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정치학석사학위논문

**Foreign Aid, Clientelism and Democratic
Consolidation in Sub-Saharan Africa
in the post-transition period**

해외 원조, 후견주의와 민주주의 공고화
전환기 이후 사하라 이남 아프리카를 중심으로

2015년 2월

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Foreign Aid, Clientelism and Democratic Consolidation in Sub-Saharan Africa in the post-transition period

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Abstract

This study aims to understand the impact of foreign aid on democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa in the post-transition period. There is disagreement amongst political scientists about the role of development aid in the democratization of fledgling democracies. It seems that the existing literature on the relationship between foreign aid and democracy has not paid enough attention to political clientelism and its pernicious effects on democratic consolidation in comparative perspective. Politicians in recipient countries have discretion as to how aid is allocated to induce maximum political support from voters. Incumbents offer public investment to local political elites in return for votes. Thus, I put incumbent's clientelistic strategy as the key mediating variable between foreign aid and democratic consolidation.

I employ a mixed-methods approach to investigate this relationship, including using theoretical models, quantitative analyses, and historical substantive country-specific approach. The donor-incumbent sequential game and incumbents' aid allocation strategy model generates four main hypotheses: (1) foreign aid hampers democratic development in general; (2) economic aid strengthens political incumbents' support; (3) democracy aid has no significant impact on political incumbents' support; and (4) when the amount of aid gradually decreases, politicians will allocate less and less aid to influence certain leaders than influence uncertain leaders.

In order to empirically investigate hypotheses, I use a two-stage least square analysis (2SLS) approach to take account of the potential for endogeneity. Specifically, it is possible that foreign aid donors may reward recipient countries with more aid where they expect less prevalence of political clientelism; if this is the case there would be a higher likelihood of economic development and

democratization. As a result of using this approach, I find that foreign aid as a whole might harm democratic consolidation in Sub-Saharan African countries. More specifically, economic aid may increase the likelihood of incumbents' political success whereas democracy aid affects the system in the opposite direction. In summary, I argue that clientelism might be the key variable which links development aid and slow democratic consolidation.

To reveal causal mechanism, I investigate a specific country case: Senegal in Western Africa. In this section, I shed light on the mechanism by which foreign aid influences the extent to which incumbents can maintain political support from voters. In Senegal, incumbent politicians mobilize voters through local political elites. The tradition of clientelistic practices in Senegal dates back to the French colonial era. Politicians provide development projects to local religious leaders in return for the votes. Thus it was inevitable that the ruling party lost political support when the amount of aid gradually decreased during the 1990s. More specifically, they changed aid allocation strategy to maintain a certain level of vote, minimizing involved electoral risk. However it led to the withdrawal of political support from influence certain leaders and the victory of the opposition party in the presidential election in 2000.

Keywords: foreign aid, clientelism, democratic consolidation, incumbency advantage, aid allocation, Senegal.

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Chapter I. Introduction

1.1. Development aid puzzle

How does foreign aid affect democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa? Does foreign aid improve governance of African countries?¹ This research paper is motivated by these two research questions, as they are both important to the field of political economy of development but also controversial within it. There is disagreement amongst economists on the role of foreign aid in the economic growth of developing countries; there is also disagreement amongst political scientists about the role of development aid in the democratization of fledgling democracies. On the one hand, there is research to suggest that in certain cases foreign aid has allowed corrupt politicians and governmental systems to survive amid severe budget crises by enabling them to politically manipulate aid.² In contrast, other research has shown that the international community played a key role in the third wave of democratization by providing a credible pressure on authoritarian regimes by threatening to withdraw foreign aid encouraging donor-driven democratic reform.³

This research paper will focus upon the clientelistic nature of politics and its outcomes on the democracy in Africa. As Stokes (2009) has put it, political clientelism “slows economic development, vitiates democracy, allows dictators to hold onto power longer than they otherwise would” (Stokes 2009, 604). Accordingly, many comparative political scientists have struggled to

1 In this paper, I use the term foreign aid interchangeably with development aid.

2 See, for instance, van de Walle 2001 and van de Walle 2005.

3 See, for instance, Goldsmith 2001, Dunning 2004, and Resnick & van de Walle 2013.

understand the causes, internal dynamics, and the consequences of political clientelism in the development context. (Ibid.)

Moreover, it seems that the existing literature on the relationship between foreign aid and democracy in developing countries has not paid enough attention to political clientelism and its pernicious effects on democratic consolidation in comparative perspective. I would like to therefore assess the impact of aid on the degree of political competition in elections. In doing so, I aim to shed light on the role of development aid on the clientelistic strategy of politicians and its result: incumbents' political support. I will aim to address the following questions:

1. Does foreign aid foster democratic consolidation in terms of political competition?
2. Do economic aid/democratic assistance strengthen linkage between voters and the government party and incumbent president?⁴
3. What impact does change in the amount of aid have on the clientelistic strategy of incumbent politicians?

1.2. Democratic development in Africa in the post-transition period

In this section, I summarize how democracy has evolved in Africa in the post-transition period. The post-transition period can be divided into two

⁴ I use the term democratic assistance interchangeably with democracy aid. The difference between democracy aid and economic aid is explained in the chapter 3.1. The conceptual distinction between them was first suggested by Resnick & van de Walle (2013).

different phases in terms of democratic development: (1) the short-term democratic *transition* period in the first half of the 1990s and (2) the long-term democratic *consolidation* period afterwards as defined by Resnick and van de Walle (2013).⁵ Table 1 illustrates transition and consolidation over these periods.

Table 1. Conceptualizing the democratization trajectory

Democratization trajectory		Components
(1) Democratic <i>transition</i>		Movement to multiparty regime
(2) Democratic <i>consolidation</i>	(a) Avoiding breakdown	Preventing return to one-party regime or a cessation of leader selection via elections
	(b) Avoiding erosion	Preventing deterioration in civil liberties and human rights, disrespect for key institutions and laws, averting elections that are not ‘free and fair’
	(c) Deepening democracy	Strengthening vertical accountability, reinforcing institutions that provide horizontal accountability, and creating competitive party systems

Source: Resnick & van de Walle 2013, 30


Bratton and van de Walle (1997) describe the political trends and key political changes around the period; as part of this description, they identify that the early 1990s witnessed widespread mass political protests demanding political liberalization in Africa. It led to an increasing number of countries which

⁵ It is hard to strictly divide the 1990s into two distinct phases with a specific date. However, most of scholars would agree upon the view that (1) democratic *transition* period: 1989-1994 (the early 1990s) and (2) democratic *consolidation* period: from 1995 onwards. See Bratton & van de Walle (1997) and Resnick & van de Walle (2013) for more details.

experienced transition from one-party regime (authoritarian regime) to multiparty systems with the development of competitive elections. The impact of a series of political innovation on political sphere during this period amounted to that of political independence. (Bratton & van de Walle 1997, 2-9)

This period was primarily characterized by change. First of all, the degree of political competition in the continent was increased. This change is mainly ascribed to the introduction of multiparty regime and competitive legislative election. Secondly, citizens experienced leadership turnover. Before the transition, nearly all of incumbents consolidated their personal power and prevented peaceful political succession from happening. Finally, the rules of the political game had been changed. Constitutional reforms guaranteed political liberty and made electoral competition the fundamental pretense in the political game. (Ibid., 2-9)

Figure 1. How African leaders have left power, by decade



Source: Posner & Young, 2007

Figure 1 illustrates one such characteristic of change during the


transition period: the way in which political leaders left office saw a drastic change during this time. As can be seen, before the 1990s, more than half of the chief executives left power through illegal means such as coup, violent overthrow, or assassination. However, after the transition period, the situation reversed. In the early 2000s, about 80 percent of political incumbents left office as a result of their natural death, voluntary resignation (often constrained by constitutional term limits), or losing an election. This change implies the gradually increasing importance of electoral competition.

It should be noted that this reversal does not necessarily imply that ‘free and fair’ election is enough to empower African voters to check presidential power. It was still the case, for instance, that more than 85 percent of incumbent political leaders get reelected through competitive elections. There were also other limits to the changes occurring, or continuity factors of note. Many political incumbents still enjoyed incumbency advantage in competitive election. Moreover, most of political institutions were not strengthened by the adoption of multiparty election (Posner & Young 2007, 128-131).

The relatively large incumbency advantage in Africa, even after democratic transition, hints at the intractable democratic consolidation. Figure 2 illustrates the tendency of average Political Right (PR) index of Freedom House in African countries from the 1990s to today (Freedom House 2014). The lower the index is, the higher the level of Political Right is in a given country. In the period between the 1990 and 1994, Africa witnessed a sharp decrease in the index, which implies a rapid increase in the political rights level. This change reflects sequentially occurring regime changes in the region over that period.

However, Figure 2 also suggests democratization (in terms of political rights) seemed to have stalled in between 4.2 and 4.6 after 1994. Not only did the rate of increasing political right level gradually diminish, but the trend also seemingly reversed.

Figure 2. Political Right (PR) index of Freedom House in Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: Freedom House online dataset (Freedom House, 2014), drawn by author

1.3. Case, methods, and structure of the study

This research study aims to assess the impact of development aid on democratic consolidation in African countries in the post-transition period (1991-2008). Specifically, the report will investigate the way in which development aid has influenced voters' political support toward political leaders. If aid does reinforce incumbency advantage, it can be said that aid weakens political competitiveness in African democracies. Thus, I put incumbent's clientelistic strategy as the key mediating variable; politicians in recipient countries have discretion as to how aid is allocated to induce maximum political support from

voters. I employ a mixed-methods approach to investigate this relationship, including using theoretical models, quantitative analyses, and historical substantive country-specific approach.

In Chapter II, I begin with the literature review of the impact of aid on democracy. I introduce two competing hypotheses: (1) *promotion* and (2) the *perversity thesis*. In doing so, I identify the causal mechanism at work between the two theories often overlooked in the literature. I will explain the definition of political clientelism by reviewing existing literature, and then introduce a sequential game and a simple formal model to build a linkage between development aid and aid allocation strategy of politicians as a patron. This model generates four main hypotheses.

In Chapter III, I perform quantitative analyses from the continental perspective. After explaining the research design, modelling and data used, I address three questions using the empirical approach:

1. Does foreign aid consolidate democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa?
2. Does aid (economic/democracy) increase the vote share of government party?
3. Does aid (economic/democracy) increase the vote share of incumbent president?

The results of the analyses illustrates that development aid, in particular economic aid, might hamper democratic consolidation in Africa by strengthening incumbency advantage in elections. I conclude the chapter by verifying the validity of my main hypotheses and discussing the implications of the results.

In Chapter IV, I focus on one case: Senegal in West Africa. I investigate

(1) the historical origin and evolution of political clientelism in Senegal and (2) the role of development aid in deciding the result of the presidential election in 2000. In this chapter, I reaffirm that aid help incumbents' hold onto office in Africa, due to its value as electoral resources. Moreover, I also demonstrate that the amount of aid influences aid allocation strategy of politicians.

In the last chapter, I will summarize the main arguments of this study. In addition, I will provide a description of the policy implications which would be fruitful for development practitioners and program implementing managers.

Chapter II. Literature Review & Theoretical Framework

2.1. Literature review of foreign aid and democracy

The existing academic literature on the effect of foreign aid on democracy can be divided into two main theoretical positions: the *perversity thesis* and *promotion thesis*. Scholars who support *perversity thesis* believe that foreign aid simply aggravates the situation in developing countries where political institutions are, by and large, malfunctioning by providing recipient governments rent-seeking opportunities (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2009; Brautigam & Knack 2004 as cited in Dietrich & Wright 2015 and Aronow, Carnegie & Marinov 2014; van de Walle 2001). Some scholars regard receiving development aid as curse similar to that often described as the ‘*resource curse*’ (oil curse) (Ross 2001; Djankov et al. 2008 as cited in Dietrich & Wright 2015 and Aronow, Carnegie & Marinov 2014). The effectiveness issue is not only undermined by domestic politics in recipient countries but also by problems inherent in international community. Donor’s allocation of aid is heavily influenced by geopolitical and economic incentives, and donor fragmentation lowers bureaucratic quality of recipient governments (Alesina & Dollar 2000 as cited in Aronow, Carnegie & Marinov 2014; Knack & Rahman 2007).

In contrast, there are also scholars who support *promotion thesis*. Their works suggest that foreign aid promotes democratization in fledgling democracies. The logic of conditionality underwrites this positive relationship; specifically, conditions attached to development aid give incentives to recipient governments to implement some political reforms conducive to democratization. (Goldsmith 2001; Dunning 2004) There is empirical evidence that suggests that

economic aid accelerated transition to multiparty politics and democracy aid fosters democratic consolidation. (Dietrich & Wright 2015) More recent works also offer evidence that formal democratization and transition to multiparty competition increased welfare expenditure such as education (Stasavage 2005; Harding & Stasavage 2014).

In this chapter, I argue that focusing on domestic politics in developing countries might help to solve this conflict. I suggest that political clientelism is the underlying causal mechanism which explains the impact of aid on democratic consolidation in Africa. Incumbents use their discretion over allocation of foreign aid as electoral strategy to foster voters' support in the elections. This leads to long-standing and persistent political survival of winners in African elections. My argument shares the theoretical focus of the perversity hypothesis on politicians and weak political institutions in recipient countries. However, my stance differs slightly in that my study suggests that foreign aid could help incumbent politicians even in a situation where *competitive election* takes place and aid is distributed by them *in a legal manner*. In other words, development aid might bolster incumbency advantage, thereby hampering political competitiveness in the elections.

2.2. Theoretical framework: clientelism as a causal mechanism

Clientelism exists in all politics. The forms it takes, its extent, and its political functions vary enormously, however, across time and place. (van de Walle 2007)

Understanding political clientelism has become one of the key issues in

the political economy of development as it is widely regarded as the main obstacle for good governance in developing countries.⁶ As Rodden and Wibbels (2013, 3) put it, the international development community realized that “good governance is the key to improving development outcomes.” However, clientelism significantly and pervasively undermines the responsiveness and accountability of the recipient governments.

Politicians offer material benefits in exchange for the political support of their clients, rather than offer policy options that take into account voters’ preferences. It is not citizens who hold politicians and elected officials accountable for their performance, but patrons who hold their clients accountable for their vote.⁷ This prevents the democratization of the Third wave democracies but also undermines the provision of public goods, such as well-organized transportation system, stable supply of electricity and water, low levels of corruption and rent-seeking behaviors - all crucial ingredients of economic growth (Rodden & Wibbels 2012; Stokes 2005; Hicken 2011).⁸

Additionally, clientelism has also been identified as a key to understand political behaviors in developing countries according to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007). The general theoretical explanation of responsible party government well fits into the affluent capitalist democracies while it fails to explain what happens in the poor democracies. Unlike their counterpart, the success of politicians in


6 Henceforth, I will use the term clientelism interchangeably with political clientelism.

7 Stokes (2005) named the latter mechanism as *perverse accountability* “The other side is perverse accountability: the machine’s ability to hold voters accountable for their votes.” (Stokes 2005, 323)

8 “Better a concrete material benefit today than the promise of some policy benefit tomorrow” particularly for the poor. (Hicken 2011, 299)

developing countries does not lie in whether they deliver public goods which citizens want nor do they bring redistribution of income and wealth through various policy measures. (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, 1-2) “Instead, *clientelistic accountability represents a transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services.*” (Ibid., 2; Italics in original)

Figure 3. GDP per capita (2009) and level of clientelism in various measures



Source: Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP), Duke University & The World Bank Online Statistics Database, drawn by the author.

In this manner, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) argue that understanding the clientelistic nature of politics in developing countries is of crucial importance for three reasons. Firstly, the programmatic linkage between politicians and citizens offered by the standard responsible party does not fully explain the clientelistic linkage prevalent in most of developing countries (as mentioned above). Secondly, clientelism did not gradually disappear in developed countries such as Italy, Japan, Austria, and Belgium as the modernization theorists maintained would occur. This phenomenon proved the resilience and persistence

of clientelism. Thirdly, the success of economic reform and growth might be dependent upon how the reform plan overcomes the politicians' resistance to keep clientelistic network intact and stay in power as the international donors have realized. (Ibid., 2-7)

2.2.1. Definition of clientelism and explaining models

This section will briefly introduce (1) the key concepts of clientelism, (2) the difference between clientelistic competition and programmatic policy competition, and (3) how to classify various clientelism-related concepts in distributive politics such as patronage, pork-barrel, and vote-buying. According to Hicken (2011), clientelist relationship is composed of four key elements: (1) dyadic relationships, (2) contingency, (3) hierarchy, and (4) iteration. *Dyadic relationship* means that the patron and client keep direct, personal interactions and transactions. If the clientelistic network composed of the patron, various levels of brokers, and clients, then each pair of relationship such as the patron and the high-level broker, high- and low-level brokers, and brokers and clients keep face-to-face interaction. *Contingency* means that the preferential benefit from the patron is always delivered with strings attached in the form of political support. The primary question which politicians in clientelistic settings ask their target beneficiaries is 'Did you vote for me?' (Chandra 2004 as cited in Hicken 2011, 294). This interaction demonstrates the quid pro quo nature of the relationship. *Hierarchy* means the asymmetry between the patron and clients in their social status, political power, and economic resources, and even information that they retain. Of these, it is the view of this author that economic status is the essential difference between them (Hicken 2011).

Table 2. Modes of citizen-politician linkage

	Strategic linkages		
	Programmatic valence policy competition	Programmatic policy competition	Clientelistic competition
1. Contingency of exchange: Benefit tied to vote? (“targeted” delivery)	No	No (indirect exchange)	Yes (direct exchange)
2. Nature of goods offered to voters: Private, club, or public goods?	Collective and club (“pork”) goods (“valence competition”)	Club goods (“spatial-directional” competition; redistribution)	Private or club goods
3. Predictability: Compliance of individuals/groups responding to politicians’ actions?	Low	Variable	High
4. Elasticity: Change in constituents’ vote choice due to politician’s stimulus?	Small	Medium	Large
5. Monitoring and external enforcement of the exchange?	No	No	Variable: 1. Individual surveillance 2. Group oversight and self-policing

Source: Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, 21

Iteration is the last crucial element of clientelism due to the property of clientelistic exchange; in other words, the non-simultaneity of the exchange. Two parties exchange promised benefits and political support based on credibility toward each other. Repeated interaction is the prerequisite of trust-building between them. Besides, provided enough numbers of iterated interactions, the


patron can predict and monitor behaviors of clients. Meanwhile, history of repeated interactions between the incumbent and voters in clientelistic setting reinforce the political advantage of incumbent vis-à-vis the challenger. The competitor faces a disadvantage because she lacks credibility as an alternative provider of clientelistic good. (Hicken 2011; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, 12-13)

Table 2 summarizes the differences between programmatic competition in affluent democracies and clientelistic competition in poor democracies in terms of five concepts: (1) *contingency*, (2) *nature of goods*, (3) *predictability*, (4) *elasticity*, (5) and *monitoring and external enforcement of the exchange*. In short, clientelistic offer composed of private or club good is contingent upon the client's political support. Since this exchange is quid pro quo type of transaction, the patron can predict the electoral return on the norm of reciprocity and expect that his strategic investment has huge impact on voters' choice (high elasticity). Finally, the incumbent monitors and externally enforces the transfer to deter the exit of voters who do not reciprocate with votes for their patron (Hicken 2011, 292-94; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, 21-24).

How can we differentiate between clientelism and other types of benefits? Here, I briefly summarize the discussion of Hicken (2011) again for reference. Put simply, whether other benefits such as patronage, vote buying, and pork-barrel fall into the category of clientelism largely depends on the contingency and the iteration of transactions. Patronage is regard as an equivalent term for clientelism for many authors; however, it could also imply one specific type of transfer in the form of public sector jobs in certain contexts. We can classify vote buying as clientelism only when it is contingent upon voter's choice and it is not

one-shot interaction. Figure 4 illustrates the categorization of clientelism and other benefits. (Hicken 2011, 295-96)

Figure 4. Clientelism versus other benefits



Source: Hicken 2011, 296

2.2.2. Political clientelism in Africa

In this thesis, I address the following research question: does foreign aid foster democratic consolidation in Africa? I argue that the key determinant on whether foreign aid positively influences democracies in Africa might be the persistence and salience of informal political institutions in the form of clientelism. Though I explored the general theory of clientelism in the previous section, I will describe distinct characteristics of political clientelism in Africa and its possible linkage with development aid.

According to van de Walle (2007), political clientelism in Africa can be

easily distinguished from other regions in the world due to the lower level of economic income, less developed state apparatus, and long history of authoritarian regime. He elucidated two main differences: (1) elite clientelism rather than mass clientelism and (2) prebendalism rather than patronage.

In this case, elite clientelism argues that the politicians use state resources to forge intra-elite accommodation to maintain political stability. Since most African states are multiethnic societies, the argument provides an explanation for the political cooperation between elites from different ethnic backgrounds that is observed in practice. Thus clientelism in Africa did not function as a redistributive measure and delivered its benefit to only a limited number of populations. (van de Walle 2007, 50-63)


On the other hand, prebendalism means that politicians distribute public office to allow their clients to gain personal access to and control over state revenue. Patronage indicates the practice of providing political clienteles jobs and services by using state resources in return for their political support. Prebendalism is different from patronage in that it often undermines the rule of law, while patronage practice does not (Ibid., 50-63).

Indeed, it seems evident that politicians' behavior is, to a certain extent, constrained by formal institutional rules after democratic transition as Posner and Young (2007) have suggested. However, unsurprisingly, recent empirical evidence reveals that politicians are likely to depend upon clientelistic practice in a persistent manner, and this proclivity has increased over the last two decades. This implies the same likelihood of foreign aid as clientelistic end of political incumbents as before democratic transition, though the clientelistic practice

could have evolved into more nuanced way.

The results of a survey study conducted by Lindberg and Morrison (2008) in Ghana suggest that political competition may encourage a higher degree of clientelism, thereby causing more political corruption. The same trend is echoed in the survey results from the Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP) by Duke University (2013).

Figure 5. Clientelistic efforts and capacity comparison (Now vs. 10 years ago)



Source: Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP) reproduced by author

Figure 5 demonstrates that the level of clientelistic effort and the capacity of politicians has been maintained (and even increased) in some countries in Africa. As can be seen, the majority of respondents answered 3 (about the same amount now) or higher than 3 (somewhat greater/much greater amount) to the question of whether politicians make greater or lesser effort/have greater or lesser capacity to provide preferential benefits to individuals and small

groups of voters than they did about ten years ago.⁹

Among major changes in foreign aid practice, focus on ownership also may further strengthen the likelihood of clientelistic practices in African countries. Since the early 2000s, the discussion within the international donor community has shifted emphasis onto the ownership of recipient governments and away from identifying why foreign aid has not stimulated economic growth to the extent that was initially expected. This focus upon ownership is expressed clearly in the statement of the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* in 2005: “[p]artner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate.” (OECD 2008, 3) Though the commitment to ownership would increase state capacity for formulating and implementing policies, it should be also noted that recipient governments might prefer discretionary, if not programmatic, distribution of benefits with a higher degree of freedom in decision-making along aid-allocation processes. (Resnick 2011)

Jablonski (2014) has provided a good explanation of this mechanism as a result of a combination of electoral incentives and informational advantages of local politicians over donors. In this regard, I presume that foreign aid strengthens incumbent’s political standing against opposition across the continent, thereby undermining fledgling democracies.

9 “Experts who complete the survey are individuals who know about their country’s parties, campaigns, and elections because they learned about these subject matters in their university training. They teach, or actually observe and research these subjects in their professional life. Most of them are located in university political science departments, but they may also be affiliated with law faculties, sociology, history or public policy departments or work in independent research institutes or non-profit agencies and interest associations.” (Kitschelt 2013, 10)

“[E]lectoral strategies play a strong and consistent role in aid in Kenya is biased in favor of an incumbent’s political supporters. I also argue that this bias arises because of inefficiencies in aid allocation. Donor agencies often lack information about who is most deserving of aid funds and thus delegate to recipient governments considerable discretion over the allocation of aid. Incumbents take advantage of this discretion and their informational advantages over donors in order to allocate more aid to the voters that are most likely to help them win electoral contests.” (Jablonski 2014, 294)


How about democracy aid? Does democracy aid promote democratization in Africa as it is planned? Democracy aid fundamentally differs from economic aid in terms of its purpose and modalities. Initially, democracy aid was intended to support elections; as it has developed, its focus has shifted and is now expanding to include strengthening civil society and supporting institutional reform of legislatures and the judiciary in developing countries. (Carothers & Ottaway 2000 as cited in Resnick & van de Walle 2013; Dietrich & Wright 2015). According to Resnick and van de Walle (2013), democracy aid has played an important role in advancing fragile democracies in Africa by helping recipient countries’ institution-building with regard to democratic elections, while it did not play a significant role in the democratic transition in the early 1990s.

2.2.3. Development aid and incumbents’ electoral advantage

In this section, I will explain how incumbent politicians can divert foreign aid into their clientelistic resource with a sequential game. The logic of the sequential game is based on the Buchanan’s Samaritan’s dilemma. A Samaritan (Player A) wants to help somebody (Player B). However, Player B has

incentives not to do his best because he knows Player A will always help himself. Thus, Player B gets away with free-riding. Here's the Samaritan's dilemma (Player A). In other words, Player A's help could hamper Player B's incentives to work.¹⁰ As in this dilemma, donors want to help recipient countries, so they provide foreign aid with them for developmental purpose. However, incumbents in recipient countries have incentives to allocate aid in favor of their political gain, not for satisfying citizens' needs. Therefore, donors have same dilemma with the Samaritan in the Samaritan's dilemma.

Figure 6. Sequential game of donors and incumbents in recipient countries¹¹



In the donor-incumbent sequential game, there are two players: a donor

¹⁰ See Schmidtchen 2002, 472-474 and Gibson et al. 2005, 35-41 for more details such two-by-two matrix games.

¹¹ See Schmidtchen 2002, 477. A dynamic one-shot game between Samaritan and its opponent is presented in Figure 3. I modified the payoffs of the game a little bit so that game captures more exactly the essence of aid-involved situation.

and an incumbent politician in a recipient country. Donors include bilateral donors, and multilateral donors who offer official development aid which requires recipient countries' agreement to accept. Donors can offer aid with two different choices: they can provide aid with their own allocation plan, or without plan. When incumbents received aid and they have discretion over distribution of aid, they can allocate aid based on citizens' needs or their electoral strategy. In contrast, when donors provide aid with an associated plan, incumbents can simply accept the offer or reject it.

In practice, the extent to which donors get involved in policy formulation varies depending on the type of aid.¹² In most of cases, donors have participated in various levels of the decision-making processes in the past because they did not trust politicians and government officials in recipient countries. In their view, recipients do not serve citizen's needs and often lack capability to formulate a policy and execute the plan (van de Walle 2001, 201-210).¹³ This has been identified as one of the main problems inherent in development aid; it is therefore unsurprising that first important agenda in the Paris Declaration 2005 was ownership.

However, for the sake of simplification, I make the assumption that that there are only two kinds of situations in the model. With a backward induction, incumbents' best response is (1) to allocate based on electoral strategy in the first situation, and (2) to accept donors' offer in the second situation. Donors' best response depends on the payoffs of A and B. It is evident that donors prefer the

12 See Gibson et al. 2005, 112-128 for more details.

13 See van de Walle 2005, 19-28 for more details.

situation in which incumbent politicians receive aid without any predetermined plan and they take initiative in allocation process of aid to improve their citizens' welfare. Yet this option is removed by incumbents' choice. Thus donors are forced to choose less preferred options. They could offer aid with their own plan (when $\alpha > \beta$) or offer aid without plan and see incumbents take advantage of aid to increase reelection probability (when $\alpha < \beta$). In other words, equilibrium could be (A, C) or (B, C').

The bottom line is that politicians in recipient countries could strengthen incumbency advantage further in elections with foreign aid in either case. Even in the second situations, donors cannot prevent incumbents from influencing donors' decision-making process. As Jablonski (2014) has identified, incumbent politicians have informational advantage. This implies that even with a predetermined plan, in the implementing process donors should consult government high officials and politicians in recipient countries to obtain relevant information. Thus, incumbents can induce donors to reallocate aid projects to where they want to foster political supports. In addition, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that incumbents may take credit for distributed aid benefits even when they are wholly delivered by international donors. (Resnick 2011)

In summation, donors may fail to deliver aid to citizens who are in need of aid projects while incumbents might enjoy their informational advantage in allocating aid for increasing their reelection chances. It is almost impossible for donors to hold incumbent politicians accountable for aid allocation based on

citizens' needs.¹⁴ This leads to the main hypothesis that development aid, particularly economic aid, would play an important role in fostering political supports toward incumbents in legislative/presidential elections in recipient countries.

2.2.4. Aid allocation strategies: supply side


Next, I will account for possible strategic choice of the incumbent and its result, employing Magaloni's portfolio diversification model (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros & Estevez 2007). In their model, they assumed incumbent politicians strategically choose a portfolio composed of the mixture of public good and clientelistic good which minimize the risk involved in securing a fixed amount of vote. In other words, the key question which the ruling party faces is "how to minimize involved risk when securing a desirable level of electoral support?" Two kinds of transfer are given to the incumbents. They can invest resources either in private good, of which transaction cost is high, or invest in collective good provision, of which transaction cost is low. However, it should also be noted that public good is a high risk high return type of investment while a private good is low risk low return type. This is because a public good is not excludable. It increases the welfare of all citizens but the politician cannot suggest *quid pro quo* exchange with this kind of good. In other words, voters are not bound to vote for her since they know that she cannot prevent them from

14 See Schmidtchen 2002. He demonstrates that solving the Samaritan's dilemma needs Samaritan's delegation of the power of decision as to help to the third party such as courts. In reality, international/bilateral donors do not have any other party to delegate their power of decision. This implies that incumbent politicians in recipient countries could always take advantage of foreign aid for their own political gain.

access to it. (Ibid, 187-192)

I employ a simple analogy based on this model, adding a exogenously given variable D , the amount of development aid in that year.¹⁵ Instead of diversifying the investment of public good and clientelistic good, incumbent politicians allocate aid to local political elites. They could be traditional chiefs, ethnic leaders, or religious leaders who influence their followers' vote choice. There are two kinds of elites: a small portion of them (influence certain leaders) who can secure exact number of votes and a large portion of them (influence uncertain leaders) whose influence are not sure to deliver the desirable number of votes to incumbent politicians. Incumbents allocate aid to constituencies where local elites exercise their power to voters' vote choice.

Figure 7. Incumbent choice set and expected payoffs



Source: Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, & Estevez 2007, 189, modified by this author

The critical assumptions underlying the model are discussed in detail

15 This means that the model, critical assumptions, the solution, and the interpretation presented here is nearly identical to Magaloni et al. (2007)'s model except that I inserted new exogenously given variable, D (the amount of foreign aid) in the existing model. I also added some graphs drawn by myself.


below:

1. The electoral return of influence for uncertain leaders (majority) exceed that of influence for certain leaders (minority) due to the difference in the number of them; $Y < E[X]$;
2. 'X' is a random variable which indicates electoral return of influence uncertain leaders with a known variance;
3. The incumbent politicians, who are risk-averse, try to secure a certain vote level for an electoral victory with as low risk as possible;
4. The electoral return of aid investment to local leaders is proportional to the amount of aid distributed to them. More incumbents deliver development aid to local leaders, more electoral support toward them can leaders return.

Figure 7 illustrates the incumbent choice set and their associated expected payoffs. They allocate $D\alpha$ of development aid to uncertain leaders and $D(1-\alpha)$ of aid to influence certain leaders, where D indicates the total amount of aid in that year. Allocating aid to uncertain elites entails certain amount of risk due to the limited influence they hold. However, politicians have to invest aid to influence uncertain leaders because they outnumber certain leaders. In other words, this implies $E[X]$ is larger than Y . Therefore, it is possible to model the vote which incumbents receive as determined by the following equation:

$$V = D\alpha E[X] + D(1 - \alpha)Y$$

Figure 8. The relationship between the vote, the amount of aid, $E[X]$, and Y



In this setting, the incumbent tries to find an optimal portfolio made up of distribution to two types of local elites: Influence certain leaders and influence uncertain leaders. Politicians try to mobilize voters through these local elites. Incumbents offer development projects and budget as material benefits to leaders in return for votes. Yet incumbents should allocate aid strategically because their investment involves risk. This means that influence uncertain leaders could fail to deliver promised number of votes due to their limited political influence on voters. Certain leaders do not involve risk while they are minority. In contrast, uncertain leaders are majority while they involve a certain extent of risk. Therefore, risk-averse politicians prefer minimizing risks with securing a certain level of votes. In other words, the optimal portfolio of incumbents' investment minimizes the variance in electoral returns (risk) with satisfying exogenously given target level of political support (surely more than majority). The solution might lie somewhere between a portfolio with all uncertain leaders and one with all certain leaders. Hence we put the solution as a portfolio composed of a proportion α of investment in influence uncertain leaders and the remainder $(1 - \alpha)$ of investment in influence certain leaders. The risk measured by the variance in vote returns is given by:

$$S = D^2 \alpha^2 \sigma_x^2, \text{ where } \sigma_{xy} = \sigma_y = 0$$


A constrained risk minimization of given vote constraint gives the optimal proportion of development aid allocation: (λ is a Lagrange multiplier which means the acceptable level of electoral risk to politicians):

$$\alpha^* = \frac{\lambda(E[X] - Y)}{2D\sigma^2}$$

The interpretation of the solution can be defines as follows: all else being equal, the proportion of allocations to influence certain leaders will be smaller (α^* is higher):

1. The smaller the total amount of development aid (D) in that year
2. The smaller the risk of aid allocation to uncertain leaders (σ)
3. The higher the incumbents' risk-aversion (λ)
4. The higher the difference between expected return of aid allocation to two types of leaders ($E[X] - Y$)

Figure 9. The change of aid allocation when the amount of aid decreases



Using this model, I would like to focus on the change of the optimal

proportion of aid allocation when the amount of aid changes. Other variables such as the degree of incumbents' risk aversion are endogenously determined unlike the amount of foreign aid. It is evident that the optimal proportion is inversely proportional to the total sum of aid. When the amount of aid increases, politicians expect higher level of electoral support with increased clientelistic resources, regardless of the changes in proportion. In contrast, when the amount of aid decreases, incumbents have to adjust the proportion of aid allocation to sustain a desirable level of vote.

The solution predicts that politicians will invest more of aid to uncertain leaders who would return more political support toward them with uncertainty. In other words, they are forced to take certain amount of risk since the number of influence certain leaders is smaller. As a result, incumbent politicians invest less and less aid to the minority, as shown in Figure 9. It is therefore not only the case that the relative proportion of influence certain leaders decreases, but also the absolute amount of aid allocation to them decreases at a faster rate. As a result of this finding, I expect it is more likely that incumbent politicians are finding it increasingly difficult to stay in power due to the gradual loss of political support from the small number of influence certain leaders.

2.3. Main hypotheses

Taking these discussions into account, I suggest four hypotheses:

1. *Negative effect hypothesis*: foreign aid *hampers* democratic development in general; (to be verified in the chapter III)
2. *Economic aid as clientelistic resource hypothesis*: economic aid *strengthens* political incumbents' support; (to be verified in the chapter III and IV)
3. *Democracy aid as non-clientelistic resource hypothesis*: democracy aid *has no significant impact* on political incumbents' support. (to be verified in the chapter III);
4. *Decreasing aid and changes in allocation strategy hypothesis*: When the amount of aid gradually *decreases*, politicians will allocate *less and less* aid to influence certain leaders than influence uncertain leaders and it would lead to the failure of staying in power. In other words, incumbents invest aid to influence uncertain leaders at risk to secure a certain level of votes. (to be verified in the chapter III and IV).

Chapter III. Quantitative Analysis: the Continental Perspective

In order to empirically investigate these hypotheses, I use a two-stage least square analysis (2SLS) approach to take account of the potential for endogeneity. Specifically, it is possible that foreign aid donors may reward recipient countries with more aid where they expect less prevalence of political clientelism; if this is the case there would be a higher likelihood of economic development and democratization. As a result of using this approach, I find that foreign aid as a whole might harm democratic consolidation in Sub-Saharan African countries. More specifically, economic aid may increase the likelihood of incumbents' political success whereas democracy aid affects the system in the opposite direction. In summary, I argue that clientelism might be the key variable which links development aid and slow democratic consolidation.

3.1. Research design, model, and data

I test three hypotheses in this chapter (as defined in the previous section). Firstly, I test the general hypothesis that foreign aid undermined democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. I used the Polity IV (revised) index¹⁶ as the dependent variable of the first analysis, because it is regarded as the standard measure in the literature on democratization (Aronow, Carnegie & Marinov 2014). The index is composed of evaluations on five categories such as Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, Openness of Executive Recruitment, Constraints on Chief Executive, Regulation of participation, and Competitiveness of

¹⁶ Revised Combined Polity Score, the name of variable in the original dataset is POLITY2

Participation. The scale ranges from -10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic) (Marshall & Jaggers 2014).

Table 3. Summary Statistics Table

	Mean	Standard Error	Min	Max
Aid	4.78	1.14	0.3	8
Economic Aid	3.67	0.79	0.2	6
Democracy Aid	1.11	0.61	0.0	3
Inflation	2.44	0.95	1.2	8
Women In Parliament	19.65	3.88	8.3	32
log GDP pc	7.07	0.91	4.8	10
log Population	8.90	1.25	5.9	12
Civil War	0.19	0.37	0.0	2
Oil rents	1.40	2.46	0.0	10
IMF Programme	0.48	0.44	0.0	1
Polity2 IV index	0.59	5.51	-10.0	10
Vote Share of Government Parties	66.06	19.34	12.2	100
Vote Share of Incumbent President	62.63	20.88	26.6	100
N	684			

The dependent variables with regard to political incumbents' support are: (1) the total vote share of all government parties; and (2) the vote share of incumbent in the 1st/only round from the DPI (Database of Political Institutions). Other than these two variables, I used the dataset provided by Dietrich and

Wright (2015)¹⁷. For independent variables, foreign aid commitment data from AidData 2.0 is employed, and operationalized in the same way as they did¹⁸. Economic aid includes economic infrastructure and service aid, budget support aid, commodity and general program aid, debt relief aid, social sector aid, environment, and multi-sector aid. In contrast, democracy aid entails democracy and civil society aid (DCA) and democracy and governance aid (DGA). (Dietrich and Wright 2015, 222)

To address endogeneity concerns, I performed two stage least square analyses (2SLS) with a panel data set which included 38 countries over the period 1991-2008. I removed some data from the original dataset in the analyses because of missing values¹⁹. Two instrumental variables – *Inflation* and *WiP* (women in parliament) are employed for economic aid and democracy aid, respectively. These variables represent information from donor countries. This approach is a simplified adaptation of the instrumental variable approach used by Dietrich and Wright (2015). Descriptive analyses revealed that the domestic inflation rate and the percentage of women in parliaments in donor countries are highly correlated with *economic aid* and *democracy aid*, respectively, but it is not likely that they directly influence the dependent variable, the political support toward incumbent politicians in recipient countries.

Therefore, these characteristics satisfy the basic conditions that are

17 I am very grateful to Professor Joseph Wright (Pennsylvania State University) and Professor Simone Dietrich (University of Missouri, Columbia) for sharing their original data. All the quantitative analyses here are performed with their data.

18 For example, Aid is: $\ln\left(\frac{Aid_{t-1} + Aid_{t-2} + Aid_{t-3}}{3}\right)$ where Aid is constant dollar aid commitments per capita.

19 Analysis with one way fixed effect (country)

required in order to employ an instrumental variable approach in 2SLS analysis. In the previous study, various other variables are tested on the premise that they might be somehow correlated with instruments which would imply that they might indirectly affect democratic outcome in recipient countries. (Dietrich & Wright 2015)

My model is composed of the following two-stage equations, as defined below:

$$\begin{cases} Foreign\ Aid_i = \pi_0 + \pi_1 Inflation_i + v_i \\ Polity\ IV\ Index_i = \beta_0 + \beta_i \widehat{Foreign\ Aid}_i + u_i \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} Economic\ Aid_i = \pi_0 + \pi_1 Inflation_i + v_i \\ Vote\ Share\ of\ Incumbents_i = \beta_0 + \beta_i \widehat{Economic\ Aid}_i + u_i \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} Democracy\ Aid_i = \pi_0 + \pi_1 Women\ in\ Parliament\ (WiP)_i + v_i \\ Vote\ Share\ of\ Incumbents_i = \beta_0 + \beta_i \widehat{Democracy\ Aid}_i + u_i \end{cases}$$

3.2 Aid, democracy, and incumbent's support

3.2.1. Foreign aid and democracies

In this section, I investigate the general impact of foreign aid on democracy in Africa in the post-transition period. Polity IV index is the dependent variable which measures the level of democracy in a certain country. Using OLS and 2SLS (IV) analyses, I test the first hypothesis that foreign aid might hamper democratization in Africa.

Table 4 presents the results from the tests for the general impact of foreign aid (the total sum of economic aid and democracy aid) on the democracy outcome variables previously defined. Column 1 reports the OLS estimate and

column 2 reports the IV estimate. As can be seen from the results, *Aid* is statistically significant in both columns. The sign of *Aid* term is changed from positive to negative, indicating why the instrumental variable approach is useful. As expected, donor countries reward recipient countries depending on their democratic performance; the results suggest democracy index is positively correlated with foreign aid.

Table 4. Summary Table: Foreign aid and Polity IV index


	OLS	IV
<i>Aid</i>	0.510 (0.157)***	-1.562 (0.803)*
R^2	0.15	
N	684	684
		<i>Aid</i>
Inflation		0.224*** (0.0391)
F-test		14.80

By addressing the potential for endogeneity, it becomes explicit that foreign aid may negatively influence democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. The regression coefficient of *Aid* term is -1.562 in the IV result column. This indicates that the expected change of Polity IV index is 1.562 decreases with respect to one unit increase in *Aid* holding all other variables fixed. Since *Aid* represents the average of aid per capita for last three years in log scale (See footnote 14), one unit increase means six-fold increase in aid per capita (USD)²⁰.

20 More exactly, one unit increase in *Aid* means 3×10^{-2} (6.155) times increase in aid per capita in last year, or 272% increase in aid per capita for last three years. The same holds for the next two analyses.

According to this prediction, 0.45 decreases in the Polity IV index in a recipient country would be expected with two-fold increase of *Aid*.²¹ *Inflation*, the instrumental variable, is positively correlated with *Aid* and statistically significant in the first stage. The p-value of Hausman Test for the IV model is close to 0.²² (See Table 7 in the end of this chapter)

Figure 10. Scatterplot (OLS) and Regression coefficients of Aid term in Polity IV index regression



3.2.2. Foreign aid and vote share of government party

Table 5 reports the results from the tests for the impact of economic aid and democracy aid on the vote share of government parties. The first two columns present the effect of economic aid. As can be seen from the results, *Economic Aid* is positive and statistically significant in both models. This finding

21 As *Aid* term is defined as $\ln(\bar{Aid}_{t-1} + \bar{Aid}_{t-2} + \bar{Aid}_{t-3}/3)$, $\ln(4/3) * (-1.562)$ yields (-0.45) .

22 The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the *Aid* term (*Economic Aid* term, *Democracy Aid* term in the following analyses) is an exogenous variable. The fact that p-value of Hausman Test for the IV model is close to 0 implies that we can reject the null of exogeneity. Thus, the *Aid* term (*Economic Aid* term, *Democracy Aid* term) can be treated as endogenous in the model. The same holds for the following analyses. See <http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rivregresspostestimation.pdf> for more details.

hints at the possibility of aid allocation based on clientelistic logic, specifically location and timing.


Table 5. Summary Table of Foreign Aid on Vote Share of Government Party

	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Economic Aid	15.553 (7.619)**	65.604 (32.350)**		
Democracy Aid			17.021 (8.405)**	-44.647 (215.197)
R^2	0.12		0.12	
N	123	123	123	123
		Economic Aid		Democracy Aid
Inflation		0.221*** (0.0807)		
Women in Parliament				0.0168 (0.0371)
F-test		3.325		5.818

Moreover, the findings suggest that receiving economic aid bolsters incumbency advantage for members of parliament in local elections. The coefficient of *Economic Aid* is about four-times larger in the IV estimate than in OLS estimate. This suggests that the influence of *Economic Aid* might be stronger when taking into account the potential for endogeneity. The regression coefficient of *Economic Aid* term is 65.604 in the IV result column. This indicates that the expected change of the vote share of government party in legislative election is 65.604 percent increase with respect to one unit increase in *Economic Aid* holding all other variables fixed. Since *Economic Aid* is in log scale, one unit increase means six-fold increase in aid per capita (USD). According to this prediction, incumbents would expect 18.87 percent increase in

the vote share in legislative elections with two times increase in total amount of *Economic Aid*.

Figure 11. Regression coefficients of Economic and Democracy Aid terms in Vote Share of Government Party regression



The next two columns represent the effect of democracy aid. As in Table 4, *Inflation* is positively correlated with *Economic Aid* and statistically significant. *Democracy Aid* is positive and significant in the OLS, while neither positive nor significant in the IV estimate. This result does not provide evidence supporting a meaningful interpretation of the data because *Women in Parliament* is not significant in the first stage. The p-values of Hausman test for first and second IV estimate are close to 0 and 0.0041, respectively. (See Table 8 in the end of this chapter)

3.2.3. Foreign aid and vote share of incumbent president

Table 6 presents the findings of tests on the impact of foreign aid on the vote share of incumbent president in the presidential elections in the first or only round. As in Table 5, the first two columns reports the impact of economic aid, and the next two columns report findings on democracy aid. The sign of

Economic Aid is both positive but statistically significant only in the IV estimate. This suggests that economic aid may play an important role in strengthening sitting presidents' electoral advantage in presidential elections as in the case of local elections. The results also suggest that incumbents might leverage their discretionary power to decide when, where, and to whom to allocate aid projects for their electoral success in the post-transition period.

Table 6. Summary Table of Foreign Aid on Percentage of Vote for President (First/Only Round)

	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Economic Aid	7.899 (10.081)	71.227 (36.654)*		
Democracy Aid			5.027 (6.583)	-17.686 (18.585)
R^2	0.15		0.15	
N	69	69	69	69
		Economic Aid		Democracy Aid
Inflation		0.171** (0.0653)		
Women in Parliament				0.0428* (0.0256)
F-test		2.437		6.266

These findings are consistent with the low number of peaceful turnovers of political power in Africa; there had been only eight times of incumbents' leaving office after losing presidential elections (Dietrich and Wright 2015)²³. It is also notable that the size of the coefficient of *Economic Aid* in the IV estimate

23 Benin 2001, Cape Verde 2001, Ghana 2000, Guinea-Bissau 2000, Kenya 2002, Madagascar 1996, Mali 2002, and Senegal 2000 (Dietrich & Wright 2015)


is approximately nine-times larger than the corresponding coefficient in the OLS estimate. It is very likely that donor countries reward fledgling democracies which hold competitive elections, conducive to democratic consolidation.

When accounting for the potential of endogeneity, the magnitude of the impact of economic aid on the political support toward incumbent presidents becomes much larger. The regression coefficient of *Economic Aid* term is 71.227 in the IV result column. This indicates that the expected change of the vote share of government party in legislative election is 71.227 percent increase with respect to one unit increase in *Economic Aid* holding all other variables fixed. Since *Economic Aid* is in log scale, one unit increase means six-fold increase in aid per capita (USD). According to this prediction, incumbents would expect 20.49 percent increase in the vote share in the first/only round of presidential elections with two times increase in aid per capita of *Economic Aid*. The sign of *Inflation* is positive and significant in the first stage. The p-value of Hausman Test for *Economic Aid* is close to zero (0).

In the next two columns, it is notable that the sign of *Democracy Aid* is changed from positive in OLS estimate to negative in IV estimate, though not statistically significant. The basic estimates may suggest donors distribute more democracy aids to African countries where incumbents are less likely expected to hold political office again, because donors prefer political competitiveness in these countries as in economic aid. From the basic results, it seems that democracy aid is positively correlated with higher probability of electoral victory of incumbent presidents. However, by accounting for the potential of endogeneity, we observe an impact of democracy aid in the opposite direction.

These findings therefore suggest that democracy aid may lower the likelihood of votes for the incumbent presidents in recipient countries, thereby making elections more competitive. The sign of *Women in Parliament* is positive and significant in the first stage. The p-value of Hausman Test for *Democracy Aid* is close to 0. The different sign of coefficients of economic aid and democracy aid well reflects distinct impacts of each aid on the prospect of electoral victory of incumbents, as was equally emphasized in Dietrich and Wright (2015). Yet we have to cautiously interpret these results in the third analysis because the number of observations is somewhat small: only 69 election-years. (See Table 9 in the end of this chapter)

Figure 12. Regression coefficients of Economic and Democracy Aid terms in the Percentage of Vote for President regression



3.3. Results of quantitative analyses

I used a quantitative approach to reveal the impact of development aid on democracy in Africa. In investigating research questions, I used a two-stage least square (2SLS) analysis to take account of the potential for endogeneity. Specifically, it is possible that foreign aid donors may reward recipient countries

with more aid where they expect less prevalence of political clientelism; if this is the case there would be a higher likelihood of economic development and democratization. As a result of using this approach, my findings suggest that foreign aid as a whole might harm democratic consolidation in Sub-Saharan African countries. More specifically, economic aid may increase the likelihood of incumbents' political success whereas democracy aid could affect the system in the opposite direction (without statistical significance). This result suggests that clientelism might be the key variable which links development aid and slow democratic consolidation.

The fundamental question addressed by this section relates to whether foreign aid promotes democratization in recipient counties; this problem has implications both for academic researchers as well as for development practitioners and program implementing managers. The current academic literature remains inconclusive, dividing researchers into aid-advocates and aid-skeptics. As has been said, one of the main obstacles to identifying the net effect of foreign aid on the democratic outcomes in Africa is the potential for endogeneity. Specifically, donors tend to reward and punish recipients for their economic performance and competitive elections with the amount of aid.

Democratization is seemingly so intractable in Africa due to the absence of politically competitive elections. The findings of this report suggest that economic aid significantly increases the likelihood of electoral victory for incumbents at the national and local level. Although democracy aid might weaken political support toward incumbents, the negative effect of economic aid seems to outweigh the potentially positive effect of democracy aid. This is likely

because the magnitude of economic aid amounts is much larger than the magnitude of democracy aid amounts. This result suggests that the effect of foreign aid on African politics is multi-faceted rather than straight-forward.

The results of this empirical study also suggest that foreign aid attempting to support economic growth can have unintended consequences if it is conducted in a context in which politicians leverage discretion over the allocation of aid. Moreover, the clientelistic relation between voters and politicians, notwithstanding formal institutional reform, has been largely untouched. Indeed, democratic institutions in the region have encouraged the provision of basic services to citizens such as education (Harding and Stasavage 2014).

Nonetheless, fledgling democracies in Africa are far from mature electoral democracies. This has been already argued by Brown (2005, 184), who indicated that ruling elites have consented to “allowing opposition parties to compete, but not win; permitting an independent press to operate, but not freely; allowing civic groups to function but not efficiently; and consenting that elections be held, but not replace the ruling party.”

Table 7. Foreign aid and Polity IV index

	OLS	IV
Aid	0.510 (0.157)***	-1.562 (0.803)*
Log GDP pc	7.920 (0.914)***	8.992 (1.108)***
Log population	-0.974 (0.520)*	-0.820 (0.590)
Civil War	-0.035 (0.508)	-0.464 (0.596)
Oil rents	0.223 (0.145)	0.361 (0.171)**
IMF programme	-0.568 (0.393)	0.521 (0.605)
_cons	-65.501 (8.213)***	-66.853 (9.278)***
R ²	0.15	
N	684	684
		Aid
Inflation		0.224*** (0.0391)
Log GDP pc		1.560*** (0.288)
Log population		-0.0364 (0.129)
Civil War		-0.205 (0.125)
Oil rents		0.0918** (0.0357)
IMF programme		0.495*** (0.0946)
Constant		-9.716*** (2.564)
F-test		14.80

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Standard errors in parentheses. $N \times T = 684$ observations in 38 countries from 1991-2008. Dependent variable is Polity IV (revised) index.

Table 8. Foreign Aid on Vote Share of Government Party

	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Economic Aid	15.553 (7.619)**	65.604 (32.350)**		
Democracy Aid			17.021 (8.405)**	-44.647 (215.197)
Log GDP pc	-45.403 (28.884)	-4.321 (43.922)	-88.623 (31.968)***	21.712 (386.750)
Log population	25.179 (17.368)	16.919 (22.145)	34.010 (17.603)*	11.314 (82.308)
Civil War	8.449 (17.722)	15.569 (22.425)	13.927 (18.099)	-13.938 (99.896)
Oil rents	-4.971 (4.755)	-4.523 (5.906)	-5.719 (4.766)	-3.514 (9.852)
IMF programme	-13.425 (12.417)	-39.253 (22.186)*	-3.380 (11.825)	-10.694 (29.726)
_cons	214.888 (253.330)	-267.446 (433.224)	569.478 (262.775)**	-172.191 (2,607.082)
R^2	0.12		0.12	
N	123	123	123	123
		Economic Aid		Democracy Aid
Inflation		0.221*** (0.0807)		
Women in Parliament				0.0168 (0.0371)
Log GDP pc		0.250 (0.557)		1.351 (1.039)
Log population		-0.0134 (0.252)		-0.314 (0.259)
Civil War		-0.141 (0.248)		-0.464* (0.237)
Oil rents		0.0549 (0.0707)		0.0229 (0.0693)
IMF programme		0.461*** (0.167)		-0.108 (0.158)
Constant		0.807 (4.692)		-8.834 (7.759)
F-test		3.325		5.818

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Standard errors in parentheses. $N \times T = 123$ observations in 38 countries from 1991-2008. Dependent variable is vote share of government party.

Table 9. Foreign Aid on Percentage of Vote for President (First/Only Round)

	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Economic Aid	7.899 (10.081)	71.227 (36.654)*		
Democracy Aid			5.027 (6.583)	-17.686 (18.585)
Log GDP pc	-47.924 (21.514)**	-43.851 (31.003)	-57.224 (24.399)**	-17.503 (40.843)
Log population	-0.647 (9.309)	4.115 (13.620)	-1.859 (9.318)	0.935 (10.914)
_cons	469.748 (190.461)**	157.909 (320.077)	586.788 (210.493)***	233.754 (358.016)
R ²	0.15		0.15	
N	69	69	69	69
		Economic Aid		Democracy Aid
Inflation		0.171** (0.0653)		
Women in Parliament				0.0428* (0.0256)
Log GDP pc		0.628 (0.417)		1.443** (0.559)
Log population		-0.160 (0.143)		0.362*** (0.137)
Constant		-1.136 (3.598)		-15.37*** (4.217)
F-test		2.437		6.266

*Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Standard errors in parentheses. $N \times T = 69$ observations in 29 countries from 1991-2008. Some countries with missing data are removed from the dataset. Dependent variable is percentage of vote for president (first/only round).*

Chapter IV. A Case Study: Senegal

In this chapter, I will investigate the impact of foreign aid on democratic consolidation by focusing on a specific country case: Senegal in Western Africa. Quantitative analyses in the last chapter confirmed empirically that development aid may hamper democratic consolidation by strengthening the incumbency advantage of ruling party in legislative and presidential elections from the continental perspective. In this section, I plan to shed light on the mechanism by which foreign aid influences the extent to which incumbents can maintain political support from voters. In particular, I would like to focus on the aid allocation strategy of incumbent politicians to secure electoral support to win elections.

4.1. The Senegalese presidential election in 2000


The presidential election in 2000 is a watershed event in the history of Senegal, because it was the first election in which the Senegalese experienced a political turnover. Though they had held multiparty election long before the Third wave democratization in Africa in the early 1990s, it was always the Socialists who took the office since the independence of the country from France. The more detailed explanation is provided by Galvan (2001):

“On 19 March 2000, Senegal reclaimed its cherished status as Africa's most "advanced" democracy. On that day, Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal's dominant political opposition figure for the last quarter-century and a five-time presidential candidate, defeated 19-year incumbent Abdou Diouf of the Socialist Party in the second round of the presidential election. [...] Despite a long tradition of electoral self-rule, Africa's most vibrant free press,

and open party competition, Senegal's democratic credentials had been called into question for at least a decade by the apparent impossibility of removing the Socialist Party from office. By graciously accepting defeat, Diouf [...] broke the political monopoly of a deeply entrenched and dominant ruling party.” (Galvan 2001, 50)

Galvan (above) emphasized that a one-time political turnover does not necessarily imply that democratic consolidation is fully completed; there was a huge leap in the standard indices of democracy around the year 2000. It reflects the historic importance of a peaceful transition in the African context. For example, the Freedom House Political Rights (PR) index of Senegal changed from 4 to 2, where 7 represents ‘least free’ and 1 represents ‘most free’. The Polity IV index of Senegal rapidly increased from -1 to 8, as shown in Figure 13 below.

Figure 13. Changes of Freedom House PR (Political Rights) Index and Polity IV Index of Senegal from 1991 to 2008



Source: Freedom House Index and Polity IV Index dataset

It is true that the Senegal of 2000 was marked by its old democratic

tradition as compared to other African countries. As compared to its neighbors who experienced coup d'état or suffered under the rule of repressive authoritarian regime for long period, Senegal's relative political stability, free and fair election, and greater tolerance of opposition parties were notable. It was one of few countries in Africa that could be categorized as a multiparty system, from independence in 1960 to 1989, amongst various model regimes including plebiscitary one-party systems, military oligarchies, competitive one-party systems, and settler oligarchies. (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 77-82; Villalón 2013, 239-241)

Nevertheless, the electoral regime transition in 2000 election was one of the most historic events in Senegal in terms of democratic consolidation. This is because the old regimes, both Senghor (1960-1980) and Diouf (1980-2000) fell short of today's standard of democratic regime, particularly in the dimension of free and fair political competition with opposition parties. After independence, Senegal was more similar to the single party regime of the *Parti Socialiste* (PS) than a multiparty regime. Even after providing a constitutional mandate for opposition parties in the mid-1970s, electoral processes were subject to careful monitoring by state apparatus; the regime was still able to impose sanctions on dissenting voters so that the ruling party was not threatened by the possibility of turnover. When the *Parti Socialiste* won again in the 1988 election, despite increasingly severe economic downturn, the regime was surprised by the extent of violent protest that resulted. The ruling party announced a 'state of emergency' and arrested opposition leaders. It was not until the 1993 election that the ruling party made a crucial concession and forged an agreement on 'the rules of the game' with other competing parties. (Young and Kanté 1992, Villalón 1994: both

as cited in Villalón 2013, 239-241)

4.2. Historical origin of clientelism in Senegal

To understand the impact of foreign aid on democratic consolidation in Senegal, it is important to understand the logic of political clientelism. In order to do so, this section will address the following questions:

1. What was the historical origin of clientelism?
2. How has the relationship between politicians and Muslim religious leaders developed?
3. How do Senegalese politicians take advantage of this social structure to mobilize voters for electoral victory today?

The historical root of clientelism in Senegal dates back to the French colonial era. The Sufi religious tradition in West Africa, which was already prevalent in Muslim regional expressions since the beginning of the eighteenth century, had evolved into a mass religion during the twentieth century. In this process, the Sufi religious leaders – *marabouts* – played a crucial role in shaping tight Islamic educational network in each region and reshaping ethnic and religious amalgamations, which led to the transformation of existing social structure (Diouf 2013, 7-8). It is notable that *marabouts* had strong personal religious relationship with their followers – *taalibe* – in the widespread clientelistic network. Koter (2013) briefly describes the *marabouts*' tie with their followers in her account:

“The strength of the *marabouts*' ties with their followers rest on the important social roles that those leaders play, in both the spiritual and the

material realms. A key characteristic of Sufi Islam, as it is practiced in the area, is that an individual must become a member of a Sufi order by taking a pledge of allegiance to a *marabout*.²⁴ A disciple thus is connected to the order through his personal religious leader, rather than by virtue of a general membership in the brotherhood. Being a follower of a *marabout* places an individual inside an important network, which has consequences for his advancement and well-being. *Marabouts* can facilitate the acquisition of essential goods and services and provide a form of social insurance.²⁵ Disciples have a sense that should they be afflicted by misfortune, such as illness or drought, they can turn to their *marabout* for help. This help often extends to finding employment or even a spouse.²⁶ In brief, the *marabouts* “serve as conduits for redistribution,” which allows them to maintain their following.” (Koter 2013, 201; italics are made by this author)

At first, French colonial administrators regarded Islamic leaders as a hostile threat, because they suspected that *marabouts* would accrue wealth and followers for “jihad” against them. However, they soon realized the potential of this social structure for creating and upholding political and social order in favor of their colonial rule model. This was especially the case in sparse and vast rural areas. Recognizing that “[t]he Muslim leaders were in many ways colonialism’s perfect intermediaries,” (Boone 2003, 54) French colonizers not only searched out *marabouts* as their partners in local governance but also ultimately facilitated the transformation of *marabouts’* Muslim boarding schools into groundnut plantation. (Diouf 2013, 8-9; Boone 2003, 54; Galvan 2001, 58)

24 Villalón 1995, 64. (as cited in Koter 2013)

25 Villalón 1995, 124; Coulon 1981, 115 (as cited in Koter 2013)

26 Coulon 1981, 112. (as cited in Koter 2013)


Under the guidance of their *marabouts*, *taalibes* cultivated peanut farms as their Islamic religious duty. In return for the rural religious elite's accommodation of the French rule and collaboration in the colonial governance, the French administrators offered the group infrastructure and security as well as political authority to govern at local levels. This included rights to distribute state resources, to regulate land access, and to administer local justice. In short, this 'social contract' was a result of the combination of formal political institutions of the French colonizers and informal institutions of Sufi Islamic brotherhood. Local religious leaders had become essential intermediaries between the French colonial state and the rural population, translating the language of command in Wolof by the 1920s. (Diouf 2013, 8-9; Boone 2003, 54; Galvan 2001, 58)

After independence in the 1960s, it is notable how the Senegalese politicians tried to take advantage of the social structure formed during the colonial state as a means of electoral mobilization. The first president Senghor inherited the French tradition of coopting *marabouts* in state governance. He provided resources to local religious elites including cash, infrastructure, and other development project licenses in return for their religious edict, or *ndiggel*. *Marabouts* demanded that their *taalibes* should vote for a particular candidate whom they support before the coming elections. (Diouf 2013, 16-32; Boone 2003, 60-67; Galvan 2001, 58)

Marabouts rewarded their followers who obeyed their political instruction with spiritual and material gains. If a candidate won an election, thereby becoming able to access and distribute state resources, then the Sufi *marabout* received clientelistic resources from the incumbent politician which

they could subsequently redistribute to their *taalibes*. (Diouf 2013, 16-32; Boone 2003, 60-67; Galvan 2001, 58)

Figure 14. Mobilization through intermediaries in Senegal



Source: drawn by this author based on the conceptual framework of Koter (2013)

This form of electoral mobilization through intermediaries – the Sufi brotherhood in Senegal – has become the dominant mobilization strategy among politicians in West Africa today. Politicians and political activists attempt to win the support of *marabouts* who can influence the vote choice of their followers, jockeying for a dominant position in the elections. In this rivalry, the ruling party often enjoys significant incumbency advantage compared to competing opposition parties mainly because they can access state resources and use these resources to bargain for votes. (Koter 2013, 208-210)

This interactive pattern is evident in the testimonies of the Senegalese politicians in the ruling party and the opposition parties alike.²⁷ Members of the *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS), which was the ruling party of President

²⁷ Koter (2013) performed interview with various level of political figures in Senegal from 2006 to 2007.

Wade in 2006, openly acknowledged that the political victory of their party depended on the support of local religious leaders for electoral mobilization during the run-up to the February 2007 election. In this case, they told that the purpose of Wade's campaign is to identify influential brokers in local communities and offer them material benefits for gaining votes. Politicians in the opposition parties said that this type of electoral mobilization strategy was ubiquitous in Senegal; all parties were keen to foster links with *marabouts* to win their support. According to opposition leaders and activists, the ruling party had information on religious leaders such as who can influence vote choice of local residents. The model of mobilization strategy employed across different parties in Senegal is fundamentally based on the belief of politicians that *marabouts* deliver votes. (Ibid., 208-210)

4.3. Development aid as a clientelistic resource in Senegal

In the previous section, I demonstrated that the clientelistic nature of politics in Senegal has a long historical tradition: the cooperative relationship between French administrators and *marabouts* had evolved into clientelistic network between national politicians and *marabouts*. Thereafter it has become deeply entrenched to such an extent that the Senegalese politicians cannot think of electoral campaigns in terms other than the mobilization of votes through intermediaries. One of the important points to keep in mind is that politicians need state resources to gain political support of Islamic religious leaders. The political deal between political parties and the Muslim brotherhood is simply a *quid pro quo*. Candidates are obliged to offer various types of material benefits to *marabouts* in return for votes in the upcoming elections.

In this section, I intend to answer the following questions:

1. Do Senegalese politicians use foreign aid as a clientelistic resource like state revenue?
2. Does rapid decrease in economic aid flow in Senegal cause decrease in incumbents' vote level in elections? (Hypothesis II)

To answer the questions, it is crucial to note that how foreign aid is managed in the recipient country. If politicized bureaucrats rather than apolitical technocrats are more likely to involve in the aid management/allocation process, politicians could turn foreign aid more easily into resources for building up their strong clientelistic network. On top of that, if foreign aid plays an important role in delivering large portion of national budget and various social services in the recipient country, it is more likely that politicians easily take advantage of their discretion to allocation of foreign aid in favor of their electoral support in the elections.

The original plan of the Senegalese government was to make public investment with foreign aid according to the three-year rolling programme of public investment (Programme Triennal d'Investissements Publics in French; henceforth PTIP)²⁸ since 1987. The PTIP had been the key program management mechanism and aid project-selection tool in Senegal during the 1990s. This system had first been adopted by the World Bank's initiative during

²⁸Source of governmental website: <http://www.finances.gouv.sn/index.php/finances/programme-triennal-d-investissements-publics-ptip-2015-2017> (Search date: Jan 9, 2015). In this page, the PTIP report for 2015-2017 term is presented. (Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et du Plan; MEFP in short)

the period 1987-1990 as one of main components of the Structural Adjustment Programme in Senegal. It should be noted that the PTIP was of particular significance as during this time the majority of the Senegalese government's public investment was funded by international donor funds. In these circumstances, the PTIP took on the role of managing aid flow as well as program selection and evaluation. (Clark, Gaye & Sow 1998, 151-155).

Table 10. Sectoral allocation of aid to Senegal 1993-94

Sector	In per cent
Budgetary assistance	29
Social sectors	29
Agriculture	17
Water Sanitation	14
Telecommunication and transport	5
Energy	4
Other	2

Source: Clark, Gaye and Sow, 1998, 150

In theory, interested parties are supposed to meet annually to identify current progress of ongoing projects and to initiate new projects based on the priorities laid out in the country's development plan and government's financial capability. These interested parties include the Planning Division (DP), the division of economic and financial cooperation (DCEF) in the ministry of the economy, finance and planning (MEFP), and the project selection committee. The government then takes the recommendations of this task force and seeks out international donors to finance projects which passed the selection committee's standard. However, in reality the process is not as straight-forward as the system design was intended to be. (Ibid., 151-155).

As stated by Clarke, Gaye and Sow (1998),


“over the six-year period 1986-93, the project selection committee met only five times-hardly enough to establish a definitive list of projects to be selected, considering the number of new aid proposals normally developed each year. Since 1993, despite a revision that year to the PTIP legislation to revitalize the process, the committee has not met. Does this imply that no new projects were added to the PTIP since 1993? No. Not surprisingly, an ad hoc system has developed, in which many decision are handled at the ministerial or political level rather than at the technocratic or civil service level. It is also a system in which 170 out of 316 projects (or 54 percent) actually included in the PTIP have not been the subject of evaluation by the government of Senegal.²⁹ The breakdown in the system has also given rise to a number of projects which, while not included the PTIP list, are being implemented are considered ‘hors Programme.’” (Ibid., 152-153)

Simply put, the aid management system of Senegal lacked objective evaluation in the review of executed projects or new formulated projects. It was therefore unsurprising that the realm of technical assessment congruent with national development planning had becoming embedded with the political rivalry among government ministries. There were multiple loopholes in the PTIP system that government ministries were capable of taking advantage of so as to circumvent the official procedures in order to achieve their own political priorities. (Ibid., 149-154) The discretionary adoption of public investment projects through aid posed a serious problem not only in terms of the

29 UNDP, 1993

effectiveness of aid but also in terms of fair political competition; incumbent politicians and their government could manage public investment in favor of their political support.

Figure 15. Total Government Revenue of Senegal from 1995 to 2005




Original Source: African Development Bank (AFDB), Statistical Data Portal, drawn by author

Moreover, Senegal during the 1990s had been one of the top aid-recipient countries in the world; the total amount of aid inflow was some USD 645 million in 1994. (Ibid., 149) This tremendous amount of aid is equal to 16 percent of its GDP which is far beyond the average of 10 percent in African countries. (OECD 1995 as cited in Clarke, Gaye & Sow 1998) As shown in the Figure 15, the figure was nearly as much as the total government revenue of Senegal in the 1990s. These facts imply that development aid potentially represented a valuable clientelistic resource in the sense that political parties needed access to state resources in order to offer patronage and resources to local religious leaders in return for their electoral backing.

Taking into account the high proportion of state resources that were driven by economic aid, it is notable to consider the significant decrease in the total amount of resources available to the Senegalese government over the 1990s. This decrease was mainly due to the rapid decrease of the aid commitment per capita of economic aid, with government revenue relatively constant over the same period. As shown in Figure 16, from 1990 to 1994, Senegal experienced 45% (lagged three-year moving average) decrease in the amount of economic aid per capita. This abrupt cutoff in the inflow of aid was not recovered until the mid-2000s. It is therefore implicit that incumbent politicians might have had a more difficult time sourcing clientelistic resources to distribute to local leaders during the period 1994-2000.

Figure 16. Changes in the amount of Economic Aid in Senegal from 1991 to 2008



*Original source: foreign aid commitment data from AidData 2.0, drawn by author
 Note that the figure is defined as three year average in log scale*

My hypothesis that foreign aid bolsters incumbency advantage in the elections is supported by further evidence as shown in Table 11. In the section

3.2.2 and 3.2.3, I derived two predictions about the relationship between the amount of economic aid and the incumbents' vote in the elections from my 2SLS analyses. Incumbents would expect (1) 18.87 percent *decrease* in the vote share in legislative elections and (2) 20.49 percent *decrease* in the vote share in the first/only round of presidential elections with two times *decrease* in aid per capita of *Economic Aid*. The Senegal case is consistent with my predictions.

Table 11. Party vote and vote change: 1993, 1996, 1998, 2000 in Senegal

Year	Election	% Votes Parti Socialiste du Sénégal (PS)	% Votes Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS)	% Turnout
1993	Presidential	58.4	32.0	51.5
	National Assembly	56.6	30.2	41.0
1996	Local	66.3	22.6	43.0
1998	National Assembly	50.4	19.2	45.0
2000	Presidential (1 st round)	41.7	31.0	63.0
	Presidential (2 nd round)	41.3	58.7	61.0

Source: Vengroff & Magala, 2001, 131

As shown in Table 11, the vote share of *Parti Socialiste* (incumbent party before 2000) decreased from 56.6 percent to 50.4 percent in the legislative election. The difference (6.2 percent) is less than what my hypothesis would have predicted. However, the impact of cutoff in economic aid is clear from the presidential election. From 1993 to 2000, the vote share of *Parti Socialiste* declined from 58.5 percent to 41.7 percent. The decrease in the vote share of *Parti Socialiste* between two presidential elections was substantial: 16.8 percent

which is similar to the figure yielded from my prediction (20.66 percent).

In short, deep-rooted clientelistic logic of electoral politics in the historical case of Senegal supports my hypothesis: applying my hypothetical framework to the case of Senegal would have predicted the failure of the ruling party in the 2000 election Senegal. Empirical evidence, including the decreasing amount of economic aid, stable income of government revenue, and gradually decreasing in the vote level of *Parti Socialiste* altogether demonstrate that the incumbent party could not source a sufficient amount of state resources which represented essential ingredients supporting their clientelistic electoral strategy over the previous decade.

4.4. Incumbents' aid allocation strategy and the 2000 presidential election

In this section, I intend to answer two questions regarding politicians' behavior:

1. How do incumbent politicians respond to the decreasing amount of available state resources?
2. Do they change the aid-allocation strategy to two different types of religious leaders as my fourth hypothesis expected? (Hypothesis IV)

Before explaining how my theoretical model neatly describe the situation in which the Senegalese politicians face allocation choice, I would like to shed light on the size and political clout of Sufi brotherhoods in Senegal. The whole Sufi brotherhood is composed of four groups: the *Tijaniyya*, *Mouridiyaa*, *Qadiriyya*, and *Layène*. Among them, the two largest brotherhoods comprise 81 percent of total population in Senegal. Summing up all four brotherhoods gives

90.1 percent, which represents an absolute majority of Senegalese identified as Sufi Muslim. (Resnick 2013, 165).

Table 12. Description of Sufi Brotherhoods


Brotherhood (sects, <i>subsects</i>)	Founder	Spiritual Center	Share of Population Belonging to Brotherhood
<i>Tijaniyya</i>	-	-	
Malikiyya	El Hajj Malik Sy	Tivaoune, Thiès	
Moustarchidine	Moustapha Sy		49 %
Niassène	Al-Hajj Abdoulaye Niass	Kaolack	
<i>Mouridiyya</i>	Cheik Amadou Bamba Mbacké		32 %
Baye Fall	Ibrahima Fall		
<i>Qadiriyya</i>	Chiekh Bou Kounta	Ndissane, Thiès	8.5 %
<i>Layène</i>	Mouhamadou Seydina Limamou Laye	Dakar	0.6 %

Original Source: Population shares based on the 2002 Senegalese census, accessed from the Minnesota Population Center (2011) as cited in Resnick (2013, 167)

Though the *Tijaniyya* outnumbered the *Mouridiyya* in the population, when it comes to the degree to which the brotherhood is tightly organized for gaining material benefits from politicians, the latter overcomes the former. According to broad scholarship on the Sufi brotherhoods and their solidarity for political influence, the linkage between *Mouride marabouts* and their *taalibes* is closer than *Tijani*. Moreover, due to their relative solidarity, it is more likely that *Mouride taalibes* follow *ndiggel* – the religious order issued by *marabouts* which demand *taalibes* to vote for a particular candidate. It is therefore unsurprising that the *Mouride marabouts* exert stronger influence over their *taalibes* than

marabouts in other brotherhoods; subsequent to this, the *Mouridiyya* wield more political influence in shaping the political landscape of Senegal. (Koter 2013, 211-212; Resnick 2013, 167-169; Schaffer 1998, 106-110; Boone 2003, 91;)

Figure 17. *Parti Socialiste*'s choice set and expected payoffs with respect to allocation decision to Sufi brotherhoods marabouts



Source: Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, & Estevez 2007, 189, modified by this author

The incumbent politicians in the *Parti Socialiste* faced a situation which is comparable to my simple theatrical model. With a constant vote constraint, surely more than majority, they had to find the optimal aid allocation portfolio which distributed to different Sufi brotherhoods in order to minimize associated risk. The *Tijaniyya* and other brotherhoods are almost twice larger (60 percent) than the *Mouridiyya* (30 percent), while the investment to them involves significant risk. Yet *Mouride marabouts* are influence certain leaders. It was evident that they can deliver more votes to politicians than *marabouts* in other brotherhoods with same amount of investment through aid allocation due to their political clout over their followers.

As shown in the section 2.2.4, my model predicts that the incumbents will invest less and less aid to the minority of influence certain numbers than the

majority when aid resource is gradually decreasing. They could lose the hold on power since they ultimately cannot secure a sufficient amount of clientelistic resource. However, in these circumstances they cut more aid allocation to the influence certain leaders than to the majority of influence uncertain leaders; it is therefore probable that they lose more political support from the minority than the majority in the process.

It is clear that the ruling party *Parti Socialiste* failed to draw political support from the *Mouridiyya* in the 2000 presidential election as my model predicts. In the elections of 1983 and 1988, one of the heads of the *Mouride* brotherhood, Abdoul Ahad Mbacke instructed his followers to support President Abdou Diouf. (Schaffer 1998, 109) In the 2000 election, the *Mouride* religious leaders did not issue the voting order informing their followers to support a given political leader because they were not satisfied with the decreasing stock of clientelistic resource distributed to them by the ruling party – the Diouf regime. In contrast, Cheikh Tidiane Sy, one of the chiefs of the *Tidiane* Sufi brotherhood in Tivaoune, Thiès, decided to openly deliver an *ndiggel* to their *taalibes* to vote for Abdou Diouf. (Diop et al. 2002, Villalón 2004 as cited in Resnick 2013, 168)

Chapter V. Conclusion

Foreign aid hinders democratic consolidation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Economic aid, in particular, hampers political competition by enhancing incumbency advantage in the legislative/presidential elections. Politicians who receive development aid in the recipient countries use aid as a clientelistic resource. Their political influence over the allocation of aid allows them to strategically distribute development projects funded by international donors in favor of their electoral success.

The first 2SLS analysis reveals that the amount of development aid is negatively associated with the progress in democratic consolidation in Africa, dealing with the endogeneity concern that donors might reward the recipient countries which they expect to be more democratic or hold politically more competitive elections. The next two 2SLS analyses suggest that development aid is positively associated with the vote which incumbent politicians get in the elections. More specifically, the model predicts that a 18.87 percent *increase* in the vote share of incumbents in legislative elections is associated with a 20.49 percent *increase* in the vote share of incumbent in the first/only round of presidential elections with two times *increase* in aid per capita of *Economic Aid*.

In applying my theoretical model and empirical findings to the case of the 2000 presidential election in Senegal, I demonstrated the impact of development aid on the incumbents' standing in the elections. The ruling party in Senegal suffered a rapidly decreasing amount of foreign aid, which resulted in a shortage of state resource that could be used to buy political support from *marabouts*. This led to the gradual loss of votes along in the series of elections

held in the 1990s. The decreased amount of aid unexpectedly threatened incumbents' clientelistic network and it helped the opposition party to get over long-standing incumbency advantage in electoral competition.

Incumbent politicians changed aid allocation strategy when they faced cutback in foreign aid. To minimize electoral risk, they might have allocated more aid to influence uncertain leaders (the *Tijanyya* and other Sufi brotherhoods) and less aid to influence certain leaders (the *Mouridiyya*) as economic aid which they receive decreases. Thus, the failure to stay in office is probably associated with the loss of political support from the minority of influence certain leaders.

This study of the impact on political competition in Africa associated with foreign aid informs the distribution and political consideration of aid flows. On the one hand, development projects delivered by donors could foster economic growth; however, my findings suggest that on the other hand this same development aid could hamper democratic consolidation in African countries. The emphasis on ownership of the aid-recipient country is conducive to building state capacity and enhancing the effectiveness of aid. However, taking into account that recipient countries allocate development projects as a means for building up their clientelistic network, the development community should take a more cautious approach with regard to coordination of aid distribution with recipient governments.

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국문초록

해외 원조, 후견주의와 민주주의 공고화 전환기 이후 사하라 이남 아프리카를 중심으로

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정치학과

이동일

본 연구의 목표는 해외 원조가 전환기 이후 사하라 이남 아프리카의 민주주의에 미친 영향을 분석하는 것이다. 개발원조가 신생 민주주의 국가들의 민주화에 어떤 영향을 미치는가에 대해서는 정치학자들 사이에 이견이 존재한다. 해외 원조와 민주주의와의 관계에 대한 기존 문헌은 비교적 관점에서 정치적 후견주의와 후견주의가 민주주의 공고화에 미치는 악영향에 대해서 충분한 주의를 기울이지 않고 있다. 원조 수혜국의 정치인들은 유권자들로부터 최대의 정치적 지지를 끌어내기 위해 원조를 배분할 수 있는 영향력을 가지고 있다. 정치인들은 지역의 정치 엘리트들에게 공공 투자를 제공하는 대신 표를 대가로 돌려받는다. 따라서 본 연구는 현직자의 후견주의적 전략을 해외 원조와 민주주의 공고화 간의 핵심적 매개변수로 간주한다.

본 연구는 해외 원조와 민주주의 공고화 간의 인과관계를 밝히기 위해 이론적 모델과 정량적 분석, 그리고 역사적 정성적 접근을 모두 사용한다. 공여자-현직자 순차게임과 현직자의 원조 배분 전략 모델은 네 가지 주 가설을 제공한다. (1) 해외 원조는 민주주의 공고화를 저해한다; (2) 경제적 원조는 현직자에 대한 지지를 강화시킨다; (3) 민주주의 원조는 현직자에 대한 지지에 주요한 영향을 끼치지 않는다; (4) 원조의 양이 지속적으로 감소할 때, 정치인들은 영향력이 확실한 지역 유지들에게 점점 더 적은 원조를 할당한다.

이러한 주 가설들을 경험적으로 검증하기 위해 본 연구는 2 단계 최소제곱법을 사용하여 예상되는 내생성(쌍방향 인과 편향)에 대처한다. 구체적으로 해외 원조 공여 기관들은 정치적 후견주의가 덜 만연할 것이라고 기대되는 국가들에 더 많은 원조로 보상할 수 있다. 만약 그러하다면 민주주의가 더 공고한 국가는 그러한 보상으로 인해 더 높은 확률의 경제 발전과 민주화를 경험할 가능성이 있다. 이러한 접근방법으로 분석한 결과, 해외 원조는 일반적으로 사하라 이남 국가들의 민주주의 공고화를 저해한다. 구체적으로 경제적 원조는 현직자들의 선거에서의 득표 확률을 증가시키는 반면, 민주주의 원조는 유의미한 영향을 미치지 못한다. 요약하면 이 분석 결과는 후견주의가 개발 원조와 더딘 민주주의 공고화 사이를 잇는 핵심 변수라는 주장을 뒷받침한다.

이러한 인과관계를 밝히기 위해 본 연구는 서아프리카의 세네갈이라는 특정한 국가의 사례를 연구한다. 세네갈에서는 정치인들은 지역의 정치 엘리트들을 통하여 유권자들을 동원한다. 이러한 후견주의적 정치

행태는 프랑스 식민지 시대 때부터 발현된 것이다. 정치인들은 개발 프로젝트들을 지역 종교 지도자들에게 할당하고 그 대가로 표를 얻는다. 그러므로 1990 년대에 해외 원조에 크게 의존하고 있던 세네갈이 원조 액수가 감소하자 집권당이 정치적 지지를 잃게 된 것은 필연적인 결과였다. 구체적으로 집권당은 원조 감소에 대응하여 선거적 리스크를 최소화 하면서 일정 수준의 득표를 유지하기 위해 원조 배분 전략을 수정하였다. 그러나 이는 영향력이 확실한 유지들의 집권당에 대한 정치적 지지 철회로 이어졌고 2000 년 대통령 선거에서 야당이 승리하게 되는 결과를 낳게 되었다.

주요어: 해외 원조, 후견주의, 민주주의 공고화, 현직자 우위, 원조 배분, 세네갈

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