



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

문학석사학위논문

Pictorial space as Heterotopia:
An Analysis of *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* through
Foucault's Archaeological Methodology

헤테로토피아로서의 회화 공간:

푸코의 고고학적 방법론을 통한 『이것은 파이프가 아니다』 분석

2015년 8월

서울대학교 대학원

미 학 과

김 정 은

Pictorial space as Heterotopia:
An Analysis of *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* through
Foucault's Archaeological Methodology

지도교수 Peter W. Milne

이 논문을 문학석사 학위논문으로 제출함

2015년 8월

서울대학교 대학원

미 학 과

김 정 은

김정은의 석사 학위논문을 인준함

2015년 8월

위 원 장

오 중 환



부 위 원 장

이 해 완



위 원

Peter W. Milne



Abstract

Pictorial space as Heterotopia:

An Analysis of *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* through Foucault's Archaeological Methodology

Kim, Jung-eun

Department of Aesthetics

The Graduate School

Seoul National University

This study analyzes *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* through Foucault's archaeological methodology and argues for the significance of a new pictorial space as heterotopia, that is, as a heterogeneous space contesting its surrounding orders within the existing society.

Foucault uses what he calls an archaeological methodology to analyze Magritte's paintings. Such a methodology does away with the blind faith in an unchanging, absolute, constituting subject, revealing the limitation of the existing rules by which we recognize and understand paintings, and describing Magritte's paintings as a significant *event* that contains the transformation of the rules of painting by redefining the relations of elements inside the pictures. According to Foucault, Magritte's paintings exploit the traditional functions and arrangements of linguistic and plastic representation so as to disturb their traditional relation. In Foucault's view, the two principles of traditional western paintings from the 15th century to the 20th century are as follows. 1) When linguistic representation and plastic representation

meet at a certain place, the subordination of one to the other occurs, in spite of their separated mechanisms. 2) A plastic resemblance is reducible to the linguistic affirmation that says “This is a representation of that.” These two principles have been intended to build coherence between linguistic representations (words) and visual representations (images). But in Magritte’s paintings, the predominant principles of representation are dislocated within the traditional representational system. Firstly, in his paintings, an original model or a common place shared by text and images, which guarantees the identity of representations, disappears. Once the original disappears, the title (words) of a painting no longer affirms the identity of images, and images are released from the obligation of resembling the original. In the situation where one cannot say what represents what, images come into the self-referential relation of similitude.

Therefore, this study suggests that Foucault sees Magritte’s painting as being on a *threshold* between, to use Foucault’s archaeological terminology, the episteme of identity and that of dis-identity. Instead of being an exemplar of a new age after the beginning of the 20th century, the established principles of representation are sustained on the surface but actually are transformed and broken off. On the threshold of the representational system, Magritte’s paintings show not just historical variations of pictorial rules, but the moment when the absoluteness of the predominant norms of the representational system are being cracked.

It is in this very sense that Magritte’s paintings can be seen as a pictorial space of heterotopias. While a threshold is a descriptive term of the space between epistemes, “heterotopia” is an expression that applies the resistant possibility of the threshold to practical lives. This study redefines heterotopia, based on Foucault’s archaeological methodology, as the space between epistemes. In the transitory space from one episteme to another, there

occurs a rupture of the knowledge system; the predominant norms operating in the existing society are shaken and different rules can be newly rising. In this space, we can map and take a critical view on the existing historical *a priori* working in the present knowledge system, in particular here, relating to the domain of representational paintings. As mentioned above, by being on the threshold, Magritte's paintings reveal the traditional principles of representation that we taken for granted by distorting them. Furthermore, heterotopias have a possibility of resistance that denies the social order controlling us, even though they are a part of the society. It is possible because heterotopias have a characteristic of juxtaposing diverse sites which are incompatible. Diversity and incompatibility here mean a number of differences that do not have common ground. That is, heterotopias collapse the base of knowledge shared by the whole society and crowd many things together in a space, which causes a situation where an existing rule cannot be dominant, where the established social norms cannot operate properly. Using in particular Magritte's painting *La trahison des images*, this study articulates the concept of threshold in Foucault's archaeological analysis of Magritte's paintings and extends his paintings to the heterotopic space, a new pictorial space manifesting differences within the traditional representation system.

Keywords : Heterotopia, Threshold, Archaeological analysis, Representation, Common place, Similitude

Student Number : 2012-22903

Contents

Abstract_ i

Introduction_ 1

I. What is Archaeological methodology?_ 10

A. Purpose of Archaeological methodology_ 14

B. Archaeology as description of discursive events_ 18

C. Significance of Archaeological methodology_ 27

II. Archaeological analysis of *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*_ 32

A. Conventions of Representation_ 34

1. Two principles of traditional western paintings_ 34

2. Calligram: Complementary combination of text and image_ 39

B. Magritte's Paintings on the Threshold_45

1. Collapse of the traditional system of representation_45

2. *Les deux mystères*: Ground for diverse discourses_56

3. Self-referentiality of similitude and Heterotopia_62

III. Pictorial Space as Heterotopia_67

A. Understanding of Heterotopia_68

1. The Space between Epistémès_68

2. Expansion to the Space of resistance_72

B. Magritte's Painting as Heterotopia: Unraveled Calligram_75

Conclusion_80

Reference_85

Illustrations_87

국문초록_113

Introduction

This study analyzes *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*¹ through Michel Foucault's archaeological methodology. *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* is an art criticism on René Magritte (1898-1967) written by Michel Foucault. In this text, Foucault didn't follow the traditional evaluation of art history, but looked at Magritte's paintings in a new way. Before Foucault, Magritte had been classified as a surrealist in art history and his works had also been interpreted with the unconsciousness, fantasies, mysteries, and dreams. Especially *dépaysement*, one of the major techniques of Surrealism, which gives a viewer a shock that liberates the unconsciousness from rationality by combining ordinary objects in an unusual way, had been an important tool for analyzing the forms of Magritte's paintings. However, Foucault removed the name tag of Surrealism given to Magritte and looked into his paintings with the eyes focused on representation. Through archaeological methodology, he analyzed regularities of representation, instead of the unconsciousness or fantasies in order to explain the adversarial and simultaneous relation between the two representational orders, the image and the language in Magritte's paintings.

Looking into the philosophical/aesthetical research trends of *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*, we can generally classify them into two types. One is to suggest various interpretations of

¹ Foucault, Michel, *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*, Montpellier: fata morgana, 1986.

significance of similitude discovered by Foucault in Magritte's paintings. The other is to attempt to put *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* with other art critiques of Foucault in terms of archaeology or genealogy, which are, as we will see in the first chapter, his unique styles of analysis in particular periods.

The former trend of research has an interest mainly in similitude, which is distinguished from resemblance by Foucault. He differentiates between similitude and resemblance in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* according to Magritte's advice, while using the terms without any distinction in *Les mots et les choses* (Paris, 1966).² According to Foucault, resemblance is the likeness between the original and its copies; it always presupposes the existence of an original model. In the relation of resemblance, copies are inferior to the original because they are not as ideal as the original. In contrast, similitude is the likeness between repeated similar images; it is impossible to tell apart and hierarchize the original and its copies. As we will see later, like images in two mirrors facing each other, in the relation of similitude, images are self-referential in the sense that they refer to nothing but themselves. Most of the research on similitude deals with Foucault's critique of Magritte in relation to the transgression against the principle of identity which has influenced our epistemology for a long time. For example, Gary Shapiro insists that Foucault's conception of similitude is a variation of anti-platonic thought of Nietzsche and Deleuze.³ Petra Carlsson finds a move away from the representational system operated by the principle of identity in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* and

² Magritte sent letters on May 23rd, and June 4th in 1966 to Foucault after reading his fashionable work, *Les mots et les choses*. He suggested that the words 'resemblance' and 'similitude' should be differentiated and gave Foucault some inspiration for writing *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*. To read Magritte's letters to Foucault, see *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*, pp.85-90. (Eng. pp.57-58)

³ Shapiro, Gary, "Pipe dreams: Eternal recurrence and simulacrum in Foucault's ekphrasis of Magritte", *Word & Image: A Journal of Verbal/Visual Enquiry*, No.13, No.1. (1997)

proposes it as a possibility of new explanation of negative theology.⁴ On the other hand, there are studies which try to elaborate the notion of similitude itself. Silvano Levy argues that there is a terminological confusion of resemblance and similitude between Foucault and Magritte, and attempts to resolve it.⁵ And Scott Durham explains how similitude functions differently in art and literature.⁶

The representative researcher of the latter trend is Joseph J. Tanke, who reflects on the emergence of modernity by emphasizing the genealogical character of Foucault's essays on art. He reconstitutes almost every consideration of visual art of Foucault from *Las meninas* by Velázquez to the photos of Duane Michals, the contemporary photographer. Tanke understands that Foucault regards the individual artworks, where the traditional rules are broken and new forms of art appear, as the sporadic and discontinuous branch of modern art. For Tanke, *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* is a writing which characterizes the shape of post-representational art, complementing discussions of Manet considered as a pioneer of modern art before Magritte.⁷ And Tanke's study is also relevant to the former trend in research because it pays attention to Magritte's paintings as artworks that reject the traditional vocation of representing exterior models but accomplish modernity of similitude.

However, the existing research pays less attention to the fact that Magritte's paintings

⁴ Carlsson, Petra, "Foucault, Magritte and negative theology beyond representation", *Studia Theologica - Nordic Journal of Theology*, In Press, 2013.

⁵ Levy, Silvano, "Foucault on Magritte on Resemblance", *The Modern Language Review*, Vol. 85, No. 1. (Jan., 1990)

⁶ Durham, Scott, "From Magritte to Klossowski: The Simulacrum, between Painting and Narrative", *October* Vol. 64. (Spring, 1993)

⁷ Tanke, Joseph J., *Foucault's philosophy of art – A genealogy of Modernity*, London; New York: Continuum, 2009.

are analyzed in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* through what Foucault calls archaeology, which is an analysis of knowledge system in a certain epoch.⁸ The details of archaeological methodology will be given in the first chapter, but it is important here to note that an understanding of what Foucault calls archaeology is necessary in this study precisely because we can better understand *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* with comprehension on how Foucault made full use of his archaeological concepts to specific paintings. What the existing research has neglected is that Foucault's analysis of Magritte's paintings is a sort of extended archaeology whose aim is to avoid being caught by subject-centered viewpoint based on continuity and to describe ruptures and discontinuities of knowledge in history as they spread out. That is, Foucault's archaeological analysis in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* suggests Magritte's paintings as breaking points in the domain of paintings. But, as we have seen above, the main subject of existing studies is weighted heavily on the destruction of traditional representation and the emergence of similitude. Many commentators of the text study how Foucault compares similitude, as an alternative to the traditional representation system, to resemblance, and understand Magritte's paintings as a completely new type of paintings in modern society. They suppose that Foucault presents Magritte's works as an archetype of similitude in the era of dis-identification.⁹

⁸ It may appear contradictory to Tanke's re-interpretation of Foucault's art critiques by means of archaeology and genealogy. Although Tanke says clearly that he tries to analyze *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* through archaeological methodology, he simply defines Magritte's paintings as 'archaeological events', following Foucault even to his method of explanation and doesn't give any specific explanation of how archaeological concepts and methods operate in the text.

⁹ I'm not saying that the existing research puts the traditional representation system aside and ignores it, nor that what it has done is wrong. But most studies of *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* don't try to precisely explain the relation between the principles of traditional western paintings and similitude; they merely regard similitude as what is located on the opposite side of the traditional principles of paintings according to Foucault's distinction of similitude and resemblance. However, unlike the existing research, this study shall attempt to explain similitude as what is partly attached and partly detached from the traditional principles of paintings.

However, we can discover an unprecedented point of view on paintings from *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* upon consideration of archaeological methodology of which Foucault makes use to analyze Magritte's paintings: *the pictorial space as heterotopia*, which is a heterogeneous space in reality which contests its surrounding orders. What we need to pay attention to is that Magritte's paintings don't abandon the traditional representation system completely. Like heterotopias, they are still located in a real world while disarranging the conventional orders of paintings. In fact, Foucault does not completely separate Magritte's paintings from the principles of traditional western paintings. In *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*, Foucault does not consider Magritte's work as one of the traditional representational paintings from the 15th century to the beginning of the 20th century, but neither as the spearhead of a new flow of paintings that will lose their identities, as in Andy Worhol's *Campbell's soup* series.¹⁰ According to Foucault, Magritte's paintings exploit the traditional functions and arrangements of text and images so as to, ironically, disturb their traditional relation. Therefore, this study aims at showing that Foucault proposes Magritte's painting as being on a *threshold*, which is Foucault's archaeological term, where the established principles of representation are sustained on the surface but actually are transformed and broken off, instead of being an exemplar of a new age.

In this sense, this study discovers a pictorial space that can be described as a heterotopia, which the existing research hasn't studied thoroughly, from Foucault's archaeological analysis of Magritte's paintings. Foucault does not mention the concepts of threshold and

¹⁰ Foucault says at the end of *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* as follows: "A day will come when, by means of similitude relayed indefinitely along the length of a series, the image itself, along with the name it bears, will lose its identity. Campbell, Campbell, Campbell, Campbell." (*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*, p.79, Eng. p.54.) Here, Foucault implies that paintings of the coming century would be operated by similitude, calling out the famous work of Andy Worhol, *Campbell's soup*.

heterotopia in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*, but this study shows that Foucault's description of Magritte's paintings eventually produces them as a natural consequence in the pursuit of understanding the relation between similitude and the traditional principles of representation. Especially a threshold can be recaptured as a heterotopia; both are still connected to the existing system but contain the changes of the system as well. Foucault does not give a clear definition of heterotopia, but this study attempts to give its definition through Foucault's archaeological methodology and apply it to the domain of painting. By reflecting on Magritte's paintings as heterotopias, we can realize that the principles operating in the system of paintings are transformable in history, which show not just historical variations of pictorial rules but the moment when the absoluteness of predominant norms of representational system is being cracked. And in the very sense, Magritte's paintings have the possibility of extending to the space of resistance against the representational system governing constantly from the 15th century on the basis of identity. In short, the present study shall analyze *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* through Foucault's archaeological methodology and show that the text reveals certain spaces to be heterotopias.

This study shall treat only Magritte's paintings which Foucault mentioned in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* to explain the paintings as heterotopias, but this idea isn't limited to them. It is probable to say that the works of Manet are heterotopic based on the analysis of Foucault¹¹, and that, to some degree, even those of Klee and Kandinsky which Foucault suggested to compare with Magritte are also heterotopic. The reason I set the limit on the range of analysis

¹¹ Nicolas Bourriaud explains that in analyzing Manet's works. Foucault seems to have been influenced by the heterotopic ground and *Manet* (Geneva, 1955) written by Bataille, who first invented the concept of 'heterology'. Bourriaud adds that the mirror as an absolute heterotopia is a specific object which links Manet, Bataille and Foucault. See the introduction of *Michel Foucault – Manet and the object of Painting*. (London, 2011).

to the pieces of Magritte is that heterotopic characteristics are prominent in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* among others: Magritte cleverly escapes from the system of representation by twisting the principles of traditional painting, *from the inside of the system*. I took particularly the works of Magritte as a starting point to study art as heterotopia but it would be better if more artworks are created and appreciated in this regard based on this studying.

The remainder of the study is organized as follows: In chapter I, we will look into what archaeological methodology is according to Foucault. Archaeological methodology aims at approaching historical documents without the subject-centric vision constituting a history for its own identity. Foucault insists that it is necessary in archaeological analysis to detach a discourse from all the unities that we have taken for granted. Especially we examine how Foucault abandons a unity of the enunciating subject here. Leaving the place for the subject of a statement unfixed, Foucault suggests describing a set of regularities and relations that condition one statement to appear instead of another so that he pays attention to the history of discontinuity, of rupture in opposition to that of linearity, of continuity.

In chapter II, we will see how Foucault applies his archaeological methodology to Magritte's paintings and how they can be regarded as being on the threshold where traditional rules of representation are transformed. As explained in the first chapter, the archaeological analysis of Magritte's paintings is conducted with the exclusion of the unified subject. Foucault firstly describes two predominant principles of traditional western paintings: the separation between linguistic representation and plastic representation, which enter into a subordinate relation when placed at the same space, and the reducibility of resemblance to affirmation. By pursuing these principles to the extreme, calligrams become perfect

complementary combinations of text and images. However, Foucault soon describes the collapse of these rules in Magritte's paintings. The rules of representation are nullified by the absence of common place between text and images, and by similitude. Foucault particularly demonstrates superiority of similitude to resemblance by exposing seven different discourses hidden in the statement "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" in Magritte's painting through analyzing the variable place of its enunciating subject. Foucault also emphasizes the self-referentiality as the primary characteristic of similitude, which leads us, taking into account the analogy of mirror, to the notion of heterotopia that is present in reality, operating its contesting function to the rest of society. What is important in this chapter is that the transformation of representational principles is made in the existing system of representation. That is, Magritte's paintings are on a threshold in the sense that they destroy the established orders of paintings from within their episteme.

In chapter III, we shall try to articulate heterotopias as the spaces between epistemes, and investigate their possibility to be extended to the spaces of resistance with their characteristics. Firstly, heterotopias have a system of opening and closing to its surroundings with its essential function of contesting other ordinary social spaces, which makes it possible to keep the distance from the society which they belong to and to render its order legible. That is, heterotopias do not completely follow the existing rules of an episteme, and neither do they completely exist out of them. Like thresholds, they are the spaces between epistemes. Secondly, heterotopias can superimpose many incompatible spaces together so they problematize received knowledge by destabilizing the ground where knowledge is built, which implies the possibility of inverting the existing orders. With these understanding of heterotopia, we will come back to Magritte's painting which is also a heterotopia where

Foucault reads the careful unravelling of a calligram by Magritte: how Magritte disturbs the combination of words and images in a calligram, while still remaining within the traditional system of representation.

I . What is Archaeological methodology?

Generally speaking, there are three distinctive analyses in Foucault's philosophy. Foucault himself named these analyses archaeology, genealogy, and ethics. Sometimes the three terms are used in a broad sense to mark the periodization of Foucault's thinking: archaeology from the 1950s to the 1960s, genealogy in the 1970s and ethics in the 1980s. But to be more exact, each of them differs in its own domain of analysis. Archaeology is the analysis of systems of knowledge: it hypothesizes that the knowledge accepted as true is formed by a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements and attempts to write a history of statements, a history of these ordered procedures¹²; it analyzes the regularities operating in a discourse of a particular period, permitting us to state and speak of certain things at a certain time and place. Genealogy is the analysis of mutual relation between knowledge and power, denying the origin of Truth: it reveals that there is a 'political regime' of the production of truth¹³; it implies that knowledge supports power to make its position secure and power engages in social procedures to exclude or produce a certain kind of knowledge. Lastly, ethics is a study of the self's relationship to itself: it deals with 'how one is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions'.¹⁴ Each kind of analysis is not totally separated by a sharp

¹² Davidson, Arnold I., "Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics" in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986, pp.221-222

¹³ Ibid. p.224

¹⁴ Ibid. p.228

line for distinction but instead may appear to mingle with one another even in a single text.¹⁵

What we shall look into closely in this chapter for the study is archaeology. The reason why we pay attention to archaeology in particular is that it proposes an alternative way of appreciating paintings as it strives to escape from the subject-centered view of anthropology which, as we will see, guarantees the privileged position of the human. This study shows how archaeological methodology can be applied to paintings and what it can find out in paintings. In terms of painting, archaeological methodology helps to show how the distribution of painting's formal elements occurs with a describable regularity in a given period. That is, it recounts how color, space, depth, lighting, distance, and volume appear as a result of certain rules of formation.¹⁶ In fact, archaeology is the analysis of regularities of discourses which consists of knowledge of each period, but Foucault explicitly extends its range of analysis to paintings. He says what is important in archaeology of paintings is to show that a painting is a discursive practice or a certain set of regularities embodied in techniques and effects, rather than a pure vision of a painter or a source of infinite interpretations.¹⁷ In other words, the archaeological analysis of paintings intends to reveal the intrinsic relations that determine a painting, in contrast to the old way of analyzing paintings by their external factors such as art history, personal life and motives of an artist.¹⁸ To borrow an expression from Foucault,

¹⁵ To get a better understanding of the different analyses, see also the introduction of the same book above, written by David Couzens Hoy.

¹⁶ Tanke, Joseph J., op. cit. p.61

¹⁷ Foucault, Michel, *Archéologie du savoir*, Paris : Gallimard, 1969, p.263 (Eng. p.194)

¹⁸ This point may remind one of Clement Greenberg's formalism. Tanke tries to distinguish Foucault's archaeological analysis from Greenberg's critics. "While Foucault does not specifically mention the aesthetic formalisms of art criticism, his remarks about linguistic formalism make it clear that such methodologies are limited in scope. This is important, I suggest, for distinguishing Foucault's approach from critics like Clement Greenberg, with whom there is a superficial resemblance. Formalism, be it linguistic or aesthetic, never

applying archaeological methodology to paintings is a new way of analysis that interrogates a painting at the level of the painting itself, freeing it from the vision of human subject. And as a result, we will discover the new pictorial space, a heterotopia in Foucault's archaeological analysis of Magritte's paintings, which is the space that belongs to cultural systems of a society but at the same time disturbs and contests the sovereignty of the system.

The term archaeology first appeared in his supplementary treatise for National doctorate, *Introduction à l'anthropologie de Kant (Introduction to Kant's Anthropology)* in 1961, which analyzed Kant's *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, 1798)*. Foucault considered *L'anthropologie* as the work given to us with its weight of sedimentation of time in the sense that it was written and developed for over 25 years and certainly transformed as Kant's thinking was taken in new directions. He attempted to figure out what related *L'anthropologie* with the critical enterprise of Kant, asking whether "if an archaeology of the text were possible, would it not reveal the genesis of a "*homo criticus*," the structure of which would be essentially different from the image of man that went before?"¹⁹ Here, the term archaeology is used as a metaphor of a method of analysis that interrogates how the final content of *L'anthropologie* was made and what successive deposits were added to this text afterward, and attempts to reveal what position the text takes in the whole compositions of Kant's philosophy, and what relation it has with the three

explains why a statement occupies a place of historical necessity or how it relates to other statements within a given discursive formation. Rather than working in the realm of possibility, archaeology wishes to show 'why [a discourse] could not be other than it was, in what respect it is exclusive of any other, how it assumes, in the midst of others and in relation to them, a place that no other could occupy' (AK, 28). While Foucault's immediate emphasis on painting's material properties seemingly brings his approach into contact with 'formal analysis,' he insists upon treating painting at the level of its historical existence." (Tanke, Joseph J., op.cit. p.62)

¹⁹ E. Kant; Foucault, Michel, presentation by D. Defert, Fr. Ewald, F. Gros, *Anthropologie d'un point de vue pragmatique : précédé de Michel Foucault, introduction à l'anthropologie*, Paris : J. Vrin, 2008, p.12 (Eng. trans. Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs, *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, Los Angeles : Semiotext(e), 2008, pp.19-20)

Critiques.²⁰

Most of Foucault's following works are also archaeological. But the archaeological method was applied more to social and cultural domains. The best-known one of them is *Les mots et les choses*. In this work, Foucault is clear that archaeology is not a metaphor but a method of analysis. He defines *archaeology* in contrast to *history* in the traditional meaning of that word: it is an attempt to reveal the *épistémè* (episteme), or the epistemological field in which knowledge manifests its conditions of possibility, rather than a history of its growing perfection.²¹ This book in 1966 brought Foucault a great public success by demonstrating diverse forms of empirical science within the space of knowledge and its discontinuities between the forms, even though it was criticized for various reasons.²²

Three years later, in 1969, Foucault published another book, which is the result of his effort to give greater coherence to his preceding works and to include some corrections and internal criticisms: *L'archéologie du savoir*. He tries to articulate the details of archaeological methodology which are not clearly explained in previous books: what purpose archaeology

²⁰ Eribon, Didier, *Michel Foucault*, Paris : Flammarion, 2011, p.187

²¹ Foucault, Michel, *Les mots et les choses: Une Archéologie des Sciences Humaines*, Paris: Gallimard, 1966, p.13 (Eng. p. xxii)

²² According to Foucault, each period has its own episteme and there must be discontinuities between them. Foucault revealed two ruptures. One is between Resemblance of Renaissance and Representation of Classical age, and the other is on the beginning of the 19th century with History, breaking up with the classical age. The main criticism of this archaeological way of thinking was that Foucault did not explain how and why an episteme changes in history. And it is also pointed out that if an episteme is explainable for all knowledge formation in a particular period, Foucault himself is unavoidably a part of one. Pierre Billouet suggests three other critical points of *Les mots et les choses* in his book, *Foucault* (Paris: les Belles Lettre, 1999, pp.84-100): firstly, advocates of Sartre and some Marxists accused Foucault of his structuralist approach. They condemned *Les mots et les choses* as 'the last barrier of bourgeois' for disturbing political subjectivity of human. Secondly, it is criticized for the fact that Foucault changed his judgments of his own work according to shifting his position from supporting structuralism to expressing himself as an anti-structuralist. The book in 1966 is no longer manifestation of structuralism but would become the reflection of human subject in this point of view. Lastly Billouet points the ambiguity of the status of economics and some confusions of certain analysis in the book.

has, how it can be carried out as a method of analysis and where it can be used. We shall see the concepts and principles of archaeology Foucault kept thinking and finally organized despite its controversies and how these are applied to Magritte's paintings specifically in this study.

Foucault describes archaeology in *L'archéologie du savoir* as follows: "This term does not imply the search for a beginning; it does not relate analysis to geological excavation. It designates the general theme of a description that interrogates the already-said at the level of its existence: of the enunciative function that operates within it, of its discursive formation, and the general archive system to which it belongs."²³ What does "interrogating the already-said *at the level of its existence*" mean? How is it possible? And what will we end up with it? Above all, for what reason does Foucault call for archaeology?

A. Purpose of Archaeological methodology

Foucault tries to define archaeology as an approach to the history of thought, which eliminates the fundamental role of the human subject in *L'archéologie du savoir*.²⁴ He already argued that "man", which we believe to be original and permanent, is a quite modern discovery in *Les mots et les choses*. Furthermore he not only describes but also claims the historical disappearance of man and of modern humanism.²⁵ As mentioned above, Foucault defines the episteme as the condition of possibility for knowledge to appear in a certain

²³ *L'archéologie du savoir*, p.180 (Eng. p.131)

²⁴ Gutting, Gary, *Michel Foucault's archaeology of scientific reason*, New York : Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp.227-228

²⁵ Billouet, Pierre, op.cit. p.62

period and presents the fundamental characteristics of epistemes in particular periods as follows: resemblance in the Renaissance, representation by identities and differences in the Classical age, and history in the modern age. These respective characteristics of epistemes construct the knowledge, playing a role of epistemological frame of each period that regulates the mode of being of things and of the order that divides things up and establishes them as the objects of the knowledge. The fact that each period is characterized by different epistemes shows Foucault's intention of disclosing the discontinuities, instead of presupposing the continuity or development (evolution) in the history of thought. "Man" is also not a concept that has existed as ever from the beginning. It is a new concept born in the modern age, emerging only at the end of the 18th century. In the Classical age, according to Foucault, things were analyzed, compared, and distributed into series by their identities and differences, forming a table²⁶ by which one could arrive at a complete certainty of truth. That is, it was presupposed in the episteme of the Classical age that the manifestation of truth is to be found in an evident and distinct perception.²⁷ As a result, Foucault considers that in the Classical age language was to function as a means of converting what is visible in the perception into the sayable as it is. Language in the classical age was so transparent that it was not only charged with a task of representing the thought as well as things, but also identified with the thought itself,²⁸ which we will come back to in Chapter II with Magritte's claim of relation of affirmative words to the resemblance in traditional

²⁶ "[A] table, a *tabula*, that enables thought to operate upon the entities of our world, to put them in order, to divide them into classes, to group them according to names that designate their similarities and their differences – the table upon which, since the beginning of time, language has intersected space" (*Les mots et les choses*, p.9 (Eng. p.xvii))

²⁷ Ibid. pp.69-70 (Eng. pp.55-56)

²⁸ Ibid. pp.92-93 (Eng. p.78)

representation system. However, in the modern age, a table of representation made up of identities and differences forms nothing more than a superficial order on the basis of the visible. Instead, origin, causality, and history which are great hidden forces developed on the basis of their primitive and inaccessible nucleus emerge as a new epistemological frame constructing the knowledge.²⁹ This discontinuity of episteme causes the transformation of knowledge system as well. Knowledge is no longer formed in a table: it is formed in the process of constituting the whole by connecting partial elements in a temporal series, finding the invisible powers beneath the superficial visibility. Therefore, whereas representations were identified with things and thoughts in the Classical age, what is represented is separated from representation itself and questions are raised about the principles of representation as a specific form of thinking in the modern age³⁰ with a sudden emergence of “man” as the subject of representation and the object of knowledge. In short, the human ability to represent is put to the test and the “man” who is the subject of representation becomes the object of the knowledge in the modern age. In this sense, one can say that modern philosophy takes its form as anthropology in the attempt to understand the human constituting the knowledge by representation.

However, what is important for Foucault is that when history appears as a characteristic of the modern episteme with “man”, a privilege is necessarily granted to the position of “man” in the process of finding his origin: “man” is so unique contrary to the other ordinary things of the world that he must be originated from what is essentially different from himself

²⁹ Ibid. p.263 (Eng. p.251)

³⁰ Gutting, Gary, op.cit. pp.181-182

³¹; he is the only one in the world that exists as a transcendental subject with *a priori* structures for constituting the knowledge about himself as an empirical object. Seeking for the origin of this unique existence has an unsolvable problem: if the human being tries to discover its essential nature and identity by tracing back to its history to an origin, any point of origin described apparently on the line of *human* history will turn out to be not the true origin; on the other hand, the true origin will be a point at which human being as such is not present; it will not be *its* origin. In short, the origin of human always retreats and we can never arrive at it by going back to the series of events that make up its history. But at the same time, it is history by which human being has its essential identity and obtains its privileged position: history is where “man” makes up himself and his world. The ceaselessly retreating origin of human is a part of the historical reality constituted by the human being. Foucault thinks that anthropological approach of history attempts to overcome the retreat of the origin by re-apprehending the origin in constituting the history and to promote the return of the origin.³²

The retreat and the return of the origin show that anthropology grants the absolute authority to the subjectivity of “man” that constitutes the history of the world. “Man” guarantees the continuity of the thought by making up his own history and preserves its totality by integrating the dispersed things by the flow of time. Foucault criticizes the history of thought based on anthropology as “a privileged shelter for the sovereignty of

³¹ See the same book above, p. 205. “But presumably Foucault's point is that the ordinary things of the world originate as members of a series of homogeneous elements. The "other" from which they arise is another of the same sort. Man, however, as the unique reality capable of knowing the world of which he is nonetheless a part, originates from what is *essentially* other than him. It is as though his origin is the limit of a series of terms (man's history) to which it does not belong.”

³² Ibid. pp.205-206

consciousness”³³ of the subject. In this sense, it is possible to say that anthropology means now the human subject-centrism for Foucault. He tries to dislocate the “man” from this privileged position through archeological methodology. He expects to find the new possibility of thought by “the end of man”.³⁴ And his analysis of Magritte’s paintings should be regarded in the same context. We can see in *Ceci n’est pas une pipe* that Foucault tries to restore the inner relations as they are among the pictorial elements in a painting, not rationalizing them by the vision of the constituting subject: which means that he demonstrates that Magritte’s works are not the paintings constituted and given the order by the “man” but those with the autonomous operating principle in themselves.

B. Archaeology as description of discursive events

Foucault articulated the problem of sovereignty of the constituting subject in anthropology as “the questioning of the *document*”³⁵ in *L’archéologie du savoir*: how to treat historical documents. Describing history for anthropology is a *reconstitution of the past* where the documents are produced and fade out behind us there after. Its most important task is, as mentioned above, to find the true origin which will never be found by tracing back to the past. In order to achieve the consistent and continuous history from the true origin, documents have to be tested, verified, and filtered of impurities and finally become “treated as the language of a voice now reduced to silence, its fragile, but possibly decipherable

³³ *L’archéologie du savoir*, p.22 (Eng. p.12)

³⁴ *Les mots et les choses*, p.396 (Eng. p.385)

³⁵ *L’archéologie du savoir*, p.14 (Eng. p.6)

trace”.³⁶ The subject constituting its history re-appropriates the residues of the past which are swept away in the flow of time if we leave them as they are, holds its dominance over them and keeps them beside itself permanently. The subject of thought gathers and integrates the things which are divided and dispersed individually in time and constructs a history intended to maintain its identity with its synthetic activity. Foucault points out that making the discourse of the continuous by historical analysis and making the original subject of all becoming and of all practices by the human consciousness are just two faces of the same system of thought.³⁷ Linear history running to its end corresponds with the conscious subject heading for its noble reason. In this sense, it can be said that the history of knowledge so far has contributed to protecting the absoluteness of the subject.

It is the same in the analysis of paintings. For a long time we have considered paintings as the results of what painters intend to represent. That is, a painting is constituted by the consciousness of a painter. Thus when analyzing the painting, we have presupposed that its lines and colors are distributed, the composition is formed, and proper techniques are determined according to the intention of the painter. In addition, paintings should be entitled in the best manner of revealing the creator’s intention. A work can be appreciated only under the condition that it is a complete and consistent result which promises not only the harmony among its inner plastic elements but also its title that affirms and refers to what it represents. According to Foucault, this tendency was dominant from the quattrocento to the early 20th

³⁶ Ibid. p.14 (Eng. p.6)

³⁷ Ibid. p.23 (Eng.p.12)

century in western paintings. He introduces two traditional principles of representation in western paintings during this period, which we shall see at the beginning of the next chapter.

On the other hand, Foucault insists that “history must be detached from the image that satisfied it for so long, and through which it found its anthropological justification: that of an age-old collective consciousness that made use of material documents to refresh its memory”³⁸: he feels the necessity of liberating documents from the methodology of the existing history, which had subordinated documents to the teleology derived from anthropocentric interests by cutting out, rearranging and granting significance of the documents. Under the human-centrism, documents are always regarded as the best tool for reorganization of history in returning to the origin. Thus, Foucault suggests the new methodology of history, which releases documentary material from the restraints of human history, of restoring what people have done and said, by working on them from within and trying to define their inner relations which are linked inextricably: archaeology. Whereas history “undertook to ‘memorize’ the *monuments* of the past, transform them into *documents*” in its tradition, archaeology “transforms *documents* into *monuments*”³⁹. History in tradition made records of memorable events and tried to interpret them again for reconstituting itself according to its end. It was under control of the synthetic activities of the subject. Archaeology, on the contrary, treats the document itself as a monument: it is concerned with “[how] one particular statement⁴⁰ appeared rather than another.”⁴¹ Under

³⁸ Ibid. pp.14-15 (Eng.p.7)

³⁹ Ibid. p.15 (Eng. p.7)

⁴⁰ The original word is *énoncé* in French, which is from the verb *énoncer*. It means the thing enunciated includes not only the spoken but also the written. In this sentence above, “statement,” that is *énoncé*, can be read as the written in relation to documents. A more exact explanation of this term will be given later.

archaeology, documents escape from depreciation of being traces of human activities and become the worthwhile *event* in itself. They must be asked the conditions of their emergence, their existence in history. And if a painting is also a document in the sense that it records or expresses things, events, thoughts in the form of an image, it can be said that the archaeological analysis of a painting discloses the diverse relations the painting contains, escaping from the life, motive, intention of the painter, as Foucault shows in Magritte's works. Archaeology grasps the conditions of possibility of paintings, that is, the regularities that permit one particular painting to appear rather than another.

In short, what archaeological methodology aims at is to separate statements from the synthetic activities of psychological subjects; to analyze and grasp other forms of regularity and other types of relations among them such as their coexistence, succession, and mutual functioning. If we conduct an archaeological analysis on the discourses in historical documents, it opens us a vast field spreading all effective statements in their dispersion as events and in the occurrence proper to them.⁴¹ Likewise, if we conduct an archaeological analysis of paintings, they also become events that contain their conditions of existence in themselves.

To accomplish an archeological analysis, Foucault requires abandoning the concepts which we've taken uncritically: those of obscure forces such as tradition, influence, development and evolution, or spirit; those of familiar division and grouping like a book and an *œuvre* expected to have a certain unity; that of the secret origin which we ceaselessly seek

⁴¹ Ibid. p.42 (Eng. p.27)

⁴² Ibid. p.41 (Eng. pp.26-27)

for but never arrive at. Foucault questions the self-evidence of these concepts and asks us to keep in mind the fact that they are the notions which require a supporting theory and need to remain in suspense.⁴³ Foucault detaches what he calls “the project of a *description of discursive events*”⁴⁴ from all concepts of unity that hold the dispersed discourses together and help the constituting subject to make the continuous history. But this doesn’t mean that his approach is a kind of language analysis constructing the general structure existing exterior to us. He explicitly distinguishes archaeological description of discourses from the analysis of *langue (language)*⁴⁵: the latter is to establish the general abstract system of rules permitting not only one statement but all other possible statements to be made up, which can explain the infinite performance of individual speech (*parole*). On the other hand, the archaeological description is to find out the set of regularities of a certain statement with the limitation of

⁴³ Here I introduce briefly Foucault’s explanation of unquestioned notions above: Tradition enables us to isolate the new against a background of permanence, and to transfer its merit to originality, to genius, and to the decisions proper to individuals. Influence refers to an apparently causal process (but with neither rigorous delimitation nor theoretical definition) of the phenomena of resemblance or repetition. Development and Evolution make it possible to group a succession of dispersed events, to link them to one and the same organizing principle. Spirit allows the sovereignty of collective consciousness to emerge as the principle of unity and explanation. As for division and grouping, for example, he points out that we didn’t articulate the genres such as literature, politics, philosophy in the 17th century as we did in the 19th century; they are not intrinsic, universally recognizable characteristics but are always reflexive and normative, institutionalized categories. Furthermore, the material unity of a book or an *œuvre* is also variable and relative because the frontiers of a book are caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences and because the unity of an *œuvre* is the result of an interpretive operation as we see in the case, for instance, that we don’t grant the same status to the text published with an author’s name and its first draft after his death. (Ibid. pp.33-38, Eng. pp.21-24) Lastly, Foucault points out that the secret origin brings another unquestioned concept: the “already-said” to which all manifest discourse is secretly based on. But this “already-said” is not just a phrase that has already been spoken or a text that has already been written, but also the “never-said”, an incorporeal discourse, a voice as a breath, a writing that is merely the hollow of its own mark (Ibid. pp.38-39, Eng.p.25) That is, we recall the original discourse of what we’re reading now, the already-said of what we’re dealing with and to presuppose the continuity of the two, but at the same time, we never think this preceding discourse, the already-said shows all about itself. Therefore, the already-said makes us search for the origin persistently and by not exposing itself entirely induces the infinite interpreting of itself as the “never-said”.

⁴⁴ Ibid. p.41 (Eng. p.27)

⁴⁵ Ibid. pp.41-42 (Eng. p.27) The difference between formalism and archaeology in analysis of paintings is already mentioned in footnote no.14.

actually articulated one occupying a particular time and space. It does not consider the statement that is not stated yet but has a possibility of being stated. It deals with only the formulated statements on its own existential level.

Therefore, we can say that Foucault's archaeological methodology deals with the actually written, the actually spoken, or the statements themselves that are present. Foucault posits that a statement is a function which enables one to have a say of a series of signs whether or not the signs are present in it: the function of existence which reveals signs with their specific contents in time and space, which determines whether the signs make sense or not, what rules they follow in their succession, what they concern, what acts connect with them, etc.⁴⁶ This existential function is activated in particular ways, which Foucault calls the *enunciative function*. He introduces four domains where the enunciative function operates: the domain of objects⁴⁷, the group of possible positions of subject, the associated field⁴⁸, and

⁴⁶ Ibid. p.120 (Eng. p.86)

⁴⁷ Statements have particular relations with what they state. This relation is not identical with that of the signifier and the signified, of a name and what it designates, of a proposition and its referent, of a sentence and its meaning: the former is the function of making the latter legible in the sense that a statement relates to a group of domains where the objects have possibility of their emergence and of being given relations with their signs. A statement is linked, beyond the one-to-one confrontation, to "a 'referential' that is made up not of 'things', 'facts', 'realities', or 'beings' but of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects that are named, designated, or described within it, and for the relations that are affirmed or denied in it." In this referential, objects are differentiated and enunciative level of formulation is regulated. (Ibid. pp.121-126, Eng. pp.88-92)

⁴⁸ The enunciative function cannot operate without existence of an associated domain. Whereas we can judge whether a sentence or a proposition is self-evident with no other associated sentences or propositions, a statement is not able to work in isolation. In order to be a statement, sentence and proposition need to relate with the associated field, which is not a mere context, nor a consciousness of speaking subject. At the different level of enunciation, this field endows them with a particular context, a specific representative content, forms a complex web. It is made up of all other formulations within which the statement appears and forms one element, of all the formulations to which the statement refers, either by repeating them, modifying them, or by opposing them, of all the formulations whose subsequent possibility is determined by the statement, and lastly of all the formulations whose status the statement in question shares, among which it takes its place without regard to linear order. (Ibid. pp.132-138, Eng. pp.96-100)

the repeatable materiality⁴⁹. Describing the enunciative function corresponds to undertaking to uncover what Foucault called the *discursive formation*.⁵⁰ A discourse is made up of statements. But when talking about discursive formation, it is analyzing a set of regularities shown in its statements, or a group of relations established between diverse elements for its formation. Foucault introduces four directions in which a discourse is analyzed: formation of objects, formation of the subjective positions, formation of concepts, and formation of strategic choices. Since the enunciative function and the discursive formation are established correlatively,⁵¹ we need to deal with these two archaeological approaches together. What we look into closely in particular is the second part of enunciative functions and discursive formations, which Foucault applies immediately to the analysis of Magritte's *Les deux mystères* where latent discourses are reconstituted⁵².

In regard to the discursive formation, it is generally believed that we can define the unified group of statements, that is, a discourse, according to their form and type of connection or a certain style, a certain constant manner of statement. However, Foucault

⁴⁹ The enunciative function must have a material existence, which makes it repeatable. It is not disputable that a statement requires its own material, support, space and time in any form. If these requisites were to change, the identity of the statement also changes. Then how can we guarantee the identity of statements? What is the repeatable materiality proper to statements? It is not a fragment of physical material which is added by the space it occupied or its date of formulation. It is the order of the institution, the rules of non-discursive practices where statements are applied to and perform their function. As the theme varies in multiple discourses according to its strategic choices, the identity of statement varies in institutional practices by their schemata of use, application rules, constellation, and strategic potentiality. In the field of stabilization, which is constituted by its surroundings connected with non-discursive practices, a statement is able to repeat its identity in spite of all the differences of enunciation. (Ibid. pp.138-145, Eng. pp.100-105)

⁵⁰ Ibid. p.160 (Eng. pp.115-116)

⁵¹ Ibid. p.161 (Eng. p.116)

⁵² Foucault says in analyzing a painting, one can reconstitute the latent discourse of the painter. (Ibid. p.262, Eng. p.193)

points out that in *Naissance de la Clinique (The Birth of the Clinic)*⁵³, the perspective and attitude of the doctor, as a medical subject, have transformed constantly; in that text he recognized “that clinical discourse was just as much a group of hypotheses about life and death, of ethical choices, of therapeutic decisions, of institutional regulations, of teaching models, as a group of descriptions . . . that the descriptive statement was only one of the formulations present in medical discourse”⁵⁴. Thus, Foucault insists that we cannot say that a certain form of a statement defines the unity of a discourse.⁵⁵

Rather, he questions as follows in order to discover the law operating behind the diverse statements and the place where they come from. First question: *who is speaking?* That is, what is the status of the speaking individual? Through the status of the doctor we can grasp the legal conditions that give the right to practice and to extend one’s knowledge, a system of differentiation and relations with other individuals or other groups, a number of characteristics that define its functioning in relation to society, etc. Second question: *where is he speaking from?* Even the same statements form diverse relations with one another according to the site where they occur, such as a hospital, a private medical clinic, a laboratory, or a documentary field like a library. Finally, *in what situation is the subject involved?* The subject of medical discourse has occupied diverse situations in relation to perceptual distance, with other theoretical domains and institutions. In short, discourses are formed by establishment of multiple relations among distinctive elements. When discourse takes advantage of these sets of relations regularly, we can obtain the unity of the discourse.

⁵³ Foucault, Michel, *Naissance de la Clinique: une archéologie du regard médical*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963.

⁵⁴ *L’archéologie du savoir*, p.50 (Eng. pp.33-34)

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* pp.50-51 (Eng. pp.33-34)

To sum up, Foucault insists that enunciative modalities are irrelevant to the unity of subject. What defines the regularity of enunciation is not the transcendental subject which founds pure rationality, nor the psychological subjectivity which synthesizes its empirical experiences: it is the relations established among dispersed elements of diverse status, sites and situations. Therefore, discourse is not the result of the manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but the field where dispersion and discontinuity of the subject are determined.⁵⁶

This formation of the speaking subject in a discourse can be re-articulated in terms of the enunciative function as follows: statements function when they have particular relations with their subject. The speaking subject of a statement has a special function: the function of emptiness which can be virtually filled with any individual when he formulates the statement.⁵⁷ As a speaking subject is determined by the relations among diverse elements in discursive formation, the statement relates with groups of different positions of different subjects. The speaking subject of a statement varies in the group of its possible positions and is assigned through the relations determined within it, in contrast to the subject which is fixed already and remains unchangeable so that we are under the obligation to find out the true owner of the statement. The vacant place of the subject opens the dimension of possibility of specifying all formulations as statements by enabling anyone to occupy its position.⁵⁸

Here, the notion of the subject which has been believed as self-evident is eliminated by Foucault. The speaking subject of a statement in fact is formed in a group of multiple

⁵⁶ Ibid. pp.72-78 (Eng. pp.50-55)

⁵⁷ Ibid. p.129 (Eng. p.93)

⁵⁸ Ibid. pp.131-132 (Eng. pp.95-96)

relations. Therefore, as the fixed place of the subject becomes unstable, the constituting subject of anthropology is threatened. This study will show how archaeological methodology undoes the unity of the speaking subject in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*. In the analysis of Magritte's painting, Foucault uncovers seven discourses by making the inner elements of Magritte's painting compete with one another for the place of the subject that states "Ceci n'est pas une pipe."

C. Significance of Archaeological methodology

Foucault says that archaeological analysis reveals the historical *a priori* of a particular episteme:⁵⁹ the system of a particular temporal dispersion and transformable group of regularities. This term, "rather barbarous" at a glance, indicates the *a priori* of the things actually said, or "the condition of reality for statements", in contrast to the formal *a priori* which is the "condition of validity for judgements"⁶⁰ as in Kant's philosophy. Whereas the formal *a priori* remains as a universal, constant and atemporal structure in order to draw correct judgements under the reign of reason, an *historical a priori* is assigned by Foucault to explain the dispersion, non-coherence, overlapping and mutual replacement, simultaneity without unification, succession without deducibility of statements in a given episteme.⁶¹ If archaeology were to describe the things said manifestly in their space of dispersion as they are, at the level of themselves and not through the vision of a subject that seeks for their

⁵⁹ Ibid. p.174 (Eng. p.127)

⁶⁰ Ibid. p.174 (Eng. p.127)

⁶¹ Ibid. p.175 (Eng. p.127)

origin, an historical *a priori* is the system of a dispersion of statements, which is described by archaeological methodology. On the other hand, a historical *a priori* is also conceived as a formal *a priori* that is also endowed with a history.⁶² In the sense that the system of a dispersion of statements revealed by archaeology is temporal, Foucault says “It [a historical *a priori*] does not elude historicity.”⁶³ If a certain decisive threshold appears with the transition of time, a group of rules that characterize a discursive practice (statement) are transformed with the elements which they relate together.⁶⁴ In this sense, an historical *a priori* implies the discontinuity, which causes the rupture of knowledge as an episteme changes in each period.

A *threshold* expressed by Foucault here is very important in our study. A threshold can be understood as a space where an historical *a priori*, a series of rules that characterize a discursive practice, becomes unstable. We can take a few examples from *Les mots et les choses*. In transition from the Renaissance to the Classical age, Don Quixote was sneered at by others because he did not conform to the change of episteme from resemblance to representation. At the end of the Classical age, Velázquez came to paint an odd painting *Las meninas* because he tried to represent the representing subject before the birth of the modern notion, “man”. Like this, a period shifting from one episteme to another, a period when an historical *a priori* faces a sudden change, a period when the predominant order over a time falters yet the new order system is not completely settled, these are expressed by the spatial notion of “threshold” by Foucault. A threshold indicates a state of neither completely

⁶² Ibid. p.176 (Eng. p.128)

⁶³ Ibid. p.175 (Eng. p.127)

⁶⁴ Ibid. p.175 (Eng. p.127)

belonging to a system nor escaping from it, as it is a narrow space that is not the inside nor the outside of the door.

When an historical *a priori* meets a threshold by which it cannot sustain itself any longer, the new historical *a priori* emerges that brings the break with the precedent one. Therefore, it can be said that the concept of historical *a priori* contains the discontinuity because of the changeability of regularities of a discursive practice. Foucault proposes the possibility of describing a discontinuous history by the description of historical *a priori* through archaeological methodology. We can also find the discontinuity of rules of a discursive practice in the analysis of paintings. In *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* Foucault firstly explains the dominant principles of the traditional representational system and then he shows how they are collapsed. In this respect, this study insists that Foucault locates Magritte's paintings on a threshold where the rules of a discursive practice such as painting change. In other words, Foucault describes the discontinuous history of painting through archaeological methodology.

Gutting points out three significances of archaeological methodology.⁶⁵ Firstly, archaeological methodology opens up an important new dimension for understanding our past. It sheds light on a history of contradictions and ruptures, which have been sacrificed in constituting the human-centric history, by dealing with discursive practices on an archaeological level beneath that of human subjectivity. Foucault does not insist that archaeology should replace the existing historical description. But it is a valuable means of developing new historical perspectives through examining the previous method of describing

⁶⁵ Gutting, Gary, op.cit. pp.287-288

history.⁶⁶ Secondly, archaeology is a significant counter to some of the best hidden mechanisms of domination in our society. Foucault neutralizes the absoluteness of major bodies of present knowledge and problematizes its authority, instead of choosing the overall revolution attempting to deny and overturn the established social system. This makes it possible to recognize the implicit danger of absoluteness of knowledge and to consider the effective ways of opposing it. Lastly, archaeology offers the hope that we can remain free even without the Truth. This does not mean that he denies the possibility of objective truth in sciences. But he does not pursue the traditional notion of the ultimate and fundamental truth. Through archaeology, Foucault looks into how the notion of Truth has been made and developed, which gives an opportunity of detaching from the constraints of the supreme Truth.

I would like to add to Gutting's comments the significance of archaeological analysis for the study of paintings. A painting can be regarded as a discursive practice in the broad archaeological sense. Archaeological analysis of paintings offers a new perspective to paintings which are not comprehensible in the existing discourse by disclosing discontinuities and ruptures within it. Archaeology is distinguished from the established aesthetical discussions that recognize paintings as the results of painter's expressive action or that

⁶⁶ It is true that Foucault is critical of the subject-centric attitude in the history of thought so far, and that the archaeological methodology is achieved as a way of criticizing it. However, Foucault never suggests archaeology as a new norm that all historical description should follow from now on; archaeological methodology is not an attempt to overturn what has been done in the existing research of history. It is because that establishing a new standard still contains the danger of developing it into the totalitarianism. Thus Foucault's aim should be understood as reviving the historical documents, which has been neglected in the existing research, as they are, through archaeological methodology, instead of denying all the results of historical research. When undertaking to clarify the archaeological methodology, he actually admits that he is not aware of what will come in the end and that he has no proof of finding the principles of statements (*L'archéologie du savoir*, pp.57-58, Eng. pp.38-39). That is, it can be said that Foucault's valuation is limited to the driving force to develop archaeological methodology, and that archaeological analysis itself is not a normative work but an examination of historical phenomena as objective as possible.

promote the excessive interpretations of a painting. Even though it is true that a painting is created by human being, there is no unifying constituting subject to all paintings as discursive practices in terms of archaeology. A painter-subject who has made a certain work is neither continuous nor identical with that of another work. The place of the subject is vacant and its occupant varies in status, sites, and situations. It cannot be denied that the works of Magritte are painted by Magritte himself. But it doesn't mean that his paintings are the pure reflection of his mentality. Instead, archaeological analysis of Magritte's paintings implies that they contain the conditions that permit Magritte to have his intention as such at that time: Magritte's works exist *historically* under the episteme of that period. Therefore, a painting can be explained as an event that embodies transformations and dispersions of discursive rules that form a painter-subject and its intention, rather than being a simple expression of a painter.⁶⁷ And archaeological methodology guarantees the positivity that protects paintings from getting lost in the inexhaustible interpretations of appreciators; for the diversions of regularities in paintings have actually taken place in history. That is, when analyzing pictorial spaces through archaeological methodology, we will neither be tied to the originality of a creating painter-subject, nor wander in the infinite meanings of an interpreting spectator-subject: we will achieve specific singularities of paintings that are proper to them.

⁶⁷ Likewise, a pictorial space as heterotopia is exposed when one separates a painting from its constituting subject. If one says that Magritte deliberately painted his works as heterotopias, the concept of heterotopia becomes a new standard for determining the individual value of Magritte's paintings. Evaluating his works according to the pre-set purpose of expressing heterotopias causes a dichotomy again between the successful paintings that accomplish the aim and the inferior ones whose singularities will be ignored and whose value of existence will be depreciated.

II . Archaeological analysis of *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*

In this chapter, we shall discuss the main subject of this study, *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*. First of all, Foucault discloses some rules of representation that characterizes paintings from the quattrocento to the 20th century before focusing on Magritte's works: two widespread principles of traditional western paintings and the calligram, which is an unusual art form in which those two principles are intensified together. These two principles are intended to build coherence between linguistic representations (words) and visual representations (images). But soon Foucault describes how the rules are transformed in Magritte's paintings. He explains how Magritte destroys their operation, while still maintaining the framework of representation. In a crumbling situation of the traditional representational system, Foucault points out that Magritte chose not to abandon the representational system completely but rather to borrow its form with a slight twist, which causes two changes: the absence of a common place between words and images and the self-referentiality of similitude.

As a result, this study defines Magritte's paintings as a threshold where there is a shift in historical *a priori*s from the episteme of identity to that of dis-identity. But it is necessary to make it clear that these epistemes are named by this study for distinct account for description of Magritte's paintings as thresholds. As mentioned before, Foucault divides up three epistemes per time in *Les mots et les choses*: resemblance in the Renaissance, representation in the Classical age, and history in the modern age. But in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*, Foucault classifies paintings into two groups without defining what epistemes they belong to: one is from the 15th century to the 20th century as traditional western paintings, and

the other is of the next era whose example is suggested as Andy Warhol's work. Magritte's paintings exist between these two groups. Foucault suggests the essence of the traditional western paintings from the Renaissance to the beginning of the modern time is the corresponding relation between words and images based on identity. This explanation is consistent with the relation between words and things in each episteme analyzed in *Les mots et les choses* in wide outlook; in the Renaissance, words were signs that resemble the things they signify; in the Classical age, words went into the system of representation in which they represented the things like transparent mirrors; entering the modern age, words formed their own closed system of signifier and signified. The relation between words and things has changed through time, but the identification of what words refer to with things has been maintained during three periods with each of its own episteme, which would be broken off from the 20th century. Thus, this study argues that the characteristics of traditional paintings can be identified in regard to the episteme of identity. However, Foucault gives few comments on the prospective principles of future paintings. The reason why he cannot articulate confidently the contemporary episteme is, as he concedes in *L'archéologie du savoir*, because the description of our own episteme relies on the rules that the very episteme has.⁶⁸ But this study insists that it is possible to explain the episteme of today as exclusive, dis-identified relation between words and images based on difference, considering Foucault's remark on literature of the 19th century in *Les mots et les choses*⁶⁹ and his emphasis on

⁶⁸ *L'archéologie du savoir*, p.179 (Eng. p.130): "It is obvious that the archive of a society, a culture, or a civilization cannot be described exhaustively; or even, no doubt, the archive of a whole period. On the other hand, it is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rules that we speak, since it is that which gives to what we can say – and to itself, the object of our discourse – its modes of appearance, its forms of existence and coexistence, its system of accumulation, historicity, and disappearance."

⁶⁹ See *Les mots et les choses*, pp.312-313 (Eng. pp.299-300): "Finally, the last of the compensation for the demotion of language, the most important, and also the most unexpected, is the appearance of literature,,

dislocation of text and images in Magritte's paintings in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*; words and images assert their right to independent existence without any obligation to correspond to each other. Magritte's paintings affirm nothing but differences within the forms of representation expected to imply the identity between the words and images. In this sense, Magritte's paintings exist on the threshold between the episteme of identity and that of dis-identity and we can find a possibility to conceive of some paintings of Magritte as heterotopias, that is, as spaces which are present in the real world but which exert a counteraction on it.

A. Conventions of Representation

1. Two principles of traditional western paintings

Before presenting two representational rules operating in traditional western paintings under the episteme of identity, Foucault points out the old habit operating in the domain of paintings: relating images with words. In fact, images and words have different mechanisms. Words are traditionally supposed to refer to objects by a combination of graphical units. Words differentiate their meanings according to how signs combine with one another; a single alphabet makes up different meanings in a word as in the case of 'dog' and 'dig', or

This is because at the beginning of the nineteenth century,, [language] was also reconstituting itself elsewhere, in an independent form, difficult of access, folded back upon the enigma of its own origin and existing wholly in reference to the pure act of writing., it becomes detached from all the values that were able to keep it in general circulation during the Classical age (taste, pleasure, naturalness, truth), and creates within its own space everything that will ensure a ludic denial of them (the scandalous, the ugly, the impossible); it breaks with the whole definition of *genres* as forms adapted to an order of representations, and becomes merely a manifestation of a language which has no other law than that of affirming – in opposition to all other forms of discourse – its own precipitous existence; and so there is nothing for it to do but to curve back in a perpetual return upon itself, as if its discourse could have no other content than the expression of its own form;”

even the same alphabets have different references when they change their order as you see in the words ‘bear’ and ‘bare’. In other words, language designates its reference with differences among letters or phonetic elements. Foucault formulates it as “we speak through difference”⁷⁰. On the contrary, the image has a function “to elicit recognition, to allow the object it represents to appear without hesitation or equivocation.”⁷¹ Especially, paintings from the Renaissance to the beginning of the 20th century aimed at re-presenting the three-dimensional volume of the real world onto a two-dimensional canvas as accurately as possible. Images have been conducted by resemblance, while the linguistic system is possible through difference; the necessary condition of painting is to let spectators perceive its object at a look and the success of painting has been determined according to how much it resembles its object. Foucault shows the opposite ways of representation that images and words take: “to show and to name; to shape and to say; to reproduce and to articulate; to imitate and to signify; to look and to read.”⁷²

However, our old habit comes from not discriminating the intertwinement of words and images that have different mechanisms as above. We look *and* say. “What is this drawing? It is a calf, it is a square, it is a flower.”⁷³ Considering this familiar custom, which is prevalent in educational sites or even in the art world, the two distinguishable orders of representation seem as if they are headed for the same place, that is, the same, single object. And because of this old habit, we feel uncanny when looking at Magritte’s paintings, which break into two

⁷⁰ *Ceci n’est pas une pipe*, p.39 (Eng. p.32 “...we...speak across difference”)

⁷¹ *Ibid.* p.18 (Eng. pp.19-20)

⁷² *Ibid.* p.22 (Eng. p.21)

⁷³ *Ibid.* p.18 (Eng. p.19)

ways in tactics: by eliminating a common place between words and images, and by achieving similitudes by repeating resemblance furthermore and discarding affirmation.

From this unquestioningly accepted and practiced custom, Foucault draws two principles of representation which has been dominant over western paintings from the quattrocento to the 20th century. One is the separation between the linguistic reference and the plastic representation.⁷⁴ As we have seen, the way that the two systems operate is fundamentally different: one by difference and the other by resemblance. Therefore, these two independent systems cannot intersect or merge.⁷⁵ However, cultural customs show that, in more cases than expected, words and images are placed in a single space and they seem to melt into one another in balance. What matters here is this harmonious appearance: the fact that when these representational orders are given at once, one appears to help the other for the whole. In other words, there always has been a subordinate relation between the two, no matter the direction of subordination: either the text is regulated by the image or the image by the text.⁷⁶ Take, for example, the figure of St. John the Baptist in Grünewald's *Crucifixion*, the man standing on the right with a lamb (Figure 1). His words are written between his face and index finger: *illum oportet crescere me autem minui*.⁷⁷ His voice is inscribed clearly with an arrangement of characters and it never spoils the dramatic mood of the painting. Instead it plays a role in making its spectators feel maximum empathy with Jesus dying in

⁷⁴ Ibid. p.39 (Eng. p.32)

⁷⁵ Ibid. p.39 (Eng.p.32)

⁷⁶ Ibid. pp.39-40 (Eng. p.32)

⁷⁷ He must increase, but I must decrease. (The gospel of St. John 3:30)

pain, Mary Magdalene and the Virgin Mary in inconsolable grief.⁷⁸ Likewise the inscription of the date and the age of the character shown in a portrait by Hans Holbein gives us information of the painting, not standing out too much in the picture, with the same golden color in dark green background as the Lord's restrained golden ornaments of darker green garments (Figure 2). In more cases, we can see that text is placed as props, without harming the contents of paintings (Figure 3 & 4). All these examples indicate the subordination of text to images. The opposite direction of subordination, that is, dependence of images on text, can be found more easily. A number of pages of encyclopedias, novels, and specialized books contain images appropriate to the contents of the text (Figure 5). In these cases, the function of images is to help the reader's understanding by showing what the text says. These subordinations to each other, which force one to complement the other, imply the fact that verbal signs and visual representation cannot be given simultaneously, keeping both their own autonomies. What Foucault discovered is the hierarchy operating inside the representational customs, which makes a superior-inferior connection between two separate systems of text and images. The subordinate relations between them will be eventually broken by the absence of a common place in Magritte's paintings.

The other principle of traditional western painting is the equivalence between the fact of resemblance and the affirmation of a representative bond.⁷⁹ If a figure resembles an object

⁷⁸ Gombrich insists that the words of St. John accord with the form of characters in the painting. He proposes the possibility that the artist enforced us to feel this phrase in body as actual enlargement of Jesus and diminishment of ourselves. He provides evidence, for example, that the hands of Jesus are much bigger in comparison with those of Mary Magdalene. According to Gombrich, Grünewald did not follow the law of perspective but modified the sizes of figures on purpose in order to enhance the dramatic effect of his painting, and the inscription of the words amplified the virtue of this artistic device. (Gombrich, Ernst Hans, *The story of art*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1998, pp.258-259)

⁷⁹ *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*. p.42 (Eng. p.34)

(or some other figure), it is enough, almost every time, for an obvious statement to slip into the painting, saying “What you see is *that*.”⁸⁰ For instance, if there is a figure with a big body, four strong legs, two large ears, and one long nose on canvas, we can say that “It is an elephant”, no matter through which means it is represented, what color or what size it has. This phenomenon, which one can still find in practical life quite easily, has to do with the anthropological desire mentioned in *L’archéologie du savoir*: the subjective will to arrange the dispersed events in the linear history for its identity. Similarly, the subject’s consciousness intends to determine what is exterior to itself through its cognitive faculty, designation, naming and signification so that it relieves the anxiety of what, otherwise, would have been out of its control and disrupted its consistent cognition. The reduction of the visible to the sayable bestows a proper name to a picture, that is, its title to what it shows. The textual function of the title is to affirm what the image figures. No matter whether a painting is referring to the visible world, or whether it creates itself an invisible world with abstraction.⁸¹ Look at the two paintings of guitarists by Pablo Picasso. In the work of the blue period, the title verifies the object that the painting faithfully represents (Figure 6), while in the cubistic work, the title defines what the image depicts (Figure 7). In both cases, the title corresponds with its image and we never believe that it betrays us. Foucault discovered the fact that between the pictorial representation and its object, there is an affirmative voice saying “This is a representation of that” and “That is its model.” However, the equivalence of resemblance and affirmation will be destroyed as well in Magritte’s paintings in a very unique way through similitude.

⁸⁰ Ibid. p.43 (Eng. p.34)

⁸¹ Ibid. p.43 (Eng. p.34)

We've been looking into the relation between text and images shown in traditional customs of representation, as Foucault describes this relation. He regards linguistic representation and pictorial representation as two independent, autonomous orders because of their different ways of operation. However, at the same time, he realizes that they work together in the same space in many actual practices from the 15th century to the 20th century. From this, he draws out two rules of representation: the subordination of one to the other occurring, in spite of their natural independence, when text and images meet at a certain place; and the reducibility of plastic resemblance to linguistic affirmation. Foucault finds the most radical example showing the relation between words and images in the calligram, which has been considered as the most perfect form of complementation of the two representational ways, but which Foucault thinks of as a form concealing their own autonomies.

2. Calligram: Complementary combination of text and image

Calligrams are known as a new form of poetry invented by the French poet and critic, Guillaume Apollinaire (See Figure 8-10).⁸² *Calligramme* is a compound of the Latin word *Calli-* (beauty) and *-Gramme* (-gram), which means 'beautiful pictograph'. It has been used

⁸² Guillaume Apollinaire (1880-1918) disobeyed the traditional poetics and deviated from the horizontal/vertical structure of poetry, seeking new possibility of expression. He especially explored the possibility of the simultaneous combination of text and image through the grafting of linguistic signs and plastic figures. As a result he created a kind of 'painting-poem' (*poème-peinture*) by which a poem reminds one of a painting and at the same time a painting expresses verses. This is what he called a calligram. Calligrams are generally expected to stimulate associations more widely by forming a harmonious mutual relation between verbal elements of poetry and visual elements of painting. Its aesthetical value is still evaluated on the basis of simultaneity of text and image. Yun Min-Hie (Korean), "L'esthétique de la simultanéité sur peinture et poésie dans les *Calligrammes* de Guillaume Apollinaire", *Etudes de la Culture Française et des Arts en France* Vol.38, 2011, pp.195-204

for the first time in the collection of poems by Apollinaire, *Calligramme* (1918).⁸³ But in fact we can find its tradition from the medieval books containing decorative letters. At first, letters were decorated beautifully and splendidly, but later, they became absorbed into figures and played a role of fulfilling the image (Figure 11-13).

Foucault explains the triple role of the calligram which has been carried out in this millenary tradition: to compensate for the alphabet, to repeat without the aid of rhetoric, and to trap things in a double cipher of words and images.⁸⁴ However, he thinks that in fact the role of the calligram distorts the relation between linguistic representation and plastic representation. And he suggests that Magritte untangles the calligram elaborately so that he restores the autonomies of the two representational systems. But firstly, we re-examine here the triple role of the calligram conceived as a perfect complementation of text and images by dividing it up into three segments: principle, function and significance.

The first role of the calligram as for its principle is to complement alphabets. It is a question of how to make a calligram. When a text and an image coexist, it is generally for the former to convey meanings in horizontal/vertical arrangements of letters and for the latter to figure its object with continuous lines. However, the calligram brings a text as close as possible to an image and eventually makes the succession of letters and the lines shaping the form of the object unite into one.⁸⁵ Lines of image which are extended without a break are now replaced with discontinuous letters. But these letters are not scattered carelessly. They

⁸³ Ibid. p.197

⁸⁴ *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*, p.20 (Eng. p.20)

⁸⁵ Ibid. p.20 (Eng. pp.20-21)

have to still maintain their signification and at the same time should be distributed so as to draw what they signify. That is, they have to be redistributed according to “the laws of simultaneous form.”⁸⁶ Arbitrary alphabets are complemented by showing what they are saying under this principle. Alphabets are mere signs which don’t have any meaning in themselves, and reading what they say has a limitation in the sense that it lacks a form of their object that can be obtained immediately by seeing or experiencing for oneself. For instance, it is possible for those who don’t speak French to have general idea of what is said in the poem of Apollinaire by *seeing* it. A calligram overcomes the limitation of letters by an image drawn with their succession, as the saying “A thousand hearings are not worth one seeing.” But this does not mean simply that alphabets complete the contour line of the image. Following the outlines of the image which are made of letters, we read a series of words having meanings, which implies the signification process more than the perception of object.⁸⁷ Letter-contour of an image should be interpreted in order to understand the implicit meaning of the object. That is, the object in a calligram has dual representation, linguistically and plastically.

Thus, tautology is the second role of calligram and its function.⁸⁸ In fact, the term tautology comes under the linguistic system. But Foucault distinguishes the tautology of the calligram from that of language. The latter, which was used in rhetoric, is based on language surplus; it repeats twice the same thing with different words, or it refers to two different things with a single word. However the tautology of a calligram operates in a totally different

⁸⁶ Ibid. p.21 (Eng. p.21)

⁸⁷ Ibid. p.21 (Eng.p.21)

⁸⁸ Ibid. p.21 (Eng.p.21)

manner. An object repeats in a calligram, but it is explained by words and appears through an image at once. It is not only a text but also becomes an image. It is possible because a calligram uses two characteristics of letters simultaneously: one as signs fixing the instant phonetic materials and imposing meanings, and the other as linear elements being disposed in a space and showing figures.⁸⁹ Alphabets don't have any meaning in themselves but they express meaningful words by recording regularly the phonetic values we speak out and arranging them consistently. Also, a series of alphabets are capable of making any forms by inscribing visibly, being unraveled from the rigid quadrangle it once belonged to. In this way, letters operating in a calligram play the role of language and of image at the same time. Therefore, Foucault says that a calligram aspires playfully to efface the oppositions of linguistic representation and plastic representation which are stated previously.⁹⁰ For with a calligram it is possible *to name, to say, to articulate, to signify, to read and to show, to shape, to reproduce, to imitate, to look at* a single object all at once.

The last role of a calligram and its significance is that a calligram seizes its object in a perfect trap with what Foucault calls a double cipher⁹¹: a mark that consists of both writing with abstract signs and drawing concrete figures. Actually, text and images both have respective limitations. Text obtains references through abstracting universal properties, omitting the individuality of specific objects no matter how closely they describe their object; once the object comes in the linguistic system, the small differences it has in comparison with others are erased, summed up into the larger sameness and eventually substituted for

⁸⁹ Ibid. p.21-22 (Eng. p.21)

⁹⁰ Ibid. p.22 (Eng. p.21)

⁹¹ Ibid. p.22 (Eng. p.22)

generalized concepts. Linguistic representation only refers to its object with these concepts, not showing the object itself: it always implies the absence of specificity of the object in itself. However, in a calligram, this “invincible absence that words cannot come to overcome” is banished because a chain of letters show what they speak of, making a visual image.⁹² On the other hand, an image always remains in its ambiguous state since it doesn’t have any word to articulate itself at all. But, likewise, this “immobile, ambiguous, nameless presence” is finally granted a signification by text building a form of the image. That is, an image is fixed by certain words and has its name.⁹³ An inarticulate image is determined definitely by getting into a linguistic system, that is, a discourse, saying what it is. Like this, texts fulfill their deficiency by an image and an image by text in a calligram. Therefore, we can say that the calligram, made by means of a double cipher that is abstract on the one hand and concrete on the other, is the perfect representation of an object because it speaks about the intrinsic nature of an object and, at the same time, shows its appearance. And it doesn’t end up as an effort to explain an object completely with a simple complementary relation between text and images. Instead, it goes a step further: a calligram combines text and images in itself *physically*: it is a text *and* an image; it is what gives rise to an object in text and images with simultaneity. Now an object doesn’t exist half-and-half where the text says and where a painting shows. The whole object, both ideal and material, is trapped in a calligram which is not only a text but also an image. The reason why a calligram is a perfect ‘trap’ is that it is where an object is said and at the same time where it appears as well.

We’ve been investigating the calligram, which is the most radical form of the

⁹² Ibid. p.22 (Eng. p.22)

⁹³ Ibid. p.22 (Eng. p.22)

traditional principles of representation that Foucault reveals. For a long time the calligram was regarded as a complete combination of the two orders of text and images that subordinated and complemented each other in relation to a single object. When a text and an image, which share the same object in each order, are united into one, there is no vacant space splitting up the text and the image. This space has had the role of a *common place* between words and images: where our belief that two representational orders are relevant to the common object is realized. For example, if there is an image of a banana above and a word 'banana' below on a card, a connecting link arises in the blank between the two by the real banana object. It is "these few millimeters of white" where they have a common ground, a place where they can interfere, where words are capable of taking shape and images of entering into lexical order.⁹⁴ However, in a calligram, text and images meet so closely without any crack that this space disappears. Instead, a calligram itself becomes a common place with its text and image. In this sense, a calligram seems to be an art form as perfect as its real object. But when Magritte unravels the calligram, although its text and image return to their own places as the former goes down and the latter comes up in a picture card, their common place does not reappear: it is absent in Magritte's paintings and there remains only a similitude or a play of simulacra free from the duty of representing faithfully the real object.

⁹⁴ Ibid. pp.33-34 (Eng. p.28)

B. Magritte's Paintings on the Threshold

1. Collapse of the traditional system of representation

From now on we shall see how the rules of representation demonstrated previously are transformed in Magritte's paintings. We shall look into Foucault's description of the discontinuity of the representational system shown in Magritte's paintings. The changes of the rules disclosed by archaeological analysis on the one hand remain in the system of representation in appearance, but on the other hand, they collapse the system from within. Thus, it is difficult to say that an historical *a priori* of the representational system under the episteme of identity has shifted completely. In this sense this study insists that Magritte's painting is a *threshold*, rather than a typical example of the new episteme of dis-identity, in the terms of Foucault's archaeological analysis.

The traditional system of representation, which appeared to attain perfection through calligrams, started to falter from the 20th century. Works of art that are inexplicable by the relation of text and images we have seen so far began to emerge: some artworks attempted to confuse the representational system that we belong to, threatening its predominant conventions. They contain the moment of a sudden rupture of the historical *a priori* that was valid in the domain of representation after the Renaissance. Among them, Foucault especially appreciates Magritte's paintings, because they break the existing representational customs in a much bolder and cleverer way: they are "an art more committed than any other to the careful and cruel separation of graphic and plastic elements. If they happen to be superimposed within the paintings like a legend and its image, it is on condition that the statement contests the obvious identity of the figure, and the name we are prepared to give

it.”⁹⁵ In Magritte’s paintings, text and images, which were united into one in the calligram, become re-separated and go back to their traditional arrangements, but they no longer stay in subordinate relations. Rather, they conflict and compete with each other for their own independence.

From this description of Magritte’s paintings, we can draw two facts. One is that it is not true that Foucault insists that Magritte deviates from a traditional representation simply by estranging himself from it: Magritte adheres to the precedent historical *a priori*, that is, the rules of characterizing the representational practices from the 15th century, but he destabilizes them from within; words and images can be placed in the same pictorial space, as in the traditional paintings, but their relation becomes dis-identified. We can infer from this that Magritte’s paintings are on a threshold containing historical practices which show us a break and a discontinuity, and in this sense that they imply the primary principle of heterotopia that is present in the real world but exerts a counteraction to it, which we shall see closely in the next chapter. The other fact is that Foucault does not establish a new norm which replaces the existing system of representation but describes transformations of representational principles through Magritte’s paintings. As mentioned before, archaeological methodology is the result of negative valuation of historical constitution, and Foucault judges Magritte’s paintings as noteworthy archaeological events. However, what Foucault reveals through his archaeological methodology is the condition that characterizes Magritte’s specific paintings, not a criterion for contemporary paintings to follow. Of course, it can be said that Magritte himself established the discord between images and words as a new criterion of paintings. But archaeological methodology is for the description of conditions for a discursive practice

⁹⁵ Ibid. p.45 (Eng. p.35)

such as a statement, or a painting in this case, to appear in history: it describes the collapse of the existing episteme and the emergence of a new episteme; it does not decide right or wrong among these events. Likewise, Foucault's analysis of Magritte's paintings merely shows us the collapse of the existing order: text and images don't try to relate to one another in a subordinate way, nor do they attempt to correspond to each other for the same object in Magritte's paintings. But they still coexist, competing for their natural autonomies. They are as independent of each other as they are exclusive to one another. Therefore, we can say that Magritte's paintings show the collapse of the preceding episteme of identity itself in Foucault's analysis. We will impart a new meaning of heterotopia to this archaeological description of Magritte's paintings. But firstly we shall see how Magritte separates the once-solid union of text and images.

To do this, we need to begin with the way that Foucault introduces Paul Klee (1879-1940) as an artist who abolished the first traditional principle of representation, that is, the separation between plastic representation and linguistic reference. Klee juxtaposed shapes and words into an uncertain, reversible space.⁹⁶ This space is where neither text nor images have the initiative over the other. They overlap without subordination, staying in an unseparated state from each other. For example, in *Villa R* (Figure 14) there is a street on the field under the moon light, and beside the street there is a white building that looks like a house or a cathedral. And there stands an obvious capital R as if it asked us what is so strange about itself. The letter "indicat[es] the way to go and nam[es] the landscape being crossed."⁹⁷ ("R" in German is the abbreviation of the right (*Recht*), and the street runs on

⁹⁶ Ibid. pp.40-41 (Eng. p.33)

⁹⁷ Ibid. p.41 (Eng. p.33)

the top right. Furthermore, the title of the painting is *Villa R.*) As this, Klee created the space where words and figures are overlapped indifferently. In addition, his works consist of the things that are “at the same time recognizable figures and elements of writing.”⁹⁸ The eyes, nose and mouth of the white face in *Death and Fire* (Figure 15) are also the spellings of the German *tod* (death). And once again, its arm and hand is readable as the capital T, the fire on the hand as O, and the whole contour of the face as D. In calligrams, a cloud of words and letters should take the shape they designate and the figure should dissect itself into alphabetical elements.⁹⁹ However, in the works of Klee, words and plastic elements are not defined with separation, but still remain in the indeterminate state. Klee particularly used an arrow as a way of breaking the traditional rule, and Foucault considers it as the “sign bearing a primal resemblance, like a graphic onomatopoeia, and shape that formulates an order”.¹⁰⁰ According to Foucault, Klee’s paintings are “the intersection, within the same medium, of representation by resemblance and of representation by signs”¹⁰¹, whereas calligrams at once acknowledge the distinction between text and images and unite them into one by the subordinate relation. For Klee, text and images are not two different orders separated from each other, but remain in the reversible state in the same single space.

While Klee made “quite another space than that of the painting”¹⁰², the traditional space

⁹⁸ Ibid. p.41 (Eng. p.33)

⁹⁹ Ibid. p.42 (Eng. p.33)

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p.41 (Eng. p.33)

¹⁰¹ Ibid. p.42 (Eng. pp.33-34)

¹⁰² Ibid. p.42 (Eng. p.34)

of representation that separates text and images remains in Magritte's paintings, but it is "excavate[d] with words."¹⁰³ Foucault says that Magritte plays a sort of game in the trial of strength of words and images.¹⁰⁴ The game Magritte enjoys is mainly to dislocate words and images. In calligrams, the same object is presupposed as the model of representation and the reference of language. On the other hand, Magritte shows that plastic representation and linguistic reference are two distinctive systems and that there is no exterior object common to both of them: no common foundation exists between the two. For instance, the titles of Magritte's paintings do not perform the role of giving a faithful explanation or of identifying what is shown. Instead, they ring forth the familiar expression until it becomes absurd.¹⁰⁵ Foucault illustrates it by various examples, one of which is *Le soir qui tombe* (*The evening that falls*) (Figure 16). It represents literally the idiomatic expression "the sun goes down": the sun fell and shattered. This image itself is representational and it appears that nothing is wrong with it. But what the title refers to is ambiguous: it is confusing as to what we have to pay attention to in this picture, whether it is the scene of sunset or the broken double of the sun. That is, we cannot know what object is shared by both the title and the image.

Perspective: Madame Recamier by David (Figure 17) and *Perspective II: Manet's Balcony* (Figure 18) are more certain and direct examples. These paintings borrow the work of Jacques Louis David and that of Edouard Manet respectively. However these artworks, which are the exact reproductions of the traditional paintings, do not show the figures that the titles designate. Madame Recamier, particularly depicted by David, and figures on the balcony

¹⁰³ Ibid. p.48 (Eng. p.37)

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p.50 (Eng. p.38)

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. p.51 (Eng. p.38)

painted by Manet are all substituted by wood coffins. Foucault appreciates the coffins as the visualization of *non-lieu* (non-place)¹⁰⁶ : non-place means, superficially, where figures no longer exist in the painting, but more deeply, is the absence of the common place of words and images: no foundation supporting both words and images. The absence of the same object where text and shapes correspond with each other implies the absence of their point of contact at which they meet: the absence of their common place. The “non-place” emerges “in person” – in the place of persons and where no one is present any longer, Foucault says.¹⁰⁷

Klee directly effaced the separation between the plastic representation and linguistic reference and destroyed their subordinate relation in order to break the first traditional principle of representation. He made use of the indeterminate elements which are at once plastic and referential and created the new space where words and shapes are juxtaposed indifferently. In contrast, according to Foucault, text and images are still two separated orders as in tradition, but they exist in their pure independence, not relating to each other through subordination in Magritte’s paintings. Foucault expresses it as *non-rapport* (non-relation); given the way of making a title for Magritte’s painting, non-relation signifies that no relation exists between a painting and its title; Magritte says, “The titles are chosen in such a way as to keep anyone from assigning my paintings to the familiar region that habitual thought appeals to in order to escape perplexity.”¹⁰⁸ That is, Magritte keeps respect for the act of naming of words but gets rid of their duty of being consistent with images. For example, in

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p.57 (Eng. p.41)

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p.57 (Eng.p.41)

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. pp.47-48 (Eng.p.36)

Magritte's paintings, if a word is inserted in a picture, it functions independently and even exclusively to the image (Figure 19).¹⁰⁹ Taking note of this conflicting relation, Foucault articulates non-relation again as “the very complex and accidental relation”¹¹⁰ between text and images; words and images have an odd relation to each other in the pictorial space of Magritte, which occurs under the condition of the absence of a common place between them, the non-place. Then we can say that it is also appropriate to clarify non-relation as “non-usual relation” or “not a relation that is made in an expected way”.

The works of Magritte certainly exist at the threshold between the preceding historical *a priori* and the one yet to come, in the sense that they appear to admit the first principle of representation by keeping the separation between text and images but in fact they disrupt the conventional space where the principle operates by dislocating text and images. This becomes the primary understanding of heterotopia that has the system of opening and closing to the existing order of society at once. In addition, whereas calligrams themselves are the common places of text and images, the works of Magritte show non-places, the absence of the common place which text and images belong to together. This will be important in the next chapter, as we will see how we can explain the possibility of resistance in heterotopias, where the existing order has collapsed, by the concept of non-place since it permits unusual and strange relations of the two different orders, not making them combine together with the

¹⁰⁹ The word *sirène* is written in this picture, of which ‘i’ is substituted by an enormous index finger and a bell. It is possible since an image is equally substantial as a letter. However, there is no siren which is referred by the word in the painting. An index finger just designates a bell in the air. The word and the image do not attempt to constitute a single figure. On the contrary, they are deployed in two different directions. (Ibid. pp.57-58, Eng. pp.41-42)

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p.47 (Eng. p.36) The French adjective “aléatoire” is translated into the word “problematic” in English. But I put it as “accidental” since the English word could give a negative impression to readers.

single criterion.

The next artist Foucault nominates as a painter who subverts the second principle of representational conventions, the equivalence of resemblance and affirmation, is Vasili Kandinsky (1866-1944). Kandinsky isolated the painting from the plastic resemblance and from the affirmation with words at the same time. Foucault articulates Kandinsky's strategy as follows: "A double effacement simultaneously of resemblance and of the representative bond"¹¹¹. On the one hand, the works of Kandinsky became completely abstract, escaping from the representative tradition based on resemblance (Figure 20). On the other, he gave a title to his painting in relation to the gesture that formed it such as an "improvisation" or a "composition", or to what is found there like "a red shape", "triangles".¹¹² He even entitled his work as "untitled" (Figure 21). Kandinsky cut off every referential relation with exterior objects as for both resemblance and affirmation, concentrating on the intrinsic expression of painting.

However, Magritte severs the connection between the resemblance and the affirmation according to Foucault. Magritte makes each operate in isolation, pursuing as closely as possible the resemblance which stems from painting, but excising from it any affirmation that belongs to discourses.¹¹³ That is, in Magritte's paintings the resemblance on which the painting traditionally is based goes on infinitely whereas it is impossible to affirm that "It resembles this", or "The model of this representation is that". *Similitude* emerges in the very

¹¹¹ Ibid. p.43 (Eng. p.34)

¹¹² Ibid. pp.43-44 (Eng. p.34)

¹¹³ Ibid. p.59 (Eng. p.43)

moment when the affirmation of successive resemblances disappears.

Foucault explains the difference between similitude and resemblance through Magritte's work, *Représentation* (Figure 22).

[This work] is an exact representation of a portion of a ball game, seen from a kind of terrace fenced by a low wall. On the left, the wall is topped by a balustrade, and in the juncture thus formed can be seen exactly the same scene, but on a smaller scale (about one-half). In the same painting, two images bound thus laterally by a relation of similitude are enough for exterior reference to a model – through resemblance – to be disturbed, rendered floating and uncertain. What “represents” what?¹¹⁴

Similitude is basically composed of repetitions of resemblance. When resemblances successively continue, one does not try to find the model exterior to them but the inner order between them. But soon it turns out that one cannot determine any hierarchy governing the successive resemblances. Which one plays the role of the origin for the other, the smaller scene or the larger one? Which one is prior/superior to the other? These questions, to which no one can give answers with conviction, make a distinction between similitude and resemblance. In other words, whereas resemblance is the likeness which forms the hierarchy of all copies according to the original, similitude is the likeness which does not have any order of rank between the original and its copies. If there is only one image that resembles something, we can easily figure out what the image refers to, by what model the copies are imposed an order. The exterior model reigns over its copies as the norm they should follow

¹¹⁴ Ibid. pp.61-62 (Eng. p.44)

faithfully and the value of a copy is determined according to how much it resembles the model. But images in the relation of similitude are self-referential, which means that they don't have the original model to refer to. In order to understand the self-referentiality of visual images, let us remind ourselves of mirror images. If there is one mirror, the relation of resemblance is established between the image reflected on the mirror and the object exterior to it. We can say that the image (copy) represents the object (the original). However, suppose that there are two mirrors facing each other. The image in a mirror reflects itself in the other mirror: this image is self-referential. If more mirrors are placed on every side, each image in every mirror refers to itself reflected in other mirrors without letting us know what represents what. It is self-referentiality of similitude that these images in mirrors show, which entails the disappearance of the original and the circulation of images. In this sense, Foucault says that the repetition of images is enough for the original to be disturbed; it is the condition for similitude. Without its external model, an image in the series of the diverse versions of the similar refers to nothing but itself. Similitude “develops in series that have neither beginning nor end, that can be followed in one direction as easily as in another, that do not obey any hierarchy, but propagate themselves from small differences among small differences.”¹¹⁵ In short, similitude is what is discovered in an infinite series of resemblances without conformity to the external origin, but with small differences which refer to each other and make it impossible to affirm what refers to what.

Foucault explains that the similitude shown in Magritte's paintings has an advantage over the resemblance used in traditional representation. While resemblance merely permits

¹¹⁵ Ibid. p.61 (Eng. p.44) English version has a mistranslation here: “... that obey on hierarchy”. The original text articulates as “... qui n'obéissent à aucune hiérarchie”. The citation above is rectified as “... that do not obey any hierarchy”.

one to recognize the clearly visible, similitude makes the invisible visible: “it reveals what recognizable objects, familiar silhouettes hide, prevent from being seen, render invisible.”¹¹⁶

The purpose of resemblance is to reproduce copies of the original and to recognize them in relation to the original in traditional representation system where representation itself is considered to be a foundation of the knowledge for true reality. So the results of resemblance should be subordinated to the order based on the origin, and make a unique assertion, always the same,¹¹⁷ saying “This is an apple”, “This is an elephant” and “This is a pipe.” As we have seen in the episteme of the classical age in chapter I , plastic representation based on resemblance is turned into transparent language that affirms what we see. In this sense, Foucault agrees with Magritte’s claim that resemblance is the property of thought: recognition and affirmation are the sovereign way of making things appear, which is the human ability of thinking.¹¹⁸ A thought is what the subject constitutes through representation, in opposition to a thing which exists in the world of raw materials. As mentioned in the previous chapter, representations are fundamental forms of thought in the Classical age. The linguistic representation particularly made up of ideal signs is believed to represent objects transparently that the world offers to it. Similarly, resemblance is the virtue of plastic representations. In short, both resemblance (plastic representation) and thought (linguistic representation) are required to have the deducibility or the quasi-identity to their original object in the real world by representational system. Thus, Magritte regards

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p.65 (Eng. p.46)

¹¹⁷ Ibid. p.65 (Eng. p.46)

¹¹⁸ Ibid. p.66 (Eng. pp.46-47) Foucault cites as follows: “Only thought,” says Magritte, “can resemble. It resembles by being what it sees, hears, or knows; it becomes what the world offers it.”

resemblance as a characteristic proper to the thought. Then it is easier to connect the plastic resemblance to the affirmation constituted by the thought, which verifies what is shown with always the same, single statement. However, similitude develops itself, being full of small differences among the similar. Unlike resemblance, it multiplies different affirmations.¹¹⁹ Foucault demonstrates this by analyzing *Les deux mystères* (*Two mysteries*) (Figure 23), one of the most famous works of Magritte, with a group of possible positions of the subject explained in *L'archaéologie du Savoir*.

We've seen so far that Magritte seems to stay within the conventions of traditional representation under the episteme of identity but in fact shakes them by eliminating the common place between words and images and taking similitude into paintings. In his paintings, the separation between linguistic representation and plastic representation is maintained, but their subordinate relations are broken. And resemblance is repeated infinitely while affirmation, which is said to belong to discourses determining what represents what, is abandoned. Magritte's paintings show dis-identity with the form of representation under the episteme of identity, which permits us to say that they are on a threshold. In the next section, we shall look into how Foucault analyzes the similitude in *Les deux mystères* through his archaeological methodology before recapturing Magritte's paintings as heterotopias.

2. *Les deux mystères*: Ground for diverse discourses

As mentioned above, Foucault analyzes Magritte's problematic painting, *Les deux*

¹¹⁹ Ibid. pp.65-66 (Eng. p.46)

mystères in order to demonstrate the virtue of similitude in overcoming the limitation of resemblance: similitude can show invisible statements, different affirmations, whereas resemblance only reproduces the visible and connects it to the same, single affirmation. That is, similitude revives the conflicting voices of a statement which have to be silenced for the identification of the visible to the sayable in the traditional system of representation. It is important to note that Foucault uses the archaeological method in his analysis, which interrogates the already-said at the level of its existence, escaping from appreciating paintings with the human vision as demonstrated in the previous chapter. To be more exact, he treats the text written in the picture, “Ceci n’est pas une pipe,” as a statement and describes its enunciative function in particular relation with the subject. We’ve seen in *L’archéologie du savoir* that Foucault said a statement does not imply the same relation between the enunciating subject and what is being stated. For a statement, the enunciating subject is a particular function, that is, an empty function that can be filled by virtually any individual when he/she formulates it. The place of the subject of a statement varies with different positions: different status, different sites, different situations of the enunciating subject. Therefore, when the position which can be occupied by any individual is determined in a number of relations, it is possible for him/her to be the subject and a formulation could be described as a statement.¹²⁰ In this way, Foucault describes the function of existence of the statement “Ceci n’est pas une pipe”: how the formulation, expected to be erased or corrected in ordinary customs because of its incongruity with images, functions as a statement in the artwork of Magritte; how it is determined in the relations with other elements in the picture, with possible positions of the subject; how it makes itself something more than a mere group

¹²⁰ *L’archéologie du savoir*, pp.126-132 (Eng. pp.92-96)

of signs made by a human being. Foucault verifies the power of the similitude which makes the invisible visible and multiplies different affirmations through the analysis.

Let's take a look at the *Les deux mystères* (Figure 23): there is an enormous pipe floating in the air, a small pipe drawn exquisitely in a canvas on the unstable easel, and a statement "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" written under the small pipe. The repetition of the pipe images satisfies the condition for similitude, but Foucault clarifies the relations of similitude operating in this painting through an archaeological analysis of the statement, discovering a series of statements hidden in the simple oppositions. He says it is sufficient to ask *who speaks in the statement* in order to establish the series of different affirmations concentrated in "Ceci n'est pas une pipe."¹²¹ He draws seven discourses from this statement.

First three discourses are drawn out from the self-denials of each element in the picture. Firstly, the small pipe says, "I'm not a pipe." It denies itself as a pipe because it is made up of a mere bundle of lines which forms it or it forms: it is just a drawing, a representation of a pipe. But it defines itself as a similitude which does not refer to a real pipe but forms a series of a pipe in vertical relation with the larger pipe. Secondly, the larger pipe in the air also says "I'm not a pipe", because it floats beyond space and without fixed foundation. It thinks it is too misty to be a real pipe. Maybe one can guess that it symbolizes an idea of a pipe.¹²² However, it regards itself as a similitude referring to nothing, but permitting the text and the drawing below it to communicate with each other. Thirdly, the statement comes forward to speak for itself. It also denies being a pipe since it knows its place as naming what it

¹²¹ *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*. p.68 (Eng. pp.47-48)

¹²² A "simple notion or fantasy of a pipe" or "a pipe dream" according to Foucault's offer. (Ibid. p.12, Eng. p.16)

describes, the pipe. It limits itself to a series of written letters, or a graphism that resembles only itself and knows nothing of the value of what it says.¹²³

Then Foucault makes three pairs of elements and puts each of them in the place of the subject speaking “Ceci n’est pas une pipe.” He draws three denials of the third element as a pipe. Firstly, the statement itself and the smaller pipe in a canvas enter into a relation by the fact that they are located in the same frame. They say “This enormous pipe, floating in the air, beyond any referent is not a pipe.” It is propelled to the abstract apparition of a pipe; unanchored, mute, and invisible idea that does not exist as real. Secondly, the two pipes are bound together by their reciprocal similitude because of the fact that they are successive resemblance of a pipe. They contest the right of the written statement to call itself a pipe because it consists of the signs with no resemblance to the thing they designate. For them, the statement is just a group of signs for designation of the real object. Thirdly, the text and the floating pipe join by the transcendence from the fact that they each come from elsewhere: one is a discourse capable of conveying truth while the other is like the ghost of a thing-in-itself. They both come from the space beyond the canvas, implying transcendence. Thus, they insist that the represented pipe on a canvas is not a pipe.¹²⁴

Finally, Foucault finds a voice without location, in the possible positions of the subject of “Ceci n’est pas une pipe.” It is the voice of the painting itself, saying that there is no pipe but everything is just a simulacrum: a text that simulates a text, a drawing that simulates a drawing of a pipe, a pipe (drawn above, not as a drawing in a canvas) that is the simulacra of

¹²³ Ibid. pp.68-69 (Eng. p.48)

¹²⁴ Ibid. pp.69-70 (Eng. pp.48-49)

a pipe (drawn from the way of a pipe that is not itself a drawing). Since it contains the painting on a canvas in itself, no element can assert its right to reality at the level of the whole painting.¹²⁵

As we have seen, Foucault directly applies his archaeological methodology to Magritte's specific artwork, *Les deux mystères*. As a result, archaeological analysis describes the new relations between pictorial elements and reveals the unnoticed discourses of the painting. The existing discourses of *Les deux mystères* try to solve the strained relation between its statement and images in the painting: depending on what the demonstrative pronoun "Ceci" refers to, it is said that the empirical, psychological subject denies the enormous, floating idea of a pipe in the air, or that the transcendental subject denies the precise drawing of a pipe. In either case, the place of the subject enunciating "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" is fixed as one in the attempt to bring the statement and images into accord in the painting. But the archaeological analysis of the painting describes the tense relation between words and images as it is, discovers seven enunciative subjects concealed in a statement, and shows their seven different discourses. That is, Foucault changes the problem of choosing either idealism or empiricism, which necessarily deny and negate one another, into the affirmation of small differences between the similar: he overcomes the simple negation of the statement and goes forward to "the affirmation of the simulacrum, affirmation of the element within the network of the similar."¹²⁶ Archaeological analysis makes positive discourses of similitude diverge from the statement "Ceci n'est pas une pipe", which appears to be a firm negation. Now *Les*

¹²⁵ Ibid. pp.70-71 (Eng. p.49)

¹²⁶ Ibid. p.67 (Eng. p.47)

deux mystères becomes a new pictorial space generating multiple discourses with a collapse of the same, of the sole existence of an affirmation, maintaining its position in the representational system. In this painting, regularities of representation are on a threshold, which is neither completely inside nor outside of the representational system familiar to us.

The capability of similitude to make the invisible visible brings a critical change to our cognitive system based on identity, as we have seen so far. Under the episteme of identity, what is not included in the discourse constituted in the pursuit of the original is considered as the unreasonable to say, as we can see in the word *non-sense*, and treated in the knowledge system for Truth as if it doesn't exist. However, similitude, which does not presuppose the original, is released from the duty of identity; it implies the possibility of simultaneous existences of different discourses. If we realize through similitude that the existing system is not absolute and that there can be other systems which have different values from ours, we will be able to broaden our understanding of reality, attempting to grasp the mechanism of our own knowledge system precisely; we will not be satisfied with only pursuing the identification of already-set knowledge; we will consider the limitations and errors of our knowledge system in itself and move forward to the more productive knowledge system in which it is possible to understand the absence of common place and dislocation of common sense, which this study named the episteme of dis-identification previously. This study shall now examine heterotopias where these changes occur within the existing society with self-referentiality of similitude.

3. Self-referentiality of similitude and Heterotopia

We've looked into, on the one hand, the predominant principles of representation under the episteme of identity, and on the other hand their alternations in Magritte's paintings. In the analysis, we found that his works exist on a threshold on which there is a transition in historical *a priori*s in the domain of paintings. Now we will treat the self-referential characteristic of similitude springing up from this threshold, which seem to correspond to those of what Foucault calls heterotopias as spaces contesting the established order of a society even though they are also partly connected to that society. So we shall also examine how the self-referentiality of similitude introduces the notion of heterotopic space through the analogy of a mirror.

The paintings of Magritte create a conflict with the principles of traditional representation by pursuing similitude with infinite resemblances but keeping away from any affirmation that verifies what represents what. One of his works, *Les deux mystères*, has shown the multiple relations and discourses on the basis of the similitude it contains. In the analysis, we can realize that every element speaks of interior elements of the painting: it speaks of itself. Like this, similitude has the referential relation to itself internally, instead of the model exterior to itself. As we saw in the explanation of *Représentation* in the first section, Foucault points to *self-referentiality* as the primary characteristic of similitude:

Henceforth similitude is restored to itself – unfolding from itself and folding back upon itself. It is no longer the finger pointing out from the canvas in order to refer to something else. It inaugurates a play of transferences that run, proliferate, propagate, and correspond within the layout of the painting, affirming and representing nothing. Thus in Magritte's art

*we find infinite games of purified similitude that never overflow the painting.*¹²⁷

Whereas the status of the original and its copies are fixed and unchanged in the relation of resemblance, the inner elements of similitude transfer their positions ceaselessly in indeterminate relation by self-referentiality.

Foucault explains Magritte's two other ways of expressing the self-referentiality of leaving images without an original model: destroying the identity by metamorphoses and mixing the painting and what it represents.¹²⁸ In *Les Grâces Naturelles* (Figure 24) and *La Saveur des Larmes* (Figure 25), we can see the figures which would have been impossible if they had represented the exterior model. At first, they are so well-painted that we are not likely to feel a sense of incompatibility. But soon we become confused by unfamiliar appearances in transitions. The identities of birds and leaves are broken and they transform themselves into the other. "Is it the plant whose leaves take flight and become birds, or the birds that drown and slowly botanize themselves, sinking into the ground with a final quiver of greenery?"¹²⁹ On the other hand, the painting and what it represents are mixed in *La condition humaine* (Figure 26). A horizon is formed without a break between the ocean view out of an arch (which appears to be a model of representation) and the painting representing the view on a canvas. They make a single scenery by mingling together and permeating into each other. By this perfect continuity of scene, the linearity, the continuous overflowing of one into the other, Magritte erased the duality, the necessary distance between the object of

¹²⁷ Ibid. p.71 (Eng. p.49)

¹²⁸ Ibid. pp.71-73 (Eng. pp.49-51)

¹²⁹ Ibid. p.72 (Eng. pp.49-50)

representation (model) and the result of representation (painting).¹³⁰

Les liaisons dangereuses (Figure 27) is the work where all the tactics of Magritte have been put together.¹³¹ In the painting, a nude woman holds a mirror that almost completely hides her. But it is never that simple. Although the mirror faces the viewer, it reflects the image of the same woman who is trying to hide, functioning as a radioscopic screen. In addition, her image reflected on the mirror is quite different from the woman holding the mirror: her body stands facing forward, but her image is in profile, turned to the right; she is stretching out her arms to support a big mirror, but those of the image are tucked beneath her breasts; the hair that is to extend behind the mirror on the right flows down, in the mirror, on the left. That is, the identity of the woman is broken up and her appearances are altered without consistency. There's more. The duality of the woman holding the mirror and its reflection in the mirror is effaced by the crude overlapping of the hidden part and the reflected part, by the continuity of her hair and her thigh. Lastly, Foucault reveals that *there is nothing* in the thin space between the mirror's sleek surface containing the reflection and the opaque surface of the wall that catches only shadows; it must be very narrow in consideration of the posture of the woman and the clear, dark shadows of her head, thigh, and the mirror; however, among them, the shadow of her left hand that should hold the mirror is missing. That is, the hidden body holding a mirror is elided between the wall and the mirror. Therefore, Foucault says, the woman and her reflection on the mirror we've been looking into are all "similitudes that no reference point can situate: translations with neither point of

¹³⁰ Ibid. p.73 (Eng. p.50)

¹³¹ Ibid. pp.74-76 (Eng. pp.51-52)

departure nor support.”¹³²

The mirror strategically used in the painting needs to receive attention once again. The image reflected on a mirror in *Les liaisons dangereuses* completes the figure hidden behind the mirror but contradicts it at once. A mirror, like similitude, reflects the invisible but in the way that it destroys the identity we expect to achieve. Destruction of identity means the disappearance of the original as something to represent. In Magritte’s paintings the mirror doesn’t reflect the faithful representation of the original, but produces self-referential images, which don’t have the original model exterior to themselves, through the destruction and reconstitution of reality.

Foucault explains this duality of the mirror with utopia and heterotopia in *Des espaces autres*. While utopias are unreal spaces, that is, sites with no real place, heterotopias are a kind of counter-term to utopias: “real places - places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society – which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted.”¹³³ As a “placeless place”, a mirror is “a sort of mixed, joint experience between utopia and heterotopia.” That is, a mirror is a utopia as long as it opens up an unreal, virtual space behind its surface. But at the same time, it is a present place in so far as it exists in reality; it is a self-referential heterotopia in the sense that it is where I see myself who is present in reality through my virtual

¹³² Ibid. p.76 (Eng. p.52)

¹³³ Foucault, Michel, “Des espaces autres”, *Dits et écrits II. 1976-1988*, (édition établie sous la direction de Daniel Defert et François Ewald avec la collaboration de Jaques Lagrange), Paris: Gallimard, 2008, pp.1574-1575 (Eng. : “Of other spaces”, translated by Jay Miskowiec, *Diacritics*, Vol.16, No.1 (Spring, 1986), p.24) “Des espaces autres” was a speech delivered at a conference of Cercle d’études architecturales on 14th, March, 1967. Foucault didn’t allow the publication of the text written in Tunis in 1967 until the spring of 1984.

appearance.¹³⁴

In *Les liaisons dangereuses*, the mirror shows the self-referentiality of similitude through reflection with distortions of its image, which corresponds with the characteristics of heterotopia. Heterotopia is self-referential like a mirror image, because it not only represents the social spaces it belongs to but even disarranges the established order regulating them. Then, we can also say that *Les liaisons dangereuses* itself displays a heterotopia as a sort of realization of self-referentiality: on the one hand, it is the real artistic practices that belong to the art system of a society and built up with the material supports; on the other hand, it is self-referential so long as it is an image without the original model and it makes us think back to the existing order of our representational system by destructing the identity of images with distortions. Like this, this study will show in the next chapter that Magritte's *La trahison des images*, which is on a threshold between the episteme of identity and that of dis-identity, can be re-interpreted as a heterotopic space which is self-referential by a transformation of pictorial rules or similitude in representational system.

¹³⁴ Ibid. p.1575 (Eng. p.24)

III. Pictorial Space as Heterotopia

According to Foucault, a heterotopia is a counter term to a utopia: it signifies a heterogeneous space present in reality or a kind of counter-space which contests the orders regulating its surrounding society by heterogeneous arrangements. In fact, Foucault explains a heterotopia with its six characteristics instead of giving a clear definition.¹³⁵ However, this study attempts to take back up the notion of heterotopia from Foucault's archaeological methodology and to explore it as a way of thinking about art by relating it to *L'archéologie du savoir* and *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*, which Foucault worked on at the same period. Above all, heterotopias can be defined as two spaces in Foucault's archaeology: the space between epistemes where we can map the precedent historical *a priori*, and the space effacing a common place of existing orders which implies a possibility of resistance. The former concerns with the characteristics of heterotopia that it has a system of opening and closing that isolates itself and makes it penetrable at once, functioning as contestation of all the other spaces that surrounds it. The latter is related to another characteristic of heterotopia: that it brings incompatible sites together. After defining heterotopias with their characteristics, we

¹³⁵ I list six characteristics of heterotopias briefly here. It is not true that a heterotopic space has all these characteristics or that it needs to meet all these conditions. Foucault seems to describe informal ideas of heterotopias. For further description of these characteristics, see "Des espaces autres", pp.1575-1580 (Eng. pp.22-27) : (1) Heterotopias are constructed in every culture in the world. (2) A society can change the existing function of its heterotopias diversely. (3) Heterotopias place many incompatible sites in one space. (4) Heterotopias are related to time in non-traditional ways: both the accumulation of time and the fleeting, transitory aspects of time. (5) Heterotopias always require a system of opening and closing which isolates them from ordinary spaces and simultaneously makes them penetrable. (6) Heterotopias have a function to all the other spaces that they relate to.

shall come back to Magritte's paintings. We shall examine how Magritte's paintings function as heterotopias as defined above: the pictorial space created by Magritte manifests a heterotopia where a calligram is torn into text and image in their natural state within the form of traditional representation.

A. Understanding of Heterotopia

1. The Space between Epistémès

First of all, in order to define a heterotopia as the space between epistemes where it is possible to recognize an historical *a priori* which we belong to, we need to understand one of its characteristics: that it always has the system of opening and closing at the same time with its surrounding society. Foucault points out that heterotopias always require a system of opening and closing which isolates them from ordinary spaces and simultaneously makes them penetrable.¹³⁶ That is, a heterotopia has the duality of connecting with social spaces it belongs to and simultaneously detaching itself from them in the analogy of a mirror that is present in real world but whose reflection has a steady distance from reality.

The paradox of connection and isolation of heterotopia is caused by its essential function of contesting the other ordinary spaces of society. Heterotopias exist inside a society and are connected to its other spaces, but they can separate themselves from its dominant order by contesting the rest of social spaces. According to Foucault, heterotopic contestations are made by two ways: by creating a space of illusion that denounces all other real spaces and

¹³⁶ Ibid. p.1579 (Eng. p.26)

their inner displacement which departmentalizes human life as more illusory; or on the contrary, by creating another real space which is so perfect, meticulous, and well-arranged that it makes our society appear disordered and messy. Foucault uses as examples a brothel such as the one Louis Aragon (1897-1982), a French poet and novelist, indulged his fantasies in, and colonies which were really built by western countries.¹³⁷ A brothel makes its visitors regard their real experiences of love as illusions and provides a fantasy which permits them to forget social norms, social ethics and to pursue the abstract desire. A brothel is present in a corner of real society, but separated from it by refuting its predominant rules and orders of sexual desire. In contrast, in the case of colonies, they are perfectly planned societies where not only education, social classes, economic structures, land utilizations, populations are all controlled but even an individual life is regulated by the norms of governing nations. Colonies have been present in history by the western powers, but they have disproved the imperfectly ordered state of the rest of the world through their exceptionally perfect order, in complete isolation. In short, whether it actualizes an illusion or it compensates reality, a heterotopia has a simultaneous system of connection and separation by arguing with the dominant order of its surrounding spaces.

This heterotopic characteristic makes it possible to map the space of established knowledge and to make the existing order legible.¹³⁸ According to Topinka, heterotopias provide an avenue for the distance that permits us to make objective observations of the

¹³⁷ Ibid. pp.1580-1581 (Eng. p.27)

¹³⁸ Topinka, Robert J., "Foucault, Borges, Heterotopia: Producing knowledge in Other Spaces", *Foucault Studies*, no.9, September 2010, p.56

knowledge, cultures and orders that we've taken for granted.¹³⁹ It is impossible to develop critical thinking about the frame itself while remaining in the given epistemological frame. We need to take a step backward from it in order to distinguish and recognize something from the others. Heterotopias keep distance from other social spaces and guarantee their objective vision, questioning the self-evidence of orders in a society. However, the fact that a heterotopia is still connected to other spaces is not contradictory to its function of distancing. Actually, it is this connection that permits heterotopias to render the existing order legible and builds contestation into heterotopias.¹⁴⁰ They are capable of functioning as contestations of the dominant order of the society, precisely because heterotopias are partly attached to them. If heterotopias were simply separated from the existing society, they would not give us an opportunity to think back on it. If a brothel or a colony were not connected with ordinary social spaces, if they did not exist in reality, they would be just utopias which are considered as daydreams. But since they are heterogeneous system in reality, it is meaningful to map the established social system, orders, knowledge by comparing them with what is counted as normal. As we grasp ourselves present in reality and change our appearance, through what we saw beyond the surface of a mirror, we can obtain the ability to figure out the given orders and customs and to reconstitute them through heterotopias. "Heterotopias make legible the ground on which knowledge is built by complicating that ground."¹⁴¹

The fact that heterotopias are detached from other ordinary spaces, and at the same time they always function in the relations with other spaces reminds us of some points of

¹³⁹ Ibid. pp.65-66

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. p.60

¹⁴¹ Ibid. p.61

L'archéologie du savoir. Firstly, the distance, the separation itself that heterotopias have, means that the order constituting the knowledge of a society is discontinuous in itself, that it implies break and rupture. If a single order continued from the past, keeping its identity, it would be impossible to keep distance from it in isolation and heterotopias as *other spaces* also could not exist. In addition, the function of heterotopias, which always occurs in relation to other spaces, is similar to the archaeological methodology that analyzes historical discourses in the ensemble of relations. Statements and the discourses made up of them do not maintain permanent meanings, keeping their identities. They are accepted differently according to the variation of relations of their surrounding elements: the various relations determine the discourses and statements. And when the relations are established in a certain manner for a certain period of time, we say that there is a set of regularities of statements, that is, a historical *a priori*. In the sense that they exist only “in this relationship between spaces”¹⁴², heterotopias are new spaces found in archaeology by Foucault.

To sum up, heterotopias enable us to read the social orders that we believe to be purely given and to pose questions regarding their constancy through distancing by the system of opening and closing themselves to the society. Heterotopias are the spaces which still exist in the society where a group of regularities already govern all the social discourses but which are escaping from those existing rules. In this sense, we can consider a threshold as a heterotopia as well. A threshold is a space which is not completely free from the dominant episteme, but also not completely restrained by it; which exists with the predominant regularities to some degree but which conducts the analysis of the relations determining them

¹⁴² Hetherington, Kevin, *The badlands of Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1997), p.ix (Re-cited from Topinka, op.cit. p.63)

and destabilizes their identities; where a transition happens from one episteme to another.

From now on, we regard heterotopias as the spaces between epistemes, that is, as thresholds, in order to come back to Magritte's painting.

2. Expansion to the Space of resistance

Although heterotopias don't promise complete liberation from the existing social orders, they can be understood as a temporary passage away from them.¹⁴³ And the contestation of the predominant orders that is performed by this transitory space is achieved through the absence of a common place, as we saw in the previous chapter. Now we need to pay attention to another characteristic of heterotopia: they can superimpose many incompatible spaces into one space. In fact, Foucault had already explained this function of heterotopias in the preface of *Les mots et les choses*. Foucault gives an explanation of heterotopias through 'a certain Chinese encyclopedia' cited by Borges.¹⁴⁴

*'animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies'*¹⁴⁵

Foucault pointed out that what is strange about this classification is not its peculiar items but

¹⁴³ Topinka, op.cit. p.60

¹⁴⁴ Jorge Luis Borges (1899-1986) is an Argentine poet, novelist and critic. The classification Foucault quoted is from a short story of Borges, "The Analytical Language of John Wilkins".

¹⁴⁵ *Les mots et les choses*, p.7 (Eng. p.xv)

the limitation of our own ability to think *that*, the impossibility of thinking that those items could be placed in one place.¹⁴⁶ That is, it is impossible in the existing epistemological frame which appears to make sense that they are placed at the same site, sharing the space together. However, in the encyclopedia Borges cited, diverse things are placed in one category, without any interstice where the relations between them can be generated: there is no common place which permits one to determine the relations explaining consistently the meeting of the things. The gaps between the things become so close that it disappears. As mentioned before, humans need to place things on particular sites in order to make sense of them. We need a space that supports the classification of things according to their similarities and differences, which thus enables our ability to form knowledge.¹⁴⁷ However, when the support, the common place that sustains the existing order disappears, we see the crowdedness of everything together in one place with the collapse of the order we've relied on. The same thing happens in heterotopias: "By juxtaposing and combining many spaces in one site, heterotopias problematize received knowledge by revealing and destabilizing the ground.....on which knowledge is built."¹⁴⁸

Foucault made clear that language in particular does not operate in its ordinary way in heterotopias.

..... *the **heteroclite**; and that word should be taken in its most literal, etymological sense: in such a state, things are 'laid', 'placed', 'arranged' in sites so very different from one another*

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. pp.7-8 (Eng. pp.xv-xvi)

¹⁴⁷ Topinka, op.cit. p.62

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. p.56

*that it is impossible to find a place of residence for them, to define a common locus beneath them all..... **Heterotopias** are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this **and** that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy 'syntax' in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to 'hold together'....., heterotopias (such as those to be found so often in Borges) desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences.¹⁴⁹*

The referential function of the language becomes completely out of order since there is no common place for relating words to their referents, the things that they designate. If the linguistic system, which codifies the knowledge of a society and imparts it to the next generation, becomes impaired and does not function anymore, the solidity of a common sense in which we believe is threatened. Therefore, heterotopias can also perform a function of resistance against the existing knowledge the society constructed and the orders based on that knowledge.

However, what we can see in heterotopias is not the new order that substitutes for the existing one, but "the impossibility itself of an order."¹⁵⁰ In the Chinese encyclopedia Borges cited, we see the possibility of impossibility of an order when breaking the bounds of the epistemology we belong to. Heterotopias are capable of resisting these bounds by disclosing the instability of the order.

¹⁴⁹ *Les mots et les choses*, p.9 (Eng.pp.xvii-xviii)

¹⁵⁰ Gros, Frédéric, "De Borges À Magritte", *Michel Foucault, La Littérature et les arts*, Paris: Kimé, 2004, p.17

One may be dissatisfied with the meaning of resistance in heterotopias because they do not propose a certain order to open the new period. But it plays an important role of giving a great significance to active resistance, and revolutionary attempts. For example, the similitude emerges simply as a result of the collapse of traditional principles of representation in Magritte's paintings. But in recent decades, we have experienced the tremendous change of status of images without the original in representational art system and appreciated a number of drastic works that bring into question the institutional system itself. It's not saying that everything would be impossible without the efforts of Magritte. Instead, these artistic attempts are acceptable and explainable with the impossibility of an order shown in Magritte's works, that is, the possibility of resistance of heterotopias, which we shall see more closely in the next section. The possibility of resistance of heterotopias is significant in the sense that it is one way of salvation of the practices that don't accord with the existing order from adjusting them or even neglecting them for the established values or ends. In short, heterotopias imply the possibility of expansion to the active resistance as they admit the autonomous existences of the things in their juxtaposition, not re-arranging them with consistency.

B. Magritte's Painting as Heterotopia: Unraveled Calligram

A calligram is a perfect harmony of text and images: it complements the alphabet by approaching one to the other as close as possible, repeats without the excess of words by using letters as linear elements and as signs at once, and grasps its object completely by overcoming the limitations of each. Foucault suggests that Magritte made and then scattered

carefully this perfect complementary combination in his painting.¹⁵¹ According to Foucault, this breakup is intended to show the fact that the triple function of calligrams in fact distorts the systems of language and image proper to each one, and hides their mutual exclusivity. That is, calligrams, which are reliant on the traditional system of representation, pervert the independent, separated orders of language and image, and their competence for winning autonomy of their own by refuting each other, not working together. The picture Foucault called an unraveled calligram is *La trahison des images* (*The treachery of images*) (Figure 28), inserted in *Les deux mystères*. In the latter, Magritte achieved similitude by drawing the same pipe as the former, by pursuing the resemblance once more. The former is much simpler but it already implies the principles of heterotopia.

This painting, *La trahison des images* was made as a calligram at first. Foucault insists that its words are images of words and its image is a figure formed with literation, since the words are within the general perimeter of the picture and the image is drawn by the same hand and with the same pen as the letters of the text.¹⁵² But soon the combination of this calligram becomes deconstructed. Its words and image go back to the traditional place of their own. The words come down and become the legend that refers to and explains the image. The image goes upward and shows what it represents with silence.¹⁵³

The calligram, which puts its elements back into the traditional places, now exposes its own nature. The calligram we believed as a tautology of the same object, discloses the

¹⁵¹ *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*. pp.19-20 (Eng. p.20)

¹⁵² *Ibid.* pp.24-25 (Eng. p.23)

¹⁵³ *Ibid.* pp.23-24 (Eng. pp.22-23)

impossibility of its simultaneous functioning as a text and an image. In appearance, this painting looks like the simple correspondence of the image with its legend. However, compared to the traditional function of the legend, Magritte's text is doubly paradoxical. It attempts to name something too obvious. And at the moment it does so by denying that the object is what it is.¹⁵⁴ For it is actually impossible to read its words and look at its figure at once when facing a calligram. If you try to read the words, the image is scattered as literal signs. If you try to see the whole figure of a calligram, the succession of letters are recognized only as a line and the meaning it conveys cannot be grasped. "The calligram never speaks and represents at the same moment."¹⁵⁵ Calligrams are not the repetition but the mutual concealment of text and images: one must be concealed in order that the other functions.

Therefore, calligrams are ultimately the visualization of countervailing relation between text and images instead of the perfect trap capturing the object, the complementary combination. In calligrams text and images assert their respective apparentness. The figure of a pipe is so evident as to be ridiculous to write down that it is a pipe, thus it excludes any explanatory or descriptive text. As a result, there is no text forming an image in Magritte's unraveled calligram. Its image doesn't need to consist of text. On the contrary, the text insists on the autonomy of what it names because it always guarantees firm understanding through the clear arrangement and succession of letters and it retains the same meaning all the time by

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. pp.25-26 (Eng. pp.23-24)

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. p.28 (Eng. p.25)

not changing its forms. The text denies the image in its autonomous function of reference.¹⁵⁶ In the painting of Magritte, the words and the image coexist in mutual exclusion, while keeping their own independent orders.

Foucault argues that Magritte stipulated the absence of a common place between text and images by putting down “Ceci n’est pas une pipe (This is not a pipe)” in his painting where text and images get dislocated. There is an unstable link “Ceci (This)” between the text and the image, which doesn’t have any definite referent. But, the text and the image are destined to be out of joint in the end because “une pipe (a pipe)”, their original model, their common place is denied by “n’est pas (is not)”. Nowhere is there a pipe; all that remains the text and the image which only assert themselves.¹⁵⁷

La trahison des images follows the ordinary disposition of the image and its legend by re-separating the text and the image united in a calligram in a traditional sense. However, the order governing the disposition in this work, that is, the traditional rule that the text and the image share a commonality and correspond with one another for the thing, is denied. Magritte shakes the order by dislocating the language and the image, by the absence of their common place. In the sense that Magritte’s painting belongs to the traditional disposition and still shows and explains the representative figure, it is connected to the existing system of representation and it makes the order of the system legible. Especially, Foucault refers to its heterotopic function by analyzing the traditional principles of representation explicitly. On the other hand, in the sense that the common place is already destroyed and the text and the

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. pp.28-30 (Eng. pp.25-26)

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. pp.30-35 (Eng. pp.26-29)

image are juxtaposed in the incompatible state within the painting, this pictorial space is disconnected with the existing system of paintings and furthermore implies the collapse of the system. Therefore Magritte's painting, *La trahison des images* is a heterotopia as a threshold having the system of opening and closing onto the predominant system of representation. In addition, it is also a space of resistance because it visualizes the collapse of the established system of representation and the heterogeneity caused by the transformation of representational rules. Therefore, we arrive at the conclusion that the paintings of Magritte manifest heterotopias through archaeological methodology of Foucault.

Conclusion

This study has argued for the significance of a new pictorial space as heterotopia to Foucault's description of Magritte's paintings by analyzing *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* through Foucault's archaeological methodology. Exploring pictorial spaces with the concept of heterotopia is based on an understanding of Foucault's archaeological methodology: archaeological analysis of paintings exposes heterotopic characteristics of paintings by showing the discontinuities of regularities in paintings in history and shedding the blind faith in an unchanging, absolute, constituting subject. The archaeological analysis of Magritte's paintings reveals the limitation of existing recognition and understanding of paintings, describing his paintings as a significant *event* that contains the transformations of rules of paintings by defining the relations of elements inside the pictures. This study not only articulated the concept of threshold in Foucault's analysis of Magritte's paintings but also presented heterotopia in particular as the most obvious form of meaningful *event* in itself that Foucault attempts to discover through archaeological methodology. As a result, Magritte's paintings can now be understood as an event in which the existing representational principles are dislocated in the traditional system of paintings, that is, as a new pictorial space of heterotopia.

By highlighting the concept of heterotopia, this study prepares an aesthetical ground for re-evaluating diverse paintings which are devaluated in the existing art system. The concept

of heterotopia casts new light on the works considered as preliminary in the sense that they were made before so-called a golden age of a painter, a style, or a school; they are regarded as imperfect works which didn't arrive at the peak and which didn't realize their painters' intention fully. But understanding of heterotopias can characterize these paintings with an archaeological concept, *threshold*, and reveal their individual value of existence without any consideration of pre-established criteria.

Furthermore, this study demonstrated that pictorial spaces as heterotopias have political implications as in the paintings of the Other such as working class population, females, mental patients, and those in subcultures. Some heterotopias can be extended to the spaces of resistance that visualize powers operating subtly in our daily life and deny them. In the very sense, the concept of heterotopia complements that of threshold: while the latter is a descriptive term of the space between epistemes, the former is an expression that applies the possibility of threshold to the practical lives.

However, the possibility of resistance of heterotopia should not be understood in terms of human subject. If a painting has the heterotopic possibility of resistance, it is not because its painter intends to disclose the mechanism of powers in social system, but because the painting itself exists as a discursive practice of the other in the existing structure of power. Generally, a statement of the other is excluded from the discourse system and reduced to silence for the reason that it is different from the normality prescribed by the dominant discourse.¹⁵⁸ In order to appreciate its heterogeneous existence, we do not need to be "afraid to conceive of the *Other* in the time of our own thought"¹⁵⁹, for which Foucault suggests his

¹⁵⁸ *L'archéologie du savoir*, pp.28-29 (Eng. p.17)

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p.22 (Eng. p.12)

archaeological methodology describing differences and dispersions. In the space where the heterogeneity of discourses is accepted, the norms that dominant discourse has prescribed do not operate consistently. What runs away from the norms are already out of control. Thus the possibility of resistance in heterotopias should be treated on the spatial level, on which the otherness of discourses that are different from regulations grows in the existing knowledge system and discloses its existence. Likewise, paintings that can be heterotopias are the spaces which embody heterogeneity within the pre-established system of paintings. For example, the series of Cindy Sherman's art-history portraits have been mainly analyzed in terms of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Still they are treated in the discourses of the subject, which is looking at an object, but at the same time, is looked at by a gaze.¹⁶⁰ Here, escaping from the concept of the subject under a quite contradictory position, we can say that this series manifests the otherness existing in the present system. Although they are not paintings but photos, they show us the way many male painters depict females in historical paintings and the vision of the other, for whom the traditional method produces an uncanny feeling at that way we've taken for granted. In fact, their value, before the shift to the grotesque, can be admitted by the fact that they reveal the existence of the other in the dominant discourse of the art system, and not the subject, even if this subject is transformed.

These paintings have political significance by contradicting and refuting against the orders, while still remaining in the existing society rather than getting out of it and conducting overall counteractions. This kind of resistance has not been grasped properly since the art history usually keeps its eye on the overall revolutions against the art system.

¹⁶⁰ Hal Foster gives a brief explanation of the Lacanian psychoanalysis of Cindy Sherman's works in his book, *The Return of the Real* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996). See Chapter 5.

However, pictorial spaces as heterotopias show more effective form of resistance we can adopt against the existing system. As Gutting points out, Foucault insists on the highly specific, regional character of archaeology, not saying that the elimination of dominant discourses can solve all our problems.¹⁶¹ This “unending series of local battles” is too weak to overturn the dominant system at once, but it threatens the authority of the system by constantly raising questions. Likewise, pictorial spaces as heterotopias contribute to disturbing the absolutization of authority of the existing art system by posing questions to the space where “the relations of ideology to the sciences [of paintings] are established.”¹⁶² The paintings of the Other are valuable not just because they are abnormal and novel; but for they have the political power that can cause changes of system in virtue of their different rules exhibited in the present art system.

In this sense, in regard to the possibility of resistance, I would like to suggest that the genealogy that Foucault develops afterwards can be read in the perspective of the concept of heterotopia. Heterotopia looks into political powers related to the orders of knowledge, helps to disarrange the orders of the existing system, and shows that the present knowledge-power system is not absolute but correlative.¹⁶³ With this rough sketch, this study leaves as the task of future studies whether the duality of heterotopias that keep distance from the society and

¹⁶¹ Gutting, Gary, op.cit. p.288

¹⁶² *L'archéologie du savoir*, p.250 (Eng. p.185)

¹⁶³ For example, Foucault implicitly reveals the relation between power and knowledge regarding practices of painting in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*. He supposes the painting on the easel drawn in *Les deux mystères* as either the blackboard in a classroom or the completed artwork in exhibition. His metaphors are meaningful. The classroom is a representative space of power where the reproduction of dominant discourses and the injection of social orders occur. Likewise, an exhibition is the space in the artistic domain where works which accord with dominant discourses and orders are evaluated and their values are admitted as arts by power. Finally, there is a teacher who faces the collapse of the existing order, of the system-oriented principles. He strives in vain to explain the painting with his knowledge and to control the students with his pedagogical power.

have political influence on social orders can be a key to Foucault's philosophical enterprise.

References

- Billouet, Pierre, *Foucault*, Paris: les Belles Lettre, 1999
- Bourriaud, Nicolas, “Michel Foucault: Manet and the Birth of the Viewer”, *Michel Foucault – Manet and the Object of Painting*, London: Tate Publishing, 2013
- Carlsson, Petra, “Foucault, Magritte and negative theology beyond representation”, *Studia Theologica - Nordic Journal of Theology*, In Press, 2013
- Davidson, Arnold I., “Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics” in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986
- Durham, Scott, “From Magritte to Klossowski: The Simulacrum, between Painting and Narrative”, *October* Vol. 64 (Spring, 1993)
- Eribon, Didier, *Michel Foucault*, Paris : Flammarion, 2011
- Foster, Hal, *The Return of the Real*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996
- Foucault, Michel, “Des espaces autres”, *Dits et écrits II. 1976-1988*, (édition établie sous la direction de Daniel Defert et François Ewald avec la collaboration de Jaques Lagrange), Paris: Gallimard, 2008
- _____, (trans.) Jay Miskowiec, *Diacritics*, “Of other spaces”, Vol.16, No.1 (Spring, 1986)
- _____, *Anthropologie d'un point de vue pragmatique : précédé de Michel Foucault, introduction à l'anthropologie*, Paris : J. Vrin, 2008
- _____, (trans.) Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs, *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, Los Angeles : Semiotext(e), 2008
- _____, *Archéologie du savoir*, Paris : Gallimard, 1969
- _____, (trans.) A. M. Sheridan Smith, *The Archaeology of Knowledge And The Discourse on Language*, New York : Vintage Books, 2010
- _____, *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*, Montpellier: fata morgana, 1986

- _____, (trans.) James Harkness, *This is not a pipe*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008
- _____, *Les mots et les choses: Une Archéologie des Sciences Humaines*, Paris: Gallimard, 1966
- _____, *The Order of Things: An archaeology of the Human Sciences*, New York: Vintage Books, 1994
- Gombrich, Ernst Hans, *The story of art*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1998
- Gros, Frédéric, “De Borges À Magritte”, *Michel Foucault, La Littérature et les arts*, Paris: Kimé, 2004
- Gutting, Gary, *Michel Foucault's archaeology of scientific reason*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989
- Hetherington, Kevin, *The badlands of Modernity*, London: Routledge, 1997
- Levy, Silvano, “Foucault on Magritte on Resemblance”, *The Modern Language Review*, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Jan., 1990)
- Shapiro, Gary, “Pipe dreams: Eternal recurrence and simulacrum in Foucault’s ekphrasis of Magritte”, *Word & Image: A Journal of Verbal/Visual Enquiry*, Vo.13, No.1 (1997)
- Tanke, Joseph J., *Foucault’s philosophy of art – A genealogy of Modernity*, London; New York: Continuum, 2009
- Topinka, Robert J., “Foucault, Borges, Heterotopia: Producing knowledge in Other Spaces”, *Foucault Studies*, no.9, September 2010
- Yun, Min-Hie, “L’esthétique de la simultanéité sur peinture et poésie dans les Calligrammes de Guillaume Apollinaire”, *Etudes de la Culture Francaise et des Arts en France* Vol.38, 2011

Illustrations




Figure 1. *The Crucifixion* by Mathias Grünewald (1515)



Figure 2. *Sir Richard Southwell* by Hans Holbein, the Younger (1536)



Figure 3. *The death of Marat* by Jacques-Louis David (1793)



Figure 4. *Georg Gisze, a German merchant in London*
by Hans Holbein, the Younger (1532)

upwards, as if by an incipient smile, though at the time they are not amused or pleased.

A young orang, made jealous by her keeper attending to another monkey, slightly uncovered her teeth, and, uttering a peevish noise like *tish-shist*, turned her back on him. Both orangs and chimpanzees, when a little more angered, protrude their lips greatly, and make a harsh barking noise. A young female chimpanzee, in a violent passion, presented a curious resemblance to a child in the same state. She screamed loudly with widely open mouth, the lips being retracted so that the teeth were fully exposed. She threw her arms wildly about, sometimes clasping them over her head. She rolled on the ground, sometimes on her back, sometimes on her belly, and bit everything within reach. A young gibbon (*Hyllobates syndactylus*) in a passion has been described¹⁶ as behaving in almost exactly the same manner.

The lips of young orangs and chimpanzees are protruded, sometimes to a wonderful degree, under various circumstances. They act thus, not only when slightly angered, sulky, or disappointed, but when alarmed at anything—in one instance, at the sight of a turtle,¹⁷—and likewise when pleased. But neither the degree of protrusion nor the shape of the mouth is exactly the same, as I believe, in all cases; and the sounds which are then uttered are different. The accompanying drawing represents a chimpanzee made sulky by an orange having been offered him, and then taken away. A similar protrusion or pouting of the lips, though to a much slighter degree, may be seen in sulky children.

¹⁶ G. Bennett, *Wanderings in New South Wales*, &c., vol. ii. 1834, p. 153.

¹⁷ W. C. Martin, *Nat. Hist. of Mamm. Animals*, 1811, p. 495.




Fig. 18. Chimpanzee disappointed and sulky. Drawn from life by Mr. Wood.

Figure 5. *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animal*
by Charles Darwin (1872)




Figure 6. *The old guitarist* by Pablo Picasso (1903-1904)



Figure 7. *The guitar player* by Pablo Picasso (1910)



Figure 11. The *incipit* (the opening line) of the Gospel of Matthew : It was made at Lindisfarne at the coast of Northumberland around 700.



Figure 12. A 9th century copy of Cicero's *Aratea*, a work of astronomy

: The text shows animals that represent constellations and the firm red dots are stars.



Figure 13. Hebrew Torah in the 13th century




Figure 14. *Villa R* by Paul Klee (1919)



Figure 15. *Death and Fire* by Paul Klee (1940)



Figure 16. *Le soir qui tombe* by René Magritte (1964)



Figure 17. *Perspective: Madame Recamier by David* by René Magritte (1949)



Figure 18. *Perspective II. Manet's balcony* by René Magritte (1950)




Figure 19. *La Lecture Defanse (L'usage de la Parole)*

by René Magritte (1936)



Figure 20. *Avec l'arc noir* by Vasili Kandinsky (1912)



Figure 21. *Untitled (First abstract watercolor)* by Vasili Kandinsky (1910)



Figure 22. *Représentation* by René Magritte (1962)




Figure 23. *Les deux mystères* by René Magritte (1966)



Figure 24. *Les Grâces Naturelles* by René Magritte (1948)



Figure 25. *La Saveur des Larmes* by René Magritte (1946)




Figure 26. *La condition humaine* by René Magritte (1935)




Figure 27. *Les liaisons dangereuses* by René Magritte (1926)



Figure 28. *La trahison des images* by René Magritte (1928-1929)

국문초록

본 논문은 푸코의 고고학적 방법론을 통해 『이것은 파이프가 아니다』를 분석하고, 마그리트의 회화에 대한 푸코의 고고학적 분석이 헤테로토피아(heterotopia)라는 새로운 회화 공간을 보여주고 있음을 밝힌다.

푸코는 마그리트의 회화를 분석할 때, 자신이 고안해 낸 고고학적 방법론을 이용한다. 마그리트의 회화에 대한 푸코의 고고학적 분석은 영원불변하고 절대적인 구성적 주체에 대한 맹목적 믿음을 무너뜨리고, 그림에 대한 기존의 인식과 이해의 한계를 드러내며, 마그리트 회화의 내부 요소들 사이의 관계들을 규명함으로써 해당 회화를 중요한 ‘사건’으로서, 다시 말해 회화에 관한 규칙들의 변환을 드러내는 사건으로서 기술한다. 푸코에 따르면 마그리트의 회화는 언어적 재현과 조형적 재현의 전통적 기능과 배열을 활용하는데, 이는 역설적이게도 그 전통적 관계를 방해하기 위해서이다. 푸코가 제시하는 서양 전통 회화의 두 가지 원칙은 첫째, 별개의 독립된 질서인 언어적 재현(말)과 조형적 재현(이미지)이 한 공간에 놓이는 순간 둘 사이에 종속 관계가 발생한다는 것, 둘째, 조형적 유사성(무엇이 무엇과 닮았다는 사실)은 언어적 재현(“이것은 저것의 재현이다”라는 확인)으로 환원될 수 있다는 것이다. 15세기부터 20세기 초까지 서양의 전통적 회화 영역을 지배해온 이 재현 원칙들은 언어적 재현과 조형적 재현 사이의 일관성을 확보하기 위해 작동해왔다. 그러나 마그리트의 회화에서는 이 재현 원칙들이 전통적인 재현 체계 내에서 탈구된다. 우선 그의 회화에서는 말과 이미지라는 두 재현 질서의 공통 장소이자 그것들의 등가성을 보장해주었던 원본이 사라진다. 원본이 사라지자 회화의 제목(말)은 더 이상 이미지의 정체성(identity)를 확인시켜주지 않고, 이미지는 원본을 닮아야 한다는 유사(resemblance)의 의무로부터

자유로워진다. 더 이상 무엇이 무엇을 재현하는지 말할 수도, 원본과 복사본의 관계가 뚜렷하지도 않은 상황에서 이미지들은 자기 지시적인 상사 관계로 접어든다.

이에 본 논문은 마그리트의 회화를 20세기 후반부터 등장하는 새로운 회화의 전형이 아니라 푸코의 고고학적 용어인 ‘문턱(threshold)’으로서 제시한다. 문턱이란 기존의 에피스테메에 완전히 속하지도, 그로부터 완전히 벗어나지도 않은 공간이다. 마그리트의 회화에서 기존의 재현 원리들은 표면적으로는 유지되지만, 실제로는 변형되고 단절된다는 점에서, 그의 작품들은 동일성의 에피스테메와 탈-동일성의 에피스테메 사이에 존재하는 재현 체계의 문턱 위에 있다. 재현 체계의 문턱 위에 존재하는 마그리트의 회화는 단순히 재현 원칙들의 역사적 변이를 보여주는 것이 아니라, 재현 체계를 지배하던 관습적 규범의 절대성에 금이 가는 순간을 포착한다는 의의를 갖는다.

바로 이러한 점에서 마그리트의 회화는 문턱 위에 존재할 뿐만 아니라 헤테로토피아라는 새로운 회화 공간으로 확장될 수 있다. 헤테로토피아란 한 사회 체계 내부에서 주변의 지배적 질서를 반박하는 이질적 공간을 의미한다. 문턱이 단지 에피스테메들 사이의 공간이라는 기술적 용어라면, 헤테로토피아는 문턱에서 일어날 수 있는 저항의 가능성을 실천적 삶의 영역에 적용한 표현으로써 더 풍부한 함의를 갖는다. 본 논문에서는 푸코의 고고학적 방법론에 기대어 헤테로토피아를 우선 ‘에피스테메들 사이의 공간’으로 재정의한다. 하나의 에피스테메에서 다른 에피스테메로의 이행이 일어나는 공간에서는 인식 체계의 단절이 발생하는데, 이때 기존의 사회 체계 내에서 통용되던 지배적 규범들은 흔들리고 상이한 규칙들이 등장하기도 한다. 이 공간에서 우리는 현재의 지식 체계, 특히 재현 회화와 관련된 영역에 작동하고 있는 역사적 선형성에 대해 비판적으로 고찰해볼 수 있는 기회를 갖는다. 위에서 언급했듯이 문턱 위에 선 마그리트의 회화는 우리가 당연시 여겼던 전통적 재현 원리들의

작동을 왜곡함으로써 그 원리들을 오히려 가시적으로 드러낸다. 나아가 헤테로토피아는 사회 체계의 한 편에 속해있으면서도 내에서 우리를 통제하는 사회적 질서를 부정하는 저항의 공간으로 확장될 가능성을 갖는다. 이는 헤테로토피아가 양립 불가능한 다양한 장소들을 한데 포개는 특성을 갖기 때문에 가능하다. 양립 불가능한 다양성이란 공통적 기반을 갖지 않는 다수의 차이를 의미한다. 즉 헤테로토피아는 한 사회에서 공유되는 인식의 기반을 붕괴시키고 서로 다른 것들이 한 공간에서 혼재하도록 한다. 이는 하나의 질서가 지배적일 수 없는 상황, 사회의 규범들이 제대로 작동할 수 없는 상황을 나타낸다. 마그리트의 회화 역시 15 세기 이래 동일성을 중심으로 회화 영역을 통제해온 재현 체계에 맞서는 저항적 공간으로 재평가 될 수 있다. 특히 본 논문은 마그리트의 회화 중 <이미지의 배반>이 어떻게 헤테로토피아적 공간으로 재조명될 수 있는지 밝힌다. 이상의 논의를 통해 본 논문은 마그리트의 회화에 대한 푸코의 고고학적 분석으로부터 문턱 개념을 명료히 이끌어내고, 마그리트의 회화를 헤테로토피아적 공간으로 확장하여 전통적 재현 체계 속에서 ‘다름’을 구현하는 새로운 회화 공간을 제시하는 바이다.

주요어 : 헤테로토피아, 문턱, 고고학적 분석, 재현, 공통 장소, 상사

학 번 : 2012-22903