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Degree of Master of International Studies

(International Area Studies)

**Analysis of the Colombian Program for
Economic Reintegration of Members of
Illegal Armed Groups (2008 – 2016)**

August 2018

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

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**Analysis of the Colombian Program for
Economic Reintegration of Members of
Illegal Armed Groups (2008 – 2016)**

A thesis presented

by

ANGELA MARÍA BERDUGO FERNÁNDEZ

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Abstract

Analysis of the Colombian Program for Economic Reintegration of Members of Illegal Armed Groups (2008 – 2016)

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The signing and approval of the peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla in Colombia has placed the peacebuilding initiatives as a first priority for the Government. On the most relevant angles of this process is the economic reintegration of ex combatants as one of the factor that will have a direct influence in the long-term sustainability of the recently achieved peace.

The economic reintegration strategy of Colombia is a program created as part of the reintegration policy in 2008 and requires a close work with the private sector to promote the hiring of ex combatants and the joint work with the micro businesses they create with the help of the Colombian Government, however the companies are not always willing to engage in mainly political issues like the guerrilla conflict.

After almost 10 years of implementation, the economic reintegration program will be tested again with the collective reintegration of the FARC members setting the perfect moment to make a revision of the results and propose improvements to achieve a more sustainable reintegration process and long-

term peace. According to this, the present paper analyses through different tools the level of success of the Colombian economic reintegration program based on the hypothesis that the set of market solutions established for facilitating the economic reintegration of ex combatants haven't been sufficient to achieve a successful inclusion in the labor market and to promote the massive participation of the private sector.

The main findings suggest that even if the reintegration policy and the economic reintegration program have been well structured, following the international standards, there's still room for improvement in its implementation strategy as well as in the monitoring and evaluation systems.

Keywords: Colombia armed conflict, peacebuilding, FARC guerilla, private sector and peacebuilding, economic reintegration of ex combatants, DDR.

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I. Introduction

1. Motivation

Colombia has suffered the most intense and long-lasting conflict in the Western world (Rettberg, Rivas, 2012), however the Foreign Direct Investment - FDI has been growing fast in the past decade, in 2016 the country was the fourth receptor of FDI in Latin America, after Mexico, Brazil and Argentina (PROCOLOMBIA, 2016), creating a relevant mixture of national and international companies, relevant for the analysis of the private sector as a peacebuilding actor.

This paradox implies that the country is a complex and relevant case study to analyze the relationship between enterprises and armed conflict; so far most of the existing investigations focus on the role of the private sector as an actor and victim but not so much as peace builder (Jiménez, 2014).

The end of the armed conflict with the FARC guerrilla poses a big challenge for the Colombian Government in many fields, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of 7.500 combatants and around 10.000 members of militias (Revista Semana, 2016) which will come back to the civil life and will need accompaniment for creating a new way of life.

Colombia already has experience with the implementation of reintegration programs, since two rebel groups have signed peace agreements with the Government in the past, the M-19 guerilla in 1990 and the AUC paramilitary group in 2005.

Until 2016, and according to information of the Colombian Agency for Reintegration, more than 55.000 ex-combatants have reintegrated to the civil

life in the country. These past processes have left good practices and lessons learned that should be taken into account, especially for enhance the legal framework and the reintegration policy, facing the challenge of successfully reintegrating the former FARC members.

The Colombian Agency for Reintegration - ACR is currently in charge of implementing the reintegration policy and will be in charge of attending the new process with FARC. As part of the duties defined by the policy, the ACR and the private sector have been working in partnerships to enhance and facilitate its implementation, especially in the economic reintegration component.

As a result of these partnerships “there has been an increase in the number of private actors contributing in the implementation of the policy. In December 2015, 650 companies were engaged in this process through multiple mechanisms such as employability, tailor-made training processes, labor practices, suppliers, volunteers and reconciliation scenarios” (ACR, 2016).

However the number of ex combatants working in the formal sector and the companies engaged in this initiative is small compared with the magnitude of the challenge. The private sector participation participation has been shy, according to a survey made to a sample of 361 companies, only 20% participates in reintegration initiatives, of these the 60% are big companies, 28% medium and 11.9% small enterprises (Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2009). Taking into account that small, medium enterprises - SME create 67% of the employment in Colombia (Revista Dinero, 2016), their participation in the reintegration process is still an opportunity to explore.

A successful reintegration process will contribute to improve the business climate and will facilitate the development of these companies, especially in the conflict zones but even if they are located in the cities, the transportation cost and the violent incidents against their properties and goods will be reduced. Having a stable security environment in the country will facilitate the expansion of the private sector to regions that were ruled and economically exploited by the illegal armed groups and which may lead to the creation of new job opportunities.

Finally, also the government will have access to new places where the illegal groups were settle and will have to provide new schools, hospitals, and infrastructure projects to reinforce the State's presence and these will require suppliers from the private sector which means more opportunities for growing.

The Peace Agreement with the FARC guerilla poses a challenge for the Reintegration Policy and the ACR but also brings big opportunities to explore and create new alliances between the government and the private sector that could be mutually beneficial and will help to assure a proper income for the ex-combatants and their families, reducing the risk of relapse in illegal activities and facilitating their reintegration to civil life. Because of this it is important to evaluate and analyze the achieved results after almost a decade of implementation and propose doable improvements to enhance the capacity and positive results.

2. Literature Review

The main topic of this research lays on the analysis of the interconnected area between the actions of the public and private sector, specifically on how the

government can enhance and promote their partnerships in favor of peacebuilding and the possible positive effects of these for the economic reintegration process of ex combatants.

For this purpose the literature review was separated in two categories that will facilitate the analysis of two academic areas, the first is the role of the private sector in a peacebuilding initiative, why the firms would and should engage in a mainly political process? The second area is the economic reintegration of ex-combatants and is focused on analyzing how the participation of the private sector can be promoted through governmental programs and policies and finally which is the better approach for creating innovative and efficient solutions to the challenge of reinserting ex combatants to civil life and assuring access to labor opportunities.

According to different relevant researches, in Colombia, the engagement of the private sector in peacebuilding presents low rates and is mainly focused on big companies that participate in the international market and have to engage in accountability processes with international stakeholders (Rettberg, Rivas, 2012). The companies located in regions with armed conflicts can choose either engaging or not in the peacebuilding process. The economic motivations for the participation of the private sector in peacebuilding are diverse, for example the possibility of enlarging their business in a peace state, reducing their production costs related to the conflict or the necessity of guaranteeing their investments. However it is a task of the government and the public administration to design the proper strategies for encourage and engage the private sector in this process, by facilitating the creation of economic and non-market benefits (Jimenez, 2014).

2.1 The role of the private sector in a peacebuilding process

For some scholars the role of the private sector in a peacebuilding process is not relevant or well defined basically because this is not part of their core business, which leads to a lack of capacity for engaging and actively participate in the construction of peace. For others the private sector has a relevant role in peacebuilding, contributing through their “economic influence and political contacts, their financial resources, their skilled workforce, their capacity to drive balanced development and their connections at all levels of society” (Killick, 2005, p. 4).

This becomes in a real capacity of investing and creating jobs opportunities for the demobilized combatants, their families but also the conflict victims. Certainly, working on making new employment and other economic opportunities can strengthen fragile peace agreements. This process cannot rely only in the State and should not focus excessively either on the victims or offenders (Jimenez, 2014, p. 72), so the private and public sectors should work together and give preference to the partnerships for the creation of mutual beneficial solutions for all the parts engaged in the conflict.

One of the main obstacles for maximizing the potential of the private sector in peacebuilding is the lack of recognition amongst the business community itself, NGOs, and the international community that the private sector has an important role to play in this situations coupled with a lack of understanding of what that role might be (Killick, 2005, p.20).

In accordance to this, “with the UN resolution on cooperation between the UN and the private sector in 2001, the private sector has become one of the most important strategic partners for the international and domestic organizations in

building sustainable peace” (Rettberg, 2010, p. 5) and this aim has been added to the concept of “Business for Peace”, included in the UN Global Compact¹.

Also, the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), created as a “comprehensive and detailed set of policies, guidelines and procedures for undertaking DDR programs, cover 27 program areas within DDR, based on over 25 years of experience and lessons learned at the country level, and have been the subject of broad consultation” (UN, 2006). As part of the DDR process, the UN has established international standards for the reintegration process and has defined the private sector as one of the main actors and partners for national Governments in this task, especially in the employability area to improve effectiveness of the programs.

According to the IDDRS, the public private partnerships are needed to generate the needed opportunities for absorbing the demobilized in the legal labor market. “Involvement of the private sector in the planning of reintegration programs maximizes the relevance of reintegration assistance and can ensure that training activities support the skills required within the prevailing employment market. Private sector actors should be sensitized to DDR program activities and consulted from the initial program design stage so that the reintegration assistance can target actual needs in the labor market” (UN, 2006).

¹ Business for Peace (B4P) is a business leadership platform launched by UN, which aims to expand and deepen private sector action in support of peace, in the workplace, marketplace and local communities. Identified in Forbes as one of the five areas defining the future of Corporate Social Responsibility, the platform assists companies in implementing responsible business practices aligned with the UN Global Compact Ten Principles in conflict-affected and high-risk areas and catalyze actions to advance peace.

a. Economic Reintegration of Ex Combatants

“Monitoring institutions and a number of scholars have drawn a relationship between, on the one hand, the tendency of demobilized falling back into illegal behavior and, on the other, the lack of opportunities to generate income. In relation to this, International Crisis Group emphasizes the need of an improved economic reintegration program as an important step towards peace in Colombia. International experiences show, however, that this is not easily done” (Thorsell, 2012, p.4).

The United Nations has promoted peacebuilding models, based on liberal ideals, promoting democratic governance, market –led economies, promotion and respect for human rights and social government institutions. A free market, where the private sector can grow and compete, is a good scenario for creating integration opportunities for ex combatants.

The Colombian Economic Reintegration Strategy is mainly focused on these liberal ideas and advocates for enhancing the training to create a competitive demobilized population to be absorb by the labor market and access to job opportunities in the private sector. A second strategy of the policy is to promote the entrepreneurship among the ex combatants, which will also rely on the free market movements and the competitiveness of their projects to hold down. Different studies have shown that having a stable source of income for former combatants is key for the peace consolidation and preventing the re incidence in illegal activities.

There is another group of scholars that emphasize on the need of having parallel non-market solutions for the promotion of the economic reintegration of ex combatants. These are people-centered approaches and recommend separating

the economic reintegration from the DDR process by promoting large-scale employment projects for all affected groups. According to this argument, in terms of socioeconomic and governance issues, the discussion needs to move beyond market analysis to consider also the people's priorities and how they can be achieved taking into account the political, economic, security and time constraints (Jennings, 2008).

So, with the aim of contributing to these debates, this paper will focus in the analysis of the implementation of the economic reintegration program of Colombia and the different Government strategies for promoting the participation of the private sector in the peacebuilding process, especially in the economic reintegration of ex combatants, to identify improvement opportunities facing the challenge of the reintegration of the FARC members.

3. Theoretical Framework

This theoretical framework is focused on the peace theories supporting a comprehensive concept of peace, wider than the classical definition of absence of war or conflict and also the role that the private sector can play to achieve it. Also, will be mentioned the liberal peacebuilding approach that has been guiding the Colombian Government strategies and finally the concept of people-centered interventions in peacebuilding will be taken into account for analyzing the improvement opportunities for the Colombian reintegration strategy.

3.1 Market and non-market options for economic reintegration of ex combatants

The documents setting the international standards for DDR process and also the scholars have traditionally emphasize in the importance of the market driven solutions for guiding this type of practices. The United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), published in 2006 defines that for the economic reintegration of ex combatants and the creation of new jobs it is important to have training, identification of employment opportunities in the private sector and promoting the creation of microenterprises, which is clearly the basis followed for the Colombian reintegration program.

For example, in the debates on how to implement the policy, “in relation to employment, a debate within the Government emerged on whether specific incentives for companies to hire demobilized, such as tax exemption, should be created. Given the resistance against any kind of market distortions, this idea was immediately discarded. Another idea, was to make companies that bade for governmental contracts, obliged to hire demobilized. Neither the Government, nor the private sector, supported this” (Thorsell, 2012), focusing mainly in the generation of capacities, a market solution.

However some scholars also take into account the necessity of having non-market solutions as a complement. For example, “during the DDR process in Liberia there was a (...) mismatch between training thousands of ex-combatants for employment and the severe shortage of jobs, including in the informal economy. This mismatch was only exacerbated by the (...) dependence on the private sector to provide the bulk of employment and generate growth dependence that seems grossly misguided given the private sector’s extremely

low capacity at the end of the war, notwithstanding the pro-private sector and privatization policies mandated by the international financial institutions (Ibid).

Based on this, some scholars recommend creating economic reintegration programs not only for de mobilized ex combatants but for all the people affected during the conflict (Jennings, 2008). This proposal is very relevant in the Colombian case, since one of the biggest claims of the civil society is that members of illegal groups are getting special treatment and benefits while the victims and others civilians struggle with access to the labor market and high level education, so the conditions and reality of the socioeconomic aspects of the country need to be taken into account to establish a suitable and successful policy that responds correctly to the specific needs of the environment.

However, a balance needs to be found since Colombia and other countries living a peacebuilding process have structural restrictions that have to be noticed in order to not harm important economic and social segments, as the private sector. The UN also states “post-conflict stabilization is not necessarily synonymous with restrictive fiscal and monetary policy. On the contrary, capital account movements, including remittances, aid inflows; foreign direct investment and repatriated flight capital may favor the financing of outlays for demobilization, infrastructure, investment and emergency employment programs without undue pressure on the fiscal situation. There is no pre-set formula or single monetary or fiscal policy mix best suited for achieving these macroeconomic outcomes, (United Nations, 2009).

The Colombian reintegration program is clearly following market solutions by the creation of capacities on the demobilized populations to make the suitable for competing for jobs or by helping them to create their own microenterprise

able to compete in a free market. However the results of this strategy are not as positive as expected which gives space for the analysis of the possible causes and improvements facing the reintegration of FARC members in the next years.

In 2011, President Santos created an incentive to those companies that hire a person considered vulnerable, including ex combatants, through taxes exemptions. However there are no data about the impact of this incentive in the creation of direct jobs for the demobilized population and in the ACR are some voices against it, claiming that this subsidy equals less than 10 percent of the salary of the demobilized during a period of maximum three years, which most likely does not create a sufficient initiative towards the employers. Also, it establishes that demobilized can apply for a house subsidy if they have been working as employee for at least 12 months (Thorsell, 2012).

3.2 A Comprehensive Definition of Peace

The concept of peace has been defined from different perspectives, traditionally, from a narrow point of view, it is the absence of conflict or war however, in a wider point of view, a comprehensive definition of peace is necessary for attacking all the forms of violence and the structural causes of the conflict in a peacebuilding process, “violence are avoidable insults to Basic Human Needs (BHN), and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible” (Galtung, 1969, p. 168), meaning that peace requires a balanced system able to keep the economy, society and economy properly functioning for everyone. This balance refers to the sum of survival,

wellbeing, freedom and identity human needs (Galtung, 1990)². In this sense, in a peacebuilding process it is necessary to assure basic securities and opportunities that benefit both victims and offenders for having positive and sustainable results.

According to this, the Colombian peacebuilding process is based on a broader definition of peace and on the aim of providing sufficient opportunities and securities to the victims and demobilized members of the guerilla. The government has been constructing an institutional and legal framework as a mean to achieve a real and long lasting peace³.

However, in a wider perspective, the unequal resources distribution and the difficult access to productive factors determines the structural violence expressed in high poverty levels, low education rates and others (Galtung 1969), this is the case of Colombia and especially of the vulnerable population, including the demobilized people. The BHN are not easily covered for the vulnerable population, especially located in the rural areas where most of the combatants come from.

On the other hand, “contemporary peacebuilding is often described as ‘liberal peacebuilding’. The theoretical underpinning of liberal peacebuilding is the

² According to Galtung, in the case of Colombia, structural symptoms interact to create the root causes of violent conflict. The structural violence doesn't allow the existence of an ecological balance in Colombia and has been the base of the manifestations of direct violence that at the same time has been the cause of the historical existence of structural issues, creating a cyclical relationship.

³ The Colombian peacebuilding process has been atypical since it started the creation of the legal and institutional framework before a peace agreement or even a ceasefire was achieved and has been implementing peacebuilding activities in the middle of the conflict. Most of the international experience in the field regarding this topic is mainly focused on peacebuilding processes that started after a peace agreement was reached.

liberal peace: the idea that certain kinds of, liberally constituted, societies will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are” (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009, P.13). In this sense the United Nations has been promoting this model to guide the peacebuilding initiatives and the Colombian government has adapted this framework to its institutional peace arrangements.

4. Purpose of the Research

The aim of this paper is to analyze the Colombian program of economic reintegration, its implementation and results to give useful recommendations to improve it by adjusting the different strategies according to the lessons learned after almost 10 years of implementation, increasing the engagement of the private sector in the peacebuilding process and strengthening the ACR management.

The research questions that will guide this paper are:

- Has the economic reintegration program of the Colombian Government been successful facilitating the entry of ex combatants in the labor market and self-income generation?
- How can the Strategy be improved facing the implementation of the Peace Agreement with the FARC guerilla?

Even if the role of the private sector in peacebuilding has been studied before, this paper will contribute to the discussion by analyzing it from the perspective of the Colombian case study and will identify the variables that have determined its engagement in the economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

Also, the results will be evaluated as well as the management of the ACR as the main responsible for the programs' implementation. This will lead to make a proposal for improving the reintegration program aiming to achieve better results and increasing its sustainability facing the implementation of the Peace Agreement with the FARC guerilla.

The relevance of this research lays on the lack of a comprehensive research that gathers together and compares different sources to evaluate and analyze the different, internal and external, variables affecting the implementation and results of the economic reintegration program and makes an improvement proposal based on the identified flaws. The main contribution of the study is the effort for contrasting and critically analyzing the different interviews, sources, official data and other relevant information to create an accurate picture of the state of art of the program and its results, which are scattered and presented in different formats and with unstable periodicity.

The hypothesis that will be tested in this paper sets that the Colombian economic reintegration program has been design as a set of mainly market solutions as an answer to the needs of the ex-combatants' and their families of having a stable income. However these solutions have not been sufficient to achieve a successful and sustainable inclusion into the labor market and to promote a massive participation of the private sector.

5. Research Methodology

This paper is a qualitative research focused on the critical analysis and evaluation of the implementation process and results of the Colombian program

for economic reintegration of ex combatants and the designed framework for promoting and running the partnerships with the private sector.

First, the qualitative research is based on the revision of primary and secondary sources used as the basis for a critical analysis of the different official documents and data, published interviews with ex combatants and other relevant actors, academic papers and media news to compare the results of the program and get to know the beneficiaries' perceptions and identify possible gaps.

Second, for the program review and evaluation, the existing indicators were analyzed with the objective of identifying if the results of the program implementation are positive or not in terms of their sustainability in the short and medium run. It takes into account the objectives set by the policy itself, and the chosen variables are those related to the participation in the policy and the economic reintegration of ex combatants

To proceed with the analysis of the results, the variables were studied through the methodology of Project Cycle Management (PCM) useful also to revise programs, based on the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, according to the availability of data and information and as a results a first group of findings were established. Finally, a perception survey was applied to a small group of SME to know about their willingness to participate and their knowledge about the economic reintegration program. The survey focus on SME, since there is already information about the perception of the bigger companies in Colombia and also these have historically been the target of the Government for this type of joint work.

The survey is also mainly focus on this section of companies with the objective of amplifying the existent information in this issue, since in Colombia the SME are the main generators of jobs and also are located all over the country in contrast to the small number of big companies working only in certain regions, in this perspective, the SME may have a big potential to boost the results and sustainability of the program.

For the construction of the program recommendations program a few strategic management tools were used, since the main findings pointed that there is a mismatch between the objectives and the implementation and measurement of the program's actions. So, the first step was creating a PEST analysis for organizing the main macro-environmental factors that have an influence over the economic reintegration program in Colombia and defining the possible directions for the policy recommendations, focused only on the main issues discussed through the paper and over the economic reintegration program.

Then, with this information a SWOT analysis was made since it permits to organize the internal and external factors that influence, positively and negatively, the process of achieving the two specific objectives of the program.

Finally and taking into account the findings, the PEST and SWOT analysis information, a proposal based on the balance scorecard tool was constructed as an improvement recommendation for the economic reintegration program. This tool was chosen because the main issues regarding the program were found in its implementation and monitoring strategies, which can be analyzed through this instrument.

The most relevant limitations for this research and analysis is the lack of sufficient primary information and data related to the results of the program's

implementation regarding its impact and sustainability, also about the perceptions from the private sector point of view regarding their role on the implementation of the economic reintegration program.

6. Definition of terms

For the purpose of this research the following terms will be referred as follows:

- **ACR:** Colombian Agency for Reintegration.⁴
- **Big, Medium, Small and Micro enterprises:** This research will use the classification made by the Colombian Government in the Law 590 of 2000 and its modifications, Law 905 of 2004.

Size	Total Assets
Micro enterprise	Up to
Small	USD 122.953
Medium	From USD 122.954 to USD 1.229.528
Big	More than USD 1.229.529

Table 1, Classification of companies in Colombia

Source: BANCOLDEX; 2017

**Exchange rate 1 USD = 3.000 COP.*

⁴ The institutional name was changed in 2017 to Agency for the Reincorporation and Normalization, however in this study the ACR name will be used since is mainly composed of a historical revision.

- **Ex-combatant:** Person that have voluntarily abandoned their activities as members of Illegal Armed Groups and surrendered to official authorities.
- **Private Sector:** Productive organizations, for-profit owned by private, individual or collective actors.

II. Private Sector and Peacebuilding in Colombia

This chapter will first present a brief historical analysis of the relationship between the public and private sector through the different phases of the conflict in Colombia and the companies' attitude facing past peacebuilding attempts.

The private sector's position during the last fifty years of conflict has been fluctuating and changing according to different variables, for example the level of threat to their business' interests, the direct attacks against the infrastructure, workers and other valuable assets, but also the impact of the conflict in the Colombian economy and society which affects the development and growth expectations of the companies.

These variables will allow identifying the characteristics of the current role of the private sector in peacebuilding in Colombia and demonstrate how the past experiences have created companies more aware of their role, prepared,

professionalized and open to work in association with the public sector in this specific issue (Rettberg, 2013)⁵.

As part of this analytical exercise, the role of the private sector in the Colombian conflict will be revised both as victims and funders of illegal groups, not as a general practice but as a situation presented more than a few times. Later on, a characterization of the dynamics, activities and incentives for their participation in peacebuilding will be made.

Finally this chapter concludes with the understanding of the differentiated roles that private and public sector should take in the creation of partnerships and for promoting a successful reintegration process. Overall this will seed the basis of the relation between companies and peacebuilding for continuing with the analysis of the specific case of economic reintegration in the following chapters

1. Historical Analysis

“Marked to different extents by the vagaries of political and economic crises, the Colombian business sector is not a newcomer to peace negotiations in the country. However, in the course of history, its participation has become both more intense and more professional due to its accumulated experience and knowledge of the challenges involved in peacebuilding” (Ibid).

In the 1980’s, during the first attempt to start a peace negotiation with the different armed guerrilla groups in the country, the private sector didn’t show

⁵ The study focuses on big companies, most of them multinationals that have traditionally been in charge of extractive activities and large scale agricultural projects, however, small companies located in remote areas because of the nature of their activity have also been included and affected but in a smaller amount.

commitment for supporting these initiatives. “At that time there was no awareness among businesspeople that we should be a part of this [effort to negotiate peace] [...]. The private sector in the 1980s was either skeptical or clearly opposed to peace negotiations. [...] Remember, this was during the Cold War” (Rettberg, 2002).

As a result of this first attempt, a group of FARC members demobilized generating interest in the private sector for engaging in future initiatives, however their participation was still very limited and shy, taking into account that during this phase the conflict remained a mainly political one and in a low scale of violence compared with the following years.

During 1990’s the private sector became more aware of the limitations imposed to the Colombian economy by the ongoing conflict and its effects on their own growing and development, mainly influenced by the results of the global economic crisis of the beginning of the decade and the raising violence in the guerrilla actions promoted with the resources received from new illegal practices as drug trafficking and kidnapping. “Fears that the conflict was scaring away foreign investors and preventing domestic capital from being used more productively figured prominently among business arguments in favor of talks,(...) many businesspeople believed that the long-standing Colombian conflict had finally become a liability to the country’s competitiveness both regionally and globally” (Rettberg, 2013).

These were the main incentives for the participation of private organizations in the peace negotiations held during 1998 and 2002, led by President Andrés Pastrana, where the representatives of the private sector had a relevant role as

facilitators and advocates of civil society, this was their first strong and active engagement in peacebuilding issues.

As a result, a stronger conscience about the capacity and the role the private sector could exercise for creating win-win solutions hand to hand with the government was created in the country. Consequently, this “activated flows of resources to corporate-led peacebuilding activities, and attracted the attention of international donors and development offices and Peace is better business was the standard slogan expressed by public and private officials alike” (Ibid). Many companies started creating and implementing their own initiatives in different conflicting regions with the aim of bringing development and peace as a counterpart to the violence created by the guerrilla groups.

However, this attempt of peaceful negotiations is seen in the history of Colombia as one of the biggest failures since no real improvement in the violence rates was achieved and neither an agreement reached, nevertheless the lessons learned for both public and private organizations has been useful for the future peace initiatives.

This failure led to a completely change of strategy, supported by both the private sector and the Colombian civil society in general, which massively voted to elect Álvaro Uribe as president who promoted a military strategy to defeat the guerrillas both in the voting of 2002 and 2006. The new approach affected the engagement of the private organizations and their role in peacebuilding activities, which were severely reduced, however some of them were maintained, especially those that implied a public-private association, for example the reintegration program.

In addition, the business community, in contrast to those in other transitional countries and those during previous periods of the Colombian armed conflict, maintained its pledge to pay taxes related to both peace and war efforts (Rettberg and Rivas, 2012).

During the first period of Juan Manuel Santos' government, the attempt of reaching a negotiated solution with the illegally armed groups became relevant again because even though the military approach of Álvaro Uribe could be defined as successful, the conflict in Colombia did not disappear but evolved instead and adapted to the new circumstances. During this last effort to reach peace, the private sector has again played an active and relevant role in promoting and facilitating the negotiations basically because the companies have identified the economic and security benefits of reaching a peaceful end to the fifty years conflict.




Figure 1. Intensity of the Colombian Conflict

Source: Salas, 2014

Summing up, this figure shows the dynamic of the intensity fluctuations in the Colombian conflict and the historical review presents the relation between the

level of violence and hostilities and the engagement of the companies in peacebuilding activities. It is relevant to highlight the increases of violence in 1990's and a second one in the 2000's, matching the picks of the private sector engagement.

Finally, the current peace process in Colombia could be defined as atypical since the level of the conflict was not heavily increasing but the companies have been participating actively in peacebuilding activities and supporting the peace negotiations. This attitude shows a private sector more mature and experienced, aware of the benefits that peace can bring them and, since they have already lived it, the dangers and problems that a reactivation of the conflict can bring.

This historical background is useful to understand the variations in the levels of commitment of the Colombian private sector with peacebuilding activities, the past decades gave them the knowledge and experience for reaching and presenting nowadays a more mature position about their capacity and responsibilities in the promotion of peace in Colombia, however the levels of participations vary according certain characteristics of the companies, which will be study on the next chapters.

2. Participation of the Private Sector in the Colombian Conflict

The Colombian conflict, as many others, merged as a response to the lack of opportunities and the inequality in the society “furthermore, as all countries depend on investment for economic stability, governments often cater to private interests in an attempt to maintain or stimulate economic growth, and these

efforts tend to heavily favor elite interests while further hurting the lower class” (Novick, 2012).

The Colombian economy is highly defined by the extraction of natural resources, specially oil and coal, and also for its agriculture production, the places where these activities are held are usually located distant from the urban areas. At the same time it is relevant to highlight that the Colombia conflict has taken place mostly in rural areas, leading to the interaction between companies, both national and international, and illegal armed groups, leading to a shared territory situation in many cases in areas that were characterized by the absence of the state presence

Despite the existence of the armed conflict, the Colombia economy has been growing fast during the last decade and this growth has been motivated mainly by the petroleum and coal boom that attracted big amounts of Foreign Direct Investment, mainly in poor, rural areas. However, the necessity of the private sector of dealing with armed groups in Colombia started by the end of 1970’s when many companies of the oil sector suffer extortions from the guerrilla, actions that continued and expanded during the 80’s and 90’s.

The status of the private sector and the conflict in Colombia can be seen both as a victim and as funders of the illegal armed groups. During more than thirty years many companies, operated freely because of their agreements and payments to guerrillas and paramilitaries to prevent actions against their assets, operations and employees.

Some multinational companies faced accusations of creating economic relations with leaders of different illegal groups, which was ratified, later on with the

testimonies of demobilized paramilitaries leading to the judgment of these companies (Massé and Camargo, 2012).

As a victim of the conflict, the companies have suffered many attacks that threaten their stability and security, for example regarding the kidnapping of employees in the hydrocarbons sector, the data for 2011 presents a significant increase of 377% compared to the previous year, from 9 cases to 4340. Regarding the attacks against the oil infrastructure, the data of the Ministry of Defense reports that between 2011 and 2012 a variation of 185% was presented (Ibid)⁶.

However, the actions of some companies helped to promote and increase the conflict through their actions and strategies. Some of the conducts of companies that have worsen the conflict in Colombia are for example, remaining passive in the conflict, “choosing to internalize the impact as an additional operating cost rather than working to quell the violence, other have taken advantage of the conflict, demonstrated by the success of private security and insurance companies. Even worse are companies who directly contribute to violence through repressive labor practices and support of paramilitary groups” (Novick, 2012).

One of the cases that set an example of the active role of the private sector in the promotion of the violence in Colombia as a strategy to protect its own interests, is the American Company, Chiquita Brand, that worked in Colombia through its subsidiary, Banadex, Chiquita’s most profitable banana producer

⁶ During this period many international companies decided to close their businesses in Colombia, however, for many others, the profits and the large scale and nature of their activities didn’t allow this shift of location, this situation had a big negative impact in the economy, which served as a basis for the following policies and the change of approach regarding the armed conflict.

until 2004 (Ibid). This company agreed to pay to paramilitary groups, fighting against guerrillas and the Colombian army, in order to prevent hostile actions.

These resources were used to buy weapons and fight against the guerrillas in the company's area of actions but also to carry on illicit, territorial and social control, basically the right to social protest in Urabá, the region of banana production, was eradicated, and the company stored munitions and weapons that belonged to the paramilitary groups. Because of these actions the American Chiquita Brands was pleaded guilty in 2007 for financing an armed group in Colombia and fined \$ 25 million after accepting that she handed over a total of \$ 1.7 million to Colombian paramilitaries between 1997 and 2004, arguing the need of protecting their workers' lives (Caracol Noticias, 2017).

Similar examples can be found in different sectors and regions of Colombia, where the private sector, in the aim of protecting its productive activities and assets agreed to give funds to the armed groups, helping to increase their financial resources and expanding their illegal activities.

Currently, the investigations against different companies are still open and the Colombian High Commissioner for Peace mentioned that there were more than 13,000 pages of investigations against businessmen in the Office of the Prosecutor for this crimes, however given the numerous cases of civilian participation in the conflict, some have proposed to examine them through the transitional justice system.

However the Colombian civil society, victims and government leaders have pushed and demand to the private sector taking responsibility for their actions and as part of the process they have had to prove their real engagement in the

peacebuilding process through funds and programs to promote its different stages.


3. Why the private sector engages in peacebuilding in Colombia?

The participation of the Colombian private sector in peacebuilding activities had different incentives along the past years. Around the 1990's and beginning of 2000's the main incentive was to reduce the impacts and costs of the conflict on the companies' economic structure, but currently the participation of different sectors shows that there may be other variables influencing their participation, for example the realization of the expanding and growing opportunities that could be realized on a peaceful environment (Rettberg, 2013).

A survey held in 2008 with businessmen in Colombia shows that, under their perception, the conflict has held down the economic development and activities but this cost has been assumed by certain group of companies defined by variables like its origin, the region in Colombia where they operate and the sector of the economic activity instead of evenly among all the economic actors.

The survey also showed that most of the Colombian companies suffered indirect costs as a consequence of the conflict instead of direct costs, also that small businesses were more likely to pay extortions to the illegal groups and also to close their operations, and that companies working in extractive industries tend to report most the direct costs related to the conflict while services companies the least. Taking this into account a correlation between the perception of high conflict costs and the willingness to participate and support in peacebuilding process can be established (Ibid).

To the question *in what way would you run your company differently in the absence of armed conflict in Colombia (in percentages)?* The survey had the following results, showing the restrictions war possesses on them.



Source: Rettberg (2008).

Figure 2. How would the companies in Colombia run different their business in the absence of the armed conflict?

Source: *Ibid.*

According to the UNDP Human Development Report for Colombia in 2003, between 1.5% and 4.5% of GDP was reduced as a direct consequence of the armed conflict. In 2004, the World Bank estimated that if Colombia had achieved the peace 20 years ago, the average income of Colombians would be 50% higher (Morales et al, 2012).

Because of this, after fifty years of internal conflict, the Colombian private sector has multiple incentives for actively support the peacebuilding process during the past years and even more nowadays after the signing of the Peace Agreement with the FARC guerrilla. Summing up these incentives can be organized as following:

First, the higher costs that the conflict possess on companies, mostly in security but also on the prospects of economic growth and benefits. A reactivation of the conflict with an intensity similar to that presented during the middle 90's to early 2000's is the biggest fear of the Colombian private sector and is a possible situation since almost 9000 people remain engaged on illegal activities and the urban violence and criminal and drug trafficking bands formed by demobilized combatants are creating social and political instability, so the current peace process is a big opportunity for consolidating the advances achieved so far. This consolidation would enhance the investor's confidence in the country and also would facilitate the operations to meet the requirements and demands of the international partners.

On the other hand, a relevant group of companies already have experienced participating in peacebuilding government-led programs during the past demobilization of guerrilla and paramilitary groups, and these have become aware of what it takes to carry out a reintegration process and the dangers of not doing it properly.

Third, a damaged image of the private sector as funder of the armed groups or as violator of Human Rights against vulnerable population in rural areas has led to the pressure of civil society and other relevant stakeholders in the country to assume responsibility through the support to peacebuilding programs.

Fourth, a positive consequence of the past years economic growth and the increasing of the FDI received in the country and the internationalization of the national firms is the increased need of fulfilling international Corporate Social Responsibility standards, like the UN Global Compact and norms for corporate practice that enhances the role of the company as an active member of the

society where it operates and promotes the hand in hand work with the public sector and to create positive social outcomes from their economic activity.

Finally, “the majority of the Colombian private sector would be among the winners in the event of a successful peace accord. Although the costs of conflict have been steadily declining over the past years, improved security, fewer operational costs, more investment partners, and greater international opportunities resulting from the demobilization of the largest remaining guerrilla force in the country are still sufficiently attractive to enlist business support” (Rettberg, 2013).

4. Public and Private Sector Roles in Peacebuilding

The Colombian case is a relevant example for analyzing the interactions between government and companies in a peacebuilding scenario since the country, as mentioned, has been able to maintain a functioning and solid private sector and even attracting FDI resources during the conflict period. In a process of national and international importance as a peace negotiation and a later peacebuilding process, it is relevant to clarify and differentiate the fields of action and responsibilities that each actor, public and private can and should take.

The overall purpose is to successfully combine the potential and capacities of the public and private sector to fulfill the requirements of the process and achieve a mutually beneficial objective. However it has to be clear that for the essence of a peacebuilding process, the government should be forefront and the private sector is a powerful ally that, as part of the society in conflict, should participate in the construction of the solution.

Also, this participation has to be limited to the aspects related or derived of its own activity and must not be seen as a replacement of the government or engage in activities that are not beneficial or even damaging for their business since the main purpose is to have even stronger companies to grow faster after the peace consolidation.

According to this, in a first phase of negotiations the government is in charge of leading and conducting the approaches with the illegal groups as well as facilitating the interactions with other sectors of the society like the private sector, to assure maintaining always its legality.

In this scenario the main role of the private sector associations and leaders is to accompany and work hand in hand with the government in the process to assure also the representation of their interests in the possible peace accord. The participation of this sector is also helpful to give credibility and validation to the outcomes, as well as to reduce the probabilities of strong opposition from the companies. Basically this first phase should be inclusive and the private sector as a highly representative faction of the civil society in a country and a highly determinant faction of the economic stability of the country should be taken into account and actively included.

In the case of Colombia peace negotiation process, the private sector leaders participated as members of the official negotiating group, counting with a permanent seat in the talks, one of these is representatives is Luis Carlos Villegas, president of the largest associations of enterprises in Colombia, ANDI, whose daughter was also kidnapped by the guerilla, also others businessmen have worked as facilitators and sponsors.

The Government has also picked businessmen to lead the peace process; an example is Frank Pearl, currently high commissioner for peace. “Their presence in the negotiating team is, overall, a positive sign. Not because they represent the private sector as a whole, but because their understanding of and contact with the sector will most likely provide the legitimacy and resources required to support the fledgling peace process in Colombia” (Ibid).

In following chapters the complimentary of the roles of public and private sector in the specific case of Colombia, regarding the economic reintegration of ex combatants, will be analyzed.

III. The Reintegration of Ex Combatants in Colombia

The Colombian government has been working for several years in the creation and implementation of different mechanism and institutions to promote the reconciliation among the society and, what has been called, a peacebuilding within the armed conflict. One of these mechanisms is the National Policy for Social and Economic Reintegration of Members of Illegal Armed Groups (PRSE). This is the main tool to materialize the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex combatants.

The policy is a long term plan with the main objective of ensuring an effective reincorporation to the civil society for the members of the illegal armed groups, that have shown their will to do so, and it relies on both an individual and a community approach to facilitate the integration of the demobilized into civilian life (Gruesso, López and Antón, 2016). This chapter will present the policy’s characteristics, with the focus on the economic reintegration of ex combatants,

the achieved results and challenges facing the implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla.

1. The Colombian National Policy of Social and Economic Reintegration for Members of Illegal Armed Groups.

The reintegration policy of Colombia is an attempt to centralize in a coordinating institution and improve the past efforts for receiving the members of different armed groups in Colombia that show the will of returning to civil society. This attempt takes into account the lessons learned from past peace agreements, group demobilizations and the work with individual demobilized that voluntarily surrender⁷.

According to the Department of National Planning of Colombia (DNP), the reintegration policy has two main objectives; the first one is to contribute to the generation of capacities, skills and abilities in the demobilized population to allow them, as any other Colombian, to perform properly in the labor market. The second is to facilitate their entry to the legal economic and labor market by generating skills, supporting employability processes, and facilitating and supporting the development of productive plans (DNP, 2008).

The reintegration policy is implemented by the ACR, a government institution that designed the ‘reintegration route’, composed by three stages, basic, intermediate and advanced, and lasts approximately six and a half years to be

⁷ The ACR and the reintegration policy were built on the basis of a work started in 2003 when the Program for the Reincorporation to Civil Life was created as part of the Ministry of Justice and evolved to the High Presidential Counseling for the Reintegration in 2006 until the ACR was established in 2011.

completed. In the basic stage, the objective is to achieve reintegration into civilian life; the intermediate seeks to promote community and economic reintegration and the advanced to achieve sustainability in legality.




Figure 3. Stages of the Reintegration Process

Source: Translated from Grueso et al., 2016.

According to this, the reintegration policy takes into account a total of eight dimensions: personal, productive, family, habitability, health, education, citizenship and security to assure a successful return to civil life of ex combatants. This paper is focus on the productive dimension of the policy that starts in the intermediate stage. In this area the reintegration policy seeks to ensure that the demobilized population and their families to have access to education, health, labor market and effective social promotion mechanisms (Ibid).

The spent budget per area of attention presents, which are the areas of the policy those that receive more resources for their promotion. Between 2008 and 2014, within the different areas of reintegration program, psychosocial

accompaniment and basic education, have received most of the resources and a smaller amount has been for the training for work area, which gives a first hint about the general results specifically in the economic reintegration of ex combatants that will be analyzed later.

Area of attention	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Jun-14	Total
Psychosocial Accompaniment	30,986	34,011	32,725	32,418	32,809	30,700	25,777	219,426
Education	5,336	25,681	23,602	18,011	10,459	7,814	5,636	96,539
Training for Work	11,062	10,885	10,129	7,384	3,210	4,500	2,843	50,013

Table 2. Budget expenditure per strategy of the reintegration policy.

Source: *Ibid.* *Numbers in COP millions.

1.1 The Participation of Ex Combatants

Colombia has experienced two major group demobilizations but also during the past decades has received many individual demobilized. Among 1990 and 1998 a total of 4.991 people reentered the civil life and from 2003 to 2014 a total of 56.939 gave up on the armed war (Contraloría General de la República, 2014). Of this total a great majority has participated in the reintegration process but most of them have not finished it yet or quit.




Figure 4.
Participation in the reintegration process.
Source: *Ibid.*




Figure 5. Status in the reintegration process.
Source: Ibid.

According to the official numbers of the ACR, only a 16.68% of the people entering the program have successfully finish it, meaning they reached a full reintegration to civil society, including the economic stage. However, the total of absent and retired people, summing a 49% is a red flag for the accuracy of the program and the real capacity of the Colombian government to assure a proper reintegration.

2. The Economic Reintegration Program

All the stages of the reintegration process are interconnected, because of this, for the successful implementation of the economic reintegration of ex combatants; the previous steps must be correctly fulfilled. A reintegrated person must be socially active in the civil society, have a proper education and training for work and mental stability that allows coexisting pacifically with others.

The main issues taken into account to define the current structure of the economic reintegration strategy of Colombia were the low levels of formal education of the demobilized people, the limited or non-existent experience and

training for work as well as structural market factors that impede the stable generation of income (DNP, 2008).

2.1 Low levels of formal education for demobilized

First, most of the population in reintegration process can be labeled as ‘functional illiterates’ since they abandoned school at a very young age. On the other hand, Colombia has limitations on the education options and the relevance of the education services; according to the region, the education offer may be limited only to elementary school. The country doesn’t counts with a specific educational offer for the demobilized population, which raises the deserting probabilities.

2.2 Limited or non-existent experience and training for work

The demobilized population is not trained in any legal occupation and don’t have the abilities and the social or commercial references to find a formal work or start a business for their own. Also, they have many restrictions for accessing to productive factors. Their mindset is another barrier for their economical reintegration; this population tends to have a short-term vision of life making it difficult to engage in long-term training or productive processes. Finally in some regions of the country, the private sector doesn’t take its social responsibility on the consolidation of peace; so do not participate in peacebuilding initiatives (DNP, 2008).

Aiming to contribute to the economic reintegration of ex combatants by tackling these issues, the policy seeks to contribute to the creation of abilities and development of skills for work and entrepreneurship in the targeted population, to ease their insertion in the legal labor market for the income generation.

2.3 The Strategy

The policy establishes three lines of work to promote the economic reintegration. The first one is promoting the training for work to facilitate the access to the labor market, by developing tailor made education programs for the target population but also identifying the needs of the productive sector and the interests of the ex-combatants. The objective is to them give them the proper tools for competing in the labor market.

The second line is facilitating the employability as an opportunity for the income generation through capacitating the population to find a job or to help them in this process; the ACR identifies opportunities through lobbying and joint work with interested companies of the public and private sector. The main principle is to maintain the independence of the employer for choosing the needed profile and the responsibility of the ex-combatant to maintain the job with his skills.

The third line of work is the development of business plans to promote the entrepreneurship. The ACR facilitates the technical, commercial and financial analysis of the productive projects, the accompaniment and advice through the whole process and the seed capital. The strategy also establishes the creation of an investment fund with resources donated by the private sector to fund the best business plans⁸.

⁸ The 'Social Work' strategy was not included in this research because in its current state; it is not designed to create capacities or facilitate the economic reintegration but to fulfill some social work hours as reparation to the community.

3. Relevance of Economic Reintegration for Peacebuilding

The labor dimension is relevant in a peacebuilding process since it is one the basic demands of former combatants to do not relapse on illegal activities and improve their socioeconomic conditions as a pillar for a sustainable peace (Jaramillo, 2016). Even if the recidivism phenomena can't be totally explained by the impossibility of accessing the labor market, a correlation between these two variables can be determined.

To analyze this correlation, the NGO, Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), made a study with a total of 1158 demobilized and found out that 76% of them is not recidivist⁹, while 24% has engaged in recidivism (FIP, 2014). To reach this conclusion, they created three different measures to identify direct recidivism, proclivity to recidivism and vulnerability to recidivism.

In the analysis of the variables that explain recidivism in ex combatants, the existence of a stable job has a relevant role, especially in the measure of vulnerability to recidivism (Ibid). As many authors have point out already, unemployment is one of the main causes for returning to illegal activities; others have called out for the necessity of creating and maintaining an economic reintegration policy that guarantees constant income and reduce the probability of recidivism.

The government itself cannot implement this effort, since the companies are the basis of the productive sector, an effective and sustainable strategy must count with their active participation. This has already been proved in the Colombian case, where the most successful initiatives for the economic reintegration have

⁹ Recidivism is considered not only as going back to the armed conflict but to engage in any type of illegal activity.

been constructed and implemented hand in hand with the private sector, however, as mentioned before, the guidance on how to conduct this process is a government role but in partnership with the companies. The successful and unsuccessful experiences will be review later on.

IV. Evaluation of the Economic Reintegration Program

The reintegration policy and the ACR have established internal indicatives and monitoring tools to measure the implementation of the economic reintegration program, however these focus mainly on its management and immediate results but lacks of sustainability and impact measures. In this chapter the different existing indicators will be analyzed with the purpose of identifying if the results of the program implementation are positive or not in terms of the policy and program objectives and its sustainability in the short and medium run.

The general purpose of the policy is to reintegrate in the social, community and economic areas to the demobilized members of the armed illegal groups; to support, train and sensitize the demobilized people to empower them to get involved autonomously and take part of the advantages and opportunities offer by the civil life and fulfill their social duties, also to promote the coexistence and reconciliation of the recipient communities to maximize their acceptance over the demobilized population (DNP, 2008).

The long-term objectives are to incite the demobilizations and boost a peaceful conclusion to the armed violence. Also to consolidate the advances regarding the security issues in the country and contribute to peacebuilding through the disarmament and demobilization of people in the armed illegal groups. The policy contributes to peacebuilding by creating spaces for the harmonic

encounter and tolerance among the population. Another purpose is to prevent the return to illegality of the demobilized people and guarantee the non-repetition of violent acts and the diminish of victims of armed violence in the country (Ibid)

Finally, the specific objectives regarding the economic reintegration of ex combatants are:

- To contribute to the creation of abilities and skills that allows the successful integration to the labor market and self-income generation.
- To facilitate the entering to economic legal activities creating labor skills and supporting employability processes as well as facilitating and developing productive plans (Ibid).

For this evaluation different sources were consulted beside the official ACR data and the baseline created for the policy construction in 2008; these additional sources are the results of the control institutions of Colombia, for example the office of the General Attorney, in charge of revising and evaluating the policy implementation. Finally published interviews with ex-combatants were revised with the aim of contrast the results information and amplify the information and understanding of the results and finally identify gaps, strengths and weaknesses.

1. Program Positioning and Participation

Of the total of demobilized people in Colombia, the higher number is located in the departments of Antioquia, Meta and Valle del Cauca and the city of Bogotá itself has received the second larger number. According to the following map, made for this investigation, these places are also those with the larger number of companies in Colombia are located and with the higher production generation.




Figure 6. Ex combatants location and departments with higher numbers of companies and GDP.

Source: Made by the author with ACR information.

The results of this comparison shows there is an important opportunity for the economic reintegration of ex combatants on these specific places and targeting them will allow to reach the biggest number of beneficiaries since, as a result of the Colombian context, they consider will find better economic opportunities in the most prosperous places. However, to get the best results of this situation is basic to have a suitable strategy to incentive the private sector to participate in the program, which will be analyzed in following sections.

According to the official data obtained through the Information System for Reintegration (SIR), of the historical numbers of demobilized people between 2008 and 2014, a total of 85.37% (ACR, 2017) has entered the reintegration program, showing a high acceptance and will to engage in this process. Taking into account a group of interviews made to a group of demobilized; there are different ways on how they decide to enter this process, some of them based on the institutional arrangements and others on the previous knowledge about the program of relatives or people closed to the combatants. Two examples of this are shown is these interviews translated for this paper:

I was a trusted person of comrades, I was sent to the towns to make intelligence, or to buy things. My brother was captured a year before making that decision, so through him I learned that there was a Reintegration program where they supported him. And on an opportunity that I left I came on the direct bus to the city and I surrendered (Espada, 2016 - translated).

The army sergeant called me and said there was a government program for demobilization and told me my daughter was already in that program and that was the option they gave me. Otherwise I would be charged for terrorism, so I said I would join because I don't want to be in jail at my age. I was also

thinking about my daughter that was already out, so I decided to join (Mejía, 2014 - translated).

The data and the reviewed interviews show that the ACR and the program has been able to gained recognition among the different Colombian institutions involved in the conflict and also with the combatants in the field and their close social circle, so this is one the policy's strengths.

The SIR numbers show that of the 85.37% that participated in the program, the 11.67% is considered absent, meaning he hasn't officially resigned but has not been participating in the reintegration and monitoring activities; 35.85% have successfully finished the reintegration program; 24.92% is still active in the process and 27.56% (ACR, 2017) have been spelled or quit and are accordingly out of it. Summing the percentages of those with the absent and out of the program status shows that almost the 40% of the total of participants are not continuing their reintegration route for different reasons but the strategy failed keeping them active, presenting a weak point for improvement.

Some of the revised interviews mention different factors for quitting or not actively participating in the program, pointing the impossibility of working and attending the reintegration activities at the same time. Even if the program establishes economic incentives for those who participate in the activities, the received money is not enough for covering the basic needs (Mejía, 2014).

2. Results of the Economic Reintegration Program

The economic reintegration program is highly related with the previous stage of education that beneficiaries must fulfill as part of the capacities and skills

generation for being able to find their own job or benefit from those managed by the ACR. About this, the official data shows that from the total number of people that entered the program, 8,36% only know how to write and read (literacy), 27,4% has finished the first school cycle (primary), 15,89% finished the second school cycle and 30,31% the high school education (ACR, 2017).

This information is relevant as a basis for the employability and entrepreneurship strategies since gives guidance about the type of jobs and business projects that may be suitable for the beneficiaries, however this scholar levels are insufficient for creating work skills and specific job training need to complement this phase of the process.

2.1 Training for work

According to the ACR, until 2014, 3.142 demobilized have benefit of trainings for work, meaning that only the 6% of the total population has participated. For these, 81% of the quota was for special classes, 5% for events, 4% for technical studies and 1% (ACR, 2017) for qualified workers. According to this, 86% of the quota was used for short classes, attending to punctual needs and knowledge actualization of unemployed. Finally, 77% of courses were taught in classrooms and 6% through virtual modality, there was no information reported about the remaining percentage (Reyes et al, 2014). This situation is far from ideal since the education level of the ex-combatants has already been identified as low, focusing on short courses cannot create new abilities or skills for work.

The departments with the highest numbers of beneficiaries match with the places where most of the demobilized live, 19% in Antioquia and 10% in Bogota (Reyes et al, 2014). In this issue the biggest identified challenge is to be

able to coordinate the necessity of the demobilized of having a sufficient income, so they have to work, and the schedules of the courses and also the pertinence of these. Since the objective in this matter is to create abilities and skills for work, it should be congruent with the type of courses taken.

2.2 The occupation status of beneficiaries

Moving on, the occupation status of the beneficiaries is another relevant element to take into account for evaluating the policy. Of the total of participants in the program 71.4% are occupied and 28.6% are unemployed of which around 15% is economic inactive. Of those who are leveled as occupied, 73% are working in the informal sector and 27% (ACR, 2017) in the formal, however, of these has been revealed by the General Attorney of Colombia, that there is an important percentage that are receiving less than the minimum wage, lacking the proper conditions for achieving the reintegration goal, since some of the jobs offer the minimum wage or less (Ordoñez et al, 2011). Among those who are working in the formal sector some economic activities have received the biggest amount of demobilized, 30% of them work in the security sector, 11% in construction and 8% in the industrial sector.

The high percentage of the beneficiaries working in the informal sector, 71.4%, is also a red flag for the economic reintegration since it determines the absence of legal standards for the job, as well as the social protection that comes with it. There is also a big risk of not always obtaining the basic means for subsistence. This data matches with the information given by interviewed demobilized.

I work by my own in a truck selling oats and donuts, that's my livelihood, I earn daily \$30,000 (usd10) or \$35,000 pesos (usd12) daily there are bad and good

days. Well thank God I've had good luck and I can always earn what I need daily for my house (translated Briceño and Bonilla, 2016).

This show the high risk of the income, which has no stability and depends on daily variables and circumstances, another participant of the program mentions how he arranged his own jobs and secures his income. *I did not have job opportunities, I found my jobs by myself, I work in a farm doing different activities, especially of security and collecting the crop* (Ibid).

Even if this situation is far from ideal, is in certain extend a reflection of the Colombian job market where in the general population the job informality reaches the 47% (Portafolio, 2017), however the percentage in the demobilized population is 24% higher than the average of the rest of the society and it is the result of different variables like the lack of education and training for work, the stigmatization of this population among others. Also presents a relevant improvement area to increase the employability of ex combatants in the formal sector as a way to assure the sustainability of the program's results.

2.3 Employability of ex combatants

The existent data “shows that from 2007 to March 2012 just below 3.200 participants directly benefitted from the employability program. Of these nearly 1.900 have been offered jobs arranged by the ACR. The different revision have shown that of 595 jobs arranged by the ACR in 2008, 20 percent were paid lower than the legal minimum salary, 47 percent offered a minimum salary and only 1 percent more than two minimum salaries” (Thorsell, 2012). According to this, the economic reintegration program is not providing the minimum conditions for the demobilized persons and their families.

The number of companies working in partnerships with the ACR during the last years in the economic reintegration of ex combatants have presented a relevant improvement, in 2012 only 115 were engaged in the process and currently a total of 650 are directly involved creating between 1.500 and 2.000 job positions monthly (ACR, 2016). Also, 8.000 job positions have been found directly by the ex-combatants in different sectors and in most of them their employers don't know about their condition because consider this would put them on disadvantage or even endangered their job. This situation presents a challenge for the ACR team to improve their lobby activities with the private sector and achieve a change of perception towards the ex-combatants and facilitate their entrance to the legal productive activities.

Since the employability program is mainly led by the market forces, the role of the ACR focus in lobby activities with the companies to avoid the stigmatization and permit the competition of ex combatants for the job opportunities, it is deeply related and dependent of the capacity building and job training process. Mittrioti stated "I do not ask the employer to hire the demobilized person, that would be a positive discrimination, in terms of equity, it would be inequitable for the victims, for the poor, for many Colombians; what we ask the businessman is not to deprive the demobilized of the opportunity to be demobilized" (Dinero, 2017).

Some investigations have been conducted regarding the stigmatization issue and the obtained results are far from positive. An investigation made by Angelika Rettberg shows the entering to formal employment of the demobilized people doesn't have social acceptance, the participants believe society has a bad perception of them, creating a form of discrimination for their membership to an illegal armed group in the past. Between 40 and 60% of the people that

participated in this survey would be willing to give work to a demobilized. However the results of a second survey made by Garcia, Rodriguez and Seligson shows that in no case more than 41% of the participants would be willing to give work to a demobilized person (Grueso et al, 2016).

2.4 The Business Plans

A total of 13.993 disbursements of seed capital have been made to support equal number of business plans approved by the ACR to benefit 18.308 ex combatants, of these the 80% was given to demobilized that finished the reintegration route and the 20% to people in the process (ACR, 2017). Also, according to the location trend, in this component the majority of disbursements were made in the city of Bogota and the Antioquia department, where the second biggest city of Colombia is located, showing a trend to locate in the urban areas.

However, the current situation of the business units is what can gives a hint over their sustainability and capacity for generating an income that permits satisfying the beneficiaries' basic needs. According to the program revision made by the General Attorney in 2014, 32% of the business units were closed, 22% working, 3.6% in risk of closure and the status of 42.4% was unknown (Reyes et al, 2014), this situation is shows a relevant weakness of the program and is the lack of capacity for monitoring the impact of these projects and the correct use of the public resources.

Finally, it is also relevant to analyze the success of the active projects for economically reintegrating their owners since, according to the ACR information; these generate incomes just above the poverty line, which gives

not enough resources to cover all the basic needs for their families. With this extremely low income, the micro entrepreneurs supported by the ACR are not able to rely on this option for assuring their subsistence. “Micro-business initiatives have to reach a certain size, before they can compete on the market. Therefore, rather than being a magic key to poverty alleviation, microenterprise can be seen as merely a way to help unemployed poor to generate enough income to have the most basic needs covered” (Thorsell, 2012).

Consistent with this trend, one of the interviewed beneficiaries mentions: *I presented a project to have an Internet cafe; my cousin helped me with all the required papers because he provided me everything for the business. They approved and gave me four millions but at the end I got three because I paid the people from the office to help to speed up the process, there, they tie the projects and ask for commissions, then I got three million, but I closed it, that business did not work* (Devia and Rojas, 2016 - translated).

This testimony and the available data present a worrying picture of the situation and sustainability of the entrepreneurship component and allow the identification of relevant weaknesses that undermine its capacity of success. On one hand and according to the available data, the sustainability of the projects is low, most of them have closed because of the lack of capacity of creating sufficient incomes to the beneficiaries, showing an important gap in the evaluation process of proposals and the profile of proponents that ACR does before giving the seed capital, this has turned into a waste of public resources since the main objective of creating microenterprises has not been achieved.

On the other hand, the complaints over the corruption in the regional offices of ACR for the disbursement of resources is also a red flag for the image,

sustainability and effectiveness of the program since the money is received by those who pay a fee to the people in charge of this procedure and not those with the best opportunities and capacities for creating a profitable microenterprise. If this situation is repetitive the program may be seen as a onetime opportunity for receiving certain money and not as an opportunity for creating a stable income source for their families.

Finally, most of these issues are related to the low monitoring capacity of the ACR to make a proper accompaniment of the approval and implementation of the projects, to the point that there is no information at all about 42.4% of these. A possible explanation for this situation is that ACR program has been focused on other stages of the reintegration route and not so much on the economic reintegration of ex combatants. For example, the budget allocated for promoting the business plans component represents only 3.1% (Reyes, et al, 2014) meaning this aspect has not been considered as priority in the implementation of the reintegration process.

So, even if the reintegration policy in Colombia has been established as the main tool to assure a proper social and economic reintegration of ex combatants as a way to give them opportunities to reenter the civil society and prevent the return to illegality. However the measure of the strategy's results are focused on the immediate results but have no perception of the sustainability and real impact of the economic reintegration of the beneficiaries. This first part of the analysis focused on revising the available data and the perception of some demobilized people, with the aim of identifying the main gaps of the program and make an improvement proposal.

3. Analysis of the Results of the Economic Reintegration Program

The variables taken into account in this first analysis are related to the participation in the policy and those related to the economic reintegration of ex combatants and the main issues found will be summarized.

To proceed with the analysis of the results of the economic reintegration program the selected criteria will be studied through the methodology of Project Cycle Management (PCM) used also to revise programs. There will be a review of the program based on the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, according to the availability of data and information.

To conceptualize the selected evaluation criteria thorough the PCM framework, the terms will be used as follows:

- **Relevance:** Seeks to evaluate the congruence of the program with the objectives established in the national development plan of Colombia and in the reintegration policy and also with the demands and needs of the beneficiaries.
- **Effectiveness:** Analyses if the programs objectives have been fulfilled by comparing what was planned and what was achieved.
- **Efficiency:** Measures the relationship between the used resources and the achieved results. Until what extend have the inputs become results?
- **Impact:** Even if this research doesn't pretends to be an impact evaluation, some consequences of the program's implementation can already be identified and will be included in this criteria to analyze the changes and effects, positive and negative created

direct or indirectly by the program, taking into account its defined objectives.

- **Sustainability:** Revises if the results of the project are continuous over time, once the ACR has completed the implementation of the program.

Finally, the variables and indicators measure what the program established as relevant, however, by the end of each criteria an analysis of these will be added with the objective of pointing the main findings of the evaluation. The variables in taken into account in this chapter are those related to the implementation of the economic reintegration program.

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Relevance</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>
<i>Program</i>			
<i>Economic Reintegration Program</i>	<p>The economic reintegration program is part of the <i>National Development Plan 2006-2010</i>, in the chapter Defense and Democratic Security, in the subchapter Reconciliation.</p> <p>Specifically it stands that the economic reintegration of the demobilized population will be actively linked to the private sector, through the construction of viable and durable options that result in the expansion of the job offer, labor training, and generation and support of new productive processes.</p>	<p>Here will only be analyzed those indicators related to the implementation of the economic reintegration program.</p> <p>It is important to previously highlight that the policy doesn't defines clear numerical goals for the main variables of the economic reintegration program, training for work, employability and business units.</p> <p>Variable 1: Number of participants finishing the reintegration route.</p> <p>Effectiveness at least 100%</p>	<p>Of the total ACR budget, 95.4% correspond to money transfers to support all the strategies and the incentives to the beneficiaries, the second is the human resources salaries, 2.7%, 1,1% to goods and services for functioning and 0,8% for investments (Reyes et al, 2014).</p> <p>Variable 1: Population Service Coverage (all services)</p> <p>Efficient: >50%</p> <p>Indicator 1: Economic benefit per component /</p>

	<p>This, under the premise that society in general will contribute to peace as a catalyst for the process and as a guarantor of the permanence of demobilized population demobilized in a legal and peaceful way of life (DNP, 2006).</p> <p>Later on, the <i>National Development Plan 2010-2014</i> establishes two goals for the policy: First, to engage new institutions to support its implementation and second, to increase the number of participants that successfully finish the reintegration route.</p> <p>In addition, it is contemplated in the document <i>Vision Colombia Second Centennial: 2019</i>, in the Policy of Consolidation of Democratic Security, goal #3: Demobilize the illegal armed groups, standing that this should be done through the promotion and consolidation of a strategic alliances system between the public and private sector, at the national and international level, working as the basis for a continuous improvement of processes and component of reintegration (DNP, 2005).</p> <p>Finally, the program is an integral part of the reintegration policy issued in 2008. The specific objective #5 seeks to contribute to the creation of abilities and skills that allow a successful integration in the labor</p>	<p>Indicator: Number of participants/Number of expected participants.</p> <p>Set goal: 1.105 Achieved goal: 1.158</p> <p>Result: 95%</p> <p>Variable 2: New institutions engaged in the policy implementation.</p> <p>Effectiveness at least 100%</p> <p>Indicator: New participant institutions / Total number of participant institutions.</p> <p>Set goal: 4.540 Achieved goal: 4.334</p> <p>Result: 105%</p> <p>Variable 3: Participation of the private and third sectors in the implementation and appropriation of the PRSE.</p> <p>Indicator 1: Number of actors that participate in activities of the PRSE.</p> <p>Set goal: 300 Achieved goal: 314</p> <p>Result: 104.7%</p> <p>Indicator 2: Number activities realized for socialization and promotion activities of the PRSE.</p> <p>Set goal: 117 Achieved goal: 127</p> <p>Result: 108.55%</p> <p>Variable 4: Reduce the stigmatization of the civil</p>	<p>total functioning–transference budget.</p> <p>Result: The average over all the analyzed years is 52%.</p> <p>However, this indicator is set taking into account all the policy’s component and not only the economic reintegration. If we analyzed the results for these components only the results are as follows:</p> <p>Variable 2: Job trainings population coverage.</p> <p>Compared with other components the budget for this area corresponds to 14% of total.</p> <p>Result: The coverage is only of 3.5% of population while other like basic education and psychosocial are around the 30%</p> <p>Also this component had suffered a relevant reduction of budget allocation from 7% in 2010 to 3% in 2014. This is congruent with the poor results of other components of the program.</p> <p>Variable 3: Business Plans</p> <p>During the evaluation period a total of 9.691 people benefit of the seed capital given to implement their business plans with an average</p>
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	<p>market and the self-income creation, establishing three strategies to achieve this:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training for Work - Employability - Business Plans <p>All of this with a permanent interaction and through</p>	<p>society against people in the reintegration process.</p> <p>Indicator 1: Increase the percentage of the potential positive attitudes of the civil society regarding the demobilized people. Set goal: 45% Achieved goal: 51.9%</p> <p>Result: 115.33%</p> <p>According to this, the management of the ACR has been effective, in terms of the defined variables and indicators.</p> <p>However it is noticeable that any besides the variable 1, all the others are not directly related on the results of the program but in measuring only the procedures and daily work activities that may or may not have direct incidence in the fulfillment of the general objective of the policy or the specific objectives of the economic reintegration program.</p>	<p>investment of 5.92 million of pesos¹⁰ per person.</p> <p>Result: the status of the business units is as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 32% are closed - 22% are operating - 3.6% in risk of closing - 42.4% don't report <p>In terms of efficiency the percentage of operative and not in risk of closure business is only 22% showing a low efficiency rate in the use of this budget.</p> <p>Variable 4: Recidivism</p> <p>For the analyzed period the probed recidivism was of 12%, and the policy has proven to have a 76% of success for maintaining people out of illegality while the jail system only has 30% for this.</p> <p>Also, the cost of having a person working in the reintegration route is \$5.700.000 pesos¹¹ while the cost of a person in jail is \$17.500.000¹² pesos per year.</p> <p>In this sense, the policy and the program has shown to be a more efficient solution compared to the jail system</p>
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10 USD 1.973

11 USD 1.900

12 USD 5.833

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Impact</i>	<i>Sustainability</i>
<i>Program</i>		
<i>Economic Reintegration Program</i>	<p>In general terms the economic reintegration program has not properly measured its impact however there is relevant information that allows having a broad picture of the achieved results and the consequences generated in the beneficiaries and their surroundings.</p> <p>Variable 1: Job training</p> <p>Results: 6% of total beneficiaries have benefit for this component. Of these, 81% of the quota was for special classes, 5% for events, 4% for technical studies and 1% for qualified workers.</p> <p>This means 86% of beneficiaries attended only short classes, for punctual needs and knowledge actualization.</p> <p>The impact the policy is generating in this topic is very low since the capacity building programs for specializing in certain job is nor happening, which can be related to the next variable results.</p> <p>Variable 2: Occupation of beneficiaries.</p> <p>Results: 71.4% are occupied and 28.6% are unemployed of these 15% is economic inactive population. A total 73% of occupied beneficiaries are working in the informal sector and 27% in the formal.</p> <p>According to this, the impact in the beneficiaries' occupation is setting a trend to the informal economy.</p> <p>Variable 3: Stigmatization of ex combatants in the private sector.</p> <p>Results: The number of companies working with ACR in the economic reintegration program has multiplied almost 6 times in the last 5 years as a result of the lobby and sensitization activities with the private sector reducing the stigmatization towards the ex-combatants, facilitating their entrance to the legal productive activities.</p> <p>Variable 4: Business plans</p> <p>Results: Taking into account the numbers of the status of the status of the business units:</p>	<p>Currently the policy doesn't count with a sustainability measure system since it is focus on monitoring the management of the program and the short run results. For example, the studies of ACR on the business plans projects focus on revising if the beneficiaries count with all the paper work and basic requirements but do not revise if the business is going to really be profitable in the long run or if the owner will have the required needs to manage it correctly.</p> <p>Also, the monitoring system is not able to follow the track of what happened with the approved projects.</p> <p>So, according to ACR data the program management has been overly successful however the results show a lack of stability even in the short run.</p> <p>The program lacks of a sustainability strategy and this is reflected on the results of the program implementation.</p> <p>According to this, a sustainability strategy needs to be implemented regarding the economic reintegration of ex combatants and this will be revised in the following chapter.</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 32% are closed - 22% are operating - 3.6% in risk of closing - 42.4% don't report <p>We can imply the positive impact is very low specially for achieving the ultimate goal of economic reintegration.</p> <p>Variable 5: Economic incentive system</p> <p>The beneficiaries of the program receive monetary incentives for participating in each of the strategies, and one participant can attend at the same time one or more activities of different strategies and receive more subsidies from the program. This system has created some undesirable impact as pointed out by some of the beneficiaries and also ACR workers and even its General Director, for example: <i>We had a scheme set up which mainly benefited the basic structure, the demobilized began to generate dependence on the benefit and we found out people who had been in the reintegration process for 7 or 8 years had received up to \$ 35,000,000¹³ pesos without advancing from the first grade in elementary school, ACR General Director (Mejía, 2014).</i></p> <p>According to this, the program has created undesirable impact by generating dependency from these subsidies and not achieving any goals and creating no capacity for the beneficiaries or the society and spending public resources.</p>	
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Table 3. Evaluation of the economic reintegration program

13 USD 11.667

4. Findings

The main findings of this revision regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the program will be organized over the different aspects mentioned during the revision:

4.1 Participation in the Program

The policy has a good recognition from the different national and regional institutions and also on the beneficiaries' social groups, which can be seen on the high numbers of participants, taking into account that this is a voluntary program.

However the participation in the economic reintegration program is low, this can be seen on the beneficiaries in the job training activities' budget and results. This is happening because the economic reintegration program is part of the intermediate stage on the reintegration route and after the beneficiaries participate in the first stage start requiring to work, even if they haven't complete all the trainings and education options offered.

This training and education opportunities do not fit the requirements of the beneficiaries because they have to choose either on working or participating in the trainings and the daily needs of them and their families make them opt for quitting the program and those who don't develop an assistance relationship with the ACR which translates in a low number of people that successfully finishes the reintegration route.

4.2 Training for Work

The program is not creating capacities on the beneficiaries since the trainings for work are focused on short classes with low intensity leaving the demobilized almost at their own expenses to find a job without any real capacity. This, mixed with other variables, can be seen on the low rates of demobilized with jobs in the formal sector and the high levels of informality among the beneficiaries. The high levels of informality among the beneficiaries are a threat to the sustainability of the program's results and for the objective of maintaining them in the legality.

Also, and according with the first point, the resources of the policy for this component is minimal affecting also the relevance of the courses offered and the participation of the beneficiaries that with a cost-benefit evaluation would prefer finding any job on their own.

4.3 Employability

The economic reintegration strategy was created by the government institutions and international cooperation organizations without the agreement or participation of the private sector and is one of the causes of the shy participation of companies in the program implementation. Even if the number of enterprises working with the ACR has been increasing over the past years, the results of the job creation and the actual number of reintegrated people with formal jobs, arranged with help of ACR is still low.

Also, and related to the last point, the professional profile of beneficiaries, with low training and capacities, is not necessarily attractive for the companies in a

total market situation, they could prefer hiring someone with more experience and better trained that is not a demobilized person.

According to this, also the stigmatization of the civil society, including private sector, over the demobilized people persists and is an aggravating variable for their entrance to the formal sector. Finally, the activities of lobby and sensitization of the ACR has been focused on the big companies as their main partners for the economic reintegration program but in Colombia most of the jobs are created by the SME, so there is a big opportunity to enlarge the program's capacity.

Finally, a survey published by the Observatory of Reintegration in 2009 and led by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Mayor's Office of Bogotá and the Chamber of Commerce of Bogotá, based on a sample of 800 small, medium and large companies in the capital city, concluded that even guaranteeing the accompaniment in the program, only 39% of the companies would participate in the process; on the other hand, 45% of employers would not participate in any case in the process and definitely 23% would not be willing to provide direct employment to this population (Ibid).

With this social environment surrounding the economic reintegration of ex combatants, it is necessary that the first task of the ACR is to keep working on changing the social stigmatization over the beneficiaries of the program as a basic step to achieve a massive participation of the private sector.

4.4 The Business Plans

The business plans component strategy is mainly focus and is being measure only by the disbursements of seed capital to the beneficiaries that fulfill certain minimum requirements however the results present a worrying picture about the real capacity of the demobilized people and their business plans but also on of the ACR to keep track of what happened with these resources.

Most of the approved business plans have result being unprofitable and not sustainable for their owners even in the short run. Most of these lack of gear with the private sector, clusters or any other relation with the economic structure that may facilitate and improve their activities.

Also, this component has been designed relying too much hope on the beneficiary capacity for participating in the free market on his own, since the ACR makes no proper tracking of activities and don't have a professional guiding and constant training for the improvement of the microenterprises, leading to poor results.

4.5 ACR management

The policy and the economic reintegration program are relevant in the Colombian an international contexts since they provide an option for the members of illegal groups that decide to quit the armed conflict. Regarding this, the program presents a good enough option from the broader point of view, since the other alternatives are to continue fighting in the war and remaining in illegality or going to jail. To the Colombian Government the policy and program are also a good cost/benefit alternative taking into account the lower

costs of the reintegration route, compared to having a person in custody in jail and the relative low percentage of recidivism.

Also over the years the ACR has created a relevant network of companies, international organizations, NGO and national institutions for the implementation of the policy and the program and it is a good base for its improvement facing the reintegration of FARC members.

The ACR has also developed a suitable monitoring system to keep track of the routine management of the institution however this system is incomplete since it doesn't allow to see the results achieved by through that daily management so they are working blindly and under the assumption that what they do will create the desired outcome.

4.6 Program Sustainability

In general terms the policy, the program and the ACR don't count with a strategy thought from the sustainability perspective but more focused on attending the immediate issues and challenges without much attention to the impact and the long term stability of the achievements. This is the main finding over the economic reintegration program and will be the main focus of the following policy recommendations section. Also the market-led solutions have proved to be an inefficient option for some of the program's components that require more accompaniments in their implementation and intervention from the ACR to assure its success and sustainability, in this regard a suitable balance is yet to be found.

Summing up the program has relevant strengths on its built capacity, recognition and the monitoring system for tracking internal and daily work results but lacks a sustainability strategy to assure the maintenance over time of the achieved results in the economic reintegration activities and these are also designed and measure to fulfill the short term requirements but have shown not to be totally adequate for assure a long term economic reintegration of beneficiaries.

4.7 The Private Sector Participation – Perception Survey Results

A survey was conducted with the aim of amplifying the information for this research, especially over the willingness of the private sector to participate in the economic reintegration program and their knowledge about it. The survey focus on SME, since there is already information about the perception of the bigger companies in Colombia and also these have historically been the target of the Government for this type of joint work.

Directives and owners of small and medium businesses in different regions of Colombia participated in this survey with the purpose of finding some hints over the perception of the SME on their role in the promotion of the employability and entrepreneurship of ex combatants. Even if due to location and budget restrictions the survey was not applied to a representative number of companies, variations on sector, size and location were taken into account.

The survey is also mainly focus on this section of companies with the objective of amplifying the existent information in this issue, since in Colombia the SME are the main generators of jobs and also are located all over the country in contrast to the small number of big companies working only in certain regions,

in this perspective, the SME may have a big potential to boost the results and sustainability of the program.

A total of 26 Colombian companies participated in the survey, 65% of them were micro and small businesses, 23% medium size companies and 12% big, according to the Colombian law. The sector of work of the participants is diverse, 31% belongs to the service sector, 15% to the industrial, 15% works in construction, 11% in agriculture, 8% in commercial activities, another 8% in the food sector, 4% in health and 4% in telecommunications. The obtained results are presented next, each participating company received a number of identification to maintain the confidentiality of the results. Also, the survey was done originally in Spanish so all the questions and comments from the participants were translated:

To the question *do you consider the private sector has a role in peacebuilding in Colombia?* The companies answered as follows:




Figure 7. Survey results: Do you consider the private sector has a role in peacebuilding in Colombia?

According to this, most of the companies have the perception that the private sector has a work to do over the peacebuilding process in the country and only

one of the participants consider its participation is no relevant. However the most interesting findings were made with the different answers to the explanations over their answers of question one. Most of the participants through their answers, showed to have certain degree of consciousness about the required coordination of the whole society to absorb and completely reintegrate the ex-combatants, in this line some of the comments were:

Company #1: *They (the companies) will be the vehicle through which ex-combatants will be able to become part of the productive system of the country.*

Company #7: *It is necessary that the government establishes the appropriate methodologies for the reintegration of people in different sectors and linking them with productive projects, providing education and assuring the commitment of the parties, also it needs to give a reasonable time to guarantee reintegration, always with justice.*

Company #9: *The private sector is the generator of the economic guarantees that will sustain the reintegration process, since we are the ones that create wealth.*

However, in this same group, some companies answered that the role of the private sector is more limited to the achievement of their legal requirements as the on time tax payments and working hard to promote the economic growth.

To the question *do you know the institutional offer of the Colombian Reintegration Agency (ACR) to work with the private sector, creating partnerships and jobs to benefit the demobilized population?* The participants answered as follows:




Figure 8. Survey results: Do you know the institutional offer of the Colombian Reintegration Agency (ACR) to work with the private sector, creating partnerships and jobs to benefit the demobilized population?

This presents an important challenge for the ACR, there's still a long run to go to promote the participation of the private sector in the economic reintegration program. As mentioned before, one of the main strengths of the ACR is that has been able to be well known by other public institutions related to the reintegration process and in the direct beneficiaries as well as their social surroundings however the work and results with the companies is the opposite. According to this, the participants mentioned they haven't worked with the ACR.

To the question *is your company open to facilitate the economic reintegration of ex combatants by hiring demobilized people that successfully finished the reintegration program?* The participants answered as follows:



Figure 9. Survey results: Is your company open to facilitate the economic reintegration of ex combatants by hiring demobilized people that successfully finished the program?

Even if majority answered “yes” to this question, there was a big percentage of those who answered “no” showing an important polarization of the opinion that is also a reflection of the general situation of the civil society over the peacebuilding issue and the peace agreement with FARC.

Some of the participants that answered “no” actually explain that they need trained workers that fulfill a required profile; assuming that the demobilized population do not have this profile and a group of people that answered “yes” put the fulfillment of a basic training and appropriate profile as a condition to hire the program’s beneficiaries. This also shows the lack of information regarding the program strategies. Other answers given by those who would be open to participate in the program mentioned they were motivated to give a chance to those who decided to give up on the conflict and that this was a way they could do it from their companies.

For example the Company #17 mentioned *that we are (the company) looking for people who want to learn and grow with us, if the demobilized person is*

clean with the law and really wants to build a new life as a civilian, our doors are open.

Those who answered “no” mentioned different factors as fear on receiving ex combatants in their companies and distrust in the demobilized population. Regarding this, the Company #12 said they would not open the option *because of distrust and it would be necessary to be sure if these people have been sincerely reintegrated to the civil society and have detached from the previous life.*

To the question *is your company open to facilitate the economic reintegration of ex combatants by establishing commercial relations with companies composed by demobilized people that successfully finished the reintegration program?* The participants answered as follows:



Figure 10. Survey results: Is your company open to facilitate the economic reintegration of ex combatants by establishing commercial relations with companies composed by demobilized that successfully finished the program?

According to this, the majority of participating companies are willing to take part in the economic reintegration process, especially by including small business of demobilized people as part of their value chain, more than hiring them, which could be a good solution to increase the success rate of the business units. However there is more information in the analysis of the explanations given regarding these questions. Those who answered “yes” mentioned that this option gives them more security since it would be easier to take action in case the commercial relationship doesn’t work, some of the received comments were:

Company #8: If our company needs it (the product or service offered by the company created by reintegrated ex combatants) and it is a high quality product and competitive.

Company #12: (With this option) they would not be inside the company and it would be easier the monitoring of the results and accomplishment of their contracts.

These answers make evident that there’s still a big challenge on overcoming the stigmatization on the reintegrated population but also show that the approach taken by ACR on the need of training the de mobilized for them to be able to fit in the economic and job market is accurate and shared by the entrepreneurs, however these strategies have problems in their implementation and procedures.

To the question *from your point of view, which is the main obstacle for the companies to hire or create commercial links with demobilized people?* The companies answered as follows:




Figure 11. Survey results: From your perspective, which is the main obstacle for the companies to hire or create commercial links with demobilized people?

In accordance to some of the explanations received in the last question, most of the participants answered their main obstacle for participating in the economic reintegration of ex combatants is distrust on this group of people, remarking the necessity of improving the sensitization and lobby activities to increase the knowledge of the private sector over the reintegration program.

Finally, and regarding the ACR positioning within the companies, especially SME, the survey asked if *to have the Colombian Reintegration Agency (ACR) as intermediary would facilitate the participation of your company in the economic reintegration of ex combatants?*




Figure 12. Survey results: Having the Colombian Reintegration Agency (ACR) as intermediary would facilitate the participation of your company in the economic reintegration program?

To which 56% of participants answered “yes” indicating that having the national Government as a guarantor of the reintegration process of the ex-combatants gives them more security and reduces the uncertainty, however a relevant percentage, 44%, answered this would not facilitate their participation or they are not sure, showing the need of a deeper positioning of the ACR with this sector.

Some of the comments received regarding these questions are:

Company #7: There is no massive information project to companies to inform about the pros and cons of the different options provided by the ACR.

Company #23: Possibly, although we do not know the role or functions of the ACR.

On the other hand some commented:

Company #9: *Yes, it would be a greater guarantee that the reinserted is following and accomplishing their reintegration agreements.*

Company #1: *100% since it (the ACR intermediation) represents an institutional support in a process that needs confidence and guarantees.*

V. Recommendations and Conclusion

This chapter will organize and summarize the relevant information presented in this paper through some useful management instruments with the purpose of using it to create an improved strategy to enhance the capacity and results of the economic reintegration program. Finally, the conclusions of this research will be presented.

1. A Proposal for Improving the Economic Reintegration Program

To create suitable policy recommendations it is relevant to well organize the findings and complement them to create a logical proposal that includes the different analyzed factors, specially taking into account that in the evaluated issue converge different sectors, motives, incentives and actors. So, the first step is creating a PEST analysis for organizing the main macro-environmental factors that have an influence over the economic reintegration program in Colombia and defining the possible directions for the policy recommendations. The PEST will be focused only on the main issues discussed through this paper and over the economic reintegration program. Taking into account the specific

characteristics of the program, the political quadrant will also include legal issues.

The next step is to create a SWOT analysis that permits to organize the internal and external factor that influence, positively and negatively, the process of achieving the two specific objectives of the program:

- To contribute to the creation of abilities and skills that allow the successful integration to the labor market and self-income generation
- To facilitate the entering to economic legal activities creating labor skills and supporting employability processes as well as facilitating and developing productive plans (DNP, 2008).

Finally and taking into account the findings, the PEST and SWOT analysis information, a proposal based on the balance scorecard tool will be constructed as an improvement recommendation for the economic reintegration program. This tool was chosen because the main issues regarding the program were found in its implementation and monitoring strategies, which can be analyzed through this instrument.

LIVELIHOOD AND INCOME GENERATION: BASIC GUIDELINES	
Government role	Governments should encourage and support private sector growth through enabling legislation, investment in infrastructure and expansion of business development services.
Use existing employment opportunities	Reintegration programmes should use existing employment opportunities wherever possible, as the risk of failure is lower than if ex-combatants try to start new microenterprises.
Offer employment incentives	Reintegration programmes can help to expand the opportunities available to ex-combatants by offering wage, training and equipment subsidies or in-kind donations to businesses.
Labour rights	Labour rights should be upheld and respected. No ex-combatant or associated person should become a 'slave' of the private or public sector.
Specifically designed support	When developing micro enterprises, reintegration programmes should offer ex-combatants support that is specifically designed to meet their needs.
Diversification	Many different types of small businesses should be established, to promote diversity and reduce vulnerabilities to collapse of any one sector.

Figure 13. UN basic guidelines for promoting livelihood and income generation. Source: United Nations, 2016.

The economic reintegration program was designed taking into account the international recommendations established by the United Nations through its Integrated DDR Standards in accordance with the main findings that suggest that the program is well designed and structured but the implementation presents improvement opportunities.

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1.1 PEST Analysis

Political/Legal

- The Peace Agreement with FARC guerrilla was negotiated with the participation of different sectors of civil society, including the private sector, however it didn't count with the approval of the majority of Colombians and was rejected by voting and later approved by the Congress.
- The Government has established some tax incentives to benefit the companies that hire vulnerable population, including ex combatants, like reduction on taxes. There is also an initiative of the National Road Institute, where the companies working with them must hire at least a 10% of their employees of this population if they are located around the work area.
- The policies in Colombia are mostly seen as short term initiatives because each presidential period last 4 years with option of 4 more and normally the policies tend to change drastically with governments.

- The Government created a system to receive and use important economic resources from the international community to support peace initiatives like re integration.
- With the FARC peace agreement, its leaders will have a political party.

Economic

- Colombia has important issues guaranteeing the access to work to its whole population and unemployment rates are around 9.5% of the economic active population.
- The 47% of the Colombian population is occupied in the informal sector of the economy.
- The perception of the private sector in Colombia is that they pay high taxes to fund the different government initiatives including the peacebuilding process.
- The Colombian private sector is mainly characterized by the SME, 94.7% of the registered companies are SME and create 67% of employment. Even if the FDI has been growing and the Colombian big companies have expanded are reduced in number and are concentrated in certain regions however they have a bigger participation in the GDP.
- The big companies in Colombia have participated with different approaches in the negotiation processes with illegal armed groups because the political conflict also affected the economic development and the companies' activities.

Social

- Polarization in the Colombia civil society, including the private sector over the accuracy and support of the process of reintegration of ex combatants.
- Stigmatization of the ex combatants even after their reintegration process in both the civil society and the private sector.
- More than 55.000 people have demobilized from illegal armed groups, of these less than 10% are in economically inactive ages.
- The 60 years long conflict has affected the Colombian society in different extends and it has make difficult the transition and the reintegration of the illegal armed group members, since the guerrillas were seen more as offenders than fighting for a political project.
- The mindset of the ex combatants is a relevant challenge for their economic reintegration since they have been used to illegal economic activities and different social interactions

Technological

- The National Service of Learning (SENA) has developed multiple online courses that can be used freely only by doing a register on their webpage.
- The Colombian population doesn't have a high level of access to technological devices like smartphones and computers and the

penetration rate is especially low in the rural areas and for the vulnerable population.

1.2 SWOT Analysis

Strengths

- The program is part of a public policy as a recognition to its importance for the Colombian Government and the relevance of the issue, especially with the implementation of the FARC peace agreement.
- The approach of the program is consistent with the international standards but also with the possibilities of the Colombian economic context and the capacities of the private sector. It is well-structured.
- It establishes a clear entrance and finish point for the people that start the reintegration process.
- ACR has a good level of recognition among the other national institutions working in the internal conflict issue and also within the members of the illegal armed groups and their social groups.
- ACR has a good system for monitoring its daily and internal activities.
- Presents an option for those who decided to quit the illegal armed groups.
- Presents low rates of recidivism and is a good cost/benefit option if compared with the jail system.

Weaknesses

- Identification of relevant stakeholders like the SME as important partners for the program implementation.
- Socialization of the policy and program, many relevant stakeholders, like civil society and companies don't know about the mission and activities of ACR in peacebuilding.
- Monitoring of activities and results is not adequate to measure the impacts of the program and the beneficiaries' situation.
- ACR doesn't measure the effectiveness of the activities in terms of their general objectives. Lack of a sustainability strategy.
- Inadequate implementation, there's no match between the companies need and the profiles of ex combatants who are also not finishing the programs because it doesn't fit with their realities.
- Lack of appropriation of relevant actors and partners in the program implementation, like the private sector (the program was not constructed with them).
- It is increasing the informality in the economy and has created dependence on subsidies for a group of participants.
- Has not been able to create a suitable offer for the beneficiaries needs (they can't work and study at the same time).

Opportunities

- The relevance of the economic reintegration issue and the international cooperation resources that Colombia is receiving for peacebuilding could help in the strengthening of the program.
- The increasing interest and number of strategic actors, like companies, engaging in the economic reintegration.
- The majority of private sector members have not been sensitized by the ACR yet, especially in the SME sector, an important generator of formal work.
- The SME sector is open to work in the economic reintegration of ex combatants, especially including the demobilized business units as part of their value chain and suppliers system.
- The peace agreement with FARC guerilla presents a valuable opportunity for improving the program taking into account the lessons learned from past processes.

Threats

- The proportion of multidimensional poor people in relation to the total population is 5.9% points higher nowadays than in 2012.
- The profile of the persons in process of reintegration presents difficulties for its inclusion in diverse contexts, especially educational and labor (it does not fit the labor supply of the region).

- There is evidence of a decrease in access to the benefits granted by the program, mainly due to inactivation, suspension and expulsion on the route, partly explained by the need for the beneficiaries to work or move to other regions.
- Beneficiaries have been confronted with different types of expressions of stigmatization due to their status. The fear and distrust that the demobilized people generate in the majority of the population persists, maintaining a negative perception of them and, therefore, of the processes. This also has an impact on external actors like the private sector that, in some sectors have increased its participation in the programs, in many others maintain resistance to be linked to the process.
- The challenge of reintegration goes beyond the capacities and scope of the ACR and implies an inter-institutional coordination work. In Colombia there's a prevalence of government policies instead of state policies and the change of government is a threat to the process continuity

1.3 Improvement Proposal Based on Balanced Scorecard Model




Figure 14. Proposed strategic map for the economic reintegration program.

Perspective	Strategic Map	Objective	Goal
BENEFICIARIES (CLIENTS)	Capacity building and training for work	Increase the offer of technical and professional studies for creating capacities in the beneficiaries, according to their time needs (nights and weekends)	Reverse the tendency of the program to offer short courses and counting with untrained labor force. At least 70% of the beneficiaries count with proper training to work.
	Increase the formal job opportunities	Open more opportunities with the companies to hire demobilized as part of their human resources	At least 60% of beneficiaries choosing the employability option find a formal, stable job
	Improve the support for creating business plans	create a business plan count with the technical advice and support in the conceptualization and implementation phases and continuous review, capacitation and monitoring for at least 5 years	The beneficiaries count with a microbusiness that generates at least 2 minimum wages for at least 3 years
INTERNAL PROCEDURES	Strengthen visibility and sensitization strategy	Increase the number of partners in the private sector and reduce the stigmatization of beneficiaries	Double of the current number of companies participating in the economic reintegration program
	Amplify the range of work with the private sector	Create, in partnership with the private sector, new strategies to support the program	Existence of a differentiated strategy for different types of companies to participate, according to their possibilities, in the program
	Improve the criteria and evaluation system for approving the business plans	Strengthen the process of choosing the business plans that will receive the seed capital	At least 70% of the approved business plan fund are still running after 3 years and generate at least 2 minimum wages.
	Modify the subsidy system for beneficiaries	Reduce the possibility of creating dependence on the economic incentives given to beneficiaries	90% of the participants finish the reintegration program in the term of 8 years with financial independence

LEARNING AND GROWTH	Strengthen the monitoring system	Measure the results of the activities in the short and medium term to adjust to the requirements of the beneficiaries and partners	Quarterly reports of the program performance and implementation of adjustment measures, improving the effectiveness
	Implement periodic impact evaluations	Measure the impact of the strategy and take corrective actions on the weaker performance points	To have a basis for implementing improvements in the program, knowing the causes and effects
FINANCIAL	New resources	Increase the capacity of the institution and the program for giving a better attention to beneficiaries	with the professional support to implement their economic reintegration plan and is effectively monitored At least 30% of the policy's implementation budget is for the economic reintegration program
	Optimize the use of financial resources	Distribution of resources among all the program's components according its needs to have a program equally strong in all of its phases	At least 80% of the beneficiaries has achieved the economic reintegration

Table 4. Proposal for improving the economic reintegration program.

This proposal seeks to bring the attention on the main findings and suggest a new approach especially regarding the implementation of the strategy; next the main suggestions will be made regarding the analyzed variables:

a. Participation in the Program

To assure the participation of the beneficiaries through all the reintegration route, including the economic reintegration program, the institutional offer has to be adapted to fit with their basic needs, the schedule of the activities and trainings must have options for those who have to work as a complement to the

economic incentives that ACR gives because those are not enough to sustain their families, this is included in the ‘beneficiaries perspective’.

Also, since participants are reduced in number, also the budget for this strategy is less compared to others in the policy, regarding this issue new funding sources must be taken into account and the current moment with the FARC peace agreement gives a chance to knock doors in the international cooperation system to fortify these activities. This issue is included in the ‘financial’ perspective.

b. Training for Work and Employability

The training opportunities given by the ACR and its partner should move from short courses to technical and even professional ones, to really create capacities, this issue is included in the ‘beneficiaries’ perspective. On the other hand, as a result of this, the trend for the demobilized is to join the informal sector of the economy, with better capacity and training this trend could be reversed but also increasing the sensitization and lobby work with the private sector and having a wider range of companies to work with, especially including the SME, these issues are included in the ‘internal procedures’ and ‘beneficiaries’ perspectives.

c. Business Plans

This strategy needs to be adjust in its implementation because it is a very good option however has not been well executed leading to the waste of most of the public money invested on it. First, it is necessary to have a proper orientation for the beneficiaries because for most of them this will be the first time creating

a business plan, so accompaniment is crucial in the preparation, implementation of the plan even a few years after it started to keep a continuous improvement of capacities and checking the development of the business and also having accountability about the efficiency in the use of the public resources. This issue is included in the ‘internal procedures’ and ‘beneficiaries’.

d. ACR management and sustainability

It is necessary to strengthen a periodic monitoring system to keep track of how much the daily activities are contributing to the achievement of the strategic goals also an evaluation of the impacts generated has to be an implemented practice with the main purpose of making adjustments knowing well what is working and what isn't, this requires a change of perspective over the current system that is mainly focus on the measure of daily activities instead of the long term effectiveness and the impacts created. This issue is included in the ‘learning and growth’ perspective.

e. The private sector participation

To encourage the participation of the private sector in the program, besides working on the stigmatization issue through the visibility strategy and the sensitization activities, it is also important to create differentiated options to engage in the program, taking into account the capacities and needs of different sections of companies, these options need to be constructed hand in hand with them to really get to know their perceptions, fears and motives, so the program

will be more accurate. This issue is included in the 'internal procedures' perspective.

First of all, it is necessary to amplify the range of work of the ACR with the private sector, for this a new range of companies should be included, the SME, with a specific focus on medium size enterprises, among these, those who have a Corporate Social Responsibility program will be easier to target and engage in this type of activities, without discarding those who doesn't have. However it is important to create a wider portfolio of options, for example there are still many options to be explored or need more emphasis like matching the entrepreneurship business with the value chain of companies, amplifying the funding options engaging private sector banks that work in microfinance programs and establishing a wider range of action to the incentives given to companies that hire people in vulnerability situation including the ex combatants, creating options more attractive to the SME range.

2. Conclusion

The main findings of this research show that the economic reintegration strategy has been partially successful in its implementation since currently a whole institutionality is able to attend, through a well-defined reintegration route, to those who decide to give up on the armed conflict facilitating their reintegration to civil and economic as an alternative to illegal activities.

In particular, the economic reintegration program has designed two main strategies to facilitate the entry of the beneficiaries to the legal economy through the creation of capacities and work as employees in the private sector

or establish their own microenterprise to generate financial independence by generating their own income.

However, even if the strategies seem suitable and with great potential to achieve the economic reintegration goal, in practice the results are not as positive as they could be, basically for a mismatch between the planning and the reality of the beneficiaries and also for a lack of accompaniment and technical support to assure the sustainability of the results.

Another important failure for the program was identified, since it doesn't count with a monitoring and evaluation system that is able to properly and systematically measure the results and its contribution to the achievement of the general and strategic objectives leading to an implementation with no guidance which may end up in the creation of undesired impacts and misleading actions.

Also, the participation of the private sector, even if it has been increasing over the past years, it's still shy and not been able to absorb the required amounts of beneficiaries which instead have opted for the informal sector which threatens the sustainability of their economic reintegration. Finally, the private sector has been poorly engaged in the support and promotion of the business units created by the ex-combatants even when the few success cases have shown that including the microenterprises in the chain value of a larger company or in a cluster area increases the probabilities of success. This basically shows that there still are many opportunities and strategies that can be implemented to fit the needs and capacities of the different types of companies and increase their participation.

According to this, and taking into account the research question and hypothesis presented in the introductory chapter, the Colombian economic reintegration

program cannot be considered a failure because it has improved and facilitated the reintegration of the ex-combatants however it can either be consider a success because the results of the strategies have proven not to be sustainable and have increased the informality numbers in the country.

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VII. APPENDIX

Survey Questionnaire

Participation of Companies in the Economic Reintegration of Ex Combatants in Colombia

- 1. According to the Colombian legislation, how is your company classified?**
 - a. Microenterprise
 - b. Small Business
 - c. Medium Company
 - d. Big Company

- 2. In which productive sector your company works?**

- 3. How many employees has your company?**

- 4. What is your position in the company?**

- 5. Do you consider the private sector has a role in peacebuilding in Colombia?**
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Maybe

- 2. Please explain your answer**

- 3. Do you know the institutional offer of the Colombian Reintegration Agency (ACR) to work with the private sector, creating partnerships and jobs to benefit the demobilized population?**

- a. Yes
- b. No

4. If you answered yes, has your company participated in any of the offered strategies?

5. If you have participated, please bravely share your experience

6. Is your company open to facilitate the economic reintegration of ex combatants by hiring demobilized people that successfully finished the reintegration program?

- a. Yes
- b. No

7. Please explain your answer

8. Is your company open to facilitate the economic reintegration of ex combatants by establishing commercial relations (for example as part of your suppliers or chain value) with companies composed by demobilized that successfully finished the reintegration program?

- a. Yes
- b. No

9. Please explain your answer

14. From your point of view, which is the main obstacle for the companies to hire or create commercial links with demobilized people?

- a. Fear
- b. Distrust
- c. Lack of guarantees
- d. You don't know how to do it
- e. Other

10. If you answered “other” please explain

16. Having the Colombian Reintegration Agency (ACR) as intermediary would facilitate the participation of your company in the economic reintegration of ex combatants?

Thank you for your participation.

국문초록

콜롬비아 FARC 게릴라와의 평화 협정 체결과 승인은 평화 구축 노력을 정부의 최우선 과제로 자리 매김했다. 이 과정에서 가장 중요한 부분은 최근에 달성 된 평화의 장기적인 지속 가능성에 직접적인 영향을 미칠 요인 중 하나로서 전직 전투원의 경제적 재 통합이다.

콜롬비아 경제 재 통합 전략은 2008 년에 재 통합 정책의 일환으로 만들어진 프로그램이며, 민간부문과의 긴밀한 협력을 통한 전 전투원의 고용 촉진과 콜롬비아의 지원을 받아 세워진 마이크로 비즈니스와의 공동 작업을 필요로 한다. 그러나 기업들은 게릴라 분쟁과 같은 정치적인 문제에 대개 관여하려 하지 않는다.

약 10 년간의 이행 끝에, 경제 재 통합 프로그램은 결과를 수정하고 보다 지속 가능한 재 통합 과정과 장기적인 평화의 달성을 위해 FARC 회원들의 집단적 재통합을 통해 다시 점검하게 될 것이다.

이에 따르면, 논문은 여러 방법을 이용해 콜롬비아 경제 재 통합 프로그램의 성공 수준을 분석하고, 전직 전투원의 경제적 재 통합을 촉진하기 위해 설립 된 시장 해결책(market solution)은 노동 시장(labor market)에 성공적으로

포함될 수 없으며 민간 부문의 대규모 참여를 촉진하기에 충분하지 못하다는 것을 보여준다.

주요 결과는 재 통합 정책과 경제 재 통합 프로그램이 국제 표준에 따라 잘 구조화되어 있다고 하더라도 구현 전략과 모니터링 및 평가 시스템에서 여전히 개선의 여지가 있음을 시사한다.

주요어: 콜롬비아 무력 충돌, 평화 건축, FARC 게릴라, 민간 부문 및 평화 구축, 전직 전투원의 경제적 재 통합.

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