fees in the most recent 2014 Incheon Asian Games. Although special financial treatment of states is an unusual practice, considering South Korea's economy is 40 times larger than that of their Northern neighbors¹⁰⁸, it may be a gesture that would be well appreciated by North Korea and also reiterates Seoul's commitment to reunification. The financial support seldom provided is an indirect contributor to reunification and is not a huge burden on government expenditure considering the possible positive effects it could create.

Thirdly, South Korea should engage in trilateral dialogues between North Korea and major sport INGOs such as the IOC, IAAF and FIFA, with the purpose of normalizing sporting relations with North Korea by putting in place trust through cooperation. One of the essential characteristics of international sporting events is harmony between states across the world. As seen with the unified Korean teams in the Olympics of the early 2000s, a powerful statement of intent can be made through these events. The South Korean government must recognize, along with North Korea and the sport INGO, must attempt to utilize every event from an early stage to ensure maximum positive outcomes can be achieved. Regular dialogue would create opportunities for all parties involved and

108 "Walls Still Impede South Korea's Reunification With North." Wall Street Journal. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Nov. 2014. <<http://www.wsj.com/articles/walls-still-impede-south-koreas-reunification-with-north-1415276912>>.

allow a clear route towards a successful international sporting event from the perspective of peace. Although this is much more difficult in practice to achieve, the non-binding, apolitical platform may allow a relaxed atmosphere to allow these dialogues to happen. It is in the interest of the South Korean government to explore the possibility of making these dialogs a regular occurrence.

Fourthly, the South Korean government should reengage the South Korean private sector in the possible development of North Korean sporting infrastructure. North Korea has improved their sporting infrastructure in the past number of years, but it is still not up to the standard of international facilities. During the ‘Sunshine Policy’ period, certain companies such as Hyundai Asan built a number of facilities such as a basketball area. Considering the significance of domestic sport to North Korea’s international sporting participation that was highlighted in this thesis, the reemergence of private companies and the South Korean government providing assistance and expertise in the construction of certain sporting facilities will support the essential conclusions of this thesis and ensure that sport in North Korea will continue to thrive, from the perspective of general health and wellbeing and that of nurturing athletes to an international standard. Although the experiences of South Korean companies in North Korea are a mixed one, the viewing of assistance and expertise as development relief can allow it to act as a token of goodwill rather than that of opportunity. An essential fact is that a reunified Korea will have implications for all within Korean society for better or worse. It is imperative that the South Korean government engages all stakeholders in the process of improving relations

between the two Koreas. Although sporting infrastructure is not hugely significant in holistic terms, it has benefits that are unbounded in the realm of sport.

Fifthly, the South Korean government should initiate North Korea's participation and cooperation in the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea and utilize such opportunity for engagement. Although North Korea's record in international events related to winter sports is far from successful, the upcoming 2018 Winter Olympics presents a unique opportunity for the participation, cooperation and engagement of North Korea. The games will be hosted in Pyeongchang, Gangwon Province, and the only divided province between the two Koreas. The opportunity of, creating a symbolic and unprecedented gesture of reunification by embracing North Korea's input into this event, would be quite beneficial to future relations between the two Koreas. North Korea have been developing the Masik Pass Ski Resort in the past number of years and the reasons for this development may include the improving of training infrastructure before the Pyeongchang games to increase the number of athletes that will qualify to take part in 2018. Additionally, the North Korean government may request that a certain number of events within the Pyeongchang games be held in North Korea. The South Korean government would most likely reject this unprecedented occurrence, but if all parties could agree a suitable arrangement, it would be very beneficial to the relations between the two Koreas and would create a new cooperation paradigm within North and South Korean sport.

Finally, although outside the mechanisms of international sports events, the South Korean government should focus any future inter-Korean sporting exchanges in sports that North Korea have been successful in on the international stage. North Korea has won numerous medals in international sporting events such as the Olympic Games and the Asian Games. The South Korean government should examine the sports that North Korea are succeeding within and offer exchanges within these sports. The opportunity for sporting exchanges is not something that presents itself quite often, however, the chance of North Korea accepting such sports exchanges is more likely in a sport that they are quite successful within.

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Areas of Pyongyang represented by school children during the Arirang Mass Games



Appendix 2: One Land (하나땅도)



**Appendix 3: A view of the armed equipment of the Korean People's Army
(KPA) (조선인민군 무장장비관)**



Appendix 4: The great leader and general are the everlasting sun of Juche ideology. (수령님과 장군님은 주체의 영원한 태양)



Appendix 5: There is a bright future for the new generations of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il's North Korea! (김일성, 김정일 조선의 새 세대들에게 밝은미래가 있으라!)



Appendix 6: Love future generations, love the future (후대사랑 미래사랑)



Appendix 7: Without the Communist Party, there is no new China! (공산당이 없으면, 새중국도없다!)



Appendix 8: North Korea's Olympic Medals by Sport

Sport	Gold Medal	Silver Medal	Bronze Medal	Total
Weightlifting	4	4	5	13
Wrestling	3	2	4	9
Boxing	2	3	3	8
Judo	2	2	4	8
Gymnastics	2	0	0	2
Shooting	1	0	1	2
Table Tennis	0	1	2	3
Speed Skating	0	1	1	1
Volleyball	0	0	1	1
Short Track Speed Skating	0	0	1	1
Total	14	13	21	48

Appendix 9: North Korea's Asian Games' Medals by Sport

Shooting	39	37	29	105
Gymnastics	16	20	23	59
Weightlifting	14	23	18	55
Boxing	7	5	8	20
Athletics	6	5	11	22
Wrestling	5	9	11	25
Judo	4	16	14	24
Football	4	4	1	9
Table Tennis	2	2	17	21
Archery	1	1	4	6
Diving	0	6	11	17
Rowing	0	8	9	17
Canoeing	0	3	6	9
Synchronized Swimming	0	0	3	3
Swimming	0	2	0	2
Handball	0	1	0	0
Basketball	0	0	1	1
Total	98	132	166	396