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Master's Thesis

PERCEPTION OF THE ELITE COMMUNITY ON  
DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT

August 2015

Graduate School of International Study

Seoul National University

Master's in International Studies(International Area Studies)

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PERCEPTION OF THE ELITE COMMUNITY ON  
DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT

By

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## **ABSTRACT**

The choice of the elites in this study is based upon the understanding that this important segment of the population must be taken into consideration in order to have a complete picture of Egypt's political transition. The role of elites "intellectuals" in any society is indeed one of the crucial elements to the development of society.

The Egyptian elites proved their important role when they sparked the Egyptian January revolution in 2011. Most of the new scholars were eager to know the perception of the Egyptian elite community on democracy, political system and ways of governance in one of the most famous revolutions in the Arab world, keeping in mind that the elite activists of January 25 uprising spanned to disenfranchised Egyptians, the working class, and politicized reformers. Since the demonstrations began, discussion of the political path forward has engaged not only elites, but also the ordinary citizens.

The Egyptian elites' perception about the real problem concerning the democracy and political system is the weak state which is the lack of the

role of the state institutions, in addition to the lack of consolidation and solidarity that led to the absence of democracy in Egypt.

The elites believe that democracy can be reactivated only by two channels, first; the reform of the state institutions , second; raise awareness among people of concepts such as equality, freedom of speech, etc.

Although the scene of democracy and political system as well as economic growth of Egypt might be gloomy currently, the Egyptian elites are optimistic that these transitional periods usually take years until the country get back to the right track with their contribution in the process of democratization.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>CHAPTER I</b> .....	1
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	1
1.1 DEFENITION OF ELITE:.....	1
1.2 BACKGROUND .....	2
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT:.....	5
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS:.....	5
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES: .....	6
1.5.1 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE .....	6
1.6 METHODOLOGY: .....	7
1.6.1 SOFTWARE TO BE USED: .....	8
1.6.2 SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE.....	8
1.7 JUSTIFICATION .....	8
1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATION: .....	10
1.9 THESIS ORGANIZATION: .....	10
<b>CHAPTER II</b> .....	12
<b>LITERATURE REVIEW</b> .....	12
2.0 INTRODUCTION .....	12
2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT EGYPTIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND DEMOCRACY: .....	12
2.2 THEORY OF EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION CASE: .....	15
2.3 THEORES OF LEADERSHIP: .....	17
2.4 INDICATORS OF ELITE PERCEPTION ON DEMOCRACY AND SYSTM E .....	18

2.4.1 Level of Education:.....	18
2.4.2 Level of development of Economy: .....	23
2.4.3 Religious Orientation Influence Attitudes towards Democracy: .....	28
2.4.4 Institutions and the rule of Law: .....	30
2.4.5 Democracy and Influence from Foreign Countries: .....	32
2.5 STAKEHOLDERS ROLE OF JANUARY REVOLUTION: .....	36
2.5.1 Egyptian Regime using Framework not to Collapse: .....	36
2.5.2 Elite Youth in January Revolution: .....	38
2.5.3 Military Rule:.....	39
2.5.4 Unified and Board Opposition: .....	41
2.5.5 Social Media by opposition:.....	42
<b>CHAPTER III</b> .....	<b>46</b>
<b>OVERVIEW OF ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT</b> .....	<b>46</b>
3.1 EGYPT PROFILE:.....	46
3.2 POLITICS: .....	48
3.3 EDUCATION:.....	50
3.4 ECONOMY AND MAIN INCOME RESOURCES: .....	50
3.5 Ancient EGYPT IANS: .....	51
<b>CHAPTER IV</b> .....	<b>53</b>
<b>RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</b> .....	<b>53</b>
4.0 INTRODUCTION:.....	53
4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN: .....	53
4.2 MEASUREMENT: .....	55
4.3 SAMPLE SIZE AND DATA COLLECTION: .....	55
4.4 DATA ANALYSIS: .....	56
4.5 SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE:.....	56
4.6 TIME LIMITATIION:.....	57
<b>CHAPTER V</b> .....	<b>58</b>

<b>ANALYSIS AND RESULTS</b> .....	58
5.0 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS:.....	58
5.1 FURTHER ANALYSIS:.....	63
5.1.1 Political System in Egypt:.....	64
5.1.2 Ways of Governance in Egypt.....	65
5.1.3 Democracy:.....	66
5.1.4 Level of Satisfaction:.....	68
5.1.5 MISCELLANEOUS:.....	69
<b>CHAPTER VI</b> .....	73
<b>FINDINGS AND DISSCUSSION</b> .....	73
6.0 INTRODUCTION:.....	73
6.1 PERCEPTION OF EGYPTIAN ELITES TOWARDS POLITICAL SYSTEM IN EGYPT:	73
73	
6.2 THE PERCEPTION OF EGYPTIAN ELITES TOWARDS WAYS OF GOVERNANACE IN EGYPT:	76
6.2.1: Elite perception of leadership:.....	77
6.2.2 Elites' perception of Military Rule:.....	81
6.3: THE VIEWS OF ELITES OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT:.....	82
6.3.1: Democracy effect on the economy:.....	82
6.3.2 Religious Orientation Influence Attitudes towards Democracy Positively:	85
6.3.3 Highly Learned People and Academia Affected Attitudes towards Democracy Positively:.....	86
6.3.4 Influence from Foreign countries affected the Political System Positively:.....	92
6.3.5 Views from Women have affected the Political System Positively: ...	94
<b>CHAPTER VII</b> .....	98
<b>CONCLUSION &amp; RECOMMENDATION</b> .....	98

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.....	27
Table 2: Democracy Index 2012.....	49
Table 3: Cross tabulation of Gender and Age of respondents.....	59
Table 4: Cross tabulation of Gender and Current Occupation of respondents.....	62
Table 5: Respondents rating of the Political system in Egypt.....	65
Table 6: Respondents rating of the Ways of Governance in Egypt.....	66
Table 7: Respondents rating of the Views on Democracy in Egypt.....	67
Table 8: Respondents rating of Level of Satisfaction with Democratic values in Egypt.....	69
Table 9: Percentage of Egyptians in support of Military Led system of Governance.....	70
Table 10: Do you expect this percentage to Increase or decrease in the coming years.....	70
Table 11: Percentage of Egyptians in support of Multi-Political Party System of Democracy.....	71
Table 12: Do you expect this percentage to Increase or decrease in the coming years.....	72
Table 13: Egypt: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators.....	84

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Democracy in the world.....	49
Figure 2: Cluster bar chart of marital status by Gender of respondents.....	60
Figure 3: Cluster bar chart of marital status by educational levels of respondents.....	61
Figure 4: Cluster bar chart of marital status by religious affiliation of respondents.....	62
Figure 5: Egyptian Elites' Views towards Political System.....	73
Figure 6: Egyptian Elites' Views on Ways of Governance.....	76
Figure 7: Egyptian Elites' Views on Democracy.....	82

# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

This study investigates the perception of the Egyptian elites on the recent state of democracy in the once peaceful and quiet North African country. It seeks to examine their perception on the general political system, Governance, democracy as well as levels of satisfaction according to recent events.

### **1.1 DEFENITION OF ELITE:**

The term "elite" is the core of the study. The term "elite" in the context of the study: people from Academia and highly learned people or the intellectuals in Egypt.

The term elite described people who lived in the nineteenth century as Bottomore said "In nineteenth century... ..those who had received a university education which qualified them for professional occupations; ... and who are engage in non- manual occupations " He added: "The intellectuals are generally regarded as comprising the much smaller group of those who contribute directly to the creation, transmission and criticism of ideas..... " Bottomore (1964)

Pareto defined elites: “..elites in the sense of groups of people who earlier directly , or were in position to influence very strongly the exercise of , political Power”. Mosca added that Elite is: “a class of People who have the highest indices in their branch of activity”. Bottomore (1964)

Bottomore defined elites in the twentieth century as : “...among social groups which have risen to prominence in the tremendous social and political changes of the twentieth century; three elites- *the intellectuals*, the managers of industry and the High government officials- .... as vital agents in the creation of new forms of society. Bottomore (1964)

## **1.2 BACKGROUND**

Scholars have long recognized that stable democracy depends upon having not only the proper political institutions but also a democratic political culture. This includes, for example, high levels of interpersonal trust, political interest, involvement in community and civic organizations, and tolerance of others.

Throughout 2011, a wave of protests swept the Arab world started by Tunisia, Egypt, passing by Libya , Yemen and ending tragically with Syria. This process known among scholars as snowballing, which Huntington defines it "An important cause for x in one country may be the occurrence of

x in another country." Huntington (1991). Although multifaceted, with causes and implications specific to each country, these protests shared a number of themes, including frustration over poor economic performance, anger at corruption and lack of institutionalizations in the existing political system, nepotism, inequality and poverty. These uprisings have dramatically altered the balance between the state and society in many cases, leading to the fall of dictators and a reversal of the de-liberalization process that had been going on in many countries for well over a decade.

Thus the definition of democracy in Egypt is simply “not the Mubarak regime.” Indeed as according to experts, Cairo protests were revolutionary because for the first time, the people are taking responsibility from the government and embracing notions of a need to do something about it. Democracy is thought to encompass “individual freedom and identity, diversity, [political and economic] competition, [popular sovereignty], and political accountability.” Tessler (2007). In particular, Egypt wanted an end to Mubarak’s thirty-year rule, and wanted to get rid of its late constitution.

Now that Mubarak stepped down and Morsi become ousted , the world seeks to examine how Egypt’s expectations align with that of their reality, even though Egypt’s expectations are more so vaguely. Now as Egypt’s President is a former military officer and currently is ruling the

country, the world seeks to examine how the debate behind Egypt's ability to democratize will play out. The country is at a very critical point where patriotism (or more accurately, anarchy) and democratization are battling it out. Moreover regarding Egypt's fragile political state, Egypt's political history can further exacerbate this slip back into authoritarianism, which is not in favor of successful democratization. Egypt's political history poses the greatest impediment to Egypt pursuing a democratic form of governance on account of its numerous cycles of authoritarian rule.

Democratization may prove a challenging development for Egypt because they have democratic rule to refer to in their history. However, revolutionary and modernization theory suggest that intellectual, educated, middle-income may help Egypt to reach successful democratization, and embrace diversity of a range of different ideologies which are being expressed by movement groups like: Kifaya movement (Enough), Muslim Brotherhood, April 6 movement. All along with mobilization of labor activists (Almahalla workers), political NGOs, election-monitoring groups, and human rights organizations, all of which were subject to extensive government pressure regardless of whether they were secular, nationalist, Islamist, or politicians. Some of the pre-revolutionary political parties, including Ayman Nour's *Ghad Party* [Tomorrow], the *Gabha Party*

[Democratic Front], and *Tagammu' Party* [National Progressive Unionist], also rallied with the enthusiasm of some youth.

Despite a few exceptions, the Arab world has made relatively little progress toward political liberalization in recent years. On the contrary, some of the experiences in democratization that were launched a decade or so have been cut back substantially or even abandoned.

### **1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT:**

The study discusses, a demographic characteristics attitudes toward democracy using public opinion data collected from academically and high learned elites in Egypt forms the basic problem of our study. Issues regarding elites' perception on the general political system, Governance, democracy in Egypt at present, and many of such concerns led this study primarily. The basic problem of this study is seeking to resolve through research and attempt to know the real perception of Egyptian elites and if they can influence the democracy and political system in Egypt.

### **1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS:**

- Why Egyptian elites perception is neutral and sometimes negative on political system, governance, and democracy?

- ❖ What is the perception of elite Egyptians on present and future political system in Egypt?
- ❖ What is the perception of the elite Egyptians on accepted ways of governance?
- ❖ What is the perception of elite Egyptians on democracy and its future in Egypt and current key indicators of democracy and good governance in Egypt?

### **1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES:**

Generally, the study aims at critically examining the perception of the elite Egyptians on the recent state of democracy, political system, and ways of governance in the once peaceful and quiet North African country, Egypt.

This study seeks to identify the Egyptian elites' or high learned people's perceptions to reach successful democratization, and embrace diversity of a range of different ideologies.

#### **1.5.1 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE**

The specific objectives which the study shall focus on are as follows:

- To examine the perception of general political situation in Egypt, before April 2011 and presently through the views of elites.

- To analyze the perception of the elite Egyptians on accepted ways of governance
- To analyze the perception of elite Egyptians on the concepts of democracy and its future in Egypt
- How elites may influence the path of democracy positively.

### **1.6 METHODOLOGY:**

This study is conducting two ways of analysis: a qualitative approach; descriptive analysis, and a quantitative approach; a questionnaire is designed to examine views from Egyptian elites. A minimum of 200 responses would be sought through a non-probability purposive sampling with specific interest on the elite community in the capital city of Cairo.

The study as well explores descriptive, graphs and other statistical qualitative and quantitative tests of associations to critically analyze of the perception of the elite Egyptians on the subject under study.

Despite the importance of such research, there have been few studies of the attitudes and values related to democracy held by ordinary Arab men and women. There has been some relevant research using public opinion data from Palestine (Khalil Shikaki, 1996), as well as political attitude surveys of more limited scope and relevance in Lebanon (Hilal Khashan, 2000), Egypt

(Nevine Khalil, 1998), and Jordan (Maher Massis, 1998). Overall, however, the absence of such researches have been noted and lamented by students of Middle East politics (Michael Hudson, 1995).

#### **1.6.1 SOFTWARE TO BE USED:**

The Statistical Package for System Solutions (SPSS) would be used in analyzing responses from the field questionnaire. Other statistical and numerical simulation software for plotting and displaying graphs such as Microsoft Excel would be utilized as and when deemed fit.

#### **1.6.2 SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE**

The main source of knowledge for the successful completion of this study would be the Seoul National University Library and the Egyptian Centre for democratic studies. However, the internet and other democracy Think Tank have and would continue to help enrich the progress and outcome of the study.

#### **1.7 JUSTIFICATION**

One of the Egyptian sociologists argues that "political reform must be initiated, or else there is a real danger of political chaos," while a second Egyptian scholar laments that, "although I dreamed of democracy in my

youth, I now see that our country is regressing politically. Fahmy (1999). Studies of democratic transitions and democratic consolidation identify two analytically distinct concerns to which attention must be devoted.

This study primarily deals with a case study that examines demographic characteristics on attitudes towards democracy using opinion data collected from academically elite and highly educated persons in Egypt.

The goal of this studies it to examine elites' perceptions, regarding the general political system, ways of governance, and democracy with regard to recent events in Egypt. This study's findings are expected to offer a clear view of the academically Egyptian elites on the on-going democratic developments in Egypt.

On the basis of available empirical evidence, the results of this study will seek to offer a clue to the best ways forward, and this can in particular inform all stakeholders in the On-going political developments to pursue acts that further stimulate peace and stability in Egypt. Additionally, this study would also contribute to knowledge in this area of democracy in the Arab world with a view to stimulating further research.

## **1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATION:**

The scope of this study is restricted to the perception of the Egyptian elites on the recent state of democracy in Egypt. It seeks to examine their perception on the general political system, ways of governance, democracy in recent events in Egypt. The findings of this study therefore even though may have the “Arab wave” characteristics, would be explained within the scope of the study area only. This may be a limitation to the study. The fact that data required for this study had to be collected from Egypt even though the author was in Seoul National University in Korea also posed a lot of difficulties and may be identified a constraint. It is also envisage that, the study will suffer constraints of time, resource inadequacy, unavailability of relevant literature.

## **1.9 THESIS ORGANIZATION:**

This study is organized in seven chapters. *Chapter 1:* is the introductory chapter to the entire study; it takes a critical look at the general background of democracy in Arab world in general with specific emphasis on Egypt, the problem statement, research questions and objectives, research

methodology, as well as justification of the study. *Chapter2*: reviews related literature based on the thesis objectives. *Chapter3*: General view describes Egypt's profile. *Chapter4*: describe the methodology of the study. *Chapter5*: is dedicated to data collection, and analysis. *Chapter6*: discussion and results. *Chapter7*: conclusion for the study by stating specific recommendations to stakeholders based on the major findings made in the study.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.0 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter discusses the literature available on the views of political System in general. In addition to that it discusses views of Egyptian elites about democracy situation and political system in Arab Republic of Egypt.

#### **2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT EGYPTIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND DEMOCRACY:**

The 2011 Arab uprisings which swept the entire Arab region took people by surprise; for it had never been apprehended that such phenomena would take place in Middle East . This in particular was the assertion of some Arab political analysts who had been arguing for quite some time that political stability and economic prosperity could only be promoted by autocratic authoritarian regimes. These political analysts strongly believed in the preponderant power of those authoritarian regimes and that no political forces should dare to challenge them. But such assertions proved to be wrong, as the Arab people and in particular the young people went to the

streets and demonstrated against these autocratic regimes. This is an indication that Arab citizens managed to overcome their fear vis-a-vis the repressive state and hence restore their dignity. This in turn has necessitated the reassessment of our political methodology which for quite some time ignored and underestimated the role that could be played by the unorganized radical political movements in Arab societies.

The reasons behind these uprisings in general are autocratic regime, weak state "weak governmental institutions", faulty constitution of 1971 amended 1977, deteriorating economies, the uneven distribution of economic resources, and the spread of poverty ( 37.5% of Egyptians are living under the international poverty line), unemployment, the repressive violent nature of the Arab regimes and corruption coupled with catalytic factors such as the arrest and torture of Khaled Said in Egypt and Fathi Tirbal in Libya have been the major causes for the popular uprisings that swept the entire Arab region in 2011.

There has been some resistance from some of Arab regimes against the movements of the rebellions. Arab regimes—like Tunisia and Egypt - have immediately collapsed while others have shown fierce resistance such as Libya and Yemen. As for other regimes like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman Sultanate and Sudan have been relatively

immune to popular uprisings because of the centralization of political power and authority as well as autocracy. It has been also pointed out that the Arab regimes of Jordan, Bahrain, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria and Lebanon, even though they have faced continuous major protests, have thus far survived. From a more regional point of view, the Arab revolutions have induced some Arab regimes to contemplate the idea of “political unity.” Salih (2013)

The Egyptian activists unseated Mubarak in a mere 18 days, relatively peacefully in comparison to other uprisings in the Arab Spring. The acceleration of events was the efficient use of social media networks as a form of organizational infrastructure that began with virtual networks and was transposed to offline networks.

The late President Morsi waned during the first half of 2013, with critics alleging that he was more focused on unity power for himself and Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated party - Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) than working to resolve Egypt’s severe economic and governance problems, while we have to confess that Morsi’s June 2012 election had ended a period of military rule after the ouster of long time authoritarian regime of Mubarak.

The implications for Egypt were charging the Egyptian people with a new sense of positivity, empowerment, determination, national pride, and solidarity. a peaceful, youthful grassroots revolution that was “across the

board” involving different political, religious, and social groups, a unique “leaderless revolution”, unity between Muslims and Coptic Christians, the significant role of women in the revolution, a new era of social and democratic reform: “Egypt will not go back to where it was before January 25<sup>th</sup>”.

## **2.2 THEORY OF EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION CASE:**

The Egyptian people have had to go through various forms of governance system change. For analytical purposes Linz categorized regime changes into three processes, namely *reforma*, *ruptforma* and *ruptura*. The mentioned groups that are both in power and out of power play a role in the regime change. However, the usefulness of the three paths is that they distinguish between how much of a role is played by each group and, to what extent each group is responsible for the regime change. Linz (1990).

*Reforma* is used to label regime changes in which the ruling elites (in power) instigate democratic reforms without doing so to alleviate any internal dissent or opposition.. In this path, the regime itself is the most important actor as it plays a “decisive role” in ending authoritarian practices and bringing about democratic reforms. In contrast, *ruptforma* occurs as a result of joint action by both opposition groups and the as such, those in

power and out of power are seen to play a fifty-fifty role in bringing about regime changes. Ruptura could occur as a result of protests or uprisings which the ruling elites (in power) respond to effectively or as a result of the regime co-opting opposition parties, for example, reforms could be offered in the form of greater individual freedoms and, when lived up to by the regime, cause a change to authoritarian practices and allow for some democratic practices to surface. The final path is that of ruptura which occurs when an authoritarian regime collapses from the actions of opposition groups who do not hold power play the most significant role as a regime can only take this path in conditions of revolution and mass protests.

There are three phases in the ruptura process: *the struggle to produce the fall of the regime, the fall of the regime and the struggle after the fall*. Huntington argues that a triggering event must occur to “crystallize the disaffection” of those out of power as only opposition groups that are united have the ability to wear down the regime and shift the balance of power.

The ruptura model can be applied in the case of Egypt where the collapse of the Mubarak regime in Egypt clearly falls as a result of protesting by the opposition groups instigated uprisings and were apathetic toward the proposed concessions (ruptura model). As noted by Linz (1990) regime ruptura occurs as a result of a “constellation of social and political

forces...the nature of the authoritarian regime...and, to some extent, the international context". In offering variables that may cause regime collapse, the literature focuses on both structural and non-structural factors in addition to factors that are exogenous and endogenous to the regime and the state in which the regime operates. Exogenous factors are argued to be equally as important as endogenous factors when considering regime collapse. Linz (1990), Huntington (1991)

### **2.3 THEORES OF LEADERSHIP:**

According to Max Weber there are three types of leaders: bureaucrat, charismatic and traditional leaders. They operate under transactional model (use knowledge or legal authority) and transformational model (utilize their personal charisma) of political leadership.

George Burns accept the categories of leadership models explaining five divisions to transactional political leader : opinion political leader who has an ability to sway public opinion, political party leader holding various positions, executive leader who is the head of the state, bureaucratic, legislative leader who is behind the scene. As for the transactional who is using his knowledge; Burns explained this leader represent scholar and elite who shape the political society through their clearly vision on political

affairs, leaders who reform address issues of societal morality. Revolutionary leaders bring rapid political transformation, while charismatic political leaders utilize personal charisma to change political system.

The leaderships in Egypt have been depending on transformational model utilizing their personal charisma since the revolution of 1953 against Monarchy.

## **2.4 INDICATORS OF ELITE PERCEPTION ON DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL SYSTEM**

### **2.4.1 Level of Education:**

As the study mentioned in the beginning the elites including two groups which are the academia and high learned people. Regarding the academia people's role in political system and democracy Popkewitz described them; "academic freedom" as representing "a myth of the university as a 'market place of ideas' where different intellectual traditions can debate freely the major social, political, and economic ideas of a time, untrammelled by outside interests and pressures" . Popkewitz (1984)

Ginsburg explained as a professor in the university the position and role of professors: "..... treat university professors as a relatively distinct social group: This is evidenced when they discuss whom we need to

mobilize: labor, community people, religious persons, and students. The fact that I often found myself in the role of the "neutral" mediator, of course, is both constituted by such ideas, and concomitantly constitutive of them. Ginsburg (1987)

From a social relations or ideologies point of view Ginsburg highlighted, , the contradictions in the role of professor as activist present possibilities and limitations. There is space for progressive social critique and action. At the same time, there is space for similar activity by those contributing to the perpetuation and legitimacy of regressive, reactionary and illiberal forces. There is also space? Perhaps, because of academic traditions as well as the demands of research and instructional commitments, the easiest to occupy for intellectuals in institutions of higher education ? For muting one's voice and not acting in accord with one's beliefs. Ginsburg (1986).

The question that we confront is what the implications of not speaking and not acting. Gramsci posits that: every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates within itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function

not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields . Gramsci (1971).

In contrast with this category of "organic" intellectuals, who may be connected to dominant or subordinate social groups, Gramsci identifies what the terms "traditional" intellectuals. The traditional intellectuals are those whose origin and organic connection is with a (normally dominant) group associated more clearly with a previous social formation, for example, those who were "organically bound to the landed aristocracy" Gramsci, (1971) in the epoch of monopoly capitalism. Gramsci (1971). Gramsci goes on to explain, "Since these various categories of traditional intellectuals experience through an esprit de corps their uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification, they thus put themselves forward as an autonomous and independent group."

This notion of autonomy or neutrality has been discussed above in some detail. Gramsci develops the discussion further by stating that: one of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards [or attempting to maintain] dominance is its struggle to assimilate and conquer "ideologically" the "traditional" intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in

question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals . Gramsci (1971).

Another point of view related democracy to the level of education, though the influence might have a slight effect. As originally proposed by Lipset, the explanation for positive effect of economic development on the likelihood of a country establishing and maintaining democracy emphasizes two interrelated intervening variables: political culture and social structure. First, economic development is closely associated with increases in education, which in turn promotes political attitudes conducive to democracy; e.g., interpersonal trust and tolerance of opposition. Lipset (1959) . "Moreover, because middle-class occupations require an educated population, the middle class will hold political attitudes conducive to democracy that is acquired through formal education" Muller (1995). Also Kuzman mentioned in his study about the importance of intellectuals to democracy he said ; " The prominence of students and graduates in democracy intellectuals and democratization movements of the early 20th century, .... leads us to identify the intellectual "class" as the social basis of democratization". Theories date back to Edmund Burke's disparaging reference to the prominent role of "men of letters" in the French Revolution Charle (1996). The self-proclaimed "aristocracy of intelligence" in the

Austrian revolution of 1848. Namier (1946). Oxford dons' search for an alliance of "brains and numbers" in 1860s . Britain Kent (1978). The Dreyfus Affair intellectuals' evolution into a prodemocracy movement in France in the early 20th century Blum (1935). The global student movements of the 1960s. Brochier (1968), Gouldner (1979).

This theory matches the findings of Benavot (1996), who finds a positive effect of higher-education enrollment rates in 1980 on democratization during the period 1980–88. Recent case studies of intellectuals' prodemocracy mobilization include protests in (1995) Cote d'Ivoire; Calhoun (1994) and Cherrington (1991) on China; Garcelon (1997) and Greenfeld (1996) on the Soviet Union; Puryear (1994) on Chile; Torpey (1995) on East Germany; and Williams (1998) on Nigeria. He added "Intellectuals mattered for democratization in two 20th-century waves of democratization, as in 1905–12: nondemocratic countries with more intellectuals were more likely to undergo democratization than those with fewer intellectuals; the intellectuals' collective organizations provided the backbone for the prodemocracy movements" (Kuzman, 2004) .

Kuzman assured that the academia and high learned class can effectively participate in political life in a country but not all the time, said Kuzman (2004). This suggests that causal explanations of democratization

may need to be cautious about generalizing across time: rather than search for a generalized association between certain social classes and certain political configurations, the analysis of democratization may be forced to limit itself to time-specific contexts. The minimal implication is that elites sometimes matter for democratization, as for instance in the beginning and end of the 20th century. How they matter may have changed over the course of the century, but they—and other classes—deserve systematic attention in the literature on democratization.

#### **2.4.2 Level of development of Economy:**

The causal link between democracy and development is a controversial issue. For most of the twentieth century, conventional wisdom has held that autocracies are better able to marshal the resources necessary to promote economic development than are democracies, and that a certain level of economic development is necessary for democracy to take hold and flourish in a country. That view deserves a new examination in the post-Cold War world.

When the countries of the world are examined as a whole, democracies do perform better in terms of economic development than do autocracies or mixed polities. The debate concerns developing countries –

specifically, can democracies develop as low income countries; can poor countries democratize; and does democracy among low income countries make any difference for their development success? Lipset explained positive effect of economic development on the likelihood of a country establishing and maintaining democracy emphasizes, two interrelated intervening variables: The first political culture and social structure."..The second one is economic development alters the pyramid-shaped social stratification system, in which the majority of the population is lower-class and poor, to a diamond shape, in which the majority of the population is middle-class and relatively well-off", as it mentioned in the previous point.

The middle class emerges as the main pro democratic force in Lipset's analysis, and this class gains in size with socioeconomic development. Stephens (1992).

Since Lipset (1959) introduced his seminal theory that a country's chances of sustaining democracy depend fundamentally on its level of wealth, analyses of the structural causes of democracy have emphasized economic development..... In recent analyses of the conditions that promote democratization. Dahl argued that economic development along with the syndrome of factors associated monotonically with development, which

together produce a "modern dynamic pluralist society," are especially favorable to the development of democracy. Dahl (1989).

Huntington as well confirmed the idea of Dahl by concluding that two key factors affecting the future stability and expansion of democracy are economic development and political leadership. Huntington (1991).

Yet during the 1960s and 1970s, middle-income and upper-middle-income countries that fit the prediction of the economic development hypothesis (e.g., Portugal, Spain, and Thailand) were vastly outnumbered by middle-income and upper-middle-income countries that did not fit it (e.g., South Korea, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uruguay). What, then, went wrong? Why did economic development bring instability and authoritarianism rather than stable democracy to some modernizing countries? Proponents of the economic development explanation of democratization assume that reduction of income inequality goes hand-in-hand with economic development and that income inequality has no significant effect on democratization independent of level of economic development. But income inequality is not a characteristic of an MDP (modern dynamic pluralist) society that is highly correlated monotonically with economic development. Instead, income

inequality is an inverted-U function of level of economic development. Countries at intermediate levels of economic development thus tend to have the highest levels of income inequality. And, as the cross-national data reported, countries with high levels of in-come inequality in 1970 were much more likely to suffer a substantial decline in level of democracy from 1965 to 1980 (65 %) than were countries with relatively low levels of income inequality (14 percent). Moreover, multivariate analysis of structural determinants of change in level of democracy from 1965 to 1980 shows that income in-equality has a robust negative impact on democratization that can counteract the positive impact of economic development. Income in-equality therefore appears to be important in explaining why economic development has often failed to promote stable democracy.

In three of the non crisis transitions-Chile, Turkey, and Thailand-transitions occurred under constitutions written by the outgoing authoritarian government. Although incoming oppositions succeeded in negotiating some amendments, these constitutions provided the framework within which new democratic governments operated. In Korea, Chun Doo Hwan's government was forced to make substantial concessions to opposition demands after the mass protests of spring and summer 1987. Nonetheless, the constitution was written prior to the military's exit and reflected the military government's

preferences in important ways. In the crisis transitions, opposition forces wielded much greater influence. Their influence was particularly strong where authoritarian rule collapsed relatively swiftly, in the Philippines and Argentina; opposition politicians made institutional choices with little input from the outgoing government and returned to constitutions that pre dated authoritarian rule. In Bolivia, groups linked to the authoritarian order participated to a greater extent but yielded the presidency to a representative of the most militant opposition. In Uruguay, deteriorating economic conditions and mounting protest forced the government to abandon constitutional demands that would have perpetuated the influence of the military and its supporters within the traditional parties.

**Table 1: The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions**

	Crisis Transitions	Non-Crisis Transitions
Political changes in authoritarian regime	Political demands overlap with: * Primarily political demands *Defection of business elite for *Economically mass motivated protest * Divisions within government over resource distribution	Primarily political demands for liberalization
Process of constitutional reform	* Strong opposition influence	* Dominated by authoritarian constitutional reform incumbents

Jurisdiction of enclaves	* Elimination of authoritarian enclaves Reduced military prerogatives	Significant authoritarian enclaves
Barriers of political entry	* Few limits on participation * Permissive voter and party registration laws	* Continuing limits on some political groups * Restrictive voter and party registration laws

### 2.4.3 Religious Orientation Influence Attitudes towards Democracy:

In origin of Islam there is a term called "Shura" which indicate consultation over the matters concerning the nation. Shura is to seek the opinion of knowledgeable people (mature Muslims elect those who they deem worthy of power and governance). In other words, it is to poll the opinion of the nation or its representatives over its issues. Therefore, Muslims took Shura as one of the principles and bases of governance. Shura may be seen as *parallel* to the democratic principle in western political thought, having analogous aspects and about the same tendency or direction. In addition to shura principles there are three basic precepts, *first*, that all persons in any given society are equal in human and civil rights, *second*, that public issues are best decided by majority view, *third*, the three other principles are justice, equality and human dignity, which constitute Islam's moral core, and from which all Islamic conceptions of human and civil rights derive, under *shura* governance." Sulaiman (2008).

What confirms this fact is that the Prophet (peace be upon him) did not leave a written text, nor did he name his successor. Rather, he made it up to consultation among Muslims. While democracy stipulates that the rule of people should be assumed by people; people should draft their own constitution and laws; and people are the judicial authority that judges among people through the application of positive laws. The previous paragraph is clarified that there are similarity between the norms of democracy and the norms of Islamic Shura .

It is worthy to mention that Islam is not against democracy because one of the pillars of Islam is that the leader should consult his consultants in any decision concerning the nation. This study is discussing Egypt , the leader country in the region , as “the [Arab] brains are in Cairo,” Egypt is the key to figuring how the intertwine democracy with Islamic culture will be in the future.

"Research on democratic transitions and consolidation has emphasized the importance not only of structural factors, such as institutional reform and economic development, but also political culture. There are different opinions towards whether a democratic political culture can emerge in the Arab world, however more specifically, there is disagreement about whether the Islamic attachments of ordinary citizens discourage the emergence of

democratic attitudes and values. One of the previous studies which used World Values Survey data from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria to assess the influence of Islamic orientations on attitudes toward democracy. It resulted that all four countries are similar, show that strong Islamic attachments do not discourage or otherwise influence support for democracy to any significant degree". "There is little evidence, at least at the individual level of analysis, to support the claims of those who assert that Islam and democracy are incompatible. The reasons that democracy has not taken root in the Arab world must therefore lie elsewhere, perhaps in domestic economic structures, perhaps in relations with the international political and economic order, or perhaps in the determination of those in power to resist political change by whatever means are required Tessler. (2002) , Do Islamic orientations influence attitudes towards Democracy in the Arab World?

According Tessler Islam as a dominant religion in the four countries is not influence on the attitudes towards democracy.

#### **2.4.4 Institutions and the rule of Law:**

Four characteristics feature for regime change in recent democratic openings. Each proposition contain what I believe is an important characteristic of large majority of these transitions. The prevalence of these characteristics supports my claim of shift from democratic "transition" to

stand still. First characteristic concerns elections, it seems Increasing countries conduct more or less democratic elections, yet they are not democratic in other important respects and many of them are not making any moves in that direction. They remain electoral democracies. Second characteristic concerns lack of statehood that is the institutions and procedures needed for maintaining order and effectively formulating and implementing policies. Many countries exhibit some democratic features while also being weak states, sometimes on the verge of collapse. Third characteristic is elite (power) domination; a strong man and his followers or some narrow coalition of elites dominate the political scene and prevent the adoption of policies that go against their vested interests. Although these three characteristics overlap in concrete cases.

Many states in the gray zone are weak states (lack of effective institutions). They may conduct political process that is fairly democratic but any progress towards consolidation in democracy is impeded by the problem of weak statehood. A successful process of democratization requires that these countries develop more "stateness" that is, become stronger state.

The notion of weak state is an imprecise concept that has been defined variously. For present purpose, we may distinguish between a broad and a narrow concept of state weakness. In the broad sense, weak states are

deficient in three basic respects. First the economy is defective; there is a lack of coherent national economy capable of sustaining a basic level of welfare for the population and of providing the resources for running an effective state. The second major deficiency in weak states concerns relations between people in society; they don't make up a coherent national community. The third major problem in weak states concerns the state apparatus in a direct sense ( i.e. the institution of a government at all levels). The last one precisely is the case of Egypt" Weak state lack effective and responsive institutions". In weak state bureaucracy is incompetent and corrupt, and the political leadership does not seek to provide public or collective goods. It rather seeks to mold the state apparatus into a personal source of income." Sorensen (2008)

One involves political institutions and processes where institutional considerations call attention to the need for mechanisms that make political leaders accountable to those they govern, including free, competitive, and regular elections. Mainwaring (1999).

#### **2.4.5 Democracy and Influence from Foreign Countries:**

Huntington (2006) stated that invasion of foreign ideas spark revolutions. Especially if those foreign ideas are dramatically different than that domestically, the revolution is sparked only to be left with how to

reconcile traditions starkly different than modernity. Such culturally ideological differences lead Egypt's expectations of democratization to optimistically exceed that of reality.

One of the most important issue is about the influence of foreign Countries seeks to assess the external dimension of the Arab Spring through an examination of the role of the United States in the outbreak of the uprisings and the direction of their subsequent paths. In accounting for the causes of the Arab Spring, some analysts argued that the uprisings were an outcome of a carefully planned US strategy aimed at restructuring the political map of the Arab world in tandem with American interests in the region. Mark Glenn of the Crescent and Cross Solidarity Movement contended that the Arab Spring uprisings were an ultimate outcome of persistent US efforts from 2008 onwards to remove specific Arab regimes through various democratic movements funded by the US government. This was achieved in an attempt to maintain control over particular countries passing through difficult socioeconomic conditions, and accordingly to abort the outbreak of a "true grassroots revolution" as had happened in Iran in 1979 . Glenn, (2011). In the same vein, Tariq Ramadan, Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies at Oxford University, contended that it is "naïve" to relate the Arab uprisings to US policy in Middle East.

Controversy, The United States pushed toward the outbreak of these uprisings in an attempt to restructure the Arab world in line with US regional interests (Ramadan, 2012). William Engdahl, an American analyst, put it bluntly by arguing that the United States orchestrated the Egyptian as well as other regime changes from Libya to Yemen and beyond, in a process referred to as “creative destruction.” This was achieved with a view to create the conditions conducive to the establishment of the Greater Middle East project advocated by the George W. Bush Administration. Engdahl, (2011). The short-lived US democracy-promotion agenda following 9/11 did not result in any meaningful democratization in the Arab world.

The United States abandoned this agenda and did not incur any major risks as a result; it seemed content with its policy of endorsing the Arab autocrats. That explains the fact that the United States was surprised by the outbreak of mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. The United States did not plan the Arab Spring as claimed by some analysts, as the local autocrats were doing everything possible to secure American and Israeli interests in the region. Following the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the United States embarked upon a process of political engineering under which it was able to reverse a revolutionary trend which could have jeopardized American interests in the Arab world. Afifi ( 2012).

Today, the revolutionaries who initiated the change did not assume the leading positions in dismantling the old authoritarian regimes and building new democratic ones. Ironically, elements of the old pro-American regimes assumed these tasks in Egypt and Yemen. For the first time, we have democratic projects designed and implemented by elements who were main actors in the old dictatorships. In the case of Libya, a complete reshuffling process took place where the revolutionary movements were marginalized and a new pro-American regime was installed, thus replacing the insubordinate, highly unpredictable regime of Qaddafi. In the case of Bahrain, the United States was able to suppress revolutionary changes through covert military intervention.

It is important to note, however, that these strategies did not resolve the main problems which produced the revolutionary discontent in the Arab world. Rather, they prolonged them and opened new horizons for further upheavals in the Arab world. Perhaps the most noticeable among these problems are (i) the continuity with the neo-liberal economic policies, which had created a tremendous gap between the rich and the poor unprecedented in recent Arab history, and (ii) the US full endorsement of Israeli policies in the region. These policies are bound to generate more anti-American resentment in the region and lead to more future surprises. In other words,

the United States has not grasped yet the social and historical underpinnings of the Arab Spring. The United States may have won in the short-term; however, in the long-term, more violent developments are bound to occur.

## **2.5 STAKEHOLDERS ROLE OF JANUARY REVOLUTION:**

### **2.5.1 Egyptian Regime using Framework not to Collapse:**

There are two ways of power that the regime may use for suppressing the rebellions. Regimes may utilize persuasive power to achieve “the deference and cooperation” of the population and to help establishing regime legitimacy in the minds of the population .Goodwin (2007). The second way of power is coercive power, or hard power, is the ability of a regime to repress and intimidate potential opponents, both internal and external to the regime, through the use of threats and real violence. Coercive power is measured utilizing two dimensions: scope refers to the size of a regime’s coercive apparatus, which incorporates all of its security sectors, and cohesion refers to the level of compliance from those within the coercive apparatus to orders issued by the regime Levitsky & Way (2010).

If a regime’s ability to use coercive power is removed, it is then forced to rely solely on its persuasive power, especially during times of regime instability, requires exceptional political talents and oratory skills. Huntington (1968). There are three main strategies, or tactics, that

authoritarian regimes utilise to retain power and increase their legitimacy: the use of periodic elections; the creation of enemies external to the regime and population; and hereditary leadership selection Schedler (2002).

Authoritarian regimes do hold periodic elections not for the purpose of democratizing their nations but for the sake of holding their power. First strategy; regimes can gain efficacy by claiming that an enemy, external to the regime, presents a threat to the national aspirations of the people, some regimes have appealed to their populations on the basis of nationalist or ideological grounds in order to obtain legitimacy. Second strategy is to declare states of emergency for substantial periods of time as a way to obtain legitimacy based on an external other. Huntington (1991) and Goldstone (2011). Third strategy utilized by authoritarian regimes to maintain regime legitimacy is hereditary leadership selection (Brownlee 2007). Hereditary leadership selection occurs when an authoritarian ruler hand-picks her/his successor, usually her/his eldest son, who is then groomed to take over the reins of power in the near future Stacher (2011). However, hereditary succession strategies are a “particularly difficult challenge” confronting authoritarian regimes Linz (1990). Mubarak regime uses the three strategies above to keep ruling Egypt. Mubarak regime legitimacy has also been found

to naturally decline over time due to unaccountability promises and the frustrations of the population from corruptions.

### **2.5.2 Elite Youth in January Revolution:**

The elite youth play a vital and main role in January revolution in Arab countries the first type is based on participation for the fulfillment of a certain goal, ‘those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take. The second type of political engagement is based on participation driven by a duty to participate in public affairs in one’s own country.

In Egypt, The boldest move for political reform were initiated in 2005, when the amendment of Article 76 of the constitution changed the election for the presidency from a plebiscite in the National Assembly to direct elections. Changes of constitutes articles were driven from the participation of duty in public affairs in one’s own country.

"The Egyptian activists unseated Mubarak in a mere 18 days, relatively peacefully in comparison to other uprisings in the Arab Spring. The acceleration of events was the efficient use of social media networks as a form of organizational infrastructure that began with virtual networks and

was transposed to offline networks. Egyptian activists were able to successfully play off the strengths of the social networking capabilities of Face book and Twitter by capitalizing on their “many-to-many” communication capabilities and the speed with which information can be transferred and spread, an inherent characteristic to any digital media. Wael Ghonim’s Face book group (*We Are All Khaled Said*) served as an organizational platform that attracted like-minded individuals to connect over a common interest to commemorate Khaled Said (a successful young man was killed, he was beaten to death by police officers claiming that he had drugs). This evolved into a common interest in forming an opposition to the Egyptian police force, which evolved into a movement to force Mubarak to step down. Not only did Face book provide the organizational infrastructure, but also it provided a crucial platform for potential protesters to network with one another and share their common grievances, as well as mobilize youth. Storck (2012).

### **2.5.3 Military Rule:**

The Military institution in Egypt has been always seen by the people different than any other states; it is the guardian of the country since the first revolution in 1952 which was started by group of military officers to liberalize Egypt and Egyptians from monarchy . Egyptian people believe

that military is one of the important pillar of the state. According to Egyptians army is the only institution that protects the country domestically and internationally. Moreover, in the similar situation, when the army intervene in Tunisia and Libya was protecting the dictatorship, while Egyptian army intervene to protect the citizens , it has a played a different role by supporting protestors and the second surprising issue differ from all other nation the army was welcomed by the people.

In order to protect Egypt, The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) , headed by Marshal Tantawy took the power in February 2011 and submit the authority to the first elected president Morsi on June 2013. It is worth to say that the SCAF play a key role in upholding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation -state .Unless the SCAF took the power in Egypt at that time the country would go deep in chaos, riots, and security deterioration would prevailed like other Arab countries as Syria, Lybia and Yemen. Two years from February 2011 until June 2013, there was no head of the State in Egypt and it was possible that chaos could be spread all over the country.

As for the June revolution , here was the real danger when Egyptian were divided into two sides , One of those sides protest in Tahrir Square against Morsi as for their point of view , he was supporting only Muslim

brotherhood and their party. While other side protest against ousted of Morsi . They believe that Morsi should finish his term and then Egypt go for new election for new president. The main reason that SCAF ousted Morsi and suspended the constitution that was approved by Morsi was to prevent Egypt to go back into chaos and devastating .

#### **2.5.4 Unified and Board Opposition:**

There is an abundance of literature outlining that regime collapse is most likely to occur when opposition groups encompass a “broad-based section of the population”, are composed of “average men and women, students and workers” and include all ethnic, religious and socio-economic groups. Goldstone (2011), Linz (1990). Essentially, unified opposition groups turn “into a greater whole which identifies itself as ‘the people’” and can exert strong pressures on a regime. Ulfeder (2005). The more representative the opposition group, the less likely any segment of that population will be to tolerate violence used against the opposition group. Huntington (1991).

This ultimately undermines the effectiveness of any regime propaganda or inducements aimed at any section of the population, restrict the regime’s ability to employ a policy of divide and rule, and impede the regime’s persuasive power. Ulfeder (2005).

However, one must look to historical factors, namely the opposition present during the formation of the regime, when considering the impact a broad opposition would have on regime collapse Smith (2005). If a regime begins its rule with little to no opposition present it is unlikely to build strong coalitions or invest in party institutions as it would if there were strong opposition. Smith (2005). As such, when faced with broad uprisings which it has not encountered before, the regime is somewhat fragile and cannot effectively respond. This was happening in Egypt in January 2011 revolution as all population were together including Muslims, Copts, workers, men, women, secularists, and all sects of the society. But the problem occurred in June 2014 revolution when the Egyptians was divided into two groups the opponents and the supporters of Morsi's regime.

#### **2.5.5 Social Media by opposition:**

Authoritarian rule is often legitimated through the use of manipulated media and information, with many regimes in the 21st century assigning the task of information control and propaganda dispersion to specific ministries within the regime.

However, social media has become a proverbial double edged sword for regimes as they are not the only ones using it strategically. Haass (2011).

The rise of mass communication and social media has allowed populations under authoritarian rule to communicate with the outside world, engage with different cultures and ideas and be exposed to values not a kin to their own. (Kubba 2000).

Many scholars have identified that the influential power of social media is not limited to the social realm and that its use has broader implications for politics and political structures including the loss of power by regimes (Scott 2012). Recently, a causal explanation has emerged in the academic literature; *the strategic use of social media by the opposition* to bring about the collapse of authoritarian regimes. Scott (2012) and Shirky (2011). The previous strategic was the one of the main factors of the collapsing of the Mubarak regime. Populations can effectively reshape their opinions and learn about alternative forms of government. For Egyptian protestors, the strategic use of social media has allowed for an effective method of communication to organise demonstrations and evade authorities thereby limiting the extent to which regimes can actually use violence or exercise their coercive powers. Khoury (2011). Anti-regime sentiments can be vented on social media sites thereby undermining regime legitimacy and causing the regime to lose the effectiveness of its persuasive power. Haass (2011).

This is expressing what happened in Egypt in the January 2011 revolution that the regime at that time used the whole media to convince the population that Mubarak is the best for Egypt. While another type of media was the main assistance to the oppositions and demonstrations which was the face book and twitter (social contact media). Though there is a range of opinion as to how influential social media was in generating political mobilization in the Egyptian uprising, it has been argued ... that its main role were in providing an organisational infrastructure, as a form of alternative press, and as generating awareness both domestically and internationally of the ongoing revolution. By analysing the way the activists utilized the tools of social media through established theories of communication, one can see how the inherent characteristics of social media and the Internet were able to foster the necessary requirements for collective action. However, despite its success in organizing the uprising, it would seem from the current situation in Egypt that social media has been less useful in translating the needs and demands of protesters into political reality. A further study of the use of social media in Egyptian politics post-uprising could investigate the role of social networking in establishing new political parties or civil society groups, a process that has proven itself to be the main obstacle to protesters gaining political legitimacy. Storck (2011) .

The role of social media in political mobilization in 2011 was the basics of the revolution through the dialogue taking place via face book, twitter and other SMSs was used by the mainstream media as a source during the height of the protests. Storck (2012).

## **CHAPTER III**

### **OVERVIEW OF ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT**

#### **3.1 EGYPT PROFILE:**

Arab Republic of Egypt is situated at the intersection of ancient continents: Africa – Asia, and Europe. Egypt is overlooking two seas, namely the Red Sea (East), Egypt bordered with the Occupied Land - Palestine "Israel" from the northeast, the Mediterranean (North), Libya from the west, Sudan from the south. Egypt places one foot in Asia (Sinai), although it belongs to the African Continent. In addition, it overlooks the Suez and A`qaba Gulfs where Egypt hosts one of the important international waterways, namely; the Suez Canal(*an artificial sea-level waterway in Egypt, connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. Opened in November 1869 after 10 years of construction, it allows ships to travel between Europe and eastern Asia without navigating around Africa*).

The major water source in Egypt is the Nile which is the artery of life for Egyptians. The other water sources are rainwater, torrential and underground water.

Simultaneously, Egypt, due to its position among the Muslim world, maintained the role of a beacon for Islamic thinking and civilization whereby it embodied the values of moderation, tolerance and coexistence reflecting the essence of Islamic teachings. Additionally, Egypt assumes a major cultural, ideological, and political role in the Arab region. In this regard, it undertakes a significant share of efforts aiming to establish stability, peace, progress and development in the Arab World and Middle East.

Total land area: 1,001,450sq km, land: 995,450 sq km, water: 6,000 sq km.

Arabic (Modern Standard Arabic) is the official language of the Egyptian people with Majority Muslims, and Minority Christians. The Egyptian population at home increased from 85 million in August of 2013 to an expected 86 million(February, 2014), which means one million in six months. Age 12-54 is the highest percentage of the population 56%.

Cairo is the capital. Cairo is a long rooted city occupying a prominent position among world's capitals. In terms of population, Cairo stands as largest in the Arab world and Africa scoring around eighteen million

accommodating an area of 3085 Km<sup>2</sup>. Other major cities: Alexandria, Sharm El-Sheikh, Giza, Luxor & Aswan.

### **3.2 POLITICS:**

The Current President of Egypt is A. El-Fattah El-sisi.

Gamal Abdel Nasser (2nd president) with Mohamed Naguib (1st president to Arab Republic of Egypt) led the July 23rd Revolution in 1952, which brought many achievements and the Establishment of the Republic of Egypt. The Arab Republic of Egypt is a sovereign, united, indivisible State, having a democratic republican system that is based on citizenship and rule of law. Sovereignty belongs only to the people, who shall exercise and protect it.

The political system is based on political and partisan pluralism, peaceful rotation of power, separation and balance of powers, the inevitable correlation between powers and responsibilities, and respect for human rights and freedoms. The President of the Republic is the head of State and the head of executive power. The legislative power shall consist of the House of Representatives (magles el shaab) and the Shura Council.


The Egyptian Judiciary Authority is two parts; the Ordinary Courts and the Administrative Court or the State Council.

Egypt according to Democracy Index 2012 categorized as a hybrid country (mixing authoritarian regime with democratic regime). It ranked at 138 out of 167 countries.

**Table 2: Democracy Index 2012**

Type of regime	Scores	# of countries
Full democracies	8.0 to 10	25
Flawed democracies	6.0 to 7.9	54
Hybrid regimes	4.0 to 5.9	37
Authoritarian Regime	0 to 3.9	51

**Figure 1: Democracy in the world**



(The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy index map for 2012 . The darker colors represent more democratic countries.)

### **3.3 EDUCATION:**

Compulsory Education: 9 years, Academic Year: October to June.  
Number of Universities 42 (19 private), Number of Students: 6,846,000 (secondary, 12-17); 2,646,000 (tertiary), Literacy Rate: 87.5%. The ratio of people has tertiary education 1% to the total population.

### **3.4 ECONOMY AND MAIN INCOME RESOURCES:**

GDP per Capita PPP (2012): USD 6,724, 70% 2011: Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) 2.2% 2013: GDP growth, GDP: U\$500.9 billion. According to an official toll in 2010, the Egyptian economy is the second in order in Africa, and the 11th in the Middle East as to per capita income.

Egyptian Pound (EGP) - According to Egyptian Central Bank 2014: market rates - (2014), \$1 = 7.14 EGP.

The Egyptian economy is one of the most diversified economies in the Middle East. It depends mainly on agriculture, Suez Canal revenues, tourism, cultural and media production, oil exports and remittances of Egyptian expatriates (*More than three million Egyptians work abroad, mostly in the Gulf countries. Their remittances constitute an important resource for Egyptian economy*), possesses mineral resources, namely

phosphate, raw iron, gold and oil. Egypt has received from USA foreign aids since 1979 (an average of \$2.2 billion per year) as Egypt is the third-largest recipient of such funds from the United States in Middle East.

Egypt is a member of African economic blocs such as Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) creates a full free-trade area among its 19 member states providing Egypt with duty-free access to a market of more than 400 million consumers.

In the wake of January 25th Revolution, 2011, the State is tirelessly exerting efforts to bring Egyptian economy back on the right trajectory, and to overcome the huge hurdles. This is sought through consolidation of efforts on the local level and opening new windows on world to pump some vigor in the economic performance.

### **3.5 Ancient EGYPT IANS:**

Egypt is famous for its ancient civilization and some of the world's most famous monuments, including the Giza pyramids, the Great Sphinx and the ancient temples and tombs of kings and Queens of Luxor dating back thousands of years. It has ancient pharos, Romans, Christians, and Islamic monuments. Although focus of most tourist visits remains and the great monuments along the Nile, enjoying sightseeing , snorkeling and diving

along the Red Sea coast. Other tourist attractions in Egypt include hiking the mountain of Sinai and camel trips, remote oases tours, or visiting Islamic Mosques and Coptic monasteries .

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **4.0 INTRODUCTION:**

This chapter discusses the methods employed by this study in eliciting the required responses to the research questions. The methodology details the study design framework with emphasis on the research design approach, study population, method of determining the sample size and the sampling techniques used to select the required respondents for the study. Finally, the chapter provides an overview of the methods used to collect and analyze data for the study.

#### **4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN:**

In the view of Adelman *et al.* (1977) cited in Bell, (2004), a case study is an umbrella term for categories of research designs having in common the decision to focus on an inquiry around an instance. Bell (2004) also claims that the case study research design is appropriate for studies that require an in-depth information about a phenomenon within a limited period where a large scale survey may not produce the true results. Similarly, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996,) cited in Quansah, (2009) and

Denscomber (1998) cited in Bell (2004) argue that a case study design is very useful in investigating a contemporary phenomenon from a selected case.

However, the case study research design is criticized on the grounds that generalization is often difficult to make Bell (2004). In countering the argument against the case study, Denscomber (1998) cited in Bell (2004) claims that results from a case study research may be generalized when the phenomena have similar characteristics. Thus, a case study research design can be used for studies that require detailed information about a phenomenon within a limited time span. The study utilized a survey design. This design was appropriate because the study sought to investigate intellectually elite's views or opinions regarding the struggling democracy in Egypt.

A quantitative research approach was adopted to achieve the research objectives. This approach was chosen because the study collected numeric data instead of non-numeric. Quantitative approach was also appropriate because questionnaire instead of interview was used to collect the data in the study.

A qualitative research approach as descriptive research as well adopted to achieve the research objectives through the literature review .

This approach was chosen to confirm the results from the quantitative approach.

#### **4.2 MEASUREMENT:**

Since most of the previous studies on democracy in Egypt did not use a structured questionnaire there was a lack of appropriate instruments to measure items consisting of ‘Perception on the Political system,’ ‘views on Governance,’ and ‘indicators of adherence to democracy and rule of law.’ In addition, since this study focused on the elite perception on democracy in Egypt, there was a need to develop an instrument with study-specific items.

Thus this study attempted to develop an appropriate research instrument for use in this study. In order to develop the structured questionnaire relating to ‘Perception on the Political system,’ ‘views on Governance,’ and ‘indicators of adherence to democracy and rule of law,’ through the literature Review.

#### **4.3 SAMPLE SIZE AND DATA COLLECTION:**

A non-probability purposive sampling with specific interest intellectual elites in Cairo. A total of 215 questionnaires were collected. However, there were 15 incomplete questionnaires which were deleted and

the final sample size for statistical analyses was 200 questionnaires. Data was collected using a structured questionnaire relating to ‘Perception on the Political system,’ ‘views on Governance,’ and ‘indicators of adherence to democracy and rule of law.’ Participants who agree to take part in the study. Participants were assured of confidentiality of information that they will provide. Data collection took one month.

#### **4.4 DATA ANALYSIS:**

Data collected were screened, coded and entered into the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (IBMSPPSS) version 20.0 for windows. This software was used to facilitate the data analysis process. Using this software, frequencies, percentages, tables and charts were generated to explain the data. The study explores descriptive, graphs and other statistical qualitative tests of associations to critically analyze the perception of the intellectual elites on democracy in Egypt.

#### **4.5 SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE:**

The main source of knowledge for the successful completion of this study would be the Seoul National University Library and the Egyptian Centre for democratic studies. However, the internet and other democracy

Think Tank have and would continue to help enrich the progress and outcome of the study.

#### **4.6 TIME LIMITATION:**

The study explores critically analyze of the perception of the intellectual elites on democracy, political system and ways of governance in Egypt from January 2011-June 2014.

## CHAPTER V

### ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

#### 5.0 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS:

The data used in this study is a primary data collected from elite Egyptians and other experts in democracy. A total of 200 responses were sought through an in-depth interview with the respondents chosen by a non-probability purposive sampling with specific interest on the elite community in the capital city of Cairo. Firstly, the general demographic characteristics of the respondents were examined by gender, Age, educational level, marital status, and current occupation status. All tabulations are SPSS outputs while excel 2010 was used in fitting some tables.


In all, 113 out of the total 200 respondents were males representing 56.5% of total respondents while 87 out of the total 200 respondents were females representing 43.5% of the total respondents. It therefore indicates that more males responded to the study than females. It is also a reflection of the gender biased nature of general issues of Politics and Governance. **Table 3** gives the cross tabular breakdown of the total 200 respondents by their Gender and Age.

**Table 3: Cross tabulation of Gender and Age of respondents**

		Age					Total	
		18 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 - 69		
Gender	Male	Count	15	37	32	19	10	113
		% within Gender	13.3%	32.7%	28.3%	16.8%	8.8%	100.0%
	Female	Count	15	35	25	9	3	87
		% within Gender	17.2%	40.2%	28.7%	10.3%	3.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	30	72	57	28	13	200
		% within Gender	15.0%	36.0%	28.5%	14.0%	6.5%	100.0%


The ages of the respondents to this study reveals that the elite community in the capital city of Cairo were between the ages of 30 – 39 years with 72 (36.0%) out of 200 respondents respectively. The 40 - 49 years group also came next with 57(28.5) out of 200 respondents. Of the 72 respondents aged 30 – 39, 37 (51.4%) of them were males while 35 (48.6%) of them are females. The majority of respondents married. 110 respondents representing 55.0% of men and women had married while 60 respondents representing 30.0% of them had never married. The cluster bar chart cross-table below shows the marital status by Gender of respondents.

**Figure 2: Cluster bar chart of marital status by Gender of respondents**



The majority of respondents have obtained Bachelor’s degree and above. The study found that about 92 (46.0%) of respondents had Bachelor’s degree as their highest education attained with same percentage having master degree and above. Only 16 (8.0%)of respondents had higher national diplomas. The survey were aiming to people have obtained Bachelor’s degree and above to concentrate on the elite perception. The bar graph below reveals the educational levels of respondents by Gender.

**Figure 3: Cluster bar chart of marital status by educational levels of respondents**



Just few respondents to this study were unemployed as time of the study. 19 (9.5%) out of the 200 respondents were unemployed out of which 13 were males with the remaining 6 being females. Of the remaining 181 (90.5%) who were employed, 21 (10.5%) of them were self-employed, 95 (47.5%) employed in the Public sector while 65 (32.5%) were employed by the Private sector. Details are found in table 4 below:


**Table 4: Cross tabulation of Gender and Current Occupation of respondents**

		Current Occupation				Total	
		Unemploye d	Self Employe d	Employe d (Public Sector)	Employe d (Private Sector)		
Gender	Male	Count	13	16	45	39	113
		% within Gender	11.5%	14.2%	39.8%	34.5%	100.0%
	Female	Count	6	5	50	26	87
		% within Gender	6.9%	5.7%	57.5%	29.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	19	21	95	65	200
		% within Gender	9.5%	10.5%	47.5%	32.5%	100.0%

The Egyptian people are majority Muslims and minority Christian society.

This also showed itself evidence in the respondents religious affiliation.

**Figure 4: Cluster bar chart of marital status by religious affiliation of respondents**



**Figure 4** above shows respondents' religious affiliation. A whopping 184 (92.0%) of respondents were of the Islamic faith out of which 105 (52.5%) were males and 79 (39.5%) are females. A clearly few respondents 14 (7.0%) out of the total 200 were of the Christian faith. Also worth noting is the 2 (1.0%) respondents who were of no religious affiliation.

### **5.1 FURTHER ANALYSIS:**

Egypt's political rights rating declined from 5 to 6 and its status declined from Partly Free to Not Free due to the overthrow of elected president Mohamed Morsi in July, violent crackdowns on Islamist political groups and civil society, and the increased role of the military in the political process. This is the scene from outside of the country and the ranking of Egypt through foreign think-tanks, this study is exploring the scene from inside the country through elites.

This part of the analysis critically looks into the perception of our respondents on the Political System of Egypt rated over a 5-point Likert-type scale where 1 = Very bad, 2 = Bad, 3 = neutral, 4 = Good and 5 = Very Good. The table below presents summaries to these effects. From this table and subsequent table of the kind, perceptions from respondents are classified

into four indicators; Political System in Egypt, Governance, Democracy as well as levels of Satisfaction on some indicators of Good governance and the rule of law.

### **5.1.1 Political System in Egypt:**

Views over these major indicators were accessed based on ratings made by respondents ranging from Very bad through to Very Good. On the whole, respondents are either neutral else vehemently rate “very bad” to all the statements listed. A total of 137 (68.5%) elites rated the Egyptian Political system 10 years ago as very bad. The Egyptian Political system just before 2011 protest was also rate as very bad by an overwhelming percentage of elite respondents.

In summary, statements that received above 30.0% ratings for “Very bad” include; ‘Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system 10 years ago’ with (34.0%), ‘Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system just before 2011 protest’ with (30.5%), and ‘Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system after overthrow of president Mohammed Morsi’ with (35.0%). **Table 5** below presents details for the perception of our respondents on the Political System of Egypt rated over a 5-point Likert-type scale where 1 = Very bad, 2 = Bad, 3 = neutral, 4 = Good and 5 = Very Good.

**Table 5: Respondents rating of the Political system in Egypt**

Rating CODE		Very	Bad	Neutral	Good	Very	Total
		Bad	Bad	Neutral	Good	Good	
<b>Political system</b>							
Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system 10 years ago	Frequency	68	69	54	9	0	200
	Percent	34	34.5	27	4.5	0	100
Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system just before 2011 protest	Frequency	61	108	23	8	0	200
	Percent	30.5	54	11.5	4	0	100
Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system between 2011 overthrow and June 2013	Frequency	57	51	74	18	0	200
	Percent	28.5	25.5	37	9	0	100
Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system after overthrow of president Mohammed Morsi	Frequency	70	54	40	32	4	200
	Percent	35	27	20	16	2	100
Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system presently	Frequency	49	68	58	25	0	200
	Percent	24.5	34	29	12.5	0	100
Where on this scale would you put the future of Egyptian Political system	Frequency	33	61	31	57	18	200
	Percent	16.5	30.5	15.5	28.5	9	100

### 5.1.2 Ways of Governance in Egypt

Again, respondents are either neutral or else would rate “very bad” to all the statements listed under indicator of good governance. For instance, a total of 139 (69.5%) elites are of the view that, ‘*Having a strong Leader who does not have to bother with Parliament and general Elections*’ is very bad.

Also, the view of ‘*Ignoring Governments, and having experts make decisions according to what they think is best for Egypt*’ got some appreciably diverse views even though still those that rated it as very bad were in the majority. 67 (33.5%) respondents rated it as very bad, while interestingly, 49 (24.5%) respondents each rated this view as good and bad respectively. ‘*Having the Army (Military) Rule*’ was rated as very bad by a majority of our respondents. **Table 6** below presents details for views of our respondents on the indicators of good government rated over a 5-point Likert-type scale where 1 = Very bad, 2 = Bad, 3 = neutral, 4 = Good and 5 = Very Good.

**Table 6: Respondents rating of the Ways of Governance in Egypt**

Rating CODE		Very Bad	Bad	Neutral	Good	Very Good	Total
<b>Ways of Governance</b>							
Having a strong Leader who does not have to bother with Parliament and general Elections	Frequency	89	50	24	34	3	200
	Percent	44.5	25.0	12.0	17.0	1.5	100
Having the Army (Military) Rule	Frequency	83	46	49	11	11	200
	Percent	41.5	23.0	24.5	5.5	5.5	100
How do you perceive the future of Egyptian Democracy	Frequency	24	43	49	63	21	200
	Percent	12.0	21.5	24.5	31.5	10.5	100

### 5.1.3 Democracy:

Furthermore, respondents are either neutral or else would “strongly disagree” to all the negative statements listed under indicator of Democracy.

**Table 7** below presents details for views of our respondents on the indicators of good government rated over a 5-point Likert-type scale where 1 = **Agree Strongly**, 2 = **Agree**, 3 = neutral, 4 = **Disagree** and 5 = **Disagree Strongly**. For instance, a total of 82 (41.0%) elites agree with the statement that, ‘*Is Democracy affect Economy positively*’. Also, the view that ‘*Democracies are good at Maintaining Law and Order*’ was agreed by a hooping 112 (56.0%)of the respondents.

However, 69 (34.5%) of the respondents agree with the statement that “*Religious Orientations Influence Attitudes toward Democracy*” 120 (60.5%)

**Table 7: Respondents rating of the Views on Democracy in Egypt**

Rating CODE		Agree Strongly	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Disagree Strongly	Total
<b>Views on Democracy</b>							
Is Democracy affect Economy positively	Frequency	82	50	44	8	16	200
	Percent	41.0	25.0	22.0	4.0	8.0	100
Democracies are good at Maintaining Law and Order	Frequency	112	62	8	2	16	200
	Percent	56.0	31.0	4.0	1.0	8.0	100
Democracy may have its own problems but it still better than any other form of Government	Frequency	48	75	41	21	15	200
	Percent	24.0	37.5	20.5	10.5	7.5	100
Religious Orientations Influence Attitudes toward Democracy	Frequency	75	45	56	5	19	200
	Percent	37.5	22.5	28.0	2.5	9.5	100
Highly learned people have Influenced Attitudes toward Democracy	Frequency	76	24	49	9	42	200
	Percent	38.0	12.0	24.5	4.5	21	100
Employment Status	Frequency	14	22	63	68	33	200

have affected the Present Political System positively	Percent	7.0	11.0	31.5	34.0	16.5	100
Views from the academia have affected Democracy	Frequency	9	32	86	53	20	200
	Percent	4.5	16.0	43.0	26.5	10.0	100
Views from the illiterate community have affected the Present Political System positively	Frequency	2	41	32	97	28	200
	Percent	1.0	20.5	16.0	48.5	14.0	100
Views from women have Attitudes toward Democracy	Frequency	5	64	62	54	15	200
	Percent	2.5	32.0	31.0	27.0	7.5	100
Influence from Foreign Countries have affected the Present Political System positively	Frequency	13	34	53	63	37	200
	Percent	6.5	17.0	26.5	31.5	18.5	100

#### 5.1.4 Level of Satisfaction:

From the analysis below, the majority of respondents are “very dissatisfied” with the level of Respect for Human Rights in Egypt Presently, the way Present Leaders in Egypt are handling the affairs of the country, the Present Democracy in Egypt as well as the way Democracy is developing in Egypt. 74 (37.0%), 63 (31.5%), 76 (38.0%) and 88 (44.0%) respectively, are very dissatisfied. **Table 8** below presents details for views of our respondents on the indicators of good government rated over a 5-point Likert-type scale where 1 = **Very Satisfied**, 2 = **Satisfied**, 3 = neutral, 4 = **Dissatisfied** and 5 = **Very Dissatisfied**.

**Table 8: Respondents rating of Level of Satisfaction with Democratic values in Egypt**

Rating CODE		Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	Total
<b>Level of Satisfaction</b>							
How satisfied are you with Respect for Human Rights in Egypt Presently	Frequency	5	9	37	75	74	200
	Percent	2.5	4.5	18.5	37.5	37.0	100
How satisfied are you with the way Present Leaders in Egypt are handling the affairs of the country	Frequency	3	18	61	55	63	200
	Percent	1.5	9.0	30.5	27.5	31.5	100
How satisfied are you with the Present Democracy in Egypt	Frequency	1	3	73	47	76	200
	Percent	0.5	1.5	36.5	23.5	38.0	100
On the whole, are you satisfied with the way Democracy is developing in Egypt?	Frequency	4	18	46	44	88	200
	Percent	2.0	9.0	23.0	22.0	44.0	100

### **5.1.5 MISCELLANEOUS:**

The majority of our respondents are of the view that, more than 50% of Egyptians are still in support of Military Led system of Governance. From the table below, a total of 64.0% of the respondents are of the view that **Egyptians in support of Military Led system of Governance are in the**

**range of 50% to 100%.** This serious situation is expected to remain the same or decrease marginally in the coming years. **Table 9** presents detailed analysis of response from our respondents when we asked “*Do you expect this percentage to Increase or decrease in the coming years*”

**Table 9: Percentage of Egyptians in support of Military Led system of Governance**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Less than 10%	1	.5	.5	.5
Valid 10 - 20%	12	6.0	6.0	6.5
Valid 20 - 50%	59	29.5	29.5	36.0
Valid 50 - 70%	83	41.5	41.5	77.5
Valid 70 - 100%	45	22.5	22.5	100.0
Total	200	100.0	100.0	

**Table 10: Do you expect this percentage to Increase or decrease in the coming years**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Increase greatly	22	11.0	11.0	11.0
Valid Increase marginally	36	18.0	18.0	29.0
Valid Remain the same	41	20.5	20.5	49.5
Valid Decrease marginally	68	34.0	34.0	83.5
Valid Decrease greatly	33	16.5	16.5	100.0
Total	200	100.0	100.0	

**In a similar instance**, the majority of our respondents are of the view that, less than 50% of Egyptians are still **in support of Multi-Political Party System of Democracy**. From the table below, a total of 76.0% of the respondents are of the view that Egyptians who are actually in support of Multi-Political Party Democracy are in the range of 10% to 50%. This serious situation is expected to remain the same or increase marginally in the coming years. Table 5.9 presents detailed analysis of response from our respondents when we asked *“Do you expect this percentage to Increase or decrease in the coming years”*

**Table 11: Percentage of Egyptians in support of Multi-Political Party System of Democracy**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Less than 10%	8	4.0	4.0	4.0
Valid 10 - 20%	70	35.0	35.0	39.0
Valid 20 - 50%	82	41.0	41.0	80.0
Valid 50 - 70%	28	14.0	14.0	94.0
Valid 70 - 100%	12	6.0	6.0	100.0
Valid Total	200	100.0	100.0	

**Table 12: Do you expect this percentage to Increase or decrease in the coming years**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
Increase greatly	19	9.5	9.5	9.5
Increase marginally	68	34.0	34.0	43.5
Remain the same	78	39.0	39.0	82.5
Decrease marginally	31	15.5	15.5	98.0
Decrease greatly	4	2.0	2.0	100.0
Total	200	100.0	100.0	

## CHAPTER VI


### FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

#### 6.0 INTRODUCTION:

The discussion in this chapter will be based on the literature review and the survey analysis and it will be divided into three main arguments: first; the perception of elite Egyptians towards political system in Egypt, second; the perception of elites towards ways of governance in Egypt, third; the views about democracy among Egyptian elites .

#### 6.1 PERCEPTION OF EGYPTIAN ELITES TOWARDS POLITICAL SYSTEM IN EGYPT:

Figure 5: Egyptian Elites' Views towards Political System



Egypt's political system is a democratic republican system that is based on citizenship and rule of law. People are the source of powers, and safeguard their national unity that is based on the principles of equality and justice. The political system is based on political and partisan pluralism. The President of the Republic is the head of State and the head of executive power.

The perception of Egyptian elites towards political system in Egypt currently and in the future: according to the survey elites are supporting multi political party system or pluralism, a total of 76.0% of the respondents are of the view that Egyptians who are actually in support of Multi-Political Party democracy are in the range of 10% to 50%. This serious situation is expected to remain the same or increase marginally in the coming years.

Egyptian elites describes the Egyptian Political system 10 years ago as bad and very bad with percentage of 68.5%, in addition to 27% neutral , if we add these percentage it will be 95% of the elites believe that the political system in Egypt is very bad .

The reasons for the elites choosing the rating of bad of the political system 10 years ago is according to the literature review are based on two fundamental reasons; which are the corruption include the fraud presidential

and parliament elections, non freedom of speech, (especially in 2005 has been exposed to fraud elections under a dictatorship of Mubarak), while the other reason is lack of institutionalization of the state and the order which indicate the weak state.


One of the scholars supported this argument that elite as well as ordinary citizens in Egypt do not believe that political system in Egypt function appropriately since long time age, as he said: "..Second part of 1990s, coinciding with the increased activities of extremist Islamist groups many restrictions were imposed on institutions of civil societies, and the regime intervened in the parliamentary process. These also include manipulation of elections which clearly questions the view of Egypt as a country evolving towards democracy". Evanier, (2011) . This result confirmed that the state institutions is not functioning an appropriate way.

Elites rated Egyptian political system just before 2011 is bad (85%) as well, which was explained by one of the Egyptian writers Kandeel when Egypt reach the highest point of authoritarian regime and Mubarak wanted to turn the regime to heritage system : "..the January 25th Revolution proves to us beyond any doubt the extent of the penetration of rules by corruption and mating power and money in the Egyptian regime and suppressed freedom over the people and looting the wealth and destiny.

"...the influence and the power and the spread of corruption (bribery, nepotism), unemployment and extreme poverty suffered by a large segment of the people." Kandeel (2011). It seems that the authoritarian regime of Mubarak was planning to continue . Mubarak was preparing his son to be his successor. If we notice in the **table 5** in chapter 5 the percentage of the elites perception about political system in Egypt in the future is declining until it reach 47% as bad and very bad, this indicates that after the January revolution elites were having a little optimistic view of the future that democratization process would be achieved after Mubarak regime. While 37.5% of the elites believe that political system is under the process of developing, but this attitudes can be different from time to time according to the power of effectiveness of the elites in the country.

## 6.2 THE PERCEPTION OF EGYPTIAN ELITES TOWARDS WAYS OF GOVERNANCE IN EGYPT:

Figure 6: Egyptian Elites' Views on Ways of Governance



### **6.2.1: Elite perception of leadership:**

Association of Political Studies assured in one of its research that the most important of the governance pillars is the leadership "leadership is highly observed phenomenon globally, however it's poorly understood".

"Having a strong Leader who does not have to bother with Parliament and general Elections" 69.5% of the elites believe that this is bad and very bad , as those elites are very educated and believe that with strong leader only without paying attention to the parliament will be lack of real democracy and express the lack of role of the state institutions. Saad El-deen Ibrahim , an Egyptian American sociologist, advocates for the important of the parliament and elections expressing the real democracy is not to have a strong leader without paying attention to the parliament . No doubt this situation will pull Egypt back to the authoritarian regime without any doubt. The group that agree the phrase above is only; 18.5% of the elites believe it is good to have strong leader without the opinion of the parliament and these elites argue that Egypt needs now first security and stability rather than democracy.

The case of Egypt have witnessed three presidents since 1952, they were depending on the transformational model utilizing their personal charisma.

Concerning the late two presidents of Egypt, the view of Egyptian elites categorize them as Max Weber mentioned the two models of transactional and transformation. President Morsi couldn't represent neither the transactional political leader who can utilizing his knowledge to convince people that he is on the right path nor he was able to utilize his charismatic and impose his own views and ideas. He also could not utilize the state institutions and there was a lack of institutionalization.

On the other hand when President El-sisi come to be the leader, as Egyptian elites argued he is utilizing the charismatic characteristic as he convinced most of the Egyptians that he is the right person to lead Egypt in this transitional period. He utilize the institutions like the police to return the stability and security to the country and establish a plan directly which is the "road map" that will be followed to achieve democracy and economic development in Egypt.

To analyze the situation deeply, the Egyptian elites were divided into three groups, the 1st group argued that President Morsi was not capable to be the president of Egypt and President El-sis is the right one although he is

coming from military back ground but he was elected by 96.1% of success against his counterpart Sabahi. While the second group is argued that President Morsi should finish his term and then elect a new president taking in consideration as what happened with G.W. Bush, the son, most American were against the invasion of Iraq but according to the American constitution people wait until the end of his term then elect another president , the third group is neutral in their opinion as they argued neither the late president nor the new one is able to bring Egypt to the right path of Democracy. Patrick Kingsley and Martin Chuloy in The Guardian (2013) wrote: "A polarized Egypt is facing the most critical phase of its post-revolutionary life after Egypt's army ousted the country's elected president, Morsi, and scheduled fresh elections. The chief of the armed forces, General Abdel-Fatah El-Sisi, announced that he had suspended the constitution and would nominate the head of the constitutional court, Adli Mansour, as interim president. Both presidential and parliamentary elections would follow the new announcement after the popular vast protests against Morsi's rule. El Sisi announced: "We will build an Egyptian society that is strong and stable, that will not exclude any one of its sons,". He spoke of his "historic responsibility" in front of a panel of Egyptians representing what was intended to be full spectrum of Egyptian life, including the country's most senior Muslim cleric (Shiekh Al azhar), the Coptic pope, and leading secular

politician Mohamed El Baradei. Symbolically, the panel also included a representative of the Tamarod campaign, the mass movement that inspired the millions-strong protests in June revolution 2014 that prompted Morsi's departure. El-Sisi's televised statement was met by rapturous applause and a spectacular fireworks display at the centre of the anti-Morsi revolt in Cairo's Tahrir Square. Five miles in east Cairo, the mood could not have differed more. A rally of Morsi supporters booed the new president speech, .....in scenes that epitomized Egypt's divisions.

Secular Egyptians of elites blame Morsi for autocratic policies that have failed to build consensus, while Islamists elites are furious that Egypt's first democratically elected president have been deposed after just a year in office. The opposition has long maintained that Morsi was never interested in consensus. But in his late days, Morsi repeatedly claimed he was willing to share power with his opponents but that was, after El-Sisi's deadline had passed".

The scene of Egypt is expressing that the consolidation and the institution functions have not achieved yet in Egypt.

### **6.2.2 Elites' perception of Military Rule:**


The second argument is "having military rule"; 64.5% of the elites do not accept this phrase. In the period of 2011 until Morsi was elected in June 2012. This period was dominated by the SCAF (Supreme council of Army Forces) there have been several protests against SCAF led by young elite Egyptians: April 6 movement and other liberals group with the cooperation of Muslim Brotherhood (at that time all groups were united).

Bearing in mind that Egyptians, unlike other countries, have been affectionate to Military as an image of power of the country, even when the protests were against the SCAF, elites and citizens believe that this is the only accountable institution in the country.

Later, when the country faced the a state of insecurity, people including elites began to change their mind and believe that Egypt needs a strong leader even if his back ground is a military in order to retrieve the stability and security to the country; "The militaries have played an essential role in this transition period even though they are a part of the authoritarian regimes" . Vincent (2014)

### 6.3: THE VIEWS OF ELITES OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT:

Figure 7: Egyptian Elites' Views on Democracy



#### 6.3.1: Democracy effect on the economy:

The form of the relationship between level of economic development and level of democracy implies that the largest gains in democracy is not important to occur in countries at intermediate levels of development, it is not because developed countries enjoyed democratic life.

Egyptian Elites believe that democracy may only accompanied with economic development in one case when democracy is maintain law of economy and achieving equality.

The proposition of the relation between economy and democracy has been argued for decades. Some scholars argued that economic and political stability are correlated while others see no relations at all, while the third group believe that it depends on the situation of the country. In chapter 2 "literature review", I introduced the view of Lipset (1959) introduced his seminal theory that a country's chances of sustaining democracy depend fundamentally on its level of wealth, while other scholars belief it is not .

According to the survey results elites agree on the previous argument that economic may run better in democracy, and other argue that it depends and it is not a must " *economic development derive democracy* " 50% of the elites disagree . Their argument was that the economy in Egypt as a whole was performing better than ever and that indicators of the economic growth were declining after the revolution on the 25th of January. GDP growth declined from 7.2 in 2008 to 1.6 in 2011 , the CPI inflation decline from 16.2 in 2010 to 11.7 in 2011. Foreign investment gushed in at record levels, notching up a cumulative total of \$46 billion between 2004 and 2009. Gross public debt in that period fell by nearly a third. The size of the country's

foreign debt dropped below the value of its foreign reserves for the first time in decades.

"The challenges ahead of Egypt are not trivial, starting with a political transformation that is still unfolding. However, the will to make a peaceful transition to a modern state where people enjoy dignity, liberty and justice is not dying away.

According to the study conducted by Professor Ahmed Galal in 2011, budget deficit was increasing from -- -6.7 in 2008 to -9.7 in 2011.

**Table 13: Egypt: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators**

	2008/2009	2009/2010	2010/2011
Real GDP growth(Annual %change)	4.7	5.1	1-2
Consumer Price Index (Annual % change)	16.2	11.7	10.7
Current Account ( %of GDP)	-2.3	-2	-3.3
Budget Deficit ( %of GDP)	-6.9	8.1	-9.7
Public Debt ( %of GDP)	76	74	74

Source: Data - IMF

In term of inequality, the elites perceive that democracy will assist in declining the inequality through maintaining the rule of law and increase the

income to the low level wage recipient . They argue that it might be connected with economy but not essential.

### **6.3.2 Religious Orientation Influence Attitudes towards Democracy Positively:**

Chapter 2 "literature review" discussed in the origin of Islam there is a term called "Shura" which indicate consultation over the matters concerning the nation. Shura defined as the opinion of knowledgeable people. In other words, it is to poll the opinion of the nation or its representatives over its issues.

"Shura (consultation) constitutes one of the four cardinal principles in the Islamic perspective on socio-political organization; the other three are justice, equality, and human dignity

Bearing in mind that this study is discussing Egypt which is the leader country in the region as "the [Arab] brains are in Cairo," Egypt is the key to figuring how the intertwine democracy with Islamic culture".

"Research on democratic transitions and consolidation has emphasized the importance not only of structural factors, such as institutional reform and economic development, but also political culture. Tessler. (2002) .

According Tessler Islam as a dominant religion in Arab countries is influence on the attitudes towards democracy.

The survey result shows that people were affected by religious orientation with 60% of the elites agree that religious orientation affected the democracy in Egypt . This is because the Muslim Brotherhood started to have role in the political life in Egypt as in 2012 Morsi succeed to be the president with 51.7% in the presidency elections. Next, the parliamentary election (Magles al Shaab ); two parties of Islamic background - Freedom and Justice party won with 235 seats (47.2%) and Nour Party won with 121 seats (24.3%) .

One of the Egyptian scholars said that Egyptians by nature is religious not only Muslims but Copts (Egyptian Christians) as well. That is why the elites believe that the religions is influence the attitudes towards democracy.

### **6.3.3 Highly Learned People and Academia Affected Attitudes towards Democracy Positively:**

The survey result is positively as the percentage of agree of the phrase "Highly learned people democracy" is 74.5%. As mentioned in chapter 2 "literature review": The explanation for positive effect of economic development on the likelihood of a country establishing and maintaining

democracy emphasizes, two interrelated intervening variables : political culture and social structure. Lipset (1959).

Elites argued that highly learned was one of the factor that affected the democracy in Egypt while they believe that the academia people did not affect on the Democracy in Egypt.

The result according to the above statement, the highly learned people can affect more than the academia people.

No one can deny that the initiative of the January revolution established by the young highly learned Egyptians. Kruzman as well confirmed the importance of intellectuals to democracy he said; "The prominence of students and graduates in democracy intellectuals and Democratization movements of the early 20th century, .... leads us to identify the intellectual "class" as the social basis of democratization" . Kruzman (2004).

Nevertheless, the perception of the academia elites did not influence the new movement of democracy for several reasons; first the percentage of academia to the whole population is less than 1% (2.6 million: 82million) , bearing in mind that 37% of the Egyptians are illiterates which affect the participation in democracy thus the participation of the last election was only

15 million. The scholars argued that is the most important factor can delay Egypt for being democratized is illiteracy. Second; one of the Egyptian scholars asserted that people in Egypt searching for food rather than democracy, this was because of the increasing in poverty ratio in Egypt, according to recent report published by the United Nations' World Food Program (WFP) and CAPMAS (Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) indicates that 48.9 % of Egyptians were under the poverty line in 2011 . This basically means that in 2011 almost half of the population was poor, and this was the main reason for the January revolution which called for: freedom, bread "food security", and justice (equality). Third; elites who are in the academia argued that their duties concern only with the theoretical rather than practical, this argument was raised by Amr Hamzawi, a political scientist in American University of Cairo in his article on the website of Atlantic Council . Fourth; a group of elites eager to help but having some fears that if they participate in the awareness activity , they may cause the chaos and non solidarity of Egyptians so they prefer not to contribute in this stage at least until the security is balanced in Egypt and then they will contribute .

While small percentage of Elites is trying to raise awareness among youth, ordinary people and slum areas through media weather it is social or

printed media , or NGOs, such as Hazem Hosni, Seif A.Fattah, and Saad El Din Ibrahim .

Recently, one of the main arguments are raised heavily in Egypt that the lack of democracy in Egypt is not only a function of the semi-authoritarian elite (in political power), but also reflects the tension and lack of consensus among Egyptian opinion leaders on how to respond to the political challenges that facing Egypt, in addition to that Egyptians are not ready for the concept of pluralism and tolerant of others.

The concept of diversity tolerance with Egyptians will not be accepted because the main problem that they don't accept others' opinion or diversity. They believe only of "Autism" in politics and in every aspect of life.

A survey of 1617 literate Egyptians suggests that they reflect the same tension found among the opinion leaders. What these opinion leaders believe in and propagate is important in understanding the problems of transition to democracy in Egypt. The paper posits that the ideological polarization between different sects of opinion leaders exacerbates the illiberal context which is an impediment to democracy. Moataz A. Fattah ( 2005)

Moataz A. Fattah argued that the ideological positions of the opinion elites fall into three categories: traditionalist Islamists, modernist Islamists and secularists. The traditionalists are in turn split into those who advocate violence and those whose methods are non-violent. Similarly, secularists are internally diverse. They may be pluralists or autocratic statist. The article maintains that there is an ideological tension and distrust among the opinion elites from each camp. Furthermore, this tension creates uncompromising ideological divisions among the masses. Although the majority of literate Egyptians give lip service to democracy, many of them do not adopt a liberal attitude toward their opponents. This lack of liberal attitudes makes it difficult to build the mutual trust necessary for a stable democracy.

Severe tensions among Egyptian *ulama* (religious scholars), intellectuals and activists have been noted by several Egyptian and non-Egyptian commentators. These tensions are so intense that the eminent Egyptian counselor Tareq el-Bishri called it an “ideological civil war.” To verify this depiction, twenty-one intellectuals, *ulama* and activists whom the author interviewed in March and April 2002 were asked to discuss El-Bishri’s characterization. Eighteen interviewees (81.93%) agreed substantially with it. Dr. Saif Abdel Fattah of Cairo University commented: “The ‘ideological civil war’ between Islamists and secularists is becoming

less and less civil.” The late Ma’ moun al-Hudabi of the Muslim Brotherhood concurred and added that there is a conflict of paradigms. This conflict “produces a mutual contempt and fear among Islamists and secularists.” Kamel Behari of Al-Azhar University contends that there is an intra-paradigm clash among the Islamists as well. In his words, “there is uncompromising agitation between *al-Tayar al-Salafi* advocates of U.S. pressure to democratize Egypt are being called “Egyptian marines” by their secularist opponents.

The importance of the academia as Popkewitz argues: "The independent location of the university professor was to provide a vantage point to mediate [by producing and supplying scholarly, expert, and "objective," "non-political" knowledge that was "neutral" and universal] between political groups and find harmony. In that sense, the university academic would be non-partisan. But it is also clear from the debates at the turn-of-the-century that such independence did not mean a role that challenged vested interests. Popkewitz (1984).

Popkewitz described "academic freedom" as representing "a myth of the university as a 'market place of ideas' where different intellectual traditions can debate freely the major social, political, and economic ideas of a time, untrammelled by outside interests and pressures"

The Foucaultian proposal for intellectuals to provide the "instruments for analysis," thus, although perhaps necessary, is not sufficient. Activism by the professoriate, especially social scientists, is not only a fruitful way to combine theory and practice, it is also in our own best interest, thus hopefully avoiding our and others' "assimilation and conquest" by dominant groups to serve their interests. Ginsburg (1987)

#### **6.3.4 Influence from Foreign countries affected the Political System Positively:**

Huntington (2006) stated that invasion of foreign ideas spark revolutions. Such culturally ideological differences lead Egypt's expectations of democratization to optimistically exceed that of reality.

The implications of Arab world: the domino effect or the ripple effect (snow balling) as echoes of both the Tunisian and the Egyptian revolutions, comes the revolutions of Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan and Syria, Arab rulers started to take some steps in the direction of political reform and that Arab governments cannot ignore the power of the Arab street or the power of public opinion in their own countries, a new era of political change, empowerment and awakening already started in the Arab world.

The International Implications: revising the U.S. foreign policy, forging alliances with corrupt dictators, who suppress their people under the

claim of preserving stability, is not an effective strategy, under suppression and repression there is no true stability; there is only a “boiling pot with a lid ready to pop off any minute”, not buying into the “Islamic scare” strategy, which legitimizes oppression as a means to curb Islamic influence: playing on “Islamophobia”, peace and security can be achieved through fair and equitable relations between neighbors, not through strong armies and superior weapons. Khamis (2013) .

Some analysts argued that the uprisings in Arab countries were an outcome of a carefully planned US strategy aimed at restructuring the political map of the Arab world in tandem with American interests in the region. but this argument were rejected by Egyptian scholar living in US that if the USA planned for that this could harm its interest in the region and will threaten the secure of Israeli interests in the region that USA is looking for . Selim (2013)

This result that the writer reach can be identified by the result of the survey as 76.5 % the elites in the survey believe that the Arab spring and the democratization process in Egypt was not influenced by foreign powers, while only 23% believe that the situation of democratization is influenced by foreign policies .

### **6.3.5 Views from Women have affected the Political System Positively:**

The results of the perception of elite towards "views from women affected towards democracy" were 65.6 % disagree.

Although some studies proved that Egyptian women's role and participation affected greatly on the January revolution in Egypt. One of the studies examines the processes of women's citizenship-making during the Arab Spring to take count of the changes, challenges, and emerging possibilities for women's rights.

" ..while the reforms brought about by the former regime of President Hosni Mubarak's government may have improved women's ability to be free of undesirable marital ties, increased women's participation in parliament, and provided access to the judiciary (a tremendous gain), these reforms had little or no relevance to the working-class woman. The concept and practice of citizenship as the access to legal and political rights remained a privileged notion. In that sense, access to citizenship is organized through a hierarchical system and to varying degrees by members of society.....The last decade of Egyptian history attests to the growing dissatisfaction of women, who find it increasingly difficult to feed their families and to take care of their basic needs. Despite what appeared to be headway for women's rights in society,

the Mubarak era is marked by the failed neo-liberalization of Egypt's economy to the detriment of women. This is attested to by the conditions of extreme poverty among the lower socio-economic levels of society and the deterioration of government services. The structural adjustment policies of the 1990s had a long-term impact on the Egyptian economic and social structures, especially in rural areas. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank recommendations to the Egyptian government were meant to increase industrialization by encouraging migration from rural to urban centers. .... This myth of stability was shattered as millions of Egyptians quickly galvanized in Tahrir Square and across the country to demonstrate in a Day of Rage on January 25, 2011.

Although the activists of the April 6 movement (many of whom were women) who were principally behind the initial mobilizing efforts described their surprise at the sheer numbers as well as the success of the protest, it is unlikely that the uprising was simply spontaneous. While another article "Youth, Gender, and Dignity in the Egyptian Uprising" asserted that nevertheless of Egyptian participating in political activities and played a great role, Egyptian women still don't influence in the Egyptian Society .

Unfortunately, shortly after the success of the uprising in January and February 2011—and across the Middle East and North Africa—despite the

massive participation of women in the revolts and the prominent role of some female leaders, few women became leaders of the transition process, whether as popular national politicians, poised to run for presidential or leadership roles in legislatures. Hafez (2014)

Let me conclude by quoting Two statements from two of the elite Egyptians. Dr. Amr Hamzawy , Egyptian political scientist, human rights activist and public intellectual ; he said; in his article in Atlantic Council (2014) titled "Egypt's Elite and an End to a Call for Democracy" : "My mind is still bewildered as I try to explain why Egypt's elite have ceased calling for democracy and adherence to its procedures. I try to understand how they accept (sometimes silently) violations of human rights and freedoms and a renewal of the authoritarian, subjugating nature of the government's relationship to society and citizens. ... Regarding the elite who no longer call for democracy, I am speaking in general, given the actions of the majority. However, I am not blind to the presence of some exceptions, certain individuals and groups that have not ceased to defend the ideas of the transition of power, the rule of law, rights, and freedoms. Their actions have not been without cost. I could hypothesize that the Egyptian elite abandoned their demands for democracy when they realized that there are great dangers threatening the

state's cohesion, civil peace, and coexistence. Our experience in Egypt since the 1950's, as well as the experiences of other countries both near to us and far, refute the idea of a "temporary departure from democracy".

The world had witnessed the how the Egyptian revolution was peaceful and led by its youth as proof to the world that change and freedom can be without accompanied by violence. Factions of society from different ideological backgrounds stood hand in hand in seeking democracy and denouncing tools and applications of lack of good governance that branded the previous regime.

## **CHAPTER VII**

### **CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION**

This paper is presenting a political analysis through the perception of elite Egyptians towards political system, ways of Governance, and democracy. It covers the period from the fall of Mubarak February 2011 to the fall Morsi June 2014 considering options for the future. Establishing a stable democracy in a country witnessed weak institutions (Lack of power of governmental Institutions) and lack of democratic culture during almost 60 years of dictatorship, will need all sects of the society especially elites to consolidate to push the country towards new era of democracy, freedom , justice and equality .

Kruzman mentioned in his study "Intellectuals and democratization" about the importance of the elite as they are the pillars of the society. Therefore this paper concentrates on the perspective of the elite Egyptians.

According to the result of the study, large number of elites in Egypt surrendered to ideologies like secularism and Islamism without thinking or

searching for a real solution especially for the dilemma of struggling towards democracy and good governance .

In my opinion, elites may provide support through two important channels the media , the second channel, is contributing in the political life of Egypt positively rather than limit themselves in the academia life .

A vision for the future, although obstacles are surrounding Egypt in the path of achieving complete democracy as well as economic development, Egypt is being reborn with new liberal trend of Egyptian politics that is carried by highly educated young people that will not accept to revert to the old regime policies that led to the abuse of human rights, social injustice, and autocratic rule. This liberal trend will create a coalition to tolerate all diversities in ideological thinking that is occurred in the Egyptian elite community. The weak state needs the elites of intellectuals to start a reform to the state institutions to overcome all the barriers to reach economic and democratic stability.

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Appendix A:

The Survey

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**PERCEPTION OF THE ELITE COMMUNITY ON DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT**

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**INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE**

This study investigates the Perception of Elite Egyptians on the transitional experiences of the country's Democracy from 2011 to 2014. We would highly appreciate it if you would take some time to complete this questionnaire. Your responses would be treated as confidential and would be used for **academic purposes ONLY**.

**THANK YOU**

**PART A - BACKGROUND**

<b>ITEM</b>	<b>RESPONSE</b>	<b>CODE</b>
<b>1. Gender</b>	1. Male 2. Female	
<b>2. Age</b>	1. 18 – 29 2. 30 – 39 3. 40 – 49 4. 50 – 59 5. 60 – 69 6. 70 +	
<b>3. Current Marital Status</b>	1. Married 2. Never Married 3. Separated 4. Unrecognized Marriage/union 5. Widowed	

<b>4. Educational Level Completed</b>	1. Certificate/Diploma/HND 2. Degree 3. Above Degree	
<b>5. What is your current Occupation</b>	1. Unemployed 2. Self Employed 3. Employed (Public Sector) 4. Employed (Private Sector)	
<b>6. Religious Orientations</b>	1. Islam 2. Christianity 3. Any Other	

**PART B – POLITICAL SYSTEM IN EGYPT**

7. Kindly read carefully and rate the **Political system of Egypt** over a 5-point Likert-type scale where **CODE**;  
**1 = Very bad, 2 = Bad, 3 = neutral, 4 = Good and 5 = Very Good.**

VIEWS	Rating CODE				
	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Political system</b>					
<b>1. Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system 10 YEARS AGO</b>					
<b>2. Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system JUST BEFORE 2011 PROTEST</b>					
<b>3. Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system BETWEEN 2011 OVERTHROW AND JUNE 2013</b>					
<b>4. Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system AFTER overthrow of president MOHAMMED</b>					

<b>MORSI</b>					
5. Where on this scale would you put the Egyptian Political system <b>PRESENTLY</b>					
6. Where on this scale would you put <b>THE FUTURE</b> of Egyptian Political system					

### PART C - GOVERNANCE IN EGYPT

8. Kindly read carefully and rate the Way of Governance in Egypt over a 5-point Likert-type scale where **CODE**;  
**1 = Very bad, 2 = Bad, 3 = neutral, 4 = Good and 5 = Very Good.**

IEWS	Rating CODE				
Ways of Governance	1	2	3	4	5
1. <b><u>Having a strong Leader</u></b> who does not have to bother with Parliament and general Elections					
2. <b><u>Having the Army (Military) Rule</u></b>					
3. <b><u>Having a Democratic Political System</u></b>					
4. Where on this scale would you put <b>THE FUTURE</b> of Egyptian Political system					

### PART D - DEMOCRACY

9. Kindly read carefully and rate your level of agreement or otherwise with the following statements over a 5-point Likert-type scale where **CODE**;  
**1 = Agree Strongly, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Disagree and 5 = Disagree Strongly.**

IEWS	Rating CODE
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<b>DEMOCRACY</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
1. Is democracy affect the economy positively					
2. Democracies are good at Maintaining Law and Order					
3. Democracy may have its own problems but it still better than any other form of Government					
4- Is religious orientation influence Attitudes towards Democracy Positively					
5- High Learned Influence Attitudes towards Democracy Positively					
6. Employment Status have affected the Present Political System POSITIVELY					
7. Views from the ACADEMIA have affected the Present Political System POSITIVELY					
8.Views from the ILITERATE community have affected the Present Political System POSITIVELY					
9. Views Of from Women affected Attitudes Towards democracy positively					
10. Influence from Foreign Countries have affected the Present Political System POSITIVELY					

**PART E - MISCELLANEOUS**

10. Kindly read carefully and rate your level of Satisfaction or otherwise with the following statements over a 5-point Likert-type scale where **CODE**;  
**1 = Very Satisfied, 2 = Satisfied, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Dissatisfied and 5 = Very Dissatisfied.**

VIEWS	Rating CODE
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Miscellaneous	1	2	3	4	5
1. How satisfied are you with Respect for Human Rights in Egypt Presently					
2. How satisfied are you with the way Present Leaders in Egypt are handling the affairs of the country					
3. How satisfied are you with the Present Democracy in Egypt					
4. On the whole, are you satisfied with the way Democracy is developing in Egypt?					

11. In your view what percentage of Egyptians are in support of the <b>Army Led system of Rule?</b>	1. None 2. Less than 10% 3. 10 – 20% 4. 20 – 50% 5. 50 – 70% 6. 70 – 100% 7. 100%	
12. In your view, do you expect this percentage to <b>increase or decrease in the coming years?</b>	1. Increase greatly 2. Increase marginally 3. Remain the same 4. Decrease marginally 5. Decrease greatly	
13. In your view what percentage of Egyptians are in support of <b>Political Party System of Democracy?</b>	1. None 2. Less than 10% 3. 10 – 20% 4. 20 – 50% 5. 50 – 70% 6. 70 – 100% 7. 100%	
8. In your view, do you expect this percentage to <b>increase or decrease in the coming years?</b>	1. Increase greatly 2. Increase marginally 3. Remain the same 4. Decrease marginally 5. Decrease greatly	

## **Appendix B :**

### **Some Egyptian Elites & Titles:**

- *Ahmed Galal* is the Managing Director of the Economic Research Forum. He has obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from Boston University. His latest publication is «The Road Not Traveled. Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa» The World Bank 2008.

- *Amr Hamzawy*: Hamzawy regularly contributes articles in Arabic to various academic journals. He also writes a daily column for the Egyptian independent daily newspaper Al Shorouk. Hamzawy is currently a professor at the public policy and administration department at AUC. He is a professor of political science at Cairo University, a member of the National Council of Human Rights in Egypt, and founder of party Masr Elhureyya..

- Hazem Hosni, professor of political science in Cairo University.

- *Motaz Abd Elfattah*: an Egyptian professor of political science in Cairo University and Michigan University and he has been the prime minister adviser.

- Saad El Din Ibrahim; Saad El-deen Ibrahim , an Egyptian American sociologist , author and one of Egypt's leading human

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- *Seif Abd Elfattah*: Professor of Political science in Cairo University.