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국제학 석사학위 논문

Shifting Soft Power Dynamics
in *Anti-Hallyu* of China and Japan

중국과 일본에서의 반한류와
변화하는 소프트파워 다이내믹스

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Shifting Soft Power Dynamics
in *Anti-Hallyu* of China and Japan

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Abstract

This paper aims to investigate changing nature of soft power dynamics in the process of interaction with other states, through the empirical example of *anti-Hallyu* at China and Japan.

To do so, existing literature on soft power and *Hallyu* will be reviewed for suggesting new types of conceptualization on soft power dynamics based on them. Then, the comparative cases of *anti-Hallyu* in China and Japan will be analyzed and employed to evaluate the new concepts' utility in real contexts.

Soft power dynamics here would be argued as continuously shifting on inter-state negotiations, and as containing mutuality for both sides of sending and receiving states for related policies.

From the case study of *anti-Hallyu*, the monetary capital of material resources was found to be wielding influence over soft power dynamics. The reason why Korea had to adopt such wide-ranging localization efforts in Chinese and Japanese contexts was 'capital'. If Korea had a larger domestic market, it might have turned more nationalistic than trying to tailor to foreign tastes.

Also, through the case study, soft power was found to be uncontrollable by the initiator state. Through interaction between states, the same soft resource can change its character in opposite direction, as was seen in *Hallyu*'s role with China's interests.

According to interactions between states to negotiate on soft power using the resources they have, soft power dynamics keep on changing in a fluid way of going back and forth.

The outcome of the interactions, *Hallyu* resource began contributing to China's national interests, by introducing Chinese culture to Koreans via media contents. Chinese capital investments dominating over Korea's media industry resulted in indirect soft power effects.

However, Japan's protectionist approach to restricting *Hallyu* rather backfired against its own national interests by lessening its leverage for cultural influence and resulting soft power with Korea.

Keywords: Hallyu, Korean Wave, Soft Power, Popular Culture, Nationalism, Korea, China, Japan

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Research Motivation

The purpose of this article is to conceptualize shifting dynamics of soft power from empirical cases of Korea's *Hallyu*. Specifically, the research aim is two-fold: 1) to develop a new analytical framework of soft power dynamics, and 2) to conduct an empirical case study through *anti-Hallyu* cases in comparative contexts of China and Japan.

Resources for soft power are often expected to be static and to produce similar effects anywhere. However, examples in the real world reveal that they are a double-edged sword with the potential to produce opposite consequences.

Soft power policies cannot be value-neutral since national interest often involves limited resources at the competition. Thus, opposite views co-exist: while domestic public takes pride in soft power, the foreign public feels threatened by it. The inherent

dilemma between the two is further complicated by actors and interests.

Hallyu, or *The Korean Wave*, shows one of soft power dilemma situations when the domestic policy of state involvement for soft power produced foreign resistance. Also, *anti-Hallyu* cases involve states with differing capacities. Thus, they would be suitable for noting on interactive negotiations and contextual differences among states in soft power dynamics.

Case study method will be employed because it is “an empirical inquiry… within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994: 13).

For contextual differences involving *Hallyu*, research work from area studies would be referred. For details on specific changes in practical contexts, news articles would be used as the source.

1.2. Literature Review

Previous literature on soft power mainly dealt with defining its nature, since the concept is relatively new. But the focus was not given to changing aspects of soft power on interactive dynamics between states with differing capacities.

In fact, by adding these criteria of changes, soft power research can turnaround 1) from initial effects to changing effects over time, and 2) from one-dimensional to two-dimensional mutual account. This section will review the existing literature on soft power to employ for the analytical framework.

The term ‘soft power’ is characterized as a cooperative power with the ability to shape the preferences of others (Nye, 2004: 5), and is distinguished from coercing hard power. Different conceptualization on soft power by Lee (2009) distinguishes the types of powers according to the resources employed: soft power is applied when non-material symbolic ‘soft resources’ were used for drawing final outcome, whereas hard power refers to the leverages in cases where material ‘hard resources’ were utilized.

Lee (2010) also dealt with soft power dynamics, developing concepts with Robert Putnam's two-level game metaphor through conflicting levels of foreign (outward) and domestic (inward) inside soft power policies. 'Soft Power Dilemma' and 'Soft Power Synergy' each refers to conflicting and cooperative situations between the two levels, which lead to outcomes of failure or success accordingly.

Lee's changed concepts serve better for analyzing the soft power potential of 'middle power' states, which have relatively limited hard resources compared to hegemonic nations. Korea being a non-hegemonic state with certain degrees of resources to employ for soft power policies to be characterized as 'middle power', this study will take Lee's concepts of soft power instead of Nye's.

Through the concepts, *anti-Hallyu* cases in China and Japan will be comparatively analyzed as representing 'soft power dilemma' for the non-hegemonic state in conflict with superior foreign states of material hard power capacities.

This study will thus conceptualize on shifting process of soft power dynamics, especially in conflicting dilemma situation, and look at how interactive negotiations take place.

1.3. Research Question & Proposition

This paper raises research question of “How and why Korea’ s soft power dynamics after *anti-Hallyu* differed in China and Japan?” Accordingly, the comparative case study on the empirical examples will be conceptualized into an analytical framework for changing soft power dynamics in the interaction among states.

Hallyu was chosen for its representativeness as a cultural resource for soft power utilized by non-hegemonic state flowing into more powerful states, signifying the turn to oppositional direction from realist assumptions of power. *Anti-Hallyu*

movements from China and Japan meant an encounter with the systemized foreign resistance from states with higher capacities, which had the leverages to disrupt the soft power flow. Thus, the extent of appeal on achieving influence can be delineated in the comparative contexts of power relations.

Different outcomes after *anti-Hallyu* are expected in China and Japan, coming from societal factors of media environment, political structure, and historical identity. Continued or interrupted cultural exchanges after resistance would determine the contextual outcomes of increased or decreased reciprocity in soft power.

Chapter 2. Conceptual Framework

2.1. Conflicting Dimensions of Soft Power

Compared to the clear-cut nature of material hard resources, soft resources have complex nature. For one, the soft resources are immeasurable by numbers due to their symbolic and ideational nature. Dealing with people's value systems, individual experience involving soft power would all differ as well.

Also, soft power has conflicting elements, under the two levels of domestic and foreign contradictions. Actors of state and non-state, and interests between economic and social are the representative conflicting dimensions to produce different outcomes of a soft resource according to situational contexts. That is, soft power dynamics do not stay the same, but keep on changing their shapes through the interaction of heterogeneous within-elements. The oppositional elements inside soft power would be delineated, through which empirical cases would be analyzed later.

Soft power dilemma has roots on the conflicting dimensions on domestic and foreign levels. Since the era of Westphalia system, the idea of nation-state took place and competition-based international relations became the norm. As time went on,

international exchanges became more commonplace, but still, nationalistic sentiments stayed – at times even at more severe degrees after inter–state exchanges.

On the domestic level, it is politically effective to take the nationalistic view for soft power, whereby national interest is emphasized at the expense of foreign states' resources. A typical example is the discourses on national interests of political leverage, economic profit, and cultural pride achieved through soft power.

On the foreign level, trans–national view encompassing interests of several states needs to be taken for effective soft power implementation. The point is that mutual interests are attained for both states after the cross–border exchanges, not exclusively for one side of the party. Discourses on shared regional interests or globalized networks, benefiting borderless parties, are the examples.

Second conflicting element stems from the different types of actors between state and non–state. Since the advent of nation–states, the state actor has been the main unit of analysis. But in the era of globalization, other types of actors have taken over the more

influential position in international relations. The turnaround from the official government-led diplomacy to the democratic public-led diplomacy requires new concepts for the actors and their interests.

State actors, or the government, have official nature of involving elite specialists to represent the whole nation in a top-down fashion. On contrary, non-state actors ranging from multinational companies to activist groups, now exert power in a bottom-up direction. Expansion of global network and development of information technology enabled the heterogeneous actors, from high to low levels of politics, to participate in shaping soft power dynamics.

The two main non-state actors have different ways and purposes of taking a role in the new international relations. Specifically, companies show their influence by capital flows across borders, for economic interests of making profits. Conversely, NGOs or civic organizations gather online or other platforms to form large numbers of people for social interests and wield collectivized political power.

Last conflicting element is between economic interests and social interests. Private companies' drive for economic interests tends to facilitate transnational exchanges of culture, compared to organizations serving more public purposes. That is, companies view culture merely as a tool for producing economic profit, and thus are willing to adopt foreign cultures when localization is needed for more market share. By making products tailored to foreign tastes, companies can unintentionally facilitate cultural hybridization with the capital-rich foreign states.

On the other hand, public organizations with social purposes tend to place more value on national culture. For them, culture is not a tool for something, but the ends itself designating national identity. Thus, they can suggest cultural protectionism for the public good when economic-driven cultural hybridization show signs of foreign capital's domination over national culture. The introduced conflicting dimensions are organized in Table 1, and Figures from 1 to 3 outline specific contradictory characteristics.

Table1. Conflicting Dimensions of Soft Power Dynamics

Level	Domestic	Foreign
Actor	State	Non-state
Interest	Economic	Social

Figure1. Conflicting Domestic and Foreign Levels




Figure2. Contradictory State and Non-State Actors





Figure3. Comparative Economic and Social Interests



Though nation-states similarly seek their own domestic national interests, as realism posits, the competitive state relations are not in the same fair playing field of international relations. Each state has differing degrees of power and influence in the international society. The hegemonic state has a superior amount of resources for military and economy, which is directly linked to hard power capacities and become a leader. Non-hegemonic states relatively lack in hard resources of material means. There is also varying amounts among non-hegemonic nations, and thus, some of them are separately termed as 'middle powers'.

However, soft power differs from hard power in that states' attractiveness is not proportional to material resources. Non-hegemonic states' lack of hard power rather places them in an advantageous position for soft power, due to its non-threatening image in the international relations. Distinctive features of non-hegemonic state's soft power dynamics, in opposition to the hegemonic state, would be discussed more with *Hallyu* example.

2.2. Stages of Soft Power Dynamics

The focus of this research is on soft power, not on acculturation process. So the soft power initiator state's view would be taken, between conflicting domestic and foreign positions.

Below each position of levels, there are actors of state and non-state. They can be further categorized into state actor of government, and non-state actors of companies and civic organizations.

Also, the state and non-state actors would each have public and private interests. But there is a blur on what constitutes public and private interests. For example, national interests tend to go same directions with domestic companies' successful business.

Public and private interests can be identified along the lines of economic and social interests. Therefore, economic and social interests focusing each on monetary and symbolic resources would serve as better criteria for analyzing the negotiation at work in soft power dynamics.

From the viewpoint of soft power initiator state, or on the domestic level, the changing stages in soft power dynamics consist of 1) projection of soft power, 2) adaptation of soft power, and resulting 3) reversal or interruption of soft power.

That is, the first stage starts with introducing its own culture to the foreign state and accordingly, its soft power' s effects take place. Then, the recipient state would have any kinds of reactions after the first stage, which can be acceptance beyond accidental reception to involve intentional selection or be resistance against accepting foreign culture based on nationalistic sentiments.

In terms of soft power, the second stage of dynamics would involve adaptation by the initiator state, after the foreign reaction on its resource for soft power. When acceptance occurs, more of its soft power policy can be further attempted, whereas when resistance movements appear, adaptive changes to take foreign needs into account would be conducted as countermeasures.

Lastly, there exist two kinds of scenarios as outcomes of soft power dynamics on the specific cultural resource. The first type is the situation when the cultural exchange is sustained, and a


new culture is created through hybridization of the two. The continued exchange results in the cultural outflow from the original recipient to the sender state, which also achieves relative symmetry in soft power dynamics at the same time. This result also signifies the acceptance of foreign culture.

Another scenario posits that cultural exchange is blocked after resistance against soft power resource. Because the exchange is discontinued, the former recipient country's national culture is maintained, and the former sender country's soft power is lessened. But simultaneously, the former recipient state has lost chances for cultural outflow, and resulting advantages of soft power

The situation when soft power from the former recipient to the sender state through cultural outflow is achieved would be termed as 'soft power reversal' in this paper. On the other hand, the situation when chances for enhancing soft power are blocked for both states, due to the interrupted exchange, would be termed as 'soft power suspension'. The process of soft power dynamics is illustrated in Figure 4.

To add, from the receiver states' view on 'foreign' level, the stages are interpreted as 1) reception of foreign culture, 2) selection of foreign culture on intentional terms, and resulting 3) reconstruction of hybrid culture or protectionism against foreign culture.

Figure4. Chronological Stages of Soft Power Dynamics



Chapter 3. *Hallyu* for Korea' s Soft Power

3.1. Conflicting Dimensions inside *Hallyu*

To illustrate on soft power dynamics, the example of *Hallyu* is employed. *Hallyu* signifies the rise of Korean popular culture among foreign publics, which involves the contradictory dimensions of soft power.

Before discussing on *Hallyu* as soft resource, boundaries of the term need to be set. It is employed in several different fields, such as “medical *Hallyu*” and “educational *Hallyu*”, etc. But this study will limit the discussion to Korean popular culture (dramas, pop music, and movies), the field where *Hallyu* first originated and continues at present.

Previous studies on *Hallyu* tended to take the disintegrated approach from either the recipient states (e.g. why Korean contents were popular in the local contexts) or sending the state of Korea

(e.g. *Hallyu*'s economic and cultural effects for national interests). But *Hallyu* takes place through the interaction between sending and receiving nations, rather than one-way influence from either side, determines the soft power dynamics.

One point of view on *Hallyu* is the nature of trans-nationalism, which was enabled in the era of globalization. As for the spread of *Hallyu* into Asian markets, the process is defined as “emerging intra-Asian popular cultural flows under globalizing forces” (Iwabuchi, 2002: 16), and the regional identity of East Asia is discussed. When the critical viewpoint is added, *Hallyu* is interpreted as the resistance from *the periphery*, when imagined community of East Asians was formed to target against *the other* of West, exemplified by Hollywood *the center*.

However, the unit of nation-states still exists independently, so conflicts manifest when limited resources make competition among them unavoidable. *Hallyu* and subsequent *anti-Hallyu* phenomenon reveal the conflicting cultural politics between nations, rather than shared regional identity. Therefore, this study will

follow the chronology of *Hallyu* to reveal the interactive dynamics of ‘soft power dilemma’ situation, not synergy.

From *Hallyu*, Korea benefited in both social and economic national interests, which makes it distinguished as a soft power resource for Korea. Though perceptions of foreign people are not measurable by objective numbers, *Hallyu* has increased the chances for Korean pop culture to be recognized by the foreign public. Economically, *Hallyu* was estimated to produce a total of \$7.03 billion through exports in 2015, which included \$2.82 billion from media content and the rest from other fields of economic surplus from the ripple effects (Jeon et al., 2016).

Hallyu was noted by Joseph Nye as well, who first conceptualized soft power, as one of the impressive soft power potentials that Korea has (Nye, 2009). For specific goals of national interests, *Hallyu*’ s potential as Korea’ s soft power resource lies on: 1) changing foreign public’ s image on Korea, 2) facilitating a network for spreading Korean culture, and 3) producing international celebrities with Korean nationality (Lee, 2009).

In terms of actors involved, *Hallyu* covers different levels from private to public sectors. *Hallyu* being a cultural exchange, it is not feasible to take only the public sector as actors for the activity of international relations, rather private companies' role takes up the majority part in producing and trading the contents. Also, diplomacy via soft power strategy involves low-level politics, where foreign public' s choice of products for popular culture. Therefore, the actors of the state, private companies, and the public all participate in creating soft power dynamics.

Table2. Characteristics of *Hallyu* Genres

	TV Dramas	Popular Music	Movies
Domestic vs. Foreign	National Channel	Globalized Internet	Film Festival
State vs. Non-State	State Control	Non-state Network	Non-state Trade
Economic vs. Cultural	Public Good	Commercialism	Intl' Recognition

Popular cultural products involved in *Hallyu* also show genre-based differences in dealing with foreign publics between conflicting aspects of soft power.

Firstly, TV dramas often reach a wider audience when exported and broadcasted on national TV channels. So oftentimes, TV dramas have to pass the foreign government's deliberation for broadcasting permission. Both economic and cultural interests for managing broadcasting stations and for societal values communicated to the nation's people are considered in this genre.

Secondly, popular music can target diverse foreign publics due to its relative low language barriers and the length of consumption time. Music videos appeal mainly through musical rhythms and visual factors for around five minutes. In the information age of Internet networks, YouTube has played a role in spreading K-Pop to the transnational audiences.

For K-Pop, the extensive global networks of the online world made national borders meaningless, and therefore, state control becomes weak while non-state actors lead the exchanges. As with dramas, both economic and cultural interests are sought

after. Private companies producing music are profit-driven, but they require cultural efforts of combining global and local traits to have the competitive edge.

Lastly, movies have shorter consumption time than dramas, which makes them more accessible form of storytelling despite the language barrier and cultural distance. International trade in movie genre is active around renowned international film festivals like the Cannes, where artistic recognition is often juxtaposed between cultural pride and commercialism.

Leaders in movie field are non-state actors of companies and specialists, who wield influence as mediators between domestic and foreign levels by deciding on which contents to export and import. These mediators make choices based on economic motives, considering the degree of attractiveness from cultural perspectives. Thus, movies seek both economic and cultural interests.

Table3. Nature of *Hallyu* Genres for Foreign Consumption

	TV Dramas	K-Pop	Movies
Cultural Barriers	High	Low	Mid
Length & Language	Long Stories Language	Short MVs Rhythm	Shorter Verbal Story
Commercial Freedom	Low	High	Mid
Reach & Public Needs	Widest Reach on Nation & Gov.Regulation	Online and Mass Media & Private and Public Needs	Low Range of Access & Private Control

3.2. Non-hegemonic State of Korea' s *Hallyu*

3.2.1. Korean Government's Cultural Policy with *Chaebols*

Korea lacks in hard power capacities of military or economy to be placed as a leader in international relations. Rather, Korea recognizes itself as 'middle power' in its official documents,

different from the hegemonic U.S. where Nye' s original concept of soft power was developed. Therefore, *Hallyu* became the representative case on how lesser states can attain soft power.

On the surface, *Hallyu* appears to be a private initiative without the government involved. The well-known success story of *Hallyu* follows that private companies seeking economic profit found foreign publics as consumers, and the unintentional contribution by the private sector to Korea' s national interests naturally came, which was welcomed by the state.

However, from the onset, *Hallyu* has been promoted through collaborative projects between the government and companies. The process on how exportable versions of pop cultural products were made resembles Korea' s modern history of the rapid state-led industrialization for economic development.

Viewed from a Korean perspective, the development of *Hallyu* has been a political struggle for the national interests of economy and culture. For national goals of economic profit and cultural pride, state policies were set and *chaebol* companies followed to achieve global competitiveness.

The motivation was from Presidential Advisory Board's report in 1994 suggesting media industry for national strategic promotion, writing that Hollywood movie *Jurassic Park* was worth the foreign sales of 1.5 million Hyundai cars. Big Korean conglomerates thus participated in the media sector, before Asian financial crisis stalled the efforts (Shim, 2002).

Despite the withdrawal, the media industry boom in the mid-1990s contributed by introducing advanced business strategies, such as audience research and marketing tactics (Shim, 2001).

In the late-1990s, President Kim Dae-Jung established the Basic Law for Cultural Industry Promotion and allocated a total budget of \$148.5 million to the project (Choe, 1999). With the support, international film festivals like the Pusan International Film Festival were launched in Korea (Shin, 2003).

President Roh Moo-hyun, taking office after President Kim, also acknowledged the cultural industry's economic utility, but with an ideology of more equality in spreading cultural values. But Roh's cultural policies lost vitality (Lee, 2005) around the year 2005 when *anti-Hallyu* movements began to appear.

During President Lee Myung-bak's term from 2008 to 2013, *Hallyu* was designated as a 'new growth engine' and diverse actors participated in the promotion – from government agencies, big corporations, local governments, to academia. They cooperated to export culture with economic focus (Choi, 2013).

Current President Park Geun-Hye has also continued with a corporatist approach under the administration's slogan of promoting 'creative economy', emphasizing economic benefits of *Hallyu*. At the heart of Korea's political scandal in 2016 lies the questionable usage of the governmental budgets for cultural industry.

As can be seen from above, promoting *Hallyu* overseas has continuously been a joint project between state and non-state actors, with a commercial focus on economic profit and resulting cultural gains as national interests. Though specifics on cultural policies differed according to the administrations, *Hallyu* projects continuously have been included in Korean government agenda. Korea's historical legacy of rapid economic development achieved by state-led backup for selected few *chaebol* companies took effects on making it natural for the state involvement.

3.2.2. *Hallyu's* Susceptibility to Foreign Pressures

The nature of *Hallyu* phenomenon produced by the private sector, helped foreign publics to accept the cultural products voluntarily without suspecting state propaganda. So at initiation, *Hallyu* was discussed as cultural resistance against the Western media imperialism in East Asia with shared regional identities.

However, Korean government's activities invest and utilize *Hallyu* as soft power resource (Shim, 2008) were visibly conducted, which ended up sparking nationalistic movements from foreign states as resistance against foreign pressure. So the resulting power dynamics through *anti-Hallyu* interaction in East Asia revealed that the region still has more of competitive nature with different nation-states rather than regional imagined communities.

Anti-Hallyu in China and Japan reflected hard power capacities and limitations of soft power resource as well. China and Japan had superior levels of material resources over Korea, which enabled their mutual interests for soft power to be considered.

Traditional forms of asymmetrical cultural exchange, when the sender state has superior hard power over the recipient states, have been immune to similar countermeasures. In other words, soft power policy of a hegemonic state remained intact from foreign pressures in resistance because its superior level of material resources acts as leverages to strike back against them.

However, *Hallyu*'s position is vulnerable to foreign counter-actions since South Korea is not a hegemon, and its economy is heavily dependent on foreign exports. Also, already two cultural fads have vanished in the history of East Asian context: 1980's Hong Kong Wave and 1990's Japan Wave, which led to numerous gloomy forecasts on the longevity of *Hallyu*.

So Korea's soft power policy of *Hallyu* marked a new turn after facing *anti-Hallyu* movements. In a bid to sustain *Hallyu*, new varieties of initiatives were attempted by Korean government and companies, whereby economic interests on the national level were emphasized throughout. Localizing the production of cultural contents to satisfy the foreign needs has impacted Korean media industry, and also the consequent soft power dynamics.

3.2.3. The Nexus between *Hallyu* & International Power Relations

After all, cultural exchange is the field where competitive negotiations among nation-states take place. Therefore, the interactions between Korea and the foreign powers had implications relating to concepts of international relations studies as follows.

Firstly, comparative cases revealed that soft power shifts alongside the interaction between states. Far from having unilateral nature of attractiveness as a cultural resource, over time in the foreign contexts, *Hallyu* had changing characters between the extremes of love and hate.

Secondly, despite employing voluntary appeal as their effects, *Hallyu* was under the influence of material resources. The monetary capital was the key driving factor for Korean media industry to make adaptive changes for total localization on China and Japan. Resulting cultural inflows after *anti-Hallyu* depended on degrees of capital inflow as well.

Lastly, reciprocal soft power was evidenced by the correlation between changing degrees of cultural exchange and soft power. With continued exchanges, states' mutual interests for soft power were satisfied, while the discontinued exchange worked disadvantageously for national interests of both states.

Thus, rather than designing soft power policy for one state's sole national interests, it is necessary to view through the two-way directional way of mutuality in a long-term perspective.

3.3. Comparative Contexts of *anti-Hallyu*

3.3.1. Selection of Contexts for *anti-Hallyu*

Having already around 20 years of history, chronological developments of Korea's soft power strategy can be accounted for the longest term possible with *Hallyu* example.

Not only is it valuable in terms of duration, but also in regards to environmental changes, *Hallyu* in popular culture shows a varying nature, where widespread continuing popularity and backlash from resistance movements mingled to create new scenes.

In the mid-2000s, as *Hallyu* continued in East Asia for about 10 years, the view that it contributes to Korea's national interests has gained widespread recognition, and movements of *anti-Hallyu* have followed in the region.

Nation-states competitively aim to attain soft power based on nationalism, and thus asymmetrical flow in soft power dynamics would be problematized. *Anti-Hallyu* movements also took place in resistance against the one-directional cultural inflow from Korean pop culture, which aroused worries for their national interests.

East Asia is the geographical region chosen for study, where *Hallyu* took place on national-level mainstream media. That is, the ratio of Korean media contents in local contexts was at dominant degrees to be perceived threatening to their national sovereignty. Different from Western European region, the degree of impact went beyond the limited niche markets of special interest groups.

Among such nations in East Asia, China and Japan stand out due to their unique inter-state relations with Korea. Thus, *Hallyu* phenomenon in the two contexts revealed the most wide-ranging political, economic, and cultural effects.

Also, China and Japan diverge on core values ranging from political ideology, stages of economic development and cultural identity, which make them eligible for comparison. So through this case study, the same kind of resource for soft power can be considered along different kinds of societal factors.

Table4. Comparative Contextual Differences of China and Japan

Context Factors	China		Japan	
Media Environment	Developing	State Control	Advanced	Private Freedom
Political Structure	Communist One-Party	Local Authorities	Democratic Elections	Decision on Consensus
Historical Identity	Pre-modern: Pride	Modern: Humiliation	Pre-Modern: Inferiority	Modern: Ignorance

3.3.2. Factors for Contextual Differentiation

Three factors of differences in societal contexts between China and Japan shaped their soft power dynamics of *Hallyu* to take different paths in the process.

The three stages in the chronology of soft power dynamics are influenced mainly by each factor of 1) media environment, 2) political structure, and 3) historical identity.

In the first stage, for the advent of *Hallyu*, media environment was the factor for differentiation between China and Japan. The public or private structure of media management was behind cultural or economic motives for importing Korean contents.

Chinese state has been in control of the cultural industry with censorship, so Korean drama was imported due to cultural reasons more than economic purpose. Private broadcasting networks freely decide to program based on profits in Japan, and therefore, Korean dramas were imported due to their economic values of lower costs.

For the second stage when *anti-Hallyu* movements were introduced, political structure was the one to determine the differing characteristics: between government project and public voluntary campaign. Korea's soft power adaptation of changes for localization took place accordingly.

In China's case, the *anti-Hallyu* discussion was mainly led by the government, while in Japan, online civic groups through voluntary public's formation were the main leader of movements. The political structure between ruling by Communist one-party and democratically elected representatives determined the actors, who can voice out to wield political influence.

For the third stage when historical identity decided the outcomes of *anti-Hallyu* by affecting public opinion. Either cultural hybridization or cultural protectionism resulted depending on whether public sentiments were generally for the consumption of Korean contents, or against.

In China, the Communist struggle of rebelling against the pervasiveness of Korean cultural products was launched in a top-down process from the government to the general public. But

Chinese publics' continued needs for Korean contents failed Chinese state's cultural policy since Korean entertainment companies found ways to circumvent the regulations in collaboration with Chinese counterparts and the Korean government. Sustained *Hallyu* boom in China by joint ventures of Korean and Chinese companies resulted in Chinese cultural inflowing to Korea. The outcome of Chinese capital investments on Korean media industry was Chinese cultural influence on Korea and cultural hybridization.

Unlike Chinese *anti-Hallyu* movement being economically motivated to protect the Chinese cultural industry, the main incentive of the Japanese *anti-Hallyu* movement has its roots in a cultural aspect. Anxieties of continued economic stagnation and the feelings combined with historical ignorance to create chauvinistic *anti-Hallyu* sentiments. With the alleged objective in ending anti-Japanese sentiments in Korean society, the network rightists have come out to the streets following online systemization.

The marginalization of Korean contents in Japan after *anti-Hallyu* has shown how civil society's actions on real diplomatic issues, and affect soft power strategy, whereas state-led Chinese

version failed to persuade its own people. It affected both soft power strategies of Korea and Japan, since joint projects of producing cultural contents between Korean and Japanese companies stopped, which meant fewer chances of exposure for Koreans to Japanese popular culture.

Table5. Comparative Analysis of *anti-Hallyu* in China and Japan

	China	Japan
Actor	Government	Civic Organization
Direction	Top-down: from high to low politics	Bottom-up: from low to high politics
Means	Broadcasting Regulations, News Propaganda	Internet Activism, Street Protests
Target	Market Dominance of Korean Contents	National Sentiments of Anti-Japan in Korea
Nationalism for	Economic Development	Cultural Revival
Motives	Promote Domestic Media Industry	Regain National Confidence
Korea's Changes	Access-related: Market Entry Strategy	Content-related: Remaking Local Originals
Result	Cultural Hybridization & Recovered Popularity	Cultural Protectionism & Marginalization of <i>Hallyu</i>

Chapter 4. *Anti-Hallyu* Dynamics in China & Japan

4.1. First Stage: Soft Power Projection

4.1.1. *Hallyu* for Korea's Soft Power

History of *Hallyu* dates back to the late-1990's when it spread across East Asia with media liberalization in the region, including Korea itself. Media liberalization threatened Korea media industry with foreign competition. But at the same time, since the media industry was now free from state regulations, Korean contents could now be developed more in diversity and in quality.

For Korea's national interests, Korean media companies pursued profit-maximization through international trade, equipped with the governmental support (Shim, 2006). By exporting pop cultural products, Korean culture via media contents could be

exposed to foreign publics. So Korea's soft power projection in the East Asian region started with increasing familiarity of Korean culture.

At the time when Internet was yet to be popularized, the impact of nationwide TV channels broadcasting Korean dramas was significant enough to be called as *Hallyu*. It was made possible in China and Japan for different motives of national television channels introducing Korean media products.

The two states' first encounter with Korean popular culture differed according to each local media environment, which reflected their levels of economic development, from the degree of broadcasting infrastructure, and also the nature of political authorities, from the degree of state control.

China's state-controlled broadcasting system focused on promoting traditional culture, and therefore, Korean contents were chosen due to cultural motives. But Japan's commercial broadcasting system, which was driven by monetary profits, considered economic factors for adopting Korean media products.

4.1.2. Start of *Hallyu* in China

China was the very first country where *Hallyu* started in the late-1990s. In fact, the term ‘*Hallyu*’ itself was coined first by Chinese media. *Hallyu* in China came into being specifically between 1997 and 1998, with the popularity of a Korean drama entitled *What is Love All About*. It was broadcasted on the national channel of China Central Television Station (CCTV) and recorded the second-highest ratings ever on Chinese television, reaching diverse and wide segments of the Chinese public, and (Heo, 2002).

During the late-1990s, Chinese public’s demand for cultural contents heightened following the rapid economic growth after the ‘reform and opening up policy’ by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. But Chinese own media industry was not yet able to meet the rising cultural needs, thereby importing foreign contents was in need. In that situation, Korean contents were chosen over other foreign ones by Chinese state government to be imported into China.

From Chinese government’s view, Korean contents met the requirements of its two cultural goals: 1) to guard against media imperialism and inflow of Western ideas from the United States, and

2) to revive China's long-lost traditions of Confucianism from its turbulent modern history.

The cultural motives for *Hallyu* can be seen on the perception of the Chinese state and the public about Korean contents. Korean contents were considered as the combined version of Chinese traditions and globalized modern culture. Thus, the cultural hybridity crossing over tradition and modernity in Korean contents was considered for their potential on serving cultural roles in China.

Through the combined cultural elements, Chinese people thought to view Korean contents brought them chances to reflect back on the past and to imagine the future. Confucian ideals portrayed in Korean everyday lives enabled visualization on their own forgotten past, while material affluence depicted as features of Korean society enabled visualization on their upcoming future after economic development (Yun, 2009).

4.1.3. Start of *Hallyu* in Japan

The beginning of *Hallyu* in Japan was relatively late compared to China, dating around early to mid-2000s. Japan became the main market for *Hallyu* after broadcasting the Korean drama *Winter Sonata* from 2003 to 2004 (KOFICE, 2011) when numbers of Japanese middle-aged women became consumers of fandom.

As with China, the attractiveness of Korean pop culture to Japanese public was the key feature for *Hallyu*'s entry into the foreign society. But Japanese government stayed apart from providing access to Korean contents, differently from China. The main genre at the birth of *Hallyu* – Korean dramas was imported by Japanese commercial broadcasting networks for economic profits.

After the 1990's, Japanese economy started to enter recession of the Lost Decades. Japanese commercial media personnel increasingly turned to Korean dramas, since they proved to be more cost-effective than producing their own contents in two ways: 1) by cutting down on the expenses spent through production, and 2) by attracting profit from advertisements with high ratings.

Not only did it benefit broadcasting companies, *Hallyu* also contributed to overall Japanese economy as well, by inducing additional consumption of related products. For instance, economic effects within Japan through Korean drama *Winter Sonata* reached as much as 122.5 billion Yen, according to an estimate made by Japanese research institute (Dai-Ichi Life Research Institute, 2004).

4.2. Second Stage: Soft Power Adaptation

4.2.1. Foreign Resistance of *anti-Hallyu*

Anti-Hallyu movements represent the case of nationalistic competition. A common cause of *anti-Hallyu* movements concerned the competition on limited resources for achieving more national interests against each other. In essence, *anti-Hallyu* in China and Japan involved jealousy against benefits taken by Korea.

In fact, *Hallyu* as Korea's cultural resource for soft power initially had a visible contribution to Korea's national interests but changed into an oppositional resource for soft power.

Therefore, *anti-Hallyu* reveals the changing nature of *Hallyu* and represents a case for limits of the soft resource. That is, inter-state diplomatic relations can jeopardize soft power policy, rather than vice versa effects of contribution.

Foreign publics' individual choices on cultural products are not completely of their free will. In fact, they are bound by political powers of society, which makes state-level diplomatic relations as a crucial factor to affect their soft power dynamics.

4.2.2. Different Contextual Namings on *anti-Hallyu*

Even though the resistance happens for similar reasons of nationalism, each societal context of political power differentiated the main actors in *anti-Hallyu* resisting movements. Because of the heterogeneous actors involved, the slogans used to stimulate nationalistic sentiments differed.

Korea denotes *anti-Hallyu* movements with 反 (*ban* in Korean pronunciation). It has the relatively value-free meaning of ‘against’ or ‘on the opposite side (of something)’, compared to the others used by China and Japan. For instance, 反對 (*ban-dae* in Korean pronunciation) means arguing in Con side against Pro.

Differences on naming *anti-Hallyu* in China and Japan reflect their key nature. For *anti-Hallyu* of China, 抗 (*kang* in Chinese pronunciation) is employed, which signifies the rebellion against pressures. Often used with Communist struggle movements in China, such as the 1930’s war against Japanese imperialism (抗日战争, *king/ri/zhan/zheng* in Chinese pronunciation), the character itself implies Communist state involvement to engage their publics.

On the other hand, Japanese term utilized for *anti-Hallyu*, 嫌 (*ken* in Japanese pronunciation), has more of sentimental nature, denoting hatred or disgust. The character is mostly used in the word 嫌惡感 (*ken-o-kan* in Japanese pronunciation) at Japan, which means ‘feeling of hatred’. With the emphasis on emotions, proper reasoning carried with the term is less likely than China’s 抗.

The two characters used by Korea and China both contain possibilities for negotiations because persuasion can take place after finding out the main objectives behind the resistance. So despite conflicts among different views, logic is the underlying assumption: Korea's 反 for opposing on debatable arguments, and China's 抗 for rebelling against pressures with justified causes.

But 嫌 used by Japan concerns individual feelings of disgust, which is outside the realm of logic. So Japan's *anti-Hallyu* phenomenon is the hardest kind to manage: the racist sentiments lack clear directional objective and explainable reasons.

4.2.3. Chronology & Nature of *Anti-Hallyu* in China

Anti-Hallyu in China appeared when *Hallyu* phenomenon reached its peak around the mid-2000s. By then, already around 10 years have passed with sustained popularity of Korean contents since its first appearance. The record-breaking popularity of a Korean drama called *Jewel in the Palace* in 2005 marked a peak because the drama's pre-modern setting widened the areas of interests on Korean culture among Chinese audience.

Now with the popular Korean drama *Jewel in the Palace* featuring Korean traditional food in the pre-modern era, Chinese people's interests expanded to overall Korean culture. The different nature of public fervor on Korean culture indicated the heightened status of soft power for Korea from the first stage of projection.

The logic of argument in *anti-Hallyu* movements of China called on nationalistic sentiments to protect Chinese ethnic culture against Korean invasion. But behind the slogans to provoke public sentiments, *anti-Hallyu* movements in China came more from economic reasons for the growth of Chinese cultural media industry against the dominance of Korean contents over Chinese market.

The main motives of the *anti-Hallyu* movement can be seen from the occupation and comment of its primary initiators. *Anti-Hallyu* voices started from Chinese media personnel, who opposed the prevalence of Korean cultural media products inside China. Celebrities like Jackie Chan noted on the imbalance of cultural exchanges between China and Korea and raised public awareness.

The following evidence hint at the fact that *anti-Hallyu* movements were led by the Chinese government: 1) imposed

regulations by state agencies on Korean media contents and 2) propaganda articles for *anti-Hallyu* by state-controlled news media outlets. On the contrary, Chinese public's anti-Korea sentiments were only shown at dispersed rate at online channels, where the people in large numbers can voice out, not as a systemized collective action (Kim, 2011).

Since the year of 2006, Chinese government strengthened regulations against Korean dramas. Chinese state agency, in charge of television networks, controls the total process in importing foreign dramas and broadcasting them.

Specifically, Chinese state permitted one-tenth of time previously allocated for Korean dramas before without regulations – that is, from 2000 hours in 2006 to 200 hours in 2007. 13 Korean dramas were allowed for broadcast in 2007, as opposed to 17 from Japan, and 16 from Hong Kong. It shows a drastic drop, from when Korean dramas accounted for 80% of all foreign dramas broadcasted in Chinese networks (Yun quoting KOFICE's internal documents, 2009).

Second means of *anti-Hallyu* movements by China, public propaganda was distributed through various state-controlled news platforms. To cite, Chinese state's *Renmin Newspaper* called Korean pop culture sweeping across China as 'Humiliation to China'. *Hallyu* was 'uncomfortable' to Chinese sentiments, noting that Korea historically has been only *semi-periphery* of Chinese culture.

Change in the framing by Chinese authorities on *Hallyu* reflected a turn from their focus on modern traits to traditional traits of Korean contents. Korean culture defined in relation to history at the discourse of Renmin newspaper reflects the changed interpretation on *Hallyu* from Korean variant of modern culture to a modern variant of Korean indigenous culture. Cultural proximity, which used to be Korean contents' appeal for China, was used in an opposite way against Korea. (Park, 2013).

For data on the Chinese publics' perception, a survey reveals the key points of *anti-Hallyu* in China. 34.5% of respondents answered *anti-Hallyu* occurred "Because the spread of Korean culture prevents the development of Chinese culture", and 15% answered, "Because Korea earns money using culture". Other

than the top two answers, the following responses also reflected a focus on the media industry. 8.4% answered “Because the Korean drama contents are inappropriate for Chinese people”, 5.6% answered “Because the quality of Korean contents is low”, and 5.4% answered, “Because of dislike towards certain Korean entertainers”. Hatred against Korea itself other than the cultural industry was relatively low, with 12.5% answering “Because of dislike towards Koreans”, and 3.4% answering “Because of dislike against Korea’s image” (Kang, 2008).

In sum, *anti-Hallyu* in China happened with Chinese state’s systemized actions against the asymmetrical inflow of Korean contents for the sake of promoting its own cultural industry. Still, the public sentiments were not against Korean culture and had continued needs for *Hallyu*, regardless of Chinese state propaganda. Thus, joint projects between Korean and Chinese companies were welcomed as a solution to reach a win-win situation for mutual interests of both sides.

4.2.4. Chronology & Nature of *Anti-Hallyu* in Japan

As with China, *anti-Hallyu* in Japan appeared when *Hallyu*'s popularity was at its zenith in 2005. In the year 2004, Korean contents' export to Japan reached as much as the US \$36,080,000, which increased to the US \$66,370,000 in 2005. Japan accounted for 61.9% of the total export market share of Korean cultural media products, ranking at the first place, and a huge gap existed in comparison to the second place in the rank, which was Taiwan with 11.3% of the market share (KOCCA, 2006: 221).

The main actor engaged in Japan's *anti-Hallyu* movement differed from China. In Japan, the government's involvement in regulation or propaganda was not to be seen, since the media industry is run by the commercialism of private actors.

Instead, Japanese '(online) network rightists' launched and led *anti-Hallyu* public campaigns. The collective movements by civil groups expanded their influence over time starting with online mediums and reaching into the democratic election system.

Definitions on Japanese 'network rightists (*neto-uyoku* in Japanese pronunciation)' are diverse, and consensus has not yet been made due to their fluid characteristics. Some of the main traits

include that they are active online anonymously, their arguments are nationalistic and conservative – to an aggressive extent of racism and chauvinism, and they tend to show hatred against Korea and China (Hwang, 2014).

The first visible *anti-Hallyu* movement in Japan took place in 2005, with the publication of a comic book titled ‘*Hating Hallyu* (*ken-kanryu* in Japanese pronunciation)’ by a private company. The stated aim of publication was to teach ‘Japanese who originally did not have high degrees of interest for Korea’, using their most familiar media form of comic book.

Though the title includes the term *Hallyu*, actual contents of the book focused on historical disputes between Korea and Japan, rather than on pop culture. Only thirteen pages mention *Hallyu*, where Japanese media’s reporting on the rise of Korean pop culture is criticized as being excessive.

The main themes of the series included criticism against South Korean government’s diplomatic policies towards Japan, denouncement against North Korea, racism against people with Korean nationality and Korean–Japanese living in Japan, and lastly,

attacks against Japanese left-wing politicians and mainstream Japanese media for their so-called unpatriotic attitudes of being 'pro-Korea' or 'anti-Japan' (Jung, 2009).

The publication created sudden attention to the *anti-Hallyu* phenomenon in Japan, whose origins were from Japanese online community called *2 Channel*. In 2006, it boasted the second largest number of users among Japanese online communities.

The website's anonymous posts include sensational racism towards neighboring countries, discussions of social issues based on fake information, and slanders against famous people.

Thus, the substance of Japanese *anti-Hallyu* movement was characterized by a lack of truth and logic. In the comic book *Hating Hallyu*, claims on how Korea falsely argues that Japanese cultural resources like Karate, Judo, and Sushi originated from Korea can be seen, which illustrates how unverified rumors are claimed as truths.

Despite the low level of objectiveness, the book recorded selling a number of 200,000 over a week after publication. With its popularity, subsequent series followed in the years of 2006, 2007, and 2009. The total number of sales on the series reached up to

900,000 in 2009. Considering how only 1% of all Japanese book consumers used the online market at the time, the book reaching the top of the list in Amazon Japan as bestseller reveals that most readers were the online users (Dentsu Institute, 2008).

Despite the popularity of comic book *Hating Hallyu* and websites like *2 Channel*, the arguments of network rightists' were too extreme to win support from mainstream Japanese society. Therefore, Japanese mainstream newspapers rarely covered them in the initial stages of the movement. For example, *Yomiuri Newspaper*, which has the most number of readers in Japan, only started to cover network rightists from 2010.

Then, *anti-Hallyu* in Japan took a major turnaround into more active stance around 2010, when Korean media contents in Japan started to recover popularity. K-Pop stars like Girls' Generation and Kara reached the top in Japanese music charts, while dramas and movies were increasingly produced through joint projects between the two countries.

Whereas Japanese nationalistic online communities engaging in *anti-Hallyu* movements used to act online anonymously, after

2010, they came out to the streets in protest. Through systemized street protests, the network rightists aimed to strengthen their political power by trying to have their voices heard to the general public.

In 2011, large-scale *anti-Hallyu* protests in front of Fuji TV were held for four times, which were broadcasted through blogs, YouTube.com, etc., and related books were published. After 2012, Korean President Lee's visit to Dokdo Island fueled *anti-Hallyu* movements again, and the protests in front of Korean Town at Tokyo's Shin-Okubo region continued.

Another change in the *anti-Hallyu* movements of network rightists after 2010 was that the popularity of Korean cultural products within Japan became directly under attack. Specifically, the ratio of Korean dramas' broadcast on Japanese national television channels was problematized.

But as was shown by campaigning against Korean actress Kim Tae-hee for her participation on Dokdo issue, the prevalence of Korean cultural products was rather used to link with historical conflicts between the two countries, not vice versa. The focus of

Japan's *anti-Hallyu*, even when Korean contents are involved, reflects the continued concern on diplomatic issues against Korea.

Over time, the network rightists expanded their reach to mainstream Japanese society. Their extreme arguments even including racial discrimination, would not win majority support, as seen with the passing of anti-hate speech law in May 2016.

But then, network rightists have played a key role in supporting the Abe cabinet to power in the 2012 elections with their expertise in collectivization. Accordingly, they attained the heightened status of political influence on societal discourses.

To comprehend the advent of network rightists and how they managed to set the tone in mainstream Japanese society, scholars turn to mainly two environmental factors: historical ignorance and economic recession (Han, 2013).

After the Second World War, there has been intentional avoidance of teaching Korean history in Japanese society. Therefore, most Japanese people did not have chances to gain accurate knowledge about Korea. The comic book *Hating Hallyu's* stated objective is to inform the Japanese people without knowledge

about Korea, and its usage of false information on history targets Japanese people's overall ignorance about Korea.

The root of the *anti-Hallyu* problem in Japan has been on the susceptibility of Japanese public to believe false information about Korea, due to the lack of education on the inter-state issues. The historical legacy of negative imaging on Korea made it the target of nationalistic hatred when economic recession formed anxiety problems for Japan.

4.3. 3rd Stage: Soft Power Reversal / Suspension

4.3.1. Korea's Soft Power Dynamics after *anti-Hallyu*

The Korean government, along with media companies, took actions when *anti-Hallyu* reactions appeared, since Korea's nation-wide economic and cultural interests were at stake. *Anti-*

Hallyu movements did not discourage Korea from utilizing *Hallyu* for soft power.

Korean entertainment companies conducted extensive research on foreign audiences to find out their needs. Accordingly, the companies launched new varieties of projects for localization to reflect the interests of foreign audiences, and in areas where the companies alone have problems exerting influence, such as state regulations; they received help from the Korean government.

Specifically, Korean companies challenged themselves with content-wise changes to heighten appeal to foreign audiences, such as adopting foreign stories. They also initiated access-wise changes to take foreign media personnel's interests into account, engaging them through diverse ways of joint production.

The Korean government provided support for entertainment companies, but most of its endeavors did not involve foreign publics directly. Instead, the state actor engaged with its counterpart of foreign governments, or launched events to link Korean media personnel with their foreign counterparts in the field and provided informing sessions on cultural differences.

To cite examples, Korean government arranged state-level agreements, such as FTA discussions for entering foreign markets against threats from regulations. Also, the government launched cultural exchange projects to facilitate cooperation between media personnel of Korea and other Asian countries, such as the Asia Song Festival to bring Asian pop singers together for a concert, and the East-Asian broadcasting writers' exchange seminar.

Table 6. Examples of Korea's *anti-Hallyu* Countermeasures

Actors Focus	Entertainment Companies	Korean Government
Content-wise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Remake Foreign Originals -Feature Foreign Celebrities -Try Genres of Foreign Tastes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Intl' Expert Meetings -Cultural Difference Info -Funds for Researches
Access-wise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Work with Foreign Companies -Satisfy Foreign Regulations -Intl' Events like Concert, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Trade Agreements, (FTA) -Embassy's Local Events -Support Intl' Events

When viewed from the perspective of cultural encounters, two different directional paths of resulting cultural formations. One is 'Cultural Hybridization' path when elements of the introduced foreign culture are mixed with the local culture to form a new

culture. On the other hand, 'Cultural Protectionism' path deters foreign elements from entering the societal mainstream and refuses interactive exchanges with the soft power initiator state to gain attention on a mainstream level.

In terms of soft power strategy, when the initiator state's view is taken, the last stage of cultural exchange also leads to two different outcomes in soft power dynamics. One type is 'Soft Power Reversal' when the continued cultural exchange results in mutual interests. Employing capital investments for coercion and traditional cultural resources for attraction, Chinese cultural inflow and the resulting China's soft power in Korea has increased.

Another type is 'Soft Power Suspension' when stalled cultural exchange removed the possibilities involving interaction and the resulting potential for national interests. Lack of communication occurred in a place of soft power policy with Japan after *anti-Hallyu* movement widened its influence into the societal mainstream. Cultural exchanges were marginalized to special interest groups for both states, and collaborative projects between Korea and Japan for cultural hybridization were nowhere in sight.

Continuation of interaction was proven to be effective for attaining mutuality in soft power relations. Even when the interaction looks asymmetrical at first, if the receiving states have relatively superior hard power capacities, the continued exchanging interaction in long term is bound to benefit both sides' national interests. It may reach the extent when fear of domination from the former recipient to sender state is discussed, like China to Korea.

On the contrary, when the interaction is avoided due to the nationalistic resistance, the recipient state loses national interests in several aspects. Not only does it have much fewer chances of gaining and exerting soft power, but also the economic profits are at a disadvantage since innovative joint projects for cultural hybridization are lost. Potential possibilities for national interests from economic surplus to cultural recognition disappeared.

Adding onto the loss for soft power suspension is that the inter-state diplomatic problems keep on worsening due to lack of mutual communication. In fact, solution for national identity problems in diplomacy is nothing but mutual understanding through sincere communication.

4.3.2. Korea's *anti-Hallyu* Countermeasures in China

The chronology of *Hallyu* in China reveals how closer the two states' relations have gotten in the past 20 years. In essence, continued cultural exchange between Korea and China resulted in mutual soft power exchanges.

Years following the *anti-Hallyu* phenomenon in China, which occurred from 2006 to 2009, Korean cultural products suffered a period of stagnation in the Chinese market. The main reason can be attributed to access-related regulations imposed by the Chinese government. Korean cultural contents, however, returned to Chinese market after 2010 with new localization strategies.

After identification of problems with the *anti-Hallyu* movement in China, Korean entertainment companies and the government cooperated for responding to Chinese needs. Sparked by Chinese media personnel, the main focus of *anti-Hallyu* in China was economic: against the pervasiveness of Korean cultural products. Therefore, Korea's countermeasures were to be formed to provide opportunities for growth of Chinese media industry.

In essence, attempts at localization inside China had to be focused mainly on access-related changes than the contents. Korean entertainment companies thus arranged for talent swapping and provided opportunities to incorporate Chinese media personnel in production, while the Korean government worked for loosening regulations engaging its Chinese counterpart, and also funded research in the field so that effective strategies can be set for *Hallyu*-led Korea's soft power.

Various attempts have been made regarding the participation of Korean media personnel in Chinese production of cultural contents. Popular Korean actors and actresses played main roles in Chinese dramas and movies with Chinese scripts and Chinese staff. Since dubbing system is commonly used in China due to the numerous dialects of the vast territory, language was not a barrier for Korean celebrities to play major roles of Chinese contents.

For instance, Korean actor Park Hae-jin played the male protagonist role of a Chinese native speaker with Chinese nationality in Hunan TV's drama entitled *Qian Duo Duo Jia Ren Ji*, though his Chinese language skill was not qualified enough.

Many skilled Korean producers and directors of dramas and movies also were invited to China to share their expertise. The Korean creators were often asked to work on making Chinese versions of their trademark contents.

For example, Korean movie director Kwak Jae-Yong, who made the mega-hit movie *My Sassy Girl* (2001), produced a Chinese version titled *Meet Miss Anxiety* (2014).

In K-Pop sector, Korean entertainment companies set out to include Chinese members into idol groups. S.M. Entertainment's idol singer groups of EXO and f(x) both included Chinese members, who had no Korean affiliation on either ethnicity or nationality.

Other entertainment companies followed suit, as in JYP Entertainment's Miss A featuring two Chinese members. Producing K-Pop stars with Chinese citizenship not only increased familiarity for Chinese public but also enabled overcoming the state regulations.

Forms of joint productions were conducted in diverse ways as well. Selling the formats of successful Korean TV programs to give license for producing Chinese versions of them was the popular

way, many of which also included the cooperation of personnel from original Korean broadcasting systems of the TV programs.

To cite examples, the formats of entertainment programs, such as *Running Man* / *I am a Singer* / *Dad! Where are you going?* / *Abnormal Summit* was sold to Chinese broadcasting networks. Selling the formats was preferred over direct selling of the original Korean programs, since it involved more active participation from Chinese media industry and provided opportunities for them to learn from the representative Korean cases.

Another type of joint project between Korean and Chinese entertainment companies consisted of separation in roles. For example, drama *The Descendants from the Sun* (2016) was a joint project with investment from a Chinese company and production by a Korean company. Distribution in each country was managed by local companies separately.

Korean dramas traditionally had been produced alongside broadcasts, with every episode finishing on a tight schedule before airing. So drama was known to have ‘live’ character with unexpected changes along with time progress.

From the planning stage, the drama *The Descendants from the Sun* (2016) was aimed at both Korean and Chinese publics. To meet the censorship requirements of the Chinese state, the drama marked a turn in the history of Korean drama production when all the episodes were produced before broadcast.

The success factors of the drama *The Descendants from the Sun* (2016) in China also contain new platform strategy by Korea. Since 2006, regulations by Chinese authorities hampered exporting Korean drama to Chinese broadcasting networks. Then, online streaming websites suggested an alternative from the 2010s. After adoption of online streaming, record-breaking successes of Korean dramas followed – *The Heirs* (2013), *My Love from the Star* (2014), and *The Descendants from the Sun* (2016) (Yoon, 2015).

The involvement of Korean state actor was visible in addressing China's state-level protectionist measures. Major progress in high-level talks was officially signing Korea-China Free Trade Agreements in November 2014 that included the media contents business.

Figure5. Korea's Soft Power Dynamics of *Hallyu* in China




Table7. Soft Power Dynamics after Interaction with China

Genre Stage	TV Dramas	K-Pop	Korean Movies
1 st Stage	Broadcasted on National Channels	Appearance of Idol Fandom	Illegal Smuggling & Spread
2 nd Stage	Format Selling for Local Versions	Chinese Members & Songs in Chinese	Expert Outflow for Localized Production
3 rd Stage	Pre-produced with Genres for China	Continuance of Localization	Capital Inflow to Korean Companies

Thinking that Chinese market was too big to lose, Korean state and non-state actors cooperated for tailoring to Chinese needs through localization attempts. Continuation of *Hallyu* resulted in the incorporation of Chinese economic and cultural interests to be pursued along with Korean. Therefore, ‘Soft Power Reversal’ occurred after *anti-Hallyu* with China.

Chinese needs were taken into Korean media production by two types of motivating factors. One is Chinese capital investments into Korean media industry, and the other is Chinese state’s regulations. They each perform the roles of carrots and sticks from China’s soft power strategy against Korea’s *Hallyu*.

Huge inflows of capital from China were welcomed by Korean media personnel since new large-scale projects for production can be realized with more invested money. But it also became the source of Chinese interference on media production and for cultural hybridization.

The continued exchange between China and Korea resulted in cultural hybridization between the two cultures, mainly through Korean contents incorporating Chinese cultures inside to create

new types. With the continued expansion of *Hallyu* boom in China and resulting localized Korean contents for the Chinese market, Korean people naturally widened their knowledge and familiarity about Chinese culture.

Conspicuous change in production of Korean dramas is the adoption of pre-production system by several to satisfy the requirements of Chinese state regulations. The ultimate purpose in efforts to meet the criteria was to simultaneously broadcast in Korea and China. Then, Chinese illegal viewing in advance along with prior broadcast in Korea would be lessened. Accordingly, the advertising and the streaming revenues in the big market of China to be reaped at maximum if everything goes well according to the original plan.

Korean dramas that adopted pre-production were mostly by the national terrestrial channels of KBS and SBS. KBS, the state-owned public broadcasting network of Korea, is also run partly by license fees of the national tax. So KBS is bound by the harshest criteria of media regulations by Korean governmental agency on

issues like sexual expression or depiction of violence etc. for serving public interests.

Thus, with its expertise in considering the public impact, KBS were at a relative advantage over other Korean networks on making safe contents to be allowed by China's governmental regulatory board. Works made in pre-production via broadcast of KBS were: *The Descendants of the Sun* (February to April 2016, on KBS), *The Uncontrollable Lovebirds* (July to September 2016, on KBS), and *Hwa-rang* (December 2016 ~ Present, KBS).

Moon Lovers (August to November 2016, on SBS), *Legend of the Sea* (November 2016 ~ January 2017, on SBS) were the pre-produced dramas by another national TV channel for localization into Chinese contexts.

Also, the Korean version of remaking popular American drama called *Entourage* (November 2016 ~ December 2016) was also filmed on pre-production by Korea's biggest private cable channel tvN and broadcasting in China at the same time was the goal.

Originally, Korean dramas had the longstanding legacy of shooting simultaneously during the period when the broadcast is going on, in a short time barely meeting the deadline of broadcasting time.

It had ups and downs; the positive side was that competitiveness of quality could be improved along with real-time reactions from public viewers. Many of the Korean TV audience actively voice their opinions via online to the producers, and accordingly, contents of the drama can be modified to reflect latest trends and some problems that were pointed out.

But because of time shortage, many times the health or safety of media personnel and entertainers are at risk. It is known that issues of human rights from over-working hours are all sacrificed for the grand purpose of finishing the production before the scheduled broadcasting time.

Chinese capital inflow and resulting interference into Korean contents have become increasingly severe that media imperialism coming from China to Korea was guarded against (Shim, 2016).

Now, the presence of Chinese capital in Korean media industry has become so substantial that Chinese domination began to be feared.

Tackling access-related change against regulations proved to be successful for sustaining *Hallyu* since the taste of the Chinese public still favored Korean cultural contents.

But again in August 2016, *Hallyu* is facing the threat of a possible ban from the Chinese state owing to a diplomatic problem (Qin & Choe, 2016). Following the Korean government's decision to employ the U.S. missile-defense system, THAAD, on South Korean territory, rumors regarding retaliation from China against *Hallyu* have been abounding. Though perhaps coincidental, several events in China starring Korean celebrities were canceled.

For example, a fan event in Beijing with Korean entertainers Kim Woo-bin and Suzy Bae was postponed after a Chinese police bureau's notice suggesting the Chinese host delay the event. Also, pre-produced Korean dramas, such as *Hwarang* (2016), *Legend of the Blue Sea* (2016) had to face bans on their broadcast inside China from the Chinese government. The future development is to be seen from now on.

4.3.3. Soft Power Suspension in Japan

Table8. Soft Power Dynamics after Interaction with Japan

	TV Dramas	K-Pop	Korean Movies
1st Stage	Airing <i>(Winter Sonata)</i>	Idol Fandom (H.O.T.)	Export Movies on Korean Division (JSA..)
2nd Stage	Remake Originals	Songs in Japanese	Remake Originals
3rd Stage	No longer on National Channel	Exclusive Releases	Joint Ventures Stopped

Figuring *anti-Hallyu* sentiments in Japan were aroused by cultural factors, Korean cultural media product producers made attempts at more changes of localizing contents.

Many Korean dramas and movies were remade adopting Japanese original stories from novels and comic books. Examples include dramas *White Tower* (2007), *Boys over Flowers* (2009), *Master of Study* (2010), and movies *200 Pounds Beauty* (2006), *Fly Daddy Fly* (2006), and *Journey under the Midnight Sun* (2009).

Korean company CJ E&M's movie *Sayonara Itsuka* (2010) serves as an example of total localization for contents. Though produced by Korea since planning stage and created with Korean investments, the movie's original story is Japanese novel and the story's characters and actors or actresses are all from Japan.

In essence, targeted strategy of the movie was to show no sign of Korean culture in order not to evoke nationalistic sentiments from Japanese audience. As a result, it achieved success in Japan: its box-office profit which reached up to 1,077,234,100 Yen, which was 10 times more amount than the previous movie ranked at the top of Korean ones (Cho, 2010).

Many K-Pop singers entering Japanese market localized albums with songs entirely in Japanese. Korean singers also oftentimes release new songs exclusively for the Japanese market.

For example, Korean boy group singer BIGBANG released their first Japanese album in 2008 with new songs and Japanese translated versions from their Korean songs. They continued on with comprising their Japanese tracks as such, in 2009 and 2010.

However, the *anti-Hallyu* problem in Japan could not be solved since it stretched beyond media industry. The essence of *anti-Hallyu* was at diplomatic problems, concerning history between the two countries. So localization efforts were not welcomed; joint projects between Korea and Japan rather backfired.

For instance, Japanese TBS broadcasting system participated in a joint production with Korean counterparts on the drama *Iris (2009)* and decided to air it in primetime. Despite being a joint production project, the drama was scripted and acted in Korean. So TBS had to be overwhelmed by complaint calls from rightist groups pressuring to cancel their plans with the drama *Iris*.

Another example surrounded Korean actress Kim Tae-
hee's appearance in the other national channel of Fuji TV's drama *Boku-to Star-no 99 Nichi (2011)*, where she played the role of a top Korean actress who falls in love with her Japanese bodyguard. Before the scheduled broadcast, street protests against actress Kim were conducted and labeled her as 'anti-Japan figure', due to her past participation at Dokdo-related event in 2005, several years ago from the protest.

Japanese public and government increasingly have taken a conservative turn from 2011 onwards. At state-level, the diplomatic tensions between South Korea and Japan have continued. Joint projects with Japan have mostly stalled, and the decreased level of cultural exchange has stayed. The civil society's political power over public opinion was imposed to restrict consumer choice of cultural contents. No outright ban exists but social stigma prevents from choosing freely since *Hallyu* fans are labeled as 'unpatriotic citizens against Japan'.

The proof of marginalization is the fact that no Japanese national broadcasting system airs Korean dramas anymore. Fuji TV, the national TV channel targeted the protests of the network rightists in 2011, stopped broadcasting Korean dramas from August 2012. TBS stopped from March 2014, and lastly, NHK substituted all Korean dramas in October 2015. Though satellite networks like BS still air more than 200 Korean dramas a month, the audience reach is much smaller in range than that of the national networks (Tokyo Newspaper, 2015).

Revitalization of *Hallyu* in Japan calls for approaches both on traditional and public diplomacy. High-level political meetings should aim true diplomatic normalization between the two countries, after overcoming the most controversial issue of historical conflicts. But agreements between politicians would be useless when the citizens of the two countries are unwilling to accept. Rather, attempts to close diplomatic negotiations with abrupt agreements would rather worsen public-level interstate relations. Therefore, coming up with solutions to lessen perception gap between the people is necessary, but long-term efforts are expected to reach the goals of amelioration.

Japan took resistance path after *anti-Hallyu* movements. As a result, Japan had to pay the costs in losing more opportunities for cultural exchange and soft power. Street protests on *anti-Hallyu* were reported by Korean media and lowered favorability of Korean people on the image of Japan as a nation. Not only that, racial hate speeches frequently used by *anti-Hallyu* groups were problematically reported on global media like *The New York Times*, which would inevitably affect the national brand image of Japan among the global audience.


Economically there were damages on Japanese side as well, since, from the onset, *Hallyu* was made possible by profit-driven media companies that welcomed cost-effective Korean cultural contents. The Korea-Japan joint projects of contents production hampered by *anti-Hallyu* took a toll on the investments made from Japanese side at the same time.

Still, it is not that all *Hallyu* fans disappeared due to activist groups. After all, societal discourses can be affected by protests but it is hard to change cultural tastes of people. Regardless of inter-state relations, K-Pop singers like *BigBang* hold major concerts at biggest halls, including Tokyo Dome, and younger idol groups, such as *BTS / BIA4*, have been releasing Japanese albums even after major *anti-Hallyu* protests. Also, Korean dramas continue to be broadcasted on satellite channels, and Korean movies are released on independent film theaters despite all the backlashes.

Therefore, in the case of Japan after *anti-Hallyu*, taking the path of ‘Soft Power Suspension’ led to a lose-lose situation for both Korea and Japan with decreased cultural exchange. But exchange continues among mania groups of each country, which

denotes cultural marginalization owing to politics. Detailed chronological process and genre-based differences are organized as the following.

Figure6. Soft Power Dynamics of *Hallyu* in Japan



Chapter 5. Conclusion

5.1. Implications for Soft Power & *Hallyu*

Global interactions involve diverse actors and interests, which inevitably heighten complexity of soft power dynamics. The real cases will serve as guiding posts to draw analytical framework of altered dynamics.

Hallyu as soft power resource showed a blend of political, economic, and cultural factors working together, which called for interdisciplinary research in the field. Also, the importance of context-specific analysis was revealed. Despite analyzing about the same soft resource at use for Korea, specific environmental factors in each foreign society of China and Japan changed the formation and development of soft power dynamics.

Through the contextual differences in China and Japan about *anti-Hallyu*, traditional diplomatic issues involving politics turned out to be the decisive factor on soft power. Especially historical issues relate to national identity in East Asian countries with legacies of colonialism and still continue to influence with public education on a national level. Effects of soft resource *Hallyu* were stalled when other diplomatic issues of history surfaced as a barrier.

Nationalism itself is not something new and is not limited only to East Asia region. But a distinct characteristic in the region's nationalism is that culture plays a big role to be linked with political power and serve as a means for competition. In this sense, the drive for Korean national interests by Korean government and companies through *Hallyu* was bound to clash with opposition from neighboring Asian countries.

In terms of the actors involved in managing soft power, *anti-Hallyu* cases in China and Japan showed the power of civil society in shaping international relations. The effectiveness of state versus civil society on forming public sentiments differed in the two

contexts; the state's influence was revealed to be lower than the civil society's leadership in exchanges of *Hallyu*.

Still, because different nation-states can enforce political power to place regulations as in China, and since diplomatic relations still involve high-level meetings for setting national sentiments, the necessity of government participation was revealed.

Overall, Korea's new strategy after *anti-Hallyu* can be evaluated as missing the core of the problem. Korea's soft power strategy included access-related changes in China and content-related changes in Japan, but limited actions to the boundaries of the cultural industry.

From media industry's perspective, Korea's adaptations were appropriate measures that took mutual interests into account. But in order to have strategies for sustaining a long-term relationship with foreign publics, broader understanding of foreign society as a whole would be necessary.

In other words, Korea's soft power requires an enlarged view in conducting contextual research on foreign societies to encompass areas like politics, economy, and history.

The second common characteristic was that though the nature of *anti-Hallyu* differed according to contexts, they commonly wanted a more balanced cultural exchange. It was not a matter of the volume or size of the trade, but on how much more ratios between exports and imports are asymmetrical in exchange.

Therefore, we can see the importance of efforts to incorporate mutual interests in soft power policy. If driven by self-interests only, sooner or later, *anti-Hallyu* will triumph. Instead, constant attempts to reflect foreign interests would end up being beneficial for nourishing the Korean cultural industry by incorporating diversity as well.

Korea's soft power policy with *Hallyu* has taken an idealistic path of engaging foreign publics. It seems that Korea can rather benefit from its middle power position to incorporate more diversity to real terms, motivated by economic survival. Perception of danger for Korea makes it be able to take actions against resistance from asymmetrical flows of cultural exchange better than superpower countries. *Hallyu* would have significantly higher chances of sustainability in the future when the efforts from Korea to include

foreign interests continue, which would contribute to Korea's soft power overseas in the end.

5.2. Research Limitations & Prospects

Although this study has noted both conceptualization and empirical example of changing soft power dynamics through Korea's soft power resource of *Hallyu*, there were limitations in terms of measurement and further changes.

Other than inflow and outflow of cultural products in inter-state relations, criteria or tools to analyze actual influence levels were missing. Especially since the effects of soft power often have to deal with ideational areas, an objective measurement that everyone can agree on would be hard to find. Still, further attempts for international agreement on measurement tools accounting for soft resources are necessary, for facilitating discussions in the field.

Using the concepts in this paper on soft power dynamics, other types of soft resources for other non-hegemonic states can

be analyzed. Whereas soft power dynamics of *Hallyu* were measured according to the extent of cultural exchanges with Korea, further researches can be conducted with other tools to measure.

Another limitation of this study is that the example employed for soft power dynamics needs to be investigated on a longer term. Now with deteriorating Korea–China diplomatic relations over THAAD, the current cultural exchange level is already threatened when Chinese state newly imposed regulations against Korean products, including on the pre-produced dramas.

On the other hand, Korea’s relation with Japan has taken a different turn with 2016 state-level agreements of military intelligence and also of ‘comfort women’. Interestingly, the long-halted remaking attempts of Japanese originals took place in two dramas aired at JTBC Channel from late-2016 to early-2017.

It might be coincidental, but still, mass media has to reflect public needs since popularity is its means for profit and the ends itself. Though the diplomatic agreements with Japan have not been popular among Korean people, still Korean media industry seems to

be eyeing for more revived opportunities in Japanese market when THAAD issue is making all business with China at risk.

Therefore, the changing dimensions of soft power dynamics may keep on being revealed, shifting from soft power reversal to suspension back and forth along with time. What we can be sure is only the part that soft power dynamics are susceptible to changes coming from different factors. The only solution is to view the cases in the longer term than has been done now.

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요약 (국문초록)

이 논문에서는 반한류 이후에 한국의 대중문화를 중심으로 중국과 일본 각각의 나라에서 문화교류와 소프트파워의 전개양상에 관한 사례분석을 통해 소프트파워의 역동성과 상호작용성에 대해 다루고자 한다. 이를 위한 논문의 구성으로는, 우선 소프트파워와 한류에 대한 기존의 연구를 살펴본 후 이 논문에서의 새로운 개념 형성에 대한 논의를 진행할 것이고, 이러한 개념적 틀이 실제 사례에서 어떻게 반영되어 있는지를 중국과 일본의 반한류 전개과정을 비교해볼 예정이다.

먼저 반한류와 국가 간 대응 양상을 볼 때 문화와 같이 ‘매력’ 요소 즉, 물질적 자원들과 관계없어 보이는 분야에서도 자본과 같은 물질적 자원이 중요한 지위를 차지함을 알 수 있었다. 물질적 기반을 가진 정도에 따라 상대 국가에 대한 협상력이 달라졌던 것이다.

한국이 문화 교류에서 수출을 하면서도, 중국과 일본으로부터 영향을 받는 이유는 자본력의 차이에서 기인하였기 때문이다. 반한류 이후에 한국은 중국과 일본의 요구를 수용하고, 적극적인 현지화를 추진하고자 하였다. 만약 국내 시장이 더 컸다면, 한국의 전략은 국수주의적으로 바뀌었을지 모른다는 점에서 국제관계의 위계가 어떤 요인으로 형성되는지 보여주고 있는 것이다.

또한, 이번 사례분석을 통해, 변화하는 양상 속에서 한류 현상은 소프트파워 담론이 국가주의적으로 주장해온 것과 같이 일방향적으로 일어나지 않는다는 점을 알 수 있었다. 국가가 처음에 의도된 바대로 이루어지기 보다는 외국사회의 반응에 따라 예상치 못한 상황에 직면해 이에 대한 대응능력이 필요한 곳이 소프트파워 정책일 것으로 보인다.

한편, 특정 종류의 교류를 통해 얻게 되는 국가이익도 정해져 있는 것이 아니라 국가간 상호작용 과정에서 변해나간다는 점을 알 수 있었다. 따라서, 소프트파워 자원의 영향력이나 효과 분석을 진행할 때, 시간적 변화의 추이를 보는 것도 필요할 것으로 보인다.

한류 사례를 통해 지속된 문화교류는 소프트파워 수용국으로 시작한 중국이 오히려 많은 국가이익을 얻게 해주었지만, 일본은 한류 문화교류를 스스로 비활성화시킨 이후에 한국의 일본 문화 수용 또한 줄어들면서 자국의 이익 또한 함께 손해를 보게 되었다. 이는 기존에

생각되던 한류와 같은 한 국가의 문화자원이 상대방 국가의 이익보다는 자국의 이익만을 증진시킬 것이라는 선입견과 반대되는 결과인 것이다.

이 연구를 통해 변화하는 국제관계 속에서, 1) 문화교류와 같은 소프트파워 자원은 국가 간의 협상적 상호작용을 통해 본래의 효과와는 다른 종류의 역동성을 가지게 될 수 있고, 2) 자국 이익에 기반한 국제교류 활동이 상호 간에 혜택을 보는 방향으로 진행될 수 있음을 실제 미디어산업현장에서 일어난 사례들을 분석하면서 발견할 수 있었다. 이를 다시 소프트파워의 새로운 개념으로 연결시키려 하는 과정에서 이 논문의 의의를 두고자 하였다.

주요어: 한류, 소프트파워, 대중문화, 국수주의, 한국, 중국, 일본

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