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**Master's Thesis of Public Administration**

**Algerian Foreign Policy Toward Mali Crisis  
2012-2016**

**2012-2016 년 말리 사태에 대한 알제리의  
외교정책 분석**

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# Algerian Foreign Policy toward the Mali Crisis 2012-2016

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## **Abstract**

# **Algerian Foreign Policy Toward Mali Crisis 2012-2016**

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Herein, the study attempts to explore the Algerian foreign policy response to the 2012 crisis in Mali; it explores the evolution of the Algerian response through dividing it to three (3) phases, before, during and after the French military intervention. Meanwhile, it tries to test the consistency of the Algerian foreign policy toward the 2012 crisis vis-à-vis the country's conceptualized role, and the rigidity of the noninterference principle while facing a critical crisis threatening its national security, and to point out the new pragmatic tendency of the Algerian foreign policy.

Using both: the role theory and the rational actor model, the study's main findings were that: the psychological features of the president influenced the foreign policy and nourished the occurrence of the pragmatic adjustment of the Algerian position toward the military intervention in 2013. That the decision maker is rational and decisions can be beneficial if the state works as a unitary actor, without conflicting interests among its

components. The rationality of the decision can be measured by its achievement of the initial goals and its accordance with the State's priorities; the availability of data and the careful assessment of the alternatives are the keys to rationality and to the goals achievement. Nevertheless, we can notice that several factors motivate the leader's behavior apart from his psychological features that are mainly: the nature of the international system compared to the capabilities of a medium power, and the internal and social construct that bound his moves.

**Keywords:** Algeria, Foreign Policy, Mali, Crisis, African Sahel.

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## **Acronyms and Abbreviations**

PMA	Popular Movement Of Azawad
MDAC	Movement Of Democratic Alliance For Change
IAF	Islamic Arab Front
PMLA	Popular Movement for Liberation of Azawad
RALA	Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Azawad
UMFA	Union of Movements and Fronts of Azawad
SFI	Fragile State Index
AQMI	Al Qaïda au Maghreb Islamic
MUJAO	Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems
NMLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
SCM	Suisse Cheese Model
EU	European Union
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
USA	United States Of America
AU	African Union
DRS	Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité
OCJGS	Operational Committee of Joint General Staff
NEPAD	Nouveau Partenariat pour le Développement de l'Afrique
NPA	National Popular Army

AFPM	Algerian Foreign Policy Maker
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
AMA	Arab Movement of Azawad
CPA	Coordination for the People of Azawad
CNMR	Coordination of National Movements of Resistance
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Mission of the United Nations For the Stability in Mali
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Cooperation
AUSC	African Union Security Council

# Chapter 1: Introduction:

## 1.1 Introduction

*“Domestic Policy can only defeat us, foreign policy can kill us”*, these words of J.F. Kennedy can clearly define the importance of foreign policy as a part of the high politics of any nation. In short, foreign policy refers to the set of principles, orientations, tools, and practices defined inside the state and exercised outside it, having as ultimate goal the protection of the national security. Just like any other policy, foreign policy is made within the state; the only difference is that the latest is designed to monitor the state’s international relations and it is practiced on the international scene.

There is a consensus that International Relations are mainly constructed of the inter-states interactions that are based on the national behaviors of each one of the international system’s units. States were aware of the importance of building a consistent foreign policy, having as goal the protection of their acquired values and the protection of their national security, and to reinforce their international and regional position, whenever possible. All that in a globalized world characterized by new patterns of threats and challenges that are linked to each other, and which is also usually qualified as “borderless” world, where a situation in any part of it may affect the others.

Within such a complicated system, there is no country, that can entirely and constantly, be preserved from threats and security challenges, or kept away from the crisis emerging in the international arena, and this probability is even smaller when the crisis is emerging within the country’s direct regional context and in one of the neighboring countries.

Also, the ability of a state to operate, and to cope with this kind of events, depends largely on its capabilities, the consistency of its policies and principles, and on a set of external factors resumed mainly in the nature of the International system, and the international powers influencing it. It is thus, logical that, the responsiveness of countries varies, *i.e.* a developing country has a limited margin to conceptualize and implement an ambitious foreign

policy. And if the bipolar world allowed the newly independent and the LDCs to exert an amount of influence through the international institutions such as the General Assembly of the UN and the Non-Alignment Movement, the new system is taking those gains away, and getting back to a world similar to the one reigning before the Peloponnesian war, with way more developed, diverse and destructive (on the military aspect) means.

## **1.2. Background:**

Under a fierce competition over resources, and a changing nature of security threats, the region of the Sahel, came to occupy an important and advanced space, within the international agendas, and those of the international powers such as: France, the EU and The USA; especially now that Africa - more precisely the Maghreb and the Sahel regions- are at the same time a source of problems and wealth. And the crisis in 2012 came to expose the Algerian national security to some serious threats, thus the foreign policy makers had no option but to move in a way that protects the Algerian security and the Algerian interest, in accordance with its foreign policy traditions and principles.

In fact, the geographic location of Algeria at the heart of North Africa has exposed it to a diverse palette of security concerns, especially during the last 6 years, where events in the region went so fast and almost out of control. So, 2011 was laden with problems, starting with the revolution in Tunisia that gave birth to a new wave of social movements, seeking democracy all over the Arab world. The spark of revolution spread around the region like wildfire, oppressive regimes were collapsing one after the other like the dominoes start falling. While in Libya, the overthrow of Muammar El Gaddafi's regime, by the NATO military intervention, had severe repercussions on the North African regional stability through the aggravation of the situation in the Sahel region.

In addition to the fact that the Sahel region shelters 7 out of the 10 poorest countries in world<sup>1</sup>, and that it was already weakened (before the crisis in Libya ) by multiple security challenges and threats such as the presence of terrorist groups and several aspects of structural violence; studies show that 30% to 40% of drugs traffic goes through the region<sup>2</sup>; they report also, that it is the first financial source for the « Jihadism » of Al-Qaida in the Maghreb “AQMI”; according to the French National General Secretary of Defense and National security, within its contribution to the revision of the French security doctrine “The White Paper on Defense and National Security (le livre blanc)2008”; the Maritime spaces close to the Sahel region became a scene of development of criminal flux: Drugs, arms, human beings; mainly favored by the failure of the national institutions within these countries which turns them into transit regions<sup>3</sup>. As a part of the region, Mali did not break the rule; moreover, it represents the weakest link. In addition to the drugs traffic, members of the terrorist group AQMI- active in Mali and the Sahel region since 2000’s were the major beneficiary from the military intervention and the crisis in Libya, since they were able to recover the arms smuggled from the ex-Gaddafi’s militias stocks. According to “Conflict Armament research” several types of arms recovered by terrorist groups or by the separatist movement in Mali (Azawad Movement) came from the stocks abandoned by El Gaddafi’s troops after the NATO intervention<sup>4</sup>. This made the situation worst in the country, on the first hand.

On the other hand, a long-lasting frozen conflict (that can be heated up at any occasion) is comprised in these countries, especially in Mali: all the Sahel region countries, are ex-colonies that agreed upon the principle of Uti

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<sup>1</sup> Ilyes kessaissia, *The Security Threats To Algeria Under The current Regional Challenges –Terrorism and Organized Crime.*( Algiers: Algiers 3 University, PhD thesis in international Studies, 2016), P.17. (Translated From Arabic)

<sup>2</sup> Bouhenia Gaoui, *Algerian Strategy Toward The Security Situation Evolution in the African Sahel* available on <http://www.qiraatafrican.com> visited in 08-04-2017. (Translated from Arabic)

<sup>3</sup> Pascal le Pautremat, « Drogue au Sahel : la source principale du financement des Djihadistes »,in *Slate*, available on <http://www.slate.fr/> .

<sup>4</sup> Conflict Armament Research Ltd, « Enquête sur les Transferts d’Armes Transfrontaliers Dans le Sahel », ( London : Conflict Armament Research Ltd , 2016).

Possidetis; after their independence, borders among them were drawn anarchically, according to the colonizer will, that did not take into consideration the anthropological characteristics of the region. Thus a large part of the African and Saharan population (for examples Tuareg tribes in Algeria and the Azawad population in Mali) were de facto dispersed among different countries within and around the Sahel: Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya, which resulted in one of the main concerns of the region: the Tuareg issue. As a matter of fact, members of these tribes are divided around two position: one part supports the hypothesis of remaining under the rules of their current countries, with a few specific conditions related to the freedom of mobility within borders (since the majority of these tribes do not recognize borders due to their lifestyle) and autonomy and freedom of administration, and the second part calling for the independence and the creation of the free Tuareg state.

One more factor that engendered the situation was the failure of the successive governments in Mali (and other Sahel countries) to contain the Tuareg society. Actually, the Tuareg society in the north of Mali has always denounced the marginalization and the discrimination practiced by the government toward the northern parts of the country. This situation caused several rebellion movements between 1992 and 2006 usually solved by the Algerian or Libyan mediation. But due to the severe failure of the state in Mali (and the absence of the state in Libya that used to be the second regulator) and thanks to the arms flow leaking from Libya after the collapse of the regime, in addition to the alliances formed between different actors, Mali knew one of the most intense crisis in 2012, and so realizing the Algerian fears about the NATO intervention in Libya and constituted a new jeopardy to the Algerian Foreign policy.

In January 2012 the Azawad movement launched its armed actions against the government in Mali, backed by Ansar Eddin movement (an extremist movement) and the AQMI. The joint movement was able to control several sites and achieve several victories over the Malian Army, which led to a military coup in the country leading to a complete collapse of the public institutions in northern Mali and a serious humanitarian crisis causing waves of

thousands of refugees(to Algeria mainly). Then the separatist movement announced the creation of the Azawad State, a few time later, the alliance between the separation movement and the extremist “Islamist” groups’ breakdown leading to an armed confrontation that ended in favor of extremists groups.

Algeria, that considers the Sahel region as its strategic depth, and backyard, due to its awareness about the consequences of a potential military intervention on its security, had to face the situation before it is too late. Faithful to its traditions, it preferred to deal with it through the diplomatic means, and without intervening military, considering that the military intervention would not eradicate the problem, it decided to stick to its approach based on developmental and social strategies, in addition to the diplomatic means. However, later, it respected the decision of the Malian government seeking international military support, and considered that it is an internal affair and it respected the Malian authority’s decision as a part of its diplomatic customs of non-intervention, and truthful to its traditions it did not oppose the French intervention as it was under the cover of the UN, in 2013. Nonetheless, despite the international pressures to push Algeria to participate in the operations; such as the American attempt led by the State Secretary of foreign affairs Hillary Clinton, during her visit to Algiers in October 2012, and earlier the visit of the French minister of Interior Manuel Valls<sup>5</sup> and later of the French president; the international community especially France and the US, failed to convince the Algerian foreign policy maker to drop its doctrine and take part in war. Suddenly, in 2013 Algeria provided logistic support and opened its airspace to the French aircrafts intervening in Mali (which was a mean and a practice used for the first time in the Algerian policy toward the Sahel region), especially that the Algerian approval was necessary for the whole operation, as Pierre Boilley

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<sup>5</sup> Sofian Fedjri, “Will Clinton’s Visit Soften the Algerian Position Toward Mali” in *France 24* available on <http://www.france24.com/ar/29> accessed on April 9,2017.  
(Translated from Arabic)

asserted that a military intervention is possible in Mali without the Algerian support but not without its approval.<sup>6</sup> This act did not seem familiar to the AFP traditions, but considered as part of its belief in the international law and the international cooperation

It is to be mentioned, that France led later in 2013 the international military intervention in Mali, and used the Malian request and the UN support as a legitimate cover, whereas there are few other elements that motivated this policy, *i.e.* France needed to secure its interest in Niger mainly related to the uranium mines.

The crisis in Mali was a real challenge for the Algerian Foreign policy. The given main reason to decline the military intervention in Mali was due to its major principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of sovereign states. The Algerian Foreign Policy has always been reputed within its regional context, due to its principles and practices, as a medium power.<sup>7</sup> The country is considered as an important player in multiple geopolitical circles: the Maghreb, the Mediterranean, the Sahel and the African continent, besides the fact that it is a strategic alley to the international players having interest in these regions.

In fact, the country has adopted the principle of non-interference during the 1970's; the Article 89 of the Algerian constitution 1976 stipulated that “... *the Algerian Republic shall refrain from resorting to war to encroach upon the legitimate sovereignty and liberty of people. It shall endeavor to settle international dispute by pacific mean*” and article 90 stipulating: “... *Algeria shall strive for the establishment of peace, peaceful coexistence and non-interference in the internal affairs of states*”. While the article 93 reiterated

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<sup>6</sup> F.P.A, “Franco-American pressure on Algeria detaining the Main Role in Mali’s Dossier” in *El wattan News* <http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/68191> .

(Translated from Arabic)

<sup>7</sup> Guy Pervillé, *L’Algérie Puissance Moyenne?* Intervention présentée lors d’un colloque sur la moyenne puissance au XXI siècle, organisé à Paris du 9 au 11 Mars 1987. Available on [http://guy.perville.free.fr/spip/article.php3?id\\_article=117](http://guy.perville.free.fr/spip/article.php3?id_article=117).

Accessed May 19<sup>th</sup> 2017.

the emphasize on the non-interference principle “*The strengthening of international cooperation and the development of friendly relations among states based on equality, mutual interest and non-interference in internal affairs, shall be the basic principles of the national policy*”<sup>8</sup>. Since then, the principle of non-intervention became one of its diplomatic dogmas.

The Algerian Minister of foreign affairs made it clear, before the intervention in Mali and lately in 2015, that the Algerian Army will not hold any military action outside the Algerian territories, it is a fundamental principle of the Algerian Foreign Policy, and it will remain respected. However, he emphasized that *this would not mean that the country does not have other means to manage the situation*. Then, He has asserted that the Algerian voice anti-interventionist is better heard currently due to the repercussions of the NATO military intervention in Libya.<sup>9</sup> He also declared to France 24 channel in 2013, that Algeria is interested and interacts with the events in Mali, supports as much as possible and does not intervene in internal affairs, which means that the country does not take any action that can oppose the will and the desire of other people or states.<sup>10</sup> The Algerian officials have always insisted that the *noninterference is not a passive policy*, that Algeria prefers a comprehensive approach in which the coercive means are applied only by the Malian government. This is why it has always supported the Malian and the international efforts by providing logistic assistance and economic support. The

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<sup>8</sup> Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria 1976, Algerian Constitutional Council official website, accessed March 28<sup>th</sup> 2017, <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.dz/indexAng.htm>

<sup>9</sup> Rédaction du HuffPost Algérie, «La non-intervention de l’armée Algérienne à l’extérieur, « un principe bien établi et respecté »(Lamamra), *Al Huffington Post*, 29-10-2015, accessed April 04,2017. [http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/10/29/armee-algerie-interventio\\_n\\_8415990.html](http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/10/29/armee-algerie-interventio_n_8415990.html)

<sup>10</sup> Interview available on [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJZje\\_wDWUQ&t=562s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJZje_wDWUQ&t=562s)

Algerian management of the crisis represents an interesting case, to see the change and the evolution of the Algerian position, and its motivations.

### **1.3. Research questions:**

There is no doubt that the instability in Mali, would imperatively impact the Algerian National security, thus it had to respond quickly through careful decisions; especially that it does not consider the military intervention, however we may notice three phases through which the Algerian response evolved in accordance with the crisis and the international setting.

How did Algeria respond to the Crisis in Mali 2012?

1. Why is Algeria concerned about the instability in Northern Mali?
2. Why did Algeria refuse the military intervention in Mali?
3. What was the alternative adopted by Algiers to cope with the different situations?
4. To what extent was the Algerian approach successful?

### **1.4 The Purpose of Research:**

As the changes within the Algerian regional system remain relatively new, only a few number of studies discussed the Algerian response to the last crisis in Mali (2012), these studies were limited. Since they have either been driven while the events were still progressing, this means that they lacked the whole clear image and could not predict the consequences of events, or, they were focused on the security context without analyzing the foreign policy process, or questioning the reasons (motivations) and the validity of Algerian foreign policy choices and alternatives facing the current regional context. Also a primary survey of the available studies in the Algerian universities and research centers, dealing with the Algerian foreign policy toward the Malian crisis, showed that none of them tried to go beyond describing the Algerian approach nor did they evaluate the Algerian policies and position toward the crisis beyond the utopian explanation of “the faithfulness to principles”. Though, foreign policy is all about protecting the country and its interests, rather than appearing as a “good faithful country”.

The study aims:

- ✓ To point out the relation between the threats in Mali, the military intervention there and the Algerian National security, and its impact on the Algerian position toward Mali's situation.
- ✓ To study the Algerian adaptation of the Algerian foreign policy toward the crisis in Mali and its evolution in accordance with the evolution of events and international positions.
- ✓ To test the rigidity of the nonintervention principle, and to point out the new pragmatic and flexible tendency of the Algerian foreign policy, through explaining the contrast of Algiers position toward the crisis in 2012, 2013 and 2014, and evaluate its rationality and efficiency.
- ✓ To contribute in the academic field and take the study of the Algerian Foreign policy toward the Sahel one step further, from descriptive level to the explanatory, and open the sphere for the next level " prediction studies".

### **1.5.Scope and Limitations:**

- ✓ The Study covers the region of the Sahel, more specifically to Mali's crisis. And it deals with the Algerian foreign policy toward this crisis between 2012- and 2016.
- ✓ As a Jordanian scholar said, the Arab policies are at the same time easy and difficult to study, easy because of the limitation of the actors making them , and difficult because of lake of Data; the limitations that may face this study is the lack of the official data, and the confidential nature of the foreign policy making process in Algeria, since according to the Algerian minister of foreign affairs declaration to France 24, for the Algerian foreign policy confidentiality is the synonym of efficiency. Moreover, a decision is made by the president himself and his very close environment, which make hard the access to the black box of the decision making.

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review and Analytical Framework:**

### **2.1. Review and Discussion of Previous Studies:**

This literature review is an attempt to classify and evaluate the literature analyzing Algerian foreign policy toward Mali, especially after the 2012 crisis. As the conflict is quite old, the classification of the literature will be based both on the perception of researchers and in a chronologic order. The study tried to cover literature about different aspects of the conflict and the Algerian approach to tackle it, originated on Algerian and international writer, supporters of the Algerian approach and against it. In fact, since the 1990's researchers (especially Algerian academics) have paid a lot of attention to the Sahel region. However only few academic works discussed the Algerian foreign policy toward the crisis in Mali specifically and the Algerian approach to deal with it. These studies were either abstract: trying to give a global image of the Algerian foreign policy, or to describe the situation in the Sahel, or criticizing the Algerian choice of non-interference without paying enough attention to the factors linking Algeria to Mali and the factor of its position. Also none of the literatures we were able to find, neither discussed the adjustment of the Algerian position towards Mali in 2013, nor its successful settlement of the crisis in 2015, through the Algerian mediation.

A set of descriptive literatures can be found, about the security situation in the Sahel; describing the historical evolution between Mali's State and the rebellions, and the Algerian mediation process. One of the earliest ones was the study realized by Ali Achoui in 1997, (occupying later the position of deputy director of the Arab Maghreb in the ministry of foreign affairs), who described the stages of the Algerian mediation efforts during the 1990's, asserting that it was a successful experience, which reinforced the Algerian position in the region. He was also among the first researchers to point out the noise caused by both Libya and France on the Algerian mediation efforts, and the sphere of the

dominance game played in the region.<sup>11</sup> In the range of the historical perspective, Kara Leila provided a consistent research tackling the Algerian mediation towards the conflict in Mali, since 1963 to 2010. According to her the Algerian successful mediation in 1991 and 2006, gave the country a strong position and made of it a key player and “Safety valve” but exposed it to several challenges among them, as the challenge of the growing number of migrants and the issues resulting from it<sup>12</sup>. The researcher, as well, provided a chronological description to all the Algerians initiatives and efforts; nevertheless it did not go beyond that.

With the spread of the Strategic and International security studies in the Algerian university, a flux of descriptive studies of the Algerian foreign policy toward Africa and specifically the Sahel region occurred. In general, these studies were supportive to the Algerian approach; however, they failed to provide in-depth perspectives of the factors monitoring and shaping this approach, or could only consider one factor shaping the Algerian. This was elaborated by Drif Shaker in 2010, through discussing the security dimension in the Algerian foreign policy toward the Sahel region, assuming that the Algerian approach was completely built upon the issues of fighting terrorism and organized crime in addition to the fear of the societal security’ loss. The researcher considered that the efforts made by the Algerian government until 2010, were not enough to eradicate the threats.<sup>13</sup>

In 2012, Susi Dennison also was critical to the Algerian hesitating position toward the crisis, especially that the country was “the most reluctant reformer in North Africa undergoing a historical change”. Assuming that these two facts dramatically changed in a complex relation with the EU, which turns out not to be a completely consistent story; first because the Algerian internal situation

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<sup>11</sup> Ali Achoui, *Algerian Policy in The Sahel Region* (Algiers: Algiers University, Master of Art Thesis in Political Sciences, 1997), P.p. 72-74. (Translated from Arabic) .

<sup>12</sup> Kara Leila, *The Algerian Mediation In The Malian Internal Conflict*, (Algiers: Algiers3 University, Master of Arts in Diplomacy Thesis) (Translated from Arabic).

<sup>13</sup> Chaker Drif , *The Algerian Security Dimension In The Sahel Region and The African Sahara: Challenges and Stakes*\_(Batna: Elhadj Lakhder University, Faculty of Law, Master of Art in Political Sciences Thesis, 2010) (Translated from Arabic)

was way better than its neighbors since it has had its social movement in the 1980's, and its political performance was improved particularly after the end of the black decade. Also, the writer treated the Algerian position from a European perspective assuming that the expected presidential election (in 2014) to which Bouteflika was not able to run despite he was still in a good shape at the time, a hypothesis denied in 2014 as the president won the election that he run, but did not try to investigate any pragmatic, security, economic, Algerian consideration to refuse the military intervention in 2012. However, the writer mentioned the polarization between France and the US, to counter Algeria through the considerable number of visits effected by French and American authorities, without mentioning that Algeria and the US were on the same wave, in contrast with the conflicting positions between Algerian and France and their different perceptions of the solution in Mali.<sup>14</sup>

In the same tendency, Laurance Aïda Amour was also critical to the Algerian passive position in 2012, moreover, she assumed that the country used Ansar Eddin to regain its position as peace-broker, (which by the way the country has never lost till that point), and that the Algerian diplomacy used the personal link (or informal links), using Iyad Ag Ghali as an agent of the Algerian DRS, to monitor the dialogue<sup>15</sup>; ignoring the fact that Algeria was trying to break any potential alliances between the rebellion movement and terrorist groups, to avoid giving the later more credibility in the case of putting both population, Tuareg rebellion and terrorists in the same bucket. Secondly, relying on informal ties for mediation is a very accepted diplomatic behavior in foreign policy; finally even the writer cited the *defection* of Ag Ghali, an act for which Algiers cannot be blamed.

In his study entitled *Algerian Foreign Policy in the context of the Arab Spring*, Anouar Boukhars criticized the reluctant Algerian position in 2012 by

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<sup>14</sup> Susi Deelson, *The EU, Algiers and The Northern Mali Question* (The European Council on Foreign Relation, N° 69, December 2012).

<sup>15</sup> Laurance Aïda Ammour, "Algeria's Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis" in *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* ( Vol.2, N°28, 2013).

assuming that “*The burst of democracy and revolutionary instability have challenged the doctrines, principles and practices that drove the foreign policy choices of the government since independence in 1962*”. Furthermore, he assumed that the Algerian reactions to the events were not seen as “non-interference practice” but an attempt to contain the democratic wave and protect the regime. Though, according to the researcher the examination of the Algerian foreign policy principles and the strategic consideration will make the regime’s calculus looks less mischievous. The author asserts that the article aims to “*show how Algeria’s position reflects the growing disconnect between its long-standing strategic posture and a fast-changing regional order that runs counter to the ideals and principles that it champions.*” Besides he assumed that the country may forgo the opportunity to become a relevant regional actor. To examine his hypothesis, he traces the historical evolution of the Algerian Foreign Policy, then discusses the pragmatic shift in this policy by the arrival of the president Bouteflika, and that even this shifting did not bring any major changes to the long-standing doctrine, he criticizes the Algerian position toward the crisis in Libya and assume that the country should adopt a “more pragmatic” approach in Mali in case of diplomatic failure, assuming that the non-interference principle had deepened Algeria’s trust deficit in the region, then he discussed the domestic consideration mainly the regime’s considerations to adopt the non-interference policy, and then the strategic imperatives illustrated by the case of Algerian response toward the Libyan crisis. And conclude that the chain of event justified the Algerian position especially when the NATO lost control over the events. Thought, he concluded that the Algeria Foreign Policy may need to review its principles and practices. Besides the fact that the study remains brief, it also does not discuss the alternatives adopted by the country to face the new regional situation, and gives an impression that the country’ foreign policy was passive, he also focused on the *regime’s* dilemma

to justify the noninterference, but did not take into consideration other security motives.<sup>16</sup>

In another study one year earlier, the same author qualified Algeria as the “Paranoid neighbor”, and blamed it for the defection of Agh Ghali considering it as a wrong choice<sup>17</sup>. Arguments might appear consistent and may explain the Algerian position to some extent, but they also look quite exaggerating, in fact other pragmatic consideration were behind the Algerian non-intervention decision, built on a careful reading of the situation and the results of any military action, later on, time proved that Algiers was right both in Libya and Mali.

In the same context, a study realized by the Directorate-General for External Policies of European Parliament, in 2013, entitled: *Algeria's Underused Potential in Security Cooperation in The Sahel Region*, criticized the country's non-intervention policy. The study asserts that Algeria is a regional power in terms of economic, political and military capabilities, it considers it as a pivot ally to the EU in the region, however, the military action led by France in Mali, opened the debate about the possibility of gaining Algeria as a security ally; especially after the terrorist attack against it Gas facility in Ain Amenas in 2013. The study also linked this possibility to a potential change in country's leadership (Algeria had a presidential election in 2014, and the aspired change -according to this study- did not happen), assuming that this change would make it reshapes its regional policy and gives it a chance to become a regional power both in Maghreb and Africa. The study lists the Algerian capabilities and points out the international attempts to get it engaged more closely in a regional solution and qualifies its role as “unclear”

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<sup>16</sup> Anouar Boukhars, *Algerian Foreign Policy The Context of The Arab Spring* (Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, January 14<sup>th</sup>, 2013). Available on <http://carnegieendowment.org/> accessed in 9-4-2017.

<sup>17</sup> Anouar Boukhars, *The Paranoid Neighbor: Algeria and The Conflict in Mali* (Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, October 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2012). Available on <http://carnegieendowment.org/> accessed in 9-4-2017.

and its position toward the conflict in Mali as ambiguous; especially compared to its military, intelligence service and anti-terrorism experience. Then, the study reports the transnational threats emerging in the Sahel, especially after the Libyan crisis, and finally tries to draw a future image for a potential change in the Algerian foreign policy, based on Algeria's position toward the international intervention, and the flexibility it showed, particularly as the international community is promoting an alliances perspective to face the security threats, within which, Algeria is supposed to be a key actor, especially with regard to its strategic relation with France, USA and UK in addition to the EU. Yet, despite its strategic relations with EU, the report indicates that Algeria was not part of its strategy in the Sahel, and that the strategy failed in integrating Algeria as a central player in the Sahel, and concludes by recommending the revision of the European strategy and to develop a more comprehensive approach, involving Algeria as an ally and a key player in the region.<sup>18</sup>

With regard to the EU Strategy in the Sahel, the initiative was also criticized by some Algerian researchers, and considered as an attempt to neutralize Algeria, and that the whole strategy is a new face of the imperial practices, bringing back the colonial powers to the region as assumed by the Researcher Sofian Mansouri.<sup>19</sup> According to him, the Sahel region is attracting a great attention lately as it became a source of security threats and a refuge for the terrorist and organized crime groups, knowing that this region embraces a palette of the big powers economic interests, it is nowadays knowing a noticeable dynamic of developmental and security projects and policies, especially from the EU. The researcher assumes that EU strategies for peace and development in the Sahel region are one of the instruments to force its

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<sup>18</sup> Martina Lagatta & others, "Algeria's Underused Potential in Security Cooperation in the Sahel Region" in *Policy Briefing* (Belgium: The EU, Directorate-General for External Policies, June 2013).

<sup>19</sup> Sofian Mansouri, *The Horizon of The European Union Strategy For Security and Development In The African Sahel* (Batna: Batna 1 University, PhD Dissertation in International Relations, 2017). (Translated from Arabic)

dominance and supremacy over this region. His main findings were that the EU strategy reflects and depicts the new image of European colonization of these countries as it hides the European interests, then these policies are the tool of Europeans to compete over the region's resources.

On the same wave; Souad Lahrawa assumed that the international interests in the region are curbing the Algerian efforts. The study illustrates the repercussions of the crisis in Mali on the Algerian National security, and emphasizes the emergence of the terrorist threats, and the challenges imposed by the refugee's waves. It explores its diplomatic role in Mali and lightly refers to the Algerian refusal of the Military intervention. Finally it explains the disruptive to the Algerian role, resumed mainly in the complexity of the Mali conflict due to the fragmentation of the interests and actors, the weakness of the developmental plans to face terrorism, it also considers that the role played by the big powers especially France to protect its interests, by curbing the Algerian role, also, the opposition of some African actors to the Algerian role in the region especially ECOWAS and Morocco. As for the results, the study concluded that, Algeria's approach, based on the socio-economic reforms, aims to contain any potential repercussions of the conflict, that the country succeeded to some extent to devise a few preventive policies to limit the intensity of the conflict; however, it is still facing few challenges and difficulties to find a final solution to the conflict. Hence, the study did not explain why did Algerian policy maker insisted on the pacific resolution and refuse the military tool; it neither discusses the dilemma between the requirement of national security and the principle of noninterference, nor points out the new indicators of the potential changes in the Algerian foreign policy, nor it examines the process, through which the pacific approach prevailed over other alternative such as the military intervention.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Lahrawa Souad, *The Obstacles To The Algerian Role in Solving The Conflict in Mali* (Ouargla: Kasdi Merbah University, Master in International Security and Strategic Studies, 2015). (Translated from Arabic)

Other writers, firmly criticized the French military intervention in Mali, Kamal Labidi called France: “The War” State, as Holland launched the military operation in Mali, for him France is looking for its lost glory, both in Mali and Libya. Under the cover of fighting terrorism, the socialist party was looking for more legitimacy, and voter’s trust, even if that would cost lives in Mali, some opposition parties thought that launching the military intervention without the approval of the parliament was a wrong decision, namely Jean Luc Mélenchon, later on the French government asserted that it had to move quickly in Mali, and had not enough time to study the situation<sup>21</sup>

On the other hand, other researchers supported the Algerian comprehensive approach such as Samir Kelaadrous, who assumed that Algerian national security is linked to the security in the Sahel region, and that the security in this later depends on the implementation and the enforcement of the Algerian approach. He also argued that the military intervention would engender the already deteriorated situation in Mali (Which also the Algerian official position); furthermore, a human security approach can similarly bring security and stability to the region through the regional cooperation and the collaboration between the regional members and the big powers in the international system; and that building the security in Mali requires a set of diplomatic, cultural and developmental instruments, that are the essence of the Algerian approach. The researcher made a comparative study between the international approaches to reestablish the peace in Mali, to the Algerian approach, however, while studying the geopolitical importance of the region, he mentioned its importance to France but not to Algeria, also while exploring the Algerian approach the study does not go beyond its component and the challenges it faces, nor the foundations on which it is based. As for the findings, the researcher emphasized the fact that the foreign policy engineering should respond to the regional and international environment; he considered Mali as the strategic extension to the Algerian national security, thus its approach was

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<sup>21</sup> Djamel Elabidi, “The Warier State... The French Intervention In Mali” in *African Reading* (London: The Islamic Forum ,N° 16, 2013),p.74-75.

consistent, nevertheless, within its approach, Algeria underused the relations between its Tuareg tribes on its territories and those in Mali. He also, estimated that the military intervention complicated the situation instead of resolving the problem but lacked data to back up this finding, and that the Algerian approach remains the best alternative to appease the situation.<sup>22</sup>

Other literatures, discussed the impacts of the Mali and Libya crisis on the Algerian national security, especially after the international intervention. The researchers exposed the different challenges that hamper Algeria's efforts to solve the crisis in Mali, assuming that terrorism attacks aggravated, while the Algerian vision was correct. Nevertheless they predicted the collapse of the negotiation process and the Algerian mediation policy, which, so far, did not happen.<sup>23</sup>

While another range of literature, tried to evaluate the non-intervention principle in the Algerian foreign policy, through listing the benefits and disadvantages; for Geof D. Porter, Algeria adopted the principle in order to "legitimize the role it has cast for itself on the international Stage"<sup>24</sup> and to ensure the success of its mediation actions, the non-interference principle, protect the country from any international interference in its internal issues, but it may cede the battlefield to other actors that may not share its vision, position of interests.

## **2.2 Research subject (hypothesis) and Research Method:**

As the frequency of events accelerated, at the beginning of the second decade of the new century, in the Maghreb and the Sahel regions, the Algerian

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<sup>22</sup> Kalaadrous Samir, *The Algerian Approach in the African Sahel Region* (Algiers: Algiers University, Master of Art in Strategic Studies thesis, 2013). (Translated from Arabic)

<sup>23</sup> Salim Bousekin, *The Changes of the regional context and their impacts on the Algerian national security* (Biskra: Mohammed Khider-Biskra university, Master thesis In International Relations, 2015)

<sup>24</sup> Geoffer D.Porter, « Questioning Algeria Non-interventionism », in *Politique Etrangère* (Paris :Ifri, N°3, 2015),P.3.

positions and responses captivated an important interest, as a key regional actor in both of them, especially due to the importance of these regions to several international actors competing over interests: France and the USA. It appeared that the Algerian foreign policy made the wrong choice by maintaining its non-interference principle and activating the diplomatic means at the beginning of the crisis, since some of the Malian parties participating in the negotiation defected and joined the military actions, but then, all of sudden, Algeria withdrew its reservations, moreover, it cooperated and provided logistic help to the international forces intervening in Mali. It appears that events have proven that the Algerian choice and alternatives were correct to a large extent, as the intervention did not end the crisis but the Algerian mediation, since the country could finally apply its initial policy, and turned out that it was not a passive position. The Algerian decision maker had already several alternatives in place: a military policy, an economic policy in addition to the diplomatic instrument, activated right after the crisis breakout. Now that the situation appears to be clearer, the Algerian foreign policy seems to regain its prestige; moreover, it appears that after the intervention, France had needed an exit as predicted by Algeria, the military intervention did not eradicate the problem, which gave Algeria the chance to lead the international efforts to gather the parties around a negotiation table. It seems that Algeria chose the correct tools to appease the situation in Mali, but the posture it faced appeared to confuse the foreign policy maker, which makes it an interesting pattern to study in order to understand, why it has chosen and how was it able to maintain its position and avoid the direct military involvement, and evaluate the rationality of the choice by pointing out its real pragmatic incentives, and also describe the alternatives and the policies adopted by the country to encounter the challenges imposed by the crisis in Mali and its pragmatic adaptation, without ignoring the possibility of the failure of the peaceful alternative in the future. Also, we will try to follow the process of the Algerian foreign policy decision engineering towards this crisis. To do so, study will, mainly, examine the following hypothesis:

- ✓ H.1 .Mali is in the heart of the Algerian foreign policy agenda for several pragmatic considerations.

- ✓ H.2. Algeria refused the Military intervention for pragmatic reasons.
- ✓ H.3 Algerian foreign policy maker decisions toward the crisis were rational and coherent with the country's conceptualized role.
- ✓ H.4. There is a pragmatic change in the Algerian foreign policy practice.

### **2.2.1. Operationalization:**

1. The geographic and historical factors, natural resources and the number of the international actors interested in Mali reflect the importance of the Sahel region and the crisis in Mali.
2. These factors, in addition to the Algerian savoir-faire in the region were behind the Algerian refusal of the military intervention.
3. The Algerian adjustment of its foreign policy came in the right timing and was relevant, which is an indicator on their rationality; they were compatible with the country's conceptualized role.
4. The use of the Algerian airspace is an indicator of the Algerian indirect intervention in Mali, which is a new instruments used by Algeria to deal with the conflict in the Sahel can be an indicator of a new pragmatic tendency in the Algerian foreign policy practice, while preserving the core principles of the Algerian foreign policy.

In order to examine these hypothesis, approve or deny them , I will hold a descriptive, explanatory and exploratory study, based on the qualitative method, starting by providing a theoretical understanding of the Algerian foreign policy factors with emphasizing the role of the president and study the psychological features of the president "Bouteflika" and his conception to the Algerian role in the Sahel region; also point out the significance of the Sahel region to the Algerian National Security and the Algerian Agenda in this region and its management of the conflict historically until 2012, the fourth chapter will analyze the 2012 crisis in Mali, and explain its complexity and point out the involved and interested parties and their goals. Next I will study the Algerian response to the crisis in 2012 in the light of the non-interference principle and the pragmatic motivations behind its refusal of the military

intervention, and its first mediation attempt in 2012 till the beginning of 2013 and the alternatives it adopted, then we will study the Algerian decision to accept the international military intervention, and its adaptation to the international approach, I will highlight the motives of this new practice in the Algerian Foreign policy, with regard to the presidential role in the conceptualization of the National role, and how the Algerian attempt (design) of mediation was revised and the main factors motivating the decision of the foreign policy maker, and explore this new practice activated by Algeria consisting in providing the logistic support, the borders closure and the opening of its airspace to the French forces intervening in Mali and point out results of the International Military intervention, and finally the reactivation of the diplomatic means by Algerian authorities (the mediation, and the developmental approach), find out its results and analyze the “Algiers accords”, the chapter will analyze the 3 phases of the Algerian foreign policy toward the crisis (2012-2013/2013/2014-2015) and try to evaluate their rationality,

### **2.2.2. Data collection:**

The study will rely, fundamentally on the scientific observation and analysis of the events, documents and official declarations, facts and acts in addition to a deep examination of literature based on several sources such as: books, electronic sources; journals; academic dissertations and mainly the governmental researches and documents and juridical texts in addition to the think tanks works as secondary data sources; on the other hand and as the topic is basically genuine since it deals with the current event and tries to evaluate the Algerian Foreign policy response practices under international pressures, and in order to honor the study, it will also, rely on the use of “interviews” as a method to collect primary data, with a well-determined sample (judgmental based sampling) composed of a number of Algerian specialist in the Algerian Foreign Policy (academics ), in addition to Algerian Foreign Policy officials and Politicians. The interviews questions and protocol will be sent to a group of researchers in the National Graduate School of Political Sciences (PhD.

Amina Bouarour: Professor Assistant at Kolea University and the NGSPS and researcher at the CREAD) in Algeria. To increase the validity of this method, the interview protocol, is to be elaborated according to the “Interview Protocol Refinement framework”, comprised of 04 phases-processes: 1. Ensuring interview questions align with research questions, 2. constructing an inquiry-based conversation, 3. receiving feedback on interview protocols 4. Piloting the interview protocol.<sup>25</sup>

The interviews will be sent to the researcher, attached with comments and reflective notes from the direct interviewers about the course of the sessions.

Also, I will analyze official: speeches and declarations of foreign policy makers of all the countries involved.

### **2.3. Implication of the study:**

As obvious within the initial literature review, the majority of studies discussing the Algerian approach toward Mali, were descriptive, they mainly described the Algerian approach without analyzing its decision making engineering process, and without analyzing the factors influencing it, and especially motivating the adaptation or the change of the AFP toward the crisis, they, simply, argue that Algeria refused to intervene in Mali and rejected the international intervention (until France issued the UN approval and the Malian government requested), only because of its doctrine, which appears to be utopian, they also do not give any explanation to the new practice adopted by Algeria during the international military intervention. The study is an attempt to give a realistic explanation for the Algerian choice to stick to the nonintervention principle. And to explore the Algerian conception of its policy towards the Mali crisis, and try discover if the Algerian approach was really able to prevail at the end, as it provides a comprehensive approach, , and to evaluate the Algerian responsiveness to the events and its rationality.

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<sup>25</sup> Milagros Castillo-Montoya, “Preparing for Interview Research: the Interview Protocol Refinement Framework” in *the qualitative report* (vol 21 n°5, 2016).

## 2.4. Theoretical framework:

Foreign policy is a topic that derived from the field of international studies; scholars became more and more interested in understanding States' behavior in response to the international events, and in managing their bilateral and multilateral relations. According to Benko, "it is a process and a system of activities performed by a state-organized community of people within the international arena. Its intention is to influence the international arena in line with the aims and objectives of its political activities that are all geared towards its interests"<sup>26</sup>. A definition that shows the pragmatic orientation of the conception of foreign policy in accordance with the realist assumption, for his part, C.C. Rodee asserts that "Foreign Policy involves the formulation and implementation of a group of principles which shape the behavior pattern of a state while negotiating with (contacting) other states to protect or further its vital interests". This definition, emphasizes more the role of principle or states' doctrine and general values, in shaping the states' behavior without having to sacrifice its vital interests, this perception explains to some extent, in a realistic way, the Algerian case, that marries the principles to its interests, unlike the utopian explanations given to the Algerian behavior linking it exclusively to the norms and principles. This vision was also explained by the Algerian president who declared that the Algerian foreign policy may appear utopian but if the observant looked into it, carefully, he would discover that it has a pragmatic side. This definition also argues that in addition to goals, foreign policy is also constructed based on a set of principles, these later are usually generated by historical factors, they also abide to the societal values, principles might constitute the light house guiding together with goals, the making process of foreign policy. They can also be visible through the foreign policy maker behavior, and conceived in accordance with his belief system, his psychological features and his previous experiences, scholars looking for a better

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<sup>26</sup> Ernest Petric, *Foreign Policy From Conception to Diplomatic Practice* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 201), P.1.

understanding of states behavior, started observing the psychological features of political leaders in the early 1930's and 1940's<sup>27</sup>. According to Levy, the interests in the political leaders' belief system effects on the foreign policy decision making stated with George in 1969, when he studied historical leaders' operational codes.

In the 1970's several definitions linking the foreign policy making to the officials behavior, ambitions, acts and decisions occurred; such as those coined by Charles Hermann, Fliks Gross, Henry Kissinger and Richard Merrit. Then a large number of literatures started considering this dimension; a number of theories explaining the foreign policy decision making, focused on the leaders' psychological features among them the role theory and the rational model approach. Seeking a comprehensive approach that may allow us to analyze the Algerian foreign policy without ignoring any crucial factor we may need to use the triangulation of theories.

It is important to mention that the study of foreign policy requires a multidisciplinary approach that allows the researcher to highlight all the potential aspects. Therefore, the geopolitical approach will be used in order to introduce the region, in addition to its importance, to several actors, and in the definition of the factors of the Algerian interests in Mali, in addition to the historical approach to narrate the background of the conflict I may use the legal approach to point out the position of the international law vis à vis the separatist movement in Mali and the Sahel region; this way we will be able to test and verify the first hypothesis, and achieve the first part of our analysis.

Third chapter, we'll need to analyze the Algerian foreign policy globally, and especially toward the Mali crisis and as part of the international studies, the examination of the foreign policy; was also, exposed to the evolution of the approaches to the international phenomenon. Realism that we are using is one of the oldest approaches to it, as it focuses exclusively on the nature of the

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<sup>27</sup> Jack S. Levey, "Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision Making" in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Jack S. Levey & Others (editors) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 2013), P.9

international system. In our case of study, the Mali crisis attracted international attention, as the country is situated in the heart the Sahel region, which represents a gray area where conflicts of interests and multiple threats flourish (asymmetric threats), which explains the number of the actors interested. Thus, to explain the different approaches towards this region and the conflicting interests, Realism appears to be an adequate framework for this study. The theory considers the sovereign state as the prime actor, and unit of analysis, and that interactions between the polities are nothing but the extension of the selfish nature of the human being. Realists assume that states are rational actors, they make decision that, insure their survival, serve the best their interests, and guaranty their supremacy if possible, especially that they live in a “self-help” system. Thus realism may be the theory that offers the best explanation to the regional context and interaction, and the Algerian interest in Mali. However, the realist paradigm might explain the conflicting wills but implies a set of shortage, for which it has been the subject of several critics, as they ignored the other factors influencing the foreign policy making process apart from the nature of the international system, for instance realists could not predict the stability during the cold war, nor the several faces of cooperation among nations, one of the shortages of realism is that the paradigm could not explain why countries living within the same system, with same capabilities would behave differently.

Another approach to the foreign policy occurred, in the sphere of the positivist approaches, the institutional approach, like realism, institutionalism is a a state oriented, that focuses on relations of ruling the multiple institutions existing within the State (as an institution) i.e.: Foreign affairs ministry, Military institution, parliament and the president, depending on their power and their involvement in the foreign policy making. One of the critics to this approach is the fact that the change within the institutions is often slow and incremental, as there is no way to change the institutional settings through a choc, which might affect the flexibility and the responsiveness timing of the state’s foreign policy. Moreover, not all states are democratic in way that allows the coalition among the institutions. Also, foreign policy was exposed to the

different explanations given to the international relations, for instance the realist theory explained the state's behavior through foreign policy as an attempt to acquire power, later neorealist assumed that it is an attempt to preserve security, within an unstable system, witnessing the birth of the systemic explanation whereby, the state is only one unit interacting with many others, however, realists and new realists, were not able to explain the long-lasting cooperation between the international units, which led to the occurrence of the liberalism, that explained the international relations and the state's behavior through normative and economic factors, moreover liberalism emphasize the regularization of acts internally and externally which means that they emphasize the role of institutions.

In the sphere of the stat-centric approaches, the Inner-politiks tendency occurred; its advocates reject the exclusive systemic interpretation of foreign policy, that considers FPM is all about inter-states relation, instead, they believe that the domestic dynamics are decisive for foreign policy.<sup>28</sup>For them, FP, is the mirror of the domestic policy and to understand the country's behavior one should open up the "Black Box" to understand its priorities and interior settings and the preferences of its key actors, but this model fails to explain why countries with similar setting behave differently, it ignores the systemic pressures, other approaches combined both internal and external determinants yet, it was not enough.

The positivist explanations given to the state's behavior were always criticized, because of their shortages, for example, the realists have always considered the external factors: the nature of international system, and liberals to norms and economic factors, ignoring the fact that the starting point of social science and social phenomenon is the human nature and behavior, hence leaders' psychological features, which led to the occurrence of the behaviouralism in international relations. For behavioralists, states and institutions are abstract and do not behave by themselves they obey to the behavior of their leaders, moreover instead of defining state as a unique actor on the international scene,

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<sup>28</sup> "Introduction: Foreign Policy Analysis: A Conceptual Framework", P.9; available on <http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/>

it emphasizes the role of the state's leader as individuals and their influence on the strategies and decisions shaping the states foreign policies and actions within the international system, this can be found out in the functional theory by David Mitrany rooted in the federalist ideals, as the functionalists propose that more interaction between multiple actors can lead to the creation of unified global norms, and the creation of a "global organization" to which states would delegate a margin of sovereignty in order to achieve peace, through the spillover of cooperation and merger.<sup>29</sup> Here the importance of norms as emphasized by the liberalism occurs and with it the decisive role of individuals in achieving peace.

However, the behavioralism is said to have occurred in international relation by Snyder during the 1950's, through the so called "Decision Making Theory", for him foreign policy is the outcome and the sum of the consecutive decisions made by officials, delegated to handle the state's behavior, by the power vested in them by law; as per foreign policy is the illustration of these officials behavior, and to understand foreign policy, it should be seen as a process instead of being examined as outcomes. This approach maintained the realistic assumption that state is the main actor and the decision makers are rational, moreover; it is said to be the subjective outlook of objective realist perception.<sup>30</sup> However, it has also adopted a micro-level of FPA, as it considered the human and psychological features of the leader, for Snyder, no matter what the internal and external factors are, their sensibility and importance are defined based on the perception of the decision maker<sup>31</sup>, in fact the country's behavior is made by "people" thus there is a necessity in understanding the way the

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<sup>29</sup> David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World Organization" in *International Affairs* (UK: Royal Institute of International Affairs , Vol.24, Issue 3, July, 1948), P.353-554.

<sup>30</sup> Fatih Tayfur, "Main Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy: a Review" in *METU Studies in development*, (Vol.21 N.1, 1994) p.130.

<sup>31</sup> Jensen Liyod, Explaining Foreign Policy, Translated by: Mohamed Bin Ahmed Mofti & Mohamed Essyed Selim ( Riadh: King Saud University Press, 1989), P.8.

decision makers see their internal and external environment instead of trying to simply analyze the outcome of their decisions.

As the Algerian constitution considers the “Foreign Policy Making” as a reserved function of the President of the Algerian republic, as the Algerian constitution stipulates in the article 91 of the 2016: *“In addition to the powers explicitly conferred upon him by other provisions of the Constitution, the President of the Republic shall have the following powers and prerogatives: ... 3. He shall decide and conduct the foreign policy of the Nation; ... 10. He shall conclude and ratify international treaties;”*<sup>32</sup>

Also according to the Article 92:

*“The President of the Republic shall appoint: ...The President of the Republic shall appoint and recall ambassadors and special envoys of the Republic abroad.*

*He shall receive the letters of credence and recall of foreign diplomatic representatives.”*As well according to the article 93: *“The President of the Republic shall appoint the members of the Government after consultation with the Prime Minister....”*<sup>33</sup>

Thus, the president is considered as the *Ultimate* foreign policy maker, and the only decision maker, he dominates the policy making process and even the appointment of the foreign policy agents from the minister of foreign affairs to the diplomats. It is to be mentioned, that Algeria enjoys a civil rule, in which the Army’s role is limited in the protection of the National sovereignty and integrity, it is thus under the commandment of the president of the republic according to the article 91 of the Algerian constitution stipulating that: *“In addition to the powers explicitly conferred upon him by other provisions of the Constitution, the President of the Republic shall have the following powers and prerogatives: 1. He shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic; ....”*<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> The Algerian constitution, <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.dz/indexAng.htm>

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

Thus the most adequate theories to analyze the Algerian foreign policy, are those coming under the behavioral approach of the international relation, and to the foreign policy, as they highlight the effects of the leader's personal and psychological features without ignoring other factors such as: domestic policies, state's capabilities, the nature of the international system....

Hence, to understand the Algerian foreign policy in general, and Algerian foreign policy toward the Sahel and the crisis in Mali; the "Role theory" in explaining the foreign policy is strongly needed. It broadly, studies the state's external behavior by using the notion of the "role". According to Sofiane Sakhri, states can be categorized and classified in accordance with the role they choose to play: the mediator, the peace maker, the anti terrorism agent, the liberation supporter, the active independent and the regional leader<sup>35</sup> (these are roles that appears to be chosen by the Algerian foreign policy maker), and the faithful ally, the balancer and the bargainer..., it is to be mentioned that a state can choose to play more than one role, depending on: The sources of the role, and the external environment.

The theory occurred in the field of social psychology and anthropology, and first used in the foreign policy literature in 1970, by K.J Holsti, who believed that foreign policy behavior "*derives primarily from policy maker role conception, domestic need and demands ant the external environment*"<sup>36</sup>. He distinguished two phases: the role conception or perception based on the internal and external sources and the role performance which refer to the set of actions and behaviors taken to implement the NRC<sup>37</sup>. Later in 1980, that was

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<sup>35</sup> Sofian Sekhri, "The role theory approach as a theoretical framework for the analysis of foreign policy in the third world" in *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* (Vol.3 N°10, 2009),P.425.

<sup>36</sup> Marjik Breuning, "Role Theory in Foreign Policy", in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (published in May 2017), P.3 available on <http://politics.oxfordre.com/> accessed on August 12<sup>th</sup> 2017.

<sup>37</sup> Sekhri, Op.cit. P.425.

able to find “a strong correlation between national role conception of political leader and foreign policy behavior of their nation”<sup>38</sup>, role theory scholars suggest that as part of the social construction, political leaders’ national role conceptions is also affected by societal culture, history and social characteristics, as they took them into consideration to avoid making unaccepted decision among their populations<sup>39</sup>, which would threaten their political career.

In addition to the political leader conception of their nations role’s, other scholars evocate other factors determining the state’s foreign policy behavior; such as the size and the state’s attributes in addition to the nature of the international system and the distribution of power.<sup>40</sup>

The other factor that influences the definition of the state’s role is the other states expectations about the role the former ought to play. For instance, in the current study, Algeria was expected to play a bigger role at the earliest stages of the 2012 crisis. The theory assumes that when confronted to “other’s” expectations, the foreign policy maker might adjust his policy, or to defy them (the expectations).<sup>41</sup>

The study of the foreign policy decision according to this theory goes through understanding the national role that the state assigns to itself in international space, which gives foreign policy consistency and clarity, for instance a state that defines its role to be a “Balancer” would seek to balance between blocs of power to preserve its autonomy,<sup>42</sup>. According to Olé K. Holsti stressed that all States, regardless of their strength and potential, play roles, in

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Cristian Canter & Juliet Kaarbo, “Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on the Role Theory”, in *Foreign Policy Analysis* ( International Studies Association, 2011),P.6.

<sup>40</sup> Loc.cit., P.4.

<sup>41</sup> Loc.cit., P.7.

<sup>42</sup> Cristian Canter & Juliet Kaarbo, op.cit, P.4.

the international space, voluntarily and / or inevitably. Similarly one of the main assumptions was that the leader of a country “Self” already has his own belief system, and conception of the National role, which affects the State’s international behavior.<sup>43</sup> Upon to Holsti, the national role conceptions is: “*the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kind of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their ‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment*”<sup>44</sup>. As for the methodology “Walker argued that role theory has descriptive, organizational, and explanatory value for the study of foreign policy”<sup>45</sup>, it can be carried-out through analyzing speech content to find-out the roles defined by decision makers.

The role theory, is also adequate for this study, as it represents an attempt to look inside the black-boxed of foreign policy making, in this regard the role theory, suggests the existence of some degree of agreement and unity among the elites interacting in the process of the national role conception, even if such agreement does not exist in fact. <sup>46</sup>To a great extent the role theory encompasses the major determinants of the decision making: decision making environment; leader’s psychological features, internal and external settings, this will allow us to understand better and even predict the Algerian foreign policy toward the Sahel region.

As our study is also interested in finding-out the factors behind the Algerian behavior adjustment (2012-2013-2014), then, going back to the debates about the behavioral approach, emphasizing the study of the FPDM\* process instead of outcome, are a key tool, to understand the Algerian position

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<sup>43</sup> Cameron G. Thies, *The Role Theory and foreign policy* (USA: Iowa University, May 2009), available on <http://myweb.uiowa.edu/bhlai/workshop/role.pdf>

<sup>44</sup> Breuning, Op.cit. P.5.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Cristian Canter & Juliet Kaarbo, op.cit., p.8.

\* Foreign Policy Decion Making Process.

toward the crisis in Mali, and evaluate its rationality and efficiency through making use of the rational actor model theory, as mentioned earlier, foreign policy is about decision making, and as we seek revealing the real motivations behind each decision during the three phases of the evolution of the Algerian response toward the crisis. Rational model appears to be adequate for analyzing the events, and evaluating the options and alternatives, available for the Algerian foreign policy maker, and the decision made to meet the requirements of each phase, to cope up with its foreign policy principles, goals, roles and international and regional situations. The main assumption of this theory is that *“the primary decision maker is believed to be a rational person, making an optimal choice based on calculated expected benefits and guided by consistent personal values”*<sup>47</sup>. For Fatih Tayfur, the decision making is in the heart of foreign policy making, and rationality is the essence of the decision making.<sup>48</sup> Just like the role theory, this model assumes that the foreign policy actors are a unity and speak one voice. While facing a situation the foreign policy maker first sets the goals, identifies the possible alternatives to meet the goals, compare them, and finally choose the best one that matches their goal or goals.<sup>49</sup> This approach likewise, takes into consideration the human factor, through referring to the characteristics of the top level individual decision makers, assuming that it is most likely to influence the decision making and the country’s foreign policy. *“Moreover, there might be many motors and drives such as self-satisfaction or self-actualization that influence the decision making”*<sup>50</sup>one of the theory’s assumptions is that individuals react differently to the same events in the same environment depending on their vision to the world.

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<sup>47</sup> See <https://study.com/academy/lesson/the-rational-actor-model-of-decision-making.html>

<sup>48</sup> Fatih Tayfur, “Main Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy: a Review” in *METU Studies in development*, (Vol.21 N.1, 1994)\_ p.130.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Loc.cit.,p.131.

In the rational actor model, rational actors will make the choice, which they believe will “lead to the best feasible outcomes as defined by their personal values or preferences”,<sup>51</sup> the theory assumes too that other factors influences the decision making process, such as the country’s attributes, and internal environment such as the bureaucratic influence and the pressure groups, as the decision makers do not have complete freedom of actions and they are not in full control. “They must consider whatever constraints block the path to the outcome they desire and adjust their behavior accordingly, often abandoning their most preferred goal in favor of pursuit of an attainable second or third best. Sometimes they end up with their least preferred outcome even though they chose rationally at every step along the way”<sup>52</sup>. In addition to the previous considerations, the policy maker should choose the adequate means to use in order to maximize the gains, minimize loss, or to balance power, that cost the least: diplomatic tool, military tool, or simply nothing, the key to this theory is that the decision maker should keep in mind his priorities, and vital goals.

The rational model theory first occurred during the Cuban crisis in 1962, during the cold war, which came to threaten the international peace during the era of weapons of mass destruction, as the USSR decided to equip it Cuban ally with missiles able to hold nuclear heads. The world was waiting to see who will strike first, in this case, risk of mutually assured destruction was high. The American president J.F. Kennedy, decided a maritime blockade against Cuba to avoid the enforcement of its armament, and let the decision of an offensive action to the soviet so that they will be responsible for its results, and maintained the direct communication with Moscow which led to the appeasement of the crisis. As both the USA and USSR achieved remarkable goals with the optimal costs: the USA could deter the USSR, through the

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<sup>51</sup> Robert A. Denemark & Renée Marlin-Bennett, “Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice Models” in *The International Studies Encyclopedia* (USA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017), available on <http://www.oxfordreference.com/>

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

maritime blockade, and the USSR decision to spread the could warn the USA that it could damage its security, and then by withdrawing them it could avoid the escalation of the crisis and make the USA withdraw its missiles both in Turkey and Greece. In addition to the creation of the red line between: Washington and Moscow. Through analyzing this crisis Graham Allison came out with three models of decision making in foreign policy through his writings: Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1969, as “*he demonstrated that a more self-consciously theoretical approach to the study of bureaucracy and foreign policy was both feasible and desirable.*”<sup>53</sup> Graham Allison, proposed three models of decision making: Rational actor, Organizational Process and governmental politics model. In his different models, unlike other theoretical essays, dealing with the states’ governments as a unitary actor, Allison broke the government components down, also Allison, just like other behavioral organization theory such as Simon, did not believe in the absolute rationality, instead the degree of rationality depended on the number of actors involved, the degree of their goals harmony, and the available information, about the present and the future, this might be due to the time constraint, the cognitive limitation of the decision maker or even conflicting goals of different organizations and actors involved. As per, and because of the ‘Napoleonic’ nature of the Algerian state, where bureaucrats (civil and military) are simply required to provide information to the main decision maker, in the Algerian case the president. According to Allison’s rational model, the state is seen as a rational single actor, that has a set of goals, it peruses rationally<sup>54</sup>. For Allison, the first thing to investigate about a country’s foreign policy is the Goal, “Where is the pinch of puzzle raised by the New York Times over the Soviet deployment of an antiballistic missile system? The question as, the Times states it, concerns the Soviet Union’s objective in allocating such a large sums of money for this weapons system while at the same time seeming to pursue a

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<sup>53</sup> Jonathan Bendor & Thomas H. Hammond, “Rethinking Allison’s Models” in *American Political Science Review*, available on: <http://www.jonathanrenshon.com/>

<sup>54</sup> Loc.cit, P.305.

policy of increasing détente”,<sup>55</sup> for soviet this act was to achieve the desire to challenge the American supremacy. The second major assumption made by Allison is that the basic analysis is the nation, foreign affairs policies and choices are the national choice,<sup>56</sup> the decision maker are pursuing national interests, no matter which part of the government makes it, Allison’s rational model also adopts a set of organizing concepts, such as: National actor which refers to the decision maker as a mono-construct pursuing one goal, having one perception to the actions to be taken and one assessment of the consequences. The problem: refers to the threats and challenges facing the national status quo, survival or security within the international arena. Static selection that represents the sum of actions chosen by a nation as solution to the problem, and next the Action as Rational Actor, this assumption includes a set of elements that are:

Goals and Objectives: among all, and as the foreign policy is part of the high politics, the major and common goals are those dealing with security and national interests.

Options: the set of actions proposed to deal with the problem.

Consequences: representing the results of each actions, that constitute the cost and benefits with regard to the strategic goals.

Rational Choice is Value-Maximizing: in this regard the choice should always maximize the goal.

Finally, Allison emphasize what he called “dominant inference pattern”, the assumption is that “if a nation performed a particular action, that nation must have had ends toward which the action constituted an optimal means”.<sup>57</sup> As an attempts to provide an analytical framework to analyze foreign policy through the study of decision making process, based on a simple scientific model that accepts generalization, the rational actor model assumed that, we may find a specific pattern of rational decision making based on the general hypothesis

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<sup>55</sup> Graham T. Allison, « Conceptual Models and the Cuban Crisis in *The American Political Science Review*, (USA: Vol.63, Issue 3, Sep.,1969), P.691.

<sup>56</sup> Loc.cit., P.693.

<sup>57</sup> Allison, op.cit., P.694.

asserting that: the likelihood of any particular action results from results from the combination of the four components of the rational choice that are the objectives based on nation's vital values, the available alternatives and their assessment and the evaluation of their consequences, which will develop two main assumptions:

The increase of the cost of the alternative (cost vs objective), reduces the likelihood of choosing it.

The decrease of the costs of the alternative, compared to the gains (objectives) it allows, increases the likelihood for that alternative to be chosen.<sup>58</sup>

As for the goal classification is as simple and logic as: "If A is preferred over B and B over C, then A is preferred over C".<sup>59</sup>

Allison's model, as simple as it might be can give a logical explanation of the Algerian foreign policy in Mali, as it provides a systemic paradigm that allow us to include all given factors of the FPM process while constructing the scenarios of each alternative and the assessment of its consequence. This might take us back once more to the behavioral approach, since Allison's rational model, ignores the psychological features and neglects the decision maker (as a representative of the nation in the Algerian case) perception of the situation and the available data about the problem, the parties and the given alternatives. Thus we may include them by adding the micro level (using the individual as a unit of analysis, in the case the Algerian president), to the original macro level (using the State as whole unitary construct) inspired from the realist model. The psychological features cannot be ignored, especially when FPM and FPDM process are the function of the head of the state, in fact for Christopher Hill, believed that even in open societies, a charismatic personality of the president

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Sandra Shahryarifar, "A Defence on the Prominence of Rational Actor Model within Foreign Policy Analysis" in *Khazar Journal of Humanitie and Social Sciences* (Vol.19, N°1,2016), P.23.

can explain to a large extent the international behavior of a country<sup>60</sup>, this might be illustrated as following<sup>61</sup>:

- \* The increase of the decision maker interests in the foreign affairs, will lead to the increase of the impact of his personal and psycho logic features on the national external action.
- \* The increase of the decision maker's power and authority, will enhance the personal impact on the FPM process.
- \* The impact of the personal features of the decision maker will increase in unusual situation such as crisis.
- \* The lack of data about a situation will allow the decision maker to impact the FPM process as his adversaries cannot convince him to change his decision not criticize him .

A comprehensive approach that merges all major factors of the RAM, with emphasize on the president impact on the decision making process, appears to be adequate to investigate why Algeria behaved the way it did during the three phases of it management of the crisis in accordance with the later evolution.

## **2.5. The Study Plan:**

Introduction

Chapter 1: General Introduction.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and the Analytical Framework.

Chapter 3: The Algerian approach to the Conflict in Mali before 2012.

1.1 A theoretical understanding of the Algerian Foreign Policy Making

1.2 The Motives of the Algerian Approach toward the crisis in Mali.

1.3 The Algerian policies toward the conflict before 2012 crisis.

Chapter 4: Analyzing the Crisis:

4.1. The causes of the Crisis.

4.2. The Break-out of the Crisis.

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<sup>60</sup> Adila Mohamed Ettaher, *The impact of Personal Factors in Shaping The Algerian Foreign Policy* (Constantine: Constantine University, Masters Thesis in International Relations, 2005),P.32 (Tranlated from Arabic).

<sup>61</sup> Jensen Liyod, Op.cit., P.p. 16-18.

#### 4.3 The Parties involved in the Crisis.

### Chapter 5: The Algerian approach to the crisis

5.1: The Algerian refusal of the military intervention: causes and alternatives.

5.2: The Algerian pragmatic foreign policy adjustment and its factors

5.3: The Algerian mediation and the end of the Serval operation.

### Chapter 6: Results and conclusion

### Bibliography

## 2.6. Conceptual framework

**Crisis:** is used to refer to the point at which the tensions related to certain conflict escalate and reach a serious level of danger; for example the crisis of 2012 in Mali within the already existing conflict between some ethnic groups, separatists and the Malian government.

**Foreign Policy :** according to the Cambridge dictionary, foreign policy, a government's policy on dealing with other<sup>62</sup>; upon to Fatih Tayfur, *"It focuses on the external behaviors of governments and more specifically on their authorized representatives since states acts almost always through their official agents"*<sup>63</sup>; and according to Goerge Modelski, it refers to *" a system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behavior of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment"*<sup>64</sup>. This definition might be applicable to the major members of the international system, those who are relatively more powerful than the others, besides foreign policy aim might be also the maintenance of the status quo, or simply the survival for the less powerful unites. This can apply on our case study in two senses: France, US trying to push Algeria to intervene military and Algeria trying to adjust its activities with its environment, while defending its interests

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<sup>62</sup> <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/fr/dictionnaire/anglais/foreign-policy>

<sup>63</sup> Fatih Tayfur, op.cit. P.115.

<sup>64</sup> George Modelski, *A Theory of Foreign Policy* (London : Pall Mall Press, 1962)

its regional position and its national security that does not match with the military intervention.

**International pressures:** *as it will be used in this study can be defined as:* the aggregation of acts and practices, through pacific means such as diplomacy and economy, used by the international community members (or only a member), in order to influence a position, a posture or a decision within or taken by the targeted member of the system. They represent also an instrument of the Foreign Policy.

**Intervention:** Refers to the act of interference exercised by a member of the international system under the cover of the protection of human right, democracy, especially during humanitarian crisis and cases of severe oppression and authoritarian regimes, and recently to fight terrorism. The intentional community went from Non-intervention to the right of intervention then the duty to protect. Hence, the concept remains controversial as there is still an ongoing debate between “justice and benefits” and “when and where to intervene”.<sup>65</sup>

**National Security:** the notion of security has undergone several changes, as the world politics changed and the nature of the threats from national security to common security, human security, moreover scholars went from Threats (mainly military threats) to the challenges, risks and dangers, the level of analysis (the unit) also moved from the state, to society and human being, and the sectors and aspects of security multiplied<sup>66</sup>. One of the pertinent definitions given to the Notion of “security” is the one provided by Arnold Wolfers in 1952:

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<sup>65</sup> See Terry Nardin, “From right to intervene to duty to protect: Michael Walzer on Humanitarian intervention” in *The European Journal of International Law*.(Oxford University Press : Vol 24. N.1, 2013).

<sup>66</sup> See Barry Buzan, “Rethinking Security after the Cold War”, in *Cooperation and Conflict* (Vol.32, n° 1, 1997) and Barry Buzan *People, States and fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold war* (UK: UCPR press ; 2007)

***“Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”<sup>67</sup>.***

***Non-Interference:*** One of the most emphasized principles by the United Nations chart, and lately one of the most disrespected due to a diverse group of arguments established by the international unites that abrogated the international law. The principle is pointed out in the 2.4 of the charter:

***“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations<sup>68</sup>”. And 2.7 “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”***

The principle consists in forbear from intervening in other countries domestic affairs. However, the charter stipulated that the UN cannot intervene but did not mention states, and did not define “Domestic affaire”<sup>69</sup>.

***Rational Choice:*** is a set of “*decision making procedures guided by careful definition of problems, specification of goals, weighing the costs, risks, and benefits of all alternatives, and selection of the optimal alternative.*”<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol" in *Political Science Quarterly*, (USA: 1952, vol 67, N°4)P.485.

<sup>68</sup> UN Charter, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, San Francisco, 1945

<sup>69</sup>Manaa Djamal Abdennasser, *The International Order* (Annaba : Dar el Uloom for publishing and distribution, 2006),p.54. (Translated from Arabic)

<sup>70</sup> Charles W.Kegley, Gregory Raymond, *The Global Future: A brief Introduction to World Politics* (Boston: Wadsworth, 5<sup>th</sup> edition) P.85.

***The Sahel Region:*** the word Sahel (الساحل), is an Arabic word that means coasts, and as the desert in geopolitics is considered as sea, and it reflects the weakness and the vulnerability of the human being in the middle of space that seems to be endless<sup>71</sup> the region then was called “Sahel”. It refers to the region in-between the Northern Africa and the Sub-Saharan Africa, occupying 4830 Km from the Atlantic in the west to red sea to the east. It covers Parts of: Senegal; Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria (south), Niger, Nigeria (North), Chad, Ethiopia and Eretria (North).<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Roland Portier, *Géopolitique de l’Afrique et du Moyen-Orient* (Paris : Edition Servine Martineau, 2009)p.34.

<sup>72</sup> André Bourgeot, *Sahara: espace géostratégique et enjeux Politiques*,( Paris: CNRS, Laboratoire d’anthropologie Sociale, N 16, 2000), p24.

## **Chapter 3: The Algerian approach to the Conflict in Mali before 2012.**

In this chapter, we attempt to trace back the Algerian approach to the Malian conflict, starting from exploring the history of the Algerian diplomatic action in general, then covering a part that was missing in several literatures tackling the topic, that is the motivations or the factors behind the Algerian interests in Mali, and finally trace the main Algerian efforts to solve the issue before the 2012 crisis.

### **3.1 An active diplomacy and sacrosanct principles:**

As seen before, foreign policy is one of the elements of the high politics, it deals directly with the issues strongly related to the state's highest interest: survival; in another term: security. The disposal of a foreign policy agenda is, thus, important and vital to the survival of a state and its prosperity, which makes foreign policy a crucial part, if not the most important one, of the executive branch's tasks and missions. As already discussed, foreign policy refers to the set of principles, orientations, tools, and practices defined inside the state and exercised outside it, plus having as ultimate goal the protection of the National security. It is designed to monitor the state's international relations and it is practiced on the international scene, it is distinguished by its complexity, by way of the factors influencing its conceptualization are both internal and external.

Due to these considerations, Algerian foreign policymaker was always careful while setting his strategies, and has adopted a set of principles, that remained valid since the early years of the country's independence. They were linked to a set of considerations and capabilities, relying mainly on the diplomatic tool and avoiding the use of the military mechanism for reasons that will be cited when we elaborate its management during the Mali' crisis. Depending on the factors cited above, we can distinguish five phases in the history of the Algerian diplomacy:

The first one was even before its independence, and was determinant to the definition of its foreign policy after the independence; while fighting France, the FLN leaders launched what Nicole Grimaud called the “*fait Algérien*”<sup>73</sup>(the Algerian fact), having for objective to deny the French claims at the same time with the announcement of the outbreak of the liberation war; then, the Algerian international strategy was established during the *Soumam* conference in 1956<sup>74</sup>, the diplomatic machine used the international organization and the neutral allies in addition to the exploitation of the support of “Cairo” to achieve this goal; from Bandung 1955 to the 13<sup>th</sup> session of UN, the strategy paid off, and succeeded in its mission defined at the “Soumam” to internationalize “the Algerian problem”<sup>75</sup>; leading to the emergence of the international pressures on the French government, and resulting in launching the “Ivian Negotiations” that ended with the triumph of the Algerian will: Algeria’s independence in 1962 giving birth to the second phase.

The second phase was qualified by the observers as the golden age of the Algerian diplomacy, thanks to the internal political stability, and to the reputation of the Algerian liberation war, in addition to the bipolar nature of the international arena; the Algerian foreign policy was able to exercise a considerable role, on the international scene, focusing at the beginning on recovering sovereignty over its natural resource through a fierce confrontation with the French diplomacy<sup>76</sup> (an objective reached on Feb.21<sup>st</sup> 1971); without ignoring the importance of building an international position, the country was at the same time engaged (since 1963) on the international scene, especially

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<sup>73</sup> Nicole Grimaud, *La Politique Extérieure de l’Algérie 1962-1978* (Paris : Kartala,1984 )p.529

<sup>74</sup> Amina Mernache, « La Diplomatie Algérienne, La Nostalgie d’une Gloire Perdue » in *Dynamiques internationales*\_( France : Dynamiques internationales : N°7, Octobre 2012)p.3

<sup>75</sup> Algeria gate, *Phases of the evolution of the Algerian problem in the UN*, available on [http://www.algeriagate.info/2015/02/blog-post\\_15.html](http://www.algeriagate.info/2015/02/blog-post_15.html)

<sup>76</sup> Mernach, Ibid. P.p. 5-7.

after the Moroccan claims on its territories, to which it was crucial to put an end, through convincing the international community about the Moroccan aggression.<sup>77</sup> The Algerian diplomacy was active within the non-alignment movement and the Algerian foreign policy adopted one of its major principles: the noninterference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, it was also very active in supporting the liberation movements, in line with its principle of the right of people to self-determination and to its doctrine rejecting the imperialism, in this regard Algiers received the black panthers, Angela Davis et Leroy Eldridge Cleaver, Che Guevara, Nelson Mandela and other leaders fighting for “just” cases. It is thus qualified as the “Mecca of the revolutionary” as Amilcar Cabral said: “Muslims go to Mecca for pilgrimage, Christians to the Vatican and the liberation movements to Algiers”<sup>78</sup>, it has adopted –and still– both Western Sahara and Palestine issues. The Algerian foreign policy was correspondingly focusing on leading the non-alignment movement and the Third World; President Houari Boumediène was the first to call for a new international order, as the world was divided between riches and poor. It was engaged in consolidating a significant position within its national security circles: Maghreb, Africa, the Arab world, under the directions of President Boumediène and his young minister of Foreign Affairs: Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The Algerian foreign policy was leading the OAU and had made a few remarkable achievements internationally; such as the Iran-Iraq 1972 conflict resolution, it started to play a key role in a number of mediations to resolve conflicts.

The third phase was the one starting during the president Chadli’s ruling, it witnessed the last major Algerian role of the golden age, in 1981, when Algeria successfully solved the “Iran hostage crisis”. During the second half of

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<sup>77</sup> Akram belkaid, *La Diplomatie Algérienne à la recherche de son âge d’or*, in *Politique étrangère* (Paris : IFRI, n°2, été 2009) p.339.

<sup>78</sup> Mohamed Ben Slama, *Alger la Mecque des Révolutionnaires*, documentaire projeté sur Arte le 16-05-2017.

1980's one achievement was registered: the announcement of the Palestinian State in November 1988; this shrinking of the Algerian role<sup>79</sup> was due to the internal situation, imposed by the rapid motion within the international system; *i.e.* the end of the bipolarity and the 1986 crisis, resulting in a severe socioeconomic crisis. Thus, the country embraced the fourth phase, whereby, the government was more focused on the internal policies, however it was negotiating a loan from the IMF, which came with a package of political and economic reforms, leading the country to the “black decade”, after the Islamic Party won the election, and the arrest of the electoral process by the military body. During the period between 1992 and 1999, government efforts were oriented to contain the security crisis, and the eroded foreign policy had one objective: convince the international community about the gravity the terrorism phenomenon, and to deny the “who’s killing who in Algeria” accusing the Algerian army of participating in the terrorist attacks, weirdly used by media in Europe especially in France.

The fifth phase started with the coming of the president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, convinced by the military elite to come back, from his optional exhaust, to lead the country. One of the men’s pledges during his campaign was to regain the Algerian diplomacy glory days, as one of the objectives of his foreign policy, it is to be mentioned, that according to the Algerian constitution, foreign policy making is a reserved function of the president according to the articles 91, 92, 93. Bouteflika seems to be the Algerian version of the French president’ De Gaul, since 1999 he has been “the godfather” of the nation, he reestablished internal stability, and led by himself the Algerian diplomatic machine. Boumediène’s ex-minister of Foreign Affairs was longing to the glory days, he was determined to impose the country as a regional force and to offer Algeria the leadership of Africa. In 2000, Algeria successfully solved the conflict between Ethiopia and Eretria<sup>80</sup>, the country also integrated the strategic

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<sup>79</sup> See president Bouteflika elocution to the Nation, March 12,2002 ( Arabic version)

<sup>80</sup> Amara Bekkouche, « La politique africaine de l’Algérie » *in Revue africaine des livres* (Mars 2007).

dialogue with the NATO, and the negotiations with the WTO and was active within the OAU, especially through leading the NEPAD, the president Bouteflika successfully regained the Algerian position in Africa, the Maghreb and the Mediterranean region through the “5+5” dialogue, and on the international scene as Algeria was a key founder of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum, launched in September 2011 in New York. The long standing principles the Algerian foreign policy principles and history, backed him to consolidate the country’s international credibility, and the country’s economic ease situation gave him a large margin of maneuver especially after solving the conflict in Mali in 2006.

According to what has been said above, we may conclude that Algeria foreign policy is mainly characterized by the dominance of the personal aspect in the decision making process, which is illustrated by the different constitutions starting from 1963; and that it is specifically active during crisis; and also by the neutrality and the respect of the international norms especially the nonintervention and the positive neighborhood principles that gave it the credibility to act as mediator during several crisis. Moreover, one of the goals of the Algerian Foreign Policy is its attempt to establish a framework for the common security that respect peoples’ rights and based on the noninterference in the internal affairs<sup>81</sup>, the Algerian insistence on the nonintervention principle might be understood as a fortress against any eventual foreign intervention in its internal affairs, as it does not intervene in others internal affairs it expects that none should intervene in its own affairs. It is likewise its way to protect its borders and its stability.

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<sup>81</sup> Chikh Slimane et al., *Le Maghreb et L’Afrique Subsaharienne* (Paris : éd. C.N.R.S. ,1980), p.250.

### **3.2. The Factors of the Algerian Regional Foreign Policy: Algeria a Pivotal State:**

According to the American standards, Algeria is considered as a Pivotal State of its regional system<sup>82</sup>, that should be taken into consideration while engineering the foreign policy targeting its context. Thus, international powers having interests - especially in the Maghreb and the Sahel regions- always consider the Algerian position and the possibilities of its cooperation, due to its geostrategic features.

1. The geopolitical features: there is a consensus among the contemporary academics that the geographic features are of a great deal of the state's power, it is what makes polities and peoples different according to Robert Kaplan<sup>83</sup> ; also the geopolitical approach contributes to the understanding of the states' behavior.


The Algerian location, gives it a strategic position as it is somehow in the middle of the four continents. It is located in the northwestern Africa with its coordinates 28 00 N and 3 00 E, it is the largest African and Arab country and the 10th largest country in the world, its land covers 2.381.741 km<sup>284</sup>, thus it has a total boundaries land of 6734 km, It is in the heart of the Maghreb region that links Europe (through the Mediterranean sea) to Africa. Its strategic location implies a set of risks, which has been proven historically as the country was exposed to several waves of colonization through its history. Nowadays, its geographic location is becoming a source of troubles and security challenges after the Arab spring and the crisis in Mali.

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<sup>82</sup> See Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy – editors-, *The Pivotal States: a New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World*, (New York: W.W Norton, 1999).

<sup>83</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, *the Revenge of Geography* (Washington: Random Hawes, Ed.2012)p.23.

<sup>84</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *The Factbook* available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html>



*Map N°1 Algeria's Location*

Source: the library of the congress

<https://www.loc.gov/resource/g8240.ct002074/>

As for the demographic features, Algeria's population reached 40.6 million inhabitants in January 2016, according to the Algerian National Office of Statistics<sup>85</sup>, 65.4% of them are between the age of 14 and 65<sup>86</sup>, which gives the country an important pool of human resources especially that the rate of literacy in the country is 86.67% according to the ONS (Illiteracy rate is about 12.33 in 2016, compared to 22.3 in 2008\*)<sup>87</sup> they vary between Arabs and Amazigh ( Kabyle, Chaoui, Beni-Mizab and Tuareg), which links it to its neighbors countries, and explains the fact that the country has two national languages: Arabic and Tamazight.

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<sup>85</sup> The National Office of Statistics, available on <http://www.ons.dz/IMG/pdf/Demographie2015.pdf>

<sup>86</sup> The world bank, available on <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS?locations=DZ>

<sup>87</sup> Elkhobar online – Agencies , *the Illiteracy ratio in Algeria : 12.33*, available on <http://www.elkhabar.com/press/article/116822/> (translated from Arabic).

\*According to historical studies and international Statistics, the rate of illiteracy in Algeria was 3.7% in 1830 before the French colonization, and 94% in 1948 and Finally 85% in 1962, See <http://www.elmouatin.dz/> (Translated from Arabic)

2. The Economic Features and Natural Resources: the economic features can be used as means of foreign policy especially as soft power policies components, the Algerian economy relies greatly on the energetic resources, as it is the main Gas exporter in Africa, and the eighth world producer in 2017<sup>88</sup> and the eighth world gas exporter<sup>89</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup> world reserves of natural gas with 4504 Billion m<sup>3</sup>. Algeria has also 12200 million barrels of proven crude Oil reserves<sup>90</sup>, it has exported 662.1 barrels per day of refined petroleum products<sup>91</sup>, 1.6 million barrels per day of crude oil. It was also considered by the US National Energy Policy Development Group NPDGP as one of the influential countries in the prices and the production in the oil market; and a rich country of Iron (it is one of the Iron producers), especially in the unexploited mine of Gara Djibilet in Tindouf, with its reserves of 3 billion tons, and capacity of production of 40 million tons per year; besides, the country is rich in phosphate zinc and lead. However, the government have been trying to develop its industry since the 60's and 70's through the industrial revolution and also its agriculture through the agricultural revolution, both launched by the president Boumediène, but due to the economic crisis in 1986 from which the country could not recover as it entered "the black decade", until 2000's when the Oil prices have arisen making the country the n°1 economy of its region, which helped it to re-launch its developmental process and to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed by terrorists and catch up the developmental path. It is to be mentioned that the country is facing some economic concerns (even though they are not severe as the international medias try to depict it) but the government is studying the alternatives and the country is already in the process of getting off of the petroleum trap, and at the same time protecting the social

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<sup>88</sup> Global Energy Statistical Yearbook, available on <https://yearbook.enerdata.net/natural-gas/world-natural-gas-production-statistics.html>

<sup>89</sup> The National Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook, available on [/www.cia.gov/library/Publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2251rank.html](http://www.cia.gov/library/Publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2251rank.html)

<sup>90</sup> OPEC Statistics, available on [http://www.opec.org/opec\\_web/en/about\\_us/146.htm](http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/146.htm)

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

achievements to reach the welfare state. The country was actually able to overcome the trade balance deficit thanks to the governmental fund of revenue control, as it keeps the referential price of oil at 50\$ for 2017, and the previsions shows that the trade deficit will decrease in 2017 from 15 to 8%, after the OPEC countries agreed on decreasing the production. Still the government needs to review its strategy quickly and apply more reforms in the field to reach the government target to decrease the deficit to 1% in 2019, especially that the country was obliged to borrow 1 billion \$ from the African Monetary Fund in 2016. When it comes to the international trade, Algerian main partners are the EU and China.

3. History, Political Stability and the Process of Governance: As we reach the first semester of 2017, Algeria appears to be the most stable country internally in North Africa, the country avoided the Arab spring in 2011, Morocco was also stable (except its issues with the Polisario in Western Sahara, the country that the Mekhzen occupies since 1975), before October 2016, as the protests started in the country especially in the “Rif”\* region, after a fish seller was killed. Many observant questioned the Algerian exception, especially that the country knew several corruption scandals, in which important political figures were involved (El Khalifa, Sonatrach the East-West highway..), and several explanations were given, some related to the lack of awareness of the civil society, others to the relatively good economic situation in 2011. But the real reason lies in the popular epidiascope that still remind the society of the black decade, in fact the Algerian people were finally able to enjoy a normal life since 2000’s, and acquired security, and political freedom which was decisive for the stability of the country in the middle of an unstable region, also in 2011 the president launched a new batch of reforms, such as reviewing the election law and the empowerment of women role, the revision of the political parties law and the law related to the media and press activities as part of the empowerment of democracy and good governance, the government also launched the project of E-governance and administrative reform, within such atmosphere of internal stability (although the country knew a few demonstrations in the capital in 2011 having only economic claims, and in 2014

against the 4<sup>th</sup> term of the president) the foreign policymaker had a great margin of maneuver. Finally, the gratitude the Algerians still have for their president, for the reason that Algeria went from one of the most dangerous countries, to the 6<sup>th</sup> safest country in the world according to Gallup Law and Order Index for 2016<sup>92</sup>; Thanks to the *reconciliation policy*.

The public opinion has also a real impact on the conceptualization of the Algerian foreign policy, especially when it comes to the nonintervention principles, due to its tragic history with the colonial power, the Algerian society does not tolerate the presence of foreign military forces on a country's soil, and consider it as imperial practices, it also, does not accept to send its sons to fight abroad, it is a tradition stressed by the constitution. At the same time the Algerian conviction and tradition about the pacific settlement of conflict, and the memories of glorious foreign policy always gathered the popular support for the foreign policymaker, to put efforts especially in Africa.

4. The Military Capabilities: When the oil market flourished during the early 2000s, Algeria started the process of the modernization of the army especially that it acquired a great experience in fighting terrorism during more than 10 years, and its expertise became sought even by the greatest powers on the international scene. Its Army counts 792350<sup>93</sup> soldier, and 400000 reserve soldier; its military budget for 2017 is 10.86 billion \$, and its military expenditures went from 2531 million \$ in 2000 to 10646 million \$ according to SIPRI<sup>94</sup>, in 2010 Algeria was placed by SIPRI as one of the 10 largest arms importers<sup>95</sup>, in 2016 the country imported 46% of arms imported by the African continent and became one of the top 5 arms importers in the world<sup>96</sup>, and according

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<sup>92</sup>Gallup 2017 Global Law and Order Report.p.6.

<sup>93</sup> [http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country\\_id=algeria](http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=algeria)

<sup>94</sup> Available on <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-2015-USD.pdf>

<sup>95</sup> See SIPRI Yearbook 2010.

<sup>96</sup> Middle East Eye (French edition), *Armement: Trente ans de Compétition Entre l'Algérie et le Maroc*, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/reportages>

to “Global Fire Power” the Algerian Army comes second in Africa and first, in the Maghreb region and the Sahel regions, followed by Morocco, Libya (9<sup>th</sup> out of 33) Tunisia, , Chad 15<sup>th</sup> , Niger 23<sup>rd</sup> , Mali 25<sup>th</sup> out of 33 in Africa (with only 15500 soldier). In fact the gap of military imports during the 90’s due to both economic and security crisis, in addition to the unstable regional context may explain the peak during the 2000’s, also the process of modernization as part of the Algerian military doctrine to cope up with the regional variables. All these features allow the country to compete for the dominance of the region and to be the pivotal state of it.

5. The External Factors: As mentioned earlier, Algeria’s Foreign policy, like any other country’s foreign policy, is affected by the nature of the international system; the pursuit of power and the competition among the big player in addition to the polarization, are factors to be taken into consideration while shaping the country’s strategy. For example we can notice the impact of the end of the bipolarity on the decline of the Algerian international role. Under a complex interdependence that rules the world and the globalization medium and small powers ought adjust their foreign policies (sometimes even internal policies) to cope with the big powers policies, what determines the ability of these power to maneuver is the smart use of its geostrategic power if it has any, and the use of the international institutions and regional cooperation. In its foreign policy, Algeria was blessed through its strategic location, and its natural gifts, however, the leader were also smart while using them which explain the Algerian honorable diplomatic history. On the other hand, the country relies greatly on the international law and the international institutions, in its African foreign policy the country tends to rely on its weight in the African Union, to solve the issues within the containing “the Africanization of issues”, it is thus an influential country in the organization. The country also uses the competition between the USA, France and China; to dominate its region; to balance its relations and positions and sometimes to pass its agendas.

6. The Leadership: According to the study’s theoretical framework (namely the rational choice theory), the leadership features are one of the

decisive factors both in policy making and in decision making. And as the president is dominant of both process in Algeria according to the constitution, his personal attributes, shape the countries orientations and decisions. His nickname during the liberation war was “Abdel Kader El Mali” (Abdelkader the Mali), since he was the engineer of the southern front of the FLN and the ALN, he could lead his group to finally penetrate the Algerian Sahara and establish the ALN troops there through the Mali territories in 1961. Later he was appointed as minister of foreign affairs within Boumediène’s government in 1967 until 1979, known as a very active diplomat, historians assert that he has even declined the position of vice president and preferred to remain foreign affairs minister. Later in 1999 one of his pledges during his campaign was the regain Algerian prestigious diplomatic era, he was then elected as president with 70% of the voices. Bouteflika is seen as a pragmatic liberal leader, as he declared “*I believe, that tragedies thought us how to deal with the others, nothing rules our relations with them except interests*”<sup>97</sup>; he was also qualified by William Quandt as a real statesman, interested in building relationships with external worlds.<sup>98</sup> But the most important attribute is his pragmatic orientation, as he declared to the Lebanese TV channel “Elmustakbal” in November 9<sup>th</sup> 1999 that he will pursue the “nation’s” interests as long as they do not conflict with the Algerian interests, and that he was elected by the Algerian people not the Arab people.<sup>99</sup> He also emphasized the capabilities of Algeria to compete on the international scene in his speech addressed to the students of the institute of foreign policy studies in Milano in 1999, especially through its experience in fighting terrorism, he also expressed his reserves on the principle of intervention for humanitarian or democratic purposes,<sup>100</sup> which may explain the

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<sup>97</sup> A declaration of the president to the ANN, july 8<sup>th</sup> 1999.

<sup>98</sup> William B. Quandt, « Flirt Contrarié Entre Washington et Alger » in *Le Monde Diplomatique* (France : Juillet 2002),Pp. 15-15, available on <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2002/07/QUANDT/9220>

<sup>99</sup> <http://www.el-mouradia.dz/arabe/president/interview/recherche.htm>

<sup>100</sup> <http://www.el-mouradia.dz/arabe/discoursara/1999/11/html/D1171199.HTM>

Algerian position towards Mali crisis in 2012 that the study will discuss later. Bouteflika also asserted that he will take full responsibility for the political decision especially those related to foreign policy. he was also very interested in pushing the African continent to the international agenda.

### **3.3. Mali in the heart of the Algerian Agenda:**

In 1975, under the Boumediène's rule, the Algerian security doctrine was drawn after the country faced a pallet of territorial claims in addition to the Western Sahara issue; one of its pillars was the statement determining the region between Dakar and Cairo as Algeria's security region. As a security region, and due to the country's large extension of the desert to Africa, it is also a region of exposure: any threats or crisis that occur within these limits, will automatically threaten the Algerian National security. As Mali is included in the heart of the region, and represents the weakest link; the geographic factor generating the importance of Mali on the Algerian agenda of foreign policy occurs particularly while having in mind the ultimate goal of the pursuit national security and national interests represented by the leadership of the North African region and the African continent.

#### ***Why does Mali matters? ...The Algerian interests' motivations in Mali:***

The first main question, which can occur while discussing the Algerian interest in Mali crisis 2012, is why Algeria is so concerned by Mali? Is it only because it is perceived as a pivotal state, and because of its ambition to lead the regional context? In this part we will explain the Algerian motivation towards the conflict in Mali since the dawn of the independence of the regions, through highlighting several dimensions linking the country to its southern backyard.

1. Geographic considerations: As already mentioned earlier, the Sahel region is the belt separating northern Africa from the Sub-Saharan Africa (See Map n°2), it is an extended desert that links the two regions through land borders. Mali is considered as an Algerian political extension and its gate to the African continent. Its stability is also, a component of the Algerian national security, mainly because one of the Algerian and international security dogma

is to protect the national integrity, but also due to the fact that the geographic neighborhood is one of the determinant factors of any nation's foreign policy, for instance any unusual event or lack of stability in Mali, Niger, Libya will directly affect the Algerian stability, especially knowing the fact that Algerian borders with these 3 countries are desert boundaries, and they overlap with cultural boundaries within which the same ethnical group lives and moves. In fact, geography is very important to understand the challenges and the foreign policy agenda, thus, president Roosevelt asked Americans to purchase maps so that they can understand the challenges facing their nation.<sup>101</sup>It also illustrates Napoleon's belief asserting that ***“the policies of all power are inherent in their geography”***, desert boundaries are known to be areas of security exposure, due to their nature, they do not submit to the human will and calculus, and moreover, they reflect human weakness facing *“a region that appears limitless”*.<sup>102</sup>

As part of the Sahel, Mali is also a part of the uncontrolled “Gray Zone”, an area of political and security uncertainty, historically the region was called “blad essiba” which means in Arabic the uncontrolled or rebellious lands, unlike the Maghreb region which used to be called “Bilad Essilm” which means the land of peace. *“The “Sahelian Sea”, the mirror of the Mediterranean Sea, is an under administered and under-defended area”*.<sup>103</sup> It has all characteristics of a grey zone such as the High intensity of interaction of different types of actors in world politics, the absence of state monopoly for use of force and the dominance of non-state actors, such as rebel groups and organized crime groups dominating the region and the inability to establish regular state's institutions,

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<sup>101</sup> Klauss Dodds, *Geopolitics: A very short Introduction* (New York : Oxford University Press,2007), p.115.

<sup>102</sup> Roland Pourtier, *Géopolitique de l'Afrique et du Moyen-Orient* (Paris : édition Sèrvine Martineau, 2009). P.34.

<sup>103</sup> Mehdi Tadj, *Vulnerabilities and Factors of insecurity in the Sahel* (Paper published by the Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat (SWAC/OECD), N°1, August 2010).P.2.

rules and policies, the prevail of non-traditional norms, order settings of social and economic transaction set by the dominant actors. Yet the region cannot be neglected as it links the two parts of Africa and the two continents through its historical trade routes. <sup>104</sup> And as anarchy and insecurities are easily transmitted through land borders, the geopolitical factor is one of the main motivations considered by the Algerian foreign policymaker when dealing with the Sahel region in general and with Mali specifically, moreover, the geographic proximity pushes Mali to the top of its agenda.



*Map N°2: The Sahel Region.*

*Source: <http://thebriefing.info/cartes-du-sahel/>*

2. Political Consideration: Algeria as the preeminent military and political power which has sought to position itself as the regional leader. Algeria is sometimes seen as the Maghreb Prussia, in other terms a regional actor seeking hegemony or the hegemony aspiring actor , this perception was consolidated, after the election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who pledged to regain the Algerian international prestigious image, as one of the fundamental goals of his electoral campaign translated later in a new orientation of the Algerian foreign policy, seeking diverse of its international partnership, and a wider openness to the western world, through the consolidation of the Algerian-

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<sup>104</sup> Dmitry Baluev, *The Concept of « Grey Zones » of the World Politics*\_(International Conference on the Modern Development of Humanities and Social Science MDHSS, Atlantis Press,2013),P.267.

American relations, and with the NATO, the reinforcement of the Algerian-French relations, and a better focus on the African continent in attempt to lead it through several activities such as the mediation in solving a number of conflict and Crisis the conflict between Ethiopia and Eretria, the mediation in the conflict in Mali during the 1991,1995,2006 and 2009 crisis , but also through its devotion to the continent developmental issues since its independence in 1962, to its important role in the establishment of the NEPAD.

The country also was able to readjust its international position after 11/9, by developing its diplomatic and military ties with the USA and the NATO, and positioned itself as one of the (if not the most) important allies in the counter-terrorism war. Its recovering economy and growing military expenditures came to reinforce its savoir faire, in fighting terrorism forged during the black decade, its intelligence services are one of the best in the field, a fact that has been asserted even by US officers “*With a reputation for ruthlessness and efficiency second to none in the Arab world, the DRS is arguably the world’s most effective intelligence service when it comes to fighting Al Qaeda*”<sup>105</sup>, a fact that led to a strategic cooperation between the two countries in the war against terrorism since 2011 through the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership in 2005 and the bilateral coordination group about fighting terrorism and security coordination in February 2011.<sup>106</sup>

This new status, gave Algeria more a larger pace, by plying the role of the Regional Bargainer, in order to implement its perceived role of “Regional Leader”, acquired more credibility, and became a decisive number in the war against terrorism equation in the Sahel, and this juncture was beneficial for government both on the internal and external level.

In the same context, Algeria tried to ally this new status with its second perceived role, the role of the anti-colonial country which refuses the presence of any type of external intervention on the soil of its territories and affairs or

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<sup>105</sup> John R. Schindler , “The Ugly Truth About Algeria” \_in *The National Interest* (July 10, 2012), available on <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-ugly-truth-about-algeria-7146>

<sup>106</sup> Anouar Boukhars, *Op.cit.* P.15.

any other country's territories and affairs, thus, it refused to host the United States Africa Command "Africom", dedicated to fighting terrorism in the Sahel but also to protect the energetic sources and the pipelines in the region, moreover, it encouraged other countries to do so, and launched its own initiative for fighting terrorism in the Sahel.

Moreover, Algeria is incredibly interested in Mali's stability because any potential instability in the country might threaten its territorial integrity, for instance as part of its role of the anti-colonial, Algeria has always supported the Western Sahara independence, the support is also linked to its will to dominate the region, a role challenged by Moroccan ambitions, due to this support Morocco -with Libya -in response supported in 1980's the separatist movement of the Tuareg in northern Mali and southern Algeria, which would destroy the Algerian integrity, its African position and its efforts to impose the principle of "Uti Possidetis" in the organization of the African Union in 1964, after its military dispute with Morocco, leading later to the withdrawal of Morocco from the organization after the invasion of the Western Sahara. Lately, Morocco reintegrated the organization, and even tried to confuse the Algerian efforts to solve 2012 crisis through launching and supporting counter-initiatives.

The whole situation in Mali and the Sahel has always constituted a battlefield over the leadership of the regional system among: Algeria- Morocco and Libya, but as well, attracts the attention of the international powers such as France the ex-colonial power, the USA and even China. According to global records, the African continent dominates 10% of the global oil reserves,<sup>107</sup> 60% of it is in Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, three of the Sahel countries, it also dominates 8% of global gas reserves, 50% of it in Nigeria and Algeria,<sup>108</sup> the

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<sup>107</sup> Center for Security Studies (CCS), "L'importance stratégique croissante de l'Afrique", in : *Politique de sécurité Analyses du CSS*, (N°.38, 2008), P.02.

<sup>108</sup> Commission économique des Nations Unies pour l'Afrique, "Développements économiques et sociaux récents et Perspectives 2010 en Afrique de l'Ouest sur les conditions économiques et sociales en Afrique de l'Ouest ". *Rapport sur les conditions économiques et sociales en Afrique de l'Ouest*, (2010), P.14.

Niger is one of the main supplier of uranium to France, with 35% of its general needs and 75% of its electricity needs.<sup>109</sup> The AFRICOM project and the escalating Chinese presence in the region came to put an end to the French monopoly over the energetic field. Mali also dominates the African exportations of Gold, and the whole region dominates several pipelines to Europe, which means more international interests, which may disturb the Algerian role in the region, and put it under international pressures.

3. Security Consideration: The Sahel Region: a source of wealth and destabilization:

In addition to the geographic approximation, and political ambition and consideration, Algeria is linked to Mali because of the spread of several security threats in the whole Sahel region in general and in Mali specifically, that may threaten directly the Algerian national security. In 1975, Houari Boumediène declared “*the Maghreb region and the region separating Dakar and Cairo as representing a region of security for Algeria, and no change can be introduced in this region without the Algerian preapproval*”<sup>110</sup>. As a security region, and due to the country’s large extension of the desert to Africa, it became a region of exposure: any threats or crisis that occurs within these limits, will automatically threaten the Algerian National security. As Mali is included in the heart of the region, and represents the weakest link, the security factor generating the importance of Mali on the Algerian agenda of foreign policy occurs.

Just like any ex-colony, Mali scuffed all typical post-colonial problems facing the newly independent countries the country entered a new phase of ethnical disputes, which complicated the deficit of economic societal construction. Mali as any other Sahel countries, faced the “State Crisis” that

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<sup>109</sup> Sid omar Ould Chikhna, “Niger... Wealth in the Blown of International conflicts”, In *Al-Jazeera*, available on <http://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgegate/opinions/2015/11/26/>

<sup>110</sup> Abdenmour Benantar, *The Méditerrananean Aspect of the Algerian Security: Algeria, Europe and NATO*, (Algiers: the contemporaneous library, 2005),p.43. (translated from Arabic)

happens in two cases the first is when the state fails to accomplish its duties and functions, face the spread of crime and political violence whereby national troops fight rebellion groups, the spread of ethnic conflicts and the lack of governmental efficiency and infrastructures or its absence, and the abuse use of power and oppression, and the lack of control over territories and borders <sup>111</sup> the second is when the state as an institution falls apart, due to **identity crisis** and lose one the 3 component of the state's triangle: the society or population, resulting in the loss of the two other component: territory and sovereignty, this type of crisis results of what Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver called the Societal Dilemma.

In fact Mali and all Sahel countries have features of Failing State, first of all, the State building process was curbed since the early independence years by the ethnical and linguistic diversity, but also by the anarchical borders inherited from the colonial ear, that do not respect the demographic distribution of populations. The second feature is the legitimacy crisis, several Sahel countries including Mali suffer conflicts and struggle over authority among different component of societies especially tribes, until the 1990's the power shifting used to be established through military coups. 3<sup>rd</sup> feature is linked to sovereignty, States in the Sahel, in general are not able to control all territories or all society component, state especially in Mali and Niger, shares its sovereignty with the rebellion Tuareg tribes and even with terrorist and criminal armed groups, the state in these two countries lost the monopoly over the legitimate use if power. They also suffer issues of wealth distribution and economic failure, due to the corrupted governors, which result in structural violence and internal conflicts. Moreover, the ex-government (Before 2012) in Mali was accused to work with organized crime networks expressly in the northern parts of the country, which illustrates Fabio Armao's hypothesis <sup>112</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Rober I. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure" in *Washington Quarterly* (The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September, 2002),P.p 58-93.

<sup>112</sup> Felia Allum & Renate Siebert , *Organized Crime and the Challenge to Democracy* (New York : Routledge, 2003),P.26-28.

asserting that as soon as the organized crime become more hierarchically structured, it will penetrate the political and economic context of the state, creating lobbying groups and sometimes policy entrepreneurs, and in long term a “Mafia State” as shown in the figure 3.1. We can assume that a country facing economic deficit, ruled by anarchy and ethnically divided by wars and conflict is above all suitable for organized crime, and more suspected to evolve to a mafia state, a situation that led to the breakdown of the crisis in 2012. Moreover, the organized crime groups in a new trend are becoming more and more linked to the terrorist groups seeking financing resources.





Figure 3.1: The relationship between different species of organized crime and political and economic system.

Source: Why is Organized Crime So Successful in Fellia & Renae Siebert, Op.cit, P.27.

In this anarchic atmosphere, Mali was penetrated by terrorist groups such as AQMI Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, and several organized crime groups dealing in goods, drugs, arms and even human trafficking. The “drug traffic-terrorism” in Mali and the Sahel is a new threat facing the region and the Algerian national security, Mali as well as other Sahel states, constitute international routes of different types of drugs to reach Europe, coming from Latin America to the western Africa, the Sahel, then through Algeria to the European countries, according to the UNDOC (see map 3)



Map 3: showing cocaine flows from western Africa through Mali to Algeria and finally Europe.

Source: UNDOC, *Transnational Organized Crime In West Africa : A Threat Assessment*, 2013, P.1

Statistics shows that Drugs trafficking is 20 to 30 Million USD per year in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco since the fall of El Gaddafi's regime; it is one of the main financial resources contributing in the rise of the AQMI since 2012.<sup>113</sup> Moreover, reports show that the local communities became allies to the traffickers as they provide them a better life-style. Not only those trafficking in drugs and arms (a business that flourished after the collapse of the Libyan state), but also, those trafficking in subsidized Algerian goods. But the most dangerous piece is terrorist groups, especially AQMI, the group's strategy in the region was not to establish Al Sharia, since, it even tied relationships with the population ignored for so long by the government, its refreshed the economic transaction and even ensured transportation, which proves the shifting in the group's ideology, actually, its main goal was to fight the political regimes in the Maghreb states, especially the one in Algeria. In fact the group is the

<sup>113</sup> Anne Frintz, « Une Manne Qui Enrichit Bande Armées et Politiciens Corrompus, Trafic de Cocaine Une Pièce Négligée du Puzzle Sahélien » in *Le Monde Diplomatique* (France : Publié le : 1<sup>er</sup> Février 2013) Disponible sur <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1282157578/fulltext/75A46E258DAD4016PQ/1?accountid=6802>

evolution of the Algerian terrorist group GSPS and other Maghreb extremist groups, in addition to those coming back from Afghanistan. The group was first established in Mali in 2003 after a kidnapping attack in Algeria the group withdrew to Mali, since then Mali became the permanent settlement of the group especially after its connection to the international terrorist organization Al-Qaid. AQMI used Mali territories to attack Algeria, and withdraw so that the Algerian army cannot trace them, thus Algerian ex minister of foreign affairs Mourad Medelsi declared that: “*The Malian crisis is, therefore, for Algeria, as it is for many other countries, a problem of external security, but, beyond that, it is also for us a problem of national security*”.<sup>114</sup> The connection between the AQMI and Al-Qaida, and the ties between AQMI and organized crime organization were obvious in the new criminal techniques adopted and the quality of the targets. Also, between 2006 (the connection with Al Qaida) number of terrorist attacks raised notably in Algeria and Mali as shown in the figure 3.2.





Figure 3.2: Terrorist Attacks in North & West/Central Africa since 9/11

Source: Yonah Alexander, *Maghreb\_& Sahel Addressing the Rising Threat from El Qaida and Other terrorists in North & West Cenral Africa*, (Washington : ICTS,2011),P.4.

<sup>114</sup> Djallil Lounas, “Confronting Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Sahel: Algeria and the Malian Crisis” in *Journal of North African Studies* (UK: Routledge, Vol.19, N°5, 2014),P.811

One more security issue, links Algeria to the conflict in Mali are the flows of migrants and refugees (even before 2012), caused by the humanitarian crisis generated by the failure of the state, in fact several factors engendered this crisis among them: the deteriorated climate settings, the Sahel region is one of the most damaged regions in the world by the climate change, one of its new features became the drought, in addition to the poverty and the lack of education... these flows, are not always planning to stay in the country, but to use it as transit area to reach Europe: Spain through Morocco and Italy through Tunisia and Libya (See map 4) , giving the opportunity to human traffickers to invest in this situation, especially migrants traffickers, especially that prices for migrant smuggling from Africa to Africa are about 203 USD per migrant and from Africa to Europe about 6.533 USD.



Map 4: Immigration & Human Smuggling Routes from the Sahel through Algeria to Europe.

Source: <http://commerce-etre-humain.weebly.com/comment-sorganisent-les-flux.html>


As result the country faces a lot of international pressures and critics which constitute an infraction to its sovereignty and political security, as it is still stick to the notion of the “Nation-States” and did not develop any significant policies to monitor the migrants and insure their integration in the society, some of the refugees maintain relations with their family members in northern Mali and may help them to plan military actions against the Malian

army from the Algerian territories which exposed the Algerian borders to the arms and combatant flux. The other danger is the fact that these migrant as they fail in finding jobs, they tend to collaborate with organized crime organizations such as drugs dealers and migrant traffickers or goods traffickers. They may also integer terrorist groups. On the social level, on the long term, settlement of migrants Tuareg may change the social settings and features of the Algerian society, which may result in the social dilemma, and threaten the country's stability, as for short term migrant contribute to the raise of crime rates, and brought several illnesses such as the Malaria and the HIV. Economically, the migrants constitute an important financial burden on the government, they may constitute a cheaper workforce, which challenge the Algerians positions, and the result will be either pressures from civil society for restrictive policies or the spread of the xenophobia and its effects.

Finally, the Algerian regions inhabited by the Tuareg, are those dominating the natural resources generating more than 90% of the country's GDP, thus their security is crucial, and the hypothesis of separation in not an option.

4. Demographic and historical consideration: the majority of researchers do not pay enough attention to the demographic consideration of the Algerian interests in Mali, "The Tuareg" Population also called the "people of the veil," a group of social unions, the Tuareg are the aggregation of multiple tribes. There is no consensus on their origins, some scholars assert they come from pure Arab origins, others argue that they exclusively belong to the "Amazigh" (Berbère population) the original inhabitants of north Africa, other sources mention their existence in Africa starts with the Phoenician era, however, Tuareg today are, just like any other population in north Africa, a mixture of Arabs and Amazigh. They have always occupied the Sahara, several sources, argue they first come from Libya, in a region called Tergua in the province of Fezzan, and that's how they get the name "Tuareg", and spread all along the desert, they are the descendent of the tribes who fought European conquest in northern Africa, their connection to north Africa started with the arrival of

Islam, when leaders of Etrika El kadiria and El Tarrika El Tidjania transferred Islam to the Sahel.\* Nowadays, Only Mali counts 23 Tuareg ethnicity, divided among 5 large tribes: Mandingue, Bambara, Sominké, Malinké and Bozo.<sup>115</sup> After the independence, Tuareg population were divided among several new nation states: Algeria in the Hoggar –the Tuareg- , Mali in the Ifogas –the Azawad- , Niger in the Air region – The Azawad-, Chad, Burkina Faso, a total area of about 1.5 million Km<sup>2</sup> (See Map.5).



Map 5: The distribution of the Tuareg Population over the newly independent countries.

Source: [https://www.cna.org/CNA\\_files/PDF/DCP-2013-U-004799-Final.pdf](https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DCP-2013-U-004799-Final.pdf)

The Tuareg are occupying the poorest areas of these countries, and those exposed to drought and starvation; in addition, they have always been ignored by the government. It is to be mentioned that the Tuareg maintained a nomad lifestyle, and kept moving across the boundaries of the cited countries, thus we may find a complex network of familial relationships among them. One of the most tied relation is the one linking the Azawad Tuareg to the Algerian Tuareg; tied by history. In the late 1950's Kidal (Northern Mali) was the refuge of the ALN fighters, as it was crucial for them to penetrate the Algerian territories to reinforce the national integrity and to deny the French hypothesis

\* Two Religious Methods, starting From Algeria.

<sup>115</sup> Mansouri, Op.cit., P. 84.

to separate northern Algeria from the Sahara. Later, Algeria was the refuge of the Azawad suffering the repression by Keïta's regime, between 1962 and 1963 and between 1972 and 1973 and 1980 and 1984 because of the drought, and between 1990 and 1991, because of the war<sup>116</sup>. The first migration flow was the first foundation of the trust building process between Algeria and the Tuareg of the Ifogas, based on their common history, culture and religion, a sort of mutual recognition exists between the two parties.

### **3.4. The Algerian policies toward the conflict before 2012 crisis:**

The crisis of 2012 in Mali is nothing but a new episode of a long conflicting history, between the Azawad and the government.

#### **3.4.1 The history of the conflict and the evolution of threats:**

As mentioned earlier, the conflict, started right after the independence of the 'Republic of Sudan', called later "Mali" a territory of 1.241.238 km<sup>2</sup>, counting more than 20 ethnicity, among them, the country was divided to north and south, power and wealth remained with the later also known as the beneficial Mali (Le Mali Utile) inhabited mainly by the original African and the Madinga, the former, due to its Saharan nature is poorly inhabited, and its population is constituted of the Azawad (The Malian Tuareg), from where the conflict starts, as a supra-national conflict: as the Tuareg population was divided among several countries, then were also internally divided some of them simply accepted the new situation and supported their Nation state (Algeria and to some extent Libya) , others accepted the new borders but

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<sup>116</sup> Ahmed Chena, *The Blue Storm: Details of a Devastating War Ended On An Algerian Negotiation Table* (Algiers: Hadeel for publishing and distribution, 1<sup>st</sup> edition, 2006), P.96. (Translated from Arabic).

requested freedom of movement (as Nomad population) the third was the most extremist and called for the Tergui State. The reason is that the newly independent countries were exerting their sovereignty over the territories but could not provide enough development and prosperity to urge the population to settle their, even if the state was able to extinct a rebellion movement.<sup>117</sup>

The first rebellion movement of the Tuareg was 1963, known as well by “Kidal Revolution”, under the rule of the president Modibo Keita, who tried to install the socialist regime, however both the state and the population had nothing to share, as result Keita decided to collect more taxes and to nationalize some privet properties, moreover while sealing their livestock with the state’s property stamp, Keita’s soldiers did not hesitate to seize their belongings and destroy their tents\*.<sup>118</sup> These practices engendered the already deteriorated situation due to the environmental issues, the lack of resources, the wideness of the desert and the dispersion of the population, in addition to the lack of any developmental features especially the lack of education, justified by Bamako by the poverty of the state. Hence the Azawad Leaders gathered, discussed their issues with the government and decided that the only solution was the armed revolution and started targeting the Malian army. As a result, the Malian government responded aggressively, and oppressed the Tuareg population in the North. According to Mohamed Sebaoun, a retired police officer who accompanied the Algerian delegation visiting the Mali Tuareg camps’ in Algeria during the 1970’s , the Tuareg had very basic social and political grievances, they were marginalized by the African majority governing the

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<sup>117</sup> Gérard François Dumont, « La Géopolitique Des Populations Du Sahel », in *Cahier CEREM* (France : CREM,2009),P.36.

<sup>118</sup> Mohamed Ali El-Qachat, *The Tuareg: The Arab of the Sahara*\_(Libya: Center of Sahara Affaires Studies and Research, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1989),P256. (Translated from Arabic).

\* some scholars mention that this might be due to historical fact: the Tuareg were the masters of the African population governing after the independence, so it was their way to take revenge.

country, they had no roads, no water, no schools under the pretext of the country's deteriorated economic situation, they faced bureaucracy and they had no representative in the government nor in the public administration.

In the 1980's, a new separation attempt started occurring, supported by Libya, the movement had the same grievances as the change in the political system in Mali did not change the situation of the Azawad. The youth of the Azawad tribes with Libyan support, started contacting the Polisario and Tuareg elites living abroad to prepare the next revolution, in 1989, the Popular Movement of Azawad was established, led by Iyad Agh Ghali, in the mid-1990, their military action started and they were targeting military bases seeking arms, the revolutionist were able to build 3 military bases near Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. The Mali government response was aggressive against the Tuareg population, and tried to deny the accusation toward several diplomatic attempts. The uprising was appeased by the Algerian mediation in 1991, however, the actions led by the PMA and other Azawad organization did not completely stop until 1997.

A third revolution occurred in 2005, for the same reasons, poverty, marginalization, corruption, structural violence...etc., against Amadou Toumi Touré, led by Ibrahim Bahanga the chief of the Movement of the Democratic Alliance for Change MDAC. The crisis came to an end in 2006 after the Malian government requested the Algerian mediation.

### **3.4.2 The Algerian response to the threats and the conflicts episodes:**

The Algerian authorities have always been aware of the Tuareg issue, thus, it spared no efforts to contain the Algerian Tuareg, and any separations movement occurring in its neighborhood. Having as main goal: the protection of its territorial integrity especially after the sand war with Morocco, avoiding any international intervention near its borders and which may threaten its political security, and neutralize any danger of any claims of independence especially that during the 1980's Morocco and Libya used the Tuareg issue to

disturb the Algerian hegemony and in response to the Algerian support to the Polisario in Western Sahara.

In addition to the inclusive nature of the Algerian constitution, based on the principle of citizenship\*, and the developmental efforts in the Algerian Sahara: education and infrastructure\*\* in addition to their integration in the state's bodies : Executive, Legislative and judiciary, and the preservation of the Tuareg identity in the Algerian desert, and the adoption of flexible movement of the population through Saharan borders; Algeria reinforced its grip over the Tuareg in the early 1960's by offering a refuge to the Tuareg coming from Mali after the revolution of 1961 and other migration campaigns, for instance the population of the province of Tamanrasset (the main destination for the Tuareg from Mali and Niger) went from 3000 inhabitants in 1960 to 65000 inhabitants in 1998, only 16000 of them are Algerian<sup>119</sup>. However, Mr. Abdelaziz Rahabi the ex-Algerian Minister of communication estimated that President Ben Bella\*\*\*, made a strategic mistake by supporting the Malian government in the 1963 uprising,<sup>120</sup> that could be true to some extent, but looking to the whole picture, we may find out that in 1963, Algeria fought Morocco based on the "Uti Possidetis" principle, and the Malian president offered the mediation to

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<sup>119</sup> Chaker Drif ,op.cit ,P.114. (Translated from Arabic).

\* The Algerian Tuareg are highly integrated in the society according to the citizenship principle, Mahmoud Agmama the ex-parliament member representing the province of Tamanrasset, and one of the Nobles of..... the Tuareg asserted that "All Algerians are equal, there is no other belonging except to the country, the tribal belonging disappeared with the colonial era".

\*\* in a visit to both Tamanrasset and Illizi in 2014, population and Tuareg nobles asserted that they have even a better lives than the ones in Bamako capital of Mali, and that their situation is far better than their counterparts in Mali and Niger

\*\*\* Ahmed Ben Bella (1916-2012), the first Algerian president.

<sup>120</sup> Abdellah Neddour, "Rahabi to El bilad Forum : BenBella "has Mistaken" in Dealing with The Tuareg and Ouyahia Caught Up" in *El Bilad* (Algiers: published in 04-12-2012), available on <http://www.djazairess.com/elbilad/108708>

end the war, thus, the president Ben Bella could not support a movement against the same principle and give Morocco an excuse for its territorial claims.

Since the early 1960's, in addition to the development of its own Saharan regions, Algeria adopted a comprehensive and a global approach towards the Tuareg issue especially in northern Mali, not only to chase the separation movement, but also, to pursue some economic benefits through the support of the establishment of the Trans-Saharan road linking the Maghreb to Africa through Algiers and Tunis launched in 1964, From Algiers to Lagos through Bamako (Algeria will finish its Part in 2018: only 200 Km remaining to reach Mali and 50Km to meet Niger). Algeria keeps sending its humanitarian aid to the Tuareg population in northern Mali frequently, the country believes that the key to solve the conflict is development, thus, it has launched several investments.

The most powerful tool of the Algerian role in Mali, through which the country responded to the conflict, is: diplomacy and mediation. The Algerian foreign policy in the Sahel, especially in Mali, is built on a global perception of 4 main challenges:

1. The difficulty of building the State,
2. The vulnerability and non-consistency of the national identity,<sup>121</sup>
3. The shortage of political performance and the political instability (the threat of repeated military coups),
4. The spread of: terrorism, organized crime and structural violence.

In such circumstances, the best solution to solve any conflict is mediation. Algiers successfully mediated the two previous episodes of the conflict namely: 1991 and 2006, by an approach based on neutrality, and keeping the same distance from both parties: Government and Tuareg rebellions.

**a.** Internal and external preventive measures: Algerian Foreign policymaker was aware that Mali and Niger were going to a dramatic escalation of the Tuareg issue. Thus, he launched some preventive measures, Algiers

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<sup>121</sup> Mansouri, Op.cit., P.92.

called for a summit gathering governments of Mali, Niger and Libya for discussion in Janet (the province of Illizi), in 8 and 9<sup>th</sup> September 1990, as result, the parties agreed that the conflict cannot be solve by military means, that the borders areas populated by the Tuareg should be included in the developmental plans, that the marginalization of the Tuareg in the Sahel region should stop, and these countries ought improve their lifestyle.<sup>122</sup> The summit was followed by a reunion of the 4 ministers of interior affairs in October 1990, in Gao, to discuss tools to fight organized crime, monitor population movement, developmental plan of the regions (agriculture, livestock, health, education...). However, the delay of the partner countries (especially Mali and Niger), led to the occurrence of the Azawad both uprising during the 1990's

**b. The Mediation and the Tamanrasset Accord 1991-1994:** Algeria launched the mediation process, between the Government of Mali and the rebellion Azawad, in Tamanrasset, relying on the informal relations between the Algerian Tuareg and their Malian counterparts, the Algerian mediator could finally convince Iyad Ag Ghali the leader of the PMA to join the negotiation table on December 12<sup>th</sup> 1991, as the process had achieve an advanced stage. The later set a bunch of unrealistic grievances such as the establishment of the federal system in northern parts of Mali and the attribution of the sovereign ministries to the Tuareg. On January 6<sup>th</sup> Iyad Ag Ghali and Osman Goulibali (The Chief of Staff of Mali Army) signed the Tamanrasset accords in the presence of Mohamed Es-salah Moahmdi Algerian Minister of Interior and Local Authorities, ensuring Mali territorial integrity, establishing an immediate cease-fire, and the integration of the MPA and IAF (the Islamic Arab Front) combatant in the Malian army, and the establishment of a committee for the control of the pertinent implementation of the agreement

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<sup>122</sup> Houssin Boukara," The Issue of The Tuareg Minority and Its Impacts On The Stability of The Sahel Region" in *Strategic World* (Algiers: Echaabi Center of Strategic Studies, N°7, November 2008),P.6.

headed by the Algerian representative.<sup>123</sup> Unfortunately the application of the accord was curbed by the French disruption as it was not present, in addition to the split of the MPA movement and the appearance of new rebellion movements such as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad PMLA and the Revolutionary Army for The Liberation of Azawad RALA, in addition to the military coup in Mali.

c. 2<sup>nd</sup> Round of Mediation: Algeria launched a new series of mediation rounds, the first one was in 29 -30 December 1991, to prepare the negotiations process, the second was in Algiers 22-24 January 1992, during which the parties agreed to discuss: a cease-fire, the release of prisoners, the establishment of an independent investigation committee and the re-launch of the negotiations. Then the 3<sup>rd</sup> round in Algeria, on March 1992, within which the Government of Mali and the union of movements and fronts of the Azawad UMFA, agreed upon the cease-fire and the integration of the UMFA combatant in the Malian Army, and the establishment of a commission to monitor the implementation of the end on hostilities including representatives of the government of Mali and the UMFA and experts from Algeria, Libya, Niger, Burkina Faso and France. The same points were included in the National Pact signed in Bamako in 11<sup>th</sup> 1992, resulting from Algiers negotiations'.<sup>124</sup>

Algeria kept monitoring and working on peace and stability in northern Mali despite its own critical internal situation, through the organization of several dialogue sessions between Malian conflict parties to ensure stability, and the pertinent implementation of the National Pact, in 1994. Until the celebration of “the Peace Flame” in March 27<sup>th</sup> 1996 in Timbuktu, to destroy arms used during the 1990's crisis.

d. Internal Preventive measures: in order to avoid any surprises, Algerian government, approved in 1995, a 35 DZD billion developmental plan including several sectors: education, health, infrastructure, trade...etc. The

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<sup>123</sup> Accord sur la Cessation des Hostilités : Le Gouvernement de la République du Mali d'une Part et le Mouvement Populaire de l'Azaouad et le Front Islamique Arabe d'Autre Part, Tamanrasset, 06 Janvier 1991.

<sup>124</sup> Décret N°9-121/P-CTSP Portant Promulgation du Pact National, signé à Bamako le 11 avril 1992

government also standardized the Tuareg tradition trade method (bartering system) with Mali and Niger. In addition to the foundation of several camps for the Mali and Niger refugees in Tamanrasset and Illizi.

e. External preventive measure after 1994: Algeria kept providing humanitarian aid to the Mali government, in addition to economic and financial aid to face the drought and illness, and for the development of the northern regions of Mali as it donated 2 USD millions to Mali for the establishment of the National Pact in May 1994, in addition to several military devices (cars, vehicles, gasoline, military suits, tents ...).

f. The 2005-2006 Mediation: Despite all efforts, a new crisis occurred in northern Mali in 2005, for the same reasons and between the same parties: the government and the Azawad rebellions. The Malian government requested Algeria's mediation. After several rounds of preparation and dialogues, the Algerian diplomacy led by the minister of foreign affairs Mr. Mohamed Bejaoui, the Minister delegate of African affairs Mr. Abdelkader Messahel, and the Algerian Ambassador to Mali Mr. Abdelkarim Ghreib, were finally able to gather the different party to the negotiation table. The mediation under the personal auspice of the president Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, successfully ended after both the government of Mali and the MDAC signed an accord in Algiers on July 4<sup>th</sup> 2006, and the MDAC forces symbolically burnt their arms. The "Accord d'Alger 2006", confirmed the national pact, and stressed the protection of the Mali integrity, in addition to the return of all arms under the aegis of Algeria. In addition to the adoption of an economic plan for the northern parts of Mali.<sup>125</sup> Due to some implementation issues Algeria arbitrated an additional protocol to determine the technical details of the implementation on the accord in 2007. It is to be mentioned that Libya launched a mediation process in 2007 but failed, so Ibrahim Bahanga declared that he knew no mediation will succeed unless Algeria is its main actor.

g. Algerian Measures For preventing international intervention in the region: in accordance with its African vision, for dealing with the continent

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<sup>125</sup> Accord d'Alger Pour la Restauration de la Paix, de la Sécurité et du Développement Dans la Région de Kidal.

security issues including conflicts, Algeria was one of the initiators of the African Security Council. To avoid an international intervention in Mali because of the spread of terrorism in the region, it initiated a set of cooperative projects to fight the phenomena, starting from the reunion gathering the presidents Bouteflika, Gaddafi and Touré in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2009, to the establishment of a regional force of 25000 soldier to counter terrorism<sup>126</sup>, then the initiation of the establishment of Military joint commandment in Tamanrasset having for goal: fighting terrorism and organized crime, under which a unit of cooperation and integration was created to exchange intelligence information. The country also, integrated the American Trans-Saharan initiative, to fight terrorism and organized crime in the Sahel region, and played a decisive role in the international prohibition of ransom to terrorism to release hostages.

These efforts whether diplomatic, economic or military, illustrate the Algerian pacific and comprehensive approach dealing with the Tuareg issue in the region of the Sahel and its serious concern about Mali territorial integrity and about a potential foreign intervention in its backyard especially with the interests of several regional and international parties in the region. Correspondingly, the different concluded accords between government of Mali and Tuareg rebellion, signed based on the Algerian mediation emphasized the economic and developmental aspects as an attempt to eradicate the structural violence practices and eradicate the roots of terrorism and organized crime.

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<sup>126</sup> Nabil Bouiba, *The Algerian Approach Toward the Security Challenges In The Saharan Region* (Algiers: Algiers 3 University, Master of Art in Political Sciences, 2010),P.148. (translated from Arabic)

## Chapter 4: Analyzing the 2012 Crisis in

### Mali:

This chapter represents an effort to analyze the 2012 crisis through finding out its causes, its evolution, and its main actors; in a way that will allow us to analyze later the Algerian response, and why the country would refuse the military action.

#### 4.1: Crisis Causations:

In order to understand what happened in Mali in 2012, we may refer to “the Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation” elaborated by professor James Reason in 1990 that occurred first in the field of aviation accidents’, for this model the risk or the accident is the result of the succession of a set of human errors leading to the accident<sup>127</sup>.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, we may distinguish two main causes of the conflict (since the 1960’s) that were also, the reasons of the 2012 crisis, as layout of SCM and caused mainly by human mistakes:

1. The Social causes and the historical social dilemma: The dispersion of the Tuareg society among different countries, due to the colonial statement of borders, which affected their lifestyle and limited their movement. In addition to the implementation of a separation ideals by France, that wanted to separate the Sahara from other parts of the colonies after the discoveries of the energetic resources in the region.

The continuous structural violence practiced by the government in Bamako against the Tuareg society in the north, and the wrong political choices: for instance since the independence, and despite the succession of multiple governments, the Tuareg were never represented. In addition to this fact, the

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<sup>127</sup> Justin Larouzée, Franck Guarnieri, « Denis Besnard. Le modèle de l’erreur humaine de James Reason », in *Papiers de Recherche du CRC* (Paris : MINES ParisTech, 2014) , p-p. 18-20.

northern parts of the country, mainly populated by the Tuareg, were always marginalized, and excluded from the developmental plans under the pretext of poverty, also from the educational plans even since the colonial era, as Charles de Foucault advised<sup>128</sup> the continuous exclusion of the Tuareg from the educational programs which led to the absence of an educated Tergui elite able to insure the appeal to reason and peaceful means to fix their issues, in fact sources mention more than 69% of the population over 25 years old suffer illiteracy, and only 27% of kids attend school, especially in the underdeveloped regions, this covers the Tuareg regions too. The later suffers from the spread of dangerous deceases such as the HIV, in addition to the deteriorated health care system, as life expectancy is about 57 years old according to the World Bank data base.

The Tuareg society was basically, always left to face the harsh nature of the region, and to face its problems on its own, these facts led to the occurrence of the so called “social- dilemma” as this population lost its belonging feeling to the Malian society.

2. The issue of the failed State in Africa (political causes): The situation of distrust ruling the relation between the Tuareg and the Mali government, was continuously aggravated, due to the repetition of the same mistakes, and the same practices, toward the Tuareg, even with the fact that the two sides have concluded three peace treaties (1991-1997-2006). In addition, Mali was always the scene to multiple military coups, oppressing democracy deepening the situation of distrust. Mali is the typical illustration of the failing state in Africa.

The State building issue is one of the major challenges facing the Mali society, it is one of the outcomes of the colonial era that put the country due to the new borders and the colonial institutionalization; on the path of a failing state, a state that is incapable of accomplishing its role and to politically and militarily control its territories. For Barry Buzan, there are three features through which we can distinguish the failed state: the lack of legitimacy (within

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<sup>128</sup> Bourgeot, André, op.cit., P.27.

the political system) and the failure to create a socio-political consensus that allow them to eliminate the use of military force as major tool in the political life<sup>129</sup>, the inability to control the territories and the nature of its institutions and their inability to ensure the adequate performance of their duties toward all the components of the society<sup>130</sup> (these features reflects Buzan's model of the state based on the Idea, the Institutional expression and the Physical bases of the state<sup>131</sup>). These features in fact are applicable on the Malian case, as they represent the country's feature and problems causing the conflict since the 1960's, which are:

a. *The weakness of the state*: as it suffers from serious social cleavages, since we can notice the absolute dominance of the "Bambara" tribe over the most central institutions and parts of the state, while other social components are excluded, especially if those having a conflicting history with the Bambara like the Tuareg.

b. *The lack of political continuity*: the continuity is the essence of the stability as it provides the authority with the legitimacy necessary for its efficiency and ability to act. It is exactly what Mali does not have, the country suffered a series of military coups, the last one was right after the 2012 broke out, one of the reasons given by the coups' leader Amado Sanogo, was the lack of equipment and negligence of the Tuareg issue in the north which led the fallen of the northern parts of the country (Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu<sup>132</sup> and Tissalit). However one of the causes of the army's defeat is the lack of training and nepotism in recruiting soldiers, moreover some of the Malian personalities accuse the peace treaties concluded through the Algerian mediations, by which members of the Tuareg integrated the army without receiving the adequate training and without a real feeling of integration to the state idea due to the social dilemma. As a matter of fact it should be mentioned that the Mali regime

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<sup>129</sup> Bary Buzan, *People, States and Fear: the National Security Problem In International Relation* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1st edition, 1983), p.67.

<sup>130</sup> Lukvan Lange Hove, « Regionalization Human Security in Africa, » *UCL* available on: <http://www.UCL.AC.UK/Library/accsO207.shtml> (17/03/2017)

<sup>131</sup> Buzan, op.cit., P.p. 44.65.

<sup>132</sup> The French name of the city is Tombouctou.

has always been unable to insure security and internal stability, dictatorship riled the political atmosphere since the early stages of the state building process, leading to a conflict over power, which may justify the number of military coup d'État.

On the other hand, after checking the fragile state index (SFI), we may find four indicators: security, political, economic and social, according to transparency international, Mali came 105 out of 174 countries. In fact the repeated crisis of the Tuareg, are one of the most obvious proof of the successive governments failure since 1963.

c. *The crisis of the civil-military relations*: in his book “the soldier and the state”, Samuel Huntington, tried to explain the motivations of the army’s dominance over the power, he argued that the nature of the political structure of societies is the main reason, it is characterized by the weakness of the civil political institutions supposed to be able to pursue development and to solve conflicts emerging among different parts of societies.<sup>133</sup> The issue of civil-military relations is one of the main issue facing the African countries including Mali, literature assert that this relation is determined by the nature of the military institution itself, where we can figure out two main features: the first one is the dominance of the ethnic – tribal model, which results in the dominance of racism and intolerance over its elements, a phenomena that is well illustrated by the dominance of the “Songhay”, that guides them. The second is the class model, governed by the rule of ethnic or religious classes, or even families, in Mali, several families are over represented within the army such as Traouré, Koulibaly, and Keïa. This led to a dysfunction of the army as one integrated institution, and transferred the social dilemma to it. Due to these two features the country suffers –just like any African country- the issue of determining the relation between the civil and the military within the country’s institutions, the army intervene in the political life, a fact reflected through the number of military coups, ending even the bright era of democracy during the

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<sup>133</sup> Amine Essebr, *Africa: Politically, Economically and Socially*\_(Damascus: Damascus for printing and publishing, 1985),P.p 39-40.

1990's. The army uses the wars it went through to get legitimacy since the colonial era, thus, its members have the right to access the highest military and civil positions.<sup>134</sup> Moreover, the army members use the “restoration of peace and stability to take over the power; however the truth is that they made the situation worse as they tended to use repression methods especially toward the Tuareg rebellion, in addition to the inhibition of the public freedoms, and treating population based on their ethnic belonging. The dominance of the army led to the collapse of the peaceful means of conflict settlement, and the rise of internal and external military solutions. In fact as it will be explained in this chapter, the Tuareg soldiers deserting the army, with their arms in 2012, played a decisive role in the break out of the crisis. Factors of these dilemma, can be resumed in:

- *The genesis of the military institution in Mali*: the Malian army was established by the French colonizer, to establish order, thus, the governing culture overcame its behavior, detuning the institution from its central role to protect territories.<sup>135</sup>

- *The fragility of the political construction*: which is clearly illustrated in the failure of the governing party to gain the population trust, which justifies the repeated international intervention (political and military), in addition to the weakness of politicians because of the struggle over authority and the dominance of personal ambitions.

- *The Fragile socio-economic construct*: the deteriorated socio economic either push the army to intervene or justify its intervention in the socio-political life, under the pretext of adjusting the current dysfunctions.

- *Crisis of political legitimacy*: that is reflected first of all through the restricted multiparty and oppressive regime that does not allow opposition. In Mali there are 91 political parties, only three of them are really active: The

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<sup>134</sup> Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid, *West Africa's Security Challenges: building peace a troubled region*, (USA: Lynne Rienner publishers, 2004), p. 149.

<sup>135</sup> Amira Abdelhalim, « Governing in Africa ; From Military Coups to the Deliberation » in *Al Ahram Journal* published on May 2<sup>nd</sup> 2012, available on <http://democracy.ahram.org.eg/UI/Front/InnerPrint.aspx?NewsID=319> (2017/05/18) (Translated from Arabic)

alliance for democracy in Mali, the Sudan Union, the African Democratic Assembly and the Assembly for Mali. Then through the nature of the means to access to power, that comes on a tank instead of democratic elections, for instance, Mali witnessed three military coups 1968-1991 and 2012, which proves the weakness of the political institutions, and fragile the legitimacy of the authorities. The third indicator is the absence of monitoring as it lacks the so called the congressional veto, authoritarian regimes lack a higher power able to monitor its behavior, even with the presence of a constitutional law it remains infective, as these regimes try to inspire legitimacy from one political leader. The three indicators are present in the Malian case; it is enhanced by the homogenous nature of the society that contaminated the governing elite since the independence, the country is still facing problems with the state-building process, it is reflected in the lack of communication between governors and citizens, since the independence leading to the failure in solving several social, economic and political issues.<sup>136</sup>

d. *Corruption*: one of the main factors of internal instability, especially when associated to social dilemma, political and economic corruption is one of the reasons of the 2012 crisis, the country was ranked among one of most corrupted countries as it came 105 on the table of corruption index issued by transparency international.<sup>137</sup> The corruption effects are reflected by law participation in election, due to the nepotism and corruption during the campaigns. Also, in 2011, The government of Toumné Touré decided to launch a developmental plan of 50 million Euro in the northern parts of the country, however, the inappropriate implementation, the corruption and the re-settlement of the army (which was against the 2007 agreement), ended up deepening the gap between the population of the Tuareg and the government of Mali.

To these long lasting reasons of the state crisis, are added:

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<sup>136</sup> Patrich Gonin et autres, *La tragédie malienne*, (Paris : Vendémiaire, 2013), p. 83.

<sup>137</sup> Table and Ranking of corruption index 2012, available on <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results>

3. The spread of asymmetric threats: represented by the spread of terrorist groups AQMI & MUJAO and the organized crime; in fact the first one had tied some familial relations with the Tuareg. But the most important fact is that several government officials were involved and beneficiaries of the terrorist attacks, the ransom of kidnapping acts, and from money laundering and human and drug trafficking. Moreover, one of the reasons that made the 2012 a sever crisis, was the back-up the NMAL and Ansar Eddin received from the terrorist groups. These variables made that the situation in northern Mali was very complex after the crisis broke out, with the interaction between several criminal actors, as mentioned earlier, which made the country close to the mafia state.

4. Economic factors: In general, the economic resources, and incomes are what cover the practices of the oppressive regimes, and cases of economic crisis are what uncover these practices. In Mali the Tuareg occupy the poorest and least developed regions: Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal, wealth and natural resources are located in the southern regions. The unfair distribution of wealth between north (poor) and south (rich), is obvious; the former suffer the lack even in the basic infrastructure such as roads and hospitals, which gave a great opportunity to the terrorist groups to replace the state and provide transportation to the population, resulting later in the alliance between some of the Tuareg rebellion and terrorist groups, and even in the sympathy of the local population toward these groups. Actually, the 60% of population of Mali lives under 1 US dollar per day,<sup>138</sup> these facts transformed the northern regions into transit and exporting regions of different crimes.

5. The repercussions of the international intervention in Libya: in fact, Algeria opposed the military intervention in Libya, because its official knew that it will sink the entire region into anarchy. The collapse of the Non-state in Libya, led to some serious impacts on the region, and was one of the Mali crisis factors. In 2011, El Gadhafi's Army had between 250.000 and 700.000 firearms,

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<sup>138</sup> M'hand Berkouk, The African Sahel between Internal Threats and International Considerations in *Strategic World journal* (Algiers: Echaab Center for Strategic Studies, N°7, November 2008), p.p 2-3.

70% of it were offensive arms<sup>139</sup>, and a total of 40 million arm,<sup>140</sup> this arsenal spread and the terrorist groups and rebellion members in Mali were the main beneficiaries. For instance, El—Gadhafi’s arm arsenal counted 22.000 MANPADS missiles, at least 17.000 of them (70% of the total arsenal) disappeared, reports confirmed that 400 MANPADS have been sold, hundreds of Kalashnikov AK-47, were sold for prices between 150-1000 USD<sup>141</sup>, between 10.000 and 20.000 Libyan arms reached the neighboring countries especially Mali and Niger. A significant arm black-market flourished, and its main clients were the terrorist groups and groups seeking political power (in Libya and Mali). In fact reports of the special committee established by the UN, to monitor arms transfer in Libya, asserted that due to the fragmentation of the “State” the institutions lost control, that several operations to import arms, were canceled as turned out that these institutions have never ordered them, some corrupted individuals did in the name of the Libyan state. The only explanation is that these armed were ordered for Libyan militias, and that part of them has definitely ended between the hands of both Tuareg and AQMI. Moreover, the NATO helped the later to procure some arms, the terrorist group has taken advantage of the events in Libya and sent its leader: Mokhar Bel Mokhtar and Abdelhamid Abou Zaïd, who were able to access El-Gaddafi’ stocks, they had also sent one of the leaders called “El-Haïdara”, during the Arab Spring to Nfoussa mountains in Libya to convince the Amazigh groups to accede Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb to fight El-Gaddafi’s regime. Haïdara witnessed the French air-drop of weapons to the rebels in Libya in June 2011; reports asserted that he was able to recover some of these weapons in the favor of the AQMI.<sup>142</sup> Some of these weapons were seized later by the Algerian army. Reports

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<sup>139</sup> Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, “Libya: a Growing Hub For Criminal Economy and Terrorist Financing Trans-Sahara” in *Policy Brief* ( GIATOC: May2015),P.3.


<sup>140</sup> Zaouchi Soraia, *The Spread of Libyan Arms... Security Complications and Regional Fears* ( the centre of Sahara studies) available on <http://essahraa.net/?q=node%2F6349> (translated from arabic)

<sup>141</sup> Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, *Loc.cit.*

<sup>142</sup> Louanas, Op.cit. P.822.

asserted that the AQMI acquired heavy weapons, as the Nigerian president confirmed to the Jeune Afrique, such as missiles SA-7 and rocket launchers,<sup>143</sup> these facts have proven the Algerian fears before the intervention in Libya as the country became the main arm supplier to the terrorist groups, separations groups in Mali and arms dealers, the MANPADS, the SA24 and the SA-7, made the AQMI even stronger than the Sahel countries armies.<sup>144</sup> Later in 2012, the Algerian minister of foreign affairs asserted that north Africa has tangible evidences that the AQMI, could recover arms from El Gaddafi's stocks, through the black market ( Map 6) “ *It is not a worry nor a feeling, it is real*”, the fact was later confirmed by the general Carter Ham.<sup>145</sup>

**Carte 1**  
Flux d'armes et de personnel armé non étatique documentés dans le Sahel, entre 2011 et 2016



Sources: Enquêtes de terrain réalisées par CAR en Libye, au Mali, en République centrafricaine et au Tchad, 2014-15 ; sources confidentielles (en Côte d'Ivoire et au Soudan) ; CSNU (2013 ; 2014A ; 2014b ; 2016A)

Map 6: Map of routes of arm smuggling from Libya to Mali.

The black market and the terrorist attacks on arms' shipments were not the only way through which Libyan arms reached the AQMI, the AQMI was not the main player in the separations movement of 2012, and it was an ally. The main decisive factor of the 2012 crisis break out was the coming back of the Tuareg members of El-Gaddafi army, with their returning to their country, the

<sup>143</sup> RFI, « Des Armes Lourde Récupéré par AQMI en Libye », in *RFI Afrique* available on <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20110327-armes-lourdes-recuperees-aqmi-libye>

<sup>144</sup> Vincent Hurgeux & Boris Thiolay, « Les Armes de Kadhafi, Un Legs Mortel Pour l'Afrique » in *L'express* (France : L'express, Publié le 02-04-2012), available on [http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/les-armes-de-kadhafi-un-legs-mortel-pour-l-afrique\\_1042885.html](http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/les-armes-de-kadhafi-un-legs-mortel-pour-l-afrique_1042885.html)

<sup>145</sup> Ritchard Norton-Taylor & Nick Hokin, “Libya warned Smugglers Are Looting Gaddafis Gun” in *The Guardian* (UK: published on September the 2<sup>nd</sup> 2011) available on <https://www.theguardian.com/>

financial system in Libya had already collapsed, their best option was to exchange their money for weapons, for example Ibrahim Bahanga (the leader of the 2006 movement in Mali), has recovered an important part of the Libyan stocks, also, NMLA combatant asserted that they received arms from the Tebbou tribe\* from Sabha to Kiddal through Niger and Algeria. Moreover, the common interests between the coming-back Tuareg and the AQMI, led to the occurrence of an unapparent alliance. A research held by Conflict Armament Research<sup>146</sup>, proved that the Libyan arms had a big impact on the crisis breaking out. However, the Tuareg were similarly able to takeover important significant quantities of arms from the Malian stocks due to the failure of the state and the corruption of some officials, in addition to the desert of Tuareg members.

## **4.2 The Break Out of the Crisis and the Serval operation:**

As a result of the situation described, and the secession of the “human mistakes” related to the bad governance and to some international influence of actors that do not prefer a stable Mali. The country witnessed a new crisis, in January 2012, the NMLA attacked sites of the Malian army: Aguelhok, Minaka and Tassalit, and took over the region of Aguelhok.

On march 22<sup>nd</sup> 2012, Mali witnessed a new military coup against the president Ahmdou Toumai Touré (accused of the privileging a large suspicious and illicit network to monitor the socioeconomic situation in north instead of empowering state’s institutions) led by Ahmadou Haya Sanogo, the announced reason was the failure to oppress the Tuareg, but the unrevealed truth was that lower scale soldiers were upset for a while of the government, and high scale officers’ practices especially the high level of corruption.

Despite the death of Ibrahim Bahanga, while coming back from Libya, avoided the worse since he could recover arms from Libya, yet the weakness of

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<sup>146</sup> *Enquette sur le Transfert d’Armes Transfrontaliers dans le Sahel* (London: Conflict Armament Research, November 20016),P18.

\* Tebbou tribe : one of the arabo-African nomad tribes, living in mainly in Libya and Niger.

the state and the chaos the country knew, in addition to the presence of different terrorist groups such as AQMI the MUJAO, attenuated the Army, led to the Fall of the of the northern parts of the Niger river: Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, on April 6<sup>th</sup> 2012, the NMLA announced unilaterally the independence of the “Azawad region”, that encompasses “Adrar Iforghas” the land of origin of the Tamachak civilization, and the potential gathering land of Tuareg dispersed in the region, and representing 2/3 of the Mali territories. The independence declaration was declined by the regional and international community.

These two events sank the country and the region into a chaotic situation, and the option of a potential military intervention was quickly discussed since the country was divided to a north under the control of the NMLA and the south governed by a transitional government after the military coup. We should mention here that the withdrawal of the army troops, made the population of the northern parts of the country lose trust in its army, and opened the sphere for the AQMI to consolidate its presence, the Algerian intelligence services detected some social aids given by this group to the Tuareg population.

Actually, not all the Tuareg in northern Mali approved the 2012 movement, historically, the Tuareg as a tribal society suffered conflict among its components, which was one of the policies of the government to neutralize any unification attempt, and this phenomenon was present even during the 2012 movement, as there were two groups the NMLA and Ansar Eddin led by Iyad Agh ghali, one of the key actors of the 1990’s movement, later named as diplomat in Jeddah, who did not really appreciate the creation of the NMLA, and created Anar Eddin which was an extremist separation group looking forward to the establishment of El Sharia in the Azawad region. The two movements allied to chase the Army out of the region, later they announced the fusion, but the NMLA withdraw two days later as Ansar Eddin (later becoming a close ally to the AQMI) announced they opposed the independence of the Azawad.

The AQMI, played a significant role in the movement, in fact after the attacks of January 2012, against the military troops, 100 soldier lost their lives,

they were killed the same way used by the AQMI (ex GSPC in Algeria), also the Christian symbols were targeted which means that there were not simply military attacks of a separation movement, but illustrated the practices of an extremist group. Later ties were revealed about an alliance between Ansar Eddin (led by Iyad Ag ghali) and the AQMI. Then, Ansar Eddin backed by the MUJAO fought the NMLA, and chased out from Gao in July 27<sup>th</sup> 2012, the next day Ansar Eddin and the MUJAO, announced their control over the north of Mali.

Regardless of the international refusal of the military coup and the sanctions imposed to the junta in April 2012, by the UN, AU and the ECOWAS, because of the seize of power via a military coup, a practice highly rejected by the international community and by the AU; its leader requested help from neighboring countries, especially Algeria and the ECOWAS, the junta and the ECOWAS agreed upon a transitional period to recover democracy. And in April 12<sup>th</sup>, power was handed to Dioncounde Traouré as interim president, in order to prepare democratic elections; the interim president announced was against the Tuareg movement in the north until they release the cities under their control. Nevertheless, the junta did not withdraw completely from the political life, until August 2012, the country could not insure a stable government. Finally in August 2013, presidential elections were held and (after the international intervention), and President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was elected.

As the NMLA lost control over the northern parts that became under the control of Ansar Eddin, AQMI and the MUJAO, Mali' Government officially requested an international military intervention in September 2012, from the ECOWAS, and the UN to fight terrorism, despite Algeria had launched series of discussion to avoid the military intervention, insuring that it would push the region into more anarchy. France backed by the ECOWAS intervened on January 11<sup>th</sup> 2013, under the cover of "War against terrorism", based on the UN security council resolution 2071 issued on October 12<sup>th</sup>

2012,<sup>147</sup> and the resolution 2085 issued in December 2012 demanding all the rebellion movements to cut off all relations with terrorist groups, establishing a UN mission to Mali, urging the political internal and external parties to launch a negotiation process and allowing the deployment of a military force led by African countries to reestablish peace and reinforce and consolidate the Malian army.<sup>148</sup> In fact, ECOWAS, France's ally in West Africa was not planning to intervene in January 2013, nine months before the designated date. Moreover, the military intervention was supposed to be held only by the ECOWAS, to avoid French direct involvement, however due to wrong signals sent by the government in Bamako, Ansar Eddin that was ready for a ceasefire in late 2012 after negotiations with the mediation of mainly Burkina Faso and Algeria<sup>149</sup>, launched military actions in regions close to Bamako and started moving to the south and controlled the city of Konna 500 KM from Bamako, backed by the AQMI and the MUJAO. France was dragged to fight, the decision makers did not want to intervene at that moment,<sup>150</sup> in an exposed desert controlled by well-equipped terrorist groups counting among their members Tuareg who have a savoir-faire in dealing with the nature of the region, hence, Serval suffered important loss in the first day, and was obliged to deploy land forces and troops of special forces, in Bamako and the region of Adrar Ifoghas, French troops were backed by air forces from the USA, Germany, Denmark, Canada, Italy, UK, Both for intelligence services and medical rescue. It was also backed by the Algerian logistic support, NMLA were fighting the terrorist group, but at the same time attacking the Malian troops.

On January 14<sup>th</sup>, a group of jihadists, led by El Haïdara, were able to neutralize the Malian army and control the region of Diabaly, serious uncertainty occurred about the efficiency of the international intervention, as the

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<sup>147</sup> UN Security Council resolution 2071/2012.

<sup>148</sup> UN security council resolution 2085/2012.

<sup>149</sup> « Ansar Eddin » :We are ready to expel the foreign forces, in *Al-Jazeera* (published on 14-12-2012), available on

<http://www.aljazeera.net/news/international/2012/11/14/-/د-الدين-مستعدون-لطر-الأجانب-بمالي>

<sup>150</sup> Bernard Adam, *Mali de l'intervention Militaire Française à la construction de l'Etat* (Bruxelles : GRIP, Mars 2013),P.12.

group also controlled the region of Konna. Finally, after joint actions between French-ECOWAS and Malian army, they were able to recover the two regions on January 21<sup>st</sup> 2013. Between January 22<sup>nd</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup>, the joint forces were able to secure the regions northern the Niger River (Boucle du Niger) (See figure 4.1), and chase the terrorist groups out, and the forces could free Gao airport and move toward Timbuktu.



Figure 4.1: “La boucle du Niger” (Mali parts in red)

Source:

[https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger\\_\(fleuve\)#/media/File:Niger\\_river\\_mapfr.png](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger_(fleuve)#/media/File:Niger_river_mapfr.png) (Modified).

Finally on January 25th, joint military action led by French, African and Malian troops, ended by recovering Gao from the AQMI and the MUJAO, two days later, January 27<sup>th</sup> 2013, French troops recovered Timbuktu from the AQMI. Finally, on January 30<sup>th</sup> 2013, French Special Forces were able to control Kidal; beating terrorist groups in northern Mali, required more than 1000 aerial output and the presence of more than 4000 French soldier on the Mali soil. French forces handed the recovered areas to the African forces constituted mainly of ECOWAS armies. The French troupes already present in Africa: Chad, Niger and the Gabon and their re-deployment was decisive to the success of the Serval operation. Besides, the Algerian support was advantageous, as the country closed its boundaries which helped to block the terrorist groups; it has also opened its airspace to the French aircrafts and supplied them with Kerosene.

In fact, the military intervention, was efficient in fighting terrorism in northern Mali, but did not solve the real problem: the rebellion movement was still ongoing. And because the UN security council resolutions emphasized the need to reach a peaceful settlement to the crisis between the government in Mali and the rebel movements in the north, negotiations were re-launched in Ouagadougou, in order to prepare the presidential elections (held in August 2013), the NMLA, the high council for the Unification of Azawad, and the government in Mali concluded an accord in June 18th 2013, with the mediation of the Mauritanian president Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz by which the two parties accepted the conduction of the presidential elections and to ceasefire, and the disarmament of rebellion parties as demanded by the UN and the ECOWAS, starting by the cantonment of these groups' members, the accord defined the modalities of the disarmament process.<sup>151</sup> However, after the presidential elections, the NMLA withdrew from that accord, asserting that the government did not honor its pledges<sup>152</sup> and on November 30th the NMLA pull out from the accord, after the oppression of civilians protesting against the visit of the prime minister to Kidal, and to end the ceasefire status,<sup>153</sup> and because the terrorist threat did not disappear, and France had to extent its operation till august 2013, then decided in July 2014 to deploy a force of 4000 soldier in the five Sahel countries from Mauritania to Chad, through Mali where 1600 deployed in Mali<sup>154</sup>, having for goal fighting terrorism and building these countries armies' capacity, which means that the country got stuck there.

Meanwhile, ethnic confrontation continued and the country witnessed the creation of new Azawad movement, thus, the ECOWAS and Algeria, re-launched their efforts finally a new accord was signed in Ouagadougou in May

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<sup>151</sup> Accord Preliminaire à l'Election Presidentielle et Aux Pourparlers Inclusifs de Paix Au Mali. Ouagadougou, June 18<sup>th</sup> 2013.

<sup>152</sup> Reuters, *Mali Tuareg Separatists Suspend Participation in Peace Process* published in 26<sup>th</sup> September 2013, available on <http://news.trust.org//item/20130927071806-0qx16/?source=dpagehead>

<sup>153</sup> Mali's Tuareg Fighters end ceasefire in *Al-Jazeera* published on November 30<sup>th</sup> 2013. Available <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/>

<sup>154</sup> Armé : Qu'est Ce Que l'Operation Barkhane\_in *France 2* published on May 19<sup>th</sup> 2017, available on <http://www.francetvinfo.fr/>

23<sup>rd</sup> 2014, to re-activate the first accord signed in Ouagadougou on June 2011, and parties agreed upon re-launching negotiations. However the split among the Tuareg, and the lack of commitment of the government was causing a significant delay, hence, the Tuareg agreed upon Algiers as mediator, finally after a series of meetings, the mediation ended by the accords of Algiers in 2015 that put an end to the conflict.

### **4.3 The Crisis Parties:**

One of the factors of the delay in solving the 2012, is its complexity, first due to its nature as it had three dimensions: the separatists movement, the spread of terrorist threat, and the military coup and the collapse of the “pseudo democracy”, and second because of the multiplicity of the actors of the three dimensions: National, intra-national State and non-state actors, international and regional national and supranational. Herein, the study tries to discuss the aspirations and implications of each one of them.

#### 1- National Actors:

##### 1.1 State Actors:

- ***The government of Mali:*** accused to be highly corrupted and linked to the criminal groups led until 2012, by the president Amadou Toumani Touré, whose regime was reversed through a military coup, led by Amadou Sanogo, who passed the authority to Dioncounda Traouré, in fact the two presidents continued the same “mistakes” leading to the separation grievances, as Traouré announced that he will *not* hesitate to launch a war against the Tuareg, and asked the separatists to withdraw from the occupied regions. In fact even the new government could not re-build trust between the state’s institutions and the population nor was it able to establish stability. There were also tensions between the army led by Sanogo and the government of Traouré, henceforth the political stability was not ensured even among parts of the state and the dilemma of the civil-military relation was still existing, since the military coup leaders handed the power to the government under the pressure of the international society. The main goal of the government (transitional and

elected) was to ensure Mali's territorial integrity and also, to maintain the same existing elite as there were no signs of political will to integrate the Tuareg in the political life. Moreover, Traouré was one of the pro-French too and had close relations with the previous regime. Traouré, finally, requested the military intervention to recover the northern parts of the country, which did not send any signals to rebellions of a will of a peaceful settlement of the crisis.

- ***The Malian Army:*** A major player in the Malian political life, which is reflected by the member of the military coups the country known, and the lack of democracy except during the late 1990's and early 2000's. Nevertheless, this democracy did not last long, as Amado Sanogo decided to lead a new military coups, on march 22nd as a reaction by the low-level officers to the spread of corruption and to the failure of the government of Toumani Touré to overcome the rebellion movement in the north, it was also due to the lack of back up to the soldiers in the northern parts of the country, the troops were underequipped and trained despite the foreign aid, they were under the mercy of the extremist groups, and hundreds of them were killed especially during the attack against Aguelhok, which led to the collapse of the cities of Kidal and Gao. The army was facing an asymmetric war to which it was not able to oppose due to the lack of adequate air force support in a vast exposed changing area, these facts deepened the distrust situation between the two main institutions of the state: the government and the army, moreover Toumani Touré was accused of having links with the NMLA, the army was disappointed about the absence of the political class reaction to the events in the north, the army members were also disenchanted about the integration and the promotion within the army, of some ex. rebellion Tuareg members. Thus the junta led by Amadou Haya Sanogo, decided to reverse the regime on March 22nd 2012. This deteriorated situation led to the defeat of the army and its withdrawal from the northern cities, and Sanogo was obliged to request support from the international community that has placed Mali under economic and political sanctions, and under the pressure of the later, especially the ECOWAS, Sanogo was obliged to hand the power to a transitional government and nominate an interim president. However, Sanogo insisted on keeping a tight grip over the

strategic position in the government and to take revenge of the NMLA and the terrorist groups controlling the northern parts of the country.

### 1.2. Non-State Actors:

○ ***The National Movement For the Liberation of Azawad:*** a political-armed organization, constituted by the Tuareg, established on November 1<sup>st</sup> 2010<sup>155</sup>, its founding members proclaimed being liberals, and representing all the Tuareg, and encompassed previous Tuareg movements and leaders such as Ibrahim Agh Bahanga, and tried to integrate members from the Arabs and Songai, However its leadership remained to Mhamed Ag Nadjem,<sup>156</sup> which illustrates the conflict and distrust even among the inhabitants of the Azawad, the movement was also empowered by the coming back of those fighting for El Gaddafi, in addition to the soldiers who deserted the army. Actually, at the beginning the NMLA was a peaceful movement that defended the civil rights of the people of Azawad, but in October 16<sup>th</sup> 2016 the NMLA was allied to the Popular Movement of the Azawad PMA (a Salafist group).<sup>157</sup> By 2012, the NMLA had declared it was ready to fight terrorism; its leaders were trying to convince France to provide help as they were ready to fight the AQMI and the MUJAO. However, the movement was also fighting the Malian army, for the liberation of the Azawad region (northern parts of Mali). At the beginning of the crisis the Azawad declared the independence of their region, but on February 13<sup>th</sup> 2013, after the beginning of the military intervention and the internationalization of the conflict, the NMLA affirmed that the territorial integrity of Mali, is not to be negotiated, and emphasized the need to recognize the existence of the Azawad, its claims changed from independence to autonomy.

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<sup>155</sup> Ahmed Amr, "Mali's Tuareg and the Scenario's of the Crisis Solving" in *African Readings Journal* published on July 28<sup>th</sup> 2015, available on <http://syasat.org/index.php/articles/> (Translated from Arabic).

<sup>156</sup> Mohamed Mahmoud Abu El Maali, *The War Between Mali and the Tuareg.. Will It Burn the Entire Region?* Published on: February 10<sup>th</sup> 2012. Available on <http://www.swissinfo.ch/ara> (Translated from Arabic).

<sup>157</sup> *France, Allié des Rebelles Touareg*, published on: February 4<sup>th</sup> 2012 available on: <http://maliactu.net/la-france-alliee-des-rebelles-touareg/>

○ ***Ansar Eddine:*** Considered as the “Taliban” of Mali, the movement was established in November 2012, by Iyad Agh Ghali, one of Ifoghass Tuareg who were trained in Libya and sent to fight in Lebanon, and a key negotiator of the crisis of the 1990’s, and the most accessible by Algeria. The movement is the most powerful one, composed of more than 10000 men, the majority of them coming back from Libya which means that they were well equipped and trained. Unlike the NMLA, Ansar Eddin did not claim the independence; its goal was to recover Tuareg dignity and to establish the Sharia law in Mali. Later it adjusted its claims, and asserted it will apply the Sharia only in Kidal. The movement was ready to negotiate and used to be an ally of the NMLA. However, because of the government request for international military intervention; it started moving toward Bamako, and became an ally to the AQMI and the MUJAO, and became an enemy to the NMLA. The Movement was declared a terrorist group in March 2013.<sup>158</sup>

○ ***AQMI:*** as the « black decade » came to an end in Algeria in 2000, the terrorist group SGPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), defeated by the Algerian army had to withdraw to the desert, in 2003, the terrorist leader Saïfi El Aamari (Abdelrazzak el Para), kidnapped 32 Tourist from the Algerian desert and could penetrate the Mali territories with 14 of them (Algerian army could free 17 and one of them was killed), later they were freed for a ransom of 5 million Euro, That’s how the terrorist group found a source of funding<sup>159</sup>. El para and his men joined Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar, and established a terrorist group of 500 men in 2011. Mali and the Sahel gave a new birth to the SGPC, because of the poverty of the region, they were able to recruit combatant and to gain the population trust. As Susan E. Rice told the congress:

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<sup>158</sup> H.Souleiman, “Washington put Ansar Eddin on the Terrorist List” in *El-Khabar* (Algiers: Publishd on March 22<sup>nd</sup> 2013) available on <http://www.djazairress.com/> (Translated from Arabic).

<sup>159</sup> Djalil Lounas,” Confronting Al Quaida in the Islamic Maghribin the Sahel: Algeria and the Malian Crisis” in *Journal of North African Studies* (UK: Routledge, Vol.19, N°5, 2014),P812-815.

« *Africa is the world's soft under-belly for global terrorism...Much of Africa is a veritable incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism. Its poor, overwhelmingly young, disaffected, unhealthy and under-educated populations often have no stake in government, no faith in the future and harbor an easily exploitable discontent with the status quo. For such people, in such places, nihilism is as natural a response to their circumstances as self-help. Violence and crime may be at least as attractive as hard work. Perhaps that is part of the reason why we have seen an increase in recent years in the number of African nationals engaged in international terrorism....* »<sup>160</sup> The Algerian SGPC, found allies from Moroccan MICG (Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group) and Tunisian TICG (Tunisian Islamic Combatant Group) and Libyan LICG (Libyan Islamic Combatant Group), and other groups from Chad and Mali.<sup>161</sup> In 2003, The SGPC leader joined Al-Qaeda. In January 2007, Abdelmalek Droukdal announced the establishment of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The terrorist group penetrated the society in northern Mali taking advantage of the absence of the state institution, and used the region as base to launch their terrorist attacks. The group used the ransom money to raise the economic transactions with local community and its materials to gain the population's trust; plus they developed a consistent network with the organized crime groups, having relation with the "Mafia State" in Mali. Because of its savoir faire in the region, and the trust it gained among population, the AQMI played a significant role in the crisis of 2012, and helped Ansar Eddin (their ally) to control the northern parts of the country. One of the main reasons of the French quick intervention was to contain the terrorist activities, and protect Bamako.

○ **The MUJAO:** "*Movement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest*" (Movement for the Unification and Jihad in West Africa): is an extremist terrorist group, established in 2011, as the AQMI leadership

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<sup>160</sup> Lord Aikins Adusei, "Poverty and Terrorism: A Lesson For Ghana" in *Ghana Modern* (Akra:21.7.2014), Available on <https://www.modernghana.com>

<sup>161</sup> Mathieu Guidère, « La Tentaion International d'AlQaida Au Maghreb » in *Focus Stratégique*, (Paris : IFRI, Centre des Etudes de Sécurité, N°12, Decembre 2008),P.14.

was dominated by the Algerian terrorist. Led by one of the Arab Tuareg in Azawad “Soltan Ould Badi” and the Mauritanian “Hamad Ould Mohamed Elkhier”, the movement attracted a significant number of the Arab Azawad in northern Mali, mainly from Gao. It calls for the “Jihad” in West Africa. What can be noticed in the actives of the MUJAO, is that its major attack was either on the Algerian soil or against it: the kidnapping of 3 occidental workers in Tindouf camps, freed in July 2012 as their countries paid the ransom (18 million USD), a bomb in Tamanrasset and finally kidnapping 7 Algerian diplomats in Gao in 2012. As Algeria refused to negotiate the vice consul Tahar Touati was executed. The movement was also highly involved in the crisis of Mali in 2012. In fact in June 2012, the group could even control the government headquarter.

## ***2. International and Regional Actors:***

○***The United Nations:*** In compliance with its role of maintaining peace in the world, and in accordance with its charter, the UN, insisting on the peaceful means for crisis and conflict settlement, the organization first rejected the military coup in Mali, and its security council referred to the chapter 6 of the charter and imposed sanctions to the Tuareg allied with the terrorist groups (especially the MUJAO), and demanded a quick return to the constitutional order and the elected government and imposed sanctions to the junta. The UN issued three resolutions about the situation in Mali, based on the request of the African Security Council and the ECOWAS. The first one was the resolution 2056 issued on June 5<sup>th</sup> 2012 about security and peace in West Africa, the resolution, stressed the necessity to protect and respect the territorial integrity of Mali, and condemned the military coup. And invited the AU and the ECOWAS and neighboring countries to intensify their efforts to solve the crisis, peacefully. Later the UNSC, issued the resolution 2071 that gave the AU 45 days to provide a plan for the deployment of an international force of 3000 soldiers, the resolution was in accordance with the French perception. On December 20<sup>th</sup> 2012, the UNSC issued the resolution 2085, allowing the deployment of the International Support Mission to Mali ISMM, in order to reestablish Mali sovereignty over its territories. The mission was supposed to be led by the ECOWAS, and will start during the second semester of 2013, in

order to avoid hot season and prepare the African troops, but Ansar Eddin dragged France to the war much earlier, and the first troops of the ECOWAS were deployed in Bamako. The act was in accordance with the chapter 7 of the UN charter. And with its articles allowing the creation of regional organization to solve regional issues.

○ **The AU:** The African union as the main regional organization in Africa was highly concerned by the situation in Mali, especially that one of its main goals is to preserve peace and stability in Africa; it was the mediator between the ECOWAS willing to deploy forces in Mali and the UNSC. Nonetheless, the organization was also, one of the first international actors to express its opposition to the military coup in accordance with the article 16/4 of its constitutive act that rejects the unconstitutional change of government.<sup>162</sup> The African Union also announced, through his high commissioner for peace and security Mr. Ramtan Lamamara, that the African Union decided a travel ban and financial sanctions against Amadou Sanogo and all parties curbing the restoration of the constitutional practices in Mali. The AU also, rejected the independence of the Tuareg<sup>163</sup>, as the African community had adopted the principle of *Utis Possidits* since the 1960's (under the Organization of the African Unity). The organization supported the UN resolution for the deployment of an international force in Mali and later transmitted the ECOWAS plan to the UNSC.

○ **The Economic Community Of West African States ECOWAS:** mainly an economic sub-regional organization gathering countries of the west Africa, among them countries from the Sahel and three countries members of the military commandment of "Les pays du Champ": Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Aware of the relation between economic development and security, these countries established a system of common security: Defense

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<sup>162</sup> The Constitutive Act of the African Union.

<sup>163</sup> "The African Union Rejects The Independence Of The Azawad" in *BBC Arabic* published on April 6<sup>th</sup> 2012, available on [http://www.bbc.com/arabic/worldnews/2012/04/120406\\_mali\\_au](http://www.bbc.com/arabic/worldnews/2012/04/120406_mali_au) (Translated from Arabic).

Pact ECOWAS in 1980, thus the organization played a significant role in the 2012 crisis in Mali, backed by its traditional ally: France, especially that's these countries would be affected directly by the crisis due to the geographical proximity. The organization responded quickly to the military coups led by Amadou Sanogo, as the community decided to suspend Mali's membership. The organization also named Balise Compaoré president of Burkina Faso as a facilitator for the mediation. It has also closed all member countries boundaries with Mali, and decided financial and economic sanctions against the county.<sup>164</sup> Vis-à-vis the separatist movement the ECOWAS threatened the NMLA of resorting to military means to protect Mali's territorial unity. Later on in the late 2012, ECOWAS and Algeria led negotiations to convince the separatist movement about the necessity to protect Mali's territorial integrity, and the organization of the presidential election, the second part was reached successfully, nevertheless the crisis was not solved. One of the reasons of the negotiations' collapse was the fact that the ECOWAS supported and international military action. The ECOWAS and the AU suggested sending an international force to Mali, which was accepted by the UN. In its summit in Abuja in November 2012, the ECOWAS agreed upon sending 3000 soldier to Mali to restore peace and stability.

- ***The United States of America:*** the interest of the USA was growing especially after 9/11, as the nature of the threat changed, and the ability of the non-state actors was also growing, terrorist from the Sahel and Africa can threaten the stability and the security of any country due to globalization and the development of ICTs and the huge technological revolution, thus the US was aiming to create military bases in the continent and a force commandment, to fight terrorism and also to protect its energetic security and interest in the continent and compete the French historical dominance over the region. When Sanogo led the military coups the US called for the protection of

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
<sup>164</sup> Aminata D.Traoré & others, *Mali: Chronique d'une Recolonisation programmée* published on April 6th 2012 available on <http://www.medelu.org/Chronique-d-une-recolonisation>

Mali territorial integrity and the restoration of peace and security, and suspended its financial humanitarian aid to the country in addition to the suspension of the economic cooperation.<sup>165</sup> The USA, expressed its support to the UN resolution. The USA was also interested in knowing the position of Algeria as an important regional partner.

- **France:** The French presence in Mali, the Sahel and the African continent in general is not a new phenomenon. France has always paid a special attention to African countries especially to its old colonies, for several geopolitical and economic considerations; hence France has always concluded accords and treaties, with these countries in several domains: military, political economic and even cultural. Mali and the Sahel region are a zone of interests for France, first because of its location and resources (Oil, Gold and natural mineral resources), and second because it allows it to control both north and sub-Sahara Africa. In its policy “FanceAfrique” (a term used to distinguish the special relation between France and its ex colonies in Africa), France has used multiple policies among them: the Francophonie organization since the 1970’ through the “Cooperative Agency for cultural and artistic exchange with governments” to consolidate French leverage on African societies and elites, the organization plays a significant diplomatic and political role through the forms and election monitoring committees. Militarily France, has also established a number of military bases and defense accords with African countries for the capacity building and technological support for their armies, one of these countries is Mali (see Map 7)

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<sup>165</sup> Assem Feth Errahman Ahmed El hadj, “The Evolution Of The Situation In Mali” in *Soudanil* published on January 14<sup>th</sup> 2013, available on <http://www.sudaress.com/> ( Translated from Arabic)



Map 7: French Military Presence in Africa.

Source: La présence militaire Française en Afrique in *Le Monde*, published on April 4th 2006, available on <http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/>

On the economic plan France has also tight its grip over the economies of a number of African countries, and as part of its policy to protect its interests, and overcome the international competition over the continent; France would support even oppressive regimes as long as they are its allies.

During the 2012 crisis, France was a major actor as it led the international intervention in Mali, however this intervention was not its first one, since 1960, France has intervened in more than 40 African conflict (Gabon, Chad, Central Africa, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Zaire, Ruanda, and finally Libya and Mali), sometimes in favor of oppressive regimes and sometimes in favor of democratic transition depending on its interests.

In 2012, France declared its fears of impacts of the crisis in Mali on the European security (hard threats and soft challenges), the country was also concerned about its interest as the state in Mali was collapsing as terrorist groups and Ansar Eddin were getting close to Bamako, the French minister of foreign affairs declared that the military intervention in Mali had three main objectives: stop the extremist group crawl to the south, the protection of the government and the State while recovering Mali's territorial unity and

sovereignty and finally to prepare the deployment of the African force accredited by the UN, while the French president François Holland declared that the goal is as well to protect thousands of French citizen living in Bamako.

In fact the military operation was supposed to be hold in the second semester of 2013, however, the terrorist crawl to Bamako and the international conviction that the Malian army won't be able to stand the well-equipped and trained terrorist groups, and the request formulated by the interim president Dioncounda Traouré to France for rescue on January 10<sup>th</sup>2013, led to the launching of the Serval operation then next day.<sup>166</sup> However analyst such as Tawfik El mdini, assumed there were other motivations to the French military intervention among them the regain of its glorious history in Africa, and the protection of its strategic interests mainly in Niger, which was confirmed later as France sent its special forces to Niger to protect uranium deposit, being exploited by the privet society AREVA, securing 70% of French needs of uranium, France officials did not deny this fact as Jack Attali declared that the mines of uranium in Niger, crucial for France are not far from the terrorist actions in Mali.<sup>167</sup>

Other hypothesis assumed that France purpose to intervene in Mali was to involve Algeria and weaken it, and makes it face troubles with the Tuareg, under the cover of fighting terrorism, or to push the Algerian army to an undesirable war, that can last long and cost a lot of money. France fought to convince Algeria to intervene military in Mali, as a regional power and a security partner to share the costs of the war that were estimated at 200 to 300 million of Euro, moreover it appears that France wanted Algeria and the ECOWAS to fight the war on behalf of the international community, since its logistic was not ready yet, but the crawl of the extremist to Bamako left France no options.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Freedom C Onuoha, "Boko Haram's Tactical Evolution" in *African Defense Forum* (Vol.4, N°4, 2011), p.4

<sup>167</sup> Adam, Op.cit., P.10.

<sup>168</sup> Loc.cit., P.12.

In January 2013, France launched its military actions with cooperation with the ECOWAS countries, and international forces were deployed in Mali to fight terrorism and help Mali government regain sovereignty and territorial integrity. The first phase of the intervention was supposed to last one month and the French troops were supposed to withdraw by march 2013, however the as it was an asymmetric war against people who perfectly know the desert, the Serval operation lasted longer than it was planned as it was officially ended in July 2014, nevertheless France was able to remain in Mali on the Algerian borders as it launched with the ECOWAS the Barkhan operation for the capacity building of the Mali army.

The last major regional actor highly concerned with the crisis and who played a major role to get the crisis to an end is Algeria, hence Algerian foreign policy toward the crisis with the presence of this number of national and international actors that have different and sometimes conflicting interests, is to be analyzed in the next chapter.

## Chapter 5: Analyzing Algerian Management of Mali 2012 crisis.

In 2012, once again the stability in the Sahel was threatened by a new episode of the conflict in Mali, and came to jeopardize the Algerian foreign policy maker, who has been accused one year earlier to be reluctant, moreover “hostile”<sup>169</sup> toward the wave of the social movements invading North Africa, because of its emphasize on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, its refusal of the military intervention in Libya and its sticking to neutrality. Busy with its internal tensions, the coming presidential elections, the political and economic reforms he was holding, and bounded by the country’s history in solving the crisis in Mali (1991, 1997 and 2006), its principles of nonintervention, positive neighborhood and the need for a quick solution, the Algerian foreign policy maker was in a critical juncture.

Facing the Malian situation, Algeria had one more consideration that other international actors involved in the crisis (see chapter 4) did not face: its security, and its territorial and social integrity, were directly, more than any other international actor, linked to the stability in Mali. Because of the Tuareg, Mali is also an ethnic contact point for Algeria that may challenge its societal security. As mentioned earlier, Tuareg were divided some of them were perusing the dream of the free Tuareg state, and the rest were integrated in their new nation state. The first position was always a premonition for the Algerian authorities, especially with Morocco using it to influence the Algerian position toward the Western Sahara issue, under a harsh competition between the two countries to gain the hegemony over North Africa. The successive governments in Mali failed to contain this ethnic group and to govern the northern regions<sup>170</sup>, Tuareg in the north had always denounced the marginalization, and led several

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<sup>169</sup> Anouar Boukhars, *op.cit.*

<sup>170</sup> Cham Riphath Prince et Matisation KinKoulou, *La Gestion de la Crise Malienne du 22 Mars 2012* (Brazzaville : Université Marien Nouagabi, Mémoire pour l’obtention du brevet de l’école nationale d’administration et du magistrature 2012-2013)p.16-17. Available on <http://www.memoireonline.com/01/14/8636/La-gestion-de-la-crise-malienne-du-22-mars-2012.html>

rebellion movements in 1990s and 2006, that have been solved through the Algerian mediation. And with the absence of the state and the lack of development of the northern regions, a grey area rose, terrorism, drug dealing, illegal trade of arms and several wicked problems flourished; in addition to the fact that the same ethnic group, suffered the same discrimination in Libya politically, however its members were hired as member of El Gaddafi militias. Hence, when the Libyan state collapsed, these members went back to their tribes in Mali, well-armed from El Gaddafi's stocks, and nourished the grievance of the north Mali population.<sup>171</sup> The 2012 crisis in Mali was the most intense crisis among the other episodes of the conflict due to the instable regional context and the levels of rebellion's armament and training, on one hand; and the significant presence of terrorist groups and the weakness of the Malian state, on the other hand. As a pivotal state and regional power, especially in matters related to the Sahel, as the country presented itself as a peace maker and a security partner, Algeria was expected to play a major role in facing the 2012 crisis.

While observing Algeria's foreign policy toward 2012 crisis, we may distinguish three phases, we may also figure out that the country has adjusted its foreign policy in a way that appears incoherent with its sacrosanct principles of Non-interference and peaceful settlement of international conflicts, and then back to them after the international military intervention. Herein, we will examine the rationality of the decisions made during the crisis and their compatibility with the country's foreign policy goals, and principle and at the same time with the country's conceptualized regional role, through explaining the alternatives presented to the foreign policy maker at each one of the three moments: the breakout of the crisis, the international intervention, and the mediation, and the factors motivating each choice.

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<sup>171</sup> Anouar Boukhars, *The Paranoid Neighbor: Algeria and the Conflict in Mali*, in the Carnegie papers (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October, 2012), p.3.

## **5.1 The Algerian Refusal of the Military Intervention: Causes and Alternatives (January 2012-January 13<sup>th</sup> 2013).**

The reflection about the Algerian response to the 2012 crisis in Mali should take us back first to the country's conceived role by the foreign policy maker, in the case the Algerian president Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, for constitutional reasons and as Mr Abdellatif Debabech, "*A Napoleonic state concentrates, constitutionally, all foreign matters into the hands of the president*"\* to the internal and external considerations to be taken seriously in making decision process and the choice of the Alternative, and then to the reflection about the Algerian goals and considerations in each phase of the 2012, to reach a sort of a comprehensive assessment and analyze to the evolution of the Algerian position.

The Algerian foreign policy toward the crisis in Mali can be traced back to the 2011, even before the crisis break out, several literatures, as mentioned in the chapter two, criticized the passive Algerian attitude toward the "Arab Spring", accusing the regime for being "selfish" and afraid of the ongoing social movement, ignoring a crucial consideration of the Algerian refusal of the international intervention in Libya: apart from its doctrine of non-intervention, the Algerian foreign policy maker, its diplomatic and security institutions were fully aware of the consequences of such intervention, Libya (even with the Gaddafi's regime) was a balancing state in the context of a region characterized by the weakness of its states. Algeria has gathered evidences thanks to its intelligence services about the moves of terrorist groups in the region, it has warned the international community about the cruelty of the consequences of such intervention on the Sahel region, instead of the military action, Algeria was open for a mediation between El Gaddafi and the rebels, for a calm and an

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\* His Excellency, Mr. Abdellatif Debabech, Algerian Diplomat, Ex Director of Latin America at the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ex Ambassador, and Ex Minister Plenipotentiary member of the Algerian permanent mission to the UN. Interviewed by the researcher.

organized exit of the former of the power. The nature of the society in Libya, the nature of the state and the absence of institutions and an organized army in addition to the special relations between El Gaddafi and the Tuareg in northern Mali, and the presence of some of them in his militias were indicators that the region would sink into anarchy for a long time. In 2011, Algerian DRS, reported unusual moves of the AQMI in northern Mali, yet the intervention took place, and was a main reason of the 2012 crisis in Mali, because of the spread of the Libyan arsenal, we can assume that we can add one more mistake to the mistakes we have cited above (according the SCM – *Les plaques de reason-*), it was made both by Algeria and the international community, one of the parties could at least frame the coming back of the armed Tuareg, and supervise their disarmament. Unfortunately in January 2013, Algeria’s fears came true, the “Hilary Clinton emails scandal” between 2011 and 2013 revealed that Algeria opposed the international intervention in Libya during all official meeting, they have also opposed the support provided to the rebellion movements, Clinton had also admitted that the intervention had a negative impact on the regional stability, and that Algeria remains very concerned about the Libyan arms lost after the international military action, and asserted that Algeria rejected American and French requests to allow their aircrafts fly the Algerian airspace.<sup>172</sup> One more reason that may motivate the Algerian position is the country’s will to protect its chances for a potential mediation to resolve the crisis, which require maintaining neutrality.

In order to understand the Algerian position toward the crisis in Mali in 2012, we may review first the country’s conceptualized role, the Algerian goals and finally the consideration behind the Algerian position; depending on its capabilities that define its maneuver margin, in the Algerian case:

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<sup>172</sup> Louay B., “Clinton Reveals “Secret” Details on the Algerian Position toward Libya” in *Ettahrir* published on May 24, 2015. Available on <http://www.altahrironline.com/ara/> (Translated from Arabic)

### 5.1.1. Algeria's conceptualized role and the crisis in

#### Mali:

we have already mentioned in the previous chapter that Algeria sees itself as the “peace maker in the country”, according to Hamza Houssam\* through the examination of Algeria's behavior toward the previous crisis in Mali, we can assume that the country considers itself as “the peace maker” and “the main regional actor”, and “*the official declarations assert that Algeria is a country that exports stability and support peace*”, on the same wave, Mr. Mizab Ahmed\*\* assert that Algeria attempts to export its experience in fighting terrorism, it tries always to predict the crisis, especially when it comes to terrorist attacks, for Mali “*Algeria is mobilized, decades ago in all developmental projects and diplomatic initiatives to solve the conflict, ... the situation in Mali may threaten the regional security and bring back the international intervention*”. Algeria sees itself as the stability (peace) maker and the moderator of the regional game and a facilitator to help Mali overcome the difficulties of the state building process, for Ms. Amina F.\*\* Algeria sees that its role in Mali is central and strategic “it is the Mediator as it shares long borders with Mali”, obviously there is consensus among academics and practitioners that Algeria's conceptualized role, both by its president and due to its capabilities and features described in chapter 3, is “the peace maker” “the regional power” “the moderator” “the mediator” and “the facilitators”, its implication since the 1970's, illustrates this fact, also the expectations of the international powers toward Algeria's role in the crisis since it broke out.

Algeria's implication in the region can also be illustrated through the high cooperation committees with the Maghreb and the Sahel countries,

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\* Hamza Houssam is PhD. Researcher in International security studies, specialist in the Algerian security policy in the Sahel, Assistant Professor at the NGSPPS and associated researcher at Paris 8 University (interviewed by the researcher).

\*\* Mizab Ahmed: Security Analyst, the President of the Algeria-Sahel Peace and Reconciliation Committee. (Interviewed by the researcher)

\*\* Amina F., is a diplomatic attaché at the Algerian ministry of foreign affairs (interviewed by the researcher).

especially in the security aspect such as the initiative of Operational Committee of Joint General Staff OCJGS “*les pays du champs*” that targets the security and intelligence cooperation with the Sahel countries, in addition to several investments in these countries especially in Mali as preventive measures to disarm terrorist groups, and help the developmental process in this poor country, under the Algerian strategy of good neighborhood, since Algeria, according to its conceptualized role, is a country that promote principles. These facts reflect the vision of the president Bouteflika who sought the “Africanization of issues” to prevent the international intervention in the region his conviction of the presence of new colonial ambitions, in addition to his vision to the conflicts resolution in Africa that ought be based on the sustainable development, through the NEPAD and the South- South partnership,<sup>173</sup> and the reinforcement of the peoples’ right to determine its destiny. One more feature that will be obvious in the Algerian foreign policy toward Mali is the eternal conflict with morocco over the hegemony of the region, for the president Bouteflika, the relation with the Moroccan monarch “*is full of fraternity and compassion for HRH and for his family and for the Moroccan people, but when it comes to the state’s matters, we do not underestimate it at all*”<sup>174</sup>

Hence some specialists, such as Mr. Tafar Abdelkader\*, assume that the president leadership characteristics, willing to give Algeria an international role especially in the African continent (through the creation of the NEPAD), and the prioritization of the “Multilateral” relations affected the Algerian “*Politique Sahélienne*”, this will affect later the Algerian position toward the crisis in 2012.

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<sup>173</sup> Abdelaziz Boutenflika’ interviewed by the Chinese Newspaper Renlin Ribao, Beigin, August 2008, available on <http://www.el-mouradia.dz/francais/president/interview/Presidentrech.htm>

<sup>174</sup> AdelAziz Boutenflika’ interviewed during a press conference in the AUE 17/02/2000 available on: <http://www.el-mouradia.dz/arabe/president/interview/recherche.htm> (translated from Arabic).

\* Abdelkader Tafar, Ex Minister, President’s Diplomatic adviser, Ex Secretary General of the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Associated professor at the National Institute of Diplomacy and the ENSSP. (Interviewed by the researcher)

### **5.1.2. Algerian foreign policy goals and considerations during the crisis:**

Back to the role theory, goals of the external role of any state vary, between the will to change the status quo, or maintain it, it can simply be the protection of its national security or regional security. For the Algerian role in its regional context, we may extract a set of goals, based on the role the country has chosen to play, in fact the impacts of the personal expertise and characteristics of the president Bouteflika are clearly illustrated in the definition of this role, hence in the chosen goals, a new pragmatic tendency can be seen.

The very first goal of the Algerian foreign policy consists of its strategic interests, in other words: the protection of its national security, territorial integrity, and the protection of its people, in Wolfers words to protect its acquired values and to guaranty the absence of fear that these values would be the target of any attack. In the 2012, crisis, the spread of terrorist groups, and groups of organized crime in Mali were seriously threatening the Algerian security.

On the other hand the presence of a Tuareg rebels, highly equipped and trained and able to chase the Mali army out of the northern parts of Mali and claim the independence, would threaten the Algerian security and integrity, since a large number of the Tuareg society are Algerians and live on the Algerian territories, and if not, they share familial relationship with Tuareg of Mali and the rest of the Tuareg.

The third aspect is that the 2012 crisis in Mali challenged one of the Algerian role's goals, which is the protection of the country's political security, or the country's sovereignty. Due to its history, and despite the globalization effects, Algeria is still a typical "nation-state", for whom sovereignty and the independence of the political decision are crucial. In fact, even during the black decade, Algeria's foreign policy main goal was to avoid any external intervention in its internal affairs. However, the crisis in Mali

would put the country under high international pressures, as France, USA and the EU, and even the African countries were expecting Algeria to lead the international efforts both diplomatic and military to restore stability in Mali.

The next goal, to which the foreign policy decision maker had to pay attention, is linked to the Algerian economic interests, the crisis was happening in Algeria's back yard, where the main country's resources are (98% of the Algerian economy is based on the energetic incomes), which means that any retaliatory strike from the terrorists groups in case of a military intervention might damage the Algerian security.

At the same moment, Algeria shares a set of economic interests with allies such as France and the USA, meaning that the country should collaborate with them and with the international measure to solve the crisis, but at the same moment, Algeria sought, according to Amina Bouarour\*, *“to counter balance the polarization of the international powers in the Sahel, and stop any military intervention”*. One of the Algerian foreign policy goals was to prove to these powers that each region had its specific features and should solve its problems by its own, this may explain the Algerian position toward the crisis in Libya, much criticized, but turned out to be right, since the military intervention only aggravated the situation.

The next goal was to maintain the Algerian dominance on the regional system (the Maghreb and the Sahel) and remain the pivotal state, a status acquired thanks to its experience in fighting terrorism and its stability, economic potential, and military capabilities especially those related to the intelligence services. In this regards, Algeria's foreign policy decision maker should always pay attention to its western neighbor: Morocco. Especially during the Mali crisis, first because the special relation between Morocco and France, and the USA, both balancing the power between Algerian and Morocco, the later was ready to provide all the help Algeria would not provide. Second, the special relation linking Morocco to the ECOWAS and western

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\* Amina Bouarour is an Assistant Professor at the ENSM (Koléa) and specialist in Euro-Atlantic relations and the Arab world issues, also working for the CREAD. (interviewed by the researcher).

Africa countries might disrupt Algiers' role. Finally, Morocco decided to back the ECOWAS and France approach to the crisis in Mali, and the UNSC resolution 2085 was issued during Morocco presidency to the UNSC, and the council issued a statement supporting the military intervention, as an attempt to come back to Africa.<sup>175</sup> In this regard, we may understand the Moroccan maneuver in a larger historical scope, in fact during the 1980's Morocco backed the Tuareg separatist movements as a reactions to the Algerian position toward the conflict in Western Sahara, Algeria's main goal is to be the major player in the Sahel, thus Morocco had not been integrated in the initiative of OCJGS since it has no borders with the Sahel region, Morocco has a different opinion, since it considers the Western Sahara as part of its territories, it has direct borders with Mauritania. This assumption gives Morocco first the legitimacy of its occupation of the Western Sahara and second the legitimacy to act as a regional player concerned by the issues in the Sahel.

On another hand, Algeria's foreign policy maker, had too much to manage at the same moment: the already existing security threats from Libya, and Tunisia in addition to the internal reforms claimed after the "Arab Spring". For different politicians and ex-diplomats, such as there was a personal goal the president was aiming to: A fourth term for the coming presidential (in 2014), hence the foreign policy maker, should first pay attention to the Algerian Tuareg who won't accept an Algerian military intervention in Mali, but he should also pay attention to the support he needs from both France and the USA, to avoid any media' campaign or pressures that may influence the Algerian public opinion.

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<sup>175</sup> Mahmoud Maarouf, Security Efforts and Logistic Support: Mali Crisis... Morocco Gate to the AU Reintegration in *Suissinfo* published on February 12<sup>th</sup> 2013. available on <https://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/> (translated from Arabic).

### **5.1.3. The 2012 juncture and the available alternatives for the Algerian foreign policy:**

In the early 2012, Algeria was already facing the repercussions of the so-called Arab Spring, and a collapsing humanitarian situation in northern Mali, the country's borders were burning: Libya, Tunisia and the repercussions reached in Mali. For instance That was a serious source of threat to the Algerian security; on January 16<sup>th</sup> 2012, the governor of Illizi was kidnapped by 3 relatives of captured terrorist in Algeria, and driven to Libya, luckily, thanks to the good relationship between the Algerian state and the Tuareg tribes in Algeria<sup>176</sup>, the government was able to set him free 3 days later.

On January 17<sup>th</sup> 2012, the NMLA, launched the rebellion movement by attacking Malian army in Aguelhok, who could not stand and withdrew to the south, and on March 22<sup>nd</sup> Mali knew the military coup, and on April 06<sup>th</sup> 2012, the Azawad declared the independence of the northern territories of Mali. In May and June 2012 the fingerprints of the terrorist groups occurred in the military actions against the state's and the cultural institution in the north, by the end of the summer the majority of the Malian territories were under the control of the extremist Islamic groups.

#### *What was the Algerian response and Why?*

With the military coup, events went out of control and the problem of Mali, made it to the top agenda of the Algerian foreign policy maker, as the international attention was oriented to the Algerian reflex to regain stability in its backyard.

But as Mali made it to the Algerian agenda it also made it to the international powers agenda such as the USA which had as main objective to fight terrorism and the region, the EU which main concerns were related to the security challenges that may reach its territories through the Mediterranean sea, and France the ex-colonial power, who had a large number of interests in the

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<sup>176</sup> Boumahdi Belkacem, *A lecture on the Tuareg Issue in the Sahel, for the students of a Master course of International Security Studies, Algiers 3 University, April 2012.*

regions, and faced some internal tensions that needed to be oriented to a bigger issue.

So the Algerian foreign policy maker had to face the very complex crisis in Mali under a critical internal situation, within a very unstable regional neighborhood and finally severe international pressure. Its main *goals* as the crisis started was:

1. To maintain Mali territorial integrity crucial for the Algerian national security.
2. To protect Algerian national security from different threats coming from its unstable regional context, and avoid the establishment of a terrorist state on its southern borders.
3. To maintain the country's position as pivotal state in the region, that has a role and an opinion in the international strategies toward both the Maghreb and the Sahel region.
4. To avoid an international intervention in its backyard as it may aggravate the already established situation of anarchy.
5. Some analysts add the president's need for support from international and internal powers.

These were the main goals, as for the alternatives, there were three main alternatives:

1. The Military intervention to restore legitimacy in northern Mali;
2. Approve the policy of "wait and see" and secure the borders;
3. Create or support an international peaceful effort to restore stability in Mali.

Actually, Algerian foreign policy maker and institutions, could predict the raising power of criminal groups in northern Mali, and even the separatist movement, hence there were two details they could not predict, "If foreign policy is planning of what might happen and getting options ready to react in consequence, the crisis in Mali has found Algeria and its leaders totally unprepared: to the military coup, and to the quick overwhelming of the country

by the Azawad movement and later by the jihadist groups”<sup>177</sup>, these facts, have limited the Algerian alternatives. And if we try to weight each alternative, we may figure out the first one would cost Algeria a lot, this option was one of the two extremist options. It was quickly rejected by the Algerian foreign policy maker for both *empirical* considerations (related to the security environment in the Sahel region according to Hamza Houssam), As Algeria shares 1400 km of land borders with this regions, it found itself in a situation of security dependency due to the spread of threat in this region. For the Algerian foreign policy maker, the social, the economic and political causation of the 2012 crisis in Mali cannot be solved through a military intervention, for Algerians, a military intervention will only worsen the situation (just like what happened in Libya). Also, conduct a military action, would destroy the Algerian reputation and good relation it had develop since the 1970’s with the Tuareg, moreover “*designing and leading a military action would be a strategic mistake, it will be seen by the Tuareg as an attempt to break their society and curb their ambitions*” says professor Ali Kessayssia,\* it would also mean that Algeria is fighting its own Tuareg of the Songhai, directly linked to the Tuareg in Mali. The Algerian Tuareg leaders and their representative in the parliament Mahmoud Guemama opposed the military intervention, one of their leaders in October 2012, right After Clinton’s visit to Algiers, asked Algeria to maintain its position, refusing the military action and backing a peaceful political solution, “*We know, the starting of a military intervention but never its ending, Libya is the best illustration*”.<sup>178</sup> Furthermore, engaging the Algerian troops in an asymmetric war of attrition in the middle of the desert would be costly, with an undetermined duration.

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<sup>177</sup> Debabech, Op.cit.

\* PhD. Ali Kessayssia, professor of communication sciences at Algiers3 University. (interviewed by the researcher)

<sup>178</sup> Ramdan Belamri, “A Disagreement Between Algeria and the USA About the determination of Terrorist Indendity in Mali : Algeria’s Tuareg Oppising The Military Action and Calling for a Political Solution”\_in *Al-Arabiya* published on October 29,2012 available <https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world> (translated from Arabic)

On another hand, there was no need to point the obvious, the weakness of the Mali state in northern parts, and the corruption of its leaders led to the occurrence of a sort of trust between the population and the AQMI, and with the absence of any developmental projects, the youth of the population started dealing in illicit trade, protected by the AQMI, these variables mean that a military action would only fuel feeling of hatred and give the extremist groups, in this case, AQMI and the MUJAO legitimacy for a saint “jihad” against an external aggressor, opposing the establishment of the Shariaa (the claim of Ansar Eddin, later allied with AQMI).

And *normative* reasons linked to its ideological belief rejecting the international intervention and the colonial trend, and its constitutional principles emphasizing the peaceful settlement of the international conflicts, and the non-interference principle which has been so far one of the most rigid principle among all. There was a consensus among those we have interviewed (total of 13 people), that the Algerian non-interference ideology was one of the main determinant of the country’s position, however, upon to Mr. Taffar, the constitutional dispositions about the nonintervention “*Does not prohibit an Algerian intervention in Mali, that is based on a request formulated by the Malian authorities, in order to help a neighbor country being aggressed*”<sup>179</sup>. In fact, the prohibition of the deployment of Algerian troops outside the Algerian territories is rooted in its unwritten military doctrine: “No foreign troops of the Algerian soil and no Algerian troops outside the country”, that’s what justify the absence of any Algerian participation in peace keeping missions of the UN and AU, the country limits its contributions to financial and logistic aid and capacity building programs. For these reasons president Bouteflika could not decide an Algerian military intervention in Mali, he would then face the objections of the military institution which is among the most influential institutions in the country, a decision that does not respect its doctrine, would threaten the president’s political future, and the integrity and unity of the Algerian position. Thus Chafik Msbah, the ex-officer of the DRS, asserted that

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<sup>179</sup> Taffar, op.cit.

Algeria would not intervene directly in Mali even if it is allowed by the UN, and will not accept the presence of temporary foreign military bases on its territories “*when it comes to defense issues the president has to discuss with the military leader, and as long as there is no coalition the Algerian position will remain unclear.*”<sup>180</sup> According to Mr. Abdelkader Taffar, there were two tendencies within the military institution, the first one advocates for fighting remaining “residues” of terrorism on the Algerian territories and avoid an external intervention that might disperse the efforts, instead they think the NPA should concentrate its efforts in protecting the national borders, the second tendency, though it is time to revise the nonintervention military doctrine, especially within the ongoing process of the modernization of the Army, which made it the strongest army of the region, for them it is important for Algeria to assume its regional role “*puissance régionale*” in case its security is in peril. Some assume that the country is able to operate through its air force, and hold air strikes to stop the movement of terrorist to the south of Mali.<sup>181</sup>

The second alternative, “wait and see” would be quite reasonable as it will allow the country to arrange its cards, and give the Algerian foreign policy maker the time to observe the situation and develop a consistent framework; it would also, give him the time to consult his institutions: the ministry of foreign affairs, the Algerian diplomatic representation in Mali, the ministry of defense and the military leadership, and the Algerian Tuareg. It would also allow him to test the national public opinion about the available alternatives, and to consult his allies mainly: France and the USA. The price would be high, which turns out to be real, the crisis kept escalating, and thing went out of control after the military coup, as the entire north has fallen, as already mentioned, the collapse of Toumani Touré’s regime was unpredictable. This, in addition to the country’s refusal of the intervention motivations, may explain what several researcher called the reluctant position of Algerian in Mali, especially as the

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<sup>180</sup> Mohamed Meslem, “The Retired Officer Chafik Mesbah : I Do Not Think Algeria Troops Will Participate in Northern Mali” in *Echourouk* published on November 3<sup>rd</sup> 2012, available on <https://www.echoroukonline.com/ara/articles/146395.html> (Translated from Arabic).

<sup>181</sup> Taffar, op.cit.

country has been the cutting edge against terrorist groups for more than two decades, unlike the attitude adopted by a number of researchers, the Algerian reserves on the military action had multiple causes, and what appeared as hesitant position motivated by the situation of unease felt by the president because of the Arab spring and his will to protect his rule and reputation were only a facultative reason, it is the Algeria's security and stability that were on the at the stake. For Professor Mokhtar Mezrag<sup>182\*</sup> the only effect of the Arab Spring on the AFPM, lies in the succession of events, the whole context was instable and he had other occupations.

The third alternative was the most suitable for the Algerian authorities, as it would preserve its interests and meet the country's goals especially at the beginning of the crisis, it also complies with its constitutional dispositions and diplomatic tradition, and preserves the country's societal security. This was the alternative chosen by the Algerian decision maker.

#### **5.1.4. The Algerian response at the early stages of the crisis:**

Right after the crisis started in January 2012, Algeria called the two parties for an immediate ceasefire and negotiate a quick solution, reaction came quick after the break out of the crisis on February 2<sup>nd</sup> 2012 Abdelaziz Bouteflika received the Mali's minister of foreign affairs Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, and representative of the Tuareg (those present during 2006 negotiations)<sup>183</sup>, during this attempts the NMLA were not present and considered themselves as not involved in these negotiations. Later it was obvious that the collapse of Toumani Touré's regime disturbed the Algerian efforts to contain the crisis, the

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\* Mokhtar Mezreg, Professor at Algiers 3 University and a foreign policy analyst. (Interviewed by the Researcher)

<sup>183</sup> "Algeria Starts A mediation Between Mali and Tuareg Rebels", available on : <http://essahraa.net/archive/index.php/news/2564-2012-02-03-10-38-14.html> (Translated from Arabic)

country did not expect that, it ended up with no interlocutor in Bamako. In April 2012, a few days before the NMLA announced the independence of Azawad, Ahmed Ouyahia\* questioned by *Le monde* asserted that Algeria “*will never accept questioning Mali’s territorial integrity... We want a solution through dialogue... Every time that a foreign actor plays an essential role, it’s bound to end up out of control, immediately or six months later*”.<sup>184</sup> The motivations of the Algerian refusal of the military intervention have been already exposed; hence the motivation of the Algerian preference of political solution is rooted in the Algerian comprehensive approach toward the conflict in the Sahel discussed in chapter 3, the country has a belief based on its experience in fighting terrorism, that especially in the Sahel, this war should start from the eradication of the human and financial sources of terrorism<sup>185</sup>, in a way that will allow to defeat the AQMI militarily, it is well-known that factors of terrorism before being ideological are also economic, political and social, it is crucial to build the state in Mali, to develop the country to be able to disarm the terrorist groups. But “*the international decision makers know what is on the stake beyond the crisis in Mali, and they are at work ferociously competing against each other, uranium, petrol and gold among other riches located in this area are the true order of the day and it is out of question that adds to the economic development of this area. For that all the regional states should be failed states, and people’s local culture glorified*” “*In the meantime, new concepts are being adopted at the UN, reinforcing the concept of –Droit d’intervention humanitaire- and the right of minorities explore the natural resources on their soil*”.<sup>186</sup> Relying on its regional weigh and allies the president Bouteflika assigned to the Mr Abdelkader Messahel, a man who knows Africa and the Mali issue, the mission of leading the Algerian diplomatic action to avoid the

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\* Algeria’s Prime Minister

<sup>184</sup> AFP, *Algeria Rules Out Mali Split, Foreign Intervention: Report* published on April 6<sup>th</sup> 2012, available on <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/9/38627/World/International/Algeria-rules-out-Mali-split,-foreign-intervention.aspx>

<sup>185</sup> D. Lounnas, Op.cit, p.822.

<sup>186</sup> Debabech, Op.cit

military action, which was a crucial goal for Algeria, the Algerian diplomatic machine could collaborate with the ECOWAS exclusively on the diplomatic efforts (Algeria sees the organization as the French tool in the region), and gather the regional actors around its position: Mauritania, Tunisia, Burkina Faso, and Egypt whose president clearly declared the unconditional support of his country to the Algerian efforts to avoid the intervention in Mali<sup>187</sup> after the visits held by the Minister of the Maghreb and African affairs Mr. Abdelkader Messahel in October 2012, the country also could postpone the military action till the late 2013, moreover France was not supposed to intervene directly, the international plan was to deploy African forces. Algerian plan was to separate the separatist movements and the terrorist groups, in order to find a solution to the political problem first and then siege the AQMI and its ally the MUJAO. For its political elite, the country should take into account the fact that some “*of the Tuareg political claims should be satisfied, while others should not, that Ansar Eddin is not just a terrorist group, it is also a local political group. AQMI and MUJAO are transnational terrorist organization*”.<sup>188</sup> Ammar Bellani, Algeria’s ministry of foreign affairs spokesman reaffirmed the importance of distinguishing Tuareg society that has some legitimate claims and the drug illegal trade-terrorist, while analyzing the situation in Mali and evaluating alternatives.<sup>189</sup> In this direction Algeria’s diplomacy (official and unofficial through the Tuareg) intensified its efforts secretly, Mr. Guemama (Algerian Tuareg leader) asserted in October 2012, that a delegation of the Tuareg from Ansar Eddin and the NMLA were present in Tamanrasset several times, to conduct dialogue rounds, any less, Guemama did not reveal details about these sessions due to their secret character.<sup>190</sup> By the end of the year, Algeria’s

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<sup>187</sup> Mohamed Morssy’s elocation for the thirds Arab Summit for Socio-Economic Development available on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Fb8voHUzVc> (translated from Arabic).

<sup>188</sup> Cited by Djallil Lounnas, op.cit., p.823.

<sup>189</sup> “Algerian Tuareg Refuse the Military Intervention In Mali” in *El aalam* published on October 29<sup>th</sup> 2012 available on <http://www.alalam.ir/news/> (translated from Arabic).

<sup>190</sup> Ramdan Belamri, Op.cit.

minister of interior and local authorities declared to the Algerian national radio, that the separatist movements agreed to go back to the negotiations table based on Algerian instructions<sup>191</sup>. Here, we can assume that Algerian “passive position” largely criticized turned out not to be that passive. “*It appeared to be reluctant turned out to be accurate, and the accusations of fears of the Arab Spring, turned out to be true but only those about the regional anarchy after an international intervention in Libya*” said Adel Ourabah.<sup>192</sup> Finally, after Algiers played the facilitator role, a delegation of Ansar Eddin visited Ouagadougou simultaneously as another was sent to Algeria to negotiate a peaceful exit to the crisis<sup>193</sup> hence the discussion about the African forces was still ongoing between Bamako and the ECOWAS. From Ouagadougou the same delegation went to Algeria to meet delegations of the NMLA and representative of Bamako especially that the Malian prime minister declared in Ouagadougou that there is no other option except to discuss with Ansar Eddin, apparently until that moment Algeria was on the right path to break the alliance and any relation between the later and the extremist terrorist groups, and to foster the rapprochement between all the crisis parties, especially as Algerian intelligence services dominated the information in Northern Mali during the summer, and had access to Iyad Agh Ghali, the leader of Ansar Eddin, who had no separatist claims unlike the NMLA. On December 21<sup>st</sup> 2012 an agreement was signed by the NMLA and Ansar Eddin, through which both parties agreed upon give up separatist claims and to cooperate with each other and with the national government, and to regain control over the northern parts of Mali and fight terrorism, and help to set the foreigner hostages free, to ceasefire and work on a political solution to the crisis.

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<sup>191</sup> Samira, “Algeria Successfully Freezes The Project of An International Intervention” In *Mali\_in Swat Al Ahrar* published on December 5<sup>th</sup> 2012, available on . <https://www.djazairess.com/alahrar/107065>

<sup>192</sup> Adel Ourabah, Phd., Security policies analyst. (Interviewed by the Researcher)

<sup>193</sup> “A\_Delegation of Ansar Eddin Visiting Burkina Faso” in *Mintmauritania* published on November 3<sup>rd</sup> 2012 available on <https://arabliss.wordpress.com/2012/11/03> (translated from Arabic)

It appears that the decision made by the Algerian foreign policy maker was the best alternative to cope up with the situation and comply with the country's goals and ambitions deriving from its conceptualized role based on its capabilities and the vision of its leader. Hence at some point, the Algerian diplomacy was accused of remaining silent especially during the period from May to late September 2012 (apart from some diplomatic public appearances)<sup>194</sup>. This gave space to speculations about the Algerian regime's fear of the Arab spring, which turns out to be just a small piece of a larger puzzle. In fact the Algerian move toward the option of "wait and see" was itself a position, in foreign policy neutrality is a position; the move was dictated by the complexity of the situation, and because of the rapid escalation and complication of the crisis. For Abdelaziz Rahabi\* Algeria maintained neutrality to preserve all its chances in leading the mediation later, if the country positioned itself behind any party of the crisis, it would have lost its credibility (which happened later with the ECOWAS), and the trust of the other parities. One very strategic move made by the Algerian foreign policy decision maker, at the beginning of the crisis, Algeria decided to withdraw its military experts present in northern Mali, in order to implement a capacity building project designed to train the Malian army on techniques of fighting terrorism, the country also suspended its logistic support to the Mali army, and warned Bamako not to use Algerian equipment dedicated for fighting terrorism, to fight the Tuareg, as the Malian government started pulling troops from fighting terrorism camps and sent them to the rebellion regions.<sup>195</sup> The president Bouteflika, also sent the prime minister Ahmed Ouyahia, to Tamanrasset, to meet Algerian Tuareg leader Ahmed Idabir "Aminokal Tuareg" who represents the highest spiritual power on April 9<sup>th</sup>, 2012, to test their intentions, Idabir, emphasized the Tuareg support to the government measures to preserve the

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<sup>194</sup> Alexi Areif, "Algeria and the Crisis in Mali" in *Actuelles de l'Ifri* available on <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/actuellesarieffinal.pdf>

\* ex Minister of Communication and ex ambassador.

<sup>195</sup> Mohamed ben Ahmed, "Afraid of its use against the Tuareg: Algeria suspends its military support to Mali" in *El Khabar*, published on January 29<sup>th</sup> 2012, available on <http://www.vitamedz.org> (translated from Arabic).

regional stability. Algeria also, sent between 5000 and 6000 soldier to reinforce the security of the borders and maintained its military doctrine of nonintervention, and started preparations to receive refugees from Mali, since the political leadership was expecting a humanitarian crisis. All these measures were decisive later to provide the Algeria diplomacy with the credibility to lead the mediation.

## **5.2. The Algerian pragmatic foreign policy**

### **adjustment and its factors (January 13<sup>th</sup>, 2013):**

Backed by the UN resolution 2071 and 2085 that emphasize the diplomatic efforts to set a political solution to the state crisis in Mali before the military intervention, and the support of the USA, Algeria maintained its mediation efforts and there were high hopes that the crisis won't go further. However at the same moment as Ansar Eddin and NMLA were ready to renounce their separatist claims and fight terrorism in the region, Bamako and the ECOWAS were still sticking to the military option. We can assume that in early January 2013, Ansar Eddin received three wrong signals, the first one is that Bamako, lacks the will to negotiate and still prefers the military solution and the second is that it has overestimated its military capabilities and the capabilities of its allies (AQMI and MUJAO), and finally, it had a conviction that the military intervention by the MISMA decided by the UN resolution 2085 will not happen before the 2<sup>nd</sup> semester of the year and that Algeria would never support this option.

#### **5.2.1 Algeria's response January 10<sup>th</sup> January 13<sup>th</sup> 2013: "A de Facto juncture"**

Based on these signals, Ansar Eddin withdrew from the negotiations in January 3<sup>rd</sup> 2013, accusing Bamako of underestimation and recruitment of mercenaries for a near military intervention<sup>196</sup>. Backed by the AQMI and the

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<sup>196</sup> Cédric Lewandowski, French Minister of Defense (Jean Yves Le Drian) Cabinet Director, in *Mali: les Secrets d'une Guerre (Cellule de crise :Documenaire Reportage*, France 2, published on june 9<sup>th</sup> 2017) available on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YhRg3DGq6u4>

MUJAO, they attacked Konna, 500 Km to Bamako and started moving toward the south between January 9<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> 2013, a few days after Ansar Eddin announced its withdrawal from the negotiation process accusing Bamako for not being “serious”. On January 8<sup>th</sup> French intelligence could uncover unusual connection and movement between the leaders of the three groups, “*who normally would not cooperate*”<sup>197</sup>, based on that France sent a reconnaissance aircraft that confirmed the information; they are “planning something”. January 11<sup>th</sup> 2013, France launched **ALONE** a military action in Mali against the terrorism phenomenon to destroy the “jihadist”.

The intervention was not supposed to happen in January, it was not supposed to be operated only by France, actually France was not even supposed to intervene, and it was relying on its allies: ECOWAS and Algeria. Until January 10<sup>th</sup> the president François Hollande in a speech to his military staff reaffirmed that France will not intervene alone, the international community should, and France would only take part.<sup>198</sup> The same day, the Mali president contacts Hollande, requesting help according to Laurent Fabius, president Traouré said that Mali was about to be taken over by terrorists, thus Hollande decided to intervene, for Hélène le Gal a French diplomatic consoler, the rapprochement of the three terrorism groups led to an precipitated intervention. Hence, Hollande asked Traouré for a written request that complies with the French plans and allow France to operate on the ground (the initial request was for air strikes only, according to the Mali prime minister the Malian Army could chase the terrorist groups).<sup>199</sup> On January 11<sup>th</sup> 2013, France launched, the “Serval” operation, the first day, in Paris; Jean Yves Le Drian had to announce the loss of four French soldiers and a helicopter. One detail was crucial for the French operation; Serval needed the support of Algiers. If Algeria does not close its borders the terrorist will find a refuge, and as the country does not open its airspace, France will go through Morocco, the cost and the time of the flights

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<sup>197</sup> « Au Mali, Ansar Eddine Renonce à Cesser Les Hostilités »\_in *Le Monde.fr* published on January 3rd 2013 available on <http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/>

<sup>198</sup> Allocution of the French President François Hollande on January 9<sup>th</sup> 2013, to the military staff.

<sup>199</sup> *Mali: Les secrets d'une guerre*, op.cit.

will rise (350 Million Euro per flight). The cost of Serval was already high, France had to rent aircrafts from its allies to transport its material and troops, the French fleet could not insure it by itself. It is a phone call between Jean Yves le Drian and the American minister of defense that brought USA to the war as Le Drian said that Russia was ready to support France “for free”.<sup>200</sup> During the first two days, French aircrafts bombing the terrorist groups had to go through Morocco and Mauritania (See Map 8), it was the longest flight of “Rafale” 9:35h, pilots had to prepare 5 refueling process as Algeria refused to open its airspace. It was also impossible for the French offensive aircrafts to reach the Adrar Ifoghas trough Morocco, as its operational range does not go beyond 3700 Km, and the route from morocco is about more than 5500 Km.<sup>201</sup>



Map 8: Showing the itinerary of French Aircrafts bombing terrorist in Mali through Morocco during the Algerian refusal of the intervention. Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YhRg3DGq6u4>

*Suddenly*, interviewed by RTL radio, Laurent Fabius, declared that Paris had contacted Algiers, and that Algeria “has authorized *without limitations*, the

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<sup>200</sup> Loc.cit

<sup>201</sup> <https://fr.distance.to/>

fly of its airspace by the French aircraft”<sup>202</sup> he also emphasized that the two countries are working together so that Algiers close its borders as the land forces (French and African) follow the terrorist groups. Later, Laurent Fabius, asserted that he should not have revealed the Algerian support, “*J’ai peut être fait une Boulette*”. The Algerian authorities remained silent, and did not approve Fabius declarations, the reaction of the AQMI and the national opinion especially the Algerian Tuareg will not be easy to face, nor to contain.

Three days after this revelation, January 17<sup>th</sup>, Algeria undergoes the first “collateral damage”, the “Tiguentourin Hostage Crisis” when an AQMI group took expat hostages in the Algerian gas facility. Algeria, refused any kind of external intervention in its decision on how to deal with the crisis, refused any negotiations with the terrorist group who demanded to put an end to Serval operation, and discussing a ransom was not an option. Special Forces of the PNA intervened, recovered the facility and killed the 29 terrorist, 39 expat workers and one Algerian lost their lives.

Abdelmalek Sellal, declared after Tiguentourin attack that the decision to open the airspace was a sovereign decision that complies with the Algerian pragmatic interest, and was made based on the UN resolution 2085 and that discretion is one of the Algerian foreign policy features.<sup>203</sup>

Based on the above facts, we can deduct a few realities:

- That the French intervention was not planned to take place in January 2013, but came under a situation of emergency, and the operation Serval was supposed to last “only few weeks” according to Laurent Fabius.

- Based on Lewandowski 2017 words, on January 8<sup>th</sup> Ansar Eddin started having connections it was not supposed to have with the AQMI and the MUJAO, which is incoherent with the French vision that the group was a terrorist group and had strong relations with the AQMI and the MUJAO, in

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<sup>202</sup> BFMTV, « Intervention au Mali: L’Algérie Autorise “Sans Limites” Le Survol de Son Territoire » in *BFMTV* published on January 13<sup>th</sup> 2013 available on <http://www.bfmtv.com/>

<sup>203</sup> Samira Belamri, “Prime Minister AbdelMalek Sella: We Are Ready To lose Everything, except the Algerian Dignity” in *El-Chourouk* published on January 21<sup>st</sup> 2013, available on <http://www.presse-algerie.net/>

contrast with the Algerian vision that considered Ansar Eddine as a political separatist movement.

- That France was not planning to intervene but only participate in the international support forces to the Malian army.

- Based on the French officials declaration there was a continuous consultation with the Algerian party.

- That Algeria until January 13<sup>th</sup> refused to open its airspace.

- According to Fabuis declaration Algerian opened its airspace unconditionally, and “without limitation”.

- That there is an unusual adjustment to the Algerian foreign policy in Mali that even violates the country’s rigid foreign policy of noninterference.

Next, the study will analyze the motivations of the Algerian decision to adjust its foreign policy, and the alternatives given to the decision maker, in addition to the consequences of the military intervention on the Algerian national security.

## **5.2.2 The causes of the adjustment:**

To discuss the causes of the adjustment of Algeria foreign policy toward the military intervention in Mali, we should point out that the first and the second phases are vitally overlapping. The decision of the adjustment was made based on a sequence of events since the beginning of the crisis in 2012.

In general in this phase the Algerian foreign policy goals in this crisis did not change, except one goal that was roughly missed: the French intervention became a “de facto”. So now the Algerian foreign policy maker had mainly to protect its national security through avoiding the raising of “Sahelistan” as a terrorist state, and to protect the country’s regional role as the regional leader, the peace maker and the anti-terrorism agent.

At the point where France decided to intervene immediately, after the collapse of the Algerian mediation, the Algerian foreign policy maker had only two logical alternatives:

The first one is to remain neutral that would be safer internally, and would not provoke the Algerian Tuareg, but would negatively affect the Algerian regional and international position as pivotal state fighting terrorism, a status that Bouteflika fought a lot to achieve, with the benefits and strategic relations it allows: the country became a strategic ally to the NATO, and developed qualitative relations with France. The country would be “*diplomatically embarrassed, and appear as a country that curbs the war on terrorism in the Sahel especially that terrorist groups were approaching Bamako and France was backed by a UN resolution*”<sup>204</sup>, the second is to provide logistic support to the Serval operation: open the airspace, close the borders, provide aviation Kerosene, and give the permission for these aircraft to land in case of emergency. A third option was presented, is the one the president excluded since the beginning: the Algerian direct military intervention. The second option appeared more moderated, even if it represented, a breaking path point in the Algerian foreign policy history.

To understand the Algerian foreign policy maker choice we may review its external, internal and psychological environment, and the relation between the president, the ministry of foreign affairs and the Army.

#### A. International environment and pressures:

In the space of the international environment of the decision making, this phase, overlaps with the previous one, first the decision maker had the crisis in Libya and its dramatic consequences (one of them is the crisis in Mali), the instability in Tunisia; then the crisis in Mali, he was basically bounded by problems, to which he had to respond quickly.

On its western border he had Morocco, the brother rival, competing Algeria over the hegemony of the regional system.

In addition to these facts, the Algerian foreign policy machine was under huge external pressures, as the crisis started escalating in April 2012, the French minister of foreign affairs requested the help of Algiers as he declared on April 3rd “*I would like to clarify to our Algerian friends how important it is that they*

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<sup>204</sup> Adel Ourabah, op.cit

*play the most active role in coordinating the regional response to the AQMI*” at the same day Alain Juppé, asserted that France will not send military forces to Mali<sup>205</sup>. The international expectation about the Algerian role were too high due to the countries capabilities and historical role, both in dealing with terrorism and the political crisis of the Tuareg population either on its own or through its regional settings.

Visits to Algiers from western capitals did not stop until October 2012; they intensified during the fall as the deadline given by the UN to find a political exit to the crisis before to deployment of an international force, was coming to an end.

At the same time Algeria was trying to bring Ansar Eddin and the NMLA to the negotiation table and was successful to some extent. For France Algeria should consider the military action and participate in the planned international forces.

One of the major visits, was the one held by Hilary Clinton on October 29<sup>th</sup> 2012, it was the first time an American high official visits Algiers apart from the other Maghreb countries, usually USA tends to balance its relation especially between Algeria and morocco, Clinton’s visit according to Abdelaziz Rahabi, came to see Bouteflika exclusively to discuss Algeria’s attitude and role in the pressing situation, “usually during a visit of an American high official to the Maghreb, the order of the day contains three main issues: the normalization of Algeria-Morocco relations, the war on terrorism and the Western Sahara issue, this time the visit targeted Algiers only and came only one week after the starting of the first session of Algeria-USA strategic dialogue, it was clear that the main reason for the visit was the intervention in Mali” *“Clinton won’t ask Bouteflika for a direct intervention of the Algerian army, she is aware of the Algerian military doctrine prohibiting such practice, this does not mean that the Americans won’t ask Algerians to play the role of*

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<sup>205</sup> Nouara Bachouch, “France Request Algeria’s Assistance to Face the Terrorist Danger Coming From Northern Mali” in *Al-Chourouk* published on April 4<sup>th</sup> 2012 available on <https://www.echoroukonline.com/> (translated from Arabic).

*Pakistan vis à vis the situation in Afghanistan*” which would mean the exchange of intelligence information, and the closing of the borders, especially that Algeria had the military and intelligence capabilities to make the difference, according to Amin Oussama Ammani\* “*during the Serval operation France was moving precisely thanks to the information forwarded by the Algerian DRS penetrating the AQMP*”, otherwise any military intervention in northern Mali will be pointless if Algeria does not close the borders at least. During this visit in addition to discussing the potential help that can be provided by the regional power, there was a disagreement between the two parties about the status of Ansar Eddin, Algeria was insisting that it was a political movement (ties between the movement and the terrorist groups were still uncovered), as part of its strategy to break any potential liaison between them and the terrorist groups, especially that the leader of the MUJAO Abdelkaril Etargui was one of Agh Ghali’s relatives. It should be mentioned that until the beginning of the military intervention, the USA was supporting the Algerian approach looking for a political exit for the crisis which was reflected through General Carter Ham visit to Algiers. The Algerian decision maker should keep the shape of the built relation with the USA, and use it to balance the French approach, a technique that appeared to be successful before Agh Ghali’s defection.

The other external feature is the French pressures that started with the breakout of the crisis and did not stop with the military intervention. In December 2012, the French president François Hollande, visited Algiers, the visit would have been just an ordinary visit among those exchanged between the two countries since the president Bouteflika’s election, except that this time, the French president, surprisingly, acknowledged in his speech to the Algerian parliament his country’s crimes during the colonial era, “*During 132 years, Algeria was under an unjust and a brutal system, this system has a name: colonization...*” “*I avow, here, the sufferance inflicted by the French colony to the Algerian people, among them the massacres of Setif, Guelma and Kharata engraved forever in the memory of the Algerians*”, was that the price for an

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\* The president of communication committee of the Front of National Liberation (the governing party in Algeria ). interviewed by the researcher.

Algerian support? That's a hypothesis that might be proved or denied once the Algerian archives on the crisis dossiers become unclassified.

Some analysts insist that the most credible and logical explanation is that the Algerian interests in eradicating terrorism was the main reason for which Algeria approved and supported Serval, it was just a matter of interests, Ms. Amina F., asserted that Algeria's goals were to avoid that the anarchy reaches its territories, to weaken the AQMI, and to protect its international prestige and regional hegemonic role.<sup>206</sup> For Professor Mokhtar Mezreg, the strategic relation that ties Algeria to France was decisive; the two countries have always coordinated and cooperated politically and militarily. It was an opinion shared by one of the military officials in the country "*For Algeria, just like for France, the intervention became a life and death situation, Algeria had no other options*"<sup>207</sup> other analysts insist that the decision was only to satisfy the Algerian president ambitions to run of 4<sup>th</sup> term. We should mention that as the USA decided to bring its support to the Serval operation as France needed aircrafts to send logistics and troops to Mali, the balancing game was almost over for a medium power like Algeria, thus some of the analysts and officials tend to believe that it was the one and only possible alternative "*Algeria did not have much options, there was an emergency, terrorist groups were reaching Bamako*" says Mr.Taffar.

The next issue that the Algerian foreign policy maker was thinking about was Morocco, appearing to be so supportive to the international intervention through opening its airspace to the French aircrafts (even if the distance from France to Mali was longer but France had only that option before the Algerian *feu vert*), obviously the regional traditional competitor was gaining credits in the western capitals, Algeria could not afford that. Also, since the takeover of Gao in early 2012, there was one particular group that did not stop its attempts to push Algeria to intervene in Mali, the MUJAO, that attacked in April 2012

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<sup>206</sup> Amina F. Op.cit.

<sup>207</sup> Mohamed ben Ahmed, "The Full Story of The Opening of the Algerian Airspace to The French Aircrafts" in *El khabar*, published on June 19<sup>th</sup> 2014 available on <http://www.elkhabar.com/> (Translated from Arabic).

the Algerian consulate in Gao, kidnapped the diplomatic staff, and wanted to exchange them for some terrorists captured by Algeria, the later refusal to negotiate a ransom nor the release of the terrorists, led to the execution of the vice-consul Tahar Touati in September 2012, the suspicions were surrounding the acts of the MUJAO, this terrorist group targeted only Algeria (Bomb attacks in Tamanrasset and Ouargla) and Western Sahara camps to kidnap European observers, thus there were doubts that this organization is tied to the intelligence service in Morocco,<sup>208</sup> especially that the later would have been the main beneficiary of an Algerian direct interference in Mali.

Finally, the collapse of the ceasefire and the mediation, due to the defection of Iyad Agh Ghali, whose turned out to be having political ambitions and decided to cooperate with the terrorist groups, were decisive in the Algerian decision to support the Serval operation. The Algerian mediator did not take into consideration, that in this crisis, things were different, each separatist group had its own political ambitions and plans<sup>209</sup>; and the new generation of the Tuareg does not trust the government at all, moreover, it was keen to the easy life through illegal trade and cooperation with the AQMI. Here occurs another consideration, president Bouteflika with his psychological dominant features would not forgive Agh Ghali's defection leading to the collapse of the diplomatic efforts, Agh Ghali damaged the Algerian interests, which is unacceptable for the president Bouteflika as already mentioned in chapter 3.

#### B. The president psychological and Algeria's internal environment:

There is another explanation that links the Algerian adjustment of the foreign policy toward Mali crisis, to the president ambitions to run a fourth term in 2014, medias reported that the French president criticized the Algerian regime for Mr. Debabech, "*The president interested only in his reelection and not wanting at any cost to oppose French interests.... The whole show (in Algeria's foreign policy) is directed by the president himself, the initial*

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<sup>208</sup> Frederic Wehry & Anouar Boukhars, *Perilous Desert : Insecurity In the Sahara* (Carnage Endowment For International Peace, 2013), P.110

<sup>209</sup> Prince Marin George, "Mali's War and Algeria's Struggle For Peace" in *Africa Trends* (Institute for defence Studies and Analyses, published on December 2013), available on <https://idsa.in/>

*negotiations came only as a mean to ensure the sought after quid pro quo”*, the only opposition to these propos is that the intervention in Mali did not happen on its determined period, and even the initial refusal was not only related to the president will, according to Chafik Mesbah, the president Bouteflika knew at the beginning that the risks of a military intervention were high, *“The president had a road map since the beginning, he knew that Algeria cannot escape the globalization impacts on the notion of sovereignty.. He was only waiting for the coalition among the military and security institutions, he was also about to negotiate the advantages the country can get from the west especially the USA”*. Hence assuming that the decision was exclusively based on the president personal ambitions would be meaningless, especially that the country’s interests, security and position depended on that decision.

Internally, the president Bouteflika, knew that supporting an external intervention in Mali would provoke the Algerian public opinion already upset by the French intervention, as one of the Tuareg deputies declared that “France betrayed us, and curbed the political process”. Also, Mahmoud Guemama expressed the Tuareg refusal of the military intervention in Mali and urged Algeria to maintain its principle.

The Algerian opposition would not be pleased also in the case of an Algerian support of a military action. However Tiguentourin operation proved that the intervention was necessary, AQMI was able to launch a complete military action against a vital target for the Algerian economy after only few moths controlling the northern Mali, what would have happen if a “Sahelistan” was established? In fact the decision was declined by the political elite and the public opinion, but the debate did not last long. It was either supporting a military action covered by the UN in accordance with the Algerian constitution disposition that emphasize the compliance with the UN resolutions and efforts, or a “Terrorist State” in the backyard.

C. The Pragmatic Adjustment of the Algerian position: a rational decision?

Finally on January 13<sup>th</sup>, the president made the decision to open the airspace, later to close the borders with Mali, exchange intelligence

information, and allow French aircrafts to land on the Algerian soil in case of emergency. The president obviously could not wait for the coalition of the military and security institutions, especially as we have already mentioned there were two different visions toward the noninterference doctrine within these institutions, meanwhile, he has obviously referred to the constitution, article 91 giving him the title of “*the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic*”<sup>210</sup> Luckily, there were no objections within these institutions after the order was given, in this specific case, with the president using all his constitutional attributes, the Algerian state, worked as one rational mono-constructed institution. Hence, a detail that needs to be analyzed, is the declaration of Laurent Fabius who revealed the Algerian position, that was supposed to remain confidential for considerations related to the Tuareg society and the future of the Algerian mediation in the Mali dossier, Fabius made contradictory declaration while answering the question “Is Algeria supporting the Serval operation”, he literally said “*We were working with the Algerians, and they allowed the flyover of their territories without limitation*”<sup>211</sup> whereas other reports refer to the fact that the modalities of an Algerian potential support to the international forces accredited by the UN were discussed during the fall of 2012, as an extreme alternative, after the visit of Clinton and Hollande, Algeria informed the international community especially the French leadership that it won’t send any soldier to Mali, however the two countries were discussing the positional support that might be provided by Algiers to an international military action, they established a direct line of communication, and created several coordination committees between the two countries both in the ministries of foreign affairs and the ministries of defense to coordinate between the Algerian army on the southern borders and the French forces, the second committee had to discuss the air passages to be opened to the air forces and the last one was to exchange the intelligence information about the AQMI and Ansar Eddin movement in the region. In fact, as Mr. Mosbah had pointed

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<sup>210</sup> Algeria’s Constitution, available on <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.dz/indexAng.htm>

<sup>211</sup> Mali: Les secrets d’une guerre , op.cit.

out, the political leadership knew it was a matter of time before the intervention happens, thus the Algerian air force commandment had prepared the passages to open if necessary and made sure it does not cross civilian concentrations, big cities and the Algerian military cites, and made it clear that the international aircrafts would flyover in very high altitudes and were not allowed to break the sound barrier on the Algerian territories (later the French aircrafts committed to these instructions), the Algerian party also maintained the right to order any aircraft for inspection in case of suspensions about the weight, the loader and the destination. During the serval operation, no international aircraft could enter the Algerian territories unless it get the Algerian permission which denies Fabuis declarations, thus the political and military commandment gave the central operation room of the air forces commandment in Algiers, the authority to deliver the permission to overfly the national territories to each operation after receiving a special detailed bulletin from the French commandment about the number of aircrafts, their destination and their airport of departure, and their loader. The Algerian air forces kept monitoring the international aircrafts from the moment they brose the Algerian maritime territories until they leave the Algerian territories, the returning flights were subject of the same measures<sup>212</sup>

Even if the decision was made quite quickly since even the French intervention was not planned at the first place and the international support forces were planned for the 2<sup>nd</sup> semester of 2013, the sentence “without limitation” was exaggerated, but understandable, Fabuis needed to convince the French public opinion, but it cannot be true, for the simple reason that the modalities of military aircrafts flying any country’s airspace should be discussed, the airspace corridors, the modalities of fueling these aircrafts, in which military airport the French aircrafts could land in cases of emergency; all these technical aspects should be discussed, no state’s president would take such a decision if not sure of the readiness of his military forces.

*Was it a rational decision?*

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<sup>212</sup> Mohamed Ben Ahmed, op.cit.

There is a need to try to finally assess this decision, that sacrificed (to some extent) one of the Algerian sacrosanct foreign policy principles: the noninterference principle, clearly the country indirectly intervened in Mali by supporting the Serval operation, it was basically the first time in which Algeria openly prioritized its interests and appeared so pragmatic. *“If rational meant the ratio of gains to the cost, then we should cite the Algerian gains and costs: Algeria was able to curb the Azawad separatist movement that threatened its territorial integrity, it was able (through Serval and without using its own military capabilities) to weaken the terrorist groups AQMI and the MUJAO, and could preserve its international prestige and appeared as an active regional player that respects international legitimacy, as per the costs they were basically equal to none except opening its airspace and closing the borders in addition to logistic support through fueling the aircrafts allow them landing in case of emergency, it costed basically nothing, thus it was rational”* says Pr. Hamza Houssam. To some extent we may agree with him, however, through comparing the costs to the benefits of this decision, it was not close to be free, closing the borders and securing them, transferring between 5000 and 6000 soldiers from Boufarik (northern Algeria) to Tamanrasset and then the borders is expensive. The collateral damage was also expensive. Thus, the best way to determine if it was rational or not, is through tracing its effectiveness and timing.


To trace the decision effectiveness, we may compare it to the goal achieved. For Amina F. Algeria was able to achieve its main goals through preserving first its national security and façade as it fought till the end for the noninterference, and was able to preserve its regional supremacy through backing the international action and its status of the leader of the war on terrorism in north Africa and weakening the terrorist groups in northern Mali. However, Algeria faced later the humanitarian crisis in Mali resulting from the international intervention. Following this hypothesis, to determine if the price was worth it, we may take a look to the number of terrorist attacks on the Algerian targets and Algerian territories before and after the intervention,

through three indicators: Number of Attacks, number of victims and number of neutralized terrorist see (Figures: 5.2.1 and 5.2.2)

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
N. of Attacks	168	164	132	51	22	9

Table 5.2.1 showing the number of terrorist attacks in Algeria before and after the international intervention in Mali

Source: Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism in North Africa and The Sahel in 2015* (USA: Inter-University Center For Terrorism Studies, March ,2016),P.18.



Source: By the researcher.

Clearly the number of the terrorist attacks decreased after the military intervention in Mali, as it went from 132 attacks in 2012, to 51 attacks in 2013, a decrease of 61.36 %, and by 2015, a decrease of 93.18%, which proves that the Algerian decision to support the French intervention and closing of the borders was efficient. The second indicator we may chose use is the number of victims:

2010		2011		2012		2013		2014		2015	
K	I	K	I	K	I	K	I	K	I	K	I
12	81	35	35	1	0	39	0	11	5	12	4

Table 5.2.2: Sources: Number of victims of terrorist Attack in Algeria before and after the military intervention

**Source:** Country Reports on Terrorism; 2010 ( USA: Department of State, Office of Coordination of Counterterrorism, submitted to the Congress in Compliance with title 22 of the United States Code, Section 56F, released in 2011,2012,2013,2014 and 2015.) (K: killed, I: injured)

Here we can see, that the number of victims was reasonable, however in 2013, after the intervention there were an increase of the 225% (from 12 killed victims in 2010 to 39 in 2013 and back to 12 in 2015). The increase is justified by the quality of material acquired by the AQMI, and the 39 victims were all killed in the attack against Tiguentourin). Hence with the weakening of the AQMI and due to the military intervention and the closing of the borders, it is the drug trafficking crime (See figure 5.2.)




Figure 5.2.2: Algerian seizures of drugs between 2010 and 2015.

Source: by the researcher based on yearly reports of UNDOC.

Right after the anarchy in Libya; the drugs traffics to and through Algeria grew, and started decreasing right after the Serval operation which proves the relation between the terrorist groups and organized crime groups. These indicators proves that after all, a military intervention was necessary, and that the decision even if it violated one of the Algerian rigid principle, it complied to its other principle emphasizing the respect of the UN resolution

and the international cooperation, it preserved the Algerian national security and the Algerian regional role compatible with the country's capabilities and satisfying to some extent the international expectations from Algeria. The logistic support appears to be the best alternative and decision that the Algerian foreign policy maker made was effective as it helped to stop the move of terrorists toward Bamako and prevented the raise of a "Terrorist State" in the region. And to some Algeria obliged France to arrange alone the anarchy it's caused by intervening in Libya.<sup>213</sup> Hence we may assume that the price was *worth it*. Even if Algeria later suffered the repercussions of any conflict: The humanitarian crisis; the number of the refugees from Mali raised and the country as usual was ready to receive them through taking the necessary measures, in February 2012, Algerian president of the red crescent declared that the country is ready to receive the Tuareg refugees from Mali, both in Adrar and Tamanrasset. Moreover it appears that the Mali soldiers committed retaliation operation against the Tuareg once they were back to Gao, as the French and ECOWAS soldiers chased the terrorists out, which meant that the refugees waves will increase.<sup>214</sup> The fact that Algeria was ready to protect these refugees, helped increase the country's credibility and trust, especially that several journal reports mentioned the retaliation methodic killing series committed by the Malian and Nigeria (forces from the ECOWAS) against them. According to the UNHCR, the number of refugees in Algeria raised from 96545 in 2010 to 103655 in 2015 (Figure 5.2.3), knowing that Algeria is not the best destination for refugees and that more than 90.000 refugees in Algeria are from Western Sahara.

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<sup>213</sup> « Pourquoi l'Algérie A Autorisé Des Avions Français à Traverser Son Espace Aérien » in *Algérie Patriotique.com*, published on January 13th 2013, available on <http://www.algerie360.com/>

<sup>214</sup> Hassiba, "Algerians Killed In Gao By the Malian And Nigerian Soldiers" in *El Fajr*, published on January 28<sup>th</sup> 2013 available on <https://www.djazair.com/alfadjr/>




Figure 5.2.3: The increase of refugees' number to Algeria (2010-2015)

Source: By the researcher based on the UNHCR Data.

Statistics shows also that the main original country of the refugees to Algeria was Mali (see figure 5.2.4). Their number went from 10 refugees in 2010 to 51741 in 2015.

In addition the increase in the refugee's number, it became well-known that the region of Tamanrasset in Algeria became a transit region for illegal migrant coming from west and central Africa and planning to reach Europe either through Tunisia or Morocco and increasingly Libya (see figure 5.2.6).

These migrants are already involved with human smuggler, facilitating their transportation and navigation in exchange of money (see table 5.2.3), these smugglers are usually also, involved with networks of drug and arms smugglers in the region especially after the crisis in Libya.




Figure 5.2.4: Repartition of Refugees to Algeria by the countries of origin (Except Western Sahara)

Source: by the researcher, based in UNHCR data.



Map 9: Map showing Main routes of illicit migration to Europe

Source: <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/>

Routes	Mean Cost (US \$)
Africa to Europe (mainly crossing Algerian territories)	6.533
Africa to the Americas	2.200
Africa to Africa.	203

Table 5.2.3: The cost of migrants smuggling in Africa.

Source: Khalid Koser, *International Migration: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007),p.66.

These facts related to the migration and illicit migration were among the factors of the Algerian reserves on the Military intervention, and were among the costs paid by Algeria and the international community in exchange of the security and the integrity of the region. Between migration and the raise of a terrorist state, migration is mostly tolerated and affordable. In the same context of the effectiveness of the Algerian decision to cooperate with France, those we have interviewed emphasized the importance of the Algerian decision in facilitating the French military action as the country coordinated the OCJGS countries' borders control to siege the AQMI and the MUJAO elements in Mali

according to Mr. Lakhder Meslem.\* According to French officials also, the Algerian decision facilitated their Military operation related the Bombardment and the air-movement plan to route soldiers and logistics to Mali and helped them save time and money in the war against terrorism. And at the same time according to Ali Kessassia Algeria appeared as a facilitator state collaborating with the United Nations.

The second indicator through which we may judge the rationality of the decision is the timing. The Serval operation was launched on Friday, the Algerian accord came on Sunday, three days later, this delay can be justified by the Algerian reserves on the military intervention and on the presence of France in the region, and due to the cautions taken by the Algerian diplomacy because of the security repercussions of the Arab Spring as asserted by professor Nabila Ben Yahia\*\*, it can also be explained by the difficulty to reach a coalition within the military institution and with the political elite as the decision was dealing with a normative issue related to the Algerian longstanding principle, and with the Algerian Tuareg leaders, however, the Algerian decision maker of foreign policy had to take it, as it was the “most objective and the least worse alternative” says professor Mezrag. As for Mr. Abdellaitf Debabech, the president could not wait for the coalition anymore, moreover for him “*Algeria’s foreign policy is at the mercy of president whims, don’t expect much from a diplomacy which is sidelining its elites.*” “*It was his personal choice*”. However, as it was mentioned before the best solution at that moment to save the Algerian role in the region and to stop the terrorist advancement to Bamako, for Mr. Taffar “*Algeria was grabbed by its regional geopolitics.... At the moment the president had no other options but to cooperate with the international forces intervening in Mali, it was better than seeing a terrorist state being established on its borders*”. The decision coming three days after the launching of the operation, reflects the Algerian faithful adhering to the

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\* Vice president of the National Accord Movement (political party in Algeria), interviewed by the researcher.

\*\* PhD Nabila Benyahia, Professor of Foreign Policy at Algiers 3 University, interviewed by the researcher.

political solution, for Mr. Mohamed Ettyeb Elaskari\* *“Algeria accepted the overfly of its territories but was always emphasizing its opposition to the military option and its approach based on dialogue, the Algerian political leadership also pointed the importance of avoiding the collateral damage of such act, especially the danger of the spread of arms , it has also declared that the decision was based on and respected the request formulated by a friend state –Mali- for international help to fight terrorism.”* Here we can deduct that these three days although appeared to be a short period were crucial in a crisis like the one Mali was knowing and the situation the Algerian foreign policy making machine was exposed to, we may also assume that these three days were crucial for the Algerian appearance as a country opposing the intervention to protect the Tuareg. Consequently, unlike the ECOWAS, Algeria could later gain their trust and lead a successful mediation as a mediator upon which all parties have consensus. Simultaneously with the decision of opening the Algerian air space, the president Bouteflika ordered to send the necessary humanitarian aid both to the refugees’ camps in Algeria and to the affected northern regions by the military action and the events happening since January 2012.

Basically, through the decision and the timing Algeria could weaken the terrorist danger, protect its national security, protect its regional role and international image, and maintain the Tuareg trust, without engaging any soldier in Mali, which preserved its nonintervention principle to a great extent. A pretty satisfying results that support the rationality of the decision, here we may confirm the third hypothesis that the decision was rational.

### **5.3: Algerian mediation solving the crisis: (February 2013- March 1<sup>st</sup> 2015):**

Following the military intervention in Mali the humanitarian crisis in the northern regions escalated, and should not last longer, if one dimension of

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\* Senator, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, and Deputy at the African Parliament.

the crisis was diminished: the terrorist threat was significantly decreased; the political and humanitarian crisis between the government of Mali and the Tuareg was still ongoing and could not be solved through the military intervention. That's why the Algerian president, on February 24<sup>th</sup> 2013 expressed his concerns about the situation in Mali that may affect his country, simultaneously the Anadhoul press agency revealed the negotiation with Ansar Eddin to convince them not to support the AQMI in Mali.<sup>215</sup> This means that Algeria has never abandoned the dialogue as a mean to break the link between the groups with political claims and the AQMI as part of its strategy to weaken the later, and keep all the Tuareg trust in its mediation on the long term.

### **5.3.1 The necessity to negotiate:**

On the other hand, the Serval also, uncovered France's limited capabilities to lead on its own an international military intervention, first the lack of transportation aircrafts that led Le Drian to request the American support according to Lewadowski, 95% of the logistic and the soldiers sent to Mali have been sent through the aircrafts of the allies and flights rent from Russia and Ukraine<sup>216</sup>, and the clear support of the Algerian intelligence information. French military experts revealed that the Elysée has expressed his displeasure of the poor performance of the operation until the mid-February 2013, it is true that the jihadist withdrew from the vital regions, Kidal and Gao to the Adrar Ifoghas<sup>217</sup>, but the French and the ECOWAS forces were suffering different difficulties on the ground, suddenly, as the French soldiers reached the Adrar Ifoghas<sup>218</sup>, the terrorists disappear, finally the allies forces could lead a major operation in the region and kill several tens of the terrorists.

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<sup>215</sup> Amar El Hisndy, Bouteflika "Warns On the Repercussion of the War in Mali on The Algerian Security" in *Al Arabia* published on February 25<sup>th</sup> 2013, available on <https://www.alarabiya.net/> (translated from Arabic)

<sup>216</sup> *Mali: les Secrets d'une Guerre (Cellule de crise...., op.cit.*

<sup>217</sup> A New book that reveals details about the Serval operation available on <http://www.sahamedias.net/>

<sup>218</sup> *Mali: les Secrets d'une Guerre, op.cit*


The terrorist danger was diminished but not eradicated. Moreover there were combats opposing the AQMI and the MUJAO to the NMLA combating with the French and the ECOWAS forces, in addition to the Malian army. In fact, the French Ambassador to Bamako, was against the integration of the NMLA in the war against terrorism, he could predict the problem to raise between them and the Mali army, as France was handing up the freed cities to the Malian army, and the NMLA were against the presence of this Army in Kidal and the northern parts of the country, the French army handed Kidal to the NMLA. This confirms Huntington's assumption that the ethnical conflict do not disappear through the international intervention, but simply decrease, and reappear due to the inherent clash of civilizations.

The cost of Serval operation was becoming more and more expensive, and the French soldiers were having difficulties, with the nature, the unusual adversary and the communication with the allies (language issues), the operation showed the technological backwardness in term of avionics, a French pilot declared antiquated of the aircrafts and the lack of some parts of them <sup>219</sup> the operation that was supposed to last less "few weeks" attended its 3<sup>rd</sup> month. Voices from Paris started asking Algeria "to do more", according Mohamed Tayeb Elaskri<sup>220</sup>, the French authorities never stopped cooperating with their Algerians counterparts. And the terrorist attacks in Mali increased and did not stop (see figure 5.3.1).

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<sup>219</sup> Debabech, op.cit.

<sup>220</sup> Mohamed Tayeb Elaskri, Senator, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the Algerian Senate, Member of the African Senate, (interviewed by the researcher)



Source: Source: Yonah Alexander, Loc.cit.

In addition to the terrorist attacks, the battles between the Malian army and the NMLA were still ongoing, since the later did not want the former to be present in the northern part of Mali.<sup>221</sup> This was the illustration of the Algerian vision; a political issue cannot be solved militarily. The international community hence, went back to the UN resolution in the axes of finding a political solution to the crisis. The first attempt was through the ECOWAS leading to the June 18<sup>th</sup> 2013 platform signed in Ouagadougou which allowed the organization of presidential elections. Right after the NMLA withdrew from the agreement. As the process of negotiations stopped costs for France were enhancing and the political process in Mali was getting more and more complicated. Meanwhile in Algeria, the president Bouteflika, made an important decision, in addition to the presence of Mr. Abdekader Messahel on the head on the African and Maghreb affairs, Mr. Ramtan Lamamra, was appointed as minister of the state, minister of foreign affairs, in November 2013. According to high foreign affairs officials, Lamamra was given more authorities than those given to any minister of foreign affairs under the rule of the president Bouteflika. This decision was important as Lamamra, is well-

<sup>221</sup> *Ten Tuareg Rebellions Killed During Battels Against the Malian Army* , available on <http://www.elbadil.info/>

known in Africa, used to be the president of the African Security Council, the man had a reach notebook, and a great network within the continent.

### **5.3.2 Algerian Pressures?**

The main reason for which the political process was curbed was the choice of the mediator. The president Abou Baker Keïta accused the Burkina Faso president Blaise Compaoré of being biased to the NMLA.<sup>222</sup> Algeria appeared to be the best option, and France needed the exit from the Malian swamp. Several source among them high officials asserted that the Algerian diplomatic machine imposed some “conditions” the French administration in exchange of its mediation. *“I do believe that Algeria convinced France to put an end to Serval operation, the coordination between the two countries never stopped, Algeria was emphasizing the dialogue but the later needed guarantees, there was a necessity to end the Serval operation to establish peace and reconciliation in Mali”* says Mr. El Askri. For Hamza Houssam, *“the succession of events, proves there was an agreement between Algiers and Paris, the later would lead the military action while the former will manage the political solution, there is a high probability that the Algerian authorities put pressures on their French counterpart to put an end to Serval, especially that the continuity of the military action would not serve neither the Algerian security nor its interests”*. For Amina Bouarour, the French president was facing a serious crisis of trust, his popularity was decreasing that’s when he decided to launch Serval, however, later, it’s the French economy that was suffering a crisis and could not afford the costs of Serval anymore, here the Algerian role appear to give France the exit it needs through finding a political solution to the political crisis in Mali. High officials in the Algerian ministry of foreign affairs present during the process, confirmed that Algeria has imposed

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<sup>222</sup> Charlotte Boitiaux, « Le Maroc et l’Algérie Se Disputent le Role de Mediateur Dans La Crise Malienne », in *France24*, published on February 8th 2014. Available on <http://www.france24.com/fr/>

a minor presence of the French officials during the “*pourparlers*” and prohibited its direct intervention, Algeria also refused the presence of Morocco during the process despite the request formulated by France.<sup>223</sup> Especially that Morocco was trying to play the mediator as the Malian parties were looking for one, through tying relation with the NMLA. That’s how Algeria was able to protect its regional role, and to impose its alternative at the end.

### **5.3.3 The Algerian Mediation and the end of Serval operation:**

On January 19<sup>th</sup> 2014, the Mali president Ibrahim Abou Bakar Keita, was received in Algiers, by the President AbdelAziz Bouteflika, Keita, officially requested the Algerian mediation to facilitate the inter-Malian dialogue, being suspended since June 2013. Right After the diplomatic machine launched its efforts to reproach the antagonists’ points of view. On January 15<sup>th</sup> 2014, delegations of the NMLA and the Arab Azawad Movement and the High Council of the Azawad, went to Algiers to fix the milestones of the negotiations. Later on January 19<sup>th</sup>, The Algerian- Malian Strategic Bilateral Committee on Northern Mali, having for mission to frame and launch the Algerian mediation for the inclusive Malian dialogue decided in Ouagadougou in June 2013, was created. Lamamra, asserted that Algeria has the support of Africa and the international community, that places high hopes on the Algerian effort to find a solution the Mali crisis.

On June 14<sup>th</sup> 2014, the AMA, the NMLA the CPA (Coordination for the people of Azawad), CNMR (Coordination of the National Movements of Resistance), the HCUA (High Council for the Unification of the Azawad), signed a platform that foresaw the creation of a situation of trust between all parties to achieve the final solution of the conflict, and to end immediately all forms of fighting, under the supervision of the UN delegation to Mali

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<sup>223</sup> Interviews.

MINUSMA (Multidimensional Integrated Mission of the United Nations for the Stability in Mali), the parties, hence, signed the declaration of Algiers.

On July 16<sup>th</sup> until July 24<sup>th</sup> 2014, the process of mediation was launched officially, as all the crisis parties were gathered around the negotiations tables, in the presence of representatives of Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, the AU, the ECOWAS, the UN, the EU and the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Cooperation ex Islamic Forum) in Addition to Algeria the leader of the mediation, represented by Mr. Ramtan Lamamra. The round led to the ratification of “The process of Algiers” proposed in June 2014, and all parties agreed upon the millstones included in the “Algiers Platform” proposed on June 14<sup>th</sup> 2014 for an inclusive dialogue. They also agreed that each party will withdraw the forces to the limits defined by the bilateral committee.

It is to be mentioned that Jean-Yves Le Drian, has declared the Serval Operation “Terminé de Fait” (De facto ended) on July 14<sup>th</sup> 2014, (two days after the official announcement of the mediation process) declaring that France needed to reorganize its forces. And that another operation named Barkhan, will be launched to which France will participate with 5 other countries of the region to maintain stability and built the capacity of the Malian army in accordance with the UN resolutions.

From September 1<sup>st</sup> to 14<sup>th</sup>, 2014, the third round of the dialogue with the Algerian mediation was held and finally all parties could sit to the same table on September 14<sup>th</sup> 2014, after series of bilateral and trilateral reunions to explore each party’s demands, ambitions and margin of negotiation, and finally agreed upon a road map based on the protection of Mali’s territorial integrity, meanwhile Lamamra announced that Algeria has submitted a project of peace agreement for the final solution. That was one success of the Algerian diplomacy as it neutralized the threat of the Tuareg State. On November 2014, the fourth round was launched, with the presence of all parties, and the four structural negotiations groups set during the second round to discuss: Political and Institutional, and Defense and Security, Socio-economic and Cultural Development and Reconciliation, Justice and Humanitarian issues, that had work together and took into consideration the needs expressed by the civil

society. The Mediation parties had not also declined the Azawad movement claims for federal regime nor the autonomy of the Azawad, Lamara declare that the mediators were able to cover the view of the different parties towards the draft of the peace agreement submitted earlier and its appendix. All parties agreed to meet on January for the 5<sup>th</sup> round.<sup>224</sup>

The fifth round started finally on February 2015, to discuss the peace agreement, and parties ended up signing the Declaration of Algiers for the parties participating in the Algiers process, the declaration was also signed by the mediator and the representative of the UN general Secretary, and emphasized the full involvement of these parties for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Finally on March 1<sup>st</sup> 2015, the accord for peace and reconciliation in Mali was signed by the government of Mali, the AMA, the CPA and the CNMR in addition to the international mediation group led by Algeria. However, the coordination of the Azawad movements (NMLA, HCAU and the AMA) postponed its signature, for Mr. Lamamara, it was for the good reason of gathering the entire possible support to the accord. And they gave their assent to the accord on May 14<sup>th</sup> 2015, finally the accord was officially signed on May 15<sup>th</sup> 2015 in Bamako, later on June 20<sup>th</sup> 2015, the CAM, signed it too.<sup>225</sup> The accord protected Mali's territorial integrity, and recognized the cultural and ethnic distinction of the Tuareg, and emphasized the fair development of Mali with all its regions, to fight corruption, terrorism and organized crime and to renounce violence as means of expression. The accord recognized the appellation Azawad, and adopted several measures to improve security, good governance and socio-economic development. And to overcome the administrative issues the parties finally agreed to review the administrative construction and the organs of the local authorities (Mali was still using the

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<sup>224</sup> El Anadoul press, "The End of The Fourth Malian Negotiations Round" in *Afrigatenews published on November 28<sup>th</sup> 2014* available on <http://www.afrigatenews.net/>

<sup>225</sup> « La Paix Signé Par tous Les Bellingérants Au Mali » in *Le Monde.fr avec AFP*, Published on June 20<sup>th</sup> 2015. Available on <http://www.lemonde.fr>

colonial model) and assure a better representation for the northern population, with more power to the local authorities.<sup>226</sup>

Algeria did not stop there, the country launched several forums for the economic development of the Sahel, kept providing support to Mali and even sending delegations to monitor the implementation of the accord, thus on November 20<sup>th</sup> 2015, a delegation of Algerian diplomats and military officers were detained hostages in the terrorist attack against the Radisson hotel in Bamako. Ironically the attack was led by the MUJAO.<sup>227</sup>

In 2016, the accords were still suffering several obstacles, on September 2016, an armed group of the CAM was killed by the IMGHAD an armed group allied to the government in Bamako, earlier on May 16<sup>th</sup> 2016, Ramtan Lamamra declared that the implementation of the accords was facing difficulties, due to the lack of financing to the developmental project and the lack of commitment of the international community, however “*The brothers-enemies never thought to sit to the same table are now working together to overcome these difficulties and achieve the development of Mali*”<sup>228</sup>

Finally, we may say that even the decision of the mediation was made in a way that serves the Algerian interests, protect Mali’s territorial integrity and eliminate the risk of the Tuareg State. The decisions made during the two previous phases of the crisis were decisive for the Algerian position during the third phase, Algerian foreign policy maker showed a high level of farsightedness, patience and savoir faire.

That’s how the Algerian diplomacy had managed the crisis in Mali, and showed a significant amount of rationality and adaptation, and proved its regional role through putting an end to the hostilities between the Malians. However, now the entire region and the international community should help

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<sup>226</sup> Accord Pour la Paix et le Réconciliation Au Mali Issu Du Processus d’Alger. (2015)

<sup>227</sup> “Algerian Officers Among the Hostages in the Malian Hotel” published on November 20<sup>th</sup> 2014 available on <http://www.altahrironline.com/ara/> (translated from Arabic).

<sup>228</sup> “Lamamra Admits The Peace Accord In Mali is Facing Difficulties After One Year of Its Signature” in *Middle East*, published on May 16<sup>th</sup> 2016, available on <https://aawsat.com/> (translated from Arabic)

Mali to implement its developmental process, and fight terrorism, through eradicating its reasons and ensure the prosperity of Mali, which is in line with the Algerian approach to the conflict and to the threats in the regions.

## Chapter 6: Conclusion.

### 6.1. General Conclusion:

In 2013, Algeria's foreign policy maker made an unusual decision, when he decided to support "logistically" the Serval operation being led by the French Army in Mali to fight terrorism in the region. It can be qualified as revolutionary decision, since the country was always; through his diplomatic history a regional player who support international law principles and just causes.

Algeria was always deeply engaged and involved in the Sahel's conflicts; the region is defined as its security backyard since the 1970's. However, during the 2012 crisis, especially in the early stages of the crisis, the country was accused of being reluctant by some writers and politicians, as it rejected the military intervention alternative; whereas, it was seen by others as the protector of virtue, *as per* it sticks to its utopian foreign policy principle, ignoring that the later is only about interests. Thus, we tried to explore how Algeria really managed the crisis, and gave some logical and moderate explanation of each action made and each position adopted by the country while dealing with the crisis.

The starting point was to reveal the motivation of the Algerian interest in Mali. In fact, the main reason to explain that is the evidence that the Algerian national security, in a globalized world, is highly tied to the security of Mali. The two countries are sharing historical, geographic and demographic features. For instance, the raise of a Tuareg state in the region might threaten the Algerian societal security and territorial integrity, the interest is also motivated by the Algerian conceptualized regional role as peace maker and regional leader, through the role it played in the successive crisis in the history of the Mali conflict.

Analyzing the 2012, causes and actors, exposed how complex the situation was, the crisis had two aspects, political and security aspect, and the

second is the derivative of the first: terrorism. Based on the logical links we described between Algeria and Mali, Algerian national security was threatened by the two aspects: terrorism as direct threat and societal danger due to the Tuareg danger and the risk of the occurrence of the Tuareg state. As the crisis broke out Algeria was under serious pressures to react militarily in Mali in order to put an end to the crisis. The status of the pivotal state, and the country's military, economic and geopolitical feature, plus the role it gave itself historically and the new president has reinforced, in accordance with his psychological feature led to the occurrence of high international expectations vis-à-vis the Algerian position toward the crisis. Yet the country decided not to intervene and try to avoid an international intervention, in line with its role as a peace maker and mediator, not for some utopian reasons, in fact, the noninterference principle was the façade, subsequently the real motivations of the Algerian decision lies in the existence of Tuaregs on its lands who may revolt in case the country bombed their relatives in Mali, the internal public opinion refusal to an intervention and the military doctrine prohibiting an intervention and the consequences of the military action in addition to the costs, and the loss of the Tuareg trust which may destroy the country's role as peace maker and buried any potential mediation in the future, and finally the upcoming presidential elections. The situation gave to the foreign policy maker a set of alternatives, from which he picked the most adequate one for the national interests, national security and Algeria's role. To some extent the considerations that made Mali in top priorities of the Algerian foreign policy agenda, are the same for which the president chosen not to intervene, in order to preserve the country's national interests, which proves the first and second hypothesis of the study, especially as the crisis was too complex and involved a set of national state, non-state actors and different international actors with different agendas and conflicting interests, at the beginning Algeria enjoyed the American support, therefore it engaged a mediation and pursued the political settlement alternative.

As the situation escalated and the Algerian mediation failed due to the defection of Agh Ghali and the will of the ECOWAS and France to intervene,

the AQMI and the MUJAO, took over the northern part of the country and moved toward the south. Hence, the president of Mali requested French intervention and the later became a de facto situation. It is to be mentioned that Algerians had already negotiated its role in case of military intervention, as Morocco was trying to position itself as the regional player, and the risk of the raise of a terrorist state was increasing, the Algerian foreign policy maker did not have much alternatives, and not much time, thus the president took the decision to cooperate with France in weakening the terrorist groups, based on its principle of foreign policy emphasizing the respect of the UN resolutions and international cooperation, in a way that preserve the Algerian national security and its role; this time not the country's role of mediator and peace maker, but its role of fighting terrorist agent. The decision was rational to a large extent, effective and timely relevant, which proves the third hypothesis; the Algerian case here proves the assumption that rationality is "the behavior appropriate in the context of particular situation."<sup>229</sup> The president through his decision protected the principles to some extent as its soldiers did not intervene, the foreign policy maker tried to keep his decision confidential to avoid the loss of the trust of the Tuareg and the reaction of the public opinion, but it has been revealed by the French minister of foreign affairs, the timing of the decision making was significant since it came three days after the starting of the Serval operation. Thus giving the image that the country resisted the intervention until the end which let him keep the Tuareg trust for the future mediation, as he was sure the intervention would not solve the political crisis. The decision also proved and reinforced the Algerian president pragmatic character. Since his election, he kept emphasizing that he will peruse Algeria's interest, although Algeria's foreign policy appears utopian, but its principles never collide with the country's interests, the Mali crisis and the adjustment decision, proved the new pragmatic tendency in the Algerian foreign policy. The charisma of the Algerian president was also present in the decision making, he took the full responsibility (as he promised) and did not wait for the coalition, and his

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<sup>229</sup> John R. ONeal, "The Rationality of Decision Making During International Crisis" in *Polity* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, Vol.20 N°.4), P.600.

decision met the country's goals, and could adapt the Algerian foreign policy to the standards imposed but the juncture and in limited and short time, which proves Sideney Verba's assumption, that "*the rationality is better approximated when core cables are threatened and the time for deliberation is limited*"<sup>230</sup>

The country made France clean the mess it caused by intervening in Libya. In 2014, once more, when France needed an exit from Mali, Algeria imposed its conditions to lead the mediation, as it successfully maintained its status of the trusted mediator, successfully excluded Morocco, and proved it was the key actor, the mediator, and an important peace maker in the region. It has also proved that Algeria is still a medium power, which needs to balance and utilize the polarization in the most effective manner to preserve its regional role.

Finally, we may say that the principle of nonintervention in the Algerian foreign policy was maintained to a great extent, it remained significantly rigid, but the practice changed and is showing a new tendency of pragmatism and openness, with the same dignity and façade. Algeria's permitting the overflying by the FRENCH forces is not a hazardous decision, and not a decision to be let go without analysis. It was a well-studied decision made by a man known as one of godfathers of the glorious era of the Algerian foreign policy, that had France as the number one enemy. A decision that cannot be taken if he was only thinking of his reelection, since it provoked the national public opinion, who had a black image of the French army, it was the only decision made by Bouteflika that needed to be explained through medias. And for the first time even his most furious opponents and Medias did not discuss his decision, it was for the country's best interest, France had to clean the mass it created in the region and to be convinced that the military intervention does not fix human historical mistakes and the political crisis in the Sahel. Bouteflika preserved Algeria's role of anti-terrorist agent and mediator and peace maker and keeper, at the same time as preserving the principle of nonintervention and

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<sup>230</sup> Loc.cit., P.598.

Algeria's public and international image since no Algerian soldiers were sent to Mali.

## **6.2. Theoretical implications:**

On the theoretical level, the findings of the analysis of the Algerian management of the crisis in Mali, has a set of interesting theoretical implications, since from the beginning;

We could figure out that the structural violence will lead to the occurrence of conflicts and societal instability and dilemma, as argued by Barry Buzan, and that according to his model of regional security complex, the security of one unite of the regional system depends on the security of the others, which is proven through the security dependence of Algeria to the stability of its border, in our case to the stability of Mali;

This also, illustrates, the importance of geography, history and human considerations, in defining the state's foreign policy main targets and priorities, which confirms the assumptions of the geopolitical approach, notably Napoléon's saying that "*the policies of all power are inherent in their geography*".

That Algeria remained, thanks to the components of its foreign policy, its geographic, economic, and military capabilities, a medium power, able to exert a certain amount of influence especially within its geographic neighborhoods. However, the margin of this influence and role is determined by the nature of the international system and the power distribution and settings.

The margin of the influence and the national role to be played, is to be defined by the nation itself, through observing the evolution of the Algerian foreign policy, we could approve the assumption asserting that one country, might assign itself multiple roles, for instance Algeria decided to be the peace maker and broker, the development locomotive, the anti terrorism agent, and the regional leader;

However, we could also notice the internal such as the location, the size, the economic and military capabilities, and external factors can

significantly determine the scope of interference and involvement of the country, but also, the leader's vision, as we could notice, the Algerian foreign policy during the five phases was guided by the preferences of its leader and decision maker; which confirm the assumptions of the behavioral approach focusing on the influence of personal characteristic on the decision making, this was later translated by the adjustment of the Algerian foreign policy toward Mali crisis 2012, which represented a pragmatic tendency of the Algerian foreign policy and translated the president Bouteflika finger print of the Algerian foreign policy making process.

Through our research, we were also able, to notice that realist assumption are still able to explain the international relations, the Algerian foreign policy toward the crisis in Mali, since the decision of non intervention at its early stages to the adjustment of its policy after assessing the cost and benefits of each alternative, and the pressures it exercised to end the military intervention, have proven that the essence of any foreign policy even those belonging to nations with utopian principles, is interests, especially the protection of the national security, maintaining of the status quo or strengthening its international or regional position, that was clear in the Algerian refusal of international intervention, and in its acceptance to collaborate with it in 2013 to face the fierce competition with morocco over the leadership of the regional system.

As for the RMA, led by Graham Allison, we were able to, prove, to a large extent, the assumption asserting that the state is a rational single actor, when its institutions act like one single entity guided by one leader, representing the national choice. And that the key to understand the state's external behavior is to understand its goal, and ask why one nation would behave that way. For Allison the decision maker is always perusing the national interest; however the conception of the national interest depends greatly on the perception of the national actor, and his personal characteristics and vision as a mono-construct which is to some point neglect by the RMA.

The next assumption we were able to examine is the fact that every national actor, acts accordingly with the goals of his foreign policy among all:

national security, then he would study the options or the alternatives he has to deal with the problem challenging his goals, or his preferred status quo, through the assessment of the consequences of each option, by studying the cost and the benefits of each one, which was clearly illustrated through studying the different decisions taken by the Algerian president during the three phases, as he was always, preferring the optimal alternative that achieve the national goal, and maximize the national gains.

Finally, Through our research, we figured out that the increase of the cost of the alternative will reduce the likelihood of choosing it, for instance, an Algerian direct military intervention or support in 2012, would have been expensive both economically and socially as the country would directly get involved in an asymmetric expensive war and challenge its societal security and stability, hence the choice of the intervention was dropped, later on facing a de facto situation in January 2013, sticking rigidly to the country's principle of nonintervention, would make the country lose its role of anti-terrorism agent and regional leader, and getting involved since the beginning as expensive as a direct intervention, the best option was to wait for a moment (3 days are relatively a long period during a crisis) and then collaborate with the international action, in a way that protects both national security and international position, without breaking completely its nonintervention principle. This was the most optimal option, and this proves that the decrease of the costs of an alternative, compared to the gains it brings, increases the likelihood for that alternative to be chosen.

Finally, we can also, assert that availability of data, and the ability to predict, are core component of both foreign policy and also, RMA, one of the issue that face the Algerian foreign policy toward the Mali crisis of 2012, was the lack of information about the internal situation within the Malian army, the Algerian foreign policy maker did not predict the military coup which left it without a focal point in Bamako, as Traoué's regime has fallen. The crisis management would have been less complicated without the collapse of the state already weak in Mali, also, the uncertainty remains present even if the RAM is a tool to decrease the probability of its occurrence; for instance, Algeria could

not predict that the French president would decide a unilateral military intervention within less than 24 hours.

Finally, we can assume that all theories in the field of the Foreign policy studies, attempt to explain the external behavior of the states, differences may occur on the level of analysis or the factors to be taken into consideration, hence, only a holistic, comprehensive approach, that merges different components and assumptions from multiple theories, can deeply explain the external behavior of nations.

### **6.3. Policy Implication:**

The Algerian foreign policy, should pay more attention to the Sahel region and intensify its effort to prevent the crisis instead of dealing with it, and urge the international community to adopt its comprehensive approach based on the development of northern Mali, to eradicate the reasons of terrorism and rebellion movements, especially that peace accord is still facing difficulties to be established.

Mali's crisis 2012 was the result of set of human mistakes, and the last link of these mistakes was not framing the Tuareg fighting for El Gaddafi while coming back to Mali, which allowed the arrival of a huge number of weapons to the country. Algeria can consider revising the rigidity of the principle of noninterference in the cases that threaten its national security; a timely determined short-term operation can help the country avoid such crisis in the future.

The final observation that can be given, is that as long as the foreign policy making process in Algeria is overwhelmed by the president, the black box will remain an inaccessible for the researcher, and it will, motionless, be hard to provide the adequate in depth study it deserves, and need to assess its performance, evaluate, and adjust it, even if this concentration was helpful and meaningful in the context of the Mali crisis.

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## Appendix 1:

### *Interview Protocol.*

As part of a research entitled: *Algeria's Foreign Policy Toward Mali Crisis 2012-2016*, that aims mainly to point out the Algerian response to the crisis in Mali 2012, and the factors influencing the Algerian foreign policy decision making and implementation. To examine the Algerian Response to the crisis the study assumes there are 3 phases: Before, During and After the military intervention, I assume that Algeria rejected the military intervention first and examines the 1<sup>st</sup> negotiation round that failed, the second phase starts with the will of international powers to intervene and then the Algerian decision to support the military action. Finally, the study tries to figure out any potential influence Algeria exercised on the intervening forces to put an end to the air strikes and end the military intervention, and the role it played to restore the “relative” peace in Mali.

Based on that, please answer the following question:

1. How does Algeria perceive its role in Mali?
2. Why did Algeria refuse the military intervention in Mali in 2012?  
(Factors)
3. Do you think the flux of Regional events (the Arab spring) affected the president's decision vis à vis the Mali crisis? How?
4. Why did the foreign policy maker accept to provide the logistic support to the “Serval” operation, how? (Factors and negotiation process)
5. Do you think it was a timely and relevant decision? Yes/ No, Why?

6. Do you think Algeria influenced the French decision to put an end to the “Serval” Operation?

**The researcher letter of gratitude**

**To Mr./Ms.**

Following your generous participation and cooperation to the accomplishment of my master thesis, in public administration at the Graduate School of Public Administration (SNU), through answering the questions of the interview, Please accept, the expression of my deepest recognition and gratitude.

Yours Sincerely,

Yasmine ARAB.

## 국문초록

# 2012-2016 년의 말리 위기에 대한 알제리의 대외정책

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글로벌행정전공

본 연구는 2012 년 말리 위기에 대한 알제리의 대외정책을 탐색하고자 하였다. 이를 위해 알제리의 대응을 프랑스군의 개입 이전, 중반, 이후의 세 단계로 나누어 그 변화를 탐색하였다. 한편, 본 논문은 알제리의 개념화된 국가 역할과 관련하여 2012 년 위기에 대한 알제리 대외정책의 일관성과 국가안보를 위협하는 중요한 위기에 직면하여 비개입 원칙에 대한 경직성을 테스트하려고 했으며, 알제리 대외 정책의 새로운 실용주의 경향을 지적하려고 시도하였다.

역할 이론과 합리적 행위자 모델을 사용한 본 연구의 결과는 다음과 같다. 우선, 대통령의 심리적 특징이 대외정책에 영향을 미쳤으며, 2013 년의 군사 개입에 대한 알제리의 실용주의적 위치 조정의 탄생을 야기했음을 확인하였다. 또한 의사결정자가 합리적이고, 구성원 간 이해관계의 대립 없이 국가가 단일한 행위자로서 역할을 한다면 의사결정은 이득이 된다는 점도 밝혔다. 의사결정의 합리성은 최초 목표의 성취와 그것이 국가의 우선순위에 부합하는지를 통해 측정할 수 있다. 자료의 이용가능성과 대안에 대한 신중한 평가는 합리성과 목표성취의 비결이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 몇 가지 요소가 지도자의 심리적 특징과는 관련 없이 지도자의 행위에 동인으로서 작용함을 알 수 있는데, 이 요소는 주로 중재 권력의 역량과 대비되는 국제 체제의 본질과 지도자의 행위를 제약하는 내부적, 사회적 구조이다.

핵심어 : 알제리, 대외정책, 말리, 위기, 사헬

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And to my institutor, advisor and friend, who thought me about life before teaching me politics, the late Belkacem BOUMAHDI, May your soul rest in peace and may Allah grant you "Jannah".

yasmine