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An Analysis of the Korean Government Policy toward Russia:

from High Politics to Low Politics

역대 한국정부의 대러시아 정책 분석:
하이폴리틱스에서 로우폴리틱스로

지도교수 신 성 호

이 논문을 국제학석사 학위논문으로 제출함

2015년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원

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from High Politics to Low Politics**

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
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양정윤

**An Analysis of the Korean Government Policy toward Russia:
from High Politics to Low Politics**

Thesis by

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Graduate Program in International Area Studies
For the Degree of Master of International Studies

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ABSTRACT

An Analysis of the Korean Government Policy toward Russia: from High Politics to Low Politics

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This paper aims to investigate Korean government policy toward Russia after establishing diplomatic relations between Korea and Russia in 1990. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Korea and Russia established diplomatic ties in 1990. For the last some 25 years, Korea has been implementing expansive diplomatic policy toward Russia. In 1994, under the former president Kim Young-

sam administration, Korea-Russia relations were enhanced into ‘Constructive Mutually Complementary Partnership.’ In 2004, at the summit meeting held in Moscow, Korea-Russia relations were developed to ‘Mutually Trustful and Comprehensive Partnership’ and in 2008 the relations were once again upgraded as ‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership.’

Korea and Russia shared similar view and interests on many issues, such as peace in the Korean peninsula and the North Korean nuclear issue, economic interests, South Korea-North Korea-Russia Trilateral Cooperation including the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) and Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) extension, and so forth. However, neither Korea nor Russia could be completely assured of the stability of projects mentioned above due to the North Korea factor. For instance, constructing a Korea-Russia pipeline via North Korea is a lucrative project for both sides, but it causes complex security and military implications.

Nevertheless, of special interest is that South Korea maintains its active foreign policy toward Russia for last 25 years. It is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate transition of Korean government policy toward Russia for past years in the Korea-Russia relation. At first, it will provide an overview of Korean government policy toward Russia after the normalization of Korea-Russia relations in 1990, and then it will analyze changing focus of Korean government major policies toward Russia from high politics to low politics. Considering the

transition of Korean government policy to Russia and its policy issues, it is estimated that Korea-Russia diplomatic relations has been moved from high politics area to low politics area. Within the subfield of international relations, the concept high politics covers all matters that are vital to the very survival of the state, namely national and international security concerns. In opposition, low politics is a concept that covers all matters that are not absolutely vital to the survival of the state as the economics and social affairs. The hypothesis of this study is that the Korean government policy toward Russia started from high political area and gradually changed to low political area. Finally, this paper aims to evaluate Korean government policy toward Russia and implications from policy implementation.

Keywords: Korea-Russia Relations, Government Foreign Policy, High Politics, Low Politics, Korea-Russia Diplomatic Relations, Korea-Russia Economic Relations

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LIST OF ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS

ABM	Antiballistic Missile
ACD	Asia Cooperation Dialogue
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia – Europe Meeting
BDA	Banco Delta Asia
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
ESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IT	Information Technology
Korea	South Korea *In this study, Korea refers to South Korea
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NMD	National Missile Defense (system)
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ROK	Republic of Korea
START	The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TKR	Trans-Korean Railway
TSR	Trans-Siberian Railway
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

I. Introduction

After the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Russia in September 1990, Korea has been making persistent politic and diplomatic efforts for enlarging and deepening cooperative relations with Russia. Korea recognizes it is inevitable to build close cooperative relations with Russia. Korea assumes that Russia can play positive role in solving the North Korean nuclear issue, achieving peaceful reunification in the Korean peninsula, and seeking for continuous economic growth, and so forth. However, for 25 years Korea and Russia relations have undergone ‘cooperation and conflict’, ‘approach and stagnation’ continuously.

Korea and Russia have continuously strengthened their relations in various areas such as politics, economics and culture, sharing the strategic goal of common peace, stability, and economic prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia¹. There are many issues between Korea and Russia. Major discussion topics with Russia include the North Korean nuclear problem, geopolitical strategic interests, economic cooperation, South Korea-North Korea-Russia Trilateral Cooperation including Trans-Siberian Railway(TSR) and Trans-Korean Railway(TKR) extension, the Rajin Port modernization project, development of the North Pole Route and ports in the Arctic Ocean, Russia’s settlement of the economic cooperation loan, and a free trade agreement(FTA)

¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Korea, “Diplomatic White Paper”, 2014, p.71

between Korea and Russia, and constructing pipeline for building integrated energy system.

Recognizing strategic importance of Russia, Korea has stepped up its diplomacy toward Russia and continues developing relations with Russia from ‘Constructive Mutually Complementary Partnership’ under Kim Young-sam regime to the current ‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership.’

Considering transition of the Korean government policy toward Russia and its policy issues, it is estimated that Korea-Russia diplomatic relations has been moved from high politics area to low politics area. Within the subfield of international relations, the concept high politics covers all matters that are vital to the very survival of the state, namely national and international security concerns. The definition came by the Hobbesian ingredients. In opposition, low politics is a concept that covers all matters that are not absolutely vital to the survival of the state as the economics and social affairs². Presumably, the term high politics was coined by the Cold war. The advent of the atomic bomb made clear what was ultimately worth fighting for and what was not. Hence it made clear what high politics meant. On the other hand, Keohane and Nye describe that the international relations were based on a simple interdependence scheme based on national security, high politics, and that nowadays the international relations are ruled by a

² Cecilie Brein, “Does the dividing line between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics mark the limits of European integration? - The case of Justice and Home Affairs”, (European Union Politics, 2008)

complex interdependence based on domestic issues, low politics³. According to this description, this paper will categorize issues from the Korea and Russia relations into high politics and low politics area.

For Korea, Russia has received relatively little attention from scholarship in general and it was not much studied until now. Especially, Korean government policy for Russia and its evaluation is not deeply investigated. This paper attempts to identify questions “why Korean government maintains expansive diplomacy toward Russia after establishing diplomatic relations and how it has been transformed?” Sub-questions brought from the research question are as follow; 1) After the normalization of Korea-Russia relations what has been the Korean governments’ policies toward Russia? 2) How Korea and Russia analyze and evaluate the Korean government policy toward Russia? 3) What limits Korea-Russia relations? So far, no definitive answer has been given to this question and research on this area is still in its early stage.

In connection with this issue, I wish to address an overview of Korean government policy for Russia after establishing diplomatic ties with Russia under the former Korean president Roh Tae-woo administration (1988-1993). In 1994 under the former president Kim Young-sam, Korea-Russia relations were enhanced into ‘Constructive Mutually Complementary Partnership.’ In 2004 at the summit meeting held in Moscow, Korea-Russia relations were developed into ‘Mutually

³ However, the classical realism theory of international relations does only consider the high politics as relevant and completely rejects the low politics. The complex interdependence of the liberal theory considers the low politics as fundamental without rejecting the high politics.

Trustful and Comprehensive Partnership’ and in 2008 the relations were once again upgraded as ‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership.’ By reviewing these events chronically, we would recall some essential facts of Korea-Russia relations.

Table 1. Korean Government Major Policy toward Russia (1990-2014)

Date	Occasion	Level of Diplomatic Relations
'92.11	Yeltsin’s visit to Korea	Korean-Russian Joint Statement
'94.6	Kim Young-sam’s visit to Russia	Constructive Mutually Complementary Partnership
'04.9	Roh Moo-hyun’s visit to Russia	Mutually Trustful and Comprehensive Partnership
'08.9	Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Russia	Strategic Cooperative Partnership

Finally, the focal point of the discussion will be to prove evaluation for Korean government policy for Russia. In the following I will try to explain research plan, methodology in this paper and literature review.

II. Research Plan, Methodology, and Literature Review

1. Research Plan

Considering transition of the Korean government policies toward Russia and its policy issues, it is estimated that Korea-Russia diplomatic relations have been moved from high politics area to low politics area.

As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, within the subfield of international relations and political science, Keohane and Nye (1989) differentiate domestic and international issues as ‘high’ and ‘low’ political issues, where military security dominates ‘high politics’ and economic and social affairs represent ‘low politics.’⁴

The definition high politics covers all matters that are vital to the very survival of the state. It is definition by the Hobbesian ingredients that matters to the survival of the nation state, as national and international security concerns. The term ‘high politics’ is probably coined during the Cold War, given the stakes of an atomic war. The advent of the atomic bomb made clear that what was ultimate worth fighting for and what was not. Accordingly it made clear the meaning of ‘high politics.’ In that sense, countries would have gone to war for security threat

⁴ Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and. Interdependence: World Politics in Transition”, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

such as atomic threat, but would never gone to war over issues that are not directly effect on the survival of the state.

In contrast, low politics is a concept that covers all matters that are not absolutely vital to the survival of the state such as the economics, culture, and the social affairs (Hix 2006). That is to say, the low politics are the domain of the state's welfare.

Consequently, the implicit assumption is that 'high politics,' a state's security relationship with other states in the international system, is autonomous and therefore distinct from 'low politics,' societal pressures, and the domestic political economy⁵.

In this point of view, I would separate Korea-Russia relations as 'high politics' area which is concerned with state survival issues such as security issues and 'low politics' area which is inferred as economic, societal area. The Korean government has increased substantial cooperation in various field not only on the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue but also on energy development projects in Far East Siberia and aerospace technology. Therefore, to be exact, **high politics area** in Korea-Russia relations is categorized in two major issues, 1) the North Korean nuclear issue and 2) Korea's strategic interests and **low politics area** is included by other issues representatively 1) economic issues, 2) South Korea - North Korea - Russia Trilateral Cooperation including TSR-TKR and energy issues,

⁵ Michael Barnett, "High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967-1977", p531
(http://home.gwu.edu/~barnett/articles/1990_highpolitics_wp.pdf)

3) Development of the Russian Far East, and 4) other issues including cultural, human, and knowledge exchange. It is worth worthy to investigate issues concerned Korea-Russia relations and by looking into the development or transition of those issues, it suggests analytical tools for Korea-Russia relation.

As the rooting international politics theory, realism theory would be taken in order to explain two countries relations and foreign policies toward each other. Political realism is a theory of political philosophy that attempts to explain, model, and prescribe political relations. It takes as its assumption that power is the primary end of political action, whether in the domestic or international arena. Realism is therefore to be examined as either a prescription of what ought to be the case, that is, nations and politicians ought to pursue power or their own interests, or as a description of the ruling state of affairs-that nations and politicians only pursue power or self-interest. Considering the Korean government policy toward Russia and vice versa, It is assumed that by investigating Korea and Russia policies and issues, each nation pursues national interest as the most important thing.

This study is organized as follows: Chapter III provides Korean Government Policy toward Russia: from the Establishment of the Diplomatic Relation. Chapter IV describes Korea-Russia issues according to high politics and low politics, and Chapter V presents and discusses implication of analysis. Finally, Chapter VI concludes.

2. Methodology

This chapter deals with methodology of this study. Firstly, this study will try to show foreign relations between Korea and Russia after establishing diplomatic ties in 1990. In order to thoroughly investigate Korean government policy to Russia in the period of some 25 years, I will review major events chronically so as to recall essential facts of Korea-Russia relations for the better review. Mostly government released reports, statements, and statistics will be used for the research.

Secondly, in order for separating and analyzing Korea policy to Russia according to the political theory, traditional international political theories will be applied in cases and issues between Korea and Russia.

In addition, to support practical analysis, I utilize a number of indicators published by international organization such as OECD, UN, and World Bank to provide an objective level of each country, so that my research is meaningful to study.

3. Literature Review

In this chapter I provide a review of the theoretical and empirical literature that helped guide this study. I also provide a detailed overview of the concepts words that describe diplomatic relations.

According to common consensus of researchers, Russia is a crucial region for many reasons and it can play crucial role in the Korean Peninsula issue. Many researchers mostly focus on the Russia's role in the Northeast Asia, and its

centrality in establishing energy network in the Central Asia and the Northeast Asia. Many other researches focus on the Russia's national interest and its policy or Russia's role in solving the Korean Peninsula issue. Other than that, researches focus on the each project, such as TSR-TKR, North Korea-China-Russia trilateral cooperation, or energy pipeline project.

In order to understand the nature of the two countries, it is necessary to examine first the historical events and diplomatic policies for the last 25 years. In order to provide ample and exact information about the Korea-Russia information, government released reports and statements are mainly utilized. Especially, this research employed a wide range of sources from 'Diplomatic White Paper' and materials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea. In the next chapter, we shall now proceed to examine the diplomatic ties between Korea and Russia from the establishment of diplomatic ties.

III. Korean Government Policy toward Russia: from the Establishment of the Diplomatic Relation

1. Establishment of the Diplomatic Relation: Roh Tae-woo Administration (1988 - 1993)

In the late 1980s, South Korea's new-found wealth and technological power had been attracting the interest of a growing number of socialist nations. Seoul, with its economic growing power, became increasingly valuable to Russia's reform efforts at home. For Russia, Moscow had long supported North Korea's 'one Korea' policy and refused to recognize Seoul as a legitimate political entity. Although Russia began limited economic, cultural, and sports contacts with Seoul in the early 1970s, it had strictly limited its relations with Korea to the nonpolitical, nonofficial level, insisting on separating politics from economics. Meanwhile, Gorbachev promoted a new policy and demanded establishment of official relations with Korea so as to promote the Soviet Union's national interests.

In 1988, during Seoul Olympic Games, initial contacts between Korea and

Russia were explored⁶. For Korea, in initiating Nordpolitik⁷, the Roh Tae-woo sent confidential foreign policy adviser to Moscow to consult with Soviet policymakers. Kim Young-sam visited Moscow from June 2 to June 10, 1989, as Russia announced that it would allow some 300,000 Soviet-Koreans who had been on the Soviet island of Sakhalin since the end of World War II to return permanently to South Korea. Moscow even arranged Kim's meeting with the North Korean ambassador to the Soviet Union. In December 1989, Korea and Soviet Union agreed to set up consulates and in February to March 1990, consulates were established in Moscow and Seoul respectively.

The rapprochement between Korea and Russia was promoted during a number of successive summit meetings. In 4 June 1990, the former president Roh held his first summit with Secretary General Gorbachev in San Francisco, the first meeting ever between leaders of Korea and the USSR, when both were guests in the United States⁸. Under Gorbachev the Soviet Union began to change its policy towards the Asia-Pacific countries. It was very important for the USSR to develop its economic relations with the East Asian countries and to find new economic partners.

Gorbachev sought to shake off the legacy of the cold war, stabilize

⁶ Charles E. Ziegler, "The History of Russia", (ABC-CLIO, 2009), p.137

⁷ Nordpolitik was the signature of foreign policy of the president Roh Tae-woo, and it is the policy guided South Korean efforts to reach out to the traditional allies of North Korea, with the ultimate goal of normalized relations with China and the Soviet Union.

⁸Jane Gross, "After the Summit; Gorbachev, Ending U.S. Trip, Meets South Korea Leader, Who sees a Renewal of Ties", (New York Times, June 5, 1990, <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/05/world/after-summit-gorbachev-ending-us-trip-meets-south-korea-leader-who-sees-renewal.html>)

political relations with neighboring countries and be one of the guarantors of regional security. The USSR tried to initiate dialogue with the two Koreas and to support the reconciliation process on the Korean Peninsula during the Gorbachev period. Gorbachev's policy had made it possible to continue fruitful negotiations with South Korea. The new democratic government proclaimed the main principles of Russian foreign policy as being the deideologization of foreign policy and large-scale security and economic cooperation with foreign countries.

In spite of those efforts and both countries' will to establish diplomatic relations, it takes several months to make final decision for setting up diplomatic ties between Korea and Russia because of North Korea. In early September 1990, Foreign Minister of Russia visited Pyongyang to inform Kim Il Sung of Soviet plans to normalize ties with Seoul, but the North Korean leader refused to meet him, instead Foreign Minister of USSR met with North Korean Foreign Minister⁹. According to the Soviet foreign minister, Moscow needed to persuade Pyongyang that eliminating confrontation and promoting peaceful unification were top priorities for Moscow and it would do the best by establishing diplomatic ties with Seoul, while maintaining alliance relations with North Korea.

On September 30, 1990, South Korea established formal diplomatic ties with Soviet Union. Also South Korean embassy to Russia and the Soviet Union embassy to South Korea were established in October 1990 and December 1990. In

⁹ Samuel S. Kim, "Inter-Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects", (Palgrave Macmillan, Sep. 2004), p.119.

December 1990, Roh Tae-woo traveled to Moscow to meet with Gorbachev. The two leaders outlined the general principles of Korean-Soviet relations including nonuse of force, good neighborliness, and cooperation, and noted that the development of relations between Seoul and Moscow would help promote peace and security and eliminate the vestiges of the Cold War in Asia(Declaration On General Principles of Relations Between the Republic of Korea and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, December 14 1990, annex 1). Roh Tae-woo also announced that South Korea would extend \$3 billion loan to the USSR, half in cash and half in Korean products, in economic assistance.

Following the summit, Gorbachev visited Jeju island for his meeting with the President Roh in April 1991. In the summit, the two nations made a series of dramatic improvement in Soviet-South Korea relations. First, the Soviet leader told Moscow would support Seoul's membership in the United Nations, regardless of Pyongyang's opposition. Gorbachev also expressed support for South and North Korean dialogue (as well as Japan and the United States) in an effort to mitigate tensions on the Korean peninsula. They also proposed codifying the improved South Korea-Soviet relationship in a new treaty and, in support of South Korea and the US positions, called on Pyongyang to submit to IAEA inspections of its nuclear power plants.

On 25 December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and the Korean government approved the Russian Federation as successor of the Soviet Union. In November 1992, Yeltsin paid an official visit to Seoul and signed the Treaty on

Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation(한·러 기본관계조약), which laid down the main principles of Russian–South Korean relations, including the support of peace. The basic treaty repudiated the use of force in settling disputes and committed the two countries to pursuing to common values of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, and the market economy. It also committed the two sides to refrain from using force and to settle all disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the UN Charter. They agreed to hold regular meetings between the heads of state and members of the government to discuss bilateral relations and international issues of mutual concern. The two nations also signed an agreement on cultural cooperation and an agreement eliminating double taxation of incomes, in addition to a Memorandum of Mutual Understanding for 1993, facilitating the first direct exchanges between Korea and the Defense Ministries of Russia¹⁰. The two countries also signed other agreements and a Memorandum of Understanding for Military Exchanges.

The primary motive behind Yeltsin’s visit to Seoul was economy in nature while Korea’s main concern was to elicit Russia’s support in connection with inter-Korean relations and North Korea’s nuclear policy. Yeltsin expressed his support for bilateral nuclear inspections between Seoul and Pyongyang, promised stop the supply of weapons and military technology. Yeltsin also handed two black boxes

¹⁰ Youn Ikjoong, “The Development of Russian-South Korean Relations under Yeltsin: In Search of Partnership Relations based on Treaties?”, (KINU, 2004).

from the doomed Korean Air Lines 007 as a gesture of goodwill. The Korean president promised that his government would consider resuming the supply of the remaining \$1.53 billion of the \$3 billion aid package¹¹.

It is estimated that Roh Tae-woo administration's 'Nordpolitik' was a prominent diplomatic strategy as it well utilized transforming domestic and international environment and established Korea and Russia relations. Also by signing up the Treaty on Basic Relations, it laid down the basics for future comprehensive cooperation. However, \$3 billion loan to the USSR distorted Korea-Russia normalization process and it caused ongoing controversies.

2. **Kim Young-sam Administration (1993 - 1998)**

Despite of the economic and political cooperation foreseen when diplomatic relations were restored, Korea and Russia had failed to accomplish them for two main reasons; 1) Seoul's suspension of economic aid due to Moscow's tardy servicing on interest payments on previous loans and, 2) Russia's refusal to pay compensation for victims of the Korean Air Lines(KAL) flight shot down in 1984¹².

However, the successful summit meetings between Kim Young-sam and Yeltsin served to restart and increasingly cooperative relations. An agreement for

¹¹ Tae-Hwan Kwak, and Edward A. Olsen, "The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and Security", (Lynne Renner Publishers, 1996), p. 114.

¹² Young W. Kihl, and Peter Hayes, "Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula", (M.E. Sharpe, 1997)

personnel exchanges, including defense ministers and ranking military officials had been signed. The two countries have agreed to coproduce modern weapons, utilizing South Korean capital and marketing expertise and Russian technological expertise.

President Kim Young-sam visited Moscow in June 1994. During the visit, the complementary partnership between Korea and Russia was reaffirmed. The complementary nature of the relationship was proved in Russia's support for South Korea's bid for nonpermanent membership in the UN Security Council for 1996-1997 and Korea's reciprocal support for Russia's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) membership in the future¹³. The main goal of Korean president's visit was to draw Russia's support for possible sanctions against North Korea's refusal to abiding its obligations with the IAEA¹⁴. Russia fully upheld South Korea's position on inter-Korean affairs and urged Pyongyang to renounce its suspected nuclear weapon program. In turn, Korea expressed its support for Russia's proposal for a multilateral conference on security and nuclear weapon status of the Korean peninsula.

Exchanges at the ministerial level and between members of the two parliaments, military delegations, and public and science organizations, and cooperation in education, culture and sport also expanded. A further sign of the

¹³ Tae-Hwan Kwak, and Edward A. Olsen, "The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and Security", (Lynne Renner Publishers, 1996), p. 114.

¹⁴ China Daily, "Yeltsin, Kim support a nuclear-free Korea", (June 3. 1994, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/html/cd/1994/199406/19940603/19940603001_8.html)

new Russian policy was the establishment of military ties with South Korea, which included not only exchange visits for military personnel but also the export of Russian arms and military equipment to South Korea.

At the visit in June 1994, two nations agreed to develop diplomatic relations into 'Constructive Mutually Complementary Partnership'. The two sides also signed up 'the Korean-Russian Joint Declaration.' The two countries' leaders agreed that Korean unification should take place in a peaceful and democratic way, through inter-Korea dialogue. South Korea expressed support for ongoing reforms in Russia while Russia reaffirmed its commitment to ensure the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Meanwhile, as Korea and Russia developed into cooperative partners, the revision of the 1961 Pyongyang-Moscow Treaty Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance(조·러 우호·협력 및 상호원조 조약) emerged as a delicate issue since the treaty included automatic military involvement of the parties in case of war in Article 1. The automatic involvement clause had been considered a threat to the East Asian security because inter-Korean conflict is likely to directly connect with international conflicts involving major powers. Russia agreed to change the treaty and informed to North Korea that it would replace the treaty into other one similar to the Treaty on Basic Relations between Korea and Russia in 1992. In another goodwill gesture, Yeltsin handed over various documents on the Korean War while the Russian leader stopped one-way line policy toward South Korea and stretched Russia's influence on North Korea.

Still, the biggest problem between the two sides remained Russia's inability to repay loans made by South Korea to both the former Soviet Union and to Russia. In July 1995, Russian debts to South Korea were rescheduled. Under this arrangement, payments of US\$450.7 million in arrears were repackaged into a new loan with principal (amortization) payment for the period between 1995 and 1998. At the same time, some other contractual terms such as interest rates were also changed. During 1996–97, Russia transferred to South Korea arms and military equipment, including tanks and combat vehicles, worth approximately \$200 million in part repayment of its debt to South Korea. In this respect, Russian arms sales and debts to South Korea remained closely inter-related to the bilateral agreements. Russia was primarily interested in selling arms to South Korea and in converting its defense industry with South Korean assistance.

Meanwhile, in 1996, Korea and the U.S. held the four-party talks excluding Russia, so Russia strongly reacted and the Korea-Russia diplomatic relations temporary uneasy.

On July 23, 1997, during a visit of the then Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov to Seoul, a 'hot line' agreement between the Blue House and the Kremlin was signed providing for the establishment of a special communications link between the official residences of the Russian and South Korean presidents.

Still some outstanding bilateral issues were remained; Seoul's demand that Moscow pay reparation for the downing of KAL airliner in 1983, the repayment of the Soviet era debt to South Korea, a dispute over the ownership of

some diplomatic property in Seoul, the reciprocal expulsion of diplomats on espionage charges in 1998, and Russia's decision to return North Korean migrants to China. Those issues had shadowed the new Korea-Russian relationship.

Overall, Korea-Russia relations included frequent contacts in most fields, although neither country was satisfied with the outcomes. South Korean interest in expanded political and military cooperation with Russia was to diversify its political and military relations with other powers in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era while Russia sought to earn more economic rewards from South Korea in compensation for its diplomatic activities.

3. Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998-2003)

The Korea-Russia relations are rapidly frozen in Kim Dae-jung administration due to the domestic and foreign factors. Even worse, in July 1998 Korea and Russia expelled each country's intelligence diplomat. Russia expelled Korean diplomat Cho Sung-woo accusing of passing on to Seoul classified documents that he obtained from a Russian Foreign Ministry contact. After four days, Korea declared Oleg Abramkin, a first secretary in Russia's Seoul embassy in connection with activities that go against his status as a diplomat. Kremlin filed a protest over Korea and diplomatic relations between Korea and Russia worsened¹⁵.

However, the Kim Dae-jung administration measured that distant Korea-

¹⁵ Dmitry Zaks, "Russia Protests Seoul Expulsion", (The Moscow Times, July 9. 1998, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/1998/7/article/russia-protests-seoul-expulsion/288121.html>)

Russia relations does not help to both sides' national interest, then actively sought to improve foreign relation with Russia. Therefore, in May 1999, the Korean President took an official visit to Russia and reached agreements to implement measures for improving mutually complementary partnership signing up the 'Korean-Russian Joint Statement.'

In the 2001 Korea-Russia summit meeting, two nations agreed to develop deepening and evolving 'Constructive Mutually Complementary Partnership.' They also consulted South Korea-North Korea-Russia Trilateral Cooperation including TSR-TKR expansion.

After the inauguration of the Putin government in May 2000, the former President Kim Dae-jung asked Putin to visit Seoul seemingly with the following policy objectives. First, Korea sought to ensure Russia's support for North Korean engagement policy, creating an atmosphere supportive of Kim Jong-Il's visit to Seoul. Second, Korea wanted to ask for Russia's constructive role in easing tensions and creating a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula. Third, South Korea intended to actually promote economic cooperation with Russia and expected positive Russian contributions to the development of economic cooperation between South and North Korea.

As a result of the coincidence of mutual interests, Putin came to Seoul for the second time as Russian president eight years after former Russian President Yeltsin had visited South Korea. On the occasion of the South Korea-Russia summit talks, the third Korean-Russian Joint Committee on Economic, Scientific

and Technological Cooperation was held in February, 2001. Under this committee, the Korean-Russian Far East and Siberia Subcommittee was established so as to strengthen cooperation with the Russian Far Eastern and Siberian regions. Along with this, the Korean-Russian Transportation Cooperation Committee was set up so as to link the TKR to the TSR.

Both governments also signed a memorandum of intent stipulating the delivery to Seoul of a large consignment of Russian military hardware worth US\$ 700 million. A part of this sum would be paid in cash and the remaining sum would be written off the Russian debt South Korea inherited from the former Soviet Union, which has now grown to US\$1.8 billion.

In February 2001, Kim Dae-jung and Putin held summit talks two times and issued a seven-point Korean-Russian Joint Declaration. The following are outcomes from the talks. First, Korea-Russia deepened the “Constructive and Mutually Complementary Partnership.” The two presidents agreed to the first point of the joint declaration that the continuous development of the partnership is important for the interests of the peoples of both countries and for strengthening security and stability in Northeast Asia. With this summit talks the groundwork was laid to improve and deepen bilateral cooperation in such fields as politics, security and military affairs, economy, science and technology, culture, and arts. The second point of the joint declaration states that the two parties agreed to promote dialogues and consultations in various fields including meetings of heads of state, prime ministers, ministers, leaders of parliament, and to exchange views

on regular basis on the bilateral and international issues of mutual concern. The fourth point of the joint declaration states that the two parties agreed to further encourage exchanges and cooperation between the two countries in the fields of culture, art and science, education, law and so forth. In order to maintain peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region the two presidents also agreed at the sixth point of the joint declaration to strengthen their cooperation through APEC both multilaterally and bilaterally and to actively cooperate for the continued development of the ARF.

Second, Korea-Russia ensured continued support for the Engagement Policy toward North Korea. Putin assessed the first inter-Korean summit and inter-Korean relations very positively and the two heads of states were ready to continuously cooperate for the development of inter-Korean relations. The seventh point of the joint declaration states the two heads of states reaffirmed that the historic inter-Korean Summit held in Pyongyang in June of 2000 and its follow-up measures had laid the groundwork for reconciliation and cooperation between South and North Korea as well as the reduction of tensions and establishment of peace on the Korean peninsula. Speaking in the South Korean National Assembly, Putin praised the mood of detente initiated by the historic summit between the President Kim Dae-jung and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il and noted that the summit ended 50 years of enmity between the two former Cold War foes. The Russian side expressed its readiness and willingness not only to continuously support the course of enhancing inter-Korean contacts and productive cooperation,

but also to continuously contribute to easing tensions and securing peace on the Korean peninsula.

The Russian seemed to have had a pragmatic goal that if tensions were reduced and a peace mechanism in place on the Korean peninsula it could get rid of one of the reasons which the U.S. cites for deploying its NMD system. At the seventh point of the joint declaration the two parties agreed that the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework should be faithfully implemented to eliminate the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula. Both parties further expressed their hope for the early settlement of the issues regarding the development, export and deployment of missiles on the Korean peninsula through continued dialogue among the parties concerned. It means that the Russian government is opposed to certain pressures or sanctions of the U.S. and Western countries against North Korea.

In the first half of the 1990s, Russia had been thoroughly excluded from the processes of solving the North Korean nuclear problem. Therefore, at his speech delivered in the South Korean National Assembly, Putin stated that Russia is ready to play its role in these processes. Also, Putin supported the peace process and cooperation between South and North Korea based on the agreement of the Korean people without external interference, the peaceful and diplomatic solution of all Korean problems, the reliable security by creating appropriate international legal guarantees and the peaceful creation of a unified Korean state. The seventh point of the joint declaration states that the parties further agreed to closely

cooperate to establish a multilateral dialogue that will address the issues of the overall security environment and cooperation in the Northeast Asian region.

Third, Korea and Russia laid foundation for common understanding of international security problems. In the fifth point of the joint declaration, the two presidents reaffirmed their willingness to fight international terrorism and eliminate weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery. They commended the MTCR activities and exchanged views on the Russian proposal for a Global System of Control to promote the Non- Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies. And they welcomed the successful outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and expressed their hopes for the early ratification of the CTBT and the enhancement of the efficiency and effectiveness of the IAEA Safeguard System. The two states agreed that the 1972 ABM Treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability, and expressed hopes for preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty and for the early entry into force and the full implementation of the START II Treaty, as well as for the conclusion of the START III Treaty as soon as possible¹⁶.

With regard to the inclusion in the joint declaration of the phrase ‘preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty,’ this question was hotly disputed at home and abroad. The domestic and international press reported directly after the announcement of the joint declaration that it was indirectly against the U.S.

¹⁶ The U.S. asks Russia to scrap the 1972 ABM treaty in order to develop a missile defense system. The U.S. ratified the START II on January 26, 1996, while having not yet ratified the CTBT. Russia ratified the START II on April 15 and the CTBT on April 21, 2000.

administration's plan to develop a national missile defense (NMD) system or that the South Korean government supported Russia, which was strongly opposed to the NMD initiative of the Bush administration. South Korean government officials blamed the media, claiming that newspapers carried fabrications. According to officials, similar language was already used at various international conferences such as the G-8 summit in Okinawa and the Japan-Russia summit in 2000. It seems that the South Korean government included that the phrase in the joint declaration, taking into consideration a possible new crisis on the Korean peninsula rather than power relations in international politics. There were concerns that the NMD plan might cause a new arms race and dissipate South Korea's endeavors to persuade Pyongyang to give up its missile program. In addition, it was believed that the NMD plan could negatively influence the improvement of inter-Korean relations. According to newspaper reports, at the outset, Russia strongly asked for the inclusion in the joint declaration of a phrase opposing the NMD initiative, but Russia was faced with the South Korean government's stubborn resistance. It was necessary for South Korea to moderate the U.S. administration's concerns over its inclination toward Russia. Therefore, in the joint statement issued after the South Korea-U.S. summit of March, 2001, President Kim Dae-jung agreed with President Bush that new types of threats from weapons of mass destruction and missiles as a means of delivery require new approaches to deterrence and defense. The two leaders shared the view that countering these threats requires a broad strategy

involving a variety of measures including defensive systems¹⁷.

Forth, Korea and Russia improved bilateral and tripartite economic cooperation. The third point of the joint declaration stated that the two parties agreed to further strengthen cooperation between the two countries in various fields including trade and investment, energy and resources, industry, small and medium-sized enterprises, science and technology, information and communication, fisheries, maritime transportation, aviation, railways, environment, tourism and regional cooperation. The two heads agreed to make efforts for the early and successful implementation of the project to establish the South Korea-Russia Industrial Complex in the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone and to closely cooperate on a gas development project in Irkutsk (Kovykta) and on the oil and gas development projects in Sakhalin. The Irkutsk gas project includes the construction of a gas pipeline from Russia to Korea via China. The estimated cost of this project is about US\$ 11 billion.¹⁸ The Governor of the Sakhalin Region told a news conference that the companies participating in the Sakhalin project are ready to start construction of a gas pipeline in Sakhalin in 2002 and that deliveries of liquefied gas from Sakhalin to South Korea can start in 2005-2006¹⁹. Sharing the

¹⁷ Dmitry Zaks, "Russia Kremlin Pleased With Impact of Putin's Asian Swing", (The Moscow Times, March 2, 2001, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2001/3/article/kremlin-pleased-with-impact-of-putins-asian-swing/254865.html>)

¹⁸ In-Kon Yeo, "Putin's Pragmatic Approach to the Korean Peninsula", (International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol.10, No.1, 2001), pp.89-115

¹⁹ Evgeny V. Afanasiev(Ambassador of the Russian Federation), "Peace & Security in Korean Peninsula & Prospects of Russia-Korea Relations," (a paper presented at the 18th International Symposium on the Korea's Foreign Policy; Grand Hyatt Hotel, Seoul, June 8,

view that positive developments in inter-Korean relations created a favorable atmosphere for the tripartite economic cooperation. The two heads of Korea and Russia agreed to make efforts to faithfully implement such projects as energy, resources and the linking of the TKR with the TSR. Finally, South Korea supported Russia's accession to the WTO and its deep integration into the international economic system.

It is estimate that the Kim Dae-jung administration contributed to restore Korea-Russia relations which was relatively weakened in the previous administration. However, some of Kim's promises to recover Korea-Russia relations did not materialize and it undermined trust to each other.

4. Roh Moo-hyun Administration (2003-2008)

Remarkable progress has been made in Korea-Russia relations under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. In particular, since the upgrading of the bilateral relations into a "Mutually Trustful and Comprehensive Partnership" during the President Roh Moo-hyun's visit to Russia in September 2004, Korea and Russia have been fostering stronger ties of cooperation in a whole range of spheres including the political, economic, energy and aerospace fields.

During Noh Moo-hyun's visit to Russia in September 2004, President Roh and President Putin agreed to enhance the bilateral relation between Korea and Russia into a comprehensive partnership based on mutual trust. President Roh

1998), p. 26; George F. Kunadze (1999), p. 2.

attended the ceremony for the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in May, 2005 with the Russian President Putin. The two leaders agreed to endeavor for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and to set a solid basis for the development of forward-looking bilateral relations during the meeting.

On November 19, 2005, President Roh had a summit meeting with the Russian President Putin who was visiting Korea to attend the 13th APEC Summit in Busan. The two leaders exchanged views on various topics such as the North Korean nuclear issue and the development of their comprehensive partnership based on mutual trust. The two leaders agreed to work closely on the process of the Six-Party Talks for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. They also agreed cooperate for a successful implementation of the goals and principles of the Six-Party Talks which are embedded in the September 19 Joint Statement. In addition, they adopted an action plan for economic and trade cooperation in order to invigorate the comprehensive partnership. This has provided an opportunity for the both sides to devise more specific and practical means to cooperate in the various fields such as trade, investment, technology, energy, resources, connection of the inter-Korean railroad and the trans-Siberian railroad. Furthermore, they concurred to bring about peace and co-prosperity in Northeast Asia by coordinating on the government's Peace and Prosperity Policy in Northeast Asia and implementing Russia's policy on developing Far Eastern Siberia. At the time, Russia continued to grow around 7% thanks to the increasing energy exports backed by high oil prices, strong private consumption, and increased infrastructure

spending. Overall, the two nations continued to deepen and strengthen the comprehensive partnership based on mutual trust.

Based on the common interest in peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the two countries have been holding summits and high-level meetings to cooperate closely for stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia. In 2007, there were four rounds of Korea-Russia Foreign Ministerial Talks, at which they discussed measures to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue such as those relating to North Koreans' frozen accounts in BDA and the provision of energy to North Korea, and agreed to cooperate in the future in addressing regional security threats such as nuclear proliferation.

The cooperation between the two nations was expanding to a range of areas including aerospace technology, IT, and farming. The first Korean astronaut made a successful space flight on the Russian spaceship "Soyuz" in April 2008. In addition, a jointly developed Korea Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV-1) is scheduled to be launched at the Naro Space Center in Goheung in December 2008.

Korea and Russia were actively exploring ways to cooperate in the Russian Far East and Siberia. Russia planned to spend 566 billion rubles (or \$23.8 billion) to develop the Russian Far East and Siberia from 2008 to 2013, in which Russia hoped to cooperate with Korea. Korea held keen interest in investing in the resource-rich region. The two countries aimed to continue bilateral consultations on building infrastructure for the 2012 Vladivostok Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, developing oil and gas fields, and promoting

tripartite cooperation among the ROK, the DPRK and Russia including the TSR-TKR Project, which aims to connect the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) with the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR). Meanwhile, it is expected that if the situation on the Korean Peninsula is further stabilized, trilateral cooperation among South Korea, North Korea and Russia in the field of transportation such as the TKR-TSR project will be attainable.

President Roh Moo-hyun held a summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on September, 2007 while attending the 15th APEC Summit in Sydney, Australia. It was the sixth meeting during the two presidents' terms in office. At the summit, the two leaders discussed North Korea's nuclear weapons development, promotion of bilateral trade and investment and enhancement of cooperation in the defense industry and areas of energy and aerospace technology. President Roh welcomed the constructive support from the Russian government in the Six-Party Talks for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. The two leaders agreed to closely collaborate throughout North Korea's denuclearization process.

The two presidents also promised to cooperate continuously towards a South Korea-North Korea-Russia tripartite cooperation such as the TKR-TSR project and concerted efforts to build the infrastructure for the Russian Far East and Siberia as well as the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. Energy cooperation, especially in the joint exploration of Western-Kamchatka oil fields and imports of LNG from the Sakhalin II gas field, also was expected to be further strengthened as well.

Cooperation in aerospace was also expected to accelerate as the Agreement on Technology Safeguards Associated with Space Cooperation entered into force in September 2007. The Korean government has launched the “Korean Astronaut Program” and the “Korea Space Launch Vehicle Project” in collaboration with the Russian government and it was expected that the first Korean astronaut would make a space flight on a Russian spaceship in April 2008.

Overall, Roh Moo-hyun administration enforced diplomatic ties with Russia and tried to adopt ‘Action Plan’ for specifying practical cooperation of two nations.

5. Lee Myung-bak Administration (2008-2013)

In Lee Myung-bak administration, Korea-Russia relations upgraded into a ‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership.’ Remarkably, the number of summit meetings was largely increased in the Lee administration. In particular, the Lee administration was distinguished by the most active summit diplomacy, including eight summit meetings and six mutual visits. During his state visit to Russia on September, 2008, President Lee Myung-bak held a summit meeting with President Dmitry Medvedev through which the two leaders agreed to enhance the current bilateral relations between Korea and Russia into a ‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership’. In the Lee’s administration, volumes of trade, investment, and bilateral cooperation is expanded in the strategic fields of energy, natural resources, high-technology such as IT and nanotechnology and the developments of the

Russian Far East and Siberia.

President Lee Myung-bak held a bilateral meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on the occasion of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, and had an in-depth discussion on issues of mutual interest, including the North Korean issue and ways to expand economic cooperation between the two countries. Most importantly, the two presidents shared the view that North Korea's plan to launch a long-range missile is a clear violation of the UN Security Council Resolutions, and discussed possible cooperative measures to address the issue. Also, they agreed to make continuous efforts for a smooth progress of existing projects such as the triangular economic cooperation projects among South Korea, North Korea and Russia, simultaneously searching for and pursuing new cooperative projects. It is notable that based on the above bilateral agreement, Russia voted for both UN Security Council Presidential Statement and Resolution 2087, condemning the North's rocket launches. With Russia's participation, the International Community successfully delivered a clear message to North Korea that the North's nuclear development can never be tolerated.

The Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the September 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok did hold great meaning in that it provided an opportunity for an exchange of views on the direction for the development of Korea-Russia relations. At this meeting the two leaders reaffirmed the will to push ahead with the strategic project for the ROK-North Korea-Russia natural gas pipeline. Furthermore, with the aim of enhancing people-to-people and cultural

exchanges, they agreed to pursue social security agreements and visa waiver agreements for the holders of ordinary passports.

Overall, president Lee consulted with Russia of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, resolving North Korean nuclear issue through the Six Party Talks and ARF(ASEAN Regional Forum), and APEC.

Korea sent its first astronaut into space in April, 2008, through the cooperation with Russia. Since the launch of the new administrations of both Korea and Russia in 2008, the two sides have strengthened the bilateral relationship through summit meetings. The two presidents held a meeting on the occasion of the G-8 Outreach Summit, 2008, during which they discussed comprehensive matters that included bilateral economic cooperation and the North Korean nuclear issue.

Mutually beneficial achievements were made through President Lee's visit to Russia in September, 2008. The two leaders signed the MOU for Korea to annually import 7.5 million tons of natural gas from Russia over the next 30 years. Bilateral cooperation in the field of energy enhanced, as shown in the agreement for cooperation in the West Kamchatka Project. Bilateral cooperation in energy has been further enhanced by the 'Action Plan on the Development of Korea-Russia Collaboration in the Field of Energy', signed by the energy ministers in August, 2009. The agreement includes Korea's import of natural gas from Russia, the West Kamchatka Project and the modernization of Russia's power grids. In April 2009, Korea began the 20-year annual import of 1.5 tons of natural gas from the Sakhalin-II Field, which allowed Korea to diversify the country's sources of energy

supply.

The two sides also reached conclusions on 26 agreements on major issues ranging from the development of a port and logistics complex in Far East Russia and cooperation in the agriculture and fishing industries, to the developed cooperation in the areas of mineral resources, nanotechnology and finance, which will further promote the economic cooperation of the two countries. As for fisheries, both sides agreed to increase Korea's quota of Pollack in Russian waters and cooperative ties in fisheries were further strengthened through the signing of the Agreement on Cooperation in Preventing Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of Living Marine Resources. Cooperation in space development is also in progress and Korea and Russia cooperated to launch the space rocket, Naro-ho, with Korea's first space launch vehicle(KSLV-I). In addition, nanotechnology assumed also one of the most potential fields for Korea-Russia cooperation because Russia is abundant in original technology while Korea is advanced in the commercialization of this technology.

In addition, the two presidents concluded the agreement on short-term multiple visas in order to facilitate the Korean people visiting Russia. The blueprint of future relations between the two countries is well illustrated in the vision of 'Three Major New Silk Roads,' which includes the 'Iron, Energy and Green Silk Roads' that President Lee announced at the Korea-Russia Business Forum on September, 2008, during his official visit to Russia.

High-level exchanges between Korea and Russia were also promoted.

Foreign ministerial talks were held during Foreign Minister's visit to Russia in September and on the occasion of major multilateral meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD). Through these, the two ministers discussed comprehensive issues such as ways to improve bilateral relations and peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. Moreover, the diplomatic consultation channel between the two countries was strengthened through the Korea-Russia Vice Foreign Ministers' Strategic Dialogue in December. Remarkable progress in bilateral cooperation was made at the local government level and in the private sectors.

The Korean Consulate General Office at Irkusku, which opened in October, contributed to the enhancement of Korea's cooperation with the local Russian governments and the improvement of Russian consular services toward the Korean people. In addition, agreements on Korea-Russia Sisterly Relationship and Korea-Russia Friendly Cooperation were concluded between six Korean and Russian local governments. Various cultural events that promoted the mutual understanding of the two peoples were held in major Korean and Russian cities.

The bilateral trade volume in 2008 reached \$ 180 billion, a 20% increase from \$ 150 billion in 2007 that was a 50% increase from the volume in 2006. In 2008, Russia was Korea's 8th largest exporting market and 14th largest importing market. Korea's investment in Russia reached a volume of \$ 1,540 million in 2008, reflecting its upward trend. The MOU on the development of a complex for Korean companies in the Moscow region was also concluded, headed by the Korean Trade-

Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA). Russia's investment in Korea is relatively small compared to Korea's investment in Russia, amounting to \$ 34 million. It must be noted, however, that Russian companies are showing an increasing interest in Korea's automobile industry.

In addition, the Russian government is striving to modernize its economy, which is highly dependent on the energy sector. Korea and Russia jointly held the Seminar on Economic Modernization in Seoul in October 2010. Moreover, the Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development signed the MOU on Economic Modernization. Thus, Korea became the first country in Asia to establish a "Partnership for Economic Modernization" with Russia. The Partnership will increase the participation of Korean companies in Russia's economic modernization process. It will also enhance the two countries' bilateral cooperation in the high-tech field such as energy efficiency, IT, medicine, space technology, and nuclear power.

Overall, under the Lee Myung-bak administration, Korea-Russia relations developed in comprehensive field. However, gradual worsening of South Korea and North Korea relations affected Korea-Russia relations, too.

6. Park Geun-hye Administration and Policy Stance of Korea-Russia Diplomatic Relations (2013 – present)

The current Korean Park Geun-hye administration tries to reinforce Korea-Russia relations by emphasizing ‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership’ and recognizes importance of Russia on issues of the Korean Peninsula. Based on the spirits of ‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership’, Korea and Russia agreed to enhance their relations by working towards a more future-oriented and mutually beneficial form of cooperation in various areas including politics, security, trade, investment, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, and so on. Also, Park Geun-hye administration announced Eurasia initiative and its declared goal is to remove physical and other barrier to greater economic exchanges among Korea, other Asian countries and Europe. It means Seoul intends to build new infrastructure, increase regional foreign investment and enhance regional security in Eurasian nations including Russia.

In its first year in office, the Park administration promoted summit diplomacy and high-level exchanges with Russia. In particular, it held two rounds of summits with Russia, and the ROK Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs and National Security participated in the 4th International Meeting of High-level Officials Responsible for Security Matters, which was hosted by Russia in 2013. These efforts have enabled Korea and Russia to lay the basis for the

institutionalization of regular summit meetings and to bolster their strategic communication and political trust.

President Park Geun-hye and Russian President Vladimir Putin had a summit meeting on the occasion of the 2013 G20 Summit in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Through the meeting, the two Presidents shared the view that it is necessary for Korea and Russia to develop their relationship in new dimensions built on trust between the two leaders and governments. Furthermore, the two leaders agreed to make continuous efforts for the smooth progress of existing projects. They also agreed to continue their efforts to develop and carry out new and mutually beneficial projects in the fields of Korean companies' active advancement into Russia's Far East and Siberian region, utilization of the Northern Sea Route and interaction between the two countries' youths. In addition, the Korean side expressed its request for the Russia to support and participate in the Korean government's Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative.

President Putin visited Korea in November 2013 and held the second summit of that year with President Park. The two Presidents shared in depth discussions on a wide array of topics such as ways to enhance cooperation in various fields and boost people-to-people and cultural exchanges between Korea and Russia, the situations in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, and the two countries' cooperation in the international arena.

The two sides also adopted a joint statement which included the direction for further development of their relations and the concrete measures for cooperation in order to build a "new" Korea-Russia relationship and a new era in Eurasia. This joint statement reconfirmed Russia's position that it will never allow the North Korean nuclear program and stressed that North Korea must abide by the international obligations and commitments regarding its denuclearization. Furthermore, in the joint statement, the Russian side confirmed its support for the Trust Process on the Korean Peninsula and Korea side's efforts to build trust with North Korea.

In addition, the two Presidents established an institutional framework to enhance people-to-people exchanges and mutual cooperation through two intergovernmental agreements made by both countries in November on the occasion of the summit: the agreement of exemption for holders of ordinary passports and that for the establishment of a culture center.

Moreover, on the occasion of ARF, various inter-Governmental consultations including those at the high-level were actively held such the talks between the two countries' Foreign Ministers, the Korea-Russia Policy Council (Vice Minister level), Regional Directors Council, Joint Committee on Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation and Committee on Resources Cooperation.

In the economic field the trade volume between the two countries reached a record \$22.63 billion (USD) in 2013, an increase of approximately 2 percent

from the previous year's figure of \$22.45 billion (USD). Since 2009, the trade volume between the two countries has continued to expand, increasing in both exports and imports.

Korea and Russia discussed a trilateral (ROK-DPRK-Russia) cooperation plan featuring ways to connect the railroad (between a Trans-Korean Railway and the Trans-Siberian Railway), gas pipeline and electrical grid, and in 2013 the three countries have made major advancements in giving shape to the plan. On the occasion of the November 2013 summit, Korean companies and Russian Railways signed the MOU for both sides' participation in Najin-Hasan logistics cooperation projects. The Najin-Hasan project is what Russian Railways has previously carried out with the DPRK, which aims at developing the Najin port and Najin-Hasan railways. With the MOU, Korean companies will hold talks to participate in the project.

The Korean government is to review the medium-and long-term plan for the trilateral cooperation considering the project progress, commercial feasibility and development of South-North Korea relations. In this regard, the Korean government arranged a government-wide consultation system for the trilateral cooperation projects under the Prime Minister's Secretariat in August 2013.

The Russian Far East and Siberia are the major areas of strategic cooperation for both Korea and Russia. Hence, Korea has continuously enlarged its overseas expansion in energy, resource, agriculture and fishing industry as the region's biggest trading partner since 2011. Korean companies' investments have

also expanded, as demonstrated in the construction of a high voltage circuit breaker plant in the Maritime Province of Siberia. In 2013, President Park and President Putin agreed on the need for more intensified bilateral cooperation through the combination of Russia's Far East and Siberia-centered policy and Korea's policy of strengthening cooperation with Eurasia.

Further, starting with the first ever ROK pilot service of the Northern Sea Route in September-October 2013, cooperative projects in the area of the shipbuilding industry and North Pole Route development have been gaining attention as mutually beneficial cooperation projects for the future. In November 2013, the two leaders of Korea and Russia agreed to create a joint investment and financing platform of about \$3 billion (USD) which will contribute to the activation of regional investment in the Russian Far East and Siberia.

Through the summit talks of November 2013, the institutional framework for people-to-people exchanges has been strengthened. While year 2014 to 2015 has been designated as "the year of people-to-people exchanges between Korea and Russia," two intergovernmental agreements, the "Framework Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Russia on mutual visa exemption for holders of ordinary passports" and "Agreement for the Establishment of a Culture Center", have been concluded. With the agreement on visa exemption for holders of ordinary passports having entered into force in January 2014, the two countries' nationals are free to come and go for 60 days without visas.

The 3rd Korea-Russia Dialogue Forum was held successfully on November 13, 2013 with the participation of both countries' Presidents. As a representative dialogue channel with four levels of participants (citizens, government, industry and academia) from Korea and Russia, the "Korea-Russia Dialogue" has been held annually with the participation of the summits from both countries since it was first launched in 2010. The Russia-Korea Society, a permanent organization for establishing friendly networks within Russia, was founded to extend the basis for the development of Korea-Russia relations and to increase mutual understanding between the two countries. These public diplomacy efforts not only contribute to advancing bilateral cooperation in cultural aspects, but also to improving all aspects of cooperation.

For Russia, on a basis of strong domestic leadership, Putin government's strategic goal is to enhance its standing in the international community. Meanwhile, as tensions between Russia and the West grow over the issue of Ukraine, and as Russia's economy is under stress, it is expected that Putin administration will strengthen ties with Northeast Asia. Especially, as part of a 'Look East' policy²⁰, Moscow will promote close relations with Korea in order to promote developing Far East Siberia region and enlarging economic and energy cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries. However Putin regards North Korea as 'strategic assets' in the

²⁰ New York Times, "Mr.Putin's Global Courtships", (Dec. 26. 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/opinion/mr-putins-global-courtships.html?_r=0)

dynamics between countries in and around Northeast Asia (North Korea and Russian relations will be covered in part IV).

Overall, the Korean Government exerted efforts for the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Korea tries to cooperate closely with key neighboring countries and the international community to respond to uncertain surroundings regarding the situation in North Korea and tries to deter provocations by North Korea. Korea and Russia have laid the basis for institutionalization of regular summit meetings and have enhanced strategic cooperation and political trust by bolstering summit diplomacy and high-level exchanges²¹. The political dialog between Korea and Russia well-established process as the leaders of the two countries meet a least twice a year at bilateral summits or various international forums. Trade and ties in the humanitarian sphere between the two countries are expanding steadily and the number of Korean visitors to Russia and Russian to Korea is growing yearly. Sharing positions over an array of issues in international politics, Seoul and Moscow are expected to cooperate actively in the long view.

²¹ Korea-Russia Presidential Visits.

Table 2. Korea-Russia Bilateral Summits (1990-2013)²²

	Date	Occasion	Outcome ²³
1	'90.6	Korea-Soviet Union Summit held in San Francisco(Roh Tae-woo, Gorbachev)	-
2	'90.12	Visit by the former Korean president Roh Tae-woo to Russia(Gorbachev)	Declaration on General Principles of Relations between the Republic of Korea and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
3	'91.4	Visit by the former Russian president Gorbachev to Korea(Roh Tae-woo)	-
4	'92.11	Visit by the former Russian president Yeltsin to Korea(Noh Tae-woo)	Korean-Russian Joint Statement
5	'94.6	Visit by the former Korean president Kim Young-sam to Russia(Putin)	Korean-Russian Joint Declaration
6	'99.5	Visit by the former Korean president Kim Dae-jung to Russia(Putin)	Korean-Russian Joint Statement
7	'00.9	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the UN Millennium Summit in New York(Kim Dae-jung, Putin)	-
8	'00.11	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the 2000 APEC in Brunei(Kim Dae-jung,	-

²² Source : Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korea.

²³ 한정숙·홍현익·강윤희·최우익, 『한·러관계사료집 1990-2003』, 서울대학교 출판부, 2004.

		Putin)	
9	'01.2	Visit by the Russian president Putin to Korea(Kim Dae-jung)	Korean-Russian Joint Statement
10	'01.10	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the 2001 APEC in Shanghai(Kim Dae-jung, Putin)	-
11	'03.1	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the 2003 APEC in Bangkok(Roh Moo-hyun, Putin)	-
12	'04.9	Visit by the former Korean president Roh Moo-hyun to Russia(Putin)	Korean-Russian Joint Declaration
13	'05.5	Visit by the former Korean president Roh Moo-hyun to Russia(Putin)	-
14	'05.11	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the 2005 APEC in Busan(Roh Moo-hyun, Putin)	-
15	'06.11	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the 2006 APEC in Hanoi(Roh Moo-hyun, Putin)	-
16	'07.9	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the 2007 APEC in Sydney(Roh Moo-hyun, Putin)	-
17	'08.7	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the G-8 Summit in Toyako(Lee Myung-bak, Medvedev)	-
18	'08.9	Visit by the former Korean president Lee Myung-bak to Russia(Medvedev)	Korean-Russian Joint Statement
19	'09.7	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the G-8 Summit in L'Aquila(Lee Myung-	-

		bak, Medvedev)	
20	'10.9	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Yaroslavl(Lee Myung-bak, Medvedev)	-
21	'10.11	Visit by the Russian president Medvedev to Korea(Lee Myung-bak)	Korean-Russian Joint Statement
22	'11.11	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the Closing Ceremony of Korea-Russia Dialog in Saint Petersburg(Lee Myung-bak, Medvedev)	-
23	'12.3	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit(Lee Myung-bak, Medvedev)	-
24	'12.9	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok(Lee Myung-bak, Putin)	-
25	'13.9	Korea-Russia Summit held on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Saint Petersburg(Park Geun-hye, Putin)	-

VI. Korea-Russia Major Diplomatic Issues

1. High Politics Area

A. North Korean Nuclear Issue

For Korea, the most imminent security problem relating to the survival of it is always the North Korean nuclear issue. Korea is keenly interested in mutual assistance or conflicts among the powers of the six-party talk member states, China, and Japan, Russia, and U.S. These powers would have direct impact on the security on the Korean Peninsula. Following North Korea's first nuclear test, Russia refrained from directly criticizing Pyongyang, giving the impression that it was going farther than China in defense of the North over its nuclear program. Russia has maintained a consistent position in opposing the international community's measures for affirmative sanctions against North Korea, despite its concerns expressed over the North's nuclear weapons development and advocacy of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

However, Russia's response to North Korea's second nuclear test was departed from its past position. Russia, which is always taking sides with North Korea on the diplomatic stage, joined the international community's sanctions against the North, and it consented to both U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 and 1874, which imposes even stricter sanction than resolution 1718. Such a shift in attitude implies that Russia may play an important role in settling the North

Korean nuclear problem.

Despite the dramatic settlement of the February 13 agreement reached through the Six-Party Talks, there was not much hope that North Korea would fulfill its obligation under the agreement. Russia was also seen to have had little hope that North Korea would be bound to the February 13 agreement, though some say Moscow consistently played the role of faithful guardian to Pyongyang in the Six-Party framework. The skepticism Russia holds toward North Korea has its roots in their past record. Never did the Soviet Union trust the North's genuine intentions regardless of military alliances between the two.

Russia's distrust of the North resulted in the Russian Presidential decree for the implementation of the UNSC resolution 1718, only seven months after reaching the February 13 agreement. This shows that Russia regarded this agreement as the Maginot line it could use to end Pyongyang's nuclear ambition.

North Korea's second nuclear test embarrassed Russia, of course, and it imposed on Russia the need to make a significant choice to deal with nuclear-armed North Korea. That is to say, Russia decided to tolerate the international sanctions against North Korea to a certain level. As was expected, Russia consented to UNSC resolution 1874 imposing a new robust set of sanctions on Pyongyang.

Russia, however, made it clear that it never supported the level of sanctions that was suggested by the U.S. and other western countries or the idea of the military measures on North Korea. This is because Russia, though it considers

settling the North Korean nuclear problem to be important, does not want the instability on the Korean Peninsula to lead to military confrontation on the region.

Simultaneously, Russia appears to be concerned about the possibility that military measures against the North under the current security structure may lead to the weakening of its influence on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Russia is calculating what real economic gains it will acquire later, while exercising its right as a mediator at the Six-Party Talks, building of a peace regime on the Peninsula through the use of multilateral security dialogues, which includes Russia; forming reciprocal economic relationships between the two Koreas, and; balance of power in the Northeast Asian region. Russia's position on the Peninsula largely overlaps with South Korea's foreign policy in their respective surroundings and views of the Korean Peninsula. In other words, South Korea is a close ally of the U.S. which Russia regards as its largest adversary, and it has the intention to guarantee its security by retaining a mid-to-long term alliance with the U.S. On the contrary, Russia, despite saying that it understands South Korea's position, believes that the staunch ROK-U.S. alliance will never be advantageous to its security environment.

For future Korea and Russia relations, establishing peace on the Korean peninsula and the enhancement of substantive cooperation, especially the triangular economic cooperation projects among South Korea, North Korea, and Russia is important. Also, upgraded Dialogues into a new effective consultative mechanism will further deepen the Korea-Russia strategic cooperative partnership.

B. Korea's Strategic Interest

The Korean Peninsula is region where the interests of G4(the United States, Japan, China, Russia) powers are interconnected. For that reason, Russia can take a strategically important role towards the Korean Peninsula. Therefore Russia is deeply correlated with peace of the Korean Peninsula and Korea's strategic interests.

Security is a very important issue for Russia too. Russia can benefit from averting military conflicts on the Peninsula, thus reducing security costs that drag down its economic growth. For these reasons, it is inevitable that Russia remain involved, both directly and indirectly, in creating a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and its unification, as well as resolving North Korean nuclear issues.

Korea needs to evaluate Russia's stature. For the Kremlin, Russia's closer ties with South Korea are more than a matter of increasing trade. The strengthening of ties with South Korea provides a slight counterbalance to a number of Russia's security issues in East Asia, especially in light of China's explosive growth. Furthermore, a closer relationship allows Russia to further expand its presence in East Asia. In particular for the Kremlin, a quiet diplomacy with Seoul addresses three major security questions: Russia's energy trade that's overly dependent on China, the development of the Russian Far East, and increasing Moscow's leverage in the Korean Peninsula and North Korea.

In military, Korea cannot overlook Russia. Although Russia is undergoing economic depression, Russia is still 3rd largest defense budget spending country

(62.7 bn. US\$) in the world after the U.S. (62.7 bn. US\$) and China (62.7 bn. US\$) Also it has 1,300 modern main battle tanks, 4,960 modern armored fighting vehicles, 916 fourth-generation tactical aircraft, and 355 attack helicopters, 638 heavy/medium transport helicopters, with 292 ICBM. Also it has 12 ballistic-missile nuclear powered submarines, 251 bomber aircraft, and 956,000 active manpower²⁴.

For Arms transferring, Russia transferred its armament starting from 1996 to 2006. As it mentioned above, Russian arms transferring to Korea deeply related to settlement of the loan to the USSR. Even though Russia had been 3rd arms transferring country to Korea in 1996, 1997, and 2006 and the 5th largest arms transferring country to Korea as a whole from 1996 to 2006.

²⁴ Data source : Military Balance, 2012.

Table 3. List of Arms Transferring Countries to South Korea (1996 – 2006)²⁵

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total ²⁶
US	1624	888	1200	1220	953	461	272	576	858	595	1332	21544
Germany	273	163	59	173	180	161	19	25	29	30	21	2990
France	20	30	128	124	80	80	80	87	80	27	164	1478
UK	0	5	0	70	115	43	0	0	12	12	0	686
Russia	60	131	14	29	29	0	0	10	32	86	102	492
Netherlands	0	7	35	35	35	0	0	25	25	25	0	430
Israel	0	0	9	12	19	0	100	0	0	0	0	203
Italy	0	3	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	146
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	98
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	0	16	49	0	0	0	0	66
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	60

Korea and Russia also joined 34 common international organizations and it represents that Korea and Russia have strong possibility to have same voice in the international community. From the analysis, it is assumed that Russia could have pivotal role on the issues of Korea's strategic interests in high politics area.

²⁵ Data Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.

²⁶ All the period

Table 4. List of Korea-Russia Commonly Joined International Organizations²⁷

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Community of Democracies (CD), Conference of Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), East Asia Summit (EAS), Group of 20 (G-20), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), International Development Association (IDA), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCS), International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO), International Olympic Committee (IOC), International Organization for Standardization (ISO), International Telecommunication Satellite Organization (ITSO), International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Paris Club, Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), United Nations (UN), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western

²⁷ The World Factbook, CIS, (Search on Dec. 10. 2014).

Sahara (MINURSO), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ²⁸ , World Customs Organization (WCO), World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), World Trade Organization (WTO), Zangger Committee (ZC)

* Only member(Associate member) status included(except observer)

2. Low Politics Area

A. Korea-Russia Economic Relations

Korea and Russia have been developing bilateral economic relations since 1988. Since the first trade agreement was concluded, Korea has become one of the largest trading and investment partners of the Russia. As for economic exchanges, the bilateral trade between the two countries has been increasing consistently since the establishment of Korea-Russia diplomatic relations in 1990. Korea annually increases trade and investment flows to Russia and Korea becomes one of the largest trading partner to Russia. For Korea, Russia is 11st largest trading partner and continuously invest in Russian region.

For Russia, South Korea is one of the best economic partners it could hope for. South Korea has a considerably large economy as the world's 10th largest

²⁸ Russia: Permanent Member, Korea: Nonpermanent Member('13-'14)

trading nation—skilled labor, advanced technology, and a complementary economic structure. In addition, South Korea is also important to Russia in expanding its geoeconomical domain in Asia, including joining ASEM and enhancing its status in APEC, ASEAN, ARF, and ESCAP. In summary, South Korea turning to the outside for growth is compatible and complementary with Russia in terms of technology and abundant natural resources. Russia, as a new market for South Korea, and South Korea as a bridgehead for Russia to connect to the Asia-Pacific economy, can greatly benefit from closer cooperation in this area. These geoeconomical factors create a complementary relationship that can be a strong catalyst to bring the two nations closer.

From 1992 to 2012, overall trade volume between Korea and Russia has been skyrocketed about 2,100%. More specifically, Korea to Russia export increased from \$482,671,744 in 1992 to \$11,149,103,326 in 2013(2209% ↑, Figure 1, Annex 3) and import increased from \$569,330,688 in 1992 to \$11,495,033,703 in 2013(1919% ↑, Figure 2, Annex 3) The trade between Korea and Russia has risen appreciably in 23 years.

Figure 1. Korea to Russia Export Trade Value (1992-2013, US\$)





Figure 2. Korea to Russia Import Trade Value (1992-2013, US\$)



In 2010 alone, bilateral trade increased by 82.2 percent, hitting more than \$11 billion, and major South Korean brands have become ubiquitous in the Russian market. However, experts say while the bilateral exchange in trade and commerce has been growing at an even and steady pace, the quality of this bilateral trade has not seen the same improvement. This is demonstrated by the drop in the market share of Korean products in the Russian IT market. Moreover, the general perception of Korea as a country among the Russian population does not appear to be improving, either. A recent survey reveals that the Russian people are taking an increasingly compassionate position towards North Korea.

Korea's Investment to Russia has been increased not as much as it is expected by the Russian government. There are some obstacles for Korea to invest in Russia such as unfriendly investment environment of Russia.

Table 5. Korea's Investment to Russia (1990-2014, 1,000 US\$)²⁹

Year	Number	Amount	Year	Number	Amount
1990	4	8,781	2003	35	10,293
1991	9	9,539	2004	29	90,485
1992	17	7,386	2005	49	69,312
1993	28	4,943	2006	47	131,685
1994	37	52,427	2007	100	432,364
1995	29	51,618	2008	120	518,854
1996	41	72,037	2009	173	722,596
1997	24	33,642	2010	96	232,164
1998	15	34,771	2011	80	132,829
1999	10	3,376	2012	65	96,667
2000	16	11,001	2013	74	167,228
2001	16	21,191	2014	60	82,729
2002	23	46,571	Total	1,197	3,044,490

B. South Korea - North Korea - Russia Trilateral Cooperation

In 2003, energy security became a big issue in the international community. South Korea relies on imports to meet about 97% of its energy demand as a result of insufficient domestic resources, and it is one of the world's leading energy importer³⁰. Therefore, energy security was magnified and the Korean government started to find to secure Korea's energy support.


For South Korea, Russia is one of the 10 largest energy suppliers to Korea

²⁹ Data Source : The Export-Import Bank of Korea.

³⁰ EIA(US Energy Information Administration) Report, (Jan. 2014)

in the fields of oil(8th), gas(9th), uranium(1st), and soft coal(5th). Moscow also has been actively looking for new customers beyond its European and Chinese market, and this past year, it made overtures to South Korea and Japan. The high-energy economies of Seoul and Tokyo represent a large market for Russia’s energy supply, and even a point of entry into other Asian countries. Since there is no direct gas pipeline connecting to Russia, liquefied natural gas (LNG) has become the major choice of consumption for South Korea and Japan countries.

Figure 3. South Korea Total Primary Energy Consumption by fuel type, 2012³¹



³¹ Source: EAI, U.S Energy Information Administration

Figure 4. South Korea Crude Oil Import by source, 2013³²






Figure 5. South Korea Coal Import by source, 2013³³



³² Sources: EIA, Global Trade Atlas, Korea Customs and Trade Development Institution

³³ Sources: EIA, Global Trade Atlas

Figure 6. South Korea LNG Import by source, 2013



Also Russia's greatest political interest is to secure the power and influence. Moscow looks to the use of the Trans-Siberian railroad for freight transit from Asia to Europe as an opportunity for Russia to take a greater role in Eurasia, to become a link between the two continents, and to generate significant revenues and attain a higher influence in the global economy and the world³⁵.

Former Korean President Roh Moo-hyun started to discuss of creating a railroad corridor connecting Korea to Europe in order to realize his vision of making the Korean Peninsula the logistical hub of Northeast Asia. Then during his

³⁴ Source: EIA, U.S. Energy Information Administration, PFC Energy

³⁵ Alexander Vorontsov, "The Russia-to-Korea Railroad Connection Project: Present State and Prospects," 『Russian National Strategy and ROK-Russia Strategic Partnership in the 21st Century』(Korea Institute for National Unification, 2010), p148-p172.

visit to Moscow in September 2008, the president Lee Myung-bak introduced the concept of three silk roads, including Iron(rail) Silk Road.

Russia showed interest in the project from the start, as it would open opportunities for greater cooperation with both Koreas. The corresponding range of issues was discussed at the Russia-North Korea summits in 2000-2002. In August of 2001 Russian President Putin and Kim Jung-il signed a declaration in Moscow which expressed consensus on the creation of a railroad corridor linking South and North Korea and its connection to the Trans Siberian Railroad. Shortly after that, the Russian Transportation Ministry and the North Korean Railway Ministry signed a cooperation agreement which addressed specific practical issues of reconstruction of the Trans-Korean Railway and its integration with the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

Russia ran railroad company RZD in order to hold trilateral talks among South Korea-North Korea-Russia for implementation of the project. Trilateral talks went smooth and reconstruction of the railroad link via the demilitarized zone accelerated at that time. The links between Munsan(문산, South Korea), and Kaesong(개성, North Korea) in the west and between the Chongjin(청진, North Korea) and Kumgangsan(금강산, North Korea) stations in the east were functional as of May June 2003. It was decided that test trains would start passing through the demilitarized zone in early 2005 and 2006, and shortly after regular traffic would resume³⁶.

³⁶ Alexander Vorontsov, "The Russia-to-Korea Railroad Connection Project: Present State

However, this plan still has not been properly materialized. A range of factors hampers the realization of the TSR-TKR project. First, the high cost of the project and the difficulty of finding funding sources. Second, it is difficult to run business in North Korea according to the Pyongyang's disregard of common corporate standards, and last, most significantly, the political risks arising from international political tensions due to the unresolved conflict over North Korea's nuclear programs and complication in the relations between the two Koreas.

The possibility of attracting investment for the projects dropped after North Korea tested launched ballistic missiles and carried out nuclear tests in October, 2006. After that, sanctions were imposed against the North by the UN. Since Pyongyang's moves tend to be unpredictable and for its brinkmanship diplomacy, future sanctions from the international society can be possible. As a result investors are waiting to see what the future holds and have indicated that major financial investment into the reconstruction of North Korea's infrastructure can be considered after ensuring peace, security and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Disagreements over a number of specific issues among the project members, South Korea, North Korea, and Russia, also put obstacles on linking TSR-TKR project. Pyongyang's excessive cautious to cooperation with South Korea hinders the project. North Korea's core interest in its national security is the

and Prospects,” 『Russian National Strategy and ROK-Russia Strategic Partnership in the 21st Century』(Korea Institute for National Unification, 2010), p148-p172.

regime security and it makes the North Korean leadership to worry about opening up the country's southern border which could lead to its containment policy and influx other ideology. For all reasons above, there is ongoing controversy over the optimal route of the Trans-Korean Railway.

Figure 7. The Blueprint of the TSR-TKR Project³⁷



C. Development of the Russian Far East

In the issue of the Russian Far East, involvement in the development of the region, known as the world's last remaining repository of natural resources holds critical value as a strategic reserve to ensure prosperity on the Korea Peninsula.

Also the Far East as it is an area in the closest vicinity of Korea's combat radius. Should China or Japan intend to mount military demonstrations or pressure

³⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Korea, "Diplomatic White Paper", 2007. p.75.

in time of emergency on the Korean Peninsula, they will have no choice but to consider contingencies and check against Russia's Far East military movements. In particular, waters connected lengthwise to the East Sea near the Maritime Province of Siberia and near Sakhalin further north, are areas that can never be over looked by Korean security strategists. Furthermore, in the era of space and aviation in the 21st century, the Far East can serve as a strategic corridor for Korea to expand military options thereby ensuring local superiority. This is all the more reason why Korea has to be more vigorously involved in developing the Russian Far East.

Collaborative Foundations for Energy Cooperation in East Siberia and Far East Regions Korea participated in the third Far East Siberia Committee held in Blagoveshchensk in April 2007 to reinforce its energy cooperation with East Siberia and Far East regions in Russia and discussed practical ways to pursue energy cooperation in the regions. The Korean government also participated in the second Russian Far East Economy Forum in Khabarovsk in September 2007 and discussed the prospects of energy businesses in Russia.

3. Russia's Perspective

In Russian perspective, Moscow has strived to reestablish itself as a global power by international strategic relations and economy and energy cooperation especially with Asia-pacific countries. Russia is diplomatically at odds with the U.S. and the EU over the issues of Ukraine, the deployment of MD in Eastern Europe, Iran's

nuclear program, and Kosovo's independence. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated at the Russia-Iran Summit that Iran has the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, opposing military actions by the U.S. and the other Western European countries against Iran.

Meanwhile in order to reinforce its strategic interests, Russia is maintaining close relations with China. For instance, Russia designated 2007 the "Year of China" and strengthened its military cooperation with China through the SCO six nation joint military exercises and arms exports to China. While continuing its reforms for national development, further it tightens counter-terrorism measures. Accordingly, Russia has enhanced its cooperation with China in various fields including counter-terrorism and non-proliferation, security cooperation in the areas bordering Central Asia, the Far East and Siberia, and curbing secessionist movements. To this end, Russia and China discussed plans for bilateral or international cooperation on many occasions, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

To investigate Russia's policy line to the Korean Peninsula, we need to look at the transition of Russia's foreign policy. The transition process of Russia's foreign policy line since late 1991 can be divided into three phases; pro-western foreign policy line from late 1991 to late 1992, Eurasian foreign policy line from late 1992 through mid-1996, multi-directional policy line since mid-1996. Putin is in succession of Yeltsin's multidirectional policy line.

Yeltsin's foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula can be distinguished

into two phases; pro-South Korea policy until the death of Kim Il Sung in July of 1994, balanced policy toward South and North Korea since that time. The Russia-South Korea relationship was re-adjusted by re-affirming a “Constructive and Mutually Complementary Partnership” at the summit in May of 1999 between Kim Dae-jung and Yeltsin.

In the meanwhile, the transition process of Yeltsin’s foreign policy toward North Korea since the disintegration of the Soviet Union is to be differentiated in four phases: a period of aggravation until the first half of 1994, Russia’s search for improving its ties with North Korea until the second half of 1996, a period of stagnation from the first half of 1997 to the second half of 1999, and a period of re-adjustment since 2000.

After Yeltsin, Putin is carrying out a pragmatic and realistic foreign policy, which is based on more profits in the political and economic sense, while pursuing balanced policy toward South and North Korea as was in the second term of Yeltsin’s presidency. At present, Russia attaches great importance to the stability of the Korean peninsula, regarding its unification as a matter to some future occasion. Therefore, Putin is likely to maintain the established principles of the Russian policy that have balanced relations with South and North Korea, while continuing to pursue his pragmatic policy so that he may raise Russia’s voice in the Korean problems and obtain economic benefits. The below is Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020, issued in 2009 concerning the Korean Peninsula.

Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020³⁸

*11. In the long term, the attention of international politics will be focused on **ownership of energy resources**, including in the Near East, the Barents Sea shelf and other parts of the Arctic, in the Caspian basin, and in Central Asia.*

*In the medium term, the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as conflicts in the Near and Middle East, in a number of South Asian and African countries, and on **the Korean peninsula**, will continue to exert a negative influence on the international situation.*

It is witnessed that Russia pursues a more flexible foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula in order to prevent a deterioration of political and security situation near the Russian Far East. The Kremlin is not ready to use a position of strength towards North Korea. Russia attaches great importance to stability on the Korean peninsula regarding its unification as a matter for some future occasion.

A. South Korea and Russia Relations

The inauguration of the third Putin government in May 2012 indicated that the Park Geun-hye administration could be faced another take-off stage and policy re-adjustment. It is because Putin is estimated as a 'geopolitical pragmatist' and he puts more importance on 'strategic interest' and 'meritocracy' in the bilateral relations than the former president Medvedev.'

³⁸ Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020, (<http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020>)

Regarding Putin's policy toward South Korea, he would like to further extend and deepen economic relations, particularly mutual trade and investment, since there are no serious political issues pending between the two countries and Russia is very satisfied with a high level of political contacts with South Korea.

First, Russia sought to strengthen its influence on the Korean peninsula. Second, Russia intends to ensure actual economic benefits by expanding economic cooperation with South Korea and by selling its military equipment to South Korea as well as by realizing tripartite(South Korea, North Korea, and Russia) economic cooperation. Third, in order to hold the U.S. global policy in check, Russia tried to get the support of the South Korean government in international security and military affairs. In matters related to National Missile Defense, the ABM treaty, START II and CTBT, Russia was, and is, opposed to U.S. policy.

B. North Korea and Russia Relation

Regarding Putin's policy toward North Korea, he would like to revitalize a political dialogue to further normal state-to-state relations. As Russia wants reconciliation and cooperation between South and North Korea rather than military tensions and confrontation, Putin's military cooperation with North Korea will be at a level that will not undermine the political, security and military balance on the Korean peninsula.


Despite Russia's cooperation regarding the resolution of the BDA issue and the efforts to regain its influence on North Korea in 2007, the issue of North

Korea's debt to Russia is still a major stumbling block to North Korea-Russia relations.

In the economic field, the amount of Russian trade with North Korea could exceed US\$ 100 million in the near future. Strengthening cooperation in the railway sector could facilitate the realization of a project linking the TSR with the TKR. In addition, the extension of cooperation in the fields of agriculture, stockbreeding and fishery is expected between Russian Far East regions and North Korea. However, North Korean debts to Russia, amounting to US\$ 5.5 billion, and North Korean drug peddling remain obstacles to the development of bilateral relations.

Figure 8. Russia to North Korea Export and Import Trade Value

(1996-2013, US\$)³⁹



Meanwhile as the current Russian President Vladimir Putin is estimated as geopolitical pragmatist, Putin government will strengthen ‘East Policy’ in order for ‘development of Far East and Siberia region, economic and energy cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries. The government also intends to normalize relations between Russia and North Korea looking North Korea as an important strategic asset of Russia.

³⁹ Data Source: UN Comtrade

V. Implication of Analysis

This study has attempted to investigate the Korean government policy toward Russia and analyze its keynote policy changes from high politics area to low politics. Up to now we have looked that after normalizing Russo-South Korean relations, remarkable changes have been occurred on the Korean government policies toward Russia.

In 1990, Roh Tae-woo administration made an accomplishment by building ties with the USSR. The major objective of the government was to establish relations with the traditional allies of North Korea, with the ultimate goal of normalized relations with China and the Soviet Union. In other words, Korea wanted to earn strategic interests utilizing the traditional allies of North Korea in order to get leverage effect for securing peace of the Korean Peninsula. For that reason, Korea stretched \$3 billion loan to the USSR to expedite diplomatic process and it means Korea put an emphasis on the security issue than economic issue.

From Kim Young-sam administration to current Park Geun-hye administration, although Korea and Russia relations have undergone 'cooperation and conflict', 'approach and stagnation' continuously, Russia keeps maintaining denuclearization of North Korea and supporting Korea's policy toward North Korea in the international society in the long run. Korea and Russia are enlarging cooperation in various fields and it diversifies links between the two, ultimately

this consolidates Korea-Russia relations.

In general terms, what all this shows is that the way we interpret the policy changes. The implications which can be drawn from analyzing the Korea-Russia relations are Korea's major policy toward Russia has been changed from high politics area to low politics area. South Korea and Russia share the same interests on key international issues, including those involving North Korea. Russia has consistently maintained that the Korean peninsula should be denuclearized, saying that North Korea should adhere to the international non-proliferation scheme and comply with the Geneva Agreement, and that the two Koreas should take charge of resolving their issues, all of which are in line with the position of the South Korean government. Korea government started relations with Russia for high politics needs. However, as Russia continuously expresses its support to Korea's policy on North Korea as mentioned above, Korea and Russia could develop its relation to other fields and diversify their relations in low politics area.

The two nations share the same strategic initiatives, such as building a pan-Eurasian transportation network linking the South and North Korean railways, and eventually linking the TSR-TKR, establishing a Northeast Asian energy council, creating a multilateral security council within Northeast Asia, and expanding the role of the United Nations. The common view and strategic vision that the two countries share on major global issues, including the issue of the Korean peninsula, provide a solid foundation for them to develop a partnership in a mutually beneficial way.

The high politics area is deeply related to the ongoing development of low politics area. For instance, although cooperation over the Far East development and other plans is lucrative and prospective project for both nations, it will end up being a house of cards unless peace and security are guaranteed on the Korean Peninsula.

VI. Conclusion

Korea and Russia have continuously strengthened their relations in various areas such as politics, economics and culture, sharing the strategic goal of common peace, stability, and economic prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Korea and Russia have laid the basis for institutionalization of regular summit meetings and have enhanced strategic cooperation and political trust by bolstering summit diplomacy and high-level exchanges.

Korea-Russia relationship could be elevated to the next level through active summit diplomacy, and had an in-depth discussion on issues of mutual interest such as the creation of favorable conditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks and ways to cooperate for the success of the Nuclear Security Summit. They noted with satisfaction the continuous increase of trade between the two countries, and agreed to strengthen the bilateral cooperation with the Far East and Siberian region, and also in the high-tech fields such as energy efficiency, IT, and medicine. In the meantime, various other inter-governmental consultative channels were actively operated, which include Korea-Russia Strategic Dialogue, Policy Council, Joint Committee on Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation, Meeting of Director-Generals for Consular Affairs, and Committee for Fisheries, and served as an effective platform for discussions on measures to expand substantive cooperation between the two countries

The Korean Peninsula is region where the interests of G4(the United States, Japan, China, Russia) powers are interconnected. Russia can take a

strategically important role towards the Korean Peninsula because 1) Russia has been supporting the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula for strategic reasons (the strategies of cooperation and restraint toward China, which has risen as G2), 2) Russia is strategically important to secure energy resources for the development of Korea. On the other hand, Korea is also crucial for the national interests of Russia. Korea is important to Russia in pursuing the development of Siberia and Far East which contributes to Russia's economic development. Therefore, in terms of the strategic significance of Russia, it is expected that Korea would develop its strategic policy to Russia and emphasize on Russia its strategic importance for Russia's national interest as well.

Basically, Korean government has been insisted 'Trust politik' diplomacy centering on a trust process on the Korean Peninsula and the initiative for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia. To sustain Korean diplomatic lines, Russia's role in Northeast Asia is necessary. In this respect, the Russian government's policy support is of great importance.

Korea also needs to bring its attention to the military and strategic value of the Russia. Russia's pursuit of quiet diplomacy with South Korea has been a foreign policy success. The future direction of pending three-way economic cooperation projects between South Korea, North Korea and Russia, including the construction of a pipeline to carry Russian natural gas to South Korea through the North. Considering that South Korea-Russia relations are becoming ever closer with the growing importance of their future partnership, it looks safe to say the

current expansive diplomatic policy of Korean government to Russia will sustain for next few years. At the same time, it is of great importance to assess policy outcomes and plan and implement practicable policies. Russia can be conducive to bringing peace and stability to the Korean peninsula, or if it is a negative force in achieving such a goal. As we discussed above, Korea-Russia relations should not be overlooked and it is needed to be made an accurate diagnosis. By examining the possibility of stronger bilateral ties, the future relationship between the two nations can be more developed.

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Annex 1.

(Unofficial Translation)

**DECLARATION ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ⁴⁰**

Moscow 14 December 1990

(Unofficial translation)

President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea and President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having met in Moscow on 14 December 1990 and having discussed the state and the prospects of the bilateral relations as well as a wide range of relevant international issues, expressing a mutual interest in the development of a comprehensive cooperation between the two countries ; aware of the importance of peace on the Korean peninsula for that of Northeast Asia and the world at large : recognizing the aspiration of the Korean nation for unification and welcoming the expansion of South-North contacts, including the recent negotiations between the Prime Ministers of the Republic of Korea and of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ; being firmly committed to the building of a new, more equitable, humane, peaceful and democratic world order, declare that the Republic of Korea and Soviet Union shall be guided in their relations by the following principles :

⁴⁰ 한정숙·홍현익·강윤희·최우익, 『한·러관계사료집 1990-2003』, 서울대학교 출판부, 2004

- respect for each other's sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence, noninterference in the internal affairs of the two states, and recognition that all nations are free to choose their way of political and socioeconomic development ;
- compliance with the standards of international law, respect for the purposes and principles of the United Nations, set forth in the UN Charter :
- inadmissibility of the threat or use of force, of providing one's own security at the expense of other states, and of settling international controversies and regional conflicts by any means other than reaching political agreements on the basis of reasonable consent by all the parties concerned :
- development of a broad mutually beneficial cooperation among states and nations, leading to their rapprochement and to a deeper mutual understanding ;
- joining the international community's efforts to deal, on a priority basis, with the global issues of reducing the arms race, nuclear or conventional ; preventing the environmental disaster facing mankind ; overcoming poverty, famine and illiteracy : narrowing the dramatic gap between the development levels of various nations ;
- establishment of a secure and equitable world which would ensure progress for mankind and a decent life for all nations in the coming millennium.

Proceeding from the above-mentioned principles and opening a new page in history of their relations, Republic of Korea and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are determined to build these relations in the spirit of good neighborhood, trust and cooperation in the interests of

peoples of both countries. To these ends, the two states will conclude a variety of agreements with a view to establishing and improving links and contacts between the two countries in the political, economic, trade, cultural, scientific, humanitarian and other areas. The Republic of Korea and the USSR will ensure priority of universally recognized international legal standards in their domestic and foreign policies and will implement in good faith their treaty obligations.

The Presidents support the willingness of businessmen of both sides to deepen an effective and mutually beneficial cooperation in economy, trade, industry and transport, to exchange advanced technologies and scientific achievements and to develop joint entrepreneurship and new forms of cooperation, and welcome the development of and investments into mutually beneficial projects. An exchange of ideas, information, spiritual and cultural values, and expansion of human contacts in the fields of culture, art, science, education, sport, media and tourism, and a reciprocal travel by citizens of their countries will be encouraged. The sides will coordinate their efforts to control international terrorism, organized crime and illicit trafficking in drugs, and to protect the environment and to that end will cooperate in international and regional organizations.

The Republic of Korea and the Union of Soviet Republics are committed to the ideas of establishing in the Asia and the Pacific region equal, mutually beneficial relations based on the balance of interests and self-determination, and of making Asia and the Pacific a region of peace and constructive cooperation through a process of bilateral and

multilateral consultations.

The Presidents reaffirm their conviction that the development of Korean-Soviet relations contributes to the strengthening of peace and security in Asia and the Pacific, is in line with the changes under way in the region, deepens the processes leading to the removal of confrontational mentality and to the elimination of the cold war in Asia, contributes to regional cooperation and facilitates the relaxation of tension and the establishment of climate of trust for the eventual reunification of the South and North Korea.

The Soviet Union stands for the continuation of a productive inter-Korean dialogue for the removal of the political and military confrontation between the two Korean sides, for a just and fair settlement of the Korean problem by peaceful, democratic means in accordance with the will of the entire Korean people.

The Republic of Korea, welcoming the global turn from the era of confrontation to reconciliation and cooperation on the basis of universal values, freedom, democracy and justice, emphasizes a success of the Soviet reform policy as a major factor in future international relations, improvement of the situation in Northeast Asia and progress in relations between the two countries.

The Presidents proceed from the general understanding that the development of links and contacts between the Republic of Korea and the USSR must not in any way affect their relations with third countries or undermine obligations they assume under multilateral or

bilateral treaties and agreements.

The Republic of Korea and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed to pursue a political dialogue at the highest level, and to hold regular meetings and consultations at other various levels on matters of deepening the bilateral relations and on relevant international issues.

ROH THE WOO
M. GORBACHEV

Annex 2.

Korea-Russia Joint Statement⁴¹

2008. 9. 30

1. President Lee Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea paid a state visit to the Russian Federation on September 28-30, 2008 at the invitation of President Dmitry A. Medvedev of the Russian Federation.

During the summit meeting on September 29(Mon), which was held in a friendly and constructive atmosphere, the Presidents of the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation reviewed the advances made in Korea-Russia relations since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1990. The two leaders also had a fruitful exchange of views on major global issues.

2. The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction on the dynamic and multi-dimensional development of the Korea-Russia relations in recent years. Also, confirming that developing the bilateral relations is a high priority for both countries, the two leaders agreed to upgrade the current bilateral relations into a 'Strategic Cooperative Partnership.' The two Presidents agreed that they would continue to maintain close contact with each other, in order to exchange views on major issues including Korea-Russia relations, the situation in the Korean Peninsula, North East Asia, and the world as a whole, and also to enhance exchanges and cooperation on diverse levels such as the government, parliament, and public and private sectors.

⁴¹ Source : Cheong Wa Dae

3. Both Presidents agreed to hold the Strategic Dialogue between the First Vice Ministers of the two Foreign Ministries, as a high-level group for holding practical consultations in the areas of diplomacy and security. Also, both Presidents decided to activate existing consultation channels such as the Korea-Russia Forum, and to increase exchanges in various areas including culture, academic activities, youth, and sports, in order to encourage mutual inter-civil understanding between the two countries.

Both Presidents agreed that the organization of joint events, devoted to the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation would contribute to the further strengthening of bilateral relations, and decided to work together for the celebration of the jubilee as an important event, through the implementation of various cultural and other memorable projects.

4. Sharing views that the increase of people-to-people exchanges between the two nations would provide a strong foothold for improving inter-civil understanding between Korea and Russia, both Presidents agreed to improve the legal basis for such exchanges, including measures to simplify the procedures for issuing visas.

The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction in the achievements made through the implementation of the "2005 Action Plan on Economic and Trade Cooperation between Korea and Russia," which was concluded in November 19, 2005. In particular, they welcomed the rapid growth in bilateral trade and the expansion of mutual investment in diverse areas, which led to the strengthening of exchanges and cooperation between Korean and Russian companies.

In order to actualize the full potential of the cooperation, the two Presidents decided that they would continue to concentrate efforts on improving the trade structure, increasing the share of machineries and high-tech products in Russia's exports, and also improve the quality and level of the trade and economic cooperation as a whole. In this vein, the two leaders agreed to examine measures to realize free trade between Korea and Russia. Also, President Lee expressed his support for Russia's desire to enter the WTO, and anticipated the smooth process of Russia's accession into the organization.

The two Presidents noted that the Korea-Russia investment cooperation is an important means of enhancing economic ties between the two countries and that it entails great prospects. In this context, both Presidents were determined to promote information exchanges between the two countries, activate various forms of cooperation between the organizations of the two countries in implementing infrastructure projects, and promote cooperation in processing industries, high-tech areas, energy, and the development of natural resources.

President Medvedev, in taking the "The Economic and Social Development of the Far East and Eastern Siberia in 1996 - 2005 and until 2013" into consideration, highly valued Korean companies' willingness to participate in projects for the development of the Russian Far East and Siberia region. The two Presidents agreed to discuss the various details including the drafting of a joint document for cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation in the field of the development of the Russian Far East and Siberia, within the framework of the Korea-Russian Joint Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation.

President Lee wished for the success of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit Meeting which will be held in Vladivostok in 2012 and also for the success of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. Both Presidents decided to actively explore ways to cooperate in all relevant projects, including the building of the infrastructure of these international events.

The two Presidents agreed that, in order to foster a more profound economic cooperation between the two countries, it is necessary to strengthen and promote dialogue at the non-government level. In this connection, both Presidents spoke in favor of expanding the Korea-Russia Business Dialogue including dialogue at the regional level, and in encouraging more active participation from small and medium enterprises in bilateral trade and economic cooperation, and expressed hope to develop their cooperation between the non-government sectors of the two countries.

5. The two Presidents expressed their commitment to strengthen their cooperation in energy, which is one of the most important fields in bilateral economic cooperation. In this context, both Presidents endorsed the joint implementation of energy projects by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea and third countries. Furthermore, both Presidents agreed to develop close cooperation for the success of projects in developing oil fields in Russia, including the West Kamchatka Project. President Medvedev acclaimed Korea's commitment to participate in the open competition and bid for natural resources, and in the construction of petro- and gas-chemical complexes and the development of liquefied natural gas deposits in the Russian Far East region.

Both Presidents shared the view that Korea's import of Russian natural gas would bring benefits to both countries, and welcomed the conclusion of the MOU on cooperation between the state-run gas companies of the two countries.

Both Presidents agreed to expand their cooperation within the framework of the Korea-Russian Joint Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the mineral resources area, and to hold discussions on the research, reasonable use of mineral resources, and specific implementation of plans for the development.

6. The two Presidents hoped to strengthen their cooperation and promote large projects in high-tech areas, including the areas of nanotech, IT, nuclear energy, space exploration, and other fields of science and technologies, including polar research.

The two Presidents noted with satisfaction that considerable accomplishments have been made through cooperation in the peaceful use and research of outer space, and further noted that the space exploration by the first Korean astronaut in April 2008 was a success. Both Presidents also agreed to continuously expand their cooperation in aerospace technology, including the development of the Korean Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV-1).

Both Presidents noted that Russia's proposal to establish the International Uranium Center is useful for the sake of nuclear non-proliferation and stable supply of nuclear fuel, under the common perception that peaceful use of nuclear energy and the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime are important. In this regard, the two Presidents agreed to examine the possibility of cooperation in this area.

The two Presidents recognized the importance of the project on linking the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) and the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), such as the Khasan-Rajin branch reconstructing project, in the international transportation and distribution market, and also confirmed that this project will contribute to the development of the Russian Far East and Siberian region. In this regard, both Presidents agreed to work together continuously in this project to link the railways. Furthermore, both Presidents agreed to closely collaborate with each other to increase their cooperation in maritime transportation.

Both Presidents stood to further develop their mutually beneficial cooperation in the fishing industry, in accordance with the Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in Fisheries of September 16th, 1991. In addition, the leaders decided to render assistance to the creation of joint projects on the catching, reproduction, processing, and marketing of aquatic bio-resources, and to mutually cooperate for the preservation and maintenance of marine bio-resources. The two Presidents also agreed to promote cooperation for the prevention of illegal fishery in the Northwest Pacific Ocean.

Both Presidents expressed satisfaction that the bilateral cooperation has reached a high level in law enforcement, and shared the view that it is necessary to enhance the cooperation to prevent and address natural and human disasters.

Both Presidents agreed to continuously increase exchanges and strengthen their cooperation in the defense area, including military technology exchanges and personnel interaction between the militaries of the two countries.

As for cooperation in science and technology, both Presidents agreed to continue consultations on the conclusion of the implementing arrangements for the treatment of industrial property.

7. The two Presidents carefully discussed the international situation and shared the common opinion that a peaceful settlement of regional and worldwide problems through dialogue is desirable, and agreed to expand the cooperation within the framework of regional organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in order to enhance multilateral cooperation for the peace, security, and development of the Asia Pacific region.

President Lee expressed his satisfaction that Russia has applied open regionalism- the foundation on which East Asian and Pacific countries have increased their cooperation- to develop close ties with regional organizations of East Asia, and also expressed his hope for these ties to be further strengthened in the future.

8. The two Presidents recognized the importance of multilateral diplomacy, such as complying with principles of international law including the UN Charter, strengthening the UN's role in solving international problems, and enhancing cooperation to address worldwide issues.

To this aspect, both Presidents agreed to continue close discussions on areas of mutual interest in multilateral organizations and forums including the UN. In addition, both Presidents agreed that in the face of global challenges and threats, the United Nations needs to go through continuous reform to enhance UN's democracy, transparency,

responsibility, and representative nature, based on a wide range of agreement among the Member States.

The two Presidents recognized that interdependence among nations is increasing in line with the expansion of globalization, and that as a result, the security and prosperity of each country have become inseparable. Both Presidents shared a common understanding that new challenges and threats to security and sustainable development such as international terrorism, trans-border crimes and demographic imbalances are inherently international in nature, and further agreed on the need for the international community to strengthen collective efforts, so as to effectively respond to such challenges.

The two Presidents agreed on the need to strengthen cooperation through international and regional organizations as well as bilateral channels, so as to actively respond to new challenges such as climate change, energy security, and food security and also to fight against trans-border crimes, including crimes involving financial or economic areas, piracy, and cyberspace crimes.

Further, both Presidents supported the adoption of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and further showed support for adopting the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism also at the earliest possible time and for increasing bilateral cooperation to combat the financing of terrorism. Both Presidents strongly reprimanded all types of international terrorism, regardless of their purpose and motive, and reaffirmed their commitment to join efforts in tackling terrorism by participating in international or regional organizations as well as through bilateral efforts.

The two Presidents further agreed that relevant multilateral cooperation regimes should be strengthened in accordance with the Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC).

Both Presidents also agreed to devote special attention to export control, as an important means of blocking the proliferation and delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

9. Both Presidents expressed their respective concerns over the recent situation in Georgia, and reached a common understanding that the situation should be settled through dialogue, which would contribute to regional stability and international peace.

The two Presidents agreed to strengthen consultations and cooperation within the framework of the Six-Party Talks in which the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the People's Republic of China are participating, and to continue constructive efforts for the early realization of the goals of the September 19 Joint Statement in a peaceful and diplomatic manner.

President Lee expressed his support for the constructive role of the Russian Federation within the Six-Party Talks as the Chair of the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism Working Group, and President Medvedev expressed his support for the Republic of Korea's constructive role as the Chair of the Economy and Energy Cooperation Working Group.

President Lee Myung-bak explained to President Medvedev about the Korean government's efforts to advance mutually-beneficial and co-prosperous inter-Korean relations. President Medvedev confirmed his support for Korea's efforts in fostering inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation, and emphasized their importance in promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

10. The two Presidents expressed satisfaction with the results of the official visit of President Lee Myung-bak to the Russian Federation. Both Presidents shared the understanding that the visit conveyed significance to the development of the bilateral relations.

President Lee Myung-bak expressed his appreciation to the government and people of the Russian Federation for the warm hospitality accorded to him, and extended a cordial invitation to President Medvedev to visit the Republic of Korea at his convenience. President Medvedev accepted the invitation with gratitude.

Annex 3.

Status of Korea-Russia Trade

[Unit: 100 million USD, %]

Year	Export		Import	
	Amount	Rate of Change	Amount	Rate of Change
2014	9,077,842	-3.1	13,433,982	45.5
2013	11,149,103	0.5	11,495,500	1.2
2012	11,097,138	7.7	11,354,318	4.6
2011	10,304,880	32.8	10,852,171	9.6
2010	7,759,836	85	9,899,456	71
2009	4,194,066	-57	5,788,759	-30.6
2008	9,747,957	20.5	8,340,060	19.5
2007	8,087,746	56.2	6,977,477	52.6
2006	5,179,248	34	4,572,967	16.2
2005	3,864,170	65.2	3,936,623	7.2
2004	2,339,329	41	3,671,455	45.6
2003	1,659,119	55.7	2,521,780	13.7
2002	1,065,875	13.6	2,217,604	14.9
2001	938,161	19	1,929,476	-6.3
2000	788,127	23.7	2,058,265	29.4
1999	637,052	-42.8	1,590,469	59.3
1998	1,113,846	-37	998,579	-34.9
1997	1,767,932	-10.1	1,534,783	-15.2
1996	1,967,534	39	1,810,266	-4.4
1995	1,415,881	47.2	1,892,880	53.9
1994	961,911	60	1,229,652	26.1
1993	601,171	409.1	974,821	1,202.70
1992	118,084	0	74,830	0

Annex 4.

Arms Transferring to Korea⁴²

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total	
US	988	765	668	600	701	1737	1624	888	1200	1220	953	461	272	576	858	595	1332	1207	1075	209	1179	1376	950	110	21544	
Germany	32	20	20	174	168	165	273	163	59	173	180	161	19	25	29	30	21	294	387	431	38	62	38	30	2990	
France	4			20	20	20	20	30	128	124	80	80	80	87	80	27	164	184	170	160						1478
UK	115	110	97	105		2		5		70	115	43			12	12										686
Russia							60	131	14	29	29			10	32	86	102									492
Netherlands	27			61	50	38		7	35	35	35			25	25	25		39	10		10		10			430
Israel									9	12	19		100											35	28	203
Italy	53			45				3	5	5	5								3			15	3	10		146
Spain				16	82																					98
Indonesia												16	49													66
Sweden																			3	15	15	15	3	10		60

⁴² Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

국문초록

역대 한국정부의 대러시아 정책과 평가 분석:

하이폴리틱스에서 로우폴리틱스로

양정윤

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본 논문은 1990년 한국이 러시아와의 외교관계를 정상화 한 후 개선 하였던 외교 정책에 대하여 고찰하고자 한다. 한·러 수교 이후 지난 25여 년간 한국은 러시아에 대한 발전적인 외교정책을 취해왔다. 1994년 김영삼 정부는 한·러 관계를 ‘건설적이고 상호 보완적인 동반자’ 관계로 발전시키는 것을 합의한 ‘모스크바 공동선언’을 채택하였으며, 차기 김대중 정부는 2001년 서울에서 개최된 정상회담을 통해 ‘건설적이고 상호 보완적인 동반자’ 관계를 심화 발전시킬 것임을 발표하였다. 2004년 노무현 정부는 양국관계를 ‘상호 신뢰하는 포괄적인 동반자 관계’로 격상시켜, 제반 분야에서의 실질적인 협력을 강화하였으며, 이명

박 정부는 2008년 한·러 관계를 ‘전략적 협력 동반자’ 관계로 발전시킬 것에 합의하였다. 마지막으로 박근혜 정부는 한·러 관계에서의 ‘전략적 협력 동반자’ 관계의 내실화를 꾀하고 있다.

한국과 러시아는 한반도 평화와 북핵 문제, 경제 교류, 극동 시베리아 개발, 남·북·러 3각 협력사업의 일환으로 추진되는 TSR-TKR 연결과 나진-하산 물류협력사업과 같은 다양한 분야에 대한 입장을 함께하고 있으며 이익을 공유하고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 북한 변수로 인하여 위의 사안들에 대한 실행에 한계를 갖고 있다. 예를 들어 북한을 경유한 러시아 에너지수송망구축은 한국과 러시아 모두에 이익이 되는 사업이지만, 북한 정권이 내재한 불안정성으로 에너지수송망이 국가 안보와 군사 문제로 직결될 가능성을 갖게 되고, 이에 따라 사업 시행이 봉착 상태에 빠져있다. 그러나 위와 같은 외부적 요인으로 인한 정책 실행의 어려움에도 불구하고 한국정부는 지난 25년간 러시아에 대하여 발전적인 우호 정책을 고수하여 왔다.

이 논문에서는 한국정부의 대러시아 정책에 대하여 정권을 기준으로 연대기적 고찰을 하고자 한다. 또한 각 정부의 정책이 초기의 하이폴리틱스 영역 중심에서 로우폴리틱스 영역 중심으로 변천하고 있다는 가설 하에 이슈별로 이를 분석하고자 한다.

논문의 전반부에서는 한·러 수교 이후 한국과 러시아 관계에서 발생한 주요 사건들을 통하여 한·러 관계를 고찰하고자 한다. 논문의 중반부

에서는 한·러 관계에서 가장 쟁점이 되는 이슈들을 통해 한국정부의 대러시아 정책이 하이폴리틱스 영역에서 로우폴리틱스 영역으로 전환되는 것을 분석한다. 이를 위하여 하이폴리틱스와 로우폴리틱스에 대한 정의와 더불어 각각의 개념 설정, 현실주의적 국제정치이론의 관점에서 한·러 관계를 해석하고자 한다. 마지막으로 위의 연구를 통하여 대러정책의 적극적인 실현에 한계가 존재하는 상황속에서 지속적인 대러정책의 실행이 한·러 관계와 한반도 평화에 어떠한 변화와 효과를 가져오는 지에 대하여 정책 실행의 함의를 고찰하고자 한다.

키워드: 한러관계, 외교정책, 하이폴리틱스, 로우폴리틱스, 한러 정치관계, 한러 경제관계

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