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Abstract

The Concept of Affectivity in Sartre's Theory of the Image

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This thesis is focused on Sartre's concept of affectivity in his theory of the image. The image has traditionally been regarded as a representation or a picture in the mind. However, for Sartre, it is the subject's consciousness. And, the image is closely related to affectivity. His own definition of the image renders our understanding of the affectivity different from the commonsensical one. We might think that affectivity is merely subordinate or incidental to the image. However, according to Sartre, affectivity is spontaneously formed and influences on the structure of image consciousness. It is an element of image consciousness. Thus, affectivity is an essential concept in understanding Sartre's notion of the image. However, it is not easy to clearly understand Sartre's conception of affectivity. This is because his description of it is confusing and unsystematic. Another problem is the lack of preceding research. Therefore, in this thesis, I reconstruct Sartre's concept of affectivity in a clearer way.

Sartre mentions two kinds of affectivity - affective analogon and imaginary feeling - in his theory of the image. These are both closely involved in image consciousness. But they have distinctive characteristics. First, the former is used to form the image and the latter is our affective consciousness of what we imagined.

Second, the former is passive, while the latter is spontaneous. This seems contradictory. In fact, there is a lot of confusion in Sartre scholarship about whether affectivity in image consciousness is spontaneous or passive. Sartre does not clearly articulate them and barely establishes the relation between affective analogon and imaginary feeling.

Thus, in particular, the aim of my thesis is to find passages that can be used to infer this relation and to confirm what its relation should be. And I argue that affective analogon is a reflection of imaginary feeling. This means that the origin of affective analogon is imaginary feeling of subject consciousness. In the relation, the latter always takes the lead. By means of this demonstration of their relation, the spontaneity of imaginary feeling becomes clear. In this way, we can understand why affective analogon is described as passive. Ultimately, we can grasp the spontaneous characteristics of affectivity itself by focusing on the spontaneity of the imaginary feeling. Then, the apparently contradictory characteristic of affectivity is cleared up and, as a result, we could have a proper understanding of affectivity. In addition, when we imagine, the affectivity develops from an undifferentiated state to a constituted state and, in the end, becomes a general feeling. In this process, imaginary feeling can develop into bodily change.

In addition to this conceptual reconstruction, I do the analysis of appreciation of Mark Rothko's non-representational painting, *No. 10*, in order to specifically understand spontaneous characteristics of affectivity in image consciousness. Non-representational painting does not have cognizable content. This uniqueness demonstrates its affective aspect clearer. Above all, the appreciators are in an undifferentiated affective state, which is inexplicable. And their affective state is reflected as affective analogon into the irreal object of the painting. They do not

merely react to this irreal object of *No. 10*, which is imaged, but rather they decide which feeling they would properly experience in their situation. Then, the undifferentiated affective state becomes constituted. And it constantly projects its reflection into the irreal object. In the end, they encounter their own feeling through *No. 10*. And the appreciators' imaginary feeling has generality. In certain cases, imaginary feeling functions beyond its power with a possibility of accompanying bodily change. For example, we could often see people who cry in front of the work of art.

To sum up, according to my thesis, the conceptual reconstruction and its specific analysis help us better understand the concept of affectivity in Sartre's theory of the image and also strengthen its spontaneous characteristics. My thesis has other implications as well. Firstly, this examination gives us the basis of our understanding of the notion of affectivity not only in his theory of the image but also in his larger body of work. Secondly, we could find that this spontaneous affectivity of image consciousness is closely related with the freedom of consciousness. As his theory of the image is fundamentally involved with freedom, so that this thesis provides the possibility of the connection between the affectivity and the freedom by examining the image and its affectivity. Thirdly, such spontaneity or freedom as found in affectivity of image consciousness has some implication such as alleviation of affectivity, freedom, and possibility of choice in our psychic and daily life. Lastly, Sartre's understanding of affectivity could provide a very interesting way of understanding the appreciation of the work of art.

**keywords : Image consciousness, Irreal object, Spontaneity, Affective
analogon, Imaginary feeling, Appreciation of non-
representational painting**

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Abbreviations

For full bibliographical details, see the Bibliography

I	<i>The Imagination</i>
IM	<i>The Imaginary: A phenomenological psychology of the imagination</i>
BN	<i>Being and Nothingness</i>
SE	<i>Sketch for a theory of the Emotion</i>

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Introduction

When it comes to the discussion on Sartre's philosophy, the concept of affectivity is crucial to his overall philosophical system. He constantly discusses this concept throughout his main texts. Among them, his first and most important conception of affectivity is found in *L'imaginaire*, where you are provided with the basic understanding of the concept of affectivity in his other texts. In *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions*, for example, he explains 'affectivity' in a broader sense and describes it to the effect that the affective consciousness is already imaginary. And in *L'être et le néant* he holds that the freedom and spontaneity are possible only when our consciousness becomes imaginary, or affective. Lastly, in *La nausée*, he describes the affective alleviation that occurs when the protagonist listens to the music.

Normally, we wouldn't think that there is a right place for the concept of affectivity in the theory of the image. For it seems no doubt that the image is a mental product of the imagination, whether it is a representation of the sensory given from perception or a picture visualized in mind, while affectivity is a certain state of the subject, which is aroused from a certain situation. When it comes to the image, then, we might conclude that affectivity is merely subordinate or incidental to the image. For Sartre, however, the image is closely related to affectivity, or even consists of it. This is because his definition of the image is different from conventional conception. In particular, his approach to the image is phenomenological. In other words, the image is a 'phenomenon' occurring in our consciousness. And, then, its essential aspect is its appearance, whether it exists or

not in the outside world. Phenomenology could be a proper method to deal with the image in this sense.¹ Employing this method, Sartre considers the image to be a unique consciousness. The image, which has traditionally been regarded as a representation or a picture in the mind, becomes a part of the subject's consciousness so that this consciousness can spontaneously transform and synthesize it. The representation or the picture in the mind becomes the object as imaged in the structure of image consciousness. It is at this point that affectivity enters into the construction of image consciousness. Our affectivity in image consciousness provides its reflection to the object as imaged. Therefore, it becomes a part of object as imaged. That is to say, this consists of the reflective affectivity. At the same time however, affectivity becomes constituted when we imagine. This means that our affectivity becomes a certain feeling such as joy, peace, or love, etc. We will see that affectivity begins as an undifferentiated mass and becomes a certain feeling. We can see that the concept of affectivity is an essential component in understanding image consciousness.

It should, then, be noted that clarifying the characteristics of affectivity as it appears in *L'imaginaire* becomes an integral part for the proper understanding of image consciousness in Sartre. But it seems that, just as Sartre's conception of the image is quite different from its 'commonsensical' understanding, the affectivity of image consciousness has its unique characteristics as well. So, it will be helpful to briefly contrast the 'commonsensical' view with Sartre's own. From the former view, it is normally thought that affectivity is merely passive. It seems natural that

¹ 김희봉 (kim, Hee bong), 이미지에 관한 현상학적 연구 -후설, 사르트르와 메를로 폰티를 중심으로 ("A Phenomenological Study of Images - According to Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty"), 철학과 현상학 연구 (Research in Philosophy and Phenomenology), vol. 64, 2015, 3.

there are sometimes affections produced by object whether they are real or imagined. By contrast, Sartre holds that the affectivity with regard to image consciousness is not just passive but spontaneous and even serves as a component of the imagined object. When we imagine something, our affectivity undergoes a transition from being undifferentiated to being a certain feeling. This affective consciousness chooses itself in a way that properly fits our situations. In this sense, our affectivity is projected as its own reflection toward something as imaged. Thus, for Sartre, affectivity is not a response or reaction.

However, it is not easy to grasp the exact character of the concept of affectivity on its own terms in *L'imaginaire*. Firstly, the length assigned to explain it in the book is not enough. Sartre deals with it in two parts, devoting only 35 pages in the book. Secondly, the way he explains it is merely by giving a series of illustrations without clearly making conceptual distinctions. Thirdly, he sometimes uses different terms to explain the same meaning. Lastly, Sartre identifies two kinds of affectivity. Each of them corresponds to one of the two layers of image consciousness, namely, the constituent and the secondary layers. However, he does not sufficiently describe the relation between them. He merely gives a hint so that it can be inferred from two short passages in Part IV. Without identifying this relation, it is hard to properly understand the concept of affectivity which is spontaneous as it is related to image consciousness. My interest is in this spontaneous or active character of affectivity. In virtue of this spontaneity, we can experience a certain feeling that we want to experience regardless of our real situations. Moreover, even though it is felt only in the imaginary, our spontaneous feeling is able to influence our real life.

In so far as previous study, there are few studies that systematically deals with the concept of affectivity in Sartre's theory of the image. Most of them incidentally mention this concept and say no more.² Andreas Elpidorou, on the other hand, does discuss affectivity in Sartre.³ He bases his discussion of the appreciation of non-representational painting on understanding the concept of affectivity in image consciousness. I will deal with the discussion in the last chapter. Nonetheless, we will see that his conceptual framework is problematic.

The problem with regard to the text and the lack of preceding research demand reconstruction of the concept of affectivity in *L'imaginaire*. Therefore, I will focus on finding the relationship between the two qualities of affectivity that I mentioned and at the same time trying to clarify its spontaneous character. Moreover, in order to clearly understand how affectivity works in Sartre, I will show this character of spontaneity through the analysis of appreciation of non-representational painting. Even in an appreciation of representational painting, affectivity is spontaneous. However, as there is no concrete object to cognize in non-representational painting, not only is the spontaneity of affectivity more clearly demonstrated but one could even say that it is more spontaneous. Ultimately, this thesis will show the necessity of affectivity in understanding Sartre's theory of the image and its spontaneous character. In addition, this thesis will provide a new perspective of understanding

² Joseph P. Fell III tries to clarify the concept of affectivity in a comprehensive way. Yet he is mostly interested in image consciousness rather than concentrating on affectivity in image consciousness. Therefore, it is difficult to structurally understand the affectivity itself in image consciousness. (See more detail, Fell, Joseph P., *Emotion in Thought of Sartre*, London: Columbia University Press, 1965.) Brann, Eva T. H explains Sartre's theory of the image. But she does not describe a place where affectivity is situated in structure of image consciousness and its aspect. (See more detail, Eva T.H. Brann., *The world of the imagination*, avage, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield, 1991.)

³ Andreas Elpidorou, "Imagination in non-representational painting," in *Reading Sartre on phenomenology and existentialism*, Jonathan Webber(edit.), Routledge, 2011

affective experience in appreciation of non-representational painting.

Bearing in mind the project and its significance, this thesis will be constituted as follows.

In the first chapter, I attempt to understand Sartre's theory of the image. Above all, I will examine Sartre's critique of the preceding philosophical theories and introduce Sartre's acceptance of Husserl's structure of consciousness. In addition, I will examine the structure of image consciousness, which consists of the intentional object, intentional act, and the contents of consciousness as we will see later.

In the second chapter, I attempt to reconstruct the concept of affectivity in Sartre's theory of the image. I will identify the distinction between affectivities in two layers of image consciousness. These two layers are 'affective analogon' and 'imaginary feeling.' I will suggest that the affective analogon is a reflection of imaginary feeling. And I will find the development of affectivity in image consciousness, through which we will see its spontaneous characteristic in the clearest way.

In the third chapter, I will apply the image consciousness in the appreciation of non-representational painting, and analyze how affectivity works in the structure of image consciousness through an analysis of Mark Rothko's work. Through this analysis, we will know that our affectivity spontaneously becomes a certain feeling. Furthermore, this affectivity projects its reflection towards the painting so that we can encounter the reflection of our feeling by appreciating the painting.

I. SARTRE'S THEORY OF THE IMAGE

1. The Background

1.1 Critique of the Preceding Philosophical Theories of the Image

Jean-Paul Sartre publishes two books titled *L'imagination* and *L'imaginaire*, where he tries to answer the question 'What is the image?' In *L'imagination*, Sartre critically examines the preceding philosophical theories of the image, and points out that they have a common problem regarding the existential distinction between image and perception. In *L'imaginaire*, he attempts to resolve this problem by employing Husserl's phenomenology. In this section, I begin with Sartre's critique of the preceding philosophical theories of the image and illuminate the reason why they are problematic in Sartre's theory. And thereby I show the background of Sartre's acceptance of Husserl's phenomenology in his discussion of the image.

Sartre criticizes the preceding philosophical theories of the image regarding the fact that they do not distinguish between image and perception in terms of their existence. The existential character of the perception comes to be conveyed to that of the image. This conveyance happens because of the confusion between their essences and their existences. For example, the sheet of paper that I perceive and the sheet of paper that I imagine are identical in terms of their essences. In other words, the perception and the image have the same qualities such as colours, position, and shape, etc. On the other hand, they do not share the identity of existence. The sheet of paper as imaged exists differently. "It [the image] is indeed

the same sheet, the one that is presently on my desk, but it exists differently. I do not *see* it, it does not *impose* itself as a limit to my spontaneity; nor is it an inert datum existing *in itself*. In a word, it does not exist *in fact*; it exists *as imaged*” (I 4, italics given) Therefore, the existence of the perception and the existence of the image are totally different. Sartre argues that here occurs a great error in which one slides from the affirmation of the identity of essence to that of the identity of existence. The object as an existence, in fact as a material existence, is over against me. The object that exists as material existent imposes itself as a limit of my spontaneity. It’s inert as we will see again. But to make the existence of the image into the same kind of a thing is to make this image up with the material object. Sartre thinks that the metaphysics that confuses the existence of something as imaged with its existence is, in fact, naïve. The naïve metaphysician mistakenly regards the abstract as the sensible and cannot distinguish the image from objects existing outside of consciousness. As a result, this perspective makes “the image a copy of the thing, which then itself exists as a thing.”⁴ (I 6)

Sartre has in mind modern philosophers such as Descartes and Hume. In Descartes, an image is depicted materially on the body (some part of brain) via the intermediaries of the senses and the nerves. In other words, the image is the material impression produced in the brain from the exterior. “The imagination, or knowledge of the image, comes from the understanding; it is the understanding, applied to the material impression produced in the brain that provides us with a consciousness of the image.” (I 9-10) The image is created from a material impression instead of a thing. And it is hard to distinguish between image and perception, because they are taken to have the same essence that requires an act of

⁴ Gary Cox, *The Sartre Dictionary*, Continuum, 2008, 30.

the understanding to distinguish them. Similarly, for Hume, every kind of thought is reduced to a system of the image. There are only impressions that come from perception and the ideas that are copies of the impressions. The ideas and the impressions, therefore, are regarded as images. Then, ideas and impressions do not differ in their nature, so that perception is not in itself distinguished from the image. (I 14-15) Sartre diagnoses that every image comes from our perception in Hume's idea and they must have the same essence.

As we've seen in the examples, the image and perception are not distinguished in their characteristics of sensible contents, because images come to be seen as existing in the same way as perception. And then, for Sartre, on the contrary, the object of perception exists *in itself* (*l'existence en soi*), which means it exists out of control of my consciousness and of course, of another consciousness.⁵ (I 3, italics given) When looking at objects as real, I perceive their qualities which are given to me as existences that are independent of my consciousness. "They are *for* me; they are not *me*. But nor are they *others*, that is to say, they do not depend on any spontaneity, neither mine nor that of another consciousness." (I 3, italics given) Therefore, when perceiving an object, the content that appears to me cannot be transformed by my consciousness. As Sartre intimated in the quote, he calls this characteristic of an object of perception, 'inertia.'

In this sense, if the existential characteristics of perception were conveyed to the image, the image would inertly exist, appear and disappear as it pleases. In fact,

⁵ Being-in-itself is what Sartre calls existence in itself in *L'imagination*. Sartre explains that the existence in itself indicates a thing in the reality that has the characteristic of inertia. "All that can really be said about being-in-itself is that it *is*. It is its own foundation. That is, it is founded upon itself and not upon anything else. It is that which exists fundamentally, in itself, in its own right, rather than being that which does not exist in itself and is dependent upon something else for its existence. It is self-sufficient, uncreated and unchanging." (Gary Cox, 2008, 30, italics given)

people normally say that they ‘see’ or ‘hear’ the image. (I 6) If so, consciousness would not be spontaneous when we would not be producing new one as imaged. This view is problematic for Sartre since according to this view, we might eventually fail to understand the nature of the image. Then, what is the nature of the image? The image could be freely synthesized and transformed according to our consciousness. In this sense, the image is considered as the origin of our freedom. Image consciousness is, for him, the condition for the human being to become free. This is the reason why his theory of the image is evaluated as the departure of his philosophy. In order to recover spontaneity of consciousness in terms of the image in earnest, he first of all, attempts to resolve the problem of naïve metaphysics by introducing Husserl’s phenomenology before preparing the foundation of a new theory of the image.

1.2 Sartre’s Acceptance of Husserl’s Structure of Consciousness

As we have seen, the error of naïve metaphysics is in its claims that we come “to constitute the world from contents of consciousness.” (I 130) What Sartre calls naïve metaphysics is what Husserl calls immanentism. Husserl attempts to overcome this problem through the phenomenological method. For this reason, Sartre focuses on Husserl’s position.

Firstly, Sartre adopts Husserl’s concept of intentional consciousness.⁶ When I

⁶ Husserl’s concept of the intentionality comes from Brentano. Husserl thinks that Brentano understands the intentionality but still suffers from immanentism. (Herbert Spiegelberg, *Phenomenological Movement*, volum one, Martius Nijhoff/The Hague, second

am conscious of something, the object isn't in my mind from some capacity but rather my consciousness aims at it. This is 'the intentional relationship' or 'intentionality.'⁷ For example, if I see, I see something; if I love, I love something or someone; if I hear, I hear a certain sound; if I imagine, I imagine something.⁸ From this perspective, the object is no longer inherent in our consciousness, but remains outside of it. In other words, the object transcends the consciousness,⁹ as Sartre puts it in a short essay on Husserl's notion of intentionality:

Against the digestive philosophy of empirico-criticism, of neo-Kantism, against all 'psychologism,' Husserl persistently affirmed that one cannot dissolve things in consciousness. You see this tree, to be sure. But you see it just where it is: at the side of the road, in the midst of the dust, alone and writhing in the heat, eight miles from the Mediterranean coast. It could not enter into your consciousness, for it is not of the same nature as consciousness.¹⁰

In this sense, when we see the tree, the contents of consciousness do not consist of the tree itself. It remains outside of consciousness as a transcendent object. It is impossible that the object of consciousness exists in the same field with the sensible contents in consciousness. What is unique here is that Husserl separates the content of consciousness from the object and also declares that the

edition, 1969, 39-41.)

⁷ Consciousness here means the whole experience (*Erlebnis*) and experiential ego. Overall, it refers to the whole psychical events such as an act of sensation and that of perception, judgment, imagination, etc. And the reflective consciousness is also a type of consciousness. (이남인 (Lee Nam-in), 『현상학과 해석학』 (*Phenomenology and Hermeneutics*), 서울대학교출판문화원, 2013, 118-119.)

⁸ Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, Cambridge University press, 2000, 8.

⁹ Dina Levy, "Memory in the early philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre", Ph. D.diss., the Temple University, 2011, 18-19.

¹⁰ Jean Paul-Sartre, "Intentionality: A fundamental idea of Husserl's phenomenology (1939)" in *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Joseph P. Fell (trans.), Routledge, 2014, 4.

consciousness does not have a representation of object. One is directly conscious of the object itself.

Sartre claims that concept of intentionality “is destined to renew the notion of the image.” (I 129) As with Husserl’s distinction of the content of consciousness and transcendent object, the content of the image is separated from the transcendent object.

As Sartre put it:

[...] In the consciousness of a thing *as imaged (en image)*, Husserl will distinguish, as in a perception, an imaging intention and a ‘h̄ylē’ [that is, a matter or a content] that the intention comes to ‘animate’. The h̄ylē, naturally, remains subjective but, by the same token, the object of the image, detached from the pure ‘content’, is camped outside of consciousness as something radically different. (I 131, italics given)

As we can see, the mechanism of consciousness is identical to that of image consciousness. The content of the image, called a h̄ylē, or a matter, is separated from the object. This even applies to something that seems like it wouldn’t be imminent in consciousness. Sartre takes Husserl’s example of a centaur:

[Couldn’t one object to us that ...] a centaur who plays the flute, a fiction that we freely form, is, precisely because of that, a free assemblage of representations in us? – We will respond: Sure ... the free fiction is effected spontaneously and what we generate spontaneously is, of course, a product of the mind. But, as for what concerns the centaur who plays the flute, it is a representation to the extent to which one calls a representation that which is represented and not in the sense in which representation would be a name for psychic state. The centaur itself is, naturally, nothing psychic, it exists neither in the soul, nor in consciousness, nor anywhere; it does not exist at all, it is entirely an invention. To be more exact: the state of consciousness of invention

is invention *of* this centaur. To this extent surely we can say that ‘Centaur-aimed-at’, ‘centaur-invented’ belongs to the ‘Erlebnis’ itself. But let us not confuse this ‘Erlebnis’ of invention with that which, through it, has been invented as such.¹¹ (I 131-2, italics given)

Therefore, we should not confuse a centaur-itself with a centaur as illusory that appears in consciousness. (I 132) The centaur as the object of consciousness, that is, the centaur itself, cannot be in consciousness, whereas the centaur as the content of consciousness can. The centaur itself is, therefore, not immanent in consciousness but beyond, or transcendent of, consciousness.¹² In this sense, the consciousness aims at the transcendent object.

On the other hand, there is another kind of object of the image, one that exists in the real world. For example, we imagine Pierre. Because Pierre that exists in our world could have been perceived by us. Nonetheless, Husserl, according to Sartre, does not make a proper distinction between content of the image and that of perception. In other words, both are indistinguishable in that they belong together in the transcendent objects. If so, the distinction should be made not at the level of the object but that of the content. In addition to his commitment to Husserl’s phenomenology, Sartre tries to distinguish the image from the perception at the level of their contents. We will see take a more detailed look on how Sartre works out the structure of image consciousness, which he borrows from Husserl yet with more precision than is precedent.

¹¹ Ideen, pp. 42-43. [Ideas, p. 43.]

¹² A range of objects that consciousness aims at is broadly established. For Husserl, the concept of object includes not only individual existence but also ‘general objects’ such as ‘species’ or ‘essence,’ and also a ‘thing’ expressed in a statement. In addition, he admits that representations such as ‘gold mountain’ or ‘round quadrangle’ exist, even though object of representation does not exist. (기타 켄 외 지음 (Gi-ta Ken, etc.), 『현상학 사전』 (Phenomenological Dictionary) 이신철 옮김, 도서출판b, 2011, 73-4)

2. The Structure of Image Consciousness

2.1 The Intentional Object of Image Consciousness and the Intentional Act of Image Consciousness

Sartre develops his own theory of the image based on Husserl's idea, which makes his theory phenomenological. We can easily surmise it from the subtitle of *L'imaginaire, Psychologie Phénoménologique de L'imagination* (*A phenomenological psychology of the imagination*). Sartre makes a clear account for this matter:

I want only to attempt a 'phenomenology' of the image. The method is simple: produce images in ourselves, reflect on these images, describe them, which is to say, try to determine and classify their distinctive characteristics. (IM 5)

When we produce someone as imaged, that person is the transcendent object of my present consciousness. If our image consciousness continues, we could concentrate on the phenomenon that is revealed and describe the phenomenon as it is. And in order to access the phenomenon of consciousness, according to Sartre, a reflective act of consciousness is required. (IM 5) In other words, someone as imaged is to be conscious of as a part of consciousness once more.

Accepting of this phenomenological method, Sartre starts his theory by defining that "the image is nothing other than a relation" (IM 7) between our consciousness and the transcendent object. Thus, an image is not just an inert content in our consciousness any more, as in the traditional metaphysics of image. Rather it is itself a consciousness that has its own structure. Based on this new notion of the image, the structure of image consciousness consists of three components: an

intentional object, an intentional act, and content of image consciousness. Although these three components are theoretically distinctive, they are closely interrelated and work together. In this section, I will discuss the first two, and then I will discuss the last element in the next section.

First, let us examine the intentional object of image consciousness, which is transcendent. Sartre gives us an example. There are three ways to make Pierre's face appear in our consciousness when he is not in front of me: mental representation (memory), photography, and caricature. I can make an effort to produce his face as imaged by remembering him. But if his face as imaged is not produced completely, I can look at a photograph of Pierre's face. There are many detailed elements in the photograph that I could not get from my recollection. But if it is not sufficient to produce vivid expressions of his face such as subtle facial expressions or the atmosphere from the photograph, then I could see a caricature of his face highlighting these traits. By seeing his caricature, I can find what was lacking in the photograph. Finally, "I regain Pierre." (IM 17) In all these three cases, there is an intention towards the same transcendent object, the face of Pierre. This face is out of our consciousness and aimed at by our image consciousness.

Here, in order to aim at this transcendent face, it requires the situation that he not be with us. Or, even though he is really with us, he should be regarded as if not being with us.

Every consciousness posits its object, but each in its own way. Perception, for example, posits its object as existing. The image also includes an act of belief or a positional act. The act can take four and only four forms: it can posit the object as nonexistent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere; it can also 'neutralize' itself, which is to say not posit its object as existent. (IM 12)

The positional act is nothing other than the act of belief. We believe that Pierre does not exist with us when we imagine him. “The image consciousness posits its object as a nothingness.” (IM 11) As mentioned in the quote, there are four cases of positing the transcendent object¹³ as absence or non-existence. For Sartre, they are the subdivided versions of two kinds of object of the image in Husserl. (see 1.2) (1) The object posited as nonexistence implies that the object is not a real thing in the world, such as a centaur or a unicorn. (2) The object posited as absent is one that had been existent but is not existent any more. (3) The object posited as existing elsewhere refers to the object in another place except here. (4) The object posited as neutralized indicates that it is not an individual object but rather, something like spots.

Let us now turn to the intentional act of image consciousness. Sartre’s conception of intentionality in his theory of the image implies ‘a nihilating act,’ or ‘negative act.’ This is the point where Sartre differs from Husserl. For Husserl, the act of image consciousness implies the directedness towards a transcendent object. But Sartre adds to this the notion of negation, by which he means that when we imagine something, our consciousness that negates or nihilates the thing existing in real world. For example, if I imagine Pierre, my consciousness focuses on constructing the image of Pierre. In this sense, my attention negates the real world. So, I cannot take the attention to the real world around me. Even if I am with those in the real world such as a room where I am in, a wall in front of me, other people who are here together with me now, I can concentrate only on creating Pierre as imaged. The world becomes the “nihilated ground of the imaginary” (IM 188)

¹³ 이솔 (lee-sol), 사르트르의 이미지론에서 아날로공 개념의 의미 (“The meaning of the concept of analogon in Sartre’s theory of the image”), 철학 논집 (Sogang Journal of Philosophy), vol. 35, 2013, 199.

An example in *L'être et le néant* shows us the process of a nihilating act of consciousness. Suppose I have an appointment with my friend Pierre at a café. When I arrive at the café, I start to look for him. Then, all objects in the café are organized synthetically while I am searching for Pierre who is about to appear in my sight. All objects exist as they fall back into the background by the organizing consciousness. The objects which once appeared in my view disappear because of the transition of my attention. (BN 41) This is what takes place when the nihilation occurs.¹⁴ The directedness of my consciousness or intentionality makes 'nothingness' in 'a fullness of being' in the café such as patrons, tables, booths, mirrors, light, sound of voice etc. (BN 41) This nihilating process occurs in the situation of perception, but it occurs too in image consciousness. When we perceive an object, our consciousness focuses on a certain real object and nihilates all the others. On the other hand, when we imagine something, our consciousness both nihilates everything in the real world and creates the object as imaged. This object as imaged is the content of image consciousness, which is another element of the structure of image consciousness.

2.2. The Contents of Image Consciousness: Cognitive elements and Analogon

The intentional object is posited as a nothingness, and the intentional act implies the nihilating act of consciousness. When we imagine, our consciousness not only nihilates the real world but also, at the same time, forms a certain object which is

¹⁴ Herbert Spiegelberg, 1969, 505.

present as unreal in consciousness. Sartre calls this the 'unreal object,' or the 'object as imaged.' It is formed by the synthesis of certain elements from contents of consciousness which are another component of the structure of consciousness. According to classical metaphysics of the image, these contents of consciousness are composed of the image itself and assume the characteristics of a thing. On the other hand, for Sartre, they are not inert contents but an unreal object constituted by a spontaneous act of image consciousness. In this sense, these contents can be synthesized in various compositions of their elements. In this section, we will examine each of these elements and their characteristics. We will see that the object as imaged is not a copy of things but rather what involves a variety of elements including cognitive and even affective elements.

Above all, there is a *cognitive element*. "An image could not exist without a piece of knowledge that constitutes it." (IM 58) In other words, the object as imaged consists of knowledge that aims at the transcendent object. Cognitive elements aim at the transcendent object. If I imagine someone, my knowledge is about that person. However, this knowledge here transforms in image consciousness. It becomes degraded when it passes "from the state of '[pure] meaning'¹⁵ to the imaging state." (IM 63) Sartre distinguishes the signification which he here calls pure meaning from meaning (*sens*). The signification occurs in the act of a sign and it refers to what is 'signified.' In this sense, there is only information for communicating. Meaning (*sens*), on the other hand, is not an act of indicating or of referring to something. In Sartre's usage, meaning (*sens*) is not

¹⁵ There is a difference in Sartre between *sens* (meaning) and pure meaning. (Sartre uses the term '*Meaning pur*' with "meaning" in English in order to differentiate it from *sens* (meaning). So He puts 'pure' before 'meaning' in order to mark this.) Pure meaning indicates 'signification'. This needs to be kept in mind because the degradation of knowledge occurs from signification/pure meaning to meaning in Sartre's terminology.

definite. Let us think of the difference between poetry and prose as Sartre explains in *Qu'est-ce que la littérature?* The prose writer uses signs to communicate information with others. His/her aim is to convey information. However, poetry is different. It “differs from that of [the prose] writer precisely as the image and its *sens* [meaning] function differently from the sign and its signification.”¹⁶ Contrary to using signs, the image constructs its meaning with presence.

For Sartre, presence has a specific meaning. As Flynn puts in, “Sens [meaning] is self-referring or ‘presentifying’ while signification refers to another, the signified.”¹⁷ Sartre distinguishes between Guardi’s painting and Canaletto’s, both of which are of Venice. “Venis is *present* in each of [Guardi’s] canvases, as we have all *experienced* but as no one has seen.”¹⁸ On the contrary, Canaletto’s is a simple representation of the city. Guardi’s painting gives us presence of Venice, which cannot be described and explained. Meanwhile Canaletto’s painting gives us representation of Venice by referring to the city as it is. The distinction Sartre tries to draw is between presentation and representation. Guardi gives us Venice as present, not as described or explained. On the contrary, Canaletto gives us representation of Venice by referring to the city as it is. Let us think of this another way. If we imagine Venice by recollection, firstly, we will gather our knowledge of Venice. However, the city as imaged does not act as a sign. The city of Venice is present in consciousness. It does not refer to the city which is outside of consciousness. Perhaps we could say, the knowledge of image is degraded because it no longer has the clarity of a sign. The cognitive elements of content of image

¹⁶ Thomas R. Flynn, “The Role of the Image in Sartre’s Aesthetic,” in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1975, 436.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 436.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 435.

consciousness are not a signification.

There is another component of the content of image consciousness. It is what Sartre calls the *Analogon*. It originates from ‘Analogie’ in Greek, which means ‘elements of analogy.’¹⁹ In addition to cognitive elements image consciousness makes use of analogon in order to bring the non-existent or absent object present. Therefore, the transcendent object becomes present in consciousness through its analogon. In other words, what is present is not the object but rather its analogon.²⁰ The analogon provides ‘intuitive’ (IM 27) contents that allow us to create the object as imaged. Analogon has similarities with the transcendent object, whether physically or psychically or both.²¹

The analogon consists of both *kinaesthetic* and *affective* elements. The kinaesthetic analogon, which Sartre usually calls material analogon,²² derives from the real object but it must be kept separate from it. Sartre says, “a kinaesthetic series can function as an analogical substitute for a visual form.” (IM 180) and this series “externalizes it [the object] and confers a kind of visual reality upon it.” (IM 82) Thus, we can visualize our object as imaged by using a kind of visual impression, or sensible residue. This visualization does not occur in perception. It is different from the sensory given in perception, but it does come from this sensory given. It provides a kind of representation for the image to be present as a certain figure in consciousness.

¹⁹ François Noudelmann et Gilles Philippe (direction), *Dictionnaire Sartre*, HONORÉ, 2004, Paris, 30.

²⁰ 이솔 (lee-sol), 2013, 204.

²¹ François Noudelmann, 2004, 30.

²² ‘Kineasthetic analogon’ is Thomas R. Flynn’s term. It indicates ‘material analogon’ in Sartre’s term. In this thesis, I use ‘kinaesthetic’ instead of ‘material’ because ‘material analogon’ could be misleading; it might sound as if it has a material aspect or that it is a real element in perception. The analogon works only in image consciousness.

In addition, there is an affective analogon, which is synthesized together with the cognitive elements. When we imagine, our consciousness is always partly affective. Moreover, this affectivity is a factor of constructing the image. For example, when we imagine someone, we have a certain feeling of that person. (IM 71) Here, that feeling helps us to construct the person as imaged. This is the affective analogon. It is regarded as a primary element of the irreal object and provides meaning to the object as imaged. This affective meaning makes the object as imaged not by signifying but by 'presentifying' the intentional object.

Sartre provides as an example the actor Franconay imitating Maurice Chevalier. This example shows the role of affective analogon and of course, the aspect of cognitive elements and analogon in general. The viewer recalls Maurice Chevalier through Franconay who imitates her. Therefore, the viewer faces not Franconay but Maurice Chevalier as imaged. Here, the body of actor is used in constructing a kind of kinesthetic analogon here. (IM 26) Just as physical material of a portrait instigates us to construct the image of the portrait, Maurice Chevalier as imaged is constructed through the body of the actor in the consciousness of imitation. But the resemblance between the body and the object is weak in the case of imitation because the body itself cannot be transformed. (IM 27) Therefore, Maurice Chevalier as imaged can be presented at first by signs which the imitator gives via her body. Reading signs that give information of the imitated object, our consciousness becomes imaginary. Therefore, as we have seen, this information becomes degraded. But in order to produce Maurice Chevalier as imaged, it is necessary to fill up the gap of an imitator and imitated object. What fills up the gap is the affectivity that the imitator gives. (IM 29)

Therefore, we need a better understanding of affectivity, the topic of the next

chapter. So far, we can identify the basic components of the content of image consciousness as the following graph:

<Components of content of image consciousness> ²³

Content [Irrreal object]	Cognitive element (<i>savoir</i> , concept) [from signification to meaning]		
	Analogon (matter)	kinaesthetic	With sensible residue (external image)
		affective	Without sensible residue (mental image)

²³ Thomas R. Flynn, 1975, 434.

II. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CONCEPT OF AFFECTIVITY IN SARTRE'S THEORY OF THE IMAGE

3. Affectivity in Image consciousness

In the previous section, we briefly examined the affective analogon and its relationship with the other elements of image consciousness. Based on this examination, let us reconstruct the concept of affectivity in Sartre's theory of the image. Sartre considers affectivity to be a consciousness in general such as delight, sadness and melancholy. Husserl's structure of consciousness is again applied to affectivity. Affectivity is also an affectivity *of* something or someone. This 'affectivity of something' is a synonym for 'a feeling,' or 'a constituted affectivity.' (IM 69)²⁴ That is to say, feeling has a certain intentionality. For example, hatred and love are the hatred and love *of* something. (IM 69) Sartre describes the relation between affectivity and the object as follows:

To hate Paul is to intend Paul as a transcendent object of a consciousness. [...]
Feeling aims at an object but it aims in its own manner, which is affective. [...]
To become conscious of Paul as hateful, irritable, sympathetic, disturbing, attractive, repulsive, etc., is to confer on him a new quality, to constitute him

²⁴ Sartre explains affectivity in *L'être et le néant* from a distinction between 'original affectivity' and 'constituted affectivity'. Based on this distinction, the affectivity of image consciousness that Sartre deals with in *L'imaginaire* is placed on the same field with what is called constituted affectivity in *L'être et le néant*. According to Sartre, a constituted affectivity is what is revealed by introspection. It is a consciousness of something, or a consciousness of the world. "All hate is hate of someone; all anger is apprehension of someone as hateful or unjust or faulty; to have sympathy for someone is to 'find him sympathetic,' etc." (BN 435) On the other hand, an original affectivity is the stage of the affectivity before constituting an intention such as anxiety, sadness, boredom, shame, and nausea.

along a new dimension.” (IM 69)

Affectivity is not a consciousness of affectivity itself. Hatred towards Paul is not a feeling of ‘hatred’ but a consciousness of Paul as hateful. This affectivity *of* Paul is conferred to Paul. That is to say, our consciousness projects this new quality on him.

Sartre focuses on a primary state of affectivity in the process in which the object appears in consciousness. We will see through his explanation how affectivity is involved in the case of the imagined object because the way of conferring an affective quality on the object is identical in perception and imagining. Of course, there are other factors in imagining, which will be dealt with in the next section.

First, let us see how the object is cognized in general. The object first appears in a state of indefinite mass that is prior to constructing intention of the object. For example, the hair and the body that we perceive first appear as indefinite mass.

“The black hair, we did not see as black; that body, we did not perceive as a female body, we did not see those prominent curves. However, as it is a question of descending to the intuitive level, we use their sensible content in its most general features. The hair, the body are perceived as indefinite masses, as filled spaces.”

(IM 27) In order to cognize the object, the indefinite mass needs to be synthesized with cognitive elements. Finally, the object is cognized as hair and a body.

How is affectivity involved in the process? Sartre emphasizes that affectivity starts to form before cognizing a particular object. That is to say, affectivity is already formed before having an intention towards an object. Nonetheless, this affectivity is still intentional. There is affectivity *of* an indefinite object. Sartre quotes Bergson to explain this process.

A priori [...] we may expect the clear distinction of individual objects to be a luxury of perception [...] It would seem, then, that we start neither from the perception of the individual nor from the conception of the genus, but from an intermediate knowledge, from a confused sense of the *striking quality* or of resemblance: this sense, equally remote from generality fully conceived and from individuality clearly perceived, begets both of them by a process of dissociation. Reflective analysis clarifies it into the general idea; discriminative memory solidifies it into a perception of the individual.²⁵

According to Bergson, when we cognize an object, it appears at first as an indefinite state before having clear distinction of the object. Furthermore, there is affectivity before the cognition. What Bergson refers to ‘a confused sense (*un sentiment confus*)’ is in fact “sentiment” in French. Therefore, it is better translated as ‘a confused feeling.’ In this sense Bergson has clearly invoked a kind of affectivity that comes before having a clear conception of the object.

Sartre considers the affective process of perception and that of image consciousness to have the same mechanism in terms of their primary state. The confused state of affectivity which is conferred on the object before cognition is, in image consciousness, a primary state of affectivity. Bearing this in mind, let us focus on the concept of affectivity in image consciousness.

²⁵ Sartre’s quotation is in IM 27. I add more from the original text, Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (trans.), New York: Zone Books, 1991, 158, italics given.

4. Two Part Classification of Affectivity

4.1 Affectivity in the Constituent Layer: Affective Analogon

In order to explain the concept of affectivity, we need to understand that there are two layers of image consciousness. One is the primary or constituent layer, and the other is the secondary layer which is 'commonly called' the reaction to the image. The former "corresponds to the irreal object," which is constituted in consciousness. The latter is "a second-order reaction, love, hatred, admiration, etc, of the irreal object." (IM 137) These layers contain elements as follows:

There are therefore intentions, movements, knowledge, feelings that combine to form the image [constituent layer] and intentions, movements, feelings, pieces of knowledge that represent our more or less spontaneous reaction to the irreal. [so called secondary layer] (IM 136-7)

Therefore, there are also two different kinds of affectivity that is associated with each of them: affective analogon in constituent layer and imaginary feeling in secondary layer. As examined above, the irreal object is relevant to the constituent layer. (IM 137) The affective analogon, therefore, should correspond with the constituent layer as an element of the irreal object. On the other hand, the imaginary feeling towards the irreal object matches the so called secondary layer. (IM 145) In this section, we will examine the affective analogon. As we saw in section 2.2, it is one of the elements of content of image consciousness. In this content, there are cognitive elements and a kinaesthetic analogon. From the synthesis of these elements, the irreal object is constructed. Sartre tries to examine affective analogon of the irreal object without other elements in order to understand how it is constituted. In fact, in image consciousness, we cannot ever have

affectivity without cognition but here he isolates it in order to clearly understand its primary state in image consciousness. In order to do this, he proposes two hypotheses.

Firstly, suppose that we imagine vivacious, white, and fine hands. These hands as imaged, or as irreal, must contain contents of image consciousness that aim at the hands themselves. In addition, Sartre assumes that these hands as imaged are purified of all knowledge and sensible representations. If we so purify them, there should only be the pure affective analogon. In this case, it appears “as an affective consciousness of something fine, graceful, pure.” (IM 70) This ‘something’ does not appear as a clearly individualized object, for instance, as a set of hands. “The tint of the skin at the fingertips, the shape of the fingernails, the small wrinkles around the phalanx, all these” (IM 70) appear to us, but these details do not appear as themselves in their representative aspect. Instead, they appear to us as an undifferentiated affective mass, which is impossible to describe. Thus, Sartre says it is “lacking in clear and complete knowledge: it is present.” (IM 70-71) In other words, this affective consciousness is present in the irreal object as a particular form, which is the affective analogon. In this sense, “these hands are given to me in their affective form.” (IM 71)

It is here that Sartre introduces desire in proposing a second hypothesis. Through image consciousness, we possess the object that we desire, rendering it present as irreal in our consciousness. Desire “is an incantation destined to make the object of one’s thought, the thing one desires, appear in such a way that one can take possession of it.”(IM 125) If I desire to see my friend, I will imagine him.²⁶

²⁶ The act of image consciousness towards the absent or non-existent object is a very particular and independent way to fulfill desires. (IM 125) But this is the way to play

Bearing in mind this general characteristic of the desire, Sartre assumes that we desire the hands which are given as affective form. And then he assumes that this desire is also purified of knowledge and representation. He regards that the desire is consciousness of the object of desire. (IM71) If we suppose this purification, the desire cannot “entail knowledge of its object” and it cannot “posit it like a representation” by itself alone. (IM 71) As a result, the affectivity and the desire only remain in consciousness because of the hypotheses. In this process, the desire needs to be related to affectivity. Even though the object of desire is not specific, desire tries to possess the object as unreal in image consciousness. Then, desire posits its object with affective form, but does not know its object as those hands. “Desire, of course, posits an object; but this object does not exist except as the correlate of a certain affective consciousness.” (IM 71) We do not know the object of desire. Therefore, the role of desire in image consciousness is to make the unreal object through affectivity.

Through these hypotheses, we can see the pure state of the affective analogon, desire, and their relationship. Now, let us return to imagine the hands, this time with knowledge. Instead of pure affective consciousness, Sartre adds cognitive elements to it. Here the pure affective consciousness becomes a cognitive-affective consciousness. (IM 72) Moreover, desire also comes to have knowledge so that we clearly know the object of desire. Sartre explains the moment that knowledge is involved in imagining the hands:

Desire posits an object, which is the affective equivalent of those hands:

satisfaction so it does not make me completely fulfilled. The object as imaged is only a mirage, and desire nourishes itself. (IM 126) “There is always, in that act, something of the imperious and infantile, a refusal to take account of distance and difficulties.”(IM 125) The absence of an object and the desire to fulfill it as possession lead us to imagine the object in a magical fashion. It is plunged into a magic world where ambiguous phantoms wander.

something transcendent, something that is not me is given as correlative of my consciousness. But at the same time, that something comes to be filled with an imaging knowledge, which is to say I am invaded by the knowledge that this something stands for 'two hands.' This certainty appears to me suddenly. (IM 72)

Likewise, by specific knowledge, the affective analogon and the desire have a concrete intentionality towards a specific object. By having knowledge, they are constituted, for instance, as desire of mother's hands or as these lovely hands of my mother. In this sense, the affective analogon is not free. This is because "they [elements to form the image such as affective analogon] obey a directing form, a primary intention and are absorbed in the constitution of the irreal object." (IM 137) In other words, affective analogon changes depending on the intentionality of our consciousness. Therefore, "they [affective analogon] are not aimed at in themselves, they do not at all exist for themselves." (IM 137) The affective analogon only serves to construct the irreal object, and it does not serve the affectivity itself. It means that it does not work on itself, but rather it is directly influenced by our affective consciousness. This will be dealt with in section 5.1.

4.2 The Affectivity in the Secondary Layer: Imaginary Feeling

As mentioned, there is also a second layer of image consciousness. Sartre calls it imaginary feeling. Sartre illuminates its characteristics by comparing it with the

affectivity that one feels in the face of the real object. Sartre names the second one, genuine feeling. This comparison would help to understand the uniqueness of imaginary feeling.

First of all, let us take a look at genuine feeling. Its characteristics stem from the aspect of perception of real object. According to Sartre, when we perceive an object, it is presented on one side at a time. Actually, one cannot perceive all sides of this object. It is therefore necessary to apprehend it successively in multiplying the points of view because there are endlessly new details of the object according to my attention and direction. There is always something overflowing in the world of perception. (IM 9) For example, when we perceive a cube, we can perceive three sides of the cube at once, but cannot see more than that. (IM 8) Therefore, from the aspect of perceiving a real object, genuine feeling obtains the characteristics of richness and depth. This is because new elements of the real object endlessly influences the affective response. In this sense, the development of this affectivity cannot be predictable (IM 139)

On the other hand, imaginary feeling has the opposite characteristic. It does not have richness, and it is predictable. For example, after the lover has gone, the feeling for the lover is not the same as the feeling evoked directly from the lover in person. We cannot see him/her any more, but we could only imagine him/her. The lover as imaged cannot be more than what we already know. This is “the essential poverty of the image.” (IM 9) The image is nothing other than what consciousness has of it. It consists of only what I bring into the image. We cannot discover more than we already know of it. (IM 9)²⁷ Although we know the qualities of the lover,

²⁷ When we imagine an object, it is completely given. The knowledge of the image is formed immediately. Therefore, to construct the object as the image as such is a definite

these cannot confer new dimensions. Sartre describes Annie (the loved one) in this way:

First, it [the feeling] *stopped*: it ‘is made’ no more, it can barely linger in the forms that it has already taken; it has become *scholastic* in some way, one can give it a name, classify its manifestations. (IM 144 italic given)

Therefore, imaginary feeling too, cannot be enriched anymore, and it becomes general. Finally, love becomes banal. That is to say, it loses its primary unique nuance. Thus, it becomes easy to classify and name this feeling.

In addition, this affectivity is not passive. It has a kind of freedom or autonomy.²⁸ Sartre expresses it as “a kind of continuous autcreation, a kind of restless tension.” (IM 140) It sustains itself and it is a kind of ‘act.’ What does this spontaneity of imaginary feeling mean? It means that we anticipate how we feel in the face of something. The irreal object “is reproduced in order to provoke a feeling.” (IM 142) In this sense, Sartre considers the state of affectivity to be a kind of script that is well ordered. In order to recall the feeling that I want to mind, I form the irreal object and pretend/play on affectively from the object. This is why Sartre says that affectivity ‘represents’ our reaction. This is a kind of decision of the person who has the feeling. Sartre says “this is no longer an ‘affection’ in the sense that the object no longer affects me. My feeling, still here, is entirely activity, entirely tension; it is played rather than felt.” (IM 142-143) Sartre describes the affective situation in front of the irreal object through the case of the daydreamer.

judgment. (IM 9)

²⁸ The autonomy of affectivity goes together with the autonomy of image consciousness. “Sartre assigns to them [types of images such as reveries, dreams, and hallucination] a special, strange sort of spontaneity. It is ‘fascination,’ the willing bondage of consciousness before the image.” (Eva T. H. Brann, *The World of Imagination: Sum and Substance*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992, 134.)

And the description shows the method of how we construct the object as imaged and have an affectivity that corresponds with it.

Thus the dreamers can choose from a store of props the feelings they want to put on and the objects that correspond to them, as actors choose their costumes: today it will be ambition, tomorrow loving desire. Only the 'essential poverty' of objects as imaged can satisfy the feeling docilely, without ever surprising it, deceiving it, or guiding it. (IM 147)

Imaginary feeling has characteristics such as autonomy and generality. The imaginary feeling is predictable and is a spontaneous choice. Therefore, imaginary feeling is more independent, positing itself and developing freely. In this case, affectivity is easily cognized and classified and named. These spontaneous, active features are contrary to affective analogon. This discord seems odd. But we will soon understand it from examining the relationship between them.

5. Relation between Affective Analogon and Imaginary Feeling and its Development

5.1 Affective Analogon as Reflection of Imaginary Feeling

We have articulated affectivity in two layers, in which one is an element of irreal object and the other of imaginary feeling. However, Sartre does not directly and concretely describe their relationship. For that reason, we could misunderstand the concept of affectivity in his theory of the image. The affectivity in the layer representing the 'reaction' to the irreal object' (IM 136) seems like an 'affective response' to the irreal object. Therefore, affective analogon is postulated to arouse

imaginary feeling. However, Sartre describes that imaginary feeling serves to construct the irreal object. It means that imaginary feeling influences affective analogon. (Secondary and primary are actually reversed.) Thus, we could be rashly determine that affective analogon and imaginary feeling are bidirectional.²⁹ In addition to this problem, this omission causes another. Sartre characterizes affective analogon as passive and imaginary feeling as spontaneous. In this sense, one might say that the affectivity of image consciousness is passive and the another might say that it is spontaneous. Confusing the two could lead to uncertainty of whether the affectivity is passive or sponstanous. These problems will be solved by disclosing the relationship between them.

Sartre gives an example in discussion of Annie as follows. “By an essential reversal, it is now the feeling that produces its object and the irreal Annie is no more than the strict correlate of my feelings for her.” (IM 144) Sartre says that imaginary feeling is correlated with the irreal object. That “the feeling that produces its object,” means that imaginary feeling is used for constituting the irreal object. Therefore, we could say that imaginary feeling serves as an affective analogon. Furthermore, “irreal Annie is no more than the strict correlate of my feelings for her,” equally shows that affective analgon that constitutes irreal Annie is correlated to imaginary feeling.

In addition, Sartre says the following.

The irreal object exists, it exists as irreal, as inactive, of this there is no doubt; its existence is undeniable. Feeling behaves therefore in the face of the irreal as

²⁹ Andreas Elpidorou misunderstands the relation. “The order of dependence is bidirectional: not only do our feelings influence the irreal content, but also the irreal content may influence us, insofar as we are capable of reaction to it.” (Andreas Elpidorou, “Imagination in non-representational painting” in *Reading Sartre: On phenomenology and existentialism*, Jonathan Webber (edited), Routledge, 2011, 15.)

in the face of the real. It seeks to merge into it, to embrace it, to feed off it. Only, this irreal, so well specified, so well defined, is *empty*; or, if one prefers, it is the simple reflection of the feeling. Feeling therefore feeds on its own reflection.

(IM 140)

The concept of affectivity in this paragraph is about imaginary feeling as shown in the passage; ‘Feeling behaves therefore in the face of the irreal.’ And the passage, ‘It seeks to merge into it,’ means ‘Imaginary feeling seeks to be used for constructing the irreal object.’ In addition, bearing in mind that the affective analogon is a component of the irreal object, we see that there is a relationship between it and imaginary feeling. In this sense, the imaginary feeling is used for the affective analogon. It is what we found above, but there is another important implication. That ‘it is the simple reflection of the feeling. Feeling therefore feeds on its own reflection,’ shows us the following. Imaginary feeling is not used for constructing the irreal object *just as it is*. Rather, its reflection is used for the irreal object so that we can conclude that affective analogon is a reflection of imaginary feeling.³⁰ In this sense, we can understand the reason why Sartre characterizes affective analogon itself as passive is understandable; it is because it follows a directedness that comes from imaginary feeling.

³⁰ This mechanism seems to be similar to the affective quality that is conferred onto real object. But consciousness does not confer affective ‘analogon’ onto the real object. What is conferred is real affective quality. (SE 41)

5.2 Development of Affectivity in Image Consciousness: from Undifferentiated Mass to Bodily Change

Based on the understanding of this relationship, let us grasp how affectivity is involved and develops in/with image consciousness. In the relation between affective analogon and imaginary feeling, the latter always takes the lead. When we imagine, consciousness has its affective state. That is to say, affective consciousness is always involved in image consciousness. This affective state is first of all, undifferentiated. Therefore, desire tries to possess what is desired in the field of this undifferentiated affective state. This affective state projects its reflection to the object, which is also indefinite. Thus, desire tries to posit its object. Then, image consciousness has an intention and our affective imaginary consciousness becomes a certain imaginary feeling. This affective state again projects its reflection to the definite object. Meanwhile, affective analogon is synthesized with cognitive elements and with the kinaesthetic analogon. According to this development, in terms of our affective consciousness, the indefinite affective state becomes a certain imaginary feeling. And in terms of analogon, pure affectivity becomes cognitive-affectivity. The former always project its reflection, that is to say its affective analogon, onto the object. In the meantime, they become general because they only develop in/with image consciousness. Consequently, we can see a kind of ‘progression’ of affectivity: an undifferentiated state → a concrete feeling such as delight, hatred, disgust → a generalized state.

In this development, we can see the spontaneity of affectivity. Imaginary feeling spontaneously selects its feeling from the undifferentiated state. And its affective

analogon follows from this. The passivity of affective analogon appears because of its reflective characteristic. It follows imaginary feeling but the passive does not mean that it is itself responsive.

In addition, this autonomy of imaginary feeling even continues to go so far as to produce bodily change.³¹

My hunger, my sexual desire, my disgust underwent a significant modification while passing through the imaging state. They were concentrated, made more precise, and their intensity increased. (IM 137)

Affectivity becomes precise, concrete, and intensified. When imaginary feeling and the affective analogon become constituted, there is a kind of 'vertigo' in imaginary feeling. (IM 14) The vertigo is caused in the moment when imaginary feeling confronts its own reflection. If its intensity is excessive, it can develop into bodily change. Such bodily change is a result of free development of imaginary feeling.³² Sartre says that it is caused by imaginary feeling being 'over-zealous.' (IM 138)

For example, in a discussion of imaginary disgust:

It [imaginary disgust] determines itself. But that is not all: it anticipates, in some way, in the emptiness of the object to which it is addressed. It can inflate to the point of nausea, nothing can prevent the fact that it inflates of *its own accord*. (IM 140 italics given)

³¹ It is necessary not to confuse bodily change with 'bodily response'. For Sartre, bodily change is not a response or reaction to the imagined object. Robert Hopkins deals with this subject. According to him, we imagine a certain object and also imagine responding affectively to that object that is to say, representing the reaction to that object. See, Robert Hopkins, "Imagination and affective response" in *Reading Sartre On phenomenology and existentialism*, edit by Jonathan Webber.

³² However, how does imaginary feeling develop into real bodily change? We have examined what imaginary feeling is. One needs to bear in mind that the imaginary feeling is a real feeling, although this feeling appears with imaginary consciousness. The affectivity in image consciousness is real. (see 4.2)

Sartre deals with bodily change such as vomiting, nausea, pupillary dilation, and reflexes of ocular convergence. And he calls this 'spontaneous mime.' (IM 137) For example, while seeing a bad painting, we mime its awfulness via a schematic gesture like a grimace. So, we mime bodily changes like imaginary feeling is played, and it is autonomous.

Without reconstructing the concept of affectivity in relation to the image consciousness, it is hard to comprehend the spontaneity of the affectivity of image consciousness. In addition, one might think that affectivity in image consciousness is responsive to the object as imaged. However, we have seen that they are the result of misunderstanding. The correction has been made through articulating the relationship between two different kinds of affectivity.

III. THE CONCEPT OF AFFECTIVITY AS APPLIED TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE APPRECIATION OF NON-REPRESENTATIONAL PAINTING

6. The Structure of Image Consciousness in the Appreciation of Non-representational Painting

Let us analyze the experience of the artwork through the concept of affectivity in Sartre's theory of the image. This will provide us with a specific example in order to better understand this concept. Sartre provides a variety of examples of images, both representation and non-representational. (For example, portraits, caricatures, imitations, schematic drawings, faces in the fire, spots on walls, rocks in human form, hypnagogic images, scenes and people seen in coffee, and so on.)

I will analyze the appreciation of non-representational painting because of its unique characteristic. As it does not contain cognizable contents, this example can most directly show the spontaneity and generality of affectivity. This makes affectivity stand out more than other elements such as cognitive or kinesthetic. In order to analyze the affective experience of the painting, first of all, it is necessary to understand the relation between the artwork and the image. In order to do this, we must first find the structure of image consciousness in the appreciation of painting.

In *L'imaginaire*, Sartre discusses the appreciation of the artwork. He applies the account of the image to it. Thus, the appreciation of the artwork occurs based on our image consciousness. According to him, we do not perceive the artwork as a material thing, but rather through the artwork we imagine. That is to say, what we

confront, through the painting itself, is an irreal object. This is what Sartre calls the aesthetic object. Given that the aesthetic object is potentially a component of the structure of image consciousness, the appreciation of the artwork should be dealt with within the structure. Let us therefore examine the structure of image consciousness in the appreciation of non-representational painting.

Firstly, what is unique of non-representational painting is the absence of the concrete object. Therefore, consciousness does not aim at a certain object in reality. However, this does not mean that consciousness does not aim at anything. In fact, non-representational painting as a material generates a kinaesthetic analogon. Therefore, there should be an intentional object. Then, what is this intentional *object*? It is the object that does not exist in the real world: “an irreal ensemble of new things, of objects that I have never seen nor will ever see but that are nonetheless irreal objects.” (IM 190) This object is not cognized as an object such as a bouquet of flowers or a park. Nonetheless it exists as irreal object. As Mikel Dufrenne puts in, according to Sartre, “there is a subject in all the arts, even when they represent nothing.”³³

Secondly, when appreciating this kind of painting, the intentional *act* of image consciousness is two fold. One is negative or nihilating and the other is constructive or creative. The real object is nihilated. More specifically, the nihilating act of image consciousness includes the painting as material (canvas and brushes, etc.) And at the same time, our act of image consciousness creates the aesthetic object beyond the painting itself.

Lastly, as far as the *contents* of image consciousness, the aesthetic object also

³³ Mikel Dufrenne, *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*, (trans.) Edward S. Casey etc., Northwestern University Press, 1973, 202.

consists of cognitive elements and as we have already seen, analogous representatives. While appreciating the painting, image consciousness has an intention towards its object. Then, what is the cognitive element, if the object does not exist in reality? In representational images, the cognitive element is made up of signs of concrete objects. On the other hand, in non-representational painting, the cognitive element lacks signification. (see 2.2) There is no information. Therefore, it appears as meaning that cannot be described and expressed. This indicates something present without signification.³⁴

The aesthetic object also has *kinaesthetic analogon and affective analogon*. Again, in the case of representational image, the kinaesthetic analogon is revealed as the sensible residue of a certain object. For example, if we appreciate a portrait, its sensible residue would be generated from the person of portrait. Therefore, it is representational, and of course, its kinaesthetic analogon comes to be representational. In the case of non-representational painting however, it is formed from what we see such as a mass of colors, brush strokes and canvas, etc. Although it appears as sensible residue, it is indefinite and unknown. As with the cognitive elements, there is a kind of lack of clarity.

In this way, the affective analogon reveals itself in a unique way. The aesthetic object lacks not only signs but also any representational aspect of kinaesthetic analogon. Therefore, we clearly experience affective analogon in the non-representational painting. We are confronted with general feeling without any specific feeling towards a concrete object. We will see the implication of this in the next section.

³⁴ Sophie Astier-Venon, *Sartre et la Peinture pour une redéfinition de l'analogon pictural*, Uverture philosophique, L'Harmattan, 2013, 9.

Before moving on however, we can perhaps organize the structure of image consciousness in appreciation of non-representational painting through the following diagram.

< The structure of image consciousness in appreciation of non-representational painting >

The structure of image consciousness in appreciation of non-representational painting	Intentional object (transcendent object)		
	Intentional act		
	Content (Aesthetic object /irreal object)	Cognitive element (meaning)	
		Analogon	Kinaesthetic analogon (with non-representational sensible residue)
Affective analogon (without sensible residue / reflection of imaginary feeling)			

7. The Affectivity of Image Consciousness in the Appreciation of Non-representational Painting

7.1 Affective experience in the Appreciation of Mark Rothko's Painting

This section will deal with the characteristics of Mart Rothko's painting and the affective experience in face of it. The following section will provide a concrete

analysis on this experience by employing Sartre's concept of affectivity.

I will focus on Rothko's later works, in which two or three rectangles float on the colored background. [figure 1] The figures are not clear and decisive as the colors seem to seep around the vague edges. [figure 2] The background color changes in an imperceptibly degree. These paintings show imperceptible movement because of its arrangement among a scale of forms and colors.³⁵ It becomes darker and more simple in his later works. These paintings are not representative at all but only present masses of colors in vast canvas. They are variously described as transcendent, tragic, mystical, violent, serene, and if they are representational it is only representational of the void.³⁶

Rothko places an emphasis on the experience of viewer. Therefore, he adjusts the lighting in his atelier to match that of the place where his paintings will be installed.³⁷ The success of the painting does not depend on details of pigment on canvas. It depends on a particular and profound affectivity produced in the viewers. Therefore, his painting is only completed through the appreciator.³⁸ Alan H. Goldman described this experience as follows:

[Rothko's paintings] consist of horizontal rectangles with blurred edges superimposed on differently colored background that partially appear through them. The immediate effect is the appearance of ambiguous objects and spaces, the former seeming sometimes to emerge and fade, the latter seeming flat and deep at the same time. These large and deceptively simple forms have been

³⁵노버트 린튼 (Norbert Lynton), 『20세기의 미술』 (*The Story of Modern Art*), 윤난지 옮김, 애경, 2003, 239.

³⁶ Glenn Phillips, "Introduction: Irreconcilable Rothko" in *Seeing Rothko*, (edit.) Glenn Phillips ect., The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles, 2005. 1.

³⁷노버트 린튼 (Norbert Lynton), 2003, 239.

³⁸ Glenn Phillips, "Introduction", 1. In this way, Rothko's view of the artwork is very close to Sartre's theory of the image. Rothko does what Sartre defines as the act of artist: "The aim of the artist was [is] to construct a whole of *real* tones that would enable this irreality to be manifested" (IM 189)

described as suggesting “cosmic expanses and spiritual illumination,” probably because of their seeming immateriality (therefore spirituality) and equivocality, which make them seem to escape the space that contain them.

Light seems to shine through the rectangles, but what lies behind them seems hidden, creating both tension and surface calmness. The large canvases seem to envelop the viewer in their vague glowing (or dark and intriguing) spaces, and the experience of loss of self in prolonged contemplation of them palpable (and remarked upon by Rothko himself).³⁹

As such, forms in Rothko’s non-representational painting are not only described in its sensible aspects. They arouse the appreciation of something immaterial and vague. The combination of tension and calmness of the surface makes the viewers lose themselves. In virtue of non-representational depiction, the viewer receives a kind of spiritual light. These effects are disclosed in accordance with affective experience. James Elkins described the affective part of this experience through the experience of Jane Dillenberger, an art historian and a theorist who visited the painter’s atelier

For a minute she stood still, looking up and down the height of the paintings. They were almost fifteen feet tall, dark and empty like the open doorways of some colossal temple. As her eyes got used to the half-light, she began to see their surfaces – dull, blank, nearly black. She walked up to one. It was tar black, veiled with washes of deep maroon. The paint was not flat like a wall: you could look into it, and it had a kind of watery motion. As she stared, the matte canvas moved, and flowered into shifting planes of darkness. It was entrancing, and perplexing.

[...] Yet there was something in those surfaces, something waiting to be seen. They were elusive but mysteriously comforting. “I felt as if my eyes had fingertips,” she wrote in her journal the next morning, “moving across the

³⁹ Alan H. Goldman, *Aesthetic Value*, Westview Press, 1995. 166-167.

brushed textures of the canvases.” The more she stared, the more she felt at home. Then she was crying, [...] It was a moment, she told me, of “very strange feelings,” but mostly of relief, of perfect ease, of pure peacefulness and joy.⁴⁰

Dillenberger was captivated and fascinated. A strange feeling that was evoked in her is not a certain specific feeling about a specific object. Rather, it is a general feeling. That is to say, feelings such relief, ease, peacefulness, joy are not, for instance, relief towards someone, ease towards something, peacefulness, or joy towards my lover. These feelings do not have an individual nuance. Moreover, she even cries as a bodily change in the face of the painting. We will analyze this phenomenon in more detail in the next section.

7.2. Analysis of Affectivity in Appreciation of Rothko’s Painting

Let us now analyze this experience through Sartre’s notion of affectivity. Andreas Elpidorou has already done some of this work in his essay, “Imagination in non-representational painting.” He explains affectivity by using a new term, ‘emotional texture.’ According to Elpidorou, non-representational painting consists of emotional texture. This is closely related to the aesthetic object: “In the case of works of art which are non-representational, it is the latter [feelings] that take precedence. [...] Affectivity is the primary constitutive element of the aesthetic object.”⁴¹

⁴⁰ James Elkins, *Picture & Tears: A History of People Who Have Cried in Front of Paintings*, Routledge, edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005, 10-11.

⁴¹ Andreas Elpidorou, 2011, 26.

However, his description of affectivity as emotional texture contains a problem. Even though he grasps that affectivity is distinguishable into two layers, he misunderstands imaginary feeling as a response to the aesthetic object of the painting.⁴² In other word, he considers the appreciator's feeling as a secondary reaction to the aesthetic object. This is clear in his statement on the emotional texture in the face of Rothko's *No. 10* [figure 3]:

[...] The massive yellow coloured area, its position in the canvas, and the contrast between it and the coloured areas beneath it, can strike the spectator as unsettling, distressing, or irksome. One can then be motivated to imagine an unsettling, distressing, or irksome object, which, in virtue of our ability to react to an irrealty, can further upset one or put one on edge.⁴³

He clearly thinks that one owes 'our ability to react to an irrealty.' In this sense, he explains that when we appreciate *No. 10*, we affectively react to the aesthetic object. However, as examined in section 4.2, the affectivity in the face of the irreal object that is here, the aesthetic object is spontaneously played and mimed. It is not a passive affective response. Therefore, we will analyze the affective experience of *No. 10* by applying the concept as we have described it above. *No. 10* is merely an example. Any non-representational art would be the same. This new analysis can compensate for the insufficiency in Elpidorous' discussion, and provide a more clear explanation of the affectivity in image consciousness.

Affectivity constantly influences image consciousness. Affectivity in image consciousness, in appreciation of *No. 10*, aims at the object that is non-representational. It is an object that does not exist in the real world. In this sense,

⁴² Ibid., 24.

⁴³ Ibid., 27-8.

the aesthetic object⁴⁴ lacks the qualities of any specific object. In appreciation of the painting, the undifferentiated mass of yellow, blue and green, the texture of the brushstrokes, the scale of the canvas and the composition among colored masses appear in the viewer's consciousness. An affective analogon, which is an element of the aesthetic object of *No. 10*, is undifferentiated, unknown and unnamed.

In the meantime, desire constantly tries to form the aesthetic object based on this affective analogon. The viewer's desire tries to make concrete objects out of *No. 10*. Yet it is impossible to possess an individuated object in consciousness if there is no representational content, as in *No. 10*. Therefore, desire works without acquiring a concrete object. This desire just exists as a diffused state, without a precise intentionality. Thus, desire possesses the aesthetic object as the undifferentiated affective form. (See 4.1)

If that is the case, how do we experience the aesthetic object as something sorrowful, joyful, or lovely, etc. in the appreciation of a work like Rothko's *No. 10*? We have seen that the affective analogon that consists of the aesthetic object is a reflection of imaginary feeling. Thus, this sorrowful something is the product of our imaginary feeling. In this sense, we can reformulate the question more properly. How can we experience a certain feeling such as sorrow, joy, love, etc. when appreciating *No. 10*, even though there is no concrete object? Imaginary feeling in face of this painting is not a specific feeling about a specific object. When we appreciate this painting, even though there is no specific object, we can imagine having a certain feeling such as love, hatred, peace, etc. This is because of its spontaneous character. In the appreciation of *No. 10*, the viewer posits his/her

⁴⁴ This aesthetic object is the irreal object. When Sartre explains the irreal object in terms of the artwork, he mentions that it is the aesthetic object. (See 6) I will use here the aesthetic object in order to refer to the irreal object.

imaginary feeling. When we imagine, we make ourselves into a person who has such feeling and we play on the feeling. (see 4.2) The appreciator spontaneously chooses to experience a peculiar feeling. Then this peculiar feeling is not a specific feeling towards a specific object; rather, it is a schematic feeling about an unknown object. It appears with generality. That is to say we experience a general feeling of love, sorrow, hatred, pain, joy, etc. Consequently, I project my peculiar imaginary feeling on the aesthetic object as an affective analogon. That is to say, I form myself an imaginary feeling, for instance sorrow in appreciation of *No. 10*. Then, I project this feeling as a form of analogon on the aesthetic object of *No. 10*. This is because imaginary feeling always projects its reflection in order to construct the aesthetic object. Therefore, it is possible for the affective analogon to be constituted as some feeling without knowledge.

Therefore, the appreciator faces a reflection of his/her imaginary feeling through the appreciation of *No. 10*. For instance, I face a reflection of my annoyance, love, hatred, or melancholy, etc. Then, a kind of vertigo occurs from the fact that we experience some feeling and at the same time face its reflection. What's more, if imaginary feeling freely develops, bodily change occurs. As mentioned previously, it is a kind of spontaneous mime in respect that it occurs without realistic reason. Romantic feeling, for instance, in the face of *No. 10*, appears as a flutter of the heart. We saw the example of the woman who cried in the face of Rothko's painting. It is the result of the development of her imaginary feeling.

Through this analysis, Sartre's concept is more easily explained with this specific application. In fact, Sartre does not provide a detailed discussion of non-representational painting. Furthermore, he does not speak about affectivity

regarding the artwork in *L'imaginaire*. Therefore, this analysis can provide a clearer understanding of the affective appreciation of non-representational painting in Sartre's theory. In addition, we know that our feeling in the face of non-representational painting is not a reaction or a response to an aesthetic object; rather, it is spontaneous and free.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, Sartre distinguishes two layers of image consciousness. This means that there are also two different kinds of affectivity that associate with each of them. Although he explains the characteristics of these affectivities, his description is, at a glance, confusing and unsystematic. In addition, he does not provide the explanation of their relationship. He merely provides little hints about it. Given the situation, there is little preceding research that deals with the topic of affectivity in Sartre, particularly with his theory of the image.

One of the things that I have done in this thesis is to reconstruct Sartre's concept of affectivity in clearer and systematic way. In order to do this, I have distinguished the different levels mentioned above in terms of the two layers of image consciousness that Sartre identifies, and I have tried to clearly disclose their relationship. Through this reconstructive project, I have shown the unique character of the affectivity of image consciousness in Sartre's theory. Moreover, I have applied it to a specific phenomenon in order to provide a more specific understanding of it.

Why is this reconstruction theoretically important and what are its merits? What can we learn from this reconstruction of affectivity? In the context of Sartre's *L'imaginaire*, we can see the following. There is clear distinction between the affective analogon and imaginary feeling, though these are both closely involved in image consciousness. The former is used to form the image and the latter is our affective consciousness of what we formed, which is imaginary. Moreover, the former is not free, while the latter is spontaneous. This seems to be contradictory.

In fact, there is a lot of confusion in Sartre scholarship about whether affectivity is spontaneous or passive. This is because of Sartre's description. For example, he sometimes confuses the two kinds by speaking as if they were one. This misunderstanding might be the greatest obstacle to understanding Sartre's affectivity.

The seemingly contradictory explanation on affectivity is cleared up when we have a proper understanding of their relationship. In an effort to achieve this understanding, I have disclosed their relationship as the following: affective analogon is a reflection of imaginary feeling. Its spontaneity of affectivity proceeds from imaginary feeling. And the affective analogon follows the directedness of the former. By means of this reconstruction, the spontaneity of imaginary feeling becomes clear and we can understand why the affective analogon is described as passive. Ultimately, we can understand the spontaneous characteristics of affectivity in image consciousness by focusing on the spontaneity of the imaginary feeling.

This examination helps us to know the concept of affectivity in Sartre's overall philosophy. As mentioned, Sartre constantly deals with it in his main texts. Yet, his first discussion is in an early version of *L'imaginaire*.⁴⁵ Therefore, this reconstruction will strengthen the basis of our understanding of the notion of affectivity in Sartre's larger body of work. Given the importance of affectivity in other places in Sartre, this work is important for understanding its role in this broader context.

⁴⁵ *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions* (1939) was published earlier than *L'imaginaire* (1940). However, the latter was written in 1928 for his master's thesis, "*L'Image dans la vie psychologique: rôle et nature.*"

Moreover, this spontaneous affectivity of image consciousness is closely related with his philosophical concept of the freedom of consciousness. Sartre's philosophy emphasizes the freedom of human, and it is therefore characterized as "philosophy of the freedom."⁴⁶ In fact, his theory of the image is regarded as a starting point of his philosophical discussions, in particular *L'être et Le Néant*. Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre says that "the study of imagination was a significant stage in setting up this ontological drama between consciousness (or being-for-itself), the nothingness that it generates, and being-in-itself." (IM xii) The image consciousness implies these notions, and these are fundamentally related with the freedom of consciousness.⁴⁷ In fact, Sartre regards that image consciousness accompanies the freedom of consciousness. (IM 29)⁴⁸ As we have examined previously, (see 2.1) image consciousness is a negative act. That is to say, it negates the real world in order to create the irreal object. This means that for consciousness to be able to imagine, "it [consciousness] must be able to escape from the world by its very nature, it must be able to stand back from the world by its own efforts. In a word, it must be free." (IM 184) For him, basis of freedom is the negative act, or nihilating act that is the fundamental structure of image consciousness.⁴⁹ Therefore, the freedom is the condition for imagining. In this sense, reciprocally, the image consciousness realizes the freedom of consciousness. In other words, it is revealed by means of image consciousness. (IM 187) We can

⁴⁶ 기타 켄 외 지음 (Gi-ta Ken, etc.), 2011, 318.

⁴⁷ David Detmer, *Sartre Explained: From Bad Faith to Authenticity*, Carus publishing company, 2008, 111.

⁴⁸ Here, Sartre says, "the imaged synthesis is accompanied by a very strong consciousness of spontaneity, of freedom one might say."

⁴⁹ 기타 켄 외 지음 (Gi-ta Ken, etc.), 2011, 318.

even say that our consciousness is free in so far as it is imaginary.⁵⁰ According to Sartre, on the contrary, if our consciousness cannot be imaginary, “the person is squashed in the world, transfixed by the real, and is closest to the thing.” (IM 187) In this case, we cannot find new possibilities in our life because the thing has its inert characteristic, which is uncreated and unchanging. (see 1.1)

Thus, we can regard that affectivity of image consciousness is directly connected to the notion of freedom based on the discussion of this thesis. Such spontaneity or freedom as found in the affectivity of image consciousness might have some implications in our psychic and daily life. Firstly, our desire could be fulfilled through experiencing a certain imaginary feeling. Of course, this desire is not ‘really’ fulfilled, given that this ‘fulfillment’ is imaginary. Even so, this is not merely useless. Our psychic life could be protected from various situations in reality through imaginary feeling. In reality, there are always overflowing situations that are unpredictable. In this sense, in our daily life feeling is not predictable as well. On the other hand, the imaginary feeling is spontaneously formed. In this sense, we can perhaps soothe certain feelings of ours or perhaps take some control over them. Secondly, such psychic ‘taming’ is not necessarily limited to psychic life but could also affect our daily life. Experiencing a certain feeling, although it is imaginary, could bring changes in our real life. There are many people who overcome their problems through imagining other possibilities. In other words, imaginary feeling could help us make changes to the way we live by opening new possibilities to us. Indeed, this is connected with the notion of freedom discussed above. For Sartre, this freedom is the first condition for the

⁵⁰신길수 (Shin Gil Soo), 사르트르의 현상학적 상상력에 관한 연구 (“Research on Sartre’s phenomenological imagination”), 석사학위논문, 서울 : 서울대학교, 1989, 3.

human to act towards the future. This projection indicates new choices.⁵¹ Here we see the link between affectivity of image consciousness and freedom.

Such effects would take us beyond image consciousness, which is pure affective playing as we have described. Nevertheless, perhaps even more important for our considerations is that Sartre's understanding of affectivity could provide a very interesting way of understanding the appreciation of the work of art. For example, as we have examined in the analysis of non-representational painting, the affectivity of the viewer is spontaneously formed. The viewer does not just passively respond to the painting. Rather, viewers spontaneously choose their feeling in accordance with their desire. Through the work of art, our psychic life could also experience a certain fulfillment of desire which itself might be experienced as a kind of alleviation. Just as Aristotle suggests that catharsis has a social function in getting rid of negative feelings, we might see something similar in Sartre's position. By imagining through the work of art, we can get rid of the negative feelings in daily life. For example, as we have seen, someone cries in front of the work of art. Yet, this emotional reaction is not exactly responsive. It is not accidental or unpredictable. Rather, it spontaneously represents the emotional reaction. Viewers to some extent choose this emotional behavior. It is not merely passive. Thus, we might say that the artwork gives each person a chance to work through excessive emotions or to come to some terms with their own emotional life.

What's more, this leads us to another unique insight provided by Sartre's theory. The natural way for us to think of affectivity, as mentioned, is as a result of

⁵¹Ibid., 53.

our interaction with the object. However, Sartre suggests that we face a part of our own affectivity in front of the work of art. Therefore, the feeling we get from it is something we put into it. In this sense, Sartre's position might give us a hint on one way to think about the theory of art. Contemporary art, for example, is something we complete through our interaction with it. The viewer plays an important role. Marina Abramović's performance at MOMA (March 14–May 31, 2010), titled "*The Artist Is Present*" is a good example. [figure 4] She sat in the chair and viewers could come one by one to sit, keeping eye contact with her. It requires viewer's participation.⁵² During this performance, a lot of people cried in front of her and the artist also cried. This was an emotional event. In this performance, viewer's emotion becomes a part of the work of art. Thus, Sartre can give us here a way to understand it.

⁵² Information from, <http://www.moma.org/calendar/exhibitions/964?locale=en>

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Figure 1 Mark Rothko, *No. 14*, 1960, Oil on canvas, 290.83 x 268.29 cm, San Francisco, San Francisco Museum of Modern Art



Figure 2 Mark Rothko, *No. 14*, 1960 (detail: middle left)



Figure 3 Mark Rothko, *No. 10*, 1950, Oil on canvas, 229.2 x 146.4 cm, The Museum of Modern Art, New York



Figure 4 Abramović performing, *The Artist Is Present*, Museum of Modern Art, March 2010.

국문초록

본 논문은 사르트르의 이미지론에서 정서 개념을 다룬다. 이미지는 전통적으로 마음속의 그림이나 재현으로 여겨져 왔다. 반면에 사르트르는 이미지를 주체의 의식으로 여긴다. 그에 따르면, 이미지는 정서와 밀접하게 관련된다. 이미지에 대한 새로운 이해를 바탕으로 그는 이미지와 연관된 정서를 다르게 정의한다. 일반적으로, 우리는 상상할 때의 정서가 이미지에 종속적이며 부수적이라고 생각한다. 하지만 사르트르에게 정서는 자발적으로 형성되며 이미지 의식의 구조에 직접 영향을 끼치는 구성요소이다. 따라서 사르트르의 이미지론에서 정서는 필수적인 개념이다. 하지만 이 개념을 이해하는 데는 어려움이 따른다. 정서에 대한 사르트르의 서술은 혼란스럽고 체계적이지 않다. 게다가 이에 관한 기존 연구가 제대로 되어 있지 않은 실정이다. 이에 따라, 본 논문에서 나는 사르트르의 이미지론에서 다루어지는 정서 개념을 명확하게 재구성하고자 한다.

사르트르는 이미지론에서 두 가지 정서인 정서적 아날로공과 상상적 감정에 관해 이야기한다. 이것들은 이미지 의식에 밀접하게 결부되어 있다. 하지만 각각은 다른 특성을 보인다. 첫째, 전자는 이미지를 형성하는데 사용된다. 반면에 후자는 우리가 형성해낸 이미지에 대한 정서적 의식이다. 둘째, 전자는 수동적이지만 후자는 자발적이다. 이는 모순적으로 보인다. 실제로, 사르트르 학계에서도 이미지 의식의 정서가 자발적인지 수동적인지에 대한 혼란이 있다. 사르트르는 양자를 명확하게 서술하지 않으며 그들의 관계를 체계적으로 정리하지 않는다.

본 논문의 세부적인 목표는 양자 사이의 관계를 파악할 수 있는 구문을 찾고 그 관계를 규명하는 것이다. 이로써 나는 정서적 아날로공이 상상적 감정의 반영임을 주장할 것이다. 이는 정서적 아날로공의 근원이 상상적 감정이라는 것을 의미한다. 정서적 아날로공과 상상적 감정 사이의 관계에서 후자는 언제나 주도적이다. 이 같은 관계 규명을 통해서 상상적 감정의 자발성은 명확해지고 정서적 아날로공이 수동적으로 여겨지

는 이유가 설명된다. 궁극적으로, 우리는 상상적 감정의 자발성에 집중함으로써 이미지 의식에서 정서 자체의 자발적 특성을 이해할 수 있다. 정서의 모순적 특성이 정리됨으로써, 결과적으로 우리는 이미지 의식에서의 정서에 대해 올바른 이해를 획득하고 정서의 작용 과정을 파악할 수 있게 된다. 우리가 상상할 때, 정서는 미분화된 상태에서 구성적 상태로 발전하며 작용한다. 그리고 결국에는 일반적인 특성을 지니게 된다. 이 과정에서, 상상적 감정은 경우에 따라서 신체적 변화로까지 발전한다.

이 같은 개념적 재구성에 이어, 이미지 의식에서의 정서의 자발적 특성을 구체적으로 이해하기 위해서 나는 마크 로스코의 비재현적 회화 작품인 <No. 10> 감상 사례를 분석한다. 비재현적 회화는 인식가능한 내용을 포함하지 않는다. 이러한 독특함 덕분에 우리의 자발적 정서는 더욱 명확하게 드러나게 된다. 우선, 감상자는 설명할 수 없는 미분화된 정서적 상태에 있다. 그리고 그들의 정서적 상태는 정서적 아날로공으로서 그림의 비실재적 대상에 반영된다. 여기서 비실재적 대상은 우리가 상상적 태도를 지닌 채 회화를 감상할 때 회화작품을 통해서 경험하는 이미지로 된 대상을 의미한다. 이때, 감상자는 비실재적 대상에 단순히 반응하지 않는다. 그들은 자신의 상황에서 경험하고자 하는 적절한 감정을 선택한다. 이로 인해, 미분화된 정서적 상태는 구체적인 감정이 된다. 그리고 그 감정은 지속해서 비실재적 대상에 반영된다. 결과적으로, 감상자는 <No. 10>을 통해서 그 자신의 감정을 마주하게 된다. 이후에 감상자의 상상적 감정은 일반성을 획득하게 된다. 그리고 상상의 감정이 지나치게 기능할 때, 신체적 변화까지 동반하게 된다. 예를 들어, 우리는 예술작품 앞에서 눈물을 흘리는 사람을 생각해 볼 수 있다.

이 같은 개념적 재구성과 구체적인 사례 분석을 통해서 우리는 사르트르의 이미지론에서 정서 개념을 명확히 이해할 수 있다. 또한, 그것의 자발적인 특성을 확인할 수 있다. 본 논문은 다음과 같은 확장적인 의의를 지닌다. 첫째, 본 연구는 이미지론 뿐만 아니라 사르트르의 철학 전반에서 정서를 이해하는 바탕을 제공한다. 둘째, 이미지 의식에서 자발적 정서가 사르트르의 철학을 관통하는 자유 개념과 긴밀히 연결됨이 드러난다. 셋째, 우리는 이미지 의식의 정서에서 발견되는 자발성 혹은 자

유가 우리의 심적 삶과 일상에서 정서 완화 효과, 자유, 선택 가능성과 같은 함의를 지님을 알 수 있다. 마지막으로, 정서에 대한 사르트르의 이해는 예술작품 감상을 이해하는 흥미로운 방식을 제공한다.

주요어 : 이미지 의식, 비실재적 대상, 자발성, 정서적 아날로공, 상상적 감정, 비재현적 회화 감상

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