외교학석사 학위논문

Intra-Legislative Motives or Constituency Preferences?

The Domestic Politics of Human Rights Foreign Policy

2019년 2월

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이 논문을 외교학석사 학위논문으로 제출함

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Abstract

In less salient international issue areas, do legislators care more about intra-legislative motives or citizens preferences when engaging in legislative activity? Exploring the cosponsorship data of 440 legislators of the 108th House of Representatives from 2003-2005, this paper tests the effect of ideological homophily, measured as the absolute distance between a pair of legislators' DW-nominate scores, and ideological extremism on legislators' propensity to cosponsor together. Cosponsoring is mainly a relational action for enabling legislators' express their support on the legislation's issue, but also to signal support or ties to another legislator. While previous literature emphasizes position-taking motivations for cosponsoring, this paper seeks to examine *intra-legislative* motivations focusing on legislator preferences and relationships by employing a dyadic-level analysis.

The results demonstrate that one unit change in ideological distance in the first dimension decreases the odds of cooperating by 76%. Results confirm the positive association among ideological extremism, the majority party membership, and higher participation in cosponsorships. In the individual-level analysis, if the legislator was an ethnic minority, a member of the minority party, and had low unemployment levels in his or her district,

such conditions increased cosponsorship participation. More so than constituency interests, influence in Congress measured by seniority and leadership positions positively affected sponsorship decisions. However, in the dyadic analysis, district-level demographics, such as gay population and unemployment levels, significantly explained both cosponsorship and sponsorship cooperation to a greater degree than ideological homophily or institutional influence. Results imply that dyadic cosponsoring behavior is a motive of both extra- and intra-legislative motivations.

Keyword : Ideological Homophily, U.S. Congress, Cosponsorship, Sponsorship, Legislative Behavior, Intra-legislative Motivations, Human Rights Foreign Policy

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Chapter 1. Introduction

It is not a mystery that legislators endeavor to represent constituent interests in roll-call votes and cosponsorships. As the crux of representative democracy, members of Congress (MCs) are elected by their local constituents and thereby serve for the interest of their constituencies (Kingdon 2007). Although extensive literature exists in examining the electoral connection, the more interesting question lies in the conditions under which legislators' other motivations may trump constituency preferences, such as intra-legislative relationships or legislators' ideological preferences. In general, previous literature focuses on high salience issues, whereas one focus of this research lies in uncovering legislative behavior surrounding less salient issues among the domestic pork-barreling agendas. This paper focuses on the extent to which ideological homophily between a pair of legislators explains member cooperation by controlling for constituency preferences in the case of human rights foreign policy legislation. The logic behind hypothesizes that legislators have more freedom to act according to their preferences due to the constituents' lack of vigilance towards human rights foreign policy position-taking.

In the vein of literature delving into domestic explanations for international politics and foreign policy behavior, this paper is concerned with the causal mechanism between legislative behavior and national foreign policy. This research places itself within a macroscopic question regarding citizen preferences and democratic accountability at the subnational level, where it endeavors to place a stepping stone in the microscopic foundation on U.S. legislative behavior and democratic accountability. Working at the legislative level contains difficulties in clearly drawing on causal relationships with foreign policy behavior, but it is an attempt to sketch how the electoral connection could be viewed in relation to human rights foreign policy, and a novel approach from previous literature focusing mainly on presidential leadership.

The issue selection on human rights foreign policy stemmed from U.S. incompliance to human rights treaties. America stands nearly alone among Western democracies in failing to ratify the major international treaties on discrimination against women, rights of the child, socioeconomic rights, persons with disabilities' rights, and migrant worker's rights (Moravcsik 2005, 148; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2017). This paradox of non-compliance is heightened by its historical advocacy of human rights and unilateral efforts to promote freedom and



Figure 1. Histogram of Sponsor-Cosponsorship Count Data for the 108th Congress

democracy. In explaining the double standard of human rights, essentially meaning that a human rights standard applicable to the U.S. and another standard for the rests of the world exist separately, academics have turned to the idea of American exceptionalism (Forsythe 1990; Moravcsik 2001; Koh 2003; Ignatieff 2005).

As an endeavor to contribute to understanding the paradoxical puzzle of America's human rights foreign policy, especially during the War on Terror, this study seeks to examine the domestic mechanisms and motivations of Congress members in proposing and cosponsoring human rights legislation in foreign policy. From 2003-2005, during the George W. Bush administration in the 108th Congress, one legislator cosponsored an average of 276 legislations in total, but only an average of nine human rights foreign

policy legislation. Although the mean is low, the maximum number of cosponsors by a single legislator reaches 65. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possible explanations of this variation at the individual-level, and the dyad-level. The focus on human rights foreign legislation seeks to examine whether intra-legislative or preference-based hypotheses may be more suitable to less salient issue areas in contrast to the traditional position-taking hypotheses.

As the legislative scholar, Richard F. Fenno once remarked, “the more we try to understand Congress, the more we are forced to peel back the institutional layers until we reach the individual member” (Fenno 2004). Hence, studying the individual legislator as the unit of analysis will help explain why there is variation in legislative sponsor-cosponsorship following the studies that have emphasized the domestic context to explain the diffusion of norms and compliance to human rights treaties at the international level (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Simmons 2009).

Chapter 2. Literature Review

This thesis endeavors to address three questions. First, what are the individual motivations of legislators in the U.S. House for proposing and supporting human rights foreign policy? Second, how do institutional constraints, characterized by relationships with other legislators called "intra-legislative motivation" in this thesis, affect legislators' decisions to sponsor and cosponsor human rights legislations? Finally, how do these legislative behavior connect to international relations? This research mends the gap among various subjects pertaining to legislative behavior on cosponsorships and sponsorship, human rights foreign policy, and the significance of the electoral connection to international politics.

2.1. The Electoral Connection of Sponsor-Cosponsorships

Mayhew's electoral connection thesis and Fenno's three goals of legislative behavior comprise the heart of my argument. Mayhew (1974) pellucidly describes legislators as single-minded seekers of re-election. In Mayhew's thesis, MCs are self-interested agents based on rational choice theory and re-election is prioritized in their actions, since election must be

achieved to entertain other goals. Legislators engage in credit-claiming, position-taking, and advertising for re-election purposes. According to Fenno, legislators not only have re-election goals but the desire for good public policy-making and prestige in Congress.

Initial work on cosponsorship focused on its position-taking role. As one of the activities that legislators engage in, position-taking is "the public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest to political actors" (Mayhew 1974, 61). Mayhew utilizes cosponsoring behavior as an example of position-taking.[①] Cosponsorships transmit inexpensive signals to voters, with high returns, especially when voters may be attuned to policy efforts. To a legislator seeking reelection, cosponsorship is an efficient way to strengthen his or her electoral connection with politically relevant constituents outside the legislature at a small cost. In accordance, Campbell (1982) attributes position-taking as the reason for variation among active and reluctant cosponsors. Koger (2003) also

① The difference between credit-claiming and position-taking lies primarily in whether the legislative action is tangible or intangible, and the degree of abstraction. Credit-claiming plays a role when legislators can claim credit for a legislative action, such as passing a bill or implementing a policy. In the case of intangible actions, or a policy that is difficult to implement, Position-taking may be more appropriate. For such reasons, sponsoring and cosponsoring are connected to position-taking because the legislation are in the agenda-setting stage. Position-taking is more appropriate for complex issues because it is difficult to earn trust from people that the legislator could make a complex idea feasible, as in the case of international issues.

emphasizes that members' incentives to take positions for constituents, interest groups, and donors explain cosponsorship activity.

I assert that MCs cosponsor to reap the political rewards of position-taking, rather than to achieve the goal of seeking policy outcomes. The main assumption here considers MCs as re-election seekers who commit to sincere position-taking using cosponsorships, and that the ideological slant of the legislation aligns with the legislators' ideology. If, however, legislators' utilize cosponsorships as insincere or strategic position-taking, then the legislation's ideology would not demonstrate the MCs' ideology, and the MC would have stronger policy-seeking motives.

My primary question is how legislators act within the sphere of international issue agendas. The hypothetical assumption is that citizens are dispassionate about international issues and legislators' activities on human rights foreign policy. Allendoerfer (2017) tests the general assumption using survey experiments that constituents favor using foreign policy to promote human rights in foreign aid related contexts. Results demonstrate support by major constituents to punish human rights violations with cuts to foreign aid. However, the scant literature existing on human rights public opinion does not help us discern whether constituents are interested in human rights issues as to penalize or award MCs who actively entrepreneur human rights

foreign policy bills. The next step for this paper would be to evaluate the extent of citizen interest in human rights international issues, but for this paper, an intuitive and general assumption that people do not care about MCs actions on human rights will be adopted and tested with demographic variables. In such low salient issue areas, do legislators' behave otherwise to Mayhew's proposition, when it comes to sponsoring and cosponsoring bills?

Previous works highlight the collaborative and relationship-oriented nature of cosponsorship behavior. Sponsorship and cosponsorship are one of the core activities involving collaboration and sharing of interests in legislative agenda-setting (Bratton & Rouse 2011). Because bill sponsor-cosponsorships are one of the few activities that legislators can exert control over, the action signals the legislator's choice of an issue to be associated with and the reputation he or she wishes to acquire among colleagues (Schiller 1995). Acknowledging cosponsorships as an indicator of legislators' abilities to persuade others, Wawro (2000) utilizes cosponsorships as a measure of coalition building in operationalizing "legislative entrepreneurship."

In comparison to the roll-call voting stage of the legislative process during which legislators are restricted to a yea-nay vote on the determined set of policy proposals, sponsor-cosponsorships enable legislators to define

their boundaries of legislative outcomes. Cosponsorships can be associated with "yea," "do not care," "not interested," or "no opinion" (Wolbrecht 2000, 76). The degree of choice associated with cosponsorship is greater than roll call votes, which is an argument that bolsters why cosponsorships could be indicative of member preferences and policy interests (Wolbrecht 2000, 76).

To elaborate, cosponsorship provides low-cost information to MCs about the political benefits of a bill, in an environment where fully informed agenda setting is unlikely (Koger 2003). Because the alternatives of random bill selection or caucus meetings involve high cost, party and committee leaders rely to a degree on cosponsorships to consider which bills should be advanced to the level of a general agenda. Within such purview, previous works have examined the costs and benefits of sponsorship (Schiller 1995), cosponsorship as providing cues to fellow legislators regarding issue importance (Kessler & Krehbiel 1996; Krutz 2005), cosponsorship as information shortcuts (Kingdon 1989), and its contribution to legislative success and perceived effectiveness (Krutz 2005).

This line of literature falls in relation to the scholarship that advocates for, what I call, *intra-legislative* motives of cosponsorship behavior. The focal audience here refers to internal members of the legislation, rather than the external constituents. Members of Congress utilize cosponsorships to

signal messages to internal audiences in the legislation, perhaps to promote an agenda or align with a specific issue for reputation building. More specifically, Kessler & Krehbiel (1996) evoke signaling theories of legislative policies; heterogeneous signalers enhance the utility of the bill by reducing the uncertainty about the policy consequences (Gilligan & Krehbiel 1989). Wilson & Young (1997) also illustrate that cosponsorship has a bandwagon, ideological, and expertise signal, but the strength of the signal weakens after the outset of the legislative process.

As such, I adopt the position that sponsoring and cosponsoring is an intra-legislative action in connection with Fenno's triumvirate goals. Intra-legislative motivations realize the necessity for power in Congress, and the desire for good policymaking more so than position-taking or considering constituency interests. First, in comparison to roll call votes, a floor vote is a more public act than sponsorships and cosponsorships. Roll call votes elicit constituent responses, whereas cosponsorships have a lesser possibility of being noticed by voters.② A roll call vote has direct results and consequences, but sponsorships and cosponsorships may not bring any fruition. Second, cosponsorships are largely recognized as symbolic actions, and the high frequency of this legislative action undermines its value.

② The extent to which voters pay attention to cosponsorships is another under studied area.

Nonetheless, given the smaller frequency on sponsorships and cosponsorships on human rights foreign policy, this act could be interpreted as having more sincerity since one would need to spend resources to consider the legislation. Sponsoring indicates that the MC desires change in the specific policy area because not taking any action would bring no change in the status quo. This reflects interest and interest in being associated with the policy area. Such acts are characterized as legislative entrepreneurship (Schiller 1995; Wawro 2000); MCs utilize sponsorships and cosponsorships to construct their legislative agendas and build coalitions.

Cosponsorships have less of the willful characteristic of sponsorships, but rather, motivations could be due to internal pressure from fellow MCs. The simple logic here is "you scratch my back, and I'll scratch your back" as members exchange cosponsorships for the respective bills. Thus, the limited visibility of sponsoring and cosponsoring behavior, the coalitional characteristic, and internal, relational pressure from fellow MCs, signaling theory arguments support my hypothesis that sponsorships and cosponsorships tend to be an intra-legislative behavior signaling towards the inner members of the legislation.

Factors accounting for sponsorship and cosponsorship differ. Determinants of sponsorship decisions include the following: majority party status (Garand & Burke 2006), seniority (Campbell 1982; Garand & Burke 2006; Rocca & Sanchez 2008), and ideological extremism (Garand and Burke 2006; Rocca & Sanchez 2008; Schiller 1995). In general, high sponsorship activity is associated with influential legislators with majority party membership, committee chair status, and high seniority.

Research on factors influencing cosponsorship present more mixed results due to variations in time period, independent variables, and research design. While sponsorship is associated with influence, cosponsorship tends to be endorsed by legislators with less power: lower seniority (Campbell 1982; Garand & Burke 2006; Rocca & Sanchez 2008), higher ideological extremism (Campbell 1982; Garand & Burke 2006; Rocca & Sanchez 2008), minority party affiliation (Bratton & Rouse 2011; Garand & Burke 2006; Koger 2003), and re-election prospects (Campbell 1982; Rocca and Sanchez 2008). However, the margin of electoral victory is not significant in Campbell (1982) or Krehbiel (1995). Thus, institutional, individual, and electoral factors affect legislators' behaviors in participating in sponsoring-cosponsoring legislation.

Between the two contending hypotheses mentioned above on intra and extra-audiences, this paper sides with the intra-legislative argument, but follows a more specific layer advocated as the preference-based approach by Regens (1989) and Krehbiel (1995). The preference-based hypothesis suggests that "legislators cosponsor measures whose anticipated policy consequences they like relative to the status quo, and they choose not to cosponsor measures whose anticipated policy consequences they dislike relative to the status quo" (Krehbiel 1995, 910). While taking into account legislators' ideological preferences, it also suggests that ideologically extreme or those further from the House median would be more cooperative as sponsors and cosponsors. Previous literature seemed to neglect such individual preferences over electoral or signaling interests. In one interview included in Koger (2003), a second-term Republican claimed that he often cosponsors bills that advance his personal preferences:

> "I cosponsor when it's something I believe in. For example, I cosponsored the bill to abolish the death tax because I strongly support the idea and want it to become law… A lot of members avoid cosponsorship if the bill is controversial – I take the opposite tack. If I believe in an issue, I cosponsor the bill to give it energy." (qtd. from Koger 2003, 231).

Personal belief and conviction would rise to the surface more clearly in policy areas, such as human rights.

I wish to know if preference, measured by ideology in this paper, affects cosponsorship decisions, but also seek to explore the patterns of cooperation among ideologically similar MCs. The critical key word here is "cooperation." Although it is difficult to say that cosponsoring together directly implies cooperation, we will be able to see to the extent to which similar ideologies bring legislators to indirectly or directly engage with one another through legislative activity. A legislator's idea of what constitutes good policy may depend on his or her political ideology (Regens 1989). Especially for human rights legislation, bill content differs based on who from which party sponsored the bill. Republicans tend to sponsor bills calling for action or expressing negative sentiment towards repressive regimes, while Democrats have sponsored more bills calling for support of United Nations and global agendas.

In exploring the effect of ideology, this paper adopts the homophily model that argues "birds of the same feather flock together" specifically within the realm of ideological dispositions. Taking into consideration the limitations of previous works in which cosponsorship activities are separate, distinct individual-level designs, this paper employs dyads as the central

unit of analysis. The focus on individual-level methods or aggregated group-level analysis of sponsorship-cosponsorship data has made it difficult to evaluate what what brings two legislators together. At the conceptual and theoretical level, sponsorship-cosponsorship should be analyzed in terms of its interactive and collaborative process, rather than limiting it to institutional and individual contexts (Bratton & Rouse 2011).

The concept of homophily comes from social identity theory, which is employed in communications research. Iyengar, Konitzer & Tedin (2018) investigates polarization through inter-party marriage survey questions founded on the idea of homophily. The notion of ideological homophily is not unexplored in cosponsorship literature. Gross & Shalizi (2008) finds that shared committee service, the similarity in ideology, and being elected from the same state or region are significantly associated with cosponsorship. Bratton & Rouse (2011) uncover that legislators cosponsor bills proposed by sponsors who are similar to them in ideology and district proximity, but other characteristics such as, seniority, sex, race, party did not have a significant effect. This paper focused on providing a foundational analysis of dyadic relations and explore possibilities for network analysis.

2.2. Domestic Politics in International Relations

Scrutinizing the behavior of domestic actors contributes to our understanding of international relations. According to constructivist theory, international structures and state identity are mutually constructive as states constitute the system, and the system, in turn, socially constructs the interests of the state (Wendt 1995). Applying human rights into this framework enables the thought that international systems influence the states to adopt certain human rights stances, but that states' position on human rights also constitutes the international system (Mertus 2008, 12). Thereby focusing on the domestic actors who directly create legislation on U.S. human rights foreign policy, this work attempts to empirically complement domestic components of international politics. While this paper is theoretically limited in making a causal connection, it attempts to acknowledge the role of domestic politics, following the examples of studies that have emphasized the domestic context to explain the diffusion of norms and compliance to human rights treaties at the international level (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Simmons 2009).

During the Bush administration, Congress introduced resolutions calling for unconditionally releasing political prisoners and military soldiers in

Syria, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Lebanon and elsewhere (H.Res.139, H.Res.476, H.Con.Res.73, H.Res.506, H.Con.Res.123, H.Res.107). Similarly, while pursuing war for democracy in Iraq, the Bush administration turned a blind eye to lack of democracies in supporting states (Forsythe 2004, 93). Such acts of criticizing others of human rights violation, while continuing its own crimes against humanity are the double standard of America's foreign policy on human rights.

The controversial question captured in the previous works on the Bush administration and human rights is whether the War on Terror ended the multilateral human rights orientation of the U.S. foreign policy. Weiss, Crahan, and Goering (2004) argue that the Bush administration pursued multilateralism to a similar degree with Clinton's administration (Weiss et al. 2004, 4). From a broader perspective, Donnelly (2004) acknowledges that human rights became devalued due to security concerns and that the size of considering human rights changed, but not the "design." Forsythe (2004) similarly notices the failures of other administrations on pressing aggressively for rights but emphasizes the nationalist and unilateralist characteristics of the Bush administration.

More critical studies point out how Bush compromised human rights and reduced weights in multilateralism in favor of security, which

denigrated human rights norms internationally (Roberts 2003). Specifically, Bush employed human rights language when describing necessity for regime change, but relied on unilateral declarations and bilateral economic incentives for other purposes (Roberts 2003, 632). In accordance, Roth (2004) explains that human rights for the Bush administration were a dispensable means considering its illegal ways of combating terrorism and its intense opposition to the enforcement of international human rights law.

The overall focus of explaining human rights during the Bush administration returns to the idea mentioned above of American exceptionalism. Hancock (2007) utilizes Foucaultian discourse analysis to discover that Bush and his policymakers applied human rights discourse to coalesce support and legitimacy around U.S. foreign policies in terms of exceptionalism. Mertus (2008) finds that rhetoric on human rights changes from one administration to another, but American exceptionalism appears consistently since Jimmy Carter's presidency.

In literature generally dealing with the U.S. and human rights, exceptionalism is explained in terms of historical, cultural, institutional, and political forces (Moravcsik 2001). Indeed, academics reach a consensus that human rights come from a pre-existing U.S. identity and distinctive rights

culture[③] (Koh 2003; Farer 2004; Hancock 2007; McCain 2010). Here, rights culture signifies one of the three: (1) international obligations violate the U.S. Constitution and political institutions; (2) American belief in local government and popular sovereignty inclines the people to reject centralized judicial norms; (3) libertarian preference for negative rights are incompatible with international human rights obligations (Moravcsik 2005, 154).

However, the political reasons are less evident in explaining each administration's inconsistent and consistent application of human rights. Bradley (2014) suggests that human rights were a bipartisan issue among the public during Carter's administration uniting both liberals and conservatives (14). In contrast, Forsythe (1988) analyzes congressional roll call votes on human rights bills during Carter and Reagan's administration to discover that partisanship and ideology on national security influenced voting patterns.

As such, there are reasons to examine Congress and study the political aspects of human rights legislation making. It should be noted here that support for international treaties comes disproportionately from Democratic

[③] Deputy Assistant Secretary of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the Reagan Administration, Paula Dobriansky proclaimed that U.S. commitment to human rights dates from the Declaration of Independence (Dobriansky qtd. By Hancock 2007, 17).

Senators while opposition comes mainly from Republican Senators (Kaufman & Whiteman 1988; Moravcsik 2005, 184). Yet, previous literature has not focused on the motivation of legislators in promoting human rights legislation. Although congressional activity increased significantly over the years, academic work on Congress and foreign policy has been limited to studying consequences of military intervention, military assistance, economic sanctions, and economic assistance (Shea 2008; Choi & James 2007).

Nonetheless, in areas of foreign policy, explanatory variables for cosponsoring antiwar legislation (Heaney 2011) and pro-Israel legislation (Rosenson, Oldmixon, & Wald 2009) have been analyzed. In both studies, elite factors, such as partisanship and ideology influenced legislators' behaviors. Since human rights legislations are left unexplored since Forsythe (1988), this study will examine legislators' motivations in supporting human rights foreign policy legislation in the era of the War on Terror.

The contending point in the literature on legislators' motivation of supporting a bill is whether constituency preferences are reflected in the legislators' behavior, generally studied with roll call votes that signify position taking. Fenno (1973) and Mayhew (1974) posit that Congressmen

are inspired by re-election and thereby act according to his or her constituent's preference.④ Multitude of studies on constituency influence on representation have provided empirical analyses on the electoral marginal hypothesis (Fiorina 1973), salience of policy domain (Kulinski & McCrone 1980), constituency opinion (Page et al. 1984), public opinion on defense budget (Bartels 1991), the effect of diffuse interests and representation (Bailey 2001), and subconstituency preferences (Clinton 2006). In the area of human rights, Hildebrandt et al. (2013) find that partisanship and ideological distance from the president motivate Congressmen to vote for humanitarian intervention.

Therefore, in dealing with what motivates legislators, the question of the electoral constituency should be included. This leads to exploring the nexus between public opinion of human rights (i.e., the constituencies' preference of human rights) and its influence on the legislators' position. Lindsay (1994) touches upon the electoral fallacy regarding Congress' role in foreign affairs. It presumes that electoral connections will highly influence Congressmen, making them unfit for conducting foreign policy. On the other hand, constituents may not be interested or knowledgeable about foreign policy, providing leeway for legislators' to take more personal

④ Fenno considers two more goals which are influence within the legislature, and the production of good public policy.

positions. However, recent evidence suggests public wishes to engage more in foreign policymaking (Sobel 2001).

Recent literature points to domestic audience costs to explain why international commitments are effective. Domestic audience costs are defined as the cost paid by the leader for making empty foreign threats. The cost is incurred by the citizens who would think less of leaders that do not commit to international promises. Such tendentiousness would prevent leaders from making empty threats and promises. Researchers have incorporated the idea generally in various areas of international relations from modes of alliances to international cooperation. Fearon (1994) hypothesized that higher audience costs in democracies in comparison to autocracies cause the two types of regimes to behave differently.

However, previous literature does not reveal the causal relationship of whether the effect of democracy on foreign policy originates from audience costs or political regime difference (Tomz 2007, 822). Some scholars highlight citizens' disgust of leaders' empty threats, while others point out that citizens seldomly take interest in foreign policy. Thus, direct observation of audience cost is necessary for reaching a consensus on the existence, and effect of audience costs.

A recent body of literature has begun testing the microfoundations of audience costs. Notably, Tomz (2007) provides evidence of audience costs based on survey experiments demonstrating how constituents disapprove of leaders who renege from international threats. Comparing two types of presidents, people preferred the president who did not get involved in crises rather than the president who issued an empty threat.

However, considering audiences' preferences over the policy choices, Chaudoin (2014) finds that respondents to the survey experiment with expressed policy preferences had a significantly smaller effect compared to those without strong policy preferences when informed on leaders' empty promises. For example, workers' preferences for high tariff policy may trump their preferences over low tariff policy. Thereby international agreements are likely to have weaker effects on countries with domestic audiences hostile to the commitments.

Putnam and Shapiro (2017) analyze how invoking international law conditions public support for punitive policies against foreign human rights abusers. The research reveals that voters in liberal democracies positively respond to information about human rights abuses in foreign countries, leading to support for punishing violators, under the condition that the violations described are not too severe. Hence, the international legal status

of the issue brings incentives to leaders when justifying punitive actions against foreign governments.

Domestic audience cost theories are central to crisis situations. Nonetheless, more research needs to reveal which factors are crucial in shaping public opinion on foreign policy especially in non-crisis settings. For MCs to legislate bills proposing punitive action against human rights violations of foreign governments, they need the belief that the public endorses or does not oppose those actions (Putnam & Shapiro 2017). Hence, this thesis tackles the relationship among legislative actions concerning human rights foreign policy and the citizens' induced response from demographic features.

A nation-wide survey on citizens' preferences would have created the ideal data to measure constituency preferences; yet, considering that legislators also lack access to aggregated constituency opinions on human rights foreign policy, it could be argued that the data used in this research reflects the real world situation wherein MCs base decisions on indirect information about constituency preferences on less salient issues.

This thesis contains empirical and theoretical limitations in completing the entire causal dynamics on citizens preferences, responses by political elites, and foreign policy change; nonetheless, it addresses two questions

regarding the role of domestic politics on international systems that have not been discussed before. Primarily, domestic audience cost theory focuses on presidential leadership as the unitary actor responding to domestic preferences. However, I acknowledge the U.S. Congress as an institutional force that constrains presidential action and expresses its own preferences, in the complicated connection with local preferences in their districts. Thus, I focus on legislative politics which is a different focus on political leadership.

Second, previous research focuses on testing citizens' voting behavior and opinion on foreign policy, whereas my research emphasizes political elites' behaviors on policymaking. Are political elites attuned to constituency preference in foreign policy? Do indirect constituency preferences affect the legislative agenda of legislators? Finally, I am concerned with the everyday politics of foreign policymaking, not constrained by national crises or war situations. The scope of this study involves the willingness of individual legislators to take actions against international issues as legislative entrepreneurs.

In this section, I have discussed literature on legislative representation, the Bush administration's human rights policy, and the connection with the domestic and international politics. In the process, I emphasized that the

structural holes in previous literature are the lack of research on human rights legislation and domestic mechanisms, such as Congress members' motivations to signal support for certain legislation. This paper posits that rather than the extra-legislative motivations (electoral connection), intra-legislative motives drives legislators to signal positions on human rights legislation.

Chapter 3. Research Design

The novelty of this research lies in examining domestic legislation in hand with international treaty context, employing cosponsorship data on human rights legislation, and exploring the paradoxes of U.S. human rights foreign policy during the War on Terror. Based on the influence U.S. domestic politics has on international human rights conditions, its paradoxical behavior⑤ justifies selecting the U.S. as the country of study.

There are two reasons for studying the Bush administration (107^{th} – 110^{th} Congress). First, the particular circumstance in which security trumps human rights, but human rights discourse is advocated more strongly than previous presidencies, will highlight legislators' decisions in aligning with individual ideology, partisanship, or constituent preferences (Mertus 2008).

Second, the Bush administration proposed the most number of human rights legislation compared to any other administration as demonstrated in Figure 2. In total, 725 legislations originated from the House (subject to the International Relations Committee), and 296 legislations originated from the

⑤ Simmons examines domestic level variables (veto players in the executive-legislative relations, ratification process, executive's party) that affect whether a country is a 'sincere ratifier,' 'false negative,' or a 'strategic ratifier.' The results demonstrate that the U.S. is a false negative, meaning that it commits to international norms in principle, but fail to ratify treaties (Simmons 2009, 58).



Figure 2 Human Rights Foreign Policy Legislation in the House and Senate (1972-2016)

Senate (subject to the Foreign Affairs Committee). Compared to Clinton (524 House legislation, 203 Senate legislation) and Obama (602 House legislation, 288 Senate legislation), there is an advantage to studying the Bush era. The greater quantity of human rights bills during a time of national crisis sparks the question, "why are there so many human rights legislations during the war on terror, and do they comply with international standards?" The data depicted in Figure 2 was obtained from the Library of

Congress website.[⑥] The Library of Congress website contains all legislation introduced from the 93rd to 115th Congress (1973-2017) (Library of Congress 2017). The data on sponsor-cosponsors can also be obtained from the website.[⑦]

The dependent variable is the legislators' support of the human rights legislation. In the individual-level design, the variable is operationalized as the total count of (1) sponsorships and (2) cosponsorships for each member of the House. In the dyadic-design, the dependent variable is binary signifying whether or not the MC sponsored or cosponsored a bill with its partner legislator.

It is necessary to explain why this research employs sponsor-cosponsorship data, instead of the roll call vote in the human rights policy context. First, given the few numbers of bills that come to a vote in Congress, roll call votes make it difficult to generalize about Congress members' behaviors on human rights. From 2001-2008, only 218 human rights legislations from the House and 95 bills from the Senate undergo roll

[⑥] The scope of my data is limited to human rights legislation under the jurisdiction of the International Relations Committee for the House, and the Foreign Affairs Committee for the Senate from the 107th to 110th Congress.

[⑦] This research includes bills, joint resolutions, concurrent resolutions, and simple resolutions. Bills and joint resolutions become laws once they are passed in both Chambers of Congress and signed by the president; although resolutions do not have the force of law, they are utilized to express the sentiments of one or both Chambers. Since the focus of this research is on understanding why congressmen cosponsor human rights legislations, endorsements of resolutions also contribute to this understanding.

call votes. Also, the bill data will be biased because many of the human rights legislations sponsored by Democrats advocate international agendas. However, these legislations receive less general support and do not advance the Committee stage. Examples include “International Violence Against Women Act of 2008” (30 cosponsors), “United Nations Transparency, Accountability, Reform Act of 2007” (58 cosponsors), “United Nations Durban Review Conference Funding Prohibition Act” (29 cosponsors) and others. Still, the legislations mentioned above do have a significant number of cosponsors which is meaningful data, even if the legislation does not pass as a bill since the purpose of this paper is to reveal the effect of ideological homophily. Also, to examine the extent to which international norms are reflected in U.S. human rights legislations, the non-passed legislations will provide valuable data.

Second, it is difficult to measure a legislators’ position-taking with human rights roll call votes because most legislators vote in accordance to the median voter. In general, roll call votes on human rights legislations receive nearly unanimous support from Congress members. For example, a legislation that proposed providing assistance to Darfur (2004) received 412 yeas and 3 nays. “The North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004” also received a unanimous vote in the Senate. “Calling on China to immediately

and unconditionally release Dr. Yang Jianli" (2004) received 412 yeas, 0 nays, and 22 non-votes. Previous research has demonstrated that higher numbers of cosponsors a legislation acquires, the higher the possibility the legislation will become a bill (the more cosponsors, the more bipartisan the legislation seems). Most human rights legislations obtain 50 to 70 cosponsor signatures before being voted on. Thus, there is not much variation in legislators' positions during the actual roll call vote. The characteristics of a human rights legislation make it difficult for a legislator to vote independently from the general consensual sentiment on human rights. In other words, a higher risk-taking cost is associated with voting "nay" on a human rights legislation on North Korea. Therefore, sponsorship-cosponsorship data enables a more proactive outlook on operationalizing support for human rights legislation because it is a less limited action.

Although cosponsoring has no formal effect on the legislative process, there are three reasons to suspect that cosponsorship provides valuable information on legislative behavior. First, Congress members invest time and staff effort to recruit cosponsors for their bills and review other members' requests to cosponsor legislation (Campbell 1982; Koger 2003). Second, the number and diversity of cosponsors are cited by legislators as evidence of bipartisanship or majority support for the bill during floor

debate (Campbell 1982). Research also implies that a higher number of cosponsors are correlated with a higher probability of the bill being recommended to the committee (Wilson & Young 1997). Third, the frequency of bill cosponsorships delineates its importance. The average number of cosponsorships by a congress member shows a gradual increase signifying that cosponsorship activity has become more active over the years (93rd Congress: 129 mean bills cosponsored per legislator; 96th Congress: 187; 99th Congress: 329; 102nd Congress: 339; Fowler 2006). For these reasons, examining cosponsorship behavior may offer a different perspective on agenda-setting, position-taking, and credit-claiming since it delves into a sphere of legislative influence that MCs can control and act according to their strategic calculations. Cosponsorship is also a way for members to attempt to manipulate Congress's agenda in favor of their preferences even if the bill does not become law (Koger 2003). In all, the decision to cosponsor or propose legislation is dependent on the will of the member of Congress.

This research makes the main argument that cosponsorship of legislators has stronger intra-legislative motivations than extra-legislative motivations. This is partly due to the problem of measuring district and state level preferences for human rights. Indirect constructs will be used to capture

national issue salience of human rights during the War on Terror. The salience may pose as limiting conditions to legislators' cosponsorship behavior, as riskier issues call for higher costs. Nonetheless, the area of foreign affairs provides considerable leeway to legislators, and they may be willing to act according to institutional logics.

3.1. Individual-Level Model Variables

While the dyad design comprises the core of this paper, I conduct an analysis of the individual-level variables in relation to the frequency of sponsoring and cosponsoring activity by each legislator. This analysis is to provide insight into directly what variables account for the variation. Although previous literature exists on the individual-level reasons explaining sponsoring and cosponsoring motivations, the issue-specific aspect of this paper necessitates a look into the individual reasons as well.

Table 1. Individual-level Model Dependent Variables

Summary	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**Description**
Cosponsor	9.225	10.347	0	65	The number of times cosponsored by a member.
Sponsor	0.372	1.292	0	15	The number of times sponsored by a member.
Sum	9.602	11.066	0	80	The sum of sponsor, cosponsorships.

I introduce separate variables for the individual-level model that account for legislators' motivation to sponsor or cosponsor human rights foreign policy proposals. Legislators' personal attributes such as race and gender, are known to influence their cosponsorship and sponsorship activities. On coethnic legislation, Chaturvedi (2015) finds that Asian American MCs are more likely than non-Asian American MCs to provide support or propose bills. However, Rocca and Sanchez (2007) discuss that African American and Latino American legislators participate less in sponsorship and cosponsorship actions than non-minority MCs.

While few research focus on gender differences in cosponsorship and sponsorships, Bratton and Rouse (2011) supports the argument that the same gender engenders more cosponsorship and sponsorship cooperations. Heaney (2011) also reports gender as a statistically significant variable regarding MCs sponsorship and cosponsorship of antiwar legislation from 2001 to 2011.

Second, MCs position in Congress represented by variables indicating participation in the related committee, seniority, and party leadership positions also determine their choices in legislative activity (Heaney 2011). Seniority has a negative effect on cosponsorship, or a positive but meager effect (Campbell 1982; Kessler & Krehbiel 1996; Rocca & Sanchez 2008;

Heaney 2011). Committee leadership induces the MC to participate actively in cosponsorship and sponsorships, while party leadership decreases the MC's legislative activity (Rocca & Sanchez 2008). As institutional constraints influence MCs decisions, it is necessary to include related variables. It could be hypothesized that positions affiliated with more power in Congress lead to smaller cosponsorships, whereas positions signifying lack of power motivate greater legislative activities.

Lastly, the MCs incumbency in the election and the margin of victory are included in the individual-level model to test the electoral connection thesis. Campbell (1982) states that electoral margins had an insignificant effect on cosponsoring decisions in the 95th Congress. Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) find that intra-legislative signaling have a more prominent effect than extra-legislative position-taking. That is, the electoral margin has a positive but insignificant effect on cosponsorship in the 103rd Congress. Consistent with previous literature, I expect incumbency and margin of electoral victory to have less significant influences on human rights foreign policy legislation compared to personal attributes or institutional factors.

Table 2. Individual-level Model Independent Variables

Variable	Count of 0	Count of 1	Description
Minority	375	64	Factor variable where 1 signifies that MC is African-American, Latino-American, Asian-Pacific American.
Woman	380	59	Women members indicated as 1.
Committee	391	48	Members of House Committee on Foreign Affairs marked 1.
Leadership	261.9	245.51	Holding leadership positions (speakers of the house; majority leaders; minority leaders; democratic whip; republican whips; democratic caucus chairs; republican conference chairs) marked 1.
Incumbent	375	64	Incumbent in election marked 1.
South	282	157	Congressional districts counted as South.
West	343	96	Congressional districts counted as West.
Midwest	336	103	Congressional districts counted as Midwest.

*variables explanations included in dyad-level designs are excluded here.

Variable	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Description
Margin of Victory	0.422	0.263	0.0006	1.0002	Difference between first and second frontrunners divided by vote total in the 2002 U.S. House general elections.

3.2. Dyad-Level Model Hypotheses and Variables

The goal of this paper is to test the relationship between extra- and intra-legislative motivations. I propose a novel operationalization of legislators' ideology by measuring the absolute difference between two legislators' DW-NOMINATE scores. Although legislators' ideologies are core explanatory variables in sponsor-cosponsorship literature, previous works' operationalized ideology as "ideological extremism" posing contextual problems. Since individual level designs cannot utilize the ideology scores with negative or positive directions (that would flummox the effect of ideology on the dependent variable as liberals and conservative scores would amount to a different number), the ideology was calculated by taking the absolute value of an ideological score provided by the ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) or the DW-NOMINATE (Campbell 1982, Krehbiel 1995).

In addition to ideological homophily, this paper operationalizes ideological extremism as a control variable, which is the absolute value of the legislator's ideological distance from the House median following Garand & Burke (2006). Figure 3 depicts a negative relationship between the past ideological extremism measure of taking the DW-NOMINATE's absolute value and cosponsorship behavior. This result differs from previous

accounts that extreme ideology induces higher cosponsorship activity. However, utilizing Garand & Burke's operationalization, Figure 4 demonstrates that the further away from the House median ideology, the more likely it is for the legislator to cosponsor. A positive coefficient for ideological extremism, a negative coefficient for absolute ideology is expected.

Complementing previous operationalizations on ideology, I hypothesize that measurement of the ideological distance between two legislators facilitates their cooperation in cosponsorship activities.

H1. The closer the ideological distance between two legislators, the more likely it is that they will cosponsor together.

The ideological model contends that the ideology of cosponsors send a signal regarding the bill's content (Wilson & Young 1997). The diverse ideological mix of cosponsors signals the bipartisan content and majority support of the bill (Campbell 1982), while a bill with extreme ideological cosponsors signals a narrow representation or partisan preferences. Hence, taking into consideration that legislators often endeavor to gather support from a more diverse pool of legislators, I observe if legislators cooperate more with legislators with different or similar ideological preferences.



Figure 3. Plot of sponsorship count and absolute 1st dimension DW-Nominate scores (left). Plot and regression line of cosponsorship count and absolute 1st dimension DW-Nominate scores (right). Not a strong relation and rather an opposite effect claimed by previous literature of extreme ideology is observed on human rights bills. Legislators' ideologies clustered along 0.4 (mean = 0.476) show a strong tendency to cosponsor more.



Figure 4. Plot and regression line of relationship between sponsorship (left) or cosponsorship count (right) and absolute value of congressman's ideological distance from the House median. Observed to be a more accurate explanation of ideological extremity than the absolute value of DW-Nominate.

The degree to which legislators cooperate with members of similar ideology enables us to predict if legislators tend to follow their ideological preferences or cooperate with members with dissimilar interests perhaps for strategic reasons, or represent the preferences of their electorate.

In relation, examining the ideological distance between the sponsor and the cosponsor will provide further information on whether the legislation could imply a signal of the bill's content, and if legislators cosponsor due to their ideological preferences.

H2. The closer the ideological distance between two legislators, the more likely it is for the legislator to cosponsor the sponsor's legislation.

The second hypothesis has not explicitly been examined by previous literature. The differences between the sponsor and cosponsor relationships are not taken into account and aggregated as a cosponsorship network (Bratton & Rouse 2011, Gross & Shalizi 2008).



Figure 5. Ideal point locations of 108th Congress (left) and only ideal point locations of Sponsors of human rights bills (right). Lines drawn are House medians.

The DW-NOMINATE scores from Poole & Rosenthal (1991) measure legislators' ideological locations over time. The "dynamic, weighted, nominal three-step estimation" is a probabilistic model of a binary choice of legislators in a parliamentary setting over time (Carroll et al. 2009). A legislator's overall utility for voting yea is the sum of a deterministic utility and a random error. Each member's ideal point in each Congress is estimated along the first and second dimension, and the member's location can vary over time. First dimension locations are understood to reveal standard left-right or economic cleavages, whereas the second-dimension positions reflect social and sectional divisions, such as racial conservatism and liberalism.

Table 3. Dyad Model Dependent Variables

DV	Mean	SD	DV=1	DV= 0	Description
Undirected Cooperation	0.396	0.489	38558	58901	The undirected binary variable on whether a pair of legislators have sponsored or cosponsored together (Cooperation = 1)
Directed Cooperation	0.087	0.282	3198	33405	The directed binary variable on whether the partner legislator signed as cosponsor to actor legislator's legislation. (Cooperation = 1)

The independent variable measures the ideological distance between two legislators. Thereby, the unit of analysis is a pair of two legislators, and the dependent variable is whether two legislators cooperated or not. The first model consists of undirected dyads and considers only if a partner legislator has cosponsored together with the actor legislator regardless of whether the actor's position as a sponsor or cosponsor.

In the second model, directed dyads between a sponsor of a bill and all other legislators of the House create the dependent variable. Here, the distinction between a sponsor (actor) and the cosponsor (partner) is clear. While the first model (97459 dyads) is symmetric, as in the data consists of each dyadic pair of all 440 members, but the second model (36603 dyads) is asymmetric because only sponsor actors are considered. Four hundred forty

members include those who were replaced in the middle of the Congressional term, but exclude delegates.

The control variables include electoral and institutional factors. It is important to distinguish here between-dyads independent variable and within-dyads variables. A between-dyads independent variable varies from dyad to dyad, but within each dyad, both dyad members have the same score (Kenny, Kashy & Cook 2006).

A within-dyads independent variable is one that varies from person to person within a dyad, but the dyad average is the same across all dyads (Kenny, Kashy & Cook 2006). Using both variables lead to a mixed-dyads design. Such distinctions are necessary to control for the effects of the independent variables when assessing nonindependence.

The between-dyads variables in this research refer to the two leading independent variables that measure the absolute ideological distance between two legislators (Ideological Distance 1, Ideological Distance 2), and the control variables. The basic statistics are provided in the tables. The within-dyads variable scores are entered separately for each dyad unit. These include the absolute value of the first and second dimension scores (Absolute Ideology 1, Absolute Ideology 2), and the absolute distance from

the House median for the first and second dimension scores (Extreme Ideology 1, Extreme Ideology 2).

The expectation is that the less ideologically extreme, and more ideologically distant from the House median the legislator is, the more likely he or she will sponsor-cosponsor more human rights legislations.

Table 4. Dyad Model Between-Dyads Variables

Variable	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**Description**
Ideological Distance 1	0.553	0.424	0	1.754	Absolute difference between ideology on 1st dimension
Ideological Distance 2	0.402	0.307	0	2.113	Absolute difference between ideology on 2nd dimension
Seniority Difference	4.232	3.63	0	24	Difference between seniority
Indegree Difference	261.9	245.51	0	1361	Difference between indegree
Outdegree Difference	162	144.08	0	1064	Difference between outdegree
Party	0.5	0.5	0	1	Binary where zero means same party (48682) and one means different party (48777)

Other research includes the minority or majority party status as a dummy variable. It is presumed that minority party members in Congress tend to cosponsor more to voice their opinions since they have less opportunity to change the agenda in comparison to the majority party.

Additional within-dyads level variables are constituency preferences measured indirectly through district-level demographic variables representing median income (Median Income (log)), foreign-born (Foreign Born), unemployed (Unemployed), urban districts (Urban), college-level education (College Graduates), gay population (Gay), and population that voted for the current president (President Vote Share). I expect a positive relationship between the demographic variables and cosponsorship activity, except for the unemployed levels.

Previous literature on citizens' human rights interests and demographics, associate higher income levels and higher education levels with greater support for human rights (Allendoerfer 2017; Koo, Jeong & Ramirez 2015). The inclusion of the gay population in this paper is a more novel approach, especially concerning legislators' cosponsorship activity. The district demographics' effect should be lesser than those of the ideological variables, to successfully argue that legislators' follow personal ideological preferences rather than constituency interest in the area of human rights foreign policy.

I collected cosponsorship and sponsorship data from the Library of Congress webpage, based on 167 human rights policy legislation. District-level data are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2010 Decennial

Census, Warshaw & Rodden (2012), and Milner & Tingley (2011). The 2000 Decennial Census provides district-level data, but the congressional district divisions differ from that of the 108th Congress, thus utilizing the 2010 year data.

The institutional-level variables include seniority (Seniority), and network-level indicators of individual legislators' throughout their congressional career provided by Fowler (2006a; 2006b). Fowler's dataset contains cosponsorships on all legislative activity in the 108th Congress. I utilize the network level variables for observing structural associations between the legislators' position in the entire cosponsorship network and the cosponsorship behavior in an issue-specific area. That is, a legislator with a high in-degree, which is the total number of cosponsorships received by others, and high out-degree, the total sum of cosponsorships signed on others' legislation, may be more likely to sponsor-cosponsor more human rights legislation in general. A legislator with a high between-ness or closeness centrality, signifying a position of gate-keeper or high information flow, may also be more likely to cosponsor more human rights legislation. Controlling for network variables based on the entire cosponsorship activity will enable a more issue-specific interpretation.

Table 5. Dyad Model Within-Dyads Variables

Variable	Mean	S. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Description
Ideology 1	0.137	0.492	-0.669	1.085	DW-NOMINATE value of ideology on 1st dimension
Ideology 2	0.124	0.358	-0.958	1.155	DW-NOMINATE value of ideology on 2nd dimension
Absolute Ideology 1	0.476	0.185	0.051	1.085	Absolute value of ideology on first dimension
Absolute Ideology 2	0.303	0.220	0.001	1.155	Absolute value of ideology on second dimension
Extreme Ideology 1	0.463	0.274	0.002	1.024	Absolute value of (Ideology on 1st dimension – House median for 1st dimension)
Extreme Ideology 2	0.284	0.221	0.003	1.115	Absolute value of (Ideology on 2nd dimension – House median for 2nd dimension)
Foreign Born	0.097	0.107	0.002	0.585	Percent of population born in foreign country.
Unemployed	0.059	0.024	0.013	0.204	Percent identified as unemployed.
Median Income(log)	10.579	0.260	9.868	11.237	Median household incomes with natural log (ln).
College Graduates	0.205	0.098	0.012	0.537	Percent with 4 year college degree. 25 years or older.
President Vote Share	0.480	0.138	0.039	0.760	Total vote for Republican president divided by total vote for Democrat or Republican party.
Urban	0.789	0.199	0.213	1	Percent of district is urban
Gay	0.011	0.006	0.004	0.07	Percent of district population gay

Seniority	5.616	3.935	1	25	Number of congresses served
Indegree	274.899	250.615	0	1361	Total inward cosponsor signatures
Outdegree	276.922	153.4	26	1090	Total outward cosponsor signatures
Betweenness	292	271.821	0	1690	Unweighted betweenness centrality
Closeness	0.611	0.094	0.308	0.963	Closeness centrality
Eigenvector	0.040	0.026	0	0.110	Eigenvector centrality
Connectedness	0.172	0.048	0.003	0.276	Connectedness predicts which members will pass more amendments on the floor, used as a proxy for legislative influence and roll call choice.
Clustering	0.635	0.115	0	0.889	individual clustering coefficient

3.3. Statistical Model

Dyadic data of sponsor-cosponsorship partners are relational, and there exist doubts as to whether actor-partner effects exist among and within the dyad pairs. When dyad members are indistinguishable as in the case of a pair of legislators, the ordinary correlation coefficient to measure nonindependence cannot be used. Kenny, Kashy & Cook (2006) suggest the intra-class correlation (ICC) method. Otherwise, taking the Pearson

correlation coefficient and applying Fishers-r-to-Z transformation ensures the correct correlation coefficients after controlling for group effects. Before applying the Fishers transformation, I tested multicollinearity among within-dyads variables with the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix.

Additionally, I utilized round-robin social relations analysis (SRA) to observe, the variance, the extent to which individuals differ in their actor effects. The variance partitioning measuring cooperation 21.8% of the total variance is due to the actor, 6.1% to partner, 72.1% to relations. While within-dyads variables employed in this research should generally be



Figure 6. Sponsorship-Cosponsorship Count Histogram

absolutely independent of actor-partner effects, between-dyads measures contain a dominant relationship effect advising the need to acknowledge the relational aspect.

I use negative binomial regression for the individual-level design. The justification lies in the overdispersion of zeros, as demonstrated in Figure 6. Logistic regression analysis was utilized to predict dyadic legislators' behaviors. To solve the sparseness of events, rare events logistic regression may be suitable for future research (King & Zeng 2001a; King & Zeng 2001b). ⑧ In this paper, both analyses of the sponsor-cosponsor distinguished data and undirected dyad data will be tested with logistic regression.⑨ It should be noted that the results of the dyadic models have not been fully iterated in the statistical program "R," and may vary with the results from STATA and other programs.

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⑧ The 'Zelig' R-package (Imai, King & Lau 2007) can be accessed and works to a degree, but the 'robust = TRUE' function does not work according to my experience and various users experience found online. The Zelig packages are yet to be fully developed and the bias corrected models do not provide much different coefficients in comparison to the uncorrected logit models.

⑨ On whether the model should adopt a fixed effect, random effect, or mixed effects logistic model was of concern. While fixed effects are widely used with panel and logit models, it does not suffice for the current data of the cosponsorship model that has no time related effects. Considering that fixed effects estimates use only within-individual differences, discarding any information about differences between individuals, it also seems unsuitable for dyadic data that vary greatly across individuals, but vary little over time. In this case, fixed effects estimates will be imprecise and have large standard errors. Since this paper's model is not yet able to adopt a hierarchical, multilevel model and due to many previous works on logistic regression that seem to provide robust standard errors than account for the random effects, I concluded that this paper's models should suffice with logistic regression with standard errors.

Chapter 4. Empirical Analyses

4.1. Individual-Level Analysis

Negative binomial regression was conducted to examine factors that may account for individual-level motivations to engage in the legislative activity. Results demonstrate that factors influencing cosponsorships and sponsorships are different, consistent with previous research. Primarily, results elucidate that constituency demographics inconsistently influence cosponsorship and sponsorship decisions; its influence on cosponsorships is more significant than its influence on sponsorships. Legislator attributes and legislative institutional factors consistently influence cosponsorship and sponsorship. Membership in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs consistently and positively affects members' decisions to cosponsor and sponsor human rights foreign policy bills actively.

However, being a minority MC influences the legislator's decision to participate in cosponsorships, while it does not have a significant effect on sponsorships. Cosponsorships benefit minority members or less senior members in Congress because it requires fewer resources or efforts to utilize cosponsorships as position-taking. Also, less influential members may be

under pressure to support others' legislation. The finding is consistent with previous literature on how minority candidates utilize cosponsorships. A plausible interpretation sheds light on that minority candidates may refrain from sponsoring human rights related legislation because of the need to focus on more general agendas that would help them gain support from broader constituencies (Rocca & Sanchez 2008).

Ideology has statistically significant effects for cosponsorship decisions, but not for sponsorship decisions. More liberal ideology is associated with higher numbers of cosponsorships. More extreme ideology is correlated with higher numbers of cosponsorships. At the time, the Republican majority controlled Congress, and the ideological median was tilted toward the Republicans. It shows that more Democrats engaged in cosponsorship activities than Republicans, consistent with previous research that minority party candidates and ideologically extreme candidates fondly utilize cosponsorships. However, sponsorship has no relationship with ideology. This rebuts the arguments that posit sponsorships as position-taking measures. Sponsorship frequency seems irrelevant to ideology, in human rights foreign policy.

Consistent with past findings, seniority and House leadership positions significantly affect sponsorships decisions, but not cosponsorship decisions.

Table 6. Individual-level Model Negative Binomial Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Cosponsor		Sponsor	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ideology 1		-1.596***		-1.239
		(0.320)		(0.913)
Extreme Ideology 1		1.446***		0.247
		(0.312)		(0.929)
Minority	0.412**	0.254	0.245	0.134
	(0.173)	(0.167)	(0.504)	(0.504)
Woman	0.134	0.126	0.430	0.362
	(0.118)	(0.113)	(0.301)	(0.301)
Party	-0.757***	1.197***	0.423	1.584
	(0.117)	(0.344)	(0.355)	(1.123)
Committee Member	1.182***	1.210***	1.805***	1.806***
	(0.122)	(0.116)	(0.232)	(0.228)
Seniority	0.020	0.010	0.119***	0.110***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Leadership	-0.139	-0.106	-0.897**	-0.816**
	(0.192)	(0.184)	(0.619)	(0.610)
Incumbent	0.070	0.088	0.713	0.695
	(0.129)	(0.122)	(0.554)	(0.554)
Margin of Victory	0.038	-0.058	0.566	0.505
	(0.168)	(0.159)	(0.511)	(0.516)
South	-0.292**	-0.129	-0.551	-0.473
	(0.140)	(0.134)	(0.400)	(0.403)
West	-0.247*	-0.245*	-0.425**	-0.309
	(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.307)	(0.321)
Midwest	-0.103	-0.084	-0.517	-0.461
	(0.128)	(0.124)	(0.327)	(0.327)

African-American	0.192	0.341	-0.355	-0.052
	(0.443)	(0.424)	(1.297)	(1.299)
Foreign Born	0.362	0.543	1.411	1.535
	(0.595)	(0.573)	(1.523)	(1.534)
Unemployed	-9.723***	-8.757***	-8.018	-8.502
	(2.734)	(2.608)	(8.853)	(8.796)
Median Income	0.122*	0.078	0.364*	0.286
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.216)	(0.218)
College Graduate	-0.338	-0.118	-0.655	-0.120
	(0.554)	(0.527)	(1.325)	(1.359)
President Vote Share	-1.585***	-0.459	-1.529	-0.754
	(0.582)	(0.585)	(1.617)	(1.697)
Urban	0.002*	0.002**	0.002	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.0007)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Veteran	-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gay	0.0002	-0.002	0.004	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	2.595***	0.772**	-4.345**	-4.936**
	(0.548)	(0.601)	(1.843)	(7.703)
Observations	439	439	439	439
Log Likelihood	-1,280.3311	-1,262.247	-248.055	-247.037
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This implies that changing the legislative agenda to one's preferences and building coalitions by proposing bills requires prestige within Congress. On the other hand, such seniority and power are not necessary to sign on as a cosponsorship, which explains the statistically insignificant results.

Notably, the finding that minority candidates tend to cosponsor more, but that seniors and leaders tend to sponsor more human rights foreign policy, supports my argument that cosponsoring and sponsoring activities reflect intra-legislative motivations. Prestige in Congress and the desire for good policy-making seem to be reflected in the results.

Constituency demographics fail to illuminate significant effects on cosponsorships and sponsorships. While unemployed population and median income significantly affect legislators' attention on human rights foreign policy, other demographic variables (college graduate and minority population) that could be expected to suggest constituency preferences were statistically insignificant. Economic conditions indirectly demonstrate that legislators may be more preoccupied with pork-barreling agendas when unemployment are high.

However, such demographic and economic variables had no impact on sponsorship decisions. Thus, examining individual-level variables in seeking to find legislators' motivations on human rights legislative activity, we observe that for cosponsorships, MCs' ethnicity, ideology, the minority party membership, committee membership constituency unemployment are primary influencers. MCs' committee membership also positively correlate with higher sponsorships.

Table 7. List of Top Twenty Cosponsors and Sponsors

Top 20 Cosponsors	C	S	Top 20 Sponsors	C	S
Lantos, Tom [D-CA][C]	65	15	Lantos, Tom [D-CA][C]	65	15
Wexler, Robert [D-FL][C]	55	2	Smith, Christopher H. [R-NJ][C]	41	13
Berman, Howard L. [D-CA][C]	47	0	Hyde, Henry J. [R-IL][C]	17	10
McCollum, Betty [D-MN][CW]	42	3	Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana [R-FL][CWM]	37	8
Lee, Barbara [D-CA][CWM]	41	4	Lee, Barbara [D-CA][CWM]	41	4
Frank, Barney [D-MA][G]	41	1	Payne, Donald M. [D-NJ][CM]	37	4
Smith, Christopher H. [R-NJ]	41	13	Rohrabacher, Dana [R-CA][C]	31	4
McGovern, James P. [D-MA]	39	1	Maloney, Carolyn B. [D-NY][W]	29	4
Crowley, Joseph [D-NY][C]	39	1	McCollum, Betty [D-MN][CW]	42	3
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana [R-FL] [CWM]	37	8	Rangel, Charles B. [D-NY][M]	27	3
Payne, Donald M. [D-NJ][CM]	37	4	Tancredo, Thomas G. [R-CO][C]	23	3
Kucinich, Dennis J. [D-OH]	37	1	Leach, James A. [R-IA][C]	18	3
Engel, Eliot L. [D-NY][C]	36	0	Bereuter, Doug [R-NE][C]	16	3
McNulty, Michael R. [D-NY]	36	0	Wexler, Robert [D-FL][C]	55	2
Brown, Sherrod [D-OH][C]	35	1	Woolsey, Lynn C. [D-CA][W]	32	2
Jackson-Lee, Sheila [D-TX][WM]	35	0	Burton, Dan [R-IN][C]	29	2
McDermott, Jim [D-WA]	35	1	Wolf, Frank R. [R-VA]	28	2
Grijalva, Raul M. [D-AZ][M]	33	0	Millender-McDonald, Juanita [D-CA][WM]	26	2
Woolsey, Lynn C. [D-CA][W]	32	2	Schiff, Adam B. [D-CA][C]	24	2
Rohrabacher, Dana [R-CA][C]	31	4	Hastings, Alcee L. [D-FL][M]	23	2

Table 7 shows that active cosponsors and sponsors are mostly minorities. The left column consists of the top cosponsors and the right column lists the

top sponsors. In the table, “C” signifies the number of cosponsorships for human rights foreign policy, and “S” signifies the number of sponsorships for human rights foreign policy. Inside the brackets, there is information on the legislator’s party and state. Next to the MCs names and brackets, the letters in superscripts “C,” “M,” “W,” “G” each stand for committee member, ethnic minority, woman, or gay.

It could be observed that most MCs on the list are either in the category for committee member, ethnic or gender or sexual minority. Out of the twenty top cosponsors, there are eleven committee members, five ethnic minorities, five women, and one sexual minority. Out of the twenty top sponsors, there are fourteen committee members, six ethnic minorities, and six women. The observations lend support to the results from the negative binomial regression.

The statistical results partly delineate how individual MCs have personal convictions and motivations to legislate human rights related bills. This observation stands true especially for sponsorship actions as sponsoring takes more time and effort than cosponsorships. On the other hand, constituency demographics related to unemployment and party membership significantly alter cosponsorship decisions demonstrating its low cost signaling effect to external audiences.

4.2. Dyad-Level Analysis

The dyadic analysis also confirms the effect of ideological difference on legislators' sponsor-cosponsorship patterns. The logistic regression coefficients give the change in the log odds of the outcome for a one unit increase in the predictor variable (Long 1997). For every one unit change in distance between two legislators' ideology on first dimension (Ideological Difference 1), the log odds of cooperation decreases by 0.617 holding all other variables constant. The direction of change also applies to the directed model where a one unit change in ideological difference leads to a decrease in the log odds of cooperation by 1.685 in the negative direction. This signifies that more considerable ideological distance decreases cooperation between cosponsors.

The results support the hypotheses that smaller ideological distance predicts cooperation. Looking at the odds ratio, for a unit change of ideological distance, the odds are expected to decrease by a factor 0.54. For each additional ideological distance, the odds of cooperating between two cosponsors decrease by 56% holding all other variables constant. Another interpretation is that one unit distance makes the odds of not cooperating 1.85 times greater holding all other variables constant.

Table 8. Logistic Regression for Cooperation Dependent Variable and Between-Dyads Variables

	Undirected				*Directed*			
	Coop.	Odds Ratio	97.5% CI Lower	Upper	Coop.	Odds Ratio	97.5% CI Lower	Upper
Ideological Difference 1	-0.617*** (0.040)	0.540	0.5	0.583	-1.685*** (0.119)	0.19	0.147	0.177
Ideological Difference 2	0.015 (0.022)	1.015	0.972	1.06	-0.485*** (0.065)	0.616	0.542	0.700
Party	-0.459*** (0.033)	0.632	0.593	0.674	0.217** (0.096)	1.243	1.03	1.500
Seniority Difference	-0.011*** (0.002)	0.989	0.986	0.993	0.010** (0.005)	1.010	1.000	1.020
Indegree Difference	0.001*** (0.00003)	1.001	1.001	1.001	0.001*** (0.0001)	1.001	1.001	1.001
Outdegree Difference	0.002*** (0.0001)	1.002	1.002	1.002	0.0005*** (0.0001)	1.000	1.000	1.001
Constant	-0.343*** (0.017)	0.71	0.686	0.733	-1.821*** (0.047)	0.162	0.148	0.177
Observation	97,018				36,520			
Log Likelihood	-62,055.840				-10,258.160			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	124,125.70				20,530.32			
Note:	*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01							

The difference is starker for the relationship between sponsors and cosponsors. For each additional ideological distance, the odds of cooperating decreases by 81% (odds of not cooperating 5.26 times greater). The results demonstrate that the ideological distance between sponsors and cosponsors indirectly or directly affects the cosponsor's decision to support the sponsor. The ideological distance between two legislators is statistically significant, but because the observed data is large, more emphasis should be placed on the coefficient size rather than the statistical significance.

The ideological distance for the second dimension ideology score signifies that it is not a meaningful influence for two legislators cosponsoring together. As one unit of ideological distance for the second dimension increases, the odds of cooperating between a sponsor and cosponsor decreases by 39% or that an increase in ideological distance by one unit on the second dimension increases the odds of not cooperating 4.16 times greater.

The party variable was statistically significant for both directed and undirected data with different directions. For two legislators to cooperate, belonging to a different party decreases the odds of cooperation by 37%. Nonetheless, in the case where a cosponsor signs on a sponsor's bill, belonging to a different party increased the odds of cooperation by 24%.

This is an opposite result in comparison to the ideological distance between the sponsor and cosponsor. It implies that ideological distance may be a more important influence than party loyalty as legislators who are ideologically closer to the sponsor, sign as cosponsors regardless of party membership.

Interestingly, the difference between two legislators' years of service in the House, or their total number of cosponsorships received (in-degree) or given (out-degree) do not affect the way they cooperate with other legislators. The log odds of all three variables are near one meaning that the control variables do not affect the dependent variable. In sum, results point towards supporting the main hypothesis that ideological homophily exists.

Table 9 and Table 10 summarize results for a model with ideology related variables. Here, the ideological distance among the first dimension is significant, and the magnitude is large for the undirected and directed models. For a one unit change in ideological distance, the odds of cooperating decreases by a factor of 0.248 and 0.257, which is a decrease of 76% and 75%. In magnitude, it signifies that the odds of cooperating decreases nearly four times with one unit increase of ideological distance. Increase in distance for ideological scores along the second dimension is

significant by reducing the odds of cooperation near 1.3 times and 1.5 times for the undirected and directed model respectively.

A difference in party membership has no significance, but the party of each actor and partner increases the odds of cooperation by a factor of 7.357 and 10.180 for undirected, or 6.194 and 31.260 for directed cooperation. That is, a Republican legislator in the dyad increases the odds of cooperation by 64% and 91% in the undirected model, or 52% and 303% for the sponsor and cosponsor, respectively, in the directed model.

Contrary to previous literature and unlike the individual-level analysis that demonstrates a minority party effect, the results illustrate a majority party effect in the dyads. The majority party members actively cosponsor and sponsor human rights legislation. However, the results should be examined with caution. Previous plots show that more Democratic legislators tend to sponsor-cosponsor human rights bills regarding the overall quantity per member. More Republicans may have cosponsored at least one human rights bills; but per member, Democrats have cosponsored a more significant amount of human rights bills restricted to fewer people. Since the dependent variable is binary, the extent to which a member cosponsor-sponsors is not taken into account, perhaps leading to a biased

result on the party effect. Democrat legislators tend to develop expertise on human rights as their primary agenda.

Table 9. Logistic Regression for Undirected Cooperation and Ideology Variables

	Undirected			
	Cooperation	Odds Ratio	97.5% CI	
			Lower	Upper
Ideological Distance 1	-1.394***	0.248	0.004	0.080
	(0.058)			
Ideological Distance 2	-0.244***	0.783	0.733	0.838
	(0.034)			
Party	0.090*	1.094	0.998	1.199
	(0.047)			
Actor Party	1.996***	7.357	5.523	9.905
	(0.149)			
Partner Party	2.320***	10.180	6.716	15.459
	(0.213)			
Actor Absolute Ideology 1	-3.380***	0.034	0.0225	0.051
	(0.208)			
Partner Absolute Ideology 1	-4.367***	0.013	0.007	0.0226
	(0.294)			
Actor Absolute Ideology 2	-1.985***	0.137	0.123	0.154
	(0.058)			
Partner Absolute Ideology 2	-3.755***	0.023	0.021	0.026
	(0.059)			
Actor Extreme Ideology 1	4.782***	119.314	78.28	184.59

	(0.219)			
Actor Extreme Ideology 2	1.768***	5.857	5.212	6.583
	(0.060)			
Partner Extreme Ideology 1	5.940***	379.753	207.6	696.76
	(0.309)			
Partner Extreme Ideology 2	3.241***	25.547	22.624	28.85
	(0.062)			
Constant	-2.816***	0.060	0.045	0.08
	(0.150)			
Observations	97,459			
Log Likelihood	-51,269.02			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	102,566			

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 10. Logistic Regression for Directed Cooperation and Ideology Variables

	Directed			
	Cooperation	Odds Ratio	97.5% CI	
			Lower	Upper
Ideological Distance 1	-1.359***	0.257	0.197	0.335
	(0.136)			
Ideological Distance 2	-0.390***	0.67	0.574	0.799
	(0.084)			
Party	0.089	1.093	0.87	1.373
	(0.116)			
Actor Party	1.824***	6.194	3.276	11.59
	(0.322)			
Partner Party	3.442***	31.260	10.840	87
	(0.532)			
Actor Absolute Ideology 1	-2.408***	0.090	0.038	0.215
	(0.439)			
Partner Absolute Ideology 1	-4.548***	0.011	0.003	0.046
	(0.737)			
Actor Absolute Ideology 2	1.035***	2.816	1.969	4.02
	(0.182)			
Partner Absolute Ideology 2	-2.098***	0.123	0.088	0.170
	(0.168)			
Actor Extreme Ideology 1	2.233***	9.332	3.562	24.14
	(0.488)			
Actor Extreme Ideology 2	0.266*	1.304	0.958	1.779
	(0.158)			

Partner Extreme Ideology 1	6.779***	879.524	186.1	3984
	(0.782)			
Partner Extreme Ideology 2	2.079***	7.997	5.915	10.82
	(0.154)			
Constant	-5.715***	0.003	0.002	0.007
	(0.366)			
Observations	36,603			
Log Likelihood	-9,649.119			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	19,326.240			

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Nonetheless, the 108th Congress underwent a national crisis, which may have motivated more Republican representatives to propose human rights foreign policy bills against hostile states.

In relation to the party argument, the absolute value of a legislator's ideology sheds light on the negative relationship between absolute ideology scores and cooperation. A unit increase in ideology, meaning a degree towards the more extreme, decreases the odds of cooperation by 97% and 99% in the undirected model, and 91% and 99% in the directed model. As captured in Figure 5, more legislators' ideologies closer to the 0.4 to 0.5 NOMINATE score are associated with higher levels of cosponsorship activity. The logic is similar to the second dimension ideology. Thus, the results support previous expectations on the flawed measurement of taking

the absolute value to operationalize extremity. It also provides new insight on how legislators clustered around the median of each party ideology are more cooperative sponsors and cosponsors for human rights legislation.

While this is understandable in that ideologically extreme Republicans would not cosponsor or sponsor human rights legislation, why is it that ideologically liberal Democrats do not cosponsor or sponsor human rights legislation? On further examination, it is noticed that the Democrats' spectrum of liberal ideology is from 0 to 0.7, as in no Democrat exceeds the minimum -0.7 in DW-NOMINATE scores. So numerically speaking, there are many Republicans near the 0.8 to 1.1 area, but no Democrats in the -0.8 to -1 NOMINATE score range. This measure does not accurately account for liberal extremism; or directly speaking, there are no ideologically extreme Democrats as Republicans.

Observing the more sophisticated indicator of ideological extremism, the absolute distance between the House median ideology and the legislator's ideology, results follow previous literature's expectations. Ideological extremity has a large magnitude of influence on cooperation. A one unit increase away from the House median increases the odds of cooperation by a factor of 119.314 (Actor Extreme Ideology 1) and 379.753 (Partner Extreme Ideology 1) for the undirected model, 9.332 (Actor Extreme

Ideology 1) and 879.524 (Partner Extreme Ideology 1) for the directed model. Further distance from the House median increasingly influences the odds of cooperation, so legislators further from the House median tend to engage in more sponsor and cosponsorships. Such results are in accordance with the scatterplot in Figure 3 where further away from the median shows higher cosponsorship numbers. However, including constituency demographic variables decreases the amount of magnitude, as we will examine in the other models.

The results incorporating the independent and control variables are reported in Table 11 and Table 12 (refer to the Appendix). In accordance with the other models, ideological distance proves to be statistically significant in the negative direction, with a reasonable magnitude; one unit in ideological difference leads to an 82% decrease in the odds of cosponsoring together and a 76% decrease in the odds of cooperating in a directed partnership. The direction for the second dimension ideological difference is similarly negative, but the magnitude is smaller than ideological difference in the first dimension. The effect of extreme ideology's magnitude is substantial in a positive direction. Thus, greater distance from the House median ideology makes it more favorable for the legislator to be a cosponsor for both the undirected and directed models.

This is consistent with the results in Table 9, Table 10, and concurrent with previous research on the ideological distance from the House median.

Unlike the hypothesis that intra-legislative motivations, operationalized by ideological distance with other legislators, have greater influence upon human rights foreign policy cosponsorship behavior, results depict the significance of constituency demographics. Foreign-born percent population, percent unemployed, median income, college graduate percent, Republican presidential vote share, urban percent, and gay population all statistically significantly affected cosponsorship behavior. The direction of the coefficients was as expected with most demonstrating positive relationships, with the expected negative direction of unemployment.

Surprisingly, college graduate percentage also correlated negatively with legislators' cosponsorship behavior which requires deeper insight. One plausible explanation may be that a higher percentage of college graduates take more interest in legislators' activities that legislators are vigilant about spending time on more pork barreling issues. It would indeed be surprising if a higher level of education turned out to negatively influence legislators' human rights foreign policy behavior in future research.

Contrary to education level, the gay population positively affected sponsorship activity to great magnitudes. However, interestingly, a higher

gay population decreased cosponsorship partnerships. Percentage unemployed negatively affected cosponsorship levels, decreasing the odds above 90% for cosponsorship cooperation and near 100% for the sponsors in the directed model.

The network measures revealed that closeness centrality, eigenvector centrality, connectedness, and cluster coefficient have significant effects on cooperation. The further away one is to other legislators in terms of average distance (inverse of average distance from one legislator to others), the larger the eigenvector centrality meaning higher levels of influence (proportional to the centrality of legislators who cosponsor a legislator's bills), the smaller the connectedness (closeness with weighted measures testing relationship strength), the higher the clustered coefficient, the more likely it is for a legislator to cosponsor-sponsor with another.

The results of network measures support other relationships in that legislators further from the House median, but more clustered among party medians are more likely to cooperate. However, it is interesting that while seniority had no influence, which is commonly used to measure a legislator's power in the House, eigenvector centrality had a positive effect. Rather than connected legislators, the lesser connected, but more influential legislators with ideology close to the party median seem to cooperate more

in the area of human rights cosponsorships. These results, in general, do not cohere with past literature providing opportunities to ponder whether sponsor-cosponsor mechanisms truly differ by policy section.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

5.1. Summary of Findings

This paper endeavored to test whether the ideological distance between two legislators affected their decisions to cosponsor together in the broader theoretical framework on intra-legislative and extra-legislative motivations. The simple answer is 'yes,' the closer the ideological distance between two legislators, the more likely it is that the two will cosponsor at least once together. Analysis results claim that the more likely it is that a legislator will cosponsor a bill whose ideological distance is closer to him or herself. In the policy area of human right foreign policy, the results suggest that human rights is an ideologically split issue wherein bipartisan cooperation may be difficult to achieve due to legislators that tend to cosponsor ideologically similar bills.

However, results demonstrated that party similarities and differences do not guide legislators' decisions. Albeit human rights may be an ideological issue, but it is not a partisan issue. Even so, the further the ideological distance from the House median, the higher the likelihood for a legislator to cooperate. The House median is near the Republican party, which places all

the Democrats at least a bit further than a median Republican. So here, the minority party effect exists, and it is greater than the odds ratio of the party variable. Future works should focus on finding a finer line of the ideological threshold. Certainly, more legislators clustered around the 0.3~0.4 and -0.3~ -0.4 cosponsor many bills in contrast to ideologically extreme legislators. How can this be thought in accordance with the idea that further ideological distance from the House leads to more cooperation? Perhaps the solution would be measuring the ideological distance from party median, or adjusting the DW-NOMINATE scores so that the liberal extreme is not -1.0, but -0.7.

Although the logistic regression models support the two main hypotheses, the expectation that legislators' intra-legislative and ideological preferences would be more important than extra-legislative constituency interests is yet contested. The variables incorporated into the model for control purposes proved to be highly significant in effect and magnitude on the legislators' sponsor-cosponsorship cooperation. Constituency interests measured indirectly through district demographics demonstrated that among various factors, especially low unemployment and high gay populations, positively lead to more human rights bill sponsor-cosponsorships. The high

eigenvector centrality measure hints at intra-legislative influence as a possible factor for bill cosponsorships.

The conclusion is that ideological distances do matter, and they lead to more cooperation if ideological preferences are similar. However, legislators consider constituency preferences when position-taking for human rights foreign policy, and perhaps even more so than ideological similarities with the other legislators. Nonetheless, the constituency is an object of complexity (Kingdon 2007). More subtle research design taking into account the relationship characteristics of dyads, the networks of the congressmen to see the effects of intra-legislative influence, and a better measure of constituency ideology or interest would improve the robustness of findings.

Additionally, individual-level analysis conducted with negative binomial regression demonstrated mixed results on constituency demographics effect on cosponsorships and sponsorships. Of the main demographic variables, unemployed population percentage and median income significantly affect legislators' attention on human rights foreign policy. Higher unemployed population percentage lead to legislators' refraining from cosponsorship behavior. On the other hand, higher median income has both positive effects on cosponsorship and sponsorship behavior. However, the other variables,

including percent foreign-born and gay population percent, did not predict cosponsorship or sponsorships. In sum, for cosponsorships, MCs' ethnicity, ideology, the minority party membership, committee membership constituency unemployment are primary influencers. MCs' committee membership and committee membership positively correlate with higher sponsorships.

5.2. Future Directions

The current limitations of this paper stem from its novel approach to the dyadic research design. The dyadic perspective makes it challenging for the research to connect with previous literature that focuses on the individual legislator. I employed the dyadic design because previous research on individual legislators' motivations on sponsor-cosponsorship behavior exist. However, as the dyadic design could not explain the individual motivations I included individual-level analyses. Yet, for a realistically grounded understanding of how legislators decide to cosponsor or sponsor human rights foreign policy, deep case studies and interviews would be necessary to expose the true motivations. Nevertheless, this thesis contributed to studies on legislative behavior by utilizing a novel dataset and probing into a minor issue area.

Future research should seek to employ surveys and survey experiments to measure constituent preferences on human rights foreign policy, and responses to elite behaviors. Literature seeking to connect the domestic with the international levels have sought to test the domestic audience cost theory (Tomz 2007; Chaudoin 2014; Putnam & Shapiro 2017). In relation, this research would benefit from capturing citizens' preferences directly, and understand how citizens' punish or reward legislators on human rights foreign policy issues.

The constituency is an object of complexity (Kingdon 2007). More subtle research design taking into account the relationship characteristics of dyads, the networks of the congressmen to see the effects of intra-legislative influence, and a better measure of constituency ideology or interest would improve the robustness of findings. Only then would we be able to create a complete causal relationship on democratic accountability on human rights foreign policy between citizens' voting behaviors and legislators' behaviors in Congress.

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Appendix

Table 11. Full Model of Logistic Regression for Undirected Cooperation

	Undirected			
	Cooperation	Odds Ratio	97.5% CI Lower	Upper
Ideological Distance 1	-1.711*** (0.062)	0.181	0.0001	0.008
Ideological Distance 2	-0.443*** (0.038)	0.642	0.595	0.692
Party	0.038 (0.050)	1.039	0.942	1.147
Actor Party	1.956*** (0.155)	7.067	5.245	9.630
Partner Party	1.065*** (0.219)	2.899	1.893	4.462
Actor Absolute Ideology 1	-3.421*** (0.219)	0.033	0.0211	0.048
Partner Absolute Ideology 1	-2.657*** (0.305)	0.072	0.038	0.127
Actor Absolute Ideology 2	-1.035*** (0.077)	0.355	0.305	0.413
Partner Absolute Ideology 2	-1.319*** (0.080)	0.267	0.228	0.313
Actor Extreme Ideology 1	4.062*** (0.231)	58.097	37.251	92.05
Actor Extreme Ideology 2	0.886***	2.426	2.081	2.828

	(0.078)			
Partner Extreme Ideology 1	3.075***	21.647	11.61	40.654
	(0.320)			
Partner Extreme Ideology 2	1.022***	2.78	2.371	3.258
	(0.081)			
Seniority Difference	-0.026***	0.974	0.969	0.979
	(0.003)			
Actor Seniority	0.010***	1.009	1.004	1.015
	(0.003)			
Partner Seniority	0.016***	1.016	1.011	1.021
	(0.003)			
Actor Foreign Born	0.723***	2.061	1.683	2.525
	(0.104)			
Partner Foreign Born	1.129***	3.092	2.484	3.85
	(0.112)			
Actor Unemployed	-3.042***	0.048	0.016	0.146
	(0.570)			
Partner Unemployed	-10.663***	0.00002	7.2e-06	7.6e-05
	(0.603)			
Actor Median Income (log)	0.322***	1.38	1.197	1.59
	(0.072)			
Partner Median Income (log)	0.484***	1.622	1.423	1.85
	(0.067)			
Actor College Graduates	-0.840***	0.432	0.316	0.591
	(0.160)			
Partner College Graduates	-1.164***	0.312	0.213	0.421

	(0.152)			
Actor President Vote Share	0.373***	1.452	1.158	1.822
	(0.116)			
Partner President Vote Share	0.029	1.029	0.824	1.286
	(0.113)			
Actor Urban	0.497***	1.643	1.444	1.87
	(0.066)			
Partner Urban	0.551***	1.735	1.527	1.972
	(0.065)			
Actor Gay	-1.010	0.364	0.009	14.715
	(1.889)			
Partner Gay	-7.943***	0.0004	1.e-05	0.012
	(1.801)			
Actor Indegree	0.0002***	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.0001)			
Partner Indegree	0.0001	1.000	0.999	1.000
	(0.0001)			
Actor Outdegree	0.003***	1.003	1.003	1.003
	(0.0001)			
Partner Outdegree	0.005***	1.005	1.005	1.005
	(0.0001)			
Actor Betweenness	0.0002***	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.0001)			
Partner Betweenness	0.001***	1.001	1.000	1.000
	(0.0001)			
Actor Closeness	-4.074***	0.017	0.007	0.042

	(0.466)			
Partner Closeness	-11.073***	0.000016	5.7e-06	4.2e-05
	(0.513)			
Actor Eigenvector	15.638***	6.189e+6	2e+05	1.8e+08
	(1.715)			
Partner Eigenvector	44.138***	1.48e+19	4e+17	5e+20
	(1.840)			
Actor Connectedness	-0.869***	0.419	0.279	0.631
	(0.208)			
Partner Connectedness	1.152***	3.164	2.119	4.729
	(0.205)			
Actor Clustering	0.913***	2.491	1.954	3.177
	(0.124)			
Partner Clustering	1.563***	4.774	3.706	6.156
	(0.129)			
Constant	-7.012***	0.001	0.0001	0.008
	(1.093)			
Observations	94,393			
Log Likelihood	-43,879.480			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	87,848.960			

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 12. Full Model of Logistic Regression for Directed Cooperation

	Directed			
	Cooperation	Odds Ratio	97.5% CI Lower	Upper
Ideological Distance 1	-1.428*** (0.152)	0.240	0.178	0.323
Ideological Distance 2	-0.411*** (0.093)	0.663	0.553	0.795
Party	0.063 (0.127)	1.065	0.83	1.368
Actor Party	5.372*** (0.499)	215.225	80.603	570.84
Partner Party	2.773*** (0.570)	16.000	5.251	48.6
Actor Absolute Ideology 1	-7.122*** (0.674)	0.001	0	0.003
Partner Absolute Ideology 1	-3.446*** (0.788)	0.032	0.007	0.149
Actor Absolute Ideology 2	3.409*** (0.264)	30.247	18.033	50.763
Partner Absolute Ideology 2	-0.563*** (0.211)	0.570	0.376	0.862
Actor Extreme Ideology 1	5.038*** (0.756)	154.088	34.864	674.52
Actor Extreme Ideology 2	-2.476*** (0.227)	0.084	0.054	0.131
Partner Extreme Ideology 1	4.578*** (0.841)	97.350	18.872	503.44
Partner Extreme Ideology 2	0.462** (0.197)	1.587	1.079	2.337
Seniority Difference	-0.019***	0.981	0.969	0.994

	(0.007)			
Actor Seniority	-0.045***	0.956	0.942	0.970
	(0.007)			
Partner Seniority	0.013**	1.014	1.002	1.026
	(0.006)			
Actor Foreign Born	-0.011	0.989	0.624	1.569
	(0.235)			
Partner Foreign Born	0.488**	1.630	1.052	2.518
	(0.223)			
Actor Unemployed	-12.457***	0	0	0.0003
	(2.154)			
Partner Unemployed	-3.306**	0.037	0.002	0.595
	(1.433)			
Actor Median Income (log)	0.077	1.080	0.705	1.655
	(0.218)			
Partner Median Income (log)	0.684***	1.981	1.421	2.766
	(0.170)			
Actor College Graduates	-2.429***	0.088	0.041	0.191
	(0.394)			
Partner College Graduates	-0.988***	0.372	0.183	0.756
	(0.361)			
Actor President Vote Share	1.446***	4.244	2.081	8.668
	(0.364)			
Partner President Vote Share	-0.338	0.713	0.409	1.241
	(0.283)			
Actor Urban	2.122***	8.345	5.149	13.579
	(0.247)			
Partner Urban	0.519***	1.68	1.210	2.337
	(0.168)			

Actor Gay	32.143*** (2.892)	9.1e+13	3.1e+11	2.6e+16
Partner Gay	0.849 (3.685)	2.338	0.002	2.9e+03
Actor Indegree	0.003*** (0.0002)	1.003	1.003	1.004
Partner Indegree	0.00004 (0.0001)	1.000	1.00	1.00
Actor Outdegree	0.001*** (0.0003)	1.001	1.00	1.002
Partner Outdegree	0.003*** (0.0002)	1.003	1.003	1.004
Actor Betweenness	0.002*** (0.0003)	1.002	1.001	1.002
Partner Betweenness	0.0001 (0.0002)	1.000	1.00	1.00
Actor Closeness	-43.275*** (2.356)	0	0	0
Partner Closeness	-1.973 (1.331)	0.139	0.010	1.875
Actor Eigenvector	132.425*** (7.948)	3.2e+57	6.4e+50	2.2e+64
Partner Eigenvector	10.555** (4.816)	3.8e+4	3.12	4.9e+08
Actor Connectedness	-6.984*** (0.786)	0.001	0.0002	0.004
Partner Connectedness	0.193 (0.522)	1.213	0.437	3.389
Actor Clustering	7.478***	1.7e+3	330.358	

	(0.863)			
Partner Clustering	0.759**	2.135	1.040	4.470
	(0.372)			
Constant	-0.554	0.574	0.001	320.190
	(3.226)			
Observations	36,022			
Log Likelihood	-8,353.932			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	16,797.860			

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

국문 초록

이슈 선점도가 낮은 국제정치 분야 어젠더에 대한 하원의원들의 공동발의 및 발의는 어떤 요인으로부터 영향을 받는가? 본 논문은 미국 108 대 의회(2003-2005)의 440 명 의원들과 인권 대외정책 분야 공동발의 및 발의 자료를 분석하여 선거연계 명제의 입장표명(position-taking) 동기보다 의회 내적인 역학(intra-legislative motive)이 공동발의 및 발의 활동 혹은 협력의 촉매제인지 살펴본다. 대외정책 분야는 국내적인 이슈에 비해 정치 엘리트들의 정책결정과정과 연결되어 왔다. 또한 대중이 확고한 정책입장이나 관심을 표명하지 않는 정책분야로 여론의 압력을 받지 않고 의원의 개인 선호나 의회 내적인 요인에 따른 결정을 할 수 있는 기회가 많을 수 있다 (Lindsay 1994).

첫번째 분석으로 개별 의원 분석단위에서 각 의원의 인권 대외정책 발의 및 공동발의 개수에 영향을 주는 변인들을 살펴본다. 개별 의원 수준 모델에 포함한 변수들은 이념과 이념의 극단성, 의원들의 개별적인 특성, 의회의 제도적인 부분, 선거 관련 지표, 그리고 대표하는 지역구의 특성이다. 음이항 회귀분석 결과 이념이 진보에 가까울수록, 이념적 극단성이 높을수록 공동발의 참여 가능성이 높다. 반면 선거구의 실직율이 낮고 소득수준이 높을수록 공동발의 참여 가능성 또한 높아진다. 일반적으로 의회 내 영향력이 적으면 어젠더 결정과정에서 의견을 내기 위해서는 발의를 할 자원이나 영향력이 부족하기 때문에

비용이 적은 공동발의를 통한 의정활동을 한다. 그러나 인권 대외정책 이슈라는 쟁점에서는 의회 내 영향력이 적은 의원들은 선거구 이익에 집중하는 활동을 해야 해서 선거구 특징에 민감하게 반응하는 것으로 해석될 수 있다. 발의는 의회 내 영향력이 많은 의원들의 의정활동 수단으로 연관되어 왔다. 음이항 회귀분석 결과 대외정책 위원회 소속이고 의원 경력이 높을수록 발의 횟수에 통계적으로 유의미한 양의 영향을 준다.

두번째 분석은 의원간 관계를 보는 쌍의 분석단위에서 두 의원이 발의 및 공동발의를 함께 하는 데 영향을 주는 변인들을 살펴본다. 즉, 108 대 모든 의원들이 한 번씩 다른 의원과 한 쌍이 되어 공동발의를 함께한 여부와 발의를 했을 때 공동발의자로 지지를 해준 여부가 종속변수이다. 주요 독립변수는 의원간 이념 차이, 그리고 이념적 극단성이다. 기존 연구에서도 공동발의 요인으로 중요한 변수는 이념이 거론되지만, 두 의원의 이념 차에 의한 협력이 이루어지는지는 검증되지 않았기 때문이다. 또한, 의회 내적 동력을 살펴보는데 있어서 공동발의는 입장표명 보다 다른 의원과의 관계를 통해서 협력이 이루어지고 공동발의 결정이 이루어지는 행동이다. 따라서 의원 간 동질성을 이념 차이로 조작화했고 이념적 동질성은 두 의원 쌍의 DW-NOMINATE 지표 차이의 절대값이다.

이항 로짓 결과에서 이념적 거리, 정당, 이념적 극단성 모두 발의, 공동발의에 유의미한 영향을 준다는 것이 검증된다. 이념적 거리(1 차원)가 커질수록, 협력을 할 확률은 76%(공동발의),

75%(발의)로 감소한다. 두 의원의 정당이 다르면 공동발의를 함께 할 가능성을 9% 증가시킨다. 이념적 극단성의 경우에도 두 의원의 쌍에서 한 명의 극단성이 높아질수록 협력의 가능성이 각각 4.8 배, 5.94 배 높아진다. 그러나 선거구의 특징과 경제적 요인들이 공동발의 협력 여부에 큰 영향력이 있는 것으로 나타난다. 이에 따라서 이슈 선점도가 낮은 인권 대외정책 분야에서 의원들은 이념적 차이에 따라 협력여부를 결정하기도 하지만 대표하는 선거구의 선호에도 크게 의존한다는 것을 확인할 수 있다.

주요어 : 이념적 동질성, 미국 의회, 공동발의 행태, 인권대외정책

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