Master's Thesis

Reconceptualizing Good Governance

Lessons learnt from the World Bank's Demand for Good Governance project in Cambodia

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ABSTRACT

Since its appearance in the late 1980s, the concept of good governance has become a nearly unavoidable part of development discourse emanating from international organizations such as the World Bank. Nonetheless, the concept has been criticized by scholars due to its tendency to be used as a justification for policies and projects which depoliticize power relations and neoliberal economics. Drawing on a framework of power in global governance, the case of the World Bank's Demand for Good Governance project in Cambodia is examined and several of the critiques of the concept of good governance are found to be justified in practice.

Building on the case study and the history of the idea of good governance and its critics, a reconceptualization is presented in an attempt to redefine the concept and avoid some of its issues by allowing it to be purely contextually defined via participation and ''repolitization''.

Keywords: Good governance, Cambodia, World Bank, Development discourse.

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Contents

I. Introduction

The world of international development is composed of a multitude of different actors that possess different sizes and fulfill different roles and niches. By any standards, the World Bank is considered one of the major players in the field and is relatively unique in that it possesses both formal economic resources via its access to a very significant amount of funds and the ideological power via the influence it exercises over donors and other actors. In this sense, the World Bank's position is particularly important in that it is one of the few actors able to directly translate its ideas into concrete projects and strongly support their adoption in developing countries via major funding support. While acknowledging this, it is important to not make the mistake of assuming that the World Bank's views on development have remained the same since its founding. Indeed, as a child of the Cold War, its ideological base has always been firmly capitalist and free market oriented. Nonetheless, within these parameters, there have been a variety of competing approaches and particular intellectual trends that have risen to prominence or fallen out of favour within the World Bank. For instance, this can be easily seen in the evolution of the World Bank's view on the role of the state in development.[1]

Another related area in which the impact of competing views within the World Bank has left its mark is in conception of good governance. First, a literature review of the major critiques and responses to the concept put forward by the World Bank will be

[1] In the context of this dissertation and to avoid confusion, the term ''development'' will be generally employed in the conventional ''mainstream'' sense of the word used by major organizations working in the development field, meaning that it is essentially used to signify increased economic growth and improved social welfare in the general sense. There exists a wealth of literature proposing a critical re-evaluation of the term which unfortunately falls mostly outside the scope of this dissertation. Please refer to Rist, 2003 for further reading.

conducted in order to identify competing conceptions of good governance and of its application in development aid and financing. Several different streams of critique and response to the concept will be identified within the two supporters and skeptics of good governance. Ultimately, the aim of the literature review will not be to simply identify and catalogue the intellectual debate around the concept of good governance but to provide us with a solid base for a re-elaboration of the concept in the final part of the dissertation.

Following the literature review, an analytical framework adapted from Barnett and Duvall's theorisation of power in global governance will be presented with the aim of applying it to the Cambodian case study in order to illustrate how different types of power work to produce a depoliticized form of good governance.

Following the presentation of the analytical framework, the dissertation will attempt to trace the history of the concept of good governance and the World Bank's role in its promotion and evolution. The dissertation will explain the initial optimism towards the role of the state in developmental theory followed by its rejection via the structural adjustment programs (SAPs). The failure of the SAPS then led to the rise of good governance discourse promoted by the World Bank to partially explain why the SAPs had failed without having to majorly re-examine the assumptions of neoliberal economics that formed the basis of the SAPs.

The penultimate section of this dissertation will consist of a case study of the World Bank's Demand for Good Governance project in Cambodia. This case study will be used to demonstrate the Bank's continuing usage of good governance as a method to increase its productive power and maintain relevance. The World Bank's DFGG project in Cambodia has been chosen for this dissertation due to its significance as a flagship World Bank project focused exclusively on governance issues**.** The Cambodian case is also relevant to the theoretical aspect of the thesis considering that it showcases some of the problematic aspects of the World Bank's focus on the shallow inclusion of civil society actors in good governance and its focus on technocratic fizes to political problems. The case study also illustrates the necessity of a reconceptualization taking academic critiques into account in order to ''democratize'' the concept of good governance. This Cambodian example serves to demonstrate that while the World Bank has updated its rhetoric on good governance to include civil society groups as partners, their influence remains weak and the interaction of different forms of power between those involved in the project produce a depoliticized form of good governance, which benefits both the Bank and the Cambodian government in different ways.

The final part of the dissertation will attempt to reconceptualize the idea of good governance and draw on its critiques to redefine the concept in a way which can provide guidance while avoiding ''universal solutionism'', acknowledging the importance of politics and power and position external actors as equals to those they purport to help.

II. Literature Review

Since its ‘’official’’ beginning after the end of World War II and President Truman’s Point Four Program[2], the field of international development has adopted its own set of expressions in tune with the academic trends of the era and developed a jargon of its own which can be nebulous and daunting to outsiders. The concept of ‘’Good Governance’’ is no exception and following its first major appearance in the World Bank’s 1989 Report, it has become a common term adopted by most major donor organizations and its meaning has expanded to the extent that some commentators have called for the retirement of the term. Regardless of its worth, the term remains in use today and actors in the development field regularly characterize interventions with the language of good governance. The term has been a source of controversy and there have been various major academic responses coming from different perspectives which sought to support the new focus on institutions or criticize some aspects of the term and contest its usage and the implicit agenda critics associated with the term and its proponents. This section of the dissertation will attempt to review the major responses to the idea in order to later reformulate the concept of good governance in a way that takes into account common critiques.

[2] The genesis of international development as a professional field is somewhat controversial as some aspects of international development can be concretely linked to colonialism while the ideology of development has been traced back to Antiquity. (Rist, 2003) However, its genesis as a professional field in a form similar to today came in the Post-World War II Era. (Abrahamsen, p16)

1. Good Governance or Good Enough Governance?

As mentioned in the previous section, after 1989, the idea of good governance rapidly took hold outside the World Bank and was adopted by other international institutions, influencing their work and the form of interventions and projects. The rise of good governance also naturally gave birth to scholarship seeking to better understand the relationship between good governance and economic growth or other popular development indicators. Several scholars believed to have found a strong correlation between several common good governance indicators and development outcomes.

For instance, Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón created an index of governance indicators and found that ‘’better’’ governance consistently resulted in higher economic development indices. The governance indicators chosen consisted of ‘’voice and accountability’’, ‘’political instability and violence’’, ‘’governance effectiveness’’, ‘’rule of law’’, ‘’regulatory burden’’ and finally, ‘’graft’’. (Kaufmann et al, 1999) Some responses to the study have criticized an aspect of their methodology, namely, that these indices were built from the self-reported perceptions of citizens, enabling the possibility of inconsistency between perception and reality. Others have observed similar findings and support the idea that institutions rated highly by investors and other monitors are the most important factor in economic development. Around the same time, prominent scholars such as Jeffrey Sachs argued that institutions and good governance were not the key to economic growth and higher incomes. (Sachs, 2001, 2003) They focused instead on the importance of environmental factors such as climate conditions, geographic location and the presence of diseases like malaria as the major factors predicting income levels in developing countries rather than good or bad institutions. This led to a wave of studies by proponents of good governance to attempt to prove that institutions matter more than environmental factors in determining income levels. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson found that good institutions were more important than the impact of climate on incomes. They point to European colonialism as the cause of an ''institutional reversal'', which resulted in the forced implantation of institutions focused on resource extraction in populous areas with abundant primary goods, leading to dysfunctional institutions unable to govern well after independence. Conversely, they argued that areas which were sparsely inhabited prior to colonization encouraged colonizers to settle and create good institutions for their own governance, setting themselves up for success after independence. (Acemoglu et al, 2001, 2002) Rodrik, Subramian and Trebbi find similar results when comparing the effects of institutions on income levels to the effects of trade and geographical factors such as the existence of exploitable oil resources or the percentage of a country's territory situated in the tropics. Their findings were consistent with the idea that institutions are the most important factor in development but warned practioners to refrain from attempting to impose a ''one-size-fits-all'' form of institutions. (Rodrik et al, 2004)

The concept of good governance has been found useful but flawed by other scholars. Preeminent among these is Merilee Grindle. Grindle believes that the concept is useful in drawing attention to institutional factors of development but that the impact of good governance has been inflated and it is certainly not a panacea that can resolve all issues within a country. (Grindle, 2008) Grindle observes that since from 1997 to 2002, the concept of good governance dramatically increased in importance in World Bank publications and the number issues linked to the concept went from 46 to 116, demonstrating the expansion of the concept across all aspects of development. This is problematic because positioning good governance as the source of development does not explain how good governance actually develops and why many countries who are viewed as successful do not possess good governance by international standards. Conversely, there are a number of countries which are credited with good governance but are not considered as development successes by donors and researchers, particularly when democracy is conflated with good governance. By bringing up these examples, Grindle argues that the relationship between development and good governance is not as clear as it seems. To limit the inflation of this idea, Grindle has proposed to instead focus on ‘’good enough governance’’ which would focus not on the ideal qualities of a government but rather on the minimal characteristics needed to support development. In this optic, interventions must be adapted to different local contexts and political analysis remains very pertinent to identify what works and what doesn't in each country. This also implies that good governance can be defined in differing ways depending on what a population prioritizes. (Grindle, 2004, 2007) It also implies that not all issues related to governance can be addressed at once and more limited approaches may have more success. This analysis draws on the work of other scholars who have studied the rise of the East Asian developmental states and the successes of other countries despite the lack of good governance in the way the Bank envisions it. Several other scholars have used Grindle's concept of good enough governance to study the effectiveness of governance focused interventions in very varied contexts and have found Grindle's exhortation to locally focused analysis leading to tailored interventions to be useful. (Evans, 2012; Jabeen, 2007; Booth, 2011) Some have found that a global focus on empowering local government instead of the usual focus on national level governments can be the way to translate good enough governance into real contexts, particularly in post-conflict situations. (Brinkerhoff and Johnson, 2008)

There are some scholars who see a similarity between the idea of good enough governance and the developmental state, particularly in the East Asian context. The concept can be used to explain why economic growth and improvement in several measures coexisted with corruption and cronyism in other areas. Both models also emphasize the need for incremental changes over sudden ones and the importance of good governance in some areas. Ultimately, for them, the role of external actors is to support potential developmental states instead of trying to create one through their interventions. (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007) Some scholars, such as Leftwich, find the concept of good governance useful in a similar way but criticize the World Banks technical approach which downplays the role of politics in creating developmental states. He argues that the World Bank's focus on the managerial aspects of good governance and the democratic focus of Western aid agencies are unlikely to succeed in producing either good governance or democracy. (Leftwich, 1993)

2. Good Governance: depoliticizing neoliberalism?

There are many scholars who are critical of the concept of good governance, particularly in the form initially presented by the World Bank. A persistent critique of the concept of good governance as elaborated by the World Bank and other actors in the development field perceived as being aligned with neoliberalism has been that their idea of good governance consists of a ''soft'' way to introduce neoliberal-inspired policies and governance under the guise of civil society involvement or increased accountability. In *Disciplining Democracy,* Rita Abrahamsen links the idea of good governance to neoliberal modernization and argues that the due to the unpopularity and failure of the SAPs, the World Bank has pushed a superficial, pared down version of democracy in Africa that, if adopted, would result in weak democracies geared to serving the needs of international donors instead of their own populations. (Abrahamsen, 2000) Abrahamsen starts by showing how, beginning in the 1989 report which marked the first official expression of the concept of good governance by the World Bank, promoters of the idea have tried to present it as an idea rooted in local ''traditional'' concepts and supported by the public.

First, by linking the idea of good governance up with tradition and civil society support, the Bank is able to differentiate its concept from previous concepts or policies that have fallen out of favour, such as ''modernization'' or adjustment programs, which makes the idea of good governance more palatable in appearance even if it is often very similar in practice to older unpopular ideas. It also allows the concept to be more easily adopted by governments working with the Bank because they are able to claim that the Bank's recommendations take into account and reflect traditional institutions and values, making them appear less controversial. Presenting the idea of good governance in this manner also allows proponents of the concept to subtly delegitimize the role of the state in development by associating the traditional sector and economy with the ''modern'' private sector even if in reality these are distinct and sometimes incompatible. (Abrahamsen, 2000, p46-50)

Second, the discourse of good governance links up free market capitalism with liberal democracy and state intervention with authoritarianism, thus, presenting more restrictions on the role of the state or even austerity measures as democratic. The assumption underlying this is that restricting the state will lead to a decentralization of decision making and thus, more popular representativeness and the empowerment of civil society within countries adhering to good governance. Abrahamsen also criticizes the simple dichotomy established by the World Bank opposing civil society and state, noting that reality is not as simple with civil society and the state often blending together. Furthermore, this representation ignores the fact that civil society is not inherently democratic or undemocratic bur rather heterogeneous and thus casting it as necessarily democratic is misleading and serves only to further delegitimize the state and give credence to neoliberal policies.

Abrahamsen's critique echoes John Harriss' critique of the World Bank's adoption of the concept of social capital. Similar to Abrahamsen, Harriss argues that the World Bank has employed the concept of social capital as elaborated by Robert Putnam in a way that depoliticizes relations of power in development. This is done through radical simplification and the shallow glorification of civil society as an agent of popular will and agency without examining the ways in which some forms of civil society associations can end up hindering popular agency and solidify power structures. This glorifications is also done at the expense of the state and ultimately legitimizes neoliberal policies by positioning civil society as the locus of development, delegitimizing state intervention by associating it with past failures and authoritarianism. (Harriss, 2001, p111-21)

Other authors, such as Catherine Weaver and Demmers et al have argued that the World Bank's corruption focused good governance agenda was adopted as a way to approach political topics in a seemingly technical fitting with the Bank's neoliberal economics-focused internal culture. (Weaver, 2008, p92-139; Demmers et al, 2004) Indeed, as Weaver describes, the World Bank's internal culture has been dominated by economists since its inception and has employed very few other types of social scientists until recently. In addition to this, Section 10 of the Articles of Agreement explicitly prohibited political activity and this was interpreted in a very strict way until the early 1990s. Together, this resulted in an internal culture narrowly focused on economics and seemingly apolitical projects until the emergence of the good governance agenda. Promoters of this concept were successful in getting it adopted due to a confluence of factors which made it compatible with the Bank's institutional culture.

First, Weaver explains that by presenting the concept of good governance in an apolitical and technically focused manner, proponents were able to appeal to the economics oriented internal culture of the Bank. This made the topic of governance seemingly fit in with other concepts the Bank already employed, such as public sector efficiency, privatization, pro-free market legal reform and so on. Kiely links the adoption of good governance to the Bank's need to integrate the emergence of the East Asian tigers into its neoliberal model and reinterpret political decision making and state interventionism. By reinterpreting the East Asian cases to fit its idea of good governance, the Bank attempted to demonstrate that the role of the state was to ensure a free market via ''market friendly interventions'' and relatively fair institutions, consistent with its neoliberal model. (Kiely, 1998) Similarly, Stein argues that the adoption of the good governance agenda simply consisted of a rebranding of neoliberal policies in the 1990s and later in the 2000s as a rebranding of Bank activities as a whole as older programs were reclassified and reinterpreted as activities pertaining to good governance. (Stein, 2008, p42-45)

Second, promoters of the concept were able to capitalize on the appointment of president Wolfensohn and link up good governance with his anti-corruption agenda. Additionally, outside pressure from anti-corruption focused NGOs and the United States forced the World Bank to at least commit in image to anti-corruption efforts in order to appease critics. The contradiction between the Bank's internal culture of fund disbursement and pressure to reduce corruption in Bank projects shaped the form the governance agenda took and steered it to be relatively shallow and focused on balancing internal and external pressure, preventing serious political engagement.

While there has been a lot of scholarship on the depoliticizing and neoliberalizing aspects of the World Bank's good governance discourse, others have interpreted it as an institutional reaction to the failure of the Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1980s-early 1990s allowing the Bank to shift the blame on countries and away from itself, redeeming its credibility and reforming its expertise. (Best, 2014) This interpretation is not incompatible with the one presented previously but serves to provide a different explanation for the rise to prominence of the discourse of good governance within the Bank and differs in its evaluation of the Bank's view of the state. Jacqueline Best argues that the first appearance of good governance in the Bank's 1989 report on Sub-Saharan Africa serves to portray countries in the region as responsible for the failures of the SAPs instead of admitting that these policies had several inherent problems. Thus, rent-seeking behaviour on the part of state elites is cast as one of the main obstacles to development instead of other factors such as the structure of the world capitalist economy among others. Following this, the Bank developed new forms of expertise pertaining to governance and incorporated them in its neoliberal framework. Best argues that the Bank's has attempted to transform Western ideas of governance into universal, ''black-boxed'' facts in which it possesses unique expertise, justifying further intervention. This was exemplified by the adoption of institutionalist economics and the World Bank's new focus on promoting institutional reforms as a solution to development issues. Civil society within developing countries was also reconstituted as a group of ''citizen-consumers'', whose role is to consume governmental services and judge their efficiency via monitoring mechanisms. Following this, the role of the state becomes to provide certain services in the most efficient and transparent manner possible. This interpretation differs from the post-independence view of the state as the locus of development but also differs from the structural adjustment era ''hardcore'' neoliberal view espousing the most minimal state possible. Under this new paradigm, the state is encouraged to provide some services, as long as it is done in an efficient manner. Countries are then graded and ranked according to newly developed indicators measuring various aspects of good governance and compete among each other for funding. For Best, the Bank's embrace of civil society and institutional reform constitutes an example of the productive power of international organizations, as outlined by Michael Barnett in the framework presented in the next session of the dissertation. This dynamic will be further examined in the Cambodian Demand for Good Governance case study, which Best briefly mentions in her argument. (Best, 2008, p127)

III. Theoretical Framework

To interpret the case study presented in this dissertation, Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall's framework of the four different types of power, presented in *Power in Global Governance* (2005) will be used. In their book, Barnett and Duvall draw on the mass of rich scholarship concerned with power and its different forms of manifestation to identify four different types of power in global governance. While this framework was not directly developed to apply to the concept of good governance, the discourse of good governance itself certainly forms part of the larger sphere of global governance and can constitute an expression of power. Indeed, global governance is generally interpreted as being the management of issues on a global scale via more or less open and participatory global institutions. For instance, the management of trade issues through the World Trade Organization. Additionally, international organizations such as the World Bank are often able to use their power to set priorities and define issues and their solutions at the global scale.

However, Barnett and Duvall rightly point out that the critical idea of power relations in the context of global governance has been mostly ignored and the narrative of liberal institutionalism has held strong despite the obvious fact that institutions are never really neutral and can be utilized to project power in various ways. The framework created by the authors helps illustrate the four different types of power which are present within global institutions in a direct or diffuse manner. The concept of good governance can be interpreted as an extension of the way in which actors involved in global governance attempt to project power via discourse and ideological constructs.

The framework developed by Barnett and Duvall establishes four different types of power that work in different ways. The first of these is also the most overt and well known form of power: compulsory direct power. Compulsory direct power is not particularly complicated, it is the ability to force another party to perform an action through the direct use of force. Generally, this is not a very subtle form of power. However, it is important to note that Barnett and Duvall alter the definition of power which they borrow from Robert Dahl (1957) to allow the possibility of power being exercised in an unintentional way. Thus, actors can exercise compulsory power on others without being aware of it through the unintended consequences of their actions. Compulsory power can also be deployed in non-physical ways by an actor to pressure another into doing something. For instance, a country putting diplomatic pressure on another or investigative journalists exposing unethical acts by government officials to try and make them step down or change.

The second type of power identified by Barnett and Duvall is institutional power. Here, the expression of power becomes more subtle as actors attempt to control others in an indirect fashion via the rules of a particular institution. To do this, an actor does not need to completely control a particular institution but merely needs to have significant influence over it. For instance, this can take the form of influence over the creation of its rules and formal structure. The establishment of the World Bank itself can be seen as an example of this form of power. Without going into too much detail about the Bank's long history, the World Bank and the other Bretton Woods institutions were clearly intended to serve as a vehicle for Western and particularly US interest in the post-World War II era. (Peet, 2009)

The third type of power in the framework is structural power. Structural power is usually exercised in a more direct way as it essentially consists of power derived from the structural or social position of two actors in their relationship. To put it simply, the position of actors in a certain system or structure represents a power relationship that constrains how they are able to act. Not only does their position in the structure determine what actions they are able to take but it also defines what they view as their interests. A classic example of this is the concept of social class. Social class influences how people perceive the world, how they are perceived by others, restricts or expands their potential options and shapes how they view themselves. In the international field, the neoliberal world order and the institutions it has spawned can be seen as a similar system, albeit with a certain form of ''fairness'' present by design in order to bolster the system's legitimacy and make the status quo relatively sustainable. (Kapstein in Barnett, Duvall, p89-101, 2005) The ability of the IFIs to make various countries accept loans and assistance with heavy conditionality during the structural adjustment period of the 1980s and 1990s can also be seen as a result of structural power. Indeed, as Jacqueline Best points out, while countries were free to refuse the assistance offers of the IFIs, the consequence of doing so would be serious balance of payment crises, international criticism and isolation along with economic recession. (Best, p61-2, 2014) Thus, the structure of the international system essentially forced countries to accept conditionality and remain in the good grace of the IFIs.

Finally, the fourth type of power in the framework: productive power. This type of power is particularly relevant to the concept of global governance as it is the production of ideology or discourse which influences actors in a way similar to the structural form of power. The creation and reinterpretation of ideas and concepts within a particular field creates shared meanings and understandings that determines what actors see as acceptable, abnormal or ideal which, in turn, can serve as justification for the exercise of power. Labels and identities created by such types of discourse also shapes how actors perceive each other and themselves.

The concept of ''good governance'' itself serves a prime example of a constructed discourse which serves to create categories that classify policies and potential actions as acceptable or not and thus delimit the boundaries that actors are allowed to operate in and discouraged to overstep.

Visually summarized, Barnett and Duvall summarize their typology of power like this:

Figure 1.

Barnett and Duvall Framework Types of Power[3]		*Relational Specificity*	
		Direct	*Diffuse*
Power works through	*Interactions of specific actors*	Compulsory	Institutional
	Social relations of constitution	Structural	Productive

[3] Table reproduced from Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p12

This framework has been chosen over other potential options due to its direct application to the analysis of the case studies as a function of its identification of diverse types and sources of power. The framework, with the inclusion of productive, structural and institutional forms of power can help us understand some of the sources of the World Bank's authority and power along with its ability to produce the discourse of good governance and associate developmental successes with the concept, further bolstering its credibility and presence in the field of development. The case of Cambodia will be examined in order to illustrate how these four types of power intersect in the World Bank's Demand for Good Governance project. The purpose of identifying the typology of power in the Cambodian project will be to demonstrate that the concept of good governance remains a source of power and authority for the World Bank despite the nominal inclusion of civil society groups. The Bank's approach to good governance in Cambodia will be portrayed as a conservative middle ground which serves to depoliticize the political economy of corruption and ''bad governance'' in order to present it to government and civil partners as a problem resolvable by technically focused intervention spearheaded by itself.

IV. The State, Neoliberalism and the Emergence of Good Governance

The history of the concept of ''Good Governance'' is linked with the major Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) working with developing countries, namely, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and especially the World Bank (WB). These institutions were responsible for promoting the term and its adoption in the vocabulary of development practitioners and academics in the late 1980s. To understand where the term comes from and its meaning, it is critical to place it within the historical and institutional context from which it emerged.

1. The state as a motor of development

Perceptions of the role of the state in development have greatly shifted during the 20th century. In the post-World War II world, development theorists posited that state intervention and leadership in the domestic economy of developing countries would allow them to create a ''big push'' and rapidly develop their economies. Several influential post-war thinkers believed that the state would be able to support the emerging national private sector industries by investing in them and providing them with the support they needed to flourish. Naturally, there was significant debate around the specifics of what this would entail but it can be said that there was a general optimism towards the state's capacity to bring about development.

Some scholars, notably Arthur Lewis, believed that the essentially unlimited unproductive surplus labour in the massive agricultural sector of developing countries would be able to be channeled by the state into working for development. To do this, the state would need to intervene and break the bottleneck in the economy which appeared as a consequence of the lack of skilled labour, productive resources and capital in developing countries. To do this, the state could provide credit to industrialists and work to maintain a balance via taxation and regulation between the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy to ensure that optimal productivity is achieved. (Lewis, 1954, p189-191) (Polanyi, 2008) Concretely, this meant more than simply providing the industries with access to the credit they needed. This implied that the state would play a critical role in the economy by building the required infrastructure to ensure that industry would have access to the necessary technological inputs and markets, provide adequate access to education and healthcare for workers and so on.

Notably, around the same time, W.W. Rostow's infamous evolutionary model of development outlined in *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, also became influential among government officials in the West interested in bolstering the strength of allied developing countries against the threat of communism. Rostow's theory positioned countries in a teleological continuum with 5 different stages through which a country would be able to progress as it developed. (Rostow, 1960). While Rostow's theory was obviously and unapologetically capitalist, much like in Miller's model, the state had a large role to play in ensuring that the ''take off'' would happen via the funneling of profits into industrial investment and the dissemination of modern science, technology and infrastructure. Additionally, the state was expected to play a centralizing nation-building role to bring the disparate social classes and interest groups which coexisted in traditional society into the developing capitalist economy.

Other development theorists, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, focused on examining the unfavourable terms of trade which characterized economic relations and commerce between developing and developed countries. Indeed, in general, they believed that by mostly exporting and producing primary commodities, developing countries locked themselves into dependency on the West and other industrialized trade partners and would never really be able to develop without breaking this exploitative relationship. The analysis of the precise economic mechanics behind this dependent relationship differed to an extent among dependency theorists but, generally, the idea was that countries producing finished goods were able to continuously profit from the plus value generated by the transformation of imported raw materials into finished goods resold in primary resource exporting countries. Thus, resource exporting countries were generally believed to be in a disadvantageous position as they were unable transform their own resources into finished goods and mostly had to import these goods from abroad, rendering them dependent on imports.

Like the other influential post-war development thinkers briefly mentioned, the dependency theorists also viewed the state as critical in fostering development. To do this, the state needed to break the dependence on foreign imports by creating domestic industry capable of producing finished goods and encouraging self-reliance. This could be done through various means, notably via heavy subsidies to allow industry to acquire the capital it needed to start the process or through the state ownership of key industries.

During this period, the World Bank was happy to provide funds to developing countries in order to help them enact their ambitious development plans and prevent the spread of communism, consistent with the ideas presented by Truman in his Point Four program and later, Robert McNamara. While the Bank remained committed to free market capitalism, states were seen as important and necessary technical managers of development and the Bank loaned large amounts of money to states involved in poverty reduction, basic infrastructure construction and meeting basic needs during Robert McNamara's presidency. (Peet, p135-136, 2009)

Unfortunately, for various reasons, reality did not play out as the theorists had hoped and very few developing countries were able to successfully ''take off'' as they had hoped. Optimism towards the state's capacity to bring about development melted away as serious issues with import substitution industrialization and other state-led development strategies became apparent in the late 1970s and 1980s. This resulted in an influx of theories and concepts seeking to explain what had gone wrong and why reality had fallen far short of what was promised.

2. Disillusionment towards the state and the rise of neoliberalism

Coinciding with the disappointing results of development efforts throughout the world, scepticism towards the involvement of the state in the economy had independently risen to prominence within the West, as neoliberal economics became the most popular branch of economics and governments pledging to reform and reduce the presence of the state were elected in the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) were not immune to the spread of neoliberalism and were also put in the position of having to respond to the economic problems and crises which were appearing primarily in Latin America and Africa. Taking advantage of the difficult economic situation in several developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the BWIs were able to leverage their considerable power as development financiers and their credibility as ''neutral'' and ''apolitical'' technical experts to propose a solution to restore economic stability and growth to the developing world. (Best, 2014, p48) The solution put forth by the IMF and the World Bank came in the form of the infamous Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). While the SAPs differed to an extent depending on which country they were being implemented in and which institution they were being designed by, the common thread which held the programs together was their attempt to push governments into adopting economic austerity measures. Concretely, this could take the form of privatization of state owned enterprises, reorientation of the economy towards an export focus, reduction or elimination of subsidies on various goods or industries and the reduction of social welfare measures.

Following their implementation, it became quickly apparent that the SAPs were certainly not as effective as promised and their results were mixed to say the least. Indeed, on pure economic grounds, the SAPs were mostly unable to deliver the economic growth they had promised and financial liberalization did not succeed in creating a competitive export-oriented industrial base in most countries which adopted SAPs. Furthermore, the SAPs seemed to have worsened poverty and precarity in many countries. This was particularly evident in sub-Saharan Africa, where the abolition of various subsidies on vital services and products led to significant increases in the price of staple goods and healthcare, contributing to increased marginalization of the poor. (Peet, p158-162, 2010)

Naturally, the SAPs were extremely unpopular in most developing countries and led to social unrest and increased hardship for a significant amount of people in targeted countries as the subsidized goods they relied on shot up in price and newly elected governments were forced to break their electoral promises and cut back expenses to please creditors. Ultimately, the SAPs were harshly criticized and the BWIs were forced to admit that they had not lived up to expectations. This greatly undermined the credibility of the IMF and the World Bank considering that it relied on their so-called technical expertise which had failed to deliver results in a spectacular way as several of the SAP adopting countries failed to show any significant development as a result of the adoption of the programs. (Best, 2014, p74-76, 85) A few years later, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dramatic failure of neoliberal marketization policies (shock therapy) supported by the IMF and the World Bank further damaged the credibility of these institutions and their ability to stabilize economic conditions and create prosperity. (Weaver, 2008, p96-97)

However, for the BWIs, what was at fault was not the design of the SAPs but rather the lack of commitment on the part of recipient countries and imperfect implementation of the recommended policies. In their view, the fault of the international institutions lay with faulty assumptions about how institutions functioned within the countries adopting the SAPs. Thus, the task of fixing these malfunctioning institutions by increasing their efficiency, accountability and transparency became part of the solution proposed by the World Bank. (Weaver, 2008, p96, 98)

3. Good Governance: The return of politics at the World Bank

The failure of the SAPs led the World Bank to expand its range of operations into more clearly political fields, namely, the construction and reform of governance institutions as a way to distance itself from the failures of the past and remain relevant. (Abrahamsen, 2000, p49) During the late 1980s, governance issues slowly started being approached in World Bank discourse on Sub-Saharan Africa as a report examining the region's economic crisis clearly cast the region's lack of proper governance as one of the major sources of its problems. The inclusion of governance issues in the report was also inspired by the input of African scholars, who were concerned with the lack of development under authoritarian regimes but also by the numerous problems stemming from the Bank's SAPs. (Mkandawire, 2007) While a relatively minor part of the overall report, a section pointed to the lack of free press and accountability, patronage politics and corruption fuelled by Western aid as sources of the ''governance crisis'' in Sub-Saharan Africa. (World Bank, 1989, p60-61) This was not without controversy as Section 10 of the Bank's founding Articles of Agreement prohibited the Bank from engaging in political matters: *The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes* *stated in Article I.* (IBRD, 1989, Section 10) Despite being clearly associated with the United States during the Cold War and certainly using obviously political criteria for project selection in many cases during the Cold War period, the Bank had always tried to present itself as neutral by focusing solely on ''technical'' programs. This had traditionally been viewed as one of key strengths of the Bank which allowed it to expand its power and authority in the field of development. Compared to more technical programs such as general financial assistance and loans for infrastructure construction, the Bank's entry into the field of governance could not be easily portrayed as apolitical considering the fundamental nature of the topic. At the same time, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western donor countries active in the Bank became increasingly interested in governance reform for the newly dependent post-Soviet countries. Combined with the increasing prominence of the discourse of governance and institutionalism in academia, the topic of governance became unavoidable. (Weaver, 2008, p106) This created enough unease within the Bank to force the Bank's top legal advisor to reinterpret Section 10 and develop a legal framework so that the Bank could engage in programs pertaining to governance without issue. (Lateef, 2016, p3-4) The new framework allowed the Bank to promote governance reform programs as long as the Bank did not get involved in partisan politics or favour a particular party within a country over others and maintained the appearance of neutrality. The Bank would also only be able to support governance reform initiatives if they were being undertaken for primarily economic reasons, meaning that it would not be able to support democratization efforts but it would be able to support increased monitoring mechanisms and anti-corruption programs. This shaped the form of what the Bank would promote as good governance and the types of projects it would get involved in. A discussion paper on governance issued in 1991 to support the reinterpretation of Section 10, outlines key areas of governance in which the Bank can assist: improving public sector management, accountability, predictability and the legal framework for development and lastly, information and transparency. (World Bank 1991, p8-12) While the concept of ''good governance'' itself is not clearly defined by the Bank in the paper, it can be inferred that it is mostly in tune with neoliberalism, with the state's role being to provide some public services and functioning legal institutions to support the free market in exchange for the tax revenue from citizens to finance these. Even if good governance itself is not precisely defined, what constitutes ''poor governance'' is. Indeed, poor governance is defined in the report as states making no distinction between private and public goods leading to the misuse of public funds, legal systems that are unpredictable or corrupt, the presence of too much ''bureaucratic red tape'' hindering the development of the market and non-transparent decision making in public administration. (World Bank 1991, p5-6). There is no mention of the environment and human rights, most likely to avoid any potential issue under Section 10 of the Bank's Articles of Agreement. The concept of good governance was gradually adopted precisely due to its relative vagueness and flexibility in the sense that it can incorporate aspects of both public management and political activity without having to clearly commit to a particular political system or set of precise policies. (Doornbos, 2003, p7)

Governance issues became somewhat mainstream in the World Bank with the appointment of James Wolfensohn as president of the World Bank and his infamous 1996 ''Cancer of Corruption'' speech which essentially positioned the issue of corruption as the fundamental factor holding back countries from economic development. (Best, 2014, p120) Consequently, at this point, the Bank remained primarily concerned with trying to reduce rent-seeking behaviour within states and reducing corruption in the hope that it would foster economic development. However, this mainstreaming was hampered by the fact that the Bank's staff was mostly composed of economists who had a rather shallow understanding of how institutions actually form and change. Programs adopted by the Bank thus tended to be conceived from a mostly top-down perspective and attempted to change institutions within developing countries in the same way. The Bank's institutional culture also favoured fund disbursement above all else, hampering the depth of anti-corruption efforts that could have resulted in less fund disbursement. (Weaver, 2008, p113-115, 121-2) This led the Bank to satisfy itself with the creation of new monitoring institutions and changing formal institutional structures to reduce corruption via laws or conditionality in loans without actually trying to understand why these institutions had developed in such a way or what purpose informal institutions such as patronage networks played in certain countries. In rhetoric, the Bank acknowledged these problems and the cultural/historical differences between countries which affected how institutions evolved but in practice, the Bank's institutional culture favouring narrow economically focused projects, top-down design and fund disbursement hindered the creation of long term, country-adapted, demand driven projects in the field of governance. (Weaver, 2008, p117-120)

4. Good governance in the Post-Washington Consensus era

The concept of good governance initially served as a way for the Bank to support its policies and recommendations in the wake of the failure of the structural adjustment programs while remaining mostly consistent with the dominant neoliberal ideology within the Bank. The political nature of good governance also gave the Bank more latitude to manoeuvre in when it came to policy recommendations and allowed it to support anti-corruption programs that it believed would make the state more efficient but also bolster the trust of donor countries who would feel more secure that their funds were not being wasted. However, as the discourse of good governance became more mainstream, its meaning started evolving further. The World Bank's idea of good governance may have been originally conceived as a relative narrow technocratic concept emphasizing the necessity of transparent, rational and accountable state management but, as its flaws became apparent, the concept expanded to include more overtly political ideas as it was adopted by development actors other than the World Bank. This was further compounded by the fact that the influence of ''hardcore'' neoliberalism within the Bank was waning in the latter half of the 1990s. (Best, 2014, p48-9, 150-1) Indeed, the idea that economic growth would ensure development alone became increasingly challenged as some countries experienced significant economic growth but also enduring poverty, inequality and unrest. Furthermore, the idea of governance conditionality as a way to force governments to implement reforms also went out of favour as it became clear that conditionality was far less effective than what had been envisioned and mostly succeeded in harming relations between donors, recipient countries and civil society groups. Additionally, in addition to the stream of criticisms that had been directed at the World Bank after the failure of the SAPs, the Bank became the subject of more criticism from groups that had their rights violated in various ways as a side-effect of Bank projects.

Together, this resulted in what has been described as the ''post-Washington Consensus'' era at the World Bank. (Carroll, 2010, p21-5) This period is characterized by the World Bank's promotion of a softer version of neoliberal policies which allow a more significant role for the state and tries to foster ownership of Bank recommended reforms through ownership instead of conditionality. The post-Washington Consensus era is also characterized by the spread of the discourse of good governance across all actors in the development field and the subsequent expansion of the term. Indeed, the term has been adopted by most major aid agencies and has expanded to incorporate differing elements perceived as ''good'' to the extent that ascribing a particular overall meaning to the concept is rather difficult. As Gisselquist notes; *good governance means different things not only to different organizations, but also to different actors within these organizations*. (Gisselquist, 2012, p21) Additionally, the purported benefits of good governance have greatly increased over time as the idea became credited with positive effects in poverty reduction, environmental conservation, land reform, eradication of HIV/AIDS, labour standards and much more. (Grindle, 2008, p8) However, while there have been some contradictions and changes within the World Bank regarding the meaning of the term ''good governance'', its core meaning has generally remained consistent with the initial conceptualization of the term. The Bank remained focused on accountability and transparency, with some occasional more overtly political additions related to representativity of government. In the words of Paul Wolfowitz, president of the World Bank from 2005-2007: *We call it good governance. It is essentially the combination of transparent and accountable institutions, strong skills and competence, and a fundamental willingness to do the right thing. Those are the things that enable a government to deliver services to its people efficiently.* (World Bank, 2007, p1) During his short term, Wolfowitz attempted to make anti-corruption efforts central at the World Bank to an unprecedented extent but was perceived as too confrontational by some donors and faced opposition within the Bank due to his own hypocrisy in the matter and his misunderstanding of World Bank institutional culture. (Weaver, 2008, p135-6)

Another way that the World Bank responded to some of the failures and criticisms regarding its first iteration of the concept of good governance has been to try and include the ''demand'' side of good governance in projects. The aim of this is to try and encourage ''ownership'' of its recommendations by including civil society groups in some of its projects and tailoring its approach to issues that are particularly relevant to a particular country as outlined by both its government and some domestic civil society groups. The aptly named ''Demand for Good Governance'' framework developed by the Bank constitutes an example of this that will be examined in the Cambodian case study later in the dissertation. The Cambodian case study is significant in illustrating that despite the evolution of the Bank's discourse and its focus on citizen ''demand'' for good governance, in practice, it does not seem like there has been much deviation from previous iterations of the concept and its technocratic interpretation serving to increase the World Bank's power and authority.

V. Demand for Good Governance, the case of Cambodia

In the previous parts of this dissertation, we have examined the history of the concept of good governance, in particular its linkage to the World Bank. We have also looked over the various responses to the concept that have been developed since the idea has become ‘’mainstreamed’’ in the development field. This section will attempt to illustrate how the World Bank implements its ideas about good governance in a concrete setting, namely, the Demand for Good Governance (DFGG) project in Cambodia. The case of Cambodia is also particularly relevant considering that the Bank’s activities in the country had been at the centre of accusations about its corruption enabling disbursement practices and the subsequent blind eye turned by the Bank to major ethical issues within its projects in 2007. (Carroll, 2010, p175-177) Later that year, the accusations levied at the bank about its activities in Cambodia were overshadowed by the spectacular professional misconduct scandal implicating then president of the World Bank Paul Wolfowitz which ultimately led to his resignation. Nonetheless, the increased pressure put on the Bank by its major donors over its practices in Cambodia forced the Bank to increase its focus on issues related to good governance and anti-corruption in the country.

Combined with the previous theoretical sections, the aim of this is to acquire an adequate understanding of the concept of good governance in practice in order to proceed with its reformulation in the final part of the dissertation. Before getting into the Cambodia project proper, it is necessary to outline exactly what the Demand for

Good Governance consists of to understand the framework which guided the World Bank in the designing and implementation of its project in Cambodia.

The Demand for Good Governance framework comes out of the World Bank's realization that their efforts to foster good governance from ''above'' have not generally been very successful. One of the key factors in this failure identified by the Bank was that they had been working primarily with the ''supply'' side of good governance but were ignoring the ''demand'' side of it, making institutions designed with the goal of promoting accountability or transparency have no real roots in society, leading to their lack of impact. (Chase and Anjum, p5, 2008) Thus, Bank projects within the DFGG umbrella aim to work on the ''demand'' side of good governance and support local actors which are pushing for greater accountability, transparency and responsiveness on the part of authorities. This is quite a significant step for the Bank considering that it has always had to tread extremely carefully when dealing with civil society organizations due to its core mandate forcing it to remain ''neutral'' and refrain from engaging in politics.

While it can certainly be argued that the World Bank has always been implicitly political and never truly neutral due to the nature of its work and its close ties to the United States, the DFGG framework is more explicitly political when compared to previous Bank projects which attempted to focus on financing and providing technical support. This is particularly obvious in the Bank's description of *social accountability*, a concept which it elaborated and draws on to explain how it can work with the ''demand'' side of good governance.

In one of its papers tracing the conceptual evolution of the DFGG framework, the Bank draws on the notion of *social accountability,* a concept elaborated in the early

2000s. The idea of social accountability is usually defined by the Bank as *an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e. in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations who participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability (*World Bank 2004 in Ackermann 2005) The idea behind this is that relying exclusively on the government or designated agencies to monitor actors and ensure that they remain accountable to the public is unrealistic, therefore, the public needs to be brought in and also participate in the process. The official actors charged with monitoring others may have very little capacity to do so due to a lack of funding or may have incentives to turn a blind eye to abuses for various reasons. In theory, bringing in the public to assist in monitoring can help to avoid this. Social accountability projects aim to do this by increasing the engagement of the public in issues related to transparency, accountability and equitable governance by empowering and encouraging them to speak out when they witness corruption and unethical behaviour. Within the DFGG framework, the bank identified four key pillars that would guide its efforts. (World Bank Social Development Department Demand for Good Governance Team, 2010)

The first of these pillars is the promotion of demand, which refers to the provision of access to information to civil society actors that can support their ability to demand improvements in governance. Second, the Bank outlines the necessity for demand to be mediated. The Bank believes that for demand to be effective, it must be mediated and moderated through institutions in order for it to be more acceptable for the state actor receiving the demand. Third, agencies receiving governance feedback on the part of civil society must be able to respond adequately and meet expectations. The final pillar of the Bank's DFGG framework is the process of demand monitoring. For a virtuous cycle of sorts to be created, there must be monitoring of the entire process and dissemination of information to civil society groups which allows for improvements to be made and a continuous loop of refinement and actualization of the demand process to be created. While the Bank's framework is relatively conservative in the sense that it aims to moderate and mediate demands made by civil society actors in order for them to be rendered palatable for the state, it is clear that the potential genuine inclusion of civil society actors is a step forward.

Directly involving civil society opens up a very wide range of projects to actors interested in working within a country compared to working exclusively with the authorities. However, projects in this area also run the risk of upsetting local power holders who may benefit from the current state of business. Projects aiming to increase social accountability are also more inherently and obviously political than most of the Bank's previous projects, risking tensions with partner governments. Nonetheless, the DFGG framework aims to increase overall citizen involvement in good governance issues via participatory mechanisms and cooperation with authorities sharing the same goals and vision as the Bank.

The World Bank's Demand for Good Governance project in Cambodia is often mentioned in Bank documents as one of its flagship projects focused exclusively on good governance related issues and incorporates most of the World Bank's framework on the topic. Indeed, the project's description is very straightforward in establishing its objectives and the means it will employ to do so:

The development objective of the proposed project is to enhance the demand for good governance (DFGG) in priority reform areas by strengthening institutions, supporting partnerships, and sharing lessons. The state and non-state institutions and partnerships *supported will be those that promote, mediate, respond to, or monitor to inform DFGG.* (World Bank DFGG Cambodia ICR, p9, 2015)

From the start, in rhetoric, the World Bank attempted to create a project that would be ''inclusive and consultative'' and draw together both civil society and government actors, consistent with its DFGG framework which emphasizes that there is ''demand'' for good governance, mostly coming from below, that needs to be linked up with the ''supply'' of good governance, coming from above.

Quite importantly, the World Bank emphasized the moderate nature of its projects by characterizing it as gradual, realistic and strategic. (World Bank, 2007b, p3) Putting forward the project's moderate and technical nature allows the World Bank to achieve two things.

First, the promotion of the conservative nature of the program makes it appear less threatening to Cambodian authorities, who may be concerned that the Bank's focus on accountability and participation would strengthen the opposition to the regime. Indeed, corruption is a hot issue in Cambodian politics and widespread patronage networks and clientelism have been vital to the survival and maintenance of the regime in the post-Khmer Rouge era. (Un, 2006, p227-8) It is highly likely that the Cambodian government did not intend to completely dismantle its system of patronage, which is directly linked with its lack of accountability but rather to reform it in a limited but visible way. By doing so, the government can show that it is slowly reforming, potentially appeasing opposition, while keeping its vital patronage networks in place or changing their shape to ensure that they avoid getting revealed by new transparency measures. The World Bank is certainly aware of the fact that proposing a project which is ''too radical'' would result in tension with the Cambodian government and a lack of cooperation, thus, it employs the discourse of moderation and incremental change to reduce the threat posed by the DFGG project. This does not mean that the DFGG project is worthless but simply that it has a limited scope and represents a form of compromise between the parties involved, consistent with the Bank's view that DFGG is a process which needs to be built over time. (World Bank, 2007, p1-2) This approach also helps to create local ownership of the DFGG program as it can potentially serve the purpose of all actors involved. The Cambodian government is able to present reforms and partnerships with civil society as proof of its increased accountability and potentially enjoy greater legitimacy with the public, civil society groups are able to enact their agenda in a limited way and gain influence while the World Bank can build its credentials as an expert in good governance.

Second, by describing its program as logical, realistic and strategic, the World Bank is able to present its program as one that is neutral and merely technical in order to avoid potential political conflicts and lay claim to expertise on the topic of governance. The World Bank's loss of technical credibility in the wake of the failure of SAPs across the globe have forced it to develop new forms of expertise from which it can derive productive power. (Best, 2014, p80) By laying claim to expertise on the topic of good governance and describing good governance in technical terms, the World Bank is able to expand its productive power and position itself as not only an expert on economics but also as an expert in the political management of a country or ''good governance''. It is not a coincidence that the process of politics and the efforts of civil society to increase the government's responsiveness and accountability are described and simplified in the language of economics as ''supply'' and ''demand''.

Concretely, the Bank's project in Cambodia contained several different initiatives aimed at supporting both the government and civil society organizations, coherent with its rhetoric on creating an inclusive program. To choose its state partners in Cambodia, the World Bank consulted the Cambodian government, domestic civil society organizations and major donors in the country such as DFID alongside its own research. (World Bank, 2007b, p4-5) Additionally, they opted to try and select organizations which would cover a wide range of different sectors, in the sense of strategic sectors for governance reform such as natural resource management and public finance along with different parts of the state, such as the executive and judiciary sector. Ultimately, this resulted in the selection of 5 different institutions at the onset of the program.

First, the Ministry of National Assembly-Senate Relations and Inspection (MONASRI) was selected. MONASRI is essentially in charge of fighting corruption within Cambodia and was chosen to help inform citizens of the rights they possess under the Cambodian Land Law and receive complaints when their rights have not been respected.

Second, The Arbitration Council, an independent organization which attempts to resolve labour disputes was also chosen for participation in order to expand its reach and overall ability to function.

Third, Radio National of Kampuchea (RNK), the state funded public radio broadcaster was chosen in order to support programming which would give citizens the opportunity to interact with government officials and interrogate them regarding budgeting and other policies in addition to sponsoring programming about stories related to governance.

Fourth, the Ministry of the Interior's One Stop Window Services (OSWS) / District Ombudsman Office was selected in order to scale up their expansion across the country and establish offices in major cities for each province that would provide governmental services in a transparent and fair manner.

Finally, a National Assembly Committee was convened to participate in the DFGG initiative. The idea behind the selection of these particular institutions was to ensure that DFGG capacity building efforts would be able to scale up and reach the largest amount of people via the efforts of these institutions, most of which have a core purpose that is supportive of good governance. Additionally, the state partners were selected to encourage them to build partnerships with civil society organizations via the World Bank's network in Cambodia.

The assistance to civil society organizations involved in the World Bank's Cambodia DFGG project was planned to take the form of capacity building via workshops and training with experts in the field of social accountability. The Bank also planned to set up competitions of sort in which civil society organizations would be able to propose new ideas and programs to assist in increasing accountability within state institutions or other ideas compatible with the general DFGG framework. The World Bank's support for civil society groups would be done via The Asia Foundation (TAF), who would essentially implement the Bank's plan with non-governmental actors and work with its partners to monitor state institutions and help scale up their presence and coverage within Cambodia.

The third aspect of the DFGG project in Cambodia was focused on communications, monitoring and evaluation and learning. This part of the project essentially aimed to provide project partners with capacity building sessions to show them how to better communicate their goals, ongoing initiatives and achievements in good governance. This also includes publicity campaigns to disseminate information about the project and its goals and create awareness of the issues related to DFGG.

The large scale objective of the project and the results the World Bank hoped to achieve are represented in a graph included in a project document and reproduced here. Clearly, there is a strong focus on monitoring and data collection as a way to achieve good governance and not much mention of potential political processes that can result in bad or good governance, consistent with several critiques of the Bank's conception of the idea that have been outlined in the literature review of the dissertation.

Figure 2:[4]



[4] Adapted from World Bank, 2007

Although the project's overall outcome was deemed ''moderately satisfactory'' in the Bank's post-project Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR), there were several major issues identified by the World Bank that came up during the project and forced the Bank to modify some aspects of it considerably. (ICR Review, p15, 2015) Foremost, the Bank was forced to drop both MONASRI and RNK from the program and reallocate their planned funding to other aspects to the plan in 2011. It seems that the Bank's optimism in its pre-project plans about the Cambodian government's eagerness to cooperate was somewhat misplaced as the good governance agenda pushed by the Bank never really took hold within RNK as an institution and no real commitments were made. In the case of MONASRI, the reason behind the failure of the Bank's agenda was more obviously political: the promotion of land rights in Cambodia was a source of controversy and civil society actors did not trust the ministry enough to work with it. (World Bank, 2015, p24)

Looking at the DFGG project through Barnett's framework, it is possible to view the power relations present in the project beneath the surface. When viewing the project this way, much like in other World Bank projects that have been written about, the reproduction of power relations present in the international order becomes visible. Indeed, the World Bank has been criticized from many different angles by scholars who have accused it of sneakily reproducing Washington Consensus style policies in its projects, depoliticizing fundamentally political concepts, neglecting the negative effect of its policies on human rights, democracy, the environment and much more. A particularly obvious example of this is the World Bank's efforts to push public water management privatization to civil society groups during the late 1990s and early 2000s under the guise of neutral capacity building and international networking programs.

(Goldman, 2005) During this period, the Bank sought to pressure loan recipient governments having trouble to repaying their loans to privatize public water services in order to raise more funds. To support their efforts, the Bank invoked the language of sustainability, rational management and used transnational policy networks to recruit civil society organizations engaged in water issues to their viewpoint to create the appearance of an international consensus on the issue. (Goldman, 2005, p225-46) Viewed through the Barnett power framework, the Bank essentially used its institutional power to steer the international discussion in a particular way and define what would be discussed while pushing away ideas of water management that it disliked and promoting those that fit with its vision as ‘’rational’’, ‘’realistic’’ and ‘’consensual’’. Nonetheless, while the Bank has been harshly criticized, it remains viewed as an authority in the field and both academics and states remain open to its influence. This may have to do with its inherent authority and power as an international organization perceived as embodying rational-liberal norms generally accepted by states or viewed as ‘’neutral’’. (Finnemore and Barnett in Barnett, 2005, p170-1)

The case of the DFGG project in Cambodia is not as dramatic as some of the aforementioned cases but still represents the World Bank’s productive power through the particular identification of ‘’bad governance’’ or corruption as a major problem in Cambodia and its idea of good governance as a solution to this problem. This does not mean that ‘’bad governance’’ or corruption is not a serious issue in Cambodia and has been manufactured by the World Bank but rather that it has been singled out as one of the major sources of underdevelopment instead of the myriad other potential sources such as Cambodia's position in the world system and geopolitics or the international legal environment which allows the spoils of ''bad governance'' to be stored and spent outside of the country. Furthermore, the Bank's approach to combating ''bad governance'' and corruption via the DFGG project is consistent with what critics have described as the Bank's tendency to ''fight corruption but not corruptors''. (Deneault, 2013, p117-9) By creating elaborate narratives and storylines for its project and inviting civil society and the government to design better monitoring institutions, the World Bank essentially minimizes the fact that corruption or ''bad governance'' is the result of a particular political economy and not the outcome of a lack of monitoring mechanisms, further enhancing the Bank's influence in Cambodia. The World Bank's ability to identify the lack of good governance in Cambodia and present it essentially as an issue that can be resolved through mostly technical solutions such as capacity building efforts, better monitoring and limited inclusion of civil society groups instead of addressing the domestic and international factors which give rise to ''bad governance'' and allow it to thrive in the first place constitutes a clear example of the use of productive power by the World Bank. The Bank is also able to propagate its conception of good governance in the capacity building sessions that it hosts in the context of the project, potentially influencing how participants perceive the concept. By deploying its productive power through the framing of issues in a particular way, the World Bank is able to maintain its technical expertise and authority despite the clearly political topic of good governance and state-civil society relations.

The ''partnership'' structure of the project allowing the Bank to select government and civil society partners in its project and act as a mediator of sorts between actors create a dynamic which contributes to and reinforces the institutional power of the

Bank in Cambodia. Indeed, while the Bank clearly attempted to create an inclusive project, involuntarily, the institutional arrangement of the project creates a hierarchy of power in which the World Bank is able to assert its expertise and authority. By controlling and designing the institutions that will contain the partnership and guide how actors in Cambodia interact with each other, the Bank is able to spread its understanding of good governance and encourage both governmental and civil society partners to act accordingly via incentives such as fund disbursement.

However, the Cambodian government was not a passive actor and was also able to exercise its own form of structural power to achieve what it wanted through the DFGG project. The Cambodian government was able to correctly identify that while the World Bank was a powerful international actor, it is also bound by its own rules, namely, the prohibition of political interference and its inability to strongly oppose country governments. Thus, the Cambodian government was able to leverage its position in donor-recipient relationship to its advantage. By identifying this, the government was able to ensure that the World Bank program would be conservative and unthreatening to its ability to use patronage and exploitative land and natural resource use strategies to its benefit. Thus, the government had nothing to lose by participating in the World Bank's program. (Hughes, Hutchison, 2011, p27-8) Indeed, the conservative nature of the program allowed the government to choose the organizations with which it would form partnerships, marginalizing oppositional civil society while drawing in organizations willing to collaborate. (Hughes, Hutchison, 2011, p28) Thus, the government is able to circumvent the strengthening of civil society groups opposing it on critical issues such as land rights and is able to instead channel the program into supporting groups that are inoffensive and focused on service delivery. This allows it to gain legitimacy by working with civil society groups, potentially improve its service delivery and satisfy international donors, on which the country relies for a large percentage of its budget by giving the impression that reform is being undertaken without having to upset the status quo in Cambodia. This is further compounded by the relatively abstract nature of the DFGG reforms that were adopted; the vast majority of them were technically oriented and essentially focused on making service delivery more efficient and transparent, posing little threat to powerful actors involved in the Cambodian government. The intersection of the various types of power as outlined in Barnett's framework for the Cambodian case study is summarized in the table below. Together, these forms of powers contribute to perpetuate a depoliticized, politically innocuous and technically focused form of good governance which is unlikely to result in significant empowerment and long term economic progress for the population beyond cooperative civil society groups.

Figure 3:

Intersection of power in the Cambodian Demand for Good Governance project	
Forms of Power	Representation in the Cambodian case
Compulsory	No significant presence found
Institutional	Control of the World Bank over the content, overall structure and funding of the project.
Structural	Cambodian government's leverage of its position in the donor-recipient relationship to exclude critical civil society actors and curtail serious reform.
Productive	Depoliticization of good governance via promotion of monitoring and technical solutions instead of focus on the political roots of ''bad governance''.

VI. Reconceptualizing Good Governance

The idea of good governance may not be beyond redemption; many of its critics agree on the usefulness of the core idea that good institutions are important but disagree on the particulars of what these institutions should look like and what the role of development experts should be. The Cambodian case study has served as an example of some of the pitfalls of the current approach, namely, the depoliticizing effect of the Bank's current discourse of good governance, its role as a conduit of productive power and technical authority for the World Bank and inability to challenge prevailing power structures. Thus, instead of completely abandoning the idea of good governance, reconceptualizing in an attempt to focus on local understandings of the concept and the political factors contributing to achieving it is necessary.

Reconceptualizing good governance is necessary in order to avoid some of the issues currently associated with the idea and to advance the concept beyond its usage as an extension of productive power. The Cambodian case study demonstrates that despite the adoption of more inclusive practices regarding the input of civil society in good governance projects, without a serious reconceptualization, the concept remains a vehicle for the World Bank's power through depoliticization. This has the effect of making actual change difficult to achieve by obscuring some of the causes behind ''bad governance'' and corruption in Cambodia and proposing technical solutions such as increased monitoring as solutions. This reconceptualization will attempt to transform good governance into a concept which can motivate the creation of development projects that are able to build on local ideas of good governance, making depoliticization less likely. To do this, Merilee Grindle's idea of ''good enough governance'' will be drawn on in addition to some aspects of ''participatory governance''.

Merilee Grindle's concept of ''good enough governance'' constitutes an improvement over previous conceptualizations due to its focus on the need to define and contextualize good governance depending on the country in which governance reform is attempted. By locally grounding the idea of good governance, some problems can be avoided such as ahistorical views of institutional development leading to narrow technical solutions. Indeed, the effectively ahistorical nature of the World Bank's conception of good governance hinders the development of better institutions in countries the World Bank is aiming to assist. Transparent, accountable and equitable government and institutions are laudable objectives but the only way these can become reality is through a gradual political process. Unfortunately, despite the World Bank's recognition of the importance of institutions in development, its view of good governance and projects designed to achieve this often do not really recognize the eminently political reasons why existing institutions are malfunctioning or working in a particular manner. (Weaver, 2008, p114-5) Much like in the case of Cambodia, while institutions may seem to be ineffective or malfunctioning to outsiders, often, institutions function in such a manner for political reasons. For instance, corruption within institutions is endemic as it serves the government's need to create patronage networks to reward supporters of the government or placate members of opposing political factions in order to maintain stability. The imposition of increased monitoring and technical accountability mechanisms can result in positive outcomes but does not really address these political factors and can also be easily sidestepped by governments who are able to accurately manoeuvre between the power of international organizations and their limited ability to infringe the right of states to govern within their borders.

Historically, what is often viewed as ‘’good governance’’ has almost entirely been borne out of domestic political processes, an unfortunate reality which minimizes the impact of development assistance. This does not mean that development assistance in the field of governance has no purpose but rather that it should focus primarily on serving the needs of local populations and follow their priorities rather than abstract uniform goals set by international organizations often disconnected from local contexts. To be fair, several concepts and buzzwords in the field of development such as ownership, partnerships, participatory development and more have been included in governance projects and have sought to incorporate the aspirations of local peoples into program design. However, this process is clearly difficult in reality and successes can be hard to replicate in other settings. Furthermore, there are obvious asymmetries of power between most local civil society groups, governments of developing countries and international organizations aiming to work within a country. A reconceptualization of good governance absolutely needs to take these factors into account and acknowledge that genuine inclusion and participation can only be achieved through accurate study and understanding of particular local institutions, environment, structures of power and ideas of governance.

Following this, the idea of good governance should be decoupled from the model of the West and neoliberalism. As several critics have pointed out, in its current state, good governance is often portrayed and described as essentially an idealized version of Western institutions and neoliberal economic system. (Blunt, 1995; MORE?) This is problematic due to the fact that by presenting an idealized version of Western institutions as an example of good governance, local and differing ideas of governance are effectively marginalized. The historical processes which led to the emergence of Western institutions are also often ignored in recommendations given to developing countries. In the worst cases, this locks them out of using similar trade and governance policies employed during the West's development, effectively ''kicking away the ladder'' and potentially creates further governance problems as countries struggle to conform. (Chang, 2002, Andrews, 2008) This also inherently restricts the production of locally adapted conceptions of governance and institutions by presenting potential partners in development, whether they are countries or civil society groups, with a clear cut model which is attractive and can certainly work but is not connected to local reality. It also obscures the many flaws in the Western model of good governance and the inexistence of good governance in its idealized form even in many Western countries. Transparency and accountability of institutions can take many different forms and measures aimed at achieving these goals are more effective when they reflect local history and preferences.

Ultimately, the idea of good governance as a universally defined concept should be abandoned in favor of a purely contextually defined version. This would allow the concept to move beyond its usage as a source of productive power for the World Bank and become a conceptual tool which can be employed by local actors to define priorities. Much like with Grindle's concept of ''good enough governance'', this would also likely result in a more restrictive view of good governance due to its contextually defined nature, resulting in projects with more clearly limited and hopefully attainable objectives.

There is no doubt that the theoretical adoption of this reconceptualization of good governance by development actors would necessitate a radical shift in overall orientation and the form of projects. It may also be essentially impossible for large international organizations such as the World Bank to adopt such a concept due to restrictions on political activity and the potential resistance of countries working with the World Bank to the enactment of projects which seriously threaten the networks of patronage and power on which governments rely. Admittedly, the clear power asymmetries between local governments, domestic NGOs and international organizations would also certainly hinder the adoption of truly locally defined ideas of governance over those favoured by power holders. Projects inspired by it may also fall victim to several of the same pitfalls as participatory development projects such as appropriation by local elites, misunderstanding between actors involved, political disagreement within local partner groups and so on. (Platteau, 2008) Nonetheless, the value of this reconceptualization of good governance, primarily lies in its attempt to ''democratize'' the idea of good governance by locally grounding it and rejecting universals. The idea is to enable actors other than powerful international organizations or bilateral donor agencies to define the concept and allow others to take hold of it to motivate projects which better reflect their priorities.

A reconceptualization of good governance must also acknowledge that the achievement of good governance is not a panacea which will ensure development on its own. It seems clear that institutional quality has some impact on development but this does not entail that most development efforts should be focused on the matter. There remains a large swathe of development projects which are unrelated to good governance that remain relevant. It is also possible that capacity building projects focused on other areas have spillover effects and can impact the quality of governance. A reconceptualization of good governance requires the acknowledgement of the complexity of reality and the lack of one-size fit all solutions to development or institution building. To be fair, projects inspired by the idea of good governance have gradually moved away from universalistic solutions completely divorced from local realities since the emergence of the concept. Despite its flaws, the case study presented in this dissertation integrates civil society in a certain form, which is to be lauded. However, this integration remains fairly limited and defined by the intersection of the World Bank's need to deploy productive power and define the overarching goals of the project and the Cambodian government's ability to limit the reach of the project and the inclusion of certain civil society groups. Furthermore, the involvement of civil society groups does not solve the question of popular involvement in governance projects considering that civil society does not and cannot represent everyone in a particular area. Some voices will always be louder than others and outcomes often reflect power dynamics within communities. (Gaventa, 2004) This remains a problem that a reconceptualization of good governance cannot really solve and will require more than conceptual innovation. However, by drawing on some of the ideas expressed by advocates of participatory governance and combining them with mandatory political analysis, there is a possibility that local networks of power can be exposed and their effects in agenda setting mitigated in favour of a more balanced approach. (Gaventa, 2004)

Ultimately, the reconceptualization of good governance proposed in this dissertation and a comparison with other major conceptions of the idea can be summarized in the following table.

Figure 3:

Differing ideas of good governance	Characteristics
''Classic'' World Bank Good Governance	- What is ''good'' is generally not defined contextually. - Focus on efficiency of institutions, transparency, accountability and especially anti-corruption via monitoring mechanisms, less on representation. - Good institutions lead to economic growth and development. - Concerned with creating optimal institutional conditions for development.
Good Enough Governance (Grindle)	- Limited, more contextually defined definition of governance depending on country. - Focus on ''fewer, more useful, and more feasible interventions''. (Grindle, 2007) - Minimal conditions of governance necessary for political and economic development to occur. (Grindle, 2004) - Relation between institutions, economic growth and development is not straightforward.

	- Imposition of institutions from above is essentially impossible.
Reconceptualized Good Governance	- Purely contextually defined definition of governance arrived at on a case by case basis through interaction between partners. - Builds on good enough governance and acknowledges the difficulty of actually producing better good governance via external intervention. Any attempts must be rooted in political analysis of local networks of power. - Governance is more than management, political factors must always be analysed and taken into account. Not all actors have the same interests. Builds on participatory governance by involving the concept of power to mediate between actors. Governance must be ''repoliticized''.

VII. Conclusion

In the first part of this dissertation, the history of the concept of good governance and its close links with the World Bank have been examined. The emergence of good governance was placed in its historical context as a result of the evolution of developmental thought regarding the role of the state, the failure of structural adjustment programs and the re-emergence of institutionalism. Following this, a review of the literature reacting to the World Bank's promotion of good governance found that reactions were divided among scholars despite the widespread adoption of the discourse of good governance. Some scholars broadly supported the World Bank's ideas and supported its discourse with facts linking good governance to income and growth. Others found the concept somewhat useful but took issue with the World Bank's tendency to present its findings as universally valid and were worried by the rapid expansion of the purported benefits of good governance into all spheres of development, leading to the elaboration of the idea of ''good enough governance'' among others. The idea of ''good enough governance'' avoids several of the issues with the World Bank's conception of good governance by essentially attempting to localize the idea of good governance and incorporate analyses of domestic political economy factors in development projects. However, a significant amount of critical scholars took issue with the World Bank's adoption of good governance and criticized its depoliticizing and neoliberalizing effects. Interested in the motives prompting the Bank to suddenly embrace civil society and institutional reform in the early 1990s, these critics argue that the World Bank had only changed its discourse and continued to push neoliberal economics on developing countries via governance reform. They argued that these reforms and recommendations often had the intent of marginalizing the state and depoliticizing governance which had the opposite effect of empowering society and favoured the emergence of states more attuned to the needs of international donors than their own citizens. In order to examine how the discourse of good governance translates into concrete projects, the case of the World Bank's Demand for Good Governance initiative in Cambodia was examined. Viewed through Barnett's framework of power in global governance, the dissertation argues that different forms of power interacted in the Demand for Good Governance project to produce a depoliticized form of governance. The project contained several elements consistent with the critiques overviewed in the literature review section of the dissertation. Indeed, while the World Bank's project was designed with sincere good intentions and may certainly have resulted in more efficient governmental service delivery to Cambodian citizens, the project remains emblematic of several of the flaws with the Bank's current conceptualization of good governance, notably its technically-oriented focus which neglects the role of politics and power in the development of ''good '' governance. This dissertation then proposed a reconceptualization of good governance based on localization and political engagement in order to attempt and change some of the aspects of the World Bank's conception of good governance that lead to projects with major flaws like the Demand for Good Governance project in Cambodia. However, the proposed reconceptualization is not without its limits and, much like the classical conception of good governance, should not be portrayed as a panacea for all governance and development issues. The impact of this reconceptualization is also limited by the unlikeliness that it would be adopted by the World Bank due to its internal culture and structure. Indeed, an adoption of the new good governance concept would require significant shifts in project design and in the Bank's general orientation, namely that it would need to get more formally involved in politics and abandon the pretence of being apolitical. It would also require a different set of skills to navigate local politics and work with partners. However, this reconceptualization may find its value in its attempt to ''open up'' the discourse of good governance to less powerful actors than international organizations and allow them to counter their discourse with a conception that is more flexible and adaptable to their own contexts.

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Abstract

Good governance의 개념은 1980년대 후반부터 세계은행을 비롯한 국제기구를 중심으로 논의되기 시작하여 개발 담론의 주요 화두로 부상하였다. 그럼에도 불구하고 이 개념은 개발 주체 간 권력관계와 신자유주의 경제를 탈정치화하려는 정책과 사업에 정당성을 확보하는데 이용되는 경향을 보여 많은 비판을 받아왔다. 본 연구는 글로벌 거버넌스의 권력에 관한 이론적 논의를 기반으로 세계은행의 캄보디아 사업 사례를 검토하여 good governance에 대한 여러 비판이 실제로 타당함을 밝힌다.

사례 연구와 더불어 good governance 에 대한 역사적 논의와 비판적 시각을 바탕으로 개념을 재정립하고, 참여와 'repolitization'을 통해 전적으로 맥락에 따라 정의함으로써 기존의 제기된 문제에서 벗어나 재개념화를 시도한다.