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국제학석사학위논문

China's Foreign Policies toward
Developing Countries:
A Comparative Analysis on the Cases of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America

중국의 개발도상국 외교:
아시아, 아프리카, 라틴아메리카 비교분석

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**China's Foreign Policies toward
Developing Countries:**

**A Comparative Analysis on the Cases of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America**

A thesis presented

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
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
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Abstract

China's Foreign Policies toward Developing Countries:

**A Comparative Analysis on the Cases of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America**

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With its elevating global status, China sees developing countries instrumental in facilitating its rise and is involved in very active diplomacies with them. However, it does not seem that China builds a single diplomacy toward developing countries that is universally applicable. The fact that values of each region in Beijing's strategic thinking all vary provides an implication that China's foreign policies toward developing countries must be different by region. This leaves several important questions to be answered: how and to what extent China's post-Cold War developing country diplomacies vary by region? Also, despite different characteristics of developing regions, is there a coherent set of elements in foreign policies that penetrate developing regions?

Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to look into the form and the degree to which China extends its power and influence on each developing region, and provide legitimate answers to above questions based on well-grounded observation on Chinese foreign policies toward developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America depending on political, security, economic interests Beijing finds in respective region.

Based on above analysis, this study will see which form of Third World(i.e. developing country) diplomacies of the 3 post-Second-World-War major powers, the United States(ideology-driven diplomacy), Soviet Union(ideology-driven diplomacy), and Japan(ODA diplomacy), China's case best fits into.

Aforementioned comparative analysis reveals several interesting findings. First, regional states' perception toward China largely affects on which form between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy China places stronger emphasis. Second, China's relative emphasis on bilateral diplomacy is observed in regions where there is(or are) other established power(s) and that are geographically close to China.

In spite of very differences in regional diplomacy, there are some penetrating elements found in China's developing country diplomacy during the post-Cold War era. First, China's presence in developing world is determined by its 'change in international status.' In addition, the nature of its overtures toward developing countries has gradually changed from 'passively voluntary' to 'actively voluntary' one after gaining confidence after late-1990s. Also, China is very sensitive to 'presence of major power(s) in the regional scene,' and thus often looks for places where it can find more freedom of actions. Last, Chinese developing country diplomacy reveals 'emphasis on principles.'

As to the question of which category Chinese case fits into, Beijing's diplomacy does not fall into any single category of major power developing country diplomacies in a clear-cut manner. In contrast to the 'ideologies' that U.S. and Soviet Union promoted and that often accompanied changing domestic political system, Chinese 'principles' such as Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and New Security Concept leave the existing system intact because they are designed to apply to the *modus operandi* of diplomacy, not domestic political system. Also, though China's access to the developing countries is facilitated by huge economic gifts just like Japanese experience, and both Beijing and Tokyo's intention behind ODA diplomacy

holds similar by and large, China's developing country diplomacy is carried out under a broader framework of grand strategy. Moreover, China, unlike Japan, is on the relatively unfettered position in international political, security, and economic domains and, thus, can mobilize more resources to unfold its strategy.

Consequently, China's developing country diplomacy in the post-Cold War era cannot be treated as any of developing country diplomacies by the 3 major powers of the United States, Soviet Union, and Japan. Rather, I argue that it has to be categorized as a distinct form of foreign policies due to (1) the differences in nature and intention of strategy between China and other major countries and (2) consideration of state capacity, both of which originate from Beijing's own assessment over its international status.

Keywords: China's developing country diplomacy, grand strategy, regional diplomacy, principle-centered diplomacy, ODA diplomacy, international status

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1. Introduction

Research Background: Why China's Foreign Policies toward Developing Countries?

China's rise has turned out to be a hard fact; its presence in the international theater is stronger than ever since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Since the 'Reform and Opening Up' initiated by Deng Xiaoping, China has undergone basic transformation of turning itself into truly a superpower that is equipped with due capacity in all dimension of state power. This is attributable, at the initial stage of reform era, partly to China's intensive efforts to nurture close relations with major Western countries that provided China with needed capital and advanced business skills. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, such posture has faced a major adjustment, keeping eyes on those other than the advanced countries. Chinese foreign Policy has faced two major adjustments since the end of the Cold War. First adjustment occurred during the dissolution process of bipolar international system, China experiencing Tiananmen Square Incident and Collapse of the Soviet Union. Second, during the late-1990s the Chinese leadership made another major adjustment on the foreign policy strategy which last to these days.¹

The new assessment on the international environment and adjustment on China's foreign policy framework can be attributed to two major (but highly correlated) events in the domestic and international context: Tiananmen Square Incident and the fall of the Communist bloc.² In case of former, shocked by the brutal suppression of the

¹ 조영남, 『21세기 중국이 가는 길』 (과주: 나남, 2009), pp. 231.

² 조영남, 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』 (과주: 나남, 2006), pp. 229.

protesters at Tiananmen on June 4, 1989, the Western countries led by the United States had imposed sanctions to isolate and thus teach China a 'lesson'. Such sanctions were harsh blows to China that was depending on advanced countries for export market, capital and business strategies for its development.

The collapse of the Eastern European countries in late 1980s and the Soviet Union in 1991 was other major event that triggered recalculation on Beijing over its foreign policy framework. This resulted in China as the sole surviving Communist country with political isolation. With two internal and external events mentioned above, China faced challenges from the winner of the Cold War, the United States. Therefore, China had to break out of the containment imposed on it by recalibrating its foreign policy strategy. In this process, though the peace and development remained the major themes of the era in the basic policy framework, a new thought on international system, globalization, and multipolarity came into Beijing' strategic calculus.³ In this whole new environment, China worked toward two broad strategic goals. These objectives, according to Avery Goldstein, included maintaining international environment favorable to its economic development and increase in relative capabilities, and reducing possibilities of attempts by the U.S. to 'abort its ascent'.⁴ Beijing since then added warding off the U.S. containment on China and expanding international influence on its foreign policy agenda, and developed multi-layered and omni-directional diplomacy⁵, moving away from narrow major power diplomacy of the past.

The scope of the omni-directional diplomacy covers major countries, peripheral countries and multilateral institutions, and the Third World.⁶ The peripheral

³ 조영남(2009), pp. 230-231.

⁴ Avery Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice", *The China Quarterly* 168 (December 2001), pp. 836

⁵ 조영남(2009), pp. 231.

⁶ 조영남, 『용과 춤을 추자: 한국의 눈으로 중국 읽기』 (서울: 민음사, 2012), pp. 91.

countries are very much related to enhancing 'image' that was marred after Tiananmen and Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996. Military stand-off together with memory of the Tiananmen and Chinese growing power in economic and military dimension have all contributed to expansion of 'China Threat Theory' throughout Asia and beyond.⁷ Thus Beijing had to cut down such spread of negative image of itself by expanding scope of diplomacy toward periphery⁸ and multilateral forum.

Via both peripheral and multilateral diplomacies China sought "to foster friendly and cooperative relations with the Third World countries."⁹ Though during the 1990s the developing countries confronted varying degrees of problems and challenges, China continued its overtures toward these countries and kept calling on them to object to hegemony and power politics, and developed them as staunch allies against the Western countries on the issues over human rights and Taiwan by protecting their sovereignty.¹⁰ However, it should be noted that such close relations with the Third World countries were fostered with the far-sighted insight, with intention to influence and mobilize them as political and economic allies, when need arises, to facilitate Chinese goals. Chinese diplomacy toward developing countries, therefore, can be understood in such context.

In the late 1990s, Chinese foreign policy, once again, faced major adjustment based on consideration over attaining an international status to a new level.¹¹ This confidence is attributed to two major events. First, China successfully endured the Asian

⁷ Rosemary Foot, "China's policies toward the Asia-Pacific region: Changing perceptions of self and changing others' perceptions of China?", in Hsin-Huang Machael Hsiao and Cheng-yi Lin (eds.), *Rise of China: Beijing's strategies and implications for the Asia-Pacific* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 136. For more discussions surrounding "China Threat theory", refer to David Scott, *China Stands Up: The PRC and the international system*, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007), pp.116-123.

⁸ 조영남 (2006), pp. 277.

⁹ 홍정표·장즈룽, 『현대중국외교론』 (과주: 나남, 2011), pp. 380.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ 조영남(2009), pp. 231

Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997-1998 through which China, that did not undervalue its Renminbi, surfaced as a responsible power.¹² Second, China continued to show healthy development records throughout the difficult times as AFC, and began its comprehensive engagement with the global society via accession to World Trade Organization in 2001. At the same time, perception on multipolarization and globalization has gone through majors shifts. According to 조영남, previous Chinese multipolization strategy focused on reducing the relative power of the United States or on changing distribution of power through balance of power with other major countries, but this focus shifted toward building a new operational method for international order. He notes that New Security Concept and New Order of International Political Economy can buy support of the international society and, therefore, help China achieve this end. Also, going through the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 and meeting tough attitude of the United States in the negotiation process of ascendance to WTO, China learned that globalization was something more than economic phenomenon that affects major power politics. China learned that it can exploit globalization to its advantage as a tool to restrain American hegemony by concentrating the interests of other states.¹³ Therefore, Beijing had to be more active participant in the wave of globalization to facilitate its rise. Thus, the newly-acquired confidence combined with reinterpretation of the global current resulted in "more initiatives involving bilateral ties and multilateral arrangements,"¹⁴ and led to more broad-based diplomacy. For instance, China sought to upgrade bilateral relations with strategically important countries by signing various partnership agreements, adding the fourth element of omni-directional diplomacy along

¹² Foot(2009), pp. 136-137.

¹³ 조영남(2006), pp. 225-227.

¹⁴ Robert Sutter, "China's Regional Strategy and Why It may Not Be Good for America", in David Shambaugh (ed.), *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 299.

with peripheral, multilateral, Third World diplomacies. This is one of the most pivotal characteristics shown in the Chinese diplomacy in the 1990s¹⁵, and, though initially targeted major powers, the partnerships extended to many countries in the world that share interests to a significant extent, including developing countries.

Research Question and Scope

As pointed out above, in the process of its rise in international status, Beijing has found the developing countries instrumental in unfolding its grand strategy to put itself back into its due place in the World. Therefore, China began to move actively toward stretching its arms toward countries all around the world regardless of distance, regime type, and the importance a country carries in the scene of international politics. Nevertheless, it does not seem that Beijing builds a single regional diplomatic strategy and implements it across the regions. Due to the fact that each region is endowed with its own particular political, security, and economic characteristics, and China's position toward each region has to be calibrated following these conditions. For instance, significance China attaches to geographically adjacent regions such Central Asia and Southeast Asia and the implications these regions carry cannot be the same with those of geographically distant Africa and Latin America. Also, China's manner toward the region that is under the influence of a major power(s) such as the United States and/or Russia are not likely to be equal to Beijing's posture toward a region that relatively lacks similar influence or attention. Furthermore, the strategic thinking built around a region that has experienced relative economic development must be different from one built around a region that is economically deserted, but is endowed with huge natural

¹⁵ Ibid.

resources.

These very different features of each area provide implication that China's developing country diplomacy toward each region must be different. However, following questions still remain: how and to what extent are these policies similar and different? What are the determinants of China's developing country diplomacy in respective region? Simply put, how do China's developing country diplomacies vary by region? Is there an established, coherent set of elements in Chinese foreign policies penetrating developing world? Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to look into the form and the degree to which China extends its power and influence on each developing region, and provide legitimate answers to above questions based on well-grounded observation on Chinese foreign policies toward developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America depending on political, economic, and security interests Beijing finds in respective region.

In pursuing answers to the above research question, this author has established scope of research not only to facilitate the process of analysis itself, but also to help readers avoid possible confusion that may arise from lack of proper boundary on which this article is written. First, the main purpose of this research is to delve into Chinese foreign policy toward developing countries. Generally, foreign policy of a country reflects *political, economic* and *security* interests. Therefore, this study will shed light on issues in these three dimensions and how they together produce China's foreign policy toward group of developing countries in respective region. This will lead the study to focus on *regional approach*, but that does not mean the study considers the region as a monolithic bloc. Of course not all countries can be the subject of discussion in this approach, but those carrying aspects worthy of mention do not go unnoticed.

Second, this study looks into Chinese foreign policy in developing countries *in the post-Cold War period*. That is, the research covers the period from 1989 to 2013

with regard to China's establishment and implementation of developing country diplomacies. The set period is due to the fact that in the context of Cold War coming to an end, China's overall foreign policy objective faced the turning point after Tiananmen Incident in June 1989, thus leading to readjustment of its once-cooled down relations with the developing countries.

Third, developing countries this study aims to analyze cover those countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Asia is confined to Central Asia and Southeast Asia, excluding South Asia and Middle East. This sub-division and exclusion are done for the purpose of making analytical comparisons over China's interactions with Asian countries (that are geographically located close to it) and with those countries in Africa and Latin America (that are far away from its territorial boundary) functionally convenient. Latin America refers to the integrated region encompassing both South America and the Caribbean.

Last and most important, the term, developing country, is determined following a country's level of development as measured by per capita gross national income(GNI).¹⁶ According to the categorization of the World Bank, a developing economy is one that has GNI per capita lower than 12,615 USD.¹⁷ Though a number of countries are no longer categorized as a developing country, those that were originally on a developing country status but later turned into high-income countries during the period this research focused¹⁸ are also included in the analysis and considered

¹⁶ "Statistical Annex", *United Nations*, 2012, pp. 132, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2012country_class.pdf (accessed: April 12, 2014).

¹⁷ "New Country Classification", *The World Bank*, <http://data.worldbank.org/news/new-country-classifications> (accessed: April 12, 2014).

¹⁸ Barbados (in 2003, 11,650USD; in 2004, 12,670 USD), Chile (in 2011, 12,270 USD; in 2012, 14,310 USD), Equatorial Guinea (in 2011, 11,670 USD; in 2012, 13,560 USD), Malta (in 2003, 11,300 USD; in 2004, 12,940 USD), Saint Kitts and Nevis (in 2010, 12,250 USD; in 2011, 12,660 USD), Singapore (in 1990, 11,450 USD; in 1991, 12,740 USD), Trinidad and Tobago (in 2005, 11,060 USD; in 2006, 13,220 USD), Uruguay (in 2011, 11,700 USD; in 2012, 13,580

'developing country'. Following this notion, the research is set to cover all the countries in the aforementioned regions except the Bahamas¹⁹ because that country has never been classified as a developing country.

Table 1. Developing Countries covered by Region		
Region	Countries	Total
Central Asia	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan	5
Southeast Asia	Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam	10
Africa	Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, The Central African Republic, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe	51
Latin America	Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela	20

Literature Review

An uncountable number of academic works have studied China's presence in the developing world in the post-Cold War era, unearthed China's ambition and strategic calculus behind its overtures, and analyzed how Beijing interacted and resulted in what

USD). *The World Bank*, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD> (accessed: April 19, 2014).

¹⁹ However, the Bahamas is included in the list of top Chinese leadership's visits to respective region for the purpose of reference.

outcomes. Of the existing volumes of literatures both home and abroad, I could identify the discussions surrounding China's developing country diplomacy could be grouped into two main categories, though these divisions are not perfectly distinct because they overlap with each other to varying degree.

First category of works deals with China's developing country diplomacy from regional perspective. The focus of these discussions is on China's approach to 'a' region. The scholars who gave birth to these works delve into far-ranging factors, whether it be political, economic, security, or cultural, to provide sketch over historical development of bilateral (China and the region as whole, or China and a particular country or two) relations and understand the changing dynamics between China and regional states, caused by former's (re-)engagement with the region. The works of Chien-peng Chung(2004), 박병인(2004), Niklas Swanström (2010), Jing-Dong Yuan(2010), Weiqing Song(2013), Younkyoo Kim and Stephen Blank (2013) on Central Asia, of Wang Gungwu(2006), Carolina G. Hernandez(2009), Jörn Dosch(2010), Ian Storey(2013) on Southeast Asia, of 김애경(2009), George T. Yu(2010), 김동환 and 배수강(2012) on Africa, and of 강석찬(1995), 신중호(2008), Gonzalo Sebastian Paz(2012) on Latin America contribute to understanding of newly created regional dynamics with China's 'entering into' the region, or more involvement in regional issues. Many of these works highlight Chinese approach to developing countries through analysis over China's participation in regional multilateral institutions or bilateral relations in the regional context to draw implications on the power dynamics involving other major powers (U.S., Russia).

Second division of the works focuses exclusively on single issue areas. These issue areas are those that deal with political/security and economic side of Chinese approach to the developing regions. The researches that focus on power dynamics of

China's engagement with the region shed light on dynamics between China and other major powers that hold stakes/interests in the region. David Shambaugh (2013) illustrates China - U.S. interactions in the Middle East, Africa, Europe and Latin America, and Avery Goldstein (2013) notes on U.S. -China relations in Southeast Asia. Younkyoo Kim and Stephen Blank (2013) investigate China-Russia rivalry in Central Asia, and Gonzalo Sebastian Paz on a new phase of power dynamics in Latin America between the U.S .and China. On the security front, 조흥국 (2012) and Michael Yahuda (2013) notes on newly-observed assertiveness of China in South China Sea, and Cynthia Watson (2013), by looking at growing Chinese presence in Latin America in the form of increasing arms sales, personnel exchanges, etc. with caution, assesses that various factors including China's limited military capability will not let China's presence in the region grow to threatening level for the United States. Cai Peng Hong (2005), unlike those who put weight on the traditional security issue among states, examines Chinese cooperation with Southeast Asia in the area of non-traditional security.

Moreover, there are tons of literatures that place emphasis on the economic side of China's rise. Hong Zhao (2007), Wenran Jiang (2009), and 안승준 (2012) examine China's extractive operations on energy and other natural resources in Africa. 김진오(2005) gives positive analysis on intensifying economic cooperation between China and Latin American states, while Rhys Jenkins and Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa (2012) and Ruben Gonzalez-Vincente (2012) employ more of market perspective in analyzing Chinese 'landing' in Latin American mining investment and manufacture industries. All these works come to an agreement that China's engagement with the concerned region is growing denser than ever before, with its relative power and influence also growing, though to what extent each author agrees with such argument can vary across region and issue areas. However, these works do not examine China's

emergence in the developing world in the global context and what that means for changing global power dynamics.

This study is distinct from the works so far reviewed in the sense that it takes more holistic, macroscopic approach to understand China's developing country diplomacy. Unlike the first category of previous literatures, this work will take comprehensive and comparative approach by taking the regions of Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America as the subjects of analysis, not just single region or two. Additionally, the study will encompass all major areas of interest for Beijing, namely political, economic, and security issues, rather than taking a microscopic view covering single issue area or event. Moreover, changing international status of China is also taken into account. These steps, though vast and complex in the process of data collection and comparative analysis, are necessary because the extent to which Beijing reveals its interests and the way it engages with respective region differ depending on issue area and region concerned. Together, these very distinct characteristics of the study will be able to generate grand view of overall China's strategic architecture toward developing worlds by pinpointing the penetrating elements across time, space, and interest, and contribute to understanding of how such strategy evolves with its change in status.

Analytical Framework and Research Methodology

The underlying assumption of this research is that China has grand vision to restore its power on the due status. Put differently, developing country diplomacy is carried out in the context of long-term global strategy. However, it is not surprising that a rising power has such an ambitious vision with political, economic, and military muscles getting bigger: China is not new in pursuing a 'grand vision.' Major powers such

as the United States, Soviet Union, and Japan in the post-World War II era have equipped themselves with their own grand strategy. Some of the elements of the Third World (which I see as equivalent to developing country) diplomacy these three countries employed are present in today's Chinese foreign relations with developing countries. Therefore, it would be a meaningful job to set forth cases of United States, Soviet Union, and Japan's diplomacies in the Third World during both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, and see in which of these cases China fits in or not by comparison and contrast. This would reveal overlapping aspects among these diplomacies, and help derive a certain implication.

		United States	Soviet Union	Japan
Types	Cold War	Ideology-driven Diplomacy	Ideology-driven Diplomacy	ODA Diplomacy
	Post-Cold War		X	
Purposes	Cold War	Contain Communist Bloc (support Democratic governments and enlarge market system around the world)	Compete with U.S.-led Bloc, Secure economic and military benefits	Enhance image, Secure market and resources
	Post-Cold War	Consolidate Hegemony and Secure Resources	X	More prominent role in the international affairs

The developing country diplomacy of the United States was *ideology-driven*. This approach is not affected by the structural differences between the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. First, during the Cold War, the U.S. considered promoting democratic ideal and enlarging market economic system around the world as the best way to guard against expanding Communist bloc led by its powerful rival, Soviet Union.

Therefore, large-scale economic aid and military assistance were provided to the various regimes struggling to survive the Communist wave, as can be seen in the cases of U.S. involvement in South Korea pre-/post-Korean War era, and in Vietnam. Also, the U.S. utilized its 'backyard' Latin America to fight communist infiltration and expanding influence of Soviet Union in the region and beyond.²⁰ Given the fact the U.S. was backing authoritarian regimes throughout the Cold War, such as those of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan regimes, one could easily discern the U.S. emphasis on democratic ideology was no more than a rhetoric. However, ideology was a decent tool through which American involvement was justified in the corners of the World that is vulnerable to Communism.

Second, the post-Cold War era also saw U.S. Third World policy developed around the foundation of democratic ideal. However, the policy since 1990s was designed to stop regional hegemony by other states(in other words, to consolidate U.S. hegemony), and to secure critical raw materials including energy.²¹ Therefore, the U.S. developing country policy per se can be, regardless of the period of concern, designated as an *ideology-driven diplomacy* under which the country pursued specific national interests.

In a similar vein, Soviet Union pursued *ideology-driven diplomacy* on the Third World by promoting Soviet ideology. To prove its ideological superiority of Communism and win the systemic competition with the United States, the Soviet Union called for extensive Third World diplomacy mobilizing its military, economic, and political resources. Though under the surface, much like the United States, Soviet

²⁰ 김성한, "미국의 라틴아메리카정책", 이범준 외, 『개정판 미국외교정책 이론과 실제』 (서울: 박영사, 2009), pp. 542.

²¹ Evaluation the author came up with based on 윤진표, "미국의 동남아정책," 이범준 외 (2009), pp. 491-512; 이종신, "미국의 중동정책," 이범준 외(2009), pp. 513-537; 김성한, "미국의 라틴아메리카 정책," 이범준 외(2009), pp. 539-564; 장병욱 외, 『미국의 대중동·중양아시아 외교정책』 (서울: 한국외국어대학교 출판부, 2009).

pursued more of military and economic benefits such as securing major natural resources by down-ward adjusting its expectation on the Third World since Khrushchev(for much of Soviet era),²²on the surface, it used the ideology as mere tool to buy influence in, though constantly challenged by, the Third World. Therefore, nature of Soviet interests in the Third World shifted from political to economic and military.

Japan's case is somewhat different. It has been a staunch ally of the United States since the post-War era. The country is not directly involved in systemic rivalry, but under the aegis of the U.S. security guarantee, tried to form its own competitive edge in economic dimension by actively engaging in economic diplomacy. Japanese smartly used what is widely known as *ODA diplomacy*, in a tool to pursue economic hegemony²³(later the U.S. policy makers and the public watched warily and uneasily its ally's growing economic might). Based on near 40 years of Japanese ODA diplomacy, one can summarize it as mechanism by which Japan re-established and enhanced its image as a peaceful nation,²⁴secured markets and raw materials in the developing countries during the Cold War.

Nonetheless, the nature of ODA diplomacy since 1990s has been adjusted to one that promotes and facilitates more international role for Japan. This is in part attributable to popular notion among the Japanese people who saw Japanese financial contribution was not given 'due appreciation' as observed in the case of Gulf War, and who placed emphasis on Japan playing more extended international role.²⁵ Therefore, as the ODA policy was used as an instrument to acquire more international role that is due and comparable with its status in the post-Cold War era, the nature of Japanese Third

²² 김의곤 역, 『소련외교정책론 1945-1991』 (인천: 인하대학교출판부, 1995), pp. 261.

²³ 박홍영, 『일본 ODA와 국제정치』 (파주: 한울, 2006), pp. 154.

²⁴ Takamasa Akiyama and Takehiko Nakao, "Japanese ODA: Adapting to the Issues and Challenges of the New Aid Environment," *FASID Discussion Paper on Development Assistance*, No.8, October 2005, pp. 6.

²⁵ Akiyama and Nakao(2005), pp. 7-8.

World diplomacy turned to one that is more political in nature away from economic one. Simply put, in which category China is to find itself will depend on which element(purpose) of its developing country diplomacy China stresses more. The answer to this will be explored below.

In order to capture holistic view of China's developing country diplomacy, this research takes regional comparison on Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Though it would be splendid if all the countries in the region are discussed, physical infeasibility to present analysis over all the 86 countries led me to group the countries by region and take regional approach. However, in the process of analysis, not all the countries were considered as a monolithic bloc. I noted a few players who receive more political, economic, security attention than its peers.

Also, from the thought that China's posture toward each region is expected to vary depending on diverse interests, I identified what China's motivation is in emerging on the regional stage according to each respective issue areas: political, economic, and security. These are the most basic criteria to measure a country's relations with others as well as to gauge its ambitions. Then based on such incentives, I give account for development of bilateral relations between China and the region.

Data Collection

The data collected are existing literatures on China's regional diplomacy, its relations with a (or a group of) developing country(-ies), press releases, government white papers. For statistics, data were retrieved from various sources such as the World Bank, U.N. Commodity Trade(Comtrade) databases, U.N. Statistics Division, BP, and Indexmundi. Also worth noting is, to create healthy balance in view, my research used mixture of literatures of both Western and non-Western scholars and journalists.

Structure of Thesis

This thesis is composed of 3 parts: introduction, body, and conclusion. First, introduction(chapter 1) is sub-divided into research background, research question and scope, analytical framework and research methodology, data collection, and structure of thesis. This chapter provides basic idea of why this research is significant and how the research is conducted. Second, body is sub-divided into two parts. First Part (chapter 2 to 5) identifies and analyzes China's developing country diplomacy in each respective region. This part serves as important pillars of the research by revealing how China implements its developing country diplomacy in each region that shows different characteristics whether it be (geo-)political, security, and/or economic. In second part(chapter 6), these regional diplomacies are analyzed from a comparative angle, and the variables that affect Chinese diplomatic strategy toward developing countries are explored. Most importantly, this second part of body will present answers to the research question and test compatibility of Chinese diplomacy toward developing countries with those of the U.S., Soviet Union, and Japan. Conclusion (chapter 7) will summarize all the discussions set forth and include my assessments of the findings of this research.

2. Central Asia Policy: Expansion of Range of Cooperation

The first region of focus is Central Asia. Since the end of Cold War, China has actively engaged itself into the region, a place where the Russian (former Soviet Union)

authorities held monopoly of power for last two centuries. China's contacts with the region were accelerated by border demarcation issues, and later, its entrance into the regional scene was initiated by the institution-building, as materialized into Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) in 2001. However, as it turned out later on, SCO played only supplementary role, with China's diplomacy mostly in the form of bilateral contacts as Olcott observes.²⁶ Below presents discussion over China's regional interests and approaches, and resulting dynamics between China and related actors, including Russia and to a lesser extent, the United States in Central Asia.

China's Interests in Central Asia

China's motivations in approaching Central Asia can be understood mainly from three dimensions: political, security, and economic. Politically, China's number one goal in this region is to limit the presence of other major powers like the United States and Russia, and extend its influence into the Central Asia.²⁷The fact that the Central Asian governments share political system (authoritarian in nature) and their (negative) view toward interference in the domestic affairs for the sake of national sovereignty is encouraging for China. According to Timur Dadabaev,

"The majority of these countries rejected the Western models of free liberal democracy, opting to retain the pattern of strict state controls over the economy and politics. China offers a model of development in which the

²⁶ Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia: Carving an Independent Identity among Peripheral Powers", in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (eds.), *International Relations of Asia* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), pp.248.

²⁷ Chien-peng Chung, "The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China's Changing Influence in Central Asia," *The China Quarterly*, No.180 (December 2004), pp.1006.

government plays a pro-active role while, at the same time, the economic system allows for a greater degree of freedom and private participation."²⁸

Such anti-Western postures of the Central Asian governments leave much room for China to build shared identity and maneuver those states. Chinese moves since early 2000s have taken active move to garner friendships from these states through bilateral as well as multilateral channels. Frequent high-level visits and various partnership agreements are worth noting. Also, establishing SCO and showing cooperation with the member states ranging from non-traditional security and economic cooperation to social and cultural dimension²⁹ serve as examples of China's fervent efforts to gradually undermine influence of other powers and foster its leadership in the region.

Security-wise, Central Asia means a lot to China for three reasons. First is territory. China had on-going border disputes with the Soviet Union, and with the demise of Soviet Union when those Soviet satellite republics in Central Asia were separated from the Soviet territories, Beijing had to address the border demarcation issue with these newly independent sovereign states. Second is that the stability in the Central Asia and intense cooperation with the regional governments can guard against the separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism,³⁰ and secure its unstable Northwest

²⁸ Timur Dadabaev, "Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Regional Identity Formation from the Perspective of the Central Asia States," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 23, No. 85 (2014), pp.113.

²⁹ Weiqing Song sees what one considers as 'international multilateralism' is not well achieved in the SCO. Song observes that the cooperation in SCO is having a hard time moving beyond dealing with the non-traditional security issues with somewhat skeptical postures of Russian and Central Asian governments toward the SCO. Pointing to the absence of substance under the well-established form, Song notes SCO as a well-established multilateral organization (MO) with weak international multilateralism (IM), under which China puts great efforts to achieve few things substantial under its leadership. Refer to Weiqing Song, "Interests, Power and China's Difficult Game in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO)," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 23, No.85 (2014), pp. 85-101.

³⁰ Weiqing Song, "Interests, Power and China's Difficult Game in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 23, No.85 (2014), pp. 85.

region of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Jing-dong Yuan notes,

"Beijing has found it necessary to seek close cooperation with the Central Asian states in preventing terrorist organizations in these countries from providing support to separatist groups operating in Xinjiang."³¹

With unstable Central Asia and China's lack of cooperation with these republics, Xinjiang region can be negatively impacted by possible spill-over effects, surely at the expense of the China's domestic political stability.

The third is to check on existing major powers in the region. No major power having presence in Central Asia (i.e. the United States, Russia, and China) wants to see the region dominated by a single country. From Chinese point of view, Beijing is very concerned with world's military superpower, the United States,³² near its border. China and all other countries in Central Asia take supporting stances toward U.S. contribution on stabilizing Afghanistan, but at the same time are worried that the continued presence of U.S. can "turn into 'political mentorship,' imposing the U.S. values of democracy and paths of economic and political development-an imposition that these governments appear to resent at the moment,"as can be seen in the cases of "U.S. support of anti-governmental uprising in Kyrgyzstan and severe U.S. criticisms on government actions in Uzbekistan in 2005."³³ Among all, China is the most concerned about the U.S. presence for it interprets such U.S. posture as a prelude to a 'strategic encirclement' of

³¹ Jing-dong Yuan, "China's Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO)," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 19, No. 67(November 2010), pp. 861.

³² The U.S. military is expected to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. For more detail, refer to Spencer Ackerman and Dan Roberts, "Obama orders Pentagon to prepare for full troop withdrawal from Afghanistan," *The Guardian*, February 25, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/25/obama-pentagon-us-troops-withdrawal-afghanistan> (accessed: April 23, 2014).

³³ Ibid.

China.³⁴

Neither China wants Russia to dominate the region, though does not wish to exclude Russia from the region, for huge economic benefits related with natural resources and transportation routes (which will be illustrated later on). China, by targeting the U.S. that was carrying out War on Terror since early 2000s and constantly demanding the foreign bases be removed and rejected out of the region, also sent signals to Russia to think twice before establishing military bases in Central Asia.³⁵ From this, one can learn that Beijing is also vigilant about any potential predominance of a single power in the region. Also, these reveal that China's ambition to limit major powers' access/influence in the region in efforts to establish its own sphere of influence (though not in the immediate future).

Last, and most important, abounding natural resources (often in the form of gas and minerals) have attracted Chinese attention. Central Asia is the region with second largest endowment of petroleum and natural gas, only after Middle East.³⁶ Most notably, petroleum reserves of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are reported to exceed 40 billion barrels (Kazakhstan alone accounting for 39.6 billion barrels), and gas reserves to be over 270 trillion cubic feet (Tcf).³⁷ Targeting Central Asia that is reported to have abundance of oil and gas, China has signed series of deals with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and is expected to acquire billions of cubic-meters of gas annually, even exceeding the amount Russia gets from the Central Asia. Turkmenistan, the biggest gas exporter in the region, already exports more gas to China than to

³⁴ Recited from Younkyoo Kim and Stephen Blank, "Same Bed, Different Dreams: China's 'peaceful rise' and Sino-Russian rivalry in Central Asia," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol.22, No. 83 (2013), pp.780.

³⁵ Dadabaev(2014), pp.113.

³⁶ Seong-Ae Kim, "An analysis of the China's Official Flows volume expansion: Focusing on the increase in cases of Official Flows since the late 1990s," *Master's Thesis* (Seoul: Seoul National University), 2013, pp. 46.

³⁷ Author's own calculation based on data cited by Kim(2013), pp. 47.

Russia.³⁸ This economic interest is so intertwined with Beijing's strategic interest that China is in action to diversify energy supplies. Huge oil consumer itself,³⁹ China sees steady supply of oil and gas as the underpinnings for continuing rapid economic development. However, during the contingency, the oil imports via sea-lanes through the Strait of Malacca can be placed in danger at the will of the U.S. forces stationed in Southeast Asia. Also, purely following economic logic, such oil imports travelling a long distance can add one to two U.S. dollars on to the oil price as premium.⁴⁰ Furthermore, as can be noticed from President Xi Jinping's recent proposal to build 'economic belt along the Silk Road' in Kazakhstan,⁴¹ "the construction of the second Eurasian land bridge via Central Asia and Xinjiang will reduce the overload at Chinese ports on the east coast. Development of the corridor will also increase access by China's underdeveloped western regions to world markets and balance the wealth gaps within China."⁴²In sum, all these objectives serve as motivations for China to enter into the regional theater where major powers are already in the move.

³⁸ Martha Brill Olcott, "China's Unmatched Influence in Central Asia," *The Global Think Tank*, September 18, 2013, [http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/09/18/china-s-unmatched-influence-in-central-asia/gnky?reloadFlag=](http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/09/18/china-s-unmatched-influence-in-central-asia/gnky?reloadFlag=1)

1(accessed: April 22, 2014).

³⁹ China replaces the U.S. as the world's biggest importer of oil in October 2013. For further information about Chinese oil imports, refer to "China overtakes U.S. to become world's biggest oil importer," *CBC News Online*, October 10, 2013, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/china-overtakes-u-s-to-become-world-s-biggest-oil-importer-1.1958511>, (accessed: March 11, 2014).

⁴⁰ Thrassy N. Marketos, *China's Energy Geopolitics: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Central Asia* (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2009), pp. 20.

⁴¹ Wu Jiao and Zhang Yunbi, "Xi proposes a 'new Silk Road' with Central Asia," *China Daily USA*, September 8, 2013, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-09/08/content_16952304.htm (accessed: June 28, 2014).

⁴² Marketos(2009), pp.20

China's Diplomacy toward Central Asia

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asia, which consists of 5 newly created republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, has come into the range of China's national interest because Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and a relatively weakened Russia had issues over the delineating and demarcating border with China. These countries participated in negotiation as a group, in an effort to guard against possibility that economically and nationalistically growing China exploits the dissolved and, thus, weakened former Soviet republics.⁴³ These 5 countries are so-called the 'Shanghai Five,' a group of countries with China's initiative, as can be noticed from the title 'Shanghai.' 'Shanghai Five' from 1996 to 2000 has displayed cooperation in such various issue areas as border demarcation, trust-building along the borderline, collective response to separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism, often considered the forces of regional instability, economic cooperation, drug trafficking and illegal migration. Also they had built up required experiences for establishing a multilateral institution.⁴⁴

In 2001, adding Uzbekistan into the pre-existing "Shanghai Five" arrangement, a regional multilateral institution SCO was born into the dawn of the 21st century with Shanghai Spirit (*Shanghai Jingshen*) as the founding ideology of the organization. Shanghai Spirit is enshrined in the Charter of the SCO and is noted, "the spirit of mutual trust, mutual advantage, equality, mutual consultations, respect for cultural variety and aspirations for joint development that was clearly established at the meeting of heads of

⁴³ Chung(2004), pp. 990.

⁴⁴ 조영남, "21세기 중국의 동맹정책: 변화와 지속," 『 EAI 국가안보패널 (NSP) 보고서』, No. 32, 2009년 12월, pp. 21-22.

six States in 2001 in Shanghai."⁴⁵ Along with the manifesting the Shanghai Spirit, China designed the organization based on the idea of new-regionalism.⁴⁶

As noted earlier, Russia and those Central Asian republics preferred to deal with China as a group because of fear from economically and nationalistically growing China. Therefore, China, by placing itself into the institutional framework where another comparable power Russia could hold itself on check, intended to soften the worries of these countries and especially that of Russia over Chinese penetration into what it has considered as its own traditional sphere of influence.⁴⁷ Therefore, SCO was created under the leadership of China and Russia to collectively respond to security and other issues in the region. This organization was also born out of China and Russia's mutual concern over reinforcement of U.S.-Japan military alliance, though the nature of the SCO is not a de facto alliance aimed at the U.S. alliance system.⁴⁸

SCO's main areas of operation can be divided largely into two categories: promotion of security cooperation in the region and the expansion of socio-economic cooperation. Keeping track of SCO's cooperation, however, one can observe that the areas of activities among the member states are highly skewed to the security-related issues. Security-wise, there have been regular, systematic activities as can be seen in the

⁴⁵ "Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," *Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, May 7, 2009, <http://www.sectsc.org/EN123/show.asp?id=69> (accessed March 11, 2014).

⁴⁶ For more discussion on 'new-regionalism,' refer to Chung (2004), pp.992-993.

⁴⁷ On the concern of Central Asian republics and Russia over China, Richard Weitz notes, "The central Asian governments also like how the SCO includes both China and Russia and is therefore not dominated by a single great power-condition that gives them more room to maneuver...another reason for the SCO's popularity among Central Asian governments is that the organization allows them to multilaterally manage Beijing's growing presence in their region, backstopped by Russia, rather than deal with the China colossus directly on a bilateral basis." Richard Weitz, "Balancer-in-chief: China assumes SCO chair," *China Brief*, Vol.11, Issue 12(July 1, 2011), [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=38132&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=25&cHash=f6be49406eb06e8309f8dc19b89bf407#.U2hOOfl_uI0](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38132&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=f6be49406eb06e8309f8dc19b89bf407#.U2hOOfl_uI0) (accessed: May 6, 2014).

⁴⁸ 조영남(2009), pp. 21-24.

anti-terrorism military exercises. All member states minus Uzbekistan carried out 'Cooperation 2003,' in year 2003,⁴⁹ and since then biannual anti-terrorist military exercises were carried out among the member states of SCO.⁵⁰ However, the economic cooperation was hindered by Central Asian republics' fear of Chinese products flooding into their markets and Russia's tepid attitude toward such form of cooperation due to concern of losing competitive leverage over China.⁵¹ Cultural and educational activities initiated to foster people-to-people exchange are symbolic and one-side for the most part, with China in the lead.⁵²

Most importantly, China is constrained by the presence of Russia in SCO. Though China and Russia have signed to upgrade their relations to a new high strategic partnership of coordination in 1996⁵³, the relationship between the two countries is more nuanced than a mere cooperator. With Russia seeing the Central Asia as its traditional sphere of influence from the Soviet legacy and China seeking to enter into the region for immense economic and security benefits, are more of a potential rival. Therefore, since the inception of SCO, China is structurally constrained on to what extent it can move the organization in the direction it hopes. Besides, the Central Asian countries hope to take advantage of rivalries between the two superpowers to the fullest extent, in between such rivalries between the superpowers. Therefore, this poses as a limit to cooperation

⁴⁹ Yuan(2010), pp. 865.

⁵⁰ Following are SCO's anti-terrorists exercises: 'Exercise 01'(China and Kyrgyzstan, 2002),'Coalition 03' (all member states minus Uzbekistan), 'Peace Mission 2005' (China and Russia), 'Coordination 2006'(China and Tajikistan), 'Peace Mission 2007'(involved all member states), 'Peace Mission 2009'(China and Russia), 'Peace Mission 2010'(all member states minus Uzbekistan), 'Peace Mission 2012'(all member states minus Uzbekistan), 'Peace Mission 2013'(China and Russia); compiled information from articles released by *China Daily*, *Xinhua*, and *China Military Online*.

⁵¹ Song(2014), pp. 95-96.

⁵² Song(2014), pp. 97.

⁵³ "China-Russia strategic partnership of coordination reaches new high," *Xinhua*, October 16, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/16/content_12242314.htm (accessed: March 20, 2014).

these small countries can provide to China within the institutional framework. Therefore, SCO is only supplementary in Chinese strategy to expand its power and influence in Central Asia.⁵⁴ Most of interactions between China and Central Asian republics are done on a 'bilateral basis' outside the SCO framework.⁵⁵

There are two main traits in Chinese bilateral contacts with Central Asian states. First is frequent high-level visit. As can be seen in the Table 3, since Hu Jintao came to office in 2003, there has been no single year the Chinese president did not visit Central Asian region.

Table 3. Top PRC Leaders' Visits in Central Asia			
Year	Leader	Position	Month/Country visited
2003	Hu Jintao	President	June/ Kazakhstan
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	September/ Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan
2004	Hu Jintao	President	June/ Uzbekistan
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	September/ Kyrgyzstan
	Li Zhaoxing	FM	October/ Kazakhstan
2005	Li Zhaoxing	FM	February/ Kazakhstan
	Li Zhaoxing	FM	June/ Kazakhstan
	Hu Jintao	President	July/ Kazakhstan
2006	Zeng Qinghong	VP	January/ Kazakhstan
	Li Zhaoxing	FM	January/ Uzbekistan
	Hu Jintao	President	June/ Kazakhstan
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	September/ Tajikistan
2007	Yang Jiechi	FM	July/ Kyrgyzstan
	Hu Jintao	President	August/ Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	November/ Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan
2008	Yang Jiechi	FM	July/ Tajikistan

⁵⁴ Olcott(2008), pp.248.

⁵⁵ Niklas Swanström, "China and Greater Central Asia: Economic Opportunities and Security Concerns," in Lowell Dittmer and George T. Yu (eds.), *China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2010), pp.122.

	Hu Jintao	President	August/ Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	October/ Kazakhstan
2009	Hu Jintao	President	December/ Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan
2010	Yang Jiechi	FM	May/ Uzbekistan
	Hu Jintao	President	June/ Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	November/ Tajikistan
	Yang Jiechi	FM	December/ Kazakhstan
2011	Yang Jiechi	FM	May/ Kazakhstan
	Hu Jintao	President	June/ Kazakhstan
	Yang Jiechi	FM	August/ Turkmenistan
	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	September/ Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan
2012	Wen Jiabao	Premier	December/ Kyrgyzstan
2013	Wang Yi	FM	June/ Turkmenistan
	Wang Yi	FM	July/ Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan
	Wang Yi	FM	August/ Kazakhstan
	Xi Jinping	President	September/ Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan
	Li Keqiang	Premier	November/ Uzbekistan

Source: China Vitae website.⁵⁶

This is in sharp contrast with other regions to which Hu Jintao paid state visits off-and-on. Also, this forms stark contrast with the U.S. president who has never traveled to the region not to politically award nondemocratic countries.⁵⁷ Moreover, the Table 4 shows that the high-level visit by China to Central Asian countries is noteworthy in frequency.

Country	Number of visits
Tajikistan	5
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan	7
Uzbekistan	10


⁵⁶ Reorganized based on records of top Chinese leadership visits to foreign countries from *China Vitae*.

⁵⁷ Olcott(2014).

Kazakhstan	17
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The higher visit frequency rate in Central Asia (between 5 and 17) compared with that of geographically symmetrical counterpart Southeast Asia (between 3 and 11) reveals former carries relatively more strategic importance despite paltry size of economies. Currently, China holds ‘strategic partnerships’ with all 5 Central Asian countries,⁵⁸ and in no other region of the world China’s aspiration to cultivate close bilateral relation is more noticeable than in Central Asia.

Graph 1. Chinese Gas Import Figure 2012 (bcm, %)



Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013⁵⁹

Second, as an extension of the first characteristics, China attempts to bring the region into its economic orbit by tapping the energy potential of Central Asia. This is much in line with Chinese grand strategy in which Beijing tries to diversify the sources of energy to avoid potential hiatus in economic development caused by cut in the maritime energy supply line by potential adversaries (read the U.S. and its allies).

⁵⁸ Those Central Asian countries that upgraded their bilateral relations with China to strategic partnerships include Kazakhstan(June 2011), Uzbekistan(June 2012), Tajikistan(May 2013), Kyrgyzstan(September 2013), Turkmenistan(September 2013). Compiled from articles released by *Xinhua* and *China Daily*.

⁵⁹ *BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013*, data retrieved from <http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy-2013.html> (accessed: April 24, 2014).

Central Asia is land-locked region that lacks access to the major market through land or seas, and is, thus, short of economic vitality. The region boasts humongous natural resources such as oil and natural gas, but regional countries are not in the position to exploit these decent resources to generate state wealth. First of all, the pipelines through which Central Asian countries export oil and gas to European market run via Russia. This is a legacy of Soviet era when the regime built the pipelines running through today's Russian territory.⁶⁰ Russia usually buys in oil and gas at relative low prices and sells at a higher markup.⁶¹ This dependence on Russia results in Russian political, economic and security leverage over the Central Asian republics and, thus, creates incentives among these resource-exporting countries to diversify export market. Second, lacking economic vitality, these republics were in short hand of the capital to launch a project to build alternative pipelines to the other direction.⁶² Despaired by structural quagmire, the republics welcomed overtures from Beijing to carry out massive scale of investments for oil and gas and building necessary infrastructures.

Date	Partner	Cooperation	Subject of Cooperation
May 2005	Kazakhstan	Consultation on basic principles over pipeline construction between Atasu (Kazakhstan) and Alashankou (China)	China National Petroleum Corporation(CNPC)-Kazakhstan National Petroleum and Gas Institute(KNPGI)

⁶⁰ Andrew E. Kramer, "New Gas Pipeline From Central Asia Feeds China," *The New York Times*, December 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/world/asia/15pipeline.html?_r=0 (accessed: April 22, 2014).

⁶¹ "China in Central Asia: Rising China, sinking Russia," *The Economist*, September 14, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21586304-vast-region-chinas-economic-clout-more-match-russias-rising-china-sinking> (accessed: April 20, 2014).

⁶² 윤성학·이재영·이시영, "‘중양아시아~중국 가스관’ 개통과 정책 시사점," 『KIEP 지역경제 포커스』, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2010년 1월 25일, pp. 5-6.

⁶³ 민귀식, "중양아시아국가의 에너지전략과 중국의 대응," 『중양아시아 연구의 학적 체계화』 2009, pp. 392-393.

August 2005	Kazakhstan	Feasibility study of Kazakhstan-China pipeline	CNPC-KNPGI
October 2005	Kazakhstan	CNPC acquired PetroKazakhstan with 4.18 billion dollars payment, marking the single biggest investment	CNPC-PetroKazakhstan
December 2005	Kazakhstan	Completion of 700 million dollar Atasu-Alashankou Pipeline that can supply 20 million tons of oil per year	CNPC-KNPGI
April 2006	Turkmenistan	Consultation on basic principles over pipeline connecting Turkmenistan and China; scheduled to supply 30 billion-cubic-meters of gas annually from 2009 on for 30 years	CNPC-Turkman Ministry of Oil and Gas and Mineral Resources
August 2006	Uzbekistan	Agreement on joint distribution of petroleum extracted in the Dead Sea area; 2 billion dollar investment for large-scale exploration	CNPC-Korea National Oil Corporation-Petronas Carigari(Malaysia)-Uzbeknesftgaz
April 2007	Uzbekistan	Consultation on the construction principles of China-Uzbekistan gas pipeline	Government representatives from both sides
August 2007	Turkmenistan	Permission to develop Amur River coast	CNPC-Turkman President
November 2007	Kazakhstan	Agreement on Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline construction and operation	Chinese Premier-Kazak Prime Minister
June 2008	Turkmenistan	Start of China-Turkmenistan gas pipeline construction	Government representatives from both sides
June 2008	Uzbekistan	Start of China-Uzbekistan gas pipeline construction	Government representatives from both sides
July 2008	Kazakhstan	Start of China-Kazakhstan gas pipeline construction, target to begin operation from 2009 on; supply via double-line pipes possible from 2010 on	Government representatives from both sides

August 2008	Turkmenistan	Turkmenistan supply 40 billion-cubic-meters of gas annually, surpassing previously agreed 30 bcm; stable supply for 30 years is guaranteed	Government representatives from both sides
September 2009	Central Asia	Declaration of constructing Central Asia gas pipeline and Second 西氣東輸 project	Head of Energy Bureau of China

Source: 민귀식, “중앙아시아국가의 에너지전략과 중국의 대응,” 2009.

Literally Central Asian despair and Chinese ambition met together to yield rapid development of bilateral cooperation and, thus, relations. As Table 5 demonstrates, China has extended its hands with cooperative gestures to Central Asia. Most notably, in motion to secure and diversify energy sources, CNPC acquired shares of PetroKazakhstan in 2005 for 4.18 billion dollars, and assiduously launched large-scale construction projects on pipelines connecting Central Asia and China. Also, four countries of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan and China, agreed to construct 7,600 km gas pipeline running through all these states, which became operational in October 2010.⁶⁴ This natural gas from Turkmenistan via other states supply, as of 2012, more than 50 percent of China’s total of gas. (see Graph 1) Furthermore, most recently, President Xi Jinping signed energy deals worth 30 billion dollars on visiting Kazakhstan in 2013.⁶⁵ These energy businesses have certainly contributed to growth in trades, as demonstrated in the statistics. China-Central Asia trade boosted from approximately 1 billion dollars in 2000 to 46 billion dollars in 2012.⁶⁶ ‘Side payments’ are also

⁶⁴ “Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline, Turkmenistan to China,” *Hydrocarbons-technology.com*, <http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/centralasiachinagasp/> (accessed: April 20, 2014).

⁶⁵ Usen Sulemeim, “Energy in Central Asia: Balance, Not a Great Game,” *The National Interest*, February 14, 2014, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/energy-central-asia-balance-not-great-game-9882> (accessed: April 21, 2014).

⁶⁶ Richard Ghiasy, “Central Asian Fortune in Chinese Hands?” *The Diplomat*, December 9, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/central-asian-fortune-in-chinese-hands/> (accessed: April 20, 2014).

substantial. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan can generate revenues from gas transit fees,⁶⁷ and economic activities (small, medium enterprises) initiated around energy business can breathe vitality into regional economies. In short, such role Beijing plays in Central Asia pulled China onto high-profile player, upward-adjusting potential influence it can wield across the regional governments and worked as vital stimuli for Central Asian economies.

Assessment

It is true that Chinese engagement into the Central Asian region so far can be assessed as successful. China's political and economic influence in the region is much firmer than what it was a decade ago. In early 2000s, Central Asia took heed of rising China that it considered was an economic but nationalistic power that can potentially pose as a threat to the region. Out of such concern the regional governments jointly dealt with China in border negotiation process and welcomed Russia in SCO. However, these days, that seems to have undergone fundamental transformation in nature. Most of the Central Asian states enjoy the economic opportunities and benefits that China provide with glee. They are racing to develop better relations with China, an atmosphere that was unthinkable a decade ago. This has created China more room to maneuver to wield influence over these fervent 'followers' to its advantage.

However, the optimistic prospect on seemingly expanding Chinese influence should not be overstated. First, though Central Asian states all hope to foster close relations and develop cooperation with China, comparable aspiration is hard to see

⁶⁷ Chemen Durdiyeva, "China, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan launch Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline," *Central Asia-Caucas Institute*, January 20, 2010, <http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5254> (accessed: April 21, 2014).

among the Central Asian governments toward each other. Some of these countries such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are embroiled in a few conflicts over issues related to gas supply and building a hydroelectric dam.⁶⁸ This negative development of relations among these countries can potentially disrupt China's efforts in Central Asia. Second, though Russia is overshadowed by rapidly growing Chinese economic capacity, it still retains a quite considerable voice in Central Asia through firm grips on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Russia currently has its military presence in these two countries and has them as economic hostage: remittances from Russia take up 31 percent of Kyrgyzstan's GDP and 48 percent of Tajikistan's.⁶⁹ Therefore, Russia still has much strategic space in which it can mobilize its power against potential challenge from China in the region. Furthermore, the United States, though scheduled to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in 2014, has immense interests in geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions in the region that force withdrawal alone does not directly lead to total absence of American influence; it will stay in the region in one form or the other. However, it seems reasonable to argue that relative influence of Beijing is increasing (at the expense of Russia and the United States), and projected to continue so for upcoming years.

⁶⁸ Chris Rickleton, "Central Asia: Can Chinese Cash Glue the Region Together?," *Eurasianet.org*, October 10, 2013, <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67614> (accessed: April 23, 2014).

⁶⁹ Baktybek Beshimov and Ryskeldi Satke, "The struggle for Central Asia: Russia vs China," *Aljazeera*, March 12, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/02/struggle-central-asia-russia-vs-2014225856526775-10.html> (accessed: April 23, 2014).

3. Southeast Asia Policy: Toward Gradual Socialization

Southeast Asia has been significant backyard of China for both historical and geostrategic backgrounds. Since the founding of the People's Republic, China has taken proactive posture toward the Southeast Asian region in efforts to buy political influence as the leader of the Communist World. Therefore, China went so far as to supply ammunitions to the North Vietnamese forces during the wartime in case of Vietnam.⁷⁰ However, away from such an ideology-driven approach, China recalibrated its move in the Southeast Asia region since the end of the Cold War, as demonstrated in its (increasing but gradual) active participation in multilateral forums as well as bilateral approaches when it comes to doing diplomacy with the regional governments. With change in China's posture in mind, below will present China's main objectives in Southeast Asia that triggered such a repositioning in its approach, and how China accomplishes its objectives by employing both the bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.

China's Interests in Southeast Asia

In the post-Cold War era, China's ambitions in Southeast Asia can be understood in three dimensions: political, economic, security/geostrategic dimensions. To begin with, Beijing's goal in the Southeast Asia is to dispel wide-spread China threat that has been consolidated throughout the Cold War period, and to expand its influence in what China perceives as its own 'backyard' relative to the United States. Such deep-

⁷⁰ Bob Seals, "Chinese Support for North Vietnam during the Vietnam War: The Decisive Edge," *MilitaryHistoryOnline.com*, <http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/chinesesupport.aspx> (accessed: April 21, 2014).

rooted Southeast Asian fear on the giant neighbor is not unrelated to Beijing's active support on the Communist forces in the region during the Cold War. Also Beijing's hostile actions in the South China Sea explain why the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries respond cautiously to overtures from the neighbor up north. Therefore, the ASEAN countries, even after the end of the Cold War, have harbored doubts on China's words and behaviors, and thus tended to rely politically and for security on the United States, which these states see as either a security guarantor or, at least, stabilizer in the region. Accordingly, translating its ever-growing economic and military power into political influence in order to slowly undermine and, eventually, put a limit on the influence the U.S. can wield in the region became a significant assignment for the Chinese leadership in Southeast Asia.

Second, China finds the region as a decent economic opportunity. It became quite banal to mention that the Chinese leadership sees the rapid, but sustained, economic growth as the survival strategy for its One-Party state which finds the regime legitimacy from making the Chinese nation richer. From that context, China enthusiastically works with the regional states to build peaceful environment that is imperative for sustainable development. Also, by fostering close relations with the Southeast Asian governments, China hopes to foster economic dynamics between China and ASEAN, as seen in the formation of China-ASEAN FTA(CAFTA). Southeast Asia is one of China's most important trade partners, ranked 4th only after Europe, U.S. and Japan. As of 2012, Southeast Asia is 2.35 billion dollar market(refer to Table 8 in 'China's Diplomacy toward Southeast Asia' in Chapter 3), and the fact that it is a lucrative and geographically close one makes China extend its arms to its backyard.

Table 6. Notable Trade Partners of China 2010 (million USD)⁷¹						
	Volume		Export		Import	
	Amount	Rank	Amount	Rank	Amount	Rank
Europe	4794	1	3112	1	1684	2
US	3853	2	2833	2	1020	6
Japan	2977	3	1210	5	1767	1
ASEAN*	2927	4	1382	4	1545	3
Hong Kong	2305	5	2183	3	122	NA
Korea	2071	6	682	6	1384	4
Taiwan	1453	7	296	NA	1156	5

Source: 中國海關統計, “進出口商品主要國別(地區)統計,” 『國際貿易』 2011年 第2期

Last, but not least, the security/geostrategic importance China attaches to this region is very high. China's security interest in the region can be understood in two areas: traditional security and non-traditional security. As for the former, what comes first to the China's psychology is the United States. Since the Tiananmen Square Incident in June 4, 1989, China has been very attentive to the moves by the Western democracies led by the United States to contain China for violating the human rights to the extreme. Since then, along with the Soviet collapse, China remained as a lone communist power and has watched the U.S. with suspicious look for latter's posture toward China. The memory of past containment strategy by the U.S. seems to linger on, as illustrated from the recent example of China giving uneasy look at the U.S. presence in the Central Asia. Worse yet, with countries maintaining military alliance(Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, and Thailand) or security cooperation relations(Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and India) with the United States encircling China,⁷² China sees it dire to build closer relations with the Southeast Asian countries via various channels in an effort to counter such containment strategy of the United States.

⁷¹ “進出口商品主要國別(地區)統計,” 『國際貿易』, 第2期 (2011), pp.70, recited from Kim(2013), pp.80.

⁷² 조영남(2012), pp. 106-107.

Another geostrategic importance of the region to China centers on the issue of stable energy supply. The crude oil supply of China, a huge oil consumer, passes through sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and this exposes China on strategic vulnerability. It's because the U.S. and its allies can control Malacca Strait,⁷³ a chokepoint which is the entrance into the South China Sea. Without securing navigation at the open sea, the worst scenario possible for China is that its economy can be put to an impasse.

Furthermore, away from the traditional notion of the security, the concepts of the security expanded to include economic, environment, illicit drugs, terrorism, epidemics, etc. that have no boundary and have become common foes of the nation-states in the post-Cold War era. Placing the prime importance on economic development, China will cooperate with ASEAN to tackle anything that can pose as a threat to economic development such as terrorism, epidemics, transnational crimes that threaten stable oil supply(i.e. piracy).⁷⁴

China's Diplomacy toward Southeast Asia

Unlike Central Asia where Russia has enjoyed its exclusive sphere of influence for more than a century, Southeast Asia has never been off the Chinese radar. Though the extent to which Chinese influence could reach the region during the Cold War era might be controversial, the recent development on the bilateral relations between China and ASEAN have seen marked improvement, signaling China is in action to recover its voice in the region. This is a product of sophisticated approach which simultaneously

⁷³ Ian Storey, *Southeast Asia and the Rise of China* (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp.85-86.

⁷⁴ Cai Peng Hong, "Non-traditional security and China-ASEAN Relations: Co-operation, Commitments and Challenges", in Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku(eds.), *China and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional Challenges* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp.161.

integrates political, economic, and security axis, toward the region.⁷⁵

In the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, the United States shifted its priorities in East and Southeast Asia, causing Southeast Asian countries to cast much doubt on security guarantees promised by the U.S. and to rethink their relationships with China, toward taking more engaging postures toward the country.⁷⁶ "ASEAN states...saw engagement processes as serving important reassurance functions that could ease relations with China in the event of weakened U.S. security guarantees."⁷⁷ Moreover, Ba notes "China's embrace of market reforms began to direct growing economic attention and interest from its neighbors, which saw China as both a major investment opportunity and supplemental driver of Southeast Asian growth", in contrast to the U.S. that showed its "unwillingness to support East and Southeast Asian growth and growth strategies" and thus "destabilized the foundations of that regional political economy."⁷⁸

Southeast Asian states turning their eyes to their giant neighbor did not go unnoticed by China. Besides, as much as Southeast Asia saw developing and refining its relations with China as necessary in a new political, economic, and security environment, China needed Southeast Asia for a few reasons. First, Chinese Communist Party, after the Tiananmen and the fall of Communist bloc, needed to extend its arms to neighbors to restore its fallen image and secure its survival in the changing international environment. Second, Southeast Asia had important value as market and (supposed-to-be) stable periphery, thus being critical part of China's grand strategy.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, "China's Regional Strategy," in David Shambaugh(ed.), *Power Shift*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2006), pp. 51.

⁷⁶ Alice D. Ba, "The Politics and Economics of "East Asia" in China-ASEAN relations," in Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku(eds.), *China and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional Challenges* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp.171

⁷⁷ Ba(2005), pp. 171-172.

⁷⁸ Ba(2005), pp. 176.

⁷⁹ Jurgen Haacke, "The Significance of Beijing's Bilateral Relations: Looking 'Below' the Regional Level in China-ASEAN Ties," in Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku(eds.), *China*

In short, "the impacts of the Soviet collapse led to temporary American indifference on the Southeast Asia, leading to room for new dynamics of the relations between ASEAN countries and China. As a country that calls for multilateralism, China gave due evaluation on Southeast Asia as its foothold. First, in economic terms, the region was considered as a new economic cooperator as well as competitor, and politically, ASEAN was regarded as a significant dialogue partner for regional security as well as a new variable in the process of rearranging regional order."⁸⁰ Such perceptions drove China to engage with Southeast Asia by normalizing relations with the all 10 ASEAN countries by the early 1990s,⁸¹ supplementing the bilateralism with multilateralism later in the late 1990s,⁸² and intensifying economic cooperation. Though there were on-going contacts between the two, with China invited by ASEAN to attend the meeting under latter's frameworks from early to mid- 1990s, it was with the formation of ASEAN-Plus-Three (China, Japan, and South Korea) (APT)⁸³ after the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC, 1997-1999) that truly symbolized the beginning of Chinese multilateral engagement with the ASEAN. With U.S. left out of grouping,

and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional Challenges (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp.113.

⁸⁰ 김예경, "중국-동남아 관계," 한국국제정치학회 중국분과 편, 『중국 현대국제관계』 (서울: 오름, 2008), pp. 325-326.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² The first contact between China and ASEAN was in 1991, when Qian Qichen, the foreign minister of China, was invited to attend the ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM). Subsequently, China was invited as a guest to the chair of ASEAN from 1992 to 1995, and in 1996, it became ASEAN's dialogue partner.(refer to Chien-peng Chung, *China's Multilateral Cooperation in Asian and the Pacific* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 21.) However, these events are not mentioned in the text because they are not China-led, or, put differently, *not* on Chinese initiative.

⁸³ "Following the crisis, ASEAN countries came together with China, Japan, and South Korea to form the ASEAN+3 process seeking to prevent a repetition of a crisis of the same kind that could occur in the future, or to find solutions to a similar crisis. They came up with a number of measures starting with the Chiang Mai Initiative of currency swap arrangements and regional financial surveillance monitoring." Carolina G. Hernandez, "The rise of China and implications for Southeast Asia," in Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and Cheng-yi Lin(eds.), *Beijing's strategies and implications for the Asia-Pacific* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 258.

China had more freedom of action and found itself more active in these groupings, compared with when in ASEAN Regional Forum where it is hard to raise its voice. Since then, in political and security-axis, in order to diffuse regional anxieties over expanding Chinese military capabilities and possible conflicts in the South China Sea, and to manage the tension, ASEAN and China issued the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002 as a confidence-building measure(CBM).⁸⁴ Then China acceded to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as the first external power to do so.⁸⁵ In 2004, moreover, China indicated that its desire to join in the protocol of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) of 1995.⁸⁶ Most importantly, perhaps, China established the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity with ASEAN in 2003.⁸⁷

Series of other overtures were made in the latter half of 2000s. In 2005, China National Offshore Oil Company(CNOOC) signed a Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking(JMSU) with the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation and the Philippines National Oil Corporation (PNOC), and carried out exploration on oil and gas fields of South China Sea until 2008.⁸⁸ Also, in 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao declared plan for founding of 25 billion dollar fund for infrastructure construction of and cooperation with

⁸⁴ Storey(2011), pp. 67.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ "Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People's Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity," *Association of Southeast Asia*, <http://www.asean.org/news/item/external-relations-china-joint-declaration-of-the-heads-of-stategovernment-of-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china-on-strategic-partnership-for-peace-and-prosperity-bali-indonesia-8-october-2003> (accessed: March 25, 2014).

⁸⁸ "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao's comment on the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking Accord signed by the oil companies of China, Vietnam and the Philippines,"(March 16, 2005) *Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in Sydney*, <http://sydney.chineseconsulate.org/eng/xwdt/t187607.htm> (accessed: July 1, 2014)

ASEAN.⁸⁹ Finally, in his tour of ASEAN countries in October 2013, President Xi Jinping made proposal to build a new 'maritime silk road,' and stressed 'shared destiny' of China and ASEAN members.⁹⁰ With these friendly and cooperative gestures, China aimed to undermine 'China Threat Theory' among ASEAN countries and reinforce its economic clout in the region.⁹¹

China's move in the economic dimension also can be characterized by active engagement. APT was a product of 13 countries studying the foregone financial crisis and preparing for future one.(See Footnote no. 83) Also, when ASEAN countries were swayed by the fear that their economies that just got out of sharp economic downturn wrought by the AFC will get into a big trouble with China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China introduced proposal to establish FTA between China and ASEAN (CAFTA) (CAFTA has been put into action since January 1, 2010), partly to uphold its image as a responsible power. Furthermore, Beijing has shown its active espousal to the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program (GMS) since its founding in 1992, increasingly engaging in economic interaction with the initiative.⁹²

In the process of implementing its Grand Strategy, China's motivations to actively participate in the multilateral institutions are four-fold. Through the multilateral diplomacy, China seeks to (1) make its domestic economic development sustainable, (2) realize its internal and external political interests, most well-represented by isolation of

⁸⁹ 이선진, “동남아에 대한 중국 전략: 현황과 대응,” 『JPI 정책포럼』, No. 2010-7 (2010년 3월), pp. 3-9. Recited from 박창희, “중국의 영토분쟁 정책,” 『2013 중국정세보고』 (서울: 국립외교원 중국연구센터, 2014), pp. 281.

⁹⁰ Wu Jiao and Zhang Yunbi, "Xi in call for building of new 'maritime silk road'," *China Daily USA*, October 4, 2013, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-10/04/content_17008940.htm (accessed: June 28, 2014).

⁹¹ 박창희, “중국의 영토분쟁 정책,” 『2013 중국정세보고』 (서울: 국립외교원 중국연구센터, 2014), pp. 281.

⁹² Storey(2011), pp.83.

Taiwan,⁹³(3) establish its image as a 'responsible great power', and (4) expand its influence. They are imperative elements for Chinese grand strategy, and these elements seemed to be present in China's regional multilateral diplomacy. Nevertheless, probably the most important driving reason is that ASEAN countries themselves hope to deal with China in multilateral fashion. Even though China is in active move to embrace the region, negative image of China from the Cold War era still lingers on among the regional states. Latter sees, by dealing with China bilaterally, the smaller and weaker states can be placed in an unfavorable bargaining position by leverage that a more powerful neighbor, of which strength continues to grow, can mobilize. Therefore, when explaining mushrooming multilateralism among China and ASEAN states, the strategic calculation on the latter's side must be taken into account.

Though China's ASEAN strategy witnessed mushrooming multilateral involvement, Beijing accompanies upgrading bilateral relations, and more so after the financial crisis of the late 1990s. When it comes to analysis of China's bilateral relations in Southeast Asia, it is significant to keep in mind that Southeast Asia is largely divided into two: mainland continental Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar) and maritime Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines). The former less Thailand are economically less-developed and politically unstable while latter with Thailand have achieved relative political stability with economic development. Therefore, China's expectations and policies toward these countries differ depending on where respective country is located at. Mainland (continental) Southeast Asia has geostrategic value for China in that the region touches

⁹³ 김애경(2013) notes, "though China uses bilateral relations as well as multilateral diplomacy on this issue, it uses multilateral institutions in a strategic manner by arguing that Taiwan issue is related to its own sovereignty and thus the criteria for Taiwan to be able to participate in multilateral mechanism must be determined by China." 김애경, "중국의 다자외교: 배척 비판에서 적극적 참여, 주도적 창설까지," 김홍규 편, 『중국 신외교전략과 당면한 이슈들』 (서울: 오름, 2013), pp. 137.

with Chinese southern border. This led China to enthusiastically deter these mainland countries from hosting foreign forces by providing political bulwark against Western criticisms on non-democratic, authoritarian political systems. Not surprisingly, except for democratic Thailand that is currently an allied partner of the United States in Asia-Pacific, all the countries in the sub-region tend to be either 'bandwagoners'(Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos) that "lack expressed fears of China and actively seek assistance and protection from Beijing" or 'hesitant hedger'(Vietnam) that "neither bandwagon with nor seek to balance against China while expanding economic ties with China."⁹⁴

Also, keenly aware of abundant natural resources in the continental Southeast Asia harbor, China has invested heavily, most notably in GMS. More importantly, however, sub-region is conspicuous in China's calculation on energy supply since the region can divert vulnerability generated from importing energy through SLOCs. Thus, economic cooperation in GMS is especially concentrated on building a whole new alternative transport route. China had so far invested approximately 10 billion dollars in constructing infrastructures in GMS region, and linking transportation networks in Indochina is on the final stage of construction. Currently, these international highways are running from North to South, linking China, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam, from West to East, linking Vietnam, Laos(or Cambodia), Thailand, Myanmar, and Southbound, linking Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand.⁹⁵ The very proximity of the

⁹⁴ Jae Ho Chung, "East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Patterns and Variations," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 4 (2009/2010), pp. 657-675. However, according to Chung, in contrast to this pre-2010 assessment, post-2010 period when China revealed assertive aspects in its diplomacy on issues surrounding South China Sea, those 'passive hedgers' such as Vietnam and Indonesia have actively cooperated on security issues with the U.S, and those countries considered as 'bandwagoners' like Myanmar were found to be moving toward 'hedging.' Moreover, Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore do not even seem to shy away from revealing their intention to 'balance' China, moving away from 'engaging/enmeshing' posture. 정재호, "2013년 시점에서 평가하는 미중 관계," 『2013년 중국정세보고』 (서울: 국립외교원 중국연구센터, 2014), pp. 115.

⁹⁵ 이선진(2010), pp. 3.

region to China and underlying strategic value from such geographical characteristics, therefore, give China reasons to wield influence over these countries, though with mixed (but more of positive) results.⁹⁶ The fact that China concentrates nearly a half of its foreign aid on infrastructure and related public works should be understood in this context (refer to Table 7 below).

Table 7. Reported by PRC Aid in Southeast Asia by Type 2002-2007		
	Amount (million USD)	Share
Natural Resources Extraction/Production	4788	35%
Infrastructure/Public Works	6438	47%
Not Specified/Other	2276	16%
Humanitarian	159	1%
Military	170	1%
Technical Assistance	3	0%
Total	13834	100%

Source: reconstructed based on New York University Wagner School, "Understanding China's foreign aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America," April 25, 2008.⁹⁷

Notes: Annual totals represent announced loans and other reported aid and economic projects using PRC financing.

In case of maritime Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, Philippines), the picture is quite different from above case. Maritime Southeast Asian states are placed at geopolitically more 'comfortable locations,' having some distance from the Asian continent, and are known to have achieved relative high level of economic development. Also, maritime ASEAN states compose most of the Southeast Asian economies(See Table 8), making them lucrative trade partners.

⁹⁶ Storey(2011), pp. 81-87.

⁹⁷ New York University Wagner School, "Understanding China's foreign aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America," April 25, 2008, cited in Thomas Lum, Hannah Fischer, Julisa Gomez-Granger, and Anne Leland, "China's Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, *Congressional Research Service*, February 25, 2009, pp. 8.

Table 8. Economic Size of the ASEAN countries by region 2012 (in billion dollars)				
Continental				
Cambodia	Laos	Myanmar	Thailand	Vietnam
14.038	9.01	59.444	385.694	155.82
27%				
Maritime				
Brunei	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore
16.954	878.043	304.726	250.182	276.52
73%				

Source: United Nations Statistics Division⁹⁸

Moreover, Malaysia has improved defense ties with the United States and Philippines, and Singapore have been "particularly active in cooperation with the U.S. military, including basing, defense planning, and arms acquisitions" since 2000.⁹⁹ Unfortunately for China, its increasing usage of Malacca Strait and SLOCs is accompanied by many of these U.S.-friendly states. In short, the maritime states are relatively freer than the continental counterparts from political, security and, to a lesser extent, economic influence of China. Therefore, China has ardently engaged with these states in all fronts to foster stable and cooperative bilateral relations. However, more importance seems to be attached to the sub-region rather the maritime region.

Table 9. Top PRC Leaders' Visits in Southeast Asia			
Year	Leader	Position	Month/Country visited
2003	Wen Jiabao	Premier	June/ Cambodia
	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	August/ Philippines
	Hu Jintao	President	October/ Thailand
2004	Li Zhaoxing	FM	July/ Indonesia

⁹⁸ *United Nations Statistics Division*, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dntransfer.asp?fID=2> (accessed: April 25, 2014).

⁹⁹ Robert S. Ross, "Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia," in William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski (eds.), *China's Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), pp. 142-143.

	Wen Jiabao	Premier	October/ Vietnam
2005	Wen Jiabao	Premier	January/ Indonesia
	Hu Jintao	President	April/ Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines
	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	May/ Malaysia, Singapore
	Li Zhaoxing	FM	July/ Laos, Myanmar
	Hu Jintao	President	November/ Vietnam
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	December/ Malaysia
	2006	Wen Jiabao	Premier
Li Zhaoxing		FM	July/ Malaysia
Hu Jintao		President	November/ Vietnam, Laos
2007	Wen Jiabao	Premier	January/ Philippines
	Yang Jiechi	FM	July/ Philippines
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	November/ Singapore
	Yang Jiechi	FM	December/ Laos
2008	Wen Jiabao	Premier	March/ Laos
	Yang Jiechi	FM	May/ Myanmar
	Yang Jiechi	FM	July/ Singapore
	Yang Jiechi	FM	December/ Myanmar
2009	Yang Jiechi	FM	March/ Thailand
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	April/ Thailand
	Yang Jiechi	FM	May/ Vietnam
	Yang Jiechi	FM	July/ Thailand
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	October/ Thailand
	Hu Jintao	President	November/ Malaysia, Singapore
	Xi Jinping	VP	December/ Myanmar , Cambodia
2010	Wen Jiabao	Premier	June/ Myanmar
	Xi Jinping	VP	June/ Laos
	Yang Jiechi	FM	July/ Vietnam
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	October/ Vietnam
	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	November/ Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand
	Xi Jinping	VP	November/ Singapore
2011	Wen Jiabao	Premier	April/ Malaysia, Indonesia
	Yang Jiechi	FM	May/ Indonesia

	Yang Jiechi	FM	July/ Indonesia
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	November/ Indonesia
	Hu Jintao	President	November/ Brunei
	Xi Jinping	VP	December/ Vietnam, Thailand
2012	Hu Jintao	President	April/ Cambodia
	Yang Jiechi	FM	May/ Singapore
	Yang Jiechi	FM	July/ Cambodia
	Yang Jiechi	FM	August/ Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei
	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	September/ Myanmar , Malaysia
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	November/ Laos, Cambodia, Thailand
	Yang Jiechi	FM	December/ Laos
2013	Wang Yi	FM	May/ Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei
	Wang Yi	FM	June/ Brunei
	Wang Yi	FM	July/ Thailand
	Wang Yi	FM	August/ Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia
	Xi Jinping	President	October/ Malaysia, Indonesia
	Li Keqiang	Premier	October/ Brunei, Thailand, Vietnam

Source: China Vitae website.¹⁰⁰

Country	Number of visits
Philippines	4
Myanmar, Brunei	6
Singapore	7
Laos	8
Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam	9
Indonesia	11
Thailand	12

Looking at the Chinese high-level visits to both continental and maritime Southeast Asia

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

from 2003 to 2013¹⁰¹(see Tables 9 and 10), it needs to be noted that number of visits on former, 44, far exceeds that, 37, of latter. Also, the various strategic partnerships that China holds with Southeast Asian neighbors are also telling. China, as of December 2013, has signed strategic partnerships of some kind with 7 out of 10 ASEAN countries.¹⁰² Of these 7 partner countries, 5 are those from the continental Southeast Asia, and of these 5, 4 countries hold “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation” that carries the most importance among all the partnership agreements China signed with ASEAN countries. From these findings, an implication can be drawn that China's diplomacy in Southeast Asia is geared to consolidate ties with states that either touch on its border or lean on/bandwagon with Beijing for political shield.

After East Asia experienced financial crisis in late 1990s and China's entering into the WTO, the economic balance of power began to shift toward China. With strengthened relative position, the way Beijing views Southeast Asia has undergone some major changes. Tracking the tone of wordings in the Defense Whitepapers from 1998 to 2004, Bates Gill posits that China's increasing power in all dimension of state power have provided Beijing a more stable, secure position from which to seek confidence in dealing with regional security, be more proactive, take part in regional security and CBMs (carrying out active military-to-military exchanges, for instance), and to emphasize economic and political clout, rather than (or downplay) military

¹⁰¹ According to Ba, there appeared a general trend that the bilateral relations are characterized by "high number of high-level visits and official exchanges, a significant upsurge in trade and mutual investments and the increasing institutionalization of bilateral relations," and the record of high-level visits can be a good measure of importance of a group of countries to China. Ba(2005), pp. 138.

¹⁰² In order of importance of the partnership, China established “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation” with Myanmar (May 2011), Thailand (April 2012), Cambodia (April 2013), and Vietnam (October 2013), Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Indonesia(October 2013) and Malaysia(October 2013), and “Strategic Partnership” with Laos (September 2009). Compiled information from government sources of the countries concerned and various media outlets.

might.¹⁰³The course of actions China has been displaying seems to be in line with what Western international relations scholars view as 'socialization.'¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, whether China is completely socialized to appear as a peaceful power is not certain. Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, there have been ongoing debates over alleged assertiveness of Chinese diplomacy. In Southeast Asia, the debates were developed around the issues related to South China Sea. Michael Yahuda, a realist thinker who advocates the idea that Chinese diplomacy turned into an assertive one, gives ominous prospect for the regional security in Southeast Asia. He argues that, since 2008, seeming shift in balance of power to China's favor (against the U.S.) seems to have triggered Beijing to seek its national interest beyond the narrow confines of its immediate water as demonstrated in those "countries who sought to challenge China's maritime claims in the South China Sea."¹⁰⁵ Yahuda stresses "China's maritime interests are no longer confined to concerns with Taiwan and deterring possible American military intervention, but they have recently been extended to an interest in controlling adjacent seas and to preventing the interdiction at sea of China's supply lines for the energy and raw-material needs of its domestic economy."¹⁰⁶ Change in international status, Yahuda posits, made China more outright in claiming what it considers as its national interest. However, against this interpretation of today's Chinese diplomacy in Southeast Asia, there is an counter-argument that what features Chinese diplomacy lately is a tactical, not strategic, adjustment responding to events initiated by

¹⁰³ Bates Gill, "China's Regional Security Strategy," in David Shambaugh(ed.), *Power Shift* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2006), pp. 249-260.

¹⁰⁴ The western IR scholars argue that "States are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in that world. States are socialized to want certain things by the international society in which they and people in them live."Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 2.

¹⁰⁵ i.e. South China Sea

¹⁰⁶ Michael Yahuda, "China's New Assertiveness in the South China Sea," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol.22, No. 81 (2013), pp. 447-449.

other parties. 조영남 illustrates some of the characteristics of what the realist observers name 'assertive diplomacy.'

It is proper to see 'assertive' diplomacy as a change in diplomatic 'behavior' that resulted from the 'process' of responding to various internal and external situations, rather than think it as a product from implementing a new foreign 'policy'...Therefore, Chinese 'assertive diplomacy' is characterized as reactive and instantaneous, not as active and planned...In other words, in most of the cases China reacted in assertive manner to events that happened already, or to situations that were initiated by other countries...Absent long-term and comprehensive strategy or plans, China is having a hard time in responding to either simultaneous or serial conflicts.¹⁰⁷

조영남 recognizes that some assertive elements constitute a newly-introduced 'Scarborough Shoal Model,'¹⁰⁸but, at the same time, diplomatic practice of China (which he sees currently on its transitional stage) was found to be flexible, containing both hard and soft approaches. As can be seen in the case of territorial conflicts surrounding South China Sea between China and Philippines from 2008 to 2011, "China at first took stubborn stance by sticking to the principles of 'resolution of conflicts by parties directly involved in the issues (no intervention of the third party),' and 'bilateral negotiation(no multilateral talks) against Philippines' active and assertive diplomatic provocations on

¹⁰⁷ 조영남, 『중국의 꿈: 시진핑 리더십과 중국의 미래』 (서울: 민음사, 2013), pp. 244-246.

¹⁰⁸ Scarborough Shoal is a English name for Huangyan Dao(黄岩島). According to Scarborough Shoal Model (黄岩島模式, Huangyan Dao Moshi), China first, switches mode of response from 'defense' to 'assertion,' second, declares bottom-line to the related parties, and third, presses the other by mobilizing all the political, economic, and military measures possible. 조영남(2013), pp. 247-248.

China. Especially deserving spotlight is the issue on the enactment of guideline of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002. Afraid to see the guideline acted through multilateral talks which will place China on the contest against all ASEAN countries, China continued to oppose the enactment. However, after international criticism on China accelerated, latter changed its position to relieve fear and vigilance ASEAN states harbor on China."¹⁰⁹

In sum, it is more accurate to say fundamentals in bilateral relations between China and Southeast Asia have not changed. Both see in each other potential opportunities as much as potential threats. Therefore, the recent developments of conflicts surrounding the South China Sea should not be overstated. The issues are of among a few direct parties, and that alone is not enough to shake the whole establishment of bright side of the bilateral relations. With maritime territorial conflict as exception, Chinese regional diplomacy was successful in embracing regional states into its arms (to some, but satisfactory, extent).

Assessment

Consequently, Chinese diplomacy in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War era seems to have developed from passive engagement (due to circumstances China found itself after the Cold War) to active and intensified engagement with a series of charm offensives(with reconsideration over its global status).¹¹⁰ During the last two decades, China actively moved entered into the region via political and economic tools, and approach turned out to be very successful. Despite the fact that deep-rooted fears on

¹⁰⁹ 조영남(2013), pp. 250.

¹¹⁰ Ian Storey categorized 1990s as a decade of engagement and hedging, and 2000s as a decade of Charm Offensive in the China-ASEAN relations. See Storey(2011), pp. 38-98.

China in the Southeast Asia's side have not been completely eradicated, the relationship between the two has never been better. Though some assertive elements showed up in Chinese diplomatic behaviors post-2008, as 조영남 points out, China's diplomacy is in the transitional stage and it is too early to tell whether fundamental shifts in Chinese diplomatic strategy are looming as a result of accumulated 'assertive' behaviors, or such behaviors are only some outliers in the current strategies.¹¹¹

However, though giving positive evaluation is no problem, concluding overly optimistic prospect from current configuration of regional power dynamics must be heeded. Given that the United States is turning its eyes back to Asia-Pacific with "forward-deployed diplomacy" based on reinforcing ties with its allies-South Korea, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand- and deepening partnerships with Indonesia, India, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand,¹¹² it would not be (has never been) as easy and comfortable as many might believe for more powerful China to carve out a separate sphere of influence of its own.

4. Africa Policy: Discovery of ‘Distant’ Sphere of Influence

For previously-discussed Central Asia and Southeast Asia, I delineate the driving reason these countries buy China's various concerns and interests, be it political, economic, or security, originate primarily from the geographical proximity. However,

¹¹¹ 조영남(2013), pp. 254-256.

¹¹² Hillary Clinton, "Inaugural Richard C. Holbrooke Lecture on a Broad Vision of U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century," Benjamin Franklin Room, Washington, D.C., January 14, 2011.

the case of Africa is a bit more complicated. First of all, the African countries are not just geographically far from the Chinese border but also they face wide range of, often uncontrollable, inner problems from domestic instability caused by constant civil strife to rampant diseases that make Africa population constantly sick and unable to be engaged in productive activity, not to mention well-functioning economy(though a few such as South Africa are exceptions). Nevertheless, (potential) values that Chinese leadership attaches to this continent is huge, and China sees Africa as a region which will contribute a great deal to China's return to the world's leading power status.

China's Interests in Africa

During the 'Reform and Opening Up' policy since 1978, active Chinese policies toward African states (as well as other developing countries) seemed to cool down. In contrast to extensive support including massive economic aide to these countries, China turned to a pragmatic diplomacy, reducing the size of the aid (going as far as accepting loans from capitalist multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) and confining support to the developing countries to a rhetorical one.¹¹³ However, soon after China was situated in both political and economic quagmire that the end of the Cold War system had wrought. First is the notorious Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, in which Chinese leadership gave the order to the People's Liberation Army(PLA) to crack down those protesters calling for democracy at Tiananmen Square. This came to Western democracies as a shock, and, unable to stand the horrible act of killing the innocent citizens, the West led by the United States had

¹¹³ 김동환·배수강, 『레드 & 블랙: 중국과 아프리카, 신 자원로드 열다』 (과주: 나남, 2012), pp. 157.; Peter Van Ness, "China and the Third World: Patterns of Engagement and Indifference," in Samuel S. Kim(ed.), *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium* (Boulder: Westview, 1998), pp. 156.

imposed sanctions on Chinese trade. These sanctions came as a hard hit on China that at the time just launched rapid economic development because it relied heavily on these advanced economies for necessary technology, investment, and business (management) skills. Also, China was sharply criticized, tagged a 'massive human rights violator', and confronted with an assignment that it had to break the isolation imposed by the advanced countries in the international stage. This is when Africa, as well as other third world countries appeared on the Chinese orbit. Due to the end of Cold War in the process from late 1980s to early 1990s, superpowers' expanding sphere of influence in the Third World countries became no longer necessary, and this relegated Africa into a peripheral status with reduced strategic values in the international politics."¹¹⁴ Thus, Africa was thirsty for attention from outside forces that could nurture, or at least show constant interest in it.

Against this backdrop, China noticed that it became imperative to secure international support in facing human rights issues and it saw Africa, with most of authoritarian regimes that had experienced the Western imperialism and thus very critical of internal interference as well as much in a vulnerable position in the area of human rights, could be a staunch supporter for China. In addition, in the international organization where the number of seats, not the power and influence of states, matter, Africa, the continent with the largest number of developing countries, is very good sources of political support for China that is vigilant at all times to avoid another 'century of humiliation.' From this point on, China opened its eyes and re-fostered once cooled-down intimate relations with African states.

Political incentive does not end in securing support and breaking the isolation by the West. The support China aims to secure is more in line with changing China's

¹¹⁴ 김애경, "중국의 아프리카대륙 전략적 가치 재발견", 『국제정치논총』 제49집 1호, 2009.3, pp. 184.

international status and its ambition to recoup its deserved seat of world's leading power.

Kim(2009) notes,

With the East Asian Financial Crisis as a momentum, China began to stress more on stable maintenance of existing international order, rather than refashioning it by placing emphasis on responsibility it holds as a major power. Especially entering into 2000s when objective conditions and subjective perceptions needed to become global superpower are gradually fulfilled, Chinese rhetoric on international order changed to 'peaceful development' and 'building of harmonious world'...from the 'Building of harmonious society' one can tell Chinese will to maintain, rather than change, current order stable has strengthened. Thus, support from the Third World countries and increasing influence over them has become an urgent issue.¹¹⁵

Therefore, China's political motivation in Africa is based on far-sighted calculation that takes its elevating global status and perception of itself stemming out from it as variables.

Moreover, Africa poses as a huge untapped economic opportunity for China. On the one hand Africa is reported to have abundant natural resources ranging from oil, logs, diamonds to cotton and iron ore.¹¹⁶ These resources are necessary items to keep Chinese economic development sustainable. With the economy developing at around 9 percent annum for last three decades, the demand for oil and other natural resources boosted accordingly. For instance, Chinese oil consumption at the early stage of 'Reform

¹¹⁵ 김애경 (2009), pp. 179-180.

¹¹⁶ George T. Yu, "China's Africa Policy: South-South Unity and Cooperation," in Lowell Dittmer and George T. Yu (eds.), *China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2010), pp. 140.

and Opening Up' in 1980 was approximately 1.765 million barrels per year, but that figure soared up to 9.330 million barrels per year in 2010, marking more than five-fold increase.¹¹⁷ Thus, with ever growing demand of raw materials, China has no way but to turn its eyes to wherever it can find the supply for soaring demand of raw materials.

On the other hand, Africa poses as an expansive market for Chinese products. Africa as a region has experienced a rapid economic growth in the last two decades, thanks in part to aggressive advance into the continent by the Chinese. With the start of the new millennium, China launched ambitious Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) under the leadership of Jiang Zemin in 2000 as an effort to institutionalize and foster closer relationship between the two sides. As a byproduct of FOCAC, economic cooperation between China and Africa took an upturn, contributing to Africa's development. This argument is well-demonstrated by the GDP growth rate that marked slightly over 2 percent per year in the 1990s increased to 3.6 percent in 2001, 4.9 percent in 2003, 5.5 percent in 2005, 5.6 percent in 2007.¹¹⁸ In July 2013, new report released by African Development Bank revealed that Africa score over 6 per growth rate annum, marking the faster economic growth than any other continent.¹¹⁹ Huge Africa experiencing this high speed growth rate turns it into mammoth market with potential purchasers of Chinese manufactured products. As average personal income increases, those with newly-acquired wealth are in position capable of affording high-end products. China has fervently worked hard to move up the value chain toward manufacturing high-tech, high-end products away from low-skilled, labor-intensive, and low value-

¹¹⁷ "China Crude Oil Consumption by Year," *Indexmundi*, [http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.aspx?country=cn &product=oil&graph=consumption](http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.aspx?country=cn&product=oil&graph=consumption) (accessed: April 8, 2014).

¹¹⁸ Charles Roxburgh, Arend van Wamelen and Susan Lund, "Asia Should Buy Into Africa's Growth," *Forbes*, August 12, 2010, <http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/12/asia-china-africa-trade-growth-markets-economy-investment.html> (accessed: April 7, 2014).

¹¹⁹ "Africa's economy 'seeing fastest growth'," July 11, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-23267647> (accessed: April 12, 2014).

added products. Thus, finding buyers who can 'contribute' to 'nurture' Chinese fledgling latecomers in the industries up in the value chain is a great fortune to China. "China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation", a whitepaper released in 2010 by the Information Office of the State Council of China recognize this notion:

During the 1980s and 1990s, China's export to Africa were mainly light industrial products, food, chemical products, native produce and animal by-products. Since 2000, the export of machinery, automobiles and electronic items has been dramatically increasing, with product quality and technology markedly improved. Currently, the proportion of machinery and electronic products accounts for more than half of China's exports to Africa.¹²⁰

China's Diplomacy toward Africa

As previously mentioned, China, since the international isolation following Tiananmen Square Incident, has discovered African countries on its 'radar screen'. The 'numerical importance' of Africa that China attaches to the continent can be best illustrated by the fact that China's first destinations of high-level visit of every year since 1991 have been countries in Africa where the most number of developing countries are located.¹²¹ However, it was in the 2000s that meaningful increase in bilateral interactions has surfaced. The establishment of aforementioned Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was an event marking the historical turning point in the sheer

¹²⁰ "China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation," *Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China*, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2010-12/23/content_21604490.htm (accessed: April 8, 2014).

¹²¹ 김애경(2009), pp. 179.

volume of cooperation but the nature of the relation itself.

FOCAC is held once every three years alternately held by China and another African state. "The primary known function of the FOCAC had been to review past interactions between China and Africa, to reiterate policies, and to announce new projects."¹²² Nevertheless, the FOCAC has more meaning to it than just gathering together to review and announce policies and projects. What makes this forum very significant and deserve world-wide attention is that it allows China to acquire and, then, gradually secure its political and economic influence in Africa. As can be observed from the announced projects, most of them are almost unilateral in nature. Of course, on the surface, abiding by the principle of mutual benefit, both sides seemed to get considerable benefit from the projects. However, the degree to which poor African countries benefit outweigh what China can get in *economic terms*. Strictly speaking, the cooperation is only a cover name for aid. First of all, at the First Ministerial Meeting of FOCAC in 2000, Shi Guangsheng, Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, announced in his speech that China will incrementally increase aid to Africa according to China's development, and in next 2 years write off debts that worth 1 billion yuan held by the heavily indebted countries and the least developed countries with the largest debts. Besides, he noted that China will provide financial support to those Chinese businesses entering into Africa and establish 'Africa Human Resources Development Fund' to train Africa's professional talents.¹²³ At the Second FOCAC meeting in 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao declared that the aforementioned promises were all kept, and announced new measures of cooperation. Worth noting among these promises is that Chinese government will increase the amount of aid to Africa within the

¹²² Yu(2010), pp.135.

¹²³ Shi Guangsheng, "To Intensify China-Africa Forum for a Brilliant Future," *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing*, October 11, 2000, <http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dyjbzjhy/SP12009/t606809.htm> (accessed: December 9, 2013).

framework of FOCAC, more open its market, and provide duty-free markets to Africa's some least developed countries. Additionally, he pledged to increase investment on Africa Human Resources Development Fund by 33 percent and train 10,000 African professionals.¹²⁴

The Third FOCAC meeting held in Beijing elevated to Summit Meeting from the previous ministerial-level meeting, and 41 heads of state and heads of government from 48 of 54 African countries attended the meeting.¹²⁵ In this internationally high-profile event, China's President Hu Jintao, under the banner of 'forging new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa' and strengthening cooperation in more areas and at a higher level', proposed 'eight steps' of cooperation.¹²⁶

Step	Measures
1	Double its 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009.
2	Provide US\$3 billion of preferential loans and US\$2 billion of preferential buyer's credits to Africa in the next three years.
3	Set up a China-Africa development fund which will reach US\$5 billion to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and provide support to them.
4	Build a conference centre for the African Union
5	Cancel debt that matured at the end of 2005 owed by the heavily indebted poor countries and the least developed countries in Africa that have diplomatic relations with China.
6	Further open up China's market to Africa by increasing from 190 to over 440 the number of export items to China receiving zero-tariff treatment from the least developed countries in Africa having diplomatic ties with China.

¹²⁴ Wen Jiabao, "Let Us Build on Our Past Achievements and Promote China-Africa Friendly Cooperation on All Fronts", *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Addis Ababa*, December 15, 2003, <http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dejbzjhy/SP22009/t606816.htm> (accessed: April 7, 2014).

¹²⁵ "Chinese Leader Hu Jintao holds ceremony to welcome African leaders attending Beijing Summit," *Beijing Summit and Third Ministerial Conference of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, http://english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/04/content_4917.htm (accessed: April 7, 2014).

¹²⁶ Hu Jintao, "Address by Hu Jintao President of the People's Republic of China at the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation," *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing*, November 4, 2006, <http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dscbzbjhy/SP32009/t606840.htm> (accessed: April 8, 2014).

7	Establish three to five trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa in the next three years.
8	Over the next three years, train 15,000 African professionals; send 100 senior agricultural experts to Africa; set up 10 special agricultural technology demonstration centres in Africa; build 30 hospitals in Africa and provide RMB 300 million of grant for providing artemisinin and building 30 malaria prevention and treatment centres to fight malaria in Africa; dispatch 300 youth volunteers to Africa; build 100 rural schools in Africa; and increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from the current 2000 per year to 4000 per year by 2009.

Source: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Website <http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dscbjhy/SP32009/t606840.htm> (accessed April 8, 2014).

China's such active charm offensive continued in the 4th and the 5th FOCAC held in Sharm El Sheik, Egypt in 2009, and in Beijing in 2012, respectively. Wen Jiabao(at the 4th FOCAC) and Hu Jintao(at the 5th FOCAC) showed off close ties with the African states by promising cooperation measures in diverse issue areas.¹²⁷

However, African states receive not just material 'support' from, but also find psychological/mental comfort in China. The phrase that makes most frequent appearances in the FOCAC by Chinese head of state (Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao) and head of government (Wen Jiabao) is the 'respect of state sovereignty.' Of course, 'respect for state sovereignty' is not just one of the central tenets of Chinese diplomacy, but it is also the issue in which China can arouse empathy over it among the African states that remember long time of colonial experiences under European powers and currently face wide range of problems caused by remnants of such colonialism, even after achieving long-sought independence. Wen Jiabao announced in the 4th FOCAC speech,

Chinese government and Chinese people respect that African states have

¹²⁷ For more detailed information on Chinese aid measures, refer to Wen Jiabao, "Building the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership," *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Sharm El Sheikh*, November 8, 2009, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dsfbz_jhy/zyjh/t625623.htm (accessed: December 9, 2013); Hu Jintao, "Open Up New Prospects for A New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership," *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing*, July 19, 2012, http://www.focac.org/en_g/ltada/dwjbzjjhys/zyjh/t953172.htm (accessed: December 10, 2013).

their rights to choose their own social system and the development path suitable for their countries...China has never attached 'political strings' on support and aid to Africa, and will never do in the future.

This statement clearly reveals that China aims to share psychological burden and pressure imposed by Western countries for so long. Also, Wen declared in the 2nd FOCAC meeting,

As one of the permanent member of UN Security Council, China will always stand together with Africa and developing countries of other regions, and support their legitimate demand and rational proposals.

China's diplomacy on African states is not limited to the multilateral approach. China has demonstrated impressive efforts to bolster ties with the African states through bilateral contacts. As can be seen in the table below, in the last decade, top Chinese officials(President, Vice-President, Premier, Chairman of National People's Congress, and Foreign Minister) have visited almost 44 out of 52 countries the African states that he has diplomatic relations with China (See Tables 12 and 13).

Table 12. Top PRC Leaders' Visits in Africa			
Year	Leader	Position	Month/Country visited
2003	Wen Jiabao	Premier	January/ Egypt
	Tang Jiaxuan	FM	January/ Mauritius, Togo, Benin, South Africa
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	December/ Ethiopia
2004	Hu Jintao	President	January/ Egypt, Gabon, Algeria
	Li Zhaoxing	FM	January/ Sudan, Comoros, Djibouti, Uganda, Egypt
	Li Zhaoxing	FM	February/ Gabon
	Zeng Qinghong	VP	June/ Tunisia, Togo, Benin, South Africa

	Li Zhaoxing	FM	September/ Egypt
	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	October/ Kenya
	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	November/ Zambia
	Hu Jintao	President	November/ Egypt
2005	Li Zhaoxing	FM	January/ Lesotho, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius
	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	September/ Morocco
2006	Li Zhaoxing	FM	January/ Mali, Senegal, Liberia, Nigeria, Libya
	Hu Jintao	President	April/ Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	June/ Egypt, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda
2007	Li Zhaoxing	FM	January/ Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau , Chad, Eritrea, Central African Republic
	Hu Jintao	President	February/ Cameroon, Liberia, Sudan, Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, Seychelles
	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	May/ Egypt
2008	Yang Jiechi	FM	January/ South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi , Ethiopia
	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	November/ Algeria, Gabon, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Seychelles
2009	Yang Jiechi	FM	January/ Uganda, Rwanda, Malawi, South Africa
	Hu Jintao	President	February/ Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, Mauritius
	Yang Jiechi	FM	April/ Egypt
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	November/ Egypt
2010	Yang Jiechi	FM	January/ Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Morocco
	Xi Jinping	VP	November/ South Africa, Angola, Botswana
	Xi Jinping	VP	December/ South Africa
2011	Yang Jiechi	FM	February/ Zimbabwe, Guinea, Gabon, Togo, Chad
	Yang Jiechi	FM	May/ Egypt
	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	May/ Namibia, Angola, South Africa
	Yang Jiechi	FM	August/ Sudan, Egypt
2012	Yang Jiechi	FM	January/ Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Namibia ,

			Ethiopia
	Yang Jiechi	FM	June/ Tunisia
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	June/ Morocco
2013	Yang Jiechi	FM	February/ South Africa
	Xi Jinping	President	March/ Tanzania, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo
	Zhang Dejiang	NPCSC Chair	September/ Nigeria
	Wang Yi	FM	December/ Algeria, Morocco

Source: Compiled information from China Vitae, FOCAC, Congo Planet, CriEnglish websites.¹²⁸

Country	Number of visits
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Rwanda, Libya, Malawi, Mozambique, Botswana, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire	1
Madagascar, Zambia, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Chad, Tunisia	2
Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Namibia, Mauritius, Seychelles, Benin, Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Togo, Angola, Kenya, Mauritius, Benin, Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Togo	3
Gabon, Ethiopia	4
Nigeria, Morocco	5
Egypt, South Africa	11

Largely gone ignored for not meeting the democratic standards set by the Western countries, African states all welcomed high-profile visits by the top Chinese leadership. These visits are important in two aspects. First, they give political legitimacy on those regimes that stand up on fragile domestic political base due to leadership's dictatorial nature. Also, the visits usually come with economic gifts 'without political strings.' One

¹²⁸ Compiled information from records of top Chinese leadership visits to foreign countries from *China Vitae* and articles released by *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, *Congo Planet*, and *CriEnglish*.

report on the president Hu Jintao's visit in 2007 notes,

Mr Hu offered a sweetener immediately before leaving for Cameroon, the first of eight countries on his 11-day tour, by announcing \$3bn (£1.5bn) in credit to African countries along with additional aid and interest-free loans. China emphasised[sic] that the new money comes with none of the "political conditions" attached to aid from western governments.¹²⁹

Moreover, during the Africa tour of 2007, Hu's visit to Sudan that was expected to contribute to stopping genocide in the country turned out to be de-facto support for the regime and its genocidal acts when Hu Jintao promised the Sudanese president who advocated the genocide to help build a presidential palace with interest-free loans.¹³⁰ These visits have worked largely as an assurance that further tightened up the bilateral intimacy. However, it should not be mistaken that China's aid and loans are given only to those corrupt, rogue regimes to buy their support. Chinese economic gifts are distributed fairly evenly around the continent with concessions loans are given on the basis on recipient country's ability to pay. This reveals that the regime type, whether it is democratic or non-democratic, does not really matter, but diplomatic conditionality (that each country sticks to 'one-China' principle and that it has diplomatic relations with

¹²⁹ Christ McGreal, "Hu Jintao starts Africa tour with loans promise," *The Guardian*, January 31, 2007, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/31/china.chrismcgreal> (accessed: April 12, 2014).

¹³⁰ Sebastian Mallaby, "A Palace For Sudan: China's No-Strings Aid Undermines the West," *The Washington Post*, February 5, 2007, <https://uyghuramerican.org/article/palace-sudan-chinas-no-strings-aid-undermines-west.html> (accessed: April 12, 2014); Cao Changqing, "Hu Jintao Visits Sudan, Supports Darfur Genocide," *The Epoch Times*, March 4, 2007, <http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/7-3-4/52359.html> (accessed: April 12, 2014).

China) is what counts more.¹³¹ Moreover, China goes as far as establishing strategic partnerships with 5 of 52 countries that it has diplomatic recognition.¹³² These partnerships encompass geo-strategically important countries such as Egypt, Angola (huge oil-supplier, accounts for 31.7 percent of total Chinese imports from Africa in 2012), Algeria (oil-supplier) and the top three African markets such as South Africa (Chinese exports to South Africa composes 21 percent of total Chinese exports to Africa), Nigeria (12 percent), and Egypt (11 percent).¹³³

Moreover, what is worth being noted is that, as can be seen in the Table 13, the number of Chinese leadership's visits on South Africa and Egypt dwarfs those on any other country in the region. Such number of VIP visits compared to any other developing country in the global standard reveals something more than simply tightening bilateral relations. For now, one possibility is that fostering good relations with developing country is not an end in itself, but one of means to realize its grand strategy to become global power from regional power. Though first used to buy political influence over the region, economic tools have more and more become intertwined with China's vital interest. One of the top agenda for Chinese Communist Party is to maintain China's economic growth sustainable. As mentioned previously, securing energy and natural resources to fuel the dynamic economy is imperative part of grand strategy. Additionally, though the leadership is gradually shifting engine of growth toward one


¹³¹ Deborah Brautigam, cited in Elleka Watts, "As Xi Jinping Visits Africa: What are China's Intentions?," *The Diplomat*, March 25, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/as-xi-jinping-visits-africa-what-are-chinas-intentions/> (accessed: April 13, 2014).

¹³² As of December 2013, China has established "Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships" with South Africa(2013) and "Strategic Partnerships " with Algeria(2004), Nigeria(2005), Egypt(2009), and Angola(2010). Compiled information from articles released by *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, and *State Information Service of Egypt*.


¹³³ International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics, recited from Larry Hanauer and Lyle J. Morris, "Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy," *RAND Report*, 2014, pp. 29.

driven based on domestic demand, rather than export,¹³⁴ still China needs some places to sell out its products. Africa can fulfill all of China's wants: "about 40 percent of global reserves of natural resources, 60 percent of uncultivated agricultural land, a billion people with rising purchasing power and a potential army of low-wage workers."¹³⁵

Graph 2. Chinese oil imports 2001 (in million tons)



Graph 3. Chinese oil imports 2010 (in million tons)




Sources: UN Comtrade Statistics Database. <http://comtrade.un.org/>.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Refer to Li Keqiang, "China deepens strategy of domestic demand expansion in the course of reform and opening-up," *China Internet Information Center*, March 4, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2012-03/04/content_24801231.htm (accessed April 13, 2014).

¹³⁵ Bartholomäus Grill, "Billions from Beijing: Africans divided over Chinese presence," *Spiegel Online*, November 29, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chinese-investment-in-africa-boosts-economies-but-worries-many-a-934826.html> (accessed: April 11, 2014).

¹³⁶ It should be noted that these statistics are based on China's reports to the Comtrade. Since the reports are carried out on a voluntary basis, those imports data that are deemed sensitive or are required of confidentiality with the partner countries may not be reported to the Comtrade, leading to a gap between the total amount of imports declared by the Chinese Customs and the total Comtrade data can provide. However, despite taking such handicap into consideration, the


Graphs 2 and 3 illustrate two interesting aspects in China's oil imports. One is that China in the first decade of the 21st century have strenuously worked to diversify the sources of oil, and the other is that the share of oil imports from Africa has increased markedly.¹³⁷ Furthermore, the above observations, with the data shown on graphs 4 and 5 provide rough picture of China's trade relations with Africa: the continent is China's pivotal business partner, supplying energy and natural resources and buying the goods the latter produced.



two general trends of diversification of import sources and increase in share of Africa oil can be easily detected.

¹³⁷ One needs to be cautious from accepting at face value such an allegation that China intends to lock in energy and other natural resources by holding hands together with corrupt regimes. There is a possibility that China had to go into this unstable region 'reluctantly' at a high potential cost due to the fact that China had to find somewhere else not dominated by the West for securing the resources. On this, refer to Hong Zhao, "China's Oil Venture in Africa," *East Asia* (2007), Vol. 24, pp.402 and Wenran Jiang, "Fuelling the Dragon: China's Rise and Its Energy and Resources Extraction in Africa," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 199 (2009), pp. 595-597.

Graph 5. Chinese Imports from Africa, by Product 2011



Sources: (Exports) International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics; United Nations Comtrade¹³⁸; (Imports) International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics; "China's Trade and Investment Relationship with Africa," United States International Trade Commission(USITC) Executive Briefings on Trade, April 2013.¹³⁹

Additionally, of 15.1 billion dollars worth of investment made for share of African corporations in between 2008 and 2010, 11.2 billion dollars were put into mining industries such as iron ore, bauxite, platinum, copper, and uranium.¹⁴⁰ Also, of total 49.2 billion dollar investment China made with support of The Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank in between 2008 and 2011, approximately 31 billion dollars were used for the production of, or to build necessary infrastructures for oil, gas, copper and chrome.¹⁴¹ Mobilization of such huge capital is also observed in the Table 14, with more than 50 percent of Chinese aid spent for construction of infrastructures and related public works.

¹³⁸ International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics, and "China's Trade and Investment Relationship with Africa," *United States International Trade Commission (USITC) Executive Briefings on Trade*, April 2013, recited from Hanauer and Morris(2014), pp. 30.

¹³⁹ International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics and United Nations Comtrade, recited from Hanauer and Morris(2014), pp. 31.

¹⁴⁰ Compiled information from various sources of *Consulate General of Republic of Korea in Shanghai*, World Mineral Production 2005-2009(2011), Jiang and Sinton(2011), Frontier Advisory(2011), recited from 김동환·배수강 (2012), pp. 214-215.

¹⁴¹ Compiled information from various sources. *Consulate General of Republic of Korea in Shanghai*, CSIS (2008). Afrodad(2008). Frontier Advisory (2011), recited from 김동환 · 배수강(2012), pp. 216-217.

	Amount (million USD)	Share
Natural Resources Extraction/Production	9432	28%
Infrastructure/Public Works	17865	54%
Not Specified/Other	5024	15%
Humanitarian	802	2%
Military	4	0%
Technical Assistance	10	0%
Total	33137	100%

Source: NYU Wagner School(2008).¹⁴²

This simple observations show that China's dependence on African oil and natural resources are gradually increasing so as to make active economic interaction with Africa is no longer just a tool to buy influence, but intertwined with China's overall national interest of securing fuel for growth. However, to the extent China's need of Africa rises, latter's need of former rises, but at a more desparately fast pace. As can be seen in the Table 15 below, African countries' dependence on developing natural resources for generating GDP intensifies while contribution by manufacturing sector is on the downtrend across African continent. This observation is not unrelated to China's forays into this region to secure steady supply of natural resources and other raw materials, gradually pushing the regional developing countries to be trapped in resource curse.

	% Share ODA GDP	2000	2005	2008
African Developing Economies	Industry	35.5	38.8	40.7
	Manufacturing	12.8	11.6	10.5
	Mining&Utilities	18.4	23	25.8

¹⁴² Reconstructed from Lum et al.(2009), pp. 8.

¹⁴³ Reconstructed from United Nations Industrial Development Organization and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Economic Development in Africa Report 2011: Fostering Investment Development in Africa in the New Global Environment* (United Nations Publication, 2011), pp. 15.

Eastern Africa	Industry	18.6	20.6	20.3
	Manufacturing	10.4	10.3	9.7
	Mining&Utilities	3.1	3.6	3.7
Middle Africa	Industry	50.4	57.9	59.8
	Manufacturing	8.2	7.3	6.4
	Mining&Utilities	39.3	47.9	50.5
Northern Africa	Industry	37.8	45	46
	Manufacturing	12.8	11.3	10.7
	Mining&Utilities	19.5	28.2	29.8
Southern Africa	Industry	32.7	31.7	34.5
	Manufacturing	18.4	17.9	18.2
	Mining&Utilities	11.7	11.2	13.1
Western Africa	Industry	39.8	36.7	37.4
	Manufacturing	7.8	6	5
	Mining&Utilities	29.3	27.7	29.6

Source: UNCTAD/UNIDO

Overall, this allows China more room to maneuver the bilateral relations to its advantage. China's goal to realize its grand strategy seems to be well on its way at a stepping-stone called Africa. As a Tanzanian reporter succinctly notes,

With Chinese economic dominance, the West's political influence is gradually being eroded. In authoritarian countries like Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, the model of the Chinese development dictatorship, which prioritizes growth over freedom, has long been a welcome alternative to liberal democracy.¹⁴⁴

Assessment

Identifying China on the side of the developing world is a smart tactic that

¹⁴⁴ Grill(2014).

provides African countries a sense of mental support. Consequently, China mobilized great political as well as economic resources to foster closer relations between China and Africa, and so far result has been successful. "Liberation from ideological fronts freed China to pursue expanded and deeper relationships on the foreign policy front,"¹⁴⁵ as can be seen in the case of its approach to Africa. FOCAC, though held only once every three years, is very critical multilateral institution because it is the forum on which China can testify its sense of moral and economic superiority relative to Western democracies that frequently infringe on national sovereignty and abstain from providing financial assistance to the non-democratic regimes, acting contrary to them. China, unlike other Western countries, respects state sovereignty, and generously provides unprecedented economic packages without lengthy negotiations. Thus, an inference can be derived that China seems to believe economically generous benefit as a simple means to turn into political clout over African states. In last 5 times of FOCAC meetings, China set the targets and fulfilled them till the next meeting, and the repetition of such actions became the symbol of 'friendship'.

China scored high-level visits to most of the countries it holds diplomatic relations with. This is very an unprecedented move that cannot be expected from the West. Additionally, these visits followed by political as well as economic support make high-profile visits by China a very popular event among African states.

China began using economic package as a decoy to draw these African states closer, so as to wield influence on African countries. Nevertheless, in the process of continuous development, measures such as aid, loans, and investment were implemented to facilitate sustainable economic development at home, not just as a political means to influence others.

¹⁴⁵ Yu(2010), pp. 135.

5. Latin America Policy: Into the Rival's Backyard

Latin America is equipped with two distinct attributes when it comes to discourse on Chinese approach to the region. First, unlike other regions previously discussed, China virtually had almost no historical linkage with the region, and Chinese appearance in the region visible during the Cold War era was negligible at best. During the Mao era, though Mao Zedong himself included Latin America into his famous "Three Worlds Theory"¹⁴⁶ along with Asia and Africa in the category of 'Third World', Chinese presence in the region was meager one, mostly observed in the form of contacts with leftist guerilla forces by exporting revolutionary ideologies, rather than a formal state-to-state relationship.¹⁴⁷ This is due in large part to the fact that Latin America, with sheer geographical distance and as the proclaimed 'backyard of the United States' as enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine, had well-established American presence in the region. Chinese leadership was well-aware of that, and could not compete with the U.S. in such a setting.

Second, as a corollary of the first aspect, China is almost a new comer in Latin America. During the period of 1970s throughout the 1980s, the region saw series of establishment of bilateral relations with China,¹⁴⁸ and following Deng Xiaoping line of Pragmatic Diplomacy, the very nature of bilateral relations between both parties transformed into formal and economic one¹⁴⁹ away from informal and ideological one. Especially since 1990s, a series of mutual visits by top Chinese and Latin American

¹⁴⁶ 문흥호·신중호, "중국의 對중남미정책과 중·미관계," 『중소연구』, 통권 111호, 2006 가을, pp. 117.

¹⁴⁷ 김진오, "중국의 對중남미 경제협력 강화 배경과 전망," 『세계경제』, 2005.4, pp. 93.

¹⁴⁸ Recited from 강석찬, "중국의 중남미정책: 정책과 행위의 양면성을 중심으로," 『중국연구』, 14권(1995년 12월), pp. 174.

¹⁴⁹ 김진오(2005), pp. 93.

leaderships has consolidated ties based on expanded investment and trade, and also efforts were made to score diplomatic relations with other regional states that still recognize Taiwan as the sole legitimate China.¹⁵⁰ However, the density of mutual tie was not comparable to those China kept with other regions and it was not until after entering into the 21st century that relations got closer enough to buy world's attention. Thus, not like in Africa where China re-fixed its eyes to the continent only after the Tiananmen, China's emergence in Latin America can be seen as *utterly new*.

China's Interests in Latin America

That said, what are the driving reasons that dragged China into the region where it has to face unpleasant 'predominant power', the United States? One of the fundamental motivations can be found in the economic domain. China's interests in economic relations with Latin America can be categorized *mainly* as follows: market and primary products. To begin with, Latin America as a region is a good partner to do trade with. The region boasts population of over 600 million with approximately 5.6 trillion dollar economy size is fairly attractive to Chinese products.¹⁵¹ With many of the regional states falling into either high income or upper-middle income range,¹⁵² they

¹⁵⁰ 문흥호·신종호(2006), pp. 120.

¹⁵¹ Aggregate from the World Bank Data (accessed: April 20, 2014).

¹⁵² According to the World Bank, the range of upper middle income falls in between 4,086 U.S. dollars and 12,615 U.S. dollars, while that of high income is 12,616 U.S. dollars or higher, *The World Bank*, <http://data.worldbank.org/news/new-country-classifications> (accessed: April 19, 2014). As of 2011, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, The Bahamas, and St. Kitts and Nevis are categorized as high income countries while Peru, Mexico, Jamaica, Grenada, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Suriname, Uruguay, Chile, Cuba, Belize, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Lucia as the upper-middle income countries. *The World Bank*, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD> (accessed: April 19, 2014). 24 countries out of 33 countries in the region, including major economic players and markets, holding middle income or above are highly attractive to Chinese export industries.

have huge potential to absorb Chinese exports into the region. In his state visit to 4 Latin American countries, Chinese President Hu Jintao set the goal for the bilateral trade to reach 100 billion dollars by 2010 (only to be achieved ahead of schedule by 2007).¹⁵³ Just by the recent phenomena in which China became the largest trading partner of many Latin American countries, supplanting the U.S., one can gauge how China actively targeted and approached the region for the regional market.

Besides, China imports various kinds of primary products from Latin America, and this can be sub-categorized into energy, non-energy, and agricultural/food items. The fact that Latin American continent is home to abundant natural resources caught Chinese attention instantaneously. Just as in Africa, Beijing has launched aggressive forays to facilitate sustainable supply of oil from well-endowed partners to keep its economy running. As an extension of this, not surprisingly, China's devouring of natural resources is not limited to oil, but include such wide range of mineral resources as iron ore, steel, coal, zinc, lead, tin, nickel, copper, aluminum and timber.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, agricultural products and food such as soy, soybean milk, leather, meats, etc. are among the items that are imported to China in the category of primary materials.

Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that China moved into the region solely after economic interests. Latin America poses as a politically vital region for China. First of all, it is an arena where China and Taiwan unfold diplomatic contest over which represents the sole, legitimate government of 'China.' Out of 33 countries in the region, China currently has established diplomatic relations with 21 of the countries. Though currently such diplomatic competition subsided, thanks to Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou's call for 'truce' to stop dollar diplomacy to buy and hold friends and

¹⁵³ James Painter, "China Deepens Latin America ties," *BBC News*, November 21, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7737554.stm> (accessed: April 19, 2014).

¹⁵⁴ 문흥호·신종호(2006), pp.125-127.

China's tacit agreement by showing self-restraint and allowing Taiwan more access to international organizations,¹⁵⁵ the region holds possibility re-ignite such competition.

In security terms, it is a place where China can guard against the U.S. by gradually engaging with the region. China's engagement with the region has strengthened via its participation in various regional multilateral institutions in Latin America covering Inter-American Development Bank (became full member in 2008), Organization of American States (as an observer country), and many others, via forging diplomatic strategic partnerships with many countries on a bilateral basis, and encouraging party-to-party exchanges.¹⁵⁶ Along with such moves, China's military appearance in the region, though not impressive in size and importance, has opened a future gateway into the region where China can monitor its rival up north, namely the United States, at a closest point.

China's Diplomacy toward Latin America

To begin with, China has successfully penetrated into the Latin America market, and vice versa, as the Graph 6 illustrates. Under the strategy of 'Zou Chuqu'(literally meaning, 'Going Out') that was introduced on President Jiang Zemin's report at the 16th Party Congress in 2002 along with preexisting strategy of Yin Jinlai('Bring In')¹⁵⁷, Chinese government actively encourages Chinese businesses, especially the State Owned Enterprise(SOE)s and companies supported by the state, to go out to invest

¹⁵⁵Jessica Drun, "China-Taiwan Truce Holds Despite Gambia," *The Diplomat*, March 29, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-taiwan-diplomatic-truce-holds-despite-gambia/>(accessed: April 19, 2014).

¹⁵⁶ David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 113-115.

¹⁵⁷ "Full Text of Jiang Zemin's Report at 16th Party Congress," *China Internet Information Center*, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49007.htm#5> (accessed: May 2, 2014).

abroad.¹⁵⁸ However, the picture is more complex than one might think. Latin American countries, unlike those in Africa, are each placed in different level of development with different stakes in facing Chinese overture. This inevitably leads to "complex blends of symmetries and asymmetries, complementarities based on the occupation of identical economic niches."¹⁵⁹ Some countries like Ecuador show strong complementarities with China when it comes to industrial structure and trade. Mexico, on the other hand, is a good candidate for fierce competition, especially in production of automobiles and parts and components. Brazil, the largest economy in the region and with diversified structure of export, however, has both complementary and competitive aspects in doing trade with China.¹⁶⁰

However, the common denominator of the regional countries is the worry that cheap Chinese products entering into the region can hurt existing industries that cannot stand up against price competition with Chinese industries. While Chinese exports to the Latin America are price-competitive manufactured products and capital products, Chinese imports from the region consist largely of natural resources including energy and other primary products. Though Chinese authority voice complementary aspect-that means, China is in a better position to 'manufacture' while Latin America is better to specialize in 'cultivating' and extracting'-such call almost certainly falls on deaf ears. Wide-spread concerns on possible deindustrialization, failure to move up the value chain, and 'primarization'¹⁶¹ produced sentiment that China is no different from other Western

¹⁵⁸ Ariel C. Armony and Julia C. Strauss, "From Going Out (zou chuqu) to Arriving In (desembarco): Constructing a New Field of Inquiry in China-Latin America Interactions," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 209 (2012), pp. 2.


¹⁵⁹ Armony and Strauss(2012), pp. 4.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Rhys Jenkins and Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa, "Fear for Manufacturing? China and the Future of Industry in Brazil and Latin America," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 209 (2012), pp. 62-63; However, the authors note that, with Brazil as the case study, alleged claim that Brazil will face deindustrialization due to Chinese products is exaggerated. Though former lost some market

power that exploited the region to their advantage. Therefore, out of such concerns caused by cheap Chinese products flooding into the region, a few countries like Mexico and Argentina that granted China Market Economy Status (MES) has gone so far as to take heavy protectionist measures 'directed at' China in 2007.¹⁶² However, gains from Chinese engagement often are overwhelmed by the sheer negative perception of China in Latin America. It should be noted that positive aspects of the trade relations do exist, and with China driving up the price of commodities and importing immense amount of the raw materials to feed its resource-hungry economy, for instance, many resource-exporting countries like Chile, Peru, Venezuela, and Brazil(though not as dramatic as former three) are enjoying increase in foreign exchanges.

Graph 6. China-LA Trade Volume



Source WTO International Trade Statistics 2006(1995-2005), 2008(1997-2007), 2011(2000-2010), 2012(2001-2011), 2013(2002-2012).¹⁶³

share to China in the external markets of traditional industries and medium- to high-technology industries, the authors stress that it is not to a threatening extent but Brazil should be aware and well-prepared for what is coming up.

¹⁶² David Shambaugh and Dawn Murphy, "U.S.-China Interactions in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Latin America," in David Shambaugh (ed.), *Tangled Titans: The United States and China* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), pp. 336-337.

¹⁶³ WTO International Trade Statistics, http://wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its_e.htm (accessed: December 7, 2013).

The source of afore-mentioned apprehension can be found in the trade structure, in which Chinese imports are concentrated much on raw materials such as energy and non-energy natural resources. For instance, China Development Bank and Sinopec were signed into agreement to loan out 10 billion dollars to Brazil's Petrobras in return for 200 thousand barrels of oil every day for next 10 years in 2009.¹⁶⁴ Also, in 2007, Venezuela and China signed into a joint investment worth 6 billion dollars to build necessary infrastructure in the former and oil refineries (to process Venezuelan oil) in latter.¹⁶⁵ Late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, in 2009, promised to Beijing that Venezuela will quintuple its volume of oil export to China from 200 thousand barrels per day to 1 million barrels per day.¹⁶⁶ From the sheer size of the agreement based on which China will be supplied oil for its economy, two inferences can be derived. First, as a general rule, China needs more oil in absolute terms. With size of the Chinese economic pie ever growing, a corollary can be drawn that simply more oil is needed to run the 'bigger engine.' Second, as discussed above, it is a part of Chinese strategy on a global level to secure its oil supply by diversifying the suppliers. The Table 16 serves as an evidence for that argument, and demonstrates to what extent Latin American countries became significant trade partners of China in latter's energy calculus, securing and diversifying the sources of energy imports.

¹⁶⁴ Recited from Michael Cerna, "China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region," *China Research Center*, Vol.10, No.1, April 15, 2011, <http://www.china-center.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/> (accessed: April 29, 2014).

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Shambaugh and Murphy(2013), pp. 336.

Year	Sources	million tons	Year	Sources	million tons
2001	Iran	10.847	2012	Saudi Arabia	53.915
	Saudi Arabia	8.778		Angola	40.152
	Oman	8.14		Iran	21.926
	Fmr Sudan	4.973		Oman	19.567
	Angola	3.799		Iraq	15.684
	Viet Nam	3.362		Venezuela	15.291
	Indonesia	2.645		Kazakhstan	10.704
	Yemen	2.287		Kuwait	10.49
	Equatorial Guinea	2.146		United Arab Emirates	8.744
	Kuwait	1.46		Libya	7.306
	Qatar	1.326		Brazil	6.047
	Malaysia	0.899		Congo	5.365
	Cameroon	0.815		Yemen	3.584
	Nigeria	0.773		Colombia	2.909
	Brunei Darussalam	0.754		Algeria	2.572
	United Arab Emirates	0.65		Equatorial Guinea	2.001
Kazakhstan	0.65	Sudan	1.831		
Congo	0.642	Argentina	1.205		
Iraq	0.372	Malaysia	1.114		
Libya	0.25	Mexico	1.015		

Sources: UN Comtrade Statistics Database¹⁶⁷


Only a little more than a decade ago, none of the Latin American countries was on the top 20 exporter of oil to China. However, a decade later, a dramatic shift occurred, with a quarter of the list filled with the Latin American countries.

Furthermore, China's appetite for natural resources does not stop at oil but go so far as to encompass minerals. Shambaugh and Murphy note China, in 2008 for instance, imported "\$16.8 billion in iron ore; \$7.4 billion in copper ores; \$5.8 billion in

¹⁶⁷ *UN Comtrade Statistics Database*; The rank solely based on the UN Comtrade data. Data of a few countries can be missing due to sensitivity and/or confidentiality issue between the reporter and the partner.

refined copper; and lesser (but still significant) amounts of aluminum, nickel, lead ores, zinc, manganese, and molybdenum."¹⁶⁸ China also buys in from the region massive volume of soybeans, soy oil, fish meal, sugar, meats and leather goods for Chinese market.¹⁶⁹ One of the most recent data, as illustrated on the Graph 7 below, reveal raw materials including energy account for 70 percent of total Latin American exports to China of which more than three quarters are minerals.

Graph 7. Latin American Exports to China 2011



Sources: UN Comtrade Statistics Database. <http://comtrade.un.org/>

Table 17. Reported by PRC Aid in Latin America by Type 2002-2007		
	Amount (million USD)	Share
Natural Resources Extraction/Production	18585	69%
Infrastructure/Public Works	7535	28%
Not Specified/Other	608	2%
Humanitarian	32	0%
Military	0	0%
Technical Assistance	1	0%
Total	26761	100%

NYU Wagner School(2008).¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Shambaugh and Murphy(2013), pp.336.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Reconstructed from Lum et al.(2009), pp. 8.

Country	Type of Assistance or Investment	Description	Value
Brazil	Infrastructure/ Public Works	ports, aviation, rail	8.2 billion USD
		power plant	850 million USD
	Natural Resources	oil exploration	10 billion USD
Chile	Natural Resources	copper	500 million USD
	Infrastructure/ Public Works; Natural Resources	ports, shipping, mining	100 million USD
Columbia	Natural Resources	steel, oil exploration, mining	400 million USD
Costa Rica	Humanitarian, Infrastructure	X	400 million USD
	Infrastructure/Public Works; Natural Resources	stadium, oil refinery	130 million USD
Cuba	Humanitarian	hurricane relief-repair of hospitals	70 million USD
Grenada	Infrastructure/Public Works	tourist marina	83 million USD
Venezuela	Infrastructure/Public Works; Development; Natural Resources	oil and gas exploration and production; transportation, telecom, light industries	16.4 billion USD
		infrastructure, electricity, health and education	4 billion USD (to be paid back in oil)

Source: NYU Wagner School(2008).¹⁷¹

Ruben Gonzalez-Vincente identifies three general characteristics of Chinese mining investment as first, Chinese investors' capacities to develop infrastructure that

¹⁷¹ Reconstructed from Lum et al.(2009), pp. 15, 24.

will contribute to mining projects(in Tables above, one can easily find that more than a quarter of aid is used for building infrastructure and most of infrastructural projects are related with energy/non-energy raw material extraction activities and transport), second, limited reliance on stock markets for profit, and third, easy access of companies to credit from state banks (though he later picks out liberal governance regime and business strategy around Chinese market as replacing the first and the second notions in the case of Peru).¹⁷² Acquiring resources sure seems to be an imperative objective in the region, and Beijing seems to be so far successful to that end by being faithful to these strategies.

China's increasing engagement with the region in a manner that emphasizes mutual interest and provides financial support without much pre-conditions attached gives the Latin American countries some breathing space separate from that of the neighbor up-North. Many of the region's economies have fostered relations with China to the extent that China's presence is imperative to stimulate growth in the region that has gone through economic ups and downs since the 1980s. Therefore, China's position is gradually fomented into one that can potentially wield political influence based on growing regional economic clout. Then question arises: what has the U.S. done during all these times when China encroached on its 'backyard'? Graph 6 gives a hint to that question. One can easily observe that bilateral trade (namely, bilateral tie) began to be strengthened since the year 2003, posing a stark contrast to the previous years leading up to 2002. This can be explained by two important events happened at the turn of the Century. One is China's accession to World Trade Organization(WTO) with the following strategy of 'Zou Chuqu,' and the other is 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. The accession has placed China onto a better position to carry out trade with other countries and Zou Chuqu has actively encouraged Chinese enterprises to make investments in the

¹⁷² Ruben Gonzalez-Vincente, "Mapping Chinese Mining Investment in Latin America: Politics of Market?," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 209 (2012), pp. 37-40.

other parts of the world. In this context, many of the investments went to resource rich countries in Africa and Latin America. Graph 7 illustrates half of Chinese imports from Latin America comprises oil and other mineral resources, and therefore, economic interaction accelerated in the form of trade is attributable to Beijing's comprehensive efforts to open and engage itself with the world.

Also, 9/11 attacks led the then-U.S. president George W. Bush to focus on War on Terror in the Middle East, not paying close attention to Latin American issues.¹⁷³ During this period, the region was left without needed American attention, and that is when China made its way into the region. Beijing's penetration into the region is scored with important political-security implication. One analyst made an intriguing comment on such posture taken by China:

"Beijing might even be able to use its engagement with the region to diminish U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, or at least pressure Washington to commit more resources to the hemisphere-resources that might otherwise be deployed in Beijing's backyard, Southeast and Northeast Asia."¹⁷⁴

China's strategy to reinforce the bilateral relations is detected in multiple forms. First of all, the instances of Chinese participation in the multilateral forums have increased in dramatic manner. China currently places itself into a web of Latin American countries through its presence in regional organizations. In sharp contrast to Cold War era, just by looking at China's member/observer/dialogue partner status in such wide

¹⁷³ Robert Valencia, "US and China: The Fight for Latin America," *World Policy Institute*, June 24, 2013, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america> (access ed: April 17, 2014).

¹⁷⁴ Joshua Kurlantzick, "China's Latin Leap Forward," *World Policy Journal*, Vol.23 (2006), pp. 35.

range of forum as Inter-American Development Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank, the Organization of American States, the Rio Group, MERCOSUR, the Caribbean Community and Latin American Conference, the China-Latin America Forum, the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum, the China-Latin America Common Market Dialogue, the China-Andean Community Consultation Forum and the China-Latin American Business Summit,¹⁷⁵ one can gauge China's engagement with region is that of unforeseen one.

However, one should not overstate Chinese presence in these multilateral mechanisms because its memberships in most of these forums are symbolic at best. None of the above Latin American regional institutions carries strategic weight that is found in other regional multilateral mechanisms such as ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, FOCAC, and SCO. Therefore, Chinese approach to the regional countries is via reinforcing bilateral relations. Similar to other developing regions, China's strategy toward Latin America is marked by frequent high-profile visit by top Chinese leadership (see Tables 19 and 20¹⁷⁶).

Year	Leader	Position	Month/Country visited
2003	Wen Jiabao	Premier	December/ Mexico
2004	Li Zhaoxing	FM	October/ Barbados, Guyana
	Hu Jintao	President	November/ Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Cuba
2005	Zeng Qinghong	VP	January/ Mexico
	Hu Jintao	President	September/ Mexico
2006	Li Zhaoxing	FM	May/ Mexico, Bahamas

¹⁷⁵ Shambaugh and Murphy(2013), pp. 334.

¹⁷⁶ The most number of visits on Latin American countries is 7 times to Mexico. The number is quite low compared to those of other regions (17 times to Kazakhstan, 12 times to Thailand, 11 times to South Africa and Egypt). This comparatively low figure may be attributed to, as will be pointed out later, the fact that the region is the backyard of the U.S. and thus China had to be more cautious in its approach to Latin America.

	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	September/ Brazil, Uruguay, Chile
2007	NA	NA	NA
2008	Hu Jintao	President	November/ Costa Rica, Cuba, Peru
2009	Yang Jiechi	FM	January/ Brazil
	Xi Jinping	VP	February/ Mexico, Jamaica, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil
	Wu Bangguo	NPCSC Chair	September/ Cuba, Bahamas
2010	Hu Jintao	President	April/ Brazil
	Yang Jiechi	FM	July/ Cuba
	Yang Jiechi	FM	August/ Costa Rica
	Hu Jintao	President	November/ Venezuela
2011	Xi Jinping	VP	June/ Cuba, Uruguay, Chile
2012	Hu Jintao	President	June/ Mexico
	Wen Jiabao	Premier	June/ Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile
2013	Xi Jinping	President	June/ Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, Mexico

Source: Compiled information from *China Vitae* and Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.¹⁷⁷

Country	Number of visits
Barbados, Guyana, Peru, Jamaica, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago	1
Bahamas, Argentina, Venezuela	2
Uruguay, Costa Rica	3
Chile	4
Cuba	5
Brazil	6
Mexico	7

Besides its traditional tie with Cuba, China has developed bilateral relations to the point of upgrading it to diverse forms of strategic partnerships. As of June 2013, China has

¹⁷⁷ Compiled information based on records of top Chinese leadership visits to foreign countries from *China Vitae* and articles released by *Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China*.

established 'comprehensive strategic partnerships' with Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, and 'strategic partnerships' with Venezuela, Argentina and Chile.¹⁷⁸ Among these six, four upgrades in bilateral relations have occurred within one-year period. These countries are among the ones that China has biggest trade volumes with (that indirectly means these countries are resource-rich). Thus, one might think that China's intention here is to foster trade relations with these countries. True, but one must not forget that these are the ones that can wield the influence on the regional countries, should a need arises. Thus upgrading of bilateral relations with these countries is not a coincidence but rather a calculated move by China. This is to amplify its presence in the region and thus successfully restrain potential moves by the U.S. to mobilize these countries at China's expense.

Third, China has increased its military exchanges with Latin American countries. Gabriel Marcella argues that Chinese military activities can be understood in five dimensions: "(1) humanitarian, (2) peacekeeping, (3) military exchanges, (4) arms sales, and (5) technology transfer".¹⁷⁹ The most sensitive among these to the United States are military exchanges and arms sales. According to a report released by Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) under the U.S. Army War College, Chinese military engagement with the region is divided and put into activities of 5 classifications: "(1) meetings between senior military officials, (2) lower-level military-to-military interactions, (3) military sales, (4) military-relevant commercial interactions, and (5) Chinese physical presence within Latin America with military-strategic implications."¹⁸⁰ Though Chinese


¹⁷⁸ Venezuela (2001) Argentina (November 2004), Brazil (June 2012), Chile (June 2012), Mexico (June 2013), and Peru (April 2013). Compiled from articles released by *Xinhua* and *People's Daily*.

¹⁷⁹ Gabriel Marcella, "China's Military Activity in Latin America," *Americas Quarterly* (Winter, 2012), <http://americasquarterly.org/Marcella> (accessed: April 20, 2014).

¹⁸⁰ R. Evan Ellis, "China-Latin American Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," *Strategic Studies Institute Monograph*, August 2011, P. IX-X,

arms export to Latin America explains only small portion of its overall arms exports (see Graph 8), the sales are 'increasing.'¹⁸¹ That said, the U.S. cannot take its eyes off the Chinese military interaction with the region. Though recognized the Chinese engagement itself is not necessarily a problem, the SSI report is concerned with scenarios in which (1) Chinese interests in the region are damaged, (2) Chinese weapons systems go into the hands of countries hostile not just to surrounding countries, but also the United States, and last and most significant, (3) U.S.-China relations degenerate.¹⁸² Though avoiding the worst scenario possible, the U.S. "will find its freedom of action in the region constrained in ways that were not the case in the past."¹⁸³

Graph 8. China's Worldwide Arms Sales 2005-2010



Source: PRC Worldwide Arms Sales. Arms sales for 2005-2010, by region. *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011*.¹⁸⁴

However, overall assessment is that China's posture in the Latin America is

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077> (accessed: April 14, 2014).

¹⁸¹ Cynthia Watson, "China's Use of the Military Instrument in Latin America: Not Yet the Biggest Stick," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.66, No.2 (Spring/Summer, 2013), pp. 108.

¹⁸² Ellis(2011), pp. 41-42.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011," *U.S. Department of Defense*, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf (accessed: April 18, 2014).

somewhat restrained because it is well-aware of U.S. sensitivities to China's presence in the place it has considered its own 'backyard.' Also, China does not show any intention of showing outright challenge to the U.S. presence in the region. Gonzalo Sebastian Paz points to an incidence in which Argentina Kirchner's secret request for Chinese financial help to pay off debt with the International Monetary Fund was rejected by China for latter's calculation to avoid creating perception of hegemonic challenge to the U.S. that embodies its Latin American policy via IMF.¹⁸⁵ Such restraint can be understood in the fact that China's presence in all dimension of state power is not firmly established to move on to such an adventure, as was observed at the earlier stage of China's relations with the region during the Cold War. However, with China's power growing stronger and its voices more influential than any other point of history since its founding, there is high possibility that current state of its posture in the region will be subject to change with (upward) adjustment in its global standing.

Assessment

China's emergence and integration with the region is analogous to an airplane that just took off and finding itself several miles off the ground within a few minutes. At a very fast pace, China had forged cooperative relations with regional countries in economic, political, and security domains. Entering into a new millennium, bilateral trade took off, recording over 200 billion dollars in volume which is approximately 20-fold increase from the year 2000-level. Not just economic, but also political ties are ever strengthening with China utilizing upgrade of its relations with major countries in the

¹⁸⁵ Recited from Gonzalo Sebastian Paz, "China, United States and Hegemonic Challenge in Latin America: An Overview and Some Lessons from Previous Instances of Hegemonic Challenge in the Region," *The China Quarterly*, Vol.209 (2012), pp. 24-25.

region and having joined various regional multinational organizations. To a lesser extent, China's military interactions with the region contribute to forming cooperative relationship with the countries involved. All these efforts gave Latin America that was 'tied' to the U.S. some breathing space in a manner avoiding total dependence to their 'big brother' up North. Also such Chinese endeavors have opened a gateway for China to expand its presence in the region, creating a new regional dynamics involving the U.S., China, and Latin American countries.

Despite such a new dynamics, China has shown restraints on the actions it takes. Such a move is designed not to alarm the U.S. for fear of its growing presence in the region can be hindered by the concerned rival in the North. However, the issue of status quo with current situation is open to debate. As its international status rises along with its growing power and influence, China will be able to find more room to maneuver the situation to its advantages in order to affect the status quo, or its currently restrained posture in the 'backyard' of the U.S. Nonetheless, the process will be one of gradual and nuanced approach, than outright confrontation.

6. Chinese Foreign Policies toward Developing Countries from a Comparative Angle

Comparative Analysis

This section is devoted to cross-check China's foreign policies toward developing countries in each region, and present summary of comparative analysis over these regional diplomacies. The previous chapters presented the discussion of Chinese

developing country diplomacy by region, and China's motivations (interests) and the policies (strategies) it takes are summarized in the Tables 21 to 25.

Table 21. Central Asia Policy	
Summary	
Main Interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ limit U.S. and Russian influence and expand its own in the region ▶ demarcate borderline, fight 'Three Evils' (Separatism, Religious Extremism, and Terrorism), and build transportation corridor connected to Europe ▶ diversify energy supply sources
Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Shanghai Cooperation Organization under which to deal with security issues along the border ▶ high number of VIP visits ▶ loan and investment through pipeline projects since mid-2000s ▶ strategic partnerships with all 5 regional states.

Table 22. Southeast Asia Policy	
Summary	
Main Interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ break out of post-Tiananmen isolation, dispel 'China Threat theory', and expand its influence in the region ▶ secure peripheral stability, territory in South China Sea, markets for Chinese goods, and sources of raw materials ▶ address regional non-traditional security issues
Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ more (nuanced) emphasis on continental Southeast Asia ▶ participation in various multilateral institutions →GMS(since 1992), ASEAN+1, +3 (since late 1990s), ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership (2003), SEANWFZ (2004), CAFTA (basic framework in 2002, FTA in work since 2010) ▶ frequent VIP visits ▶ strategic partnerships with 7 of ASEAN countries.

Table 23. Africa Policy	
Summary	
Main Interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ break out of post-Tiananmen isolation and secure supporters at international organizations ▶ diversify energy supply sources and acquire other raw materials

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ secure market for Chinese goods
Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ assiduous efforts to pay VIP visits(in between 2003 and 2013, VIP visits to 85 percent of regional countries recognizing PRC) ▶ generous offer of aid and loan, and investment in resource extraction/production and infrastructural construction ▶ triennial FOCAC(2003) as the main mechanism by which to engage with Africa ▶ strategic partners with geo-strategically important regional states

Table 24. Latin America Policy	
Summary	
Main Interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ win diplomatic competition with Taiwan ▶ increase its regional presence from near total absence and guard against the U.S. ▶ diversify energy supply sources and acquire other raw materials ▶ secure market for Chinese goods
Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ VIP visits and strategic partners with influential or natural-resource-endowed regional states ▶ investment in resource extraction/production and infrastructural construction ▶ participation in many multilateral mechanisms (OAS, IDB, Rio Group, MERCOSUR, China-Latin America Forum, etc.) ▶ low-profile military exchanges

Table 25. Characteristics of China's developing country diplomacy by region	
Summary	
Central Asia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Expand range of cooperation from security to economic dimension ▶ bilateral approach on the driver's seat; SCO, though ambitious initially, shrunken to supplementary role due to impact from two superpowers in one organization
Southeast Asia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Proactively engage and gradually 'socialize' itself based on its own assessment of itself as a responsible power ▶ more active in multilateral fashion due to reluctance of regional states to deal with China on bilateral basis; even economic integration on a multilateral basis
Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Establish sphere of influence

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ FOCAC, unlike SCO, plays prominent role; though bilateral contacts are still more important, FOCAC's symbolic function as uniting forum by China and Africa is enormous ▶ targeted partnerships with a few countries
Latin America	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Guard against the U.S. ▶ bilateral approach on the driver's seat with multilateral participation having and carrying no substantial role or significance ▶ targeted partnerships with a few countries

From the above tables, one might think that there does not seem to be any set of established and coherent elements in developing country foreign policies for China. On the surface, that observation might be valid. There does not seem to be overlapping, or penetrating, elements when one examines China's developing country diplomacy toward respective region, except Beijing's desires to extract natural resources from all corners of the world to diversify sources of energy and other non-energy raw materials. Even, weight that either bilateral or multilateral diplomacy carries is different from one another. Bilateral approach seems to be on the driver's seat when it comes to China's developing country diplomacy, but, in some regions like Africa and Southeast Asia, activities via multilateral mechanism carry comparable significance. However, I find this is attributable to regional states' perception toward China and presence of other major power in the regional scene.

To begin with, China's stronger emphasis on which form of diplomacy between bilateral and multilateral approach is largely affected by regional states' perception toward China. For instance, African states, almost deserted after the Cold War's end, was thirsty for attention from a major international player and China was, to the eyes of African leaders, was one last hope. Therefore, when China launched multilateral forum such as FOCAC in 2000, many of African states welcomed such moves, and number of forum's participants gradually increased. In contrast, however, to the eyes of ASEAN

countries, negative image of China from the Cold War era remained even during the post-Cold War era so that these countries were cautious toward overtures from China that is on the way to becoming a world's superpower. Thus, ASEAN countries were always in favor of dealing with China in multilateral fashion, rather than on bilateral basis. Also, initial negative perception of Central Asian states on China led them to bind China in the institutional framework of SCO together with Russia.

Second, China's relative emphasis on bilateral diplomacy is observed in regions where there is(or are) other established major power(s). This line of thinking is instrumental in explaining why countries in Latin America, the region that experienced neglect from the U.S. caught in War on Terror in Middle East, saw China as a potential engine of regional growth and vitality, but did not see comparable development of multilateral diplomacies between China and the region. This is because, in regions where China competes (outright or tacitly) against other established power(s) for influence, regional states can acquire more latitude in their action. Therefore, China's developing country diplomacy in Central Asia and Latin America are characterized mainly as bilateral approach. Though Beijing participates in regional multilateral mechanisms in both Central Asia and Latin America, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, though ambitiously launched at the beginning, was relegated to a supplementary institution, and Chinese participation in various Latin American intergovernmental organizations carries no more than symbolic importance.

The case of Southeast Asia is somewhat complicated and needs extra explanation. Though the U.S. maintains its presence in Southeast Asia, ASEAN countries adhere to multilateral diplomacy in dealing with China. This is related with 'hostility variable' embedded in relations between China and ASEAN countries. As previously mentioned, China has a history of invading Vietnam during the Cold War era. Also, China and a few of ASEAN countries have developed on-going tensions

surrounding territories in South China Sea for several decades. As a country develops its current strategic thinking on others based on the memory built up from past, this potential threat from Beijing, which I identified as a hostility variable, is embedded in relations between China and ASEAN, leading the latter to stick to multilateral setting.

Also worth noting is that established strategic partnerships with developing countries show different pattern according to geographical distance. In nearby regions like the Central Asia or Southeast Asia, China established some kind of strategic partnerships with all or almost all the regional states. On the contrary, in case of African and Latin America that are geographically distant, China established strategic partnerships with a few countries. This difference can be accounted for as follows. First, the sheer number of countries in Africa and Latin America are simply too many for China to establish strategic partnerships with them all. 'Strategic partnerships,' by definition, can be established when involved parties consider each other as having strategic values to each other. However, though many of African or Latin American states might see their relations with China elevating to strategic partnerships as valuable and important, it is highly likely that China does not see strategic values in small and underdeveloped countries. Some countries that China is unlikely to establish strategic relations with, however, have something that can make themselves appear to be strategic to Chinese eyes: crude oil and other raw materials.

Second, geographical distance itself is an important variable that explains China's more 'comprehensive' establishment of strategic partners. China has various political, security, and economic interests on countries that touch on its borders. As pointed out throughout this research, China has revealed its desire to keep periphery stable and conducive to sustainable development and supply of energy, diffuse China Threat theory, enhance its image as a responsible and peaceful power, and gradually expand its sphere of influence. Therefore, development of intimate relations with

surrounding countries is imperative, and it is not hard to see that a series of strategic partnership agreements are output of such strategic thinking. However, geographically distant Africa and Latin America lack parity in strategic assessment. This leads Beijing to upgrade relations with a few regional powers that can wield influence on other regional states or that are endowed with immense natural resources China finds imperative to sustain its development.

These very differences found in regional diplomacy might lead one to think that China lacks any established coherent developing country diplomacy. Nonetheless, if one takes some variables-situational and functional factors-into account, more meaningful interpretation can be produced. To begin with, one of the situational variable is '*change in international status of China.*' When China was vulnerable on its footing after isolated by the Western countries and the collapse of Soviet-led Communist bloc, Beijing was desperate to reach out to the developing countries that can provide diplomatic support in the international politics as seen in the case of Africa. Also, China aspired to enhance its fallen image post-Tiananmen to relieve surrounding neighbors and, thus, have its development path unaffected by political hardship. This reaching out to the developing world was voluntary, but '*passively voluntary.*' This oxymoron well-captures Chinese developing country diplomacy immediately after the Cold War's end since, rather than reaching out to the world because it was glad to do so, China 'had to' extend its hands for survival.

'Passively voluntary' diplomatic posture lasts till the second major adjustment in Chinese diplomacy occurs in late-1990s. Successfully warding off sweeping financial crisis in Asia in late 1990s and engaging comprehensively with the world via accession to WTO, China was more confident of itself, taking bolder approach of extending hands to all four regions discussed in this paper. In Southeast Asia, Beijing established its image as a 'responsible power' by not devaluing its currency and participated in

ASEAN+1 and +3 framework. Also it joined in a series of confidence building measures such as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in early 2000s. In case of Africa, Beijing launched Forum on China-Africa Cooperation(FOCAC) in 2000, and, in Central Asia, it led initiative to launch Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) in 2001. Last, in Latin America, "in what may one day be considered the turning point of Latin America's shift away from the U.S. relations,"¹⁸⁶ Hu paid visits to five Latin American countries of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba, and signed 39 *commercial deals* with these countries¹⁸⁷ in 2004. Investments signed in for Argentina alone reached approximately 20 billion dollars. So, although forms of approach differ by region, Chinese overtures can be assessed to be based on newly-acquired self-confidence and courage. Therefore, the Chinese behaviors since the late-1990s can be understood as '*actively voluntary*.'

Second situational variable worthy of noting is '*presence of major power(s) in the region*.' In doing diplomacy with developing countries in respective region, China seems to be very much affected by the fact that there is already an established power. Therefore, often China looks for places where it can find more freedom of actions. Beijing smartly caught the opportunity that the strategic values of African states among the major powers were relegated with the closing of Cold War by a set of measures that resemble Japanese ODA diplomacy. Also, Chinese active posture in Southeast Asia corresponds to temporary U.S. neglect in the region, and its forays into U.S. backyard correspond to relative indifference U.S. showed toward Latin America while its attention was caught in the 'War on Terror' in the Middle East. In case of Central Asia where Russian influence co-existed with that of the United States, and where China could not

¹⁸⁶ Cerna(2011)

¹⁸⁷ Saul Landau, "Chinese Influence on the Rise in Latin America," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, June 2005, <http://www.other-news.info/2005/07/chinese-influence-on-the-rise-in-latin-america/> (accessed: April 25, 2014).

discover similar chances as in other regions, compromised by what we see as dual leadership in the SCO framework. SCO, itself, provided decent institutional framework through which China could enter into and engage with Central Asian republics by economic cooperation based on investment and loan.

Last, Chinese developing country diplomacy reveals a functional variable: emphasis on principle. Though the nature and contents are different, as examined in the first chapter of this research, both U.S. and Soviet Union pursued its own national interest in the process of diplomacy with the Third World under the banners of democracy and markets, and communism, respectively. The presence of ideological elements, therefore, characterizes Third World diplomacy of both the U.S. and Soviet Union as ideology-driven diplomacy. In contrast, China's developing country diplomacy centers on principles and Beijing sends its overtures to the developing countries by presenting Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which later changed and developed into New Security Concept in 1996 reflecting conditions of the post-Cold War era.¹⁸⁸ The ideals U.S. and Soviet promoted during the Cold War were often related to changing system of government and society of a state, but these principles Beijing advocates leave the existing system intact because they are designed to apply to the *modus operandi* of diplomacy, not domestic political system. Also, the principles per se are different from ones that are in common use internationally (namely the principles that are advocated by the U.S. and Europe) and can be assessed to carry China's 'will' since they are created by Beijing itself. This 'principle-centered diplomacy' was designed to justify its approaches toward developing countries, many of which are branded authoritarian states

¹⁸⁸ The elements of 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' are mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in the internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The New Security Concept comprises 4 core concepts of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation. For more details of these two concepts, refer to 조영남(2009), pp. 238-246.

that often disregard human rights (thus not follow the Western model of democracy) by the West that tries to 'discipline' them via various channels. Therefore, Beijing's stress on non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit itself is attracting 'followers' and facilitating bilateral relations between involved parties at China's initiative. Given these favorable environment, China can develop mutual ties with these countries and, in the long run, help secure its national interests that can be found in the regional states. The case of most of African states that reject Western 'ideology', but accept Chinese 'principles', and the cases in which China foster closer relations to the extent that cooperation in energy sector is reached, well-capture the notion of Beijing's principle-centered diplomacy in the Third World.

China's Developing Country Diplomacy: which style?

Given above explanations, which category of developing country diplomacy will Chinese case fall into? Unfortunately, Chinese case does not fall into any single category in a clear-cut manner. The form of the diplomacy, as demonstrated above, is "principle-centered," but 'principle-centered diplomacy' alone does not exactly capture Chinese version of developing country diplomacy. China's foreign policies toward developing countries simultaneously have similar elements of Japan's ODA diplomacy such as giving aid, loans, and investments to the states that Beijing considers have strategic (political, economic, or security) value. At the same time, the goals are more in line with those of Japanese ODA diplomacy. Post-Tiananmen China was in dire need to improve its image, and secure stable markets and resources that could sustain its economic development and go up the ladder of international status. Japan shares very similar developmental/diplomatic history as it had to rise back up from the ashes of war-torn country through achieving the goals that China also worked hard to achieve.

Nevertheless, when it comes to putting China into Japan's case, the former does not fit in either. Therefore, I posit that what we see and consider as Chinese style developing country diplomacy is a whole new version that combines principles and economic 'gifts,' and does not fall into any of the major power style diplomacy category proposed in the introductory chapter of this thesis.

Then, how does Chinese diplomacy toward developing countries demonstrate differences from those of the United States, Soviet Union, and Japan? To find answers to this question, one should note that the type of diplomacy a country pursues is intimately intertwined with international status of the country. In case of the United States and Soviet Union, both countries turned out to be the winners of the World War II, and are the ones that designed the post-War World order. Though the world after 1945 was characterized as bi-polar system in which neither superpower enjoyed global hegemony, each one of them was a hegemon in respective bloc or sphere of influence. Put differently, both the U.S. and Soviet Union were already well-established 'leaders' of each camp from the beginning. Therefore, they could mobilize resources and exploit their international standing by pursuing ideological elements when implementing diplomacies toward developing countries. However, China's case departs from both superpowers' in that Beijing's position has never been as concrete as latter's since mid-19th century. Though China often called for leadership role among the Third World countries, it did not have comparable political, economic, and military resources to, first, build its own sphere of influence, and, second, consolidate its position as leader among the 'followers.' The situation did not improve much even after the Soviet collapsed. Rather, China found the post-Cold War world more hostile and problematic given a series of events that led to its international isolation. Overall, unlike the United States and Soviet Union, China was in no concrete position to force, not to mention transplant, its ideology to other countries. Therefore, the principles and concepts were designed to

pull China out of struggle to enhance its image, make friends, and thus eventually move up the ladder of international status. That is why principles such as Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and New Security Concept of Chinese foreign policies are focused on *modus operandi* of the international relations, rather than aim at triggering internal systemic transformation of a country because latter approach is sure to encounter with backlash from most of developing countries that desire freedom from external interference in their domestic affairs. Also, as noted earlier on, many of developing countries are the ones criticized by the West for non-democratic political systems that often accompany violation of human rights. Therefore, approaching to these countries, from Beijing's point of view, carries risk of potential damage on its image, and thus had to be backed up by a set of principles that can justify its overtures toward these non-democratic countries. In short, nature and intention of 'principle-centered diplomacy' is different from ideology-driven diplomacy of the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, latter is not appropriate in accounting for China's developing country diplomacy since 1990s.

Then, one might think Chinese version of foreign policies toward developing region can be explained by Japanese ODA diplomacy. Such supposition is partially valid due to the fact that Beijing's access to the developing countries is facilitated by huge economic gifts in the form of ODAs, write-off of debts, FDIs, etc. Intention behind the diplomacy holds similar by and large because both Japan and China look to recover the international status that they once enjoyed. However, China's developing country diplomacy is carried out under a broader framework of grand strategy. China, unlike Japan, is on the relatively unfettered position in international political, security, and economic domains. First, China is a member of P-5 of the United States Security Council. With China holding a veto power at UN, identifying itself as one of the developing countries and armed with Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence under

which it promises not to interfere with internal affairs of other states, developing countries see rallying behind China as potentially beneficial to their interests. As previously mentioned, in the international politics that is dictated by and operated under international law, and therefore, number of votes matters more than power a country can wield, a group of supporters on the Chinese side along with pre-existing political resources could place China onto a freer and 'better' political environment than Japan that lacks comparable number of supporters. Besides, China is militarily independent in contrast to Japan that depends in large part to the U.S. for its security. Accordingly, in case of Japan, military measures (euphemism for force) cannot serve as an instrument of foreign policies in projecting influence and securing interests. However, Beijing's military resources can be used as a diplomatic tool as demonstrated by, for instance, a series of military exercises with the SCO member states and its firm stance in the South China Sea. The fact that rising Japan in 1980s experienced its status did not move beyond economic superpower reveals that China's rise in all dimensions of state power carries very different implications. Furthermore, China that is experiencing average growth rate of approximately 9 percent per annum for last 30-plus years is equipped with more economic resources it can mobilize to attract developing countries than Japan, struggling to get out of economic quagmire for last two decades, does. Therefore, China's developing country diplomacy is designed and implemented at the global strategic dimension to restore its 'due status,' and must be very different from Japanese ODA policy that is endowed with structural restraints.

Consequently, China's developing country diplomacy in the post-Cold War era cannot be treated as any of developing country diplomacies by the 3 major powers of the United States, Soviet Union, and Japan. Rather, this author argues that it has to be categorized as a distinct form of foreign policies due to (1) the differences in nature and intention of strategy between China and other major countries and (2) consideration of

state capacity, both of which originate from Beijing's own assessment over its international status.

7. Conclusion

This study has examined China's developing country diplomacy by employing regional approach. Chinese diplomatic postures toward developing countries in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America were explored by following Beijing's interests in the political, security, and economic issue areas. Though seemingly absent of any coherent set of developing country diplomacy that is applicable to all four regions examined, this research found out that China's developing country diplomacy is much affected by China's change in international status. As China overcomes hardships and gains more confidence, its posture toward developing world shifts from one of 'passively voluntary' to 'actively voluntary' one. Second, China's developing country diplomacy is affected by presence of established major powers in the region. When its state power is not so strong, China looked for places where it could avoid encounter with such powers, or created institution through which it could enter and engage with the regional states. Third, China uses a set of principles such as Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and New Security Concept to justify its diplomatic behavior toward developing countries. The host countries find it comfortable in dealing with such principles while reluctant and often avoid accepting ideology promoted by a certain superpower due to such ideology's nature of structural transformation in domestic politics and society of host countries.

On the first finding, China responded to 2 major foreign policy adjustments during the post-Tiananmen era and in late-1990s. This boils down to China's omni-

directional diplomacy that was initiated after the Cold War. Therefore, through investigation into the regional developing country diplomacy of China from a comparative angle, this author affirmed China's Third World country diplomacy have been carried out as a part of grand strategy.

On the second finding, I interpret such careful approach was based on China's relatively weak power and its corresponding international standing. Therefore, in the era when China's rise is being materialized, a somewhat different picture will be produced on this notion. As the political, economic, and military armors that China is wearing gets increasingly thicker, Beijing can better stand against possible blows from its potential foe regardless of in what form. Therefore, China will find more psychological comfort in dealing with other major powers, and will be more open, audacious or even brazen once in a while. Alleged China's assertiveness in the South China Sea may be understood in this context that Beijing is simply more confident to be more vocal on what it considers as harmful to its national interest. That does not mean that the established powers will not sit by idly, watching a python turning into a huge dragon. The responses from these powers to any signs of seeming Chinese challenge to their interests will be more determined and intense than before. This is the point where potential conflicts can erupt.

On the third finding, China has never tried to export ideology as a tool to buy influence since the Reform era began. However, a consistent set of principles that leave countries with different political systems alone have become deeply-rooted in China's foreign policy and, paradoxically, most of the developing countries that have tasted these 'sweets' have welcomed and looked to such principles as an alternative to ideologies imposed by others that often intend to transplant their values and systems.

On this issue of finding 'precursor' of Chinese developing world diplomacy, an assessment can be given what matters in explaining particular series of interactions in

international society called 'diplomacy' is the underlying purposes. Therefore, looking at the purposes/goals of previous policies is a very good starting point from which to understand how the later policies with similar purposes will be developed. By following the way Japanese purposes of their ODA diplomacy developed, one can gauge in which way Chinese diplomacy toward the Third World will develop.

In case of Japan, after long period of reconstructing its image and securing market and resources, the country wanted a bigger voice in the international politics. So the goal of the policy was readjusted to one calling for more prominent role in the international affairs. Would the Chinese follow suit after Japan? Yes, because it is undeniable fact that China is on the rise, and China will unavoidably find it demand more appropriate level of responsibilities comparable to its newly-acquired status (unless "China-is-the-largest-developing-country" rhetoric continues). At the same time, China is in more favorable position compared to Japan three decades ago when Japan Bashing was prevalent in the United States. First, Chinese economy is growing and projected to grow at current growth rate for, more or less, next decade.¹⁸⁹ Second, unlike Japan that had its 'purse' full, but was not armed with 'guns,' China holds both 'full purse' and 'loaded guns' on its hands. This means that Beijing will have more options available when it comes to going after due international role. Therefore, China is likely to follow Japanese suit, and if does so, the prospect is more optimistic than Japan's case in which Tokyo lacked similar level of resources Beijing is equipped with.

Throughout this study, I could confirm that omni-directional diplomacy which has become one of critical pillars of Chinese diplomatic strategies in the post-Cold War era are strenuously enacted, reaching its 'active' hands to developing countries all around, even across oceans. As found in the analysis above, Chinese developing country

¹⁸⁹ 조영남(2013), pp. 52.

diplomacy has much in common with Japan's ODA policy of the Cold War era in purpose-wise, but created its own principles to facilitate implementing grand strategy in corners of the world where the West declines to 'compliment' those authoritarian regimes rejecting to follow the West, marking difference with the ideology-driven diplomacy of the U.S. and Soviet Union. China uses its own version of diplomacy toward developing countries as a part of its grand strategy to recoup its lost seat as the world's leading power, and it is expected that the purpose of the policy is likely to face major adjustment as Beijing's international status moves upward and consolidates.

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국문초록

국제 지위가 상승하고 있는 중국은 개발도상국들을 자신의 부상을 위한 중요한 존재로 인식하며 이들과 매우 적극적인 외교활동을 벌이고 있다. 그러나 개개의 국가가 중국의 전략적 구상에서 차지하는 가치가 지역별로 상이하기 때문에 중국이 보편적으로 적용할 수 있는 하나의 개발도상국 외교정책을 수립한 것 같지는 않다. 이러한 사실은 몇 가지 중요한 질문들을 남긴다. 첫째, 탈냉전기 중국의 개발도상국 외교는 지역별로 어떻게, 그리고 얼마나 다른가? 또한 지역 별로 상이한 특징을 가지고 있음에도 불구하고, 중국의 개발도상국 외교는 지역을 관통하는 일관된 요소가 있는가?

따라서, 이 논문은 중국이 자신의 세력과 영향력을 각 지역에 얼마나 그리고 어떠한 형태로 확대해 나가고 있는지를 검토하고, 정치적, 안보적, 경제적 이익에 따른 중국의 아시아, 아프리카, 라틴아메리카 개발도상국들에 대한 외교를 관찰함으로써 위에서 언급한 연구질문에 타당한 답안을 제시하고자 한다. 이러한 분석에 기초하여, 본 논문은 2차 대전 이후 세계 강대국들(미국, 소련, 일본)의 냉전기 및 탈냉전기 제3세계외교(즉, 개발도상국외교) 중, 중국의 개도국외교의 형태가 어느 국가의 제3세계외교와 가장 유사한지 살펴볼 것이다.

이러한 비교분석은 몇 가지 흥미로운 사실을 시사한다. 첫째, 지역 개도국 외교를 전개하는 중국이 양자외교와 다자외교 중 어느 형태의 외교에 강조점을 두는지는 중국에 대한 역내 국가들의 인식이 결정적으로 작용한다. 둘째, 이미 타(他)강대국의 세력이 확립된 지역 및 중국과 지리적으로 인접한 지역들에서는 양자외교를 중심으로 개발도상국 외교를 전개한다.

하지만 이러한 지역외교의 차이점에도 불구하고 중국의 개발도상국 외교가 지닌 지역을 관통하는 요소들을 발견할 수 있었다. 첫째, 탈냉전기 개발도상국에서의 중국의 존재(presence)는 '국제지위의 변화'에 의해 결정되었다. 여기에 더해, 중국의 개발도상국 외교는 1990년대 후반을 기점으로 자신감을 얻어 '소극적 자발성(passively voluntary)'에서 '적극적 자발성(actively voluntary)'을 보여주는 외교로 전환하였다. 또한 중국은 역내 타 강대국의 존재에 매우 민감하여 이들로부터 행동의 자유를 얻을 수 있는 지역을 선호한다. 마지막으로 중국의 개발도상국외교는 '원칙중심외교(principle-centered diplomacy)'이다.

어떤 유형의 개발도상국외교가 중국에 가장 부합하는가에 대한 질문과 관련해서는, 공교롭게도 중국은 위에서 언급한 그 어느 개도국 외교의 유형에도 뚜렷하게 들어맞지 않음을 알 수 있다. 국내 정치 체제의 전환을 동반하는 미국과 소련의 이념과는 달리, '평화공존5원칙'과 '신안보관'과 같은 중국의 '원칙'은 정치 체제가 아닌 외교의 운용방식(modus operandi)에 초점을 두기 때문에 기존의 체제를 유지하는 부분에서 상이성을 발견할 수 있다. 또한 비록 중국의 접근이 일본의 경우와 같이 거대한 경제력에 기반하여 이루어지고 있지만, 그리고 중국과 일본 모두 일종의 ODA외교를 전개하는 것은 비슷하지만, 중국의 개발도상국 외교는 대전략의 보다 광범위한 정책기조하에 추진되고 있다. 게다가, 일본과 다르게 중국은 국제 정치, 경제, 안보 영역에서 자율성을 확보하고 있기 때문에 가용할 수 있는 자원이 더욱 많다.

결과적으로, 탈냉전기 중국의 개발도상국 외교는 미국, 소련, 일본의 그것 중 어느 것으로도 분류될 수 없다. 오히려 중국의 개발도상국 외교는 국제지위에 대한 스스로의 평가에서 나온 (1) 다른 국가들과의 '전략의 성격 및 의도의 차이'와 (2) 자신의 '국가역량에 대한 고려'에 기초를 둔 전혀 다른 유형의 개발도상국 외교라고 보는 것이 타당하다.

주요어: 중국의 개발도상국 외교, 대전략, 지역외교, 원칙중심외교, ODA 외교, 국제지위

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