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Master's Dissertation in International Studies(International Area Studies)

**TRANSITION TO MULTI PARTY DEMOCRACY;  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN UGANDA  
AND SOUTH KOREA**

August 2015

Graduate School of Seoul National University  
Graduate School of International Studies  
Department of International Development Policy

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**TRANSITION TO MULTI PARTY DEMOCRACY; A  
COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN UGANDA AND SOUTH  
KOREA**

A thesis presented

By

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To

The Department of International Development Policy

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of  
Master of International Studies(International Area Studies)

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to my parents Sam Bwango Akiiki and Mary Busingye (both deceased) for their love and care and to my uncle Asaba Amooti-Winyi and his dear wife Eunice Winyi who have supported me thus far.

## Contents

DEDICATION .....	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	i
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .....	ii
LIST OF FIGURES .....	iii
LIST OF TABLES.....	iii
CHAPTER ONE .....	1
1.1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE .....	9
1.3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY .....	9
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	10
1.5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY .....	10
CHAPTER TWO .....	12
2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .....	12
2.1.1. POLITICAL PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY .....	17
2.1.2. DEFINITIONS.....	18
2.1.3. AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: FROM OLIGARCHY TO INTERNAL DEMOCRACY .....	20
CHAPTER THREE .....	24
3.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF UGANDA .....	24
3.1.1. BRIEF OVERVIEW .....	24
3.1.2. THE BRITISH COLONIZATION OF UGANDA (1894-1962).....	26
3.1.3. POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD: FROM POLITICAL TURMOIL TO THE DICTATORSHIP .....	32
3.1.4. NRM REVOLUTION AND TRANSITION TO MOVEMENT SYSTEM.....	36
CHAPTER FOUR.....	46
4.1. POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM IN SOUTH KOREA.....	46
4.1.1. BRIEF OVERVIEW .....	46

4.1.3. ELECTORAL SYSTEM.....	56
4.1.4. LEGAL REGULATIONS.....	61
4.1.5. PARTY FUNDING.....	66
CHAPTER FIVE .....	68
5.1. ROLE AND STRUCTURE OF SOCIETIES IN THE TRANSITION TO MULTI PARTY DEMOCRACY BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND UGANDA.....	68
5.1.1. ETHNICITY .....	70
5.1.2. RELIGION.....	75
5.1.3. FOREIGN INFLUENCE .....	82
CHAPTER 6 .....	89
6.1. ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF UGANDA’S FAILURE TO FULLY TRANSIT TO MULTI PARTY DEMOCRACY IN CONTEXT OF FULL DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH KOREA.....	89
6.1.1. ROLE OF MULTI ETHNIC STRUCTURE IN UGANDA .....	89
6.1.2. BACKGROUND OF MULTI PARTY SYSTEM IN BOTH COUNTRIES .....	92
6.1.3. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. ....	103
CHAPTER 7 .....	112
7.1. CONCUCLUSION .....	112
7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS .....	114

## **ABSTRACT**

This research paper is a comparative study of the transition to multiparty democracy between Uganda and South Korea. The research will focus on showing why Uganda has not transformed fully democratically as South Korea despite the similar historical paths such as colonization, coup d'états, suspension of constitutions, dictatorships and military rule. This will be done by critically analyzing the role of ethnicity, religion and foreign influence in the democratization process of both countries. It also describes the political systems of both countries more so shows why and whether it was inevitable to change to multiparty democracy in both countries. Finally concludes with lessons and recommendations drawn from Korean transition to full democracy.

**Key words:** Multi party Democracy, Transition, Ethnicity, Culture, Religion, Uganda, South Korea, colonialism, dictatorship and political system

## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CEC	Central Executive Committee
CP	Conservative Party
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DP	Democratic Party
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
IPD	Intra-Party Democracy
JEEMA	Justice Forum
KY	Kabaka Yekka
LEGCO	Legislative Council
NCC	National Consultative Council
NEC	National Election Commission
NRA	National Resistance Army
RC	Resistance Councils
SMCs	Single- Member Constituencies
UNC	Uganda National Congress
UNLA	Uganda National Liberation Army
UPC	Uganda National Congress
UPC	Uganda People’s Congress
UPU	Uganda Peoples Union

## **LIST OF FIGURES**

Figure 1: Showing party affiliation.....	106
Figure 2: Showing trust in the electoral commission over the years .....	108
Figure 3: Showing the rule of law and justice .....	109
Figure 4 : Showing perception on free and fair elections in Uganda.....	110

## **LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1: Similarities in transition to democracy, Korea and Uganda .....	9
Table 2: Political Systems.....	45
Table 3: Ethnic groups religion and foreign influence.....	69

## CHAPTER ONE

### 1.1. INTRODUCTION

*"First of all, the idea of multi-parties is not a new one in Africa. Here in Uganda, we had multi-parties between 1962 and 1966. The generals took over power all over Africa because the multi-parties had failed: this is a historical fact. Their failure was, however, not surprising because we are talking about systems from completely different societies. In Africa, we still have pre-industrial societies without any significant level of social stratification and therefore, we are still dealing mainly with tribal groups. Political pluralism will come to Africa, no doubt, but not at a forced pace." (Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda)*

Uganda's history of ethnic and regional division which has been the main hindrance to multi party politics roots from the British colonial policies of indirect rule and so-called "sub-imperialism" which were effectively used to divide and rule the population. The British concentrated more on developing the southern region, particularly Buganda, but they neglected the other parts of the country. Along with religious conflicts between Muslims, Protestants and Catholics, colonial policy set the stage for the subsequent divisions after decolonization.

Since independence in October 1962, Uganda's failure to develop a functional democracy has been as a result of Conflict which was based on ethnicity and religious tensions more so reflected in the early formation of political parties. After being granted independence, Uganda became an independent country with Milton Obote, as prime minister and Kabaka Muteesa, the king of Buganda as president. This arrangement later led to sharp ethnically charged tensions, resulting into a one-party state under Milton Obote in 1967. To make matters worse, Idi Amin's military coup in 1971 subjected Ugandans to nine years of brutal dictatorship (1971–79) that was sustained by military governors in almost all state positions.

There were 1980 elections that were controversial, organized on a multiparty basis, failed to produce a clear winner thus sparking another wave of instability and civil strife. Between 1981 and 1986, the country suffered a guerrilla war fought by the National Resistance Army (NRA), spearheaded by Yoweri Museveni. The guerrilla war contributed to the failure of Obote's second Uganda People's Congress (UPC) government to return the country to normalcy. The capture of state power by NRA/NRM in 1986 ushered in the "no-party system" or "Movement" regime, which claimed "restoration of democracy" as point number one in its Ten-Point programme which emphasized "participatory democracy" based on "individual merit" in elections and "non-partisan politics".

The NRM government used this to suspend the activities of political parties (Mamdani 1988). Indeed, elections held in 1989, 1996 and 2001 (Kasfir 1992, 1998, Makara et al. 1996, 2003, Apter1995) under the Movement system elections were organized following the concept of “individual merit”. The 1995 Constitution (Article 269) provided that candidates for all elections were prohibited from seeking sponsorship of a political party, opening branches, displaying party colors, or in any way attempting to use the facilities and slogans of a political party.

President Museveni resisted the transition to multiparty politics for many years on the grounds that multiparty politics were the root cause of Uganda’s instability in the 1960s, and during subsequent attempts at civilian rule. The Movement system was originally conceived as a competitive political system within a “no-party” or “non-partisan framework—i.e. the NRM was *not* a party in the conventional sense, but rather a “big tent” to which all Ugandans belonged and within which all could compete on the basis of their own “individual merit” rather than on the basis of their party affiliations. “The decision of whether to use the strategy of democratic mass movements or multi parties should be the business of each individual country.” (Museveni2000: 220). This was an alternative to liberal Western democracy, according to its makers, based on an all-inclusive principle of citizenship and individual merit rather than membership in “divisive” political parties. (Ddungu,1989; Kabwegyere 1996).

Referendum on political systems took place in 2000 and 2005. However, that of 2000 re-affirmed the Movement system, while the one in 2005 changed the system to multi party system.

## **SOUTH KOREA**

Korea traces its founding to 2333 BCE by the legendary Dangun. Since the establishment of the modern republic in 1948, South Korea struggled with the aftermath of Japanese occupation (1910-1945), the Korean War (1950-1953), and decades of authoritarian governments, undergoing five major constitutional changes. While the government officially embraced Western-style democracy from its founding, presidential elections suffered from rampant irregularities. It was not until 1987 that direct and fair presidential elections were held, largely prompted by popular demonstrations.

A large part of the reason that South Korea has attracted the attention of scholars interested in democratic transition is the dramatic way in which the political institutions of the Republic of Korea were established. Prior to the first constitution in 1948, South Korean society had no real experience with democratic institutions. Following thirty-five years of Japanese occupation, which ended along with World War II, most Koreans had no understanding of democratic institutions or representative politics. The election of members to the first National Assembly and drafting of the first constitution were based on a decision by the US Military Government in Korea to establish a separate Korean state south of the thirty-eighth parallel; this after three years of military

occupation in the face of a communist regime in the Russian-occupied zone north of the thirty-eighth parallel that refused to agree to UN supervised elections.

Not surprisingly, the structure of the First Republic was strongly influenced by the American presidential system. The first president, Syngman Rhee, who was educated and spent nearly forty years in exile in the United States, was nominally elected by the National Assembly, but clearly chosen by the United States to be the first leader of the country. The unicameral, National Assembly was made up of two hundred legislators, of which eighty five were officially listed as independent. The remaining 115 members represented fourteen different political parties. This rather abrupt establishment of a democratic government without significant participation by the South Koreans themselves also created a serious void on the representational side of the process.

Given the circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that Rhee became increasingly powerful by the end of the Korean War in 1953. After the war, Rhee was elected by popular vote by increasingly large margins in 1956 and 1960. However, in the face of abysmal economic conditions, growing protests in South Korea and weakening support from the United States, President Syngman Rhee eventually went into exile in 1960 to Hawaii after a student uprising citing civil unrest and general political instability that led to his resignation.

General Park Chung-Hee led a military coup against the weak and ineffectual government the following year. Park took over as president from 1961 until his assassination in 1979, overseeing rapid export-led economic growth as well as severe political repression. The year following Park's assassination was marked by considerable political turmoil as the previously repressed opposition leaders all clamored to run for the presidential office. In 1980, General Chun Doo-Hwan launched a coup d'état against the transitional government of Choi GyuHwa, the former prime minister under Park and interim president, to assume the presidency. Chun's seizure of power triggered national protest asking for democratization particularly protests in Gwangju, South Cholla province. Chun sent in the Special Forces to suppress the city, and many students and civilian were killed brutally. The protesters armed under the name of Civil Army, but at least suppressed by military force.

South Korea began its democratic transition in 1987, when after several waves of popular protests authoritarian President Roh Tae-Woo called direct presidential elections for later that year. National Assembly elections were subsequently held in the spring of 1988. Though the incumbent ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), retained both the presidency and the legislature after these momentous founding elections, democratic institutions had been introduced and elections were hotly contested. Indeed, in many respects, Korea's democratic reforms have been effective, with Korea being hailed as

one of the success cases among “third wave” democracies (Huntington, 1992; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995).

However, South Korea is now widely recognized as one of the most successful third-wave democracies in Asia (Chu, Diamond, and Shin, 2001; Diamond and Plattner, 1998; Shin and Lee, 2003). For more than a decade, it has regularly held free and competitive elections at all levels of government. Both nationally and locally, citizens choose the heads of the executive branches and the members of the legislature through regularly scheduled electoral contests. It has peacefully transferred power to opposition party, the Millennium Democratic Party. Accordingly, there is little doubt that the political regime of Korea fully meets the democratic principle of popular sovereignty featuring free and fair elections, universal adult suffrage, and multiparty competition. The party system there is considered to be weakly institutionalized, unstable and ineffective.

**TABLE SHOWING SIMILAR PATHS TOWARDS MULTI PARTY DEMOCRACY IN BOTH SOUTH KOREA AND UGANDA**

	Uganda	South Korea
1	<b>1894</b> Colonized by the British	<b>1910</b> Colonized by Japanese
2	<b>1962</b> Gained independence First national elections	<b>1948</b> Gained independence General elections, presidential election in national assembly
3	<b>1963</b> One man/party rule by Milton Obote starts	<b>1950</b> one man rule Rhee Syng Man <b>1955</b> Two party system; Liberal party and Democratic party <b>1963</b> Change in two party system; Democratic Republican party and Democratic party)
4	<b>1971</b> Coup d'état by General Idi Amin	<b>1961</b> Coup d'état by Gen Park Chung Hee
5	<b>1966</b> The constitution was abrogated by Milton Obote	<b>1972</b> First Suspension of constitution by Gen Park Chung Hee
6	<b>1980</b> First multiparty presidential elections	<b>1956</b> First multi party presidential elections
7	<b>1986</b> No party democracy(Movement system) <b>1995</b> Adoption of current Constitution	<b>1987</b> New democratic constitution enacted

8	<b>2005</b> Reintroduction of multi party democracy	<b>1997</b> First peaceful regime change to opposition party leader
9	<b>2006</b> First multi party elections since 1986	<b>2008</b> Second peaceful regime change

**Table 1: Similarities in transition to democracy, Korea and Uganda**

The above table shows that Uganda and south Korea have all under gone through colonialism , one man/single party rule soon after independence, coup d'états, dictatorships under Idi Amin and Park Chung Hee respectively and suspension of the constitution. It's the above table that I draw the significance of the research.

## **1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE**

*To show why Uganda has failed to fully transit to multi party democracy as South Korea did despite having similarities in their democratization process*

## **1.3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

Things do not automatically become better simply because a transition has taken place (Linz and Stepan, 2000); *“We are painfully aware that most political transformations away from a once stable non democratic regime do not end in completed democratic transitions”*. They argue that in societies already rent by ethnic and social cleavages, and with no clear political platform presented to voters, voting patterns inevitably still generally reflect ethnic and other primordial loyalties rather than a true exercise in democratic preferment.

Basing on the countries histories Uganda and South Korea have all undergone colonization, dictatorship and military rule however ethnicity has always been pivotal in the politics of Uganda which is not recorded South Korea due to the absence of multi ethnicity. The research will focus on showing why Uganda has not transformed fully democratically as South Korea has despite the similar historical path such as colonization, coup d'états, suspension of constitutions, dictatorships and military rule

#### **1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

1. How the Ugandan multi-ethnic structure has hindered its democratic process?
2. Was the change from no party democracy to multi party democracy inevitable in both Uganda and South Korea?
3. What triggered the change to multi party politics in both South Korea and Uganda
4. Why Uganda is seen as not a full democratic country although it has achieved the transition to multiparty democracy compared to South Korea?

#### **1.5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY**

The research will be qualitative mainly descriptive analysis by reviewing and analyzing papers, reports, relevant text books and Journals on transition to multi party democracy in both countries. Reliable sources such as Afrobarometer were used to show the political dominance of the ruling party over the years and the trust of the electoral commission by the electorates. The Afrobarometer is a comparative series of public attitude surveys, covering up to

35 African countries in Round 5 (2011-2013) and used a national probability sample of 2400 adult Ugandans selected to represent all adult citizens of voting age. It measures public attitudes on democracy and its alternatives, evaluations of the quality of governance and economic performance. In addition, the survey assesses the views of the electorate on critical political issues in the surveyed countries. Another reliable source, Democracy audit 2008-2013(HURINET-U) was used to comprehensively show the rule of law and Justice and also showed if there have been Free and Fair elections in Uganda. Democracy audit 2008-2013 was a study to assess Uganda's democratic experience over the past five years. It engaged over 3000 people in all regions of Uganda with primary focus on the colonial regions namely; Buganda, Busoga, Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro, Teso, Acholi, Lango, Kigezi, west Nile, Bugishu, Sebei and Bukedi.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There are studies to show a new form democracy then which the no party democracy based on individual merit prevailed in 1986 and addressed the issue of parties being embodied in tribes and religion by Mamdani, Mahmood (1988). Most provocatively, Uganda created the ‘no-party’ electoral system, which required candidates to run for political office on ‘individual merit’ alone. Though it no longer has this system in a pure form, Uganda’s political experimentations have highlighted a fundamental importance of democratic procedures throughout the African continent. Many states, including Rwanda and Ghana, have supported a similar no-party model of democracy. Although their systems were often considered *de facto* one-party states, no-party systems are different in theory from their one-party counterparts, and the case of Uganda highlights some of these differences.

However some Ugandan scholars criticized this system and noted that the Movement system (no party democracy) was a perverted version of one-partyism and was out of touch with the realities of the democratizing world. Sabiiti Makara and Lise Rakner (eds) (2008), *Electoral Democracy in Uganda*. Bwengye, Wazarwahi Francis (1985)

Prior research has been done to show how the existence of multiparty politics doesn’t necessarily deepen democratic governance in the country like

Uganda. More so emphasizing that electioneering doesn't necessarily produce democratic governance or create the condition and norm necessary for institutionalization of democratic rule as it evident in Uganda. Makara,(2010).

In their book "Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation- Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe" Linz and Stepan did not bother with the definition of the term "democracy" but concentrated on the concrete issues of democratic transition and consolidation. The questions posed by the authors were: how the character of different non democratic regimes affects, or does not affect the paths that can be taken to complete a democratic transition? Also, what implication do prior non-democratic regimes have for the probable tasks of getting a transitioned democracy consolidated?

In answering these questions the authors were of the opinion that a democratic transition is regarded as complete: when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government; when a government comes to power that is the result of a free and popular vote; when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies; and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*.

Linz and Stepan insist that with the completion of democratic transition, there are still many tasks left to be completed, conditions to be established, attitudes

and habits to be cultivated before a democracy could be said to have been consolidated. A consolidated democracy was then said to be one in which:

1. No significant national, political, social or institutional actors spend significant resources to bring about undemocratic regimes or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state.

2. A strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern life in a society as theirs.

3. Governmental and non-governmental forces within the state become subjected to and habituated to the resolution of conflict within the specific laws and institutions sanctioned by the democratic process.

There have been studies to show the Ethnicity and Transition to Democracy in Nigeria by Okechu Kwulbean where he explained the passing of authoritarian rule in a Multi-ethnic Society and the centrality of ethnicity in the transition to democracy in Nigeria. When Western democratic institutions are merely transplanted into Africa, a dangerous gap often develops between them and the democratic struggles of the people. This gap is often filled by various undemocratic and anti-democratic forces, such as ethnic, religious and other millenarian and pseudo-political organizations that manipulate and feed on the fears and deprivations of the people.

Studies in Indonesia have been carried out to go beyond the electoral arena to see whether political parties still maintain a degree of competition after

the election. Competitiveness may disappear once the parties leave the hurly-burly of the election and enter a new arena of interaction. One is that meaningful political competition in new democracies can only be achieved through the presence of a well-structured party system (Bielasiak, 1997). More so, better democratic process in a lot of ways depends on a well functioning party system (Kitschelt et al, 1999).

Similarly, political pluralism tends to be equated with the presence of multiple political parties contesting elections without regard to the political environment in which they operate and the internal institutional structures and processes by which these parties offer real choices and options to the electorate. It is this realization that has sustained the long fight for constitutional and political reform in all three East African countries to provide a level playing field for all political parties (Musambayi 2003).

Previous studies also show increased civic awareness from mass civic education programmes especially since the late 1990s may have increased voter turnout and participation in elections, but this is more a reflection of the voters' faith in the electoral process as a means of changing leadership, as opposed to faith in political parties as institutions of democracy (Chege 2007).

The choice between direct and representative democracy is however still contested in comparative political literature (Teorell 1999). Consensus is however emerging in the majority of research on democracy in Africa in favor

of representative democracy and the role of political parties as key actors in the democratization process (McMahon 2001). Political parties however face a credibility challenge as argued above. Internal democracy is therefore indispensable if political parties are to fulfill their role as legitimate and credible agents of democratization in the wider society.

The President of the African Studies Association in the United States and Uganda specialist, Aili Tripp, following Larry Diamond, depicts “hybrid” or “semi-authoritarian” regimes across Africa as characterized by violence and patronage coupled with ineffective democratic institutions and frustration among civil society groups. She argues that broad-based coalition governments in Africa eventually fall toward authoritarianism because “the need to hold onto power trumps other considerations.”

Leaders such as Yoweri Museveni in Uganda eventually fall toward clientelistic politics even if the rhetoric of the government is nationalistic. “One of the main constraints on democratization is the divisive politicization of ethnicity, religion, caste and other identities.” Although she writes that the term hybrid is a challenge to “linear and teleological march of democratization,” there is in reality only two options presented in her most recent book and her analysis clearly positions the notion of hybridism between the concepts of authoritarianism and liberal democracy.

In this context, entrenched leaders, such as Uganda's President, Yoweri Museveni, embody a central and important procedural debate about appropriate length of term in office and tendencies towards dictatorship. As Giovanni Carbone argues, the problem of moving a hybrid regime into a multiparty democracy is difficult because of turn towards democracy .Both Carbone and Joshua Rubongoya have written that Uganda's political system should be considered a "hegemonic party system," which, they argue, follows Sartori's analysis based on "one party dominance". In Uganda for instance, opposition political parties operate under severe constraints imposed by President Museveni and his authoritarian government (Chege 2007). The lack of institutionalised structures within political parties leads to the development of personality cult politics.

### **2.1.1. POLITICAL PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY**

Political parties are pre-eminent institutions of modern democratic governance. The general consensus in comparative political thought and among policy makers is that political parties play a central role in deepening and fostering democracy in both established as well as emerging democratic polities. This is aptly captured by the assertion that political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the political parties (Schattschneider, 1942: 1). The relevance of political parties in the organization of modern politics and governance is not a recent phenomenon of

contemporary societies. Political parties have been part and parcel of political organization since the creation of the nation state

This chapter seeks to establish a working definition of political parties as institutions of political organization. It explores the various conceptions of political parties in comparative political thought and literature and contextualizes this within the broader debate on democracy and more specifically participatory democracy. It pays particular attention to the historical, socio-economic and cultural determinants of the evolution and development of political parties. This approach in my view is relevant in distinguishing characteristic variations between political parties within and between emerging African democracies like Uganda and those pertaining to established democratic polities like South Korea. Political parties are essentially products of social organization for political power and are best studied and understood in juxta position with the social-historical forces at play providing the context in which they emerge and operate.

### **2.1.2. DEFINITIONS**

As early as the 18th century, Edmund Burke described a political party as a body of men united for promoting, by their joint endeavors, the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed" (Churchill, 1963). Modern political parties however exhibit three distinct characteristics lacking in Burke's definition. First, they have become more

organized and centralized institutions with bureaucratic structures, secretariats and paid staffers. Secondly, modern parties do not necessarily work towards a national interest, but any kind of interest including regional, ethnic, racial, religious or economic objectives.

Parties are not organized along a particular principle as many manifest a conglomeration of varying interests, ideologies, principles and objectives. Third, political parties are largely organized with the sole objective of competing for and capturing political office (Hague and Harrop 2007). The nature, forms and functions of political parties have continued to evolve in response to socio-economic and political changes in society. Earlier conceptions of political parties have therefore demonstrably changed over time.

The element of competition and striving to govern is a central component of modern political parties. Sartori aptly describes a political party as any political group identified by an official label that present at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office (Sartori 1976: 63). This definition however still falls short of capturing the organizational as well as interest aggregation and articulation dimensions of political parties. It is thus preferable, for the purposes of this discussion, to adopt the definition by Maliyamkono and Kanyongolo (2003:41) that “a political party is an organized association of people working together to compete for political office and to promote agreed-upon policies”

### **2.1.3. AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: FROM OLIGARCHY TO INTERNAL DEMOCRACY**

African political parties are products of distinct historical, socio-economic and political conditions that influence their character and functioning different from those prevailing in western democracies. The only somewhat parallel historical point with the European model was the immediate pre and post independence period when African political parties were broad-based mass liberation movements embodying a single ideology of liberation from colonial rule.

Independence political parties, formulated under the single ideology of majority African rule provided a unifying force among societies that were historically antagonistic along ethnic lines. Unlike the majority of their western counterparts almost all African nation states (with the exception of countries such as Somalia) lack in distinctive cultural or ethno-linguistic homogeneity. They are highly heterogeneous along ethnic, regional, religious or clan cleavages. Although western European polities such as the Netherlands may have had rifts encompassing Calvinists, Socialists, Catholics, western entrepreneurs, southern small farmers etc, they remained relatively stable and political competition was contained within established structures and traditions (NIMD 2008).

African societies on the other hand lack in socially entrenched and institutionalized political, social and governance structures along which political competition can be channeled. They are therefore highly fractious and fragile. Political competition and organization tends to follow these pre-existing

fault lines which in turn determine the structure of political parties. Manning (2005:718) characterizes African parties as not being organically linked to any particular organized social group, and so have often resorted to mobilizing people along the issues that are ready to hand – ethnicity, opposition to structural economic reform – without regard for the long-term consequences.

Modernization theory to this extent therefore, falls short of capturing the essence of post third wave African political parties. Instead of providing stability and ordering the political system, reigning in divisive and potentially explosive social forces, African political parties and the elites that control them tend to play on these very social cleavages to gain power through inherently undemocratic means. This characterization seems to affirm Robert Michels (1968) assertion that political parties have an inherent tendency towards oligarchy. According to this approach, not only do political parties develop undemocratic characteristics in the way they control and manipulate social cleavages, but also in their internal organisation and decision-making processes.

The paradox of the majority of African political parties is that most of them are poorly organized and lack institutional capacity, their decision making processes are unstructured and power often lies in the hands of the party leader and a few of his cronies who are usually wealthy enough to bankroll the party (Wanjohi, 2003). Furthermore the role of the party membership is reduced to a bare minimum, usually to endorse decisions already made by the elite. Political mobilization assumes the form of personality cults and loyalty is often to the

party leader as opposed to the party as an institution. This encourages the politics of “party hopping” where leadership disagreements may lead to one leader jumping from one party to another and carrying his supporters with him/her.

On the other extreme are the well organized, highly centralized and structured parties that have been in power since independence such as CCM in Tanzania. Centralization then takes away decision making power from lower party organs and branches and concentrates it on a core group of party oligarchs such as the Central Committee of the CCM. Such parties are usually found in single-party regimes where the party and the state are so fused that they became indistinguishable from each other. Whatever the case may be, both categories of parties, either by default or design, are considerably lacking in internal democracy.

Other approaches advanced to explain the democratic deficit between African political parties and a truly representative democracy include developmental theory which argues that certain minimum socio-economic pre-conditions are necessary for democracy to thrive. It further argues that the low socio-economic condition of the African polity and the distinct lack of clear ideological foundations, allow for the development of clientelist and patronage based political structures through which access to, and distribution of state resources can be channeled. While describing the socio-economic basis for the lack of intra-party democracy in western societies, Otto Kirchheimer (1966)

aptly captured a picture that is as much applicable to modern African political systems. In his view, contemporary political parties are characterized by the decreasing influence of individual party members, lack of specific class appeal in favor of other pre-existing social cleavages in order to appeal to voter support base, increasing autonomy of the leadership from internal checks and balances, and the complete lack of ideology in the parties' programmes.

## CHAPTER THREE

### 3.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF UGANDA

#### 3.1.1. BRIEF OVERVIEW

##### **Uganda**

Uganda is a small, landlocked former British East African colony of close to an estimated 35 million people. At Independence in 1962 it was relatively prosperous, its revenue deriving mainly from coffee, cotton, tea, and other agricultural products. Like most other African countries it was highly differentiated internally and the political problem was from the start and in common with other African countries, to find an appropriate political framework that could contain and make use of this differentiation in a positive way.

When Arab traders moved inland from their enclaves along the Indian Ocean coast of East Africa and reached the interior of Uganda in the 1830s, they found several African kingdoms with well-developed political institutions dating back several centuries. The most important of these kingdoms were Buganda in central Uganda, and the kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara located to the north and west of Buganda. The Arab traders brought Islam to Uganda. Arab traders were followed in the 1860s by British explorers searching for the source

of the Nile River. Protestant missionaries entered the country in 1877 followed by Catholic missionaries in 1879.

In 1888, royal charter assigned control of the emerging British "sphere of interest" in East Africa to the Imperial British East Africa Company, an arrangement strengthened in 1890 by an Anglo-German agreement confirming British dominance over Kenya and Uganda. The high cost of occupying the territory caused the company to withdraw in 1893, and its administrative functions were taken over by a British commissioner. In 1894, the Kingdom of Buganda was placed under a formal British protectorate. In 1896, Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole and Busoga were added to the protectorate and the British signed treaties with other tribes north of the Nile. In 1900, the Buganda Agreement was made which stipulated that the Kabaka (name for the ruler of Buganda) could remain the ruler only as long as he did so in cooperation with British interests. By 1914, the region, which is now Uganda, was completely under the control of British administration.

Uganda is one of the most populous countries in Africa. The urban population has grown at a rate of 5.7 percent annually and now represents 12.5 percent of the total population. There are 65 ethnic groups in Uganda of which the largest in number are the Bantus who occupy the central and western regions of the country. Bantu groups include the tribes of Buganda, Banyankole, Basoga, Bakiga, Batoro, Banyoro, Banyarwanda, Bagisu,

Bagwere and Bakonjo. The Nilotics, who occupy the north-central regions include the Lango, Acholi, Alur, Padhola, Lulya and Jonam. The Nilo-Hamitics who occupy eastern and northeastern regions include the Teso, Karamojong, Kumam, Kakwa, Sebei, Pokot, Labwor and Tepeth. Other Nilo-Hamitic groups including the Lugbara, Madi and Lendu live in the northwest of Uganda.

In general, religious affiliation in Uganda can be broken down in the following way: 41.9 percent of Ugandans name themselves Catholic, 35.9 percent Protestant, 12.1 percent Muslim and others 10 percent according to the 2002 population census. Most Ugandans are Christian; Catholics and Protestants comprise the largest denominations. However the Pentecostals and other smaller groups have been increasing over the years. Islam was introduced by Arab traders in the early 19th century while Christianity came to Uganda in 1875.

### **3.1.2. THE BRITISH COLONIZATION OF UGANDA (1894-1962)**

When the first European explorers arrived in the 1860s in what is now Uganda, the kingdom of Buganda was at the height of its political powers over neighboring kingdoms on the north shore of Lake Victoria. To its north was the formerly powerful kingdom of Bunyoro, which had once controlled large sections of what is now southern and southwest Uganda but had been declining in regional power and influence since the seventeenth century. After a highly tumultuous period in the 1880s whereby roughly equal halves of the Bugandan

population was converted to Protestantism and Catholicism, the British were able to sign a treaty with the Kabaka (king) of Buganda and then use Buganda as a base for extending their rule throughout the surrounding area.

Colonel Henry Colvile was assigned in 1893 to take control of the Nile basin north of Buganda, which inevitably led to clashes with the obstinate Kabalega, the Omukama (king) of Bunyoro, whose troops Colvile pushed back to north of the Kafu river before conquering the kingdom altogether. This war of pacification was extremely bloody: while the full scale of the violence is unclear, it is certain that it led to the deaths or forced migration of a large majority of the kingdom's subjects, a demographic collapse from which the Banyoro did not recover for more than a half-century. Before ending his tour of duty in 1894, Colonel Colvile promised conquered territory south of the Kafu River to Bugandan chiefs. Colvile's successor, E.J.L. Berkeley wrote that;

*“The annexed provinces in becoming part of the Kingdom of Uganda, must, of course recognize the sovereignty of the King of Uganda, the supremacy and authority of the chiefs selected (with the approval of Her Majesty's Commissioner) to govern them and they must understand that henceforth they are subject to all laws, regulations, obligations as to local taxation and tribute, etc. that are in force in the other parts of the Kingdom. At the same time, however, that these provinces became part of the Kingdom of Uganda so would their native inhabitants become Waganda an, as such entitled to all the public and private rights of Waganda in any other part of the Kingdom.”*

In other words, Berkeley did not see a reason why those inhabitants of the region who had survived the pacification war would not assimilate into Buganda as they were governed by Bugandan chiefs and laws. Thus Berkeley's conception that the resident Banyoro would "become Waganda" because they were now part of the Buganda kingdom corresponds exactly to the constructivist paradigm of ethnicity conforming to colonial administrative boundaries rather than the other way around. Despite the fact that resistance to the transfer began immediately, Berkeley's successors nonetheless accepted the annexation as final. It did not matter that only later, after the lost counties had been incorporated into Mubende district, did the British find out that the lost counties hosted all the tombs of all former Abakama (kings) of Bunyoro, for which they allowed the Bunyoro Native Government to appoint a special salaried chief (the Mugema) to reside in Buganda and look after the tombs in 1915. Indeed, the British continued to ignore the nine formal requests of various Abakama to have the matter investigated between 1931 and 1958.

Thus by 1903 almost immediately after the British formalized their forceful occupation, they introduced the cultivation of cotton on peasants plots to feed the cotton mills of Britain and British India. Equally, because the colonial authority required an army and police, it placed guns in the hands of designated "Marital tribes", those thought not only to pose risk but also to be sufficiently reliable to enforce colonial orders(Kirunda,1995) .The British also never intended for Uganda to be an independent nation-state but viewed the

colony primarily as an economic resource and used a method of the British to divide-and-rule. During this period of time the province of Buganda continuously developed into the more prosperous part of Uganda and as the British attempted to widen their reach in the region a divide was created and reinforced between the premiered Buganda province and the rest of the protectorate.

The British colonial rule created a system of extensive ethnic fragmentation in Uganda resulting in a nation consisting of unranked groups and communities, the concept of which are explored above, living side by side, attempting to co-exist under the British colonial administration. This applies both to the indigenous ethnic communities in the region but also to the immigrating peoples, for example the Nubians, who were supposed to be incorporated into a region to which they were at the best alien and at the worst brutal mercenaries having exerted relentless conflict and violence on the indigenous population.

Several political parties were formed before independence, Uganda National Congress (UNC), which was formed in 1952 under the leadership of Ignatius Musazi. The UNC emerged out of the Uganda African Farmers Union (UAFU) which was a movement of small holder farmers agitating for better prices of coffee and cotton. At the time, the main economic and political activities were concentrated in Buganda and naturally the leadership was mainly drawn from Buganda. With time, the Baganda lost out

on the political leadership because they lacked the local base and support of Mengo establishment. This therefore, changed the ethnic and character of the leadership of the party. The Party was the first Ugandan Party to be established and to have branches country wide.

The fact that UNC adopted a socialistic orientation meant that it had an uphill task dealing with the colonial administration and religious establishments. The result of this was that the party was consumed by internal conflicts fermented by the colonial rulers. Very many small parties were encouraged to form like the Progressive Party under E. M. K Mulira in January 1955. The Progressive Party never achieved much of a following.

United Congress Party was formed by a splinter group in 1956 under Dr. E. Muwazi but was unable to capture the branches of UNC. UCP decided to take the line of Buganda Government to fight direct elections. In 1958, political leaders in the LEGCO particularly those from outside Buganda formed Uganda Peoples Union under the leadership of W.W. Rwetsiba. The Uganda Peoples Union represented the first major effort at political organization lead from outside Buganda. The Democratic Party which was formed in 1954, partly as a bulwark against communism and marginalization of Catholics in Buganda was later in 1956 led by Matayo Mugwanya who was a minister in Buganda government and in 1955 lost the Katikiro position by 41 votes to Kintu with 42 votes.

Between 1956 and 1960 UNC was characterized by internal conflicts and splits which culminated into the emergence of A. M Obote as a compromise candidate to replace I. K Musazi. The change took place at the Annual Delegates Conference held in Mbale on the 12th January 1959. On 9<sup>th</sup> March 1960, UNC Obote faction merged with UPU to form UPC. In June 1960, a moderate group of Baganda launched the United National Party under the leadership of Apollo Kironde the former member of UNC and Y.K Lule a lecturer at Makerere University and Abu Mayanja as its publicity secretary. This signed the death warrant of UNC. UNP soon afterwards decided to merge with UPC.

At Independence, it was clear that the Baganda (the largest ethnic group) wanted extensive autonomy in Uganda, and the Buganda King's party Kabaka Yekka ("*The King Only*") emphasized this desire. However this was not favored by most Ugandans of other tribes and amongst some Buganda educated elite. The three parties (Kabaka Yekka, UPC and the Democratic Party) contested the first pre-Independence election. As expected, Kabaka Yekka won most of the seats in Buganda and the UPC won most seats in the North and East. However the Democratic Party (DP) led by Benedicto Kiwanuka emerged as the largest single party. Kiwanuka was on the verge of becoming the first Prime Minister of independent Uganda when he was thwarted by a surprising alliance between the UPC and Kabaka Yekka.

The Kabaka was afraid that DP would remove the Monarchy in favor of a more modern looking Uganda. As for the UPC, Milton Obote, realizing he had lost the election, saw the alliance as the way to power. In return Obote offered the Kabaka a ceremonial role in the new administration and the retention of all royal powers. The UPC/KY alliance thus formed Uganda's first government with Milton Obote as Prime Minister.

### **3.1.3. POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD: FROM POLITICAL TURMOIL TO THE DICTATORSHIP**

Presenting the Bill of Uganda's independence, the Earl of Dundee, who had been part of the independence conference, told the Lords that it was noted during the conference that joining together the traditional kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro and Tooro into structures of modern government was not going to be easy because of the exceptional strength of tribal loyalties to these institutions. In his submission, he said: *“Uganda is notable for the strength of the monarchical system. The kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole have always thought that the British administration tended to underestimate how deeply rooted monarchy is in the minds and the loyalties of the people. In Buganda, the Kabakaship is regarded as being sacrosanct. It is the outward and visible sign of their history and of their sense of nationhood, while at the same time it carries with it a certain indefinable but, nevertheless, powerful mystique. I have known two Kabakas, and can testify to the devotion*

*and loyalty shown by their subjects, both to their office and to their person. The same is true of the other kingdoms."*

When Uganda acquired its independence, it was neither a monarchy nor a republic it was simply referred to as "the Sovereign State of Uganda". The democratic transition from Protectorate to republic was not without internal problems: many of the deep seated divisions, based partly on religion and partly on the existing tradition systems, remain today. (Eric Masande,2005)

The transition from colonial rule to independence in Uganda was based on the Westminster model of democracy and the period 1961-1962 is indicative of a fundamental flaw in the running of the civil service, which had the task of providing continuity and serving any democratically elected government. The Westminster model was based on the principal of meritocracy regardless of race, sex, religion or ethnicity. It assumed the existence of honesty, integrity and that incorruptibility and dedication to duty would be observable in Uganda since the underlying pillars of the model.(mugaju,1996:1) .The evidence of rigging in the 1961 elections indicates that this was unlikely from the start.

Uganda had Apollo Obote as prime minister, supported temporarily by the powerful Kabaka of Buganda who became the president the following year.(Kyemba,1977:22). However Uganda the post colonial semi federal arrangement of the state was short lived. Ethnic and class conflicts tore it apart and the immediate post independence political alliances collapsed.(Kotecha and Adams 1981:55). In 1966, Obote suspended the constitution, abrogated federal

and semi-federal institutions, and declared a state of emergency in Buganda. The latter and the other kingdom-states were abolished as legal and jurisdictional entities.

There were violent protests carried out by the Baganda against Obote's consolidation of power. Other uprisings came from the Ugandan military. General Idi Amin Dada an illiterate career soldier of "limited intelligence" from the minority Kakwa tribe in the northwest of the country, served as Obote's army commander. In 1971, Amin overthrew Obote, suspended the constitution and ruled under a provisional government structure until 1979. The coup was at first well received with wild enthusiasm especially among the Baganda.

Amin's Asian expulsion highly disrupted the colonial economic structure which was efficiently run despite the indigenous populations seeing it this as their first opportunity to secure economic self determination since the indigenous population were kept safely out of the system, out of their government, their economy and their military structures at the time especially in the central region.

A lot of controversies have been given to show why Amin attacked Tanzania, an act that led to an all out war to topple his regime. Unlike Uganda, Tanzania was a rarity in a disturbed continent. It had enjoyed a continuous system of government right from independence to the time of the war, and had been endowed with a principled leadership that had a full grasp of the essential of nation building. This was followed by a Moshi conference on 24<sup>th</sup> March

1979 to decide Uganda's future after the defeat of Amin by the Tanzania forces whereby Professor Yusuf Lule was elected as chairman of a new broad based movement, the Uganda National Liberation Front. The National consultative council was formed at Moshi conference which included the interim legislature, the National Executive Council which was the cabinet, and the Military commission to run Uganda.

There were struggles culminated into in ousting of Professor Yusuf Lule on 19<sup>th</sup> June 1979, just 68 days after becoming president, this event was brought about in essence by the undemocratic culture which had developed among Ugandan leaders in that they failed to discuss issues openly. Godfrey Binaisa became President after elections by the National Consultative Council. However there were conflicts between different groups headed by Binaisa, Paul Muwanga and Oyite Ojok. In February 1980, President Binaisa tried to neutralize Paulo Muwanga by sending him to Geneva as Ambassador which Muwanga challenged in the NCC and after a debate the president was forced to back down. President Binaisa this time tried to dismiss Oyite Ojok as army chief of staff which prompted the Obote clique headed by Muwanga and Ojok to decide that time was ripe to get rid of President Binaisa. This was followed by Paulo Muwanga issuing a proclamation declaring that the Military Commission of which he was chairman had taken over the government of the country with the backing of the army.

Milton Obote returned to Uganda on 27<sup>th</sup> May 1980, he immediately started to reactivate the UPC and Muwanga announced that political elections would be held that December despite no infrastructure to mount a viable election. As predicted the elections were rigged by UPC who was declared victors. The elections were contested by four parties which include; DP, UPC, UPM and CP. The DP had majority of popular support in the areas of west, central, eastern Uganda and Arua. The Ugandan people had hoped to defeat Obote through the ballot box and formed a great anti-Obote coalition involving original members of the DP, mostly Catholics, those who had no political affiliation.

#### **3.1.4. NRM REVOLUTION AND TRANSITION TO MOVEMENT SYSTEM**

Throughout the 1980 election campaigns Museveni publicly declared that he would go to the bush if the elections were rigged. The DP went to court and lodged election petitions. The victorious UPC formed a government as the DP formed the opposition in parliament. The top executive of Museveni's UPM met under his chairmanship to discuss the way forward for the party and Uganda. The Executive Committee discussed two issues; whether to go back to the people and build the party or to take up arms and fight the government. Members, except Museveni, unanimously agreed to build the party. Museveni stormed out of the meeting declaring that he had taken the option of armed rebellion.

On the 6<sup>th</sup> February 1981, 27 armed men out of 34 launched the revolution by attacking Kabamba barracks. Museveni's military strategy was to accumulate territory one area at a time. He entered the central Luwero triangle and by 1986 controlled the capital in Kampala, and most of Uganda in general. From Fidel Castro, who was already very influential on the African continent, he adopted the 'foco' method of warfare, and he was careful to bring as many villages as possible into his fold as he approached the central capital city, gathering many supporters for his revolution along the way.

There was establishment of the National Resistance Council which could organize civilian committees to support by giving intelligence information, recruitment and food to the popular resistance army which was headed by the high command. The NRC operated at the national level with subsidiary committees at the local level. By August 1981 there were no go areas for government and the civilian committees. These were later renamed resistance councils and resistance committees, comprised of clandestine supporters with nine councilors at every level from the village to parish, subcounty and later on zonal (operational) level.

There was a coup on 27<sup>th</sup> July 1985, where Bazililo Okello one of the commanders of the UNLA that together with the Tanzanian army overthrew Amin announced that the Obote regime had been overthrown. This time Obote left the country to Zambia where the government offered him a sanctuary. General Tito Okello, who replaced Bazililo Okello as chairman of the military

council came to power through coup, only lasting 6 months after failed Nairobi peace talks where he hoped to convince Museveni with ministry offer. Later in December agreed to sign a compromise deal guaranteeing equal status in a provisional government of which was declined.

On 27<sup>th</sup> January 1986 the Museveni's guerilla warfare took over the capital Kampala and thereafter, he was sworn in as Uganda's president .As President museveni was being sworn in he pledged that his administration would bring a fundamental change in the country . He didn't elaborate this statement but it was generally interpreted to mean a promise to break the existing cycle of violence and bring out regeneration or restructuring of state institutions. This guiding framework of the government's program was laid down in the ten point program which was a kind of manifesto that he and his lieutenants prepared in the final years of the bush war.(Gkwandi 1999:43)

One of President Museveni's first acts upon seizing power in 1986 was to outline a ten point Programme in which he emphasized democracy, security, national unity, independence, restoring and rehabilitating social services, ending corruption and misuse of power, dealing with the plight of displaced people, pan-African cooperation and pursuing a mixed economy as the basic tenets of his philosophy. These were intended to provide the basis for a nationwide coalition of political and social forces which could usher in a better future for the long-suffering people of Uganda. Specifically, he pledged the consolidation of national unity and the elimination of all forms of sectarianism.

One of the responses of Museveni and the NRM to ethnic difference and “sectarianism” was the formation of local Resistance Councils (RCs), which were named after the Resistance Movement that Museveni himself championed. These RCs grew out of the efforts of the NRM (then the National Resistance Army, or NRA) from their underground bush war beginnings in 1981. When Museveni came to power in 1986, the RC structures were formalized all over the country. The RCs were structured hierarchically, beginning with an elected committee at the village level, which was known as RC1. “Above the RC1 came the Parish Resistance Council... The system was replicated through the sub-county, RC3, level, to the county, RC4, and on to the district, RC5, level.” Theoretically, and to some extent also in practice, the RC system allowed thousands of Ugandans to participate in the governing process. Yet the RCs wield an enormous amount of power. RCs vetted recruits into the army and police, they had judicial powers to decide on some civil cases, and were made responsible for a broad range of development in their areas, such as building clinics, dispensaries and schools.

The 1989 RC elections and its perception by the voters apart, most people agree that a fundamental change has taken place in Uganda politics since 1986. Under the 1995 constitution, the resistance councils were renamed as the local councils. It is a miracle that LCs could apprehend an army officer whom they find staying illegally in their area for questioning yet in the past they were untouchable. The LCs have the right to resist the police from arresting suspects

in their area without their consent thus controlling the corrupt police whose power was unchecked.(byarugaba,1997:5-6) .In tandem with his building of RCs at various levels, Museveni banned all political parties, which are so closely tied to ethnic and religious groups. Political parties were banned under the 1986 Political Parties and Organizations Act.

Many of the kingdoms had fought on the side of Museveni during the bush war when Museveni “marshaled all aggrieved parties” to fight against Obote. These kingdoms were eventually reinstated under in 1993, but without any political powers. The existence of the kingdoms is now protected under the 1995 Constitution.

In July 2005 a national referendum was held in which the people of Uganda resolved to return to multi party politics. The result of the referendum in effect marked an end to the movement system of government. And so in February 2006, Ugandans went to the polls under a multiparty system of Governance for the first time since 1986. Foundation for Human rights Initiative in its Report on the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2006 noted that “The return to multipartyism was received with a lot of excitement but not much preparation or understanding. Most people were registered as members of one political party or the other without a clear understanding of what party membership entailed. The vast of the majority of Ugandans went to the polls and voted not out of party loyalty, but they voted for an individual

which is explained by the fact that most Ugandans still only understand the principle of individual merit.

Uganda is now governed under a multi-party system and has a parliament that has an Opposition and an official leader of the opposition at the level of a Cabinet Minister. However, the opposition in Uganda faces several challenges in a sense that it is young, fragile and weak – consisting of not more than 70 MPs in a parliament of 332 MPs; and is yet to establish a strong base at the grass root level.

In February 2011 Uganda held its fourth presidential and general election since Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) captured power in 1986. It was also the second multiparty election in the country since 1980. The hallmark of Museveni regime has been the conduct of elections at regular intervals since 1996 but successive polls have been controversial, poorly managed and characterized by excessive regularities, reported rigging, violence and parties in the political opposition no longer had confidence in the Commission.

**TABLE SHOWING THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF BOTH UGANDA AND SOUTH KOREA**

	Korea	Uganda
1	Presidential system	Presidential system
2	Single 5 year presidential term	5 year presidential term(no term

		limits)
3	President assisted by prime minister	President assisted by vice president and prime minister who heads government business in parliament
4	The Cabinet of South Korea consists of the President, the Prime minister, 17 ministries, two agencies and 5 boards.(18 Ministries)	The president , vice president and such number of Ministers as may appear to the President to be reasonably necessary for the efficient running of the State comprise the cabinet.(71 ministers)
	Nine Justices serve on the court, all of whom are appointed by the President. Three of the positions are appointed directly by the President. Of the remaining six positions, three are appointed from candidates nominated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and three are appointed from candidates elected by the National Assembly. In addition, the head of the court is chosen by the President, with the consent of the National	Judges for the High Court and court of appeal are appointed by the president; Judges for the Court of Appeal are approved by the legislature.

	Assembly	
	<p>The National Election Commission is an independent constitutional agency composed of 9 members. 3 members are appointed by the President, 3 elected by the National Assembly and 3 nominated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson are elected from among the Commissioners and as is its custom, the Justice of the Supreme Court is elected to be the Chairperson</p>	<p>The electoral commission, all seven (7) Commissioners are appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament. The current seven-member Commission was appointed re-appointed in 2009</p> <p>Not trusted by the opposition</p>
	<p>A unicameral legislature, a single large assembly of 244 members in single-seat constituencies and 56 members by proportional representation.</p> <p>The members of the National Assembly serve for four years.</p> <p>In the event that a member becomes unable to complete his or her term, by-election replaces them</p>	<p>Parliament consists of 303 members when fully constituted. The majority of Members of Parliament are elected through universal suffrage, with a provision for special interest groups namely: women, the armed forces, the disabled and youth elected through Electoral Colleges.</p> <p>The members of the National</p>

		<p>Assembly serve for five years.</p> <p>Unable to complete his or her term, by-election replaces them</p>
	<p>provides campaign financing for all political parties -subsidies are only given to the parties which meet certain legal requirements</p>	<p>Use of Government or public resources for political party or organization activities.</p> <p>Government shall contribute funds in respect of normal day to day activities, funding shall be based on the numerical strength of each political party or organisation in Parliament</p>
	<p>The main political parties in South Korea are the Saenuri Party(NFP), the New Politics Alliance for Democracy(NPAD, former Democratic Party), the Unified Progressive Party(UPP), and the Justice Party. The conservative Saenuri Party and the more liberal Democrats(NPAD) are the dominant forces of South Korean politics. The socialist UPP is aligned with labour unions and farmers groups. But UPP was</p>	<p>The main parties are National Resistance movement (NRM) Forum for democratic change (FDC),Democratic party (DP), Uganda people's congress (UPC),Justice party(JEEMA), Conservative Party (CP). The seats are therefore shared among these parties and other groups as shown.</p>

	<p>torn into two parties after 2012 election, and 6 of 13 MPs of UPP formed the Justice Party.</p> <p><b>Structure of National Assembly as of 15 August 2014.</b></p> <p>Conservatives(NFP) : 158(+1)</p> <p>Liberals(NPAD) : 130(+3)</p> <p>Progressive(UPP, JP) : 10(-3)</p> <p>Independents : 2(pro-NFP)</p>	<p>Constituency seats –elected representatives (237)</p> <p>District Woman Reps -112</p> <p>UPDF (army Reps)-10</p> <p>Representatives of youth-5</p> <p>Representatives of persons with disabilities -5</p> <p>Representatives of workers -5</p> <p><b>Structure of National Assembly as of 15 August 2014.</b></p> <p>NRM 263</p> <p>FDC 34</p> <p>UPC 10</p> <p>CP 1</p> <p>DP 12</p> <p>CONSERVATIVES 1</p> <p>JEEMA 1</p> <p>INDEPENDENTS 43</p>
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Table 2: Political Systems of both Uganda and South Korea

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **4.1. POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM IN SOUTH KOREA.**

#### **4.1.1. BRIEF OVERVIEW**

The Republic of Korea was established under the Presidency of Syngman Rhee after World War II in the southern half of the Korean peninsula while a communist regime under Kim II Sung was installed in the north. The Korean War (1950-53) resulted in an armistice which split the peninsula with a demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel.

Once a country of rice-farmers and peasants, since the early-1960s, South Korea experienced rapid industrialization, emphasizing the manufacture of consumer electronics and automobiles becoming the 10<sup>th</sup> largest economy in the world today. The country has few natural mineral resources and the engine of growth is therefore highly dependent upon trade and exports. Citizens have enjoyed growing affluence; the per capita GDP quadrupled from about \$4000 in 1975 to around \$18,000 in 2005 driven by a remarkable average annual economic growth rate of 6.1% during this period.

Economic growth was accompanied by rising living standards and educational levels, urbanization and human development, as well as the widespread diffusion of new information and communication technologies. A relatively homogeneous society, with the exception of a very small minority of

ethnic Chinese, the country shares a common language and religious affiliations are spread among many faiths, including Buddhists, Christians, Confucians and shamanism

The transformation of the Korean economy and society, including the expansion of the urban workers and service-sector professional middle class, would gradually generate the underlying conditions most suitable for democratic consolidation. After the end of the war, South Korea was ruled by an unstable autocracy, under a succession of military-backed dictators; President Syngman Rhee resigned in 1960 following a student-led uprising, replaced by Chang Myon who fell after a year due to a military coup led by Major General Park Chung-hee, before Park was in turn assassinated in 1979. Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan declared martial law and seized power until 1987, when pro-democracy activists and waves of student demonstrators forced concessions from the government, including restoration of direct presidential elections.

The 1987 contest elected a former General, Roh Tae-woo, to the presidency and he was succeeded in a peaceful transition in 1992 by Kim Young-Sam, representing the first civilian elected president in 32 years. The 1997 elections saw a further step towards democracy, as the opposition leader, Kim Dae-jung, succeeded to power, followed by the election of the human rights advocate, President Roh Moo-hyun, in 2002. President Roh was a

prominent figure in the 1987 pro-democracy movement and he had been briefly jailed for his activities.

The Sixth Republic Korean constitution, last modified in October 1987, established a strong directly-elected presidency (using a simple plurality system), limited to a single 5-year term. The executive is counter-balanced by a National Assembly which plays a more minor role in political decisions. Members are elected using a combined-dependent electoral system, where representatives are elected in single-member constituencies while the remaining 46 are elected from nation-wide proportional representation party lists, using a simple Hare quota. The party list seats are allocated using a complicated formula which reinforces the seat allocation for larger parties, making the system less proportional than the combined-dependent system used in Germany.

#### **4.1.2. POLITICAL SYSTEM**

Before Japan annexed the Kingdom of Joseon in 1910, the political model was an absolute monarchy. The social and cultural system was deeply penetrated by Neo-Confucian philosophy, and the economic system was predominated by feudalism, with a rudimentary market system based on agriculture and almost with no modern industrial structure (Nahm, 1993). Due to the internal schism between domestic social-political groups and also to the rise of the Cold War during the American occupation, Korea ended up with the

establishment of a separate government in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. Although the U.S. helped lawmakers to transplant various institutions of 'American democracy', the young Korean democracy faced highly unfavorable conditions (Lee, 1990: 19).

The vast majority of Korean citizens had little understanding of democratic idea itself and its institutions. The political party system was highly fragmented and polarized. Most of political parties were at best proto-parties, founded by and grounded in a few charismatic leaders as political machines. The division of Korea into two hostile states and the subsequent Korean War (1950-53) seriously hampered the development of a stable party system composed of ideologic-ally diversified parties. Given the hegemony of anti-Communism and rightist nationalism, even liberal or centrist, let alone moderate socialist, parties were suspected of supporting North Korean regime, and for that reason, they were brutally oppressed.

During the 1950s, President Rhee Syng Man gradually consolidated his one-man rule. However in 1960, he was expelled from the presidency by those students and urban dwellers, got angry at a widespread election fraud and went into exile. A new constitution which provided for a cabinet system and a bicameral parliament was passed in June 1960 and subsequently the Second Republic was inaugurated. However, the new Chang Myon government, which originated from the former opposition party became widely corrupt and moreover was incapable of managing popular political-economic demands. In

consequence, Korean democracy became uncontrollable and finally a group of military officers led by General Park Chung-Hee led a coup and took over government power in May 1961. The same military officers stepped down from duty became politicians and wrote a new constitution which restored the presidential system. It was approved by a referendum in December 1962 where under the new constitution civilian-turned Park was elected as president in October 1963.

He was reelected for another four-year term in 1967 and during his second term, he amended the constitution so as to serve a third term. In the 1971 presidential election Park barely defeated the candidate of the opposition party Kim Dae-jung despite of massive election fraud. Park declared martial law and suspended the constitution in October 1972 mainly because he was afraid that he might be unable to win the next election under the current constitution which stipulated the direct election by popular vote. After dissolving the National Assembly and banning the activities of political parties, he drafted a constitutional amendment with the advice of a handful scholars and lawyers.

In December 1972, the notorious Yushin(reform) Constitution was legitimized through the national referendum. It allowed Park to stay in power as president indefinitely by abrogating the three-term limit, and institutionalize indirect election of president through the National Council for Reunification (TongilJucheKukminHoiui). It gave extraordinary power to the president, such

as the right to dissolve the National Assembly, the extra-constitutional power to enact special measures, and the right to nominate one third of the NA members. As a result, the power of the National assembly was considerably weakened especially with the power of legislative oversight over the executive branch being eliminated.

The Yushin system was legitimized by the necessity for strong leadership, which it was argued would help stave off the heightened military threat from North Korea amid an eroding American military security commitment and promote economic-prosperity by getting rid of 'luxury and inefficiency' of parliamentary politics. However as Korean economy went into a deep recession at the end of 1970s and as students and workers' protest spread over, President Park was in big trouble and was finally assassinated by his close aide in October 1979. President Park's death did not lead to democratic opening and consolidation.

A brief democratic opening in the spring of 1980 was intercepted by another round of military intervention. Several factors – such as weak political leadership of the transitional government, internal division among political leaders, and economic crisis – provided the military with an opportunity to intervene in politics, as in 1960. After controlling the military through a mutiny on 12<sup>th</sup> December 1979, a new military group led by General Chun Doo Hwan imposed a ban on political activity and brutally repressed the Kwangju uprising and other popular protests by massacring a few hundreds of innocent citizens

including junior high school girls. They wrote a new constitution and enacted it through national referendum on 27<sup>th</sup> October 1980. The new constitution explicitly limited the presidency to a seven-year singly term, but gave strong powers to the president such as the power to disband the National Assembly, impose extraordinary measures, and submit constitutional amendment bills as well as laws.

Until the mid 1980s the political parties were simply differentiated into ruling party which supported the government and the opposition party. The parties were also closely represented of specific regions such as the southeast and southwest regions of Korea which created so-called regional conflicts. This geographical split can be attributed to the fact that nearly every single Korean president, including those during the period of dictatorship hailed from south east region and thus the ruling party received overwhelming support from those provinces the political parties followed this regional division

Politically, 1992 will be remembered as a watershed year for the Republic of Korea. After 31 years of direct or indirect political domination by the military and soldiers- turned-politicians, South Korea elected a civilian president in a peaceful and fair election, thereby lending support to the optimistic view that South Korea will continue to progress toward political democratization. The general election of the National Assembly in March 1992 and the presidential election on 18<sup>th</sup> December 1992 dominated the South Korean political scene throughout the year. Stakes were particularly high

because of the general consensus that the ROK was poised to end authoritarian rule and consequently, the roles played by the National Assembly and the President were expected to change.

Presently there are five parties active in the party system in ROK the parties can be indentified either by ideology or by electoral strongholds .if described by ideology the parties can be grouped as follows; The Uri party split off from the Millennium Democratic Party in 2004 and indentified strongly with former President Roh. It is centered –progressive, heir to the Sunshine policy on engagement of North Korea and take a critical stance on united states while emphasizing distribution of wealth and resources rather than development

When the Uri party was formed in 2003, party leaders proclaimed that they would transcend the regional based system. The progressive party , the Democratic Labor party with their first success in electing assembly members in 2004 general elections , has also presented themselves as the political voice of laborers and farmers rather than any regional interests. Never the less ROK parties remain heavily affected by regional influences.

Accordingly the most political ideologies can be divided into the following categories relating to; relations with North Korea, position on reunification and policies on US-Korea relations. In the recent years discussions on development and distribution have also began to manifest themselves in key policy differences but no concrete policies have been formulated as yet.

Most political parties exhibit very strong nationalistic tendencies, so are united as one voice in discussions about policies regarding Japan.

However, South Korea is a republic whose president is the Head of State and whose Prime Minister is the head of government. It is a multi-party system with the president elected for a single five-year term in office by popular vote. The Prime Minister is appointed by the president with the consent of the National Assembly. The National Assembly (*Kukhoe*) is made up of 299 seats; 245 are decided in single seat constituencies, the rest being elected by proportional representation. Members serve a four-year term. Legislative power is shared by the government and the National Assembly. A State Council is appointed by the president after recommendation by the prime minister.

The president holds general responsibility for the affairs of the state. The executive power is balanced by a legislature that is formally independent of the president however political and administrative power is concentrated in the presidency. Whereas the national assembly's authority rests in the parliamentary inspection of the government and the right to dismiss the cabinet. By constitution, the president has the right to dissolve the national assembly. Yet except for the case in 1972, no president has made use of that power.

Before the period of democratization, the National Assembly could not control the President. During the dictatorships of the 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s, the government intervened in the electoral process – the president selected the

candidates in the ruling parties for the national assembly – and consequently the ruling party was dominated by the president’s will. After democratization in 1987, the president’s influence over the party was reduced and the power of the national assembly increased. From then on, the most important elections in Korean political system became the presidential elections and the general elections for the National Assembly. Since 1995 elections for local governments and assemblies have been implemented. This contributed to some counter balance to the national Presidency because at the local level candidates from the opposition parties got access to offices.

In December 1997, South Korean democracy faced the fifteenth presidential elections since the Republic of Korea became independent in August 1948. For the first time in almost 50 years, elections led to a take-over of power by the opposition. Simultaneously, the election marked the tenth anniversary of Korean democracy, which successfully passed its first ‘turnover test’ (Huntington,1991) when elected President Kim Dae-jung was inaugurated on 25<sup>th</sup> February1998.

For South Korea, which had had six constitutions in only five decades and in which no president had left office peacefully before democratization took place in 1987, the last 15 years have marked a period of unprecedented democratic continuity and political stability. Because of this, some observers already call South Korea ‘the most powerful democracy in East Asia after

Japan'(Diamond and Shin, 2000: 1). The victory of the opposition over the party in power and, above all, the turnover of the presidency in 1998 seem to indicate that Korean democracy is on the road to full consolidation (Diamond and Shin,2000: 3).

#### **4.1.3. ELECTORAL SYSTEM**

The history of the Korean electoral system goes back to 1948. Since then there has been universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage. Candidates running for the National Assembly have to be 25 years old, while the minimum age for presidential candidates (at least in the 16 presidential elections held so far (1948-1997) is 40. From the First to the Fifth Republic (1948-1987) the voting age was 21years, but the ninth constitutional amendment of October 1987 reduced it to 20 years.

The National Election Commission (NEC) is responsible for the organization and supervision of electoral campaigns, elections and vote-counting. The NEC is an independent constitutional agency, equal in status to the National Assembly, the executive branch of the government, the courts of justice and the constitutional court. It has a four-tier structure, consisting of the NEC itself and16,724 sub-national and voting district electoral commissions. The NEC is made up of nine commissioners in total. Three of them are appointed by the president, three by the National Assembly and three by the chief justice of the Supreme Court. The NEC's chairperson and a standing

commissioner are chosen from these nine. By tradition, the chief justice of the Supreme Court is elected chairperson.

The district electoral commissions are formed by commissioners chosen on the advice of the courts, political parties with factions in the National Assembly, a pool of scholars and/or other individuals known for their high academic and moral standards. The election law gives the NEC and the electoral commissions a mandate to supervise and manage all national and local elections, as well as the referendums.

The plurality system was used for the presidential elections. For the first 40 years after independence, elections were indirect. The president was elected either by the National Assembly (1948), by the bicameral parliament in a joint session (1960), or by an electoral college (National Conference of Unification) from 1972 to 1981. In the intervals 1952-1960 and 1963-1971, the presidential elections were direct. After democratization in 1987, the principle of direct presidential election was re-established.

The frequent changes of electoral system are largely attributable to the political interests of the president in office, who changed tactics for every election in the face of domestic political pressure and shrinking voter support. The second constitutional reform (November 1954) limited the four-year presidential term of office to two terms; the first incumbent was exempt from

this requirement, however. In October 1969, the number of presidential terms was extended to three, and the term limit disappeared in November 1972. But with the eighth amendment in October 1980, the President's term of office was limited to one seven-year term

Since the early 1990s, elections have also been held at local and provincial levels. The regular term of office for the president is five years without re-election and four years for the National Assembly (no term limits). In order to be eligible for the presidency citizens must be at least 40 years old, have resided in the country for at least five years and qualify as eligible members of the National Assembly. They may run as party candidates or as independents. An independent candidate needs the support of 2,500-5,000 electors, among whom not more than 500 may live in the same city or province. A public official who wants to register as a candidate must resign from his/her post 90 days before the date of the elections.

In parliamentary elections, candidates may be recommended either by a political party or by electors (independent candidates). Independent candidates need the recommendation of 300-500 electors. Candidates in the national constituency can only run as party candidates on a party's list. Candidates who apply for registration have to pay a deposit of 10 million Won (approximately US\$8,300 in 2001). The money is returned if the candidate receives at least half of the quota obtained from dividing the total number of valid votes by the

number of candidates (local constituency), or if at least one of the candidates on the list concerned is elected (national constituency).

The electoral system used in presidential elections is a first-past-the-post system (Korea Legislation Research Institute, 1998: Article 187). In legislative elections a segmented system is used. The electoral system applied in 1988 and in 1992 was similar to the systems used in 1985: three quarters of the seats were elected by plurality in Single Member Constituencies, while one quarter was allocated proportionally in on a national constituency. If one party wins at least half of the popularly elected seats, it is automatically entitled to two thirds of the seats on the national list; if it gains less, the strongest party is still awarded half of the national list seats. In the Fifteenth National Assembly election (1996), 253 seats were elected in SMCs. The remaining 46 seats (15 per cent) were allocated proportionally to the parties that had obtained at least 5 per cent of the total valid votes/seats in SMCs, while the special seat bonus for the largest party was abolished (Korea Legislation Research Institute, 1998: Article 189).

However South Korea has used several versions of a mixed system since democratization. In 1988 and 1992, South Korea used a one-vote mixed system, where voters chose a district candidate and this vote not only determined district winners but was aggregated to the national level to allocate party list seats. However, the party list remained far from proportional: the party to win the most districts automatically received half to two-thirds of the

party list seats. In 1996 and 2000, a one-vote system endured, but the allocation of all party seats was by proportional representation, similar to that used in Mexico. After the Constitutional Court decision in 2001 found the party list allocation determined by district votes to be unconstitutional, South Korea has used the more common two-vote system, where voters had a separate ballot for both the district and the party list.

There is a general view among the students of Korean politics that, the regional cleavage, traditionally the most important determining factor of election outcome in South Korea however it is gradually disappearing due to the rise of the ideological and generational cleavages since 2002. Korea is a country with relatively homogeneous population sharing ethnicity, language, and historical traditions; so these factors do not present as cleavages dividing the Korean people. Due to the authoritarian rule imposed on Korean people by force, first by General Park Chung-Hee, and then by Generals Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, a single most dominant cleavage in Korea was the authoritarian-democracy divide until 1987, when the democratic transition began.

With democratic opening and free elections, regionalism cropped up as dominant cleavage in Korea. This was especially in the case of the rivalry between southeastern region called Youngnam and southwestern region of Honam. This became the case since the political leaders who emerged as alternatives to authoritarian rule were perceived as representing certain regions

of Korea without nationwide appeal with their party support firmly entrenched in those regions. It is widely agreed among the observers of Korean politics that electoral competition since the democratic opening was used as an expression of regional frustration and/or animosities, and the regionalism played the deciding role in the vote choice of the Korean electorate (Choi 1995; Chung 1993; Lee, Nam Young 1999, 1998; Park 1993).

However, it was largely expected that the impact of regionalism would decline starting with 17<sup>th</sup> National Assembly elections in 2004 for various reasons: first, three key charismatic leaders who single-handedly controlled their own regionally-based parties had retired from politics by this time (two of them after having served as presidents of the country); second, candidate Roh Moo-Hyun of the New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP) won the presidential election only two years before the scheduled National Assembly elections. The NMDP was a regional party representing the Honam region, but Roh himself came from the rival Youngnam region, thus diluting the effect of regionalism in politics; third, it was widely viewed that Roh Moo-Hyun was elected with support primarily from younger generations and more progressive elements of the Korean society, thus paving a way for ideology and generational issues to play greater role in Korean politics.

#### **4.1.4. LEGAL REGULATIONS**

Article 9 of the constitution explicitly refers to political parties as follows;

- I. The establishment of political parties shall be free and plurality of the party system shall be guaranteed. Political parties shall be democratic in their objectives organization and activities and they shall have necessary organizational arrangements to participate in the formation of the political will of the people.
- II. Political parties shall be protected by the state as provided by the statute and may receive subsidy for operation from the state as prescribed by an act. If the purposes or activities of a political party are contrary to the democratic basic orders, the president, the government or the national election commission may initiate an action for its dissolution to the constitutional court which is the only institution that can dissolve a party.

Under the constitution, there is a specific law for political parties, the political party law. According to the definition of a political party in the constitution, by virtue of being protected in its activities and organizational process. Political parties shall contribute to the development of sound democratic politics .this provision stresses freedom of political activities .According to the political party law a political party is a private entity organized by the people in order to the express people’s political opinions . Political parties may achieve their objectives by presenting responsible opinions and policies and by supporting certain candidates in public elections for the

benefit of the people. The law also elaborates on the rules for establishing and maintaining political parties and the requirements for democratic organization and operation.

The Korean constitution of 1987 requires that political parties have to be democratic in their organization and operations. In fact, if a party violates the fundamental democratic order the constitution court can force its dissolution. The political parties act (amended in 2000) requires all parties to register with the NEC to hold elections for the party's leaders and officials, to establish branch offices and to provide lists of all members to the NEC. The law also places a limit on the number of paid employees in a party.

The political fund act (amended in 2000) includes provisions on fundraising ,expenditures and party reporting .There are both income and expenditure limits on parties at all times and donations are funneled through supporters associations established for the parties and candidates , the NEC receives names of all members of and donors to the supporters associations , which become part of the public record although in certain circumstances contributors can request anonymity .The law also provides state funding for political parties and also party annual audits and financial accounts can be accessed by all citizens.

The act on election of public officials and the prevention of election malpractices (amended in 2000) creates the framework for electoral competition in Korea and establishes the NEC as the oversight body for all elections. The NEC sets campaign income and expenditure limits and requires each candidate or election campaign to appoint an accountant to maintain a record of all financial transactions. Receipts for expenses and contributions and a report of all accounts must be submitted to the election commission within 20 days after the election. These accounts are available for public inspection for a period of three months.

In order to keep democratic order within a political party there is both a representative body and an executive body to express party member's collective opinions. If party members have been elected to the national assembly a general meeting must be held (article 29) After registering with the NEC, a party is automatically considered to be officially established. In order for the party to be established, there needs to be 20 initiators at least for a national party and minimum of 10 members for a regional party.(articles 4,5, and 10) a preparatory committee for a political party composed of initiators can be operated within the party's objectives after submitting requirements to the NEC(articles 7,8,9 )

The political party law also covers the requirements of who/what can constitute a party as well as guaranteeing the extended rights provided to

political parties such as freedom of assembly, speech, etc. Despite other regulations that limit party activities by government employees, according to the political party law anyone who possesses the right to vote in national assembly elections is permitted to become a member of a political party. However members of the media and government employees appointed by executive order are barred from political party activities (articles 17).

The political party law was enacted in 1962 and had been revised seven times since 1969. There are few current complaints about the law except regarding the prohibition of political activities by government officials who attempted to organize a trade union. In the recent revision of the law implemented on 12<sup>th</sup> March 2004 the main focus was on increasing the participation of women. Article 31 specifies that for the proportional races, whereby 56 deputies to the national assembly are elected, political parties must include 50 percent women on candidates' lists. For the plurality majority portion of the election whereby 243 representatives are elected in single member districts, political parties are recommended to include 30 percent women candidates. The law resulted in an increase to 13 percent of elected women assembly members in April 2004 election up from 5.9 percent in the previous legislature. Additionally in this revision of the party law, regional parties of the national parties were abolished and simply folded into the larger party structure.

There are no restrictions in qualifications regarding who is allowed to establish a political party and recruitment of candidates is largely determined by individual party's regulations, except for the 2004 revision mandating 50 percent women candidates to be fielded in the proportional races. The recruitment of candidates is decided by the election polling committee of each party, which is composed of several members and non-members of the party. The NEC then confirms the parties' candidates are qualified according to election law and registers them as official candidates. It is not possible for a person whose suffrage is limited by the election law to register as a candidate of a political party.

#### **4.1.5. PARTY FUNDING**

The state provides campaign financing for political parties. Article 8 of the constitution states that "...the state may offer subsidies necessary for the operation of political parties in accordance with the operation of political parties in accordance with the provisions of the relevant laws. The subsidies are only given to the parties which meet certain legal requirements. The amount of subsidy is calculated by multiplying 800 won by the number of votes the political party received in the most recent national election. The subsidies are added up after each presidential, national assembly and local election.

All the financial affairs are controlled by the law for political funds. The distribution of state finances is based on the number of party members in the

national assembly, with these government subsidies proportionally awarded. Each assembly member also organizes their own supporters association through which they can collect political funds for their individual campaigns. In the case of individual funds, each donor must register with their legal name and the candidate must report all received donations as well as expenditure with the national election commission.

A member of a political party who violates the law for political funds is punished and the specific punishments can be summarized as follows;

Those who donate or receive political funds by methods not approved by law (this refers to violations by members of groups outside the political party, candidate support committee or corporations) are punished by up to five years imprisonment or a fine up to W10 million. This does not apply to those who are merely relatives of the recipient or donor. The law treats all parties in an equal way and almost all political parties are in compliance with the law.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.1. ROLE AND STRUCTURE OF SOCIETIES IN THE TRANSITION TO MULTI PARTY DEMOCRACY BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND UGANDA

**THE TABLE SHOWING COMPOSITION OF ETHNIC GROUPS,  
RELIGION AND FOREIGN INFLUENCE OF BOTH SOUTH KOREA  
AND UGANDA**

	Uganda	South Korea
1	<p><b>Population:</b> 34.9 million (2014)</p> <p>National population and housing census</p>	<p><b>Population:</b> 50.22 million (2013) World Bank</p>
2	<p><b>Multi ethnic</b></p> <p>With over 40 ethnic groups</p> <p>65 ethnic communities</p> <p><b>Official languages:</b> Swahili, English</p>	<p><b>Mono ethnic</b></p> <p>with more than 99% of inhabitants having Korean ethnicity</p> <p>The percentage of foreign nationals has been growing rapidly. As of 2009, South Korea had 1,106,884 foreign residents, 2.7% of the population; however, more than</p>

		<p>half of them are ethnic Koreans with a foreign citizenship</p> <p><b>Official language:</b> Korean</p>
3	<p><b>Religion</b></p> <p>Uganda is religiously diverse nation with Christianity and Islam being the most widely professed religions. According to 2002 census, 85.4% of the population is Christian, while 12.1% of the population adheres to Islam (mainly Sunni)</p>	<p><b>Religion</b></p> <p>Today, freedom of religion is guaranteed by the constitution, and there is no state religion</p> <p>None 46%</p> <p>Buddist 23%</p> <p>Protestant 18%</p> <p>Catholic 11%</p> <p>Folk 1%</p> <p>Other 1%</p>
	<p>Religion is highly entrenched in political parties.</p>	<p>Religion has no role to play in political parties however they were vocal during the transition especially the Christians.</p>
4	<p>Foreign influence was only actively visible in the democratization process late early 1990s as they advocated for democracy as condition for aid.</p>	<p>Foreign influence has been vital since the United States intervened on the Korean Peninsula in 1950</p>

Table 3: Ethnicity, religion and foreign influence.

### 5.1.1. ETHNICITY

#### **Uganda**

Ethnicity in itself is not necessarily evil or negative (Mohochi 2002). Kibwana (cited in Muhochi 2002) makes a distinction between positive and negative ethnicity. He specifically refers to negative ethnicity as tribalism in reference to the misuse of tribal or ethnic identity to demand or obtain unfair advantage within a national or regional or local context. Positive ethnicity, in contrast, would refer to the promotion of an ethnic group's positive attributes such as language, culture and philosophy. As such, the nature that ethnicity takes depends on the way it is perceived and managed. The concerns raised in this section are mainly about negative ethnicity.

In the African context and in Uganda in particular, ethnicity has created enormous impacts on every facet of nation building (Kigongo 1995). It has been one of the outstanding impediments to national integration and development in several African states (Chukwu 2002). Among the most important reasons for the concern with ethnicity is the tension between ethnic groups and the state (MacMillan 2001); and between ethnic groups themselves resulting into intolerant behavior and exclusion. The case of Buganda in Uganda exemplifies the tension between an ethnic group and the state (Mamdani 2004). Inter-ethnic tension can be exemplified by the Bakiga and the

Banyoro conflicts in Kibaale in Uganda; the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda (Mamdani 2001; Storey 2002).

Bruce Berman claims that ‘African ethnicity is a construction of the colonial period through the reactions of pre-colonial societies to the social, economic, cultural and political forces of colonialism.’ The term ethnicity however has no concrete definition, and among other things can refer to nationality, provincial identity, community, village, chiefdom or kin-group. Nelson Kasfir notes that ‘ethnicity is a fluid, not a fixed, condition of African politics. Within this research the term ethnicity will be used to describe the different communities of Uganda, mostly separated by region and culture.

In 1962, Uganda consisted of the kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro; the territory of Busoga; and the districts of Acholi, Bugisu, Bukedi, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei, Teso and West Nile. Loyalty to such local institutions and identities meant that political behavior was largely based upon ‘linguistic, socio-cultural and economic identities of interests.’ The Independence Constitution negotiated in London a few months prior to independence, granted full federal status to Buganda and a semi-federal relationship to the other kingdoms. Such devolution of power undermined the authority of the state, and left Uganda in a ‘quasi-federal milieu.’

Ethnicity plays a significant role in Uganda's politics (Nsambaet al. 2007), religious, economic and social relations. Whereas ethnicity does not constitute a well-defined line for policy-based exclusion or inclusion today, in some cases it can be seen or perceived to motivate socio-economic discrimination. Though they had gone down in the early years of the current government (1986 to the late 1990s), perceptions and sentiments of ethnic marginalization and domination have resurfaced in Uganda. For example, “There is a widespread perception that he [president Museveni] has favored his own ethnic group when it comes to government positions and all attendant benefits” (Seela 2009, p.12).

It should be noted that in Uganda, like in many other African countries (Wrong 2009), some people equate political power to economic benefits that have to go to the ethnic group of the incumbent leader. Thus those who are not in power will either be marginalized in some way or harbor the feeling that they are being excluded. Okuku (2002) notices that in Uganda ethnicity has always been more intimately linked to political and economic conditions that is the unequal distribution of and competition for power and wealth.

## **South Korea**

Koreans have developed a sense of nation based on shared blood and ancestry. The Korean nation was "racialized" through a belief in a common

prehistoric origin, producing an intense sense of collective oneness. Ethnicity is generally regarded as a cultural phenomenon based on a common language and history, and race understood as a collectivity defined by innate and immutable phenotypic and genotypic characteristics.

But historically, Koreans have not differentiated between the two. Instead, race served as a marker that strengthened ethnic identity, which in turn was instrumental in defining the nation. Koreans thus believe that they all belong to a "unitary nation" (danilminjok), one that is ethnically homogeneous and racially distinctive. Despite 1,000 years of political, linguistic, and geographic continuity and contrary to popular belief this sense of ethnic homogeneity took root only in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Faced with imperialist encroachments, Koreans developed the notion of a unitary nation to show its autonomy and uniqueness. They stressed the ethnic base rather than civic elements in defining the Korean nation.

The need to assert the distinctiveness and purity of the Korean nation grew even more important under colonial rule, especially as Japan attempted to assimilate Koreans into their empire as "imperial subjects." The Japanese assimilation policy was based on colonial racism, which claimed that Koreans and Japanese were of common origin but the former always subordinate. The theory was used to justify colonialist policies to replace Korean cultural traditions with Japanese ones in order to supposedly get rid of all distinctions

and achieve equality between Koreans and inlanders. Colonial assimilation policy included changing Korean names into Japanese, exclusive use of Japanese language, and school instruction in the Japanese ethical system, and Shinto worship.

Koreans resisted by asserting their unique and great national heritage. Yi Kwang-su, a key figure during colonial rule, claimed that "hyeoltong" (bloodline), "seonggyeok" (personality), and "munhwa" (culture) are three fundamental elements of a nation and that "Koreans are without a doubt a unitary nation (danilhanminjok) in blood and culture. Such a view was widely accepted among Koreans: To impugn the natural and unique character of the Korean ethnic nation during colonial rule would have been tantamount to betraying Koreanness in the face of the imperial challenge of an alien ethnic nation. Japanese rule did not erase Koreans' national consciousness but rather reinforced their claim to a truly distinct and homogeneous ethnic identity.

After independence in 1945, despite peninsular division into North and South, the unity of the Korean ethnic nation or race was largely taken for granted. Neither side disputed the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean nation, spanning thousands of years, based on a single bloodline of the great Han race. Instead, both sides contested for the sole representation of the ethnically homogeneous Korean nation. Even today, Koreans maintain a strong sense of

ethnic homogeneity based on shared blood and ancestry and nationalism continues to function as a key resource in Korean politics and foreign relations.

Ethnic national identity has been a crucial source of pride and inspiration for people during the turbulent years of Korea's transition to modernity that involved colonialism, territorial division, war and authoritarian politics. It has also enhanced collective consciousness and internal solidarity against external threats and has served Korea's modernization project as effective resource. Ethnic nationalism will remain an important organizing principle of Korean society.

### **5.1.2. RELIGION**

#### **UGANDA**

By the nineteenth century, Buganda had expanded considerably and comprised about 50 clans. These clans upheld traditional religious beliefs, involving the worship of deities and spirits. The first Arab merchants arrived in the 1840s and introduced Islam. David Livingstone, who inspired the missionary movement in Africa, was genuinely persuaded that slavery would not end unless Christianity and commerce were introduced and developed. Though he had questionable motives, Henry Stanley acted on that initiative and made his own appeal for the practical Christian tutor, who can teach people how to become Christians, cure their diseases, construct dwellings, understand

and exemplify agriculture, and turn his hand to anything, like a sailor... In return, Stanley assured that Mutesa would give the missionary anything he desired.

London's (Anglican) Church Missionary Society quickly responded and, by 1876, eight missionaries were sent to Buganda. In 1879, the French (Roman Catholic) White Fathers also arrived and set about redeeming African souls and countering Anglican heresy. As Pulford describes it, though both groups of missionaries had the same evangelical objectives, intense rivalries developed because they had fundamentally different interpretations of the scripture. 'Even the physical locations of the missions in the capital underlined the competition, the Catholics on Rubaga hill and the Protestants facing them across a valley from another hill, Namirembe. Under Mutesa's leadership, all religious groups had some license to evangelise.

Conditions changed dramatically after king Mutesa's death. Mwanga, who succeeded him as King of Buganda in 1884, attempted to expunge all foreign religions, which entailed persecuting the Christians. Therefore, just prior to the colonial period, religious violence probably caused more devastation in Buganda than the Kingdom had ever experienced. This persecution had major unintended effects: the murdered Christians were celebrated as martyrs and Protestants and Catholics formed political parties, in opposition to the Muslim and traditional groups. However, in 1888, when

Mwanga plotted with the traditionalists to eradicate all foreign religions, the Roman Catholic, Anglican Protestant and Muslim political parties collaborated and overthrew him.

Subsequently, the Muslims expelled the Christian groups from government and Buganda was turned into an Islamic state. Excluded from power, the Catholic and Protestant factions agreed that if/when they returned to government, they would divide power and resources equally between them; Muslims and local religious groups would be denied. Later, when Muslims were removed from power, Catholics and Protestants controlled state resources, as they had hitherto agreed.

At that time, even the Baganda were speculating about which colonial power would eventually control the state. The Christian collaboration did not last. In 1892, Catholics and Protestants fought to control Buganda. The Protestant victory (bolstered with Lugard's supplies of guns and ammunition) relegated Roman Catholics to a secondary position and marginalized the Muslims. Anglican Protestantism became the prominent religion and the basis for favored access to resources. Historically, the DP was formed in the 1950s to champion Catholic interests because the colonial state had allied itself with the Protestants (Church of Uganda) in different parts of Uganda. Later, the UPC was represented mainly by the Protestants

The problem with the Muslims is that historically they have been divided on various grounds. Support from various Arab-Islamic countries, especially financially, has tended to factionalise the Muslim community in Uganda. Attempts by governments, and the NRM in particular, to forge Muslim unity has caused even further divisions among them. Although the leadership of Justice Forum (JEEMA) has not openly admitted that they formed the party as a strategy to redress the suppression of Muslims in the country, it is arguable that Islam was the basis for the formation of the party. The majority of its leaders are Muslims. At one time, the Tabliq fundamentalists threatened to form a party based on Islamic fundamentalist principles.

There have also been attempts by the various Christian evangelical or born-again ('saved') groups, the overwhelming majority of them originating from the USA and more often than not linked to fundamentalist churches and right-wing political interests in the USA, that have shown an interest in launching a political party. It is arguable that these religious groups, sects and denominations can be, and been, agents of antinational foreign interests (Ibid). At times, they have been used internally to cause illegitimate divisions in politics and other social spheres.

## **SOUTH KOREA**

The predominant religions in South Korea are the traditional Buddhist faith and a large Christian population (composed of Catholics and Protestants of various denominations). Although a large segment of the population claims to not be affiliated with any organized religion, most South Korean households continue to observe traditional ancestral rites and Confucian philosophies that have been integrated into Korean culture. The practice of both Christianity and Buddhism has been strongly influenced by the enduring legacies of Korean Confucianism, which was the official ideology of the 500-year-long Joseon Dynasty, and Korean shamanism, the native religion of the Korean Peninsula

In South Korea, Seon is the dominant Buddhist order, and it closely related to Chinese and Japanese Zen traditions. Zen is the most contemplative and individualistic form of Buddhism. Zen Buddhism prescribes meditation to achieve enlightenment. Enlightenment, put simply, refers to perfect awareness of the true nature of reality. Zen Buddhist doctrine encourages the cessation of desire. Rather than change one's environment, practitioners are instructed to concentrate on changing their own minds. Zen masters claim that one's reality is generated in the mind, and only by changing one's mind can one change his or her reality.

Perhaps because of its individualistic, intellectual and introverted orientation, there are relatively few Buddhist charity organizations or colleges. Although approximately 25 percent of South Koreans are Buddhist, only 14 percent of religion-based charity organizations are Buddhist (Jeong 2010: 147). Furthermore, there are only four Buddhist-founded colleges in South Korea, compared to 201 Protestant colleges (148).

It should also be noted that Protestantism is connected with political discourse in South Korea. After the period of Japanese colonization and the Korean War, Protestant Christianity became tied with South Korean nationalism. Korean nationalists saw Protestant Christianity as not only more “modern” than Buddhism, but also symbolically more distant from Japan.

In South Korea, protest events were staged by groups of actors that maintained similar occupational identities and often times made their claims based on these identities. For example Christians assumed that the job of caring for the souls and wellbeing of their laity applied to the political and humanitarian spheres as well as the religious. Of course alliances were created between these social groups and often times they worked together to organize protest events (Chang 2007). Some groups, such as the Christians in the 1970s, were especially adept at organizing inter-group protest events (Chang 2006).

Christians were another important group in South Korea's democracy movement. While scholars have pointed to the tendency for Korean Christianity to be conservative, both theologically and in praxis, a minority of Christians became champions of democracy and human rights primarily during the 1970s (Lee 2006; Chang 2006). Some of the most important leaders of the democracy movement were Christian clergy such as MunIk-hwan, Pak Hyŏng-kyu, and Cardinal Kim Su-hwan. Other important leaders were Christians by faith including dissident poet Kim Chi-ha and Kim Dae Jung. Christians contributed to the democracy movement in many ways including the provision of unique organizational resources in the form of church networks and a spiritualized form of the minjung ideology in the form of Minjung Theology.

One additional important contribution Christians made to the democracy movement was their connection to international organizations and individuals. Korean Christians were connected to foreign missionary groups including the "Monday Night Group" who helped protestors in important ways (Stentzel 2006). Also, Christians, both Protestant and Catholic, had direct organizational connections to the sympathetic international community. For example, the Korean National Council of Churches is the Korean chapter of the World Council of Churches and the Korean Student Christian Federation is the Korean chapter of the World Student Christian Federation. Examples of international support include Bishop Chi Hak-sun who was, technically speaking, an

employee of the Universal Catholic Church and the Vatican made pleas for his release when he was arrested for violating Emergency Decrees 1 and 4

Although Christians' activism did not particularly stand out in the 1980s compared to the 1970s, their participation in the democracy movement was still significant. For example, MunIk-hwan was the chair of the People's Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification, which was one of the leading democracy movement organizations from the mid to late 1980s. Cardinal Kim Su-Hwan continuously supported the pro-democracy struggle and announced a declaration demanding constitutional revision and democratization in 1986. And the organizational symbol of Korean Catholicism, Myōngdong Cathedral, remained a sanctuary for those fleeing government repressions in the 1980s. When Chun publicly opposed constitutional revision in 1987, Christian leaders and priests launched hunger strikes.

### **5.1.3. FOREIGN INFLUENCE**

The United States and South Korea have been allies since the United States intervened on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 and fought to repel a North Korean takeover of South Korea. Over 33,000 U.S. troops were killed and over 100,000 were wounded during the three-year conflict. On October 1, 1953, a little more than two months after the parties to the conflict signed an armistice agreement, the United States and South Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty,

which provides that if either party is attacked by a third country, the other party will act to meet the common danger.

The first step in the process of South Korea's independence was the decision of the United States Military Government in Korea to establish a separate Korean state south of the thirty-seventh parallel. A draft constitution was elaborated by a parliament (National Assembly) which had been directly elected in May 1948. This National Assembly in turn elected Syngman Rhee to the presidential office. The Republic of Korea eventually became independent on 15 August 1948. The young state faced highly unfavourable conditions for developing a stable democracy (Lee, 1990: 19)

Soon after the area of Korea under the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel came under US protection in 1945, Lieutenant General John R Hodge proclaimed that one of the first and foremost US objectives would be to work out measures for assisting the development of a democratic self government. American influence extended directly into nearly every aspect of Korea's political and economic development. The United States largely shaped the structure of the independent government, the post-war education system, the country's internal and external economic relationships and increasingly thereafter through its training and education programs the attitudes of key groups especially in the education sector, bureaucracy, military and business community.

As a democratic role model, United States helped to create a desire to democratize among the Korean public by naturally reinforcing the symbols and values of democracy which helped an internal and quite indigenous attachment to democratic principles. The United States also had various forms of leverage over the South Korea to press for democratization including; a security treaty, a large military presence, foreign military sales credit, government and private loans, market for Korean exports, supply of police equipment, public civilization and diplomatic representation. Thomas Carothers aptly sums up United States policy on democratization when he writes; high flying rhetoric notwithstanding security and economic interests still often point United States policy in a contrary direction; Democracy promotion remained at most one of several major United States foreign policy interests, sometimes in competition with other stronger interests.

Ronald Reagan's presidency signaled a new era in US -Korean relations. One of his first acts after becoming president in 1980 was to reaffirm friendly relations by inviting Chun to White House as the first Major visiting Head of State. Afterwards Reagan chose to use quiet diplomacy pressuring for democracy and liberalization privately but rendering this pressure insignificant by publicly reaffirming United States commitment to Korea and bolstering Korean security through increased military aid

In 1986 the United States had a role in the successful overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines and just as the failures in Iran made the Carter administration more risk averse as James Fowler writes the success in the Philippines caused the Reagan administration to become more aggressive in South Korea giving the US confidence in its ability to push for positive changes. Democratization in the Philippines also increased pressure on the US from the press and the American people to take a more active role in Korea. The post-Vietnam era of fear of intervention had dissipated and instead editorials...called on the United States government to replicate its success from the Philippines in Korea by abandoning "quiet diplomacy"

In contrast to how human rights were shrouded under the table in 1979, there were at least seven congressional hearings dedicated entirely to democratization in Korea in 1986 and 1987. In June of 1987, several senators in the midst of South Korean riots introduced the Democracy in South Korea Act in the United Senate "to bring the blessings of democracy to South Korea by means of a range of American economic sanctions. The United States also claimed credit for the democratic process in Korea asserting that, the administration and congressional efforts have helped stimulate positive developments in democratization.

The U.S.-ROK alliance is one of the most successful of its kind in history. The alliance not only succeeded in defending South Korea from North Korean

aggression for over half a century but also oversaw the industrialization and democratization of South Korea as the once impoverished country led by authoritarian leaders grew into the world's 10th-largest economy with a flourishing democracy

## **Uganda**

Uganda from independence didn't have too much foreign influence towards democratization not until 1980s. However countries like United States and Britain occasionally discouraged dictatorial tendencies such as Idi Amin's atrocities. Following the democratic transitions of the late 1980s and early 1990s and the ebbing of the Cold War, democracy promotion became a key element of foreign policy and development assistance.

In addition to governments, multilateral organisations and a large number of national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) renewed and expanded their commitments to international engagement to support democracy. A consensus developed within the international community that considerations of national sovereignty should not shelter a country's internal political arrangements from outside observation or criticism. Thus, not only did democracy emerge as a universal aspiration, but norms also emerged in the international community indicating that it was legitimate to have an

interest in promoting and supporting democracy abroad (Bjørnlund,2004; Burnell, 2000).

Since the early 1990s, many Western donor governments have claimed one major aim of their foreign policy and foreign aid to be the support of democratization in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. After the Cold War ended, bilateral Western donors began to use democracy as an ideological argument for foreign aid; assistance could no longer be justified to domestic- audiences as support for the fight against communism. Reasons given for donor targeting of African countries for political reforms have included donor recognition that the lack of success of economic reforms in Africa called for political solutions (Robinson I 992: 2), and the argument that African countries offered few, if any, economic or geopolitical interests to donors and were therefore in a weaker bargaining position to withstand donor demand for reforms (Crawford 1997: 90-I; Moore & Robinson 1994: I 50)

Donor involvement in Uganda increased significantly between 1989 and 1994. Not only did bilateral foreign aid from major Western donors almost double, from \$179-7 million in 1989 to \$342-7 million in 1994 (OECD 1996: 30), but donor interest in the unfolding of political events in Uganda also intensified. During these years several events revealed that Western donors did not accept the movement political system as democratic. Before the 1994 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, several Western donors remained

reluctant to support the elections financially because they were not going to be held on a multiparty basis.

Reports from officials about the negotiations in the autumn of 1993 between donors and the Ugandan government show that President Museveni firmly insisted that the Constituent Assembly elections be held on the movement basis, while Western donors argued for multiparty elections (Hauser I 994-5). This series of events shows that donors chose to use the dialogue/persuasion method to attempt to influence political change in Uganda, even when pressuring for multiparty elections. It's the persuasion of the donor community that saw Uganda finally ditch the movement system in 2005 and adopted the multi party system after successfully conducting a referendum on whether adopt multi party system.

## CHAPTER 6

### 6.1. ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF UGANDA'S FAILURE TO FULLY TRANSIT TO MULTI PARTY DEMOCRACY IN CONTEXT OF FULL DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH KOREA

#### 6.1.1. ROLE OF MULTI ETHNIC STRUCTURE IN UGANDA

*“The control of the state is the greatest prize in ethnically plural societies— it is regarded not only as the source but also the distributor of resources commonly valued in the society. As the chief ‘allocator’ of services, facilities, and factors of development, the state becomes a target over which control, ethnic territorial groups engage in an endless struggle” (Otite 2001: 179)*

Ethnic diversity or pluralism usually inclines to confliction and coercive political behaviour in a society (Furnivall 1948). The ethnic conflicts are usually struggles and wars of subordination, rebellion and hegemony. These are characteristically struggles for autonomy and freedom from exploitation by small groups from large groups, for example the ethnic struggles that led to the breakup of the Soviet Union, or by large groups under the thumb of powerful minorities, for example, the wars in Rwanda between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi powerful minority. The bid to gain relative advantage in competitive access to goods and benefices catalyze these struggles or wars. The result is usually a crisis of state power which leads to ethnic unionization, to seize the apparatus of the state as an instrument for seeking advantage or exclusive aggrandizement (Otite 2001).

What has been observed in Africa to date is that party systems have failed almost everywhere to fulfill their proper functions mainly because they have not suited the socio-cultural conditions and processes that characterize their environment. From their beginnings in the anti-colonial struggle through governing regimes in the post-independence period and up to date, the various generations of party systems in Africa have tended to reflect pressures towards the ethnicisation, regionalization, and patrimonialisation of power. Donald L. Horowitz(1985).

Before the independence of Uganda in 1962 three political parties had emerged. The first political party was the Democratic Party (DP) that took its ideology from the Germany Christian Democrats and represented the catholic population but highly tied to Buganda ethnicity group. The second was the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) that was mainly supported by northern and western Uganda ethnic groups. The third was the Buganda nationalist party named Kabaka Yekka (KY) meaning, "King only.

When Western democratic institutions are merely transplanted into Africa, a dangerous gap often develops between them and the democratic struggles of the people. This gap is often filled by various undemocratic and anti-democratic forces, such as ethnic, religious and other millenarian and pseudo-political organizations that manipulate and feed on the fears and deprivations of the people. In time, "democratic" institutions become distorted

and converted into instruments of authoritarianism. However, this is not an acceptance of the opposing argument that cultural and civilization traits of non-Western societies make Western values like democracy a source of conflict both within such societies and the West (Huntington, 1996)

### *Constraints on Constructing Multiparty Democracy under Ethnic Conditions*

Several characteristics of the African ethnic contours pose severe constraints to the various forms and levels of democratic institutional development (Berman et al. 2004: 317-318). These constraints are:

- Contemporary African ethnicities are modern, not primordial, survivals of some primitive tribal past. They are recent and dynamic responses to the political, economic and cultural forces of Western modernity as introduced to Africa during and after the epoch of European colonialism;
- There is an intimate linkage between contemporary African ethnicities with the processes of colonial and post-colonial state formation and the development of capitalist market economies. They are thus grounded in, and express, in particular, the inequalities of, economic development and access to state resources within and between ethnic communities;
- The distinction between the internal and external dimensions of ethnicity is critical for understanding the relationship between ethnic communities,

capitalism and the state. Ethnicity is not just about culture and tradition; it is also about competition for wealth and political power;

- The internal contestations are also moral conflicts over fundamental issues of social responsibility, solidarity, and collective moral responsibility. The hierarchical and conservative values and the clientelistic relationships expressed in the internal processes of ethnic development may conflict with the liberal individualist values and liberal democracy;
- The external confrontations between ethnic communities over access to and control over state institutions take place in an amoral free-for-all pervaded by ethnically based patron-client networks (see Wrong 2009: 121-144). Thus, in the clash of 'political tribalism', the formal rules of the political process mean little, and control over parts of the state apparatus mean a great deal.

### **6.1.2. BACKGROUND OF MULTI PARTY SYSTEM IN BOTH COUNTRIES**

*In Uganda the change to multiparty democracy was not inevitable as shown below;*

Political parties are vital political institutions for the functioning of a modern democracy. They are essential for the organization of the modern democratic polity and are crucial for the expression and manifestation for political pluralism. Political parties are presumed to be central to the democratization of any state. Defined as an organization whose prime objective

is to mobilize its supporters to assume a leadership role, a political party of any significance is viewed or views itself in terms of providing alternative policy platforms, ideological direction, as well as redefining the agenda of government.

In the Ugandan context, the Political Parties and Organizations Act (2005) defines a political party as “a political organization the objects of which include the influencing of the political process or sponsoring a political agenda, whether or not it also seeks to sponsor or offer a platform to a candidate for election to a political office or to participate in the governance of Uganda at any level”. In a liberal democracy, political parties perform the function of integrating individuals and groups in society into the political system

Generally, political parties in Africa played a key role in the nationalist struggles against colonial rule. On attaining independence however, most of the ruling parties of the day either outlawed opposition parties, criminalized their activities or their contribution to national debate/policy were belittled and disparaged. After independence, most African rulers proclaimed one-party states .Whether undermined by the civilian or the military, the consequences of diminishing the role of political parties in building democratic states and societies were disastrous.

Dictatorship, authoritarianism, cronyism corruption and economic collapse became rampant, leading to the ubiquity of collapsed or failed states in

Africa. Despite the fact that competitive multiparty regimes governed well immediately after independence, this gain was short-lived as selfish post-colonial leaders abandoned the ethos of democratic pluralism. As some scholars have pointed out, most of the post colonial leaders in Africa chose to rule in a style similar to that of the colonial rulers by relegating the majority of the people and isolating the opposition groups. These tendencies sowed the seeds of authoritarian rule in Africa and Uganda in particular.

In retrospect, the foundation for multiparty democracy that was laid at the time of independence has been dismantled. Whereas the liberal tradition perceives democracy as the right of the people to organize and choose their government through an institutionalized multiparty system, in Uganda, this is still viewed with suspicion by the political elite.

The successful capture of state power in 1986 by Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) began from a point of undermining the role of political parties. Legal Notice No.1 of 1986 banned the activities of political parties. It claimed that political parties had not been banned. However, the law barred parties from holding delegates' conferences, opening party branches, sponsoring candidates, recruiting of membership and displaying of party colours. The temporary measures turned into a permanent ban on party activities when they were reproduced in the draft constitution in 1993, and later entrenched in the new Constitution of 1995.

The NRM under the Movement system was used to enjoying all the political space alone. The reintroduction of multi partyism is somewhat perceived as an obstruction of that abundant political space. This may explain the post 2006 political conduct of several state institutions towards opposition political parties and their activities. While the NRM government had allowed civil society organizations to proliferate and to conduct their business freely, there has been increasing intolerance of the activities of political parties. In the past such activities were disallowed because they were banned under the law

Beyond the above arguments, it is plainly clear that money matters in politics because parties need resources for administration and election campaigns. But money should not be allowed to buy access to decision-making. The issue of money in politics is complicated due to a number of reasons. Firstly, under-funded political parties are not likely to compete effectively in the political game and are unlikely to nurture the growth of democracy. Secondly, ruling parties are likely to use their influence to solicit much more financial resources than the opposition parties. Thirdly, opposition parties are likely to illicitly solicit resources from sources restricted by the law. In addition, most parties, whether in government or opposition are tempted to conceal their sources of funding, which is dangerous to both democracy and the security of the state

## **South Korea**

*The change to multi party democracy in South Korea was inevitable because of the following;*

The democratic transition in 1987 resulted in the foundation of the Sixth Republic with the ratification of a new constitution. Under the democratic Sixth Republic, Korea has experienced a series of democratic reforms on political institutions and practices (Shin 1999). Before the transition to democracy, political institutions and practices were characterized with limited public contestation of power, executive domination over the legislature and the judiciary, control of mass media, curtailment of civil and political rights, and little protection of social rights. Yet, the new constitution of the Sixth Republic restored key democratic political institutions and practices

The new constitution provided for direct popular election of the president with a single, non-renewable five-year term. As in the authoritarian past, the president represents the state and heads the executive branch of government. Yet, the chief executive's powers are reduced considerably, while those of the legislative and judicial branches are expanded significantly. Specifically, the president's powers regarding emergency decrees and dissolution of the National Assembly are abolished. Legislative oversight over the executive is restored and strengthened. These and other institutional changes render the legislature no longer a rubber stamp of the executive. The

judiciary becomes independent in their rulings and appointment of judges and the Constitutional Court is newly established for strengthening judicial reviews. The limits of political and civil rights are greatly expanded and basic social rights began to be protected. The constitution protects political parties against arbitrary decisions to disband while requires them to promote internal democracy. The constitution also explicitly states the political neutrality of the military.

A variety of liberalizing reforms were adopted to safeguard political rights and civil liberties among individual citizens as well as civic and political associations for example, new laws allowing assemblies and demonstrations were enacted in March 1989. A new constitutional court was created to prevent any branch of national and local government from abusing the democratic constitution or human rights .the laws governing the judicial system proceedings were also modified to make judicial system more independent of the executive control and freer from political interference. The basic press law, one of the most repressive legal tools of authoritarian fifth republic, was formally repealed in November 1987 to ensure freedom of expression and association.

The dismantling of the deeply entrenched power bases of the previous military authoritarian regimes by president Kim young Sam within few months of his inauguration; he purged the generals and colonels who had been key

players in those regimes. He disbanded the Hana Hoe club, a secret clique in the army whose members had served as pillars of the military dictatorship for thirty years and occupied all the key strategic positions in the military.

The revised laws forced the agency for the National Security Planning (ANSP)- formerly the Korean central intelligence Agency – and the military security council, the two most powerful and oppressive institutions of the military dictatorship to “leave politics” and return to their origin missions thus losing their status as a “reserved domain” of Korean politics with exclusive control over national security expenditures, defense strategies , personnel management ,development and procurement of weaponry and intelligence gathering. Those agencies all became subject to parliamentary oversight and were prohibited from conducting political surveillance over other branches of government, public officials or private citizens

There have been institutional reforms to extend the limits of political rights and civil liberties. In 1994 the Office of Ombudsman was established to address citizen complaints against government agencies. In 2001 the National Human Rights Commission was constituted to monitor and oversee violations of human rights. Since 1998 the Information Disclosure Law has been implemented to give citizens the rights of access to government records and documents.

In March 1994, the national assembly attempted to strengthen the enforcement of those principles in political life by revising the existing laws on elections, campaign financing and local autonomy. The new comprehensive election law imposed numerous new restrictions on campaigning and spending to make it more transparent i.e. they required all parties and candidates use only funds withdrawn from their bank accounts for campaigning and they submit their account books to the Central Election Management Committee.

*The following triggered the change to multi party politics in both South Korea and Uganda;*

## **Uganda**

Strategically, the Movement officials and their supporters perceived the opening of the political space as a strategic calculation that would give the NRM a new lease on their life in power. Tripp, Aili Mari (2004). This would allow the president who had already served the two eligible terms then eligible to stand again under the multi party system.

After the Cold War ended, bilateral Western donors began to use democracy as an ideological argument for foreign aid; assistance could no longer be justified to domestic- audiences as support for the fight against communism. Reasons given for donor targeting of African countries for political reforms have included donor recognition that the lack of success of economic reforms in Africa called for political solutions (Robinson I

992:2), Donor methods to promote democratic reforms have included financial support for specific political reforms; dialogue with recipient governments to persuade them to implement democratic reforms; and strong overt pressure on recipient governments to make reforms, often taking the form of political conditionality on aid (Nelson & Eglinton 1992: 8-9). Political conditionality can be defined in several ways.

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### **South Korea**

In October 1979, the conditions were ripe for a transition to democracy in South Korea. After two decades of stunning economic growth, the plunge toward recession had begun. Labor unions launched a wave of strikes and demonstrations. Korean students also filled the streets in protest. Churches also lent their support to the movement. Finally, the workers, students and clergymen were joined by the parliamentary opposition, which had prestige but not power. Although the United States customarily favored stability in South Korea, the Carter administration resented the Park dictatorship, both because of

its human rights violations and its apparent efforts to bribe American legislators. A. David Adesnik and Kim Sunhyuk (2004)

Works by Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Economic Development and Democracy'. Lipset compares five indices of economic development in different types of countries: stable democracies, unstable democracies, and dictatorships. Lipset concludes: 'the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy' (Lipset 1960:31). The same result is found in the works of other authors such as Phillips Cutright (1963) and Ken Bollen (1979). Although various measurements and comparison schemes are employed, these studies show a consistent positive relation between the level of development (both economical and social) and possibilities of democracy of which is Korea has economically developed.

He also referred to 'Industrialization And Democracy: Economic Necessities' Karl de Schweinitz (1964), his attention is given to the conditions of democratization such as international development environment, the strength and character of state, the activeness of the working class and examining how those factors have even facilitated democracy in the West. Korean political culture changed during the years of intensive development (1961-1987).

He also highlighted valuable research on postures of different classes towards democracy by Barrington Moore. Moore focuses his attention on the role of the bourgeoisie that he asserts is decisive in democratization: 'no

bourgeoisie, no democracy' (Moore 1966:418). Many political scientists agree with Moore, confirming that the bourgeoisie, by nature, suit democracy. In modern times, however, as almost all countries in the world have adopted capitalism, the bourgeoisie lose their revolutionary role to the new middle class, comprising of midedhelon managers, professionals, white-collar workers, etc.

For democracy to function well, popular participation is necessary. Democratic politics also needs a new culture in which fair competition and mutual tolerance are routinely practiced. This requisite is met gradually in the development process. Lipset (1960) remarks rightly that prosperity makes people more tolerant and they tend to choose peaceful solution to conflicts

Changes in the world political arena in the 1980s had a great impact on Korea intensifying the internal struggle for openness. South Korea's political transition was in fact in tune with the third wave of global democratization (Huntington 1981); it was obviously under pressure from the international community and the democratic wind blowing from other countries at the time. Before 1961, Korea's political culture was a mixture of conservative Asian thoughts derived from Confucianism, Japanese militarism and some indigenous traditions. A few years under the occupation of American troops and the heavily dependence on the superpower later also brought in a gush of liberal democratic ideas.(Nguyen 2004)

However the major turning point was 29<sup>th</sup> June 1987 , when Roh Tae Woo, the presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) announced an eight point pledge , subsequently dubbed the June 29 declaration of democratic reform which served as the first threshold of Korea’s democratic transition from military dictatorship. In response to seventeen consecutive days of street demonstrations, during which the government fired 300000 teargas canisters at protestors, the military government headed by former General Chun Doo Hwan and the ruling DJP formally accepted public demands for democratic reforms and incorporated those demands into Roh’s June 29<sup>th</sup> declaration.

### **6.1.3. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.**

South Korea was considered a “full democracy,” along with only 26 other countries (representing 12% of the entire population) out of the 167 nations covered by the index. South Korea received high scores for its electoral process and pluralism (9.17) and civil liberties (8.82) but relatively lower scores in the functioning of government (7.86); political participation (7.22) and political culture (7.50).( The Economist Intelligence Unit,2010)

A report by Flattau Associates--a Washington-based firm which conducts government assessment and monitors democratic stability in countries, states that democracy in Uganda has “declined to slightly worse than moderate levels” .The report notes that that while Mr. Museveni is credited with

bringing economic and political stability to Uganda and fostering efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, “many critics, however, cite the Museveni administration’s continuing repression of freedom in the country in an attempt to consolidate power.” For all intents and purposes, the President has succeeded in this endeavor rating Uganda’s overall strength of democracy on a 0-10 scale—with 0 representing weak, 5 representing moderate, and 10 representing strong, the Democracy Monitor Quarterly (DMQ) report hands Uganda a 4.1 score. It concludes that the country “has not registered a quarterly gain in over two years now from 2011 elections. The report states that over the past two years, Uganda’s opposition have had no ability to form, operate, and participate in government processes without restriction or interference from President Museveni and the entities that he has control over which include the security forces, police, military and party members.

The opposition has a special role in any functioning democracy. It is very clear that the opposition in Uganda is yet to be fully embraced. With cases of intimidation and harassment, there is fear to associate with the opposition for fear of being equally harassed by the state. Although Parliament passed the Political Parties and Organisations Act, 2010, which provides for funding of political parties represented in the House, this has not been implemented. The general perception among opposition members is that this is a deliberate attempt by the government to subvert the opposition.


Civil society was never seen as playing any partnership role and instead was always viewed with hostility because the colonial and postcolonial states did not desire competitors. Under colonialism, civil society in Uganda was marginalized and conscripted into the state machinery to contain the African majority, which was completely excluded from any institutional role in governance

Despite the return of multiparty politics in Uganda, neither has democracy been consolidated nor have elections acted as effective instruments for advancing democratization in the country. Democracy has remained elusive in Uganda despite the re-introduction of multiparty politics. Incumbency advantages, manipulation and unconstitutional use of state resources and apparatuses, and removal of the constitutional term limits on the presidency have combined to hamper effective growth of multiparty politics and democracy in the country. (Makara,2010)

There is what some scholars call path dependence. In common parlance this simply means that history matters Uganda was under authoritarian colonial British colonial rule for sixty eight years from 1894 when it was declared a British Protectorate until 1962 when it attained independence. The legacy of British authoritarian rule still conditions the political behavior of both the rulers and the ruled in Uganda. Ugandan presidents since independence have imitated colonial governance by centralizing power and abhorring any form of dissent,

policy criticism or alternative centers of power. This has been exacerbated by what Oloka-Onyango calls presidentialism, a situation in which a great deal of power is vested in the Executive arm of government, and by extension, the President (Joe Oloka-Onyango, (2007)

### POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION 2000-2012



SOURCE: AFRO BARAMOTER 2013

Figure 1: graph showing party affiliation


This substance gap between the level of support for the ruling party and opposition parties suggests that multi party system has not been consolidated. Currently there are over 30 registered political parties in Uganda. Only National Resistance Movement (NRM) Democratic Party (DP), Uganda People's

Congress (UPC) Justice Forum (JEEMA) Conservative Party (CP) and Forum for Democratic Party (FDC) have Members of Parliament in Uganda.

There is also lack of inclusiveness in ideology and policy formulation processes supports the indicators of institutionalization, inclusiveness and decentralization among all political parties. This is one of the most centralized and non-inclusive aspects of most political parties both institutionally and structurally. Party formation and ideological orientation is usually the preserve of a few individuals who characteristically become the party owners. These founders then centralize power and decision-making prerogatives among themselves. Such practices only serve to entrench personality politics where loyalty to the party is substituted with personal loyalty to the party leader hence further diminishing prospects for party institutionalization and overall democracy.

There is fusion of dominant party (NRM) and state which constitutes a real challenge to the sustainability of multiparty politics in Uganda. While the problem is more serious in Africa than in other regions, it is certainly a common feature also in other regions, including Europe. Carothers (2006: 68–73) provides a useful insight into this problem at the global level. Such parties are usually found in single-party regimes where the party and the state are so fused that they became indistinguishable from each other.

## TRUST IN THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION



SOURCE: AFRO BARAMOTER 2013

Figure 2: showing trust in the electoral commission over the years

The performance of a multiparty system of governance is enhanced by a belief amongst stakeholders that there are fair electoral laws and institutions that can ensure free and fair elections. In Uganda, parties have been revived despite the existence of an intransigent Electoral Commission (EC), which has been accused by the opposition groups as being skewed in favour of the NRM. Such a view was given credence by the Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2001 and 2006 elections when it ruled on both occasions that the Electoral Commission failed to administer free and fair elections. (Makara,2010) this is more so reflected in the survey that was carried that over the last 6 years the electoral commission has lost trust of the electorates and mainly the opposition.

## SHOWING THE STATUS RULE OF LAW AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN UGANDA

	SD	D	NAD	A	SA
There is an Independent Judiciary free from executive pressures	27.6	37.2	12.6	17.4	3.6
Citizens have equal access to justice in Uganda	35.7	35.7	8.2	14	5.1
Courts are geographically easily accessible to the citizens	20.9	29.7	9.2	30.6	6.3
Traditional justice systems are more effective on delivering justice as compared to the formal systems	10.7	23.3	17.4	32.4	14.3
The procedures for amending the constitution have been fair	32.1	36.9	9.6	14.6	3.7
The judiciary is Corruption free	42.6	34.9	8.5	9.7	3.4

Source: Democracy Audit 2008–2013, (HURINET–U)

Figure 3: Showing the rule of law and justice

As the statistics in the table above indicate only 4% of the respondents strongly agree while 17% agree that the judiciary is free from executive pressure or interference. This is corroborated by reports indicating that the Judiciary ranks among the most corrupt institutions in the country. In the recent past, there have been attacks by the executive on the judiciary as well as interference with the decisions of the courts, a factor that could explain the lack of confidence in the institution of the Judiciary. Uganda is experiencing constitutional challenges over the principle of separation of powers. Experience shows that the executive most times treats the other branches: Parliament and Judiciary as appendages.

### FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.

The high watermark of liberal and competitive democracy is widely thought to be the holding free and fair elections. When asked whether there

were free and fair elections in Uganda only 18% agreed while 5% strongly agreed. Fully 36% strongly disagreed and 31% disagreed with the statement, as indicated in Table below

### **SHOWING PEOPLES VIEWS IF THERE WERE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS**

	SD	D	NAD	A	SA
There are free and fair elections in Uganda	35.8	31.1	10.5	18	4.6
The Electoral Commission is independent of government control and influence	34.7	32.6	11.3	16.3	5.1
The registration and voting processes and procedures are free from abuse	27.3	34.3	11.2	21.6	5.6
Politicians lie in order to be elected	8.2	7.7	8.5	34.8	40.8
Politicians bribe in order to be elected	8	6.7	7.8	34.5	43
All social groups (e.g., tribes, religion, gender) have equal opportunity of access to public offices in Uganda	27.6	31.6	10.8	20.8	9.2

Source: Democracy Audit 2008–2013, (HURINET-U)

Figure 4: Showing perception on free and fair elections in Uganda

The responses to the above question were as follows;

27% of the respondents were very dissatisfied and 33% were dissatisfied that the official results reflected the will of the people. Only 19% agreed while 10% strongly agreed. Going by the above responses, there is low confidence in the official results of the general elections. This kind of electoral perception and lack of confidence in official results does not augur well for the growth of democracy in the country.

The 9<sup>th</sup> Parliament has the highest number of independents. As a block they are larger than the opposition. The party’s political organs and programs

were undermined by “independents” or basically NRM misfits (like the rebel MPs) who run for office anyway and were elected to parliament. This has been followed by expulsion of rebel MPs by the ruling National Resistance Movement whom court further ruled they should be thrown out of Parliament. The MPs, according to CEC, were found guilty of faulting Rule 4 of the party constitution which prohibits the use of foul language, campaigning against official party flag bearers in elections, being an agent of foreign agents to the detriment of the party or country and willingly spreading malicious propaganda.

Along the bumpy road to the 2016 elections, “individual merit” appears to be gaining ground in spite of the multiparty democracy system in place, raising questions about whether political parties are still viable vehicles through which one must run for office. The debate surrounding the ‘rebel MPs’ is neither about a strong Parliament versus strong political parties, nor Parliament versus the Executive, but rather, it is about strong individuals in Parliament versus strong political parties in Parliament. There were 43 independent MPs in the 9<sup>th</sup> parliament, up from 29 in the 8th Parliament.

## CHAPTER 7

### 7.1. CONCUCLUSION

It's now evident that both South Korea and Uganda have undergone similar paths towards democratization which included colonialism, one party system, dictatorships, constitution abrogation and later introduction of multiparty democracy. However Uganda lost track towards achieving full democracy due ethnicity, religion and culture that highly got entrenched in the political process unlike South Korea's mono ethnic structure based on shared blood and ancestry. Ethnic national identity was crucial source of pride and inspiration for people during the turbulent years of Korea's transition to modernity that involved colonialism, territorial division, war, and authoritarian politics. Korea became in 1987 the most powerful democracy in East Asia after Japan with a peaceful transition driven by a combination of civil society, international pressure and elite negotiation, followed by political stability and continued buoyant economic growth, the country has often been described in western news media and scholarly community as East Asian model of prosperity and democracy.

It has also enhanced collective consciousness and internal solidarity against external threats and has served Korea's modernization project as an effective resource. Not only did the foreign influence especially united states also play a crucial role in South Korea however the civil society should be

highly regarded for the great role in achieving full democracy which Uganda has lacked since independence because of state control and few reliable elite groups to pressure the regimes over the years.

The research has also shown difference in the political systems of both countries that highly limit Uganda's transition to multi party democracy especially the constitution and no separation of powers are the biggest challenge. The political road map of Uganda also highly highlighted the role of the military and patronage of the Yoweri Museveni who was also further popularized by the movement system before tactic fully restoring multi party politics in Uganda.

The research also comprehensively showed the role of ethnicity in limiting Uganda's transit to fully democracy. It further showed whether it was inevitable for both countries to restore multi party politics and why. The research then highlighted why Uganda is not considered as full democracy or has not fully transited to democracy. It's on this basis of the Korean experience of active civil society, reliable constitution, the dismantling of the deeply entrenched power bases of the previous military authoritarian regimes, important liberising reforms, electoral and party reforms that I draw lessons and recommendations for Uganda.

## 7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

Low party durability and a high relevance of independents in Uganda are signs of a weak integrative effect of the electoral system therefore there is need for reorganization of the party system and the palpable moderation of opposition programmes. In other words, electoral reform in a democratic system should aim at optimizing the integrational representation and decisional capacities of the electoral system. Candidates in the national constituency should only run as party candidates on a party's list. Candidates who apply for representative democracies, it is important that the electoral system leads to the formation of political parties and also limit factional tendencies rendered more difficult by the fact that the respective parties are mainly 'caucus parties' that are hardly ever visible except prior to elections.

There is need to dismantle the deeply entrenched power bases of the revolutionary military who have are still influential in the running of the country. This is evident with their presence in the parliament and also recently in the Cabinet. This was one of the turning points in South Korea achieving democracy when President Kim young Sam disbanded the Hana Hoe club, a secret clique in the army whose members had served as pillars of the military dictatorship for thirty years and occupied all the key strategic positions in the military.

There is need to strengthen power of the constitution which will be vital in reducing powers of the presidency and executive considerably, while those of the legislative and judicial branches should be expanded significantly as its evident in South Korea. Specifically, the president's powers regarding emergency decrees and dissolution of the National Assembly should be abolished. Legislative oversight over the executive is restored and strengthened. These and other institutional changes will render the legislature no longer a rubber stamp of the executive.

There is need for politically elites to become consensually unified around the basic procedures and norms by which politics will be played and when this unity becomes embedded in mutually respectful, crosscutting patterns of face to face interaction and in this regard both the ruling and opposition parties have to ensure electoral reforms are carried out such as appointing the equally convincing electoral commission.

Dialogues should be continued with stakeholders at the national and sub-national level that are focused on more peaceful political processes, transparency of electoral law reform and processes, strengthening multi-party democracy, improving service delivery and passage of a code of conduct for political parties which should be vigorously enforced to promote harmony and ensure that the activities of political parties and organizations do not endanger the common good.

Although the role of political parties in promoting democratic governance is commonly understood, most African countries like Uganda use political parties in the narrow sense as instruments developed by the elite for state capture. This could be rectified through increased capacity-building and awareness workshops and seminars on the centrality of political parties for thriving democratic governance.

There is a pressing need for the vast documentation on internal and external party regulations to be subjected to a reality check in order to support political parties through workshops, training and capacity-building programmes to redress deficiencies in their organization, structures and functions. Too little is also known about how political parties are managed and internally organized, how their programmes are developed (and in fact the content of these programmes and how the global context affects them), what mechanisms parties have in order to implement these programmes once in government, or how opposition political parties develop policies to influence government programmes by actively referring to and improving their own. There is therefore a need for training programmes on political party management and organization in order to increase their effectiveness, transparency and accountability.

More efforts are needed to find ways in which to curb domination by ruling party through the abuse of state funds and resources. Independent audit

functions can be introduced, but parliamentary committee systems can also contribute to transparency in this regard. The establishment of a code of conduct for ruling parties and coalitions in the opposition could be another important step in the right direction.

Although the generic relationship between political parties, government and parliament is well understood, in fact the constellation of these relations between elections is poorly understood. This could be a result of too much capacity building for parliamentarians (in effect empowering the machinery of government) and too little training for political parties' leaders and their key members. Training for political parties and political party functionaries is important for creating democratic interfaces and synergies as well as building a solid base for democratic practices which can be passed 'up the line' from political parties to parliament.

The media can play a big role in consolidating democracy. The media has the ability to provide citizens with electoral and other kinds of social choices related to the provision of information about political candidates and events. The media can be vigilant against corruption practices and tendencies and can keep public figures accountable in the public realm. The media should scan information and set the agenda for politicians and citizens in the domestic and international arena.

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