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경영학석사 학위논문

**High-Status Affiliation and Task  
Performance:  
The Analysis of  
Categorical Alignment as a  
Moderator**

시장 지위가 높은 타자와의 협업이  
작업 성과에 미치는 영향에 관하여  
: 범주적 정체성 일치의 조절 효과에 대한 연구

2017년 7월

서울대학교 대학원

경영학과 경영학전공

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이 논문을 경영학석사 학위논문으로 제출함  
2017년 7월

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## **ABSTRACT**

# **High-Status Affiliation and Task Performance: The Analysis of Categorical Alignment as a Moderator**

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This study attempts to extend the theoretical argument on the effect of high-status affiliations and the role of audiences in the process of performance evaluation.

Because the status of an actor is dependent on the context that the actor is located in, it is problematic to conclude that positive effect of high-status affiliations is constant regardless of the category-based identity of affiliating actors. I suggest that an actor's rewards from high-status affiliations are contingent on the extent to which category-based identity of the actor overlaps with that of its affiliates. Two types of audiences -conformity-seeking and novelty-seeking- are expected to draw different judgments on the category overlap between affiliating parties, moderating the effect of high-status affiliations on actor's reward.

I tested the predictions by investigating the collaboration between actors and directors in the context of Korean feature film industry from 2006 to 2015.

Confirming the earlier researches, I found that actors who collaborated with high-status directors were likely to attain greater box-office success and receive more awards than those who collaborated with low-status directors. For actor's box-office success, the positive effect of directors' status was strengthened with the overlap of genre identity between them. For actor's artistic recognition, however, the favorable effect of high-status affiliations was attenuated with genre overlap.

**Keywords: High-status affiliations, category, organizational identity, audience heterogeneity, social network analysis, film industry**

학번: 2015-20616

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| <b>I. INTRODUCTION .....</b>  | <b>5</b>  |
| <b>II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES</b>  |           |
| <b>i. Domain-Specificity of Audiences and the Interaction Effect of<br/>    Status and Category Identity.....</b> | <b>8</b>  |
| <b>ii. Categorical Alignment in Dyadic Relationship and the Role of<br/>    Audiences .....</b>                   | <b>10</b> |
| <b>iii. Empirical Setting and Hypotheses: High-status Affiliations in a<br/>    Film Industry .....</b>           | <b>13</b> |
| <b>III. METHODS</b>   |           |
| <b>i. Data and Sample.....</b>  | <b>19</b> |
| <b>ii. Variables .....</b>  | <b>20</b> |
| <b>iii. Estimation.....</b>   | <b>26</b> |
| <b>IV. RESULTS</b>  |           |
| <b>i. Model 1: Commercial success .....</b>   | <b>28</b> |
| <b>ii. Model 2: Artistic Recognition .....</b>  | <b>31</b> |
| <b>V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .....</b>   | <b>36</b> |
| <b>REFERENCES .....</b>   | <b>38</b> |
| <b>ABSTRACT IN KOREAN .....</b>   | <b>46</b> |



## LIST OF TABLES

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| <b>[Table 1] Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlation (Sample Used in Estimating Box-office Gross) .....</b>                  | <b>29</b> |
| <b>[Table 2] Fixed-effects OLS Regression on Box-office Gross .....</b>  | <b>30</b> |
| <b>[Table 3] Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlation (Sample Used in Estimating Number of Awards) .....</b>                  | <b>32</b> |
| <b>[Table 4] GEE Estimates on the Number of Awards (Distributional Specification of Dependent Variable: Poisson) .....</b>           | <b>33</b> |
| <b>[Table 5] GEE Estimates on the Number of Awards (Distributional Specification of Dependent Variable: Negative Binomial) .....</b> | <b>35</b> |

# I. INTRODUCTION

An organization can climb the ladder of status by affiliating with desired partners (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Piazza & Castellucci, 2014; Podolny & Phillips, 1996; Sauder, Lynn, & Podolny, 2012; Slavich & Castellucci, 2016; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). This upward mobility is thought to be beneficial for the focal organization for two reasons. First, viewing networks as pipes or conduits, resources, information, and opportunities flow from high-status to low-status actors, thus providing a chance to improve the actual quality of the product (Podolny, 2001b). Second, an organization affiliated with high-status partners can achieve greater success regardless of actual product quality because of the signaling value of networks. Benjamin and Podolny (1999) find that wineries with high-status appellations get greater profits by claiming higher prices than those who affiliated with low-status appellations for a comparable quality of the product. Stuart et al. (1999) indicate that young biotechnology firms affiliated with high-status strategic alliance partners and investors achieve more favorable performance consequences. More recent research also confirms these findings in the haute cuisine industry by showing that chefs affiliated with high-status masters at the early stage of their career tend to get better evaluations from critics than those with low-status masters (Slavich & Castellucci, 2016).

However, affiliation with high-status partners might have opposing effects depending on the context in which actors are located in (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999: 581; Jensen, 2003; Jensen, Kim, & Kim, 2011). Specifically, coordinating with high-status partners whose status is based on the context

relevant to the focal actor's position is expected to guarantee positive performance consequences. This positive outcome is attributable to status spillover effects because the third-parties who have an interest in the given segment of the market might view the focal actor positively. On the contrary, if an actor is affiliating with a high-status partner whose social position is grounded in a disparate context, partners' prominence is less likely to provide benefit to the focal actor (Jensen et al., 2011). Furthermore, affiliations between actors who have different category identities may confuse audiences because their collaboration can be perceived as unusual. It suggests that simultaneous consideration of partner's status in market and category identity is necessary to explain the performance consequences of high-status affiliations.

In this paper, I argue that an actor's rewards from high-status affiliations are contingent on the extent to which category identity of the actor overlaps with that of its partner. To develop a theoretical argument, I limit the scope of this research to feature film industries where the status of affiliating partners is critical because of the difficulty of objective assessment of product quality (Delmestri, Montanari, & Usai, 2005; Ertug, Yogev, Lee, & Hedström, 2016; Yogev, 2010). Since cultural goods are commercial products as well as artistic creations, performances in cultural industries are often evaluated inconsistently by heterogeneous groups of audiences. Two primary groups of audiences- critics and industry peers respectively- have substantial power over these two distinct types of valuations. Specifically, critics' favorable evaluation of a cultural product leads to high commercial performance because their coverage attracts the attention of

potential customers while industry peers' assessment of the product plays a pivotal role in artistic recognition.

The current study not only contributes to studies on high-status affiliations by incorporating category identity of affiliating parties but also extends studies on the role of audiences by taking audience heterogeneity into consideration. Specifically, high-level of category overlap between the affiliates are expected to be perceived positively in the eye of critics who seek conformity, strengthening the positive effect of high-status affiliations. On the contrary, industry peers who are more open to novel innovation are likely to prefer low-level of category overlap, because they acknowledge the importance of recombining established categories in deriving innovative outcome.

I tested the hypotheses by investigating the collaboration between actors and directors in the context of the Korean film industry from 2006 to 2015. Confirming the previous findings on the positive effect of high-status affiliations on the focal actor's performance, actors who collaborate with high-status directors were likely to attain greater box-office success and receive more awards than those who collaborate with low-status directors (Faulkner, 1983; Rossman, Esparza, & Bonacich, 2010). However, the effect was moderated by genre overlap between and the focal actor and directors. Findings show that high-level of genre overlap had a positive moderating effect on actors' box-office success while it had a negative moderating effect on the number of awards assigned to the focal actor.

## **II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES**

### **i. Domain-Specificity of Audiences and the Interaction Effect of Status and Category Identity**

Extant literatures suggest that affiliating with high-status partners is beneficial for improving focal actor's performance (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Stuart et al., 1999). The explanation on the advantage of high-status affiliations is twofold depending on the definition of status. In earlier researches, status is defined as 'signal of quality' which delivers information to potential consumers (Podolny, 1993). From this perspective, relational information such as high-status affiliations is important que that helps customers infer product quality since actual quality of the product is not known to external parties until direct consumption of the product (Podolny, 1993, 2001a; Sauder et al., 2012). Thus, connection to the high-status partners can be a significant resource to the focal organization.

However, more recent researchers posit that status is more than a signal of quality (Jensen et al., 2011; Piazza & Castellucci, 2014). While they do agree with the idea that status is an indicator of product quality, the highlight is on the idea that conceptualization of status should be grounded in viewing market as socially constructed space (Piazza & Castellucci, 2014: 292). From this broader perspective, status is defined as organization's social position or rank order given that the market has a hierarchical structure (Jensen & Roy, 2008; Washington & Zajac, 2005).

Viewing status as rank in social system suggests that the advantage of

high-status affiliations stems from the third-parties' perception of relationships. Deference that accrues to high-status partners will be transferred to the focal organization since their ongoing relationship promotes audiences' perceived association between high-status partner's prominence and the capability of focal actor (Stuart et al., 1999). Thus, the embeddedness of organizations in social system generates 'non-performance based advantage' to actors by influencing the perception of audiences (Sorenson, 2014). Therefore, from this broader conceptualization on status which incorporates organization's rank order in social space as well as signaling aspects, it is necessary to take the audiences into consideration when studying high-status affiliation.

In the cognitive structure of audiences, the context which gives meaning to status is demarcated by category boundaries. Even though organization first initiates their domain of market activity by producing specific types of product, it is audiences' confirmation and approval that ultimately determines their future economic behavior (Hsu & Hannan, 2005). Because categorical boundaries are a useful tool for audiences by helping them to grasp the typical characteristics of an organization, audiences confer collective identity to a group of actors based on established category (DiMaggio, 1987; Zerubavel, 2009). Thus, prior studies indicate that external audiences rely on categories to make sense of an organization (Hsu, 2006a; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2005; Zuckerman, 1999).

Rank held by an organization within social space is usually contingent on the context that an organization is located in because each domain has distinct groups of audiences. Audiences are "collections of agents with an interest in a

domain and control over material and symbolic resources that affect the success and failure of the claimants in the domain” (Hsu & Hannan, 2005: 476). Because of this domain-specificity of audiences, accepted rank order of an organization in one market may or may not be transferrable to another market. For example, a prior study on the transferability of status suggests that signaling value of status based on a market is likely to be stronger in the market than other contexts (Jensen, 2003: 472). For this reason, Jensen et al. (2011) emphasize that an actor’s social position entails its category identity and rank at the same time. Building on this argument I suggest that the theoretical argument on the consequence of high-status affiliations should be expanded by incorporating category identity.

## **ii. Categorical Alignment in Dyadic Relationship and the Role of Audiences**

Previous studies emphasize affiliating partner’s status as an important indicator of focal actor’s performance under uncertainty (Podolny, 1993, 2001a; Sorenson, 2014; Stuart et al., 1999). However, I propose that affiliate’s category identity is a simultaneously critical factor for predicting the focal actor’s rewards because both affiliate’s status and category construct audience’s perception. When category identity is taken into consideration, an affiliation of two actors is divided into two cases depending on the existence of categorical alignment which I define as affiliating actors’ overlap of category identity. In the current study, categorical

alignment refers to the situation where two actors reside within the same niche in horizontal market space.

First, if two actors are affiliating while maintaining categorical alignment, the collaboration between them ensures maintaining established identities as audiences' cognition on their identity remains stable. Moreover, category overlap between collaborating actors is expected to strengthen their collective identity by facilitating audiences' perception on clustering process. On the other hand, if two actors are affiliating without maintaining categorical alignment, the level of perceived association between the focal actor and its partner is low. Thus, it may take longer time for audiences to interpret the meaning of collaboration or they even have to reframe established perception on each actor's identity.

The significance of categorical alignment in dyadic relationship raises the following question: what is the implication of categorical alignment on the performance consequence of high-status affiliations? According to the institutional theory that underscores the pressure of conformity, the affiliation between actors in the homogeneous category is preferable since it confirms established identity. By corresponding to audiences' perception on actors' prior identities, audiences are likely to perceive their affiliation as legitimate. Previous literatures suggest that category spanners who straddle multiple boundaries face sanctions from audiences as they fail to signal clear identity (Hsu, 2006a; Leung & Sharkey, 2013; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001; Zuckerman, 1999; Zuckerman & Kim, 2003; Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, & Von Rittmann, 2003). Because categorical alignment strengthens



affiliating parties' established identity, the focal actor can signal coherent identity to the third-parties, and thus they can avoid sanctions from audiences.

However, above conclusion is questionable because the argument on the pressure of conformity focuses on a single type of audience, despite the fact that there are distinct groups of audiences within a market. For example, in Zuckerman (1999)'s study on 'illegitimacy discount,' the analytical focus was on the securities analysts who play a pivotal role in mediating the buyer-seller relationship in the stock market. In this context, securities analysts are specialized by industry, and thus their coverage is expected to be dependent on industry boundaries, leading to the conformity pressure. However, within a market, different groups of audiences exist, and the interpretation of the same information is likely to vary by their preferences. For this reason, Jensen and Kim (2014) specified the distribution of audience tastes to note that audiences' preference can be divergent or convergent. To incorporate the different taste of audiences, Malter (2012) also divided individuals into two groups, conformity-seeking and uniqueness-seeking types.

Thus, I argue that effect of categorical alignment versus misalignment on the focal actor's rewards from high-status affiliations will be contingent on the types of audiences. To be specific, if audiences are seeking novelty rather than conformity, categorical misalignment rewards focal organization more in high-status affiliations. Scholars have highlighted the power of recombination in driving innovation (Schumpeter, 2013; Weitzman, 1998). De Vaan, Stark, and Vedres (2015) empirically show that collaborating actors' diversity of cognitive structure

promotes the possibility of recombining established categories, leading to the innovative outcome in video game industry. Because of the possibility innovation coming from recombination, audiences who seek novelty may reward more to the actors who affiliate without categorical alignment.

### **iii. Empirical Setting and Hypotheses: High-status**

#### **Affiliations in a Film Industry**

Scholars have recognized that affiliate's status have a positive effect on focal actor's performance in various context (Piazza & Castellucci, 2014). However, the effect is expected to be especially stronger in cultural market. Objective assessment on cultural products such as film, architecture and fine arts is barely possible because differences in quality among products are difficult to identify (DiMaggio, 1977; Ertug et al., 2016). Thus, the status of affiliating partner has been pointed as an important indicator of success, guiding audiences' evaluation (Yogev, 2010).

Participants in film market confront uncertainties caused by shifts in consumers' taste and variability in evaluation criteria employed by critics (Hirsch, 1972: 645). Among the film market participants, however, directors and actors are likely to face a higher level of uncertainty than others because producers and distributors can release uncertainty to some extent by leveraging their investment, while actors and directors do not have a similar opportunity to engage in several films at a time. Accordingly, actors and directors have to carefully choose their

collaborating partner because it is the primary source of reducing uncertainty (Usic, 2004). Thus, in current research, I focus on actor-director collaboration relationship to investigate moderating effect of categorical alignment on the focal actor's rewards from high-status affiliations.

Films are cultural products which have a dual nature in that “they are simultaneously economic products and artistic creations” (Delmestri et al., 2005: 975). For this reason, film performance has been evaluated by two dimensions: commercial success and artistic merit (Delmestri et al., 2005; Hadida, 2009). In the film industry, two particularly important groups of audiences engage in the process of performance assessment and artistic performance respectively: critics and peers. Critics are important third-party in film market because they mediate the relationship between filmmakers and moviegoers. Scholars have shown the role of critics in attracting the attention of final consumers in the context of cultural industries (Eliashberg & Shugan, 1997; Holbrook, 1999; Litman, 1983). For example, critics' coverage on films affects prospect moviegoers' decision-making process (Eliashberg & Shugan, 1997; Hsu, 2006b; Litman & Ahn, 1998; Litman, 1983). On the other hand, peers such as film directors, screenwriters, and cinematographers are allowed to participate in the award process, expressing industry opinion on cinematic excellence and artistic quality of films. Accordingly, recognition of peers leads to greater artistic achievements.

Taking two types of audiences into consideration, I argue that directors' status has a positive influence on actor's economic and artistic performance. Both

critics and industry peers perceive that an actor who collaborate with high-status directors is likely to have reliable skills and capacity. Also, perceived association between director's prominence and actor's capability will increase the probability of attaining successful performance consequences. Empirically, Rossman et al. (2010) found that actors are most likely to get Academy Award nomination when they are collaborating with high-status peers. Because critics also acknowledge director's authorship, identifying film with the director, they may view actors affiliated with high-status directors positively. Thus, I present following baseline hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1a: An actor who collaborates with high-status directors is more likely to attain commercial success than an actor who works with low-status directors.*

*Hypothesis 1b: An actor who collaborates with high-status directors is more likely to achieve artistic recognition than an actor who works with low-status directors.*

However, the impact of directors' status on actor's commercial and artistic performance will be contingent on the categorical alignment between directors and the focal actor. As mentioned in the previous section, the category identity of affiliates is simultaneously important in predicting the performance consequences of high-status affiliations because the status of an actor is dependent on specific context that the actor is located in.

In the film market, genre categories are analogous to product categories. By classifying films based on stylistic elements, genre information provides a framework to make sense of typical characteristic of the movie. Because prior participation in certain film genres may shape audiences' perception, audiences are likely to have different expectations on actors based on the film genre that they worked in the past. Similarly, directors can be classified by the genre of films that they produced. Thus, I use film genre as a proxy for classifying the category identity of actors and directors.

Following the definition of categorical alignment which refers to affiliating actors' overlap of category identity, an actor may experience categorical alignment when there is a high level of similarity between the composition of film genres that he or she had worked in the past and that his or her partners participated. Conversely, affiliation without categorical alignment in our empirical context occurs when there is a lack of genre overlap between an actor and his or her affiliates.

Given the two primary groups of audiences in the film market, critics and peers, I argue that categorical alignment has mixed results on focal actor's commercial and artistic performance depending on the types of audiences. Specifically, I expect that categorical alignment between an actor and directors will be perceived positively by critics, strengthening the effect of partners' status on the actor's commercial success. As mentioned above, critics mediate potential customers and filmmakers by shaping consumers' perception of the film. Even if

the critics' belief can affect consumers' selection of films, an overriding factor in shaping consumers' perception is the number of critical coverage written by critics. Regardless of critics' judgment of film, the critical review itself is a primary source of information for consumers to rely on when they are trying to make sense of the movie. Receiving greater attention from critics thus precedes meeting greater consumer demands which will eventually lead to attaining commercial success.

Because critic's attention has limited capacity and because they have to legitimize their evaluation criteria as an expert, critics may have professional specialties based on the classification of the category. Thus, they are likely to seek actors' conformity in particular category. In support of this, Hsu (2006b: 5) argue that "critics are likely to avoid offerings from categories in which they have not developed coherent schemas for evaluation because they feel less confident in their ability to make and defend claims regarding quality in these arenas." In a similar vein, empirical studies reveal that that films that span multiple genres suffers illegitimacy discount (Hsu, 2006a; Hsu, Hannan, & Koçak, 2009). Thus, categorical alignment between and actor and directors is likely to attract more attention from critics.

On the contrary, industry peers look for novelty and thus categorical misalignment between an actor and directors will be perceived positively in the eye of industry peers, strengthening the relationship between partners' status and the focal actor's artistic recognition. Unlike critics, elite peers may seek novelty rather than conformity. Delmestri et al. (2005: 977) suggest that artistic recognition is a

signal of “path-breaking artistic innovation” pursued by restricted cultural elite. This tendency can be found in the speech of chief delegate who belongs to a prominent film festival. For example, Cannes artistic director Thierry Fremaux mentioned that “The Festival de Cannes is a celebration of cinematographic art. I exist to showcase the new writing, new genres and new visual innovations of our time”, emphasizing the creative and novel aspect of the film among various selection criteria. Thus, industry peers are likely rewards more to an actor who works with directors from different backgrounds regarding the film genre.

*Hypothesis 2a: Categorical alignment between an actor and the directors whom he or she collaborate with strengthens the positive relationship between directors’ status and the focal actor’s commercial success.*

*Hypothesis 2b: Categorical alignment between an actor and directors whom he or she collaborate with weakens the positive relationship between directors’ status and the focal actor’s achievement of artistic recognition.*

## III. METHODS

### i. Data and Sample

Empirical context of the current research is Korean feature film industry. For our study, I collected data on entire feature films released in Korea from 2006 to 2015. I obtained data from open API provided by Korean Box Office Information System<sup>1</sup>. The data include descriptive information on films such as genre, title, release date, production year, the name of directors, the name of lead and supporting actor, distributor, producing firm, box-office gross, and the number of audiences. To gather information about the work history of actors and directors I backed up the data using the database provided by Korean Film Council<sup>2</sup> and Korean Movie Database<sup>3</sup>. Both of them provide information on cast and crew including their filmography, gender, age, and the awards assigned to each individual.

Unit of analysis in the current study is an actor, and the sample was selected based on two criteria. First, I included actors who participated in at least one films released in Korea from 2006 to 2015. Second, I restricted observations to actors who played the lead role in each film and excluded actors with a supporting role.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.kobis.or.kr/kobisopenap>

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.kofic.or.kr>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.kmdb.or.kr>



From 2006 to 2015, 1,772 lead actors participated in at least one movie. However, because database before 2009 does not include observations on box-office results of each film, I excluded observations from 2006 to 2008 to estimate the box-office gross. However, I included all observations from 2006 to 2015 to estimate the number of awards assigned to actors. Thus, actor-year panel data for estimating box-office gross consist of 2,097 observations on 1,476 lead actors from 2009 to 2015. Data for estimating the number of awards consist of 2,797 observations on 1,772 lead actors from 2006 to 2015.

## **ii. Variables**

### ***Dependent Variables.***

*Box-office gross.* Previous studies indicate that box-office revenue or the number of attendance reflects moviegoers' selection of the film (Delmestri et al., 2005; Hadida, 2009). Thus, empirical researches on film performances exploited box-office results to measure the commercial performance of the films (Hsu, 2006a; Zuckerman & Kim, 2003). Building on these literature, I averaged domestic box-office gross of films that the actor participated in a given year to capture the commercial success of an actor. Because the distribution of average box-office revenue is skewed, I transformed the data using natural log.

*Number of Awards.* Awards have been understood as the reflection of

creativity because industry peers engage in the selection processes. Scholars note that award is an “institutionalized measure of film quality and excellence” (Holbrook, 1999: 149). Even though artistic recognition and commercial success are likely to be mutually enhancing, studies reveal that these two dimensions are rather distinct. For example, researchers indicate that there is a negative correlation between award-winning and commercial success (Ginsburgh, 2003; Ginsburgh & Weyers, 1999; Hadida, 2003). To capture an actor’s artistic recognition, I aggregated the number of domestic and international awards assigned to an actor in a given year.

### ***Independent Variables.***

*Directors’ status.* Although there are various types of affiliates from actor’s perspective such as director, producer, screenwriter, distributor, editor, and cinematographer, I focus on directors as an actor’s collaborating partners. Films are often identified as directors’ artistic creature because of their authorship. Thus, compared to other crew members, visibility of directors will be higher than other crew members in the perception of audiences. To measure the status of a director I went through the following three steps.

Following the definition of status, actor’s rank order in social space, I first unveil director’s social position in the film market. To begin with, I construct a two-mode network which includes a set of directors and a set of actors for a given

year. In the bipartite graph, the link between actor and director means their joint participation in filmmaking. Thus, in this director-by-actor matrix  $X$ ,  $X_{ij}$  equals to 1 if the director  $i$  worked with the actor  $j$  on the same filmmaking project.

Next, I transformed this bipartite graph  $X$  into the one-mode network,  $XX'$ , which is composed only of directors. In  $XX'$  adjacency matrix,  $XX'_{ij}$  equals to 1 if the director and  $j$  had worked with the same actor at least one time in the past. Because directors are connected to each other through actors, tie between two directors can be interpreted as their reliance on same the actors in film production. Thus, given that actors are one of the significant resources in filmmaking, the director-by-director adjacency matrix can be seen as 'directors' resource sharing network' in that each cell in this adjacency matrix represents two actor's niche overlap.

Lastly, I measured directors' degree centrality using 'directors' resource sharing network' to capture status because it reflects director's position within a network structure. A director with high degree centrality in the resource sharing network means he or she is collaborating with actors who work with other directors. Because superstars or known actors collaborate with various directors, a director with high degree centrality is the one who works with known actors. Therefore, they can garner diverse and valuable resources. By the same logic, directors with low degree centrality may work with a limited number of unknown actors who rarely cast by other directors.

After calculating degree centrality of each director, I divided the observation into two groups. Thus the observation was coded one if the average of directors' status was greater than the median. I used a ten-years moving window starting because the degree centrality in this networks had the highest correlations with the number of awards assigned to each director.

### ***Moderator variable.***

*Categorical alignment.* Since film genres are parallel to product categories (Hannan, 2010), each actor and his or her collaborating director have their category identity based on the genre of films that they worked in the past.

To measure the time-varying degree of actor-director genre overlap, I first collected data regarding the genre code of films that each actor and director participated in a year and any of previous years. I constructed 17-dimensional vectors for all actors and directors whom they affiliated with based on this information. For example,  $i$  dimension in this vector represents the number of participation in film projects which have genre code  $i$ . The 17 genre codes I used are documentary, drama, romance, mystery, western, action, horror, adventure, war, comedy, fantasy, criminal, musical, thriller, family, science fiction and sa-geuk (Korean traditional film). Thus, information on each participant's involvement in 17 kinds of the genre is represented in this vector.

Using genre involvement vector of each actor and director, I calculated cosine similarity score between the dyad. Cosine similarity measures cosine of the angle between two vectors. In the field of organizational study, cosine similarity has been used to measure niche overlap between two actors (Sohn, 2001), similarity in product composition between focal actor and its alliance partner (Lee, 2007) and “pairwise product market complementarities” which refers to consumers’ tendency to use products from both markets (Lee, Venkatraman, Tanriverdi, & Iyer, 2010). Thus, cosine similarity can be seen as a relevant construct to measure overlap of genre category between an actor and his or her affiliate. I averaged the cosine similarity score between the dyads if an actor collaborated with more than one director in a year.

### ***Control Variables.***

*Actor’s Status.* Previous literature reveals that actors tend to collaborate with partners who have similar status with themselves (Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; Podolny, 1994; Podolny & Phillips, 1996). Thus, I control for the effect of actor’s status because it is expected to be correlated with directors’ status. Measurement of the focal actor’s status has to capture the actor’s relative position among other players. To measure an actor’s social location, I constructed two networks sequentially.

First, I constructed a matrix of actor-by-film affiliation network ( $Z$ )

where  $Z_{ij}$  equals to 1 if actor  $i$  performed in the film  $j$ . I transformed this network into actor-by-actor adjacency matrix ( $ZZ'$ ) by multiplying  $Z$  and its transpose. In this actor-by-actor network, actors are connected to each other through the films that they jointly participated. Following the common practice, I assume that actors who jointly participated in the same project know each other (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008; Newman, 2001; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005).

Based on this actor-by-actor network, I computed eigenvector centrality. Faulkner (1983: 169) suggests that “actors who are tied to important actors are themselves more important than those who tied to an equal number of actors on the periphery of collaboration network.” Thus, I chose eigenvector centrality as a proper measurement which reflects actor’s status. Similar to Bonacich centrality with positive  $\beta$  which captures “degree to which an individual’s status is a positive function of the statuses of those whom he or she is connected” (Bonacich, 1987: 1170), eigenvector centrality “weights contacts according to their centralities” (Bonacich, 2007: 555). Eigenvector centrality thus reflects the concept that actors who are linked to high-status alters will be located in the higher position in vertical space than those who are linked to low-status alters. I used three-years moving window following the common practice.

*Tenure.* Novice actors may have less opportunity to collaborate with high-status directors than an experienced actor. Thus, I control for the effects of tenure.

*Number of films.* I included the number of films that actor participated because it is expected to be positively related to partner’s status and categorical alignment.

*Gender*. I control for *gender* because actresses were less likely to get lead role than actors in our data.

*Major Distributor*. Engagement of major distributor increases the visibility of films and attracts more attention from audiences. Thus, I included *Major Distributor* variable to control for the effect of major distributor's engagement. Specifically, it takes the value of 1 if an actor participated in at least one film that major distributor participated.

### **iii. Estimation**

#### ***Model 1: Commercial success.***

In the first model, I test our hypotheses regarding commercial performance. The dependent variable was measured by averaging domestic box-office revenue of films that an actor participated in a given year.

Distribution of individual talent among actors may constrain or promote the opportunity to collaborate with the high-status director. Therefore, to control for this unobserved individual-level heterogeneity, I used fixed-effects OLS regression model. Moreover, Hausman rejected the null hypothesis that random-effects model is appropriate. This result supports our use of fixed-effects regression.

$$Y_{i,t} = \beta_1 HD_{i,t} + \beta_2 HD_{i,t} CA_{i,t} + \beta_n \Lambda_{i,t} + \alpha_i + u_{i,t},$$

where  $HD_{i,t}$  indicates actor  $i$ 's affiliation with the high-status director in year  $t$ ,

$CA_{i,t}$  indicates categorical alignment between actor  $i$  and the directors in year  $t$ ,  $\Lambda_{i,t}$  indicates the set of control variables,  $\alpha_i$  indicates time-invariant actor's attributes and  $u_{i,t}$  indicates error term.

### ***Model 2: Artistic recognition.***

In the second model, I test hypotheses regarding artistic performance. The dependent variable in this model the total number of award assigned to an actor in a given year. Because our dependent variable is count data with many zeros, fitting linear regression model which assumes continuous dependent variable to the data may lead to biased results. Thus, I assume that our dependent variable follows Poisson distribution. Accordingly, the expected number of awards assigned to an actor is specified in the following way:

$$\lambda_{i,t} = E(y|X) = \exp^{\beta_1 HD_{i,t} + \beta_2 HD_{i,t} CA_{i,t} + \beta_n \Lambda_{i,t}}$$

This equation can be expressed as follows:

$$\ln(\lambda_{i,t}) = \beta_1 HD_{i,t} + \beta_2 HD_{i,t} CA_{i,t} + \beta_n \Lambda_{i,t}$$

where  $HD_{i,t}$  indicates actor  $i$ 's affiliation with the high-status director in year  $t$ ,  $CA_{i,t}$  indicates categorical alignment between actor  $i$  and the directors in year  $t$ ,  $\Lambda_{i,t}$  indicates the set of control variables,  $\alpha_i$  indicates time-invariant actor's attributes and  $u_{i,t}$  indicates error term.

Similar to model 1, unobserved individual-level attributes are expected to cause endogeneity. To deal with this issue, I chose to use generalized estimating equation to estimate the model. Although fixed-effects models provide better



control for time-invariant individual attributes, GEE allows efficient use of data compared to fixed models (Schneper & Guillén, 2004: 284). Because of the presence of over-dispersion in our data, I also estimated the negative binomial model using GEE.

## **IV. RESULTS**

### **i. Model 1: Commercial success**

Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 1. To identify the existence of multicollinearity problem, I computed variance inflation factor for each variable in the model. VIF statistics for all the variables including an interaction term in the model were less than 10 and the mean VIF was 3.69, indicating that the model does not have serious multicollinearity issue.

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlation (Sample Used in Estimating Box-office Gross)**

| Variables                          | Mean | S.D.  | Min  | Max   | 1    | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5    | 6    | 7    |
|------------------------------------|------|-------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1. Ln(Box-office gross)            | 8.25 | 2.72  | 3.69 | 11.13 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 2. Tenure                          | 8.75 | 73.54 | 1    | 78    | 0.32 |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 3. Gender                          | 0.59 | 0.24  | 0    | 1     | 0.09 | 0.07 |      |      |      |      |      |
| 4. No.of films                     | 6.57 | 94.68 | 0    | 99    | 0.38 | 0.69 | 0.18 |      |      |      |      |
| 5. Major distributor               | 0.21 | 0.46  | 0    | 1     | 0.54 | 0.15 | 0.01 | 0.19 |      |      |      |
| 6. Actor's status                  | 0.02 | 0.01  | 0    | 0.25  | 0.54 | 0.28 | 0.15 | 0.51 | 0.33 |      |      |
| 7. Categorical alignment           | 0.35 | 0.13  | 0    | 1     | 0.33 | 0.40 | 0.05 | 0.39 | 0.23 | 0.31 |      |
| 8. Directors' status - high or low | 0.48 | 0.25  | 0    | 1     | 0.67 | 0.33 | 0.05 | 0.39 | 0.40 | 0.48 | 0.41 |

Correlations greater than or equal to  $|.01|$  are significant at  $p < .05$

Table 2 reports the result of fixed-effects OLS regression on box-office gross. Model (1) includes all control variables, actor's tenure, the number of films that an actor participated in any of previous years, the engagement of major distributors, and actor's status. It shows that major distributor's engagement has a positive effect on the commercial success of films ( $p < 0.001$ ). In support of previous studies on the positive effect of focal actor's status on its performance consequences (Podolny & Phillips, 1996; Podolny, Stuart, & Hannan, 1996), actor's status has a positive influence on commercial success ( $p < 0.001$ ).

**Table 2. Fixed-effects OLS Regression on Box-office Gross**

| <b>Variables</b>                          | <b>Model (1)</b>   | <b>Model (2)</b>   | <b>Model (3)</b>   |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Tenure                                    | -0.04<br>(-1.70)   | -0.05*<br>(-2.18)  | -0.05*<br>(-2.17)  |
| No. of films                              | 0.02<br>(1.44)     | 0.011<br>(0.75)    | 0.01<br>(0.74)     |
| Major distributor                         | 0.68***<br>(8.34)  | 0.53***<br>(6.97)  | 0.53***<br>(6.96)  |
| Actor's status                            | 7.16***<br>(5.05)  | 5.81***<br>(4.44)  | 5.81***<br>(4.43)  |
| Categorical alignment                     |                    | 0.26*<br>(2.35)    | 0.24<br>(1.41)     |
| Directors' status - high or low           |                    | 0.94***<br>(9.58)  | 0.92***<br>(6.98)  |
| Directors' status × Categorical alignment |                    |                    | 0.03<br>(0.18)     |
| Constant                                  | 8.13***<br>(46.25) | 7.82***<br>(47.62) | 7.82***<br>(46.82) |
| R-square (within)                         | 0.15               | 0.28               | 0.29               |
| F   | 27.96              | 41.76              | 35.74              |

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Two-tailed tests

Model (2) tested hypothesis 1a, which predicts that actor's commercial success increases positively with the status of actor's affiliate. Supporting the hypothesis 1a, model (2) shows that holding other variables fixed, affiliating with high-status directors lead to increase in actor's commercial success and the effect was statistically significant ( $\beta = 0.944, p < 0.001$ ). Also, categorical alignment between actor and its partner lead to increase in actor's performance ( $\beta = 0.263, p < 0.05$ ), indicating that an actor who collaborates with directors who have similar genre identity with him or her may experience commercial success. This model explains 28.95% of within variance in our dependent variable.

Hypothesis 2a is about the interaction effect of categorical alignment. Specifically, hypothesis 2a predicts that categorical alignment between actor and its affiliating partners strengthens the relationship between directors' status and the focal actor's commercial success. To test this hypothesis, I included the interaction term in model (3). As expected, the direction of regression coefficient was positive. However, the coefficient for interaction term was insignificant, failing to support hypothesis 2a.

## **ii. Model 2: Artistic Recognition**

Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations. To evaluate the presence of multicollinearity, VIF value for each explanatory variable was computed. VIF value of all variables was less than 10 with mean VIF 3.57, suggesting that multicollinearity is not serious in our model.

**Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlation (Sample Used in Estimating Number of Awards)**

| <b>Variables</b>                  | <b>Mean</b> | <b>S.D.</b> | <b>Min</b> | <b>Max</b> | <b>1</b> | <b>2</b> | <b>3</b> | <b>4</b> | <b>5</b> | <b>6</b> | <b>7</b> |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1. Number of awards               | 0.10        | 0.25        | 0          | 7          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 2. Tenure                         | 8.60        | 73.17       | 1          | 78         | 0.09     |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 3. Gender                         | 0.59        | 0.24        | 0          | 1          | -0.01    | 0.07     |          |          |          |          |          |
| 4. No. of films                   | 6.45        | 92.88       | 0          | 99         | 0.12     | 0.68     | 0.17     |          |          |          |          |
| 5. Major distributor              | 0.37        | 0.23        | 0          | 1          | 0.09     | 0.13     | 0.01     | 0.17     |          |          |          |
| 6. Actor's status                 | 0.02        | 0.01        | 0          | 0.30       | 0.17     | 0.28     | 0.14     | 0.48     | 0.30     |          |          |
| 7. Categorical alignment          | 0.34        | 0.13        | 0          | 1          | 0.09     | 0.38     | 0.06     | 0.38     | 0.19     | 0.29     |          |
| 8. Directors' status –high or low | 0.51        | 0.24        | 0          | 1          | 0.10     | 0.29     | 0.04     | 0.36     | 0.36     | 0.46     | 0.40     |

Correlations greater than or equal to  $|\text{.01}|$  are significant at  $p < .05$

Table 4 presents the GEE estimates on actor's artistic recognition under the assumption that our dependent variable follows passion distribution. Model (1) includes all control variables. The coefficient on actor's status was positive and statistically significant, suggesting that increase in actor's status lead to increase in the number of awards assigned to the actor.

**Table 4. GEE Estimates on the Number of Awards**

**(Distributional Specification of Dependent Variable: Poisson)**

| <b>Variables</b>                          | <b>Model(1)</b>       | <b>Model (2)</b>      | <b>Model (3)</b>     |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Tenure                                    | 0.01<br>(1.13)        | 0.01<br>(0.72)        | 0.01<br>(0.66)       |
| Gender                                    | -0.44<br>(-1.88)      | -0.45<br>(-1.95)      | -0.42<br>(-1.82)     |
| No. of films                              | 0.01<br>(1.93)        | 0.01<br>(1.60)        | 0.01<br>(1.78)       |
| Major distributor                         | 0.45<br>(1.92)        | 0.39<br>(1.69)        | 0.40<br>(1.79)       |
| Actor's status                            | 11.19***<br>(5.38)    | 10.42***<br>(4.88)    | 10.73***<br>(5.16)   |
| Categorical alignment                     |                       | 0.46<br>(0.97)        | 1.75**<br>(2.80)     |
| Directors' status - high or low           |                       | 0.20<br>(0.61)        | 1.07**<br>(2.68)     |
| Directors' status × Categorical alignment |                       |                       | -1.99**<br>(-2.75)   |
| Constant                                  | -2.999***<br>(-14.77) | -3.204***<br>(-13.13) | -3.71***<br>(-10.70) |
| Prob > chi2                               | 0.000                 | 0.000                 | 0.000                |

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Two-tailed tests.

Hypothesis 1b predicts that affiliating with high-status partners lead to an increase in artistic recognition. The estimates in model (2) indicates that the effect of directors' status is positive but statistically insignificant. However, as I include the interaction term, the effect of directors' status was positive and statistically significant, supporting hypothesis 1b. Moreover, in support of hypothesis 2b which predicts that categorical alignment between an actor and directors weakens the relationship between directors' status and focal actor's performance consequence, the interaction effect of high-status director and categorical alignment on artistic performance was negative and statistically significant.

Table 5 reports GEE estimates on actor's performance under the assumption that distribution of dependent variable follows negative binomial because of the presence of over-dispersion in the data. The estimates under distributional specification of negative binomial yielded similar results.

**Table 5. GEE Estimates on the Number of Awards**

**(Distributional Specification of Dependent Variable: Negative Binomial)**

| <b>Variables</b>                          | <b>Model (1)</b>      | <b>Model (2)</b>      | <b>Model (3)</b>     |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Tenure                                    | 0.01<br>(0.93)        | 0.01<br>(0.58)        | 0.01<br>(0.57)       |
| Gender                                    | -0.45<br>(-1.86)      | -0.46<br>(-1.91)      | -0.45<br>(-1.91)     |
| No. of films                              | 0.01<br>(1.85)        | 0.01<br>(1.46)        | 0.01<br>(1.75)       |
| Major distributor                         | 0.47*<br>(2.00)       | 0.42<br>(1.87)        | 0.43<br>(1.94)       |
| Actor's status                            | 13.18***<br>(6.37)    | 12.21***<br>(5.69)    | 12.54***<br>(6.14)   |
| Categorical alignment                     |                       | 0.53<br>(1.11)        | 1.79**<br>(2.82)     |
| Directors' status - high or low           |                       | 0.14<br>(0.41)        | 1.00*<br>(2.53)      |
| Directors' status × Categorical alignment |                       |                       | -2.00**<br>(-2.76)   |
| Constant                                  | -3.052***<br>(-14.76) | -3.245***<br>(-13.20) | -3.73***<br>(-10.70) |
| Prob > chi2                               | 0.000                 | 0.000                 | 0.000                |

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Two-tailed tests.



## V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The current study attempts to extend the theoretical argument regarding the performance consequence of high-status affiliations by incorporating the concept of categorical alignment. Antecedent studies reveal the underlying mechanisms regarding the benefits of high-status affiliations by focusing on within category setting. However, direct application of the mechanism into affiliation between actors from different segments of markets can be problematic because the theoretical scope was limited to within category setting. Thus, current research contributes studies on the performance consequences of high-status affiliations by suggesting that affiliate's category identity and status are simultaneously important factors in predicting focal actor's reward.

Secondly, our study highlights the role of different groups of audiences in evaluating performance consequences of affiliation between actors with homogeneous and heterogeneous category identity. Going further from previous studies that focus on critics' category-based conformity seeking tendency, I take another type of audience group into consideration, industry peers who seek novelty.

Despite these contributions, the present study has a limitation in that a tie between two actors is not only a "prism" which delivers informational cue to the third-party but also a "pipe or conduit" which delivers resources, information and opportunities to the direct parties (Podolny, 2001b). In specific, while I suggest that collaboration between two actors with heterogeneous identity lead to artistic

recognition because of industry peers' "perception" that their performance may have path-breaking innovation, their "actual performances" are likely to have innovative elements in that the difference in information that flows between the dyad can be seen as a source of innovative outcome.

Burt (1992)'s structural hole theory is in the same line with the argument that I suggested above. That is, lack of categorical overlap between collaborating actors might be observed in the situation where two actors are located at the brokerage positions which connect two separate clusters. In this case, there is low-level of information redundancy between them, and thus innovative performance can be achieved as a result of knowledge sharing.

Thus, further researches that incorporate two distinct roles of the network might contribute to a more comprehensive understanding regarding the implication of categorical alignment in dyadic relationships, especially in high-status affiliation setting.

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요약 (국문초록)

시장 지위가 높은 타자와의 협업이  
작업 성과에 미치는 영향에 관하여  
: 범주적 정체성 일치의  
조절 효과에 대한 연구

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본 연구의 목적은 높은 시장 지위를 가진 타자와의 제휴 관계가 중심 행위자(ego)에게 미치는 영향에 대한 기존의 이론적 논의를 확장시키는 것이다. 선행 연구의 결론은 중심 행위자가 자기 자신보다 위상이 높은 타자와의 제휴 관계를 통해 시장에서의 지위 향상을 도모할 수 있고 이에 따른 이익을 향유할 수 있다는 것이다. 그러나 행위자의 시장 지위는 그

행위자가 위치하고 있는 적소(niche) 범위 안에서만 유의미한 자원이 될 수 있다. 따라서 지위 향상의 효과에 대해 논의하기 위해서는 행위자의 범주적 정체성에 대한 정의가 선행되어야 한다. 그럼에도 불구하고 지위 이동에 대한 선행 연구에서는 범주적 정체성에 대한 사전적인 논의를 간과하고 있다. 본 연구의 논지는 적소 범위에 의해 결정되는 행위자의 범주적 정체성이 제휴 관계에 있는 타자의 범주적 정체성과 일치하는지의 여부에 따라 제휴 관계를 통한 지위 향상의 효과가 달라진다는 것이다.

논문에서는 2006 년~ 2015 년 사이의 한국 장편 영화산업에서 배우와 감독의 협업 데이터를 통해 위의 가설을 검증한다. 기존의 연구에서 밝혀진 바와 같이 영화 산업에서 위상이 높은 감독과 협업한 배우는 그렇지 않은 배우보다 더 높은 상업적 성과와 예술적 성과를 거둔다. 그러나 상업적 성과의 경우 타자의 높은 지위에 의한 긍정적인 효과가 중심행위자와 타자 간의 범주적 정체성 일치에 의해 강화된 반면 예술적 성과의 경우 지위 향상의 긍정적인 효과가 범주적 일치에 의해 약화되는 양상을 보여주었다. 이와 같은 결과는 제휴 관계를 통한 지위 이동에 대해 논의하기 위해 범주적 정체성에 대한 고려가 선행되어야 한다는 점을 시사한다.

주요어: 제휴 관계를 통한 지위 이동(향상), 범주적 정체성, 조직 정체성,

청중 이질성, 사회 연결망 분석, 영화산업

학번: 2015-20616