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**Degree of Master of International Studies
(International Area Studies)**

**(Re-)Asserting Indonesia's Role to (Resume)
the Six-Party Talks:
Creating the Region Conducive**

August, 2017

Development Cooperation Policy Program
Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University

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(Re-)Asserting Indonesia's Role to (Resume)

the Six-Party Talks:

Creating the Region Conducive

A thesis presented

by

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Abstract

(Re-)Asserting Indonesia's Role to (Resume) the Six-Party Talks:

Creating the Region Conducive

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The Six-Party Talks has yet to resume since 2008. Each and every party was yet to share the view to reconcile the divergence. Differences in stakes and interests deem to be the main impediment in crafting the peaceful resolution on the Peninsula. Impartiality is therefore a key to approach the Six-Party Talks, in particular, and the Korean Peninsula, at large. It has been missing on the deliberation. The emerging role of the Middle Power offers a promising alternative to help resuscitate the stalemate. With its impartiality, Middle Power could assert its Third-Party and mediating role on the Talks. Through Hopmann's four-pronged approach, Indonesia, as among the prominent middle power, may give a new hope to the Peninsula constellation.

Keywords: Six-Party Talks, Korean Peninsula, Impartiality, Middle Power, Stalemate, Third-Party, Mediating Role, Hopmann's Four-Pronged Approach

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Table of Content

Abstract	i
CHAPTER I.....	1
GENERAL OVERVIEW	1
I. The Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula.....	1
II. Repeated Attempts to Establish Security Dialogues on the Peninsula.....	4
III. Impartial Rapprochement to Foster the Six-Party Talks.....	7
IV. Research Questions.....	9
V. Methodology	10
CHAPTER II	12
LITERATURE REVIEW	12
I. Six-Party Talks and Its Challenges	12
A. <i>Institutions Approach</i>	13
B. <i>Actors Approach</i>	15
II. Alternative Rapprochement to Resume the Talks.....	21
A. <i>Middle Power</i>	22
B. <i>Middle Power Diplomacy</i>	24
C. <i>Emerging Middle Power Role in the Asia-Pacific</i>	26
D. <i>Middle Power's Role on the Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula</i>	31
CHAPTER III.....	36
INDONESIA'S "NON-ALIGNMENT" AND "ACTIVISM"	36
I. Indonesia and Its Non-Alignment and Activism	36
III. Evolving Nature of Indonesia's Foreign Policy	39
III. Promising Modalities for Middle Powermanship	40
IV. Indonesia's Mediating Role Experiences	42
V. Indonesia and the Korean Peninsula Dynamics	46
CHAPTER IV	50
ANALYSIS: ASSERTING INDONESIA'S ROLE TO RESUME THE SIX-PARTY TALKS	50
I. From Asymmetry to Go-Between.....	50
II. Four-Pronged Approach to Help Resuscitate the Stalemate.....	51
A. <i>Process Facilitator</i>	53
B. <i>Facilitator of the Communication, Compromise and Convergence</i>	56
C. <i>Facilitator of Cognitive Change</i>	58

D. <i>Formulator</i>	59
CHAPTER V	61
CONCLUSION	61
REFERENCE	63
요약 (국문초록).....	69
학번: 2015-25101.....	69
LETTER OF APPRECIATION.....	70

CHAPTER I

GENERAL OVERVIEW

I. The Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula

The Korean War that took place back in 1950-1953 has yet ended. The 1953 Armistice Agreement between the Republic of Korea (ROK), which was represented by the United Nations Command (UNC)¹, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) entails potential conflicts in the region. The political collapse in Pyongyang, not to mention the North Korean nuclear weapon advancement, compounds the Peninsula's security problem. This, indeed, has put the Peninsula, in particular, and the global theater, at large, at stake.

Korea had been an object of regional power competition for quite some time (Conroy, 1960). During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Korea became the object of competing imperial interests as the Chinese empire declined and Western powers began to vie for ascendancy in East Asia.² Britain, France, and the United States each attempted to “open up”

¹ President Syngman Rhee, the first president of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea and the first president of the Republic of Korea, and his government had handed over the operational control of the South Korean armed forces to the UN commander, where the South Korean forces were under the UN Command during the Korean War (known as the Taejön Agreement or Taejön Declaration) (Taegyo, 2008).

² Retrieved from “Korean History and Political Geography”, <http://asiassociety.org/education/korean-history-and-political-geography> (visited on August 25th, 2016).

Korea to trade and diplomatic relations in the 1860s despite some resistances from the Korean kingdom.³

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Japan, China and Russia were competing for earning influence on Korea. After gaining victory in the first Sino-Japanese war and Russo-Japanese war in 1895 and 1905, respectively, Japan turned to be a predominant power on the Korean Peninsula until the Enola Gay dropped the "Little Boy" atomic bomb on Hiroshima and The Bockscar dropped the Fat Man atomic bomb on Nagasaki back in August 1945.

After the Japanese surrender in the World War II, the dark clouds started to gather over the Korean Peninsula. The division of the Peninsula into two separate states; the Republic of Korea (South of the 38th Parallel), "backed" by the US (and its allies), and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North of the Parallel), backed by the USSR and the People's Republic of China, had further complicated the regional configuration. The perpetual peace in the Peninsula is therefore far-fetched. These mammoths had put the Korea as a buffer zone between the Communist Bloc and the Capitalist Bloc during the Cold War period.

The inception of the nuclear program in the Peninsula had further escalated the tension. Back in the year 1960, the DPRK started developing its first nuclear program. Yongbyon Nuclear Complex, located in the county of Nyōngbyōn in North Pyong'an Province, about 90 km north of Pyongyang, was its first nuclear plant which was the outcome of the nuclear research agreement between the DPRK and the USSR back in the

³ Ibid.

early 1959. Experts believe that the reactor could make one bomb's worth of plutonium per year.⁴

There are a few doubts that from the earliest stages, North Korea's elite were interested in the military applications of their nuclear program. But it seems that the decisive turn occurred in the 1970s.⁵ At that time, South Korea was also developing its own nuclear weapons, which came quite close to success.⁶ Therefore, it ignited the North to boost their military nuclear program around 1975.

North Korean leaders essentially had two main goals in mind when promoting their nuclear program (Lankov, 2015).⁷ First and foremost, it serves military purposes. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, and, with a credible nuclear potential, North Korea is unlikely to be attacked by any foreign power.⁸ The Iraq and Libya cases were among the reinforcing factors of the DPRK leaders to develop their nuclear program. “Nuclear Diplomacy” would serve the second rationale behind the nuclear weapon development program of the DPRK. Lankov argued that the nuclear weapon is “an efficient tool for diplomatic blackmail”.

Quite recently, the DPRK conducted its fifth nuclear test which drew wide condemnation. Until today, the United Nations Security Council

⁴ Retrieved from “N Korea's Yongbyon plutonium site likely reactivated says IAEA”, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36466247> (visited on July 21, 2016)

⁵ Lankov, Andrei, “The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia”, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 181-182

⁶ Oberdorfer, Don, “The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History” (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 68-74.

⁷ Lankov, Andrei, “The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia”, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 183

⁸ Ibid.

(UNSC) had adopted five major resolutions since 2006. They “impose and strengthen sanctions on North Korea for continuing to develop its nuclear weapons program and call on Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear program ‘in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner (CVID)’ and refrain from ballistic missile tests.”⁹ These international political and economic sanctions have put the North Korean regime in deeper isolation as well as the people in rampant starvation. However, the sanctions are yet to be efficacious in urging the regime to give up their nuclear weapons.

II. Repeated Attempts to Establish Security Dialogues on the Peninsula

The DPRK nuclear development program has, indeed, drawn wide-ranging attention. A number of platforms, including bilateral, regional as well as multilateral, have been established to address the issue. Beginning in the first North Korean nuclear crisis, (direct) bilateral channel between the US and the DPRK was opted for as a vehicle to address the nuclear issue. This in turn led to the inception of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework on which the DPRK agreed to dismantle the nuclear program. It was, however, disrupted after Pyongyang-Washington confrontations on Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) over suspected North Korean violations of the framework agreement.

Multilateralism was later put forward after the first Korean Nuclear Crisis. Choo opined that it was buttressed by the political shift in the

⁹ Retrieved from “The UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea”, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea> (visited on August 25, 2016)

Chinese side.¹⁰ The destructive nature of the crisis which could pose significant threat to the Chinese growth and development pushed Beijing to engage Third Party in addressing the issue (Carlin and Lewis, 2008). Prior to that, Beijing seemed reluctant to bring the North Korean issue to the regional as well as multilateral platform. They define the crisis as “must be handled by the immediately concerned parties (*dangshizhe yuanzi*)”¹¹.

On April 1996, Presidents Clinton of the USA and Kim Young-sam of ROK proposed the creation of the Four-Party Talks with the PRC and the DPRK. This platform explored ways to replace the Korean Armistice with a permanent deal without “deadlines or preconditions”.¹² However, the Four-Party Talks could not sustain for the two camps proposed opposite agendas for the talks. Washington and Seoul put forward the need to discuss and implement confidence building and tensions reducing measures while Pyongyang proposed such painstaking issues as “the US withdrawal from South Korea as well as a US-DPRK peace treaty”¹³.

A few years later, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) was launched as a means of institutionalizing the process of consultation and policy coordination on North Korean Affairs. Apart from a reflection of the US’s “hub and spokes” arrangement, the TCOG, which

¹⁰ Choo, Jaewoo, “Is Institutionalization of the Six-Party Talk Possible?”, (Springer Netherlands: 2005), East Asia December 2005, Volume 22, Issue 4

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Retrieved from “North Korea Agrees to Join 4-Party Talks”, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/01/world/north-korea-agrees-to-join-4-party-talks.html> (visited on August 27, 2016).

¹³ Lee, Inbae, “A Study on Multilateral Approaches to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Maze”, Chung-Ang University.

was a triangular relationship between the US, South Korea and Japan, was critical in expressly “devising a comprehensive and integrated approach to North Korea”.¹⁴ The greatest utility of the TCOG was its role of reinforcing solidarity among the three countries and simultaneously consolidating policy approaches between the two-way relationships within the trilateral coordination framework.¹⁵

Another effort made was the establishment of the Five-Party Talks, which was originated from the so-called “P5 plus 5” (i.e. the United Nations Security Council Permanent Five plus the Republic of Korea, Japan, Australia, the European Union and the DPRK) meeting back in January 2003. The proposal was rejected by Pyongyang which continued to request direct DPRK-US bilateral talks through the US-DPRK “New York channel”¹⁶. The then Foreign Minister and Vice Prime Minister Qian Qichen of PRC later proposed “Three-Party Talks” during his visit to Pyongyang in 2003. The platform was then dissolved after Washington refused to have (direct) bilateral contacts with Pyongyang.

After series and rounds of failed attempts and negotiations, ‘Six-Party Talks for Solving the North Korean Nuclear Problem’ (in short, ‘Six-Party Talks’) was established in 2003. Having DPRK, Japan, PRC, Russian Federation, USA and ROK on board, the Six-Party Talks deemed to be a

¹⁴ Kang, Stephanie Nayoung, GSIS, 2013, “The Incomplete Journey of US-ROK-Japan Trilateral Cooperation: The Establishment and Dissolution of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG)”

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ The New York channel originally referred to business-like communications between the US Department of State’s Director of Korean Affairs and the DPRK’s Deputy Permanent Representative at its UN Mission in New York. This channel was later upgraded and involved the passage of government communications between the DPRK’s UN Ambassador and the US Special Envoy for Negotiations with the DPRK (Pritchard, 2005)

promising platform to address the DPRK nuclear program. The inclusion of relevant stakeholders as well as the DPRK, as the “Target State”, in the platform entails positive-sum solutions to the long-standing North Korean nuclear issue. However, after five-year negotiations, it reached a momentum where the stark divergences were yet to be reconciled.

III. Impartial Rapprochement to Foster the Six-Party Talks

The divergent perspectives and expectations have impeded the establishment of a comprehensive strategy and the formation of a permanent security regime on the Peninsula (MacQueen, 2008). Each and every party in the Talks pursues their own interests and agendas. It is further deteriorated with domestic policy constraints, differing priorities, and conflicting historical analogies among each of the countries which later have brought vastly differing perspectives to the multilateral negotiating table (Park, 2005).

Mutual distrust, insecurity, and hidden agendas often prevent countries from resolving disputes despite prolonged efforts and sacrifices. Thus, at a certain point, one must consider the possibility of involving additional parties in order to maneuver intractable conflicts beyond the parochialisms that have hindered development in the past.¹⁷ Therefore, it is, to some extent, rational should the DPRK asked the Norwegian government, as an alternative power, to take participation in the Six-Party

¹⁷ MacQueen, Simon. 2008. *Middle Powers and the Korean Peninsula: A New Security Paradigm*, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University.

Talks back in the year 2006, despite the disapproval of Norwegian government upon the request.¹⁸

This so-called Third Party involvement, which, to some extent, envisaged ‘neutral’ as well as ‘impartial’ view, has a long and deep root in the Korean Peninsula history. Dated back to the Korean War in the period of 1951-1953, the two Koreans, as appeared in the Korean Armistice Agreement, recognized Sweden and Switzerland (from the UN Command side) and Poland and Czhechoslovakia (from the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers) as the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.¹⁹ The Commission was established with the purpose to, among other things, “carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission”.²⁰

Despite having a deep-rooted history, impartiality deems to be the missing link on the resolution of the DPRK nuclear program thus far. Each and every party put forward their vested interests to the table. Against such a backdrop, it necessitates to find “impartial” party(ies) to unlock the (political) impasses of the Talks. ‘Middle Power’ countries are well positioned to act as informal mediators and facilitate a smooth

¹⁸ Retrieved from Reuters. 17 March 2006, “DPRK Asks Norway to Broker Nuclear Deal”

¹⁹ “Neutral nation is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea” (under Chapter C “Neutral Nations Supervisory Comission”, Sub-Chapter 1 Composition, Article 37 of the Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Vommand, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea).

²⁰ Article 41 of The Armistice Agreement.

transition between the DPRK and the international community of ‘friendly nations’.²¹

Middle Powers are often in a suitable position for promoting and maintaining mechanism for security. They enjoy robust relations with great powers whilst at the same time Middle Powers are very unlikely to confront smaller nations, either in military, economy or politics. In short, middle powers have a reputation for (relative) neutrality.

IV. Research Questions

Against such a backdrop, this thesis attempts to explore alternative approach to help restart the stalemate of the Six-Party Talks which is navigated through the following research questions:

1. *Why do Middle-Tier Countries (i.e. Indonesia) deem to be able to play a constructive role in resolving the Six-Party Talk stalemate which later could lead or develop as well as find mutually-beneficial resolutions of the DPRK nuclear program despite the Six-Party Talk member states’ unrelenting efforts in solving the matter thus far?*

2. *How could the Middle-Tier Countries (i.e. Indonesia) navigate the muddy-water of the Six-Party Talks without infringing the lowest-common denomination of each party concerned?*

²¹ MacQueen, Simon. 2008. *Middle Powers and the Korean Peninsula: A New Security Paradigm*, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University

V. Methodology

The paper holds on to a premise, which is discussed in the following chapter, that different agendas pursued by each and every member of the Six-Party Process (actor's approach) is the main impediment in attaining the collective goals to denuclearize the Peninsula. All the parties pursue their own interests which later led to the political deadlock. Impartiality is, therefore, a key in asserting alternative approach in garnering collective political will to restart the Talks.

The aforementioned impartiality could not be found in the members of the Talks. They pursue their own interests on the Talks. The emergence of Middle Power role in the regional as well as global architecture is seen as an alternative platform in addressing the loophole. Impartiality is among the major modalities that the Middle Power diplomacy proposes. Such element would be the key in fostering the Talks with the goals to create the region conducive, through denuclearization of the DPRK.

Indonesia deems to be the most potential candidate in exerting its role to help resume the Talks. “Non-alignment” and “activism” Foreign Policy serves among utmost modalities that put Indonesia in a relatively best leverage. This paper is therefore to explore Indonesia’s constructive role to help resuscitate the Six-Party Talks. In so doing, the paper is to make use of P. Terrence Hopmann’s roles of Third-Party in the international disputes, notably (i) process facilitator; (ii) facilitator of the

communication, compromise and convergence; (iii) facilitator of cognitive change; (iv) formulator; and (v) manipulator²².

The paper puts more weights on the first four roles of the Hopmann's concept. The fifth Manipulator role, as Hopmann argued, works best only for powerful as well as partisan mediators. It is clear to argue that Indonesia does not fall under strong power but Middle Power group. In addition, as among the most potential candidate of the Third-Party on the Six-Party Talks, Indonesia is relatively impartial in asserting its role. Therefore, the fifth role of Hopmann's Third-Party concept does not fit to be applied on the paper.

²² Hopmann, P. Terrence, "The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts", (Columbia: 1996), University of South Carolina

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

I. Six-Party Talks and Its Challenges

September 9th 2016 has reminded us that the world is facing a real threat. The DPRK conducted its fifth nuclear test which many experts believe as the strongest and most advanced one. Many predicted that the DPRK is to gain its capability in developing the cutting-edge nuclear weapon within a very foreseeable future.

Nuclear proliferation in the Peninsula has gained significant weight in posing substantial threat to the global peace and stability. Repeated attempts had been made to mitigate this very issue. Despite its stalemate due to verification protocol in December 2008, Six-Party Talks, as many experts argue, remain the most plausible channel in resolving the nuclear proliferation in the Peninsula peacefully.

The potential of the Talks in resolving the DPRK denuclearization has drawn wide-ranging attention. A rich body of literature, not to mention policy papers, has discussed the issue attentively. Tae-Hwan Kwak, the Chair-Professor at South Korean Kyungnam University, among many scholars and experts, goes with the argument that Six-Party Talks (SPT) is “the best means to resolve the North Korea’s nuclear issue”.²³ Not only involving relevant stakeholders, SPT also set a roadmap to the

²³ Kwak, Tae-Hwan, “The Six-Party Talks and North Korea’s Denuclearization: Evaluation and Prospects”, Pacific Focus, Vol. XXV, No. 2 (August 2010), 211–236, 2010 Center for International Studies, Inha University.

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as well as provided commitment-and-commitment-and-action-for-action steps towards implementing the roadmap in phased manner, which in turn spurred optimism among the parties concerned on the prospects of the North Korea denuclearization.

Similar notion was also emphasized by Scott Synder. He envisioned the 2005 Joint Statement as the *raison d'etre* of the (continuation) the Six-Party Talks. He believes that SPT signals a continued commitment by all concerned parties to, among other goals, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of the bilateral relations among the SPT member states, economic development and peace and stability maintenance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.²⁴

Despite such potential roles, Six-Party process has yet resuscitated since 2008. The collective idea to attain regional and global peace and stability through denuclearizing the DPRK is therefore at stake. Along this line, a number of scholars discussed the SPT challenges in attaining its collective goals which this paper classifies into two major approaches, namely institutions (regime theory) and actors view.

A. Institutions Approach

Among many “school of thoughts” which envisages the SPT challenges is the institutionalism. Sangtu Ko, Professor at the Graduate School for Area Studies of Yonsei University, South Korea, is one of many prominent scholars who microscopes the failure of the SPT from the

²⁴ Synder, Scott, “North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Tests and Six-Party Talks: Where Do We Go From Here?”, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, 2009.

institutionalism point of view. In his piece of work titled “The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Six-Party Talks: The Logic of Regime Failure”, he focuses on three bottlenecking elements which impede the development of the Six-Party Process, namely asymmetrical information, narrow incentives and (limited) sanctions.

With respect to asymmetrical information, Ko underlined that “the distribution of information was structurally obstructed by the division of the participating countries into two groups: the US, Japan, and South Korea; and China, Russia, and North Korea.”²⁵ Despite each trilateral group worked in concert, Ko further argues that this served as an obstacle to the distribution of unbiased information.

Ko also analyzed the problem of incentives in the Six-Party Talks “lies in the unequal readiness to shoulder the burden of providing incentives to North Korea.”²⁶ South Korea and Japan pledged to provide food and energy incentives, while the US offered security assurances and release from trade restrictions. This difference comes from divergent solutions the parties have pursued in dealing with North Korea.²⁷ South Korea preferred a Ukrainian model and was ready to provide large-scale financial assistance, whereas the US insisted on a

²⁵ Ko, Sangtu, “The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Six-Party Talks: The Logic of Regime Failure”, Yonsei University

²⁶ Ibid.,

²⁷ Ibid.,

Libyan case approach and just promised to help North Korea integrate into the international community.²⁸

Sanctions, as Ko argued, are regarded as critical to the viability of the Six-Party Talks. However, there was a wide divergence among parties concerning the issue of sanctions.²⁹ The US government adopted the toughest sanctions towards the DPRK. According to a 2016 report by Office of Foreign Assets Control, the US government adopted multi-faceted sanctions program towards the DPRK since 2008. In the meantime, the Chinese side displayed some reservations to lay tougher sanctions upon the DPRK. Regime collapse was among substantial backgrounds for the Chinese side to call on for tougher sanctions. South Korea eagerly wanted to prevent the nuclear development program but was opposed to any military option.³⁰ It pursued at best regime transformation through an opening and reform policy in the North.³¹ However, the other member states did not buy these ideas.

B. Actors Approach

The main *rationale* behind the establishment of the Six-Party Talks is the collective aspiration shared by the US, Japan, ROK, China and Russia on the denuclearization of the DPRK. The DPRK nuclear technology has been regarded as a substantial challenge to the regional and global peace and stability. Therefore, there was a collective need to

²⁸ John Park, "Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2005, p. 79

²⁹ Ko, Sangtu, "The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Six-Party Talks: The Logic of Regime Failure", Yonsei University

³⁰ Ibid.,

³¹ Ibid.,

address the issue peacefully and constructively. However, in reaching the mentioned ultimate goal, each and every party pursued different interests which then have put the negotiations in stalemate since 2008, as the theory calls “Actor’s approach”, which the paper holds on to.

Since the 1990s, “verifiable denuclearization” has been the catchword of Washington’s successive administrations (Chung, 2013). Washington remains steadfast in putting forward the DPRK denuclearization as its top priority until today. Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID) of the DPRK is of the US “lowest-common-denomination” that has been “rejuvenated” by the 2005 Agreement. In addition, human rights violation and lack of attention on economic and welfare in spite of its simultaneous pursuit of nuclear development are, at the same time, echoed by the US delegation on the Six-Party Talks. The UN’s findings on “several alleged violations, including those concerning the right to food and those associated with prison camps; torture and inhuman treatment; arbitrary detention; discrimination; freedom of expression, movement and religion; the right to life; and enforced disappearances, including abductions of nationals to other countries”³² have further fueled the US to urge the DPRK to embrace “Open Door” policy which entails democratization and economic revitalization.

³² Retrieved from “Unspeakable Atrocities” Reported by the UN Inquiry into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea,
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/UnspeakableatrocitiesreportbyColinNorthKorea.aspx>

As a traditional ally of the US, in the meantime, the ROK shares similar stance on the issue of the DPRK nuclear disarmament, not to mention their long-aspired peaceful unification as well as better Inter-Korean relations (i.e. economic exchange and cooperation) with hopes of resolving the continuous direct and omnipresent (military threat from its Northern neighbor since the year 1945. For the last two administrations, notably Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hyee, Seoul continuously demanded Pyongyang to abandon their nuclear program. Under the Lee Myung-bak administration, for instance, Seoul strongly urged Pyongyang through the “Denuclearization, Openness, 3000” policy which implied that Seoul would assist Pyongyang to achieve \$3,000 GDP per capita, once Pyongyang denuclearized and opened up.³³ In the current Park Geun-hyee administration, in addition, the ROK has been recorded to demand the North to show its “sincerity” in the negotiation table by living up to its international obligations and previous agreements to give up its nuclear weapons and development program under the so-called *Trustpolitik* which underlines the principles of trust, pursuing peace and joint prosperity in the Korean Peninsula while cooperating with the international community.³⁴ However, coordination with ally and building trust across a divided nation has proven to be difficult.

³³ Eun-sook, Chung, “Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Positions of Countries Involved”, *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* Vol. 25, No. 1, March 2013, 1–15

³⁴ “North Korea has Nothing to Gain from Nuclear Weapons and Missiles”, News Zone, Ministry of National Defense, Sep 29, 2013

Rozman, in the meantime, argues that Japanese government pursues three different goals in the DPRK/nuclear negotiations, not to mention abduction issue as a domestic politics stake. First and foremost, it is to soften the Korean position on its historical occupation.³⁵ Japan and South Korea are at odds on the issue of colonial era. Against this, Tokyo “makes use” Pyongyang issue to lower the temper on the matter. The Japanese government, as the Rozman further argues, is to become a political power that could shape the development of relations between the South and North, since vital security interests were at stake and the United States could not be trusted to share them.³⁶ Lastly, regional power rivalry fuels Japan to assert its role in the denuclearization talks. It is of Japanese aspiration to be able to deal with China and Russia independently of the US. The isolated North gave Japan its opportunity.³⁷

Unlike the US and its allies, China attached greater emphasis on the peace and stability in the Peninsula and the Northeast Asia. China’s aspiration to be a global player, which is of a pivotal element in actualizing the Chinese dream, deems to be the rationale behind the China’s less-pressure and “benign” policy Viz-à-Viz the DPRK. Beijing would rather go for consultation and dialogue than laying upon stricter economic sanctions, which would, to Beijing’s concern, pose a challenge to the “equilibrium” and stability in Pyongyang (i.e. regime

³⁵ Rozman, Gilbert, “Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and United States”, New York: 2007, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 145.

³⁶ Ibid,

³⁷ Young-Sun Lee and Masao Okonogi, “Japan and Korean Unification”, (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), p.38-40.

collapse which would lead to the US' and the ROK's control over Peninsula as well as bring hordes of refugees over the China's area). Such “soft-power” approach seems to be the Beijing's top priority in better ensuring the peace and stability in the Peninsula, in particular, and the North East Asia, at large, where their main interests lie. An observation by Dong-ryul Lee could better explain the aforementioned Beijing's aspiration. He argued the gap between China's long-term goal to be a global power and microscopic viewpoint in addressing the nuclear issue has led it to seek diplomatic, multilateral means to address the nuclear issue (reference to the Six-Party Talks framework, adoption of sanctions, persuasion, conciliation, pressure) while it also eventually wants a DRPK regime that is a friendly to itself, used as a strategic buffer and increased influence over Korean Peninsula among the powers in the Northeast Asian region.³⁸

Among the four major powers, Russia has the weakest links to the Korean peninsula and East Asia in every sense—political, economic, and cultural.³⁹ Against this, SPT serves an avenue for Russia to gain their foothold in the region. In political aspect, the Russian views SPT as a means to hinder the US hegemony in the world as well as China's importance in East Asia, as in creating a multi-polar world (Toloraya, 2008). Moscow is to earn equal footing with the US, China and Japan on the issue of North Korea denuclearization. On the economic sphere,

³⁸ Dong-ryul Lee, “China's Policy and Influence on the North Korea Nuclear Issue: Denuclearization and/or Stabilization of the Korean Peninsula?”, *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 22:2, 2010, pp. 164, 171-172

³⁹ Meer, Sico van-deer, “Russia: Many Goals, Little Activity”, Clingendael Diplomacy Paper, (The Hague: 2008), Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”

Moscow set their goal in better integrating with the East Asia. Moscow expected South Korea to become an important customer of Russian oil, gas and other raw materials from Siberia (Trans-Siberian Railroad), which could even function as a springboard to other Asian markets like Japan.⁴⁰ Failure to move forward on the Korean issues, if it leads to war or the stagnation of regional economic development, threatens Russia's domestic development program for the RFE (Russian Far East) (Kim and Blank, 2010)

As the so-called “Target State”, the DPRK plays a key role in the deliberation of the Six-Party Talks. Their “alleged” nuclear weapon serves as the trump card for the regime to whether embrace the perpetual peace and stability in the Peninsula by living up to the international aspiration or turn the Peninsula to a “battlefield” by turning down the negotiation. Yet, the DPRK’s tacit bargaining strategy attested a thorny road to achieve the former outcome. American security assurances (i.e. non-aggression pact), permanent peace treaty, normalization of bilateral relationship and nuclear-weapon-state recognition are among key stakes that the DPRK attempted to pursue in return for the nuclear disarmament. Iraq and Libya are among significant lessons-learnt for the DPRK regime to seek for the formal US security guarantee as the pretext of the future denuclearization. Bilateral normalization, on the other hand, deems to be of significance for Pyongyang to thrive. The US and Japan are among major stakeholders that place economic as well as political significance for the DPRK long-standing existence.

⁴⁰ Ibid.,

Different stakes have impeded the deliberation of the SPT process. Each and every party keeps holding onto their “common denomination” in the negotiation table. The US sticks with their “verifiable denuclearization”. Whilst China and Russia buttressed the security guarantees and economic assistances towards the DPRK with the purpose of avoiding the regime collapse. However, bearing in mind the current geo-strategic rivalry among the stakeholders, including the US-China, China-Japan as well as China-Japan-Russia-South Korea on territorial disputes, reconciling the diverging interests would be a key in reaching the perpetual peace and stability in the Peninsula.

II. Alternative Rapprochement to Resume the Talks

Partiality highly colors Six-Party Talks process. Each and every party pursues their vested interests through the platform. This common phenomenon turned to be the otherwise when there is no consensus to accommodate the differences. The current fifth DPRK nuclear test of October 2016 shall be the reminder on the importance of reconciling the divergence towards achieving the long-awaited collective goal—peace and stability in the Peninsula.

Since 2008, concerned parties have not done nothing to pursue their collective agenda. Yet, it did not turn out as expected. The lowest common denominator (read: partiality) deems to be the major stumbling block for the advancement of the Talks. With this in mind, the Process necessitates alternative approach. One that fulfills and satisfies all concerned parties’ aspiration. One that explores non-zero-sum-game agenda. One that is impartial.

A. Middle Power

Middle Power has been gaining significance for the last decade or so. They play a unique role in the globally geo-strategic multipolar architecture. The concept of the ‘middle power’ itself dates back to the late 16th century, when Italian Renaissance philosopher, Giovanni Botero, divided the world into three types of states—*grandissime* (empires), *mezano* (middle powers), and *piccioli* (small powers).⁴¹

Despite no general consensus on the definition and typology of Middle Powers, voluminous literatures have discussed this emerging issue. Not the least, a number of prominent scholars devote themselves to explore as well as elaborate (the role of) middle power (see *inter alia*: Beeson, 2011; Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993; Cooper, 1997; Cotton, and Ravenhill, 2012; Cox, 1989; Efstathopoulos, 2011; Gilley, 2011; Holbraad, 1984; Holmes, 1966; Jordan, 2003; King-Gordon, 1966; Manicom and O’Neil, 2012; Nossal and Stubbs, 1997; Ping, 2005; Pratt, 1990; Ravenhill, 1998; Rutherford, 2010; Soeya, 2012; Stairs, 1998; Van Der Westenhuizen, 1998; Ungerer, 2007; Wood, 1988).

Various approaches are coined to theorize about middle powers. Richard Higgott, Vice Chancellor and President Murdoch University, Western Australia, approach Middle Powers through four basic approaches, namely (i) Realist-Positionalist, (ii) Normative/Identity-driven, (iii) Behavioral and (iv) ‘Systematic Impact’ approach. Realist-Positional approach prioritizes protection of core interests (Holbraad,

⁴¹ Schweller, Randall L., “The Concept of Middle Power”, Prepared for the “Study of South Korea as a Global Power” Project.

1984). The Normative and behavioral approaches emphasizes the values of *what* the states ought to do and *how* they do, respectively (Cranford Pratt *et al.* 1990, Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993). Whilst the systemic impact emphasizes on the impact made by the middle powers (Carr, 2013).

In the meantime, prominent international relations theories, namely realism, liberalism and constructivism, also approach middle powers based on their own criteria. Realists utilize material status, such as military and economic capability as well as population size, to explain the category of middle powers, as not as high of those of superpowers but also not as low as those of the small ones (Holbraad, 1984). From a liberal-institutionalist perspective, middle powers are good multilateralists or good global citizens who respect international values, seek to improve trading networks, and enhance communications to promote understanding as well as prefer multilateral ways of solving conflicts to unilateral ones,⁴² or so-called ‘Middlepowermanship’. From a Constructivist or neo-Kantian approach of understanding states, the middlepowermanship is highly related to their behaviors and statecrafts.⁴³ According to Benedict Anderson’s “Imagined Communities”, states are formed around a dynamic mix of ‘genuine, popular nationalist enthusiasm and a systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, the educational system, administrative regulations, and so forth’ (Anderson, 1991). Therefore, Middlepowermanship status is also what a state

⁴² Kantacha, Nawapan, “Middle Power Diplomacy: Comparing South Korea and Indonesia”, (GSIS, SNU: 2014), p. 6.

⁴³ Ibid.

imagines of itself, which is originated from ideas, such as goals, threats, fears, identities, and other elements of perceived reality that influence states and non-state actors within the international system.⁴⁴

B. Middle Power Diplomacy

According to Cooper et al., the rise of the middle power activism since the late 1980s can be attributed to; (i) the decline of American resources in responding to greater vulnerabilities, especially in the international economic system; (ii) change from security related, high policy issues in the Cold War era to economic security and social concerns of environment and human rights; and (iii) the role of domestic politics on foreign policy.⁴⁵

Ever since, Middle Powers play an increasing role in the regional as well as global configurations. A number of prominent scholars identified Middle Power's roles in their large volume of works. Beeson and Higgott, for instance, looked at middle power not as a giant but a good dancer. They are also very skilled in persuasion, coalition building and 'the art of the indirect'. They play the role as (i) catalyst, (ii) facilitator and (iii) manager.⁴⁶

As catalyst, the middle power provides stimulus and energy to stalled and frustrated negotiations. Clear and innovative intellectual

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.,

⁴⁶ Beeson, Mark and Richard Higgott, "The Changing Architecture of Politics in the Asia-Pacific: Another (lost) Middle Power Moment?", Paper Presented in the Session II: Roles of Middle Powers in the 21st Century: Theoretical Perspectives" of the 2013 KAIS-KF International Conference "Roles of Middle Powers in the 21st Century".

contributions from different perspectives have shown to be beneficial to the resolution of protracted conflicts.⁴⁷ As facilitators, they could develop agendas, set priorities, cement coalitions and plan and arrange meetings. In addition, as a manager, they build institutions, develop monitoring systems and create liaisons and other systems for increasing confidence (Dunk and McKay, 1997).

Keohane, writing in 1969, echoed similar approach to that of Beeson' and Higgott's coalition building principle in defining Middle Powers' roles. He argued middle (or "system influencing") powers "cannot hope to affect the system acting alone [but] can nevertheless exert significant impact on the system by working through small groups or alliances or through universal or regional international organizations." 'Like-Mindedness', in this vein, is of a significance for Middle Powers in conducting their diplomacy.

In a more institutional and practical manner, Tiberghien goes with arguments on the Middle Powers' roles. He argues that middle powers can play three crucial roles. *First*, they can advance socialization and trust building among key major powers (by offering neutral forums). Socialization is a critical component in the formation of cross-national understandings around concepts of public goods and systemic risks among national elites (Johnston, 2008; Kent, 2002). Middle powers can enhance this process through the creation of track-two processes, foundations, symposiums, and information meetings (Tiberghien, 2013).

⁴⁷ MacQueen, Simon, "Middle Powers and the Korean Peninsula: A New Security Paradigm", (SNU, 2008), p. 52.

Second, propose and create innovative institutional designs. Middle powers have a key comparative advantage in developing new ideas, concepts, given the lower costs of experimentation in middle powers (Tiberghien, 2013). *Third*, initiate a small-scale experiments and host secretariat-type organizations, which in turn can shift boundaries. By playing first movers, they can generate new actors that will in turn accelerate the process of global governance by serving as laboratories for ideas and governance advocates (Tiberghien, 2013).

Given this large number of constructive and alternative role of Middle Powers, it is encouraging to learn how Middle Powers exert their role in the region. Asia-Pacific, which is claimed to be “the center of the global importance”, serves a paramount example and case to further explore the role of Middle Powers to create the region more conducive and prosperous.

C. Emerging Middle Power Role in the Asia-Pacific

As Cooper et al. theorized, the increasing Middle Power activism gained its stronger hold ever since 1980s. In Asia-Pacific, the increasing role of Middle Powers is clear and sound. Australia and the Republic of Korea are among the prominent Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific which play a significant role in the international configurations. Through their wide-ranging initiatives and proposals, Australia and the Republic of Korea give a significant contribution to the global dynamics which later serves as among the main *rationales* for this paper to discuss them. Their robust economic growth, among many other things, boosted significant

leverage for both countries to exert their constructive role in the international configurations.

I. Australia and Its Advancement of the National Interests

Oliver and Trood observed the unique characteristics of Australia as a foreign policy entity. Its position as part of the British Empire and its western identity (with the British Monarch still its head of state) is intertwined with its geographical situation in Asia.⁴⁸ Amplifying global agenda for the sake of protecting and promoting the security and prosperity of Australia and Australian turned to be the pivotal value for Australia's advancing the national interests (Foreign and Trade Policy, 2003).

Combating terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament, climate change, human rights, humanitarian assistance and development are among the Australia's global agenda. These multi-faceted agendas are channeled through regional as well as multilateral platforms, notably ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), G-20 and United Nations-led processes, which Canberra has assumed the rotational UNSC seat in 2013-2014.

Along with their global agenda to advance their national interests, Australia also attaches great importance on protecting and promoting the security and prosperity of Australia and Australian. Bridging building and reconciling differences are then among

⁴⁸ Oliver, Alexandra and Russell Trood, "Public Diplomacy and Australia's Middle Power Strategy in East Asia" p. 179.

Australian ways to attain the aforementioned goal. With its “abundant” politically and economically influential endowment, Australia has played a facilitating role in the global dynamics.

This facilitating activism has a long and deep-rooted history. Since 1945, Australia wrestled to put forward the agenda of “in-between” countries in the San Francisco meeting. Herbert Evart, Labor Foreign Minister, first used the label of “middle power” in the 1945 conference.

More recently, Australian official emphasis on Middle Power opportunities, “Middle Power dreaming” for some, have been prominent in the Labor Party administrations of Bob Hawke (1983-1991), Kevin Rudd (2007-2010, 2013) and Julia Gillard (2010-2013).⁴⁹ Gareth Evans, Australia’s Foreign Ministry from 1988-1996, translated “Middle Power diplomacy” as “the kind of foreign policy we have been crafting and implementing in recent years in which the characteristic method is coalition building with ‘like-minded’ countries”.⁵⁰

Kevin Rudd, during his Prime Ministership and Foreign Ministership, coined “Creative Middle Power Diplomacy” as the Australia’s foreign policy prime mover. Under that concept, Rudd placed Australia “in bringing together major, regional and small

⁴⁹ James Cotton and John Ravenhill, *Middle Power Dreaming. Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010* (Oxford University Press, 2011)

⁵⁰ Scott, David. *Australia as a Middle Power: Ambiguities of Role and Identity*. www.journalofdiplomacy.org

powers to shape and implement solutions through ‘Creative Middle Power Diplomacy’.⁵¹

In the meantime, Julia Gillard spearheaded Australia’s longstanding commitment to active middle-power diplomacy. She put much weight on practical problem solving, effective implementation and building coalitions with others as the main prescription of the “Middle Power Diplomacy” concept.

II. South Korea and Its *Junggyun-guk*

The Inter Korean War that took place in early 1950s engendered massive destruction to South Korea in the following decade. A report mentioned that in 1960, South Korea’s GDP was equal to USD 79 only. This put the nation even lower than the Sub-Sharan countries in terms of its economic size.

Thanks to industrialization policy of Park Chung-hee. Under his administration, Park Chung-hee propelled the massive ‘outward-looking’ industrialization which later gives significant stimulus to the economic growth and development. Poor natural resources endowment, low savings rate and tiny domestic market pushed the Park administration to “bring” South Korea to international stage and market. Not least than four decades, South Korea has emerged from the ashes of the Korean War into to the member of OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) back in 2009.

⁵¹ Rudd, “The Rise of the Asia Pacific and the Role of Creative Middle Power Diplomacy,” May 19, 2011, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2011/kr_sp_110519.html

The transformative economic growth has indeed imbued South Korean leaders to exert a more constructive role in the regional as well as global architecture. President Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) coined the “Nordpolitik” in which the South effort to reach out to the traditional allies of the North Korea with hopes of creating peace and stability in the Peninsula. Later in the Kim Young Sam administration, South Korea envisioned “*Segyehwa*” agenda to advance its status in the global theater by embracing multi-faceted “political, cultural and social globalization”⁵². Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” envisaged the reconciling policy of the South Korean administration Viz-à-Viz the DPRK regime.

The discourse about South Korea’s middle power diplomacy is taken up more seriously under the leadership of President Lee Myung-bak, as South Korea seeks to project its influence beyond the traditional security alliance into the region and the world.⁵³ “New Initiative” and “Global Korea” are among the South Korea’s buzzwords asserting in the regional and global context during the period. In addition, Park Geun-hye administration further reinforced the Middle Powermanship of Korea. She envisioned South Korea’s Middle Powermanship through three levels, including “Diplomacy as Middle Powers”, “Diplomacy Towards Middle Powers” and “Diplomacy with Middle Powers”.

⁵² Kim. S, Samuel, “Korea and Globalization”.

⁵³ Kantacha, Nawapan, “Middle Power Diplomacy: Comparing South Korea and Indonesia”, (Seoul, 2014), p. 26.

In general, Seoul's approach of *Junggyun-guk* or Middle Powermanship is focusing more through foreign aid (Official Development Assistance/ODA) as well as global non-traditional challenges initiatives (Peace Keeping Operations/PKO). Embarking on a phenomenal economic growth, South Korea started to reverse its role from a recipient to a donor country since 1987. Korean Exim Bank reported ever since 1987 South Korean government has committed USD 11.8 billion of ODAs to 53 countries until 2015.⁵⁴

PKO serves a pivotal conduit for South Korea's regional and global activism. South Korea began its involvement in UN peacekeeping with the 1993 operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) by sending a battalion 504 personnel known as the Evergreen Unit to repair roads and provide other types of humanitarian assistance (Groves, 2007: 44). At this time, South Korea has approximately 1,440 service personnel deployed to over 30 countries and regions for UN peacekeeping, multinational peace operations, and security cooperation activities (ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2012: 110). Over the past two decades, South Korea sent a large number of troops to three specific missions, *inter alia* UNIFIL in Lebanon; MINUSTAH in Haiti; and most recently UNMISS in South Sudan.

D. Middle Power's Role on the Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula

Although Middle Power Diplomacy gained stronger significance in the global dynamics, there are a few literatures on Middle Power's role in

⁵⁴ Presentation by Director of EDCF of Korea Exim Bank, SNU, September 28, 2016

the Korean Peninsula, in particular on the denuclearization issue. With its bridge-building and impartial capability, the role of Middle Powers, especially in the Peninsula, is yet to be explored and capitalized in the literatures. Given this, the study attempts to fill and explore the academic gap on the mentioned issue.

Among a few references, Simon MacQueen, a graduate of the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, offered his prominent views on the matter. Through his “Middle Powers and the Korean Peninsula: A New Security Paradigm”, MacQueen explored the (potential) role of middle powers in the Peninsula.

MacQueen argues that Middle Powers are often in a suitable position for promoting and maintaining mechanism for security. They enjoy robust relations with great powers whilst at the same time Middle Powers are very unlikely to confront smaller nations, either in military, economy or politics. In short, middle powers have a reputation for (relative) neutrality.⁵⁵

Historically, middle power conduct on the Korean Peninsula lent credence to the realist theory of middle powers as ‘followers’ (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993). During the relatively stable period of 1997-2002, it illustrated Middle Powers’ engagement with the DPRK, *inter alia* the (re-) establishment of diplomatic ties, increased aid and

⁵⁵ MacQueen, Simon, “Middle Powers and the Korean Peninsula: A New Security Paradigm”, SNU, 2008.

humanitarian assistance and various other track two initiatives.⁵⁶ Yet, as Ronald M. Behringer postulated Middle Powers will not harvest when their initiatives are at odds with the great power ambition. It is therefore clear when they returned dutifully in line order not to contradict US policy as the US castigated the North in 2002.⁵⁷

There is a discussion among scholars and outside observers on the need and feasibility of the middle power involvement in the Korean Peninsula. Some argue that the existing platform, the Six-Party process, would suffice. Some others believe that the involvement would further complicate the negotiations. However, as the Northeast Asian region espouses increasing geo-politic and –economic significance to the Middle Powers, the involvement of Middle Power deems to be of significance in maintaining stability for they have the necessary skills and knowledge of the area, as argued by MacQueen.

He further goes with the argument that it is important for middle powers to remain current with Six-Party negotiations and take care not to counteract progress made by other governments.⁵⁸ By playing different roles and committing to distinct activities, including establishing a forum or regional ‘watchdog’ organization for transfer information, middle powers can minimize the possibility of clashing with the interests of great powers (MacQueen, 2008). MacQueen later

⁵⁶ MacQueen, Simon, “Middle Powers and the Korean Peninsula: A New Security Paradigm”, 2008.

⁵⁷ Robertson, Jeffrey, “Position Vacant: Middle Power Coordinator on the Korean Peninsula”, *The Institute for Far Eastern Studies* (October, 2007).

⁵⁸ MacQueen, Simon, “Middle Powers and the Korean Peninsula: A New Security Paradigm”, 2008, P. 17.

emphasizes that middle powers can play a strategic role in the low-key sectors, such as environmental, economic, social and educational, rather than the denuclearization per se.

On the other hand, the prominent asset that the Middle Powers could assert in the Korean Peninsula (and Six-Party Talks) issue is ‘impartiality’ as Bercovitch suggested. Impartiality is among the major missing links in the issue despite being an important yet qualifiable element for successful mediation. The tendency of each member to retain separate, widely different perceptions and agendas is a perennial difficulty associated with tightly-knit, high-tension regions along with historical and strategic stakes of outcome (Macqueen, 2008).

Due to the intense nature and lengthy duration of great power rivalry on the Peninsula during the Cold War, middle power conduct in the region was highly constrained (MacQueen, 2008). It is, thus, not surprising that they have shown caution and reluctance to become actively involved-in fact the major powers have on occasion been suspicious of attempts by outside parties to suggest alternative arrangements to the status quo.⁵⁹ In addition, it seems that middle power engagement in the Peninsula lacks of coordination, Some commentators maintain that one specific country should act as leader, harmonizing the initiative (Robertson, 2007).

Having said this, the middle power’s role in the Peninsula, in accordance to MacQueen’s principle, shall compliment and supplement existing bilateral efforts in the region instead of replacing them. Dewitt,

⁵⁹ Retrieved from http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10a_Dunk_McKay.html

writing in 1997, further reiterates that middle powers will not act as panaceas and solve all of the Peninsula's problems rather as alternative arrangements with lower probability of unanticipated negative consequences.

CHAPTER III

INDONESIA'S "NON-ALIGNMENT" AND "ACTIVISM"

I. Indonesia and Its Non-Alignment and Activism

Gaining independence after the World War II, Indonesia struggled to be recognized as an independent state on the global chessboard. Cold War rivalry serves a substantial challenge for Indonesia to navigate in the global theater. The so-called “Capitalist” and “Communist” bloc vied for global influence in a very delicate international configuration. As a “new kid in the bloc”, Indonesia shall opt for a policy which could bring up peace and prosperity to their people, in particular, and the world, at large.

“Free” as in Non-Alignment and “Active” are later opted for the Indonesia’s Foreign Policy adages. As a newly-independent state, Indonesia requires a peaceful and friendly dynamics to serve a conducive conduit to grow. Indonesia’s first Vice President Mohammad Hatta translated the adages in his “Rowing between the Two Reefs”. Hatta stressed his thought on the importance of maintaining Indonesia’s “neutrality” as well as “impartiality”. Her independent policy keeps her from enmity with either party, preserves her from the damage to her own interests that would follow from taking sides, and permits her to be friends with all nations on a basis of mutual respect.⁶⁰


⁶⁰ Hatta, Muhammad. *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*. Foreign Affairs. April 1953.

Along this line, in 1950s, Indonesia initiated the establishment of the Asia-Africa movement as well as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Amidst the global and omnipresent rivalry between the two blocs, Indonesia, and the other Third-World countries, met in Bandung to spearhead the spirit of freedom and independence. They also echoed anti-colonialism which was prevalent in that period. This initiative serves a huge stepping stone for Indonesia to play a more constructive role in the global theaters in the years to come.

The Establishment of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) back in 1967 attested another stepping stone for Indonesia's activism foreign policy. Together with Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, Indonesia spearheaded the regional grouping, which later expanded to Brunei, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, to embrace the political and economic dynamics in the region and beyond. As among the founding countries, Indonesia recognizes ASEAN as a strategic platform to navigate their foreign policy. ASEAN, in turn, became a substantial element of Indonesia's foreign policy.

The significance of ASEAN on Indonesia's foreign policy is translated into the "First Concentric Circle" of Indonesia. The Concentric Circle is a foreign policy concept which underlines the level of strategic importance for Indonesia to exert its role in accordance to the geographic proximity as well as geo-strategic and geo-economic modality (which appears as Figure 1 below). As the first Concentric Circle, ASEAN plays an important role for Indonesia's foreign policy. In terms of geographical proximity, ASEAN is located in South East Asian region of which Indonesia is part. It is also

home to more than 600 million population which entails a promising market for Indonesian products. In terms of economic size, ASEAN ranks as the 7th largest GDP (current prices) in 2013.⁶¹



Source: <http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/IFP.aspx?P=Regional&l=en>

Figure 1 Indonesia's Foreign Policy Concentric Circle

In addition, ASEAN + 3 envisaged another important layer for Indonesia's foreign policy. 10 ASEAN member states plus 3 ASEAN Strategic Partners, notably China, Japan and Republic of Korea, serve a pivotal ground for Indonesia to exert their role. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are the strategic partners of Indonesia in multi-array of areas of cooperation, including but not limited to politics, economy and socio-culture. Last but not least, Indonesia attach and keep renewing great

⁶¹ <http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/understanding-asean-seven-things-you-need-to-know>

importance on the relations with the US and EU as well as other like-minded countries. They are mutual partners of Indonesia in streamlining the regional as well as global interests in the international arena.

III. Evolving Nature of Indonesia's Foreign Policy

Since its independence back in 1940s, Indonesia defines its foreign policy on the framework of “Free” as in “Non-Alignment” and “Active/Activism”. This framework remains the “core values” of Indonesia’s foreign policy from time to time despite different conducts by different administrations.

In the Soekarno administration, Indonesia put greater emphasis on drawing and garnering political support from the global theater. As a newly independent country, Indonesia requires political recognition as well as acknowledgment. Foreign policy was, therefore, navigated to attain the mentioned goal. The 1955 Non-Aligned Movement and Asian-African Conference was among the catalysts of the political agenda.

Soeharto, the following administration, took full benefit of the political foundation built by Soekarno. In his governance, he spearheaded “development” diplomacy. He established cooperation with key donor countries to help build Indonesia’s economy. In the post-Soeharto era (so-called “*Reformasi*” era), notably Habibie’, Abdurrahman Wahid’ (Gusdur) and Megawati’s era, Indonesia embraced a newly-growing democracy. During the “transition period”, it navigated its foreign policy to rejuvenate its past image as well as propelled economic cooperation.

Under the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono term, Indonesia elevated its foreign policy approach. Embarking on a high-key approach, Yudhoyono

successfully put Indonesia to a higher and greater level in the global theater and configuration. Playing as well as exerting a constructive role in the global agenda setting through multilateral platform, Indonesia gained wider recognition as an emerging regional power. “Thousand Friends, Zero Enemies” and “Navigating in the Turbulent Ocean” are Yudhoyono’s Foreign Policy adages and concepts.

Coming from a business sector background, the current President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo took an “aggressive” economic foreign policy. Jakarta recalibrated its foreign policy approach with its counterparts to a “people-centred priorities”. Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum policy, recognised as his signature foreign policy, provides a good example of Jakarta’s new approach. The policy is strategically designed to address the massive infrastructure development required to unlock Indonesia’s domestic economic integration and drive growth. As such, Jokowi perceives the strengthening of bilateral, rather than multilateral, relationships as the most efficient policy for attracting foreign investment to meet the USD \$6 billion required to develop Indonesia’s port infrastructure.⁶²

III. Promising Modalities for Middle Powermanship

As the biggest archipelagic state on earth with over 17,000 islands, Indonesia, according to the World Factbook, is the world's 15th-largest country in terms of land area and world's 7th-largest country in terms of combined sea and land area.⁶³ Its robust economy has put Indonesia as one

⁶² Retrieved from http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian_outlook/a-retreat-from-multilateralism-foreign-policy-restructuring-under-jokowi/

⁶³ Central Intelligence Agency (17 October 2006). ["Rank Order Area"](#). *The World Factbook*. US [CIA](#), Washington, DC.

of the world's best performing and most consistent ones. Its average growth rate since 2001 is 5.4 percent, despite the global financial crisis, making it jump from being the world's 27th largest economy in 2000 (nominal GDP) to the 16th largest today.⁶⁴

The 2016 Global Investment Trends Monitor report, issued by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on Oct. 6, puts Indonesia in ninth position on its list of top prospective host countries for foreign direct investment (FDI) from 2016 to 2018, up from the 14th position in 2014.⁶⁵ It is also forecast to take the 7th rank by 2030 and the 4th largest in 2040 by McKinsey Global Institute and Citibank respectively. The number of middle-class and affluent consumers, possessing at least Rp 50 million (US\$3,825) in household assets, is set to increase to 141 million people by 2020, up from 88 million in 2014, according to a Boston Consulting Group (BCG) survey.⁶⁶

The “non-aligned and active” foreign policy reiterates Indonesia’s “Middle Powermanship”, including Viz-à-Viz the major powers. Santo Darmosumarto, an Indonesian diplomat, argues looking at Indonesia’s positions and policies regarding different issues preoccupying the region, Indonesia has legitimate reasons to call itself the regional, and probably also international, community’s “key balancer, mediator, and mobilizer” and be accepted by both the “developing and developed world, the North and South,

⁶⁴ Kantacha, Nawapan, “Middle Power Diplomacy: Comparing South Korea and Indonesia”, (Seoul, 2014)

⁶⁵ Retrieved from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/10/14/indonesia-remains-global-investment-sweet-spot.html> (visited on October 14, 2016)

⁶⁶ Ibid.,

and Muslim and non-Muslim-majority countries.⁶⁷ In the meantime, Indonesia attached great importance on the multilateral institution/processes, especially ASEAN and other ASEAN-led regional mechanisms. The South China Sea disputes, for example, gives vivid idea on how Indonesia, by echoing exemplary multilateral approach, recognizes the significance of the platform which in turn put Indonesia as a ‘good global citizen’.

IV. Indonesia’s Mediating Role Experiences

Indonesia’s active and independent foreign policy statute further shapes its navigating role in the global architecture. Active in giving significant contribution to the global peace and stability and independent in non-aligning to any of the global powers’ agenda have put Indonesia in a better leverage. Neutrality and sincerity turned to be the political commodity that Indonesia exerts to the international dynamics.

Mediation, in this context, is therefore not a far-distant agenda from Indonesia’s foreign relations network. It has a deep root in Indonesia’s history and significant prevalence to Indonesia’s today. Back in 1978 at a time when Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja chaired the ASEAN Standing Committee, Indonesia displayed its leading activism in the so-called the ‘Third Indochina War’ (1978-1991). Taking full benefit of the chairmanship, Minister Mochtar, speaking for the ASEAN, deplored the Vietnamese invasion to Cambodia and urged as well as called for the Vietnamese troops’ withdrawal from Cambodia.

⁶⁷Kantacha, Nawapan, “Middle Power Diplomacy: Comparing South Korea and Indonesia”, (Seoul, 2014).

Along this vein, Indonesia spearheaded the other ASEAN member states to place the dispute on the UN Security Council agenda. Although there is a geo-politic divergence with Bangkok on the issue of ASEAN Centrality towards Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and Khmer self-determination, Jakarta actively sought to engage the Khmers and Vietnamese and their External Sponsors in search for a settlement that would recognize legitimate interests on all sides.⁶⁸ From 1982 to the signing of the Final Act of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia on 23 October 1991, Indonesia played a central role in peace negotiations under both Mochtar and his successor, Ali Alatas.

Pursuing bilateral political communication with Hanoi while maintaining its commitment to the ASEAN formula or so-called "Dual-Track" diplomacy deem to be the Jakarta's main formula in the dispute. It later cemented the acknowledgement of Indonesia's official 'interlocutor' role with Vietnam by ASEAN in 1986. In July 1987, the concerned parties witnessed a breakthrough of the conflict. Minister Mochtar and Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach of Vietnam welcomed the Indonesia's initiative to conduct an informal meeting between the Khmer parties, to which other concerned countries would also be invited.

This so-called "cocktail party" formula in turn led to the first Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM I) in July 1988, "at which the issue of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia--the external question--was decoupled from the Khmer "civil war"--the internal question."⁶⁹ A

⁶⁸ Retrieved from 'Indonesia, ASEAN and the Third Indochina War'
<http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/99.htm> (visited on October 14, 2016).

⁶⁹ Ibid.,

change of administration in Thailand which had exceptionally shifted the Bangkok's policy Vizà-Viz the negotiated settlement served the ground for the Second Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM II) in February 1989. Chaired by Alatas, the JIM II deliberated on the “international control mechanism” for Cambodia which was accepted by Hanoi. It, therefore, fostered the efforts which in turn led to the July 1990 Paris International Conference on Cambodia co-chaired by Indonesia and France.

The conference, however, did not deliver significant progress. But, by then international events influencing great power relations had outpaced ASEAN's and Indonesia's ability to coordinate.⁷⁰ The five permanent members of the UN Security Council--working through Paris International Conference on Cambodia channels--took up the challenge of negotiating a peace settlement in Cambodia and, with Indonesia assuming a burdensome diplomatic role, fashioned a peace agreement that led to the deployment of forces of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).⁷¹ Jakarta's sense of achievement and pride in its role in delivering peace to Indochina was reflected in among others the South China Sea claims, which not only took the initiative to multilateralize the issue but also reconcile the divergences.

South China Sea disputes is another Indonesia's testing ground. This conflict has been raising its tension since the last four decades. Involving both island and maritime claims among six parties in the region, namely Brunei Darussalam, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Malaysia, the Philippines and Viet Nam, the South China Sea has

⁷⁰ Ibid.,

⁷¹ Ibid.,

become a difficult and complicated area in Asia's regional security. China seems to be trying to monopolize overall control of the whole area of the South China Sea, and its claim is widely referred as the *nine-dash line*, of which interpretation deviate substantially from long-established international conducts and protocols such as UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea).

South China Sea is rich in oil and gas reserves. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, hydrocarbon reserves in the South China Sea amount to 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The Sea canvassed a strategic location where it has a large number of vital Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) connecting Malacca Strait/Singapore and Luzon Strait/Bashi Channel, which have traditionally been the lifelines of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China, as well as the United States.

Despite a non-claimant state, Indonesia plays a constructive role in the dispute. The 45th ASEAN Foreign Minister's Meeting in Phnom Penh back in 2012 best illustrates its invaluable mediating role of Indonesia in the dynamics. For the first time in the ASEAN history, it had failed to reach a consensus on (how to put reference on South China Sea dispute in) a joint communiqué. Indonesia, later, took initiative to conduct 'Shuttle Diplomacy' to the capitals of the Philippines, Cambodia, Singapore and Viet Nam with the purpose to converge the divergence among the parties concerned.

During the 72-hour Shuttle Diplomacy marathon, Indonesia's former Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa put forward the Six Points of Principles. The six points itself reaffirm the foreign ministers' commitment to observe

the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and follow the guidelines for its implementation; to work toward an early adoption of a Code of Conduct meant to strengthen the 2002 Declaration; to exercise self-restraint and avoid threatening or using force; and to uphold the peaceful settlement of disputes in keeping with universally recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).⁷² Eventually, the divergence managed to be reconciled. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers later shared collective aspiration on the issue of the South China Sea.

V. Indonesia and the Korean Peninsula Dynamics

The peace and stability in the Peninsula is of utmost importance for countries in the world, including Indonesia. In the economic facet, there are, not the least, three Indonesia's major trading partners. Japan, China and the Republic of Korea are the first, second and sixth Indonesia's biggest trading partner in 2014, consecutively.⁷³ In addition, the Peninsula stakeholders, notably the US, Japan, the ROK, China and Russia, contribute over USD 2,250 million worth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Indonesia in the first quarter of the year 2016, which is equivalent to 32% of total FDI to Indonesia.⁷⁴ As FDI plays an important role on Indonesia's economy structure, which shares over 65% of the total investment ratio of the first

⁷² Retrieved from <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/29/beyond-the-six-points-how-far-will-indonesia-go/>

⁷³ <http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/indonesia/tradestats> (visited on July 22nd 2016)

⁷⁴ Retrieved from the Indonesia's Investment Coordinating Board (2016)
http://www7.bkpm.go.id/images/uploads/investasi_indonesia/file/PRESS_RELEASE_REALISASI_INVESTASI_TW_I_2016_-_IND.pdf

quarter of 2016,⁷⁵ it is therefore of Indonesia's aspiration to pursue perpetual peace and stability in the Peninsula.

Korean Peninsula has been 'integral part' of Indonesia's Foreign Policy since its early age. During President Soekarno's administration, the first Indonesia's president, Indonesia had a very strong relations with the DPRK. Back in 1964, Soekarno paid a state visit to Pyongyang. And in the following year, Premier Kim Il Sung paid a return visit to Indonesia.

In this context, idiosyncrasy plays a crucial role in the Indonesia – DPRK relations. Soekarno and Kim-Il Sung set a solid ground for both countries to further develop their relations. The collective spirit of Asian and African people against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism deemed to be of the main engine in navigating the cooperation at that time.

Soekarno 'factor' serves an important modality for Indonesia to garner the DPRK's trust in playing a mediating role in the Peninsula dynamics. From 2002 to 2011, it is reported that there are three high-level Indonesian visits to Pyongyang. In 2002, the fifth Indonesia's President Megawati Soekarno Putri, the daughter of Soekarno, paid a state visit to Pyongyang and had a tête-à-tête meeting with Kim Jong-Il. A number of media sources reported that Megawati was on the mission of conveying President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea as well as the US government's message to the North Korean government regarding the nuclear issue.

⁷⁵ Retrieved from <https://beritagar.id/artikel/berita/investor-asing-dominasi-investasi-di-indonesia>

In addition, in the year 2005 and 2011, respectively, the former President Megawati paid another visit to Pyongyang with the similar purpose of delivering message on Peninsula reunification and denuclearization as well as Indonesia's mediating proposal to the Kim Jong-Il's regime.

Indonesia also exerted its mediating role through multilateral platform. During 2003-2008, Indonesia sent a special envoy to the Six-Party Talks. Ambassador Nana Sutresna, former Indonesian Permanent Representative to the UN in New York for the period of 1988-1992 and former Indonesian Ambassador to the United Kingdom of 1999-2002, following the instructions of President Megawati as well as former Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, acted as an 'acknowledged interlocutor' between the DPRK and the other five-party members. His mission was to, among others, bridge the diverging interests between the DPRK and the other five members.⁷⁶ In this spirit, he took shuttle diplomacy to all Six-Party member countries and garnered strategic messages to help expedite the negotiation rounds.

The establishment of ASEAN Committee in Pyongyang (ACP) is another mediating initiative of Indonesia in regards to the Peninsula dynamics. Comprising of five ASEAN member states' missions in Pyongyang, namely Indonesia', Cambodia', Lao PDR', Malaysia' and Viet Nam's, ACP is an informal grouping/dialogue among the Head of Missions (Ambassadors). Apart from being an internal dialogue platform among ASEAN Head of Missions on common issues and challenges, ACP also

⁷⁶ <http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=53655> (visited on September 1, 2016)

serves a bi-folded feature. In one hand, it plays a crucial role as a trust-building platform with the DPRK side. It offers a platform for ASEAN Head of Missions to exchange views with the DPRK government officials, although the outcomes or feedbacks are limited⁷⁷. On the other hand, it also offers first-hand information for the outside actors since one of the ACP's activities is to conduct seminar or workshop on wide-ranging issues by inviting international body officials, including that of Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).

⁷⁷ Retrieved from an interview with H. E. Nasri Gustaman (Indonesia's Ambassador to DPRK for the period of 2010-2014), Jakarta 27 July 2016.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS: ASSERTING INDONESIA'S ROLE TO RESUME THE SIX-PARTY TALKS

I. From Asymmetry to Go-Between

Impartiality has been a long-standing issue in the DPRK's denuclearization resolution. Each and every party was "entangled" with their vested interests on the table. China, for instance, as a "bridge builder" between the DPRK and the US-led faction, thrived to reach their own compromise in negotiating with both sides. While conveying the CVID message to Pyongyang, Beijing, at the same time, attempted to manage the peace and stability intact in the Peninsula with the purpose of providing an avenue for their peaceful rise. As the compromise was yet to be reached, it later led to the (political) stalemate which put the regional and international peace and stability at stake.

Asserting neutral bridge builder, or so-called the Third-Party, to the Talks, against this, seems to be promising in unlocking the impasse. This Third-Party, first of all, is benefited with their "impartiality", which Oran R. Young defined as "a situation in which the third party favors neither side to a crisis"⁷⁸, in helping navigate the negotiations. They are relatively impartial

⁷⁸ Young, R. Oran, "The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crisis", (1967: New Jersey), Princeton University Press Princeton, pp. 81

towards any of the party in the negotiations. It later puts them in a better leverage to gain the trust. They, in addition, hardly put their own agenda forward to the negotiation. By engaging the Third-Party, they could help “rejuvenate” the relevant stakeholders in further exploring alternative and constructive solutions.

As impartiality is among the utmost elements of the Third-Party in helping pursue constructive solutions to the Talks, Middle Power is therefore a potential candidate in undertaking the mandate. Jacob Bercovitch, a widely-regarded-leading expert on international mediation, theorized that Middle Powers are of better leverage with their impartiality. They enjoy robust relations with great powers whilst at the same time Middle Powers are very unlikely to confront smaller nations, either in military, economy or politics. They, in addition, have a key comparative advantage in developing new ideas and concepts (Tiberghien, 2013).

II. Four-Pronged Approach to Help Resuscitate the Stalemate

Barry M. Rubin, professor on international relations, has noted that negotiations stalemate offers an ample opportunity to the assertion of a Third-Party. As the disputants are unable to reconcile the differences, “they are sufficiently cooperative that they are willing to invite or accept (with the strong emphasis added) the intrusion of one or more external (third) parties who may be able to break the conflictual stalemate.”⁷⁹ Touval and Zartman

⁷⁹ Hopmann, P. Terrence, The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts, (Columbia: 1996), University of South Carolina Press, pp. 222

further asserted that “third-party intervention is most likely to be successful when the parties have encountered what they call a ‘hurting stalemate’— a situation in which the parties feel uncomfortable and where events may be on the threshold of worsening, perhaps through an escalation of the conflict or getting better through the resolution of the conflict.”⁸⁰ This maybe particularly true if the parties both want to bring an end to their conflict but seek face-saving ways to do so, to prevent from damaging their image as negotiators.

However, as Hopmann argues, “the two camps may not necessarily share the desire to accept mediation with equal enthusiasm.”⁸¹ Parties in possession are less receptive of third-party efforts than are parties who feel that such efforts are likely to result in a solution or adjustment more favorable to them than the continuation of the status quo”⁸²

Given this, Indonesia, apart from waiting for the request, could also approach the Six-Party Talks members to offer the Third-Party good offices for the impasse. Its long-standing mediating experience in pursuing resolutions in international conflicts is of utmost significance for Indonesia to exert its role in the Peninsula. In addition, its consistent impartial role in the Peninsula serves best modality to (re-)gain the trust, support as well as legitimacy from the concerned stakeholders. After having the trust and legitimacy, Indonesia suffices to exert its P. Terrence Hopmann’s roles of Third-Party in the international disputes, notably (i) process facilitator; (ii) facilitator of the communication, compromise and

⁸⁰ Ibid.,

⁸¹ Ibid.,

⁸² Ibid., pp. 223

convergence; (iii) facilitator of cognitive change; (iv) formulator; and (v) manipulator⁸³.

However, the paper puts more weights on the first four roles of the Hopmann's concept. The fifth Manipulator role, as Hopmann argued, works best only for powerful as well as partisan mediators. It is clear to argue that Indonesia does not fall under strong power but Middle Power group. In addition, as among the most potential candidate of the Third-Party on the Six-Party Talks, Indonesia is relatively impartial in asserting its role. Therefore, the fifth role of Hopmann's Third-Party concept does not fit to be applied on the paper.in the Six-Party Talks to help explore positive-sum solutions for the parties concerned.

A. Process Facilitator

Hopmann defines "Process Facilitator" as a party who "tries to create conditions that are conducive to reaching agreement (good offices)".⁸⁴ This Facilitator, first, puts significant weight on how to make the disputants feel convenient in undertaking their negotiations. Offering avenue (facilities) for negotiations is therefore among their notable contributions to the negotiation.

Such "Process Facilitating" role is deeply rooted in the Indonesia's go-between role. Dating back to the Jakarta Informal Meeting in 1970s, Indonesia offered Jakarta to the concerned parties to conduct the negotiations. As the capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta, in that context,

⁸³ Hopmann, P. Terrence, "The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts", (Columbia: 1996), University of South Carolina

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 231

envisioned “neutrality” to all stakeholders. Under such a high-tense circumstance, neutrality is of utmost importance in ensuring the continuing dialogue to find positive-sum solutions.

In the Six-Party Talks context, Indonesia could propose Aceh (a city in Sumatra, western part of Indonesia) to be the “Facilitating” avenue. After struggling to fight against its long-standing and multi-faceted insurgency for three decades, Aceh has transformed to be a peaceful, vibrant and promising city through an extensive-but-worthwhile Peace Agreement between the government and the rebel group. Such association would, to some extent, best help build confidence and optimism among the parties concerned that positive-sum resolution is not unfeasible.

Secondly, Process Facilitator, as argued by Hopmann, may also help further improve communications among the disputants. They may listen to the parties and help them identify the space for bargaining—negotiable and non-negotiable undertakings. At a time when there is no bargaining space, the Process Facilitator will help create the “equilibrium” point, including “possible linkages and tradeoffs between non-negotiable issues that, when combined, may produce negotiable packages of issues”.⁸⁵ In addition, they also give contribution to the agenda setting. Identifying the easiest, which will put as the first agenda item, to the toughest issues, leaving to the last and final deliberation, to be put forward on the table is part of their responsibility, to this end.

⁸⁵ Ibid.,

Given the intricate and complex nature of the Six-Party Talks, Indonesia may garner insights and stakes from each and every party which later help them identify the bargaining space as well as (non-) negotiable issues to move the Talks. As shown in vast body of literature, Comprehensive, Verifiable and Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID) is the most un-negotiated issue on the Talks. For the DPRK, nuclear is not solely a weapon but mostly an ideology. While for the US (and its allies), this issue is equally principle to “*Jus Cogens*”⁸⁶. The US has taken upon itself the task of defending the NPT and has regarded it as an issue of principle that should not be compromised in a process of mutual concession-making (Buszyinski, 2013).

In the meantime, accountability and mutual respect deem to be the most tangible and earliest-harvest agenda item for the parties to put on the table. There has been a wide concern on the DPRK’s intention to make use of the (foreign) aid to further develop the nuclear program despite its original humanitarian function. Its “hermit” governance triggers wide suspicion on the foreign aid misconduct. On the other hand, the US faction lacked trust on the legitimacy of Kim Jong-un regime. Against this, it is feasible for Indonesia to convey to both parties to exercise accountability as well as respect the other’s political regime with a view to building confidence and trust between both sides which in turn may help the parties to make a progress of the Talks.

⁸⁶ The application of *Jus Cogens* in international law, which embraces the prohibition on genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery, racial discrimination, piracy and torture cannot be subject to compromise or mutual concession-making in negotiations (Buszyinski, 2013)

B. Facilitator of the Communication, Compromise and Convergence

Advocating mutual and simultaneous flexibility is a key role of this Facilitator of the Communication, Compromise and Convergence of Hopmann. Firstly and most importantly, they seek the principle and fundamental interests of each and every party. They may also identify the limit to the acceptable concession. Afterwards, it is of the Facilitator's "responsibility" to provide channels for the parties to exchange their basic information which serves among fundamental foundations for a successful negotiation.

Once communications lines have been opened, the next obstacle may often be the mutual fear of making initial concessions, which will likely be perceived by others as a sign of weaknesses.⁸⁷ To tackle this, the Facilitator may initiate a "private-reciprocated agreement" which ensures a two-way or simultaneous concession from each party which then could lead them to a tit-for-tat process towards convergence. "They may try to convey concessions by one party to the other as if they were proposals of the mediator rather than concessions extracted from the opponent."⁸⁸ By so doing, none of the party would lose their "face" in the negotiation. Also, it may make the proposals be less "challenged" by the other party.

The role of the US Assistant Secretary of State for East and Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher R. Hill on the landmark 2005 Joint

⁸⁷ Hopmann, P. Terrence, *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts*, (Columbia: 1996), University of South Carolina Press, pp. 232.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*,

Agreement serves as the best example for this facilitating role. Unlike the neo-conservatives, he supported the South's offer to provide electricity to the North and agreed to place the issue of the Light Water Reactors (LWRs) on the agenda.⁸⁹ It, in many ways, implied that the US recognized the DPRK nuclear program, despite a peaceful one, which, thus far, had been the toughest issue to be settled. That later gives a significant confidence to the DPRK to reciprocate the “flexibility”, notably dismantling their nuclear program.

Similar role may also be assumed by Indonesia. Having identified the most sensitive issues, Indonesia may establish mutual confidence to craft tit-for-tat concessions. Widely recognized as the impartial and neutral facilitator, Indonesia is of better leverage to convince the parties on the proposals as well as avoid each party losing their face in the negotiation. Joint Commission and Bilateral Meetings may offer an “amicable” avenue for Indonesia to undertake this facilitating role. By “disguising” the other parties’ concession under a wide and general agenda item, including “Regional Security Issues”⁹⁰, Indonesia may garner the opponent’s stance which in turn could lead to a mutually beneficial concession.

⁸⁹ Buszynski, Leszek, “Negotiating with North Korea: The Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue”, Routledge: 2013, New York, pp. 96

⁹⁰ Retrieved from an Interview with Mr. Lee Jaehyon, Senior Research Fellow on ASEAN and Oceania Studies Program, Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Seoul, Republic of Korea, October 21, 2016.

C. Facilitator of Cognitive Change

This facilitating role seems opposite of the previous one. Rather than trying to persuade the parties to change their positions along an issue dimension, in this case the mediator tries to induce the parties to change their preferences themselves through seeing the problem in a new light.⁹¹ Change of paradigm, in this context, is pivotal in leading to “conciliation”, “a process in which the mediators tries to modify the parties image of each other and to influence them to make concessions by clarifying to each his opponent’s views and the bargaining situation that both face”⁹². To do this, it is important to understand each other’s policy deeply or as Hopmann calls “to get into the shoes of other person”.

Such “image constructing” role entails a long-termed process. To better understand each other’s policy, Indonesia necessitates conduct unrelenting and continuous discussion and other trust-building measures with all the parties.⁹³ By so doing, Indonesia may come up with problem-solving resolutions to the parties concerned. Second-track or informal channel deems to be the most feasible and rationale way of engaging the other parties in a way to de-construct the stereotype. Informal shuttle diplomacy or other bilateral platforms may work to this end. Also, informal regional and multilateral platforms, such as the

⁹¹ Hopmann, P. Terrence, *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts*, (Columbia: 1996), University of South Carolina Press, pp. 234

⁹² Ibid.,

⁹³ Retrieved from an Interview with Mr. Lee Jaehyon, Senior Research Fellow on ASEAN and Oceania Studies Program, Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Seoul, Republic of Korea, October 21, 2016

Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)-like, is worth encouraging with a purpose to mainstream the image deconstruction to have a better and more constructive paradigm in reaching the problem-solving situation as well as to reduce misunderstandings.

D. Formulator

As implied on its name, Formulator brings new hope and new solutions to the negotiation stalemate. The mediator may function by encouraging the parties to brainstorm.⁹⁴ After listening to the parties' stake, the Formulator takes the lead to propose mutually beneficial and problem-solving solutions which was yet previously considered by either party.

Given this, brainstorming seems to be a major missing link in the Six-Party Talks rounds. Each and every party persists with their un-negotiable interests and goals. US-led faction perseveres with their CVID agenda. Beijing and Moscow, on the other hand, staunchly uphold on to the peace and stability prescription. Last but not least, Kim Jong-un and its previous administrations recognize nuclearization as their ideology and constitutional mandate.

Pruitt and Rin later proposed a roadmap that includes general to specific issues to resolve the stalemate. Recalling the 2005 Joint Agreement, there were no provisions for timing and scheduling. Neither did they stipulate when the disarmament would begin (Buszynski, 2013). Despite its complex and complicated issue, however, brainstorming on denuclearization or long-termed solution timetable or roadmap seems to

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 235.

be worth exploring by Indonesia should they assume the Formulator on the Six-Party Talks stalemate.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Perpetual peace and stability in the Peninsula remains a collective aspiration. The DPRK denuclearization poses a substantial and ubiquitous challenge to the region and beyond. A number of platforms have been undertaken to address this very issue. However, the long-awaited outcome remains elusive.

The Six-Party Talks, which is still regarded as the most plausible platform to address the DPRK issue by large number of scholars and policy makers, is yet to find converging interests on pursuing for permanent peaceful solutions in the Peninsula. As this paper argues, differences in interests and agendas deem to be the main impediment in fostering the resolutions. Each and every party, as theory called “Actor’s Approach”, staunchly holds on to their respective agenda which in turn leads to the political stalemate where compromise is yet to be reached.

As different factions pursue different interests, impartiality is, therefore, a key to help reconcile the divergence. However, impartiality could not be found in any members of the Talks as they clearly pursue their own interests on the platform. The emergence of Middle Power role in the regional as well as global architecture deems a promising alternative (Third-Party) in addressing the loophole. Its impartiality as well as neutrality in the conflicts turns to be their major modality in garnering political support as well as legitimacy to help reconcile the difference.

Indonesia, with its non-alignment and activism, starkly came up as the most potential candidate in helping explore positive-sum solutions on the Six-Party Talks. Indonesia remains committed to maintain its neutrality and impartiality in their foreign policy activism. Its long-standing mediating and Third-Party role in a number of international conflicts deem to be a valid argument in orchestrating Indonesia's as the most fitted candidate in helping explore peaceful resolution on the Six-Party Talks through its go-between role.

P. Terrence Hopmann's articulated four-pronged Third-Party approach to help Indonesia explore positive-sum solutions in the Six-Party Talks. Through being a process facilitator; facilitator of the communication, compromise and convergence; facilitator of cognitive change; and formulator, Indonesia is expected to be able to help concerned parties explore solutions to resume the Six-Party Talks. However, resolving disputes requires perseverance, persistence and flexibility. It is a long-termed process. Unless, there were an Aladdin's lamp which could have made the perpetual peace and stability in peninsula happened soon.

This research is one among a few references on the role of Middle Powers in the Korean Peninsula. Despite some flaws and limitations, the paper is expected to give significant contribution and foundation to the future researches on the mentioned area.

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요약 (국문초록)

6 자회담 재개의 필요성은 2008년 이래로 지금까지도 대두되고 있다. 회담의 각 참가국들은 여전히 그들의 서로 다른 견해를 통합할 수 있는 하나의 관점을 공유하지 못한 상태다. 상충되는 각국의 관심분야와 이해관계는 한반도의 평화적인 화합을 만들어내는 데에 있어 결정적인 장애물로 작용하고 있다. 그러므로 각국의 이해관계에 대한 형평성을 만들어내는 것이 6 자회담, 특히 한반도에게 있어 가장 중요한 열쇠로 여겨진다. 이것은 아직 심도 있게 고려되지 못한 사항이다. 중견국들의 새로운 역할은 막다른 길에 봉착한 현 정세에 대해 새로운 대안을 제시하는 것이다. 중견국들은 그들의 공평함을 가지고 제3당으로서의, 또는 중재국으로서의 역할을 주장할 수 있게 되었다. 본고는 호프만이 제시한 네 가지의 접근법을 통하여, 중견국 가운데서도 주요한 역할을 수행하고 있는 인도네시아가 한반도 정세에 새로운 희망을 제시할 수 있음을 제시하고자 한다.

주요어: 6 자회담, 한반도, 형평성, . 중견국, 교착 상태, 제3당, 중재,

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