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Two-Level Games between the Two Koreas
- Political and Military Inter-Korean Talks, 2008~2017 -

남북회담과 양면게임 이론
2008~2017년 정치∙군사회담을 중심으로

August 2018

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Abstract

Two-Level Games between the Two Koreas
- Political and Military Inter-Korean Talks, 2008~2017 -

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This study analyzes political and military Inter-Korean talks between the year of 2008 and 2017. Based on Putnam’s Two Level game theory, the winsets of each talks were thoroughly examined. According to Putnam, there are three factors that determines winset size; the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level 2 constituents, Level 2 political institutions, and Level 1 negotiator’s strategies.

Level 1 refers to negotiation itself and Level 2 is domestic society. In this study, three determinants were modified in the context of reality of Korean peninsula. Level 1 negotiator’s strategies refer to Level 1 negotiator’s autonomy, which includes the chief negotiator’s rank, position, and experience. Level 2 preferences and coalitions were analyzed by specific agendas in each talks. In addition, Level 2 political institutions were set as fixed variable.

In order to do the comprehensive analysis, the graph was introduced putting x-axis as Level 1 autonomy and y-axis as Level 2 preference and coalition. Inter-Korean talks for ten years were located on the graph. This graph shows that Level 1 is more influential than Level 2 in Inter-Korean talks. We also can find that the powerful chief negotiator can enlarge Level 2 winset, so he/she can achieve to make consensus even though when Level 2 winset is very small.

Keywords: Two level game theory, Inter-Korean talks, political and military talks, winset

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Research Background

Inter–Korean relations faced a sharp transition in 2008 with the launch of Lee Myung Bak government. Conservative party took power in 10 years based on reflection on engagement policy to North Korea, so called ‘Sunshine policy’, for previous ten years. Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye government targeted the sincere attitude change of North Korea, and thought Inter–Korean Talks must contribute to the change of the North. Otherwise, Inter–Korean Talks were considered not helpful to development of Inter–Korean relations.

In conclusion, the number of meetings between Two Koreas sharply decreased. 25.1 Inter–Korean Talks were held in annual average from 1998 to 2007, but from 2008 to 2017, the number decreased to 5.8. There are controversies over Lee and Park government’s North Korean policy. Hasty decisions must be avoided on long–term policy. However, it is meaningful to analyze last decade’s Inter–Korean talks at this point. First, in cooling–off period, the flow of talks is different from the period when the conversation is active. Second, South Korea had went through political change recently, and North Korea policy changed accordingly.

When South Korean government involves in Inter–Korean talks, they do not deal with North Korean government, but also concern South Korean public.¹ South Korean delegation team to the talks

¹ Personally, I started my career at the Special Office of Inter–Korean
must have domestic situation in mind when they are faced with North Koreans. Moreover, the delegation tends to feel much more pressure than other international negotiation. This is originated by unique operating system of Inter–Korean talks. In Inter–Korean talks, the contents of the talks are reported to headquarter of Seoul and Pyongyang in real time and every general meeting is live–broadcasted to each headquarter. Even worse, the detailed meeting schedule, the outline and the mood are disclosed to the media every day during several days of talks. In this situation, the pressure felt by delegation is enormous. Some say that representatives can do nothing but as an actor not as a negotiator. In this regards, domestic situation has a huge impact in Inter–Korean talks.

Understanding complexity about the relation between domestic situation and Inter–Korean talks is crucial not only to draw an agreement but also to implement the agreement successfully. In these reasons, the study about the dynamics of domestic politics and Inter–Korean talks is needed. This study examines the reality of Inter–Korean talks based on Robert Putnam’s Two–Level Game theory.

1.2 The Purpose of Research

The purpose of research is to improve the understanding on political and military Inter–Korean talks of past decade. Many factors affected Inter–Korean talks. Based on Putnam’s theory,
this study will categorize the factors and find out interaction among them. First, this study will analyze the South Korean winsets of each meeting. Winsets are the possible range of compromise and determine the success of negotiations. According to Putnam, the determinants of winsets are level 1 negotiator’s strategy and level 2 preferences and coalitions. This study will then analyze how the level 1 and level 2 winsets affected the success and failure of the talks.

Based on this analysis, we can find that which factors are more influential than others are. This study also will draw implications of Inter-Korean talks in political and military fields since 2008, and make proposals for improving Inter-Korean talks in the future.
Chapter 2. Theoretical Background

2.1. Literature Review

Many studies used this theory to analyze specific negotiation cases in reality. Especially many of them studied Inter-Korean relations. Although the South and North both admit that reunification is needed, there are extreme differences in methodology since they have different political and economic system and social atmosphere. Negotiators of two Koreas have struggled to make consensus in this hostile environment.

About this reality of Two Koreas, many researchers have suggested interesting opinions. Kim (2010), Chun (2002) applied Putnam’s theory into the reality of Korean Peninsula. Kim analyzed the progress of six party talks through this theory and Chun explained The South, The North and U.S.’s position with this theory.

Interestingly, Chun explains the three actor are facing different arena of game. The North is playing one-level game, U.S. is two-level, and The South is facing multi-level game. North Korea only concern negotiation strategy itself, because domestic disagreement is negligible. U.S. has to concern negotiation strategy and domestic politics at the same time. However, South Korea has to face with many countries related including U.S. and North Korea and has to deal with domestic politics also. Kim (2011) and Park (2016) applied Putnam’s theory into specific cases. Kim (2011) explains the progress the second summit meeting in 2007, and Park (2016) analyzes Mt. Geumgang Tourism Project with the theory.
Meanwhile, many researches do not advert Putnam’s theory directly, but include the factors of Two-Level Game Theory. Studies by Yoon and Gu (2013), Cha (2012), Yee (2014), and Kim (2007) are about the relationship between domestic politics of the South and Inter-Korean talks (or relationships). These researches also give implications to this study.

In addition, Koo (2013) applied Putnam’s theory into the FTA negotiation between South Korea and United States. He compared negotiations in 2000s with those in 1990s and pointed out that strengthened chief negotiators’ autonomy, combined with their free-trade ideas as well as with their own institutional interest, made the domestic constituency’s winset as perceived by chief negotiators larger than Putnam’s two-level game analysis would have predicted. His research gave much implication to this study because there are similar cases in Inter-Korean talks.

There are two major differences between the precedent studies and this one.

First, compared to this study, the precedent studies applied the theory too broadly or too narrowly. Chun (2002) and Ahn (1997) used Putnam’s theory as one among many negotiation theories they applied to Korean peninsula. Therefore, they just mention some special features based on the theory. On the other hand, Kim (2011) and Park (2016) explained just one single talks or cooperative business with the theory. Koo (2013) and Kim (2010)’s study is similar to mine in terms of the range, but the research field was different.

Second, most of the studies are about the situation before 2008. The South and the North were in active conversation in the early years of 1990 and 2000s. Therefore, the studies about Inter-
Korean Talks are concentrated to these periods. After 2008, the Two Koreas’ relationship was getting worse, and Two Koreas could not hold talks frequently as before. However, since 10 years have passed from 2008, we need to look at this period. Moreover, it is necessary to see the relationship between domestic politics and Inter-Korean talks because the cooling-off season itself was caused by the domestic situation of Two Koreas.

Regarding the actual situation of Inter-Korean talks since 2008; this study refers to the memoirs of President Lee Myung Bak and white papers published by the Special office for Inter-Korean dialogoue of the Ministry of Unification. The booklet 'Inter-Korean Dialogue' published by the Ministry of Unification described not only the background of the talks but also the some contents of the talks between the North and South Korean delegates, which helped to grasp the actual atmosphere of the talks. However, About the President Lee Myung Bak's memoirs, the Government of the Republic of Korea has not officially recognized its full contents. Therefore, this study considers the memoirs to be one of among countable scenarios rather than a solid fact.

2.2. Two-Level game theory by Robert Putnam

This study will take a closer look at Robert Putnam’s Two-Level Game Theory and its developments. Putnam published his thesis ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics – The Logic of Two-Level Game’ in 1988. According to Wikipedia, this theory views “international negotiations between states as consisting of simultaneous negotiations at both the domestic level and the
international level”.

Level 1 – international level – refers to the negotiation table between the representatives. Their agreement is usually tentative, needing for domestic ratification. In addition, he presumes the chief negotiator as an individual who has no independent policy preference, but “seeks simply to achieve an agreement that will be attractive to his constituents”. (Putnam, 1988)

Level 2 – domestic level – is the stage of discussion among domestic groups about whether to ratify the agreement. Through the domestic negotiations, the chief negotiator can be informed and he/she accepts the domestic situations and sometimes builds coalitions with them. With those domestic concerns, the chief negotiator tries to make an agreement that is in the range of the possible 'wins' in his domestic 'win-set'. “Winsets are the possible outcomes that are likely to be accepted by the domestic interest groups who either must ratify the agreement or provide some other form of government backing.” (Putnam, 1988) International agreements can be achieved when the negotiators share the each domestic winsets in the international negotiations.

After Putnam published the thesis, there have been numerous studies to develop the theory. Many researchers have suggested strategies that can enlarge the opponent’s winset, and shrink mine to maximize my interest.

Putnam says that the size of the winset is very important in the negotiation. The first reason is that larger winsets make Level I agreement more likely. And the second reason why winset size is important is that the compared size of the Level II winsets will affect the result of the international bargain. “The larger the perceived winset of a negotiator, the more he can be pushed around
by the opponent. Conversely, a small domestic winset can be a bargaining advantage.” (Putnam, 1988)

Putnam suggested three factors that affect winset size. They are the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level 2 constituents, Level 2 political institutions, and Level 1 negotiator’s strategies.

First, the distribution of power, preference, and possible coalition among constituents is important. For example, if the congress supposed to ratify the result of the negotiation, the position of major party, the possibility of coalition among parties, and preferences of each party affects the process of ratification. In addition, the interest group and public sentiments of civil society can also influence on the ratification. Putnam compares between homogeneous and heterogeneous topics. If the result of the negotiation affects people homogenously, there would be minimal conflict among people. However, if there were winners and losers according to the negotiation result, the conflict would be serious.

Second, the size of winset rely on the political institution. The ratification process is complicated and takes time in democratic system. However, in the authoritarian government, political leader can push on the ratification. In some authoritarian countries, the result could not disclose to the public. In addition, unofficial ratification including political and cultural acknowledgement is also important in some counties.

Third, negotiator’s strategy determines the size of the winset as well. The negotiator could make an effort to draw consensus among people by compensating the domestic loss due to the international agreement. Whereas, the negotiator can serve his/her own interest of belief. If the negotiator personally believe that
certain agreement is needed for the sake of his/her country, he/she would use the discretionary power to the maximum to achieve it.

Although this well-known negotiation theory effectively examine the mixture of factors that affect international negotiation, there are also limitations on this theory.

First, Putnam’s theory may oversimplify the negotiation process. Chun(2002) well pointed out that South Korea is facing multi-level game on North Korean issue. However, it seems that Chun did not deny the value of theory itself. He rather used the basic concept and diverted it into “multi-level game”. The theory has oversimplification issue actually. However, it also has potential power of the expandability.

Second, Schoppa(1993) pointed out that Putnam’s theory is “underdeveloped”, because the theory dose not inform about the practical strategy on particular instances. Putnam himself admit that there can be various strategy based on his theory and just exampled some. This theory is definitely not about ready-made tactics for negotiator. Therefore, we cannot undervalue this theory for the practical reasons.

Lastly, many scholars have been questioning on the role of the chief negotiator. Putnam considers the chief negotiator as an agent with no personal preference. However, Koo(2013) argues that the chief negotiator’s autonomy plays important role in negotiation. The powerful chief negotiator can enlarge the Level 2 winset. Furthermore, Jacobson(1996) pointed out that the chief negotiator is the product of domestic politics. He argues that there is no two level at all, but only one level of domestic politics that deal with both domestic and international issue at the same time.

These critics helped this study to have deeper look on this
theory. Based on the various aspect of the theory and it is clear that Two-Level game theory has its integrity. Among the various literature, this study took Koo’s point of view to elaborate the assumption.

Above all, this theory is a useful frame to see the reality of Inter-Korean talks. First, each factors that affects Inter-Korean talks can be identified. We can pick out the influential factors in the complicated environment of Inter-Korean talks. Second, we can compare the influential power of each factor to negotiation by measuring the size of the winset.
Chapter 3. Analytical Framework

This research will analyze political and military Inter–Korean Talks from 2008 to 2017 based on Two–Level Game theory. This study chose to analyze political and military field of Inter–Korean Talks. Since it is too wide to study all of them for decade, and political and military talks drive other part in the Inter–Korean relations. Political and military talks come forth and lead other issue, so it will be good for us to see overall Inter–Korean relations.

There were ten talks in this field for last ten years, and this study got the basic data of each talks from Special Office for Inter–Korean Dialogue website and white papers published by Ministry of Unification. About domestic situation of the South and the North, this study refered weekly and monthly report on North Korea provided by Ministry of Unification and press releases.

This research takes a form of case study design. This study uses multiple cases and embeds case study method. At first, this study analyzed the Putnam’ s two level game theory thoroughly. With detailed content of the theory, the critics were introduced as well. In addition, this study talked about the meaning of the theory in the context of Inter–Korean talks. Putnam’ s theory was modified so it can fit well in the Inter–Korean talks.

Robert Putnam suggested three determinants of winset – level 1 negotiation strategies, level 2 preferences and coalition, and level 2 institutions.
Level 1 negotiation strategies

The concept of level 1 negotiation strategies was modified as level 1 autonomy. This study will focus on the chief negotiator’s bargaining power. Actually, Putnam said that it is ‘Level 1 negotiator’s strategies’ that affects winset size and he presumed the chief negotiator as “has no independent policy preferences, but seeks simply to achieve an agreement that will be attractive to his constituents.” However, Putnam himself admitted that it is simplification for clear logic of theory.

Though Putnam presume the chief negotiators as passive reflector of domestic situation, it is natural and realistic that each chief negotiator has different bargaining power and preferences as well as negotiation tactics. Putnam also says that the chief negotiator considers side payment of his own and his political standing in domestic society. However, in the field of political and military Inter-Korean talks, representatives cannot get any economic benefits from the result. Of course, he/she could gain some level of public awareness of political benefits concerning people’s interest on Inter-Korean talks domestically and internationally. However, with the same reason, there is a certain limit to seek the chief negotiator’s own interest as an individual in this field.

In this study, the chief negotiators are considered to have certain power to lead the talks and persuade domestic people. ‘Negotiator’s autonomy’ was set as determinant of winset, and the autonomy is determined by the rank of the chief negotiator, negotiation skill of the chief negotiator, and comparison value of the chief negotiator’s ability and agenda difficulty.
Higher the rank is more bargaining power he/she has. We should note that unofficial rank is as important as official one. The distance to the highest power – the president – is important. Therefore, special envoy and officials of Blue House are more powerful than others are.

In addition, negotiation skill of the chief negotiator cannot be ignored in negotiation. There have been representatives who made consensus eventually with clear logic, improvisation and persistence. Therefore, negotiation skill must be considered in negotiator’s autonomy.

Lastly, comparison value of the chief negotiator’s ability and agenda difficulty is important to determine autonomy of the chief negotiator. If top rank negotiator dealt with easy agenda such as holding next meeting, it would be easy to lead the negotiation. However, low rank negotiator dealt with difficult agenda such as Cheonan sinking, it would be very hard to lead the conversation.

**Level 2 preferences and coalition**

Level 2 preferences and coalition were thoroughly analyzed by main agendas of each talks. In order to do that, this study classified talks by major agenda, followed the course of discussion about the agenda and find a position of each talks in the stream. Furthermore, the positions and the situations of the South and the North were concerned respectively. Therefore, winset of level 2 represents not the possibility of ratification, but acceptance by government, parliament, press, and ordinary people. It can be not clear to tell ‘the acceptance’, but we can tell the public sentiments about main agendas in Inter-Korean relations as time went by.
Putnam suggested three criteria that can analyze level 2 preference and coalitions. First, the characteristic of the issue, in other words, whether it is homogeneous issue or heterogeneous issue. Second, the degree of politicization of the issue in the country. Third, the trade-offs across different issue.

The issues related to Inter-Korean relations are fractional because of the duality of the Inter-Korean relations. Public sentiments are extremely divided on each case, and there is little room for compromise. In addition, the Inter-Korean problem is much politicized in South Korea. Unification is an important task that determines the fate of the nation. In addition, almost all politicians want to get public attention in relation to North Korean issues. Finally, the trade-offs between issues is often seen in past Inter-Korean talks. However, the conservative government has given each agenda its own value and meaning, making it difficult to trade off issues.

This study examined Level 2 preferences and coalitions on each agendas considering Putnam’s theory. Four main agenda suggested that dealt with in the Political and Military Inter-Korean talks for last decade: North Korea’s military provocations, Calumny and Slander to each other, Mt. Geumgang Tourism Project, and Preparation for main talks.

**Level 2 institution**

Level 2 institution is important determinant also but it is a fixed variable in Inter-Korean talks. Putnam says that ratification procedure and state autonomy from domestic pressure are two main factors to tell political institution of the country. This study
analyzed political institutions of two Koreas. It appeared that though two Koreas have different political system, they have not changed for decades so their influence have not dramatically changed on each talks. Therefore, this study set Level 2 institution as a fixed variable in this study.

**Graph design for comparative analysis**

Putnam says these three determinants can increase or decrease the size of winset. For the convenience of the analysis, this study assumed that each of determinants also have winsets – kind of sub winsets – that affects the winset of negotiation. If the size of sub winset is large, it makes the winset size larger too. And it would be easy to make consensus in the international negotiation because the winset – the range of compromising – is large. In contrast, if the size of ‘sub winset’ is small, it makes the winset size smaller. Accordingly, it is difficult to make consensus in the negotiation.

In order to do the clear comparative analysis, the graph was introduced with the size of winset of level 1 as the x-axis and the size of winset of level 2 as the y-axis. Level 1 winset is about the chief negotiator’s autonomy. If the chief negotiator has great autonomy, the Level 1 winset size is large, and vice versa. Level 2 winset is based on the preferences and coalition of level 2. If the agenda is homogeneous issue and less politicized, the level two winset is large. In contrast, if the agenda is heterogeneous issue and highly politicized, the level 2 winset is small. This study assumed level 2 institution as a fixed variable, so it is not counted into this graph.
Considering each characteristics of meetings, each meetings were place on a graph. Based on the graph, each quadrant and each talks can be analyzed. In this process, this study could find common point among talks as well as different points. Furthermore, this study classified talks by consensus success and failure cases and analyze success and failure factors of each talks. To do this, this study look into strategy of the South and the North. Based on each case studies, this study drew cross case conclusion and developed policy implications.

To achieve the validity of research, this study tried to follow several principles: to use multiple source of evidence, to maintain the chain of evidence and to create a case study database.
Chapter 4. Inter-Korean Talks 2008~2017

4.1. Inter-Korean talks Overview

4.1.1 2008~2012: Working level military talks on North Korean provocation

During this period, Inter-Korean talks was held 4.2 times in average in a year, sharply reduced from the 34.2 times annually in 2003–2007.2

On March 29, 2008, the North Korean government unilaterally called off all Inter-Korean talks. Accordingly, the Inter-Korean talks that had continued until February 2008 could not be in progress any more. In July 2008, the Inter-Korean relations became more dismal after the shooting incident on Mt. Geumgang.3

In September, North Korea criticized the South on South Korean civic group’s scattering of leaflets into the North. In this regard, the 37th Working-level Military Talks was held on October

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2 During this period, North Korea had expressed a strong resentment to the North Korea policy by the Lee Myung Bak government. Accordingly, Inter-Korean relations had been crushed right after the angulation Lee Myung Bak. In addition, North Korea repeated the large and small military provocations throughout the Lee Myung Bak administration and these made the Inter-Korean relationship uneasy.

3 South Korea demanded to take thorough investigation on incident and measures to prevent recurrence, but North Korea refused. Rather, North Korea blamed the South and demanded an apology the next day. The tourism was suspended. However, blaming the South, the North expelled South Korean personnel in the Mt. Geumgang.
2, 2008. The North focused on rebelling on the scattering of leaflets by civic organization. The North demanded an apology from the South.

Moreover, North Korea declared on November 12, 2008 that they would restrict the pass through the Military Demarcation Line from December 1, and closed the Panmunjeom Liaison Office.

In 2009, North Korea took hard position continuously. However, the Inter-Korean talks for the repatriation of South Korean internees were held and the detainees were repatriated on Aug. 13. On August 21, the tensions between South and North Korea were eased by a visit by a senior North Korean delegation to former president Kim Dae Jung’s demise.

According to the President Lee Myung Bak’s autobiography, a channel for private negotiations between South and North Korea was opened on the visit of this delegation. In the second half of 2009, The Red Cross talks on August and October, the reunion of separated families, and working-level meeting regarding the Imjin River flood control issue were held. At the end of 2009, the South provided with the H1N1 pandemic to the North, and the Inter-Korean talks on the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. Geumgang tourism were continued until early 2010.

However, as the Cheonan sinking incident occurred on March 26, 2010, the South-North relationship rapidly cooled down. The

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4 North Korea declares that it will enter into a confrontation with North Korea on Jan. 17, and on March 30, detained Korean workers who worked in Kaesong Industrial Complex. After North Korea launched a missile on April 5 and a second nuclear test on May 25, Inter-Korean relations got darker.

5 After Cheonan sinking which led to the deaths of 46 South Korean soldiers were revealed to be done by North Korea, the South Korean government urged the North to take responsible measures. In addition,
North declared a cut off all Inter-Korean talks. In August of this year, after the South Korean government announced its urgent support for the North Korean floods, talks between South and North Red Cross was resumed and continued until October, but on November 23 North Korea again raided the South Korean territory of Yeonpyeong Island. Inter-Korean talks was stopped once again.

In early 2011, out of sudden, North Korea suggested to hold Inter-Korean talks. North Korea proposed to discuss various agendas in various fields at the same time. The South Korean government made it clear that it should resolve the nuclear issue and the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents first, and proposed to hold talks for these matters. The working level military talks for solving the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong problems were held on February 8, but were dismissed unanimously. After that, academic-level Inter-Korean contact has continued.

South announced 5.24 measures including suspension of Inter-Korean trade. However, the North denied the results of our investigation.
Table 1: 2008~2012 Outline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>The Chief negotiator</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008.10.2</td>
<td>The 37th Working level Military Talks</td>
<td>South: Lee Sang-chul (Colonel, MND) North: Park Lim-soo (Senior colonel, KPA)</td>
<td>Calumny and Slander (leaflets by South Korean NGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010.9.30</td>
<td>The 38th Working level Military Talks</td>
<td>South: Moon Sang-kyun (Colonel, MND) North: Ri, Sun-kwon (Senior colonel, KPA)</td>
<td>North Korea’s military provocation (The sinking of the Cheonan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011.2.8-9</td>
<td>The 39th Working level Military Talks</td>
<td>South: Moon Sang-kyun (Colonel, MND) North: Ri, Sun-kwon (Senior colonel, KPA)</td>
<td>North Korea’s military provocation (The sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Unification (South–North Dialogue in Korea No. 74 and No. 75)

In June of this year, North Korea disclose that there was confidential meetings between the two Koreas to resolve the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong issue and blamed the South government for failing it. North Korea's unilateral disclosure of confidential contact has irreparably damaged North–South trust. By the end of 2012, intermittent private level Inter–Korean exchanges had repeated stop and go, but no official Inter–Korean talks was held.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) Kim Jong Il died in December 2011, and Kim Jong Un succeeded to the North Korean regime. In 2012, North Korea continued its belligerent attitude by unilaterally destroying the 2.29 agreement with the United States and continuing the missile launch experiment.
4.1.2 2013~2014: High-levels talks to restore relationship

In February 2013, President Park Geun Hye began her term. At first, it was difficult to talk with North Korea. The North disconnected the Inter-Korean hotline in March. Following this, the North suspended the operation of the Gaesung Industrial Complex withdrawing North Korean workers on April 8. As a result, all of the Inter-Korean communication channels were shut down.

However, the two Koreas tried to resume talks and to improve their relations. The South government suggested Inter-Korean authorities’ talks for the normalization of the Gaesung Industrial Complex consistently. In reply, North Korea responded to South Korea’s proposal for Inter-Korean authorities’ talks on June 6.

The two Koreas held working-level meetings for Inter-Korean authorities’ talks, and achieved an agreement to hold Inter-Korean authorities’ talks on June 12–13 in Seoul. However, two Koreas failed to make a consensus on the rank of the head of delegation. Therefore, the Inter-Korean authorities’ talks was called off.

After the breakdown of the Inter-Korean authorities’ talks, South Korean government continued to try to resume Gaesung Industrial Complex and succeeded. At the same time, the South

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7 North Korea had escalated tension on the Korean Peninsula conducting a third nuclear test on February 12, 2013.

8 South Korea proposed Inter-Korean working-level authorities’ talks for Gaesung Industrial Complex considering bad conditions for tenant companies in the Gaesung Industrial Complex. Accordingly, the first Inter-Korean working-level talks for the Gaesung Industrial Complex were held. After six more rounds of talks with a view to restarting the Gaesung
suggested Red Cross talks to hold the reunion of the separated families, but this attempt was failed.⁹

In early 2014, the two Koreas once again tried to promote Inter-Korean relations through holding the reunion of separated families. First, the Red Cross talks were held. High-level meeting was then held on February 12 and 14 for more comprehensive consultations including suspension of the calumny and slander to each other. In the high-level meeting, the Blue House personnel in the South and the defense committee members in the North, who can directly convey the opinions of the top leaders of both sides, participated. In this talks, the two Koreas agreed not to slander each other and to promote the reunion for separated families as planned.

Immediately after the Inter-Korean high-level meeting, however, North Korea heightened military tension by firing ballistic missiles. Moreover, the North criticized the South, claiming that statements by the president and other government officials were a “violation of the agreement on the cessation of slander.” South Korea expressed displeasure and urged the North to stop criticizing the president and government of the South.

Industrial Complex, The Agreement on the Normalization of the Gaesung Industrial Complex was adopted on August 14. This agreement prevented further suspension of the Gaesung Industrial Complex by North Korea, and promoted the Gaesung Industrial Complex as an international industrial complex.

⁹ From August to September, Red Cross talks for the reunion of separated families and talks for the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism were promoted. The two Koreas agreed to hold a family reunion event through Red Cross talks, but failed to hold a planned reunion family reunion, as they did not agree on the date of the talks for resuming tourism on the Mt. Geumgang.
In spite of the threatening atmosphere between the two Koreas, Inter-Korean talks went on. On August 11, South Korean government proposed second High-level talks to the North.

On October 3, a day before the closing ceremony of the Incheon Asian Games, the North said that they would send High-level delegation to Incheon to the closing ceremony. The South accepted their offer, so on October 4, Inter-Korean High-Level Talks on the occasion of the Incheon Asian Games took place. The two sides agreed to hold the Second Inter-Korean High-Level Meeting that the South had proposed.

However, on October 7, North Korea provoked the South by violating the Northern Limit Line. Then, the Inter-Korean Military Authorities’ Meeting were held to discuss the issue, but it broke up without agreement. Two Koreas talked about this issue in Military Authorities’ Meeting on October 15th, but failed to make consensus. The North demanded to stop spreading anti-DPRK leaflets continuously and the South argued that the leaflets were from NGOs and were nothing to do with the government. Two Koreas could not hold talks but argued about the leaflets.

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10 The Kaesong Subcommittee was held in March and Inter-Korean talks was held in July to discuss the North Korean athletes’ participation in the Incheon Asian Games.

11 The delegations were Hwang Pyong-so, the Director of the General Politics Bureau of the Korea People’s Army (KPA), and Choe Ryong-hae and Kim Yang-gon, both Secretaries of the Workers’ Party.
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>The Chief negotiator</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
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| 2013.6.9−10| Working level meeting for Inter−Korean Authorities’ Talks            | **South:** Chun, Hae−sung (Assistant minister, MOU)  
**North:** Kim, Sung−hye (Senior Official of the Secretariat of the CPRF) | Preparation for the ministerial level talks                                 |
| 2014.2.10, 12 | High−level Meeting                                                          | **South:** Kim Kyou−hyun (First Deputy Director, National Security Office)  
**North:** Won Dong−yeon (Deputy Director, united Front Department) | Calumny and Slander Reunion of Separated Families                         |
| 2014.10.4  | High−level talks in Incheon Asian Games                               | **South:** Kim Kwan−jin (Director of the National Security Office)  
**North:** Hwang Pyong−seo (Director of the General Politics Bureau of the KPA) | North Delegation visited Incheon Asian Game  
Agreed to hold the 2nd High−level meeting                                  |
| 2014.10.15 | Military Authorities Meeting                                            | **South:** Yoo Jeh−seung (Assistant Minister, MND)  
**North:** Kim Yong−chol (Director, General Reconnaissance Bureau) | North Korea’s military provocations (NLL Invasion)                        |

Source: Ministry of Unification (South−North Dialogue in Korea No. 76 and No. 77)
4.1.3 2015~2017: Brief success of high-level authorities’ meeting

In the first half of 2015, two Koreas continued to argue in a harsh atmosphere. However, South-North relations faced dramatic change on August. Amidst military tensions heightened by North Korea’s wooden-box landmine provocation on August 4 and its firing on loudspeakers on August 20, North Korea urgently proposed an Inter-Korean meeting. From August 22 to 24, an Inter-Korean High-Level Authorities’ meeting was held. During the talks, the North explicitly expressed regret about its landmine provocation, and the two parties agreed to activate Inter-Korean talks and non-governmental exchanges.

In the second half of 2015, the two Koreas undertook to implement the agreement reached at the Inter-Korean High-Level Authorities’ Meeting. From September 7 to 8, an Inter-Korean Red Cross working-level meeting was held, resulting in both sides’ agreement to hold a reunion for separated families on Chuseok. From October 20 to 26, the reunion took place at Mt. Geumgang.

On November 26, at the working-level meeting preparing for Inter-Korean Authorities’ Talks, the South and North agreed to have the First Inter-Korean Authorities’ Talks, at which the chief

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12 The North repeated their requirements including to stop ROK-US military exercises and to prohibit the dissemination of anti-DPRK leaflets to the South. The North argued that these were a prerequisite for improving Inter-Korean relations and Inter-Korean talks. South Korea urged the North to respond to its proposal that it enter into South-North talks. In July, the Sixth South-North Joint Committee Meeting for the GIC was held. However, the meeting ended without agreement due to the difference in positions between the two parties.
delegate of each side would be a vice-ministerial level official. At the First Inter-Korean Authorities’ Talks held in Gaeseong from December 11 to 12, the South and North exchanged opinions on pending issues about Inter-Korean relations, such as the resolution of the issue of separated families. However, the North insisted that the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism should be a prerequisite for further discussion, and the meeting ended without agreement.

**Table 3: 2015~2017 Outline**

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>The Chief negotiator</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
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| 2015.8.23–24 | Inter-Korean High-level Authorities’ Meeting | **South:** Kim Kwan-jin (Director of the National Security Office)  
**North:** Hwang Pyong-seo (Director of the General Politics Bureau of the KPA) | North Korea’s military provocation (Landmine explosion in DMZ)  
Calumny and Slander (Loud speaker broadcasting in DMZ) |
| 2015.11.26 | Working-Level Meeting for the Inter-Korean Vice-Ministerial Level Talks | **South:** Kim Ki-woong (Assistant Minister, MOU)  
**North:** Hwang Chol (Senior Official of the Secretariat of the CPRF) | Preparation for the vice-ministerial level talks |
| 2015.12.11–12 | The 1st Inter-Korean Vice-Ministerial Level Talks | **South:** Hwang Boo-gi (Vice Minister of MOU)  
**North:** Jon Jong-su (Deputy Director, Secretariat of the CPRF) | Mt. Keunmgang Tourism, Reunion of the separated families |

Source: Ministry of Unification (South-North Dialogue in Korea No. 77)
On January 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test. Since then, all of the Inter-Korean talks were suspended, and two Koreas continued confrontation during the Park Geun Hye administration.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{4.2 Winsets analysis for each talks}

\textbf{4.2.1 Level 1: Chief negotiator’s autonomy}

As for the chief delegates, it is necessary to analyze their rank first. In the past nine years, there were 10 political military talks. Among them, two talks were the minister level, two were the vice minister level, three were assistance secretary level, and three was the sectional chief level. Usually, in the South Korean government, 

\textsuperscript{13} South government criticized North Korea’s nuclear test. In addition, as part of sanctions against North Korea's nuclear development, on February 10, South government closed the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Against this measure, North Korea declared to disconnect communication channels between South and North Korea on February 11. The South continued to urge North Korea to suspend its nuclear development and the North had demanded the South to change its policy toward the North. North Korea conducted another nuclear test on September 9, raising concerns of the South and the international community. In the South, corruption scandal of the president and people who are close to the president had been revealed. President Park Geun Hye's office was suspended from December 2016 and imposed impeachment on March 2017. North Korea's nuclear tests and the political situation of South Korea including president’s impeachment and early president election did not create an environment to promote Inter-Korean talks.
above vice minister level is called “High-level”, and below vice minister level is called “working level”.

As expected, the higher the level of the chief delegate, the easier the consensus was drawn. In particular, the Chief Security Officer Kim Kwan-jin, who served as chief delegate to the 2014 and 2015 talks, was in fact a most powerful authority among ministers in his position as the chief of the ROK’s foreign and security policy.

In terms of bargaining power, the chief delegates were public officials who were recognized for their highest expertise in their field. Most of the chief representatives were Inter-Korean relations experts who have been engaged in Inter-Korean talks for a long time, and there were experts in defense and international negotiations. All of them were good bureaucrats, but the negotiation with North Korea was unique, so the delegates who attend the Inter-Korean negotiations for the first time in his life would have to face with an unfamiliar environment.

In the case of military talks, all the talks were a working-level meeting, but the agenda was very difficult to solve, including the Cheonan incident and the NLL issue. In comparison, the high-level talks between South and North Korea during the closing ceremony of the Incheon Asian Games were a kind of good will talks among top-ranking officials. It can be easily guessed that talks and consultation were smooth at this meeting.
4.2.2 Level 2: preferences and coalitions

Level 2 preferences and coalitions vary among agendas. Here are four main agendas that were on the Political and Military Inter-Korean talks from the year of 2008 to 2017.

North Korea’s military provocation

Since the military provocation of North Korea has been frequent for the past nine years, Inter-Korean talks have also addressed this issue. These include the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong events, DMZ landmine incidents, and NLL involvement.
The Cheonan and Yeonpyeong events occurred in March and November 2010, respectively. North Korea attacked South Korean territory and territorial waters, causing 50 deaths, including soldiers and civilians. Naturally, the South Korean government wanted to address this issue first before discussing other agendas. South Korea continued to urge North Korea to take responsible measures, including punishment of those responsible.

North Korea’s attack on our territory and territorial waters caused a massive casualty and shocked both at home and abroad, because it was the first territory attack since the Korean War. Of course, the people of the South were very angry and thought that the North must take reasonable measures. Some people questioned the Cheonan incident, but in the case of Yeonpyeong Island, people saw the attacking situation on air. The South Korean people were very surprised by the militancy of North Korea, and became very negative about North Korea. Many people got to recognize North Korea as an enemy, not a friend who goes to unification together.

In October 2014, North Korean troops invaded the NLL and received warnings from our troops. In fact, the NLL invasion of the North Korean army was not usual. However, North Korea proposed to the South to hold talks to discuss the case. The offer for the talks was rather surprising. North Korea seems to have wanted to discuss the NLL issue in some way. The NLL problem has been a longstanding problem between the two Koreas and has been discussed in the Inter-Korean talks for more than 30 years. The NLL is an issue that cannot be easily compromised because it is boundary issue. The NLL problem prompts immediate opposition from conservatives of the South. Some argue that, given the complex historical background of the NLL, it must be acknowledged
that it is a problem to be resolved in the course of unification. Although, it is true that the boundary issue is very sensitive.

In August 2015, two South Korean soldiers were seriously wounded by North Korea's mines buried in the DMZ. The people who were angry with the past military provocation of North Korea were angrier with this incident. Nearly all the people condemned North Korea 's actions, and soldiers put off their discharges until the case was resolved and defended the front line. It is presumed that the North Korean government, which constantly monitors the South's public sentiment through the media, would be upset by the anger of the South Koreans.

In the past, there have been several provocations of North Korea's armed forces. Military clashes in the NLL have killed soldiers and North Korea have sent spies to South Korea. Depending on the case, North Korea expressed regret to the South, but it used to use ambiguous expressions and mainly through informal channel.

However, Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye government wanted North Korea to recognize its own fault and to apologize properly. This problem requires political commitment and corresponds of the highest leader level. It is over the authority of the working level talks.

In fact, according to Lee Myung Bak's autobiography, the special envoy of president for the Cheonan has conducted a secret meeting to resolve the issue. Unfortunately, the talks broke down. In the period of President Park Geun Hye, High-level authorities meeting was held in 2015. At this meeting, two Koreas reached the agreement to solve the DMZ provocation problem. At this meeting, the top officials in the field of diplomacy and security in North and
South Korea met. North Korea expressed regret over the DMZ 
provocation here. At the time, the South Korean media interpreted 
the result that the South Korean government had reached a 
consensus by giving up some of its stance.

**Calumny and Slander to each other**

Historically, North Korea reacted sensitively to the comments 
about its regime and supreme leader. This is because the 
maintenance of the regime itself was difficult due to the economic 
collapse and the losses of the solidarity of socialist countries. In 
addition, the social atmosphere inside North Korea, which is banned 
from criticizing the government, seems to be a reason. It is a very 
important task for the North Korean government to control its 
residents to obey the North Korean government's policies. The 
voice of objectively evaluating the North Korean regime is very 
uncomfortable for the North Korean government.

The North Korean government has urged the South Korean 
government and the media to stop to refer on the North Korean 
situation. Moreover, the North calls it “calumny and slander”. 
Related articles are also included in the Inter-Korean Basic 
Agreement, which was created in the early 1990s. In particular, in 
2004, a North-South agreement was made in North Korea's 
request to dismantle all the national propaganda that was installed in 
the military demarcation line.

For the past nine years, North Korea has been very sensitive to 
leaflet issues, particularly from the South Korean civilian 
organizations on the north and south boundaries. This leaflet 
pointed out the contradictions of the North Korean regime, and the
North Korean dictatorship. The North asked the South Korean government to sanction the activities of these NGOs through talks. After the North Korean mine strike in August 2015, South Korean government resumed the propaganda broadcast on the military demarcation line. Against on this measure, the North Korean government proposed to hold talks to stop it immediately. North Korea also responded very sensitively to the statements of our press and government personnel that are the demand for North Korea’s nuclear dismantlement, the state of human rights in North Korea, and reports on Kim Jung Eun, the highest leader in North Korea.

The North’s demands are not well understood by people in South Korea. In South Korea, where freedom of expression is guaranteed, the blame for the South Korean government is not banned. On the contrary, if someone does not talk about the reality, he/she would be criticized as being insincere. In order to achieve unification, it is very important that the North Korean people should know precisely about the reality of the North Korean government and the international reality. On the other hand, there is some opinion that the need to regulate the level of criticism of the North Korean regime in order to improve the relations between the two Koreas, while fully acknowledging the need.

The South explained the South Korean situation in the North at the talks and persuaded them that the government cannot restrict the freedom of expression in the Republic of Korea. However, the North had not accept this argument.
Mt. Geumgang Tourism Project

In July 2008, a South Korean tourist was killed by the gunshot from a North Korean soldier at Mt. Geumgang. The South Korean government immediately stopped touring Mt. Geumgang and demanded responsible measures from the North, but the North denounced the South rather than respond to the South's demands. Although the North–South working-level talks have been held, it has been confirmed that there is a great difference in opinion between the two Koreas. Since then, skeptical voices on large-scale business projects with North Korea increased in the South.

Since Mt. Geumgang tourism was the source of the cash flow, North Korea hoped to resume this project. They had urged the South to resume the tourism of Mt. Geumgang. At the vice-ministerial level talks in December 2015, the North strongly demanded the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism. The meeting was supposed to discuss on the various pending issues. However, the North strongly emphasized the resumption of tourism on Mt. Geumgang and did not actively participate in other discussions. When the South prioritize separated families issue, the North proposed to resolve the disputed family problems and resume the tourism of Mt. Geumgang at the same time. However, South Korea decided that they could not pursue two issues in parallel.

Preparation for main talks

The high-level talks between the two Koreas will discuss the overall Inter-Korean relations and hold large-scale related events.
Therefore, it is common to hold a working level meeting to prepare for the high-level talks. At the working-level talks, some important issues such as which delegates will be present at the main talks and what agenda to discuss will be agreed upon. In addition to this, representatives discuss various events to hold talks such as the event schedule and preparatory procedures.

In 2013 and 2015, working-level talks were held to prepare high-level talks. Political talks have never been held throughout the Lee Myung Bak administration, so the Inter-Korean inter-government talks that was scheduled for 2013 were high-level political talks in a quite long term. The two Koreas held preliminary talks to hold successful talks.

Domestic expectations for high-level Inter-Korean talks held in a long time were high in the South. There were many people hoping that Inter-Korean relations would improve again. However, as a result, high-level talks failed to narrow the differences between South and North Korea on the rank of the chief delegate. Of course, it was an important issue for the same rank-and-file delegation, but there was a domestic controversy about whether it was important enough to cancel the talks itself. Many people were saddened about the breakdown of the high-level talks in 2013.

These failures and regrets have contributed greatly to the success of the 2015 working-level talks. Two Koreas have made every effort to ensure to hold the talks smoothly. The people also understood the difficulties of the negotiations and hoped not to repeat the disappointing results of 2013. As a result, the level 2 winset in 2015 is much larger than in 2013.
Size of the Winset

The level 2 winset size depends on the issue. The South Korean people were very angry about the deaths or injuries of the South Koreans due to the North's attack, so it was difficult for the government to present a different position from the people. In this case, the winset is very small. The same is true of the boundary line, such as the NLL. The winset is very small because the South people have a unified attitude toward this problem.

The South government can take a more flexible stance on the so-called calumny and slander problem than the North Korean military provocation problem. Whereas South Koreans are very interested in North Korea's military provocation issue, there is little interest in so-called calumny and slander related issues. However, the conservatives have a very negative view of making compromise on this issue to the North, so the winset is not big.

Mt. Geumgang tourism is a problem that the South Korean government can exercise more flexibility. Opinions differ among South Koreans about resuming tourism. There are many opinions that the conservative party should not resume the business because it contains a cash inflow into the North Korean regime. However, it is highly persuasive to argue that, in spite of some problems: the government should promote and expand Inter-Korean cooperation projects in order to develop Inter-Korean relations. Depending on the way that resume the tourism and North Korea's attitude, South Koreans can accept the resumption of tourism in Mt. Geumgang.

As for preparatory talks before the high-level talks between the two Koreas, the level 2 winsets in South Korea are quite large. Most South Koreans have a positive perception of Inter-Korean
talks. Even people who dislike North Korea could not deny the need for peaceful ways to improve relations and achieve unification through talks. Some people in South Korea, however, think that they should carry out the South’s argument from the preparatory talks. This is a matter for the South Korean government to persuade North Korea and its people at the same time.

**Graph 3: Level 2 winset size comparison**

![Graph showing various levels of meetings and talks between North and South Korea](image)

- 37th Working-level Military Talks
- High-level Meeting
- Working-Level Meeting 2013
- Military Authorities Meeting
- Vice Ministerial Level Talks
- High-level Talks in Incheon Asian Games
- 38th and 39th Working-level Military Talks
- High-level Authorities’ Meeting
- Working-Level Meeting 2015
4.2.3. Level 2: Institutions

Institutions of the South and the North

As for the South Development of the Inter-Korean relations Acts stipulates that “The National Assembly shall have a right to consent to the conclusion and ratification of South-North Korean agreements which place heavy financial burdens on the State or nationals, or South-North Korean agreements concerning legislative matters” in article 21. And constitution of the ROK stipulates that “the attendance of a majority of the total members, and the concurrent vote of a majority of the members present, shall be necessary for decisions of the National Assembly” in article 49.

The issue of Inter-Korean relations often arise controversy in the South, and such conflicts are reflected in the National Assembly, so ratification of the Inter-Korean agreement is not easy. For example, parliamentary ratification process of the 2007 summit and the prime ministerial agreement was discontinued at the debate before the vote.

So far, more than 200 Inter-Korean agreements have been signed, but the National Assembly has ratified only 11 of them. This disproves the difficulty of ratifying the National Assembly. In the past nine years, no agreement has been signed that requires ratification of the National Assembly by the law. Therefore, there is no agreement that has passed the parliamentary approval process. However, in the case of future agreements that place heavy financial burdens on the State or nationals, the process of ratifying the National Assembly is likely to be a challenge.
South Korea is a democracy that guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of expression. The power of the state is also divided according to the divide spirit of three volumes. Therefore, the state autonomy from the domestic pressure is not high. The press and experts continue to monitor and evaluate the government's North Korea policy. Because they reflect public sentiment, the Korean democratic government elected by the vote cannot ignore their voices.

Compared with South Korea, North Korea has very high state autonomy. Although there are constitutions and laws in North Korea, it is not certain whether they are functioning properly in the situation of the Labor Party taking control of all state organs. Therefore, it seems that there is no reason to discuss the ratification procedure set by the law.

In terms of national autonomy, North Korea is incomparably higher than South Korea. The decision-making process of the North Korean government is not exposed to the outside. It is hard to find any criticism of the government in the North Korean media. Therefore, the North Korean government will be able to pursue the policy without worrying about the public opinion as compared with the South Korean government.

**Level 2 institutions as a fixed variable in Inter-Korean Talks**

The South and the North have such a contrast political system. Of course, they affect Inter-Korean talks. South Korean delegates are more concerned about the public sentiment in the talks, but they
can lead the talks in a liberal atmosphere compared to the North Korean delegation. However, the North Korean delegation should pay more attention to the dictatorial government, which is constantly monitoring them, rather than paying less attention to the opinions of the North Koreans. Therefore, their behavior can be more rigid.

In addition, the system of the two Koreas has a great influence on the talks. However, this study will exclude the analysis of the influence of the North and South Korean political institutions. This is because the political institutions of the two Koreas is a fixed variable that does not change. The political system of the two Koreas has not changed much since the 1970s when the Inter–Korean talks began. As the democracy of the South develops over time, the situation changes, but the democracy itself does not shake in a big way. In North Korea, new political lines such as Songun politics, Kim Il Sung–ism, and Kim Jong Il–ism are being proposed, but it has not changed from a large framework to be a socialist dictatorship state.

Among the three determinants of winset that Putnam suggested, level 1 negotiator’s strategies and the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level 2 constituents change depending to the talks but the Level 2 political institutions is applied equally to all the talks. Therefore, this study excluded the Level 2 political institutions from the analysis.
Chapter 5. Political and Military Inter-Korean Talks 2008~2017

5.1. Comprehensive Analysis of winsets

This study is an analysis of inter-Korean talks over the past decade. Based on Putnam’s Two-Level game theory, this study examined public sentiment on each talks as well as negotiation strategies of representatives. In order to do this, this study overviewed inter-Korean talks and relationship, and drew the determinants of winset in each talks. In addition, this study compared the size of level 1 and level 2 winset relatively. Now, it is time to make a comprehensive approach based on previous analysis.

According to Putnam, the size of winset decides the result of the negotiation. If the winset size is large, it is more likely to make an agreement and if the winset size is small, building consensus is very hard because the one part has to compromise unilaterally. Putnam says that the size of winset is determined by three factor. They are level 1 chief negotiator’s autonomy, level 2 preferences and coalitions, and level 2 institution. This study put level 2 institution as a fixed variable in inter-Korean relation and examined level 1 chief negotiator’s autonomy and level 2 preferences and coalitions thoroughly in each talks.

Now, this study introduces two-dimensional graph, setting level 1 chief negotiator’s autonomy as X axis and level 2 preferences and coalitions as Y axis. Based on previous analysis on last decade’s Inter-Korean talks, each talks can find its coordinates.
According to Putnam’s theory, if the x-axis and y-axis are high, then the talks must have agreement. Ten inter-Korean talks are located on the graph. A half of them made consensus, and the other half failed. On graph 4, one can tell that the reality of the inter-Korean talks is consistent with the Putnam’s theory.

Graph 4: Level 1 – Level 2

- Double square: Consensus success cases
- Single Square: Consensus failure cases

Graph 4 tells that the reality is consistent with theory in many ways. However, there are some exceptions. Before drawing implications, this study will discuss the talks in each quadrant in detail.
(1) Quadrant 1: Both Level 1 and 2 have relatively large winset

The chief representatives of three talks had high bargaining power, and agreements of the talks were about holding next talks. Therefore, achieving consensus was relatively easy.

Especially, top-level representatives of both side met in High-level talks in Incheon Asian Games. The chief representatives were very close to each supreme leader, so literally they could talk and make consensus about anything. However, two side agreed to have other political talks since it was just a goodwill visit.

However, working level meeting in 2013 was difficult to negotiate. Since it was the first political talk of Park government, so the South and the North fight for pride to tame others. Eventually it led to failure of implementation. Based on this failure, the South and the North well knew about winset of the other. It made negotiation of working level meeting in 2015 much easier. Although the two talks were working level, the chief negotiators of the two talks – Cheon Hae Seong in 2013 and Kim Ki Woong in 2015 – were the two top working-level veterans in political Inter-Korean talks in the South. They participated in political Inter-Korean talks for decades, and were well known for their experienced and logical talks not only in the South but also in the North. Therefore, though their official ranks were not relatively high, their bargaining power from good strategies and negotiation tactics were very high.
(2) Quadrant 2: Winset of Level 2 is large but Level 1 has small winset

The main agenda of the vice-ministerial talks in the second quadrant was the tourism of Mt. Geumgang and the reunion of separated families. Originally, this meeting was supposed to deal with the overall pending tasks of Inter-Korean relations, but the agenda was reduced as North Korea became obsessed with the resumption of tourism in Mt. Geumgang. As stated above, South Koreans have an open attitude toward the tourism issue of Mt. Geumgang compared to North Korea’s military provocation or so-called calumny and slander problems. However, North Korea tries to solve this problem urgently in connection with the issue of separated families, which has reduced the scope of negotiations for the South Korean delegates.

South Korea’s chief delegate, Vice Minister Hwang Bu-ki, was an Inter-Korean relations expert who worked in the Unification Ministry for decades especially in the field of Inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. He was the first South Korean government official to have lived in the Kaesong Industrial Complex and had negotiations with North Korean officials. Although the personal capacity of the chief delegate was excellent, the task given to him was too difficult. North Korea wanted to accept its demands fully and promptly. In such a situation, the negotiating power of the chief delegate is supposed to be weakened. Eventually, the talks ended without agreement.
(3) Quadrant 3: Both Level 1 and 2 have relatively small winset

There are four talks in quadrant 3, and these were very difficult talks. These talks were all working level talks. However, the agenda of the talks was very difficult. In the case of the 37th working level military talks, the chief delegate was the director. At the talks, North Korea strongly demanded that the leaflets be stopped. At the time, this was a tricky issue in South Korea, so it was not an issue that could be handled by the director level. The 38th and 39th military talks were more serious. At the talks, the director level chief delegate discussed on Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents with the North. However, neither of them could compromise on these agendas.

As noted earlier, two Koreas were failed to make an agreement on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong problems even in secret meetings of the president’s special envoy according to Lee Myung Bak’s autobiography. Throughout the talks, the South and the North had to reiterate their claim.

The chief representatives who attended these three talks were experts in Inter-Korean relations who have been engaged in the military talks for a long time. Although their personal expertise, the challenges were beyond their capabilities.

The situation in the case of military authorities meeting was not much different. At the talks, the North Koreans seriously raised the NLL issue and the so-called calumny and slander problem. The NLL issue was related to the border issue. There was a related discussion on the 2007 summit, but the South had a domestic controversy about the agreement even the agreement had been done by president. Naturally, there was no discretion to the Chief Negotiator.

In these four talks, the two Koreas continued their sharp confrontation. The talks broke up without consensus.
(4) Quadrant 4: Winset of Level 1 is large but Level 2 has small winset

The two talks in the fourth quadrant were very high-level. In the South, representatives from the Presidential Office attended, and in the North, high-level officials from the Labor Party and the National Defense Commission attended.

In the case of high-level meetings, the South's chief delegate was an expert on international affairs who had been in the ministry of foreign affairs for a long time. He was an experienced international negotiator, but it was the first Inter-Korean talks for him. At the talks, the North raised the issue of so-called calumny and slander. It was a difficult issue to compromise, but the chief delegate persistently negotiated and led the agreement. However, this agreement was not properly implemented. The two Koreas agreed on the next round of talks, but no follow-up talks were held because of North Korea's rejection.

In the case of High-level authorities’ meeting, both chief delegates were considered to be top officials of both sides, and the press was considered to be the representative of the summit. The talks held shortly after the provocation of North Korea's landmines, so it seemed to have little chance of successful agreement between the two Koreas. However, both chief delegates were in a position to directly communicate with the top leaders, and the chief delegates of both sides scrambled for four days to solve the problem. As a result, the two Koreas succeeded in a dramatic agreement.
5.2. Implications

(1) **Level 1 is more influential to make consensus.**

Based on the graph 4, this research could draw implications. The first one is that level 1 is more influential to make consensus. It is clear when we consider the results of the talks.

**Graph 5: Consensus Success/Failure cases**

- Blue square: Consensus success cases
- Orange Square: Consensus failure cases
In this graph, the talks in big blue square are talks that succeeded to draw agreement. As mentioned before, the reality is quite consistent with the theory. All of the talks in quadrant one, succeeded to make an agreement as expected. On the contrary, all of the talks in quadrant three failed. Quadrant two and quadrant four is gray area in the theory. This study found that all of the talks in quadrant four had succeeded to make a consensus, and the talks in quadrant two had not. In other words, we can see that the consensus was achieved when the level 1 winset was relatively large. In this case, small level 2 winset did not interrupt to make consensus. On the other hand, the talks with relatively small level 1 winsets ended without agreement. Even though the level 2 winsets were relatively large, they could not contribute to success. As a result, level 1 has had a greater impact on reaching consensus.

Especially the talks on quadrant three and four dealt with agendas including North Korean military provocation and slander that had the least winset in both side and were so the chronic issue in Inter-Korean relations. Arguments from both side were contradict on these agendas.

Moreover, the position of leading party and others were very different and so the public sentiments were. Of course, most of the South Koreans blame North Korea for its provocation, and could not highly appreciate the North. However, in the aspects of negotiation strategy, progressive party argued that the government has to solve this matter quickly for the sake of promoting inter-Korean relations. On the side of leading party, they argued that the North has to apologize sincerely before we promote other cooperative business. Likewise, South Korean public were divided into two camp on this issue. The agreements were not necessary to be ratified by
parliament, but they clearly affected the negotiation.

Accordingly, it was very hard to make consensus on working level. All of the talks on quadrant three is working level and we can see they all failed. Working level chief negotiators just had to repeat the each side’s original position, and had no discretionary power to convert it. However, High-level chief negotiators could achieve consensus with very difficult agenda. The reason is that they divert their original strategy to make a room for compromise or bypass the agenda to achieve the bigger goal.

As for the Vice-ministerial talks on quadrant two, the agenda was relatively easy to compromise, but they failed to achieve consensus. There could be many reasons why they failed, but many people agreed that main reason was not South Korea. The North repeated their argument unilaterally, and made it hard to compromise. In addition, when the South Korean chief negotiator mentioned about North Korean nuclear issue in the dialogue, the North rebelled harshly and did not continue to talks about the issue. After the talks, the North radically changed their policy direction from negotiation to nuclear experiment after this talk. We can assume that they had hard strategy for this talks with the option of future policy change.
(2) Small domestic winset can be enlarged by Chief Negotiator’s power.

Second implication from graph 4 is that small domestic winset can be enlarged by chief negotiator’s power. It is related to ‘the gray area’ of the theory. Putnam said that it is more likely to make consensus when the winsets are large. Then, what would happen when level 1 winset is large but level 2 winset is small? The graph 4 shows certain result.

**Graph 6: Impact of Powerful Chief Negotiator**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Working-Level Meeting** In 2013
- **High-level Talks** in Incheon Asian Games
- **High-level Meeting**
- **37th Working-Level Military Talks**
- **38th and 39th Working-level Military Talks**
- **Military Authorities Meeting**
- **Vice Ministerial Level Talks**
- **High-level Authorities’ Meeting**
High-level meeting and High-level authorities’ meeting in quadrant three had small level 2 winset in the South. The agenda was calumny and slander and North Korean provocation. Park Geun Hye administration had a principle that they should reveal North Korean reality as it is, but North Korea took it as calumny and slander. Especially, in High-level authorities’ meeting, North Korean military provocation agenda was entangled with calumny and slander agenda. Therefore, the negotiation expected to be difficult.

However, they succeeded to make an agreement in both cases. They even agreed on to hold the next round of talks. This study could find its reason in the chief negotiators. From the South, the chief negotiators in both talks were from presidential office. North Korean negotiators were close to the supreme leader’s office also. They could directly received the direction from the top leaders of both sides. In particular, in the case of High-level authorities’ meeting, the chief representatives were high-ranking officials who were capable of direct conversation with the top leaders of both sides. In this case, despite the small winset of level 2, representatives drew the agreement. When the chief representatives explained the results of the talks to the people after the talks, the people accepted the results positively.

There is a saying that “Political will of top leader is the most important in inter-Korean relationship.” Every presidents in South Korea has wanted to improve inter-Korean relations, and tried to do so. However, North Korea has been always unpredictable. They are masters of brinkmanship and sometimes they had done military provocations. Facing the difficulties to deal with North Korea, some leaders had lose their interest and had gotten anger to the violation.
In this situation, political leader’s strong will and patience are necessary. North Korea has never been easy game to the South. However, they are definitely not negligible because they are the partner to pursuing unification. Therefore, strong political will and tight strategies are needed in the inter-Korean relations. This study shows that political will produced achievement even in the difficult situation.

In addition, we have to focus that these talks were held in conservative governments in South Korea. Political will is more powerful in the conservative administration because they tend to be pessimistic about inter-Korean talks originally. Whereas progressive party argues that two Koreas should meet and talk frequently, Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye administration set the principle that inter-Korean talks is meaningful only when the talks contributes to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the inter-Korean relations development. In this reason, the number of inter-Korean talks decreased. However, the agendas to discuss had not the misunderstanding were accumulated. Public sentiments toward North Korea had gotten to be bad also. Even in this situation, when political leaders of two Koreas had will to solve the issue, they achieved what they wanted. Since the conservative government had strict standard to North Korea, the government making progress was considered genuine and sincere. In this reason, even when the level 2 winsets were very small, the chief representative empowered by president could enlarge them. Unfortunately, these developments had not lasted long. South Korea did not lower the bar and North Korea frequently closed the door of dialogue blaming the South. As mentioned before, two administration cared for the genuine progress of inter-Korean
relations, not the talks itself. However, resuming the talks was constant issue during two administration paradoxically.
Chapter 6. Conclusion

6.1 Evaluation

Some argues that the North Korea policy is an act of the state. It is distinct from other policies that are strictly enforced within the framework of established laws. Of course, the North Korean policy should be enforced in accordance with the Constitution and laws, but it is often difficult to predict and need to urgently respond. Therefore, people say that it is very important to show the will and direction from the Presidential Office in the progress of Inter-Korean talks. This research confirms those kinds of beliefs. This research found that the influence of the top leaders of the two Koreas shown through the chief representative heavily influences the success or failure of the talks.

The two Koreas are enemies in a military confrontation, and at the same time, are a companion to go toward unification together. The contradictory duality of Inter-Korean relations makes it dynamic. The South Korean government should use this dynamic wisely to improve Inter-Korean relations and achieve unification.

Considering the duality of Inter-Korean relations, the view of the people of the two Koreas about each other may change according to the situation. South Koreans have a mind to think that North Korea is an enemy and a friend at the same time. Depending on the attitude of North Korea and the situation of Inter-Korean relations, the proportion of enemy increases or the proportion of friend increases in the minds of South Koreans. In this respect,
level 2 winsets can be expanded according to the capacity of the chief delegate.

6.2 Talks in 2018 and prospect

We can find that this conclusion is valid in the series of Inter–Korean talks in 2018 by Moon, Jae In administration. Despite of the negative public sentiments and suspicious prospects at the beginning, South Korean government promoted successful inter–Korean talks with the President Moon Jae In’s strong will.

Until the year of 2017, the tension between two Koreas were heightened. The communication between U.S. president and Kim, Jeong Un of North Korea was the ‘word war’ level. South Korean government had struggled between two. Accordingly, public sentiment to the North was quite hostile in South Korea. However, the situation had dramatically changed from the early 2018.

Since his inauguration, Moon Jae—in had continuously suggested North Korea to the talks for easing tensions and promoting peace. In response, Kim Jong Un expressed his will to improve Inter–Korean relations at the New Year Speech in 2018. Pyeongchang Winter Olympics provided the chance for improving Inter–Korean relations. The two Koreas held high–level talks in January and agreed on North Korea’s participation in the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games. North Korean athletes participated in the Olympic Games successfully. At the opening and closing ceremony of the Olympic Games, a high–level delegation from North Korea visited the president. After that, President Moon Jae In sent special envoys to North Korea. Through the special envoy meeting, the two Koreas agreed to hold the Inter–Korean
From the High-Level talks on January 9 2018, there have been 14 times of political and military talks so far (as of June 25 2018). Most of them were related to preparation of Inter-Korean Summit meeting and its followings. All the talks were held with the President Moon Jae In’s strong will, so none of them broke down.

At the beginning of the year, there was substantial public opposition to progress in Inter-Korean relations; some even opposed North Korea’s participation in the PyeongChang Olympics. However, President Moon Jae in – in promoted Inter-Korean talks with a strong will. As a result, the Inter-Korean summit were held and made great achievement in the denuclearization of North Korea and peace building of Korean peninsula. Accordingly, South Korean public sentiment have changed favorably to Inter-Korean talks.14

The progress in inter-Korean relations led to North Korea-US summit. On June 12, Kim Jong Un and President Trump met and agreed on the complete denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. President Trump had to go through hostile public sentiment and pessimistic critics domestically. Compared to South Korea, President Trump had to face even more hostile environment domestically.

First, reviewing past 25 years of negotiations with North Korea, almost all of US professionals concluded that negotiation with North Korea would never succeeded or lasted long. In the past, North Korea and USA had two opportunities to resolve the nuclear

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14 According to polls by Real Meter, only 54% of South Koreans agreed on supporting North Koreans to join in PyungChang Olympics on January 8. On February 15, 62% agreed on holding Inter-Korean Summit. However, 78.7% of South Korean were for Peace Treaty in Inter-Korean Summit on April 19, 2018.
problem and to promote relations. They achieved Agreed framework in 1994 and Joint Statement of the six party talks in 2005. However, they failed to implement the agreements and the situation have been worse. In the year of 1993, the first North Korean nuclear crisis happened, North Korea was suspected to have primitive level of nuclear program. However, North Korea apparently has nuclear weapons of advanced level 25 years later. Most of the US professionals have blamed North Korea to they have never stopped the nuclear development during the negotiations, and they cast suspicious look on future negotiations.

Second, the Republican Party, which is home to President Trump, had considered North Korea as a bad nation and had argued for tough policies. The Democrats had been in a position to resolve this problem by negotiations rather than sanctions, but they became skeptical of negotiations with North Korea for the reasons above. Besides that, they seemed not to trust President Trump as a leader.

Third, President Trump’s approval rating had scored historic low recently. He had a short career as a politician and few people had expected him to win the presidential election, President Trump had been suffered from low approval rating during his angulation. It is hard to get public support on any policy in this situation.

However, President Trump had a strong will on North Korea issue, and he had been very active in this work in his unique style. In spite of small domestic winsets, North Korea and USA succeeded in making consensus and revving up the engine for denuclearization. This is quite consistent with the findings of this research.

Now, their challenge is to carry out the agreement in reality.

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15 According to polls by NBC/WSJ, 39% of American approve of President Trump in April 2018.
Despite of the urgent need, denuclearization takes time and effort naturally. There will be series of negotiation and implementation and verification will have to follow for each talks. Therefore, it is very important for both sides to maintain their current position continuously. If they can show smooth progress to the public, they will be able to enlarge US domestic winsets in the related negotiations in the future. In this way, the virtuous cycle of negotiation and implementation could be achieved.

6.3 Future Research

First, Inter-Korean talks is the area of confidentiality. This is the one of the main reasons that research of this field is not common. This study used open source materials thoroughly.

Second, this study focused on the process of negotiation reaching consensus and public reactions right after the meetings. Unfortunately, the process of implementation of agreement is not included in this study. Considering Putnam’s interest on the process of ratification, this study is not fully reflecting his theory. Instead, this study explained about poor implementation performances and the reason why in the conclusion part.
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국문 초록
남북회담과 양면게임 이론
- 2008년~2017년 정치·군사회담을 바탕으로 -

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강유진

남북은 2008~2017년간 10회의 정치·군사회담을 가졌다. 이 논문은 이 10회의 회담을 퍼트남의 양면게임 이론에 입각하여 분석한 내용이다. 퍼트남은 협상장을 Level 1으로, 동 협상과 관련한 국내 상황을 Level 2로 설정하였다. 그는 협상의 결과에 영향을 미치는 요소로 세가지를 들었는데 Level 1에서 협상에 참여하는 대표들의 전략, Level 2에서 동 회담의 의제에 대한 국민들의 여론, 그리고 Level 2 정권의 성격이다.

이 논문에서는 퍼트남의 이론을 남북관계 현실에 맞게 수정하여 활용하였다. Level 1 협상 대표의 전략은 회담 수석대표의 협상력으로 수정하였다. 구체적으로는 수석대표의 공식적/비공식적 지위와 경험 등을 의미한다. 협상력이 크면 Level 1의 winset이 큰 것으로 하였다. Level 2 국내 여론은 각 회담 의제에 대한 국내 여론을 개별적으로 분석하였다. 양면게임 이론을 바탕으로 동 의제가 국민들에게 균일하게 영향을 미치는지, 얼마나 정치화 되어있는지, 협상에서 거래가 가능한 의제인지 등을 살펴보았다. 의제가 국민들에게 균일하게 영향을 미치고, 정치화가 덜 된 경우, 그리고 협상에서 거래가 가능한 의제인 경우 Level 2의 winset이 큰 것으로 하였다. Level 2의 정치 시스템은 고정변수로 놓았다.

종합적인 분석을 위해 Level 1의 winset을 X축으로, Level 2의 winset을 Y축으로 하는 그래프를 도입하고, 분석 결과를 바탕으로 지난 10회의 정치 군사 회담을 그래프에 배치하였다. 그리고 각 회담의 합의 성공 여부도 알아보았다.
그 결과, Level 2보다 Level 1가 회담의 결과에 더 큰 영향을 미친다는 것을 알 수 있었다. Level 2와 관계없이 Level 1의 winset이 큰 경우에 모두 합의에 성공한 것으로 나타났기 때문이다. 또, Level 2의 winset이 매우 작은 경우에도 협상력이 큰 수석대표가 회담을 이끄는 경우 합의에 성공했던 것으로 나타났다. 즉, Level 1의 winset이 큰 경우 Level 2의 winset이 작더라도 이를 확대하는 효과가 있는 것으로 분석된다.

주요어: 남북회담, 정치회담, 군사회담, 양면게임 이론
학번: 2016-27066