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국제학석사학위논문

**A Study on the NGO-Government
Relationship in Education Sector:
Cases of BRAC and PRONADE School**

교육분야에서의 NGO-정부 간
관계 변화에 관한 연구:
BRAC과 PRONADE학교 사례분석

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Sector: Cases of BRAC and PRONADE School

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Sector: Cases of BRAC and PRONADE School

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
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Abstract

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This study examines the ways in which the evolving ideas/paradigms of education have affected the non-governmental organization-government (NGO-GO) relationships in Bangladesh and Guatemala in particular. The study identifies three types of NGO-GO relationship: complementarity, cooperation, and co-optation/cessation. This analysis focuses on accounting for the two possible routes of change in NGO-GO relationships: changes from complementarity to cooperation and from complementarity to co-optation/cessation. In doing so, Vivien Schmidt's version of discursive institutionalism serves as the foundation for the analytical lens of the two case studies: BRAC and PRONADE schools.

The NGO-GO relationships forged in these two countries were complementary to the government's education system at first. However, BRAC and the government of Bangladesh (GoB) advanced to cooperation

whereas the NGO-GO relationship under PRONADE schools waned into co-optation/cessation.

The study attributes this difference to the policy translation process of these two countries. In Bangladesh, both BRAC and GoB actively translated Education for All (EFA) paradigms into their national policy contexts; thus, they have satisfied the idea of both ensuring ‘access’ and ‘quality’ of education proposed by the EFA. On the other hand, in Guatemala, it appears that only the government could actively translate the EFA paradigm into their national policy context. Though NGOs were integral part of PRONADE schools, they could not secure their positions and roles in the program. Consequently, the GoG absorbed the roles of NGOs, leading the NGO-GO relationship to co-optation/cessation.

Keywords: NGO-Government Relationship, Education for All (EFA), BRAC, PRONADE, Discursive Institutionalism, Policy Transfer/Translation

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Abbreviations

AL	Awami Leagues
ANER	Adjusted Net Enrolment Ration
BNP	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
BPS	BRAC Primary School
COEDUCAs	Comités Educativos
DI	Discursive Institutionalism
EFA	Education for All
GO	Government
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
GoG	Government of Guatemala
GPS	Government Primary School
GPU	Government of Bangladesh Partnership Unit
ISEs	Educational Service Institutions
MEP	Mass Education Program
MOE	Ministry of Education
MPME	Ministry of Primary and Mass Education
NCTB	National Curriculum and Textbook Board
NFE	Non-Formal Education

NFPE	Non-Formal Primary Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPA	National Plan of Action
PPS	Pre-Primary Schools
PRIME	Primary Initiatives in Mainstream Education
PRONADE	Programa Nacional de Autogestión para el Desarrollo Educativo
PRONERE	Programa Nacional de Evaluación del Rendimiento Escolar
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SMC	School Management Committee
UIS	UNESCO Institute for Statistics
UPE	Universal Primary Education
URNG	Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity

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I. Introduction

“Everyone has right to education.”The Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 asserts that education shall be free for all regardless of one’s nation, racial or religious groups. Since then the universal primary education (UPE) has been on the international agenda.¹ Indeed, donor agencies, national governments, private enterprises, and civil society actors have put their heads together to seek solutions to pressing challenges in education sector. The effort has continued for almost over four decades with different approaches and paradigms. However, despite their rigorous effort the harsh realities persist.

¹ [Table 1] briefly summarizes the international efforts to guarantee the right to education by decade.

[Table 1] International Efforts to Ensure Right to Education by Decade

	1970s	1980s-1990	1990s-2000s
Approach	Non-Formal Education	Formal Education with Alternatives	Complementary
Paradigm	Universal Primary Education (UPE)	Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)	Education for All (EFA)
Main Concerns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Criticized formal schooling - Increasing access to primary education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Downplayed non-formal approach as 'band aid' and second best - Increasing access to primary education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Aligning between government and non-state approaches - Increasing quality of primary education

Source: Organized by the author based on Rose (2007 and 2009)

This international initiative for education has kicked off in earnest based on the agreement reached at the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990. Delegates from 155 countries and other representatives from 150 governmental and non-governmental organizations proclaimed the *World Declaration on Education for All* which confirmed the education as a fundamental human right. The declaration insisted countries to strengthen their efforts to fulfill the basic learning needs of all. In doing so, the delegates adopted the *Framework for Action to Meet the Basic Learning Needs* to make the primary education accessible to all children and to massively reduce illiteracy before the year 2000 (UNESCO, 1990). As

indicated in its purpose, the main concern of Jomtien framework was to expand access to primary education for all children in need. However, the Jomtien EFA targets were not achieved by 2000.

In order to resolve these remaining challenges, the international community once again gathered in Dakar, Senegal in 2000. A total of 164 governments have pledged to carry out the *Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments*. The framework identified six key goals for education to meet the learning needs of children, youth and adults by 2015. However, the Dakar EFA targets were not fully achieved by the year 2015 (UNESCO, 2000).

According to the Global Monitoring Report (2015), the Dakar EFA framework has shown mixed progress.² The total primary education adjusted net enrollment ration (ANER) increased from 84% in 1999 to 91% in 2012. Along with the improvement in net enrollment ration, the percentage of children who have never been to school decreased in a great majority of countries. In particular, the ten countries³ where at least 20% of children were not enrolled in 2000 had more than halved the percentage by

² Among many indicators used to measure the progress of Dakar EFA goals, this study will focus on the primary education ANER and the internal efficiency in primary education (e.g. repetition, dropouts, and completion rate) as these figures capture the progress in broadening the access to primary education and the quality of education.

³ The ten countries are Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Nepal and the United Republic of Tanzania.

2010. These results suggest that the some improvements have made in providing access to primary education for school-age children.

Meanwhile, the internal efficiency in primary education did not demonstrate considerable improvements. For instance, the number of repeaters in primary school fell from 33,626 (5.2%) in 1999 to 32,438 (4.6%) in 2012. Though the number has declined slightly, the number of repeaters still remained at the somewhat same level. Moreover, the dropout rates lingered at the same level. The number of dropouts slightly decreased from 34,200 in 1999 to 34,047 in 2012. These rates signal inefficiency and danger to the quality of education. Hence, unlike the progress in assuring access to education, significant challenges persist with dropout and completion rates.

Despite its partial progress, the Dakar framework for EFA is meaningful in number of aspects. First, the framework called all the relevant ministries and national civil society organizations to participate in implementing EFA at the sub-national level (UNESCO, 2000). In other words, the framework highlighted the national ‘ownership’ of achieving EFA targets. This in turn granted more space for NGOs’ participation in delivering education services alongside the governments.

The Dakar framework reaffirmed the vision of the World Declaration on EFA in 1990 with much detailed targets and approaches. In

particular, the framework emphasized universality, inclusiveness and the good quality of education. The initial EFA goals were mainly concerned with ensuring the universal ‘access’ to learning without the specific mentioning of targeted groups. On the other hand, the second set of EFA shifted its emphasis to providing good ‘quality’ education for all. For example, the second goal, more specifically than the earlier pledge, states the commitment to provide access to education of good ‘quality’ for all. [Table 2] below indicates such changes made in EFA goals.

[Table 2] Shift of Emphasis in the EFA Goals

EFA Jomtien Goals (1990)	EFA Dakar Goals (2000)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Universal access to learning 2. Focus on equity 3. Emphasis on learning outcomes 4. Broadening the means and the scope of basic education 5. Enhancing the environment for learning 6. Strengthening partnerships by 2000 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children 2. Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality 3. Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life-skills programmes 4. Achieving a 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults 5. Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls' full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality 6. Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills

Source: UNESCO (1990 and 2000)

Then why did the international community directed its attention to the issue of ‘quality’? In short, the quantitative number of students enrolled at school does not entail how much students actually learn in classrooms (UNESCO, 2005). An example of Philippines will suffice to illustrate the importance of quality in education. The country used to be one of the most highly-educated developing countries in the world in the 1980s; however, the educational outcomes did not reach its expected potential. It turns out that only 40% of fourth Grade students had completed third Grade, and 30% of first-year high school students had achieved 6th Grade level in English, math and science (World Bank, 2014). Besides Philippines, the poor quality education had endangered children’s right to education around the globe. Thus, when the international community has gathered again in 2000 it paid greater attention to the quality of education.

Against this backdrop, the study fundamentally seeks to understand the subsequent impact of EFA paradigm shift— from access to quality—on the NGO-GO relationship in education sector. To begin, the study first reviews the roles of NGOs in education sector and the previous discussions on the NGO-GO relationships in general. Then Chapter 3 will lay out the analytical framework to examine the policy ideas of the two selected countries: Bangladesh and Guatemala. These two countries are specifically

chosen due to their exceptional performance in pursuing EFA goals in tandem with NGOs. The first case of BRAC in Bangladesh presents a NGO-led education initiative; the BRAC operates thousands of non-formal schools and has positioned itself as a salient education provider. In contrast, the case of Guatemala's PRONADE is a government-led initiative to incorporate NGOs and communities under the formal education system. The NGO-GO relationships forged under these two systems were complementary to the government's education system at first; yet, each diverged into cooperation and co-optation/cessation. Questions on how and why the NGO-GO relationships of these two countries changed in a way they did are the starting point of this analysis.

Keeping this in mind, this study seeks to address the below research questions when analyzing the NGO-GO relationships in Bangladesh and Guatemala's education sectors.

- RQ1: How did the EFA paradigm affect the relationship between NGOs and government?
- RQ 2: How was the EFA paradigm transferred and/or translated at the national policy level in Bangladesh and Guatemala?

II. NGO-Government Relationship

2. 1. NGOs and Development

2. 1. 1. Role of NGOs: Implementers, Catalysts and Partners

Lewis and Kanji (2009) broadly summarize the key roles of NGOs: implementer, catalyst, and partner. However, the role of NGOs is not confined to a single activity. In other words, a single organization may participate in all three activities or may shift their focus from one to another over time. This in turn reflects the expanded scope and intricacy of NGO roles in development activities.

The *implementer* role is characterized as “the mobilization of resources to provide goods and services to people who need them” (p.12). The service delivery is probably the most noticeable role of NGOs in development activities as many have been contracted by governments and donors to carry out healthcare, microfinance, agricultural extension emergency relief and human rights related projects. Next, NGOs serve as a *catalyst* “to inspire, facilitate or contribute to improved thinking and action to promote change” (p.13). Through their advocacy work and lobbying, NGOs instigate changes among policymakers, grass root organizations and local communities. Lastly, NGOs are regarded as *partners* of government,

donors and private sector. In practice however, NGOs are frequently partners only in terms of policy rhetoric. NGOs and government demonstrate asymmetrical power relationship thereby NGOs end up conforming to the government or donor's requirement to acquire financial resources. In this analysis, NGO's role in service delivery will be studied in relation to that of government.

2. 1. 2. NGOs' Participation in Development Activities

It is without a doubt that government has been the leading actor in development process; however, participation by NGOs in development process has noticeably increased for the last three decades. In the past, there was little or no mention of NGOs in development process and the roles of NGOs were restricted to either humanitarian or relief work. Now, the presence of NGOs both in terms of scope and performance is widely accepted. For instance, traditional donors have openly welcomed civil society actors to participate in the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. The agreement acknowledges the essential roles of civil society organizations in promoting rights-based approaches, designing development policies and partnerships, providing complementary services

and in monitoring their implementation (OECD, 2011). It is now suffice to say that the present development discourse cannot be addressed without the mentioning of NGOs participation.

Then, why have NGOs entered into mainstream development policy? Lewis (2001) identifies four reasons to explain the current rise of NGOs in development policy. First, it was argued that dominant development ideas such as modernization and radical dependency had lost their appeal. Instead, both scholars and practitioners were attracted by an alternative idea, namely ‘people-centered’ approach which invites participation by different organizational actors in development process besides the state actors. It turned out NGOs were the perfect candidate to carry out this new approach. Likewise, a sense of frustration with the poor performance of the government to eradicate poverty further accelerated the search for alternative actors. Third, the main concerns of development discourse have shifted from economic and political issues to environment, gender and social development in which NGO presence and influence were evident. Lastly, policymakers regardless of their political orientation welcomed NGOs’ participation. For liberals, NGOs serve as a mediator between state and business interests whereas for neo-liberals NGOs are the vehicles to increase the role of market and to solidify the ground for privatization.

Furthermore, Edwards and Hulme (2000)⁴ clearly state the need for partnership between NGOs and government in order to support sustainable program operation of NGOs. These two scholars argue that there are legitimate reasons for NGOs to enter into a “creative dialogue” (p.46) with the government which establishes official development policy and provides development services. Though the state remains as the ultimate decision makers of the wider political changes on which development depends, cooperation with the government increases the chances of realizing visible impact on policy and practice. Indeed, the support from the government allows NGOs to ‘scale-up’ their projects which in turn enhances the sustainability of NGOs’ participation in service provision.

2. 1. 3. NGOs in Education Sector

Traditionally, basic education is regarded as a state responsibility. Education is believed to play a central role in shaping national identity as well as accruing benefits in terms of social and economic development. Moreover, education is the key service sector to solidify the legitimacy of

⁴ The essay is included in Pearce, J. (2000). Scaling up NGO impact on development: Learning from experience. In *Development, NGOS, and civil society: Selected essays from Development in practice*. Oxford: Oxfam.

state. The government promotes its legitimacy by providing education to all groups in the society, serving the interest of the public (Rose, 2007). Due to these understandings, government has served its role as the main provider of education.

However, given its size, cultural, social and economic dimensions, many governments in developing countries are either unable or unwilling to provide universal access to education through state provision alone (Rose, 2007). Thus, many governments often invite non-state actors to fulfill EFA commitments. NGOs step in to carry out the functions which are otherwise expected of government. In fact, the proliferation of education services provided by the private sector, by community, non-formal and religious schools⁵ to satisfy the demands for education and desires of parents became more visible in the past two decades (UNESCO, 2015).

For example, a Bangladesh NGO called BRAC provides primary education to eight to ten year olds in rural areas. Interestingly, the school attendance and completion rates of BRAC Primary School (BPS) tend to be higher than those of government schools: BPS attendance was about 96%

⁵ According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) private schools refer to “institutions as those that are not operated by public authorities but are controlled and managed, whether for profit or not, by private bodies such as NGOs, religious bodies, special interest groups, foundations and business” (UNESCO, 2015, pp. 93). The definition largely encompasses so called community schools (e.g. PRONADE school) and non-formal schools (BRAC primary school).

whereas the attendance rate of government schools showed 61% (DeStefano, Moore, Balwanz and Hartwell, 2007). The BRAC model illustrates NGOs' successful provision of education in the face of deficiencies of the government.

As demonstrated from the above example, the complementary mode of relationship is most commonly observed in the service provision (Najam, 2000). As both government and NGOs strive to achieve the shared educational goals, NGOs complement government's strategy with their people-centered strategies. Complementary education models buttress the formal public education system by offering students an alternative means to accomplish the educational outcomes⁶ (DeStefano et al., 2007). The models are not to substitute the role of government but to support it from the other end. Such characteristics are succinctly summarized in the table below.

⁶ Education provided by NGOs is often associated with non-formal approach whereas education provided by state is associated with formal education. Non-formal education refers to "any organized, systematic, educational activity carried on 'outside' the framework of the formal system to provide selected types of learning to particular sub-groups of the population, adults as well as children." Examples include agricultural extension training programs, adult literacy programs, vocational training, and community programs on health, and family planning (Coombs and Ahmend, 1974, p. 8).

[Table 3] Complementarity of the State and NGO's Education Service

	State	NGO
Geographical Coverage	National or mass system	Excluded, marginalized, disadvantaged
Class Size	Large to small	Very small
Curriculum	Government	Adapted from government
Language	National or local	Local
Timetable	Rigid	Flexible (e.g. seasonal adjustment)
Teacher Recruitment	National	Community-based

Source: Organized based on Rose (2007 and 2009)

2.2. Previous Understandings on the NGO-Government Relationship

Partnership between NGOs and government has been the buzzword in the field of development. It is widely believed that those who are in need of governmental care can be better served through partnership as NGOs have comparative advantages in delivering services to rural population with their profound local knowledge and ties. Increasing number of NGOs around the globe, their successful performance in various areas, and their 'discovery' by scholars and international community has further cemented the need for the partnership (Najam, 2000). Based on this understanding, both practitioners and scholars have actively promoted the need and significance of partnership

between NGOs and government in service provision.

However, it is not until recent (e.g. 1980s) that such importance had been realized. In the past, scholars have either overlooked such relationship or stressed tension and competition between NGO and government in public service provision (Najam, 2000; Salamon 1987; Smith and Grønbjerg, 2006). Most of the previous studies reflect the perspective of either the non-profit organizations or the government but rarely addressed the perspective of both (Kramer, 1994).

According to Salamon (1987), such negligence was due to neither the novelty of the topic nor the lack of research. Salamon contends that the lack of concrete theory on the relationship between government and non-profit sector has resulted in such inattention to the possibility of cooperation. The existing two theories often used to elucidate the roles of NGO and government in service provision hardly mentioned the possibility of cooperation. For instance, the theory of welfare state heavily emphasized the monolithic character of the welfare state with the power of governmental institutions and their control over the voluntary sector. This in turn has left little room for active participation of voluntary sector, hindering the partnership between two actors. In addition, the theory of the voluntary sector underlined the failures of government to provide goods and services to

satisfy the demands of people. This theory again failed to acknowledge the cooperation.

As indicated above, considering NGOs and government together as partners was unthinkable back then. NGOs were primarily perceived as subject of government's control or competitor. It is only a recent phenomenon that scholars and practitioner began to embrace the importance of NGO-government partnership. Therefore, much is to be explored on the topic of NGO and government partnership.

2.3. Types of NGO-Government Relationship

Unfortunately, despite the ubiquity of NGO-GO interactions, the lack of a firm theoretical basis for NGO-GO relationship still remains (Kramer, 1994; Najam, 2000). Nevertheless, many scholars have attempted to analyze the relationship between NGO and government (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Coston, 1998; Gidron, Kramer and Salamon, 1992; Im, 1998; Lewis, 1998; Najam, 2000; Seibel, 1990; Young, 2000). The interactions between NGOs and government show different forms and characteristics, and such types of relationship need to be better understood to facilitate fruitful models of partnership in development process.

[Table 4] Literatures on the NGO-Government Relationship Types

Scholars	Dimensions	Types of NGO-GO Relationship
Brinkerhoff (2002)	Mutuality and Organizational Identity	Partnership, Contracting, Extension, Co-optation & Gradual Absorption
Coston (1998)	Resistance and Acceptation of Institutional Pluralism	Repression, Rivalry, Competition, Contracting, Third Party, Cooperation, Complementarity, Collaboration
Gidron, Kramer, Salamon (1992)	Finance and Service Provision	Government Dominant, Dual, Collaborative, Third Sector Dominant
Im (1998)	Accordance and Discordance of Policy Sector	Substitution • Contract, Rivalry • Competition, Cooperation • Collaboration
Lewis (1998)	Process of Partnership Building	Active Partnerships, Dependent Partnerships
Najam (2000)	Similarity and Dissimilarity of Goals (Ends) and Preferred Strategies (Means)	Cooperation, Complementarity, Co-optation, Confrontation
Seibel (1990)	Style of Government, Third Sector Interaction Pattern	Competition, Manipulation, Consensus, Concentration
Young (2000)	Different Strands of Economic Theory	Supplementary, Complementary, Adversarial

Source: Synthesized by the author

For example, Brinkerhoff (2002) describes NGO-GO relationships based on two dimensions: mutuality and organizational identity. Mutuality refers to interdependence between NGO and government: it measures the

degree of NGOs' involvement in program design, implementation and evaluation. Organizational identity indicates the level of NGOs' endurance to maintain their characteristics such as core beliefs and values across time and contexts. Based on these two dimensions NGO-GO relationships are organized into partnership, contracting, extension, co-optation and gradual absorption.

Coston (1998)⁷ defines the relationship based on several dimensions: government's resistance or acceptance of institutional pluralism, power symmetry and the degree of formalization of relationship. According to Coston, there are eight possible types of relationship, namely repression, rivalry, competition, contracting, third party, cooperation, complementarity, and collaboration. Among these eight categories, collaboration is regarded as the most ideal type; yet, true collaboration is in fact difficult to achieve as it requires NGO participation in planning, policy, and implementation. In practice, such balanced power symmetry is impossible. At best, NGOs are seen as implementers or junior partners.

Some scholars have categorized the relationships based on finance and service provision. For instance, Gidron, Kramer and Salamon (1992) distinguish the relationships into four types: government-dominant model,

⁷ See Appendix I for the visual representation of Coston's categorization of the NGO-GO relationships.

third sector-dominant model, dual model and collaborative model. This particular model describes the division of labor and financial responsibility between NGOs and the government. Traditionally, government was largely responsible for finance and service delivery; yet it appears that NGOs are increasingly participating in finance as well as service provision.

Lastly, a scholar like Najam (2000) distinguishes the NGO-GO relationships based on institutional goals (ends) and preference for strategies (means). The model examines the similarity and dissimilarity of policy goals and strategies of each actor. For example, when the goals and means of both NGO and government are similar, the relationship is identified as cooperation. In contrast, when NGO and government show dissimilar goals and strategies, the relationship is characterized as confrontation. This particular model is distinctive from other models as it is not based on theories of comparative advantage, resource flows or inter-organizational styles, but on a theory of strategic institutional interests.

[Figure 1] Najam’s Four C Model of NGO-Government Relationship

		Goal (Ends)	
		Similar	Dissimilar
Preferred Strategies (Means)	Similar	Cooperation	Co-optation
	Dissimilar	Complementarity	Confrontation

Source: Najam (2000)

Najam’s Four C model does not account for a fifth possibility: non-engagement. It is possible that NGOs and government may choose not to or unable to engage with one another in the policy stream. For instance, the protectorate government of Malawi and missionaries demonstrated no signs of engagement until the late 1920s in providing education. Due to its lack of capacity, the government did not intervene in providing education services, hence, leaving education solely in the hands of the missionaries (Kadzamira and Kunje, 2002). Such non-engagement is beyond the scope of this study; thus, the possibility of non-engagement will not be addressed.


III. Analytical Framework

3. 1. Types of NGO-Government Relationship

Upon reviewing a considerable number of literatures on NGO-GO relationship, this study largely categorizes the NGO-GO relationships into three types: complementarity, cooperation, and co-optation/cessation. This categorization is a modified version of Najam's Four C model.⁸ It appears that the case of confrontation is rarely observed in education sector as most governments in developing countries welcome NGOs' participation in social sector. Therefore, the case of confrontation is excluded for the sake of this analysis. Based on this categorization a total of six possibilities can be expected.

⁸ The author has chosen to consult Najam's Four C model because his categorization is most intuitively understandable without the prior knowledge on NGO-GO relationships.

[Figure 2] Possible Routes of Change in NGO-Government Relationship



Source: Organized by the author

However, this paper will not examine all six possibilities. Instead the paper will specifically focus on the relationship changes from complementarity to other two types as the complementary type is the most commonly observed mode of interaction between NGOs and government in the current education sector. Furthermore, the analysis clearly recognizes that the government is the main provider of education services.

Bearing this in mind, the three types used in this analysis will feature the following characteristics.⁹ First and foremost, complementarity describes

⁹ The key characteristics of these three types are largely drawn from Coston (1998) and Najam (2000).

the symbiotic relationship in which NGOs and government pursue common goals proposed by EFA and they are strategically and geographically complementary. For example, the bottom up approach by NGOs complement the top down approach of the government; in addition, NGOs geographically complement government's education policy by providing services in remote areas which are not prioritized by the government. In this type of relationship, the government still holds the upper hand in decision making yet the role of NGOs are evidently acknowledged in service delivery.

Next, cooperation describes the relationship in which NGOs and government pursue common goals with common strategies. Under this relationship, NGOs and government work together in same directions based on the commonly agreed policy framework. Cooperation is the most desirable type of NGO-GO relationship in this analysis. This relationship demonstrates somewhat symmetrical power relation between NGOs and the government as NGOs can clearly voice their ideas in policymaking process.

If the above two types demonstrate somewhat working relationships, the last relationship describes a relatively dysfunctional relationship. Co-optation/cessation describes the relationship in which one or both parties attempt to change the behaviors of others. In so doing, the power asymmetry will decide which side will remain or disappear. Whoever is the dominant

provider of education may absorb or even remove the role of the other by terminating the ongoing program. In this study, the case of Guatemala will show how the Guatemalan government gradually eliminated the role of NGOs in executing PRONADE school program.

3. 2. Theoretical Basis: Discursive Institutionalism

Since the declaration of EFA in the early 1990s, ideas of providing universal ‘access’ and ‘good quality’ education for children have dominated the international discourse on education. Over the last decade or so some 180 countries have participated in achieving these goals set forth by UNESCO. As a result, the proposed EFA has become an overarching paradigm for education and it is now suffice to say that the influence of EFA in making the national education policy is indisputable. Keeping this in mind, this analysis will examine the ways in which these evolving paradigms of education have affected the NGO-GO relationships in Bangladesh and Guatemala. In doing so, discursive institutionalism (DI)¹⁰ will serve as the foundation for the analytical lens of the below case studies.

¹⁰ Among scholars who have associated with the DI tradition, namely Mark Blyth, Robert Cox, John L. Campbell, Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott etc., Vivien Schmidt’s version of discursive institutionalism will be used in this analysis.


A growing number of scholars from the older three new institutionalisms ¹¹ — rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism — have sought to ‘endogenize’ change as they believed that external shocks alone cannot account for the dynamics of institutional change (Schmidt, 2008). Thus, some scholars have turned to ideas and discourse to provide dynamic approach to institutional change. Against this backdrop, the ‘fourth’ new institutionalism, DI, has surfaced (Schmidt, 2010).

Discursive institutionalists regard institutions as both structures and constructs internal to agents whose ‘background ideational abilities’ within a given meaning context explicate the creation of institutions and whose ‘foreground discursive abilities’ explain institutional changes. In other words, DI mainly looks into the substantive content of ideas and the interactive process by which these ideas are exchanged via discourse to understand institutions and their changes (Schmidt, 2010). According to Schmidt (2008), these ideas exist at three levels, ranging from policy ideas to programmatic ideas or paradigms to philosophical ideas. As the term indicates, policy ideas refer to the particular policy solutions suggested by policy makers whereas programmatic ideas indicate the problems to be solved by the policies. Lastly,

¹¹ DI mainly deals with institutions like the other new institutionalisms; yet, it differs in its definition of institutions, objects, logics of explanation and explanation of institutional change (Schmidt, 2010). See Appendix II for the comparison of all four new institutionalisms.

philosophical ideas point at the ideas that undergird the policies and programs with values, and principles of knowledge and society.

[Figure 3] Three Levels of Ideas



Source: Illustrated by the author based on Schmidt (2008)


As previously mentioned, ideas are conveyed through the interactive discourse. Discourse comes in two forms: the coordinative discourse and the communicative discourse. Policy actors often engage in the construction of policy ideas via coordinative discourse. These policy actors consist of epistemic communities of elites, advocacy coalitions, and advocacy networks of activists with contesting ideas. On the other hand, the communicative discourse is carried out between the policy actors and the public. During this process, ideas exchanged among policy makers through coordinative discourse are communicated to the public (Schmidt, 2008 and 2010).

3. 3. Proposed Analytical Framework

Based on Schmidt's version of the discursive institutionalism, this analysis seeks to identify how and why the changes in NGO-GO relationships occurred in Bangladesh and Guatemala's education sector. Particularly, the analysis will focus on the ideas and the discourse between the government and NGOs. The underlying assumption here is that EFA indeed has an impact on the countries' national education policy. Hence, the changes in the NGO-GO relationships will largely depend on how the government translates this macro-paradigm into its policy level ideas and how NGOs accept and adapt to these suggested policies.

Therefore, ideas at the national policy level will be assessed in depth. In other words, the analysis will first investigate how policy makers in Bangladesh and Guatemala have taken the international paradigm of education into their national education policies. Furthermore, the analysis will look into the communicative discourse in these two countries. NGOs' responses and/or reactions to the policies proposed by the policy makers will be studied. For this, NGOs' own policies on education or public statements will be examined. Ultimately, the study seeks to account for the changes in the NGO-GO relationships by putting these findings together.

[Figure 4] Proposed Analytical Framework



Source: Illustrated by the author

IV. Case Studies

4. 1. Complementarity to Cooperation: Bangladesh

4. 1. 1. Background

Bangladesh is well known internationally for its flourishing development NGO sector. In fact, Bangladesh celebrates a long history of homegrown development activities. An exceptional number of homegrown development NGOs are involved in Bangladeshi civil society. Needless to say remarkable performances of two Bangladeshi organizations in particular — Grameen Bank and BRAC — clearly support this claim. These organizations have earned international reputations for their success in microfinance and primary education respectively. The success story of Bangladeshi NGOs is especially noteworthy since international agencies tend to occupy nongovernment sector in most developing countries. Given this unique characteristic, this study will investigate the change of relationship — from complementarity to cooperation — between BRAC and the government of Bangladesh (GoB) by identifying policy ideas behind such change.

The flourishing development NGO sector is the fruit of active Bangladeshi civil society as well as a consequence of political instability of the country. Bangladesh experienced perpetual political instability since its

independence from British and Pakistani rule in 1971. The country sought to build its nation after the war; however, military regimes led by General Zia and General Ershad for the following two decades hampered the efforts of nation building. When General Ershad was finally ousted in 1990, many expected the stable political transition to parliamentary democracy. In fact, the country introduced a period of renewed democratic politics; nonetheless, this did not put an end to the political turmoil. The political gridlock between the main political parties, Awami Leagues (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), drove the country to the verge of collapse (Lewis, 2011).

Taking this political context into account, it comes as no surprise that GoB had not delivered sufficient education services to its people. Though the GoB made great strides in providing education to the underserved children in the first decade of independence, problems remained. For example, the government concentrated most of its schools in urban areas, leaving rural areas unattended. This resulted in a lack of educational access to children who reside in rural areas. In addition, the government sought to encourage school attendance by integrating food rations and feeding programs; yet, this damaged the quality of education by overcrowding the government schools (Asadullah and Chaudhury, 2008; DeStefano et al., 2007).

It was in this context that BRAC, the world's largest NGO, stepped in to complement the role of GoB. The following section will demonstrate how the relationship between BRAC and GoB has transformed from complementarity to cooperation by examining the national education policies and BRAC's primary school programs.

4. 1. 2. BRAC Schools in Bangladesh

Today, BRAC schools are acclaimed by many as a success story. In fact, BRAC accounts for 76% of all NGO primary schools in Bangladesh (Asadullah and Chaudhury, 2008). BRAC launched its education program in 1985 with 22 one- room primary schools. The purpose of BRAC Primary School (BPS) is to 'complement' the Government Primary School (GPS) by providing cost-effective, quality primary education for children not currently assisted by the GPS system. Ultimately, it seeks to contribute to eradicate poverty in Bangladesh. For this, BRAC actively incorporates relevant and appropriate measures into their education program under the umbrella of the GoB's overall education policy (Kassam, Raynor, Ryan and Wirak, 2003).

The key features of BPS show BRAC's effort to 'complement' the government primary education system. First, teachers play significant roles

in BPS.¹² Teachers in the BPS system carry out the responsibilities which are frequently missing in the GPS. BRAC teachers participate in twelve to fifteen days of training prior to the start of the school as well as monthly refresher courses to polish their teaching skills. These trainings ensure the quality of education delivered in BPS. Moreover, teachers are responsible for student attendance and progress. Teachers must check up on students who are absent and dedicate more attention to slow learners so that students can keep up with the curriculum. In fact, BPS attributes high attendance and completion rates to the close relationship between the teachers and the students (DeStefano et al., 2007).

Second, BRAC offers the same competency-based curriculum that is used in the GPS. In 1999, BPS renewed its tutorial guides, workbooks, and textbooks to fully mirror the 53 competencies defined by the Bangladesh National Curriculum and Textbook Board (NCTB). In doing so, BRAC assured that students in the BPS attain the same level of academic competencies as those in the GPS. Furthermore, given that GPS textbooks are only available in Bangla, BRAC produces its own independent textbooks and materials for Grade I through Grade III in two or three indigenous

¹² BRAC prefers female teachers who live within the community; have completed at least ten years of education; are willing to teach on a part-time basis; accept wages much lower than those paid to GPS teachers; and agree to thoroughly work within the BPS system (DeStefano et al., 2007).

languages and publishes story books in these languages. When students enter Grade IV and V government textbooks are finally used in BPS (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Australia (DFAT), 2011).

Lastly, BPS complements GPS by promoting active community participation. Community as a whole decides the location and schedule of BPS; moreover, the community provides labor and materials to build school. The majority of initial cost of building the school is covered by BRAC whereas the maintenance cost of the classrooms is the responsibility of the community (Asadullah and Chaudhury, 2008). Once established, each school organizes seven-member school management committee (SMC).¹³ The responsibilities of SMC include ensuring regular attendance of both students and teachers; arranging school timing; organizing the parents meeting; and encouraging graduates of BPS to enter secondary school (DFAT, 2011). In short, BPS complements GPS's top-down approach by welcoming community participation at all levels of operation.

4. 1. 3. Government of Bangladesh: National Education Policy

The above description clearly shows the complementarity between

¹³ BRAC Program Organizer clearly allocates the responsibilities for parents. This involvement fosters better understanding between BRAC and the community (DFAT, 2011).

BRAC and the GoB. Now, in order to identify how this relationship has advanced to cooperation, this section will first review the national education policies of Bangladesh. In doing so, it will focus on how the GoB had transferred and translated EFA paradigms into their national education policies and the role of NGOs in education sector.

Following the World Conference on EFA in Jomtien, the GoB introduced its first EFA: National Plan of Action (NPA) I, covering from 1991 to 2000. The overall aim of NPA I was to improve both their quantitative and qualitative dimensions and also adopt other possible supportive programmes to attain the EFA 2000 targets (Government of Bangladesh, 1995). In fact, many of the EFA goals were largely in line with the government's aspirations for education¹⁴; thus, the GoB actively participated in achieving the EFA goals on the basis of its NPA I.

However, NPA I did not grant much space for NGOs in its education sector. It acknowledged the government as the main provider of education and stated that Non-formal education (NFE) could serve as 'parallel mode' for meeting EFA goals and complements the formal education system (Government of Bangladesh, 2003). In other words, the role of NGOs was

¹⁴ Prior to the EFA goals, the GoB had already introduced the Universal Primary Education (UPE) program on a limited scale and a Mass Education Program (MEP) in 1981 to improve access to primary education and increase literacy (Government of Bangladesh, 2003).

confined to complementarity under the NPA I.

Despite its active support for the EFA, the GoB had failed to achieve the EFA goals by 2000. Consequently, the GoB introduced another set of plan in 2003, namely the NPA II. The noticeable change in the plan is its stance on the role of NGOs in education. The NPA II called on the government, NGOs, broader civil society, the community and other stakeholders to share the responsibility and work together to realize EFA national goals. In particular, the government called for building ‘partnership’ with NGOs. The NPA II evidently underlined that EFA goals can only be obtained through the support of the abovementioned actors (Government of Bangladesh, 2003). Indeed, it was in the early 2000s that both BRAC and the GoB enforced cooperative policies in earnest.

In addition, NFE Policy Framework reflects this shift in EFA paradigm as well. To be specific, the policy elaborates measures for quality assurance. For instance, it proposes standardized learner assessment procedure, instruments and system; core NFE national curriculum and learning modules; and training of facilitators. Moreover, the policy stresses the importance of establishing a working mechanism of government, NGOs and broader civil society for policy coordination, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation as one of its objectives (Government of

Bangladesh, 2006). This certainly has opened up much wider space for NGOs to participate in the primary education sector. Based on these measures, the GoB now seeks to satisfy the new education paradigm which emphasizes the quality of education and participation.

For this, the GoB gradually provided support to BPS, recognizing the importance of BPS to enhance education system of Bangladesh. For instance, the government supplies textbooks to Grade IV and V students enrolled at BPS. This ensures that all students enrolled in both GPS and BPS acquire the same level of competencies.

Furthermore, the government offers a sit for students who complete primary courses at the Primary Education Terminal ('Shomaponi') Examination. BPS students who pass this examination are eligible to enroll at the government secondary schools. In fact, around 99% of BPS students passed this terminal examination and about 98% of graduates move on to the secondary schools. Such support from the government has created an organic linkage between BPS and government education system, furthering the cooperation between BRAC and GoB (BRAC, 2012; DFAT, 2011).

4. 1. 4. BRAC's Response to Education Policy Ideas

Due to a number of conflicts and natural disasters, the state and its institutions were regarded as the problem which must be overcome to free the poor. Naturally, the traditions of voluntary actions¹⁵ were fostered in the Bangladeshi society (Lewis, 2011). Against this backdrop, local development NGOs intervened to liberate the poor. Thus, the ideas of self-help and voluntarism largely legitimized the activities of BRAC in providing education services to children in rural communities.

Since 1985 BRAC has implemented its Non-Formal Primary Education (NFPE) programs as one of its three core programs, namely rural development, education and health (Kassam et al., 2003). At first, BRAC sought to complement the formal education system by providing primary education in rural communities. Thus, during the Phase I (1993-1996) of the NFPE program BRAC focused on expanding the number and size of its activities. It seems that BRAC's strategy during the early 1990s was in line with the government's position on NGOs indicated in the NPA I document.

¹⁵ Voluntary actions have long been documented activities in East Bengal. Interwoven with traditions of religious charity, philanthropy and self-help, voluntary actions in Bangladesh have demonstrated exceptional performance. For instance, self-help village level organizations were readily found in many districts of Bengal from the 1930s onwards. These organizations were often encouraged by local colonial administrators along with local good works and in the establishing of local patronage relationships (Lewis, 2011).

During the Phase II (1996-1999), BRAC sought to stabilize the program with the emphasis on qualitative improvements (Kassam et al., 2003). It appears that there was a little room for cooperation between BRAC and GoB yet. In fact, between Phase I and Phase II, there was no evident mention of ‘cooperation’ in BRAC’s strategies.

It was not until the Phase III (1999-2004) of its NFPE program that BRAC engaged in a new type of relationship with the government. In response to the NPA II, BRAC underlined ‘linkage’ with the government as one of the key strategies within its NFPE program. For this, BRAC firstly established the Government of Bangladesh Partnership Unit (GPU) in 2001 to strengthen the ambit of cooperation with the GoB in the primary education sector. Under this unit, BRAC has implemented Primary Initiatives in Mainstream Education (PRIME) which focuses on providing Pre-Primary Schools (PPS) for the mother GPS and community schools which had been handed over by the GoB to BRAC. In essence, PRIME prepares students with Bengali alphabet, numerals and the hygiene and feeds them into the GPS. This again demonstrates the organic linkage between BRAC and GPS.

One of the distinguishing features of PRIME is that it actively invites the participation of both community members and teachers from the mother GPS. PPS hire adolescent girls who graduated from BRAC’s NFE

system as part time teachers. This provides opportunities for adolescent girls for professional development and the income from PPS teaching position helps girls to continue further education. In addition, PPS are mainly sustained with the assistance by teachers at the mother GPS. The head teacher of the GPS serves as a Chairperson of the School Management Committee in PPS. Indeed, teachers from the mother GPS participate in the overall management of PPS from developing pedagogical model, conducting surveys and selecting children and location of the school to the evaluating the performance of PPS students. The clear responsibilities inculcate a strong sense of ownership of the PPS on the part of the GPS teachers, thereby strengthening the cooperation between BRAC and the government education system.

Lastly, BRAC's GPU operates community schools in tandem with the government. Previously in 1998, the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MPME) assigned 186 dysfunctional community schools to ten NGOs for revival, out of which 44 schools were handed over to BRAC. BRAC has successfully restored these 44 dysfunctional community schools by refurbishing school facilities, setting up SMCs and mobilizing community etc. The government was satisfied with the performance of these renewed schools; hence, the government allocated additional 96 dysfunctional

community schools to BRAC to render them into operational schools (Kassam et al., 2003). This arrangement between BRAC and the government shows the possibility of integrating non-formal approaches with the formal community schools.

Overall, the result of this cooperation was successful, positioning BRAC at the forefront of NFPE system. Since then BRAC has been aiming for ‘integrating’ its approach in the context of national policies based on this heightened status. In addition, BRAC also shares the risks by alleviating the financial burden of the GoB. For instance, when the GoB was unable to pay salaries for community school teachers, BRAC bore all the costs, sustaining these schools (Kassam et al., 2003). This shows that BRAC has fully embraced the role of the ‘partner.’ It no longer restrains its role to complementarity but has expanded to cooperation.

4. 1. 5. Findings

To sum up, the relationship between BRAC and GoB presents an example of successful transition from complementarity to cooperation. This study attributes such change to the way in which BRAC and the GoB had ‘translated’ the EFA paradigm into their own policies. Both actors did not

stop at simply transferring EFA to Bangladesh but actively ‘translated’ these paradigms into their own context.

The GoB formulated its national education policies in accordance with the EFA goals. Particularly, the GoB strengthened the quality of education and the role of NGOs through the second NPA and the NFE policy framework. Likewise, BRAC has actively reflected EFA goals in their NFPE program. At first, BRAC volunteered to serve as a complement to the government by providing increased access to primary education for children in rural communities; then, it gradually contributed to improving the quality of education by creating a linkage between its program and that of the government. Overall, it appears that education policies of Bangladesh are heavily driven by the EFA paradigm and changes in policy ideas seem to have led the change in the NGO-GO relationship, from complementarity to cooperation.

4. 2. Complementarity to Co-optation/Cessation: Guatemala

4. 2. 1. Background

Although Guatemala experienced years of civil war, natural disasters and human rights violation against the indigenous population throughout

1970s and 1980s, Guatemala's education model, namely PRONADE Programme (Programa Nacional de Autogestión para el Desarrollo Educativo) flourished during the late 1990s up to the recent years. The program has resonated in many Latin American countries due to its exceptional success in expanding access to education and unique positioning of communities and NGOs in the education system. Unlike the case of BRAC in Bangladesh which was initiated by the NGO itself to provide complementary service, PRONADE was a government-led program which started out as a formal education system to integrate communities and NGOs into its system. In fact, PRONADE was the largest partnership between NGOs and the Ministry of Education (Carter, 2012). This collaborative relationship between the NGOs and the government is noteworthy as it served as an ice breaker between the NGOs and the government after a long history of mutual distrust mounted over the 36-year civil war.

For this renewed version of NGO-GO relationship to gain a firm footing, the government of Guatemala (GoG) enacted a law that institutionalized its complementary approach within the Ministry of Education (MoE). The GoG granted legal status to PRONADE schools and relevant committees; and established ministerial department to manage the allocation of funds for these schools. Moreover, it created mechanisms for contracting with NGOs

for technical assistance and support services (DeStefano et al., 2007). In other words, the complementary NGO-GO relationship was forged under the auspice of the Guatemalan government itself.

Given this unique characteristic, this case study will demonstrate the change of relationship —from complementarity to co-optation/cessation — between NGOs and the GoG. For this, the analysis will first introduce the structure of the PRONADE Program. Then, it will further elaborate on how the GoG has dissolved the EFA paradigms into their national education policy and how NGOs have responded to such policy. At the end, this section will argue that the GoG had not satisfied the EFA paradigm through its policy ideas; hence, the NGO-GO relationship in Guatemala has moved from complementarity to co-optation/cessation.

4. 2. 2. PRONADE Schools in Guatemala

PRONADE schools are government charter, or self-run schools while formal government schools are founded by the GoG. Even before the Accords, it initially started as a pilot program in 1992, covering 19 rural communities to increase access to education in remote areas. From the beginning, it seems that the aim of the program largely matched with the

EFA goals proposed earlier in 1990. By 1994, the GoG had developed PRONADE to collect information on rural populations, provide access to additional 250,000 children not being accommodated by the formal education system, and establish parent-community committees. Upon the conclusion of the Accords, the government placed PRONADE under the arm of the MoE in accordance with the law 24-97. Thus, the government reassigned the role of PRONADE to increase access to primary education. Based on its new role, PRONADE has evolved to a nationwide program providing primary education in 4,100 communities to 445,000 children by the mid 2000s (DeStefano et al., 2007; Rojas, Valerio and Demas, 2005).

Besides the strong initiative taken by the GoG, PRONADE is known for its unique structure. The program consists of three main actors: PRONADE implementation unit, COEDUCAs (Comités Educativos) and ISEs (Educational Service Institutions). Each of these actors plays specific roles to operate PRONADE schools. The implementation unit is responsible for planning, financial management, and monitoring and evaluation. The unit coordinates the overall activities of PRONADE; it is regarded as a control tower of the program. Specific activities include: (i) designing the general framework of the program; (ii) determining the geographical areas (project

sites¹⁶); (iii) signing the legal agreement with the COEDUCAs; (iv) identifying, selecting, contracting and supervising ISEs; (v) monitoring and evaluation of the program; (vi) wiring funds to the COEDUCAs; and (vii) communicating with the Ministry, departmental offices and other institutions (Di Gropello, 2005; Rojas et al., 2005).

Under the implementation unit's coordination COEDUCAs or community school councils serve at the heart of this program as the actual operator of the PRONADE schools. As mentioned above, COEDUCAs are legal entities delegated with administrative tasks of the program. Members of COEDUCAs are elected locally and consist of parents and community members of the community whom are at least two must be literate. Their responsibilities include: (i) hiring and paying teacher¹⁷ salaries; (ii) keeping accounting records; (iii) checking teacher and student attendance; (iv) determining the school schedule and calendar in accordance with the national legal framework; (v) procuring school materials; (vi) managing school libraries; and (vii) organizing school feeding programs (Di Gropello, 2005;


¹⁶ PRONADE schools are established in remote rural areas to provide pre-school and primary education. The project site is selected based on these four criteria: communities with (1) interest and ability to manage the school; (2) no public school within three kilometers; (3) at least 20 pre-primary and primary school age children; and (4) no official teacher (Di Gropello, 2005).

¹⁷ Teachers must be licensed to take the positions in pre-primary and primary schools. For extremely rural regions, exception was allowed: the COEDUCAs could hire people with the minimum certification. When hired, teachers were asked to present a photocopy of the most recently approved teaching license (DeStefano et al., 2007).

Rojas et al., 2005). It is clearly evident that PRONADE schools save considerable room for community participation.

Lastly, ISEs are involved in the PRONADE schools. ISEs refer to the contracted NGOs like FUNDAZUCAR and FUNDAP to provide technical support for the implementation unit and the members of COEDUCAs to effectively run the program. Many of these NGOs were already working at the community level, hence increasing the chances of NGOs ably serving as intermediaries between the Ministry and the PRONADE schools (Carter, 2012; DeStefano et al., 2007). The key responsibilities of ISEs include (i) inquiring educational needs in the communities; (ii) organizing and assisting COEDUCAs to obtain legal status; (iii) providing capacity building trainings for the COEDUCAs; and (iv) collecting up-to-date information on the schools and students (Di Gropello, 2005; Rojas et al., 2005). From this, it can be concluded that the type of NGO-GO relationship under PRONADE is complementarity. In other words, NGOs technically complement the government by supporting the members of COEDUCAs to operate PRONADE schools on behalf of the government.

[Figure 5] Division of Roles and the Structure of PRONADE



Source: Rojas et al. (2005)

Indeed, PRONADE had a considerable impact on Guatemala's education. The program has accomplished beyond its initial targets. PRONADE schools provided education to about 445,000 students from 1997 to 2004. Particularly, the program offered access to primary education to the poor and mostly indigenous children in rural and marginalized communities. Besides, the program has contributed to raising the awareness of Guatemalan communities on the importance of primary education (KfW, 2004). Albeit its success, the program ended in 2008 and these PRONADE schools were converted to official schools (Meade and Gershberg, 2014). The following

section will elucidate further on why the program had been terminated by examining the policy ideas of both the GoG and the Guatemalan civil society.

4. 2. 3. Government of Guatemala: Education Policy

This section will examine Guatemalan policies which embodied the EFA paradigm into their national context. Particularly, it will delve into the Peace Accords which provided the legal groundwork for PRONADE schools. In doing so, it will first review a brief history of Guatemala to highlight the significance of this Accords for the NGO-GO relationship.

In response to the heinous earthquake in 1976 and the long history of political instability under the dictator Lucas García and José Efraín Ríos Montt, NGOs entered into Guatemala's political arena. Particularly, countless NGOs have emerged to provide basic education in the country. The MoE in Guatemala at the time was unable to provide the most basic services and support for public schools across the country (DeStefano et al., 2007). In fact, the role of these NGOs was significant as the donors (e.g. USAID) channeled their development aid directly through NGOs to condemn the ongoing human rights violations in Guatemala. Consequently, this trend fostered a culture of mistrust between NGOs the GoG. However, as the role

of NGOs increased in Guatemala, the government started to sense the need to increase cooperation with NGOs (Carter, 2012).

The change in NGO-GO relationship kicked off in earnest with the conclusion of the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace (Peace Accords) in 1996 between the GoG and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), supporters of the country's guerrilla movement. Putting an end to the 36 years of civil war, the Peace Accords called for the transformation of the country's education system to address both social and economic inequalities (Anderson, 2001).

In the search for growth, economic policy must be directed towards preventing processes of economic exclusion, such as unemployment and impoverishment, and towards optimizing the benefits of economic growth for all Guatemalans. Raising the standard of living and ensuring health care, *education*, social security and training for Guatemalans are preconditions for achieving sustainable development in Guatemala (Article 8, The Peace Accords).

Accordingly, the GoG declared three-year primary education as a national objective and stipulated the government to decentralize its education system

(Di Gropello, 2005). The GoG realized the importance of the roles of parents and NGOs which were close to indigenous population to fulfill these objectives. It was against this backdrop, that COEDUCAs and ISEs undergirded the PRONADE schools.

Nonetheless, this complementary relationship transformed on the basis of the number of policy changes. The inauguration of an administration hostile to PRONADE had contributed to the termination of the program. There were a number of signs that the President Alfonso A. Portillo¹⁸ did not consider PRONADE a national priority. For instance, the number of communities participating PRONADE slowly declined from 3,437 to 3,410 during the first three years (2000-2002) of the Portillo administration. In addition, spending on education stabilized under Portillo. In fact, PRONADE received 39% of the initially requested budget in 2001 (Corrales, 2006).

Moreover, opponents of the program argued that PRONADE schools hampered the quality of education caused by the limited roles of the government in the program and the poor quality of teachers in these schools. According to a report published by the Programa Nacional de Evaluación del

¹⁸ Although Portillo had a leftist, pro-guerrilla background, he was affiliated with the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) which campaigned on an anti-reform populist-conservative platform. Led by José Efraín Ríos Montt, FRG believed that PRONADE undermined the power of state; hence, the party did not support the program (Corrales, 2006).

Rendimiento Escolar (PRONERE) in 2000, PRONADE schools were among the poorest performing schools in Guatemala. The poor quality of teachers was largely due to low salaries and excessive power of COEDUCAs over teachers' job security. According to the Guatemalan teachers' union, parent power over teacher selection and annual contract renewals exposed teachers to danger of corruption. Some teachers had to pay COEDUCAs to hire them (Altschuler, 2010).

Thus, the MoE withdrew the role of teacher training from ISEs in 2001 to ensure the quality of teacher's pedagogical skills¹⁹ (DeStefano et al., 2007). Consequently, the number of ISEs declined from its peak at 25 in 1998 to 16 by 2000 (Corrales, 2006). Furthermore, the GoG transferred PRONADE school teachers to the ranks of traditional system teachers in 2010 (Altschuler, 2010). Based on these changes in policy ideas the GoG gradually absorbed the role of both COEDUCAs and ISEs.²⁰

¹⁹ Previously, ISEs offered three to five weeks of training per year; however, the Ministry of Education cut down the training to three days.

²⁰ Ana de Molina, the Minister of Education replaced the support for the community with a program called *Mi Familia Aprede* (My Family Learns). The program sought to continue the support for parents or community participation by training on values, nutrition and community participation; yet, upon the resignation of the minister, the program was eliminated, leaving parents with virtually no training or supervision (Altschuler, 2010).

4. 2. 4. COEDUCAs and ISEs' Responses to Education Policy Ideas

As noted above, PRONADE was highly praised for its innovative structure to include parents, community and NGOs in their formal education system. Indeed, the government delegated the administrative and technical functions to COEDUCAs and ISEs respectively so that the voices of parents and communities could be reflected in running these schools. This unique structure between the communities, NGOs and the government greatly shaped the NGO-GO relationship in Guatemala. Therefore, this section will examine how the members of COEDUCAs and ISEs influenced the NGO-GO relationship by reviewing their responses to the PRONADE.

The role of COEDUCAs was significant in realizing this program. In fact, even when PRONADE experienced the lack of support from the GoG, some communities were able to operate schools autonomously. The number of students enrolled in PRONADE schools actually increased despite the decreasing number of PRONADE schools during the Portillo administration (Corrales, 2006). Community members had shown overwhelming support for this program by playing active roles in management and decision making at the school level; however, in reality they were relegated to administrative functions (DeStefano et al., 2007). It appears that COEDUCAs served as an

extension of the GoG; hence, the relationship between COEDUCAs and the government was structurally limited to complementarity.

Likewise, the relationship between ISEs and the GoG faced limitations to evolve from complementarity to cooperation. PRONADE acknowledged NGOs as legitimate actors in the education system by assigning them with a task of technical trainings for teachers and member of COEDUCAs. However, the decline in impact was observed among supervisors and the ISE technicians. Supervisors were unable to deliver information clearly and each supervisor communicated the materials with different techniques, causing confusion among trainees. Moreover, no significant differences in teaching style had been observed between PRONADE and government school teachers. This implies ISEs contributed to increasing access to education by training teachers and the members of COEDUCAs in a short span of time; yet, it may have had limited influence on enhancing the quality of education, hindering the chances of advancing the NGO-GO relationship to cooperation.

4. 2. 5. Findings

To sum up, the relationship between ISEs and GoG presents a case

of transition from complementarity to co-optation/cessation. Based on the Peace Accords, the GoG designed its national education policies to increase access to education for marginalized population. In doing so, the GoG accommodated both communities and NGOs under its formal education system. Nonetheless, the government eventually co-opted the roles initially assigned to COEDUCAs and ISEs to assure the quality of education. The policy changes occurred during the early 2000s coincided with the overall paradigm shifts in EFA which placed emphasis on the access to quality education. This again highlights that the influence of EFA paradigm on Guatemala's national education policies.

COEDUCAs and ISEs served as a complement to the government in order to increase access to primary education. However, little discourse between the government and these two actors were allowed under the PRONADE's structure; they could only play the assigned roles. In other words, COEDUCAs and ISEs were inherently designed to be complementary; thus, no further roles were able to develop.

Therefore, this analysis attributes such NGO-GO relationship change to the lack of abilities on the part of COEDUCAs and ISEs to translate the EFA paradigms into their own policy terms. Although the GoG actively 'translated' the EFA paradigm by establishing the innovative PROANDE

school structure, members of COEDUCAs and ISEs could simply ‘transfer’ the government policy and carry out the tasks given by the government. As a result the NGO-GO relationship under PRONADE inevitably changed from complementarity to co-optation/cessation.

V. Conclusion

5. 1. Summary

Before drawing implications of this study, it will first summarize the key findings from each case study. First, the relationship between BRAC and GoB presents an example of successful transition from complementarity to cooperation. The changed relationship emphasizes the ‘organic linkage’ between BPS and GPS by aligning the curriculum and accepting BPS graduates to government secondary schools. In addition, BRAC and GoB actively ‘combine’ both non-formal and formal approaches. In other words, GoB takes advantage of BRAC’s non-formal approaches: equipping pre-primary students with basic knowledge and skills essential before entering GPS and in reviving dysfunctional community schools. On the other hand, BRAC takes advantage of the government’s resources such as trained teachers. It invites GPS teachers to provide technical backstopping to less trained BRAC’s teachers, putting these GPS teachers in charge of the quality management of PPS.

In short, it seems that both BRAC and the GoB actively sought to achieve the EFA paradigms throughout 1990s and 2000s. BRAC and the

GoB satisfied the idea of providing ‘accesses’ to education. The GoB acknowledged the comparative advantage of BRAC in service delivery; hence, the complementary NGO-GO relationship had been established. Then, the type of relationship has changed to cooperation as these two sought to realize the idea of providing access to ‘good quality’ education by aligning their education programs. Therefore, the study refers the change of NGO-GO relationship — from complementarity to cooperation—to the active policy translations by both BRAC and GoB.

In contrast, the case of Guatemala’s PRONADE demonstrated a relationship change from complementarity to co-optation/cessation. Despite its innovative structure at the initial stage, the GoG eventually eliminated the role of ISEs which were composed of contracted NGOs to perform technical trainings for teachers and community members. Although the division of roles between ISEs and the MoE of Guatemala constituted a complementary relationship, NGOs could not stand on an equal footing with the government. In fact, the very structure of PRONADE undermined the position of NGOs. It constrained the NGOs to stay under the arms of the government.

Unlike BRAC in Bangladesh, NGOs involved in PRONADE had little part in influencing the national education policy. BRAC successfully


created an organic linkage between its education programs with those of the government. However, in case of Guatemala's ISEs, they were structurally confined to technical support only. Though it contributed to increasing the access to education for all, ISEs did not play a role in enhancing the quality of education. In fact, poor quality of ISE trainings degraded the quality of PRONADE schools.

Although the NGO-GO relationship in Guatemala started out as complementarity, it gradually turned to co-optation/cessation. It appears that this is because only the government could translate the EFA paradigm into their national policy context. NGOs transferred the EFA paradigm by participating in PRONADE; yet, it seems the structure of PRONADE did not allow room for NGOs to translate EFA paradigms into their own policy terms. Thus, NGOs became a mere extension of the GoG at the end. In a nutshell, this study attributes the change of NGO-GO relationship— from complementarity to co-optation/cessation — to the unilateral policy translation by the GoG.

Based on these findings, the following broad conclusion can be drawn. Those NGO-GO relationships which successfully satisfy the proposed ideas (e.g. EFA paradigm) are more likely survive and advance their relationships to cooperation. On the other hand, those NGO-GO

relationships which do not meet the proposed ideas are less likely to sustain; one will co-opt the role of another in search of effective and efficient service delivery. The author acknowledges that the conclusion was drawn based on only two case studies and that the relationships can be directed according to the given policy environment, capacities of both government and NGOs involved and other external or endogenous shocks. Therefore, this conclusion may not be generalized to all types of NGO-GO relationships.

[Figure 6] Summary of Findings



Source: Illustrated by the author.

5. 2. Implications

As the year 2015 marks the target deadline for achieving EFA goals, it seems that this study appears at an opportune time to look back on how NGOs and governments have worked to realize these EFA goals. This study finds its meaning in number of ways. Particularly, the study is notable as it attempted to study the NGO-GO relationship in developing countries. Most of the previous literatures examine the NGO-GO relationships in developed countries. These studies assume favorable or politically stable environment is present for NGOs to operate; in addition, NGOs are expected to have competencies for service delivery. In fact, some NGOs are acknowledged as proxy to the government services (Salamon, 1987). However, this is not the case in developing countries.

Many governments in developing countries do not guarantee favorable or stable environments for NGOs to operate. Even if they allow NGOs' activities, the scope of activities is often limited to social sector. The position of NGOs in developing countries clearly differs from those in developed countries. Therefore, it is imperative to note that the NGO-GO relationships cannot be generalized across the countries. Each relationship deserves a particular analysis which takes the country's context into

consideration.

Second, the success and failure of policy is related to the ways in which these policies are transferred. In other words, the process of policy translations matter when determining the success or failure. According to Lendvai and Stubbs (2007), the meaning of policy is always plural and contentious; thus, it requires 'active readership' by different policy actors and relevant publics. Accordingly, this study attributes the successful cooperation of Bangladeshi NGO-GO relationship to their mutually active participations in the policy translation process. Both BRAC and the GoB transferred EFA paradigms and translated them into their national education policies/programs. On the other hand, the translation process among NGOs involved in PRONADE was missing; only the GoG could do so. Though it is uncertain whether this is due to NGOs' lack of capacity, yet it reaffirms the limited role given to NGOs in policymaking or decision making process.

Lastly, the above findings imply the inherent nature of NGO-GO relationships: one cannot exist without the other. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, NGOs emerge when the government fails to provide necessary goods and services to its people. Hence, the governments of developing countries inevitably depend on NGOs to meet the demands of people in the country. Likewise, NGOs in developing countries depend heavily on

government subsidies to implement their projects. In a nutshell, NGOs are inseparable from government and vice versa.

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
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Appendix I: Coston's Model of NGO-GO Relationships



Source: Coston (1998)

Appendix II: The Four New Institutionalisms

	Rational Choice Institutionalism (RI)	Historical Institutionalism (HI)	Sociological Institutionalism (SI)	Discursive Institutionalism (DI)
Object of explanation	Behavior of rational actors	Structures and practices	Norms and culture of social agents	Ideas and discourse of sentient agents
Logic of explanation	Calculation	Path-dependency	Appropriateness	Communication
Definition of Institutions	Incentive structures	Macro-historical structures and regularities	Cultural norms and frames	Meaning structures and constructs
Approach to change	Static – continuity through fixed preferences, stable institutions	Static – continuity through path dependency interrupted by critical junctures	Static – continuity through cultural norms and rules	Dynamic – change (and continuity) through ideas and discursive interaction
Explanation of change	Exogenous shock	Exogenous shock	Exogenous shock	Endogenous process through background ideational and foreground discursive abilities
Recent innovations to explain change	Endogenous ascription of interest shifts through RI political coalitions or HI self-reinforcing or self-undermining processes	Endogenous description of incremental change through layering, drift, conversion	Endogenous construction (merge with DI)	Endogenous construction through reframing, recasting collective memories and narratives through epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions, communicative action, deliberative democracy

Source: Schmidt (2010)

국문 초록

성 명: 김다은

학과 및 전공: 국제학과 국제협력 전공

학교명: 서울대학교 국제대학원

본 연구는 Education for All (EFA) 패러다임의 변화에 따른 방글라데시와 과테말라의 교육 분야 내 NGO-정부 간 관계의 변화를 살펴보고자 하였다. 이를 위해, 본 연구는 NGO-정부 간 관계를 세 가지 유형(보완적, 협력형, 억압형/소멸형) 으로 나누고 Vivien Schmidt의 담론제도주의에 입각한 분석틀을 고안하였다.

분석 결과, 방글라데시의 BRAC 학교와 과테말라의 PRONADE 학교 사례 모두 보완적 성격을 띠고 시작하였으나, BRAC은 정부와 협력적 관계로 성장하였고, PRONADE 프로그램에 참여한 NGO들은 결국 정부에 흡수되어 억압형/소멸형 관계로 쇠퇴하였음을 발견할 수 있었다.

이와 같은 상반된 관계변화의 원인은 정부와 NGO들의 정책이전(policy translation) 과정에서 찾아볼 수 있었다. 방글라데시의 경우, BRAC과 정부가 모두 적극적으로 EFA 패러다임을 국내 정책으로 이전

하여 EFA 패러다임에서 제시한 교육의 ‘접근성’ 향상과 ‘양질’의 교육 제공이라는 두 가지 아이디어를 모두 충족 시킨 반면, 과테말라의 PRONADE는 오직 정부만이 정책이전과 의사결정(decision making) 과정에 참여하여 NGO들의 역할과 입지를 보장하지 못하였고 결국 정부가 NGO의 역할을 흡수하여 교육의 ‘접근성’만을 확대시키는데 그쳤다.

주요어: NGO-정부 관계, Education for All (EFA), BRAC, PRONADE, 담론제도주의, 정책이전

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