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언론정보학과석사학위논문

# **Aged Minds of Current Citizens**

: The Changing Nature of Regional Prejudices  
in the South Korean Public

지역감정의 변화가 유권자의 의사 결정에 미치는 영향  
: 2012 대통령선거와 2014 지방선거를 중심으로

2015 년 2 월

서울대학교 대학원

언론정보학과

이 지 혜

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
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## **Abstract**

# **Aged Minds of Current Citizens**

**: The Changing Nature of Regional Prejudices  
in the South Korean Public**

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Recently, repeated surveys of public opinion have shown that long-standing regional prejudices, especially towards the two contending regions of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do, have radically decreased during past decade. Given the rapid transformation of contemporary Korean society, the “revisionist” approaches have optimistically speculated that regional bias in the minds would be replaced by other factors such as political ideology, generational differences, issue preference, and so forth. Yet, recent electoral results and intensifying hate speech stemming from regional animus online show that regional bias is still pervasive in the public mind. Despite the ample evidence, empirically documenting the regional attitudes of the Korean public is a challenging task. The dominant approaches to regionalism seem to suffer from a lack of analytical tools to explore the persistent effects of regionalism underlying the Korean electorate’s political decisions.

Particularly, there is a lack of understanding about how regional bias is constructed in the individual citizens' political belief system. In addition, majority of existing studies on regionalism are vulnerable to the criticism that they derive conclusions about individual voters based on the analysis of group data, and thus face the issue of falsifiability. As a result, significant portion of existing studies on political regionalism fail to provide useful analytical tools to investigate how regional prejudices are being constructed and have changed in the citizens' minds. Against this backdrop, this study aims to contribute to the vehement academic debate over the continuing power of regionalism in the Korean society. Specifically, the current manuscript is based on the fundamental idea that the extension of the intellectual implications from the history of research on modern racism allows us to identify the changes in the origins and working of regional bias. A large body of literature on modern racism has suggested that traditional, overt racism changed into the newer form of racism, which is more indirect, subtle, and ostensibly nonracial. Along this line, the current research investigated whether the inherent nature of regional prejudices has evolved into a more covert, ambiguous, and elusive belief system just as racial prejudices have developed in the contemporary American society. To properly capture the transforming nature of regional prejudices, the Region Implicit Association Test (IAT) experiments were developed and administered nationwide during the 2012 Presidential and 2014 Local elections campaign seasons. Overall, the results suggest that regional bias in the Korean public is not disappearing but is changing fundamentally. That is, "testing effects" rather than substantial changes in regional attitudes could have made sanguine, yet erroneous, impressions that regional bias is on the wane in the minds of citizens. Additionally, the results suggest that generational effects rather than geographical mobility contribute to lowering the level of regional hostility in the minds of

citizens. Lastly, the findings of this work indicate that different dimensions of regional bias are significantly related to the citizens' party preference and candidate choice. All told, this study demonstrates the continuing power of regionalism in the citizens' political judgment. Based on these findings, what would be the political implications of the findings of this work in a broad context of the Korean political landscape? As generational effects were found to reduce regional prejudices, if such generational effects were held constant over time, how would the enhancement in regional attitudes influence the distribution of political preference? The results suggest that the improvements in the citizens' regional attitudes are expected to influence the representation of the electorate's party preference. That is to say, generational effects on political regionalism may influence the structure of regionally dominant party system by re-distributing the political preference of the electorate and leading political parties to respond by aligning their positions to these changes.

**Keywords:** regionalism, generational effects, geographical mobility, testing effects, Region Implicit Association Test (IAT)

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# INTRODUCTION

It is widely agreed that political regionalism has played a decisive role in the choices of the Korean electorate since the 1987 democratic reform. The regional rivalry, especially between the southeastern region of Gyeongsang-do and the southwestern region of Jeolla-do, abruptly emerged in the course of democratization and has served as a primary societal cleavage (Choi, 1999; Moon, 2005). Given the prevalence of intense hostility toward particular regional groups and the dominance of voting behaviors along regional affiliations in political arena, considerable amount of scholarly attention has been paid to the origins and political impacts of regional contention between the two southern regions. Recently, repeated surveys of public opinion have shown that long-standing regional prejudices in the minds of Korean citizens have radically decreased during past decade. Considering the rapid transformation of contemporary Korean society such as generational shifts in regional attitudes and increased geographical integration, the “revisionist” approaches have optimistically speculated that regional bias would be transient and likely merge into other political factors such as ideology, issue preferences, and so on (Kang, 2003).

Yet, recent electoral outcomes show that Korea is not completely free from the territory-based political cleavage of regionalism. For example, in the most recent 2012 presidential election, which was a vehement contest won by the mere margin of 3.5 percent, the president-elect secured more than 69 percent of votes from Gyeongsang-do, while the opposition leader garnered around 80 percent of the support from Jeolla-do. In addition to the realm of elections, intensifying hate speech stemming from regional animus online and enduring experiences of

regional discrimination in most domains of daily life illustrate that regional prejudices still continue to exert a pervasive influence on the minds of citizens (Lee, 2013).

Despite the ample evidence of lingering regionalism, empirically documenting the regional attitudes of the Korean public is a challenging task. Possible sources of impediments to assessments of regional prejudices can arise from the pressure of social desirability and inadvertent misrepresentation. As a lot of political scientists and journalists have regarded regional contention as the biggest obstacle to democracy, survey respondents may be motivated to disguise their true regional attitudes (Choi, 2008). Indeed, public opinion polls conducted by the National Election Commission revealed that the percentage of voters considering “birthplace of a candidate” as important factor in their vote choices has never been above 3 percent since the 1997 presidential election (Korean National Election Commission, 2012). At the same time, however, there have been alarmingly conspicuous patterns of regional votes during the same period. Hence, a staggering gap between what people answer to opinion polling and how they cast their votes at the ballot box demonstrates that it can be quite difficult to adequately assess regional attitudes. Moreover, even if people do not deliberately misrepresent their attitudes, their introspective access may be limited. This is because some stereotypes and prejudices remain spontaneous, automatic, and consequently introspectively inaccessible (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).

Even though vast amount of extant scholarly research on regionalism has demonstrated the origin and impacts of regionalism on the electorate' decisions, the dominant approaches to regionalism seem to suffer from a lack of analytical tools to explore the persistent effects of regionalism underlying the Korean voters'

political decisions. Particularly, there is a lack of understanding about two important aspects of Korean regionalism. Although majority of existing studies on regionalism assume that voters' regional prejudices influence their political judgment either directly or indirectly (Choi, 2008), most researchers have rarely attempted to discuss how regional bias is constructed in the citizens' political belief system. Thereby, significant portion of existing studies on political regionalism fail to provide useful analytical tools to investigate how regional prejudices are being constructed and changed in the citizens' minds, and more importantly their changing nature and impacts on the citizens' political judgments. Another critical appraisal of existing studies points out a lack of falsifiability (Park, 2001). More specifically, many electoral studies derive conclusions about individual voters based on the analysis of group data such as regional votes or support for a regionally dominant party across regions. However, such implicit reduction from aggregate level of observations to individual voters renders it unfalsifiable (Popper, 1953). Consequently, the nature and role of regionalism in the Korean politics remain as a matter of some debate.

This study aims to contribute to the vehement academic debate over the continuing power of regionalism in the Korean society. Specifically, this paper is concerned with the questions such as "Are the regional prejudices disappearing in the minds of citizens? If not, how has the nature of regional bias changed and in what ways is the transforming nature of regional prejudices related to the citizens' political preferences?" and "What would be the democratic implications of the discussion of this work in our society?" To address these research questions, this paper explores whether regionalism has met its demise or the inherent nature of it has changed. Acknowledging the shortcomings in the previous research and attempting to tackle the measurement problems, the current research investigates

whether the fundamental nature of regional prejudices has evolved into a more covert, ambiguous, and elusive belief system just as racial prejudices have developed in contemporary American society. Through this approach, this study attempts to explore the psychological structure and dynamics, which contribute to the citizens' behavioral consequences and ultimately democratic implications of the transforming nature of regional bias in the citizens' mind in the context of our political landscape.

The novelty of this study stems from the ability to integrate the internal validity strength of experimental design with its supplementary survey data. Despite the obvious utility of this approach, to my knowledge, this is one of the first such attempts. As will be discussed more in detail in the following sections, the substantial disparity between what people tell survey and what they do in reality indicates that the inherent nature of regional prejudices may as well have evolved into a newer form of regionalism, guiding the behavioral consequences of the Korean voters. By integrating the approaches to political regionalism in Korea into the study of modern racism, this paper aims to contribute to our understanding of regionalism and its societal implications in the Korean political landscape.

This research will begin with the discussion of the existing literature on political regionalism. This part will lead to examining the two hypotheses that are closely related to the revisionist approaches to political regionalism. In evaluating the revisionist perspectives on political regionalism, different forms of regional prejudices would be discussed; 1) Overt Regionalism; 2) Symbolic Regionalism; and 3) Implicit Regionalism. For conceptualization of different forms of regional bias, substantive and analytical implications of the history of research on modern racism will be discussed. Following, the study will proceed to introduce the study

method for sampling and procedures of the survey and the experiments. Actual findings of the different dimensions of regional prejudices will be presented and the two revisionist hypotheses will be tested. Lastly, democratic implications of the aforementioned findings will be examined in the political arena, leading to the discussion of implications and limitations of this study.

# LITERATURE REVIEW

## **A Brief Summary of Previous Literature on Regionalism in Korea**

The concept of political regionalism has a broad scope and polysemy: it manifests in various forms ranging from an individual's attitudes such as regional hostility, prejudice, and sentiment to a relatively aggregate level of regional cleavage and conflict. In this work, political regionalism is meant by an individual's tendency to hold prejudice against the two contending southern regions of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do and make political judgment along his or her regional affiliations (Choi, 2008; Kim, 1989).<sup>1</sup>

Although regional rivalry and animosity along geographic lines are often found within the territorial boundaries of nation-states such as Quebec separatism in Canada, regionalism in Korean politics has some distinctive features (Kim, 2006; Moon, 2005). According to modernization theory, urbanization, universal education, and development of transportation and communication technology lead to the integration of ethnic, linguistic and regional divisions in a country (Almond & Verba, 1963; Deutsch, 1961). Recent political development in South Korea,

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<sup>1</sup> Suffice it to note that majority of existing studies on regionalism have focused on regional rivalry between the two southern regions. However, there have been some other forms of regional dispute such as 'Daegu-Gyeongbuk regionalism' stemming from staunch sociopolitical reform during Kim Young Sam presidency (1993-1998), 'Chungcheong regionalism' arising from the vehement debate over relocating the capital city, and the 'new regional division' emerging from considerable disparity between metropolitan areas and the rest (Jang, 2006). Rather than delve into these details, however, I shall re-direct focus on one of the most dominant regional splits between Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do or Jeolla-do and the rest.

however, has unfolded in the opposite direction: the regional rivalry between the two southeastern regions has constantly been a primary cleavage in Korea. Intense regional animus and enduring dominance of regional voting in Korean politics have received considerable academic attention. As a result, much scholarly work on political science has invoked a whole variety of factors to explain the origin and impacts of regionalism (Choi, 1999).<sup>2</sup>

One traditional approach to political regionalism attributes regional disintegration to the structural political and economic inequalities among regions (Hwang, 1997; Lee & Brunn, 1996). Hechter (1975) proposed a notion of internal colonialism, which refers to uneven effects of economic developments on a regional basis and the exploitation of minority groups within a nation state. According to this perspective, political regionalism has originated through internal colonization of the underprivileged region of Jeolla-do. Finding analytical utility of the core-periphery relationship, Hwang (1997) interpreted regionalism as the consequence of regional inequality stemming from Jeolla-do-discriminant economic policies implemented by President Park Chung-Hee. By examining regional favoritism by the ruling elites, which systematically excluded the southwestern region of Jeolla-do for a long time, Hwang (1997) indicated that this regional unfairness had been firmly entrenched and justified through cultural division of labor.

Analogously, Lee and Brunn (1996) compared the economic status among

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<sup>2</sup> Note that the concept of regionalism could be defined as various ways in different approaches examined below. In vast amount of existing literature on regionalism, the concept of regionalism is meant by a structural phenomenon, which includes both an individual and an aggregate facet. That is, regionalism is more than a sense of kinship between the candidates and the voters who came from similar district; rather, it has consolidated into an institutional phenomenon that impact Korean politics significantly at a micro as well as a macro level.

regions in terms of the number of high government officials, variation in income distribution, industrial output, and so forth. Their results indicated regional economic differentiation in the Korean politics and such provincial favoritism was especially pronounced in the two contending southern regions of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do. The political economy theory shows how structural inequality between the two contending southern regions of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do has emerged and become embedded in our society. Yet, critics argue that the political economy view is weak to the criticism that it cannot account for why the decreasing gap of economic disparity between regions has not induced corresponding reduction of regionalism in our society.

Contrary to the political economy approach predicated on a macro structure, another line of research points out strategic mobilization of political regionalism by political elites (Kim, 1995; Choi, 1999). According to the political mobilization theory, even though there are numerous latent social cleavages, only particular cleavages become salient in the process of electoral competition through selective mobilization of political actors (Przeworski & Sprague, 1986). This standpoint maintains that a strategic motive of political actors for electoral victory induces them to rely on a regional cleavage. For example, Roh (1998) examined the relationship between birthplace of political figures and their party membership during the 13<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> legislative elections. His findings show that there is a significant association between a politician's place of birth and his or her affiliation to a certain political party. That is, politicians deliberately utilized the territorial cleavage in their attempt to win elections.

The cleavage mobilization theory indicates that the rise of regionalism is an interaction between strategic behaviors of political factors and societal structure. Choi (1999) suggests that the political economy theory explains social contexts of

political regionalism, which the structural political economy perspective neglects to concern. However, it has limitations in explaining why politicians selected regional cleavage other than other factors from the first place. Furthermore, regardless of political mobilization of political elites, questions can be raised about why Korean voters have overwhelmingly embraced such appeals.

Finally, another variant of traditional approaches to political regionalism is a rational choice model of regionalism, which puts more emphasis on the individual voters rather than a macro structure or strategic motives of political elites (Kim, 2004; Moon, 2005). Scholarly works on rational choice model claim that individual voters have “instrumental rationality” to maximize the utility. Notably, Downs (1957) extended an economic framework to electoral behaviors. In the seminal work of “An Economic Theory of Democracy,” Downs asserts that voters seek to maximize the utility of their votes just as consumers act to maximize the benefit of their market choices. Under this approach, a line of research explains underlying motives of regional voting in the Korean politics. Cho (2000), for example, claims that regional voting is a rational choice of individual voters who face the prisoners’ dilemma in electoral settings. Although regional voting restricts political competition to a somewhat narrow regional conflict, voters are still able to gain short-term benefits from their regional voting. Similarly, Moon (2005) mathematically demonstrates that Korean voters have an economic incentive for regional voting because their regional party or candidates provide them with the greatest benefit or satisfaction. Moon identifies three motives leading to voters’ regional voting behaviors: “(1) voters’ expectations that their regional party would improve the political and economic conditions of the region, (2) apprehension that the party of a rival region could take regional benefits away from them, or (3) feeling of relative deprivation that the party of a rival region has

taken regional benefits away from them (p.8).” Based on this speculation, Moon (2005) modeled the electoral mechanisms of the 17<sup>th</sup> legislative election and concluded that regional voting was an effective way to guard the voters’ economic interests as the political parties’ ideological positions became less distinguishable.

A rational choice model interprets regionalism as a reflection of voters’ intentions to safeguard their political, economical, and societal interests. This view is in direct opposition to the commonly held belief that regionalism is the hallmark of immature, atavistic or primordial society. Given that regionalism has recently appeared since the democratic reform, a rational choice model argues that accusation of regionalism as an output of unsophisticated voter decisions leaves something unexplained. Notwithstanding its explanatory potential, the rational choice model has faced criticism since it lacks explanations for how the behaviors of individual voters can translate into group actions.

To recapitulate, a large body of existing literature has enquired into the origin and political leverage of regionalism with diverse analytical tools; a political economy perspective has mainly focused on a macro-political structure and show how structural inequality becomes embedded in a society. The political mobilization approach interprets regionalism as a mobilization of political actors for their electoral success. Finally, a rational choice model views regionalism as a reflection of voters’ intentions to safeguard their political, economic, and societal interests. Premised on the argument that regionalism is one of the most influential factors that shape the electoral decisions, this line of research might be termed “traditional” view of political regionalism.

Recently, some scholars have suggested a more benign prospect that a long-standing regional cleavage is being replaced by newfound cleavages such as ideological orientations, issue positions and so on (Kang, 2003). More specifically,

there has been a common perception that the 2002 presidential election was a critical juncture at which other social cleavages came to the epicenter of the Korean politics. Many scholars regarded the 2002 presidential election as a “watershed election” that witnessed great surge of alternative forces other than a long-established cleavage of regionalism (Lee & Shin, 2003; Song, 2003). In that election, other societal factors such as political ideology and generational differences were regarded to significantly influence voters’ political judgments, diluting the impacts of regionalism. Thus, detecting a decline of regionalism in electoral settings, revisionists have optimistically forecasted that regionalism would be transient and likely to merge into other social and political forces. That is to say, the South Korean political landscape is being dramatically reshaped.

The first branch of this view focuses on the rise of ideological orientations in the electoral consequences. There has been a common perception that the left-right ideology did not exert noticeable impacts in Korean politics, mainly because there was no meaningful ideological distinction among political parties (Kim, Jun, & Cho, 2008). Affected by vehement ideological tensions during the cold war era, practically all the parties formed in South Korea have been conservative parties that emphasized anticommunism, national security and economic growth (Lee, 1998; Choi, 2002). Yet, some researchers have argued that ideological differences gained political leverage in contemporary Korean politics. Notably, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), which proclaimed social welfare, progressivism and the interests of working class, entered the parliamentary by the 2004 legislative election. Many observers of Korean politics interpreted this as the emergence of ideological politics since it was the first legislative success of a liberal party without any regional base in the democratized Korean politics. Furthermore, many scholars have paid attention to the ideological divide by generation. As

generational units hold different political orientations from each other, close relationships between the younger generations and liberal ideology or the elder generation and conservative ideology have been recently given much scholarly attention (refer to the next section of 'Revisionist Perspectives on Regionalism' for more details).

Another stream of revisionist perspectives puts more emphasis on voting decisions guided by policy preferences. Traditionally, most of electoral studies have regarded political regionalism or candidate characteristics as to be the important determinants of electoral outcomes (Kim, Choi, & Cho, 2008). This is because personalistic and paternalistic political parties have formed onto regional support since the democratic opening of 1987. However, recent research on voting behaviors has reported the ascendancy of policy-orientated votes as seen in such recent examples as; withdrawal of a few charismatic election candidates who held firm regional bases; the phenomenal success of "Blacklist movement" in the 2000 legislative election that emphasized the desirability of policy-oriented political parties; the rise of a few conspicuously salient issues that occurred right before the election (e.g., presidential impeachment in 2004) and their subsequent impacts on voters' electoral decisions. Along this line, some researchers have claimed that voters are motivated by policy preferences outside the regional lines (Kang, 2003).

Empirical evidence from recent elections has lent support for this standpoint that policy preferences have played a key role in the electoral outcomes. The 2007 presidential election, for example, is viewed as an exemplary event in which "economic voting" had significant influences on the vote choices (Lee, 2008). Lee (2008) examined how the value of economic issues impacted on voting decisions in the 2007 presidential election. Based on post-election survey analysis, this study revealed that voter's prospective perception on national and individual

economic conditions significantly influenced their electoral decisions. Similarly, Kang (2013) explored determinants of vote choices in the 2012 presidential elections and concluded that a sufficient number of voters voted in accordance with their perception of the congruence of policy preference about economic growth.

To summarize, significant amount of academic attention has been paid to examining the source and the role of regionalism in Korean politics with diverse analytical tools. The “traditional” approaches have shown that political regionalism is one of the most decisive factors that have guided the electorate’s decisions in Korea over the last few decades. Recently, some “revisionists” point out the declining power of regionalism in the Korean society and speculate that regional bias has decreased in the public mind. Given the rapid transformation of the contemporary Korean society, the revisionist approaches to political regionalism pay close attention to the emergence of other factors such as political ideology, generational differences, policy preference, and so on in the political realm. As the heated academic debates suggest, the current status of research concerning the role of regionalism in the Korean politics is still a very much unexplored area.

## **Revisionist Perspectives on Regionalism in Korea**

In the previous section, I briefly presented the “traditional” and “revisionist” views of regionalism that have reported very conflicting conclusions about the role of regionalism in Korean politics. Traditional approaches such as a political economy theory, a cleavage mobilization theory, and a rational choice model, claim that the voters’ or politicians’ place of birth has dominated the

electoral outcomes. On the other hand, revisionist views of regionalism put more emphasis on other influential factors and suggest that the impact of regionalism in the political arena has declined. In this section, I will elaborate the two revisionist hypotheses that are closely related to the aforementioned revisionist approaches of regionalism.

First, the generational effects hypothesis posits that generational differences have come into national prominence in contemporary Korean politics (Kang, 2002). Based on the theory of generations posed by Mannheim (1952), this strand of research suggests that South Korea has undergone rapid social changes that have led to the formation of unique generational units. Particularly, many scholars have focused on the 2002 presidential election, where a progressive, younger candidate Roh Moo Hyun defeated a conservative, elder, and established political figure of Lee Hoi Chang by a narrow margin of 2.3 percent. For example, by examining candidate choice during the 2002 Korean presidential election, Song (2003) argued that the younger generations have developed far different value systems from their elder counterparts.

In a similar context, Kang (2002) examined characteristics of “Nosamo,” an internet-based support group for President Roh Moo Hyun. Investigating social and political backgrounds of “Nosamo,” Kang concluded that so-called 386 generation, people in their 30s, educated in the 1980s and born in the 1960s, was one of the main driving forces for the rise of new political leadership in the Korean politics. In a more recent work conducted by Kang (2008), generational differences in voting behaviors were investigated. The results of this work show that the sharp division between different age groups in their vote choices resulted from different political views held by each generational unit. More specific, Kang (2008) argues that young generations hold negative attitudes towards the authoritarian legacies,

unlike elder generations. Thus, Mr. Roh's electoral victory was mainly attributed to his successful mobilization of young voters' generational characteristics rather than long-standing regional appeals.

Additionally, much academic attention has been paid to the close relationship between generational split and the left-right, ideological division. According to cleavage theory, influences of societal cleavages can be enhanced or mitigated by interaction between ongoing cleavages (Sani & Sartori 1983; Simmel, 1950). If cleavages overlap with each other, it can heighten the social conflict and make compromise across groups more difficult, contributing to sociopolitical polarization. On the other hand, if cleavages cut across each other, this can "bridge" conflicts across groups, reducing disagreement and antagonism. In this sense, many researchers have explored whether generational chasm coincides with ideological divide and, more importantly, whether these reinforcing cleavages cut across a regional cleavage. Lee and Shin (2003), for instance, empirically investigated to what extent generational cleavages were overlapped with political ideology during the 2002 presidential election campaigns. The findings suggest that overlapped cleavages of 'ideology-generation' lowered intensity of regional voting, especially for young voters.

In another study conducted a few years later, Kim and his colleagues (Kim, Choi, & Cho, 2009) examined the changing cleavage structures in Korean electorate's choice of party and candidate. By analyzing the voting behaviors of the electorate in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> National Assembly Elections, the researchers investigated the influence of three major political cleavages in Korea: regionalism, ideology, and generational differences. Their analysis shows that the political leverage of regionalism has declined although it still remains quite strong. In addition, the findings suggest that the significance of political ideology increased

along with generational differences. Likewise, Choi and Cho (2005) investigated the impact of regional cleavage on the citizens' vote intention for conservative parties. Their analysis on the probabilities of vote decision to the candidates of conservative party during 17<sup>th</sup> legislative election indicated the dwindling power of regionalism in the political realm with the rise of generational and ideological cleavages.

Aside from political roots, a generational cleavage can have to do with economic division. Park (2011) points out that the monetary interests of older and younger generations significantly diverged in recent years. Since South Korea has been struggling to tackle the economic recession and the burden of its aging society, employment conditions have deteriorated for the younger generation. Many young people feel as if the older generation has occupied their jobs and still forced them to support the older population without sufficiently guaranteeing retirement benefits for them (Chun, 2010). Hence, growing concerns about economic interests can lead to pocketbook politics amongst different generations.

In sum, the generational effects hypothesis speculates that much of the long-term change in regional attitudes could be attributed to new age cohorts (Park, 2010). According to this perspective, generations who have developed different lifestyles, political orientations, and economic incentives play an important role in electoral outcomes, consequently diminishing the political leverage of regionalism. That is, generational differences are expected to reduce the impact of regionalism in the electorate's decisions.

*Hypothesis 1 (H1).* Younger generations are less likely to display regional prejudices than their elder counterparts.

Another line of revisionist approaches to political regionalism asserts that increased geographical mobility contributes to the decline in regional prejudices of the mass public (Jeon, Kim, & Seo, 2008). As developments of transportation and communication technologies have prompted geographical integration, impacts of residence or birthplace upon voter's political preferences have waned. Research from social psychology and political socialization may shed light on the underlying mechanisms how geographical mobility can lower regional hostility.

To begin with, studies of intergroup attitudes and intergroup contact posit that individuals' prejudices largely stem from ignorance (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Pettigrew, 1998). Thus, increasing interaction with different groups would replace in-group ignorance with firsthand knowledge that contradicts stereotypes and ultimately reduce intergroup biases. Kalin and Berry (1980), for instance, showed that geographical mobility enhanced the level of general ethnic tolerance. Subsequent studies provided considerable evidence for the contact hypothesis in various situations such as prejudices toward homosexuals (Herek & Capitano, 1996), people with physical challenge (Yuker, 1988), and the homeless (Lee, Farrell, & Link, 2004).

Research on political socialization may also provide relevant insights to the discussion of the Korean public's regional prejudices. From its onset, much scholarly attention to political socialization has focused on attitudinal persistence in voters' decision-making processes (Sears, 1975). A persistence hypothesis suggests that individuals' initial predispositions are unlikely to change despite the exposure to new environments (Jennings & Markus, 1984; Prior, 2010). In other words, political attitudes formulated at an early age such as party identification, political trust, etc., are likely to persist regardless of one's subsequent experience during adulthood. For example, in their long-term longitudinal study, Sears and

Funk (1999) demonstrated the continuity of core political predispositions across the full adult life span. Empirical research based on cross-country data also support attitudinal persistence. By examining the stability of voters' political interest in four different countries, Prior (2010) empirically showed that political interest formed at a young age is strikingly stable over long periods of time.

Relevantly, Lee (1997) included a geographical mobility factor in examining the influence of regionalism on the electorate's decisions. With regard to the increased geographical integration, Lee employed the analytic strategy of differentiating and comparing the impact of voters' current place of abode and places of birth on their voting decisions. He reasoned that if voters continued to support the party of their hometown rather than switch to the party of their current residence, it would indicate that traditional regionalism wield much power over voters. Instead, if voters changed their party affiliations from their place of hometown to their current residential areas, it would mean that voters emphasize their economic interest. The results of his work indicate that voters' birthplaces, not their places of abode, are more strongly associated with their party preference. That is, voters' affiliation with a regional party is likely to persist even if voters are exposed to different geographical environments.

Other studies on political behaviors, however, have shown that environmental influences such as ongoing political events, life transitions, or exposure to new status can shape individuals' attitudes in adulthood (Glaser & Gilens, 1997; Hoskin 1989; Miller & Sears, 1986; Sigel 1989). Exposure to new environments with different political and social norms can influence and alter individuals' predispositions in adulthood. This perspective was supported in the well-known early effort by Newcomb (1943, 1958). In his field non-experimental study, Newcomb (1943) examined whether students had changed their political

attitudes as they moved from the conservative families to the liberal Bennington College community. The results revealed a consistent trend towards liberalism in various social and economic issues. The findings of this work indicate that geographical relocation to new environment can provide a new reference group for individuals' political and social attitudes. In addition to the case of political attitudes, malleability of racial attitudes in the differing environments was also examined. Glaser and Gilens (1997), for example, investigated whether exposure to the different racial-political climate of the southern and northern United States influenced the voters' behavior of racial attitudes. The findings of their work show that individuals' preference for racial policy changed considerably in response to the change in political context.

Along this line, Kim (2009) explored the influence of Seoul residents' places of birth on their candidate choice. To this aim, he conducted empirical analyses on the vote choices of people whose place of abode was Seoul but place of birth was either Gyeongsang-do or Jeolla-do. His analysis based on the voting behaviors in the 15<sup>th</sup> - 17<sup>th</sup> Presidential elections show that the natives of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do represented a relatively high level of a regional party support based on their places of birth. However, some noticeable patterns were found; unlike the natives of Gyeongsang-do who consistently supported a political party based on their native region, the natives of Jeolla-do considerably deviated from their native regions especially in the 17<sup>th</sup> Presidential election. Kim (2009) concluded that such change of the voting behavior among the natives of Jeolla-do was mainly attributed to their retrospective evaluation of regime. Thus, these results suggest that increased geographical mobility has weakened regional voting behaviors of the natives of Jeolla-do.

To sum up discussions above, the geographical mobility approach revolves

around whether individuals' attitudes toward particular regions persist even when they are exposed to new environments. Although individuals' initial attitudes toward a particular region may persist as suggested by heated academic debates on political socialization, individuals' predispositions consistent with long-held regional prejudices can undergo fundamental changes as geographical integration increases. That is to say, geographical relocation may have the potential to put existing regional attitudes under pressure and result in changes in individuals' regional attitudes.

*Hypothesis 2 (H2).* People who have migrated to new environments would show less regional prejudices compared to those who were born in their residential region and have only lived in that region.

## **Extending the Idea of Modern Racism to Regionalism**

The current manuscript is based on the fundamental idea that the extension of the intellectual implications from the research on modern racism allows us to identify the changes in the origins and working of regional bias. A large body of literature on modern racism has suggested that traditional, overt racism, with its creed of White supremacy, may have disappeared; it has only been replaced by the newer form of racism, which is "more indirect, more subtle, more procedural, more ostensibly nonracial" (Pettigrew, 1979, p. 118). Accordingly, a related line of research on racism has been preoccupied with developing alternative indicators to properly capture the changing natures of racial attitudes (Greenwald et al., 2009; Sniderman et al., 1991). Hence, a history of studies on racism can have a

significant amount of association in addressing the Korean public's regional prejudices, which have become increasingly obtrusive and thus share concerns over measurement issues (Cho, 1999; Choi, 2008).

With regard to the nature and role of regionalism, some scholars suggested a comparative perspective. They argue that sufficient parallels can exist to generalize findings on racism in America to regionalism in South Korea (Cho, 1999; Choi, 2008). This is because a comparative view can provide applicable insights into the changing aspects of regionalism in contemporary Korean society. For example, Cho (1999) suggests that comparative analysis of regionalism by racism can provide exciting opportunities to examine the origin and mechanisms of regional cleavages. Cho (1999) delineates many parallels between racism and regionalism in that they both serve as an instrumental role in electoral processes; appeal to voters' emotions rather than reasons; and are a valence issue rather than a position issue.<sup>3</sup>

A further similarity between regionalism and racism resides in the measurements of prejudicial beliefs, which has become an increasingly elusive task. Choi (2008) claims that Korean electorate has also reached the public support for regional equality just as American voters have for racial equality. Thus, transparent and obvious measures of regionalism no longer adequately assess regional bias in much of the Korean electorate. In a similar sense, this section will review a brief history of research on racism for the light they may shed on political regionalism.

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<sup>3</sup> For clarification, some dissimilarity, of course, exists between the Korean regionalism and the American racism. For instance, Cho (1999) points out that racial prejudice is a lot more conspicuous than regional hostility since racial cues are much more salient than regional aspects.

*Revisionist Interpretations of Racism: From Overt To Symbolic and Implicit Racism*

Although public opinion had shown increased acceptance of racial equality in most areas of life, governmental efforts to promote racial integration in public schools have met with legal resistance, protests, and violence on the part of the white (Rossell, 1978). Given the considerable disparity between reported behavior and actual behavior, it was widely agreed that racial prejudice in contemporary era had become more elusive (Clark et al., 1999).

Sharing concerns over the increasingly elusive nature of racial attitudes, one line of research on racism has attempted to identify underlying psychological sources of public resistance to policies designed to foster racial harmony. According to such revisionist view, symbolic racism is “a blend of anti-black affect and the kind of traditional American moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic” (Kinder & Sears, 1981, p. 416). Examples of the cherished values include “hard work, individualism, sexual repression, and delay of gratification,” among others (McConahay & Hough, 1976, p. 41). In this sense, people who abhor blacks need only declare that they oppose government assistance to blacks not because they dislike them but because they believe in self-reliance (Sniderman et al., 1991). Since symbolic racism is more indirect, this new form of racism is hardly tabbed by traditional survey questions such as “How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that black people are generally not as smart as whites?” or “Is it a bad idea for blacks and whites to marry one another?”

Given that social desirability can pervade surveys that ask socially sensitive issues, researchers have proposed more broad-based and ambiguous indicators of racial prejudice than the typical direct questions (Kuklinski, Cobb, & Gilens, 1997). Notably, Crosby and his colleagues (1980) conducted experiments

on helping behavior, aggression, and nonverbal communication. The findings in each of these area indicate anti-black sentiments were much more prevalent among white Americans than the survey data led one to expect. Therefore, the results indicate that when asked about socially sensitive issues, people tend to give an inaccurate answer and conceal their true preferences behind publicly desirable, or politically correct, answers.

Another branch of research on racism has been interested in developing methods to indirectly access the contents of preferences and beliefs. More specifically, research on implicit social cognition on race raises doubts over the fundamental premises of the self-reported instruments. The wide use of self-reported questionnaires implies that researchers believe respondents to be both willing and able to report their attitudes on demand (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Several psychological studies, however, have revealed that the assumptions of survey research do not necessarily stand up to scrutiny (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nisbett & Willson, 1977). Even if people do not deliberately misrepresent their attitudes, their introspective access may be limited. In this case, the use of traditional, self-report methods cannot estimate the attitudes that lie outside conscious awareness and control.

Accordingly, this line of research has been concerned with developing alternative indicators to bypass the standard posing of questions and overcome unconscious bias. Among the most influential methods has been Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 2009). In the IAT, the automatic association between bipolar target concepts (such as white vs. blacks) and bipolar attributes (such as good vs. bad) is assessed through a series of discrimination tasks that require rapid responses. An extensive literature has indicated that implicit regional attitudes can be divergent from explicit ones and their relationship to

explicit behaviors (Dovidio et al., 2002; McConnell & Liebold, 2001; Iyengar et al., 2009).

In conclusion, there have been numerous attempts to sufficiently measure individuals' racial attitudes and beliefs. A major impediment to assessments of racial bias can arise from social desirability pressure and inadvertent misrepresentation. Consequently, a considerable bulk of research on racism has been devoted to developing unobtrusive or automatic measures to investigate the changing nature of racial prejudice.

*The Rise of Modern Regionalism? From Overt To Symbolic and Implicit Regionalism*

Perhaps the largest segment of existing studies on regionalism has resorted to self-reported instruments as expressed by participants. One of the most frequently employed techniques is the self-report questionnaire in which respondents are asked directly to express their regional bias (Kim, 1989). For example, self-report surveys including items such as "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement that people from Jeolla-do are unreliable?" were delivered to respondents to assess people's regional bias.

Another explicit measure of regionalism commonly used is a social distance scale (Choi & Kim, 2000). The psychological testing scale created by Bogardus (1925) is to empirically measure people's willingness to participate in social contacts of varying degrees of closeness with members of diverse social groups, such as racial and ethnic groups. Applying the concept of Bogardus scale, for example, Nah (1990) developed social distance scale that asked people the extent to which they would be accepting of people from Jeolla-do as their close relatives by marriage, as their personal friends, as their neighbors, and as their

coworkers in the workplace.

Although the studies based on self-report instruments may help explain how regionalism manifests itself in a society, scholarly works on modern racism suggest that social desirability bias can jeopardize validity of research based on such explicit measures (Paulhus, 2002). To be specific, as old-fashioned, overt forms of regionalism have lost much of their appeal in the Korean politics, traditional, direct, and straightforward survey method may impose social pressure on respondents to conform to social norm. For example, when confronted with the question of “Do you think that people from Jeolla-do are selfish?,” participants nowadays may be inclined to say socially desirable responses rather than answer truthfully. That is to say, people may be motivated to “disguise” their regional bias and instead conform to widely-shared egalitarian norms. In fact, there have been considerable concerns over regional divides that have hampered voters from asking electoral accountability to representatives (Choi, 1991). Within this context, traditional self-report instruments that vast amount of traditional studies on political regionalism have used may produce biased estimates about people’s regional attitudes.

One of the few scholarly efforts to address possible measurement problems of regional attitudes was an article by Choi (2008). Choi acknowledged the possible “testing effects” of public opinion surveys on regionalism. Consequently, based on unobtrusive survey items that Kuklinski and his colleagues created in order to tab symbolic racism, Choi (2008) developed more indirect, broad-based, and subtle items to assess regional attitudes. More specifically, Kuklinski and his colleagues (Kuklinski et al., 1997) administered the list experiment as a way of unobtrusive measure. One half of respondents were presented with a list of three items and asked to say how many of the items made them angry. The other half

received the same list plus an additional item about race and were also asked to answer how many of the items made them angry. Then, the average numbers of items that made respondents angry between two conditions were compared. The three items both groups received were (1) the federal government increasing the tax on gasoline; (2) professional athletes getting million-dollar contracts; and (3) large corporations polluting the environment. The fourth item selectively offered to a treatment group was (4) a black family moving in next door. The findings showed that racial prejudice was still high in the South in spite of the universal endorsement for the social norm of racial equality.

In this light of view, Choi (2008) conducted the list experiment with unobtrusive survey items to capture the symbolic dimension of regional prejudices. Three items offered to both groups were similar as those used in Kukliski et al.'s study (1997): (1) the government increasing the tax on gasoline; (2) professional athletes getting million-dollar contracts; and (3) chaebol polluting the environment. In Choi (2008)'s study, the treatment item was modified with either (4.1) a boss from Jeolla-do in your workplace or (4.2) a boss from of Gyeongsang-do in your workplace. The former statement was given to respondents from other than Jeolla-do and the latter was offered to respondents from Gyeongsang-do.

The results of this study indicate that regional prejudice does not exist anymore in Korean society. While I agree with Choi's view that the citizens' regional attitudes are hardly captured by explicit self-reports that majority of existing studies on political regionalism have relied on, I depart from his argument in that his study was marred by somewhat precipitous conclusion. Even though his study has obvious strengths, his conclusion that there is no significant regional hostility between the two southern regions seems rather premature. As a matter of fact, there remain important signs of continued resistance to full regional equality.

For example, one of the recent surveys reveals that the substantial disadvantages experienced by Jeolla-do residents have not disappeared. According to the results recently released by the Presidential Committee for National Cohesion (Lee, 2013), 14.3 percent of Jeolla-do residents expressed that they experience regional discrimination around 4.8 times as much as Gyeongsang-do residents. This non-negligible disparity between the contending regions implies that regional prejudices still continue to exert a pervasive influence on society, making themselves felt. Along with the daily experiences of regional discrimination, there have been growing concerns over intense verbal abuse against Jeolla-do people online such as Ilgan Storehouse. Given the abundant evidence of regionalism in our daily lives as discussed earlier, the conclusion of Choi's study seems to have its own limitations.

Another frequently evoked concern with self-reports collected through surveys is that they presume respondents are capable of recognizing their attitudes and beliefs, which are often complicated, ambiguous, and elusive. Yet, much psychological literature has shown that even broad-based, unobtrusive surveys may not be able to capture the unintentional bias that people are largely unaware of (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). That is to say, the use of traditional, self-report methods cannot estimate the attitudes that lie outside conscious awareness and control. Applying this standpoint to the discussion of regionalism, it can be assumed that certain parts of regional attitudes may be unreachable since regional prejudices may involve little effort, intentional control, or awareness.

Relevantly, a body of research on group interactions has revealed that the mere process of group distinctions can give rise to in- or out-group stereotypes and prejudices (Dovidio et al., 2002). More specifically, the social identity theory

posits that collective (or social) group memberships are important to individual's self-concept, which has two distinctive attributes – personal identity and collective identity (Tajfel, 1978). This theory suggests that an individual's social identity derives largely from self-enhancing purposes through category distinctions between in-group and out-group (Turner et al., 1987). Intriguingly, many studies on social identity and group distinctions have shown that the mere process of making salient 'us' and 'them' distinctions can translate into evaluative biases toward in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. For example, Perdue et al. (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990) conducted an experiment where participants were repeatedly exposed to nonsense syllables unobtrusively paired with in- group designators (e.g., us, we, ours) and out-group designating pronouns (e.g., them, they, theirs). Even though participants did not realize the unobtrusively paired in- or out- group designators, they rated meaningless syllables as more pleasant if it had been provided with in-group designators. The results suggest the prejudicial attitudes and beliefs can be embedded in our mind without even conscious efforts. Since social identity can derive from a variety of group memberships, including race, gender, occupation, and region in this case, regional bias may be automatically activated by the mere presence of the attitude object.

To restate, this paper aims to explore the fundamental changes of regional bias. If the implicit measure of regionalism were significantly different from parallel explicit measures of it, it would indicate that regional prejudices are not disappearing, but evolving into different forms. Based on the distribution of the diverse dimensions of regional prejudices, the revisionist hypotheses would be tested regarding the different forms of regional attitudes (Research Question 1). In addition, it seems worthwhile to investigate how the different aspects of regional prejudices impact citizens' political decision (Research Question 2). Finally, this

paper attempts to obtain political implications of the aforementioned discussion in a broad context of the Korean political landscape (Research Question 3).

*Research Question 1 (RQ1).* How are revisionist approaches such as the generational effects hypothesis (*H1*) and geographical mobility hypothesis (*H2*) related to the different dimensions of regional prejudices?

*Research Question 2 (RQ2).* How do the different aspects of regional prejudices influence voters' political judgment such as party preference and vote choice?

*Research Question 3 (RQ3).* What would be the political implications of the changing nature of regional prejudices in the Korean political landscape?

# METHOD

## Sample and Procedures

The study was administered during the 2012 Korean Presidential and 2014 Local election campaign seasons. Participants were recruited from an opinion research firm in Korea, respectively. Macromil-Embrain retains an online panel of approximately one million Korean citizens. Among them, those who satisfied all the three prerequisite conditions were selected as the study sample. The three requisite conditions were for an individual to be eligible to vote, participate in both the online survey and the study experiment, and successfully complete the experiment tasks.<sup>4</sup> During the recruitment, I acquired the consent from the participants to access to their response data.<sup>5</sup>

Upon entering the study website, participants were informed that they would take part in a study on regionalism. After completing the online survey, participants were directed to the study site where they were given a warm-up task designed to acclimatize them to the experimental situations. Table 1 presents the demographic characteristics of the participants in this study. For clarification, the sample is not entirely representative of the Korean population since participants were recruited from an online panel. Compared to the national sample of the 2012 Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), for example, younger generations, males, liberals or independents, and residents of Seoul and Gyeonggi-do were

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<sup>4</sup> Participants whose responses during trial blocks took greater than 10,000 milliseconds were identified as outliers and thus excluded from the analysis (Hahn et al., 2013). For more details on the outlier detection of the IAT responses, refer to Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003.

<sup>5</sup> The current research secured IRB approval from Seoul National University (IRB No. 1402/001-009).

overrepresented in the study sample of 2012 Presidential election. In a similar sense, people aged more than fifty were underrepresented in the study sample of 2014 Local election. Analogously, there was some notable discrepancy between the national sample of 2012 KGSS and the study sample of 2012 Presidential election. Particularly, those who were aged under fifty, male, liberal or independent, received higher education, and dwelled in Seoul and nearby metropolitan areas were included disproportionately large in the study. Selection bias in both cases of elections is partly attributed to the online method employed in the current study. Nevertheless, this work tried to sufficiently secure a diverse pool of national voters in both cases of studies.

## **Measures**

### *Implicit Measures of Regional Bias*

To properly measure the implicit dimension of regional prejudices, this study developed the Region Implicit Association Test (IAT) experiment (see Figure 1). The IAT experiment (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) is a computer-based task that instructs participants to rapidly sort items into categories. Based on the time it takes to sort items and the error rate, the IAT measures how strongly the categories are associated in a participant's mind. Since it was developed in the 1990s, the IAT has been extensively used to measure latent or implicit bias in dozens of published papers (Iyengar et al., 2009).

**Table 1.** Demographic Characteristics of the Participants


		2012 Korean General Social Survey	2012 Presidential Election	2014 Local Election
Age	19-29	206 (14.756%)	135 (25.328%)	228 (27.175%)
	30-39	188 (13.467%)	128 (24.015%)	218 (25.983%)
	40-49	264 (18.911%)	110 (20.638%)	222 (26.460%)
	50-	724 (51.862%)	160 (30.018%)	171 (2.381%)
Gender	Male	617 (44.198%)	314 (58.912%)	450 (53.635%)
	Female	779 (55.802%)	219 (41.088%)	389 (46.365%)
Education	Middle School	475 (34.206%)	-	6 (.715%)
	High School	405 (29.011%)	-	149 (17.759%)
	Enrolled in College		-	115 (13.707%)
	Undergrad Degree	481 (34.456%)	-	492 (58.641%)
	Higher than Grad-Degree	35 (2.507%)	-	77 (9.178%)
Political Ideology	Liberal	440 (31.519%)	217 (40.713%)	361 (43.027%)
	Independent	404 (28.940%)	183 (34.334%)	243 (28.963%)
	Conservative	461 (33.023%)	133 (24.953%)	235 (28.010%)
Residence	Gyeongsang-do	308 (22.063%)	98 (18.386%)	159 (18.951%)
	Busan	106 (7.593%)	33 (6.191%)	65 (7.747%)
	Jeolla-do	200 (14.327%)	54 (10.131%)	78 (9.297%)
	Chungcheong-do	138 (9.885%)	40 (7.505%)	91 (1.846%)
	Gangwon-do & Jeju-do	46 (3.295%)	12 (2.251%)	34 (4.053%)
	Seoul & Gyeonggi-do	598 (42.837%)	296 (55.535%)	412 (49.106%)
N		1396	533	839

Most IATs contain four distinct categories consisting of a pair of bipolar targets and a pair of bipolar attributes. In the case of the Race IAT experiments, a pair of bipolar target categories is usually ‘African American’ and ‘European American’ and a pair of bipolar attributes is ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ These category labels are displayed on either the left or right side of the screen while words or pictures representing those categories appear one by one in the middle of the screen. Participants sort each item as it appears into its corresponding category using only two computer keys: ‘E’ for exemplars of a category on the left, ‘I’ for exemplars of a category on the right (see Figure 1).

In a similar vein, the Region IAT experiments were created. Particularly, a pair of bipolar target categories in the Region IAT experiments is ‘Jeolla-do’ and ‘Gyeongsang-do’ and a pair of bipolar attributes is ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ The target categories ‘Jeolla-do’ and ‘Gyeongsang-do’ are represented by words relating to each region such as the colloquial terms referring to each region, names of political figures, and a professional baseball team in each region. The attribute categories ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are displayed by words conveying positive and negative concepts (see Table 2).

Implicit regional attitudes are assessed by subtracting the response times during blocks with the “compatible association pairings” (e.g., ‘Jeolla-do’ paired with ‘bad’ & ‘Gyeongsang-do’ paired with ‘good’) from the response times during blocks with “incompatible association pairings” (e.g., ‘Jeolla-do’ paired with ‘good’ & ‘Gyeongsang-do’ paired with ‘bad’). An effect size, or the “*Region IAT score*,” ranges from -2 to 2, where 0 means the absence of latent regional preferences, positive values display regional hostility towards Jeolla-do, and negative values suggest regional antagonism towards Gyeongsang-do (2012 Presidential election: mean = .133, s.d. = .604; 2014 Local election: mean = .101,

s.d. = .622).



**Figure 1.** Screen of the Race (top) and Region (bottom) IAT experiments

**Table 2.** Words that Represent Target and Attribute Categories of the Region IAT experiment

Categories	Words
Gyeongsang-do	Youngnam, Samsung Lions, Park Chung-Hee
Jeolla-do	Honam, Kia Tigers, Kim Dae-Jung
Good	generous, refined, intelligent, reliable
Bad	resentful, deceptive, sly, sychophantic

*Explicit Measures of Regional Prejudices*

The current research relies on two survey indices of explicit regional attitudes - Overt Regionalism and Symbolic Regionalism. The former is based on a set of eight trait ratings that respondents apply to those born or residing in the two contending regions of Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do. The final indicator of *Overt Regionalism* is the difference between the ratings of each region, ranging from -1 to 1, where 0 represents no specific regional prejudices; positive values mean regional antipathy to Jeolla-do; and negative values suggest regional animus towards Gyeongsang-do (2012 Presidential election: mean = .053, s.d. = .177; 2014 Local election: mean = -.023, s.d. = .181).

The first item in the Overt Regionalism set was worded as follows: “We’re interested in your opinions about different regions in our society. Using the scale shown below, where a score of 1 would mean that you think most of the people in the group tend to be “reliable,” while a score of 7 would mean that most of the people are “unreliable,” where would you place people of Jeolla-do?” This was followed by trait scales with end points of “interact with people of different backgrounds” and “stick to themselves,” “favorable” and “complains incessantly,”

“positive” and “negative,” “cooperative” and “unduly domineering,” “modest” and “conceited,” “listen to criticism” and “behave self-righteously,” and “friendly” and “aggressive.” Same items were also asked about the people of Gyeongsang-do. The Alpha values for Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do were .902 and .833 in the case of 2012 Presidential election, and .865 and .913 in the case of 2014 Local election, respectively.

*Symbolic Regionalism* is based on a set of four agree-disagree items that tap beliefs about regional minority and support for regional equality policy. The items to capture the symbolic dimension of respondents’ regional attitudes were as follows: (1) Government should strive to take all the measures necessary to ensure people have equal opportunities regardless of their birthplaces. (2) Without regional prejudices, our society would be much better. (3) Over the past few years, Jeolla-do residents have gotten less than they deserve. (4) To overcome the long-standing political regionalism in our society, the government should prioritize the southwestern region of Jeolla-do more than any other region in infrastructure development. As to these four items, respondents answered each item along a four-point scale that ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” The items were converted to a 0-1 metric and an index score was computed as the average of the four items. Coefficient Alpha was .690 and .706 for the 2012 Presidential and 2014 Local election, respectively. *Symbolic Regionalism* ranges from 0 to 1, with values larger than .500 representing stronger regional prejudices against Jeolla-do (2012 Presidential election: mean = .287, s.d. = .156; 2014 Local election: mean = .282, s.d. = .160).

As Table 3 shows, there was some notable discrepancy among regions. To begin with, the mean values of the Region IAT score indicate that Gyeongsang-do (.347) and Busan (.342) represented a significantly high level of implicit hostility

towards Jeolla-do in the case of 2012 Presidential election. Analogously, residents of Jeolla-do displayed extremely high level of implicit antagonism towards Gyeongsang-do as manifested by a negative coefficient (-.308). Other regions, except Gangwon-do and Jeju-do (-.157), showed a smaller degree of antipathy to Jeolla-do as indicated by a smaller value compared to the two contending southern regions of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do. Similar patterns were found in the case of 2014 Local election. One interesting exception comes from residents of Busan (.106), which expressed implicit aversion to Gyeongsang-do. Although the absolute value of Busan itself was much smaller in the case of 2014 Local election compared to the case of 2012 Presidential election, residents in Busan showed contradicting results in implicit dimension. In the case of explicit measures, all regions were found to show extremely small degree of Overt Regionalism, where mean values were less than .100 with exception of Busan in the 2012 Presidential election. Finally, the distribution of the other explicit measure of Symbolic Regionalism was congruous with our reality in that resident of Jeolla-do represented the smallest level of animosity towards itself. However, as the mean values smaller than .500 suggest, the level of opposition to regional equality policies in other regions was not significantly high. That is to say, participants expressed high levels of conformity to the norms of regional equality.

**Table 3.** Distribution of Implicit and Explicit Regional Attitudes in Each Residence

Residence	2012 Presidential Election						2014 Local Election					
	Implicit Measure		Explicit Measures				Implicit Measure		Explicit Measures			
	Region IAT		Overt Regionalism		Symbolic Regionalism		Region IAT		Overt Regionalism		Symbolic Regionalism	
	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.
Gyeongsang-do	.347	.582	.089	.173	.305	.166	.392	.508	-.053	.184	.299	.159
Jeolla-do	-.308	.531	-.045	.149	.151	.117	-.327	.593	.062	.166	.187	.126
Busan	.342	.520	.106	.172	.326	.149	.106	.627	-.041	.178	.319	.139
Chungcheong-do	.141	.538	.009	.133	.281	.141	.059	.615	-.015	.185	.270	.166
Gangwon-do & Jeju-do	-.157	.519	.050	.106	.340	.115	.071	.649	-.074	.238	.287	.148
Seoul & Gyeonggi-do	.129	.599	.059	.184	.300	.151	.081	.615	-.023	.172	.289	.163
Total	.133	.604	.053	.177	.287	.156	.101	.622	-.023	.181	.282	.160

### *Generational Units*

In an attempt to test the Generational Effects Hypothesis (*H1*), which posits that younger generations would represent lower levels of regional prejudices than their elder counterparts, I constructed four-class of dummy variables of generation aged '19-29,' '30-39,' '40-49,' and '50 and more.' In the analyses that follow, generations aged '50 and more' were treated as a baseline for the model. That is, the coefficients for the dummy variables of each generational unit represent the level of the participants' regional bias in comparison with the baseline.

### *Geographical Mobility*

To address the Geographical Mobility Hypothesis (*H2*), which concerns the effects of geographical relocation on individuals' affective reactions towards particular regions, people related to Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do were divided into four dummy groups, respectively. For example, subgroups of Gyeongsang-do residents were composed of those (1) who were born and have been residing in Gyeongsang-do (i.e., non-mobility) and (2) who were born elsewhere but are currently residing in Gyeongsang-do. Additionally, people who are not currently living in Gyeongsang-do were also divided into two dummy groups based on their or their parents' affiliations to the region of Gyeongsang-do. As a result, people (3) who were born in Gyeongsang-do but have settled elsewhere and (4) whose family origin is Gyeongsang-do but are living somewhere else other than Gyeongsang-do were also created into a separate geographical mobility group. Here, family origin of the participants was measured by their parents' places of birth or residential areas. Same rules were applied to the case of geographical mobility groups of

Jeolla-do (see Table 4).<sup>6</sup>

**Table 4.** Geographical Mobility Subgroups of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do : 2014 Local election

(total N = 839)	
Region	N
Gyeongsang-do (G)	
Born & Residing in G	125 (14.899%)
Born elsewhere & Residing in G	34 (4.052%)
Born in G & Residing elsewhere	66 (7.867%)
Family origin of G & Residing elsewhere	283 (33.731%)
Jeolla-do (J)	
Born & Residing in J	70 (8.343%)
Born elsewhere & Residing in J	8 (.954%)
Born in J & Residing elsewhere	42 (5.006%)
Family origin of J & Residing elsewhere	205 (24.434 %)

Regarding the eight subgroups of geographical mobility in Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do, those who reside in areas other than two contending regions without any relation to those areas were treated as a baseline reference category for the model. This is because residents in other regions without any affiliations to the two contending regions are expected to hold comparatively neutral perspective in regional aspects. Thus, all region dummy variables display differences of the participants' regional attitudes from the baseline. If a coefficient were close to

<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, in the case of 2012 Presidential election, the questions to tab the degree of geographical mobility were omitted.

zero, it would mean that the level of regional prejudices of a particular geographical mobility group were similar to the relatively neutral geographical baseline groups. On the other hand, a positive coefficient suggests a greater level of regional hostility towards Jeolla-do compared to the baseline and a negative coefficient indicate a higher level of regional bias towards Gyeongsang-do. To summarize, the coefficients for the dummy variables of geographical mobility indicate the level of regional prejudices compared to the relatively neutral standing geographical groups, after controlling other relevant variables.

#### *Party Preference*

Respondents indicated their feelings (warm or cold) towards each political party on a 100-point thermometer scale. In the case of 2012 Presidential election, party preference was measured by the difference between thermometer ratings for a conservative candidate Park Geun-hye and a liberal candidate Moon Jae-In with positive values representing conservative candidate preferences and vice-versa. Since different candidates ran the local election across regions, party preference was operationalized as the difference between thermometer ratings for a conservative party (Saenuri party) and a liberal party (New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD)) with positive values representing conservative party preferences and vice-versa. The mean values were -17.747 (s.d. = 46.744) for 2012 Presidential election and -9.692 (s.d.= 33.299) for 2014 Local election.

#### *Candidate Choice*

Regarding the vote choice, vote intention for a liberal party candidate was coded as 0 and a conservative party candidate was coded as 1. As described above, liberals were overrepresented in this study sample and thus the level of support for a candidate from a liberal party was far higher than that for a conservative candidate in both elections. For example, 64.343 percent (2012 Presidential

election) and 63.971 percent (2014 Local election) of the participants expressed an intention to vote for a candidate from the liberal party.

#### *Other Relevant Items*

In the current study, a set of control variables includes gender, income, education, and political ideology (refer to Appendix for the entire survey). Gender was coded as “Female” = 1 and “Male” = 0. Income index measured annual household income where “Less than 1,000,000 KRW” = 1, “1,000,000 – 1,990,000 KRW” = 2, “2,000,000 – 2,990,000 KRW” = 3, “3,000,000 – 3,990,000 KRW” = 4, “4,000,000 – 4,990,000 KRW” = 5, “5,000,000 – 5,990,000 KRW” = 6, “6,000,000 – 6,990,000 KRW” = 7, “7,000,000 – 7,990,000 KRW” = 8, “8,000,000 – 8,990,000 KRW” = 9, “9,000,000 – 9,990,000 KRW” = 10, “More than 10,000,000 KRW” = 11, and “Don’t Know” = 12. Education was coded as “Less than High School” = 1, “High School” = 2, “Enrolled in College” = 3, “Undergraduate Degree” = 4, and “Higher than Graduate Degree” = 5. Finally, Political Ideology index was constructed based on the question where participants indicated their position on a 10-point thermometer scale with 0 representing extremely liberal and 10 suggesting highly conservative (2012 Presidential election: mean = 4.587, s.d. = 2.026; 2014 Local election: mean = 4.634, s.d. = 1.848). These individual-level attributes of the participants were obtained from the online survey, which were matched with the behavioral data drawn from the Region IAT experiments.

## RESULTS

### **Comparing the Distribution of Different Forms of Regional Attitudes**

Prior to testing the hypotheses, this section examines the distribution of implicit and explicit measures of regional attitudes. Given the considerable evidence that explicit measures drawn from traditional self-reports typically understate the level of bias (Iyengar et al., 2009), this study speculates that there would be greater differentials in the magnitude of implicit regional bias in the two contending regions of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do than in any other regions. Additionally, IAT scores would show a greater degree of discrepancy across regions than explicit measures of it. This is because the level of attitude-behavior inconsistency would be stronger for those with higher level of implicit regional bias.

Overall, the patterns of Figure 2A provided supporting evidence for this speculation. In the case of 2012 Presidential election, the magnitude of differentials in the Region IAT score was far more conspicuous in Gyeongsang-do (53.062 percent) and Jeolla-do (78.572 percent) than for other regions (e.g., Chungcheong-do: 15 percent). In addition, the IAT score showed greater fluctuations (28.889 percent) across regions compared to explicit measures with the average amounts of 16.738 percent and 17.778 percent for overt and symbolic regionalism, respectively.


A similar pattern held for the case of 2014 Local election (see Figure 2B). The extent of differentials in the Region IAT score was particularly pronounced in Gyeongsang-do (66.038 percent) and Jeolla-do (61.538 percent) than for other

regions (e.g., Chungcheong-do: 5.494 percent). Besides, the IAT score represented greater variations (27.675 percent) across regions compared to its parallel explicit measures with the average amounts of 11.998 percent (Overt Regionalism) and 6.263 percent (Symbolic Regionalism). To put things together, the discrepancies of implicit and explicit regional attitudes suggest that regional attitudes may be evolving into a more elusive and subtle form, hardly captured by traditional opinion surveys.


An interesting point is that residents of Busan represented a significantly high level of implicit bias towards Jeolla-do in both cases of elections. More specifically, significantly high rate of Busan resident expressed implicit hostility towards Jeolla-do (i.e., pro-Gyeongsang-do and anti-Jeolla-do) in both 2012 Presidential election (81.818 percent) and 2014 Local election (67.692 percent). Even though some scholars claim that voting behaviors of the residents in southern Gyeongsang-do areas - especially Busan - show that traditional regionalism is being replaced by other relevant factors such as political ideology, generation, and so on (Choi & Cho, 2005; Jeon, Cha, & Kim, 2007), the distribution of regional attitudes in Busan is found to be not significantly divergent from that of Gyeongsang-do in general.

Another interesting point is that there is extremely low level of differentials in the Symbolic Regionalism indicator across regions. With the exception of Seoul and Gyeonggi-do (33.784 percent) in the case of 2014 Local election, at least 75 percent of all participants displayed the wide acceptance of the principle of regional equality. As discussed earlier, Symbolic Regionalism was composed of four survey items to capture the citizens' regional attitudes by asking the level of individuals' acceptance of government policies to prevent region-based discrimination. The high level of support for regional equality policies and

strikingly small variation of across regions (2012 Presidential election: s.d. = .156; 2014 Local election: s.d. = .160) might arise for two reasons. First, the uniform distribution of the regional policy preferences among regions might indicate that the principle of regional equality is quite universally embraced. Alternatively, the small degree of variation in symbolic dimension of regional attitudes might result from the fundamental differences between regional policy preference and regional prejudice. This is because individuals' policy dimension and personal attitude dimension are distinguishable and respond to political environments in a different way. Glaser and Gilens (1997), for example, found that geographical mobility led individuals' racial policy preferences to change dramatically. On the other hand, respondents' racial prejudices were found to remain quite stable and change modestly despite the exposure to new political environments. Regarding the difference, they suggest that racial attitudes may have deep psychological roots and consequently tend to remain highly stable across the life course (Converse, 1964; Kinder & Sears, 1981). Along this line, the Korean citizens' regional policy preferences might have changed more radically in response to social change in contemporary Korean society, whereas regional prejudices remain quite stable. As a consequence, participants might have expressed quite uniform consent to regional policies across regions, while their implicit regional prejudices persists in their minds.



**Figure 2A.** Distribution of Implicit and Explicit Regional Attitudes in Each Residence: 2012 Presidential Election



**Figure 2B.** Distribution of Implicit and Explicit Regional Attitudes in Each Residence: 2014 Local Election

## Hypotheses Tests

The next phase of the analysis proceeds to a more rigorous test of the revisionist hypotheses. Before conducting statistical analysis on the hypotheses, I checked for multicollinearity. As VIFs ranged from 1.03 to 1.44 (2012 Presidential election) and from 1.01 to 1.87 (2014 Local election) respectively, VIFs did not exceed the normally accepted value of 10 for both elections.

To begin with, I attempted to test the generational effects hypothesis (*HI*) in the case of 2012 Presidential election by looking at the estimates for generations aged '19-29,' '30-39,' and '40-49' (see Table 5A). The generational effects hypothesis posits that younger generations would represent lower level of regional prejudices than their elder counterparts. Consistent with *HI*, younger generations showed notably lower levels of implicit regional prejudices than the generational group of '50 and more' as manifested by negative coefficients with the asterisks in the column of the Region IAT (19-29:  $b = -.240, p < .001$ ; 30-39:  $b = -.147, p < .05$ ). In the case of generation '40-49,' the generational effects were found to be in the predicted (negative) direction but such effects were not statistically significant ( $b = -.084, p = .232$ ).

The explicit measures produced discrepant results regarding the generational effects. Parallel to the case of the Region IAT score, younger generations showed significantly lower levels of implicit regional bias than the generational group of '50 and more' in the case of Overt Regionalism (19-29:  $b = -.071, p < .001$ ; 30-39:  $b = -.053, p < .01$ ; 40-49:  $b = -.051, p < .05$ ). However, the improvements in regional attitudes among younger generations were not found in the case Symbolic Regionalism. It is worth noting that the generational unit aged '20-29' showed even greater level of antipathy towards Jeolla-do (19-29:  $b = .037,$

$p < .05$ ). These results indicate that young generations in their age of ‘20-29’ hold different attitudes toward regional equality policy from its elder generations. Considering that there have been growing concerns over youth radicalization in their regional attitudes (Lee, 2013), these findings are not surprising.

**Table 5A.** Hypotheses Tests in Different Forms of Regional Prejudices : 2012 Presidential Election

	Implicit Measure		Explicit Measures			
	Region IAT		Overt Regionalism		Symbolic Regionalism	
	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
Constant	.035	(.088)	.037	(.026)	.205	(.022)***
Generation						
19-29	-.240	(.067)***	-.071	(.020)***	.037	(.017)*
30-39	-.147	(.068)*	-.053	(.020)**	-.008	(.017)
40-49	-.084	(.070)	-.051	(.021)*	-.014	(.018)
Residence						
Gyeongsang-do	.193	(.065)**	.024	(.020)	.004	(.017)
Jeolla-do	-.392	(.083)***	-.090	(.025)***	-.137	(.021)***
Busan	.226	(.103)*	.050	(.031)	.031	(.026)
Chungcheong-do	.005	(.095)	-.050	(.028)	-.006	(.024)
Gangwon-do & Jeju-do	-.321	(.166)	-.015	(.050)	.057	(.042)
Female	-.077	(.050)	-.023	(.015)	-.010	(.013)
Ideology	.052	(.013)***	.016	(.004)***	.020	(.003)***
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.143		.109		.158	
N	533		533		533	

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

Note: Cell entries are given as OLS estimates.

In addition, with regard to the parameter estimates of the different forms of regional prejudices, three null hypotheses were tested respectively: a)  $H_0: \beta_{19-29} = \beta_{30-39}$ ; b)  $H_0: \beta_{30-39} = \beta_{40-49}$ ; c)  $H_0: \beta_{19-29} = \beta_{40-49}$ . First, in the case of the Region IAT score, the null hypothesis was rejected in one out of three cases in the 2012 Presidential election case (c):  $p < .05$ ). On the other hand, in the case of Symbolic Regionalism, the null hypothesis was rejected in two out of three cases, indicating that a young generation aged '19-29' has developed different attitudes toward regional equality policy from its elder generations (a):  $p < .05$  and c):  $p < .01$ ). Lastly, the null hypothesis was not rejected in all three cases for Overt Regionalism.

The generational effects hypothesis (*HI*) was also tested in the case of 2014 Local election (see Table 5B). In a similar way to the case of 2012 Presidential election, younger generations represented lower levels of implicit regional bias than the generational group of '50 and more' (19-29:  $b = -.339, p < .001$ ; 30-39:  $b = -.232, p < .001$ ; 40-49:  $b = -.134, p < .05$ ). However, the generational effects were not found for explicit measures. Given the relatively small variance of the explicit measures possibly stemming from social constraint effects, these results are understandable (Overt Regionalism:  $s.d. = .181$ ; Symbolic Regionalism:  $s.d. = .160$ ).

Likewise, three null hypotheses were tested regarding the parameter estimates of regional prejudices in the case of 2014 Local election: a)  $H_0: \beta_{19-29} = \beta_{30-39}$ ; b)  $H_0: \beta_{30-39} = \beta_{40-49}$ ; c)  $H_0: \beta_{19-29} = \beta_{40-49}$ . Similar results were found in the case of 2014 Local election. Specifically, in the case of the Region IAT score, the null hypothesis was fairly rejected in all three cases, indicating that generational units hold distinctive regional attitudes from each other (a) and b):  $p < .01$ ; c):  $p < .001$ ). In contrast, in the case of Symbolic Regionalism, the null hypothesis was

rejected in two out of three cases (a) and c):  $p < .05$ ), consistently lending support for the results induced in the case of 2012 Presidential election and suggest that a young generation aged ‘19-29’ has developed distinctive political, social attitudes towards the principles of regional equality. Finally, the null hypothesis was not rejected in all three cases for Overt Regionalism, which probably resulted from the testing effects. In other words, participants might have concealed their true regional responses due to the social desirability constraint. Taken together, the outcomes of Table 5A and Table 5B imply that self-reports about regionalism, which most of the existing studies are based on, can be systematically biased.

The second hypothesis predicts that an increase in geographical mobility would enhance the general level of individuals’ regional attitudes. If the geographical mobility hypothesis ( $H2$ ) holds, the coefficients for subgroups of each region should move closer to zero as mobility increases and the differences between them should be statistically significant. Using the non-mobility group in each region (i.e., those who were born in Gyeongsang-do (or Jeolla-do) and have continued residing in that region) as the basis for comparison, I conducted formal tests of the difference between the coefficient estimates of mobility subgroups in each regional dimension.

As shown in Table 6, most of the null hypotheses could not be rejected for both regions; exceptions came from  $\beta_{\text{Born \& Residing in G}} = \beta_{\text{Born in G \& Residing elsewhere}}$  for Symbolic Regionalism ( $p = .074$ ) and  $\beta_{\text{Born \& Residing in J}} = \beta_{\text{Family origin of J \& Residing elsewhere}}$  for the Region IAT ( $p = .086$ ) at the  $p = .10$  level. That is, the change - or lack of change - in the citizens’ regional attitudes is not likely to lead from interregional migration. All told, these results show that different mobility subgroups are not statistically significantly different from each other in most cases. Therefore,  $H2$  is not supported for both the Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do regions at the  $p = .05$

**Table 5B.** Hypotheses Tests in Different Forms of Regional Prejudices  
: 2014 Local Election

	Implicit Measure		Explicit Measures			
	Region IAT		Overt Regionalism		Symbolic Regionalism	
	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
Constant	.069	(.113)	.089	(.034)**	.227	(.029)
Generation						
19-29	-.339	(.059)***	.011	(.018)	.016	(.015)
30-39	-.232	(.061)***	.018	(.018)	-.014	(.016)
40-49	-.134	(.059)*	.001	(.018)	-.023	(.015)
Mobility						
Gyeongsang-do (G)						
Born & Residing in G	.272	(.068)***	-.012	(.020)	-.003	(.018)
Born elsewhere & Residing in G	.203	(.101)*	.009	(.030)	.007	(.026)
Born in G & Residing elsewhere	.201	(.085)*	-.011	(.025)	.037	(.022)
Family origin of G & Residing elsewhere	.106	(.056)	-.023	(.017)	.000	(.015)
Jeolla-do (J)						
Born & Residing in J	-.328	(.083)***	.060	(.025)*	-.060	(.022)**
Born elsewhere & Residing in J	-.051	(.201)	-.029	(.060)	-.063	(.052)
Born in J & Residing elsewhere	-.215	(.102)*	.051	(.030)	-.055	(.026)*
Family origin of J & Residing elsewhere	-.116	(.059)	.039	(.018)*	-.059	(.015)**
Female	-.025	(.040)	.023	(.012)	-.019	(.010)
Income	-.015	(.009)	-.003	(.003)	.001	(.002)
Education	.052	(.024)*	.001	(.007)	-.007	(.006)
Ideology	.020	(.011)	-.027	(.003)***	.024	(.003)**
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.180		.133		.164	
N	839		839		839	

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

Note: Cell entries are given as OLS estimates.

level.<sup>7</sup>

The findings in Table 5A, 5B, and 6 lend strong support to the generational effects hypothesis and suggest that the geographical mobility view does not fit well with the diverse aspects of regional bias. A question, however, remains: how are the generational effects and geographical mobility related to the implicit dimension of regional prejudice in each regional dimension? Would the generational effects be found in a particular region, while controlling for the degree of geographical mobility? Do the implicit regional attitudes of the three regional groups (i.e., Gyeongsang-do, Jeolla-do, and other regions) respond differently to the influence of new environment by each generational unit?

To address these questions, I examined the generational effects by the two contending southern regions of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do and the rest. As discussed earlier, the Region IAT score, which ranges from -2 to 2, where zero indicates the absence of implicit regional bias, positive values represent implicit antipathy to Jeolla-do, and negative values suggest implicit antagonism towards Gyeongsang-do. Consequently, if the generational effects held in each region, the value of younger generational units would increase or decrease to zero, moving closer to the dotted baseline in the figure.

As the upper and lower left panels in Figure 3 show, the generational effects were found in Gyeongsang-do in both cases of 2012 Presidential and 2014 Local elections. More specifically, compared to elder counterpart of the generations aged '30-39' and '40-49,' a generational unit aged '19-29' exhibited the decrease in implicit bias towards its contending region of Jeolla-do by 32.069

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<sup>7</sup> Due to the data constraint in the case of 2012 Presidential election, the geographical mobility hypothesis was tested only for the case of 2014 Local election.


**Table 6.** Formal Tests of the Geographical Mobility Hypothesis: 2014 Local Election

	Implicit Measure		Explicit Measures			
	Region IAT		Overt Regionalism		Symbolic Regionalism	
	F-test	<i>p</i> Value	F-test	<i>p</i> Value	F-test	<i>p</i> Value
<b>Gyeongsang-do (G)</b>						
$\beta_{\text{Born \& Residing in G}} = \beta_{\text{Born elsewhere \& Residing in G}}$	.36	.550	.39	.531	.11	.738
$\beta_{\text{Born \& Residing in G}} = \beta_{\text{Born in G \& Residing elsewhere}}$	.67	.415	.00	.951	3.21	.074
$\beta_{\text{Born \& Residing in G}} = \beta_{\text{Family origin of G \& Residing elsewhere}}$	2.28	.132	.11	.738	.01	.913
<b>Jeolla-do (J)</b>						
$\beta_{\text{Born \& Residing in J}} = \beta_{\text{Born elsewhere \& Residing in J}}$	1.67	.196	1.92	.166	.00	.951
$\beta_{\text{Born \& Residing in J}} = \beta_{\text{Born in J \& Residing elsewhere}}$	1.03	.311	.07	.793	.03	.870
$\beta_{\text{Born \& Residing in J}} = \beta_{\text{Family origin of J \& Residing elsewhere}}$	2.96	.086	.31	.577	.00	.983

percent and 44.034 percent, respectively, in the case of 2012 Presidential election. The improvement in regional attitudes was also recognized in the case of 2014 Local election. For example, younger generations aged '19-29' represented the lesser degree of regional bias by 21.486 percent and 34.396 percent than the elder generational units of '30-39' and '40-49,' respectively.

Interestingly, the generational effects were not found in Jeolla-do in both cases of 2012 Presidential and Local elections. As shown in the middle panels in Figure 3, younger generations in Jeolla-do represented higher level of implicit hostility towards their contending region of Gyeongsang-do. In the case of 2012 Presidential election, for instance, the younger generations aged '19-29' expressed more regional bias against Gyeongsang-do by 31.419 percent and 66.953 percent than the elder generations aged '30-39' and '40-49', respectively. Similarly, the implicit regional attitudes of the younger generations aged '19-29' deteriorated by 30.056 percent and 79.457 percent compared to generational units aged '30-39' and '40-49' in the case of 2014 Local election.

Other regions produced conflicting results. In the case of 2012 Presidential election, younger generations showed more implicit bias as indicated by moving farther from the baseline. However, in the case of 2014 Local election, the generation aged '30-39' displayed the lesser degree of implicit bias than its elder counterpart by 81.148 percent. Yet, the younger generation aged '19-29' showed more implicit antagonism than the generation aged '30-39' as manifested by greater distance from the baseline than the generation aged '30-39.' The divergent results in other regions possibly stem from the reality that the overall level of implicit regional prejudices in other regions is not as conspicuous as in the two contending regions of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do. As a result, mixed results could have been produced in other regional areas.






**Figure 3.** Generational Effects by Regions  
: 2012 Presidential (top) and 2014 Local (bottom) elections


Next, I examined whether geographical mobility would contribute to improving the regional attitudes of each generational unit in respective residential areas. In the previous analyses, geographical mobility in both regions of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do failed to lower the level of implicit regional bias to a meaningful degree. Although the exposure to the differing social contexts enhanced regional attitudes as indicated by coefficients changing towards zero, the improvement was not statistically significant (refer to Table 5B). In order to obtain the more concrete insights into the impact of geographical mobility upon the regional attitudes, I calculated the predicted level of the Region IAT score in response to geographical relocation by generation in the two contending southern regions of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do.

With regard to all generational units of Gyeongsang-do, geographical mobility was found to contribute to the decrease in the implicit dimension of regional bias towards the contending regions of Jeolla-do (see Figure 4A). Compared to the subgroup without any geographical mobility located in the leftmost in each panel (i.e. those born and currently residing in Gyeongsang-do), the exposure to new environments led to reduce the level of implicit regional bias by 36.444 percent (i.e., those born elsewhere but residing in Gyeongsang-do), 37.623 percent (i.e., those born in Gyeongsang-do but residing elsewhere), and 87.760 percent (i.e., people whose parents were born in Gyeongsang-do but currently residing elsewhere) in the case of the generation aged ‘19-29.’ Similar relationship was found in other generational units aged ‘30-39’ and ‘40-49’ to a lesser extent. The improvements in the people’s implicit regional prejudices stemming from geographical relocation were 23.243 percent, 23.995 percent, and 55.970 percent and 17.439 percent, 18.003 percent, and 41.993 percent for the generations aged ‘30-39’ and ‘40-49,’ respectively.

Analogously, the findings in Figure 4B also indicate that geographical mobility was conducive to improving the regional attitudes of people in Jeolla-do. In each generational unit, the subgroup without any geographical mobility (i.e. those born and currently residing in Jeolla-do) showed the strongest level of implicit bias. However, such regional attitudes improved in response to new social environments; in the case of the generation aged '19-29,' the size of improvement in implicit regional preferences was 61.203 percent (i.e., those born elsewhere but residing in Jeolla-do), 22.706 percent (i.e., those born in Jeolla-do but residing elsewhere), and 77.028 percent (i.e., people whose parents were born in Jeolla-do but currently residing elsewhere). All told, the geographical mobility effects by each generational unit indicate that in-group favoritism and implicit regional bias towards its contending region decreases in response to the new environments.



**Figure 4A. Geographical Mobility Effects by Generation in Gyeongsang-do: 2014 Local election**



**Figure 4B.** Geographical Mobility Effects by Generation in Jeolla-do: 2014 Local election

## **Democratic Implications of the Citizens' Regional Prejudices on Their Political Judgment**

Next, I turn to exploring the political implications of the findings in the preceding sections by testing how the different dimensions of regional prejudices are related to the participants' political judgment (*RQ2*) and the subsequent ramifications in the broad context of our political landscape (*RQ3*). To be more specific, this section examines the impact of the diverse dimensions of regional prejudices on the participants' political decisions such as party preference and vote choice. The next phase of this section proceeds to extending the findings of this work to a broad context of our political system. What would be the democratic implications of the diverse dimensions of regional prejudices? In what ways might the changing nature of regionalism be related to the structure of regionally dominant party system?

As Table 7A shows, after controlling for participants' gender and political ideology, all types of regional attitudes were found to affect party preferences in the case of 2012 Presidential election. To be specific, both the implicit ( $b = 7.263, p < .01$ ) and explicit regional prejudices (Overt Regionalism:  $b = 57.513, p < .001$ ; Symbolic Regionalism:  $b = 51.198, p < .001$ ) were related to the level of support for a conservative party in the predicted (favorable) direction. In similar fashion, regional attitudes were also found to impact the participants' vote intention. As can be seen in the right column of Table 7A, all different forms of regional attitudes were found to increase the likelihood of voting for a conservative party candidate (Region IAT:  $b = .640, p < .01$ ; Overt Regionalism:  $b = 3.265, p < .001$ ; Symbolic Regionalism:  $b = 2.161, p < .05$ ). Thus, these results show that regionalism still exerted a significant impact on the electorate's political decision in the 2012

Presidential election.

**Table 7A.** Impacts of Implicit and Explicit Regional Prejudices on Party Preference (left) and Vote Choice (right): 2012 Presidential Election

	Thermometer Ratings Difference		Vote for a Conservative Party Candidate	
	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
Constant	-63.221	(5.672) <sup>***</sup>	-3.573	(.503) <sup>***</sup>
Region IAT	7.263	(2.732) <sup>**</sup>	.640	(.209) <sup>**</sup>
Overt Regionalism	57.513	(10.022) <sup>***</sup>	3.265	(.802) <sup>***</sup>
Symbolic Regionalism	51.198	(11.265) <sup>***</sup>	2.161	(.877) <sup>*</sup>
Generation				
19-29	-16.870	(4.324) <sup>***</sup>	-.999	(.321) <sup>**</sup>
30-39	-18.167	(4.333) <sup>***</sup>	-1.184	(.335) <sup>***</sup>
40-49	-11.480	(4.475) <sup>*</sup>	-.404	(.314)
Female	-1.915	(3.164)	.238	(.243)
Ideology	8.410	(.828) <sup>***</sup>	.517	(.076) <sup>***</sup>
Adj. R <sup>2</sup> /Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.427		.308	
Log likelihood			-226.410	
N	533		502	

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

Note: Cell entries are given as OLS (left) and binary logit (right) estimates.

I also examined the effects of different forms of regional preferences on the citizens' political judgments in the case of 2014 Local election (see Table 7B).

After controlling for participants' demographic attributes and their political ideology, all types of regional bias predicted the level of party preferences at a significant level. It is worth noting that the implicit ( $b = 3.539, p < .05$ ) and symbolic regional prejudices ( $b = 38.824, p < .001$ ) were related to the level of support for a conservative party in the positive direction, while Overt Regionalism was found to be negatively associated to the extent of conservative party preferences ( $b = -41.387, p < .001$ ). In the case of vote choices, implicit regional bias failed to directly impact the measures of candidate preference unlike both survey-based measures of regional prejudice. Analogously, overt regional bias ( $b = -1.252, p < .05$ ) was related to participants' vote choice in the opposite direction to the symbolic dimension of regionalism ( $b = 4.098, p < .001$ ). Overall, these results point out the possibility that people are likely to answer questions in a manner that suggests an absence of regional bias when directly asked about socially sensitive issues.

**Table 7B.** Impacts of Implicit and Explicit Regional Prejudices on Party Preference (left) and Vote Choice (right): 2014 Local Election

	Thermometer Ratings Difference		Vote for a Conservative Party Candidate	
	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
Constant	-43.680	(5.307)***	-3.095	(.567)***
Region IAT	3.539	(1.547)*	.201	(.155)
Overt Regionalism	-41.387	(5.636)***	-1.252	(.629)*
Symbolic Regionalism	38.824	(6.420)***	4.098	(.693)***
Generation				
19-29	-5.276	(2.728)	-.425	(.279)
30-39	-9.501	(2.793)***	-.439	(.288)
40-49	-3.611	(2.698)	-.242	(.274)
Female	-4.677	(1.830)*	-.481	(.194)*
Income	.970	(.391)*	.039	(.042)
Education	-1.466	(1.070)	-.133	(.108)
Ideology	6.259	(.528)***	.410	(.060)***
Adj. R <sup>2</sup> /Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.393		.220	
Log likelihood			-346.544	
N	839		680	


\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

*Note:* Cell entries are given as OLS (left) and binary logit (right) estimates.

Based on the model coefficients, I simulated the predicted levels of party preference for each generational group when one's IAT score is one or two standard deviations below and above the mean, while holding other variables at their mean values (see King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000). As shown in the upper panel of Figure 5, participants with IAT scores two standard deviations above the mean (i.e., high anti-Jeolla-do implicit bias) represented greater level of support for a conservative party by 52.969 percent than those with IAT scores two standard deviation below the mean (i.e., those with high anti-Gyeongsang-do implicit bias) in the case of the generational group aged '19-29.' The effect size was 50.481 percent and 63.857 percent for the generational units aged '30-39' and '40-49' respectively.

The lower panel of Figure 5 displays the predicted level of party preference in the case of 2014 Local election. Participants with high level of anti-Jeolla-do implicit bias were expected to support a conservative party by 25.740 percent than those with high pro-Jeolla-do implicit bias (i.e., anti-Gyeongsang-do implicit bias) in the case of the generational group aged '19-29.' Similar patterns held for other generational units. The effect size was 27.103 percent and 22.955 percent for the generational units aged '30-39' and '40-49,' respectively.

In general, these results demonstrate that implicit regional bias against the southwestern region of Jeolla-do is positively related to the levels of support for a conservative party. Even after controlling for political ideology, diverse dimensions of regional prejudices are significantly related to the electorate's party preference. These findings suggest the continuing power of regionalism on the citizens' political decisions. That is, the legacy of the past still reaches in to the present Korean society.




**Figure 5.** Simulated Values of Thermometer Ratings by Generational Units (with 95% Confidence Intervals) : 2012 Presidential (top) & 2014 Local Elections (bottom)


To draw implications from the aforementioned findings, I estimated the predicted level of the participants' party preference and vote intention. The left column of Figure 6A and Figure 6B plots simulated probabilities of voting for a conservative party candidate when one's IAT score is one or two standard deviations below and above the mean. One standard deviation from the mean increased the likelihood of voting for a conservative party candidate by .289 percentage points (Region IAT score) and .165 percentage points (Symbolic Regionalism) in the case of 2012 Presidential election. The effects size in the case of 2014 Local Election was .120 percentage points for Region IAT score and .238 percentage points for symbolic regionalism.

The right column of Figure 6A and Figure 6B predicts the level of the feeling thermometer measure, which ranges from -100 to 100. In the case of the Region IAT score, the predicted level of preference for a conservative party in 2012 Presidential election increased by 17.020 points among the participants with the IAT scores two standard deviations above the mean (i.e., high anti-Jeolla-do implicit bias) compared to those with IAT scores two standard deviation below the mean (i.e., those with high anti-Gyeongsang-do implicit bias). The effect size was 30.009 points in the case of symbolic regionalism. In the case 2014 Local Election, the effects size was 9.048 points (the Region IAT score) and 25.739 points (Symbolic Regionalism).

Assessing the citizens' political decisions in relation to the symbolic and implicit dimensions of regionalism reveals that regional prejudices guide voters' party preference and vote preference. Both symbolic and implicit regionalism were found to be related to the increase in the level of support for a conservative party and vote intention for a conservative party candidate in various electoral settings.



**Figure 6A.** Simulated Probabilities of Voting for a Conservative Party Candidate (left) and Thermometer Ratings (right) (with 95% Confidence Intervals) : 2012 Presidential Election



**Figure 6B.** Simulated Probabilities of Voting for a Conservative Party Candidate (left) and Thermometer Ratings (right) (with 95% Confidence Intervals) : 2014 Local Election

Finally, based on the findings of this work, I estimated the predicted level of party preference of the population. As generational effects were found to reduce regional prejudices, if such generational effects were held constant over time, how would the enhancement in regional attitudes influence the distribution of political preference? In a more broad sense, what would be its political implications in terms of the representation of political parties?

To address these questions, I calculated the predicted level of thermometer ratings for political parties, applying the projected population composition for the following forty years (see Table 8). As shown in Figure 7, a liberal party garners more support by around 18.263 points in the current year. However, as younger generations with less regional bias compose a larger portion of the whole population, a liberal party is found to lose its appeal and the gap between the two political parties decreases by 12.895 percent (2024), 35.662 percent (2034), 42.227 percent (2044), and 52.089 percent (2054). These results indicate that generational effects on political regionalism may influence the structure of regionally dominant party system by re-distributing the political preference of the electorate. Changes in the distribution of voter preferences might lead political parties, which have relied on long-standing regionalism, to respond by aligning their positions to these changes (Budge, 1982; Gruber, 2014).


**Table 8.** Generational Population Projection: 2014-2054

Year Generation	2014	2024	2034	2044	2054
19-29	6,774,619 (13.435%)	6,024,543 (11.611%)	4,555,182 (8.762%)	4,468,331 (8.918%)	4,106,311 (8.823%)

30-39	7,778,651 (15.426%)	6,766,220 (13.040%)	5,997,497 (11.537%)	4,540,948 (9.063%)	4,452,029 (9.566%)
40-49	8,514,426 (16.886)	7,663,535 (14.769%)	6,668,137 (12.827%)	5,922,250 (11.820%)	4,485,756 (9.638%)
50-	18,235,645 (36.165%)	24,798,780 (47.793%)	29,673,784 (57.189%)	33,860,372 (67.583%)	35,029,483 (75.266%)

Source: [http://kosis.kr/statisticsList/statisticsList\\_01List.jsp?vwcd=MT\\_ZTITLE&parmTabId=M\\_01\\_01](http://kosis.kr/statisticsList/statisticsList_01List.jsp?vwcd=MT_ZTITLE&parmTabId=M_01_01)

**Figure 7.** Predicted Party Preference of the Population:  
Population Projection applied for 2014-2054 (with 95% Confidence Intervals)



## DISCUSSION

There is a common perception that regional prejudices, especially towards the two contending regions of Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do, have been deeply entrenched in the Korean public's mind and significantly influenced their political behaviors since the 1987 democratic reform. Considering that Korea has a relatively homogeneous population, sharing ethnicity, language, and historical traditions, the intense division of voting along regional affiliations across regions has invited much scholastic concern. Observing the recent changes of contemporary Korean society such as generational shifts in regional attitudes and increased geographical integration, the "revisionist" approaches have optimistically speculated that regional bias would be transient and replaced by other factors such as generational differences, political ideology, issue preference, and so on. However, substantial evidence suggest that long-standing regional prejudices still reach in to the current citizens of Korean society. Given the vehement academic debate over the continuing power of regionalism in contemporary Korean society, this study examines whether regional attitudes have evolved from blatant, overt hostility into more ambiguous, subtle, and even implicit prejudices. By integrating revisionist approaches to political regionalism in Korea into the study of modern racism, this study explored the changing nature of regional prejudices in the citizens' minds and its political implications in the Korean political landscape.

Overall, the results indicate that regional bias in the Korean public is not disappearing but is changing fundamentally. When directly asked about their regional attitudes, participants in all regions hid their regional hostility behind the politically correct answers. An implicit indicator of regionalism employed in

this study, however, suggest the other direction: the level of implicit bias towards Jeolla-do was particularly pronounced in Gyeongsang-do and even Busan in both cases of 2012 Presidential and 2014 Local elections. Analogously, residents of Jeolla-do represented the strong level of implicit antipathy to their contending region of Gyeongsang-do.

On all three measures of regional prejudices, Symbolic Regionalism produced quite homogenous results in all regions. The distribution of the regional policy preferences might indicate that the principle of regional equality is quite universally supported by citizens across regions. Or such small variation in symbolic dimension of regional attitudes might result from the fundamental differences between regional policy preference and regional prejudice. Relevantly, some studies suggest that policy dimension and personal attitude dimension of racism may respond differently to social context. For example, Glaser and Gilens (1997) found that exposure to new environments induced by geographical relocation led individuals' racial policy preferences to change more dramatically than their racial prejudices. In a similar context, the Korean citizens' regional policy preferences might have changed more radically in response to change in contemporary Korean society, whereas regional prejudices remain quite stable. As a result, participants might have already reached consensus to regional equality policies, while their implicit regional prejudices persists in their minds.

Regarding the diverse aspects of regional prejudices, this study investigated how the revisionist views such as generational effects hypothesis and geographical mobility hypothesis were tested. Using the multiple regression with controls for gender, income, education, and political ideology, the analysis of this study suggests that generational shifts in regional attitudes were significantly related to the decrease in regional prejudices, while geographical integration failed

to contribute to the improvement in the participants' regional attitudes. Based on these findings, the study also examined the political implications in a broad political context. The results indicate that if generational effects held constant in the future, the regional party system based on the long-standing regionalism of voters would lose its appeal. Therefore, the improvement in the citizens' regional attitudes might contribute to transforming the representation and distribution of the traditional party system.

Furthermore, the current study explored the relationship between the diverse dimensions of regional prejudices and the citizens' political judgments. The results suggest that different forms of regional prejudices are related to voters' political party preference and candidate choice. The different dimensions of regional prejudices were found to increase the level of support for a conservative party or vote intention for a candidate from a conservative party. All told, the results of this study indicate the continuing and persistent effects of regionalism on the citizens' political preferences.

Although this study identified the diverse dimensions of regional prejudices, and furthermore, empirically investigated the political impact of different forms of regional bias on the citizens' political behaviors, it is not without limitations. First, the sample may not provide an accurate representation of the population. Since the sample was drawn from the aforementioned online panel, there could have been some selection bias in this study. In addition, concerns may be raised over the issue of reliability in the Region IAT experiments. As it is the first time to measure the implicit dimension of regional hostility, the reliability of these measures require more thorough inspection through repeated applications in other settings. Besides, some may raise a concern over the generational units. Different generational units other than chronological age cohorts could reveal

different results regarding the generational effects hypothesis. However, as Park (2010) claims, generational conflicts inevitably tend to overlap with age conflicts and thus the broad definition of generational contention includes contention among different age groups. Therefore, the generational units employed in the current study are expected to serve as a relevant analytical tool. Finally, some might consider the discussion about the predicted party preference with skepticism since “aging effects,” or “period effects” were not included in the analysis. As suggested by many studies on political socialization (Lee & Jeong, 2013), there could be confounding effects stemming from cohort, age, and period on forming the political orientations of the electorate. To understand the impacts of diverse dimensions of regional prejudices across three dimensions of time, an appropriate set of data would be needed.

Despite the limitations noted above, I believe that the current research can contribute to the discussion over the political implications of regional politics. As Henry and Sears (2002) point out, the development of implicit, automatic measures of prejudice has exciting potential, both for obvious methodological reasons and substantive insights. Moreover, by matching participants’ behavioral data obtained from the Region IAT experiments and their individual-level traits drawn from supplementary surveys, this study sought to properly assess how the citizens’ regional attitudes, and ultimately their political preferences, are changing. In short, the current study attempts to contribute to our understanding of political regionalism and its democratic implications in the Korean political landscape.

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지난 수십년간 전라도 사람들은 불공평한 대우를 받아왔다.	1	2	3	4
지역주의를 극복하기 위해서 정부는 전라도 지역의 사회기반시설 확충을 다른 지역보다 우선시해야 한다.	1	2	3	4

- 다음은 귀하의 거주 지역 및 출신 지역에 대한 질문입니다.

• 귀하의 주민등록상 주소지는 어디입니까?

- |             |             |          |
|-------------|-------------|----------|
| 1) 서울특별시    | 2) 부산광역시    | 3) 대구광역시 |
| 4) 인천광역시    | 5) 광주광역시    | 6) 대전광역시 |
| 7) 울산광역시    | 8) 경기도      | 9) 강원도   |
| 10) 충청북도    | 11) 충청남도    | 12) 전라북도 |
| 13) 전라남도    | 14) 경상북도    | 15) 경상남도 |
| 16) 제주특별자치도 | 17) 세종특별자치시 | 18) 기타   |

• 위의 주소지에서 귀하께서 거주하신 기간은 어떻게 됩니까?

- |                  |                   |                  |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| 1) 1 달 미만        | 2) 1 달 이상-1 년 미만  | 3) 1 년 이상-2 년 미만 |
| 4) 2 년 이상-5 년 미만 | 5) 5 년 이상-10 년 미만 | 6) 10 년 이상-      |
| 7) 모름            |                   |                  |

• 귀하의 고향은 어디입니까?

- |             |             |          |
|-------------|-------------|----------|
| 1) 서울특별시    | 2) 부산광역시    | 3) 대구광역시 |
| 4) 인천광역시    | 5) 광주광역시    | 6) 대전광역시 |
| 7) 울산광역시    | 8) 경기도      | 9) 강원도   |
| 10) 충청북도    | 11) 충청남도    | 12) 전라북도 |
| 13) 전라남도    | 14) 경상북도    | 15) 경상남도 |
| 16) 제주특별자치도 | 17) 세종특별자치시 | 18) 평안남도 |
| 19) 평안북도    | 20) 황해도     | 21) 함경남도 |
| 22) 함경북도    | 23) 기타      | 24) 모름   |

- 다음은 귀하의 부모님께서 현재 살고 계신 거주 지역에 대한 질문입니다.

• 귀하의 아버지께서 현재 거주하고 계신 지역은 어디입니까?

- |          |          |          |
|----------|----------|----------|
| 1) 서울특별시 | 2) 부산광역시 | 3) 대구광역시 |
| 4) 인천광역시 | 5) 광주광역시 | 6) 대전광역시 |
| 7) 울산광역시 | 8) 경기도   | 9) 강원도   |
| 10) 충청북도 | 11) 충청남도 | 12) 전라북도 |

- 13) 전라남도                      14) 경상북도                      15) 경상남도
- 16) 제주특별자치도            17) 세종특별자치시            18) 기타
- 19) 모름                            20) 해당 사항 없음 (예. 사망 등)

• 귀하의 어머니께서 현재 거주하고 계신 지역은 어디입니까?

- 1) 서울특별시                      2) 부산광역시                      3) 대구광역시
- 4) 인천광역시                      5) 광주광역시                      6) 대전광역시
- 7) 울산광역시                      8) 경기도                            9) 강원도
- 10) 충청북도                        11) 충청남도                        12) 전라북도
- 13) 전라남도                        14) 경상북도                        15) 경상남도
- 16) 제주특별자치도            17) 세종특별자치시            18) 기타
- 19) 모름                            20) 해당 사항 없음 (예. 사망 등)

-다음은 귀하 부모님의 출신 지역에 대한 질문입니다.

• 귀하 아버지의 고향은 어디입니까?

- 1) 서울특별시                      2) 부산광역시                      3) 대구광역시
- 4) 인천광역시                      5) 광주광역시                      6) 대전광역시
- 7) 울산광역시                      8) 경기도                            9) 강원도
- 10) 충청북도                        11) 충청남도                        12) 전라북도
- 13) 전라남도                        14) 경상북도                        15) 경상남도
- 16) 제주특별자치도            17) 세종특별자치시            18) 평안남도
- 19) 평안북도                        20) 황해도                            21) 함경남도
- 22) 함경북도                        23) 기타                                24) 모름

• 귀하 어머니의 고향은 어디입니까?

- 1) 서울특별시                      2) 부산광역시                      3) 대구광역시
- 4) 인천광역시                      5) 광주광역시                      6) 대전광역시
- 7) 울산광역시                      8) 경기도                            9) 강원도
- 10) 충청북도                        11) 충청남도                        12) 전라북도
- 13) 전라남도                        14) 경상북도                        15) 경상남도
- 16) 제주특별자치도            17) 세종특별자치시            18) 평안남도
- 19) 평안북도                        20) 황해도                            21) 함경남도
- 22) 함경북도                        23) 기타                                24) 모름

-정치에서 사람들은 보통 진보와 보수를 구분합니다. 0 부터 10 까지 눈금 중에서 귀하 자신이 어디에 속한다고 생각하십니까? 0 은 매우 진보를 나타내며, 10 은 매우

보수를 나타냅니다.



-귀하께서 한국의 주요 정치인과 정당에 대해 어떻게 생각하시는지 알고 싶습니다. 아래에 주어진 감정 온도계 하단의 녹색 화살표를 이용하여 표시해 주십시오. 0°C는 대단히 부정적, 50°C는 호의적이지도 부정적이지도 않음, 100°C는 대단히 호의적임을 나타냅니다.

박근혜	
문재인 (새정치민주연합)	
안철수 (새정치민주연합)	
새누리당	
새정치민주연합	
통합진보당	

-귀하께서는 이번 지방선거에 투표를 하실 예정입니까?

- 1) 투표 할 예정이다
- 2) 투표하지 않겠다
- 3) 아직 결정하지 못 했다





## 국문초록

지역감정의 변화가 유권자의 의사 결정에 미치는 영향

: 2012 대통령선거와 2014 지방선거를 중심으로

지역주의는 오랜 기간 한국사회에서 정치적 양극화의 주요 원천으로 작용해 왔다. 특히 영·호남을 중심으로 형성된 지역감정은 우리 사회의 지배적 균열 질서로 작용하며, 정치·사회·문화의 전 영역에서 압도적 영향력을 행사해왔다. 그런데 최근 들어 지역주의의 완화를 전망하는 “수정주의적 시각”이 제기되었다. 이러한 수정주의적 입장은 주로 이념, 세대, 정책 선호 등과 같은 요인에 주목하며, 젊은 세대를 중심(‘세대 효과 가설’)으로 또는 지역간 교류의 기회가 증대됨(‘지역 이동성 가설’)에 따라 기존의 지역주의가 대체되고 있다고 본다. 지역주의를 둘러싼 이와 같은 논쟁에 비추어 볼 때, 한국의 지역주의는 과연 완화되고 있는가? 본 연구는 지역감정이 유권자들 개인 차원에서 어떻게 구성되고 변화하고 있는지 진단함으로써 지역주의의 완화와 관련한 논쟁에 기여하고자 한다. 이를 위해 미국의 인종주의(racism) 연구가 고안한 방법론이 활용되었다. 이는 오랜 시간 미국 사회의 화두였던 인종차별과 관련하여 변화하는 인종 편견을 어떻게 측정할 것인지 많은 연구가 축적되어 왔기에, 한국 사회에서 지역감정의 변화를

논의하는데 의미있는 시사점을 제공할 수 있으리라 기대되기 때문이다. 구체적으로 제 18 대 대통령 선거 (N = 533)와 2014 년 지방선거 (N = 839) 캠페인 기간에 전국의 유권자를 대상으로 지역 암묵적 연합 검사 (Region Implicit Association Test) 및 설문을 실시하였다. 분석 결과 호남에 대한 한국인의 부정적 지역감정은 직접적이고 명시적인 차별 (Overt Regionalism)에서 내재적이고 은밀한 신념 체계 (Implicit Regionalism)로 변화되고 있음이 관찰되었다. 다만 지역주의의 병폐에 대한 인식 및 이를 극복하기 위한 정부 정책 (Symbolic Regionalism)에 대해서는 상당히 높은 수준의 사회적 합의에 도달해 있는 것으로 드러났다. 한편, 지역주의에 대한 수정주의 가설을 검증한 결과 젊은 세대일수록 호남에 대한 부정적 지역감정이 유의미하게 감소하는 것으로 드러나 세대 효과 가설이 지지되었다. 이와는 대조적으로 지역 이동성 여부는 지역감정의 감소와 유의미한 관계를 보이지 않았다. 이상 논의된 지역주의의 변화가 우리 사회에 던지는 함의는 다음과 같다. 먼저, 유권자 개인 차원에서 다양한 차원의 지역감정은 그들의 의사 결정에 유의미한 영향력을 미치는 것으로 드러났다. 보다 구체적으로 이념, 세대 등을 통제했을 때 다양한 차원의 지역감정은 유권자들의 보수 정당 지지, 보수 성향의 후보자 선호에 유의미하게 관련되는 것으로 나타났다. 한편 현재와 같은 세대 효과가 지속된다고 가정할 때, 지역감정이 상대적으로 덜한 젊은 세대가 앞으로 우리 사회의 대다수를 차지하게 되면 기존의 지역주의 정당 구조는 정치적 호소력을 잃게 될 것으로 예측되었다. 즉, 지역주의의 약화에 따른 유권자 정치 선호의 재분배는 오랜 기간 우리 사회를 지배해 온 지역주의

정당 구조의 재편을 유도할 유인을 제공할 수 있는 것이다. 이와 같은 결과는 비록 현재 우리 사회에 지역주의가 상당히 존재하고 있으며 내재적 차원으로 변모함에 따라 그 양상을 진단하는 것이 어려워지고 있지만 세대 교체가 이뤄지는 미래에는 내재적 지역주의가 감소함에 따라 결과적으로 지역주의 정당의 분포가 재구성 될 수 있음을 시사한다.

**주요어:** 지역주의, 지역감정, 세대 효과, 지역 이동성, 조사효과 (testing effects), 암묵적 연합검사 (Implicit Association Test, IAT)

**학 번:** 2012-22959