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Master's Thesis

Comparative Study of Germany and Austria
Xenophobia Changes from 2002 to 2014

August 2017

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction.....	3
1. Research Backgrounds.....	3
2. Theoretical Backgrounds.....	7
3. Data and Methods.....	12
4. Research Question.....	15
II. Backgrounds.....	18
1. Migration History before 2002.....	18
1-1 Austria.....	18
1-2 Germany.....	19
III. Comparison of Germany and Austria	21
1. Political Perspective.....	21
1-1 The Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties.....	21
1-2 Political Regimes in Charge between 2002 and 2014.....	32
2. Economic Perspective.....	37
2-1 Economic Threat and the Populist Party.....	38
2-2 Individual and Group Threat.....	41
3. Cultural Perspective.....	46
3-1 National Identity.....	46
3-2 Following the Leading Culture.....	50
IV. Conclusion.....	53

References

Appendix

List of the Figures

- Figure 1. Xenophobia Scale Changes from 2002 to 2014
- Figure 2. Xenophobia Scale Changes in Austria and Germany from 2002 to 2014
- Figure 3. Parliamentary Popular Vote in Austria from 2002 to 2013
- Figure 4. Supporting Party and Xenophobia Scale in Austria
- Figure 5. Federal Election Popular Vote in Germany from 2002 to 2013
- Figure 6. Supporting Party and Xenophobia Scale in Germany
- Figure 7. GDP per Capita (PPP, \$) (World Bank)
- Figure 8. GINI Index in Germany and Austria (World Bank)
- Figure 9. Unemployment rate from 2002 to 2014 (Eurostat, 2016)
- Figure 10. Job Type and Xenophobia Scale
- Figure 11. Satisfaction with present state of economy in country
- Figure 12. Do you see yourself as..?(Eurobarometer, 2014)
- Figure 13. Attachment to the Country in Austria and Germany (Eurobarometer, 2014)
- Figure 14. Better for a country if almost everyone shares customs and traditions (ESS)
- Figure 15. Qualification for Immigration; committed to way of life in country (ESS)

Abstract

Comparative Study of Germany and Austria

Xenophobia Changes from 2002 to 2014

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Xenophobia has existed everywhere throughout history. Due to several global changes such as refugee crises, an increase in terrorism, and the recent rise of populist parties' in Europe and the US, immigration is becoming a more salient issue. Among European countries where a huge amount of migrants are moving back and forth, Austrian and German xenophobic attitudes both changed exceptionally, but in opposite ways in recent years. From 2002 to 2014, xenophobia in Austria grew, whereas xenophobia in Germany decreased significantly.

This thesis examines the possible reasons for this difference between Germany and Austria from three perspectives; political, economic and cultural. From a political perspective, the popularity of extreme right-wing parties increased in Austria whereas in Germany, right-wing parties could not enjoy the same level of support

because of the political culture that shuns the use of nationalism as a political tool. From an economic perspective, the economic recession and the political framing of extreme right-wing parties which utilized it by blaming migrants increased xenophobia in Austria. Lastly, from a cultural perspective, strong national identity in Austria and relatively weaker national identity in Germany was an important factor in the changes of xenophobic attitudes. Despite its seemingly greater acceptance of migrants, Germany still prefers to assimilate migrants rather than to integrate them into the society.

Keywords: Austria, Germany, Comparative Studies, Xenophobia, European migration, 2002-2014

Student Number: 2015-25166

I. Introduction

1. Research Backgrounds

In 2016, the online English dictionary website “Dictionary.com” chose “xenophobia” as the word of the year. Due to the European Refugee Crisis, the increasing threat of terrorism and extreme right-wing parties’ popularity, not only individuals but also governments and international institutions have been heavily affected by migration issues. On the one hand, refugee-welcoming culture is flowering, whereas hatred against migrants is becoming an on-growing issue and anti-immigrant populist politicians are gaining popularity in many countries.

This thesis will look at the changes in xenophobic attitudes in Europe, mainly focusing on Germany and Austria. Germany and Austria share many cultural characteristics: the same language, a Christian majority and a relatively good economic situation. However, as we can see from the refugee crisis which started in 2014, Germany and Austria reacted in very different ways toward refugees. In these regards, this thesis will explore the reasons behind these changes in xenophobic attitude.

The word xenophobia is the combination of two Greek words ‘xenos’ meaning strange and ‘phobia’ which means fear. The suffix ‘phobia’ is usually used as a psychopathological term, which includes the disproportionate and unconscious reaction to a danger which is often imagined and leads to irrational and uncontrollable behavior (*Dictionary of race, ethnicity and culture / edited by Guido Bolaffi ... [et al.]*,

2003). In other words, xenophobia can be understood as a deep-rooted fear towards foreigners, which is based on individual's imagination and unconscious hatred. It seems like this term became popular in recent days resulting from on-growing right-wing parties' prevalence in Europe and the US. However, negative attitudes and hatred against foreigners are natural instincts of human beings and have long been a part of our society. Since ancient times, as foreigners speak different languages and use different customs, both individuals and social groups have been afraid of the foreigners whom they are unfamiliar with. Growing fear decidedly results in hostile attitudes toward foreigners and migrants.

There are many other terms which imply a negative attitude toward foreigners. Racism can be a good example. According to Marger (2003), racism can be identified as such;

1. Humans are divided naturally into different physical types.
2. Such physical traits as they display are intrinsically related to their culture, personality, and intelligence.
3. By their genetic inheritance, some groups are innately superior to others.

(p.25)

With this definition, we can then define racism as a belief that humans are stratified by their physical traits and therefore, some race or races that have special traits are superior to the others.

Though racist sentiments did exist in many societies, racist ideology was

firmly established around the 18th century (Fredrickson, 2002) with Western colonialism that socially divided people according to race and skin color. This social division created many prejudices and led to the discrimination of people with different skin colors, which typically regarded white people as superior to others. This social division even developed into scientific racism, which tried to justify the superiority of the white over the other races with scientific methods and data.

Although racism and xenophobia share many common characteristics, there are some crucial differences between racism and xenophobia. The main difference lies in the fact that those two terms have different bases. For racism, superiority over a different race is the primary root; especially, white supremacy over black is a good example. On the other hand, xenophobia is based on a perceived 'difference.' It targets specifically foreigners who are not within the defined community, regardless of their visible characteristics such as skin color and ethnicities.

Secondly, xenophobia is an old and virtually universal phenomenon. It has already been mentioned that xenophobia involves psychological effects which are deeply rooted in human beings to evade 'foreignness.' It contains both 'despise' and 'fear' against foreigners. On the other hand, racism is historical construction with a traceable history covering the period between the fourteenth century and the twenty-first (Fredrickson, 2002). Before the 14th century, the concept of evaluating and stratifying races did not exist.

However, in Europe, xenophobia cannot be strictly differentiated from racism and anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe, since they are intermixed terms (OH, 2015).

Along with fear of foreigners, many Europeans show discrimination against other races and these feelings are reflected in their political stance. For example, Neo-Nazi parties which strongly support racism are gaining popularity in many countries and whenever a terrorist attack happens. Therefore, in this thesis, the term xenophobia can be interpreted as 'anti-immigrant sentiment' and somehow related with 'racism', since it is difficult to differentiate xenophobia and racism in European context.

2. Theoretical backgrounds

The most popular theory which explains anti-immigrant sentiment is the *group threat theory* (Blumer, 1958; Sherif, 1967). This theory explains that racial prejudice is not necessarily related to an individual's interests, but more with the dominant group's privileges. According to group threat theory, as a reaction to a possible threat from minority group(s) to the majority group, majority group members will have anti-immigrant attitudes and prejudices against these minorities— so-called out-groups. Therefore, the larger the minority group(s) become, the more the majority group feels threatened, since human beings have a natural instinct to join the majority group of their society.

Another important theory is the *social identity theory*, which is closely related with symbolic threats. This explains why people have general disposition to negative intergroup attitudes in the first place (McLaren & Johnson, 2007; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998). This theory refers to the perception and fear that out-groups who practice different cultural traditions will pose a threat to in-groups' certain values or way of life. Also, social identity theory explains that out-groups who are threatening the national identity evoke hostility to in-groups (Tajfel, 1981). Therefore, opposition to immigration comes from the migrants' ethnic and cultural characteristics that seem to be threatening the 'native identity' of the soil.

With these two theories related with anti-immigrant sentiment, this thesis will explain the reasons for the Xenophobia Scale changes in three perspectives: Political,

Economic and Culture. The economic threat is closely related with group threat theory, since members from the majority group fear that minorities will steal jobs and social welfare from their groups thus resulting in an economic recession. The cultural threat is related with social identity theory. People fear that their cultural traditions and their identity will be substituted by the culture of minorities. The stronger the native group members' feelings are for preserving their own culture, the more the native group members will have stronger anti-immigrant sentiment. Political perspective is related with both theories, or will affect the other two threats since how the political parties and government in charge reacts to certain situations affects people's perception toward migrants significantly.

Political Environment

Political climate apparently affects ordinary people's attitude toward foreigners. The stronger the support for right-wing ideology within the state becomes, the more negative attitudes toward the foreign population exists (Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2006). According to Semynov et al., in European countries especially, the people who are supporting the conservative parties have a tendency to hold negative views on migrants, and this trend has increased notably in the past few years. These conservative parties generally claim to protect the interests of the national social groups, especially those who are in socioeconomically inferior positions. Therefore, people supporting the conservative parties have a tendency to show more xenophobic attitudes, since migrants can be a possible threat to their countrymen.

Additionally, anti-immigrant attitudes are related to the emergence of extreme right-wing parties particularly in Western Europe (Golder, 2003). Populist parties often blame foreigners for the economic downturn of their countries, by linking unemployment of their native-born citizens with the number of labor migrants. These political parties then create anti-immigrant sentiment and make political agendas which restrict and exclude migrants and foreigners to get political attention and support. Especially, the European case shows that increasing anti-immigrant sentiment is not because of the increasing number of immigrants but because of extreme right-wing parties' policies and intentions (OH, 2015). Those parties make use of stereotypes that present immigrants as threats, by invoking intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes (Matthes & Schmuck, 2017).

Economic threat

There exist two leading theories regarding economic threats from foreigners. Realistic group conflict theory (Sherif, 1966) argues that conflicts between two groups result from competition over limited resources. Assuming that the contest over scarce resources is a zero-sum game, realistic group conflict theorists argue that the competition over the limited resources results in prejudices against out-groups. Adding on to this argument, Quillian shows with the empirical data from European countries that economic conditions such as low GDP per capita and high unemployment rate bring about anti-immigrant prejudice (Quillian, 1995).

The second theory is called split labor market theory (Bonacich, 1972). This theory explains that different wage scope between different ethnicities increases xenophobic attitudes. Since migrants are usually more willing to accept lower wages and poorer working conditions in the receiving country than natives, the overall wage level in the country can decrease. The advocates of this theory argue that the low wage level of migrants undermines the job opportunities of majority group members, which result in anti-immigrant sentiments against the foreign workers.

Cultural threat

Cultural threat can be understood with the social identity threat, since different cultures may threaten the 'original' identity of the society, which can be very important for majority group members. However, these cultural differences are mostly subjective and invisible. It is based on perceived knowledge, which stems from positive or negative stereotypes toward foreigners. Among those differences, religious practices may be a main concern for many Europeans. Recently, Muslims in Europe, whose color and religious culture are different from the 'native' culture of the European continent, are seen as hostile and aggressive toward Europe and Christianity in particular. Goldberg finds the reason for this racial discrimination in European colonization (Theo Goldberg, 2006). He argues that European colonial domination in the Middle East resulted in the prejudice that the people and culture from the Middle East are historically and culturally immature and inferior to European culture.

Moreover, for many Europeans, Muslims are perceived as failing to adopt the cultural norms and lifestyle of their new homeland and refusing to assimilate into society.

In European perceptions, crimes are closely connected to the immigrants in European society. Many Europeans are reluctant to receive refugees because they are recognized as committing crimes and related with Islam infiltrators¹. Especially, Islam is perceived as a violent and aggressive religion, which is closely related to terrorism. Sabri Ciftci argues that this phenomenon started from the 9/11 terror attacks and successive terrorist bombings in European capitals and the media bias framing Islam as a violent and dangerous religion (Ciftci, 2012). Recently, since many terrorist attacks in big cities in Europe such as Paris, London and Berlin have been recognized as IS (Islamic States)'s crimes, Islamophobia (which refers to the hatred against Muslims) is rapidly increasing.

Moreover, media coverage influences the perception of people that crimes are mostly done by the Muslim migrants and refugees. The news which negatively portrays immigration increases people's fear of crime and hatred toward immigrants. This leads media consumers to subconsciously link immigration and crime (McLaren & Johnson, 2007), even though many data prove that the crime rate of immigrants is almost the same as that of natives or sometimes much lower than the perception and even the average of the whole population².

¹ <https://www.ft.com/content/b5a8867e-28ea-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c>

² <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/immigrants-do-not-increase-crime-research-shows/>

3. Data and Methods

In order to calculate a Xenophobia Scale and its changes, European Social Survey data and questions are used in this thesis. European Social Survey is a cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe. It mainly focuses on measuring the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of diverse populations in European countries including Israel. This survey has been conducted every two years since 2002. Among the various themes covered by European Social Survey, the 'Immigration' part has been conducted twice, once in 2002 (Round 1) and once in 2014 (Round 7). Therefore, I will compare the data from the European Social Survey of 2002 with that of 2014 for this thesis.

This thesis uses the Xenophobia Scale measuring method from Hijerm and Nagayoshi's article (Hijerm & Nagayoshi, 2011). The two scholars made a comparative analysis of 21 countries in the European Union, by using 2002 European Social Survey immigration data (Round1). By taking the concept of the group threat theory, which explains that interaction between diverse groups with different interests result in struggles and invoke negative attitudes towards other groups and finally influence individuals' recognition of other group members, Hijerm and Nagayoshi research European perspectives on 'Foreignness.' Hijerm and Nagayoshi hypothesized that both the economic threat and cultural threat are the main reasons for xenophobia. They calculated the Xenophobia Scale from the six questions in European Social Survey data related with xenophobia. The six questions that are used are as such:

[Economic Threat]

- 1) Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or help to create new jobs?
- 2) Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?
- 3) Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?

[Cultural Threat]

- I. Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?
- II. Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?
- III. Are [country]'s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?

These survey questions are calculated on a scale from 0 to 10 and answers closer to 10 mean that the respondent is more favorable to the migrants. By adding up the points from the respondents' answers, the average number of the points refers to the individual Xenophobia Scale. By using the methodology of Hjerm and Naoyashi, I will do research on the Xenophobia Index of Germany and Austria.

Then, I will compare data from 2002 to 2014 to find out the reasons behind why different xenophobic attitudes resulted in both countries. For this work, 2002 and 2014 European Social Survey data will be used (www.europeansocialsurvey.org). The Cronbach's alpha score, which refers to a measure of internal consistency, that is, how closely related a set of items are as a group was over 0.8 in all sectors, which means that those questions are closely related in each country.

4. Research Question

By using the above mentioned method to calculate the Xenophobia Scale, 18 European countries¹ Xenophobia Scale differences from 2002 to 2014 were measured. The bigger the Xenophobia Scale is the more positive a nation becomes; the smaller the Xenophobia Scale is, the more respondents have negative views toward foreigners. The results are as such:




Figure 1. Xenophobia Scale Changes from 2002 to 2014

According to **Figure 1**, the Xenophobia Scale in most countries has notably changed from 2002 to 2014. 14 countries out of 18 countries experienced positive changes during this 12-year period. On the other hand, the other four countries including Austria and Hungary were more xenophobic in 2014 than in 2002. However, compared to the other countries, Austria was extremely more xenophobic in 2014,

whereas Germany has changed in a totally opposite way, becoming exceptionally positive toward migrants and foreigners.




Figure 2. Xenophobia Scale Changes in Austria and Germany

If we look at Austria and Germany's Xenophobia Scale changes more specifically, we can tell the remarkable differences. According to **Figure 2**, in 2002, Austria's Xenophobia Scale was slightly higher than Germany, which means that Austrians were more positive toward migrants than Germans. However, in 2014, the result shows the opposite outcome. Austria's Xenophobia Scale significantly fell from 4.75 to 4.27 whereas Germany's Xenophobia Scale increased from 4.47 to 5.21. Since the two countries are neighboring countries whose official language is the same and have similar economic conditions and share similar cultural bases, there should be some significant reason behind these extreme differences between the two countries during 12-year period from 2002 to 2014. Therefore, the thesis will find out why they had opposite xenophobic attitude changes toward migrants and foreigners between

2002 and 2014.

To explain the changes, this thesis will examine three possible perspectives to understand these differences. First of all, the political perspective will be examined. The political systems and political culture heavily influence people's thinking and attitude toward immigrants. But at the same time, how people react and think is reflected in everyday politics. Therefore, the political situation and history specifically related with migrants and foreigners will be discussed to find out the possible reason for the increasing xenophobia trend in Austria, as well as anti-xenophobia attitude in Germany. Secondly, the economic perspective will be examined. According to the theory, wage differences, limited resources, and its distribution can be critical factors for growing xenophobia. Thus, economic figures and data will be analyzed both in macro and individual level. Lastly, the cultural perspective will be examined. As is mentioned above, both Austria and Germany use the same language and religious background, and have a shared history. Nonetheless, these two countries experienced entirely different xenophobia changes in recent decades. Hence, the specific level of cultural changes and differences, specifically regarding people's perceptions, will be analyzed in this thesis.

II. Background

1. Migration history before 2002³

1-1 Austria⁴

Until the 1960s, Austria did not observe a significant inflow of migrant workers. However, since Austria was on the borderline with Eastern Bloc countries, it became a major destination for political refugees and asylum seekers from communist countries after the establishment of the so-called Iron Curtain. In the 1960s, like other countries in Europe, Austria made agreements for importing guest workers from other countries to solve its labor shortage problems. The main principle of the guest-worker system was a rotation, but that never did work because rather than going back to their hometown, many of the guest workers brought their families and settled.

In 1974 and 1975, due to the economic crisis resulting from the oil shock, the Austrian government tried to reduce the number of foreign workers and stopped recruiting them. In the late 1980s, due to the dismantling of the Iron Curtain and the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the number of asylum seekers and migrants coming to Austria rapidly increased which became an important domestic political issue. Moreover, as the migration issue morphed into a problem of security, the

³ This part is a summary of Triandafyllidou, A., & Gropas, R. (2007). *European immigration: a sourcebook* / [edited by Anna Triandafyllidou and Ruby Gropas]. Farnham, Surrey, England Burlington, VT: Farnham, Surrey, England Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

⁴ This part also includes a summary of “The Impact of Immigration on Austria’s Society” (IOM, 2004)

Ministry of Interior pushed policymakers to reform the immigration legislation.

Due to public pressure to regulate immigration policies, the Residence Act was finally passed in 1992. It contained a quota system, which limits the maximum number of migrant workers in each sector and the renewal of residence permits which increased residence insecurity and denial of migrants. In 1997, a new Immigration Act was introduced, which focuses on the integration of settled immigrants with the slogan of 'Integration before new immigration' and restricts new immigrants from coming in.

1-2 Germany

At the end of the Second World War, Germany was divided into two and these two Germanys experienced different migration patterns. East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR) closed its borders, but imported migrant workers mainly from socialist countries such as Poland and Cuba to fill its labor shortage. West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany, FRG), on the other hand, opened its doors to various countries. First, it accepted East Germans who fled from GDR and second, it signed the guest worker recruitment agreement with various countries mainly from Mediterranean countries. This program continued until 1973. From 1973 to 1990, the FRG government tried to send those guest workers back to their home, but it was unsuccessful. Rather, during this period, the family members of these recruited guest workers moved to Germany to reunify with their family member. Additionally, refugees and asylum seekers, especially from Turkey and Yugoslavia, began to flow into Germany.

In 1990, the revised version of the Foreigner's Law was enacted, which aims to prevent the further entry of non-European immigrants, to send foreigners back to their home and to promote the integration of the legal immigrants who have already settled in Germany. However, after the Berlin Wall was torn down, Western Germany faced a massive influx of immigrants such as Eastern Germans, ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and asylum seekers.

In 1998, the defeat of the conservative Christian Democrats- Liberal Democrats CDU/CSU-FDP government opened the door for a new coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Green Party. This so-called Red- Green government stood for progressive politics in Germany. The Red-Green government adopted some immigration legislation, as the government was expected to make changes in migration policies.

In 2000, the "Green Card" system was adopted, to draw IT specialists to Germany, and this became a starting signal that made all parties developed their own proposals to reform German immigration laws (Schmid-Drüner, 2006). In 2000, the Red-Green government's new Naturalization Act which contained the territorial principle (*jus soli*) for the first time in German history and rejected dual citizenship was suggested. Being attacked by a protest initiated by the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), the possibility to obtain dual citizenship was reduced to a temporary status, which meant that a person should choose one citizenship by the age of 23. But still, the Naturalization Act itself brought a big sensation since it broke with traditional idea on the process in which one became a German national (this will be analyzed in chapter 3).

III. Comparison of Germany and Austria

1. Political Perspective

1-1 The emergence of extreme right-wing parties

1-1-1 Austria

Austria is one of the European countries where extreme right-wing parties have enjoyed significant attention and support from the public. The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) was founded in 1956 by a former Nazi officer. Defined as a center-right party, it spent 20 years from 1966 to 1986 as a marginal party, receiving around 6% of the popular vote on average. However, in 1986, Jörg Haider became the party leader and shifted its ideology to the extreme right by reintegrating neo-Nazis and extreme right militants into the party (Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer, 1996). With the leadership of Haider and a modified strategy, the party began to join the political mainstream. Using xenophobic and racist rhetoric, the FPÖ popularity skyrocketed. In 1999, it gained 26.9% of the popular vote in the legislative election and made a coalition with the conservative Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) in 2000. However, as the FPÖ become responsible for governmental policies, the party could not maintain its strategy of attacking the ruling government and began to lose its legitimacy. (Heinisch, 2008a). Moreover,

internal discord between the political leaders occurred and in the next legislative election in 2002, the party only gained 10 % of the popular vote. In 2005, internal disagreements increased, and several prominent party members including Haider left the FPÖ and formed the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich-BZÖ). FPÖ continued its coalition with ÖVP, and the two parties competed against each other in the election, but in the end, the FPÖ was more popular than the BZÖ. In the 2013 legislative election, the FPÖ won 20.5% of the vote and recently, gained more votes than the ÖVP in some elections. FPÖ, voicing out the slogan “Austria first,” strongly opposes the “Islamization of Europe.” The party calls for stricter border controls and harder restriction on immigration.

There are some possible answers for why those extreme right-wing parties have had significant success in Austria. First of all, it is due to the existence of a doctrine in the Austrian political system called Proporz. Proporz allocates government shares of political influence proportionally by electoral support, which reinforces the hegemony of the two largest parties ÖVP and SPÖ. This system reinforced the collaboration of the two parties, but at the same time, it completely excluded all other political actors (Heinisch, 2008b). A good example of this political exclusion is the presidency of Austria. Since 1945, before Alexander van der Bellen became a president in 2016, all of the presidents in Austria were either from ÖVP or SPÖ. The meaning of ‘working together’ has faded away and they are considered as parties made up of politicians who keep arguing and never get anything done, which seems to result in higher unemployment rate and economic stagnation. Moreover, this system applies not

only to the country's political institutions and the economy, but to all areas of the public life. It is in this context that the FPÖ was able to criticize this "Grand Coalition" and identify itself as a party who fights for the 'common man' against the political elite parties.

Moreover, the political culture led by Austrian elites has influenced the rise of xenophobia. According to Heinisch, to make sure that Austria is seen as an independent Western democratic country, the elites tried to construct a post-war Austria as a nation of victims, stating that Austrians are non-Germans (Heinisch, 2008a). Additionally, in the 1980s, the FPÖ changed its stance which successfully positioned it as a party with a distinct ideology. The German nationalists in the party who have an unapologetic attitude toward German and Austrian roles in the Second World War, promoted the party's ideology to gain popularity from those Austrians who were irritated by international criticism that has blamed Austria (among others) for the Second World War and the Holocaust.

From 2004, when the leader of FPÖ changed to Heinz-Christian Strache, the party decidedly shifted its racist propaganda. It began to blame Muslims for terrorist activities around the world and continued the "war on terror" discourse, describing Islam as misogynistic, anti-liberal and as having a fascistic worldview. Also, by using social media, the party actively spreads its propagandas and political ideology.




Figure 3. Parliamentary Popular Vote in Austria (2002-2013)

According to **Figure 3**, we can easily see that the traditional parties ÖVP and SPÖ's popularity constantly decreases whereas extreme right-wing parties-especially FPÖ's- popularity has constantly been increasing since 2002. In 2013, even though SPÖ has won slightly more percentage than the others, all four parties (ÖVP, SPÖ, Die Grünen and FPÖ) received a similar amount of votes, each reaching more than 20% of the popular vote.

What is noticeable along with the FPÖ's growth, is the fact that the Greens (Die Grünen), which claims for the environmental protection and supports the rights of minorities, has persistently gained popularity over the past 12 years. We can consider it as representative of the polarization of the ordinary voters in Austria. As a defense

mechanism against right-wing parties' extremism, the voters are trying more to protect minorities' rights and harmony within the society.




Figure 4. Supporting Party and Xenophobia Scale in Austriaⁱⁱ

Looking at **Figure 4**, we can see some important features of party supporters. Firstly, the Xenophobia Scale from the part of the supporters of all four major parties has decreased over the past 12 years, even though the degrees are different according to the party. That means that the average person's xenophobic attitude increased in Austria. Even the SPÖ supporters' Xenophobia Scale decreased, though it is a center-left party, which is known to be more open to foreigners and migrants than the right-wing. Moreover, the Green party, which is supposed to be the most open to foreigners and migrants, also shows a decreased Xenophobia Scale in 2014, becoming more negative toward foreigners and migrants. The extreme right-wing party FPÖ supporters' Xenophobia Scale notably decreased, which means that their political stance became even more extreme. Since the FPÖ's supporters have increased in recent

years according to **Figure 3**, we can see here that the rise of the supporters of populist parties and their more negative views on foreigners have contributed to the increase in xenophobic attitudes in Austria.

1-1-2 Germany

Unlike many countries in Europe where extreme right-wing parties are becoming rapidly popular, Germany did not experience a great rise in the popularity of extreme right-wing parties. Nonetheless, a few parties that appealed to nationalism and anti-immigration did exist in German politics. The oldest right-wing party is the National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD), which was founded in 1964. The party is often described as a neo-Nazi organization, as their essential ideology stems from the phrase *Volksgemeinschaft* (people's community), which has a strong anti-Semitic and Nazi-associated connotation. Another right-wing party, the German People's Union (Deutsche Volkunion, DVU), was founded in 1987. Though the party won seats in several state parliaments, DVU never reached the 5% percent minimum popularity that is necessary to enter the Bundestag (National Parliament). Since its foundation, it has not been able to receive significant amounts of attention from either the media or public and therefore, it has maintained its marginal status in German politics. In 2004, NPD won 9.2% in the Saxony state election, and the DVU won 6.1% in the Brandenburg state election, which was a relatively big success for the two parties. However, this was considered to be a one-off event and did not help either of the parties to make a great leap toward the mainstream

parties.

But the situation totally changed with the emergence of the AfD (Ralf, 2016). Alternative for Germany (AfD) was founded in 2013 to provide a platform for criticizing the Eurozone and since it was founded, the party has enjoyed the biggest popularity among all extreme right-wing parties. In the 2013 federal election, the party won 4.7% of the votes, slightly lower than the amount needed for entering the Bundestag. In 2014, the party won 7.1% votes and earned 7 out of 96 German seats in the European election, gaining many of the votes from another extreme right-wing party, the NPD. Like many other extreme right-wing parties in other European countries, the AfD stands for Euroscepticism and opposes the “Islamization of the West,” stating that “Muslims are not welcome in Germany⁵.” But still, the popularity of the AfD is far from that of a mainstream party in German politics, as is minor compared to extreme right-wing parties in other countries in Europe.

There are quite a few reasons that can explain why extreme right-wing populist parties could not broaden their power in the post-war period in Germany. First and foremost, political culture played the most significant role in suppressing the expansion of extreme right-wing parties. In the aftermath of the Nazi regime, it became extremely controversial to frame national identity in regard to homogeneity or hierarchies in Germany. Any political attempt to consider migrants and foreigners with racist and xenophobic views, has been harshly criticized by the German public and the public elite (Green, 2013). Therefore, there is a deeper stigma attached to right-wing

⁵ <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-afd-islam-idUSKCN0XS16P>

extremism in Germany than in any other European country in not only legal, but also in social terms (Decker, 2008). A good example of this political culture would be the German Court's attempt to prohibit the NPD. In 2002, the German Federal Agency for Civic Education criticized the NPD's work and constitution, because of the political discourse they raise related with racism and nationalism. Moreover, the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz) classified the NPD as a threat to the Constitutional order. The Federal Office tried to prohibit NPD's work, but was unsuccessful after the Office for the Protection of the Constitution refused to reveal the names of the government-paid informants who had infiltrated the NPD. This event proved to be an embarrassment for the center-left Social Democrat government of Gerhard Schröder, which had initiated the ban.⁶ However, this event was significantly symbolic of German political culture, since it contains the connotation that those political actions which seem extremely racist can be socially condemned and officially banned.

Secondly, the political structure of Germany includes a barrier for new challenger parties. The German Parliamentary system has a proportional representation system that requires parties to have at least 5 % of the popular vote to get seats in the Parliament. Getting seats for the Parliament is critical for a new party because it gives the media coverage that is important for sustaining their electoral success and to get public funding, but the 5% threshold is quite difficult to achieve for newly-made

⁶ <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/world/europe/german-government-panel-seeks-to-ban-far-right-party.html>

parties and restricts their development (Decker, 2008). However, some scholars have counter-argued that this fact is still questionable. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Green party emerged as a strong party due to the existing cultural conflicts in Germany, and succeeding in overcoming the 5 % threshold and establishing itself as a mainstream party. But, despite the fact that some parties have managed to pass the 5% threshold, they have often failed to institutionalize themselves within the German states (Bornschier, 2011). Therefore, the most important factor that makes politicians and political parties to avoid using the racist and nativist discourse is the political culture that reflects on past history related with World War II and the Nazi regime.




Figure 5. Federal Election Popular Vote in Germany (2002-2013)

According to **Figure 5**, in Germany, compared to Austria, extreme right-wing parties have not received a significant amount of popular vote since 2002. On the other

hand, traditional parties such as CDU/CSU and SPD have shown different aspects. When the SPD (center-left) seized political power, its popularity decreased and it has continually gained fewer votes than the CDU/CSU (center-right). Since 2005, the leader of the CDU Angela Merkel has been the chancellor of Germany. Because of her popularity and the CDU's strong support, the party has maintained its popularity.




Figure 6. Supporting Party and Xenophobia Scale in Germanyⁱⁱⁱ

Figure 6 demonstrates the Xenophobia Scale of the German citizens who support different parties. In Germany, every party's Xenophobia Scale decreased from 2002 to 2014. It has been already mentioned that the people who support conservative parties such as CDU/CSU show relatively less positive attitudes toward foreigners and migrants. However, in 2014, the CDU/CSU's scale is already over 5, which is more positive to foreigners and migrants than negative. One of the reasons to explain this phenomenon is the leading party CDU/CSU and Merkel's leadership. Even though the

party's political position is in the center-right, the party officially supports immigration and inveighs against xenophobia so that the overall attitude toward migrants could become better even for the supporters of conservative parties which are usually more against immigration^{iv}.

On the other hand, extreme right-wing parties explicitly argue for anti-immigration and anti-Muslim policies. Compared to other respondents, the supporters of AfD's Xenophobia Scale is really small, reaching only 3.92. So we can say that the supporters of AfD are much more xenophobic than the supporters of other parties. Moreover, we can explicitly see that the NPD's supporters show rather extreme attitudes toward migrants and foreigners, with a mean of only 1.05. But since all the major parties' supporters show less xenophobic attitudes towards foreigners and migrants and right-wing parties gained only marginal support between 2002 and 2014, it can be inferred that the political culture which attempts to restrict racism and nationalism within political rhetoric contributed to less xenophobic attitudes in Germany.

1-2 Political regimes in charge between 2002 and 2014

1-2-1 Austria

In 2000, a center-right government coalition of Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) with the Freedom Party (FPÖ), whose main proposal is to cut off the number of immigrants to Austria, seized political power. This coalition undertook several revisions of immigration and asylum legislation, which were mostly unfavorable to the migrants.

Permoser argues that civic integration policies and immigration laws have played a major role with their symbolic power, which was the exact case of Austria (Permoser, 2012). The integration conditions which the ÖVP- FPÖ coalition tried to adopt at first were a revised version of the FPÖ's suggestions which reflected on the anti-immigrant sentiments of the public. Particularly in the early 2000s, integration was seen as failing mainly because of migrants' unwillingness to integrate. Therefore, the government tried to reinforce the image that Austrian government was tough on migration and restrictive on the migrants' rights.

First of all, in 2002, the migration policy of accepting low-skilled workers was abolished and the 'key personnel' quota was adopted, which focuses on attracting the high-skilled workers. Secondly, the seasonal worker system was revised by allowing seasonal workers in various sectors and extending the employment period to maximum one year. Thirdly, an integration process became mandatory for all immigrants who are third countries nationals (TCN). It obligates them to sign an 'integration agreement' and attend German language classes. Lastly, a residence

certificate was initiated. This certificate allows migrants to work in any field they want, but they can obtain it only after having resided in Austria for more than five years.

Regarding the asylum seekers, since the late 1990s, Austria became a main receiving country because of geographical reasons, as it is situated at the borderline of the Schengen Area. In response, the government focused more on restricting access to the territory and the asylum seeking process. In 2003, asylum policies were reformed once more by limiting the rights of the asylum-seekers during their asylum seeking process.

Immigration legislation was completely revised in 2005 by including residence regulations, asylum and police enforcement measures. It had to be revised to comply with the EU legislation, but other provisions were also changed. Particularly, integration agreements were enhanced by extending the scope of migrants' integration conditions. Moreover, the application for residence permits of spouses of Austrian or EU citizens became much more difficult in order to sort out 'fake marriages.' Also, the government's power was increased in regard to investigating suspected cases of fake marriages. In the end, all these procedural changes in 2005 gave more power to the government to control current and would-be migrants and asylum seekers.

1-2-2 Germany

In the 1998 election, the center-right conservative party CDU/CSU-FDP was defeated and a new SPD-Green coalition seized political power. As the Greens had the most liberal opinion on migration, the new coalition tried to enact a new immigration law in

Germany (Green, 2013). When the SPD-Green coalition (sometimes called as Red-Green government) seized power, many politicians, including the new Chancellor Gerhard Schröder from SPD, who had not experienced the Second World War, were appointed to official positions in politics which led to the different views on foreigners and migrants.

The important turning point of the concept of being “German” happened in 2000, when new laws on nationality came into force. The traditional German concept of recognizing nationality changed from having German ancestors (*jus sanguinis*) to a mixture of having German parents and being born (*jus soli*) on German territory. Moreover, it became important that either parent has a permanent residence permit and that the person has resided in Germany for at least eight years. However, dual citizenship is still not allowed, but a proposal to allow dual citizenship instead of choosing one before 23 has now also been implemented. This law played a major role in changing the traditional concept of being ‘German.’ Since children who were born in Germany can have German citizenship with a certain level of requirements, having German ancestors was no longer the only ground for becoming a German (Adam, 2015). The enactment of this law changed the traditional perception of “Germany is not a country of immigration.”

The Red-Green government was re-elected in 2002, but since CDU controlled the second chamber, the government needed the cooperation of the opposition CDU. In 2005, they finally agreed on a new immigration law. This was the first time ever that Germany acknowledged to be a “Country of Immigration”. The most important change

was that they made it easy for the “skilled migrants” to enter the country, while closing the door to the unskilled workers. This law also stipulates that immigrants themselves finance obligatory integration courses, which focus on language acquisition and German civic order.

In November 2005, CDU and SPD formed a great coalition government, which emphasized the negative aspects rather than the positive aspects of immigration. The new administration focused on restricting unwanted migration and demanded more integration from migrants.

But under the Merkel’s leadership, the CDU also began to change its position on migration. Since 2005 when she became Chancellor of Germany, Merkel has continually pursued liberal immigration and integration policies in Germany (Mushaben, 2011). Although her political background is from the center-right party CDU, she did not abandon the former Red-Green coalition's pro-immigrant policies. Only CDU/CSU hardliners clung to the myth that ‘Germany is not a land of immigration,’ but ever since Merkel became a Chancellor of Germany, Merkel’s Grand Coalition made them abandon this misconception, support migrants and pursue a multicultural society.

Lastly, the EU played a critical role in changing Germany's policy framework. Ever since the Treaty of Amsterdam was endorsed, which made immigration into the EU's First Pillar of policymaking in 1999, the EU called on not only Germany, but also other countries to comply with this policy framework (Green, 2013). Unlike Austria, Germany is the biggest member state of the EU and has a responsibility to lead in

accordance with the EU constitution. Therefore Germany performed as a significant player in building foundation stones to the EU framework for immigration policies (Mushaben, 2011).

Moreover, political elites and the government tried to convince the public that they are obliged to respect human rights as well as the needs of accepting migrants for economic reasons. In 2013, President Joachim Gauck pronounced that Germany needs to open doors and encourage a new welcoming culture for the prosecuted not only because of the history and the constitution, but also for economic reasons (Adam, 2015). Additionally, for demographical reasons, the German government tried to convince its people that there is a strong need for population if they are to continue to enjoy economic success.

2. Economic Perspective

2-1 Economic threat and the Populist party

Many scholars of the group threat theory argue that economic stagnation can be an important factor for growing anti-immigrant sentiment in a country. Actually, there is no clear and absolute evidence of connection between economic performance and the amount of immigrants in the society. Rather, there are studies that show the totally opposite results. According to Borjas, immigration is associated with the decline in the growth rate of the native workforce, resulting in lowering the average wage of the natives (Borjas, 2005). On the other hand, Card argues that increasing labor supply is related with a positive effect on average wages of natives. More than that, he argues that arrival of the immigrants brings about an increase in government revenues and boosts the local economy (Card, 2007).

However, the natives' perception on the immigrants and their economic situation is a different story. Cochrane and Nevitte argue that the interaction between economic miseries and the far-right parties' rhetoric against migrants drives strong anti-immigrant sentiment (Cochrane & Nevitte, 2014). By using the word "Scapegoating", their findings show that the presence of a far-right party is the catalyst for connecting economic stagnation, such as high unemployment rate, and anti-immigrant sentiment. In other words, immigrants are perceived as economic threats, not just because they are 'stealing' money and jobs from the natives, but because of

they are articulated as an economic threat especially by extreme right-wing parties (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011).




Figure 7. GDP per Capita(PPP, \$) 『World Bank』




Figure 8. GINI Index in Germany and Austria 『World Bank』^v

According to the **Figure 7** Austria's GDP per capita has always been higher than Germany's, reaching more than \$40,000 in 2008, which means that the average

Austrian standard of living is better than that of the average German. However, **Figure 8** proves a different fact. **Figure 8** shows the GINI index, which represents the income or wealth distribution of a nation's residents. As we can see from the graph, the German GINI index number was higher than the Austrian GINI index in the 2000s, but it consistently decreased whereas, in Austria, it increased in recent years and even in 2011, it surpassed the German GINI index.

Therefore, if we only see **Figure 7**, the average income and economy seem better off in Austria than in Germany. However, the distribution of the wealth is becoming unequal in Austria and although Germany's GDP per capita is slightly smaller than Austria's, its economic inequality is steadily getting better. It can be inferred that the real life that normal people experience in their daily lives have worsened in Austria compared to in Germany.




Figure 9. Unemployment rate from 2002 to 2014 (Eurostat, 2016)^{vi}

According to **Figure 9**, changes in the unemployment rate in Germany and Austria from 2002 to 2014 show totally opposite situations. In Austria, the unemployment rate has always been much lower than the EU 19 average in the past 12 years. However, Austria's unemployment rate slightly fluctuated in 12 years and since 2008, it has shown a tendency of increasing. Although it has sustained its low unemployment rate from 2002 to 2014, the economy didn't grow rapidly and remained at the status quo or slightly worse, which made ordinary people unsatisfied with the current situation.

Since this situation has existed for the past several years, Austria's far-right parties adopted the strong rhetoric that the influx of immigrants was to blame for the high unemployment rate. Many young people have lost hope with the high unemployment rate and economic recession. By using nationalist and patriotic rhetoric, the party claims that they can bring a bright future without the threats of unemployment, globalization and migration⁷. FPÖ harshly criticized the globalization of neoliberal capitalism and European economic integration. At the same time, they took a populist stance by deploying a massive propaganda campaign against migrants and asylum seekers, spreading rumors that migrants are Islamist, criminals and stealing Austrian jobs⁸.

Germany, on the other hand, has experienced a completely different situation from 2002 to 2014. In 2002, its unemployment rate was 8.6%, which was almost twice

⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/20/young-austrians-on-presidential-runoff-freedom-party>

⁸ <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/12/austria-freedom-party-strache-fpo-nazi-right-wing/>

as high as Austria's. It increased until 2005 to 11.2 % but since 2006, it has continually decreased and in 2013, its number even became smaller than that of Austria's.

According to Cochrane and Nevitte's article, the connection between the unemployment rate and the rising xenophobia means that it is more likely for citizens to turn against immigrants in periods of high unemployment than it is in periods of low unemployment (Cochrane & Nevitte, 2014).⁹ However, in the period of high unemployment during 2002 and 2005, there was not a major extreme right-wing party in Germany which actively blamed immigrants for the economic miseries. Also, many of the works that are considered as 3D jobs (Dirty, Dangerous and Difficult) are replaced by the low skilled migrant workers in Germany, since Germany is becoming an aging society rapidly and more and more people are not willing to do the jobs that can be replaced by the low-skilled migrants.

2-2 Individual and Group Threat

According to group threat theory, anti-immigrant sentiment comes mainly from the macroeconomic level rather than from the individual level. That is to say, narrow self-interest has less bearing on the anti-immigrant sentiment than the macro level.

⁹ This does not mean that a low unemployment rate necessarily leads to more positive attitudes toward migrants.




Figure 10. Job Type and Xenophobia Scale^{vii}

As mentioned in the theoretical background, the wage difference between different groups is known to be one of the most important issues that affect the xenophobic attitudes, since the cheaper wage of migrants distorts the market price which kicks many natives out of the job markets. In Austrian and German case, it seems clear that both in 2002 and 2014, manual workers, who seemed to be more threatened by low-skilled immigrant workers, had more negative attitudes toward foreigners. According to the cross-national study of Hjerm and Nagayoshi, the economic composition of the immigrant population is of quite substantial importance for the manual working class (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011). According to the OECD economic survey 2009 (OECD, 2009), the employment rate of unskilled workers in Austria is about 55%, which is much lower than in most other high-income OECD countries. Therefore, manual workers with relatively low skill can be more threatened by the inflow of migrants than manual workers in Germany.

However, what we have to notice here is that in 2014, Austrian non-manual workers' xenophobia scale also decreased (4.94 to 4.49), even though their jobs are not easily taken by the migrant workers. Furthermore, German manual workers came to have more positive attitudes toward migrants and foreigners in 2014 compared to 2002 (3.99 to 4.67). According to the ESS data, the percentage of manual workers from the respondents in both countries didn't change that much in 2014 compared to 2002, and even the proportion of non-manual workers is higher in Austria than in Germany, both in 2002 and 2014. Therefore, we can see here that the individual micro level conditions affect the xenophobia attitude, but cannot be the predominant factor that influenced the change of Xenophobia Scale in Austria and Germany from 2002 to 2014.




Figure 11. Satisfaction with present state of economy in country^{viii}

Instead, it seems that the macro level of threat that comes from the increase of migrants and foreigners affects a country's Xenophobic Scale much more. In **Figure 11**, we can see that people are much more sensitive toward the macro level economic

conditions of the country. During 2002 and 2014, the overall perception of the economic situation of the states in both countries has significantly changed. In European Social Survey data, the question "How satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in your country?" was asked both in 2002 and 2014. This question is focusing on the macro-level of the economy, rather than individual situations. In 2002, the mean of the satisfaction scale in Germany was 2.89 out of 10, whereas in Austria, it was 5.27, almost 2.4 points more than in Germany.

However, the result is entirely opposite in 2014. In 2014, the satisfaction more than doubled in Germany, but in Austria, it fell by 0.34 points. That is to say, German respondents had very negative views on their economy in 2002, but it became much more positive during the 12-year term. In 2014, Germans were quite satisfied with the country's economic situation. However, in Austria, the satisfaction rather decreased, though the change is not very significant. In conclusion, we can see that Austrians are coming to have much more negative view on the present state of the economy while Germans came much more positive toward the present economy in Germany.

According to the Eurobarometer, a survey held in May 2014, unemployment was the most important issue that Austrians think that they are facing, getting more than 32% of the vote from the respondents. On the other hand, in Germany, unemployment and the economic situation were far from being the main issues in Germany, getting only 16% vote overall. Instead, Germans thought that government debt and immigration were the most important issues. Accordingly, we can say that Austrians are much more concerned with their economic situation, especially with

unemployment, in 2014.

Therefore, as it is explained by the group threat theory, xenophobic attitudes are not necessarily related to individual's interests, but more with the dominant group's privileges and the leading parties' political rhetoric on connecting the economic situation of the state and the presence of migrants within the state. On the individual level, people feel anti-immigrant sentiment more on the group level, fearing that the out-group will overturn the majority group's privileges.

In conclusion, during the 12-year period from 2002 to 2014, even though Austria and Germany are ranked as well-developed countries not only in the EU but around the world, economic growth in these two countries was particularly different. Germany successfully decreased its unemployment rate and economic inequality in 12 years. On the other hand, Austria continued its high GDP per capita, but the unemployment rate is generally on rise and economic inequality has worsened. Also, the political regimes that link the connection between the economic recession and the presence of migrants in the state have heavily affected the people's perception on migrants. Therefore, Austrians' xenophobic attitude drove the thinking that immigrants are taking their jobs away, living on the dole, and are overall bad for the Austrian economy.

3. Cultural Perspective

3-1 National Identity

In cultural perspective of xenophobia, national identity is a very important topic since people have a natural instinct to protect their national identity and cultural symbols from other cultures. Hence, anti-immigrant sentiment increases when the majority group members feel that their national identity is not being protected.




Figure 12. Do you see yourself as..?(Eurobarometer)

According to the Eurobarometer data in **Figure 12**, Austria and Germany have a somewhat different level of national identity. Germans feel more attached to being European rather than being only German but in Austria, many people still regard themselves as “Austrian” before identifying themselves as a European.




Figure 23. Attachment to the Country in Austria and Germany (Eurobarometer)

Figure 13 shows the people's attachment to their country. Austrians have very strong attachment to their country. More than 60% of the respondents have shown their strong attachment to the country both in 2002 and 2014. On the other hand, Germans show much less attachment to their country than Austrians both in 2002 and in 2014. However, compared to 2002, Germans' attachment to their country increased almost 10 % in 2014.

In the Austrian case, Austria has been and still is, a typical tourist country, which is famous for its nature and cultural events such as festivals, sports and folkloric festivities (Heinisch, 2008a), which they should protect and inherit. In a deeper sense, Heinisch argues that the Austrian national identity has been and still is "ambiguous." Because of the late construction of the modern nation, Austrian elites tried to focus on its long imperial legacy and to separate its identity from that of Germany. This uncertainty of what defines Austrians has created a chance for populist parties to exploit these feelings, by emphasizing the threat of "over-foreignization" which can be

harmful to the growth of national identity. Along with the rise of extreme right-wing parties in Austria, FPÖ from the late 1990s increasingly focused on “Genuine Austrians”. They were opposed to the idea of a German identity and denied the existence of such a German identity in Austria. Rather, they proclaim themselves as “Real Austrians” arguing for the true identity of Austria.

On the other hand, in the German case, it seems entirely different. Germans are not known to be very patriotic and nationalistic compared to other European countries. Its population paid a lot of attention to not becoming nationalistic or patriotic, because of its disastrous political history. It is still a taboo in German to publically display national pride, especially related with a love and affinity for Germany¹⁰. In a 2002 survey from Eurobarometer, 49% of the interviewees responded that they were very proud of being an Austrian, while only 23% of German responded as being very proud to be a German. This avoidance of expressing national pride gives what is sometimes termed as a “negative identity” to Germans¹¹, people feeling ashamed of their past history.

This attitude somewhat changed with the 2006 World Cup, when Germans started to fly their national flag in public, which had been a taboo in German society. People came to realize that they do not have to be excessively obsessed with the past and can become proud again. Also, we have since seen the rise of the extreme right-

¹⁰ <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany-s-patriotism-problem-just-don-t-fly-the-flag-a-411948.html>

¹¹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/world/europe/how-a-sleepy-german-suburb-explains-europes-rising-far-right-movements.html>

wing political party Alternative for Germany (AfD) which claims grievances of cultural identity, arguing that the state and civil society must defend German cultural identity as the guiding culture. However, Germans are still hesitating to embrace the fact that they can show their nationalism openly in public. Therefore, AfD's popularity has fallen since it first emerged.

Social identity theory explains that identities are extremely important, so that sometimes people try to protect these identities even if they don't get any interest out of it. In Austria, people are trying to protect their national identity, regardless of the economic consequences. However, Germans do not think their national identity should be strictly protected, since they regard it as a taboo in relation to the possible recurrence of their past mistakes.

3-2 Following the leading culture

The attitude toward accepting other cultures is somewhat different from the results on national identity.




Figure 34. Better for a country if almost everyone shares customs and traditions (ESS)

According to **Figure 14**, Germans' preference for having shared customs and traditions increased in the last 12 years. On the other hand, Austrians' preference remained almost similar in the same period.




Figure 45. Qualification for Immigration; committed to way of life in country (ESS)

Also, in **Figure 15**, both Austria and Germany consider the "commitment to the way of life in a country" as a relatively important qualification for immigration. What's noticeable is that the Germans think it is more important than Austrians, both in 2002 and 2014. Both questions which were asked in **Figure 14** and **Figure 15** can be interpreted as "Migrants' willingness to assimilate into the native culture." Compared to Austria, Germany prefers more to accept migrants and foreigners who are willing to embrace and assimilate into German culture.

Here, it can be inferred that the majority of Germans are sensitive to racism and extreme right-wing parties, but they are skeptical of changing the native German culture by accepting more migrants. Therefore, in Germany, with the name of *Leitkultur* (which translates to "leading" or "guiding" culture), Germans are trying to make the migrants and foreigners follow the German way of life rather than accepting the migrants' culture as components of German society. This *Leitkultur* can be

composed of concrete values such as human rights, tolerance, and the separation of church and state¹². They seem to accept the other culture and religion, but still people's perception is that all those foreign cultures should be within the scope of the "Leitkultur" which will harmfully affect the native culture of Germany. It seems that Germany has not yet found it easy to accept its expanding ethnic and cultural diversity (Green, 2013).

¹² <http://www.dw.com/en/what-is-german-leitkultur/a-38684973>

IV. Conclusion

Situated on the European continent, Austria and Germany share many characteristics such as similar economic situations, religious culture, and language. However, during the 12-year term, from 2002 to 2014, the two countries experienced totally different situations. Austrians became more negative toward migrants and foreigners, whereas Germans become more positive toward foreigners.

To explain these differences, three perspectives were discussed. First of all, according to the political perspective, political culture played a significant role in both countries. Germans are very sensitive to the use of racist and xenophobic terms in politics because of its past Nazi history and using those terms in the political rhetoric has been taboo in public since the end of the Second World War. On the other hand, Austrian elites tried to separate themselves from German history and rather thought of themselves as victims of the war. Therefore, extreme right-wing parties' activities were not restricted, but rather supported in Austria.

Secondly, the economic perspective was mentioned. Although Austria's GDP per capita was always higher than Germany's, economic inequality and the unemployment rate have been getting worse in Austria, whereas both became constantly better off in Germany. Therefore, the overall satisfaction with the whole economy in each country seems to relate with the xenophobic changes in both countries. These economic changes, however, were closely tied with the political parties' agenda and discourses. Extreme right-wing parties usually target the migrants

for the economic stagnation and low employment rate by intriguing public dissatisfaction against the inflow of migrants. Therefore, rather than at the individual level of satisfaction with the economy and job market situations, it seems people are more affected by the macro level of economy and the flow of migrants, which can be explained with the group threat theory.

Lastly, cultural perspectives were considered. Overall, Austrians have a stricter view on the qualifications of migration than Germans, both in 2002 and 2014. Since they have a stronger attachment to their land and national identity, it seems Austrians are more willing to protect their culture. On the other hand, although it seems Germans are more open, being more lax to the inflow of migrants and the practice of their culture, they expect migrants to be assimilated and conform to German culture.

In conclusion, these three perspectives are closely related to the increase and decrease of xenophobia in both countries. The most important factor in the difference between Austria and Germany is the political changes of both countries. Political changes and the government heavily influenced the political rhetoric, which then also affected economic perceptions and cultural identity perceptions.

독일과 오스트리아 비교 연구

2002년부터 2014년까지 제노포비아 변화

국문 초록

제노포비아는 역사적으로 어느 곳에서나, 어디에서나 존재해왔다. 그러나 최근 난민 위기, 테러, 유럽과 미국의 극우 정당 득세와 같은 전지구적 변화들로 인해서 제노포비아 현상은 전세계적으로 더 중요한 이슈가 되고 있다. 많은 이주민들이 오고 가는 유럽 국가 중에서, 오스트리아와 독일의 제노포비아 경향은 최근 이례적으로 많은 변화를 겪어왔다. 2002년부터 2014년까지 오스트리아의 제노포비아는 급상승한 반면, 독일에서는 급 하락하였다.

본 연구는 이 두 국가의 최근 12년 간의 상반된 변화를 설명하기 위해 정치, 경제 그리고 문화의 세가지 측면에서 그 원인을 분석하였다. 정치적인 측면에서 오스트리아에서는 극우정당의 인기가 급격하게 증가하지만 독일에서는 국가주의를 정치적 도구로 사용하는 것을 금기시하는 정치적 문화로 인해 극우정당이 큰 인기를 누리지 못했다. 경제적 측면에서는 오스트리아의 상대적인 경제적 쇠퇴와, 그 원인을 이주민의 증가로 돌리는 정치적 프레임화가 제노포비아를 악화시킨 것으로 분석되었다. 마지막으로 문화적인 면에서 오스트리아는 독일에 비해 상대적으로 강력한 국가 정체성을 형성하고 있으며, 이것이 제노포비아의 변화에 큰 영향을 미쳤다. 그러나 독일도 여전히 이주민을 사회에 통합하려는 시도보다는 그들을 동화시키는 것을 선호하는 경향을 보이는 한계를 지닌다.

주요어: 오스트리아, 독일, 비교 연구, 제노포비아, 유럽 이주, 2002-2014

학번: 2015-25166

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
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Appendix

1. Xenophobia Scale in 2002 and 2014 – 17 countries in European Social Survey



2. ESS data information of Austria and Germany


	Austria		Germany	
	2002	2014	2002	2014
Number of respondents	1,507	1,410	2,396	2,682
Cronbach's Alpha of Xenophobia Scale	0.866	0.888	0.837	0.853

3. Germany and Austria's Political Parties

Country	Left Wing	Right-Wing	Extreme Right-Wing
Germany	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (GRÜNE) Die Linke (LINKE)	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CDU/CSU) Liberal-Konservative Reformer (LKR) Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)	Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) National-demokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) Deutsche Volksunion (DVU)
Austria	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (GRÜNE)	Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP)	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ)


4. Xenophobia Mean of Economic Threat Questions

[Austria]




[

[Germany]




5. Xenophobia Mean of Cultural Threat Questions

[Austria]



[Germany]



ⁱ In European Social Survey, 22 countries participated and in 2002 survey and 21 countries participated in the survey in 2014 data. Among 19 countries that participated both, 18 countries except for Israel are used, since Israel is not situated in European Continent

ⁱⁱ Supporters of the party were calculated with the question "Which party do you feel closer to?" However, more than half of the respondents replied with either "Inapplicable," "Don't know" or "Refusal." Therefore, missing data from this question was not deleted, since it can distort the original opinion. In Austrian data, supporters of BZÖ are not included, as the number of respondents is too small (both only three respondents) to represent the whole population.

ⁱⁱⁱ AfD and NPD are measured only in 2014 because AfD was founded in 2013 and NPD's popular vote was not significant at all in 2002 so that it was not included in the social survey data question.

^{iv} The party's stance on migrants and refugees has somewhat changed since so-called "Refugee Crisis" in Germany but this thesis focuses on the period between 2002-2014

^v World Bank only offers GINI data of Germany from 2006 to 2011 and Austria from 2004 to 2012.

^{vi} EU 19 includes the countries using Euro as their official currency. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain are these 19 countries.

^{vii} Job types were sorted out by the question "Occupational Status" in ESS data, and the way to sorting out the job types are followed by the Eurostat web page. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nomenclatures/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_NOM_D_TL&StrNom=CL_ISCO88C&StrLanguageCode=EN&IntPcKey=&StrLayoutCode=HIERARCHIC

Skilled manual workers are not included in the manual workers since the skilled manual works are not easily substituted by the migrants.

^{viii} This question was asked in 0-10 level scale. 0 means that they are not satisfied with the economy at all and 10 means that they are totally satisfied with the economy of the state. Therefore, the larger the number becomes, the more positive the residents think of the economy of the state. Skilled manual workers are not included in the manual workers since the skilled manual works are not easily substituted by the migrants.