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문학석사학위논문

Even, Still, and But:
**A Distinctive Class of Background
Meaning**

Even, still, but의 배경 의미 탐구

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Abstract

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This study aims to explore the background implications of English words *even*, *still*, and *but*: unlikelihood, expectation, and contrast, respectively, characterized by their subjectivity. In contrast with previous works, this study is particularly interested in the validity of different semantic and pragmatic approaches in characterizing the implications with respect to context.

The implications in focus have not been thoroughly investigated in previous works. Most pieces concerning these items are pragmatics book chapters on

conventional implicature, which present the three words as typical triggers of conventional implicatures. Opposed to the conventional implicature approach, Bach (1999) argues that the notion itself is deceptive, and the implications vary in meaning according to the context. Neither view, however, analyzes distinctive properties of the context within which the implications occur nor attempts to verify their superordinate based on more widely supported and comprehensive approaches like pragmatic presupposition or not-at-issue content.

This work utilizes three frameworks to describe the phenomena: conventional implicature, pragmatic presupposition, and not-at-issue content. First, taking a conventional implicature approach, I demonstrate that although these implications are conventionally rooted, their specific meanings derive from the context of conversation. Second, within the framework of the common ground theory of pragmatic presuppositions, the implications are observed to have a common ground requirement and occur in extensive contexts stretching from immediate linguistic context to general world knowledge. These properties set them apart from informative and anaphoric presuppositions alike, which is problematic for the account of accommodation in the theory.

Finally, the implications are analyzed within the framework of the not-at-issue content theory (Tonhauser et al., 2013). Adopting the taxonomy system in Tonhauser et al. (2013), I propose that the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* are projective not-at-issue contents of Class D, which show a strong contextual felicity constraint but no obligatory local effect. Class D in Tonhauser et al. (2013)

includes a few discourse-related inferences, but not conventional items like the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but*. The heterogeneity is explained through a novel property of obligatory global effect, which may or may not accompany contents without obligatory local effect.

The last approach of not-at-issue contents, unlike the former two, provides with tools to better understand the phenomena. The presence of a strong contextual felicity constraint confirms the contextual dependence of the implications not sufficiently elucidated by either the conventional implicature or pragmatic presupposition view. In addition, the context which constrains the implications is determined to range from global to local, supporting its aforementioned extensiveness.

At the end of the day, this study has significant implications for the study of background meanings. First, it discovers that the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* constitute a distinctive class of meaning with peculiar contextual properties, showing lack of clear membership in conventional implicatures and pragmatic presuppositions, and being heterogeneous even from Class D of not-at-issue contents. Next, it hints at inherent loopholes in the theories of conventional implicature and pragmatic presupposition which fail to construe the phenomena thought to be typical instances. Finally, it contributes to a unified understanding of not-at-issue contents by adding new candidates to Class D that are distinguished from other members and suggesting a possible subdivision criterion.

Keywords: Even, Still, But, Conventional implicature, Pragmatic presupposition,
Not-at-issue content

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1. Introduction

1.1 Overview

This paper is concerned with the lexical items *even*, *still*, and *but* which are arguably known to give rise to conventional implicatures (henceforth, CIs). *Even*, *still*, and *but* each introduce a background implication¹: unlikelihood, expectation, and contrast², respectively. For illustration, from (1) to (3) are utterances containing these words:

- (1) **Even** a child can solve the problem! (A child is not likely to solve the problem)
- (2) Amy is beautiful **but** poor. (There is a contrast between being beautiful and being poor)
- (3) Bob **still** doesn't have a computer. (Bob is expected to have a computer)

¹ *Background meaning* or *implication* in this thesis is employed as an umbrella term which denotes an expression's meaning that is not asserted or *proffered* (Roberts, 1996) as its central meaning but hidden and directly undeniable (see Roberts et al., 2009; Simons et al., 2010). I use the term in order to maintain neutrality and avoid using the terms from competing theories such as implicature, presupposition, or not-at-issue content.

² Labeling the three implications is done in line with previous works (Karttunen & Peters, 1979; Bennet, 1982; Levinson, 1983; Kay, 1990, Francescotti, 1995; Bach, 1999; Horn, 2004; Huang, 2007). First, *even* is known to indirectly indicate that a proposition is unlikely or unexpected to various degrees. The next implication, expectation regarding *still* always concerns time; that something is expected by a certain time point. Last, the term *contrast* for *but* not only signifies that between antonyms but is also used in the literature (Levinson, 1983; Bach, 1999; Horn, 2004; Huang 2007) to broadly refer to preclusion or relations between meanings with opposing features, like *beautiful* (positive) and *poor* (negative).

In (1), *even* introduces an implication concerning its focus *child* that a child is not likely or unexpected to solve the problem. Next, the contrast implication of *but* in (2) is that between the two conjuncts, *beautiful* and *poor*. The last implication, that of *still* in (3), is that Bob is expected to own a computer. Above, these implications are quite obvious and intuitively understood, whereas in the sentences to follow, they are not:

- (4) ?**Even** a teacher can solve the problem. (A teacher is least likely to solve the problem)
- (5) ?Amy is beautiful **but** nice. (There is a contrast between being beautiful and being nice)
- (6) ?Bob **still** doesn't have a robot. (Bob is expected to have a robot)

In order for a sentence with each of these triggers to be felicitous, not only the speaker has to take its implication for granted, but also the hearer must have some contextual knowledge about it. That is, in (4), if and only if the interlocutors mutually believe that teachers are not good at solving problems; in (5) that beautiful people are generally not nice; and in (6), that one is obviously expected to have a robot, these utterances are felicitous. In this way, these implications place a constraint on the context.

The literature surrounding *even*, *still*, and *but* is rather scarce. Although they appear in linguistics textbooks as typical examples of words having conventional

implicatures, their implications have not often been described in-depth. Perhaps the first scholar to discuss the items in focus is Frege (1918), who suggested that *still* and *but* each add an implication of expectation and contrast, respectively, without changing the semantic meaning of an utterance. Whereas Frege (1918) never used the term *conventional implicature*, researchers following him such as Grice (1975), Karttunen & Peters (1979), Bennet (1982), Levinson (1983), Kay (1990), Francescotti (1995) and Huang (2007) view *even*, *still*, and *but* as typical CI triggers.

Contrary to the canonical CI view, Bach (1999) denies the existence of conventional implicature altogether. He proposes that the so-called conventional implicature triggers, what he terms *ACIDs* (alleged conventional implicature devices) such as *even*, *still*, and *but* in fact contribute to what is said, and are variable according to the context.

Interestingly, the CI and counter-CI views both make reference to *context*. Nevertheless, in neither is the role of context or what features such context exhibits fully explicated. Furthermore, both views do not attempt to analyze these implications within the frameworks of more widely attested classes of meaning such as pragmatic presupposition or not-at-issue content. Last but not least, works on both sides handle a very limited number of made-up examples but not real-life data.

For analyzing *even*, *still*, and *but*, there are three applicable theories of background meanings: Gricean conventional implicature, the common ground

theory of pragmatic presupposition, and not-at-issue content. First, the CI theory, as stated above, has been the dominant view in the limited literature concerning *even*, *still*, and *but*. Second, the common ground theory of pragmatic presupposition is a prevalent theory which is nowadays known to subsume other classes such as CIs and semantic presuppositions. Finally, the theory of not-at-issue contents is a relatively recent yet influential one, developed by Judith Tonhauser, David Beaver, Craige Roberts, and Mandy Simons. It is an exhaustive theory that encompasses new phenomena such as Pottsian CIs, non-restrictive relative clauses, some conversational implicatures, as well as classical presuppositions.

In this thesis, the background meanings of *even*, *still*, and *but* are analyzed within the above three frameworks, taking advantage of real-life examples from the BNC Corpus. It is concluded that the former two, notions of conventional implicature and pragmatic presupposition, fail to capture important aspects of these meanings. The contextual dependence of the meanings of the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* cannot be explicated by the former, whilst their strong common ground requirement and extensiveness of context present challenges for the latter.

On the contrary, the analysis of *even*, *still*, and *but* according to Tonhauser et al.'s (2013) taxonomy system of not-at-issue contents has implications for both Tonhauser et al. (2013) and the current study. After close diagnosis, the background implications are adjudged elements of Class D in the taxonomy, yet greatly distinguished from other original constituents in the same class, giving weight to Tonhauser et al.'s (2013) proposed heterogeneity of projective contents.

1.2 Motivation

The words *even*, *still*, and *but* differ in meanings, syntactic behaviors, and parts of speech. Nevertheless, their aforementioned implications have long been clustered under the class of *conventional implicature* as its representative examples. The current collective study of these three words is further motivated by their implications sharing the property of *subjectivity*: unlikelihood, expectation, and contrast involving certain nonobjective judgment by the interlocutors.

Among typical background meanings discussed in various research, those of *even*, *still*, and *but* are exceptional in that they are subject to opinionated judgment by the speakers apart from the assertion itself. Such judgment may be something that most people can agree upon, or at other times, the speakers' particularized opinion. (1) repeated here as (7) is exemplary of the former, and (4), here (8), the latter.

(7) **Even** a child can solve the problem! (A child is not likely to solve the problem)

(8) ?**Even** a teacher can solve the problem. (A teacher is least likely to solve the problem)

In (7) and (8), what the speaker is asserting is that a child or a teacher can solve the problem. In addition to such proposition, the speaker also must believe

that a child is less intelligent in (7) and that a teacher is in (8). The former belief is common sense that most people would concede, while the latter is based on the speaker's personal opinion on teachers and thus more controversial. For (8), if the hearer also has the same belief, then it is felicitous.

Unlike *even*, *still*, and *but*, other representative CIs and presuppositions lack such subjectivity. For example, the sentences from (9) to (13) are all fairly objective statements about an event or state. A big difference between other background meanings and those of *even*, *still*, and *but* is that even when the sentence containing each word is objective, the implications of the latter always necessitate subjective judgment.

- (9) **Only** Mary came to the party. (Mary came to the party)³
- (10) Mary is **almost** thirteen years old. (Mary is not thirteen)
- (11) Mary doesn't **know** that it is raining outside. (It is raining outside)
- (12) **She** is the author of this book. (There is a female referent)
- (13) a. **Even** Mary came to the party.
b. Mary is thirteen years old, **but** she can cook.

³ This paper makes use of a non-controversial background implication or presupposition of each trigger as widely accepted by researchers. For instance, the word *only* in (9) is known to give rise to more than one implication: the prejacent implication ('Mary came'), the exclusive implication ('No one other than Mary came'), and the existential implication ('Someone came'). Nevertheless, the inference of *only* which is generally accepted by linguists to be backgrounded or implicated by the sentence is the first, the prejacent implication, the other two being asserted and entailed contents, respectively (e.g. see Roberts 2006). In cases like this, I only deal with commonly accepted background implications in line with the canonical view.

c. Mary **still** doesn't know that it is raining outside.

The examples in (9) to (13) draw contrast between other typical background meanings and those of *even*, *still*, and *but*. From (9) to (12), the CIs and presuppositions in parentheses resulting from the boldfaced words concern verifiable facts about the discourse or outside world that we can determine truth or falsity. The anaphoric presupposition in (12) is most obviously objective: if it is not true that a female referent has been mentioned in the current discourse, presupposition failure occurs. Other presuppositions and CIs are closely related to the state or event that each proposition containing them describes. For instance, (9) is a factual statement about the party event to which only Mary came. The prejacent implication coming from *only* is also judged either true or false depending on whether Mary was present at the same event. Likewise, in (10), from Mary's state—her age—we can judge whether the assertion and the implicature are true or not.

On the other hand, *even*, *still*, and *but* involve another nonobjective judgment by the speaker, opinionated rather than factual, distinct from the assertion itself. First, (9)'s counterpart, (13a), involves an additional opinion of the speaker apart from the party that takes place: that Mary is deemed unlikely to come. In (13b), the assertion that Jane is thirteen years old and can cook at the same time is subject to truth-value judgment: it is either true or false depending on Mary's state. Nevertheless, the implicated contrast between the two conjuncts, which amounts to

saying that most thirteen-year-olds do not know how to cook, is a domain of subjective opinion. Finally in (13c), it is also the speaker's own opinion that Mary is expected to know that it's raining by now. As such, each background proposition accompanies personal judgment by the speaker.

The commonality of the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* being subjective in this way has spurred more research on their behaviors. Prone to nonobjective judgment by the interlocutors, the implications are determined to be heavily dependent upon the context which the particular interlocutors are set in. This study discovers that these implications share distinctive contextual properties which will be discussed in the following chapters.

1.3 Scope of Research

When researchers put forward that *even*, *still*, and *but* each have an implication of unlikelihood, expectation, and contrast, it is intuitively understood, as these regard their somewhat representative usages. Nevertheless, when closely inspected, *even*, *still*, and *but* are polysemous, even homonymous, and not all their usages retain the alleged implications. Before moving on to further discussions, I delimit which, among a variety of meanings and usages of *even*, *still*, and *but*, this research is directly concerned with.

Evidently, uses of *even*, *still*, and *but* in other parts of speech or with distinct meanings from the ones considered so far are excluded from this research.

For instance, sentences containing the following are not considered:

(14) even numbers/ an even road/ still motion/ but for .../ not only ... but also ...

More subtle treatment of each item is necessary. Firstly, the particular *even* that this research is interested in is the adverb *even* used as a focus particle emphasizing the focus directly following it. Not only the adjectival or verbal usages of *even* but also collocational constructions containing adverbial *even* where *even* precedes *if* or *though* are not considered:

(15) a. The shop will always be open **even** if no one comes.

b. **Even** though the end result frustrated her, she never gave up.

Other simple sentences with *even* preceding its focus as the following are investigated into.

(16) a. **Even** Bill likes Mary.

b. Cathy invited **even** Derek.

c. Erin **even** put potatoes in the soup.

d. Fred arrived **even** after the professor came in.

In each of the sentences above, the subject, object, verbal phrase, and

adverbial phrase, respectively, is the focus of *even*.

For the aspectual particle *still*, the implication that an event or entity is not expected is weak in plain sentences without negation, meaning ‘at present’ or ‘in the future as previously’. On the other hand, when *still* is used with the negative, especially a negated past participle like in Frege (1918)’s example, the meaning is similar to ‘yet’ with the implication retained:

- (17) a. John's **still** waiting.
b. Amy **still** goes to church.
c. Bob **still** doesn't have a kid.

In the first two examples, it is neutral as to whether John is expected not to wait or whether Amy is expected not to go to church. In contrast, for the last negated sentence, there is a clear implication that Bob doesn't have a kid yet, although it is naturally expected for a person like Bob to. Only the latter is relevant to this research.

The conjunction *but* is generally used to show contrast, meaning ‘on the contrary’, but it still has different usages when collocated in particular ways, meaning ‘except’ or ‘otherwise than’. Moreover, when used sentence-initially, *but* may function as a discourse marker similar to *and*, with a weakened contrast implication (Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman, 1999; Bell, 2007).

- (18) a. She was so overcome with grief she could do nothing **but** weep.
b. There is no hope **but** by prayers.
- (19) People cannot make use of a technique unless the technique really works, and that it works at least to the extent it is believed to work. This is the second criterion. **But** there is one more thing to consider in a definition of usefulness.

(Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy as cited in Bell, 2007, ex. 22)

Since the contrast implication is not clear in the examples above, such usages are not included in this research. When *but* is used as a conjunction directly bridging two conjuncts within a sentence, it retains the implication:

- (20) Amy is smart, **but** she tends to be mean.

In the following sections, I discuss the implications behind *even*, *still*, and *but* with examples within the scope above.

1.4 Organization

This thesis consists of five chapters. Following the Introduction, Chapter 2 outlines theoretical background of this research, namely conventional implicature,

presupposition, and not-at-issue content. In the following sections, the phenomena are explored relative to the three theories. Chapter 3 points to limitations of the theories of conventional implicature and pragmatic presupposition, with the data from the BNC corpus. On the contrary, in Chapter 4, close inspection of these meanings according to Tonhauser et al. (2013) shows results that contribute significantly to both this study and the theory of not-at-issue contents. Finally Chapter 5 concludes the research by pinpointing what significance it can have to the study of background meanings and anticipating future research that can further progress its ideas.

2. Theoretical Background on Background Meaning

Before examining the implicit meanings that *even*, *still*, and *but* have, this chapter deals with theoretical background on different categories of background meanings that they possibly belong to: conventional implicature, presupposition, and not-at-issue content. Not-at-issue content is the broadest concept encompassing the latter two, and pragmatic presupposition may include conventional implicature. Historically, each class of meaning has been brought up to achieve a different goal: conventional implicature to explain the conventional property of some implicatures in contrast to *conversational implicature*, pragmatic presupposition to analyze presuppositions pertinent to the interaction between interlocutors in a real conversation, and not-at-issue content in order to provide with an exhaustive account of background contents that project. Nevertheless, they share the common fundamental property of being *backgrounded*, contrary to *what is said* (Grice, 1975; 1989) or asserted.

2.1 Conventional Implicature

Conventional implicature⁴ is not a class of meaning which every linguist

⁴ The term *conventional implicature* in this paper is used to refer to the class of meaning as discussed by Grice and taken by others (Levinson, 1983; Horn, 2004; Salmon, 2011; Potts, 2013; Karttunen & Peters, 1979; Francescotti, 1995; Huang, 2007). It is to be distinguished from Potts' (2005) notion of conventional implicature, which is a class of speaker-oriented meaning associated with expressives (e.g. *bastard*) and appositives. This paper is not interested in the latter, which does not include *even*, *still*, and *but* as its subset.

avows to exist, nor is it fully worked out in details. Nonetheless, *even*, *still*, and *but* have been argued by a number of researchers (Karttunen & Peters, 1979; Levinson, 1983; Francescotti, 1995; Horn, 2004; Huang, 2007) to be CI triggers. Grice (1975) briefly discusses its notion in the following passage:

If I say (smugly), *He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave*, I have certainly committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my word, to its being the case that his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an Englishman. But while I have said that he is an Englishman, and said that he is brave, I do not want to say that I have said (in the favored sense) that it follows from his being an Englishman that he is brave, though I have certainly indicated, and so implicated, that this is so. I do not want to say that my utterance of this sentence would be, strictly speaking, false should the consequence in question fail to hold.

(Grice, 1975, p. 44-5)

CI is a subset of Grice's (1975) **IMPLICATURE**, a component of speaker meaning that constitutes an aspect of what is meant, separated from what is said (Horn, 2004, p. 3). There are two types of implicature: conversational and conventional. The former, which is more popularly discussed, arises from conversational principles, such as the cooperative principle, whereas the latter is

known to derive conventionally from each individual lexical item like *manage*, *bother*, *almost*, *only*, *even*, *still*, and *but* (Karttunen & Peters, 1979; Levinson, 1983; Potts, 2013). For illustration, (21) shows typical examples of the two subtypes of implicature.

- (21) a. Even KEN knows it's unethical.
a'. Ken is the least likely [of a contextually invoked set] to know it's unethical.
b. [in a recommendation letter for a philosophy position]
Jones dresses well and writes grammatical English.
b'. Jones is no good at philosophy.

(Horn, 2004, p. 3)

In each pair above, the primed sentence is the implicature behind its unprimed counterpart. The unlikelihood implication of *even* as in (21a') is encoded in the lexicon in an idiosyncratic way. One cannot explain why the implication is attached to the word *even* through any pragmatic principle. The relationship between the two is thus said to be **conventional**. In contrast, the conversational implicature of (21b), spelled out as (21b'), emerges as a result of cooperative interlocutors' applying conversational rules, such as the maxim of Relevance. Assuming that (21b) is relevant to the purpose of the letter, the reader can infer that the author wrote (21b) to suggest (21b').

One representative property of CI resulting from conventionality is its **non-cancellability**. The contrast between conversational and conventional implicatures regarding this property is illustrated below:

- (22) a. The Duke of Norfolk has three mansions, and in fact more.
b. ??The Duke of Norfolk has three mansions, but only one car, and there is in fact no contrast between these two facts.

(Levinson, 1983, ex. 114-5)

As seen above, unlike its conversational counterpart, conventional implicatures are non-cancellable without making an utterance unacceptable. There is no way that the contrast implicature in (22b) can be removed in a felicitous utterance, whereas there is no problem for the speaker in (22a) to cancel the implicature ‘no more than three’ (Levinson, 1983, p. 129).

Another important property of CIs is that a CI, unlike an entailment or presupposition, plays no role in determining the truth conditions of a sentence (Karttunen & Peters, 1979, p. 12). This non-truth-conditionality results in the property of **detachability** of a CI. Following is a pair of sentences, with and without a CI, claimed to express the same proposition:

- (23) a. Susan is poor but honest.
b. Susan is poor and honest.

It is argued that in (23) the conventional implicature of *but*—that there is a contrast between being poor and being honest—does not contribute to the meaning of (23a). Thus, the truth conditions of (23a) are equivalent to (23b) without the CI; the CI is detachable without changing the truth-conditional meaning of the sentence.

As admitted by researchers investigating the phenomenon, the notion of conventional implicature is not very coherent and tends to be rather shaky (Huang, 2007; Horn, 2004). Although Karttunen and Peters (1979) claim that what have been considered pragmatic presuppositions are really part of conventional implicatures, most works nowadays affirm just the opposite: so-called conventional implicatures can be incorporated into pragmatic presuppositions.

2.2 Pragmatic Presupposition

In recent years, discussions surrounding conventional implicature are mostly limited to Pottsian CIs (see *footnote 4*). Instead, the so-called conventional implicatures such as those of *even*, *still*, and *but* are actually now understood as part of *pragmatic presuppositions* (Horn, 2007; Bach, 1999; Simons, 2006).

Traditionally, there have been two approaches to presuppositions: semantic and pragmatic. Due to Frege (1892) and Strawson (1950), presuppositions were defined semantically as what is required in order for a proposition to have a truth value. There are certain expressions called *presupposition triggers* which generate

such presuppositions. For instance, the assertion of (24) necessitates a particular presupposition to be true, due to the trigger *Kepler* in it.

(24) Kepler died in misery.

Here, the presupposition that the name *Kepler* designates some entity is a requirement for (24) to have a truth-conditional meaning (Frege, 1892 (1952, p. 69)). If there is no Kepler, (24) is judged neither true nor false.

On the contrary to the semantic theory, nowadays, there is a widespread consensus among researchers discussing the phenomenon that the grammatical or semantic presupposition can be assimilated into the *pragmatic* concept following Stalnaker (1974) (Boër & Lycan, 1976; Levinson, 1983; Abbott, 2000; Potts, 2013). In lieu of semantic truth conditions, pragmatic presuppositions relate to felicity conditions in a discourse. This section outlines an influential theory of pragmatic presuppositions, the *common ground theory*, and its central concepts.

2.2.1 Common Ground Theory

A **PRAGMATIC PRESUPPOSITION** in the common ground theory (Stalnaker, 1974, 1978, 2002) is defined as a background assumption taken for granted by the interlocutors. While the semantic approach focuses on what a sentence or linguistic expression presupposes, its pragmatic counterpart aims to explain what people in a

conversation presuppose. In this account, a speaker's presupposition which is believed or assumed by the speaker to hold in the common ground becomes a presupposition of the discourse. The relevant context, that of common ground, denotes the set of propositions that all members accept, all believe that all accept, all believe that all believe that all accept, etc. (Stalnaker 2002, p. 720).

The source of pragmatic presuppositions, though not explicitly specified in the works of the pioneer (Stalnaker, 1974, 1978, 2002), is mostly viewed as equivalent to semantic presuppositions of sentences. Stalnaker (1974) notes that semantic presuppositions can be explained in terms of pragmatic presuppositions, but not vice-versa. In other words, presupposition triggers in the Strawson-Frege account are expected to introduce pragmatic presuppositions as well. For example, the existence presupposition in (24) can be accounted for pragmatically. The speaker, in uttering (24), righteously presupposes the fact that an entity named Kepler exists, and also believes or assumes that the other party presupposes it as well, hence part of the common ground.

Presuppositions serving as requirements for felicity, sentences place constraints on the common ground that their presuppositions be entailed by it prior to utterance. This is called the **common ground requirement** (henceforth, CG requirement) (Tonhauser, 2015). For instance, if a speaker utters the sentence

(25) The King of France is bald.

he presupposes that there exists a King of France and asserts that this person is bald. The existence presupposition is required to be old information mutually believed by the interlocutors (i.e. already existing in the common ground) before the utterance of (25). If it is not satisfied by the common ground, the utterance in (25) is deemed infelicitous by the addressee.

2.2.2 Presupposition Accommodation

Contrary to the theory, not all presuppositions in a real conversation exist in the common ground prior to an utterance. Numerous studies (Karttunen, 1974; Lewis 1979; Heim, 1992; Stalnaker, 1998, 2002; Beaver & Zeevat, 2007; von Stechow, 2008) have discussed the phenomenon of **PRESUPPOSITION ACCOMMODATION**, through which an uncontroversial presupposition of an utterance not presupposed before springs into existence *after* the utterance. An oft-cited rule for accommodation is due to Lewis (1979): “If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t , then—*ceteris paribus* and within certain limits—presupposition P comes into existence at t .” (p. 340). For illustration, we can consider the following:

(26) I have to pick up my sister. (The speaker has a sister)

According to the common ground theory, in (26), the fact that the speaker

has a sister needs to be entailed by the common ground before its utterance. Nevertheless, if it is new information to the hearer, the process of accommodation takes place. After the speaker utters (26), the presupposition is updated to the common ground so that it becomes a prior context that entails the former. With the context properly restored, the hearer can finally interpret the assertion in (26).

Accommodation has often been criticized as a convenient rescue strategy the common ground resorts to whenever a lack of CG requirement needs be justified (Gauker, 1998; Abbott, 2000, 2008). In particular, Gazdar (1979) explicitly accuses the common ground theorists for having recourse to accommodation which “circumvent[s] any possibility of counterexamples” and therefore renders their alleged “appropriacy” relative to mutual knowledge vacuous (Gazdar, 1979, p. 107).

Against this denunciation, the CG theorists contend that accommodation is a natural and systematic process resulting from the interlocutors’ cooperation (Thomason, 1990; von Stechow, 2000). In order to carry the discourse forward, cooperative addressees adjust the common ground “quietly and without fuss” (von Stechow, 2008) whenever they notice that the CG requirement is not satisfied. The only exception to the accommodation of uncontroversial presuppositions is *anaphoric presuppositions* that simply cannot be identified, which will be explained in Chapter 2.2.3. In turn, all uncontroversial, identifiable presuppositions which are not entailed by the common ground are viable objects of accommodation.

2.2.3 Anaphoric Presupposition and Informative Presupposition

Presuppositions can be divided into two classes, according to their availability of being accommodated. First, some presuppositions including a few conventional implicatures, possessive noun phrases, and *that*-clauses of *it*-cleft sentence, can be new information, accommodated by the addressee after an utterance. Presuppositions of this former class which do not have to exist in the common ground before an utterance and are thus accommodable are called **INFORMATIVE PRESUPPOSITIONS** (Abbott, 2000, 2008; Tonhauser, 2015; Roberts et al., 2009). (26) and ones below are examples:

(27) It was the Smiths who disclosed the decades-old corruption in the village.

(Somebody disclosed the decades-old corruption)

(28) We regret that children are not allowed in the premises. (Children are not allowed)

In (27), the *it*-cleft structure presupposes the complement of *who*. However, in ordinary conversations, one need not be aware of the fact that there exists somebody who disclosed the said corruption. Similarly, in (28), the verb *regret* presupposes its complement which is not necessarily entailed by the common ground. For instance, the speaker might be making a new announcement to the

hearer to inform that children are not allowed. As such, informative presuppositions are potentially informative to the hearer, not required to be in the common ground prior to utterance.

However, not all presuppositions can be accommodated. Stalnaker (2002) admits that **ANAPHORIC PRESUPPOSITIONS**, presuppositions anaphorically constrained by the context like those of pronouns and *too*, are exceptions to the phenomenon of accommodation. Their antecedents are not accommodatable, because they “concern facts in the world no manner of mental adjustment can bring into being” (von Stechow, 2008, p. 154), because the hearer simply “does not know what it is that the other is presupposing” (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 718). For example, presupposition accommodation does not take place in (29) to (31):

(29) **He** gave up.

(30) John went to **the concert**.

(31) John had a hamburger, **too**.

What the triggers indicate in (29)-(31) can only be determined by retrieving intended antecedents in the context (Roberts et al., 2009). The utterance of (29) makes use of the pronoun *he* that refers to “a uniquely salient discourse referent” (Tonhauser, 2015, p. 78). Also, in (30), there must be a particular concert in the common ground, and in (31), both the speaker and the hearer must know of another person who had a hamburger prior to its utterance. These presupposed referents

cannot be accommodated due to lack of information to interpret these sentences in the first place. We can compare these with the examples below, the same sentences uttered after such common ground is formed:

(32) John grew tired of linguistics. **He** gave up.

(33) Maroon 5 came to Seoul last weekend. John went to **the concert**.

(34) We ate hamburgers for lunch. John had a hamburger, **too**.

In the examples above, the antecedent for each of *he*, *the concert*, and *too* is entailed or implied by the preceding sentence, which is added to the common ground, making the utterance felicitous. Without such appropriate contexts, the utterances with unidentifiable anaphoric triggers would result in infelicity, not accommodation. The following summarizes the two classes of pragmatic presuppositions.

(35) Classification of presupposition

1) Informative presuppositions: accommodable, can be new information,
possibly not entailed by CG

2) Anaphoric presuppositions: non-accommodable, cannot be new
information, crucially entailed by CG

2.3 Not-at-issue Content

As the common ground theory of presuppositions became the norm, there has also been abundant literature on the opposing side which cast doubt on the validity of associating presuppositions with common ground. In parallel with such discussions, recently, there have been attempts to incorporate different types of background meanings.

Representative of this trend are works by researchers Judith Tonhauser, Craig Roberts, Mandy Simons, and David Beaver (Roberts et al., 2009; Simons et al., 2010; Tonhauser et al., 2013). The co-authors ignited the discussion around **NOT-AT-ISSUE CONTENTS**, opposed to *what is said* or *at-issue*, defined as backgrounded contents that are not relevant to the question under discussion (QUD), the imminent goal of a conversation. This class of meaning cuts across various types of background implications, including classical presuppositions and newly explored phenomena such as parentheticals, focus, expressives, and some conversational implicatures. For example, conversational inferences such as the one in (36), which have not been dealt with in the common ground theory, are also elements of not-at-issue contents:

(36) A: I have to pay this bill.

B: The customer accounts office isn't open today.

(Roberts et al., 2009, ex. 9)

In (36), the QUD is whether A can pay his bill. There are two background assumptions that are inferentially derived from the conversation: first, that one should pay such bills at the customer accounts office, and second, that A will not be able to pay her bill today. The latter implication is at-issue, directly answering A's implicit question, while the former is a not-at-issue content that is backgrounded (Roberts et al., 2009, p. 5).

2.3.1 Projection

The co-authors put forward that not-at-issue contents are equivalent to *projective meanings* (Simons et al., 2010). **PROJECTION**, a widely discussed phenomenon of presuppositions, refers to the ability of a presupposition to survive under entailment-canceling operators. It has been considered a unique property of presuppositions, and in particular, the *P* family test of projection in Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990) is commonly adopted as a diagnostic for presuppositionality. The *P* family includes the original declarative sentence containing the trigger, negation, question, and an *if*-clause with the trigger in the antecedent:

- (37) a. The present queen of France lives in Ithaca.
b. It is not the case that the present queen of France lives in Ithaca.
c. Does the present queen of France live in Ithaca?

- d. If the present queen of France lives in Ithaca, she has probably met Nelly.
- e. There is a unique present queen of France.

(Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990, ex. 40, underline added)

Here, each of (37a-d) implies (37e), which is the presupposition of the definite description *the present queen of France*. The presupposition survives under the scope of entailment-cancelling operators of negation, question, and conditional; hence, projects (Simons et al., 2010).

The researchers maintain that such an account that identifies presuppositions with projective meanings is proven no longer valid (Tonhauser et al. 2013), as recent research (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990; Beaver, 2001; Potts, 2005) found a variety of items like appositives, non-restrictive relative clause, and expressives that are not presuppositional in nature but do project. For instance, in (38), a non-restrictive relative clause (NRRC) introduces non-presuppositional but projective content.

- (38) a. Jane, who likes to be physically active, runs, plays tennis, and swims.

(Roberts et al., 2009, ex. 6, underline added)

- b. It is not the case that Jane, who likes to be physically active, runs, plays tennis, and swims.
- c. Does Jane, who likes to be physically active, run, play tennis, and swim?
- d. If Jane, who likes to be physically active, runs, plays tennis, and swims,

she should go for the triathlon game.

e. Jane likes to be physically active.

In (38), the content in the NRRC is not presuppositional in the sense that it is subject to any requirement to be entailed by the common ground (Roberts et al., 2009, p. 6). Nevertheless, under the *P* family test, the not-at-issue content survives. Each of the sentences in (38a-d) implies (38e), and the latter is thus projective.

In lieu of the traditional accounts, the authors' main goal is to provide a unified account of not-at-issue contents, corresponding to projective contents, that sheds light on the phenomenon of projection. One of such attempts is to put together those contents traditionally classified as different types of background meanings and provide a novel method to categorize them in Tonhauser et al. (2013).

2.3.2 Taxonomy of Not-at-issue Contents

Tonhauser et al. (2013) classifies not-at-issue contents in English and Guarani based on three properties: strong contextual felicity constraint, projection, and obligatory local effect. Not-at-issue contents, all projective, fall into four different groups according to whether they are associated with a strong contextual felicity constraint and whether they show obligatory local effect. This section overviews the taxonomy system based on the two properties.

2.3.2.1 Contextual Felicity

First, **CONTEXTUAL FELICITY** is related to whether felicitous utterances containing a not-at-issue content are restricted to contexts that already entail or imply it. When the utterance context necessarily entails or implies the implication, its trigger is said to have a *strong* contextual felicity constraint. In Tonhauser et al.'s (2013) terms,

If utterance of trigger t of projective content m is acceptable only in an m -positive context, then t imposes a strong contextual felicity constraint with respect to m .

(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 11)

A subset of the utterance context, m -positive context is defined with reference to m -neutral context. The former is a context that entails or implies m while the latter is one that entails or implies neither m nor $-m$ (Tonhauser et al., 2013, p. 75). For illustration, following is the diagnosis of the possessive noun phrase.

(39) [Context: A woman who is being interviewed by a school director for a job as a teacher suddenly interrupts and says:]

I have to go now to feed **my** dog.

(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 20, boldface added)

The context in (39a) is *m*-neutral, because it does not imply or entail that the speaker has a dog. Since the utterance (39) is acceptable even in the given *m*-neutral context, possessive noun phrases do not have a strong contextual felicity constraint. On the other hand, anaphoric expressions such as pronouns, demonstratives, and the particle *too* are typical examples that do impose a strong contextual felicity constraint.

- (40) [Context: The children in a sociology class have to give presentations about their families. Marko is up first and he starts with:]
- a. #**S/he** is a farmer.
 - b. My father's name is Juan. **He** is a farmer.

(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 19, boldface added)

In (40a), the context is neutral with respect to the existence of the person that *he* refers to, and the utterance is infelicitous. On the other hand, in (40b), the first sentence introduces the relevant referent for *he*, becoming an *m*-positive context that renders the following utterance felicitous. As such, since an utterance containing the third person pronoun is acceptable only in an *m*-positive context, it imposes a strong contextual felicity constraint with regards to the existence implication.

2.3.2.2 Local Effect

Next, a rather unfamiliar property termed **LOCAL EFFECT** regards the behavior of projective contents with respect to embedding operators such as propositional attitude verbs. When an implication is necessarily included by the local context, it is said to have *obligatory* local effect. A refined definition is provided below:

A projective content m with trigger t has obligatory local effect if and only if, when t is syntactically embedded in the complement of a belief-predicate B , m necessarily is part of the content that is targeted by, and within the scope of, B .

(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 40)

In other words, if the implication of an embedded trigger is necessarily true in the context of the attitude holder, it has obligatory local effect. For illustration, consider the following:

- (41) a. Joan is crazy. She's hallucinating that some geniuses in Silicon Valley have invented a new brain chip that's been installed in her left temporal lobe and permits her to speak any of a number of languages she's never studied. Joan believes that her chip, **which she had installed last month**, has a

twelve year guarantee.

b. Jane believes that Bill, **who is Sue's cousin**, is Sue's brother.

(Amaral et al., 2007, ex. 735; Tonhauser et al. 2013, ex. 38-39)

The contents in non-restrictive relative clauses (NRRCs) are known to be backgrounded and projective implications. (41a) attributes to Joan, the attitude holder, that her brain chip was installed. In this case, the content in the NRRC is diagnosed to have local effect. On the other hand, in (41b), since the content in the NRRC that Bill is Sue's cousin is inconsistent with Jane's belief—she thinks Bill is Sue's brother—the former is not part of the local context of Jane's belief state but only that of the global utterance context. Therefore, the content of the NRRC in (41b) does not have local effect. Since local effect for NRRCs is judged optional, they do not show obligatory local effect.

2.3.2.3 Classification

Following is the categorization of four different groups of projective contents in Tonhauser et al. (2013) according to the two properties:

CLASSES	PROJECTION	PROPERTIES OF CONTENTS	
		STRONG CONTEXTUAL FELICITY	OBLIGATORY LOCAL EFFECT
A	yes	yes	yes
B	yes	no	no
C	yes	no	yes
D	yes	yes	no

Table 1: Four classes of projective contents in Tonhauser et al. (2013)

Class A, with both a strong contextual felicity constraint and obligatory local effect, has as its elements anaphoric implications such as that of *too*. In contrast, Class B is neither associated with a strong contextual felicity constraint nor shows obligatory local effect. It includes Pottsian CIs as well as classical presuppositions of demonstrative *that* and possessives. Next, projective contents in Class C are ones considered as Gricean CIs like the prejacent implication of *only* and the factive and prestate presuppositions of *know* and *stop*, respectively, that have a strong contextual felicity constraint but no obligatory local effect. Finally, a class deemed extraordinary and wanting more candidates, Class D has obligatory local effect yet no strong contextual felicity constraint, and subsumes implications *about the discourse* like the salience of alternatives of a focus.⁵

⁵ Tonhauser et al. (2013) supports the view that a trigger may have multiple implications. For instance, *too* has two implications in this study: anaphoric presupposition in Class A and discursive salience of an alternative in Class D. In the sentence “John is having dinner in New York, too”, the presupposition that there is another person having dinner in New York is an element of Class A. On the other hand, a rather unfamiliar implication, that such an alternative person is *salient in the current discourse* is that of Class D. The latter

The authors claim that since these backgrounded, projective meanings are in fact heterogeneous, their unified account of projective contents is “preferable to a collection of disparate theories that individually account only for subsets” (Tonhauser et al., 2013, p. 104). By showing that some background meanings are constrained by the context (A, D) while others are not (B, C), Tonhauser et al. (2013) proves against the view that projection occurs as the result of presuppositions placing constraints on the context (Karttunen, 1974; Heim, 1983; van der Sandt, 1992; Geurts, 1999). On the other hand, the optionality of local effect (not obligatory for Class B, D) serves as counter-evidence to the view of projection as a by-product of the global context of conversation being updated with the local context of the speaker’s belief (Schlenker, 2007; Stalnaker, 2002).

implication is due to Kripke (2009) who emphasizes that the existence presupposition is not sufficient to utter the sentence out of the blue: it is so evident that there exists at least one person who is having dinner in NY (Class A), but in addition, the speakers should have some particular alternative that’s been made prominent in the discourse (Class D).

3. The Phenomena of *Even*, *Still*, and *But* and Limitations of Previous Approaches

This section examines the phenomena of the background meanings of *even*, *still*, and *but* within the frameworks of conventional implicature and pragmatic presupposition. Traditionally, scholars have claimed that they are instances of conventional implicature. In addition, as pragmatic presuppositions are to contain CIs, it must be possible to analyze *even*, *still*, and *but* according to the former. Nonetheless, upon close inspection, it is concluded that the two theories cannot adequately capture the phenomena, failing to construe important aspects of these meanings.

3.1 Conventional Implicature Approach on *Even*, *Still*, and *But*

As the previous works concerning *even*, *still*, and *but* mostly view their background meanings as CIs, this section examines the validity of the CI approach. Two pertinent characteristics of the implications as candidates of CIs are their conventionality and contextually derived imports.

3.1.1 Conventionality

The strongest reasoning behind viewing *even*, *still*, and *but* as CI triggers is

their *conventionality*. Since the term itself is not straightforward, researchers attempt to prove that they display different properties stemming from conventionality. The evidence that most frequently appears in the literature is that the meanings are detachable, and do not affect the sentence's truth conditions (Grice, 1975; Francescotti, 1995; Bennett, 1982; Karttunen & Peters, 1979).

(42) a. **Even** Albert failed the exam.

b. Albert failed the exam.

(Francescotti, 1995, ex. 1-2, boldface added)

(42b), equivalent to (42a) lacking *even*, is argued to be the truth-conditional meaning of (42a). The researchers contend that even if the implication that Albert is not likely to fail the exam is false, (42a) will be judged true as long as (42b) is true. This is because *even* allegedly contributes nothing to the truth-conditional meaning of the sentence, instead of having a truth-value gap like presuppositions.

Nevertheless, it is not obvious whether speakers will indeed judge (42a) as true when the implication is false. Researchers have long contended that the truth-value judgment is not a reliable diagnostic, as the semantic truth-value is “not something that is subject to secure and direct intuition” (von Stechow, 2001, p. 8). In fact, speakers may assign truth-values to sentences without them, and vice-versa (von Stechow, 2001; Thomason, 1990; Soames, 1976). Furthermore, Bach (1999) adds that even if it is judged true, it is a result of a forced categorical choice

between ‘true’ and ‘false’ (p.345). The matter is not as simple since there could be many more answers in-between like infelicitous, squeamish, or somewhat acceptable.

Second, it is argued that such implications are encoded in the individual lexical items, hence the conventionality (Bennett, 1982; Karttunen & Peters, 1979; Francescotti, 1995). No one can deny that such implications are part of idiosyncratic lexical content. The relationship between the word *still* and its expectation implication cannot be explained by a general rule, and is indeed conventional. However, this fact is not sufficient to prove that they are CIs, as many presuppositions such as those of *the*, *stop*, and *know* are known to be conventionally triggered, yet not CIs (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990). Some scholars (e.g. Karttunen & Peters, 1979) go as far to say that except for conversational inferences, all presuppositional contents are conventionally rooted to different extents.

On a similar note, non-cancellability is a central property of CIs that is employed to prove the conventional source of these implications. In other words, as the triggers retain their implications regardless of the conversational context and thus cannot ever be cancelled, their source is not the conversation, but *convention*. For instance, some presuppositions are known to be cancellable, as in (43), while CIs like *but* are not:

(43) a. Susan consulted Dr. Jones before she finished her thesis.

b. Susan died before she finished her thesis.

(44) Trudy is hard-working **but** socially awkward, *#but in fact there is no contrast between those two facts.*

In (43), the presupposition that Susan finished her thesis which usually accompanies the conjunction *before* is cancelled in (43b) due to the general logic following the verb *die*. On the other hand, in (44), it is impossible to felicitously deny the contrast implication of *but*. Nevertheless, having an alleged trait of CIs does not guarantee the status of each background meaning as a member of that class. There are non-cancellable presuppositions, like those of the verb *stop* or possessive pronouns, which are not considered conventional implicatures nonetheless:

(45) Trudy used **my** computer, *#but in fact the computer doesn't belong to me.*

To sum up, although the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* can be said to display conventionality, it does not justify that they are conventional implicatures. The arguments by researchers are either unreliable (e.g. non-truth-conditionality) or insufficient to prove such membership.

3.1.2 Contextually Derived Meanings

A more fundamental way to confirm that the background meanings of *even*, *still*, and *but* truly belong to the class of CI is to seek homogeneity among these meanings and other constituents. I maintain that, contrary to the CI view, the factor of *context* actually differentiates the former from the latter. Although the implications of unlikelihood, contrast, and expectation are conventionally encoded in the items, their specific meanings actually derive from the conversational context. On the other hand, the meanings of other CIs are not only non-cancellable but consistent regardless of the context:

(46) Only Mary came to the party. (Mary came to the party)

(47) Alex almost died. (Alex didn't die)

(48) Bob managed to win. (It required effort for Bob to win)

In (46) to (48), each implicature in parentheses is interpreted independently of the context. For instance, (46) can be uttered in many different contexts: Mary may be the only person, woman, classmate, or neighbor that came to the party. Nevertheless, in any case, such a context does not change the meaning of the prejacent implication that Mary came to the party. In this way, it is possible to calculate the CI automatically from the linguistic structure regardless of the conversational setting.

In contrast, the meanings of the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* may vary according to the context. Starting from *even*, I examine how context plays such an important role determining the import of each implication. Francescotti (1995) mentions in his article that there is a contextually salient aspect *X* with regards to which the unlikelihood occurs. For illustration, he gives an example where the aspect *X* determines the felicity of a sentence:

- (49) a. Granny was accused of murder, and even kidnapping. (*X*: frequency)
b. Granny was accused of kidnapping, and even murder. (*X*: moral/ legal seriousness)

(Francescotti, 1995, ex. 26/27)

(49a) is felicitous if Granny being accused of kidnapping is more surprising than her being accused of murder. According to Francescotti (1995), this is so if the contextually determined aspect is *frequency*, as kidnapping occurs less frequently than murder. Nevertheless, our common sense tells us that murder is more striking than kidnapping. In other words, without any mentioning of a certain standard for expectation, the interlocutors are more likely to pick legal/moral seriousness as *X*, hence rendering (49a) infelicitous and (49b) felicitous. If the speaker utters (49a) in an out-of-the-blue context, it can be challenged by the hearer:

- (50) Oh, he was? But what are you suggesting? Of course, murder is more

extreme!

The context may even change the meaning of the implication of *even* in a single sentence. For instance, in (51) the context determines what *X* is, and according to *X*, the implication φ of something being surprising or unlikely differs.

(51) Ibrahim never goes out, not even to the shops or nothing. (BNC: A74 33)

a. *X*: routineness

φ : ‘It is surprising that Ibrahim does not go to places he goes to everyday such as the shops’

b. *X*: Ibrahim’s preference

φ : ‘It is surprising that Ibrahim does not go to places he loves such as the shops’

In (51a), the fact that Ibrahim does not go to the shops may be less likely than going to other places such as the museum or fancy restaurants from the perspective of routineness. On the other hand, in (51b), it could be the case that Ibrahim loves going shopping the most, and on the scale of his preference, not going to the shops is less expected than going to the park or the library. Which reading holds depends on the context, such as what kind of conversation went on previously between the interlocutors. In this way, the unlikelihood implication of *even* may have disparate meanings according to what kind of *X* the context picks

out as the relevant standard for unlikelihood.

With *still*, as Bach (1999) admits, less contextual filling-in is required than others, because there is only one possible relevant dimension for expectation, *time* (p. 348-349). Nevertheless, the temporal dimension can be further broken down. Sometimes, it is necessary for the context to fill in what kind of time aspect *X* is, and this can alter the import of the implication. There could be different categories of time: physical time, life span, generation, era, etc. For example, the following sentences may have different aspects *X*:

(52) My father still doesn't have an ID. (*X*: life span)

(53) Amy still doesn't have a cell phone. (*X*: era)

(54) I still haven't received your email. (*X*: physical time)

In (52), the expectation that the speaker's father has an ID is with respect to his age, or stage of life in the total span. On the other hand, the implication in (53) is due to the contemporary era of 21st Century where one is expected to have a cell phone. Finally, (54) is simply concerned with the physical time of *now*. In the examples above, what type of time *X* is is quite evident, even in an out-of-the-blue context, but in other sentences, the context fills in *X*:

(55) She still had not been to confession. (BNC: GUK 2655)

a. *X*: physical time

φ : ‘She was expected to have been to confession by then’

b. X: life span (age)

φ : ‘She was expected to have been to confession by her age’

If the speaker was previously talking about how he had waited for the female referent to have come by a certain period of time (e.g. 2pm or in the year of 1999), the implication will have the meaning in (55a). On the other hand, its import in (55b) is different. For example, it could mean that she was twenty years old and the speaker expected that she had been to confession by that age. In the latter case, the physical time of hour, day, month, or year does not matter, but the point in her life span does. According to the context, the standard of time for expectation differs, resulting in different meanings for the implication of *still*.

Lastly, *but* can implicate different contrasts, as determined by the context. Typically, the implication regards the contrast between two conjuncts that *but* connects. Nevertheless, as Bach (1999) points out, there could be other contextually-determined contrastive features:

(56) Shaq is huge but he is agile.

a. Shaq is huge and, unlike most huge people, he is agile.

b. Shaq is huge and, unlike others on the list, he is agile.

c. Shaq is huge and, contrary to what you said, he is agile.

(Bach, 1999, p. 346)

In (56a), the salient contrast is that between being huge and being agile; in (56b), it is between Shaq and other players on the list; and in (56c), between Shaq's agility and the hearer's previous statement about huge people. The first contrast, that in (56a), may be the most straight-forward one, yet others can also be acceptable in different contexts. Following is another example from the corpus where the meaning of the implication may differ, according to which propositions (p_1 and p_2) are being contrasted:

(57) Anne is lost, but I know where she is. (BNC: AIJ 1262)

a. p_1 : Anne is lost

p_2 : I know where she is.

b. p_1 : Your statement

p_2 : I know where she is.

(=Anne is lost, but unlike what you said, I know where she is)

In (57a), there is a contrast between Anne's whereabouts that others lost track of and the speaker's knowing it. Alternatively, there might have been a certain context that allows the reading in (57b). For instance, the speaker may have said (57) in response to the addressee's prior statement,

(58) Is Anne lost or something? I bet nobody knows where she is.

In (51) to (57), the unlikelihood, expectation, and contrast implications of *even*, *still*, and *but*, respectively, have different imports according to which context such utterances occur in. This shows that the meanings of these implications originate from the context, unlike other CIs whose imports remain the same regardless of the context. The heavy reliance of the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* on the context not only sets apart from other CIs but also contradicts the purported context-independence of conventional implicatures (Levinson, 1983; Huang, 2007; Karttunen & Peters, 1979).

In a nutshell, as there is little justification as to the claim that the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* belong to the class of CIs, and as they do not show strong membership from the perspective of context, these meanings are not true instances of CI.

3.2 Pragmatic Presupposition Approach on *Even*, *Still*, and *But*

Although researchers have not yet dealt with *even*, *still*, and *but* within the framework of the CG theory of pragmatic presupposition, it is known to subsume CIs, which have been argued to include the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but*. Besides, their property of being backgrounded and taken for granted by interlocutors clearly renders them as valid candidates of pragmatic presuppositions. This section explores the implications from the perspective of pragmatic

presupposition: whether they place a constraint on the common ground (i.e. whether they have a CG requirement), how they are distinguished from the two classes of presuppositions, and accordingly what the CG theory fails to explain about these implications.

3.2.1 Common Ground Requirement

The background meanings of *even*, *still*, and *but* seem to place a constraint on the common ground. For illustration, (59) requires the contrast implication to be satisfied by the common ground before its utterance.

(59) Pat is Russian, but he can't eat spicy food.

(59) presupposes the contrast between being Russian and not being able to eat spicy food (i.e. Russians normally can eat spicy food). We can suppose that the speaker has uttered (59) to an addressee who does not have prior knowledge that Russians eat spicy food, hence the implication being new information *not* in the common ground. In this case, uttering (59) is very awkward, and the background implication will not be easily accommodated by the hearer. On the contrary, the reason that sentences like (1) to (3), repeated here as (60) to (62) are felicitous even in out-of-the-blue contexts is because the interlocutors have what we call *common sense*:

- (60) Even a child can solve the problem!
- (61) Amy is beautiful but poor.
- (62) Bob still doesn't have a computer.

Here, the propositions that children are less capable, being beautiful is positive while being poor is negative, and nowadays one is expected to have a computer exist in the common ground as common sense between the interlocutors before each utterance, so they are felicitous. On the other hand, the following examples, when they are uttered in an out-of-the-blue context, can be awkward:

- (63) Even I have taken kids on the canals, it's great! (BNC: KLT 798)
- (64) [...]Martin was hot but nothing too traumatic. (BNC: KBW 8793)
- (65) Romania still has not learned how to look after its own.(BNC: K1C 803)

If the hearer does not have any information about the speaker and his relationship with kids, (63) will be deemed awkward by the hearer. Similarly, (64) is infelicitous in normal cases where being hot and being traumatic are not easily juxtaposed. Finally, (65) can be unacceptable in contexts where the concept of self-sovereignty of states is not yet established.

It shows that the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* have a CG requirement that they exist as old information in the common ground and that they are difficult to accommodate. For instance in (63), the hearer will have hard time

accommodating “quietly and without fuss” (von Stechow, 2008, p. 151) after the utterance that somehow the speaker is not expected to take kids on the canals and instead, may have to ask him for more information. The hearer can challenge the speaker:

(66) What do you mean, *even*? Of course, like any teacher, you could’ve taken your kids on the canals.

When there is a refined context for each sentence that contains the background implication, as hinted or directly mentioned in the BNC corpus, they are felicitous. For instance, in the reconstructed contexts of (67) to (69), the above sentences are perfectly felicitous:

(67) Context: The speaker, Andrew, is a very serious teacher, who rarely spends time with kids outside of the classroom. Andrew says:

Even I have taken kids on the canals, it's great! (BNC: KLT 798)

(68) Context: Martin and Ian are siblings who are both ill. While Ian has a hot fever and is suffering from a trauma at the same time, Martin only has a fever.

The speaker says:

Martin was hot but nothing too traumatic. (BNC: KBW 8793)

(69) Context: In the modern era, countries have become sovereign states, auto-governing their people without interference from outside.

Romania still has not learned how to look after its own. (BNC: K1C 803)

In (67)-(69), each implication must be non-informative old information entailed by the context in order for the utterances to be felicitous. Interestingly, in each of (67) and (68), the relevant context is limited only to the particular conversational setting, while the context of (69) that entails the expectation implication of *still* is quite common sense to the contemporaries. Some more examples from the corpus that require a certain common ground to be established, or otherwise awkward, are provided below with the background implication as φ :

(70) Even in Europe, Saturn is not the only planet under whose influence it is possible to be born. (BNC: A04782)

φ : It is surprising that in Europe, Saturn is not the only planet...

(71) I can't even juggle three (BNC: KDA 2530)

φ : It is surprising that the speaker can't juggle three.

(72) It is un-- unusually quiet even even for us. (BNC: JTE 137)

φ : It is not likely for the speakers to find it quiet.

(73) That poems are alive but they run away from you[...] (BNC: JSU 240)

φ : There is a contrast between poems being alive and their running away.

(74) It [an insurance broker] has cash flow but its assets are its people. (BNC: A1E 171)

φ : There is a contrast between an insurance broker having a cash flow and having people as assets

(75) When they sat down to eat, Emily had still not appeared. (BNC: ACV 2471)

φ : Emily was expected to appear when they sat down to eat.

(76) So whoever got the bike now still haven't changed the log book over to their name. (BNC: KBE 6430)

φ : The person who got the bike is expected to have changed the log book over to their name.

In the examples above, when the common ground between the interlocutors, whether the immediate utterance context or general common knowledge, does not contain the background implication φ , the sentences are not felicitous. For example, for (73), it is hard to accommodate that there is a contrast between being alive and running away, if not a cause-and-effect relationship. Nevertheless, when there is contextual background that justifies the contrast, it is felicitous. Indeed, in the prior

context presented in the corpus, the literature teacher who is the speaker of (73) talks about how poems are freely existing things but are elusive and hard to find, just like foxes. Only with the common ground already set to at least imply the contrast between merely existing and being able to be spotted, can (73) be felicitous.

The implications having a CG requirement can easily be contrasted with informative presuppositions. As seen in Chapter 2.2.3, informative presuppositions, when not included in the common ground beforehand, can be accommodated after an utterance. For instance, the following sentences can be uttered in out-of-the-blue contexts:

- (77) Susan **failed** to climb Mt. Everest. (Susan tried, or should've tried to climb Mt. Everest)
- (78) **My** cousin is coming by. (The speaker has a cousin)
- (79) Alex **almost** fainted. (Alex didn't faint)

In (77) to (79), the hearer need not be aware of the background information in parentheses. Even when the context does not entail or imply the presuppositions, the speaker can utter these sentences. If, for example, the hearer has no information about Alex, after the speaker utters (79), he can accommodate that he didn't actually faint.

On the other hand, similar to *even*, *still*, and *but*, anaphoric presuppositions

are also constrained by the context.

(80) **She** is the senator from California. (There is a female referent)

(81) Tonight, Sam is having dinner in New York, **too**. (There is another person having dinner in New York)

When uttered out of the blue, it is impossible to accommodate what *she* and *too* in (80) and (81), respectively, presuppose. Although the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* are hard to accommodate, their accommodability differs from anaphoric presuppositions in its extent: the former are more weakly constrained by the context. For instance, an overly cooperative addressee, upon hearing (59), may find it difficult but plausible to accommodate that Russians tend to eat spicy food, but when he hears (80) without any antecedent in the common ground, there is no way for him to accommodate the presupposition. In this way, there is a continuous spectrum of accommodability for presuppositions: Informative presuppositions, implications of *even*, *still*, and *but*, and anaphoric presuppositions form a gradience of being accommodable, difficult to accommodate, and non-accommodable, respectively.

There is a clearer feature that distinguishes *even*, *still*, and *but* from anaphoric presupposition triggers: extensiveness of the relevant context for the former, which will be discussed in Chapter 3.2.2.

3.2.2 Extensiveness of Context

The triggers *even*, *but*, and *still* are similar to anaphoric expressions like *he* in the sense that their inferences are to be present in the context before the utterance. The greatest difference between the former and the latter is that the former do not require their implications to be antecedents in the immediate discursive or linguistic context, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 3.2.1.

(82) He got home early today.

φ : There is a contextually salient male referent.

(83) Even after ‘drying out’, they may feel strongly pulled back into the drug world. (BNC: A01 116)

φ : It is surprising that they may feel pulled back into the drug world after drying out.

(84) They lived frugally but in style. (BNC: A05 882)

φ : There is a contrast between living frugally and living in style.

(85) [...]the driver admitted: I still haven’t got a phone. (BNC: A9W 114)

φ : The speaker is expected to have a phone.

In (82), the referent of *he* must be retrievable from a proximate context. For instance, *he* cannot refer back to a particular entity the speaker and the hearer were talking about a week ago; there needs to be a mention of the antecedent in the past not too distant from the utterance time. Typically, these antecedents exist in the immediate linguistic context, like in the examples from (32) to (34), repeated here as (86) to (88).

(86) John grew tired of linguistics. **He** gave up.

(87) Maroon 5 came to Seoul last weekend. John went to **the concert**.

(88) We ate hamburgers for lunch. John had a hamburger, **too**.

On the contrary, in each of the examples from (83) to (85), it is **not** required that each implication exist as a concrete, uttered proposition in the common ground like the referents of the anaphoric presuppositions. Even if the interlocutors have never said or explicitly agreed upon the implications, because these are entailed by their common sense, (83) to (85) can be uttered. For instance, anybody who knows that one is not expected to indulge into the drug world after drying out (i.e. going through detoxification), that living frugally normally precludes living stylishly, and that nowadays one is expected to have a phone will judge these sentences felicitous.

The context which entails the background propositions is thus much broader with *even*, *still*, and *but*: it extends beyond linguistic context to general knowledge of the participants about the external world. Different types of contexts

are compared in the following examples:

(89) John promised that he will arrive by noon. He still hasn't come.

(90) (The interlocutors got a letter the day before that John would arrive by noon today)

John still hasn't come.

(91) My father still hasn't got a driver's license.

From (89) to (91), the proximity of the context against which the implication of *still* is interpreted differs. In (89), just like anaphoric presuppositions, the preceding sentence forms the immediate linguistic context that entails the expectation of John's arrival. In (90), the interlocutors, although not having said anything about the expected arrival, have set the common ground the day before. Lastly, in (91), the common ground is the common sense between the interlocutors that middle-aged men are generally expected to have a driver's license. In this way, the context which constrains the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* is much broader than anaphoric presuppositions.

3.2.3 Counter-evidence for Accommodation Theory

The lack of membership of the background meanings of *even*, *still*, and *but* in either class of presuppositions is problematic for the common ground theory of

accommodation. One might propose to formulate a new class, somewhere in the borderline between anaphoric and informative presuppositions, and the problem is solved. Nevertheless, such an attempt jeopardizes the theory of accommodation, which is central to the common ground theory.

The reason that presuppositions can neatly be divided into the dichotomy between informative and anaphoric presuppositions lies in the common ground account of accommodation. In Chapter 2.2, we have seen that anaphoric presuppositions make up the only exception to the accommodation of uncontroversial presuppositions. Then, under a consistent theory, it must be the case that those presuppositions that are identifiable by the addressee are accommodable if they are not satisfied by the common ground prior to the utterance.

However, those of *even*, *still*, and *but* are difficult to accommodate, and this cannot be attributed to unidentifiability (i.e. the hearer failing to pinpoint their presuppositions). Rather, after the utterance, the hearer *knows* what the presupposition is, but may still fail to accommodate it.

(92) 10.10am — **Still** no decision about Tony. (BNC: A00 382)

We can suppose a situation where the speaker utters (92) above when the context does not contain the information that some kind of decision about Tony is expected. If so, as with informative presuppositions, since the presupposition is

new information that is *identifiable* by the addressee, it should be accommodated to the common ground. In keeping with Stalnaker (1998, 2002), this is not an exception like *she* and *too*, but rather the exact point where accommodation must take place. Nevertheless, in that situation, the utterance will be judged infelicitous instead, and may be challenged by the hearer:

(93) How do you mean? Were we supposed to decide that soon?

Although the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* are not valid exceptions to accommodation like anaphoric presuppositions, they are oftentimes not accommodated, which fact jeopardizes the theory's consistency. The current theory cannot elucidate why the context can be restored through accommodation when informative presuppositions are new information but cannot be in the same circumstances with the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but*.

Summing up, the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* are neither anaphoric nor informative presuppositions, having a CG requirement but the relevant context being extensive, ranging from the immediate context to general world knowledge. The fact that they do not fit neatly in the dichotomy is problematic for the notion of accommodation, central to the common ground theory.

4. Not-at-issue Content Approach on *Even*, *Still*, and *But*

In Chapter 3, we have seen that the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* are distinguished from conventional implicatures and informative and anaphoric presuppositions. This section, following Tonhauser et al.'s (2013) classification, examines how they can be explicated within the theory of not-at-issue contents. In order to do so, this section tests the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* to decide which class in the taxonomy of Tonhauser et al. (2013) they are elements of.

Tonhauser et al.'s (2013) account contains conventional implicatures such as those of *almost* and *only*, but lacks *even*, *still*, and *but*. Recall from Chapter 2.3.2 that Class D triggers are projective contents that are associated with a strong contextual felicity constraint but do not display obligatory local effect. I show that *even*, *but*, and *still* belong to this class, if classified according to the properties the authors give, and also that they are distinguished from other elements in the same class.

4.1 Properties of *Even*, *Still*, and *But*

I use the definitions and diagnostics in Tonhauser et al. (2013) to test the three properties, strong contextual felicity constraint, projection, and obligatory local effect, of *even*, *still*, and *but*. Each subsection deals with the diagnostic

application of each property discussed in Chapter 2.3.2. In order to facilitate the reader's understanding of the three properties and subtle treatments in the diagnostics, this section gives more examples in addition to those of Chapter 2.3.2.

4.1.1 Presence of Strong Contextual Felicity Constraint

Strong contextual felicity concerns the requirement to belong to the context prior to an utterance. The diagnostic in Tonhauser et al. (2013) which is accordingly adopted in this current study is presented below:

- (94) Let S be an atomic sentence that contains trigger t of projective content m .
- (i) If uttering S is acceptable in an m -neutral context, then trigger t does not impose a strong contextual felicity constraint with respect to m .
 - (ii) If uttering S is unacceptable in an m -neutral context and acceptable in a minimally different m -positive context, then trigger t imposes a strong contextual felicity constraint with respect to m .

(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 24, underline added)

Below is an illustration of *only* and its prejacent implication with regards to this property:

(95) Context: Carla, a mother of three teenage daughters, falls on the way to the supermarket and breaks her leg. She's been in the hospital for a week when her daughters come to visit her for the first time. When she asks them how they are doing, her youngest daughter blurts out:

Only I clean the house!

(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 15, boldface added)

Here, the context is neutral as to whether the speaker, Carla's youngest daughter, cleans the house or not. Because the prejacent implication that the speaker cleans the house is accepted by the hearer when the sentence is uttered in the given *m*-neutral context, it does not have a strong contextual felicity constraint.

Now the items in focus, *even*, *still*, and *but* are tested for the property of strong contextual felicity constraint. First, they are uttered in *m*-neutral contexts: namely, each context which does not entail or imply unlikelihood, expectation, and contrast, respectively.

(96) Context: Lee is urging May to exercise for her health. Mentioning Bob, May's distant uncle whom they don't know well, Lee says to May:

?Even Bob works out now and then.

(97) Context: Lee and May are looking at the photos of their friend John. Lee suddenly says to May:

?John still hasn't arrived.

(98) Context: Lee and May are pointing to a book whose cover is red. Lee says to

May:

?This book is red but difficult.

In (96), there is no mention or prior shared knowledge of Bob's tendency not to work out, in (97), there is no expectation between the speakers of John's arrival, and finally in (98), the contrast between being red and being difficult is not implied or entailed. In such *m*-neutral contexts, the utterances with *even*, *still*, and *but* are judged infelicitous. Below, the same utterances are made in *m*-positive contexts.

(99) Context: Lee is urging May to exercise for her health. Bob is May's uncle whom they think is very idle and doesn't move around much. Lee says to

May:

Even Bob works out now and then.

(100) Context: Lee and May are looking at some photos of their friend John who was supposed to have arrived today. Lee says to May:

John still hasn't arrived.

(101) Context: Lee and May are talking about some textbooks labeled by different colors. Those with a red cover are basic level whereas blue ones are advanced. Pointing at a red book, Lee says to May:

This book is red but difficult.

The context in (99) implies that Bob is not expected to exercise, since Lee and May both know he is idle. In (100), whether Lee and May are explicitly talking about John's expected arrival or not, the context entails that there is a mutual expectation between the two speakers of John's arrival. Lastly, in (101), the utterance context is one that entails that the book's color and its level are correlated. Since this implicates a contrast between the reading levels of other red books and this book, it is an *m*-positive context.

As seen in the diagnostic, since the utterances of *even*, *but*, and *still* are infelicitous in *m*-neutral contexts but felicitous in *m*-positive ones, they each impose a strong contextual felicity constraint on their implication.

4.1.2 Presence of Projection

The test of projection in Tonhauser et al. (2013) is further divided into sub-diagnostics which make reference to the strong contextual felicity constraint discussed in Chapter 4.1.1. Simply put, if a trigger is associated with a strong contextual felicity constraint like *even*, *still*, and *but*, then an appropriate context,

which is an m -positive context, should be given in order to test whether the sentence projects or not.

(102) Let S be an atomic sentence that gives rise to implication m . Let $\text{FOS}(S)$ be a set of sentences consisting of S , a negative variant of S , an interrogative variant of S , a modal variant of S , and a conditional with S as its antecedent.

(i) Trigger t imposes a strong contextual felicity constraint with respect to m : If utterances of $\text{FOS}(S)$ are judged unacceptable in an m -neutral context and acceptable in an m -positive context, then implication m is projective.

(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 37, underline added)

Because *even*, *still*, and *but* were diagnosed to have a strong contextual felicity constraint, I adopt (102) to test their behaviors with respect to projection. First, the family-of-sentences of the sentences from Chapter 4.1.1 containing the triggers are tested in m -neutral contexts.

(103) Context: Lee is urging May to exercise for her health. Mentioning Bob, May's distant uncle whom they don't know well, Lee says to May:

- a. ?Even Bob works out now and then.
- b. ?It is not the case that even Bob works out now and then.
- c. ?Does even Bob work out now and then?

- d. ?It's possible that even Bob works out now and then.
- e. ?If even Bob works out now and then, you should exercise, too.

(104) Context: Lee and May are looking at the photos of their friend John. Lee suddenly says to May:

- a. ?John still hasn't arrived.
- b. ?It is not the case that John still hasn't arrived.
- c. ?Has John still not arrived?
- d. ?It's possible that John still hasn't arrived.
- e. ?If John still hasn't arrived, we'd better call him.

(105) Context: Lee and May are pointing to a book whose cover is red. Lee says to May:

- a. ?This book is red but difficult.
- b. ?It is not the case that this book is red but difficult.
- c. ?Is this book red but difficult?
- d. ?It's possible that this book is red but difficult.
- e. ?If this book is red but difficult, Carlos cannot read it.

Like each original declarative sentence, the variants are judged infelicitous in *m*-neutral contexts. Now, I test whether the implications project in *m*-positive contexts.

(106) Context: Lee is urging May to exercise for her health. Bob is May's uncle who they think is very idle and doesn't move around much. Lee says to May,

- a. Even Bob works out now and then.
- b. It is not the case that even Bob works out now and then.
- c. Does even Bob work out now and then?
- d. It's possible that even Bob works out now and then.
- e. If even Bob works out now and then, you should exercise, too.

(107) Context: Lee and May are looking at the photos of their friend John who was supposed to have arrived today. Lee says to May:

- a. John still hasn't arrived.
- b. It is not the case that John still hasn't arrived.
- c. Has John still not arrived?
- d. It's possible that John still hasn't arrived.
- e. If John still hasn't arrived, we'd better call him.

(108) Context: Lee and May are talking about some textbooks labeled by different colors. Those with a red cover are basic level whereas blue ones are advanced. Pointing at a red book, Lee says to May:

- a. This book is red but difficult.
- b. It is not the case that this book is red but difficult.
- c. Is this book red but difficult?

- d. It's possible that this book is red but difficult.
- e. If this book is red but difficult, Carlos cannot read it.

In (106)-(108), the family sentences are all felicitous in the m -positive contexts, and each implication that Bob is least likely to work out, that John is expected to arrive, and that there is a contrast between the red book in focus and the rest, respectively, survives in (b-e). Consequently, the implications are projective.

4.1.3 Lack of Obligatory Local Effect

The last property to be explored in Tonhauser et al. (2013), *obligatory local effect*, relates to inability to project to the global context distinct from the local context of an attitude holder. Its diagnostic when the trigger imposes a strong contextual felicity constraint is presented below:

(109) Let S_1 be an atomic sentence with trigger t of content m .

Trigger t imposes a strong contextual felicity constraint with respect to m :
 Let S be a sentence where S_1 is embedded under a belief-predicate. If utterance of S is acceptable when the utterance context entails m but the bearer of the attitude is explicitly ignorant of m , then the content m with trigger t need not have its effect locally, that is, does not have obligatory

local effect.

(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 41, underline added)

Anaphoric presupposition triggers, similar to *even*, *still*, and *but*, also impose a strong contextual felicity constraint. The same diagnostic is applied to the third person pronoun *he*:

(110) [Context: The speaker, Ricardo, and Malena are lost in a city they've never visited before. The speaker, who, together with Ricardo, is a bit ahead of Malena, says:]

#'Look! There's a man. Malena doesn't see him. She thinks **he** is sick.'

(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 46, underline and boldface added)

Here, the utterance context of the speaker and Ricardo is *m*-positive, entailing that the referent of *he* exists. Nevertheless, the attitude holder, Malena, is ignorant of this referent, so the implication is not part of the local context. Since the underlined sentence, *S* according to (109), is infelicitous in this case, the existence implication has obligatory local effect.

In the following diagnoses of *even*, *still*, and *but*, the English propositional verb *believe* is used in *m*-positive global contexts—that is, those of the speakers—in which each attitude-holder is ignorant of *m*:

(111) Context: Lee and May are talking about John, whose children are failing at school. They also know that among those children, Jane has the worst grades.

Lee says to May:

John overestimates his children so much that he believes even Jane can **get an A**, but he doesn't know that Jane is the least likely one to.

(112) Context: Lee and May are talking about a couple, John and Amy. They know that Amy has been trying to break up with John for a long time.

John believes that Amy still hasn't left him, and all the worse, he doesn't even expect her to leave him soon.

(113) Context: Lee and May are talking about their tall colleagues who tend to be unprofessional. Lee talks about their boss John's impression of a newcomer

Angela:

John believes that Angela is tall but professional. Of course, John doesn't know that those tall people in our office are so lazy and dull.

In each of (111) to (113), the underlined sentence corresponds to *S* in (109), and the boldfaced, *S*₁. Each global context is *m*-positive in that the utterance context between Lee and May entails the unlikelihood of Jane getting an A, the speakers' expectation of Amy's leaving John, and the contrast between being tall and being professional. Nevertheless, the belief holder, John, is ignorant of such

implication as the latter part of each utterance explicitly indicates. Therefore, each implication is attributed not to the local context of the attitude holder, but only to the global context of the speakers. As each utterance of *S* is acceptable where only the global, not local, context entails *m*, the triggers do not show obligatory local effect.

4.2 Discussion

A table below summarizes various not-at-issue contents in English (E) and Guarani (G) which are categorized into four classes in Tonhauser et al. (2013):

LANGUAGE	TRIGGER/CONTENT	PROPERTIES OF CONTENTS			CLASS	
		PROJECTION	STRONG	OBLIGATORY		
			CONTEXTUAL	LOCAL		
		FELICITY	EFFECT			
E	Pronoun/existence of referent	yes	yes	yes	A	
	<i>too</i> /existence of alternative	yes	yes	yes		
	G	<i>ha'e</i> '3rd'/existence of referent	yes	yes		yes
		<i>avei</i> 'too'/existence of alternative	yes	yes		yes
E	Expressive	yes	no	no	B	
	Appositive	yes	no	no		
	NRRC	yes	no	no		
	<i>that</i> N/property attribution	yes	no	no		
G	Possessive NP/possessive relation	yes	no	no		
	Expressive	yes	no	no		
	Appositive	yes	no	no		
	NRRC	yes	no	no		
G	Possessive NP/possessive relation	yes	no	no		
	<i>ha'e</i> '3rd'/human referent	yes	no	no		
	Demonstrative NP/property attribution	yes	no	no		
E	<i>almost</i> /polar implication	yes	no	yes	C	
	<i>know</i> /content of complement	yes	no	yes		
	<i>only</i> /prejacent implication	yes	no	yes		
	<i>stop</i> /prestate holds	yes	no	yes		
G	<i>aimete</i> 'almost'/polar implication	yes	no	yes		
	<i>(oi)kuua</i> 'know'/content of complement	yes	no	yes		
	<i>-nte</i> 'only'/prejacent implication	yes	no	yes		
	<i>n(d)(a)-...-vé-i-ma</i> 'not anymore'/prestate holds	yes	no	yes		
E	<i>too</i> /salience of established alternative	yes	yes	no	D	
	Focus/salience of alternatives	yes	yes	no		
	<i>that</i> N/speaker indicates suitable entity	yes	yes	no		
G	<i>avei</i> 'too'/salience of established alternative	yes	yes	no		
	Demonstrative NP/speaker indicates suitable entity	yes	yes	no		

Table 2: Classification of projective contents in English and Guarani in Tonhauser et al. (2013)

To recapitulate the results in Chapter 4.1, *even*, *still*, and *but* impose a strong contextual felicity constraint but do not show obligatory local effect. Also, expected from their backgroundedness, their implications are projective. As a result, according to the table above, they belong to Class D. The following subsections discuss what this classification signifies, namely a heterogeneous Class D, and

wrap up the results by showing the implications of the findings.

4.2.1 Heterogeneity of Class D

In fact, Class D is a “tantalizing new area of research” (p. 100) to Tonhauser et al. (2013), whose constituents the authors have hard time pinpointing and leave to future research. The projective contents of Class D that Tonhauser et al. (2013) originally found are rather atypical contents that “tend to concern not facts about the external world that the interlocutors seek to describe, but *facts about the discourse situation itself*” (p. 100, italics added) such as discursive salience or deixis. For instance, the implication of indexical *that* that the speaker is actually indicating some suitable entity in the current discourse is a constituent of Class D.

(114) a. [Context: Barney and Fred are walking down the street. They haven’t been discussing cars. Barney does not point to or otherwise indicate any of the cars parked in the street. Barney says:]

#Wilma likes that car.

b. [Same context as in [114]a:]

#If Wilma likes that car, she has good taste.

c. [Context: Barney points at a car and says:]

Pebbles thinks Wilma likes that car, but of course Pebbles has no idea that I'm pointing to it.

(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 54)

(114a) employs a context where such an implication is not satisfied, and thus infelicitous. This means that the indication implication of *that* is associated with a strong contextual felicity constraint. (114b) shows that in an *m*-neutral context the implication inside the antecedent of an *if*-clause does not survive, whereas an *m*-positive context where Barney is pointing to a car would render the same sentence felicitous; the implication is projective. Lastly, in (114c), Barney's global context possibly contradicts the local context of Pebble's belief world—i.e. Pebbles doesn't know that the speaker is indicating a car—so there is no obligatory local effect. Another example found in Tonhauser et al. (2013) shows the salience implication of *too* lacking obligatory local effect.

(115) [Context: Susi, Brian, Carlos, and Maria are at a party with lots of drunk people. Susi is worried about her friend Claudia and says to Maria:]
'Claudia is drunk and Brian thinks that Carlos, too, is drunk.'

(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 57)

The salience implication of *too* in Class D is that an alternative is salient in the current discourse, not that such an alternative exists, the latter being a Class A

element. In (115), the implication that ‘someone other than Carlos is being salient in the discourse’ is satisfied by the global context, with the prior mention of Claudia. But of course, the attitude holder Brian will be ignorant of the current conversation between Susi and Maria, and therefore of the salience of the alternative. Thus, the salience implication of *too* does not show obligatory local effect.

The triggers I found here that belong to Class D, however, are very much distinguished from such contents. The authors anticipate Class D to be “a *previously unrecognized* class of projective content” (Tonhauser et al., 2013, p. 68, underline added) of “*subtle discourse-oriented* implications” (Tonhauser et al., 2013, p. 102, underline added) like the salience implication. In contrast, the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* are rather classical examples of background meanings which are evidently not about discursive saliency or deixis. They do not concern the discourse itself but unlikelihood, contrast, and expectation about the external world.

The reason that Class D can encompass these heterogeneous items seems to be due to the last property, the lack of obligatory local effect. When a not-at-issue content does not display *obligatory* local effect, it may mean two things: 1) it never has local effect (i.e. it must project globally) or 2) it sometimes has local effect but at other times projects globally. I argue that the original Class D contents exemplify the former case, whilst the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* are representative of the latter. First, the contents that Tonhauser et al. (2013) originally found have

obligatory global effect, as the salience and indication implications always concern the real conversation setting which serves as the global context:

- (116) a. [Context: Cathy and Derek are not pointing at a certain car. Their friend Amy is indicating a car, but Cathy and Derek cannot see her now so don't know of this fact. Cathy says to Derek:]
#Amy believes **that car** is cool.
- b. [Context: Cathy and Derek haven't been discussing classes. Their friend Amy is talking about classes in a different conversation, but Cathy and Derek cannot see her now so don't know of this fact. Cathy says to Derek:]
#Amy believes that the Syntax class is difficult, **too**.
- c. [Context: Cathy and Derek haven't been discussing people who could've stolen Amy's wallet. Their friend Amy is talking about potential thieves to other friends, but Cathy and Derek cannot see her now so don't know of this fact. Cathy says to Derek:]
#Amy believes that **John_F** stole her wallet.

In (116), the salience and indication implications are not attributable to the global context, as the context of Cathy and Derek does not include them. For example, in (116a), if Amy is the one who is pointing to a car, but the speakers are

not, it is infelicitous to use *that*. Similarly, in (116c), if John's alternatives are being made salient in the local context of Amy's but not in the global context of Cathy and Derek, it is infelicitous to put focus on John. As such, in addition to not having obligatory local effect, the implications must always project globally. In contrast, the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* do not have obligatory global effect.

- (117) a. [Context: Cathy and Derek don't think that the CEO is not likely to favor Amy's idea. Cathy says to Derek:]
Amy believes that **even** the CEO will like her idea. (But of course, it's so obvious to us that he will.)
- b. [Context: Cathy and Derek don't expect John to turn in his paper. Cathy says to Derek:]
Amy believes that John **still** hasn't turned in the paper. (But of course he was never going to.)
- c. [Context: Cathy and Derek don't think that there is a contrast between being smart and nice. Cathy says to Derek:]
Amy believes that John is smart **but** nice. (But I have no idea why she thinks smart people are not supposed to be nice.)

As seen in the sentences above, the not-at-issue contents of *even*, *still*, and

but do not necessarily project globally. To the speaker(s), the unlikelihood, expectation, and contrast implications do not hold, as indicated by the global context. The implications can be contradicted once more by the global context when the speaker adds the sentences in parentheses, but even so, the utterances are still felicitous. The global context in (117b), for instance, denies the expectation of John turning in the paper, whereas the local context of Amy's belief contains it. In this way, although it is proven in Chapter 4.1.3 that there is no *obligatory* local effect for these items, they may optionally show local effect and not project globally.

A new criterion adapted in this chapter substantiates the outward heterogeneity of the original items in Class D in Tonhauser et al. (2013) and the ones found in this research. The contrast derives from the former having no local effect but showing obligatory global effect contrary to the latter with optional global and local effects.

4.2.2 Implications of the Results

In sum, the not-at-issue content theory is inclusive of the background meanings of *even*, *still*, and *but*. The analysis in this section has implications for both this study and Tonhauser et al. (2013). For the current study, it has granted *even*, *still*, and *but* the status of not-at-issue content by showing that their implications are projective. In addition, the presence of a strong contextual felicity

constraint reaffirmed their contextual dependence, previously attested by the contextual base of the meanings and their CG requirement. Finally, the implication-entailing context, ranging from local to global, reinforces its far-reaching characteristic found in Chapter 3.2.2.

The most palpable contribution to Tonhauser et al. (2013) is that more elements were added to Class D, for which finding new candidates was thought to be demanding. What's more, the new items do not resemble the ones originally found in Tonhauser et al. (2013). My findings suggest a much different picture of Class D from what Tonhauser et al. (2013) anticipates it to be.

Perhaps the heterogeneity of Class D is a natural, even desirable, consequence of a unified account of not-at-issue contents. In fact, it is consistent with Tonhauser et al. (2013) in which constituents of each class are heterogeneous from the perspective of traditional theories. For instance, Class B consists of Pottsian CIs as well as classical presuppositions. The authors view this heterogeneity as indicative of "classifications of projective meanings that cross-cut the traditional notion of presupposition" (Tonhauser et al. 2013, p. 105). Then, the fact that Class D not only consists of discourse-related contents but also more classical implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* actually supports such intuition.

This research also found that the difference between Tonhauser et al.'s (2013) original Class D items and the new ones arises from the fact that the lack of obligatory local effect can mean either no local effect at all or optional local effect. This finding points to a possible subdivision of each class according to an

additional standard, *obligatory global effect*.

5. Conclusion

All in all, the main aim of the current study has been to characterize the distinctive implications behind *even*, *still*, and *but* which share subjectivity as a fundamental property. This thesis has demonstrated, with support from the corpus data, that the implications these words trigger are unique in terms of *context*. They constitute a distinctive class of meaning with marked contextual properties, not harmonizing with the notions of conventional implicature and pragmatic presupposition, and also differentiated from other members of Class D in Tonhauser et al. (2013).

I have shown that the CI and pragmatic presupposition views cannot sufficiently account for the phenomena. The imports of the implications are dependent upon the context, varying according to each context unlike other conventional implicatures. Also, the implications are constrained by the context which can extend beyond the immediate set of uttered propositions or discourse to general world knowledge. This peculiarity leads to their lack of membership in either anaphoric or informative presuppositions, which the accommodation theory cannot explicate.

On the other hand, the reason that the distinctive meanings do not pose a threat to the not-at-issue theory is because the latter is an exhaustive theory that can encompass the entire range of not-at-issue meanings, as long as they are projective and backgrounded. Apart from being sweeping, the taxonomy in Tonhauser et al.

(2013) can contrive additional devices such as contextual felicity and local effect conducive to more fine-grained characterizations of each content.

Within the comprehensive framework of not-at-issue content, the application of the diagnostics and the accompanying results provide new insight into the phenomena. The attested projectivity of the implications of *even*, *still*, and *but* confirms their backgroundedness or *not-at-issueness*. Also, the finding that the implications are strongly constrained by the context reinforces the contextual dependence suggested by their CG requirement and contextually derived meanings in previous chapters. Last but not least, *even*, *still*, and *but* being licensed by different levels of relevant context, from local to global, is in line with the intuition that the context is broad, extending from immediate context to general knowledge.

Moreover, the results in Chapter 4 are suggestive of heterogeneity of projective contents that cut across the traditional divisions, as well as of the existence of more members in Class D. A new plausible criterion for subdivision, obligatory global effect, is proposed as the cause for the contrast between the original Class D items and *even*, *still*, and *but*. When more candidates for Class D are discovered in future studies, we can form a more accurate picture of it and find out whether this class needs subdivision.

A positive step forward from this research is to find more items that behave in the identical ways with *even*, *still*, and *but* regarding the factor of context. Also, it is desirable to attempt to jump into the core of conventional implicature and inquire whether this family is a myth (Bach, 1999), in addition to examining what

the common ground theory of presupposition might be missing. Close inspection on *even*, *still*, and *but* and other triggers can bring about a more precise taxonomy of background contents.

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국문 초록

Even, still, but의 배경 의미 탐구

본 논문은 even (‘-조차도’), still (‘여전히’), but (‘-지만’)의 ‘예외성’, ‘기대’, ‘대조’라는 배경 의미(background meaning)를 탐구하는 것을 목표로 한다. 이전의 연구들과는 달리, 이 논문은 세 단어의 함의를 문맥과 관련해 특징지을 수 있는 서로 다른 의미화용론적 접근법의 유효성에 특히 주목한다.

위 의미들에 관한 대부분의 기존 연구는 화용론 기본서의 고정함축(conventional implicature)에 관한 단원으로서 이들 각각에 대해 세밀히 조사하지 않았다. 반면, 기존의 함축(implicature) 접근 방식에 반대하여 Bach (1999)는 고정함축 개념 자체가 허상이며 문맥에 따라 의미가 달라질 수 있음을 역설한다. 하지만 두 가지 접근법 모두 이런 의미들이 발생하는 독특한 맥락적 특성을 분석하지 않는다. 또, 화용론적 전제(pragmatic presupposition) 이론이나 비핵심적 내용(not-at-issue content) 이론과 같이 더 널리 받아들여지며 포괄적인 이론틀에서 그들의 상위개념을 검증하고자 하지 않는다는 한계가 있다.

본 연구는 기존의 함축, 화용론적 전제, 그리고 비핵심적 내용 세 이론의 관점에서 이 의미 현상을 설명한다. 첫째, 기존의 함축 접근법으로 이 의미들이 어휘 관습(convention)에 뿌리를 두고 있지만, 특정 의미는 대화의 맥락에서 파생되는 것을 보여준다. 둘째, 화용론적 전제의 공통 토대 이론(common ground theory)의 틀 안에서 분석해볼 때, 이 의미들은 공통 토대에 속해야 한다는 요건을 가지며 근접한 언어환경을 넘어 세계에 대한 배경적 지식으로 확대되는 광범위한 맥락에서 발생하는 것으로 관찰된다. 이러한 속성은 위 의미들을 정보성 있는 전제(informative presupposition)와 대용적 전제(anaphoric presupposition) 양쪽 모두에 포함되지 않게 하며, 공통 토대 이론 내 전제 수용 이론(accommodation theory)에 대한 반례로 작용한다.

마지막으로, 이 의미들을 비핵심적 내용 이론(Tonhauser et al. 2013)의 관점에서 분석한다. Tonhauser et al. (2013)의 비핵심적 내용의 분류 체계를 채택하여, even, still, but의 함축 의미가 강한 맥락적 제약(contextual felicity constraint)을 갖지만 의무적인 지역적 효과(obligatory local effect)는 없는 D그룹의 투사적인(projective) 비핵심적 의미임을 보인다. D그룹은 담화적인 추론들을 포함하지만 even, still, but의 함축의미와 같은 전통적인 항목들은 포함시키지 않고 있다. 본 연구에서는 이러한 D그룹 내의 이질성을 의무적인 지역 효과를 지니지 않

은 의미들에 수의적으로 수반될 수 있는 새로운 속성인 '의무적인 전체적 효과' (obligatory global effect)를 통해 설명하고자 한다.

마지막 접근법은 이전 두 가지와는 달리 위 의미들의 현상을 이해하는 더욱 효과적인 도구를 제공한다. 강한 맥락적 제약의 존재는 기존의 함축 또는 화용론적 전제 이론에서 충분히 설명하지 못했던 의미들의 문맥 의존성을 입증한다. 또한, 이 의미들을 제약하는 맥락이 지엽적 혹은 전체적 맥락 모두 가능함을 보임으로써 앞서 설명한 맥락의 광범위함을 뒷받침한다.

궁극적으로 본 연구는 배경 의미의 연구에 있어 다음과 같은 의의를 지닌다. 첫째, even, still, but의 함축 의미들이 고정함축 또는 화용론적 전제들과 구별되며 비핵심적 내용의 D그룹과도 이질적인, 독특한 맥락적 특성을 지니는 새로운 의미 부류를 형성함을 보인다. 다음으로, 이런 현상을 충분히 설명하지 못하는 기존의 고정함축 이론과 화용론적 전제 이론에 허점이 있을 수 있음을 시사한다. 마지막으로, D그룹에 다른 하위항목들과 구별되는 새로운 항목을 추가하고 잠재적인 세분화 기준을 제시함으로써 비핵심적 내용에 관한 통합된 이해에 기여한다.

주요어: even, still, but, 고정함축, 화용론적 전제, 비핵심적 내용

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