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외교학석사 학위논문

In Defense of the Philosophical John Stuart Mill:

**Towards a Millian Philosophy of
International Politics**

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Towards a Millian Philosophy of International Politics

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I . Introduction

1. Research Problem

The research problem to be dealt with here is the international political thought of John Stuart Mill.¹⁾ In specific, this is a two-part problem: the first part pertains to the preliminary question of what should constitute the proper concept of Mill's *international political thought*, or philosophy of international politics, in the truest sense; and the second part is the primary question of what is, then, the substance of Mill's true international political thought as properly understood in the first part. This research problem is particularly important because of the fact that there has been an absence of any comprehensive study on Mill's international political thought thus far.²⁾ This is a research problem that must be further inquired into because Mill perceived of himself as being a consistent and systematic thinker throughout the entirety of his life.³⁾ Thus, it is necessary and possible to reconstruct a general body, or a "Millian" theory of international politics that is logically consistent with his central philosophical and political philosophical views. This is a project to which there has been an absence of inquiry into thus

¹⁾ Hereafter referred to simply as Mill.

²⁾ Georgios Varouxakis, 2017, *Liberty Abroad*, 1st ed. [S.l.]: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-18.

³⁾ See J.S. Mill, *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, general editor F. E. L. Priestley and subsequently John M. Robson (The University of Toronto Press, 1963-1991) [hereafter referred to as: *CW*, followed by volume number in Roman numerals and by page number/s in Arabic numerals], I, p.163, 175. In this particular part of Mill's Autobiography, he clearly states that he never intended for his views on substantive issues such as political institutions or policies to be principles of action. Rather, he viewed his substantive views as being highly provisional conclusions. Furthermore, Mill clearly states that the true legacy he wishes to leave behind is his key political philosophical principles from which further generations can also deduce their necessary provisional conclusions on policy, institutions, etc.

far, as will be shown in the literature review. For the purpose of refining the objective of this research, the dual problems mentioned above will be explained in more detail below.

The preliminary problem must necessarily be dealt in order to illustrate the necessity of attempting to complete a caricature of Mill's philosophy of international politics. This is because the endeavor of imaginatively sketching a Millian theory of international politics thought solely from his philosophical and political philosophical endeavors is one that has not yet been attempted before. In fact, it will be shown in the literature review that the question of Mill's views on the relationship between empire (to a much lesser degree, non-intervention) and his main political philosophical arguments has monopolized studies on Mill's international political thought thus far. It is in light of this problem that a most recent trend has begun in attempting to establish a more general Millian theory of international politics, and not just his thoughts on empire and non-intervention. However, this one transitional attempt by Georgios Varouxakis in expanding the limited scope of research on Mill's international political thought has been restricted to simply the widening of the number of international political problems that Mill dealt with. In other words, the focus of Varouxakis has mostly been simply the historical compilation, or aggregation of the historical Mill's stances on a multitude of foreign policy issues with which Mill dealt with throughout his life.⁴⁾ This deprived state of affairs in attempting to approximate a Millian philosophy and theory of international politics necessarily requires that the problem be defined more concretely. When we speak of establishing Mill's international political thought, what do we mean by "international political thought?" Do we mean Mill's stances on a variety of foreign affairs issues that he actively dealt with during his life

⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, (Georgios Varouxakis, 2017, *Liberty Abroad*), p.1-18

as an active parliamentarian or political practitioner? Or does it refer to some kind of philosophy, or theory of international politics? If it is the latter case, then is it appropriate and possible at all to somehow reconstruct Mill's philosophy of international politics? These are the types of questions that must necessarily precede any task of searching for Mill's international political thought in general.

Once the preliminary problem is first dealt with, it is only then that the primary problem of reimagining the substance of a Millian philosophy of international politics can be addressed. This problem deals with the logical yet careful extension of Mill's thoughts on the relationship between the individual, the state or the political collectivity, and of the international society or humanity as a whole. It is essentially a problem of reconstructing a Millian theory of international politics, of which the bulk of the argument is projected in the fifth chapter of this dissertation. In essence, this kind of endeavor would in a sense be doing both the historical and philosophical Mills justice; it would be true to Mill's desires for his philosophy to transcend his actions.

2. Argument and Method

To the dual problem previously mentioned, the main argument is as follows. Firstly, Mill's international political thought should *not* simply be the historical aggregation or compilation of Mill's views on particular issues of foreign policy, but also the reconstruction of Mill's philosophy of international politics from his central philosophical and political philosophical works: *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive*; *Autobiography*; and *Utilitarianism*.⁵⁾ It is thus the argument that Mill never intended for his stances on numerous foreign policy issues to comprise any kind of general

theory of international politics. In fact, it is impossible to construct a theory of international politics from Mill's foreign policy views as a political practitioner alone, in contradistinction to a political philosopher.

Second, and more importantly, it is argued that Mill's international political thought consists of the central idea that progress in all human affairs is not possible without the designation of utility as a cosmopolitan morality that is consistently applied through all levels of human affairs, from humanity and the world down to the individual. This argument is deduced directly from Mill's central philosophical and political philosophical works: *System of Logic*, *Autobiography*, and *Utilitarianism*. The main reasons behind this argument are that Mill's philosophical theory of the principle, of the human mind, and of progress logically lead to this conclusion; and that the utilitarian argument presupposes the necessity of designating the utilitarian standard as a principle consistently in international politics.

For the sake of argumentation, the following method will be utilized for each of the two problems. For the preliminary problem, the proper interpretation of Mill's concepts of the Art of Life, and of science, will be understood through his essay, *Of the Logic of Practice, or Art; Including Morality and Policy*.⁶⁾ A careful rereading of this essay on the Art of Life and Science will shed light upon why Mill's foreign policy stances were meant to be only *provisional* and limited by Mill's time and space, and thus cannot be a *perennial* body of thought upon which Mill's general theory of international politics can be established. Furthermore, a careful reading of *A System of Logic* will reveal that it was well within the intentions of Mill that the inquirer of his thoughts necessarily utilize his main principles to find for themselves the answers to their inquiries, so long as it relates to

⁵⁾ *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative, and Inductive* will hereafter be referred to as *System of Logic*.

⁶⁾ Hereafter referred to as *Art of Life*.

human affairs. This is the method through which the argument pertaining to the preliminary problem will be addressed.

Once then the preliminary argument is established, the primary argument of the substance of Mill's international political theory will be addressed. The method through which this argument will be made is as follows. First, the central arguments of *System of Logic* and the *Autobiography* will be established through a careful reading. The conclusive logic of these interpretations will then be used to consistently reread Mill's central political philosophical argument of *Utilitarianism*. It is this order in which they are read because the utilitarian argument is but a partial component of the Art of Life as explained in *System of Logic*. This will be explained in full detail in the second chapter of the dissertation. Third, the possibility of deducing from the aforementioned arguments, a philosophy of international politics will be assessed. This means that there must be, explicitly and implicitly, an inherently international element presupposed in Mill's main philosophical views and political philosophical arguments. After finally reaching the conclusion that there is indeed this indispensable international factor inherent in main's philosophical and political philosophical arguments, an attempt to approximate a Millian theory of international politics will be made. These are the methods through which the two arguments will be made.

3. Literature Review

Literature thus far on the international political thought of John Stuart Mill can be categorized into mainly three groups. The first group consists of political theorists such as Jennifer Pitts, Uday Mehta, Pratap Bhanu Mehta,

Karuna Mantena, Michael Walzer, Michael W. Doyle, and Charles R. Beitz. These political theorists residing in the US are all occupied with either of two endeavors: the flaws inherent in Mill's political philosophy that inherently lead to an erroneous justification of empire; or with reconstructing the broader liberal stance exclusively on the basis of an in-text interpretation of a rather short essay by Mill, *A Few Words on Non-Intervention*.⁷⁾ The former group of literature is preoccupied with citing the flaws inherent in Mill's political philosophy of utilitarianism and liberalism, as well as his dichotomous distinction of civilization and barbarism in his work, *On Liberty*, that ultimately led to the wrongful and forceful imposition of despotism through imperial rule in the barbarous societies.⁸⁾ The latter group is concerned with extracting the broader liberal stance on non-intervention so as to make it contemporarily relevant to pressing issues of intervention today. They agree that, as Walzer claims, that Mill is speaking "directly to current U.S. debate about foreign policy and international society."⁹⁾ They justify contemporary international practices most definitely outside of the

⁷⁾ Hereafter referred to as *A Few Words*.

⁸⁾ See: Mehta, Uday Singh. *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Muthu, Sankar. *Enlightenment against Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2003); Parekh, Bhikhu. 'Decolonizing Liberalism', in: Aleksandras Shtromas (ed.), *The End of 'Isms'? Reflections on the Fate of Ideological Politics after Communism's Collapse* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 85-103; Pitts, Jennifer. *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton University Press, 2005); Pitts, Jennifer. 'The Boundaries of Victorian international law', in: Duncan Bell (ed.), *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.67-88; Pitts Jennifer. 'Empire and legal universalisms in the eighteenth century', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 117, No. 1 (2012), pp. 92-121; Tunick, Mark. 'Tolerant imperialism: John Stuart Mill's defense of British rule in India', *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 68 (2006), pp. 586-611.

⁹⁾ Michael Walzer, 2007, 'Mill's "A Few Words on Non-intervention": a commentary', in: Nadia Urbinati and Alex Zakaras (eds), *J. S. Mill's Political Thought: A Bicentennial Reassessment* Cambridge University Press, pp. 347-56

concerns of the historical John Stuart Mill such as humanitarian intervention as it is conceived today, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).¹⁰⁾ Other theorists such as Beitz and Ikenberry directly receive such contemporary interpretations and build upon it to answer their own theoretical questions such as state and autonomy.¹¹⁾ These endeavors are fundamentally flawed in the following respects. The first group preoccupied with Mill and empire is flawed in mainly two aspects. First, they cannot neglect, or are totally unaware of the philosophical logic in *A System of Logic* that makes the fundamental distinction between rules of conduct and the principles of moral doctrine.¹²⁾ In doing so, they mistake Mill's take on empire and civilization as having been the direct consequence of a flawed political philosophical argument of utility or of liberty.¹³⁾ The substantive views of Mill on issues of foreign policy such as empire and of civilization are results of his wrongful scientific inquiries, not his philosophy. This point will be extensively covered in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. Secondly, this group has no perception of the general theory of international politics from which Mill deduces his provisional stances on substantive foreign policy issues due to their overt attention to solely the topic of empire. They never were able to conceive of the necessity of first thinking about the general theory or philosophy of international politics of Mill as a necessary stage before conversing other more substantive themes.

¹⁰⁾ Michael W. Doyle, 2015, *The question of intervention: John Stuart Mill and the responsibility to protect* / Michael W. Doyle, (Castle lectures in ethics, politics, and economics), New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 12-34

¹¹⁾ Charles Beitz, 1979, *Political Theory and International Relations*, Princeton University Press pp. 83-92, pp.191-198; and John G. Ikenberry, 2015, Political and Legal, *Foreign Affairs*, 94(6), Foreign Affairs, 2015, Vol.94(6).

¹²⁾ CW, VIII, pp.943-952

¹³⁾ Mehta, Uday Singh. *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Pitts, Jennifer. *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton University Press, 2005)

The second group of literature on non-intervention is shortsighted because they constantly utilize contemporary concepts in interpreting the original text of *A Few Words* alone that contradict the historical context and original intention with which John Stuart Mill wrote them. Such a method is open to a number of problems. First, it is highly unlikely that *A Few Words* alone was a definitive view of Mill on a “principle” of non-intervention. Second, even if ‘A Few Words’ is to be considered as the authoritative text of Mill on non-intervention, the text itself is practically meaningless without the incorporation of Mill’s larger body of works into the interpretive process, as mentioned by Varouxakis himself but never fully developed.¹⁴⁾ Lastly, and most importantly, they, like the first group, commit the same mistake of not comprehending the provisional nature of Mill’s stance on non-intervention or any other issue of foreign policy. They commit the gravest of errors by deducing from this provisional stance on non-intervention a “principle,” or the “principles of non-intervention” for contemporary usage.¹⁵⁾ They have no knowledge whatsoever of the concept of the principle which Mill intended to be used, and this is attributable to an absence of a careful reading of *A System of Logic*.

On the contrary, the second group of literature is that which specializes in the history of political thought; they pay special attention to Mill’s textual arguments as well as Mill’s historical situation in which the text was written, and also the interactions between Mill and his contemporaries in regards to the relevant text, letter, or speech. In so doing, Varouxakis revives the historical Mill with meticulous attention to historical details.¹⁶⁾ Varouxakis then brilliantly restores Mill’s stances on substantive themes of foreign policy including not only non-intervention (which was admittedly

¹⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, *Liberty Abroad*), p. 81.

¹⁵⁾ *Ibid.*, (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, *Liberty Abroad*), pp. 96-98.

¹⁶⁾ *Ibid.*

still a major concern to Mill the parliamentarian) and empire, but also on themes such as that of international law or the idea of nationality that Mill is documented to have held in high importance.¹⁷⁾ As a result, Varouxakis has begun the most recent trend of surveying Mill's international political thoughts *generally*, and has opened up the venue for much more extensive research that could possibly culminate in a more systematic body of international political thought of John Stuart Mill. However, Varouxakis seems to fail in one particular aspect. By overemphasizing the historical features of John Stuart Mill in which he views Mill as but a political commentator whose texts reflect mere vacillations of mind, Varouxakis undermines any possibility at reconstructing a logically coherent body of international political thought, or philosophy.¹⁸⁾ This view is problematic in light of the third group of vast, comprehensive literature since the 1970's up until the 1990's that arguably succeeded in proving that Mill was, or rigorously endeavored to transcend his time and space; he was a philosopher whose aim was to produce an internally coherent, universally applicable, and architectonic body of political philosophical thought. Put simply, the shortcoming of Varouxakis' approach is that he has killed the philosophical Mill in exchange for the historical Mill, and he has interpreted the historical Mill as being the only identity of Mill that matters in establishing a general body of his international political thought. Of course, this is in contradiction to Mill's intention for his lasting legacy to be the philosophical Mill, not the provisional and somewhat narrow-minded historical Mill.

The third group is similar to the second in terms of their emphasis on the necessity of paying attention to the historical Mill, but with a greater focus on the most comprehensive canonical texts of Mill such as *Utilitarianism*, *System of Logic*, and *Considerations of Representative*

¹⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-43, pp. 44-76.

¹⁸⁾ *Ibid.*, pp.98-99, pp. 184-187.

Government.¹⁹⁾ The main theme of their intense debates dealt with the possibility of bridging together the seemingly contradictory Principle of Liberty and the Principle of Utility. The significance of this endeavor for the reproduction of Mill's international political thought is paramount because it is only through the proper establishment of Mill's key political philosophical works that a subsequently coherent body of works on Mill's international political thought may emerge. To this end, Alan Ryan enlightens us on the key role played by Mill's Art of Life as to which Mill's Principle of Liberty in *On Liberty*, and the Principle of Utility, or the ultimate teleological principle of happiness as proposed in Mill's *Utilitarianism*, is a constituting element.²⁰⁾ Furthermore, John Gray's interpretation of Mill's utilitarianism as a species of indirect utilitarianism allows for its harmonization with Mill's Principle of Liberty.²¹⁾ The critical contribution of this group of political philosophers relying heavily on the philosophical method, is that they have done justice to Mill the philosopher by interpreting Mill's thoughts in the context of his main philosophical arguments. They emphasize that Mill was a sincere and "earnest" thinker who endeavored to always maintain consistency: he tried to align his actions as a political practitioner with his philosophical thoughts; and establish a coherent system of philosophical thoughts.²²⁾ The only regrettable point about this group is that they have not yet attempted to extend their

¹⁹⁾ For Mill's *Utilitarianism*, see J.S. Mill, *John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and Other Essays*, edited with an introduction and Notes by John Gray (Oxford University Press, 1991) [hereafter referred to as *Essays*, followed by page number/s in Arabic numerals].

²⁰⁾ For a comprehensive collection of discussions by Isaiah Berlin, Alan Ryan, J. C. Rees, John Gray, C. L. Ten, G. W. Smith, and Richard Wollheim on the compatibility and relationship between Mill's Principle of Utility, Principle of Liberty, and the Art of Life, see, John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, *J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus*, London: Routledge.

²¹⁾ *Ibid.*, (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, *J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus*), pp. 190-211.

²²⁾ *CW*, I, p.163, 175

philosophical basis of Mill's arguments to more substantive issues such as international politics as of yet. However, they have grown closer to it over the years by gradually covering an increasingly diverse number of substantive themes including diversity and gender equality.

To sum up, the main goal is to reconstruct a Millian theory of international politics that is historically accurate in the sense that it remains true to the original intentions of Mill. In other words, the interpretive approach of the proposed research is a combination of the second and third group of literature with a greater emphasis on the second group, while keeping a distance from the first group. The second group's approaches are used so as to avoid the problems of the "mythology of doctrines" and overambitious linkages to contemporary issues. However it is only to the extent that this approach warns of overinterpretation, and provides historical details conducive to better understanding the intentions of Mill, that this approach is of any use. In fact, it will be shown in this dissertation that the most historical accurate interpretation of Mill is that he intended for his philosophical and political philosophical works to be utilized by successive generations to deduce their own conclusions on whatever subject of human affairs is to be inquired into. This is synonymous with the preliminary argument of the dissertation. The third group of literature thus allows for the excavation of Mill's international political thoughts that are logically consistent with his canonical works. Thus, it is through the combination of the two approaches with a greater emphasis on the philosophical approach that a historical version of Mill the philosopher may be successfully revived, and from which can be reconstructed, a Millian philosophy of international politics.

II. Mill's Concepts of Principle and Progress

Now having concretely defined the research problem and the method of approach through which this dissertation seeks to reconstruct the international political thought of John Stuart Mill, it will immediately begin with a rereading of Mill's key philosophical views. To rephrase what was briefly mentioned in the introduction, this particular rereading is crucial because of the following reasons. First, it is only through a close inspection of Mill's key philosophical views that we can comprehend the key distinction between principle, or ends, and the rules of practice for the substantive themes with which Mill dealt. It is only on the basis of this distinction that one can approximate Mill's true intention of clearing Mill of the harsh criticisms directed toward his seemingly contradictory and inconsistent behavior between his thought and his actions as a political practitioner; and also of Mill's intention for the abstract international political thought to be built from his political philosophical principles. Without further adieu, we begin a close inspection of Mill's key philosophical arguments.

1. Rereading Mill's *Art of Life*; Principle and Rules of Conduct

For this task, it is necessary to turn to the concluding essay of Mill's *A System of Logic* on his theory of the Art of Life and Science. The concluding essay is the last piece of writing to appear in the final book of Mill's *A System of Logic*, Book VI on the Logic of the Moral Sciences.²³⁾ It clarifies what Mill means by the concept of a "moral science." He means to iterate upon the relationship between that which is imperative, or *ought*

²³⁾ *CW*, VIII, pp.943-952

to be, from that which is indicative, or what *is*.²⁴⁾ Through this process, Mill also highlights the general logic that organizes the relationship between principles into one of a hierarchy centrally controlled by the Principle of Utility.²⁵⁾ It is precisely because of this reason that there has been a recent trend in referring to this essay as the general theory that links together Mill's various political philosophical works, and also clearly shows the logic that is behind Mill's actions vis-a-vis his thoughts.²⁶⁾ Before delving into these themes, the essay will be reviewed in detail.

The essay distinguishes between his two concepts of Art and Science, elaborates upon the two fundamentally different logics to which they abide, and ultimately provides a theory of their functional relationship. First, the concept of Art does not refer to art as used in the poetic sense, but to whatever part of the process of moral thinking that requires one to think in terms of imperatives, otherwise referred to as theorems or "speculative truths."²⁷⁾ This is contrary to a mode of thinking that requires one to think in terms of the indicative mood, and in terms of the assertions of fact. Art involves the defining of "desirable ends" for conduct, which is strictly an exclusive role of Art alone.²⁸⁾ Mill essentially defines morality, which he provisionally defines as knowledge of "duties, practical ethics, or morality" to be strictly directed by Art.²⁹⁾ While explaining the concept of Art, Mill refers to the Ultimate Principle of Teleology as the foundation of morals, or the ultimate end of this Art to which all other ends are subordinate and secondary to.³⁰⁾ This principle is understood and interpreted by most as the

²⁴⁾ *CW*, VIII, p. 943

²⁵⁾ *CW*, VIII, p. 949-952

²⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, *J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus*), pp. 190-211; *Ibid.*, (Georgios Varouxakis, 2017, *Liberty Abroad*), pp.96-98

²⁷⁾ *CW*, VIII, p.944-945

²⁸⁾ *CW*, VIII, p.944

²⁹⁾ *CW*, VIII, p.945-946

³⁰⁾ *CW*, VIII, p.951

Principle of Utility, the very principle that comprises Mill's most popular and significant portion of his political philosophy.³¹⁾

Outside of this essay as well as within it, Mill elaborates upon his understanding of the concept of Science in contradistinction to Art. His understanding of the concept is close to what we perceive of as the natural sciences, or sciences that serve the purpose of identifying the indicative aspects of nature through facts of reality and the scientific language of causation.³²⁾ A good portion of *System of Logic* is dedicated to analyzing this notion of Science, and highlighting its utility and limitations in inquiries about human beings and society. He speaks of psychology, physiology, and the possibility of a social science within this part of his book.³³⁾ However, he makes it clear that this notion of Science must be clearly demarcated from the realm of Art as explained in his concluding essay, for it is completely incapable of establishing whatever speaks of ends in the imperative mood.³⁴⁾ As such, Mill posits the philosophical view that the logic underlying Art and Science are mutually exclusive. This view is made concretely and conclusively in the following passage:

'A scientific observer or reasoner, merely as such, is not an adviser for practice. His part is only to show that certain consequences follow from certain causes, and that to obtain certain ends, certain means are the most effectual. Whether the ends themselves are such as ought to be pursued, and if so, in what cases and to how great a length, it is no part of his business as a cultivator of science to decide, and science alone will never qualify him for the decision... but those who treat of human nature and society

³¹⁾ *CW*, XIII, pp.949-952; *CW*, X, pp. 205-259, at pp.227-233, 240-259; *CW*, X, pp.373-402; *CW*, X, pp.403-28.

³²⁾ *CW*, XIII, pp.943-945, pp.947-948.

³³⁾ *CW*, XIII, pp.849-860

³⁴⁾ *CW*, XIII, pp.943-945, pp.947-948.

invariably claim it; they always undertake to say, what not merely is, but what ought to be. The most elaborate and well-digested exposition of the laws of succession and coexistence among mental or social phenomena, and of their relation to one another as causes and effects, will be of no avail towards the art of Life or of Society...'³⁵⁾

The last sentence of this passage on the “laws of succession and coexistence among mental or social phenomena” refers to the natural scientific analyses of the mind (physiology and psychology) and subsequently of society that precedes this essay in book VI of *A System of Logic*.³⁶⁾ What is somewhat striking is that Mill has established throughout the entirety of *System of Logic* all the metaphysical and philosophical views as well as his penetrating analysis on the philosophy of science only to uncompromisingly deny the role of Art to Science. This method of argumentation where Mill’s argument proceeds first by thoroughly analyzing a particular subject and then repudiating or limiting its implications seems to be present in a vast number of his works.³⁷⁾ This does not mean however that Mill totally negates any desirable function of Science; rather, Mill provides a thorough analysis and argument as to why the role of Science should be limited to the aforementioned role in contradistinction to that of Art.

It is the third part of the essay that is a unique and critical contribution of Mill, and to which this dissertation designates as crucial for understanding Mill’s seemingly contradictory and inconsistent behavior between his thought and his actions. The third part of the essay illuminates how the independent logic of Art and Science function together in order to constitute a “science of morals.”³⁸⁾ What Mill means by a moral science

³⁵⁾ *CW*, XIII, p.950

³⁶⁾ *CW*, XIII, pp.849-860

³⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, *Liberty Abroad*), pp.9-18

³⁸⁾ *CW*, XIII, pp.833-835

here is basically morality in reality, or morality in conduct. In other words, Mill attempts to establish how a desirable end as designated by Art is to be realized in reality. Mill makes it clear that an end can only become a “rule,” “precept,” or “maxim” of conduct or practice if it can be realized according to the corresponding Science.³⁹⁾ Specifically, Mill states that in order for a theorem or speculative truth to become a precept, one must first designate the end as an effect in reality, and then conduct a scientific operation of uncovering all the causes, conditions and circumstances necessary for achieving that desirable effect.⁴⁰⁾ However, the major caveat is that Mill displays penetrating understanding of the limits of Science in achieving this impossible feat in human affairs.⁴¹⁾ in the complicated affairs of life, states and societies; and furthermore, Mill clearly establishes his view that this shortcoming of Science, as opposed to the natural sciences, largely owes to the normative aspect of human affairs as described in Art. Thus, Mill claims that all rules or precepts for practice or action are always *provisional*, and account for only the most common occurrences.⁴²⁾ This idea he refers to as a borrowed language from German metaphysicians, the principles of Practical Reason.⁴³⁾

Furthermore, Mill makes it clear that Morality is but *a*, not *the*, only consideration when Art is defining and designating the proper end. Mill theorizes that Morality is one of three departments in the Art of Life under which all other ends of Art are subordinate to.⁴⁴⁾ The other two departments are Aesthetics, or nobility and beauty; and Prudence, which involves expediency and policy.⁴⁵⁾ Mill seems to place less emphasis on Aesthetics

³⁹⁾ *CW*, XIII, pp.943-945

⁴⁰⁾ *CW*, XIII, pp.943-945

⁴¹⁾ *CW*, XIII, pp.836-841

⁴²⁾ *CW*, XIII, pp.947

⁴³⁾ *CW*, I, p.185

⁴⁴⁾ *CW*, XIII, p.949, p.951

⁴⁵⁾ *CW*, XIII, p.949, p.951

and Prudence on the basis of his confession that, without much elaboration, the ultimate principle to which all other ends in the three departments *ought to* be justified is that of Morality, and in particular the Ultimate Principle of Teleology.⁴⁶⁾ He refers to this principle in the following excerpt:

“... the general principle to which all rules of practice *ought* to conform, and the test by which they should be tried, is that of conduciveness to the happiness of mankind, or rather, of all sentient beings: in other words, that the promotion of happiness is the ultimate principle of Teleology.”⁴⁷⁾

As such, there is a general agreement amongst interpreters that the ultimate principle of Teleology to which Mill refers here is the Principle of Utility, or utilitarianism.⁴⁸⁾ Mill however makes the distinction between making this ultimate principle the *rule of Art* to which all decisions must be made, but rather the umpire, or axiomatic principle to decide the intrinsic value of all other subordinate ends or rules.⁴⁹⁾ Indeed, Mill laments the passionate fool who refuses to think in terms of secondary principles, and only in terms of the first principle of Utility.⁵⁰⁾ In other words, all other secondary principles from which to derive a rule of conduct are to be evaluated on their degree of priority through the Principle of Utility.

⁴⁶⁾ *CW*, XIII, p.951

⁴⁷⁾ *CW*, XIII, p.951 (emphasis added)

⁴⁸⁾ *Ibid.*, (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, *J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus*), pp. 190-211.

⁴⁹⁾ *Ibid.*, (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, *J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus*), pp. 162-168; *Ibid.*, (Georgios Varouxakis, 2017, *Liberty Abroad*), p. 81; *Essays*, p.148-156.

⁵⁰⁾ *Essays*, p.157.

2. Mill's Distinction between Theory and Practice: The Errors of Confounding Mill's Foreign Policy with his Political Philosophy

Now that the main ideas of this essay have been shared, it is necessary to make sense of it by interpreting and extracting those parts of it that are of the greatest significance in understanding Mill's international political thought. The first point to be made is that Mill distinguished the logic of theory from practice, or conduct. In theory, Mill's utilitarian ethics are dedicated to the happiness of the entirety of mankind, and the other secondary moral principles to be situationally derived from Mill's first principle of utility. However, the logic of science and the departments of Art dictate the conditions and the practical limits within which these ideas can be applied as rules of conduct in the real world.⁵¹⁾ This is an all the more significant finding that helps explain the difficulties and dilemmas Mill dealt with as not only a philosopher or moral theorist, but a philosopher who was actively involved in real-world politics. This problem is analogous to the perennial rift between ideas and reality in which certain "compromises" must inevitably be made by the practitioner, not the theorist, in practical choices. This conclusion is somewhat straightforward in basically arguing that moral theories or principles are distant from real world concerns, and that they must be applied to practice and real-world phenomena on a provisional basis. This is the grounds upon which John Stuart Mill was capable of dealing with a vast multitude of substantive topics and to participate in politics as a *social scientific* practitioner than to remain solely as a philosophical and moral theorist.

The second point to be made is that Mill's various actions, speeches and stances as a political practitioner on a multitude of foreign affairs issues can

⁵¹⁾ *CW*, XIII, pp.943-945

thus *not* be viewed as constituting his international political philosophical or moral *thought*; rather, they are simply the actions of a politician occupied with as much of the real world considerations as his dedication to his ideas. The implicative argument is thus that Mill's international political *thought* can, and should be derived from his main philosophical works independently from his practical stances on a variety of foreign affairs issues. Furthermore, the implication of Mill's theory on the Art of Life extends into any substantive issue aside from just the international that Mill dealt with during his time. However, this implication does not mean that Mill's stances on a number of substantive issues were entirely independent of his philosophical views. Rather, Mill was contemplating his views on substantive themes accordingly to the logic presented in the Art of Life: the moral theories of the Principle of Utility and Liberty were the foundation with which to evaluate what *ought* to be the conclusive stance on the substantive themes, and this moral assessment was accompanied by the process of Science, or what *is*, in deducing that stance. In short, Mill's substantive views were the result of a certain interplay between scientific and philosophical contemplation.

This leads to the third point, which is that we cannot ascertain Mill's stance on a variety of substantive issues during his time, including those on foreign affairs, to be universal principles that are contemporarily relevant. The substantive views of Mill on democracy, representative government, empire and a vast multitude of substantive issues are not even perennial *principles* in the strict sense of the term as set forth by Mill; rather they were *rules* of conduct *provisionally* deduced to be applied to his own time and space. The concept of a principle was limited in its use to only the ideational arguments, and even amongst those principles it was only the Principle of Utility, which he refers to as the foundation of morals and the first principle of all morality, that was truly universal and not provisional.

This leads to the conclusion that Mill's views on a variety of substantive issues cannot be interpreted as being directly contemporary and relevant to our time, and nor should they be understood as what constitute his international political *thought*, or more accurately coined, his international political philosophical thought.⁵²⁾ Though all of these substantive issues cannot be covered in this dissertation, it is probably safe to say that Mill would have disagreed with many of our current stances on substantive issues and the quality of tradition and norms that they exhibit. Our traditional understanding of democracy, or the inculcation thereof, during our time are probably misplaced in his eyes; that is, even in spite of his stances on those issues during his own time.⁵³⁾

The final implication is the most important, and provides the foundation for the main endeavor of this dissertation. It is the controversial argument from the preceding interpretation of the Art of Life, that Mill's international political thought can and should be reconstructed independently of any of his substantive views on issues of international politics only in the language of his political and moral philosophy. This is deemed firstly necessary because the bulk of literature dealing with the international aspect of Mill's works has undermined the utility of his arguments on the basis not of his moral theory alone, but on the basis of the falseness of his scientific, or situational analysis as a political practitioner. It can be said that Mill is highly deserving in a purely philosophical treatment of his international thought as is the case for a large number of political philosophers. The inconsistencies and contradictions attributed to Mill on account of international political views as a political activist are more a result of his identity as a political practitioner than as a political philosopher.

⁵²⁾ *Ibid.*, (Georgios Varouxakis, 2017, *Liberty Abroad*), p. 6-8.

⁵³⁾ *Ibid.*, (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, *J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus*), pp. 131-162.

Furthermore, this endeavor is also possible because Mill never intended, and explicitly never discriminated the use of his utilitarian ethics in either the domestic or the international; and moreover, it can be proved that Mill intended and encouraged for the inquirer and the philosopher to utilize his moral principles to deduce for himself conclusions to subjects of interest, since a majority of the secondary principles as well as rules of conduct are provisional, not universal. It is for these reasons that the following parts of this chapter will identify the nature of Mill's philosophical principles: the legitimacy of the extension of these principles to the international will be examined.

3. Rereading Mill's *A System of Logic* and *Autobiography*: Law of Mind, Principle and Progress

To understand the underlying intentions with which Mill established his political philosophical principles, and what he understood of their nature and their applicability, we turn first to his *Autobiography*. It is first important to establish what Mill self-consciously perceived of on the possibilities and limits of his political philosophical principles, and what logic they functioned according to. The bulk of Mill's insight into the nature of principles, and the intellectual process through which he acquired this knowledge in *A System of Logic* in chapter V of his *Autobiography*: *A Crisis in My Mental History*.⁵⁴⁾ As is the characteristic of an autobiography stating the intellectual process and concerns through which he arrived at his conclusions in his major philosophical works, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive summary of this chapter. His autobiography can be said to

⁵⁴⁾ *CW*, I, pp.137-192.

cover the entirety of his thoughts in *A System of Logic* and how he perceived of them, of which most of them are irrelevant to the main objective of this dissertation. That being said, here is what can be ascertained of as the main theme of this chapter.

In his chapter on his mental history, Mill mainly deals with the intellectual crisis he underwent in the immediate years following his well-known experimental education at the hands of his father, James Mill and his teacher Jeremy Bentham. The education of John Stuart Mill was a rigorous one in which he was isolated from others his age. He was well versed in the Greek language by the age of five, and of algebra and Latin at the age of nine. With the exclusion of any material dealing with metaphysics, religion or poetry, he was taught through the classics and the natural sciences, of which chemistry and physics were studied meticulously.⁵⁵⁾ To this kind of education, Mill replies in the fifth chapter that his emotions were severely suppressed while his capacity for reasons was forcefully developed.⁵⁶⁾ It is in his first years as a young adult that he experienced a crisis of lacking purpose in the ultimate ideal of utilitarianism when imagining if he would be happy if all the utilitarian ideals were to one day to be realized.⁵⁷⁾ The main theme of this chapter is how he recovered from this mental crisis through a discovery of his capacity for emotion through the reading of the poetry of Wordsworth, listening to the Weber's Oberon.⁵⁸⁾ The more relevant part of this chapter is the portion in which he tests himself to observe if, in spite of his crisis, he was intellectually still in agreement with the main political philosophical tenets of his father and Bentham. For the most part, Mill confirms indeed that, during

⁵⁵⁾ *Ibid.*, (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, *J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus*), pp. 131-134.

⁵⁶⁾ *CW*, I, pp.137-192.

⁵⁷⁾ *CW*, I, pp.137-145.

⁵⁸⁾ *CW*, I, pp.137-145.

these years and until his later years during which he wrote and edited the final edition of his autobiography, Mill never wavered in the validity of his dedication to utility as the foundation of morality. ⁵⁹⁾

However, Mill found the utilitarian ethics he had inherited as having been lacking in its philosophical sophistication.⁶⁰⁾ Mill states that the conflicts he faced in the continuous attempt to test the utilitarian ethic as well as the acquaintance he made with a variety of other schools of political thinking made him aware “of many things which that doctrine, professing to be a theory of government in general, ought to have made room for, and did not.”⁶¹⁾ Furthermore, he states that “these things, as yet, remained with me rather as corrections to be made in applying the theory to practice, than as defects in the theory.”⁶²⁾ This was the main motive that drove him to write his *System of Logic* and his essay on utilitarianism, so as to refine it. Before explaining the incident that drove him to initiate this endeavor, the significance of inquiring into this particular part of Mill’s autobiography on mental crisis will be clarified. It is this particular part of Mill’s autobiography that gives life to the initially bland arguments proposed in his *System of Logic*. It clarifies the intentions and influences that drove him to write upon the *A System of Logic* culminating in the conclusion in his essay on the Art of Life. Furthermore, it helps deepen the understanding of Mill’s concept of moral and political philosophical principles, which is critical for the endeavor of evaluating the possibility of reconstructing an international political philosophical thought of on the basis of those principles alone.

To move on to the main tenets of Mill’s autobiography, the main incident

⁵⁹⁾ *CW*, I, p.163, 175

⁶⁰⁾ *CW*, I, p.165

⁶¹⁾ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁾ *Ibid.*

that drove Mill to initiate this independent philosophical endeavor was Thomas Babington Macaulay's criticism of James Mill's *Essay on Government* in the *Edinburgh Review*.⁶³⁾ In specific, Macaulay criticized James Mill and Bentham's utilitarianism for "*being* a theory, of proceeding *a priori*, by way of general reasoning, instead of Baconian experiment...", and thus "shewed complete ignorance of Bacon's principles, and of the necessary conditions of experimental investigation."⁶⁴⁾ Put simply, Macaulay had an understanding of politics in which conclusions must be arrived at through sense observation like in the natural sciences. For this reason, he was critical of Bentham and Mill's philosophical approach to politics in which necessary conclusions were derived independently from experience and from first premises. Mill is critical of his father's response to Macaulay's criticism as being a general attack on reason, and dismissing the criticism altogether. Mill became aware of a partial truth in Macaulay's criticism and the lack of philosophical sophistication of the utilitarian ethics.

This is the incident that drove Mill to begin writing upon the first draft of *A System of Logic*, which he began in the early part of 1830 with his theory of Induction, "postponing that of Reasoning, on the ground that it is necessary to obtain premises before we can reason from them."⁶⁵⁾ Through this revelation, Mill was able to draft the aforementioned book VI of *A System of Logic* on the Logic of the Moral Sciences; although natural science could in fact account for a study of human affairs through the study of its causes and effects, the premises from which even these studies could be commenced were entirely dependent upon the first premises, which Mill ascertained as being the subject matter of political philosophy. This leads Mill to reach this very conclusion, which characterizes the nature of his

⁶³⁾ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴⁾ *CW*, I, p.169-170.

⁶⁵⁾ *CW*, I, p.165; *CW*, VIII, p.911-930

concept of the principle:

“If I am asked what system of political philosophy I substituted for that which, as a philosophy, I had abandoned, I answer, no system: only a conviction, that the true system was something much more complex and many sided than I had previously had any idea of, and that its office was to supply, *not a set of model institutions, but principles from which the institutions suitable to any given circumstance might be deduced.* The influences of European, that is to say, Continental thought, and especially those of the reaction of the nineteenth century against the eighteenth, were now streaming in upon me. They came from various quarters: from the writings of Coleridge, which I had begun to read with interest even before the change in my opinions; from the Coleridgians with whom I was in personal intercourse; from what I had read of Goethe; from Carlyle’s early articles in the *Edinburgh* and *Foreign Reviews*... From these sources, and from the acquaintances I kept up with the French literature of the time, I derived, among other ideas which the general turning upside down of the opinions of European thinkers had brought uppermost, these in particular: *That the human mind has a certain order of possible progress, in which some things must precede others, an order which government and public instructors can modify to some, but not to an unlimited extent: That all questions of political institutions are relative, not absolute, and that different stages of human progress not only will have, but ought to have, different institutions:* That government is always either in the hands, or passing into the hands, of whatever is the strongest power in society, and that what that power is, does not depend upon institutions, but institutions upon it: *That any general theory or philosophy of politics supposes a previous theory of human progress,* and that this is the same thing with a philosophy of history... I applied to them, and to Coleridge himself, many of Coleridge’s

sayings about half truths; and Goethe's device, 'many-sidedness,' was one which I would most willingly, at this period, have taken for mine." 66)

This passage provides direct insight into the course of inquiring into those things deemed political. To recap what was mentioned right before this passage, Mill's analysis of politics from a viewpoint of philosophy of science was that it is indispensable from beginning with the first premises and deducing from them whatever subsequent inquiries are to be made. It is from these first premises that a hierarchical structure of principles is established; and in this hierarchy of principles, the Ultimate Principle of Teleology, or Utility, is the umpiring axiomatic principle. This passage is highlighting the implications as well as the prerequisite presuppositions of this concept of the principle. He is first stating that the judgment of the proper institution, which can be interpreted as meaning any substantive judgment in politics, is completely dependent upon the principle from which it is deduced through the process of syllogism. This principle is not necessarily always one of morality, as reviewed in the previous section; the principle can be based upon either Prudence or Aesthetics within the Art of Life as well.⁶⁷⁾ The latter part of the passage highlights the implications of, and the implications preceding this theory of principles.

Firstly, it is a direct implication of this theory of principle from which Mill concludes that the human mind exhibits the quality of changeability. This implication constitutes the bulk of Mill's theory on the Law of Mind, in which Mill proves that the Mind is capable of functioning independently of the physical and material reality.⁶⁸⁾ Thus borrowing from *A System of Logic*, the mind is not predestined by the philosophical school that Mill

66) *CW*, I, p.170-171 (emphasis added).

67) *CW*, VIII, pp.949-951.

68) *CW*, VIII, pp.849-860.

refers to as Necessity, and later on in the autobiography as “innate principles of German metaphysics” and its subsequent “universal principles of human nature,” to a certain result.⁶⁹⁾ The philosophical view of Mill is rather that the human mind exhibits, in contradistinction to the concept of Necessity, Liberty: the human mind is capable of free will and the conscious and deliberate selection of changing his own human nature and destiny.⁷⁰⁾ Indeed, Mill states elsewhere that human mind and human nature in its most primitive circumstances is the most wicked of men; and that what is required to change this initial human mind is a change in the circumstances to which it is attached to.⁷¹⁾ It is these circumstances that the individual has the power, through Liberty or free will, to consciously choose what character and what life he wishes for himself, and initiate change towards that idea. This is the basis from which Mill concludes that the progress of society towards one that is more in alignment with the moral ideals is a possible one that requires whatever political principles and derivative political arrangements to be devised so as to direct the individual to acquire the qualities necessary for the ideals, or the principle.⁷²⁾

Secondly, Mill speaks of the aforementioned provisional characteristic of institutions, or conclusions on substantive political themes as a logical extension of this concept of principle because when he refers to them as relative and not absolute. Thus, the differences in conclusions of Mill in themes of the same category cannot be seen as contradictory or inconsistent, and definitely not as absolute or perennial conclusions in themselves. It is only logical from Mill’s concept of the principle and its relationship with institutions that conclusions will always vary depending on the

⁶⁹⁾ *CW*, VIII, pp.836-843.

⁷⁰⁾ *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁾ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁾ Mehta, Uday Singh. *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (The University of Chicago Press, 1999).

circumstances, and that only the principles and first premises themselves are unchanging.

Thirdly, Mill argues that the concept of the principle is predated by a previous theory on the philosophy of history or of historical progress. This understanding of the philosophy of history originates from his idea on the changeability of the human mind and that of the capacity to collectively establish the circumstances for which to best influence the individual to adhere to a moral ideal. Mill later concludes that basically, progress in the secondary principles is cumulative and culminating in a final stage of progress in which the closest approximation to the proper principles is possible.⁷³⁾ Mill identifies the St. Simonians and Auguste Comte, who he personally referred to as Mister Comte, for providing him with this theory of historical progress that he inherits.⁷⁴⁾ This is elaborated upon in the following passage.

“I was by no means prepared to go with them (St. Simonians) even this length; but I was greatly struck with the connected view which they for the first time presented to me, of the natural order of human progress; and especially with their division of all history into organic periods and critical periods. During the organic periods (they said) mankind accept with firm conviction some positive creed, claiming jurisdiction over all their actions, and containing more or less of truth and adaptation to the needs of humanity. Under its influence they make all the progress compatible with the creed, and finally outgrow it; when a period follows of criticism and negation, in which mankind lose their old convictions without acquiring any new ones, of a general or authoritative character, except the conviction that the old are false... Among their publications, too, there was one which

⁷³⁾ *CW*, I, pp.171-175.

⁷⁴⁾ *CW*, I, pp.173.

seemed much more definite and instructive. This was an early work of Auguste Comte, who then called himself, and even announced himself in the title page as, a pupil of Saint-Simon. In this tract M. Comte first put forth the doctrine which he afterwards so copiously illustrated, of the natural succession of three stages in every department of human knowledge – first the theological, next the metaphysical, and lastly, the positive stage; and contended, that social science must be subject to the same law; that the feudal and Catholic system was the concluding phasis of the theological state of social science, Protestantism the commencement and the doctrines of the French Revolution the consummation of the metaphysical, and that its positive state was yet to come... I obtained a clearer conception than ever before of the peculiarities of transition in opinion, and ceased to mistake the moral and intellectual characteristics of such an era, for the normal attributes of humanity. I looked forward, through the present age of loud disputes but generally weak convictions, to a future which shall unite the best qualities of the critical with the best qualities of the organic periods; unchecked liberty of thought, unbounded freedom of individual action in all modes not hurtful to other; but also, convictions as to what is right and wrong, useful and pernicious, deeply engraven on the feelings by early education and general unanimity of sentiment, and so firmly grounded in reason and in the true exigencies of life, that they shall not, like all former and present creeds, religious, ethical, and political, require to be periodically thrown off and replaced by others.”⁷⁵⁾

Mill is basically arguing in the last sentence that progress will culminate in the establishment of a society that adheres by the Principle of Utility as established in his *Utilitarianism*.⁷⁶⁾ It can be confirmed here that Mill

⁷⁵⁾ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁾ *Essays*.

understands his Principle of Utility to be a perennial one. As mentioned in the previous section, Mill's Principle of Utility is oft debated on whether it should be understood as a principle that is strictly axiomatic, or one that is in itself a rule as utility maximizing. The latter is oft referred to as Act or Rule Utilitarianism, from which secondary principles can be deduced. However, as mentioned before, the general agreement in recent interpretations is that Mill intended for the Principle of Utility to be an axiomatic, umpiring principle not from which rules of conduct are to be derived, but for judging the priorities of conflicting principles *as well as* a principle from which to deduce the proper secondary principles.⁷⁷⁾ This topic will be covered in more depth in the following sections as they are relevant to the main objective of this dissertation. Returning to Mill's theory of progress, it is simply an affirmation of the power of his principles in driving political society to the highest level which most closely approximates the moral ideals.

4. The Role of Philosophical and Moral Principles in Historical Progress

To sum up, Mill's concept of the principle is that of first premises or principles that can improve human nature and the mind for the better through the assuredly progressive improvement of the circumstances which influence the formation of the human mind and character towards liberty and unanimity of sentiment. Mill is in essence arguing that the principle is the *possible prerequisite* of progress towards the ideals: without the proper

⁷⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, *Liberty Abroad*), p. 81-83; *Ibid.*, (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, *J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus*), pp. 131-144.

first premises to guide all other deductive secondary principles and substantive conclusions, mankind is incapable of progressing society.

Having identified the main tenets that Mill presents of the concept of principle, it is in turn time to evaluate how it relates to establishing his international political thought. However, the question is what the implications of this theory of principle are for the domestic as opposed to the international. What is clear is that Mill's logic of the principle is meant to function not only within the domestic boundaries of a political collectivity, but to the reoccurring *humanity* in general as a cosmopolitan principle. It is on this grounds that Mill's theory of principle can be interpreted as inherently a *cosmopolitan* concept to *begin* with. Through this cosmopolitan political theory of principle, all other secondary principles pertaining to the nation state, of government type, of international governance, of economy, of intervention and *all* other secondary principles and stances on *substantive* issues are to be deduced. Mill's Principle of Liberty as expounded in this theory of principles does *not* theoretically presuppose the confines of a nation state; the general unanimity of sentiment in its most ideal form most definitely does *not* limit itself to any political collectivity, but rather to the entirety of mankind.

This leads to the striking conclusion that according to Mill's philosophical logic as explained thus far, progress in history is *only* achievable when the first premise as well as the main principles that are derived from it are unconditionally designated in an international setting and when it is given a cosmopolitan quality: to the whole of mankind. The commonly received interpretation of John Stuart Mill's utilitarian ethics is it is for the most part only functional within the domestic boundaries, and a majority of the literature has been preoccupied with exploring the domestic ramifications of these this principle. Varouxakis has been partially successful in identifying that Mill's utilitarianism is at once dedicated morally to the whole of

humanity, thus concluding that Mill rather posits a cosmopolitan morality.⁷⁸⁾ However, he did not reach the conclusion, only discoverable through a proper reading of *A System of Logic* in conjunction with Mill's *Autobiography*, that the placement of Mill's two principles must *necessarily* be placed in an international setting for his theory of progress and for his political philosophy to properly function and achieve its goals. Thus, it is not simply that John Stuart Mill held a conviction of cosmopolitan morality, but that the placing of the morality in a cosmopolitan or international setting is a prerequisite step in Mill's view of historical progress to be made possible.

Some clarifications must be made as to the conclusion above. First, the conclusion does not mean at all that rules derived from Mill's fundamentally international principles must also have as its subject matter that which is only international. The previous section has elaborated upon the interaction between Art and Science in producing the rules of conduct on the basis of the principles in the three departments of the Art of Life. Through this process, any logically coherent rule of action pertaining to all political matters can be deduced. Second, the international political "thought" of John Stuart Mill consisting of his views on an assortment of substantive foreign affairs issues cannot be seen to constitute his international political philosophical thought; rather, they are but simply the collection of the actions pursued by Mill as a political practitioner. The above interpretation of his main tenets in *A System of Logic* reveal that the relevant secondary principles as well as the substantive views of Mill on representative government, on despotism, empire and other foreign affairs issues were for the most part not purely the result of interpretations of Mill's philosophical, political philosophical and moral theories, but rather an extension of them

⁷⁸⁾ *Ibid.*, (Georgios Varouxakis, 2017, *Liberty Abroad*), pp. 9-16.

through an interaction with Science. As such, those substantive views are for the most part *provisional*, and are not truly the international political philosophical thought of Mill. Indeed, Mill's views on those substantial issues have been interpreted as holding only *instrumental* value to Mill's higher principles of international politics in the Principle of Utility and the Principle of Liberty. It was indeed the long term goal of John Stuart Mill that the international society became more cosmopolitan in the longer run, in spite of Mill's political scientific theory of the impossibility of such feats in the immediate and short term future.

This leads to the third and most important point, which is that it is then necessary to expand upon Mill's main philosophical views interpreted in this chapter to a purely political philosophical body of international thought. The preceding interpretations of Mill's main philosophical tenets show that this task is none other than the "internationalization," through a reinterpretation, of the main arguments set forth in Mill's main political philosophical works: primarily, the principle of Utility as constantly emphasized in *A System of Logic*.⁷⁹⁾ In other words, it is none other than the interpretation of the principle of Utility and its main philosophical components according to an international context. Once again, this is possible only because, as stated in the conclusion of the interpretation set forth in this section, Mill's first premise or principle is essentially an *international* or cosmopolitan principle to begin with; it is a principle that implies as its subject matter the entirety of mankind, not just simply single nation states. This is the next endeavor that will be conducted in the following section.

⁷⁹⁾ *CW*, I, pp.173.

III. Utility as a Cosmopolitan Morality, and Virtue

It is now then possible to turn to the task of attempting to reread Mill's main political philosophical works under the assumption that they are essentially international political principles. Through this task, it is possible to deduce from them Mill's purely philosophical international political thought that is not obscured by his stances on the substantive themes of foreign policy. It was also concluded in the previous chapter that the principle of Utility must be an international principle, and understood in a cosmopolitan context so as to fit within Mill's understanding of historical progress, and to foster in the minds of all sentient beings changes that align better with that principle.

1. Rereading Chapter One of *Utilitarianism*: Utility as the Foundation of Morality

Mill's renowned essay *Utilitarianism* is reread here with the aim of finding the political philosophical components with which to comprise Mill's international political philosophical thought. Under the previously mentioned logically prerequisite assumption that the main Principle of Utility is logically internationally oriented, an interpretation is conducted so as to first identify the key political philosophical components and arguments within; and secondly, the international implications of those central arguments are theorized with evidence from various works of Mill to support them in the following sections.⁸⁰⁾ With this in mind, Mill's *Utilitarianism* is reread so as to first identify its central arguments. Mill's *Utilitarianism* is divided into

⁸⁰⁾ *CW*, I, pp.173.

five chapters that can briefly be summarized as dealing with the following subject matter. The first chapter is dedicated to establishing the philosophical and logical arguments underpinning his utilitarian argument. The second chapter is guised as a defense of Mill to various criticisms of the utilitarian doctrine, but in essence it introduces a theory of the good, or the happy life that is essential to his utilitarian argument. The third chapter speaks more empirically of the motives through the human mind which legitimate the utilitarian argument. The fourth chapter is the least relevant to the main objective of this dissertation. It provides a defense of utility as *the* end, or basically the sole criterion to which all other ends are subservient. The fifth and final chapter deals with the distinction between morality and justice with the conclusive view that justice is logically similar or even the equivalent of utility, but as Ryan states, “It is only in the nature of the sanction that they differ...” The specific details of the essay will now be thoroughly read through.⁸¹⁾

The first chapter once again clarifies the philosophical theories that presuppose Mill’s utilitarian argument. The content of the chapter is almost an identical restatement of what was covered in the previous section on Mill’s theory of the principle and of first premises. First, Mill addresses the “question concerning the *summum bonum*, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality...” as the perennial problem in all speculative thought.⁸²⁾ The *summum bonum* refers, simply put, to the highest good for man, and he uses the concept of the “foundation of morality” synonymously with it.⁸³⁾ This is the main question which he intends to answer throughout his essay, and to which he answers that the utilitarian

⁸¹⁾ *Ibid.*, (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus), pp. 163-164.

⁸²⁾ *Essays*, 131.

⁸³⁾ *Ibid.*

argument, or the argument that happiness or pleasure is precisely the foundation of morality.⁸⁴⁾ Mill goes on to clarify the theory of the principle by distinguishing the different logic to which the natural sciences abide, in contradistinction to the case of all principles included within the “practical arts,” of course including the study of morals. Restating what was already dealt with as the main topic of *A System of Logic*, Mill explains that the sciences rely on deduction in which the “particular truths precede the general theory,” whereas the practical art induction, which is by consequence subservient to the ends which are arrived at through the completely independent logic of Art.⁸⁵⁾ In effect, “All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient.”⁸⁶⁾ Mill thus concludes that all morality must be deduced from moral laws, and that they are evident *a priori*.⁸⁷⁾ However, Mill raises objection to the indiscriminate introduction of various maxims by many thinkers whilst lacking not a one that is authoritative, and also lacking a logic of precedence amongst them.⁸⁸⁾ Thus, he argues that it is utterly necessarily to establish that “one fundamental principle or law, at the root of all morality” that can act as an axiomatic principle to decide that lacking precedence when they are in conflict with one another.⁸⁹⁾ This is the principle of utility as he mentions, originated from Bentham.⁹⁰⁾

⁸⁴⁾ *Essays*, 132-133.

⁸⁵⁾ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁾ *Essays*, 133.

⁸⁷⁾ *Essays*, 132-133.

⁸⁸⁾ *Essays*, 131-135.

⁸⁹⁾ *Essays*, 133-134

⁹⁰⁾ *Essays*, 136.

2. Rereading Chapter Two of *Utilitarianism*: Virtue as the Central Condition to Happiness Altogether

In the second chapter, Mill intends to clear the principle of utility of gross misconceptions that complicate its acceptance and pervert its original purpose. In so doing, Mill explains, as stated in the title of the chapter, “what utilitarianism is.” Mill’s idea of happiness and of the utilitarian logic is much more complex than simply “the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number.”⁹¹⁾ Rather, Mill’s utilitarian argument is better interpreted within the chapter as “happiness altogether,” and that the central tenet of this argument is that this principle requires, as a precondition, the nurturing of virtue.⁹²⁾ By virtue, it refers to what Mill understands as a willingness to sacrifice his own happiness for the good of all. This is the central tenet that is consistently dealt with throughout the entire essay, and which Mill declares as the objective of utilitarian argument to nurture, through institutional improvement as well as the “general unanimity of sentiment.”⁹³⁾ The first passage of the essay that directly refers to this point is provided below.

“...for that standard is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. *Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character*, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so

⁹¹⁾ *Essays*, 137.

⁹²⁾ *Essays*, 142.

⁹³⁾ *CW*, I, pp.173.

far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from his benefit.”⁹⁴⁾

This raises the question of whether or not Mill’s utilitarian argument is actually paradoxical in that while it argues for the happiness of all, it negates the happiness of the individual. To this question, Mill defends his argument in the passage below.

“Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world’s arrangements that any one can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue which can be found in man. I will add, that in this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable. For nothing except that consciousness can raise a person above the chances of life, by making him feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they have not power to subdue to him: which, once felt, frees him from excess of anxiety concerning the evils of life, and enables him, like many a Stoic in the worst time of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquility the sources of satisfaction accessible to him, without concerning himself about the uncertainty of their duration, any more than about their inevitable end.”⁹⁵⁾

Thus explained by Mill is the grounds upon which he makes the happiness of all consistent with the happiness of the individual. He is basically stating that as paradoxical as it may seem, sacrificing oneself for the happiness of all is the only way in which individuals can truly achieve happiness. Indeed,

⁹⁴⁾ *Essays*, 142.

⁹⁵⁾ *Essays*, 147.

this is the grounds upon which Mill makes sacrifice an integral part of his argument. However, it is of the utmost importance to distinguish between sacrifice seen as holding intrinsic value in itself, as opposed to sacrifice holding value only when it contributes to the happiness of all.

“The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice itself is a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as waste. The only self-renunciation which it applauds, is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means of happiness, of others; either of mankind collectively, or of the individuals within the limits imposed by the collective interests of mankind.”⁹⁶⁾

Thus explained is the central tenet of Mill’s utilitarian standard. In summary, Mill elaborates that utility as the foundation of morality is essentially the maximization of happiness of the collectivity, to which it is a precondition that virtue, or what he also refers to as nobility, be nurtured in individuals to the greatest extent. He also once again makes this logic consistent with the happiness of the individual through the view that dedication to the happiness of all that individuals can truly approximate their own personal happiness. However, these portions of the second chapter alone cannot complete the utilitarian argument for the missing reasoning as to why an individual’s happiness is synonymous with a virtuous dedication to the happiness of the collectivity. To complete the circle, we turn to Mill’s theory of life as set forth in this chapter.

Mill makes it clear that the reasoning behind the central tenets of Mill’s

⁹⁶⁾ *Essays*, 148.

utilitarian argument as summarized above is made possible from Mill's theory of life. Mill states in the early part of the chapter that Mill's standard of utility is based on this theory of life.⁹⁷⁾ This theory of life is essentially Mill's particular definition of the good life, within which he more clearly defines his concept of happiness and unhappiness. Mill first explains that the good life of an individual is one that pursues a particular type of pleasure.⁹⁸⁾ Mill makes the distinction between intellectual pleasures as opposed to pleasures of the body, or of sensation. According to Mill, the truly happy life of an individual is one that is predominantly engaged with the intellectual as opposed to the sensational pleasures.⁹⁹⁾ He identifies the good life as one that is experienced in both kinds of pleasures, but after the dual experience would never degrade himself to a "lower grade of existence" by choosing the pleasures of sensation.¹⁰⁰⁾ As such, Mill invokes the saying, "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig dissatisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."¹⁰¹⁾ Furthermore, Mill states within his theory of life that the happiness of an individual is attainable, and that it is so done not through a "continuity of highly pleasurable excitement" but rather through "moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing."¹⁰²⁾ As such, Mill's theory of life posits the view that happiness is not a continuous rupture, but rather short intermissions of pleasure. This understanding of the frequency of pleasure would make it all

⁹⁷⁾ *Essays*, 137-146.

⁹⁸⁾ *Essays*, 147.

⁹⁹⁾ *Essays*, 138-140.

¹⁰⁰⁾ *Essays*, 139-140.

¹⁰¹⁾ *Essays*, 140.

¹⁰²⁾ *Essays*, 147.

the more plausible that a sacrifice of one's own happiness, if ever unpleasant in the short run, may surely lead to a very rewarding, albeit possibly a short burst of pleasure upon seeing its contributing effect to the happiness of the collectivity. This still does not complete Mill's theory of life. Another crucial part of Mill's theory of life is that an individual leads a happy life only when he is balanced in his public and private life, or "affections." He views life as being comprised of a vast number of things to interest, to enjoy, and to correct and improve.¹⁰³⁾ Given the conditions of a prevention of pain and an escape from the "positive evils of life," such as "indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness or premature loss of objects of affection," any individual can lead a life that is deemed "enviable."¹⁰⁴⁾ Thus, this crucial part of Mill's theory of life emphasizes that extremes of either public-mindedness or the private affections are miserable, and that a truly happy life is one that maintains a balance between the two. Thus summarized is Mill's very particular definition of happiness founded upon his theory of life.

The final part of the second chapter is one that is directly linked to the third chapter. It concerns the conditions through which the virtue and of character of the individual can be established. But first, Mill argues that it is in fact possible to improve upon these conditions by referring to two key philosophical views presented in his *System of Logic* and dealt with in the previous chapter of this dissertation: the Law of Mind and the possible changeability of the human nature; and Mill's theory of historical progress. In doing so, Mill makes it possible to converse upon the conditions that can be improved to nurture the character and virtue of individuals that is consistent with the utilitarian argument and the theory of life explained above. First, the following passage illustrates the conditions made possible

¹⁰³⁾ *Essays*, 147.

¹⁰⁴⁾ *Essays*, 144-145.

by the flexibility of the human mind.

“As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) interest of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes: so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being’s sentient existence.”¹⁰⁵⁾

This passage then emphasizes that so long as the human mind is capable of being educated and shaped so as to contribute to a virtuous character, that is the actual condition that must be fulfilled in order to approximate the utilitarian ideal. This involves not only the habitual association, through social arrangements, of the interest of the whole with oneself, but also the nurturing of the motives or sentiments, or the moral faculties. Before delving into the details of the moral sentiment as the ultimate sanction of the utilitarian standard, it is necessary to sum up the points and analyze their implications for the main endeavor of this dissertation.

¹⁰⁵⁾ *Essays*, 148-149.

The summary of the chapter has covered the critical details of the utilitarian doctrine in specific. A few critical points must be made in regards to the material. First, it is made clear here that the central tenet of the utilitarian argument is as much that regarding the nurturing of virtue as it is about utility as the ultimate moral standard. While it is true that the utilitarian standard acts as an axiomatic principle that judges the precedence of certain principles over others, it requires that the individuals within society are nurtured, in character and in sentiment, to become Mill's particularly defined virtuous and intellectual individual. This leads to the second, and most important point that the logical structure of the utilitarian argument is consistent with the logic of principle and progress as established in the previous chapter of this dissertation. In specific, the designation of the ultimate standard of happiness of "entire sentient creation," not simply a mutually exclusive interest of a smaller political collectivity, is the *necessary condition* through which at all other lower levels down to the individual, progress can be made. The final stage of progress that can be made at the individual level is the particularly defined virtue, or nobility of the individual. In short, progress towards the better individual, the better political society, and the best international political arrangements is only possible through the acceptance of a utilitarian standard that is committed to the overall happiness of all mankind. It is thus interpreted here that it is an inherent quality of Mill's utilitarian argument that the foundation of all goodness, at all levels of human affairs, is only possible when the ultimate standard is universal for the good of all mankind. In other words, the external morality is the prerequisite for all progress in the internal realm of human conduct in Mill's utilitarian argument. This is the most critical point of *Utilitarianism* that is directly relevant to what constitutes the international political philosophical thought of John Stuart Mill, and will be further elaborated upon in the upcoming sections of this dissertation. The remaining

chapters are less important in comparison to this most important second chapter when thinking of their implications for Mill's international political thought. They are mostly specifications of the logic of the utilitarian argument. Nonetheless, the remaining chapters will also be summarized.

3. Rereading Chapter 3 of *Utilitarianism*: Moral Sentiment and the Changeability of Human Nature

The third chapter of *Utilitarianism* is dedicated to the identifying of the ultimate sanctions that legitimate the utilitarian standard as the ultimate foundation of all morality. Mill argues that it is required for any attempt at the *summum bonum* to explain what motives or inner workings of the human being make that principle a legitimate one.¹⁰⁶⁾ Mill argues here that there are two main sanctions that work together to legitimate the utilitarian sanction: the external and the internal sanction, of which the former is a sanction that is common to all other systems of morals apart from the utilitarian standard, and where the latter is a sanction that is mostly exclusive to the utilitarian standard alone.¹⁰⁷⁾ The external sanction is “the hope of favour and the fear of displeasure from our fellow creatures or from the Ruler of the Universe, along with whatever we may have of sympathy or affection for them, or of love and awe of Him, inclining us to do his will independently of selfish consequences.”¹⁰⁸⁾ It is for this reason that Mill states that “if men believe, as most profess to do, in the goodness of God, those who think that conduciveness to the general happiness is the essence, or even only the criterion, of good, must necessarily believed that

¹⁰⁶⁾ *Essays*, 159.

¹⁰⁷⁾ *Essays*, 160.

¹⁰⁸⁾ *Ibid.*

it is also that which God approves.”¹⁰⁹⁾ In short, the external sanction of the utilitarian standard is which is derived from the fear of a supernatural moral entity. Mill deals with this particular sanction concisely, noting that this is a sanction that is just as applicable to other systems of morals as much as to the utilitarian standard. The more important sanction of the utilitarian standard is the internal sanction, which is exclusive to the utilitarian standard alone. The internal sanction refers to the “conscientious,” subjective feeling within the individual mind that comes into pain when in violation of a duty of morality.¹¹⁰⁾ This moral feeling is founded upon the natural sentiment of man: the “social feelings of mankind.”¹¹¹⁾ Of this, Mill states the following:

“This firm feeling of mankind is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilization. The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives of himself otherwise than as a member of a body; and this association is riveted more and more, as mankind are further removed from the state of savage independence... They are alas familiar with the fact that of co-operating with others, and proposing to themselves a collective, not an individual, interest, as the aim (at least for the time being) of their own actions... Not only does all strengthening ties of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the

¹⁰⁹⁾ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰⁾ *Essays*, 161-162.

¹¹¹⁾ *Essays*, 164-165.

welfare of others; it also leads him to identify his *feelings* more and more with their good, or at least with an ever greater degree of practical consideration for it.”¹¹²⁾

This leads Mill to what is considered as the ultimate stage of progress in his *Autobiography* covered previously, which is the “general unanimity of sentiment.”¹¹³⁾ This is covered in brief by Mill as the “feeling of unity” below:

“In an improving state of the human mind, the influences are constantly on the increase, which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which feeling, if perfect, would make him never think of, or desire, any beneficial condition for himself, in the benefits of which they are not included.”¹¹⁴⁾

Mill argues that these feelings of unity, through the natural sentiment of sociability, are what make the internal sanction of the moral feeling as a subjective feeling resonating from within the mind of the individual, as a very real and powerful sanction. In fact, Mill goes on to argue that the internal sanction is of higher precedence to the external sanction previously mentioned. This is because no matter the truth and the awe evident in the external sanctions through an external fear of supernatural moral authority, and no matter the truth evident in “things in themselves” apart from the sensory perception of humans, the sanction that directly influences conduct is that of the individual’s subjective feeling.¹¹⁵⁾ It is for this reason that it

¹¹²⁾ *Essays*, 164.

¹¹³⁾ *CW*, I, pp.173.

¹¹⁴⁾ *Essays*, 166.

¹¹⁵⁾ *Essays*, 162.

is interpreted here that Mill's thinking is "empirical" and "consequential"; all that matters for that which relates to the principles relating to conduct must first be conveyed through the sensory functions of the mind. Such is the summary for the third chapter of *Utilitarianism* on the sanctions of the utilitarian standard.

There is an important question that must be answered in regards to the third chapter. It is the question of what the implications of Mill's sociability inherent in human nature are for international politics. True, Mill intended for this concept to be used as a means to justify the utilitarian standard; by citing sociability as the underlying natural sentiment that can be strengthened so as to nurture the moral feelings, Mill is providing a legitimate reason for adopting the utilitarian doctrine as the foundation of morals. However, one may ask of what role sociability plays in the interaction between separate political collectivities. It is not a misplaced question when one ponders whether sociability is only a precondition of the moral feelings at the level of the individual. It is rather the contrary; the sociability of the individual as well as his moral feelings must run consistently throughout all levels of human existence: from the level of humanity, through the separate political collectivities, and down to the individual. This is an imperative that is attributable to Mill's designation of the happiness of all mankind as the moral standard to which all other secondary principles must be subservient, as mentioned in the previous chapter. In essence, this leads to the conclusion that not only must the individual be nurtured in its sociability and moral feelings, but so must all other types of political collectivities in order for the utilitarian ideal to be approximated. This idea, as well as its resulting views on the necessary sociability of the state and all other political collectivities, will be dealt within in the following sections as well.

4. Rereading Chapter Four and Five of *Utilitarianism*: The Principle of Utility and Instrumental Values

The fourth chapter of *Utilitarianism* is of the least importance in this dissertation, and deserves only a brief summarization. It has no implications for the international political thought of John Stuart Mill. It deals with the question of how the standard of utility can be proved to be the sole criterion of morality. Mill distinguishes here between proof in the natural sciences and in the any conversation pertaining to the language of principles.¹¹⁶⁾ Since principles are basically a study of the ends of human conduct, the legitimacy of those ends cannot be deduced from empirical evidence as in the natural sciences.¹¹⁷⁾ However, this is not to say that a knowledge of the ends cannot be established through reason. Rather, it is simply that principles must be reasoned in their level of priority in a different manner. The only method of ascertaining which of the maxims is the ultimate ends is by comparison.¹¹⁸⁾ If all other maxims with which utility is compared to in their level of priority can be submitted to utility, then Mill argues that it can be proven that utility is the ultimate moral standard.¹¹⁹⁾ Mill has not accomplished this feat entirely in the chapter, and indeed the question is left open for discussion for all time. This is because the maxims to which utility can potentially be compared are limitless. The only primary maxim to which Mill compares his standard of utility in depth within the chapter is that of virtue. Virtue, as distinguished from the sense of the term he used as an integral part of his utilitarian argument, here means virtue as a “good in itself.”¹²⁰⁾ Mill argues that this kind of virtue is

¹¹⁶⁾ *Essays*, 168.

¹¹⁷⁾ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸⁾ *Essays*, 169.

¹¹⁹⁾ *Ibid.*

inferior to utility because virtue is only valuable as it contributes to the general happiness; there is no intrinsic value within virtue itself that should make it a higher maxim.¹²¹⁾ This is the logic through which Mill argues that a majority of those things that are valued in life are through *association* to happiness, not because of some intrinsic value that they hold in themselves.¹²²⁾ Mill gives the examples of money, fame and power. Many individuals reply that these three are what hold most value, and thus are the standard by which they deduce their conduct. However, Mill similarly disassembles this logic by noting that the three are only valuable because they are conducive to the acquisition of a pleasure, or the freedom from displeasure.¹²³⁾ It is because of this implicit association that money, fame or power are often misunderstood to be standards of conduct in themselves. This is what he thinks also of the desire of music and of health as well.¹²⁴⁾ This phenomena he refers to as the replacement of ends by the means through association. It is through this logic that Mill arguably proves that utility is the ultimate principle of all principles.

This chapter offers the benefit of confirming that the characteristic of the utilitarian principle is that it renders everything else valuable only in their instrumental function, not as ends in and of themselves. However, it does provide also a possible limit of the utilitarian argument, which is that its large distance from the unlimited number of other values in human life has the possibility of undermining the importance that should be given to those values in the real experiences of life, even if in principle they are only instrumental. This is no more apparent than in the case of virtue, as it is defined not in this chapter but in the second and third chapters.¹²⁵⁾ That is,

¹²⁰⁾ *Essays*, 169-171.

¹²¹⁾ *Ibid.*

¹²²⁾ *Essays*, 170-171.

¹²³⁾ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴⁾ *Essays*, 172.

virtue or nobility in character and sentiment of the individual and of the political collectivity that is conducive to the approximation of the utilitarian ideal of general happiness.¹²⁶⁾ Although in principle only instrumental to utility, virtue is so essential a part of Mill's argument that it cannot be exempted from any of Mill's substantive political philosophical thought. Indeed, Mill stated this in the second chapter, to which the excerpt is referenced once more here because of its utter importance.

"Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit.

Thus, virtue exhibits the quality of a very powerful association with Mill's concept of utility and his theory of life and of happiness that renders the considerations of it just as, if not more important in actual conduct. This is also a part of Mill's utilitarianism that has ramifications for the international political thought of Mill; it is that the "general unanimity of sentiment" that is the final stage of progress in Mill's philosophy of history becomes the main objective of all other subservient goals of politics.¹²⁷⁾ This too will be dealt with, and organized into the international political thought of John Stuart Mill afterwards.

The fifth and final chapter of Mill's *Utilitarianism* is on the relationship between justice and utility. Mill takes seriously the claim that justice, not utility, should be the foundation of morality. The central idea in Mill's analysis is that the maxims of justice are also subservient to the principle of

¹²⁵⁾ *Essays*, 142, 147.

¹²⁶⁾ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷⁾ *CW*, I, pp.173.

utility, without which it is characteristic of justice to produce maxims that cannot decide upon any priority amongst them.¹²⁸⁾ This is with the exception of one maxim of justice, which is that of self-defense; the will of the individual to protect his physical and mental existence is the only maxim of justice that has a higher level of obligation than that of all other maxims.¹²⁹⁾ This is why Mill concludes that the only principle through which the precedence of maxims of justice over each other is through the principle of utility.¹³⁰⁾

Now having reread, and identified the central ideas that comprise Mill's utilitarian argument, we finally turn to the task of using these ideas to deduce Mill's international political thought in the true sense of the term.

¹²⁸⁾ *Essays*, 182-184.

¹²⁹⁾ *Essays*, 191-193.

¹³⁰⁾ *Essays*, 201.

IV. John Stuart Mill's International Political Thought

The next and final process is the attempt at organizing a Millian philosophy and theory of international politics, based on the key philosophical tenets as introduced above in *Utilitarianism*, *System of Logic* and *Autobiography*. However, it is required once again to clarify what the international political philosophical should *not* be misunderstood as in order to legitimate the endeavor of observing purely the ideational implications of Mill's political philosophy. The first part thus answers the preliminary question of why Mill's international political thought in the truest sense of the term must be found from within his core philosophical and political philosophical tenets, and not simply his foreign policy stances. After this has been completed, we finally turn to reconstructing Mill's international political philosophical thought.

1. Distinguishing Mill's International Thought from Practice

The current tradition in which Mill's thoughts on international politics, however it may be defined, consist of a sum of the collection of the stances he took as a political practitioner on a variety of substantive foreign policy issues.¹³¹⁾ This is not to say that Mill's thoughts on substantive issues of foreign policy organized as such are without any merit. Mill's international political "thought" established as such provides an illustrious account of the ways in which a philosopher reasoned when placed within the very real and limiting circumstances of political practice. In fact, Mill is arguably one of the few philosophers to have been so deeply engaged in

¹³¹⁾ *Ibid.*, (Georgios Varouxakis, 2017, *Liberty Abroad*), p.1-18

not only political philosophy, but also in the actual affairs of foreign policy. However, such historical accounts of Mill's international political thought also shows the degrading limits and failures of purely philosophical and political philosophical ideas as they enter into the real world of politics: the disparity between the ideas and practice. This does not mean that the philosophical ideas hold no truth or use in the realm of real politics, but that so long as the actual world is imperfect until it can approximate the political philosophical ideal, it is inevitable that the application of those higher principles requires immense relaxations of them, and the oscillation of those higher principles with much more expedient secondary principles of less value. This is the essence of the logic of practice introduced by Mill on the relationship between Art and Science as organized in the previous sections: Art dictates the ends, but in effect science has a harsh limiting effect on the implementation of those ends in practice.¹³²⁾

Thus, what can thus be said of the current trend of amassing Mill's thoughts on various substantive issues with which he arguably dealt with in foreign policy, is that it is inevitably doomed to be confusing and controversial when juxtaposed to his main political philosophical, and philosophical works; and that it so often criticizes those inevitable inconsistencies and contradictions to be the result of exclusively Mill's political philosophy. For instance, Jennifer Pitts laments Mill's controversial take on empire as a consequence of his political philosophy, while in contrast praising his teacher Bentham.¹³³⁾ However, this criticism is misplaced. The controversial stances that Mill took on various substantive foreign policy issues is attributable to the general disparity between ideas and practice in general; they are *not* a direct consequence of Mill's political

¹³²⁾ *CW*, VIII, pp. 943-945

¹³³⁾ Pitts, Jennifer. *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton University Press, 2005).

philosophy. Furthermore, had any of the other political philosophers engaged in political practice and policy as deeply as Mill had, they too would have failed in maintaining total consistency between their main philosophical tenets and their political actions. Thus the problem here identified is one that is not exclusive to John Stuart Mill, but to all of political philosophy. It is precisely because Mill happened to have dealt so extensively with political practice and foreign policy that he arouses so much controversy and criticism. A majority of those who inquire into Mill therefore commit the critical mistake of confounding the illegitimacy of his actions with a flaw in Mill's political philosophy itself. This is simply not true. Rather, Mill's failures (if they are evaluated as such) in the foreign policy is attributable not to a flaw in his political philosophy, but rather to both Mill's errors in the scientific analyses of those issues and the limitations that imposed by the imperfect state of affairs in reality. If one cannot distinguish Mill's foreign policy stances from his political philosophy, they will always continue to find inconsistencies and flaws in *every* substantive issue that Mill ever dealt with. An example will be illustrated briefly so as to illustrate how this is so. It is the substantive theme of nationalism. Varouxakis has highlighted and organized systematically the thoughts of Mill on the substantive theme of nationalism.¹³⁴⁾ The answer is somewhat complex and requires careful conceptual distinctions, but it is basically that he viewed nationalism during his time and space as *provisionally* necessary. He does distinguish between what he refers to as "patriotism e'clairé," or enlightened patriotism, versus selfish nationalism; he is referring to the former as the only form of national sentiment that he advocates because it is one that encourages sentiments of pride, and a shame in the absence thereof, in a foreign policy that is beneficial to other nations, whereas the

¹³⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, (Georgios Varouxakis, 2017, *Liberty Abroad*), pp. 9-16.

latter is a national sentiment that feels oppositely pride in pursuit of selfish interests at the cost of the interest of others, and shame in soft and unassertive foreign policies.¹³⁵⁾ As Varouxakis interprets, this view of nationalism is consistent with Mill's utilitarian morality because it is encouraging the outwards attitude of nations to be oriented towards the good of the greater, cosmopolitan happiness.¹³⁶⁾ However, playing devil's advocate, it can also be interpreted that the advocacy of the existence of the modern nation-state itself, and of the any form of nationalistic sentiment regardless of it's orientation towards the good of other nations, is actually inconsistent with Mill's utilitarian argument. For if the utilitarian argument suggests that all principles and rules of conduct should be subjected to the contribution to the happiness of all, than it is logically not coherent to advocate any political collectivity such as the nation-state which is arguably most concerned for its national interest and survival than the happiness of humanity. Furthermore, it can also be interpreted that any sentiment which is attached to a smaller level political collectivity such as the nation-state is automatically impossible of being *directly* attached to the general happiness of all of humanity: this is essentially similar to the inevitability of a sentiment of friend-enemy distinctions that arise from attachment to any political collectivity that is smaller than the entire world itself. Thus, nothing short of a cosmopolitan political governing entity, or basically some kind of world government is perhaps the only solution that is logically consistent with Mill's utilitarian standard, and thus practically capable of approximating his utilitarian ideal. Is Mill's main political and moral philosophic argument of utilitarianism then flawed in itself, and thus responsible for Mill's affirmation of the necessity of the nation-state and of his enlightened nationalism? *Most definitely not.* Then what is to account for having led

¹³⁵⁾ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶⁾ *Ibid.*

Mill to conclude as he did, in spite of the fact that a direct logical extension of utilitarianism rather leads possibly to the conclusion of some form of world government? It is simply a consideration, through the empirical logic of Science, in the interaction with the Art, of the limitations and the realistic circumstances of the world that must be accounted for when pondering the actual rules of action. In other words, Mill's advocations of the existence of the nation-state and of enlightened nationalism are not direct consequences of his political philosophy; they are more the result of his *social scientific* inquiry. It was politically naive to even ponder the question of a world government during Mill's own time and space, and perhaps even today due to the lack of the necessary institutions, of the material conditions, and the highly segmented and mutually hostile sentiments of people during his time. This example shows how Mill's social scientific inquiry, not his political philosophy, is responsible for his views on the necessity of the state and enlightened nationalism.

It has therefore been illustrated how Mill's stances on foreign affairs were highly provisional and mostly instrumental conclusions to which he arrived at, not without consideration of his political philosophy of utilitarianism, but more through his scientific inquiries into those substantive themes. These views of Mill should thus be taken as being worthy only of being regarded as statements by a political commentator. They were not political philosophical thoughts because they were considerations of specific policy or practice. It then leads to the conclusion that the international political thought of John Stuart Mill as understood by Varouxakis and a majority of others is not his political philosophical thoughts, but simply his foreign policy stances. It is misleading to refer to these substantive views as constituting the "international political thought" of Mill, but rather the *provisional foreign policy* of Mill. It is also of course erroneous to refer to

the aggregation of Mill's foreign policy stances to be his international political thought in the proper sense of the term. Rather, such an endeavor of Mill should be referred to as *a history of Mill's provisional foreign policies*. It is with this distinction to Mill's foreign policy and his political philosophy that we now do justice to Mill by deducing his true international political thought, or philosophy, directly from his most seminal political philosophical works.

2. Mill's Philosophy of International Politics: The Necessity of Utility as a Cosmopolitan First Principle

Then it has been established that the essence of Mill's international political *philosophical* thought does not consist of just simply the sum of Mill's stances on a number of isolated foreign affairs issues; the nature of those stances on the substantive issues are closer to Mill's social scientific inquiries than his core idea of an international political philosophy that consists of more fundamental principles. Thus, the international political thought of John Stuart Mill is highly deserving of being independently constructed on the basis of Mill's central moral and political philosophical works. The first part of establishing Mill's international political thought is through the interpretation of his *System of Logic* and his *Autobiography* on the theory of progress and the changeability of the mind as introduced in the concluding part of the third chapter of this dissertation.

The main idea here is that progress towards the happiness of all is only possible through the designation of an international first principle. This is made possible first by Mill's analysis of the human mind in the final book of Mill's *A System of Logic*. It is the analysis that the human mind is not

bound by the philosophical tradition of Necessity to behave in a predestined matter.¹³⁷⁾ Rather, the individual has the quality of Liberty, or free will, through which he can choose for himself, through a selection of the circumstances necessary, the character that he wishes to become.¹³⁸⁾ Thus, human nature is to Mill highly capable of change. Second, the theory of principle set forth by Mill establishes his view that what comprises the substance of that character, is the ends, or the principle. These principles are evident *a priori*, and thus function according to a different logic as opposed to that of the natural sciences.¹³⁹⁾ That is, the selection of the ends is done through not the dictates of science but through that of Art.¹⁴⁰⁾ It is according to these ends that the rules of conduct are deduced in conjunction with the corresponding science.¹⁴¹⁾ This, in short, that a conception of the desirable ends precedes any analysis of science through which that end, or principle, is made a reality. This theory of principle is essentially a theory of the relationship between principles and reality. This leads to the third tenet of Mill's philosophical argument, which is that progress is a concept that is only possible through the logical designation of a principle to begin with. This means that the possible *developments* in reality are only *advancements* so long as there is an *a priori* principle towards which those developments in reality can be made. Those developments are all the attempts at "bettering" life for all by changing the empirical reality that we live in, including the improvement of social arrangements, of education, of political institutions, of economy, of the individual health of all, and so on. Fourth, Mill's notion of progress presents his normative argument that true progress is one in which the reality is made better so as to contribute to

¹³⁷⁾ *CW*, VIII, pp.849-874; *CW*, I, pp.173.

¹³⁸⁾ *CW*, VIII, pp.836-848.

¹³⁹⁾ *CW*, I, pp.165.

¹⁴⁰⁾ *CW*, VIII, pp.943-952.

¹⁴¹⁾ *Ibid.*

the happiness of all. As such, Mill identifies the principle of utility as the only principle that must be designated so as to achieve the most advanced form of society in reality in which all individuals are truly happy. It was the interpretive argument of this dissertation in its third chapter that the utilitarian principle is logically an international, or cosmopolitan one in the sense that it embodies the goal of “liberty and general unanimity of sentiment” as the end stage of progress.¹⁴²⁾ The last and final conclusion is that progress towards that goal in reality of the general unanimity of sentiment and of liberty is only achievable through the designation of the first principle as a cosmopolitan one that transcends any principle that is limited to only the individual or a single political collectivity. Although by consequence this conclusion shares the view of Varouxakis that Mill’s central moral argument is one of cosmopolitan morality, it differs in the most crucial aspect: that *progress* as Mill describes it is only attainable through the designation of the first principle as a cosmopolitan one. This is the conclusive essence of Mill’s international political thought.

The first part of Mill’s international political thought is thus the philosophical reasoning that logically legitimates the view that progress is only possible through a cosmopolitan morality. The second part of Mill’s international political thought deals with showing more specifically, on a strictly *political* philosophical, as distinguished from the philosophical, basis, as to why it must be so that progress is possible only through the acceptance of a cosmopolitan morality. To address this topic, we turn to Mill’s *Utilitarianism* for the answer. The problem to solve is why it must be that the first principle must be found beyond the *political* collectivity. For surely, so long as the stage for individuals is primarily within the boundaries of his own political collectivity, then there is just as much a

¹⁴²⁾ *CW*, I, pp.173

reason for placing the first principle of utility within the confines of the political collectivity alone. Indeed, there is evidence within *Utilitarianism* that supports this view. It is that for a majority of individuals, all that is demanded of them is virtue that extends practically to his or her immediate surroundings in every day life.¹⁴³⁾ This can be interpreted as meaning that it is not even necessarily a larger political collectivity such as the state to which the commitment of the individual must extend; it is to those other individuals that are within the practical reach of his smaller community that the noble commitment of the individual should exist. Thus, the limiting of the principle of utility to not the general happiness of all sentient beings but to simply the smaller political collectivities is sufficient for also instigating those material developments necessary for nurturing virtue of character and of achieving the happiness of individuals.

The answer to this problem is that Mill is inferring something about the relations between independent political collectivities, and therefore of international relations. Mill had in mind international politics as a component of politics that it is just as important to the end goal of “liberty and the general unanimity of sentiment.” Basically, international politics to Mill was something that was critical to the guarantee of the perpetual happiness of all individuals. But it is still not clear as to whether the external behavior of the political collectivity need necessarily be committed to the happiness of other political collectivities as well. To this, there is no doubt that it must be so, and that in fact this is also a critical component without which the ultimate happiness of individuals is impossible. This is because unless the behavior of the state also be virtuous and committed to the benefit of other political collectivities, there will be a state of international affairs in which some states are caught up in circumstances that makes the general happiness

¹⁴³⁾ *Essays*, 151.

within the boundaries of their own collectivity impossible, or relatively much less possible. Thus is the presupposition inherent in the logic of Mill's utilitarian argument that the fate of the political collectivity is dependent not only upon the virtuous character of the individuals that constitute it, but also that the happiness of the individual is mutually dependent upon the fate of his own political collectivity. Therefore, the *external*, or basically the *international* circumstances of the political collectivity inevitably factor greatly into the capacity of that collectivity to generate general happiness *within* the collectivity as well. Thus, no external behavior of a political collectivity is good that unilaterally maximizes his own *capacity* for happiness at the expense of the *capacity* of other collectivities to do the same because all individuals must be made happy. The external circumstances that can be thought of must be imagined in strict accordance to the central logic of Mill's philosophical arguments. But this topic is one that demands elaboration in a work separate from this dissertation. Nonetheless, those external circumstances can at least be conceptualized and established here in the abstract; in fact, it must be defined in the abstract, for the overt specification of those circumstances demand, like considerations of Mill's foreign policy stances, the inclusion of the logic of science in arguing their appropriateness, and to which the conclusions can only be provisional. Moving on, the circumstances that dictate the capacity of the political collectivity to in turn generate internal happiness is that of the physical circumstances. This is based on the second chapter of *Utilitarianism* as explained previously in this dissertation. The concept of the physical circumstances necessary for generating happiness can be extended into the frame of international politics. It will be further explained below.

Mill states in his *Utilitarianism*, as reviewed in the fourth chapter, that there are physical, antecedent conditions that "easily kill the tender plant of noble feelings", and prevent the individual from pursuing the very narrowly

and discreetly defined good life as established in his theory of life.¹⁴⁴⁾ That is, the life in which the individual pursues the intellectual pleasures, is in enjoyment of both private and public affections, and perceives of true happiness as one in which his happiness is achievable only through a willingness to sacrifice his own happiness for the general happiness altogether. This paradoxical notion of happiness was noted duly in the fourth chapter of the dissertation.¹⁴⁵⁾ The physical conditions thus mentioned are the “positive evils of life,” such as “indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness or premature loss of objects of affection” which Mill has a dogmatic belief in the certain possibility of being rid of to a great extent in the future.¹⁴⁶⁾ it is also that of a proper education and opinion which inculcates the natural sentiment of sociability, and the subsequent capacity to feel that one is in unity with the rest.¹⁴⁷⁾ To be clear, the relevant passage is quoted once more.

“As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) interest of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes: so that not only he may be unable to conceive the

¹⁴⁴⁾ *Essays*, 141.

¹⁴⁵⁾ *Essays*, 147.

¹⁴⁶⁾ *Essays*, 145-146.

¹⁴⁷⁾ *Essays*, 147.

possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence.”¹⁴⁸)

These are the physical circumstances then that must be improved, and can certainly can be improved, that make the utilitarian argument possible. Returning to the main point, then it is undoubtedly true that the external behavior of the political collectivity towards other collectivities directly influences the attainment of these physical conditions. It is all the more logically consistent then, that like in the case of the individual, the external behavior of the collectivity must also be made virtuous so that it benefits the physical capacity of all other collectivities to maximize their own general happiness, and subsequently maximize the happiness of all individuals.

These are the circumstances that necessitate virtue in the external behavior of the political collectivity towards others. Unless the political collectivity does so, then it is impossible for the state to theoretically uphold the general happiness internally. Thus, the utilitarian principle implies that there is a continuity between the individual, the political collectivity, and of the entire international political world. Furthermore, this is why, as it is interpreted in Mill's *System of Logic*, that the first principle of utility need necessarily be consistently applied to all aspects of human affairs, in the domestic as well as the external realms of the political collectivity; without this condition being met, Mill's notion of progress towards the end goals of “general unanimity of sentiment and liberty,” and of the happiness

¹⁴⁸) *Essays*, 148-149.

of the individual cannot be realized. In other words, both the individual and political collectivity must designate as the standard of their moral obligation and sentimental commitments the happiness of all of humanity, not simply those surrounding him or even to the political collectivity alone. This argument is therefore in direct conflict with any attempt at only interpreting that it is sufficient to place Mill's principle of utility within the political collectivity, than also outside of it. This is the conclusion that is reached in this dissertation through the interpretation of Mill's utilitarianism based on the logic of principle and progress as explained in Mill's *System of Logic* and his *Autobiography*.

As a concluding remark, it is worth clarifying, for the sake of avoiding misunderstandings of the argument, that the international political thought of Mill as expounded here exhibits the quality of being more a moral and political philosophical one that is also within the branch of Morality in the three departments of Mill's Art of Life. This is because this international political "philosophical" thought of John Stuart Mill is deduced almost solely from Mill's philosophical views on principle and history, and from his political philosophical and moral argument of utilitarianism. In a sense, it is a secondary principle deduced from Mill's first principle of utility, and speaks of what is mostly imperative, not what is indicative. It is by the implication of this quality that the international political thought shown here has no direct holding over the rules of conduct. As in the case of the principle of utility as well as all other principles, or ends, within the departments of the Art of Life, the rules of actual political practice must be deduced in conjunction with the corresponding science.

3. The Philosophical Mill and Empire

The previous section has attempted to expand the key philosophical principles of John Stuart Mill to international politics. In other words, the result in the previous section is a Millian philosophy of international politics. It is crucial to note that the Millian philosophy of international politics set forth above is to be distinguished from rules of conduct, or practical norms pertaining to concrete themes of foreign policy. Moreover, it is to be distinguished from studies on the history of Mill's foreign policy advocations, which is closer to a compilation of Mill's practical thought rather than his philosophical principles. The final problem to now be returned to is the reentry into mainstream debates regarding John Stuart Mill and key substantive themes in international politics through the philosophical approach attempted in the previous section. Once again, this is for the purpose of illustrating how a purely philosophical approach to Mill's works can lead to not only interpretations that differ from prevailing historical and semi-philosophical interpretations of Mill's actions as a political practitioner, but it also helps to show how Mill's purely philosophical contributions are in themselves undeserving of much of the criticism that they are currently receiving. In particular, that criticism is directed towards Mill's philosophy and his advocacy of imperialism. Through an examination of this contentious substantive debate, it will be argued here that the purely philosophical elements of Mill's political thought was not inherently imperialistic, contrary to mainstream arguments in scholarship regarding Bentham and the two Mills.

It is of course no secret that John Stuart Mill shared his father's judgments of the inadequacy of Indian society, the dichotomous distinction between civilized and barbarous peoples, and about empire and India.¹⁴⁹⁾ Mill was in the service of the East India Company in the department of

correspondence at the age of seventeen, and continued to work in the Political Department of the East India Company throughout his life, handling relations with native Indian states. Mill argued forcefully for the preservation of the Company's rule over the abolition of the Company and replacement by British direct rule. Mill ended his career in Indian politics towards the end of his life when rule of India was eventually forfeited by the East Indian Company to the British government in spite of Mill's best efforts, where he also refused to remain as a member of the Indian government under such circumstances of direct rule in fear of the involvement of powerful selfish individual interests.¹⁵⁰⁾

Regarding his view of the Indian people and his thoughts on civilization and history, Mill agreed to and expanded his father's initial thoughts on the matter: Mill not only theoretically advocated his father's dichotomous distinction between barbarians and civilizations, but attempted to establish this theoretical dichotomy as a key principle of actual foreign affairs in practice.¹⁵¹⁾ This, as mentioned by various authors, is all the more striking in spite of Mill's original contribution to the utilitarian tradition cultivated first by Bentham and his father. Mill found his preceding utilitarian teachers to have been too narrow in their understanding of human nature; Mill thought that the far too simplistic utilitarianism first established by Bentham only tended to account for the immediate consequences of an action, whereas, as explained in full through a rereading of *System of Logic*, Mill attempted to take into account the effect of an action upon the formation of the character of individuals.¹⁵²⁾ And pertaining to this character of individuals, Mill expounded his theory of the Law of Mind, that human

¹⁴⁹⁾ *History of British India*, James Mill, 6:480.

¹⁵⁰⁾ *Affairs of India*, John Stuart Mill, pp.147-53.

¹⁵¹⁾ *Ibid.* (Affairs of India, John Stuart Mill), pp.155-56.

¹⁵²⁾ *CW*, I, p.170-171; *CW*, VIII, pp.849-860.

nature was for the most part socially constructed and capable of change, as opposed to a racial, gender-based or biologically deterministic view of human nature.¹⁵³⁾ Thus, it is clear that Mill intended to improve utilitarianism so as to make it account for a wider variety of personas and development and progress of the society through character building of individuals. However, Mill also continued onwards to apply his theory of individual character and progress to that of “national character.”¹⁵⁴⁾ Thus, like Mill’s theory of human nature, Mill believed that the nature of the state could also be improved, just as an individual could strive to build his own character towards becoming a complex, intellectual and both public and private minded individual. The critical point of the debate is as to why then Mill continued to advocate his father’s dichotomous views of national characters: “advanced-backward, active-passive, industrious-sensuous, sober-excitabile.”¹⁵⁵⁾ To this question, the majority of scholarly arguments have supported the view that it was precisely Mill’s utilitarian principle, combined with his particular dedication to and view of progress, of character, and of his utilitarian argument that Mill inevitably reached the conclusion of the civilization-savage dichotomy through which he justified empire.¹⁵⁶⁾ Some of the most influential arguments pertaining to this debate suggest that these philosophical characteristics of Mill’s utilitarianism inevitably leads to the justification of imperialism; that classical utilitarianism and liberalism as conceived and presented by Mill, is the very origin of imperialism.

One most recent and representative versions of the aforementioned kind of

¹⁵³⁾ *CW*, VIII, pp.849-860.

¹⁵⁴⁾ *CW*, X, p.99.

¹⁵⁵⁾ *Ibid.*, (Jennifer Pitts, 2005, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France*), pp. 134-136.

¹⁵⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. ; *Ibid.*, (Mehta Uday Singh, 2005, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought*), pp. 46-50.

argument is set forth by Jennifer Pitts. Pitts argues that Mill's perfectionist attitude led to the adoption of a particular view of human character and progress that, coupled with the utilitarian principle, inevitably led Mill to adopt an erroneous view on civilization.¹⁵⁷⁾ This dichotomous view of civilization was the cause behind Mill's advocacy of empire, although he did distance himself from his father by arguing that it was crucial that the East India Company, as opposed to the British government, administer the rule of India. Pitts argues, similarly to this dissertation, that Mill considered his establishment of the theory of individual and state character, through his theory of law of mind in *System of Logic*, to be his greatest contribution to the utilitarian tradition. However, Pitts argues that Mill's attempt at sophistication of the utilitarian argument and framework through the addition of a theory of character of states tended to inevitably align states on a single axis of his narrow definition of progress.¹⁵⁸⁾ Thus, Pitts argues that it was an inevitable result of Mill's theory of a singular and specific form of progress, coupled with his theory of national and state character and the utilitarian drive legitimating "assistance" through despotism, that Mill advocated the dichotomy of civilization-savagery, and subsequently advocated empire in India.

To this view and similar arguments regarding the inherent flaw in Mill's philosophical doctrines, the purely philosophical caricature of Mill's international political thought in the previous section provides an alternative argument. It is that Mill's purely political philosophical views are not accountable for Mill's advocations of empire, and even if Mill's views on empire and civilization can arguably be considered wrong, those decisions have to be distinguished from his philosophy, rather as Mill's erroneous

¹⁵⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, (Jennifer Pitts, 2005, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France*), pp. 137-138.

¹⁵⁸⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

secondary analyses, or practical thoughts and not his philosophy. To elaborate, we have reviewed how Mill's utilitarian argument, as well as his key essays in the *System of Logic* clearly indicate that he is setting forth a purely moral argument with regards to the "foundation of morality," or the first principle of all morality from which all other secondary moral principles can be deduced, and their hierarchical priorities evaluated.¹⁵⁹⁾ As such, Mill is suggesting his argument on the ultimate ends of morality, for which he answers that the cultivation of the greatest happiness of peoples *altogether* is the ultimate standard of morality; and that the approximation of this ultimate principle of morality requires the nurturing of individuals who are public-minded in spirit and willing to sacrifice their own good for the collectivity; and also of individuals who are equally rich in their private affections conducive to their happiness in the most meaningful sense.¹⁶⁰⁾ Lastly, we have also confirmed that this is coupled with Mill's key theories of character changeability and progress, which then subsequently designates the betterment of the aforementioned virtuous qualities of individuals as well as the state in its interpersonal and international relations as the ultimate conditions of the utilitarian principle.

In contradiction to the views of Pitts and Mehta, there is no element within this purely *philosophical* aspect of Mill's argument that necessarily leads to a wrongful, dichotomous view of civilization or an advocacy of empire. The characteristic of a dichotomy of civilization-barbarism implies a very powerful sense of superiority and inferiority, and furthermore also suggests that the superior are authorized to deal with the inferior in an authoritative manner so long as it is conducive to the progress and development of the inferior. However, the utilitarian argument in itself does not necessarily lead to the authorization of this kind of suppressive

¹⁵⁹⁾ *Essays*, 131-135.

¹⁶⁰⁾ *Essays*, 137-146.

authority. The addition of the forceful and authoritative element present in the dichotomy is a very particular or exclusive *secondary* extension of the utilitarian principle. That is, it presupposes that the forceful subjugation of one inferior entity is necessary for their betterment, while skipping the secondary debate as to then what is the best method through which all individuals, and all states can behave in a manner that is beneficial to the improvement of the virtuous character of their fellow states/individuals altogether conducive to their happiness. For instance, an alternative extension of the utilitarian argument could be the polar opposite of the civilization-barbarian dichotomy, such as one which believes in a normatively egalitarian approach to individuals and states, irrespective of each of their character and capabilities, as the best means through which they can culminate in the improvement of character and happiness altogether. Or, even if it is to be interpreted that there are of course differing capacities of states in being beneficial to the happiness of their peoples altogether, and to the happiness of other states altogether as well, it can still simply be said that there is still no element which automatically justifies the imposition of authority of one entity over the other just simply on the basis of their degree of character. Rather, it would be truer to Mill's purely philosophical argument that the only justified relation between states would be that which is not injurious to either and is also as beneficial to the improvement of each society. The secondary debate, on a practical level through the consultation with Science as opposed to Art, would have to ensue in defining exactly what form of relation that should be. This debate would not automatically conclude that imperialism or superiority and inferiority as the solution.

As farfetched as this alternative scenario sounds in regards to its mismatch with Mill's actual views on civilization and empire, the main point to be understood here is that the civilization-barbarian dichotomy is

not an automatic by-product of Mill's utilitarian philosophy; and that the validity of the purely philosophical argument of Mill (that happiness altogether is the ultimate standard of all morality) is, and should not be, in no way harmed by Mill's advocacy of the dichotomy between civilization and barbarians. The conclusion of this analysis would be that it is premature to consolidate the view in scholarship to associate utilitarianism and progressive liberalism as purely philosophical arguments, with imperialism, as in the case of Pitts or Mehta. Primarily, the philosophical approach to a Millian philosophy of international politics thus explained here cites the failure of Pitts and Mehta in distinguishing between Mill's practical thoughts such as his view on the necessity of force as a means to progress, and Mill's purely philosophical principles regarding what should be the ultimate ends of politics and international politics. This is more so if it is conceded, as it is in the case of a large number of literature, that Mill and his father were ignorant of the realities of the customs and traditions of the Indian society. Most certainly, the contemporary evaluation of James Mill's *A History of British India*, which John Stuart Mill also strongly advocated, is that both Mills had shockingly short-sighted and condescending views of the Indian people and their capacity for self-rule.¹⁶¹⁾ This would only further validate the argument set forth here, that Mill's key philosophical principles are still valid as valuable guiding ends of human and state action irrespective of the negligence that Mill showed towards India.

Neither does the utilitarian argument, as a philosophical argument in and of itself, hint at any form of Western exclusivity shunning tolerance and understanding of non-Western societies. Unless one decides to fall into the trap of total relativism, the utilitarian principle and Mill's views on the proper progress of humanity exhibit qualities of being universal. If there is

¹⁶¹⁾ *History of British India*, James Mill, 6:480.

ever to be rejection of the utilitarian principle as the ultimate end of morality and its conditions, then that rejection would reasonably have to occur at the philosophical level, not at the practical level which focuses on refuting Mill's practical policy stances. It is upon these grounds that the philosophical approach caricatured in the previous sections has attempted to defend the purely philosophical and moral arguments that Mill presented from the accusation, as in the case of Mehta and Pitts, that his philosophy inevitably culminates in a strained dichotomy and advocacy of imperialism. In essence, this argument has attempted to show the importance of not only accurately reviving the historical thinker, but transcending the limitations of the thinker and expanding and building upon their core philosophical tenets.

VI. Conclusion

We now reach the conclusion to the two-part problem of establishing Mill's international political thought. To rephrase the preliminary problem, it is the question of what the proper concept of international political thought to be inquired into is for John Stuart Mill. The second problem is that of the establishment of Mill's international political thought in accordance with the definition of the concept concluded in the preliminary problem. To first state the concluding answer to the preliminary problem, the international political thought of John Stuart Mill in the truest sense of the term is his *philosophy* of international politics inherent in his main philosophical and political philosophical works. Thus, it is *not* what the current trend in Mill's international political thought endeavors in, namely, the *history of Mill's foreign policy*. To reiterate the reasons, it is firstly because Mill distinguished between principles and rules of conduct; principles are truths about ends that are evident to us *a priori*, and can be deduced from each other solely in and of themselves; whereas the rules of conduct, or the maxims of practice, are *provisional* in nature, and are a function of the interplay between principles and science. Thus, this leads to the primary endeavor of establishing Mill's international political thought through solely his central philosophical and political philosophical works.

The concluding answer then to the primary problem of establishing Mill's international political philosophical thought is that the betterment of our empirical reality is only possible through the global nurturing of virtue, or the willingness to sacrifice one's own happiness for the happiness of all, and to be capable of perceiving this to be the paradoxical way in which an individual can truly achieve his own happiness. To this end, the first principle, or foundation of morality must necessarily be a cosmopolitan

morality, and it must be placed in every context of human affairs: in the international context as well as the domestic collectivity, and the individual. As such, Mill's political philosophy presupposes the continuity in his logic through the individual, to the political collectivity, and ultimately to all of mankind. As such, virtue is not only a quality that must be inculcated only in the mind of the individual, but in the external behavior of the political collectivity and states as well. This is the ultimate conclusion that we arrive at, and in so doing, we have finally done justice to the memory of John Stuart Mill, the ever so passionate philosopher of mankind.

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국문 초록

본 논문은 존 스튜어트 밀의 국제정치철학을 그의 핵심 정치철학 및 철학 논지들로부터 재구성하는 것을 주된 탐구 주제로 하고 있다. 존 스튜어트 밀에 대한 기존 연구는 그의 국제정치사상을 역사적으로 접근하고자 시도해왔으나, 이는 철학가가 아닌 정치 실천가로서의 존 스튜어트 밀에 치중하고 있다는 점에서 그 한계가 드러난다. 즉, 여태까지 진행되어온 존 스튜어트 밀의 국제정치사상에 관한 연구는 사실상 그의 국제정치 ‘철학’ 또는 ‘이론’ (Theory, Philosophy of International Politics)에 관한 것이라기보다, 존 스튜어트 밀의 외교정책사에 더 가깝다고 판단하고 있다. 이는 존 스튜어트 밀의 논리학 체계에서 드러나는 정치적 실천과 철학 각각의 독립적인 논리에 대한 명확한 구분할 필요가 있음에도 불구하고, 의회 의원으로서의 밀과 철학가로서의 밀을 무분별하게 섞어서 해석하고 있다는 점에서 부족하다. 정치 실천과 정치 철학에서의 제 1 원칙 (first principle)을 및 기타 이하 2차적인 원칙들에 관해서는 순전히 존 스튜어트 밀의 주요 정치 철학적 논지들을 중심으로 ‘Millian’ 정치철학적 원칙을 재구성해서 평가할 필요가 있음을 주장하고, 이를 본 논문에서 시도하고 있다.

이와 같은 문제의식을 바탕으로 본 논문은 존 스튜어트 밀의 논리학 체계의 핵심 논지들과, 제 1 원칙인 공리의 원칙을 다루는 공리주의를 기반으로 해서 존 스튜어트 밀의 국제정치철학을 구성해봤다. 기본적으로 논리학 체계에서는 밀의 실천의 논리, 역사적 진보와 인간 심리 이론을, 그리고 공리주의에서는 밀의 덕 (virtue)과 공동체의 행복 극대화에 대한 정치철학적 논지를 기반으로, 개인-국가-국제사회를 관통하는 일관된 정치철학적 기반을 구축하고자 시도했다. 즉, 사회적으로 구성되는 속성을 지닌 인간 심리를 덕의 함양을 목적으로 진보를 이루는 것이야말로 밀의 핵심 정치철학적 논지로 해석하고, 이와 같은 덕의 함양이 국내 사회에서의 개인뿐만 아니라 국가간 관계에도 일관되게 적용되는 논리임을

주장하고 있다. 밀의 역사적 진보에 관한 이론상, 공리의 원칙이라고 해석된 제 1 원칙이 가장 초월적인 단계, 즉 국가를 초월하여 국제사회, 그리고 국제 사회를 초월하여 ‘all sentient beings’에 적용되어야 한다는 핵심 주장을 펼치고 있다. 마지막으로, 이와 같은 Millian 사상축을 기반으로 기존에 가장 많이 다뤄지고 있는 밀의 제국 옹호라는 문제에 관하여, 기존 역사학자 또는 사상사적 접근과는 대조되는 해석을 내놓고 있다. 즉 밀의 제국 옹호가 그의 정치철학에 내제되어 있는 내적 결함으로 인해 발생한 것이라는 해석에서 벗어나, 그의 논리학 체계에서 드러나는 실천의 논리에 따른 잘못된 사회과학적 판단에서 비롯된 것이며, 그의 실천적 판단과 철학적 산물들은 구분하여 평가될 필요가 있다는 해석을 내놓고 있다.

주요어 : 존 스튜어트 밀, 국제정치사상, 논리학 체계와 실천의 논리, 제국과 자유주의, 제국과 공리주의,

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