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國際學碩士學位論文

Study on Reversing Nuclear Decision:

The U.S. Coercive Diplomacy towards South Korea's Nuclear Activity

between 1974 and 1976

핵 정책 전환에 관한 연구:

1974년과 1976년 사이 한국에 대한 미국의 강압외교를 중심으로

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Study on Reversing Nuclear Decision:
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between 1974 and 1976

A thesis presented

by

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
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between 1974 and 1976

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
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
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Abstract

This paper is searching for reasons why a country reverses its nuclear decision by looking at the South Korea's case in the 1970s. During the period, it was the time when security threats were surrounding South Korea. When the president revoked the plan in 1976, provocation from North Korea was continuously increasing yet. What made this concession possible? To find the answer, first I review the interpretation of realism on nuclear proliferation and point out that evaluation of country's intention is undermined. To better understand the intention of country's nuclear decision, I review Hymans and Solingen's work, which focuses on individual leader's perception and domestic politics influence to the leader, respectively.

Arguing that leader's perception is influenced by international security dynamics, and to explain why South Korean President Park ended up with reversing his nuclear decision, I use the concept of coercive diplomacy described by Alexander George. Testing the event between 1974 and 1976, I argue that the U.S. coercive diplomacy was successful because it could offer reciprocal inducement (the U.S. security commitment), which South Korean government was seeking for. Nonetheless, I conclude that the influence of nuclear project of South Korea on the U.S. foreign policy is limited during the specific period, because it was not only the

South Korean nuclear program but also the Ford administration which reevaluated the strategic importance of East Asia.

Keywords: Nuclear Program, Coercive Diplomacy, Threat Perception, the US Foreign Policy

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I. Introduction

In 1950, when the U.S. troops were removed from the Korean Peninsula in 1950, the Korean War broke out, and it swept through the whole country. When the U.S. President Nixon announced its new Asian policy in 1969, it looked as if the U.S. security commitment in Asia including South Korea was weakening. Communists gain victory in Vietnam, and threats towards South Korea were increasing by North Korea. In the circumstances, South Korean President Park Chung Hee sought for measures to strengthen its self-defense. In dealing with military modernization in the 1970s, he decided to operate secret nuclear weapons program. However, after when India conducted nuclear tests in 1974, the U.S. coercion got increased, and then the ambitious president approved the renunciation (or suspension) of his nuclear program.

Decision to develop a nuclear program would require intensive strategic thinking and resources, which a renunciation could be a big loss to the government and the country. Why would a country reverse its nuclear decision? During the 1970s, it was the time when security threats were surrounding South Korea. The president revoked the plan in 1976, but provocation from North Korea was continuously increasing. However, soon after the U.S. strengthened its surveillance and intelligence on global nuclear activity after the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion, President Park approved renunciation of his nuclear program. What made

this concession possible?

In order to answer to the question, my research will focus on the time scope between 1974 and 1976 when South Korea attempted to develop nuclear weapons capability with the purchase plan of French reprocessing plant. South Korea's security environment will be described in order to explain reasons why it entered the nuclear program. To argue that the U.S. foreign policy and its reflective pressure served as a main role in terms of South Korea's failed nuclear project, I will use the concept of coercive diplomacy provided by Alexander George.

In this chapter, I will overview functions of the Korea-US alliance will be briefly discussed in order to support that argument that the nuclear program was a supplement to the security of South Korea. In addition, previous studies regarding nuclear development will be reviewed. In chapter two, I will delve into the coercive diplomacy as a theoretical framework and set a couple of hypotheses, so that I can analyze why South Korea had a nuclear decision reversed in the 1970s. In chapter three, a backdrop of South Korea's nuclear development will be discussed. Korea's effort to introduce reprocessing plant and experimental NRX reactor will be supported as evidences that it was seeking nuclear weapons technology. Then, the U.S. response will be observed with the concept of coercive diplomacy, so that the policy can be delved by each categories of coercive diplomacy. Based on the analysis and findings, the chapter five will describe policy implications in terms of policy coercing nuclear development and the development in South Korea.

1. Background of Korea-US Alliance

The history of Korea-US alliance began in October 1953 with the mutual defense treaty signed after when the two nations forged the relations in blood during the Korean War. Since then the bilateral relation was challenged by crisis in and out of the nations. Domestic, regional, and international environment has been changed and each time the alliance endured and managed to overcome these challenges. One of the examples is South Korea's nuclear policy in the 1970s. It was the time when international détente was uprising between the United States and the Soviet Union, regional reconciliation atmosphere was introduced between the U.S. and China, and domestic threat perception was increased against North Korea's provocation yet.

However, it was not only the environmental factors that affected the alliance, but also the nature of alliance itself caused the challenges. Two of the features can be mentioned here. One is about formation of alliance; why nations form an alliance. This will help to understand trade-off relations between alliance and military modernization. The other is about asymmetric alliance and fears of abandonment (or entrapment); how nations reflect against ally's weakening security commitment. This will help to understand how seriously South Korea was trying to get avoided from perceived abandonment from the United States.

Seeking international survival in an anarchic system, nations as rational actors will implement the optimal policy that would maximize its security. There are several means to improve national security, and neorealist perspective sees that a nation can either choose to build armed forces itself or to ally with the other nations. Arming and alliance is two different strategies to balance against the opponent, although the two can be combined at the same time. Nations consider advantages from acquiring ally's military support as well as disadvantages of binding when measuring between arms and allies strategies.¹

For South Korea, alliance with the United States served as an external balancing measure and it sought ways to achieve military deterrence against North Korea. Placing domestic resources to build up arms is a time consuming process. This form of internal balancing may be opposed by domestic interest groups who demand to put the resources for other purposes. To balance against the imminent threat nations can choose to balance with the external forces, meaning ally with other nations. This would take less time, though it will be less reliable compared to the internal balancing.

In addition, Korea-US alliance is explained as asymmetric relations because of the gap between the two nations' military capability. One of the features that the asymmetric alliance reveals is fear of entrapment and abandonment.² As mentioned

¹ James Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security," *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1993), pp. 207-223.

² Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No.

above, alliance brings another concern for nations in terms of reliability of partner's commitment. After nations form an alliance, they need to consider how reliable the relations are. Snyder puts it as 'second' phase of the dilemma when parties of an alliance are faced with the choice of how firmly to commit each other's security policies.³

In this context, a weaker nation will face two different influences, which would lead to one direction. When its ally's security commitment gets weakened, the partner who benefited from the ally's support would have to find alternative to fill the gap in order to maintain its security measures. According to trade-offs model, it will seek another ally or try to arm itself. Facing with fears of abandonment, it will also need to find ways to supplement its defense policy. Thus, in any cases, weak nations would encounter with the moment of choice to build arms itself. The Park Chung Hee administration was not the exception.

2. Literature Review

1) Focus on Capabilities

Realist traditions claim that behaviors of the nation states on the

4 (1984), pp. 461-495.

³ Ibid.

international stage are dominated by the rules of self-help, because there is no centralized authority, which can assure the survival of the nation states. The absence of legitimate authorities in the international community leads states to behave in structure of power struggle, which makes a country to fear against the others and to act on a self-help principle basis. The environment that a country cannot trust the others, but only to rely on itself made the country to reinforce its military leverage in order to survive from the Hobbesian nature status of the international community.⁴

Because of the ‘self-help’ rule dominates among nation states, the structural distribution of power continuously generates security dilemma, and the result of searching for survival comes out as balance of power. In terms of nuclear weapons, it can be interpreted as if a country has one, and then other neighboring countries will have one. Thus, proliferation is expected with the lens of realists. Realism expects series of nuclear proliferation when countries get access to technology and its supportive material to operate nuclear weapons program.⁵

As an example of the proliferation, Mearsheimer recognizes that there is security competition in East Asia arguing that one of the indicators is burgeoning arms race in missile technology.⁶ He supports this argument by describing

⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

⁵ W. C. Potter and G. Mukhatzhanova, “Divining nuclear intentions: A review essay,” *International Security* Vol. 33 No. 1, (2008), pp. 139-169.

⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: WWW & Norton

intertwined arms race among missile threats from North Korea, corresponding effort to increase range of missile from South Korea, and movement to build theater missile defense system between Japan and the United States.

On moderate assessment on security of East Asia, South Korea maintains its shield provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but its willingness to continue the policy will be challenged by the degree of the perceived threats and South Korea's faith in the U.S. security guarantees.⁷ This argument is expected to be suitable for the nuclear development of South Korea in the 1970s. In particular, this has a strong explanatory power where South Korea found its motivation regarding the program.

Overall, common element of realists' view is that intentions of countries are not considered as a significant factor. Countries cannot trust each other, thus it is the capability they should consider. In addition, nuclear technology itself bears unique feature of dual usability.⁸ For example, one of the equipment that consists of sensitive technology is centrifuge, which can also be used for uranium enrichment as well as medical isotope production. One of the most critical issues here is that no

Company, 2001), pp. 376.

⁷ Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for rivalry: prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia," *International Security* Vol. 18 No. 3, (1993), pp. 5-33.

⁸ In fact, it is not only the nuclear technology that contains dual usability. Any commercial materials or technology that bears physical or psychological damage can be put into the same category. However, what make the nuclear technology is that it yield massive amount of energy, which can be abused as weapons of mass destruction. Thus, it is important to remind ourselves that nuclear technology bring the two important features (mass destruction and dual usability), and the first feature boosts up the gravity of the second feature.

one can assure that the facilities would be only used for the peaceful purpose. Thus, in political aspect, there in fact lies no division of military and civilian use of nuclear energy. Joseph Nye also described well about the aspect by saying that “atom was primarily a question of politics rather than physics.”⁹

2) Focus on Intentions

The alternative explanations put more emphasis on individual level or domestic politics. Some other scholars argue that intention of a country is also important for its nuclear decision. In particular, those who criticize realist's expectation on nuclear proliferation note that there were very limited cases, which support the idea.

For example, Hymans focuses on individual level to analyze the cause of nuclear decision. In particular, he argues that state leaders' motivation is important factor. He justifies this approach by saying “proliferation is an ideal place to extend this trend, because nuclear weapons programs are often and under the tight control of the top leader.”¹⁰ He argues that an operation of nuclear weapons programs is an irrational decision, which cannot be made under a cost-benefit calculation. He rather

⁹ J. S. Nye, “Maintaining a nonproliferation regime,” *International Organization* Vol. 35 No. 1, (1981), pp. 15-38.

¹⁰ J. E. C. Hymans, “Theories of Nuclear Proliferation,” *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 13 No. 3, (2006), pp. 455-465.

says under the decision lies emotional process. Potter and Mukhatzhanova, in their review essay of Hymans book, *the psychology of nuclear proliferation*, note that Hymans believes nuclear non-proliferation has to do with lack of the leader's motivation, and non-proliferation restraint stems less from external efforts to stop state from going nuclear, and more from "the hearts of state leaders themselves."¹¹ He names those irrational leaders as oppositional nationalist driven by fear and pride to develop a desire for nuclear weapons that goes beyond calculation to self-expression.¹²

Weakness of the argument based on individual leader's mind is that it does not place much attention to explain why a country changes its nuclear decision under the same leadership. Hymans tests the case of Australia, when its cabinet transformation influenced the preferential change in nuclear decision. However, he does not provide how a leader's perception can be changed. In other words, his idea of national identity conception (NIC) is attached with a leader's strategic plan and he assumes that it does not change. Thus, it would be unable to explain why a country under the same leadership changes its nuclear decision. To find the answer, we should look what influence decision of the leader from external factor, which could be both domestic political variations and dynamics in international security environment.

¹¹ See W. C. Potter and G. Mukhatzhanova, "Divining nuclear intentions: A review essay," pp. 139-169.

¹² See J. E. C. Hymans, "Theories of Nuclear Proliferation," *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 13 No. 3, (2006), pp. 455-465.

Another point that can be made assessing Hymans analysis is that it is based on irrational decision of state leader's. Defined by the NIC in the leader's mind and driven by intense emotions of pride and fear, the decision is made in haste and without careful consideration of consequences.¹³ Weakness of irrational process is that a country's nuclear pursuit can be only depicted as a rogue state's behavior. It also may be inappropriate to put this explanation to those countries seeking for nuclear deterrence, which is very rational choice of the state survival strategy.

Perhaps his explanation might fit with the notion that 1978 CIA document, *South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decisionmaking*. The documents puts President Park's decision to go nuclear was unplanned, and "the decision to initiate a weapons program in late 1974 was made by President Pak without formal Cabinet backing."¹⁴ Nixon administration's unilateral action toward China to improve its relations, and dictatorship and human rights abuse in South Korea condemned by the U.S. would have been a burden to President Park. Also Pueblo incident and Blue House raid increased threat perception of North Korea. The circumstances could have disturbed President Park's preference to seek for nuclear weapons regardless of its consequences. However, still Hymans' approach cannot

¹³ See W. C. Potter and G. Mukhatzhanova, "Divining nuclear intentions: A review essay," pp. 147.

¹⁴ US Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center, *South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decisionmaking*, June 1978, declassified for release, October 2005, p. 11 retrieved from http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001254259/DOC_0001254259.pdf.

explain why then the president decided to reverse its nuclear decision.

On the contrary, Solingen's idea of nuclear decision process is based on a rational result of domestic politics. In order to explain why some countries do and the others do not run nuclear program, rather than focusing on individual leader's mind, she puts more emphasis on domestic regime and its political economic preference, which runs upon cost-benefit analysis. "Different orientations toward the global political economy and its associated economic, political, and security institutions, she argues, have direct implications for the nuclear choices that are taken."¹⁵

For those regimes favor open economy, foreign investment to participate global trade would forgo nuclear weapons program considering counter measures such as sanctions, which will damage the ruling coalition's popular support. For example, analyzing Japan's decision not to pursue nuclear weapons program, Solingen adds Japanese leaders during 1970s justified their domestic legitimacy via export oriented economic growth.¹⁶ Indeed, it was Yoshida doctrine, which set economic progress for the priority, while placing its security issue more tightly with the American support. In particular, she argues that for the Japan's case domestic economic driven policy might be a sufficient factor for its nuclear decision, even

¹⁵ See W. C. Potter and G. Mukhatzhanova, "Divining nuclear intentions: A review essay," pp. 144.

¹⁶ Etel Solingen, *Nuclear logics: contrasting paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 69.

though one should not rule out the influence of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

She also tests her thesis with South Korea's case. Not surprisingly, she puts economic preference toward open economy influenced the choice of alliance. She admits explanations based on alliance and coercion from the U.S. is necessary, but argues domestic strategies were the factors, which can explain why "the U.S. alliance was chosen over North Korean-style juche in the first place."¹⁷ However, her definition of choosing alliance is unclear. It seems, for Solingen, alliance choice of South Korea means that the country tried to bind the U.S. on the Korean Peninsula when uncertainty was increasing due to Nixon doctrine and weakening global economy in the 1970s. Explanations on alliance choice of South Korea should be able to cover why the country chose the U.S. over other countries in the very beginning of the U.S. and South Korea relations. Thus, Solingen's idea is understood as the answer to the question why South Korea wanted to keep the U.S. as its ally.

To Solingen, it was domestic economic policy or President Park's model of political survival that served as the reason for South Korea to prefer keeping the U.S. alliance over an indigenous deterrence. Even if this is true, security aspects should be also considered dealing with questions why it was the alliance over nuclear program. Solingen also admits that domestic survival model is complementary to explain South Korea's nuclear decision, rather than is substitution factor. Whether it

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 97.

was economic development that President Park placed as a priority is in question. Contrary to Solingen's emphasis on economic pursuit of South Korea, Kim argues that one of the most challenging tasks for the president was Korea's defense security.¹⁸

Both Hymans and Solingen's approaches show counter arguments against realists perspective and provide other possibilities that structural power and alliance model could not explain. When it comes to South Korea's case, it again shows that these models also have weaknesses. Hymans idea could not explain dynamics of a leader's nuclear perception. Solingen's argument provide more explanations on change of nuclear decision, but it then undermines the importance of regional security environment by emphasizing domestic politics.

3) Other Studies on Nuclear South Korea

Studying history of mutual defense alliance between the U.S. and South Korea, Park provides historical records on reprocessing plants based on declassified documents from South Korean government. In particular, the paper provides useful notions on South Korea's position towards ratification of non-proliferation treaty as

¹⁸ H. A. Kim, *Korea's development under Park Chung Hee: rapid industrialization, 1961-79* (Routledge, 2004), pp. 94.

well as progress on negotiation for reprocessing plants.¹⁹

Cho focuses on foreign policy to explain effectiveness of nuclear development effort of South Korea.²⁰ The study sorts out time schedule of nuclear development and focuses on diplomatic leverage of nuclear program against Ford and Carter administration. However, the limit of the study is that it does not count on change of Ford administration's political objective.

Hong provides very rich historical record of Korean nuclear development.²¹ It covers from very initial stage of research for weapons development. The U.S. efforts to restrict South Korea from importing reprocessing facilities are also well described. The study argues the U.S. hegemonic power overwhelms South Korea's preference, and President Park's nuclear project was unable to induce concession on US troop's withdrawal.

In the next chapter, to see what have changed President Park's nuclear ambition, I put more focus on external factor, the U.S. coercion. In order to emphasize that inducement of military assistance is also an important factor for

¹⁹ Seung Ho Park. "The Alliance Strategy of Park Chung Hee's Government toward the United States: Self-Reliance within the Asymmetric Alliance," PH. D. Dissertation (2009), retrieved June 13, 2012, from SNU library database.

²⁰ 조철호, 1970년대 초반 박정희의 독자적 핵무기 개발과 한미관계, 고려대학교 평화연구논집 9 (2000.12), pp.189-207.

²¹ Sung Gul Hong, "The Search for Deterrence: Park's Nuclear Option", *The Park Chung Hee era: the transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim, and, Pyōng-guk Kim and,Ezra F Vogel (Harvard University Press: 2011), pp.483-510.

South Korea, I use the term coercive diplomacy, which Alexander L. George provides.²²

²² Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, ed. Art, R. J. and K. N. Waltz (Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc., 2009) pp.70-76.

II. Theoretical Framework: Coercive Diplomacy

1. Concept of Coercive Diplomacy

Together with the role of alliance, coercion has been invoked to explain anomalies of realists' argument on nuclear proliferation, although there were some disagreements on the effect of coercion from powerful countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union to North Korea, Iraq, Israel, and Pakistan. Nonetheless, it seems that between South Korea and the U.S., the latter's pressure worked as an intermediary variable to stop nuclear development. Even for Solingen, the U.S. coercion would have been an important factor for South Korea's renunciation of nuclear weapons program, although she puts more emphasis on domestic political process.²³

However, what is questionable is about the domestic receptivity that she argues as an intervening variable to the U.S. coercion and inducements.²⁴ Here, I have two points to make. First, the reason why South Korea could accept the

²³ See Etel Solingen, *Nuclear logics: contrasting paths in East Asia and the Middle East*, pp. 25.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 83.

demand of the U.S. coercion is not limited to domestic political process. It can be also explained by countries' national security concern. Second, definition of coercion should be elaborated to explain South Korea and the U.S. relations between 1974 and 1976. Solingen, for example, distinguishes the U.S. coercion and its inducements towards South Korea, but two elements can be implemented at the same, thus additional concept of mixing the two is necessary.

Implication of the strategic combination of coercion and inducement can be seen in the concept of coercive diplomacy. Combining the two, we may better explain the U.S. strategy during the period. A strategy of coercive diplomacy is a new function of force besides compellance and deterrence. According to Alexander George, coercive diplomacy is defined as defensive uses of the strategy.²⁵

Coercive diplomacy is distinguished from other strategy such as deterrence and compellance in terms of the purpose and means. Deterrence is a country's use of force – or merely deployment of military power -- to prevent an adversary's action that the country does not wish to accept. Deterrence is thus the threat of retaliation.²⁶ Coercive diplomacy is also a threat of retaliation. It also shares similar mechanism in terms of using or deploying military power but not actually using it.

²⁵ Alexander George, "Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics," *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 8.

²⁶ Robert J. Art, "The Four Functions of Force," *International Politics*, ed. Robert Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Longman, 2000), pp. 156-168.

However, it is different from deterrence because it is to stop an adversary's action, which has been already started. The purpose of coercive diplomacy is to make an opponent to revoke what it was already taken into action. It is different from compellance because the latter implies the actual use of force. "In contrast to the blunt use of force to repel an adversary, coercive diplomacy emphasizes the use of threats to punish the adversary if he does not comply with what is demanded of him."²⁷

Another advantage of coercive diplomacy compared to other sort of use of force is that the strategy costs less if successful. Coercive diplomacy does not involve deployment of heavy divisions in foreign soil, therefore lowers possible casualties and damages. Unless it is an empty test of threat, and if it can deliver actual fear of threat with noncompliance, physical collision would be unnecessary to resolve conflicts.

Nonetheless, minimum use of military force can be involved with coercive diplomacy. Force can be used as long as its function remains at symbolic use of limited military action.²⁸ In searching for implications of Afghanistan model of war, Andres, Wills, and Griffith Jr. puts the new way of war, which can be described as a combination of the U.S. airpower, special forces, and indigenous troops, can lower

²⁷ Alexander L. George, "Coercive Diplomacy," *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, ed. Art, R. J. and K. N. Waltz, (Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc., 2009) pp.71.

²⁸ See Alexander George, "Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics," pp. 10.

the costs of war, and “it creates a more credible stick to use in coercive diplomacy against small- and medium-sized opponents than do threats of conventional invasion.”²⁹

Although coercive diplomacy is described as a strategy to dissuade ‘the enemy’ of the country in general as Alexander George provides, the opponent does not have to be an adversary.³⁰ Even between the allies, one country can use coercive diplomacy to projects its power over the other, when the victim is pursuing a policy that does damage the relations between the two countries.

The modification of the concept offers merits for its effectiveness, because unlike the hostile relations, friendly relations provide better condition for efficient communication and information sharing. For the relations between the U.S. and South Korea, it is also possible to assume that both parties were able to receive related information, and evaluate it without misperception. Thus, rationality assumption that coercive diplomacy demands can be better accepted between the U.S. and South Korea relations.

²⁹ Andres, Richard B. Andres and Craig Willis and Thomas E. Griffith, “Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model,” *International Security*, Vol. 30 No. 3, pp.124-160.

³⁰ According to Alexander George, coercive diplomacy is to back one’s demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand.

2. Making of Coercive Diplomacy

Construction of coercive diplomacy requires four variants: what to demand of the opponent; whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand; whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for noncompliance; and whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand.³¹

These variants are necessarily be defined by country in exercise of coercive diplomacy, but it does not mean all the variants must be confirmed to the adversary. It is policymaker's decision to choose what variants he or she should implement, then the compositions will show different feature of the strategy. According to Alexander George, coercive diplomacy can be distinguished in four different modes: an ultimatum, a tacit ultimatum, a try-and-see approach, and a gradual turning of the screw.³²

Strategies vary in choice of variants among three: demand, sense of urgency, and threat of punishment. An ultimatum includes all three elements. Even though this type of strategy confirms all three elements, it does not necessarily mean that it is the most effective choice of the strategy. That is because a success of

³¹ See Alexander L. George, "Coercive Diplomacy," pp.72.

³² Alexander George, "Theory and Practice," *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons.(Oxford: Westview Press, 1994) pp. 13-21.

coercive strategy depends on reciprocal understanding of involved parties. For example, a tacit ultimatum, which lacks of a confirmed time limit, can be more effective than the classical ultimatum, if the adversary is determined to take actions, because the country implementing the strategy can take other possible measures before putting itself to a military action.

Other than ultimatum, coercive diplomacy also varies depending on a sense of urgency, and time limit. When a country set a demand and leaves the other variants empty, it is pursuing a try-and-see approach, so that it can wait to see if the adversary will be persuaded with the limited gesture. Coercive diplomacy also can be described as a gradual turning of the screw, when a strategy lacks of a sense of urgency but “relies on the threat of a gradual, incremental increase in coercive pressure.”³³ ³⁴

Other than the strategy itself, opponent’s response and changes in security environment would influence the effectiveness. First, success of coercive diplomacy depends on security environment. The structure of the situation as it develops can enhance or weaken the impact of coercive threats. Thus, it is important to see what has happened in security environment of East Asia during the period when the U.S. practiced coercive strategy to South Korea.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ The classification of coercive diplomacy depending on composition of the three variants is a useful toolkit to interpret a country’s action against the opponent with historical records and other declassified documents. Details of each variant for the U.S. coercive diplomacy will be described in the next chapter.

In particular, I expect that two partners still share the same goal in dealing with international security environment, and it will serve as a positive factor to enhance effective communication, thus increasing threat perception would enhance coercive diplomacy. In the case of the U.S. and South Korea, threat from North Korea can be considered. For the both countries, it was the threat from North Korea that was the glue that held the alliance together, said Donald. P. Gregg, chairman of the Korea Society and former U.S. ambassador to South Korea.³⁵

Moreover, receptiveness of the opponent needs to be considered. One of the variants that George suggests to construct coercive diplomacy is what to demand and whether to offer inducement. As what Jentleson argue, this has to do with ‘reciprocity,’ and the balance lies in neither offering too little late or for too much in return, nor offering too much too soon or for too little in return.³⁶ Last but not least, changes in leader’s perception by coercive diplomacy needs to be explored in order to answer the success of the strategy. The approach assumes the condition that leader’s nuclear decision can be altered, and it is resulted from foreign influence.

³⁵ Jayshree Bajoria, and Youkyung Lee, “The U.S.-South Korea Alliance,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, retrieved June 10, 2010, from <http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/us-south-korea-alliance/p11459#p3>.

³⁶ Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who Won Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,” *International Security* Vol. 30 No. 3, 2006, pp. 47-86.

3. Research Design

1) Scope and Purpose

The research aims to analyze factors that led South Korea to reverse its nuclear weapons plan during the 1970's. In particular, it focuses on events until 1976 when Korea's purchase plan of French reprocessing facilities failed and President Park mentioned suspension of nuclear program. Key questions are as follows: Why South Korea suspended its nuclear weapons program? Why South Korea continued to purchase certain nuclear program after India's nuclear test in 1974? How important was the U.S. intervention during the process?

This paper follows the logic of explanation arguing that South Korea's nuclear development was influenced by the unilateral US decision to pull out the armed forces deployed in Korea. Although the U.S. President Nixon confirmed that Korean Peninsula is not applicable for Nixon Doctrine, there had been reduction of an infantry division.

Delving into the initiative on nuclear program, it is important to distinguish the cause for notions related to nuclear development initiative, the cause for suspension of the program, and the cause for keeping the functions of programs behind the scene. We better separate causes that embarked an event from causes that maintained the event. This will help better understand the effects of nuclear program

at each time scope.

This paper puts nuclear development of South Korea during the 1970's into three phases. The first phase begins when South Korea allegedly started to sketch its nuclear development program in the late 1960's. Previous researches that explain why South Korea initiated its nuclear program align with this stage.

The second phase begins when the U.S. started to place pressure on South Korea in order to restrict installation of reprocessing plant, which was an essential part of the project. It is also based on President Park's interview with Washington Post on June 12 1975; he publicly mentioned on necessity of nuclear weapons development for the first time. This stage ends with the suspension of nuclear program when South Korea abandoned the plan to purchase reprocessing plant from France, and when President Park told that his government will not possess nuclear weapon during annual inspection meeting at the ministry of defense on January 29 1977.³⁷

The third phase is about South Korea's decision to keep the elements of nuclear program under low profile. This has to do with the recently revealed CIA report that mentions South Korea kept its nuclear program after 1976. My research is linked with the first and the second phase and place more focuses on the second phase.

³⁷ Young-Sun Ha, "Nuclearization of Small States and World Order: The Case of Korea," *Nuclear Proliferation, World Order and Korea* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983), pp.150.

Table 1 Scope of Research

Phase	I	II	III
Period	Late 1960's	1974~1976	1977~1978
Status	Initiated	Suspended	Kept under low profile
Factors	Weakening US security commitment	The U.S. Pressure	Recognition of Diplomatic Leverage
	North – South conflicts under détente	Changes in the U.S. Foreign Policy	Awareness in Necessary Self-Defense Capability

2) Hypothesis

Why did South Korea suspend its nuclear program? In other words, why did President Park publicly announced that South Korea would not develop nuclear weapons when he already did say his intention for possessing nuclear weapons beforehand? Was there any policy autonomy that South Korea could yield any concession from the U.S. government? In order to answer these questions, I set a couple of following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1) on the background of President Park's notion on suspension of nuclear weapons development, there were the U.S. pressure and changes in foreign policy during the Ford administration.

This hypothesis is in accordance with the realists' argument that Hegemonic power's preference overwhelms weak countries political will.

Hypothesis 2) on the course of converging power politics, South Korea's nuclear policy was effectively functioned to make an impact or concession on the U.S. foreign policy.

This hypothesis puts more emphasis on weak countries capability, which can alter the course of original power convergence in international politics as what structural realists predict.

In the next chapter, history of US-Korea relations around the early 1970's will be discussed as an initial cause of South Korea's nuclear program. Then, I will use the concept of coercive diplomacy to argue that it was the U.S. strategy to stop South Korea's nuclear weapons development. The details of the U.S. policy will be described according to the four variants of coercive diplomacy.

III. South Korea's nuclear decision in the 1970's

1. Weakening US Security Commitment

When speaking of South Korea's nuclear development in the 1970's, Nixon doctrine and withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces in Korea are usually mentioned to support the cause of the nuclear weapons project. It is entirely not a false to say that the unilateral behavior affected President Park to embark on the development of nuclear weapons.

However, it also is not appropriate to argue that the only cause of the ambitious operation is due to the U.S. action in Korean Peninsula. What is important in studying of international relations is to see a big picture. That is to say, improvement in US-China relations, dishonorable exit of the U.S. force from Vietnam and its influence on other Asian countries, and South Korea's increasing threat perception on North Korea were also factors in this matter.

Thus, it is more appropriate to say failure of the U.S. foreign policy from Vietnam expanded to South Korea represented by withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces were shockingly perceived as weakening US security commitment, and

resulted emerging nuclear policy.³⁸ The reason we should focus on these issues is to understand implication of Nixon doctrine. That is, weakening US security commitment.

1) Nixon doctrine and Vietnam

Nixon doctrine, an informal but seminal US policy announcement towards Asia in the 1970's, did not come out of nowhere. Indeed, it was the Johnson administration, which already paved a way to the new policy. During the Vietnam War, it seemed that America's commitment to prevent the Communist aggression go well until 1967.³⁹ However, the Tet Offensive in 1968 changed the pace of war and gave North Vietnam a strategic victory. Public opinion against war in the U.S. made the lame-duck president to alter his policy radically to deescalate the involvement.

The successive president Richard Nixon sought of a strategy for honorable exit from Vietnam, so that the U.S. still can be perceived as playing a role of protector and sustainer of free peoples. It was American people's demand to achieve two incompatible goals at the same time, meaning "the war to end and America not

³⁸ Joseph A. Yager, "The Republic of Korea," *Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Washington: Brookings Institution) pp. 47-65.

³⁹ Gordon Craig and Alexander George, "Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time," (Nueva York, Oxford University) pp. 239.

to capitulate.⁴⁰ Realizing the objectives, Nixon chooses the third option, which was called Vietnamization.⁴¹ There were four combined policies for the implementation: 1) gradual exit 2) pressure through expanded air campaign 3) pressure through détente with China and the Soviet 4) negotiation. Eventually, the U.S. forces were reduced from 543,000 in 1969 to 24,000 by 1973.

Although Nixon sought to achieve ‘honorable’ exit strategy, Vietnamization left not only deep wounds in American society, but also an increased threat perception in other Asian countries. With the atmosphere of détente, and domestic political and financial issues, Nixon sought to expand its de-escalation policy from Indochina to the entire Asia. In his article published in *Foreign Affairs*, he insists on Asia’s initiative for its own future and “the role of the United States as world policeman is likely to be limited in the future.”⁴²

2) Unexpected Withdrawal

Upon the release of the new US foreign policy represented by Nixon doctrine, there were no one in South Korea, who expected that the U.S. armed forces in Korea would be removed or reduced within a year, because Korean armed

⁴⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1994) pp. 675.

⁴¹ Vietnimization was to keep three elements: American domestic morale, Saigon’s honest change to stand on its own, and Hanoi’s incentive to settle, according to Kissinger.

⁴² Richard Nixon, “Asia after Viet Nam,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, 1968, pp. 111-125.

forces including with two infantry divisions, a marine brigade and a quartermaster corps was dispatched to fight a war in Vietnam.⁴³

While this was a general expectation of Korean officials, the U.S. government was searching for possible restructuring of the U.S. forces. According to an unclassified document, the U.S. government saw continued North Korean provocation would do more to strengthen stability in South Korea, and North Korea's behavior would not be an issue for disturbance of South Korea's domestic politics, because the Korean forces were well performing in counterinsurgency.⁴⁴

The report also notes that withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from the peninsula would damage confidence of South Korean government toward its future. However, the U.S. was cautious of South Korea's public threats of retaliation against North Korea, and recognized that in a certain situation the deployment of the U.S. armed forces virtually guarantee involvement of the U.S. in hostilities. This also fits with what South Korea was expecting during the time.

In practice of de-escalation of involvement, then the U.S. secretary of state William Rogers visited Korea to have a meeting with President Park Chung Hee. During the meeting, the president agreed that Asians should be capable of resolving issues of their own, but argued that it will take some time to prepare for its own

⁴³ 김정렴, “김정렴 정치 회고록,” 97, 박정희 (서울: 중앙 M&B) pp. 27.

⁴⁴ Department of Defense, Response to National Security Study Memorandum #9, “Review of International Situation 1969 – As of 20 January 1969.”

defense capability. As a response to him, the U.S. secretary said that the relations between the U.S. and South Korea will not be changed and there will be continuous military and economic aid. Defending the U.S. policy, he also added that the U.S. public opinion is against the deployment of the U.S. armed forces in Asia, giving an example of Vietnam, while adding that withdrawal of Vietnam was to encourage the people to place effort defending the countries of their own.⁴⁵

Despite the confirmation of security commitment, which I interpret it as a vague gesture from the U.S., the U.S. president Nixon signed a memorandum ordering withdrawal of 20,000 of armed forces stationed in South Korea by the fiscal year of 1971.⁴⁶ As what the U.S. sought to have ‘honorable exit’ from Vietnam, it also looked for a door in South Korea as well. According to the memorandum, the Nixon wanted the idea of withdrawal be seen as “a result from President Park’s initiative in view of present ROK strength and the agreed need for future improvements in ROK forces.”

For the consultation, three conditions were decided: (a) the U.S. will attempt to provide annual average military assistance to Korea over 1971 to 1975 with amount of 200 million dollars each year (b) the U.S. will increase its economic assistance to Korea by continuing aid at a level of 50 million dollars (c) additional

⁴⁵ 로저스 미국 국무장관 면접요지 (단독회견 1969, 8. 1.) Rogers William P. 미국 국무장관 방한, 1969 7. 31. – 8.1 pp. 135-139 MF C-0035(3042), 외교통상부 외교사료관.

⁴⁶ National Security Decision Memorandum 48, US Programs in Korea, 1970, March 20, retrieved from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdm-nixon/nsdm-48.pdf>.

withdrawals beyond 20,000 personnel could be decided when Korean forces return from Vietnam or there are improvements in the forces.

The message was delivered by then the U.S. ambassador William Porter to President Park unilaterally on March 27th 1970, and the president expressed a strong discontent against him.⁴⁷ In addition, President Park indicated his astonishment at the withdrawal of an infantry division via a letter to the U.S. president Nixon in 1970.⁴⁸ In 1970 August, the U.S. vice president Agnew visited South Korea and consulted with Park Chung Hee. Vice president Agnew made a strict promise with President Park that the U.S. will not reduce the seventh infantry more than 20,000 personnel.

However, the U.S. put a unilateral posture on the whole process. Finalizing the agreement during the meeting, South Korea set that 2.5-3.0 billion dollars would be needed for modernization of the Korean armed forces, whereas the U.S. insisted and ended the negotiation with only 1.5 billion dollars. During the meeting with President Park, the vice-president Agnew also told the withdrawal of the seventh division would not be completed until the end of the June 1971, which actually happened on March 27 1971.⁴⁹ On a flight to Taipei after the meeting on June 1971, Agnew told the press that within 5 years when modernization of Korean armed

⁴⁷ Recited from 조철호, “박정희 핵외교와 한미관계 변화,” 박사학위 논문, 고려대학교 데이타베이스, pp. 199.

⁴⁸ 한국안보에 관한 한미간의 협의, MF, G-0020(4308), 외교통상부 외교사료관.

⁴⁹ Won-chol O, *The Korea Story* (Seoul: Wisdom Tree), pp. 123.

forces is completed, the U.S. forces in Korea will completely be removed. This again surprised the Korean government.⁵⁰

The reduction of the U.S. forces in Korea was concluded with a yearlong negotiation, opening a door to start Korean defense industry. In particular, during the negotiations, the two countries decided that the U.S. provides sinews for modernization of Korean forces in order to supplement withering deterrence against North Korea.

Nonetheless, South Korea yet expressed worries against the U.S. foreign policy. In 1971 April 15, in a diplomatic message to the U.S. president Nixon, President Park said “the Nixon Doctrine should be applied discreetly and gradually in Asia, where the situation is still fluid and fraught with dangers, lest a power vacuum or disequilibrium should be created, and peace and security endangered,” and emphasized increasing threats from North Korea.⁵¹ One of the reasons for the remark was due to delayed sinews from the U.S. congress.

To sum up, in South Korea, even though Nixon assured that his doctrine is not applicable to the peninsular, where its security interest remains, ‘Asianization’ was about to be realized with the withdrawal of the Seventh infantry. During the process, South Korea could not escape from suspicions of a level of the U.S.

⁵⁰ New York Times August 27, 1970.

⁵¹ 박정희, “Nixon, Richard 미국 대통령의 외교교서, 1971,” MF, G-0020(4308), 외교통상부 외교사료관.

security commitment, and realized the necessity of autonomous defense capability.

2. Continuing threats from North Korea

As mentioned above, President Park opposed to sudden withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Korea, because he thought that the U.S. assistance is the most important factor, which could deter North Korea's attack. An as example showing his judgment, in the letter sent to the U.S. president Nixon, Park mentioned that his enemy is waiting for 'decisive opportune moment' to communize the whole of Korea by force and violence.⁵²

Then how serious was the threat from North Korea in detail? In order to explain a level of threat that South Korea perceived, military budget comparison, numbers of provocations from North Korea that South Korea numbered will be described. In addition, it would also be useful to review some of relevant speeches that Park intended to express his threat perception during the time.

⁵² Ibid.

1) Détente and North-South Relations

During the time when the U.S. sought for a moment to reconcile with the communist countries, South Korea also perceived less threat from the North and searched for a way to reconcile with North Korea. This sort of perception is well presented in a press conference at the beginning of 1970.⁵³ On prospect of international affairs in the 1970s, President Park noted that international community is shifting from the bipolarity to pluralistic system. In addition, he also recognized that power of ideology to unite countries is weakening and each country is seeking practical gains.

Alongside with the shifting international atmosphere, the relations between the two Koreas seemed to be improved at the beginning. On May 2nd 1972, then the Director of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency Lee Hu-rak was dispatched to Pyongyang and met Kim Il-song, the leader of North Korea. During the meeting the two agreed on three principles of unification; self-reliance, peace, unity of a nation. Followed by the event, the first joint statement has been released on July 4th. Moreover, the first Red Cross meeting between the two countries was held on August 29th 1972 in Pyongyang.

However, those efforts vanished in vain and conflicts continued between the two countries. In fact, we should note that relations between North Korea and

⁵³ 대통령 연두기자회견 요지, 관보, 제5448호, 1970년 1월 17일, retrieved from <http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/pages/viewer/archiveViewer.jsp?archiveId=0001650515&archiveEventId=0028532204&isEbook=Y>.

South Korea were far from reconciliation in essence. In 1970, President Park made a new year's speech and he expressed his defense policy as following.

“In addition, we must secure absolute and superior power against the North regime, so that we can respond to any form of unification – whether that is unilateral, peaceful or not peaceful – and we must, in particular, always secure independent defense capability, which can crush invasion from North Korea.”⁵⁴ (translated)

Combining the mixed messages shown at press conference and the New Year's speech, South Korea's position was still vague, but Park's perceived threats remained strong. It is also noticeable that temporary reconciling gesture was used as a tool for regime security to the both countries. Despite the talks between the two countries, South Korea cautiously analyzed the North's behavior and concluded that North Korea attempts to realize the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces in Korea by unfolding disguised posture towards peace.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ 박정희, 1970년 신년사, 1970년 1월 1일, 대통령기록관, retrieved from http://www.pa.go.kr/online_contents/speech/speech02/1306127_6175.jsp.

⁵⁵ 종합평가, 북한의 대외정책, pp.41- 43 MF, D-0013 (5965), 외교통상부 외교사료관.

2) Provocations and Military Budget Comparison

Continued provocations were enough to offset the positive influence of reconciling events during the late 1960s and the early 1970s.⁵⁶

Table 2 Series of Provocations by North Korea

Date	Event
01/1968	North Korean commandos failed to assassinate the President of South Korea. The unit approached to a checkpoint less than 100 meters from the Blue House.
03/1969	Six North Korean infiltrators killed a South Korean policeman on guard duty in an eastern coastal area near Chumunjin, Kangwon province.
04/1969	North Korean <i>MiG</i> jet fighters shot down an unarmed U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan, about 90 miles off the North Korean coast, resulting in the loss of 31 lives. ⁸
06/1969	North Korean agents infiltrated Huksan Island off the west coast; 15 were shot dead.
07/1969	North Korea unveiled the formal establishment of a United Revolutionary Party (a.k.a. the Party for Unification and Revolution) as “an underground revolutionary organization of South Korea.” The aim of the organization was to overthrow the South Korean government and replace it with a pro-North

⁵⁶ Hannah Fischer, North Korean Provocation Actions, 1950-2007 retrieved from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30004.pdf>.

	Korean “democratic regime.”
10/1969	Four U.S. soldiers were ambushed and killed by North Korean intruders near the southern boundary of the DMZ.
12/1969	North Korean agents hijacked a South Korean airliner YS-11 to Wonsan en route from Kangnung to Seoul with 51 persons aboard; in February 1970. 39 of the crew and passengers were released.
04/1970	Three North Korean infiltrators were shot to death at Kumchon, Kyonggido, south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas. Five South Korean soldiers were wounded during the encounter.
06/1970	North Korean patrol boats seized a South Korean broadcast vessel with 20 crew on board off the west coast near the military demarcation line.
06/1970	Two North Korean spies tried to plant bombs at Hyeonchungmun, the Memorial Gate of National Cemetery in Seoul, in order to assassinate government officials who were going to attend the Korean War memorial service a few days later. A bomb went off by mistake while they were setting it up, resulting in damage to nearby structures.
01/1971	A North Korean attempt to hijack a Korean Airline plane F-27 en route from Seoul to Sokcho on the east coast was foiled.
02/1974	North Korean patrol vessels sunk two South Korean fishing boats and detained 30 fishermen.
11/1974	A first North Korean infiltration tunnel dug across the DMZ was discovered.
08/1974	South Korean President Park Chung Hee’s wife was killed during another attempt on his life. An agent of a pro-North Korean group in Japan who entered Seoul disguised as a tourist fired several shots at Park at a major

	public function; Park escaped unhurt, but the First Lady was hit by stray bullets and died several hours later. The agent, Mun Se-gwang, was tried and convicted, and executed.
09/1975	Two North Korean infiltrators were intercepted at Kochang, Cholla Pukdo; one was shot dead. During the encounter, two South Korean soldiers were killed and two wounded.

In terms of military budget, North Korea shows far better performance during the time. In 1962, North Korea started to accelerate military build-up with the Four Great Military Lines, which turned out as a success in the late 1970s shown in the table.

Table 3 Military Capability Comparison

Forces	North Korea	South Korea
Ground		
Personnel	560,000-600,000	520,000
Divisions	40	20
Infantry	35	19
Motorized	3	0
Armor	2	1
Tanks	2,300	840
Field artillery pieces	3,500	2,000
Rocket launchers	1,300	0
Mortars	9,000	5,300
Air		
Personnel	45,000	30,000
Jet fighter	460	300
Fighter bombers	20	0
Light bombers	85	0

Naval		
Personnel	27,000	46,000
Destroyers and frigates	3	9
Missile attack boats	18	0
Coastal patrol craft	330	68
Amphibious craft and minesweepers	90	18
Submarines	15	0

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance recited from Joseph A. Yager, "The Republic of Korea," Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution) pp. 53.*

For Korean Peninsula, misalignment between international atmosphere and regional atmosphere boosted the mistrust on the U.S. security commitment. For example, President Park had discontent with lukewarm response from the U.S. when North Korea orchestrated the Blue House raid in 1968. After the incident, Park Chung Hee thought that there could be a ‘miscalculation’ from North Korea on a full-scale war, if imbalance of military capabilities between North and South Korea, and expected absence of the U.S. response amid the North Korea’s provocation were combined.⁵⁷

As mentioned above, on March 27th 1970, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea William J. Porter unilaterally reported to President Park that the U.S. armed forced would be reduced. The president did not repress his sense of discomfort and revealed his viewpoint that the withdrawal of the U.S. forces will detonate attack

⁵⁷ 신옥희, “데탕트와 박정희의 전략적 대응: 박정희는 공격적 현실주의자인가,” *데탕트와 박정희, 신옥희 책임편집*, (서울: 논형) pp. 61.

from North Korea and the withdrawal without South Korean consent is in violation of the mutual treaty. Also he said the withdrawal without reinforcement of Korean armed forces is unattainable.⁵⁸

Summing up these circumstances, there seems to be a gap in threat perceptions between the U.S. and South Korea. In particular, the U.S. preferred ‘first reduction, second support,’ while South Korea wanted ‘first support, second reduction.’ The U.S. policy towards Asia, the U.S. position to prevent entrapment into the North-South conflict, issues related with sinews and modernization of South Korean armed forces, and continued tensions between North Korea and South Korea were the factors helped President Park to initiate his nuclear program.

3. South Korea’s Nuclear Initiative

1) Background

After the pronouncement of Nixon doctrine in 1969 and by the time when the U.S. withdrew its Seventh Infantry Division in 1971, President Park, who set Korea’s security the highest of the priorities, became more concerned about US

⁵⁸ 조철호, “1970년대 초반 박정희의 독자적 핵무기 개발과 한미관계,” 고려대학교 평화연구논집, 고려대학교 평화와 민주주의 연구소, pp. 199.

military commitment.⁵⁹ In order to fill the gap of retrenched US army, Agency for Defense Development (ADD) was established to seek for military modernization of South Korea. It also raised its defense expenditure from 5 percent to 7.5 percent of its gross national product, but the South Korea's military capability was far behind the North Korea's capability. "It was only the U.S. military troops stationed in the South that kept the North deterred from waging war."⁶⁰

Security environment was rapidly changing during the period, yielding increase of uncertainty and insecurity in South Korea. The U.S. government's failure in Vietnam War resulted communist victory over the country. This increased threat perception to East Asian countries against the communist bloc. In particular, for South Korea, which dispatched its troops to Vietnam to support the United States and secure the station of the U.S. army on the peninsula, it was not only the expanding communist threat, but also fear of weakening US security commitment. Moreover, the U.S. and Soviet relations got improved after secret visit of Henry Kissinger in 1971, which opened the opportunity for the U.S. President Nixon to visit China in the following year.

South Korea had to look for measures to strengthen its security on a self-help basis, because it had to open the possibility of the improvement in the U.S. and

⁵⁹ H. A. Kim, *Korea's development under Park Chung Hee: rapid industrialization, 1961-79* (Routledge, 2004), pp. 188.

⁶⁰ C. J. Baik and B. K. Kim, et al., *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea* (Harvard Univ Press, 2011) pp. 488.

North Korea relations as well. Amid the circumstance, South Korea also tried to have better relations with China or other communist country by enacting laws allowing trade with the countries. However, the détente of international order did not prevailed between North and South Korea. On the Korean Peninsula, continuing provocations of North Korea, including Blue House raids (1968 Jan. 21), Pueblo Incident (1968 Jan. 23), attempted assassination of President Park (1974 Aug. 15), also made South Korea to seek more security measures. The series of events increased vulnerability of South Korea's defense security, which led to President Park's approval of secret defense project, Yolgok Operation. It was an emergency measure that Park had initiated in February, immediately after the North Korean Navy attacks on Paeng'nyong Island.⁶¹

The project invoked of nuclear weapons development. According to the CIA report declassified in 2005, South Korea authorized a program to develop nuclear weapons technology in late 1974 and President Park ordered the immediate suspension of all activities in late December 1976, but the development of missile and fissile material technology continued until late 1978.⁶² This is conducive to President Park's notion that nuclear decision relies on the U.S. security umbrella, because it was the U.S. president Carter, who proposed to immediately withdraw

⁶¹ See H. A. Kim, *Korea's development under Park Chung Hee: rapid industrialization, 1961-79*, pp. 188-189.

⁶² US Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decisionmaking, June 1978, declassified for release, October 2005, p. 11 retrieved from http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001254259/DOC_0001254259.pdf.

nuclear weapons from South Korea, and decrease of sinews to the country.⁶³

President Park mentioned several times on nuclear weapons. According to Kim, Park mentioned in an interview with Washington Post on 12 June 1975 that even if Korea is capable of developing nuclear weapons, it does not do so yet. However, the degree of the expression increased when the president publicly said in a meeting with U.S. officials that “if the U.S. nuclear umbrella is to be removed, Korea will have to develop nuclear weapons.”⁶⁴

Against this backdrop, the concern of the United States over South Korea was not limited to the possibility that the ally in the peninsula might possess nuclear weapons. After the Indian nuclear tests, it was sensitive nuclear technology itself that produced risk of nonproliferation. Reprocessing technology, which South Korea was trying to purchase, was a problem not only to the U.S. but to neighboring countries as well, because they would see South Korea as a country disturbing the stability by developing nuclear programs.⁶⁵ In 1975, US Ambassador Sneider mentioned in memorandum with Vice minister of foreign affairs in South Korea, that the U.S. is against the purchase of reprocessing facilities, because it would

⁶³ See Seung Ho Park. (2009). *The Alliance Strategy of Park Chung Hee’s Government toward the United States: Self-Reliance within the Asymmetric Alliance*, pp. 352.

⁶⁴ See H. A. Kim, *Korea’s development under Park Chung Hee: rapid industrialization, 1961-79*, pp. 193

⁶⁵ Here, my understanding of politicians and officials in the governments on nuclear facilities is prevailed by realist’s view. Today’s opinion is not so different. Amid nuclear renaissance due to climate change, countries are planning to construct nuclear power plants. However, many are worrying about nuclear weapons proliferations.

trigger other countries responses toward proliferation.⁶⁶ Also State Department opinion to a survey conducted in 1975 viewed that “the South Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons would break down regional stability by compelling China and the Soviet Union to provide the North with strategic nuclear weapons in the event of military belligerency on the Korean Peninsula.⁶⁷

2) Military and Diplomatic Uses of Nuclear Development

Following two elements can be described as effects of nuclear development. First, nuclear development has been started in order to fill the gap of military capability that was diminished by weakening the U.S. security commitment. The argument is based on material factor aligning US military presence with nuclear weapons capability. However, the limit of the study is that it cannot explain dynamics of nuclear decisions. It is also based on presumption that nuclear weapons capability is in complementary status with deployed US armed forces, thus it cannot explain why South Korea was keeping nuclear development plan behind the scene despite the presence of the U.S. forces during the Carter administration.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ See Seung Ho Park. (2009). The Alliance Strategy of Park Chung Hee’s Government toward the United States: Self-Reliance within the Asymmetric Alliance, pp. 394.

⁶⁷ See C. J. Baik and B. K. Kim, et al., *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, pp. 497

⁶⁸ See US Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decisionmaking, June 1978.

Second, the recent study complement the limit of materialistic research and argue that South Korea used nuclear development program as a diplomatic tools to enhance negotiation power after when President Park said that he is operating a nuclear project.⁶⁹ In particular, the context of the study is that South Korea wanted to yield more bold security commitment from the U.S. by publicly speaking that South Korea is under development of nuclear weapons or can immediately begin the project. These studies are related with other studies that argued weak countries can also use nuclear plans as a coercive leverage to strong countries. For example, Drennan notes that North Korea used its nuclear policy to coerce the U.S. through the use of brinkmanship tactics, the creation of deadlines, and threats of the use of force.⁷⁰

At least for the first attempt of nuclear development (failed purchase of reprocessing facility in 1976 and President Park's notion of suspending nuclear project in 1977), the initial cause fits with materialistic explanation.⁷¹ There is no evidence that South Korea intentionally and preemptively operated nuclear project

⁶⁹ 조철호, “1970년대 초반 박정희의 독자적 핵무기 개발과 한미관계,” 고려대학교 평화연구논집, 고려대학교 평화와 민주주의 연구소 pp. 189–207.

⁷⁰ William M. Drennan, “Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s Coercing Whom?” *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Robert Art and Patrick Cronin (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press) pp. 157 – 223.

⁷¹ On timely classification of South Korea’s nuclear attempt, see Young-Sun Ha, “Nuclearization of Small States and World Order: The Case of Korea,” *Nuclear Proliferation, World Order and Korea*, (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983), pp.139-144.

in order to deal with the new US foreign policy represented as Nixon Doctrine. As mentioned above, the causes were rather weakening US security commitment, increasing provocations from North Korea, and misalignment of the threat perception, which brought arguments on necessary nuclear capability.⁷²

3) Why a Reprocessing Plant?

South Korea attempted to purchase French reprocessing plant, not only because it was an essential part of nuclear weapons development, but also it was only a viable option that developing countries could implement. Until the 1970s, uranium enrichment was dominated by a few advanced nuclear countries. In addition, reprocessing plant was able to be bought for research purpose, and nuclear scientists believed that the technology could resolve problems of depletion of limited uranium ore.

Unlike what today's assessment on reprocessing technology, production of plutonium was known as a solution to overcome scarce high-grade uranium ore, and reprocessing plant was justified for a new mechanism to gain plutonium from light-

⁷² Another factor that encouraged nuclear development is due to explosive demand of energy during the 1970s. Nuclear energy served as a solution to cheap and reliable energy source, and nuclear projects were eagerly pursued worldwide. According to Juhn and Kupitz (1996), Nuclear energy industry showed almost nine-fold increase from 1970 to 1980, and an average annual growth of 24 per cent over the decade.

water-reactor spent fuel.⁷³ Moreover, during the 1960s, under the leadership of plutonium co-discoverer Glenn Seaborg, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission promoted the civil use of reprocessing to separate plutonium for use as a fuel in nuclear power reactors.⁷⁴

Nuclear scientists also believed that commercialization of fast breeder reactors would be realized in the future.⁷⁵ This meant that spent fuel could be recycled in order to slow down the use of estimated uranium ore. The zeal to achieve technological progress was a justifiable reason to introduce reprocessing facility except for the economic justification.⁷⁶ Even the U.S. government only became to practice a policy against reprocessing facility from 1985.⁷⁷

Contrary to the current level of technology, which provides enrichment facilities more advantages in terms of heat exposure and visibility, the past uranium

⁷³ Frank von Hippel, “Managing Spent Fuel in the United States: The Illogic of Reprocessing,” *A Research Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials*, IPFM.

⁷⁴ Edwin Lyman and Frank N. von Hippel, “Reprocessing Revisited: The International Dimensions of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership,” retrieved from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/LymanVonHippel#1.

⁷⁵ Jungmin Kang and H.A. Feiveson, “South Korea’s Shifting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, Spring 2001, pp. 71.

⁷⁶ After Indian nuclear explosion, the U.S. government set a position against the reprocessing technology, because it evaluated reprocessing technology is economically not beneficial. This stance is still valid for the U.S. dealing with countries pursuing new reprocessing technology.

⁷⁷ See Frank von Hippel, “Managing Spent Fuel in the United States: The Illogic of Reprocessing.”

enrichment technology demanded the large spaces and more resources and energy to build a plant in the 1950s. Enrichment facilities were not commercialized yet and were dominated by some nuclear weapons countries, while research reactors could be bought from other advanced countries. With the backdrop, plutonium was the choice of nuclear fuel as well as a weapons material.⁷⁸

4. US Response

1) Policy Objective towards South Korea

At the beginning the U.S. government even encouraged to develop reprocessing technology at civilian level. However, the hasty evaluation was faced by a transition, because of India's conduct of 'peaceful nuclear explosion' on May 18th 1974. The explosion was done with plutonium that India obtained by reprocessing facilities supplied by Canada for a research purpose.

Since the India's surprise move, the U.S. government started to pay attention to the reprocessing projects around the world and reevaluated the strategic importance of sensitive technology. The U.S. government noticed signs of

⁷⁸ Oberdorfer in his book, The Two Koreas, states that the reprocessing plant that South Korea was trying to purchase from France could produce about twenty kilograms of fissionable plutonium per year, which is enough amount for two nuclear weapons.

upcoming India's nuclear test, but it set about investigating reprocessing technology and its proliferation relevance only after the explosion.⁷⁹ As a result, a report has been produced.⁸⁰ This report warned that some of countries including Israel, Japan, Taiwan, Argentina, Iran and South Korea as a potential nuclear proliferation actors with cites from the U.S. intelligence and the U.S. navy officers.

- A. Nuclear weapons proliferation is expected among middle size countries with appropriate technology and economic capabilities in the 1980s
- B. The most critical factor, which will influence the proliferation lies at policies of superpower or nuclear suppliers
- C. Japan's leader will conclude that they must have nuclear weapons if they are to achieve their national objectives in the developing Asian power balance
- D. South Korea would need at least a decade to carry out a nuclear weapons development program
- E. It is theoretically possible for a country capable of developing a nuclear

⁷⁹ In early 1972, however--two years before the test--the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) had predicted that India could make preparations for an underground test without detection by U.S. intelligence. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb367/index.htm>.

⁸⁰ United States Atomic Energy Commission, Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Oct. 2 1974).

weapon to do so covertly, up to the test of a first device

F. Indigenous ballistic missile delivery systems would be readily identifiable early in the development cycle

Serious discussion on South Korea's nuclear issues and reprocessing plants can be found on the document produced on December 1974.⁸¹ According to the report, South Korea decided to proceed with the initial phases of a nuclear weapons development program. In addition, it contains that the U.S. found out Korea is seeking to acquire a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France.

In February 1975, the U.S. State Secretary Henry Kissinger received a report containing a draft statement, which he sent it to the U.S. embassy in South Korea after. According to the report, the department instructed the embassy to say that the U.S. government "agrees that the ROK has entered the initial stage of nuclear weapons development; affirms that ROK continuation on this course would have a decidedly stabilizing effect in Northeast Asia; defines our basic objective as to discourage and to inhibit to the fullest possible extent any ROK development of a nuclear explosive capability."⁸²

Moreover, in a report produced in March 1975, the U.S. government

⁸¹ Department of State, ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles, (1974, Dec.).

⁸² National Security Council, Memorandum 1267, Development of US policy toward South Korea Development of Nuclear Weapons, (1975, Feb. 28).

confirms its policy objective as follows: “acquisition of national reprocessing plant would be key element in weapons program and is not justified by ROK civil nuclear needs.”⁸³

Eventually, the U.S. was successful in turning down South Korea’s nuclear program. Its coercive strategy was materialized by opposing purchase of the Canadian and French nuclear facilities unconditionally. However, it remains in question whether South Korean government was able to induce concession from the U.S. utilizing the diplomatic leverage of development of nuclear weapons technology. At least, it is certain that the Ford administration’s altered view of international politics enabled the U.S. government to restore its security policy. Followings are the details of the coercive strategy that US imposed to South Korea described in aforementioned variants.

2) Coercion in Action

(1) Demand of the Opponent

The U.S. demand on South Korea’s nuclear weapons development was clear. The U.S. government wanted South Korea to completely abandon its nuclear weapons technology development. Kim cites the declassified US security

⁸³ Secretary of State, ROK Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plans, (1975, Aug. 16).

files, “that it was US policy to exert maximum pressure on the ROK to abandon its plans.”⁸⁴ In addition, the deputy state secretary Robert Ingersoll wrote a memorandum to Nixon that South Korea’s nuclear weapons program threatens the U.S. security interests in East Asia, thus it needs to act immediately to stop South Korea developing the weapons.⁸⁵

An example is the U.S. pressure to turn down the South Korea’s plan to purchase French and Canadian nuclear facilities. The U.S. intervention on South Korean effort to purchase the French reprocessing plant is well described in the 1978 CIA report.⁸⁶ The South Korean government planned to purchase a heavy water reactor from Canada (also known as a CANDU reactor) and a small reprocessing facility from France. The report analyzes that this purchase plan was suspicious because only one percent of fissile material production from reprocessing plant would be used as a fuel to a heavy water reactor. It also worried about large scale reprocessing plant, which South Korea might be able to construct in the future. It was known that the initial effort to purchase CANDU facilities was turned down because of the U.S intervention and Canada’s pressure to sign non-proliferation treaty after Indian nuclear test in 1974. Canadian

⁸⁴ See H. A. Kim, *Korea's development under Park Chung Hee: rapid industrialization, 1961-79*, pp. 194.

⁸⁵ See C. J. Baik and B. K. Kim, et al., *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, pp. 498.

⁸⁶ See US Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center, *South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decisionmaking*, June 1978.

government demanded new conditions for the purchase, so that peaceful use of the facilities can be guaranteed. It delayed to sign renewed contract, until when South Korea signed non-proliferation treaty and the plan to purchase reprocessing facility from France was renounced.

Another example is the U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's visit to Korea. When President Park made a notion of possible nuclear weapons development, Schlesinger met with the president and "obtained Park's memorandum of agreement not to develop nuclear weapons."⁸⁷ This explicitly shows what the U.S. demanded to South Korea's pursuant of its indigenous nuclear program.

(2) Sense of Urgency for Compliance with the Demand

A time schedule demanded by the U.S. government for the renunciation of the South Korea's nuclear program is unclear. However, we might find a sense of urgency when the U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was dispatched to South Korea on 27 August to stop President Park's nuclear ambition. Also, when South Korea's guided missile tests succeeded in 1978 September 26, a group of the U.S. officials and the U.S. congressmen from the Military Committee separately

⁸⁷ See H. A. Kim, *Korea's development under Park Chung Hee: rapid industrialization, 1961-79*, pp. 194.

visited the country.⁸⁸

Moreover, frequency of the U.S. inquiry of nuclear activities in South Korea and demands for stopping its nuclear weapons program can be interpreted as the U.S. effort delivering the sense of urgency. It was not only those officials described above to visit and meet President Park, but the U.S. embassy also concerned about the issue. In fact, it was “the embassy in Seoul took the most alarmist view,” and it called upon South Korea’s renunciation of reprocessing program at least twice.⁸⁹

(3) Punishment to Threaten for Noncompliance

Punishment of noncompliance, at the maximum extent, was a reconsideration of the alliance. The U.S. was placing an extreme pressure on South Korea through multiple channels. It was not only the Department of Defense that contacted with officials in South Korea. Assistance Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Philip Habib and the U.S. ambassador Sneider made threats to the Koreans. In 1975, Sneider warned that the “whole range of security and political relationships between the United States and South Korea will be affected.”⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 198.

⁸⁹ See C. J. Baik and B. K. Kim, et al., *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, pp. 497.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 501.

Also Baik and Kim describe that Sneider recommended the U.S. Department of State to issue an ultimatum regarding renunciation of South Korea's nuclear program. It is not certain whether this notion of ultimatum actually was drafted, but it can be said that the U.S. had an option to increase the degree of punishment against South Korea. In 1976, the Donald Rumsfeld, then the Secretary of Defense, warned that the U.S. will reconsider the relations with South Korea and the U.S. Congress delayed loans to South Korea's light water reactor, which was already approved in 1974.

Another punishment was to show the U.S. power projection through multilateral and bilateral approaches, so that South Korea recognizes its nuclear development, whether peaceful or military, cannot be succeeded without the U.S. support. For example, it was the U.S. pressure to postpone Canadian deal to export a CANDU reactor, and revoke French deal. In particular, Canadian government, who was seeking more strengthened contract conditions for a CANDU reactor with South Korean government, had information on US-Korea dialogue on reprocessing plant issue. Knowing that South Korea is pressured by the U.S., Canadian government was also able to place bold moves towards South Korea.⁹¹ Also the U.S. proposed countries in Nuclear Suppliers Group to draw a guideline for export control of nuclear technology, items, and facilities, and reinforced its surveillance

⁹¹ 주 카나다 대사의 전보, 카나다 도입차관, (2007-51), 외교통상부 외교사료관.

and intelligence on nuclear activities in South Korea.⁹²

(4) Conditional Inducements from Nixon to Ford

South Korea's renunciation of nuclear program was possible after its government confirmed the U.S. security commitment, which served as an inducement with the U.S. coercive strategy. When the U.S. officials visited South Korea to discuss its renunciation purchasing French reprocessing facility, the U.S. pledged its continued assistance to South Korea's nuclear development for civilian use of the nuclear energy.⁹³

Nixon administration and following Ford administration, which inherited policy on military assistance in South Korea, was ready to offer military aid. It was also the U.S. interest to maintain stability in the East Asia against the threat of the communist. Park argues that Nixon administration excluded South Korea from Nixon doctrine.⁹⁴ During the meeting when State Secretary Rogers visited South Korea, he explained that Asian countries gradually will be required to deal with defense primarily themselves, but clearly states that South Korea would be an exception. It was the position that the U.S. President Nixon also confirmed during

⁹² See C. J. Baik and B. K. Kim, et al., *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, pp. 498.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 508.

⁹⁴ See Seung Ho Park. "The Alliance Strategy of Park Chung Hee's Government toward the United States: Self-Reliance within the Asymmetric Alliance."

the summit on Aug. 21 1969.

Then, what kind of inducement could South Korea accept? To answer this, Bruce Jentleson provides a concept for coercer, which he calls reciprocity. He explains, “Reciprocity involves an explicit, or at least mutually tacit, understanding linkage between the coercer’s carrots and the target’s concessions.”⁹⁵ For South Korea, it was security vulnerability against increasing threat of North Korea, which was at the core of national interests, but the U.S. security commitment perceived as weakening. Thus, for the U.S., a strategic carrot was to help South Korea’s military modernization by supporting 1.5 billion US dollars. Also, it was the Carter administration, which provided 1.9 billion sinews, and suspended withdrawal of US troops until 1981.

It is not clear that the U.S. was willing to provide security commitment unchanged for South Korea during Nixon administration. However, it can be said that South Korea was one of the most strategic location for the U.S. against the communist, and it had a space for a negotiation. This implies that process of the U.S. inducement of providing more military aid and assistance was also a course for eliminating misperception.

Policy changes during the Ford administration weaken the argument that President Park’s nuclear program actively placed much influence on the U.S.

⁹⁵ See Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, "Who Won Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," pp. 52.

foreign policy on Korean Peninsula. During the Ford administration, the U.S. foreign policy dramatically transformed after Vietnam War. In 1975, starting with a cancellation of a withdrawal of a platoon in demilitarized zone, the Ford administration began to strengthen its support for the defense of South Korea. A study points out that the U.S. had an important moment of change, when it interpreted a visit of North Korean leader Kim Il-song to China as an attempt to reproduce the communized Indochina in Korean Peninsula.⁹⁶

Thus, whether President Park was able to induce concession from the U.S. or not is unclear. One might answer the question as it was the U.S. foreign policy already provided inducement approaching South Korean government with sinews and economic aids. It also could be added that the Ford administration reevaluated the strategic importance of South Korea regardless of the impact of nuclear program. However, others could argue that it was nuclear ambition that could deliver the message to the U.S. government, and not only put off reduction of the U.S. armed forces but also provided enhanced military aid.

This needs to be further studied, however, it would be safe to say that South Korea's strategic importance was re-discovered after the Vietnam War, and the development of nuclear weapons technology was seen as a signal to the U.S. government to postpone, reevaluate or modify its new foreign policy during the time.

⁹⁶ 박원곤, 미국의 대한정책 1974~1975년: 포드 행정부의 동맹정책 전환, 데탕트와 박정희, pp.71-99.

IV. Policy Implication

Success of the U.S. coercive diplomacy strategy provides following lessons. First, the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea means no less than the nuclear deterrence. The U.S. army was dispatched at the beginning of the independence of South Korea, and its importance has been increased as the degree of North Korea's threat increased. With the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, the deterrence effect that the U.S. army projected in Korea was maximized.

Nuclear deterrence became ever more important for South Korea, since the North Korea has been conducted a series of nuclear tests. Thus, one might expect that the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea is ever more unexpected. It would not be an ideal way for both countries, South Korea and the U.S..

Yet, a puzzle for the relations between the U.S. Force and tactical nuclear weapons in Korea remains. How South Korea became to announce denuclearization of the peninsula and removed all tactical nuclear weapons? The overall military capability of the U.S. and South Korea alliance as well as the comparison between North and South Korea's military capability should be evaluated. It was the existence of the U.S. Force in Korea for the deterrence against North Korea, when its military capability dominates South Korea's power in 1970s.

Second, the U.S. coercive diplomacy towards South Korea was completed when the two countries could resolve the latter's misperception on the U.S. security commitment. As mentioned above, the concept of coercive diplomacy assumes that the both parties are rational actors. Thus, failure of communication and unnecessary misperception work as a failure. South Korean government was able to understand that the U.S. security commitment was not compromised due to Nixon Doctrine, and thus the nuclear crisis in South Korea resolved quickly enough. In reality, not every country is rational. Moreover, there are always possibilities that misperception causes unnecessary conflicts. Implementing coercive diplomacy, coercing country would need to seek for measure to eliminate misperception, so that it can enhance the effect of the strategy and avoid unnecessary conflicts.

Third, inducement should be provided for coercive diplomacy. The reason South Korea was receptive to the U.S. demands without much costs was that there was a confirmation on continuation of the U.S. Force deployment in Korea. It was gradual withdrawal of the U.S. Force in Korea and increasing North Korea's threat that led to South Korea's nuclear weapons development. Thus, inducement for South Korea was only the continuation of existence of American forces and its nuclear deterrence. If we put this lesson to the present North Korea's nuclear weapons program, priority to resolve the issue is to eliminate the motivation. Moreover, it should be the country that can communicate with North Korea with the minimum level of misperception. In this context, the role of the U.S. might be reduced resolving the issue in terms of coercive strategy.

Fourth, it is important to directly influence a leader's perception and understanding. The U.S. was able to dissuade South Korea's nuclear weapons program, because it could deliver its original intention to President Park directly. In particular, direct meeting with leaders in authoritarian countries or dictators are important, because it is their perception and decision that affects countries' nuclear decision. Dealing with countries, where leaders are not easily met with others, the coercive diplomacy may results in failure. For example, domestic political issues and bureaucratic system may serve as an obstacle for international prudence.

Fifth, any projection of weakening U.S. military power in South Korea could lead to another nuclear crisis. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, when the U.S. military presence was challenged and long planned American army redeployment and transformation was being realized, domestic demands to increase self-reliance capability of South Korea was getting popular. It is understood as that the South Korean government announced four principles of peaceful use of nuclear energy, in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding of its ambition on nuclear weapons. Even though nuclear weapons program would not be planned under the government project, extreme parties would trigger another nuclear pursuit.

Some statements of politicians' possession of nuclear weapons can be understood as a notion that, for South Korea, it is important to balance the threat perceived from North Korea's provocations. North Korea's nuclear activity increasingly threatens South Korea's security, but there are no significant efforts to balance this threat. This does not mean nuclear weapons development of South

Korea is necessary or justified. Rather it reveals how urgent it is to eliminate North Korea's nuclear activity. For example, a politician pointed out that even if (South Korea) doesn't possess its own nuclear weapons immediately, it should secure the capability to possess them. This mention surprisingly resembles what the President Park Chung Hee told to the press during the 1970s.

However, this statement is not considering the power dynamics that would advance in East Asia. It is important to remind that why the U.S. in 1970s worried about South Korea's nuclear weapons program. In addition, today's international environment is not the same as before. Simple, the multilateral nuclear control regime is functioning effectively, which makes South Korea's another nuclear reversion more unlikely.

V. Conclusion

My research focused on failed nuclear project during the early 1970's in South Korea. It aimed to search reasons why it reversed its policy by suspending the project, despite its security vulnerability. In particular, I classified the attempt of nuclear development into three phases. Each phase has been categorized by different factors that initialized events, and the study puts its focus in the second phase in particular.

Developing my research, I first reviewed several previous studies that is related with proliferation of nuclear weapons in general or development of nuclear technology in South Korea. For example, Realist's argument on nuclear proliferation has been challenged, because its empirical projection was not correct as they expected. Besides the empirical debate, weakness of realist's debate is that they undermine the importance of intention. When it comes to nuclear program, revealing intention can be critical to find out why countries reconsider its nuclear decision.

Hymans emphasized that individual leader's mind set is the most important factor analyzing a countries nuclear decision. This approach may be valid explaining nuclear behavior of Libya, Iran, or North Korea. However, it does not open the possibility of perception change in leader, which will eventually reverse the nuclear decision. Solingen provides better explanation in terms of change in

nuclear decision. However, her focus is too much on domestic economic affairs, missing diplomatic or international dynamics of countries. In particular, regional security environment is not well placed.

Thus, in order to argue that leader's perception is influenced by international security dynamics, and to explain why South Korean President Park Chung Hee ended up with reversing his nuclear decision, I brought the concept of coercive diplomacy. Alexander L. George provides useful definition of coercive diplomacy, which combines coercion and inducement at the same time.

To test my argument, I looked into the series of events during 1974 to 1976, when President Park pursued nuclear weapons program. In particular, failed purchase plan of Canadian reactors and French reprocessing facilities provides interesting points. Implication for coercive diplomacy against nuclear ambition is as follows: US troops in Korea are important for deterring North Korea's aggression; unlike the theory, eliminating misperception is necessary to implement coercive diplomacy; inducement should be provided for a successful coercive diplomacy; direct meetings with a leader is necessary; projection of weakening U.S. military power would lead to another crisis.

However, my second hypothesis on weak nations influence on hegemonic power utilizing nuclear projects seems not justifiable when it comes to the South Korean case. This does not mean that the South Korea's nuclear weapons technology projects were unable to produce a diplomatic leverage, and induce

concessions from the U.S. government. Rather it was the U.S. policy, which was influenced by both South Korea's bold move and changes in international environment after Vietnam War. Then, the U.S. government recognized the strategic importance of Korean Peninsula and provided military enforcement and aids, which served as an inducement for South Korean government. In particular, the Ford administrations view on East Asian security was an important factor. Whether nuclear project influenced the policy is unclear, but my understanding of the active impact is not so large.

However, it is also true that the South Korean government was able to postpone the realization of the U.S. foreign policy during the Nixon administration. That would mean that the weak countries' nuclear projects have diplomatic leverage to influence policy of stronger nations. The case could be analyzed with other perspectives as well to resolve other proliferation issues around the world. The world today is still witnessing similar events regarding nuclear proliferation, although effective multilateral nuclear regime has been developed. Thus, we could conclude that South Korea's attempt to become a nuclear power in East Asia during the early 1970's failed, but left significant implications to the region.

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국문초록

핵 정책 전환에 관한 연구:

1974년과 1976년 사이 한국에 대한 미국의 강압외교를 중심으로

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이 논문은 1970년대 한국의 핵무기 기술 개발 사례를 통해 국가가 핵 정책에 대한 결정을 변복하는 이유를 찾는데 그 목적을 둔다. 이 기간 동안 한국은 안보 위협에 둘러싸여있었다. 1976년 박정희 대통령이 핵개발계획을 취소하는 발언을 했을 때에도 북한으로부터의 위협은 계속하여 증가하고 있었다. 무엇이 이러한 양보를 가능하게 만들었는가? 이에 대해 답을 하기 위해 본 논문에서는 우선 핵확산에 대한 현실주의의 해석을 검토하고 국가의 의도가 간과됨을 지적한다.

국가의 핵 결정을 더 잘 이해하기 위해 개별 지도자의 인식과 국내정치의 영향력에 대한 Hymans 와 Solingen 의 연구를 검토한다.

지도자의 인식이 국제 안보 역학에 의해서 영향을 받는다는 주장을 하면서 그리고 한국의 대통령이 왜 핵결정을 전환하게 되었는지 설명하기 위해서 Alexander George 의 강압외교(Coercive Diplomacy)의 개념을 사용한다. 1974 년과 1976 년 사이의 사건들을 검사하면서 미국의 강압외교는 한국 정부가 추구하고 있었던 미국의 안보공약이라는 상호 동기 제공에 의해 성공적이었음을 주장한다. 그럼에도 불구하고 당시의 특정 기간 동안 한국의 핵 계획이 미국의 외교 정책에 미친 영향은 제한적이라고 본다. 왜냐하면 포드 행정부는 한국의 핵 계획 뿐만 아니라 베트남 전쟁 이후의 안보 환경 변화에 따라 동아시아의 전략적 중요성을 재평가하였기 때문이다.

주요어: 핵 정책, 강압외교, 위협인식, 미국외교정책

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