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國際學碩士學位論文

**Why is there no EURATOM in Asia?**

Regionalism and the United States

아시아에는 왜 유라툼이 없는가?

지역주의와 미국

2013 年 2 月

서울대학교 國際大學院

國際學科 國際協力專攻

尹 竣 模

# **Why is There No EURATOM in Asia?**

Regionalism and the United States

A thesis presented

by

**Yoon, Junmo**

to

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# Why is there no EURATOM in Asia?

Regionalism and the United States

## 아시아에는 왜 유라툼이 없는가?

지역주의와 미국

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# **Why is there no EURATOM in Asia?**

Regionalism and the United States

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## **Abstract**

### **Why is There No EURATOM in Asia?**

Regionalism and the United States

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Despite the high dependency on nuclear energy for electricity and a vast number of nuclear weapons in East Asia, a lack of regional atomic energy organizations dealing with nuclear safety and security brings about instability and constant tensions in the region. One may question: why is there no EURATOM-type regional nuclear institution in Asia?

This article argues that collective identity plays an important role in regional groupings, especially on the issue of nuclear power. Thus, it focuses on eclectic stance that grants constitutive processes causal relevance, so called “collective identity.” Racial, historical, political, and cultural factors all together significantly affect the foreign policies of the United States toward Europe and Asia respectively. Also, this article analyzes the differences in mutual identification of the U.S. vis-à-vis Europe and Asia in terms of regionalism and the interests of U.S. decision makers.

From American perspectives, the logic in choosing multilateralism over bilateralism in Europe was a matter of course based on their perceptions and collective identity that they have been built over hundred years one another. On the other hand, Asia has been still foreign to the US with dynamic political structure and different threats. As a result, proposals for an East Asian version of EURATOM ended in failure and quickly took the shape of bilateral military agreements with the hub-and-spoke security order. Especially, when the proposals for regional collective actions contained the delicate issues such as reprocessing and a possibility of creating nuclear weapons, each party should entirely trust each other and share the certain level of collective identity with shared interests. The case of renegotiating the U.S.-EURATOM agreement and the attempt of a EURATOM-type Asian nuclear collective initiative, so-called ASIATOM in 1990s clearly show the different approaches of the US based in terms of multilateralism in Europe and Asia respectively.

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**Key Words:** Multilateralism, regionalism, collective identity, EURATOM, ASIATOM, regional groupings, nuclear program, reprocessing, the United States

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## **I. Introduction**

### **1. Asia's Nuclear Energy Growth and Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles**

The demand for electricity generating capacity and particularly nuclear power is significantly growing in Asia. Indeed, there are 117 nuclear power reactors in operation, 44 under construction and firm plans to build a further 92 in the region, especially in China, Japan, and South Korea.<sup>1</sup> In fact, countries in East Asia are planning to build new nuclear power reactors to meet their increasing demands for electricity, whereas North America and Western European countries leveled out nuclear energy, focusing more on renewable energy such as wind, solar, hydro-electric and tidal power as well as geothermal energy and biomass. Particularly, China's growth has been at an extraordinarily rapid and impressive speed, which consumes and requires an enormous amount of energy.<sup>2</sup> Given this fact, it is fair to say that Asia will be heavily dependent on nuclear energy for the electricity in the near future and the safety issue is likely to arise along with more nuclear power plants in the region.

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<sup>1</sup> World Nuclear Association, "Asia's Nuclear Energy Growth," April 2010. <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf47.html> (Accessed 2 June, 2012).

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Economic growth continues to drive China's growing need for energy," SEPTEMBER 21, 2012. <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8070>. (Accessed 11 October, 2012).

**<Table 1. Nuclear Power in Asia and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle>**

	<b>Power Reactors Operable or in Operation</b>	<b>Power Reactors Under Construction</b>	<b>Power Reactors Planned</b>	<b>Research Reactors</b>	<b>Other Stages of the Fuel Cycle</b>
<b>Australia</b>				1	UM
<b>Bangladesh</b>			2	1	
<b>China</b>	15	26	51	13	UM, C, E, FF
<b>India</b>	20	7	18	5	UM, FF, R, WM
<b>Indonesia</b>			2	3	FF
<b>Japan</b>	50	3	10	17+1	C, E, FF, R, WM
<b>S. Korea</b>	23	4	5	2	C, FF
<b>N. Korea</b>			0	1	C?,FF?,R
<b>Malaysia</b>			0	1	
<b>Pakistan</b>	3	2	0	1	UM, E, FF
<b>Philippines</b>			0	1	
<b>Thailand</b>			0	1+1	
<b>Vietnam</b>			4	1	
<b>** Total</b>	117	44	92	56*	

\* 54 research reactors operable, 2 under construction

\*\* The total includes 6 reactors in operation, plus two under construction, on Taiwan. It also has four research reactors. Taiwan has no other stages of the fuel cycle.

Key: UM Uranium Mining, C Conversion, E Enrichment, FF Fuel Fabrication, R Reprocessing, WM Waste Management facilities for used fuel away from reactors.

*Sources: WNA Reactor table, country papers, OECD/IEA World Energy Outlook, Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook<sup>3</sup>*

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

In addition to Asia's increasing energy dependency on nuclear power, the number of nuclear weapon continuously challenges regional security in East Asia.

**<Table 2. Current Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles in Asia>**

<b>Country</b>	<b>First tests</b>	<b>Operational Warheads</b>	<b>Total Warheads</b>
Russia	1949	4,650	12,000
China	1964	~180	240
Israel	1979*	unknown	80
Pakistan	1998	unknown	70-90
India	1974	unknown	60-80
Russia	1949	4,650	12,000
China	1964	~180	240

*\*unverified*

*Source: Federation of American Scientists (FAS), "Status of World Nuclear Forces 2010"<sup>4</sup>*

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<sup>4</sup> Federation of American Scientists (FAS), "Status of World Nuclear Forces 2010," - All numbers are estimates and further described in the Nuclear Notebook in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and the nuclear appendix in the SIPRI Yearbook. Additional reports are published on the FAS Strategic Security Blog. Unlike those publications, this table is updated continuously as new information becomes available - Current FAS update: May.26.2010 - last retrieved by BlatantWorld.com on August.28.2010.

[http://www.blatantworld.com/feature/asia/nuclear\\_weapons\\_stockpiles.html#references](http://www.blatantworld.com/feature/asia/nuclear_weapons_stockpiles.html#references)  
(Accessed 2 June, 2012).

Despite the fact of high dependency on nuclear energy for electricity and a vast number of nuclear weapons in East Asia, a lack of regional atomic energy organizations dealing with nuclear safety and security brings about instability and constant tensions in the region. Indeed, nuclear safety and security should be dealt through collective actions in East Asia.

## **2. Research Question and Hypothesis**

This research mainly addresses the question, “Why is there no EURATOM in Asia?” Specifically, this thesis plans to analyze the influence of the United States when it comes to regional groupings and institutional forms of the regional groupings in Asia. That is, this article scrutinizes why the United States, with or without participation, preferred multilateralism in Europe such as NATO and EURATOM, while dealing with the Asian countries on a bilateral basis without regional institutions. Indeed, U.S. policymakers considered their potential European allies as relatively equal members of a shared community, whereas potential Asian allies were seen as part of an alien and, in important ways, “inferior community.”<sup>5</sup>

In due process, this article focuses on eclectic stance that grants constitutive processes causal relevance, so called “collective identity.” Racial, historical, political, and cultural factors all together significantly affect the foreign policies of

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<sup>5</sup> Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “*Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the origins of Multilateralism.*” *International Organization*, Volume 56, Number 3, Summer 2002, pp. 575-607 (Article), The MIT Press.

the United States toward Europe and Asia respectively. Therefore, this article intends to analyze the differences in mutual identification of the U.S. vis-à-vis Europe and Asia in terms of regionalism and the interests of U.S. decision makers in Europe and Asia under the following hypotheses:

- a. Perceptions of collective identity play a critical role when it comes to regional institutionalization.
- b. The notion of multilateralism in Europe and bilateralism in Asia is a natural phenomenon for the United States mainly because of U.S. collective identities constructed by Europe and Asia respectively.
- c. A dominant Anglo-Saxon culture remained in the American society, which had a significant influence on decision-making process, and ultimately had a negative impact on the establishment of ASIATOM in 1990s.



## II. Theoretical Framework

### 1. Multilateralism and the United States

On 23 September 2009, Ali Abdussalam Treki, the former President of the General Assembly of the United Nations, said, “Multilateralism is the only practical method for tackling major international problems and the United Nations offers the most legitimate forum for ensuring countries take meaningful global action.”<sup>6</sup> It is true, as he mentioned, that multilateralism is the only way forward, especially in the era of globalization where there are many powers and only one superpower.

As a matter of fact, America’s strengths — an economy that is still the world’s largest by far, a conventional military force that simply cannot be matched, and an international system shaped in its own image — show that the U.S. has the capability and potential to accomplish the mission unilaterally.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, America accounts for half the world’s military spending — with a budget greater than that of the next 15 highest spenders combined — and even more of its military research and development.<sup>8</sup> And it has done all this while devoting less than five percent of its GDP to defense outlays.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, the U.S. did not follow the path of unilateralism. The U.S. has made a full commitment to multilateralism, such as

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<sup>6</sup> Ali Treki, "Multilateralism the Only Way Forward, General Assembly President Says." UN News Center. UN, 23 Sept. 2009, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32162>, (Accessed 05 September, 2012).

<sup>7</sup> Fareed Zakaria, “The Post-American World,” W.W. Norton & Co., New York: 2008.

<sup>8</sup> Perlo-Freeman, Sam, Olawale Ismail, and Carina Solmirano. "5. Military expenditure." *SIPRI Yearbook 2010*. SIPRI. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

NATO, G20, and the UN. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. has indeed led its allies with proper guidance, and NATO members have also ultimately been responsible for their fair share of the common defense and cooperate one another in order to fight for global responsibilities.

Despite the fact that the US preferred multilateralism, its treatment differed from the regions. For instance, the US established the North Atlantic security community in Europe multilaterally, whereas in Asia, the US preferred to operate bilateral agreements for collective measures.<sup>10</sup> Put simply, it seemed that multilateral approaches were only set with its European partners after the Cold War. This is because, as Hemmer and Katzenstein argues, “perceptions of collective identity played an underappreciated role in this decision,”<sup>11</sup> and Asian partners lacked the sense of affinities and trust from different culture, values, political systems, and religion.

## **2. Collective Identity and Regionalism**

On September 11, 2001, members of al-Qaeda hijacked jetliners and flew into the twin towers of New York’s World Trade Center. Yet another slammed into the Pentagon. Although attitudes toward Arab people were not positive before September 11, 2001, negative reactions toward individuals from those countries

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<sup>10</sup> Victor Cha, "Powerplay: The Origins of the U.S Alliance System in East Asia," *International Security* 34(3), 2011, pp.161-166.

<sup>11</sup> Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the origins of Multilateralism,” *International Organization*, Volume 56, Number 3, Summer 2002, pp. 575 (Article), The MIT Press.

definitely increased after that terrible day. American people changed their views of Muslims so quickly, that they started discriminating against these people including those who were U.S. citizens and had nothing to do with terrorism. A number of anti-Arab and anti-Islamic violent incidents were committed, and the number of hate crimes had increased dramatically.<sup>12</sup>

This is an example that shows the underlying concept of construction of collective identity. Ethnic communities do not contend over history per se; what engages them is disputes over political, economic, or cultural values and resources, all of which together called collective identity. And, historical animosities and collective memories are the ones that greatly facilitate the process of mobilization.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, it is fair to say that most ethnic communities are rooted in historical experience that its capacity for action depends on the salience of its identity and shared incentives, and that disputes involving ethnic communities are real differences over political power, economic resources, or cultural values.

The continued presence and relevance of such conflicts are reflected in the efforts to incorporate the diverse relationships into a general theory; albeit it is hard to accomplish. Thus, careful attention should be given to the sensitivity of the particular context and the unique set of circumstances that impart a distinctive character to each situation; in this case, regional groupings and institutionalization

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<sup>12</sup> Southern Poverty Law Center, "FBI: Dramatic Spike in Hate Crimes Targeting Muslims," *Intelligence Report*, Spring 2012, Issue Number: 145.

<sup>13</sup> Bojana Blagojevic, "CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK," *Journal of Global Change and Governance*, Volume III, Number 1, Winter 2009, ISSN: 1941-8760.

based on collective identity.<sup>14</sup> Accordingly, it would be prudent not to rush into conclusions to suspend judgment until the situation is fully understood although it is almost impossible to exclude moral judgments in ethnic collisions. In order to comprehend the mindset of U.S. decisions, this article will focus on ethnicity and its spin-off: collective identity.

### **3. Ethnicity and Collective Identity**

Understanding ethnicity and collective identity is required to have a better appreciation for the context, because mischaracterizing the nature and the driving forces behind it can lead to misguidance in the policy responses.

First of all, ethnic sentiment is an expression of identity. As a member of a group, each individual shares collective identity. When a collective identity is linked to an interest group, the result is known as identity politics. Normally, ethnic identity is a matter of inheritance rather than of voluntary choice. However, its particular expressions can be socially constructed and modulated.<sup>15</sup>

Ethnicity has no meaning except in relational terms. There must always be an in-group and an out-group. In this sense, ethnic solidarity is the identification that

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<sup>14</sup> Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization*, Volume 56, Number 3, Summer 2002, pp. 575 (Article), The MIT Press.

<sup>15</sup> Janis Gross Stein, "Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Osler Hampson, Fen and Aall, Pamela (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), p. 189-208.

I share the same common attributes, a valuable culture, a notable historical experience, and a common fate with my fellow ethnics. This perception distinguishes me from others, makes me feel more comfortable and secure among my own people than among others. In doing so, I may be asked and prepared to invest my energies and material resources, and I may even risk my life in its defense. Ethnic identities usually draw on deeper layers of emotional sensitivity than of those based on more pragmatic interests. For such reasons, the ethnic collective identity normally prevails in decision-making process.<sup>16</sup>

According to Milton J. Esman, there are three competing conceptions to the meaning of ethnic identity and solidarity. Firstly, the Primordialist school look upon ethnic identities as historically rooted, deeply embedded in a people's culture, reinforced by social institutions and practices, perpetuated inter-generationally by early socialization. Secondly, the Instrumentalists regard ethnicity either as a surrogate for more basic social forces such as class or colonial domination, or as a fraud perpetrated by persons with self-serving objectives to exploit mass publics in pursuit of their political or economic ambitions. Lastly, the Social constructionists regard ethnic solidarity as an invention of the human imagination. Far from being historically rooted, they argue that most contemporary ethnic communities are of relatively recent origin, serving practical and changing needs.<sup>17</sup> Although all three persuasions can find contemporary cases that illustrate their preferred explanation of

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Milton J. Esman, "An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict," 3-49 and 195-207, John Wiley and Sons Ltd: 2004.

collective ethnic identity, none of them can succeed in fully explaining the complex and multifaceted manifestations of ethnic solidarity.

The notion of ethnicity and collective identity is vital in terms of international relations as well. Particularly, constructivists seek to understand the globalized world, arguing that frontiers tend to blur and to evolve according to shared ideas and interest groups. Accordingly, they analyze the world with perception change and its impact on IR structure. This is when construction of collective identity plays an important role as identities and interests of purposive actors are constituted by these shared ideas rather than given by nature and shared ideas rather than material forces determine structures of human association. Put simply, collective identity is a highly significant factor in world politics since they help define the actors' interests and suggest the explanations of great power status and threat perception. Indeed, Wendt argues that neo-realism and neo-liberalism cannot account for changes in the system in nowadays world, but that only norms-based constructivism can since threats are socially constructed.<sup>18</sup>

#### **4. Literature Review**

Both realist and constructivist perspectives can explain the absence of a collective security institution in Asia. From a realist perspective, the huge power

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<sup>18</sup> Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425, The MIT Press.

differentials between the US and its Asian allies, also known as “extreme hegemony,” in the post-war period played a huge role in the absence of multilateral organizations in Asia. Indeed, the power gap between the US and Asia was so large that the US did not see the necessity to create a regional security organization.<sup>19</sup> US policymakers saw its Asian allies as weak actors since Asian states had little to offer, whereas they viewed its allies in Europe to recover and become valuable partners in the region. From this calculation, no doubt the US preferred bilateralism to multilateralism in the approach to Asian security. In other words, realists focus heavily on the nature of the US role and extent of US power.

Instead of focusing on the US-Asia power gap, Hemmer and Katzenstein argue for a strong sense of collective identity and shared interests for collective defense system as key factors. According to them, American policy-makers in the early post-war period “saw their potential Asian allies...as part of an alien and, in important ways, inferior community... European allies [who were seen] as relatively equal members of a shared community. Hence, Europe rather than Asia was seen as a more desirable arena for multilateral engagement because the U.S. recognized a greater sense of a transatlantic community than a transpacific one.”<sup>20</sup> From this perspective, it was not extreme hegemony, rather America’s conception of Europe as the “self” and Asia as the “other”, which explains why multilateralism in Europe

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<sup>19</sup> Donald Crone, “Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy,” *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No.4 (July 1993), pp. 501-525, (New York: Routledge, 2003).

<sup>20</sup> Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the origins of Multilateralism,” *International Organization*, Volume 56, Number 3, Summer 2002, pp. 575 (Article), The MIT Press.

and bilateral one in Asia flowed naturally.<sup>21</sup> They argue that different perceptions of collective identity are crucial in explaining why Washington favored multilateralism in Europe and bilateralism in Asia.

A different perspective for the lack of regional collective measures comes from Acharya who emphasizes a norm against collective defence which emerged and evolved through early post-war regional interactions. These interactions were shaped by the interplay of the ideas of key local agents, and the evolving global norm of non-intervention; therefore, focus on local, national, or regional political contexts on Asian regionalism. Providing several examples of early post-war US initiatives for Pacific security cooperation including President Roosevelt's proposed post-war Pacific collective security system, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations' ideas about a Pacific security organization, and especially efforts by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to create a Pacific Ocean Pact during 1950 and 1951, Acharya came up with normative explanations for why there is no multilateral institutions in Asia. According to him, there was an effort to create a multilateral security organization in Asia, and this scheme was in fact enthusiastically supported by South Korea and the Philippines. In spite of this effort, some countries such as India did not like the idea of joining collective initiatives under the US umbrella and it was mainly because of the Kashmir dispute between

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid.



India and Pakistan.<sup>22</sup> Other states also objected to the idea of bringing all together in a multilateral form in Asia. For instance, many Asian states were reluctant to join any Pacific alliances that had fearful-former-imperialist-Japan as a member. John Foster Dulles stated that many potential members of Asian alliance “have memories of Japanese aggression that are so vivid that they are reluctant to create a mutual security pact with Japan.”<sup>23</sup>

## 5. Research Design

As illustrated in Table 1, this article seeks to solve the puzzle of why the U.S. prefers a multilateral approach in Europe through organizations such as NATO and EURATOM, while dealing with Asian countries on a bilateral basis without seeking any regional solutions. In due process, this thesis seeks to identify the factor that plays an important role to explain the establishment of EURATOM in Europe and the failure of ASIATOM in Asia. Indeed, the nuclear multilateral security mechanism in Europe cannot be solely explained with extreme hegemony with the nature of the US or the role of the United States in international and/or regional relations. Especially, if it is about regional collective initiatives for nuclear power, state actors in the region become extremely responsive and sensitive to the matter

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<sup>22</sup> Amitav Acharya, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia?” The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism,” the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Paper No. 05-05, July 2005, Harvard University.

<sup>23</sup> John Foster Dulles, “Security in the Pacific,” *Foreign Affairs* 30 (2):182, 1954. The Issues at Geneva: Address by Secretary Dulles. The Department of State Bulletin 30 (777):739-44.

since it can be directly related to regional security and many thousands of lives of their citizens. In this case, perfect confidence and trust are absolutely required and the necessity of collective identity and shared interests is highly amplified. Undoubtedly, power gap theory and other realistic approaches can help understand the situation; however, it is once again collective identity that functions as an important factor to be able to create regional atomic energy organization. This article seeks to prove the hypotheses by analyzing the two different approaches of the U.S. in Europe and Asia respectively in the 1990s when the U.S. had to negotiate the new U.S.-EURATOM agreement in Europe and an ASIATOM proposal in Asia.

<Table 3. The factors to determine regional groupings and institutionalization>

	<b>NATO</b>	<b>SEATO</b>	<b>EURATOM (New EURATOM Agreement)</b>	<b>ASIATOM Initiative</b>
<b>Period</b>	1940's	1950's	Late 1990's	Late 1990's
<b>Approaches</b>	Multilateral security arrangements	Bilateral security arrangements	Multilateral nuclear agreement	Bilateral nuclear agreements
<b>Factor</b>	Extreme Hegemony / Collective Identity with shared idea		Collective Identity	

### **III. Multilateralism and Collective Identity**

#### **1. Europe vs. Asia**

For the past 60 years, the United States has mainly maintained the mechanism of bilateral alliance in Asia in the form of “hub-and-spoke” model.<sup>24</sup> Unlike the path of multilateral security in the West European region, the US favored policies of forming one-to-one security mechanism in Asian-Pacific region. Apparently, the United States is a "hub" in this model and Asian countries such as Korea, Japan, and China act as "Spokes." The examples of this arrangements are abundant such as US-Republic of Korea defense treaty of 1953, US-Republic of China security treaty of 1954, and treaties with Japan, to name a few, which manifest the relations between hub and spokes. What is interesting in this model is that there is a strong alliance between the hub and the spoke, whereas a strong sense of connection or interaction between spokes in terms of collective security measures hardly lies in this relationship.<sup>25</sup>

In fact, no multilateral security framework has been established in Asian-Pacific region during the Cold War. Compared with NATO and EURATOM, the security cooperation in Asia was mainly the bilateral agreements - usually the bilateral military alliance, known as “hub-and-spoke” model dominated by the

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<sup>24</sup> Victor Cha, "Powerplay: The Origins of the U.S Alliance System in East Asia," *International Security* 34(3), 2011, pp.161-166

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

United States. In the wake of the Cold War, states in Asia proposed a number of initiatives concerning the multilateral security and its practice in the region. However, these multilateral security initiatives and practice were not able to achieve substantial outcomes, and ultimately ended up with the bilateral security arrangement. In other words, the United States have been suspicious of and opposed any multilateral security initiatives in Asia because from the Washington perspectives, it might weaken their firmly established bilateral relations and bilateral relations with Asian states might be the most effective apparatus to wield strong influence and exercise political leverage in the region.<sup>26</sup>

On the other hand, multilateralism in Europe comes a bit more natural from the US perspective as cooperation with European countries has come from their perceived notions that they historically and/or culturally have closeness.<sup>27</sup> Sharing the same cultural and civilizational values was a huge benefit for both Europe and the US to build up collective identity and shared interests, all of which resulted in collective defense system such as NATO and collective nuclear initiatives, also known as EURATOM.

All in all, multilateralism in Europe and bilateralism in Asia is a natural phenomenon. Asia does not share the same degree of trust and power that the U.S. had offered to European states since Asia is still foreign and inferior. The fact that

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Derek W. Urwin, "The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945," pp. 14, 1995, New York: Longman.

the U.S. cannot fully trust Asian states hampers the efforts of multilateral approaches in the region.

## **2. EURATOM vs. ASIATOM**

The trust issue through collective identity can be amplified when it comes to nuclear power. The different policies and approaches of the United States in regard to establishing EURATOM and ASIATOM respectively can help comprehend the differing perceptions of two regions and the decisions by US policymakers. Particularly, this article will analyze the different policies towards Europe and Asia respectively in the late 1990s. On the one hand, EURATOM and the United States renewed the agreement for nuclear cooperation in 1995 with the issue of US prior consent rights. On the other hand, the US concluded a similar arrangement with Japan bilaterally, while turning down the agenda for regional nuclear cooperation, so called ASIATOM.

### **a. The establishment of EURATOM and the United States**

To begin with, The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was established in 1958 to create conditions necessary for the establishment and growth of nuclear industries in the region. In fact, it was the United States that

promoted the establishment of a collective nuclear initiative in order to benefit sales of U.S. nuclear power reactors and related equipment, fuels and technology in Europe, along with the efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapon after the end of World War II.<sup>28</sup> Nuclear electrical generating capacity in current EURATOM countries was 125.8 gigawatts (gross), compared with 115.4 gigawatts in the United States.<sup>29</sup>

**<Table 4. Nuclear Generating Capacity of EURATOM Countries>**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Capacity (MWe gross)</b>	<b>Generation (Percent)</b>
<b>Belgium</b>	5,834	56.8
<b>Finland</b>	2,400	29.5
<b>France</b>	60,124	75.3
<b>Germany</b>	22,470	29.3
<b>Netherlands</b>	539.00	4.9
<b>Spain</b>	7,400	35.0
<b>Sweden</b>	10,318	51.1
<b>UK</b>	12,910	25.8
<b>Total</b>	121,995	

*Source: Nuclear Engineering International, "Nuclear Generating Capacity of EURATOM Countries"*<sup>30</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Carl E. Behrens, "EURATOM and the United States: Renewing the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation," Washington D.C., USA. UNT Digital Library, <http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs312/>. (Accessed November 1, 2012).

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Global Generation Capacity for Nuclear Power Has Grown to over 346 Gigawatts since 1955," EIA, *Independent Statistics and Analysis*, 17 May 2012. (Accessed November 1, 2012).

<sup>30</sup> Nuclear Engineering International, "Nuclear Generating Capacity of EURATOM Countries," Progressive Media Markets Ltd., June 1995, p. 48.

All EURATOM members are joined to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and make a full commitment of its international safeguards. They developed a regional safeguards system of their own to reduce the burden of IAEA's safeguards.

In the years following World War II, the US was highly interested in the economic and political integration of Europe. Secretary of State George C. Marshall saw European integration as the most viable solution to the problem of what to do with Germany. Despite the opposition and doubts that Germany could be absorbed into the framework, many policymakers and scholars believed European integration would be the best way to strengthen Western European economic and political resistance to communism. Particularly, Dwight D. Eisenhower called for European unity because he believed it the best way to provide security for the Continent. He argued that if Europe remained divided, it would always be weak, and “weakness could not cooperate, weakness could only beg.”<sup>31</sup> Although their intention to bind Europe had to do with economic and political agendas, it became clear that any progress toward integration would have to be in the field of atomic energy.<sup>32</sup> Thus, the successful formation of a European atomic energy community became an important policy goal for the United States.

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<sup>31</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, “White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961,” (Garden City, 1965), 126.

<sup>32</sup> JONATHAN E. HELMREICH, “The United States and the Formation of EURATOM,” *Diplomatic History*, 15: 387–410, 1991, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.1991.tb00137.x.



In 1953, President Eisenhower announced his Atoms for Peace plan. Among many other reasons including containment of the Soviets and stimulation of foreign purchases of American reactors, the proposal was a great example to indicate that the US was eager to cooperate with other nations, and it thus established a positive tone that was especially significant for American efforts to aid the formation of EURATOM.<sup>33</sup> In the process, The United States provided the community with heavy water, depleted uranium, U-235, highly enriched uranium, and chemical separation technology. But mostly importantly, the US allowed EURATOM to reprocess fuel elements initially provided by the United States, even by encouraging European countries to develop reprocessing facilities. Many scientists and policy makers were optimistic about plutonium as reactor fuel and the commercial separation of spent fuel and the use of plutonium were in its infancy.<sup>34</sup>

#### **b. The new US-EURATOM agreement and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA)**

On October 28, 1976, President Ford announced his decision that “the reprocessing and recycling of plutonium should not proceed unless there is sound reason to conclude that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation ... that the United States should no longer regard

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Frans Berkhout and William Walker, "Atlantic impasse." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September/October 1994: 15-17.

reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle, and that we should pursue reprocessing and recycling in the future only if they are found to be consistent with our international objectives.”<sup>35</sup>

His voice was clear that the US would take a tough stance against proliferation and reprocessing. However, it maintained the room for flexibility on reprocessing with careful wording.

It was indeed President Carter who took an even tougher stance against reprocessing and his tone was completely different compared to previous policies. In an April 7 press statement, President Carter announced, “We will defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium produced in the U.S. nuclear power programs.”<sup>36</sup> It said that reprocessing should not proceed not only in the American soil but also in the entire world. The U.S. position was firm and final, and it expressly urged the other nuclear nations to adopt it as well.<sup>37</sup> In line with the Carter policy, Congress passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act in 1978 in order to establish export licensing criteria that govern peaceful nuclear exports by the United States, including a requirement of prior U.S. approval for re-transfers and reprocessing; and a guaranty that no material re-transferred will be

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<sup>35</sup> Gerald R. Ford Presidential Documents, vol. 12, no. 44, pp. 1626-1627, 1976.

<sup>36</sup> Jimmy Carter Library, Records of the Speech Writer’s Office, Statement on Nuclear Power Policy, April 7, 1977.

<sup>37</sup> A. David. Rossin, "Presidential Actions – A Brief History," FRONTLINE. PBS, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/readings/rossin1.html>. (Accessed November 2, 2012).

reprocessed without prior U.S. consent.<sup>38</sup> The U.S. was evidently aware of the danger of plutonium activities from reprocessing and stated that the US would not tolerate any proliferation attempt from reprocessing the spent fuel in the world.

In spite of these efforts, however, the Carter Administration was not consistent with the policy on discouraging reprocessing outside the U.S. and the beneficiary was once again Europe. Since NNPA added consent rights, which was imposed on EURATOM as a troublesome restraint, there was considerable European resentment of the extraterritorial reach of American law and ultimately seeking to tighten control over them. The U.S. did not want to lose its influence and leverage on nuclear power in Europe and started to attempt a different approach to its European friends.

In 1980, President Carter signed Executive Order 12193, Nuclear Cooperation With EURATOM (45 Federal Register 9885, February 14, 1980),<sup>39</sup> without the intent of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act requiring prior U.S. approval for reprocessing. Ironically, since the Carter administration, the U.S. had provided a waiver of the NNPA's conditions each year and Presidents Ronald Reagan, George Bush and Bill Clinton had continued the practice after 1978. In 1993, President Clinton announced his policy on reprocessing that "The United States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes. The

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<sup>38</sup> United States. CRS Report for Congress. Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: U.S. Policy Development. By Anthony Andrews. Order Code RS22542, Updated March 27, 2008.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

United States, however, will maintain its existing commitments regarding the use of plutonium in civil nuclear programs in Western Europe and Japan.”<sup>40</sup>

Despite the presidential annual waivers and preferential treatment, EURATOM allies were not fully satisfied. Indeed, they wanted to deal with the “prior consent” rights in the new agreement since it is closely related to EURATOM’s destiny in the future with long-term, programmatic approval of all activities related to uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, material storage and re-transfer of nuclear fuel.<sup>41</sup> Apparently, the US and EURATOM members agreed to address the prior consent issue before the previous agreement would expire at the end of 1995 and they both knew that failure to renew the arrangement would result in a significant loss in terms of both economic sense and nonproliferation efforts.

The central issue in negotiations between the two parties was the prior consent provisions required by the NNPA since section 3(d) of NNPA requires “effective controls by the United States over its exports of nuclear materials and equipment, and nuclear technology.”<sup>42</sup> The opponents of the new EURATOM agreement continued to argue that the advance approval in the proposed EURATOM agreement was contrary to NNPA, especially considering the further

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<sup>40</sup> Fact Sheet — Nonproliferation And Export Control Policy, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 27, 1993.

<sup>41</sup> Evan S Medeiros, “United States and EURATOM Strike New 35-Year Accord.” *Arms Control Today*, September 1995: 30.

<sup>42</sup> United States. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Nuclear Regulatory Legislation, 111th Congress; 2nd Session. Washington, DC 20555–0001: Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0980, Vol. 3, No. 9, 2011, pp. 1029-1061.

concessions about non-interference and suspension. In other words, the NNPA demanded the right of prior U.S. consent for reprocessing; however, some EURATOM members, most notably France, did not want to ask for U.S. consent to reprocess and recycle plutonium. The U.S. insisted prior consent over re-use of U.S.-origin nuclear materials in perpetuity; on the other hand, Europe claimed for completely objective conditions for withdrawal of U.S. prior consent.

After nearly two years of negotiations, the US finally dropped its stance against prior consent and offered the Europeans new 35-year accord with consent rights. Recognizing EURATOM as a special case, the President Clinton stated, "Accordingly, I have determined that failure to continue peaceful nuclear cooperation with EURATOM would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives and would jeopardize the common defense and security of the United States."<sup>43</sup>

On November 29, 1995, President Clinton submitted the new U.S.-EURATOM agreement to Congress. Not only did Congress in the NNPA allow cooperation to continue under the existing agreement, but also the new agreement included some consent rights over EURATOM's fuel cycle activities for it to be consistent with U.S. law.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> UNITED STATES. THE WHITE HOUSE. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. "MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES." By William J. Clinton. NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 9 Mar. 1995.

<sup>44</sup> Evan S Medeiros, "United States and EURATOM Strike New 35-Year Accord." *Arms Control Today*, September 1995: 30.

### **c. Problems of the new U.S.-EURATOM agreement**

Now, the problem lies in here with the new US-EURATOM agreement because technically speaking, the new agreement does not meet all the requirements of U.S. law, in particular the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. In fact, there are no specified consent rights in this agreement despite the fact that the core principle of NNPA is the establishment of consent right for the purpose of nonproliferation. For example, at a hearing of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Under Secretary of Energy Charles B. Curtis clearly identified the difference between the old and new agreement. He said that:

“The existing U.S.-EURATOM agreement prohibits our European allies from using U.S.-origin nuclear material or equipment for nuclear weapons or for other military purposes and it requires that EURATOM safeguards be applied to U.S. origin material in a European country... EURATOM nations are required to obtain U.S. consent before transferring U.S. supplied nuclear materials or equipment to a third party outside of the European Community. However, the agreement does not contain any other consent rights and, therefore, differs significantly from other U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements which contain U.S. consent rights over the reprocessing of U.S. origin material.”<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community. Hearing, 103rd Cong. 2d sess. 1994, 61 pp. (S. Doe. 103-944).

Giving the Europeans a huge favor, the new agreement removed some of the important, controversial provisions including: perpetuating IAEA safeguards on U.S.-origin nuclear material after the agreement expires; applying IAEA full-scope safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapons states of the European Community; explicitly guaranteeing that nuclear material will not be used in any type of nuclear explosive device, not just an atomic weapon; a U.S. right to require the return of U.S.-controlled items in circumstances related to a non-nuclear-weapon state's detonating a nuclear explosive device or terminating or abrogating an agreement for IAEA safeguards; a guarantee of adequate physical security; a U.S. right to approve storage facilities for weapons-usable materials; and a U.S. right of prior consent over enrichment, reprocessing and alteration in form or content of certain U.S.-origin nuclear materials.<sup>46</sup>

In defending the defective agreement, administration officials have said that the controls are "more implicit," and that the agreement satisfies the requirements of the law "when you roll it all into one."<sup>47</sup> However, as a result of this new arrangement, EURATOM members would have no limitation to build and operate new plants for processing U.S.-origin nuclear materials without U.S. consent. Since there are no consent rights in the new arrangement, there are no individual consents to suspend. The agreement requires that any decision with respect to activities

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<sup>46</sup> Carl E. Behrens. EURATOM and the United States: Renewing the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation. Washington D.C., USA. UNT Digital Library. <http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs312/>. (Accessed November 7, 2012).

<sup>47</sup> Kathleen Hart, "NCI Calls U.S.-Euratom Pact Illegal; U.S. Industry Is Supportive," *Nuclear Fuel*. June 19, 1995, 12.

involving reprocessing/alteration in form or content "apply to the activities of the other party...taken as a whole." This means that the U.S. should suspend all nuclear cooperation with respect to these particular activities with all members of EURATOM in order to respond to problems at a single facility, which is with no doubt politically impossible. In other words, despite the consent-rights requirement of the NNPA, the U.S. would not have any rights or means to prevent EURATOM facilities from being built and operated with U.S.-origin weapons-usable material in the new agreement.<sup>48</sup>

The State Department and the Executive Branch truly regards the new agreement as "impeccable nuclear non-proliferation credentials"<sup>49</sup> by claiming that "the EURATOM member states and the European Community itself have long been among the strongest supporters of nuclear non-proliferation efforts worldwide."<sup>50</sup> The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) assessment of the agreement also states that "the long experience of EURATOM on safeguards and on ensuring adequate levels of physical protection, when combined with the strong nonproliferation credentials and long-term political stability of these democracies,

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<sup>48</sup> Testimony of Paul Leventhal, President, Nuclear Control Institute, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on Proposed U.S.-EURATOM Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, Wednesday, February 28, 1996.

<sup>49</sup> President Clinton's letter transmitting EURATOM agreement to Congress, November 29, 1995, in "Proposed Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Between the United States of America and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)," House Document 104-138, November 29, 1995, p. 1.

<sup>50</sup> Memorandum for the President from Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary, September 22, 1995, p. 3.



adds credence to the assurance offered by EURATOM in the proposed agreement.”<sup>51</sup>

Ironically, the historical record does not support such statements, particularly with regard to the “strong nonproliferation credentials.” Indeed, evidences show that both EURATOM and its member states have provided key assistance to proliferant nations and often openly flouted U.S. non-proliferation policy and practices. Examples are abundant: France did not join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) until 1992. France provided Israel with the Dimona reactor and reprocessing plant and even helped Iraqi nuclear program with a research reactor and highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. It was also France who was the most outspoken EU opponent to a new nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. based on U.S. prior-consent arrangements as required by the NNPA.<sup>52</sup> Also, the Great Britain, the second largest supplier of commercial reprocessing services in the world, and its companies not only assisted India’s nuclear reprocessing spent research reactor fuel with sophisticated electronic equipment for nuclear and missile purposes over a three-year period, but also channeled many millions of dollars of sensitive technology to Iraq.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, Germany worked with Iran by approving about 80 percent of applications for dual-use technology exports such as German-supplied equipment useful in the development of centrifuges for uranium

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<sup>51</sup> U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), "Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement," p. 93.

<sup>52</sup> Steven Dolley, “EURATOM’S NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION RECORD,” NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE, February 9, 1996.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

enrichment to Iran despite its support of international terrorism and indications of a secret bomb program.<sup>54</sup>

Unlike EURATOM member states' statements of support for the NPT and non-proliferation, the EURATOM allies applied a double standard with a record of dangerous nuclear exports and commerce in weapons-usable fissile materials. Indeed, these ambivalent policies indicate that the Executive Branch's broad claim that EURATOM shares U.S. non-proliferation goals seems a tenuous argument. As Paul Leventhal, the President of Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), testified at the hearing on the U.S.-EURATOM agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation by the Governmental Affairs Committee, neither does the agreement meet all the requirements of U.S. law, in particular the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, nor does the agreement in its present form serve U.S. national security interests.<sup>55</sup>

#### **d. An attempt to build an Asian nuclear collective system: ASIATOM**

Currently, East Asia is the only region in the world where steady expansion of nuclear power is expected. In light of increasing demands for nuclear power, many scholars and policymakers have been calling for a regional nuclear cooperation scheme for the Asia-Pacific region, referring to the EURATOM as a

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. U.S.-EURATOM AGREEMENT FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION. Hearing, 104th Cong. 2d sess. February 28, 1996, pp. 44. (S. Hrg. 104-481).

possible model.<sup>56</sup> These suggestions resulted in several regional attempts between Japan, Korea, and other East Asian countries to build an institution, namely ASIATOM. A number of proposals for the regional nuclear programs, perhaps along the lines of EURATOM, appeared in the late 90's.

In fact, the earliest proposal came from Japan at a Kyoto seminar sponsored by Japan's Science and Technology Agency.<sup>57</sup> Atsuyuki Suzuki, a professor of nuclear engineering at the University of Tokyo, presented the proposal calling for an "Asian equivalent of EURATOM"<sup>58</sup> for the sake of more transparent regional plutonium programs. Tae Yoon-eom, a vice president of the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, mentioned that "there would be savings in time and money if the South Korea could have its spent fuel reprocessed in Japan and MOX fuel returned to the South Korea."<sup>59</sup> Kumao Kaneko, a professor at Tokai University and a former director of the nuclear energy division of Japan's Foreign Ministry, stated that "an ASIATOM could "increase the comfort level of the U.S. to the point"<sup>60</sup> where it

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<sup>56</sup> Tatsujiro Suzuki, The Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), Japan, "Regional Cooperation on Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Northeast Asia: Proposals and Prospects," presented on SNL 14<sup>th</sup> International Security Conference "Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Focus on Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle," April 4-6, 2005, Chantilly, Virginia, [http://www.intlseconf.sandia.gov/suzuki\\_05isc.pdf](http://www.intlseconf.sandia.gov/suzuki_05isc.pdf). (Accessed September 22, 2012).

<sup>57</sup> Satoshi Isaka, "Experts call for Asian nuclear pact," *Nikkei Weekly*, February 20, 1995, p. 4.

<sup>58</sup> Satoshi Isaka, "Reducing Proliferation Risks—Expanding and Internationalization of Verification and Control Regime: IAEA and Others; Managing Proliferation Risks from Civilian and Weapon-grade Plutonium and Enriched Uranium," presented at the 45<sup>th</sup> Pugwash Conference on Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World, Hiroshima, Japan, July 23-29, 1995.

<sup>59</sup> Richard H. Speier and Brian G. Chow, "Asiatom: Proposals, Alternatives and Next Steps," DRU-1367-DOE, RAND, July 1996.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

would allow the South Korea and Taiwan “the same freedom of nuclear activities as Japan enjoys.”<sup>61</sup>

Many other experts and scholars also suggested the agendas for regional collective nuclear regimes. Examples of them abound. Makoto Ishii of Azabu University suggested that the theme of ASIATOM should include: regional safeguard system, regional nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear power safety system and organization for cooperation on research and development.<sup>62</sup> Hiroyoshi Kurihara of the Tokyo Nuclear Material Control Center argued that ASIATOM or PACIATOM should include the US, Canada, and Australia and have functions including: regional cooperation and coordination of peaceful nuclear R&D; regional enrichment and reprocessing, such as a regional fuel cycle center; coordination, information clearing, and enhanced transparency for regional nuclear activities; upgraded nuclear safety, radiological protection, nuclear material control, and physical protection in Asia; a EURATOM-type regional safeguards system to reduce the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards burden; upgraded collective security in Asia; and possibly, involvement with the concept of a nuclear-free zone.<sup>63</sup> Brad Roberts

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<sup>61</sup> Satoshi Isaka, “PACIFICATOM: A New Framework for Nuclear Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region,” undated.

<sup>62</sup> Makoto Ishii, Azabu University, “Regarding ASIATOM,” Japan-U.S. Study Group on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation After the Cold War, Tokyo, September 28, 1995.

<sup>63</sup> Hiroyoshi Kurihara, “Regional Approaches to Increase Nuclear Transparency,” *Disarmament*, vol. 18, no. 2, 1995, pp. 25-40.

proposed an ASIATOM to establish regional arrangements for nuclear safeguards, nuclear safety, nuclear fuel supply, nuclear waste, and plutonium management.<sup>64</sup>

In 1996, there was the first official U.S. public discussion in regard to ASIATOM concept. For instance, Edward T. Fei of the U.S. Department of Energy presented East Asian civilian nuclear issues in Beijing. Although Fei mentioned the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines that encourage multinational ownership of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, he was not certain about the possibility of a EURATOM-like organization in the Asian region.<sup>65</sup> A heated discussion of the ASIATOM concept among American scholars and experts continued in 1996. Clifford Singer of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign suggested that South Asian and American nationals work together for the regional economics of nuclear fuel reprocessing.<sup>66</sup> Kent Clader of Princeton University also called for a multilateral Asian nuclear agency to register, monitor and allocate supplies of plutonium in the region with the inclusion of the North American countries, Australia and key Asian nations.<sup>67</sup> Robert Manning proposed PACATOM concept including China and the two Koreas with the potential membership of Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand in

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<sup>64</sup> Brad Roberts, "The Asia-Pacific and the Global Treaty Regime: The Agenda After NPT Extension," Revised Task Force Report No. 2, April 23, 1995, p. 4, the Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific (CSCAP).

<sup>65</sup> Edward T. Fei, "Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Issues in East Asia," presented at the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue, Beijing, January 1996.

<sup>66</sup> Clifford Singer, "Seeking Common Ground with South Asia Concerning Fissile Materials," discussion at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., February 14, 1996.

<sup>67</sup> Kent Calder, Director of the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, "Asia's Empty Tank," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996, p. 55-69.

the future to deal with broader political cooperation such as Korean security issues.<sup>68</sup>

Despite the deep interest in Asian regional nuclear cooperation, many proposals avoided directly dealing with the extremely sensitive issue of reprocessing the spent fuel. Rather, they suggested the proposals with a reactor focus or a nonproliferation focus.<sup>69</sup> However, the issue of allowing reprocessing in the region remained a political hot potato.<sup>70</sup> Particularly, Korean representatives argued that granting the same freedom of nuclear activities to the regional actors such as South Korea and Taiwan would save the time and money if the spent fuel management system were introduced as a regional base.<sup>71</sup> However, these suggestions can be also interpreted that South Korea and Taiwan would then be able to undertake plutonium activities taking place in Japan. Not to mention the possibility of nuclear weapon and arms race in the region, this action will absolutely result in serious dilemma and conflicts in the region with other opponent parties, namely, North Korea and China.

Of course, this regional collective action could enhance confidence building with the mutual understanding of nuclear policy and nuclear material safeguards system within the region by managing surplus materials and reducing increased burdens of the IAEA acting as mutual inspection scheme. It can also bring about

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<sup>68</sup> Robert A. Manning, "PACATOM: A Nuclear Cooperation Regime as Asian CSBM," presented at the Preparatory Meeting of the USCSCAP Task Force on Confidence and Security Building Measures, Washington, D.C., March 22, 1996.

<sup>69</sup> Richard H. Speier and Brian G. Chow, "Asiatom: Proposals, Alternatives and Next Steps," DRU-1367-DOE, RAND, July 1996.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

coordinated research and development efforts to solve emerging energy and environmental issues. However, economic and technical needs alone do not justify the establishment of ASIATOM because establishing such a scheme simply requires American acceptance.<sup>72</sup> No wonder the idea of a regional nuclear program with the possibility of reprocessing in the South Korea or Taiwan was rejected by a U.S. official.<sup>73</sup>

Indeed, it was a completely opposite approach in Asia considering the fact that the United States encouraged the formation of EURATOM in the 1950's in the European region. At that time, the U.S. considered EURATOM as a model in the world as a way of establishing responsible use and control in nuclear power. At the same time, it was a way of imposing restraint on individual nations, most prominently Germany, through the establishment of EURATOM. Unlike the case of the European model, the US did not like the idea of ASIATOM in the Asia-Pacific region. Instead of setting a multilateral regional regime, they negotiated agreements with Japan bilaterally and permitted U.S. consent to reprocess U.S.-origin spent fuel only in Japan.<sup>74</sup> One may question that the situation between 1950's and 1990's is completely different with the non-proliferation agreements such as NNPA. However, as discussed above, the U.S. permitted even more rights than 1950's to its European allies during the negotiation of the new U.S.-EURATOM agreement.

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<sup>72</sup> May, Michael; Johnson, Celeste; Fei, Edward; & Suzuki, Tatsujiro, "Energy and Security in Northeast Asia," UC Berkeley: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, August, 1996, pp. 29-41.

<sup>73</sup> Richard H. Speier and Brian G. Chow, "Asiatom: Proposals, Alternatives and Next Steps," DRU-1367-DOE, RAND, July 1996.

<sup>74</sup> Sharon Squassoni, "LOOKING BACK: The 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act," *Arms Control Today*, December 2008.

The U.S. has granted programmatic advance consent to plutonium use to only three states: Japan, EURATOM and Switzerland.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, Japan is the only state in Asia that enjoyed the same freedom of nuclear activities including reprocessing of spent fuel as EURATOM, which has been driving other states in the region such as South Korea to develop their own reprocessing capacities. No doubt the United States knew that the EURATOM-type regional organization in Asia could be very dangerous for the sake of nonproliferation and regional security, to name a few.

In the end, the United States did not go against the Carter Administration policy of discouraging reprocessing outside the U.S.; as a result, the U.S did not support or join an ASIATOM that involved reprocessing. The U.S. believed that spent-fuel processing capabilities in the region would have serious negative impact on nuclear nonproliferation, leading to further tension with extending U.S. advance consent to all members of ASIATOM.<sup>76</sup> For instance, South Korea and Taiwan might want to gain the access to reprocessing the spent fuel that can be used in nuclear weapons, if they chose so. In this case, North Korea and China are likely to respond it militarily to a nuclear-capable South Korea and Taiwan respectively. Regardless of the big agendas for regional nuclear safety, security and safeguards, such action could result in proliferation, tension, and even war.<sup>77</sup> Also, chances are

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<sup>75</sup> Tsukasa Yamamura, "Obama Administration's new approach to enrichment and reprocessing on the negotiation of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements," JAEA Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy Letter No.0001 2012-07/05.

<sup>76</sup> Richard H. Speier and Brian G. Chow, "Asiatom: Proposals, Alternatives and Next Steps," DRU-1367-DOE, RAND, July 1996.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.



that the regional spent fuel management scheme could reduce their influence over decisions on reprocessing by the recipient countries since it might weaken the firmly established bilateral relations in the past with the possibility of reprocessing use for deliberate national-level nuclear weapons production and/or the theft of separated fissile material.

#### **e. Hypothetic reasoning about the U.S. foreign policy in Europe and Asia**

George Kennan, in his interview with Richard Ullman, affirmed the relationship between the US and EU by saying, “Europe, naturally, is another matter.”<sup>78</sup> From American perspectives, the logic in choosing multilateralism over bilateralism in Europe was a matter of course based on their perceptions and collective identity as well as shared interests that they has been built over hundred years one another.

In the case of the new U.S.-EURATOM agreement concluded in 1995 after the NNPA, both the U.S. and the European Union realized that renewal of the U.S.-EURATOM agreement was critical for the Atlantic Alliance and for relations between them. The U.S.-EURATOM agreement has played an important role as a pillar of cooperation between the U.S. and its European allies based on trust and respect in one of many areas of mutual interest. Therefore, both parties were aware

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<sup>78</sup> Richard Ullman, "The US and the World: an interview with George Kennan.(political analyst)(Interview)". The New York Review of Books. 46.13 1999-08-12. 4(2). pp. 4-6.

that the costs of not concluding an agreement would be detrimental and mutual political, nonproliferation, and commercial interests would be at risk.<sup>79</sup>

Moreover, according to the consensus report of the CSIS U.S.-EURATOM Senior Policy Panel, there existed a 35-year history of good behavior and cooperation between the U.S. and the EURATOM members. The old U.S.-EURATOM agreement has been implemented with “successful and beneficial peaceful nuclear cooperation”<sup>80</sup> and future cooperation should be based upon recognition of this collective identity with shared interests. Indeed, the United States regards European states as its closest historical allies and no other countries have the same level of trust and cooperation in history with the United States as the Europe Union.

On the other hand, Asia has been still “foreign”<sup>81</sup> to the U.S., as Hemmer and Katzenstein discussed, with dynamic political structure and different threats. As a result, proposals for an East Asian version of EURATOM ended in failure and quickly took the shape of bilateral military agreements with the hub-and-spoke security order. Especially, when the proposals for regional collective actions contained the delicate issues such as reprocessing and a possibility of creating nuclear weapons, each party should entirely trust each other and share the certain

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<sup>79</sup> CSIS U.S.-Euratom Senior Policy Panel, “Negotiating a U.S.-Euratom successor agreement: finding common ground in nuclear cooperation : a consensus report of the CSIS U.S.-Euratom Senior Policy Panel,” Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 1994.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the origins of Multilateralism,” *International Organization*, Volume 56, Number 3, Summer 2002, pp. 575 (Article), The MIT Press.

level of collective identity with shared interests. After all, the United States was not ready to grant policy autonomy in exchange for institutional cooperation in Asia where they did not find substantial level of collect identity enough to seek multilateral measures. In this case, the bilateral option would be the most viable, attractive system to build political bargains and regional order without sacrificing the costs of lost policy autonomy.<sup>82</sup>

### **3. Policy Recommendation**

Jean Monnet, the postwar architect of European unity, once wrote: “Nothing is possible without men, but nothing is lasting without institutions.” When humankind fails, the best institutions save it from the brink.<sup>83</sup> This is the beauty of institutions, which is desperately needed in Asia where a new strategy paradigm is taking place in the development of regional groupings.

Bilateralism in Asia is no longer a practical route in an era of globalization since the threat has been significantly changed over the past decade after the Cold War. Today, the supposed threat has moved from Japan and a unified Europe to China, India, and rogue regimes. In light of globalization, threats include: on the one hand, the rise of heavily populated states with growing economies, like China

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<sup>82</sup> G. John Ikenberry, “American hegemony and East Asian order,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 353-367, September 2004, Carfax Publishing.

<sup>83</sup> Roger Cohen, “The Beauty of Institutions,” *The New York Times*, published October 24, 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/opinion/25iht-edcohen25.html> (Accessed 6 June, 2012).

and India, and on the other, the increasing importance of religion, terrorists, loose nuclear weapons, global warming, etc. In addition, the situation in Asia itself highly differs compared to 1960s and 90s when multilateral attempts ended in failure. There are many variables to take into consideration in Asia today including the rise of China, the demise of Japan's economic heyday, and a free trade agreement with Korea, to name a few.

There are ample examples why the U.S. should take multilateralism in Asia. The global economy doubled since 1990, thanks to four Asian tigers and rising power, China; trade between the US and Asia increased tremendously and China is the largest holder of US debt. Also, as Obama administration illustrated, the pivot moved to Asia-Pacific region and interdependency in the Asia-Pacific region is getting larger than any other regions in the world. The United States still remains by far the most powerful country; however, in the era of global economic growth, there are many other nations with great assertiveness. Currently, the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from American dominance in every other dimension, such as, industrial, financial, educational, social, and cultural. In other words, as other countries become more active, America's enormous space for action will inevitably diminish. With the rise of China, India and other emerging markets, and with economic growth sweeping much of the planet, the world is becoming increasingly decentralized and interconnected. Put simply, as the rest of the world rises, in terms of economic growth, America will experience relative decline because as others

grow faster, its share of the pie will be smaller.<sup>84</sup> In these circumstances, the U.S. simply cannot deal with all the threats and changes by itself or bilaterally; thus, it is fair to say that the US must take the route of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States must embrace its role as one superpower for consultation, cooperation, and even compromise. According to Fukuyama, the future depends not on our military power, or even the economics; however, it depends on global value, international market system, and globalization based on collaboration.<sup>85</sup> Rather than taking the short-term national interest, the U.S. must take a more humble path for common good and goals for the long run. By this, the U.S. should build bridges and alliances between itself and other rising powers instead of trying to keep itself balanced against them. The collective nuclear safety and security apparatus in Asia-Pacific region will be a big step toward a “less U.S.-centric world order.” If all of the proposals that had to do with reprocessing are not feasible in Asia, then alternative models should be reconsidered.

In light of increasing demands of nuclear energy in the region and the possible conflicts with security issues, the paradigm shift and new regional initiatives on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards should be established in Asia. A nonproliferation-oriented institution will require difficult, creative, and successful diplomacy along with sincere cooperation among the nations, especially with the

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<sup>84</sup> Fareed Zakaria, “The Post-American World,” W.W. Norton & Co., New York: 2008.

<sup>85</sup> Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History and the Last Man,” Free Press, New York: 2006

US in the region. In particular, energy security with proliferation-resistant technologies is the interest of all the countries in the region. They are highly important for the sake of a safer world; albeit, extremely difficult to achieve. After all, the benefits outweigh the drawbacks in the long run.

#### **a. Fukushima Nuclear Accident Factor**

On 11 March 2011, a 15-meter tsunami disabled the power supply and cooling of three Fukushima Daiichi reactors following a major earthquake, causing many casualties and serious economic loss. Fukushima nuclear accident clearly showed the incompetence to deal with nuclear safety and security in the region, and consequently changed the perception and awakened to the realization of Regional Atomic Energy Agency in East Asia. As a post-Fukushima concern to prevent other natural disasters and/or Fukushima-like terrorist attacks, the issue on the nexus between nuclear safety and security came to the fore in the world and the necessity of institution building in regards to nuclear safety and security in East Asia resurged.

In addition, during 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, the leaders and high-level representatives around the world came up with a joint declaration, the "Seoul Communique," to build a safer world and defeat threats. What attracted attention among many other important factors in the Communique is the acknowledgement of overlap between safety and security. Indeed, the interplay

between safety and security can bring about safety and security synergies, such as the regulatory infrastructure; engineering provisions in the design and construction of nuclear installations and other facilities; controls on access to nuclear installations and other facilities; the categorization of radioactive sources; source design; the security of the management of radioactive sources and radioactive material; the recovery of orphan sources; emergency response plans; and radioactive waste management.<sup>86</sup>

Not only is the significance and interplay of safety and security mentioned, but also the statement called for urgency of nuclear safeguards to minimize the use of weapons-usable nuclear materials including plutonium and highly enriched uranium for the sake of non-proliferation in the region. In fact, the technical objective of International Nuclear Safeguards is “the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection.”<sup>87</sup> Indeed, these actions require strong national measures and international cooperation; thus, countries in Asia should implement safety and security synergistically along with safeguards measures.

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<sup>86</sup> IAEA Safety Glossary concepts and terms, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), <http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/concepts-terms.asp?s=11>, (Accessed 01 November, 2012).

<sup>87</sup> IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001 Ed., International verification Series, No. 3, Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2002, [http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3\\_prn.pdf](http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf). (Accessed 01 October, 2012).

Ever since Fukushima nuclear accident, there has been an urgent necessity of regional cooperation or at least an arena for disclosure of information for enhancing regional nuclear safety and preventing Fukushima-like nuclear disaster and proliferation attempt in the future. Moreover, collective protection system for nuclear facilities is inevitable in the region, adding to national protection system in each country.

#### **b. The 3S Nexus through Regional Atomic Energy Agency: Safety, Security and Safeguards**

The previous proposals focused mainly on safety and safeguards separately. Although there is awareness that all of the 3S, safety, security, and safeguards, are equally critical at both domestic and international level, international society has been only focusing on domestic level of safety and safeguards respectively and neglecting the international or regional effort to establish an institution dealing with safety, security and safeguards together. Therefore, the 3S system should be implemented through the regional institution building; in this case, Regional Atomic Energy Agency in East Asia. Korea, Japan, and particularly China are much more interested in joining the institution than they were in the late 90's since it will reduce concerns on nuclear safety, security and proliferation.



The need of Regional Atomic Energy Agency in East Asia was resurged by Fukushima nuclear disaster. This institution can function in a various ways, including regional cooperation and coordination of peaceful nuclear R&D; coordination, information clearing, and enhanced transparency for regional nuclear activities; upgraded nuclear safety, radiological protection, nuclear material control, and physical protection in Asia. It is highly suggested that a EURATOM-type regional safeguards system be introduced in order to reduce the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards burden and develop an upgraded collective security system in Asia. Also, in the light of Fukushima nuclear accident, it is imperative to set up post-Fukushima international standards for design-basis accidents and design-basis threats within the region to protect from both natural disasters and possible terrorist attacks. This action will strengthen Regional Atomic Energy Agency's role to further assist national regulators, encourage states to accept International Physical Protection Advisory Service and the International State System of Accountancy and Control Advisory Service missions.<sup>88</sup>

Furthermore, providing the safe operation of LWRs with regional LWR marketing and safety assistance, Regional Atomic Energy Agency can not only reduce the concerns on reprocessing the spent fuel in the region but also breed up Asian countries' nuclear expertise and ultimately lead to commercial success. In addition, in terms of nonproliferation aspect, it is more plausible since it does not

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<sup>88</sup> Duyeon Kim and Jungmin Kang, "Where nuclear safety and security meet," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 68(1) 86-93, 2012.

produce any weapon-usable materials in the process.<sup>89</sup> These policies should be implemented under the framework on a regional level, reducing the probability of tensions among the states in Asia.

For the nonproliferation perspectives, the Regional Atomic Energy Agency should be the arena to deal with how to limit or abandon reprocessing and its by-product. Stockpiles of plutonium in China and Japan can increase the threat of nuclear proliferation; as a matter of fact, both China and Japan fear one another for increasing possibility of nuclear-weapon potential. This issue is not just limited to China and Japan, but the growing nuclear forces in either China or Japan can also stimulate Korea and Taiwan to have nuclear ambition for the sake of their national security and balance of power in the region. Thus, through the Regional Atomic Energy Agency, security measures such as regional nuclear dialogue to discourage plutonium programs should be carefully implemented. Such measures cannot be successful without transparency among the nations. In that, Regional Atomic Energy Agency can engage with the member states with careful preparation and feasible initiatives. After all, for the peaceful use of nuclear energy via Regional Atomic Energy Agency, a contribution to regional collective nuclear measures throughout the cooperative joint efforts is required in the region.

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<sup>89</sup> Richard H. Speier and Brian G. Chow, "Asiatom: Proposals, Alternatives and Next Steps," DRU-1367-DOE, RAND, July 1996

## **IV. Conclusion**

The different approaches by the US policymakers in terms of regional formation and groupings disclose a great deal about how the US as a superpower or hegemony plays a world politics game in the world. In this article, the patterns of regional groupings by the US were analyzed to show how collective identity plays a vital role in terms of decision-making process based on regional groupings. In other words, the logic in choosing bilateralism or multilateralism in each region was closely related to the collective identity and shared interests.

Some argue for American hegemonic power and US-Asian power gap as the answer to the formation of different US foreign policies in Europe and Asia respectively. Others adhere to the view that perceptions of collective identity are important on regional institutionalization. Different arguments still exist, focusing on normative explanation that local actors played a crucial role in affecting US policies in Asia rather than power gap or collective identity. Indeed, all of the explanations have contributed quite a portion of US foreign policies relevant to regional groupings. However, the most plausible and convincing explanation comes from the weakness of identification with Asia and the belief that the Asian countries belonged to a different and inferior political community. Especially, this argument makes perfect sense to explain why there is no EURATOM in Asia. Indeed, it was perceived affinities originating from common democratic society with same value and culture that made the establishment of EURATOM possible and successful

since it absolutely requires an enormous amount of trust one another based on common goals. In this sense, “we-feeling,” and “mutual responsiveness” were essential segments of forming North Atlantic security community.<sup>90</sup>

Whether the power shift with the rise of China and other economic interdependencies with Asian allies will change the sense of a European-focused American identity or whether the interaction in the Asia-Pacific region for the last decades will have a positive impact on changing collective identity remains to be seen since the situations are tremendously different from 60s and 90s. An area requires further research, but one thing became very clear: by having significant impact on policymakers’ decision, collective identity with shared interests will change the landscape of U.S. foreign relations in the future.

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<sup>90</sup> Karl W. Deutsch et al, “Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience,” Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957.

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국문초록

## 아시아에는 왜 유라툼이 없는가?

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동아시아에는 전기생산을 위한 높은 핵에너지의 의존도와 많은 양의 핵무기가 지역 내에 있음에도 불구하고, 핵 안전과 안보를 관장하는 지역적 핵에너지 기관의 부족은 끊임없는 갈등과 안보 불안정을 야기시켜왔다. 이러한 시점에서 아시아에는 왜 유라툼과 같은 지역 핵 기구가 없을까 하는 의문을 제기할 수 있다.

이 논문은 특히 핵 문제와 관련하여 집합적 정체성이 지역집단화에 있어 중요한 역할을 한다고 보고 있다. 따라서 본 연구는 절충학적인 입장에서 구성요소적인 측면에서의 인과관계를 다룬 집합적 정체성에 많은 중점을 두고 있다. 즉, 인종, 역사, 정치 및 문화 등의 모든 요소들이 미국의 유럽과 아시아 지역의 외교정책에 중대한 영향을 끼쳤을 것이라 보고 있다. 또한, 미국과 유럽, 미국과 아시아 상호 정체성의 차이점을 지역주의와 미국의 의사결정자와의 이해관계 속에서 분석하고 있다.

미국의 관점에서 보면 유럽지역에서 다자주의를 선택하는 것은 미국과 유럽 상호간의 인식과 집합적 정체성의 입장에서 보면 당연한 것이다. 반면, 미국에 있어 아시아는 다양한 정치적 구조와 다른 위협을

가진 이질적인 대상이다. 그 결과로 유라툼과 같은 동아시아 핵기구의 제안은 실패로 돌아갔으며 다자주의 대신 허브 앤 스포크 질서의 쌍무주의 체제로 나아가게 되었다. 특히, 핵 재처리와 핵 무기 생산의 가능성 같은 민감한 안건을 두고 보았을 때, 각각의 대상은 서로를 향한 완벽한 신뢰와 어느 정도 이상의 상호이익을 위한 집합적 정체성을 가지고 있어야 한다.

이러한 측면에서 볼 때, 본 논문에서 제기한 1990 년도 후반의 미국-유라툼간의 재계약과정에서 나타난 미국의 태도와 같은 시기 아시아 지역에서 유라툼과 같은 지역 핵 기구 설립의 제안을 대하는 미국의 태도는 미국이 유럽과 아시아 각 지역간에 다른 접근법을 가지고 외교 정책을 펼쳤음을 명백하고 보여주고 있다.

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**주요어** : 다자주의, 지역주의, 집합적 정체성, 유라툼, 아시아툼, 지역집단화, 핵정책, 재처리, 미국

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