

# Two Types of *there*-sentences and Feature Specification

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## ABSTRACT

This paper aimed to account for unexpected accusative case on a pronominal associate in *there*-sentences (*there was him*). It is unexpected that under the long-standing assumption in generative grammar, agreement coincides with case assignment. Since *there*-associates appear to agree with T in number (e.g. *There was/\*were a dog*), they are expected to be valued as nominative case. Furthermore, such a pronominal associate with accusative case is not available in *there*-V type sentences (*\*There arrived him*). In this paper, I propose a *multiple-*there* hypothesis* to account for different behaviors of *there*-V and *there*-BE. In the proposal, I argue that *there*-s in *there*-V and *there*-BE are base-generated in different positions due to their different “grammatical roles” (semantically null expletive vs. subject argument). Based on the distinction, I further argue that *there*-s have different feature specifications and show that the proposed system captures different behaviors between *there*-sentences with respect to sub-extraction and control.

**Keywords:** *There*-sentences, feature specification, pronominal associate, long-distance agreement, accusative case

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## 1. Introduction

English *there*-sentences have raised many theoretical issues in generative syntax. Among various issues, long distance agreement between the DP associate (or Pivot, following Milsark 1974) and the main predicate, as shown in (1), has been an important research topic during the history of the generative syntax (Following Hartmann (2008), I will use the term *there*-BE to refer to *there* sentences in which the main verb is BE, as in (1a) and *there*-V to refer to *there* sentences in which the main verb is intransitive verb, as in (1b)).

- (1) a. There is/\*are a man (in the garden).
- b. There arise/\*arises two problems.

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Particularly, the following two questions have been extensively investigated with respect to the long-distance agreement in *there*-sentences. First question is where *there*-expletive is external-merged. Traditionally, *there*-expletive has been assumed to be merged into Spec,Infl (or Spec,TP) where other regular subjects move up to satisfy the EPP requirement (Milsark 1974 and subsequent works). Such an assumption is also adopted in the early minimalist program as well (Chomsky 2000). On the other hand, more recent works have proposed that *there* is base merged in a lower position, arguably inside  $\nu$ P or predication phrase (Moro 1991 1997, William 1994, Hazout 2004, Deal 2009, Sobin 2014). The issue of the base position of *there* is closely associated with the second question, namely, what syntactic features *there*-expletive bears. I will briefly introduce how these two questions are related each other.

Based on the assumption that *there*-expletive is external-merged into SpecTP, Chomsky (2000) applies Agree system (i.e. probe-goal theory) to account for the long-distance agreement. Chomsky suggests that *there*-expletive bears only D-feature, being deficient in  $\phi$ -features. Thus, *there* just plays a role as a place holder for the EPP requirement and cannot participate in agreement being not qualified for case assignment. Since T cannot get its uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features valued by the first DP encountered, which is *there*, it probes further down to find an appropriate goal and eventually agrees with the DP associate. However, this approach has been challenged by some empirical issues. For example, *there*-insertion is sensitive to types of verbs, which is unexpected under Chomsky's system. *There*-insertion is available when the main predicate is a (sub-type of) unaccusative verb as in (2a), whereas an unergative verb is not compatible with *there*-insertion, as in (2b). According to Deal (2009), Chomsky's analysis predicts that *there*-insertion is permissible in both sentences because both types of verbs have one DP argument which cannot independently get case licensed (within  $\nu$ P), so arguably available for the agreement with T. Chomsky's system does not provide a principled way to distinguish the variation in acceptability of *there*-V sentences. Thus, the system overgenerates *there*-sentences like (2b), contrary to facts.

(2) a. There arrived a train.

b. \*There slowed a train (on the east bound track) (Deal 2009, (5))

On the contrary, the "low-origin of *there*" approach assumes that *there* is base-generated within  $\nu$ P. Although details of implementation vary among different works, they share the idea that *there*-expletive bears  $\phi$ -features that need to agree with the

DP associate.<sup>1)</sup> Under this approach, the long-distance agreement takes place in the sequence of two distinct agreements. One is between *there* and the associate and the other is between *there* and Infl/T head. The basic intuition behind the idea is that the associate in *there*-sentences do not directly agree with Inf./T, but *there* plays a role as a mediator between the associate and Infl/T. This account works once we assume that *there* has  $\phi$ -features for it to take part in agreement and a strict locality constraint blocks the direct agreement between Infl/T and the associate.

This two-step agreement system brings up an interesting question about case assignment. As have been assumed in the minimalist program, if  $\phi$ -agreement with Infl/T coincides with nominative case assignment, it is nominative case that is expected to appear on the associate in *there*-sentences. In fact, Chomsky's direct agreement hypothesis between Infl/T and the associate also predicts nominative case on the associate as well. However, pronominal associates in (3) show that it is not the case.<sup>2)</sup>

- (3) a. There were them/\*they and there was us/\*we. (Francez 2006:1)  
 b. If there were only him, you'd be denying the essential goodness of human nature. (Bolinger 1977:116)

Francez (2006) observes that a pronominal associate in *there*-BE sentences is morphologically marked with accusative case, not nominative case. A pronominal associate is expected to appear with a nominative case marker under the previous analyses in which the associate ends up  $\phi$ -agree with T. Thus, the discrepancy between agreement and case morphology is somewhat surprising under any system that associates  $\phi$ -agreement and structural case assignment. One more observation

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1) There are three lines within the low-origin of *there* approach: *there*-as a predicate in a small clause (Moro 1991, 1997, Hoekstra and Mulder 1990), *there*-as a subject in a small clause (William 1994, Hazout 2004, Hartmann 2008), and *there*-as a  $\nu$ P specifier (Deal 2009, Sobin 2014). Different analyses suggest its own way to account for various issues related with *there*-sentences, for example, the definiteness effect, *wh*-movement, or comparison with locative inversion constructions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to summarize the detailed explanation of each proposal. Rather, I refer to Hartmann's dissertation for a thorough overview. Here, I will focus on Agreement and Case issue in *there*-sentences.

2) Pronominal associates are not commonly observed in existential sentences. Given the Definiteness Restriction (or Definiteness effect), which has been thoroughly discussed in literature (Milsark 1974, Rando and Napoli 1978, McNally 1997 among many others), pronominal associates seem to violate the Definiteness Restriction. However, semantic, syntactic and pragmatic analyses have been suggested in literature to account for the appearance of exceptional definite expressions as pivot. A detailed discussion of the literature on the issue is impossible within the limits of this paper. Instead, I would like to point out that regardless of the reason of allowance of pronominal associates in *there*-sentences, the unexpected case morphology must be independently accounted for.

that must be considered together is that *there-V* sentences do not allow a pronominal associate even when the pronominal associate is accusative case marked.

(4) \*There arrived us/them.

The puzzling accusative case morphology on pronominal associates in *there-BE* sentences has not gone unnoticed in the literature. However, to my knowledge, it has not been seriously investigated in literature and no satisfactory account has been provided so far. This paper aims to account for the unexpected accusative morphology on a pronominal associate in *there-BE* sentences. In addition, I will propose a parametric feature specification to account for the difference between (3) and (4).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I will review previous approaches to case assignment in *there* sentences and point out why previous approaches cannot successfully account for the issue. In section 3, I will introduce syntactic structures of *there*-sentences proposed by Deal (2009) and Hazout (2004). Based on these previous works, I will propose two different syntactic structures of *there-BE* and *there-V* sentences. In addition, adopting Schäfer's (2013) theory of case determination, I will propose different feature specification of *there* depending on where it appears between *there-BE* and *there-V*. In section 4, I will provide further evidence in *wh*-movement/extraction and control that support the proposed structural distinction between *there-V* and *there-BE*. In section 5, I will conclude the paper.

## 2. The unexpected accusative case

In the introduction, I discussed why accusative case marking on a pronominal associate challenges any system that adopts the following two assumptions simultaneously:

- (5) a. Agreement coincides with case.  
(i.e. Any noun phrase that agrees with T gets nominative case from T)
- b. T undergoes  $\varphi$ -agreement with the associate (either directly (Chomsky 2000) or through *there* (Deal 2009)).

For (5a), this is a thesis that has widely been assumed in the minimalist program. Correlation between  $\varphi$ -agreement with T and nominative case assignment has been



Such observations have led to a reformulation of the original version of Burzio's generalization in the way preserving the core insight yet incorporating the exceptions. Abstracting away of the details, many share the idea that nominative case has a priority over accusative case. For example, Tsunoda (1981) argues that nominative case is the least marked case so that every sentence needs a nominative. Harley (1995) suggests a similar (but weaker than Tsunoda's principle) Case assignment rule in (8).

(8) Mechanical Case parameter (Harley 1995: 163)

- a. If one case feature is checked structurally in a clause, it is realized as Nominative.
- b. If two case features are checked structurally in a clause the second/the lower one is realized as Accusative, the higher as Nominative.
- c. If three case features are checked structurally in a clause, the second/intermediate one is realized as Dative, the third/the lowest one as Accusative, and the highest as Nominative.

The common idea is that if a sentence assigns one case, that should be nominative case. However, *there*-sentences with a pronominal associate, as in (3) I repeated below, seem to assign accusative case without nominative case at surface, violating the nominative priority. Thus, accusative case in (3) is unexpected as well under the perspective of general restrictions on the distribution of accusatives.

- (3) a. There were them/\*they and there was us/\*we. (Francez 2006:1)
- b. If there were only him, you'd be denying the essential goodness of human nature. (Bolinger 1977:116)

Yet, there seems to be a way of making the sentences in (3) compatible with the nominative priority. If we assume that *there* gets nominative case valued, those sentences in (3) do not violate the nominative priority since the sentence has a nominative (on *there*), and then an accusative as well. A question needs to be answered is how *there* is nominative case assigned given the two following widely accepted assumptions: Agreement coincides with case (5a) and *there* does not have an interpretable  $\varphi$ -features unlike regular DPs. Holding this question, let me introduce another relevant issue. In (5a), how is an accusative case assigned to the pronominal associates? In generative syntax, the following three configurations are

considered where accusative case is assigned: a complement of a transitive verb, a complement of a preposition, and ECM environment. However, none of them seems applicable to *there*-associates. If a pronominal associate gets structural accusative case as a transitive object does, BE-verbs are expected to behave like transitive verbs, which is hardly attested. The assumption that a pronominal associate gets structural accusative case by the null preposition is not tenable as well. It has been long discussed that *there*-associate is category sensitive, so that only noun phrase is available. Thus, PP-associate is ungrammatical, as shown in (9). There is little reason to believe that overt preposition is not allowed in the position where covert preposition is available.

- (9) a. \*There is to us.
- b. \*There arrived from here.

The last option seems dubious as well. For a pronominal associate to raise to an ECM position, the main predicate must be a type of verb that can assign accusative case. However, the main predicate of *there*-sentence is BE-verb or intransitive. Thus, this option is suffered from the same problem with the first hypothesis, namely *there*-sentences as transitive hypothesis. To summarize, in (3), not only nominative case, but accusative case is assigned in a way not structurally permissible. To resolve this puzzle, I adopt “default” case approach proposed by Schäfer (2013). In section 3, I will discuss how the puzzling case assignment can be naturally accounted for under the default case approach. Before moving into the proposal, I will discuss Sobin (2014) who proposes a view of default case approach for comparison.

## 2.2. A default case approach

Even though unexpected unaccusative case on a pronominal associate has been noted in literature, a detailed analysis has rarely been discussed. Here I would like to introduce a noteworthy study, Sobin (2014), who suggests a default case assignment analysis for the phenomenon.

Sobin (2014) argues that lexical DP associates and pronominal associates show different agreement patterns. According to Sobin, when the associate is a lexical DP, T can agree with it (10b) or not (10a).<sup>3)</sup> On the contrary, Infl/T cannot agree with

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3) Being aware of controversial judgment regarding (10a), Sobin notes that previous theoretical works have judged (10a) ungrammatical in many cases. However, Sobin points out that such a full form

a pronominal associate in number as in (11b). When the associate is a pronominal DP, BE-verb must appear in third person singular form, as in (11a).

- (10) a. There is cats in the yard. (Sobin 2014: 409)  
b. There are cats in the yard.

- (11) a. There was only you/them in the garden. (Sobin 2014: 409)  
b.\*There were only you/them in the garden.

To account for such a difference, Sobin proposes that lexical DPs in English have [uCase: ] feature, which must be structurally valued. By contrast, pronouns can have optional feature specification, either normal active case feature [uCase: ], which requires syntactic case valuation or inactive, default case feature, which is not available for case valuation in syntax. Especially, following Schütze (2001), Sobin assumes that accusative case is the default case in English. Thus, accusative pronominal DPs, *me/you/her/him/them*, have one of two feature specifications depending on their structural position. When a pronoun appears in a position where a probe requires a DP with active case feature, it must bear [uCase: ] while when it appears in a default position where a probe does not require a DP with active case feature, it must bear [ACC]. One of the default position Sobin suggests is the pivot position. In addition to the default [ACC] case feature specification, Sobin further adopts the assumptions in (12).

- (12) a. *There* may (but need not) be assigned a gratuitous person and number value such as third-singular. (Sobin 2014: 409)  
b.  $\varphi$ -agreement will coincide with NOM Case marking if it possibly can, though there are instances where it cannot. (Sobin 2014: 409)  
c. Case (uNOM) is the core feature of EPP (=Agr/Mrg) forT. (Sobin 2014: 409)

The assumption in (12a) has been suggested in literature (Hazout 2004, Deal 2009). The assumption is proposed for *there* to be able to participate in  $\varphi$ -agreement with Infl/T. The second assumption in (12b) is also a famous assumption in literature,

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of third person singular BE-verb is frequently used by colloquial standard English speakers. In addition, many corpus studies have found that sentences corresponding to (10a) are frequently used in both spoken and written English (Martinez Insua and Palacios Martinez 2003).

as I already discussed. The final assumption that links EPP to nominative case assignment is not a new idea as well. With the premises, Sobin explains the contrast in (10) and (11) as follows. The finite T bears uninterpretable  $\varphi$ -feature and case feature (for EPP). When *there* bears a gratuitous person and number features, T agrees with *there* in  $\varphi$ -features and *there* gets nominative case assigned. This is what happens in (10a) and (11a). When *there* does not bear  $\varphi$ -features, T cannot agree with *there*, so it must look further for its goal. If the associate is a lexical DP as in (10b), the agreement between T and the lexical DP is possible because the DP does not bear any Case value specified. This is why plural agreement in (10b) is possible.<sup>4</sup> By contrast, if the associate is a pronominal DP as in (11b), the agreement between T and the lexical DP is not an option because the DP already bears a specified [ACC] case value (by assumption), which would violate (12b). In other words, T cannot undergo  $\varphi$ -agreement with a DP that bears a case value other than NOM. Therefore, (11b) becomes ungrammatical.

Although Sobin's work provides an important insight that "default" case needs to be appealed to account for the unexpected morphological case realization in *there*-sentences, there still remain many unclear issues.

Most of all, it is dubious to assume that such a contrast in (10) and (11) exists. I found that there are many cases where the BE-verb seems to agree with a pronominal associate in number. Some examples are demonstrated in (13). Thus, a more proper description of the core data might be that Infl/T can optionally agree with an associate in number even when the associate is a pronominal. It seems that the preference of using singular or plural form over the other is affected by factors like interpretation. However, what is important here is that it is not true to say that a pronominal associate must not agree with Infl/T in number contrary to Sobin's generalization.

- (13) a. There were us: I want to live. (A book title edited by Camilo Prosper)  
 b. There was nothing else in the world, there was me and there were them.  
 (COCA)

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4) Sobin argues that T cannot agree with a lexical DP associate by probing "hierarchical structure". Rather, it must probe its goal in linearly. In other words, T agrees with "the nearest lexical DP". The evidence for the impossibility of hierarchical searching comes from (i). If it were to be available, sentences like (i) are predicted to be fine, contrary to facts.

(i) ?\*There are a pen and a book on the desk. (Sobin 2014, (48e))

Furthermore, Sobin's account cannot exclude the possibility that pronominal associate comes into the derivation with unspecified case value [uCase: ], like lexical DPs. Pronouns can have either active or inactive case feature under Sobin's system. If *there* does not bear  $\varphi$ -features, so that T must find another DP to agree with, the associate position cannot be a default position. Thus, Sobin's analysis predicts that the pronominal associate bears [uCase: ]. In that case, the pronominal associate is expected to undergo  $\varphi$ -agreement with T (if *there* does not bear  $\varphi$ -features) and as a consequence of the agreement, the pronominal associate is expected to have nominative case morphology, which is contrary to his core argument (even though this possibility seems to be necessary to account for sentences like (13)). In addition, simply assuming accusative case as the default case does not seem to be a fundamental account for the realization of accusative case morpheme.

Another problem is that Sobin's analysis does not predict any difference between *there-V* and *there-BE*, which is not true as shown in the difference between (3) and (4), I repeated below.

- (3) There were them/\*they and there was us/\*we.
- (4) \*There arrived us/them.

It is not clear to me why the same analysis applied to the *there-BE* sentences is not available for *there-V* sentences. I believe that the gap in the explanation comes from the ignorance of structural differences between *there-BE* and *there-V*. Once we take syntactic structures of *there*-sentences into consideration, we could find a better analysis under the "default" case approach. I will propose one possible analysis in the next section.

### 3. Two types of *there*

In this section, I will propose an alternative analysis that accounts for i) unexpected appearance of accusative case on pronominal associates and ii) the difference between *there-BE* and *there-V* with respect to pronominal associates. I will discuss more supporting evidence for the proposed analysis in section 4.

### 3.1. *There*-BE vs. *There*-V

The literature on *there*-construction has divided into two types of approaches. One is *there*-insertion approach and the other is *there within predication* approach. In this section, I argue that the two approaches are not in an either-or-relation. Rather, both approaches need to be considered to properly account for the difference between *there*-BE sentences and *there*-V sentences.

Traditionally, *there*-insertion approach assumes that *there* is inserted into SpecTP to satisfy the EPP (Stowell 1978, Chomsky 1995, 2000, 2001 among many others). However, the *there*-insertion to SpecTP approach has been questioned by many researchers. One noteworthy challenge is discussed by Deal (2009). Deal observes that *there* can be inserted only when the verb is non-inchoative unaccusative, while other intransitive verbs (unergative verbs and inchoative unaccusatives) are not compatible with *there*-insertion. Deal argues that the difference between non-inchoative unaccusatives and other intransitive verbs is whether an argument is introduced into the specifier of *v* (or voice head) or not. More specifically, unergative verbs introduce an agent entity-type argument in spec $v$ P. For inchoative unaccusative verbs (e.g. *melt*, *disappear*), following Pylkkänen (2002) and Kratzer (2005), Deal argues that CAUSE head introduces a causing event and it is “syntactically represented as an external argument of  $v$ P” (Deal 2009, p7). Based on the generalization that *there* cannot be inserted when a verb introduces an external argument, Deal argues that an external argument in Spec $v$ P blocks *there* to be inserted. According to Deal, this indicates that *there* is external merged into Spec $v$ P. The derivation of a mono clause *there*-V sentence proposed by Deal is demonstrated in (14). Deal assumes that *there* enters a derivation with unvalued/uninterpretable case and  $\phi$ -features. *There* is inserted into Spec $v$ P with uninterpretable/unvalued case and  $\phi$ -features and those uninterpretable features act as a probe looking for its goal with corresponding features. Adopting Pesetsky and Torrego’s (2004) agreement system, in which valuation and interpretation are distinct and agreement between uninterpretable features are possible, Deal argues that *there* agrees with the associate and the agreement unifies the interpretable  $\phi$ -features and uninterpretable case feature of the associate with the corresponding features of *there*. As a next step, T enters the derivation with uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features and nominative case feature. T probes down, finds its goal, *there*, and unifies its  $\phi$ -features and case feature with those already shared between *there* and the associate. As a consequence, *there* and the associate get nominative case valued. Subsequently, *there* moves to SpecTP to satisfy the EPP.

- (14) a. There appeared a train. (Deal 2009: 21)
- b. [TP there T [vP <there> v~ [vP √APPEAR [DP a train ]]]
- uφ, Case:NOM      uCase, uφ      uCase, φ:3SG
- 
- Agree (uCase, uφ) and reMerge

Deal extends the analysis to *there*-BE sentences as well. Unlike lexical verbs, according to Deal, a copular is comprised of the dummy verbalizer *v*. It takes an aspectual clause as in (15a) or a small clause as in (15b).

- (15) a. There is a child laughing in the hallway. (Deal 2009: 15)
- b. There is a problem (with the coffeemaker).

What is crucial to the current discussion is that the analysis is basically “*there*-insertion” analysis, in which *there* is semantically empty although it bears syntactic features, regardless of types of accompanying verbs. Deal assumes that *there* is introduced into SpecvP in *there*-BE sentences as same as in *there*-V sentences. I call this unifying view *single-there hypothesis*. The *single-there hypothesis* postulates that *there* bears the same feature specification and occupies the same structural position regardless of the verb they co-occur with. This hypothesis receives some benefit of making the lexicon simpler than assuming that the lexicon has multiple types of *there*-s with different feature specifications. In the latter case, it is possible that *there*-s with different feature specifications are introduced into different structural position depending on what syntactic configuration they appear. I call the latter approach *multiple-there hypothesis*. Even though the *single-there hypothesis* is economical from the perspective of organizing minimal lexicon, there are several concerns raised by such a hypothesis. First, it is not clear whether the semantic contributions of *there* in *there*-BE and *there*-V are the same. It is questionable to assume *there* to be semantically null, especially in *there*-BE sentences. One question to ask is what constitutes the small clause if *there* is introduced outside of a small clause as a semantically null element. For example, in a sentence *there is a problem* in (15b), only the noun phrase *a problem* remains in the small clause. Two possible alternatives could be suggested as I will discuss below, but none of them is tenable. First, one might assume that PP (*with the coffeemaker* in (15b)) following the associate is the predicate of the small clause. However, as discussed in Hazout (2004) and Hartmann

(2008), PP cannot be a predicate of a small clause. If it is a predicate, it is hard to account for the optionality of PP in *there*-BE sentences. Furthermore, Hartmann shows that PP is not necessarily predicative. This is demonstrated in (16). The sentence *there's tremendous under-development in Prague* does not mean that tremendous under-development is located in Prague, which indicates that the PP *in Prague* plays a role as an adverbial, rather than a predicate.

- (16) Prague is a sleeping giant as a city in Europe. [...] *There's tremendous under-development in Prague* at the moment and that's gonna take off.  
(Hartmann 2008: 37)

Another possibility is that the small clause has either null subject or null predicate. However, this is not promising as well. A consensus view on English is that it is not a language that has argument ellipsis or *pro*, which excludes the null subject analysis. In addition, even though English has VP ellipsis, *there*-BE sentences are not in a proper environment for ellipsis, without a presence of an antecedent. Thus, it seems improper to assume that the associate alone constitutes the small clause the BE verb takes.

Another problem with the single *there*-approach is that it overgenerates structures that cannot be attested in English. Williams (1994) point out that the *there*-insertion-into-SpecTP approach makes a wrong prediction that *there* sentences with two noun phrases are grammatical. I would like to point out that a similar issue occurs in the low-origin *there*-insertion approach as well. More specifically, nothing can block a situation that *there* is inserted into SpecvP and the head of vP, comprised of BE, takes small clause like [<sub>SC</sub> John a smoker]. Thus, in principle, the sentence *\*there is John a smoker* is expected to be grammatical, contrary to fact<sup>5</sup>). Of course, the small clause by itself has nothing wrong without *there*, as shown in *John is a smoker*.

I would like to note that problems pointed out above come from unifying *there*-BE and *there*-V structures. Even though the *there*-insertion into vP hypothesis seems to work well for *there*-V sentences, unifying *there*-V and *there*-BE under the single *there*-hypothesis seems to have several problems. Considering the restricted set of verbs that can co-occur with *there*, I adopt *there*-insertion into SpecvP approach rather than *there*-insertion into SpecTP approach. Crucially, I assume that *there*-insertion into


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5) One might wonder whether the ungrammaticality of *\*there is NP NP* sentences comes from the predicate restriction that disallows individual-level predicates in *there*-BE sentences. However, following Stowell (1978), Williams plausibly defended his position from the potential objection. For more detailed discussion, see Williams (1994).

SpecvP approach only for *there*-V sentences, not for *there*-BE sentences, arguing against the single *there*-approach.

Actually, there have been considerable discussions on the status of *there* in *there*-BE sentences in literature. Many have assumed that *there* is generated “inside” a small clause as a predicate (Moro 1997; 2000) or as a subject argument (Williams 1994, Hazout 2004, Hartmann 2008). Following Williams (1994) and Hazout (2004), I would like to adopt the view that *there* in *there*-BE sentences is a subject and the associate noun phrase is a predicate of a small clause, as demonstrated in (17) (Pr being an abbreviation for Predication)<sup>6</sup>.

(17) There are many problems (Hazout 2004: (44))



The structure is supported by the following observations. Williams (1994) and McNally (1997) observe that the postverbal noun phrase must have the narrowest scope. The only scope reading available in (18) is the surface scope reading. In other words, the DP associate cannot scope over the negation. This scope rigidity is well

6) As discussed in Hazout (2004) and Hartmann (2008), *there* as a predicate approach predicts that *there*-BE sentences pattern together with locative inversion constructions, contrary to facts. For example, locative inversion constructions do not allow *wh*-movement while *wh*-movement is available from *there*-BE sentences, as shown in the contrast in (i). Moro (1997) provides an explanation of the difference in (i) from *there* as a predicate approach, but Hartmann (2008) convincingly discusses why the explanation is not fully satisfactory. See Hartmann (2008) for a detailed discussion. Due to such shortcomings, I adopt *there* as a subject approach, rather than *there* as a predicate approach for *there*-BE sentences.

(i) a. \*Which wall do you think the cause of the riot was a picture of?  
 b. Which wall do you think there was a picture of? (Moro 1997:124)

accounted for if we assume that a DP associate is a predicate rather than an argument. Since a predicate does not undergo quantifier raising, it remains *in-situ* having a narrow scope.

- (18) There weren't many pictures hanging on the wall. (McNally 1997, (128))  
(not > many, \*many > not)

In addition, Hazout (2004) argues that the predicative-hood of the associate DP is observed in pairs like (19). In (19a), the postcopular noun phrase “predicates of *John* the property of *being a student who works on French syntax*... on the other hand, (19b) makes an assertion regarding the existence of some individual *x* such that *x* has the property of *being a student who works on French syntax*—that is, exactly the same property as that attributed to *John* in (19a)”(pp397-398). Even though two sentences in (19) have different subjects, one is referential and the other is non-referential, the basic semantic contribution of the nominal predicate seems to be the same in the two sentences.

- (19) a. John is a student who works on French syntax. (Hazout 2004, (13))  
b. There is a student who works on French syntax.

Let me introduce Hazout's idea in detail because the idea will be crucially adopted in the following proposal. Hazout regards the pair in (19) as to be a particular instance of a widely observed phenomenon, as in the pair in (20). In the pair in (20), the adjectival predicate expresses the same property of *being cold* in the two sentences. However, the property is attributed to a specific argument, *the coffee* in (20a), but not a specific argument in (20b) since the subject is the expletive *it*, which is a semantically empty argument.

- (20) a. The coffee is cold. (Hazout 2004, (14))  
b. It is cold (today/in Siberia).

To account for the difference between sentences with a referential subject and those with a non-referential subject, Hazout adopts Borschev and Partee's (2001) *perspective structure*<sup>7</sup>. The perspective structure of a *there*-BE

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7) Borschev and Partee (1998, 2001) suggest a notion of “taking a perspective” to account for Russian negative-genitive existential sentences. They argue that perspective structures differ between declarative

sentence is represented in (21). The schema in (21) can be interpreted as followings. The LOCation is singled out as perspective center and the rest (THING) is viewed in that situation such that “in terms of the LOCation and ‘what’s in it’” (p. 399). The location can be understood ‘here’, ‘now’, or some contextually provided time or space. What makes LOCation a perspective center is the absence of a referential DP in the syntactic subject position. In other words, when the predication phrase is comprised of a predicate and a semantically null subject, the predication has a perspective structure in (21). Thus, in (19b) and (20b), with the semantically empty subject, the perspective structure has LOCation as its center with the interpretation that the instantiation of the property denoted by a postverbal element (*a student who works on French syntax* in (19b)) or an AP (*cold* in (20b)) is in the implicit LOCation. Based on the discussion, Hazout concludes that a postverbal nominal in a *there*-BE sentence is a syntactic predicate, just like verbal or adjectival predicates, and it is in a (purely) syntactic subject-predicate relation with a semantically empty expletive, *there*.

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sentences and existential sentences. In declarative sentences in (i), the “marked” elements are the “existing object”, which is called THING. On the other hand, in existential sentences in (ii), the “marked” elements are the “domain of existence”, which is called LOCation.

- (i) a. Stok                      talyx      vod      ne              nabljudalsja.  
       Runoff-NOM.M.SG    melted    water    NEG            was.observed-M.SG  
       ‘No runoff of thawed snow was observed.’
- b. Moroz                    ne              èuvstvovalsja.  
       Frost-NOM.M.SG    NEG            be.felt-M.SG  
       ‘The frost was not felt.’ (E.g. we were dressed warmly).
- (ii) a. Stoka                    talyx      vod      ne              nabljudalos’.  
       Runoff-GEN.M.SG    melted    water    NEG            was.observed-N.SG  
       ‘No runoff of thawed snow was observed.’ (= There was no runoff.)
- b. Moroza                    ne              èuvstvovalos’.  
       Frost- GEN.M.SG    NEG            be.felt-N.SG  
       ‘No frost was felt (there was no frost).’

Borschev and Partee assume that the difference between declarative sentences and existential sentences is in their perspective structure, as shown in (iii). The two perspective structures can be interpreted as follows. When the THING is the perspective center, the existence of the THING is presupposed, and the sentence is about its LOCation or other properties in the LOCation. When the LOCation is the perspectival center, the existence of the LOCation is presupposed, and the sentence is about what THINGs there are. They suggest that the difference is in semantics, which can possibly correspond to some syntactic variations.

- (iii) PERSPECTIVE STRUCTURE (Borschev and Partee 1998: (18)):  
       In the following, we underline the Perspectival Center.  
       BE (THING, LOC): structure of the interpretation of a Locative (“Declarative”) sentence.  
       BE (THING, LOC): structure of the interpretation of an Existential sentence

(21) BE (THING, LOC)

Hazout further argues that *there*, as a subject argument, bears uninterpretable  $\varphi$ -features and Case feature, while an associate DP does not need to be case-valued as a predicate nominal. With this feature specifications, a two-step agreement takes place: one between *there* and an associate DP via a subject-predicate agreement and the other between *there* and I (or T) via a spec-head agreement. Due to the first agreement, *there* gets  $\varphi$ -features valued from the associate (i.e. predicate DP) and it gives the same values to I through a spec-head agreement, resulting in a so-called long-distance agreement. In addition, Hazout applies such an analysis to *there-V* sentences as well. The only difference between *there-BE* sentences and *there-V* sentences is, according to Hazout, that in *there-BE* sentences, predicate head is selected by V(BE) whereas in *there-V* sentences, predicate head selects a VP complement. In both cases, *there* is projected as a subject of predication projection and undergoes the double-step agreement.

Since *there* and a nominal predicate constitute a predication phrase, the approach can well account for the optionality of PP (22a). In addition, if *there* is inserted as an expletive and the associate alone is originated inside the small clause as assumed under the *there*-insertion approach, the ungrammaticality of (22c) becomes mysterious given that the associate can freely move up to SpecTP as in (22b). However, Hazout's analysis do not assume that (22a) and (22b) share the same base structure, so the ungrammaticality of (22c) is not a problem. In addition to such advantages, *there as a subject* approach can well account for the predicate-hood of the postcopular noun phrase as described above. Thus, I adopt *there as a subject* approach for *there-BE* sentences.

- (22) a. There is an egg (on the table).  
b. An egg is on the table.  
c. \*An egg is.

Basically, Hazout's analysis is another approach within a *single-there* hypothesis. However, as I discussed already, the *single-there* hypothesis bears some problems. Most of all, the unified account between *there-BE* and *there-V* sentences is challenged by differences between the two structures, which I will discuss in section 4. In addition, Hazout assumes that a nominal predicate can be arguably free from structural case assignment because it is not an argument, but a predicate. However,

*there*-sentences with a pronominal associate clearly call for an account for the obligatory accusative case morphology.

Based on the discussion, I argue that a single-*there* hypothesis should be revised into a multiple *there*-hypothesis. In the latter approach, *there* in *there*-BE sentences and that in *there*-V sentences are not only base-generated in different syntactic positions but also different features specified. More specifically, when *there* appears in *there*-V sentences, *there* is inserted into Spec $\nu$ P, as argued by Deal, as in (23a). On the other hand, when it appears in *there*-BE sentences, it is generated as a subject of a small clause, as suggested by Williams and Hazout, as in (23b). Thus, I propose a hybrid-approach. However, this proposal is more than simply combining the two approaches. Rather, this proposal is motivated by the intuition that *there* in *there*-V sentences is “inserted” into the specifier of  $\nu$  which takes a fully saturated predication phrase as its complement while *there* in *there*-BE sentence is “generated” within a predication phrase as a component. Let me elaborate on this idea further. In a *there*-V sentence, *there appeared a train*, the predicate *appear* needs a referential subject to predicate of. The DP *a train* is therefore merged into as the subject of the predicate<sup>8</sup>). Now  $\nu$  head takes the predication phrase, which is VP. Thus, when *there* combines with VP it combines with a “predication phrase” in which necessarily arguments of the predicate *appear* are all saturated. In other words, *there* in (23a) is not the subject of the predicate, but a truly semantically null expletive. What serves as the subject within the predication phrase is the postverbal DP. On the other hand, *there* in *there is a man* plays a role as the subject of the nominal predicate. Developing Hazout’s analysis, I assume that *there* is a lexical realization of LOCation as a perspective center.<sup>9</sup>) When LOCation serves the perspective center generating an

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8) Bowers (1993) argues that direct objects (and so unaccusative subjects as well) are external merged into the specifier position of VP. I adopt this idea since the spec-head relation clearly represents the structural relation between a subject and its predicate. However, the core of the proposal could also be upheld under the assumption that a subject of an unaccusative verb is generated as a complement of V.


9) Hartmann (2008) also proposes an analysis for *there*-BE sentences, similar to Hazout (2004). Hartmann assumes that *there*-BE sentences, asthetic sentences, “exhibit a predication relationship in which an abstract location is the topic and the rest of the sentence is predicated of it” (p102). Based on the idea, Hartmann assumes that *there* is a proform for a location argument in subject position. Even though Hartmann argues that *there*-BE and *there*-V must be analyzed in different ways, he assumes that *there* by itself is the same lexical element in both sentences. However, if *there* could be a proform, it is expected to be able to saturate an argument of a verb, which turns not to be true as shown in (ic). Also, see Kratzer (1995) who considers expletives as overt expressions of an event variable.

- (i) a. John arrived.  
b. It arrived.  
c. \*There arrived.

existential reading, it is realized with a so-called expletive such as *there* or *it* (as in *it rains*). Thus, *there* in *there*-BE sentences is not strictly a “expletive”, but a perspective marker that singles out the perspective center of the sentence. I further assume that *there* as a perspective marker is generated as a subject of a predication phrase because, following Hazout, a nominal predicate of a *there*-BE sentence predicates of LOCation (i.e. regarding LOCation, what is in it).

(23) Syntactic structures of *there*-sentences (to be revised slightly later)

- (a) *There*-V: *There appeared a train*      (b) *There*-BE: *There is a man*.



This analysis implies that only *there* in a *there*-V sentence is a semantically null expletive. *There* in a *there*-BE sentence is not semantically null, but a “marker” of a perspective center. Even though it does not have a referential property by itself, it contributes to compose the perspective structure of a sentence by indicating LOCation as the perspective center of the sentence, namely, “in terms of the location (under discussion), the predicate nominal (e.g. *a man* in (23b)) is in it”. I would like to suggest an analogy from a focus marker. Focus contributes to compose the information structure of a sentence. Focus in a sentence can be realized with a special intonation or by spelling out a special morphology (e.g. *only* in English). To indicate the proper information structure of a sentence, “focus” is phonetically realized accordingly. The phonetic realization of focus picks up the focused element out of backgrounds. In the same way, the phonetic realization of LOCation as *there* picks up LOCation as the perspective center, so the sentence is described from the perspective of the location. As a consequence, the nominal predicate predicates of

the property of the location, which is “having the referent of the nominal predicate in that location”. This is how the subject-predicate relation between *there* and the nominal predicate is established.

To summarize, I propose a multiple-*there* hypothesis based on the intuition that the sisters of *there-s* in *there*-BE sentences and in *there*-V sentences are different. When it combines with a predication phrase, *there* is inserted to Spec $\nu$ P as a semantically null element<sup>10</sup>). On the other hand, when it combines with a predicate, *there* is generated as a subject of the predicate. I would like to note that postulating multiple *there-s* is not necessarily mean that *there-s* in the two constructions are lexically distinct. It could be, but not necessarily. I leave the issue for future works. However, one important consequence of assuming two types of *there* is that *there* in *there*-V sentences does not bear  $\varphi$ -features as a semantically null expletive, while *there* in *there*-BE sentences bears  $\varphi$ -features as a subject argument<sup>11</sup>). It has been assumed that the property of being argument is closely related with the ability of bearing a case. In addition,  $\varphi$ -feature agreement and case assignment are assumed to be closely intertwined as discussed in the introduction. Thus, the multiple-*there* hypothesis proposed here predicts that *there* in *there*-BE sentences can be case assigned whereas *there* in *there*-V sentences cannot. In the next section, I will show

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10) One might wonder why there is *there* in *there*-V sentences. Deal argues that the definiteness effect gives rise to *there*-insertion. For a postverbal noun phrase to be able to stay inside the scope of existential closure (Diesing 1992), it cannot move to SpecTP. Thus, the expletive *there* is appealed to satisfy the EPP instead of the postverbal noun phrase. I agree with Deal on that point. However, one reviewer pointed out that this argument departs from the traditional view of the EPP. Specific question needs to be answered is why the place holder for EPP (i.e. *there*) is inserted into Spec $\nu$ P and then moved to SpecTP rather than directly inserting into the EPP position, namely SpecTP. Unfortunately, I do not have a clear answer to this question. However, I would like to provide a reason why I nevertheless assume that *there* is inserted into Spec $\nu$ P in *there*-V sentences. As I discussed already, many previous studies have observed a competition between *there* and elements that are supposed to appear in Spec $\nu$ P (e.g. transitive subjects, unergative subjects etc). The impossibility of co-occurrence of *there* and an external argument can be easily accounted for under the hypothesis that *there* is inserted into Spec $\nu$ P. On the other hand, if *there* is inserted into SpecTP, we need an (so far unattested) stipulation to account for the competition. In other words, we need an extra explanation to account for why *there*-transitive is impossible in English. In addition, Richards and Biberauer (2005) thoroughly discuss theoretical problems of the SpecTP-insertion hypothesis. Based on such ground, I assume that *there* is inserted into Spec $\nu$ P. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.

11) Even functional categories (e.g. T or C) contribute to the meaning of a sentence. Thus, even though they do not have a specific value, they have uninterpretable features. However, I regard *there* in *there*-V sentences semantically empty element that does not have any contribution on the meaning of a sentence. Thus, it does not bear any uninterpretable feature. This view is based on my understanding of the EPP as a phonological requirement, following Landau (2007). Under this view, the EPP has nothing to do with case assignment or  $\varphi$ -agreement. Thus, satisfying the EPP does not mean anything to syntax or semantics. This point is essential in the discussion in 3.2.

how this prediction well accounts for the unexpected accusative case on pronominal predicates in *there*-BE sentences and the absence of such situation with *there*-V sentences.<sup>12)</sup>

We now have a ground to discuss feature specifications of *there*-s in the two structures. I will discuss how different feature specifications between *there*-s can account for the unexpected accusative case on a pronominal associate in *there*-BE sentences on a par with the lack of such phenomenon in *there*-V sentences.

### 3.2. Agreement and case assignment

In this section, I will discuss how syntactic differences in the two *there*-sentences lead different patterns in agreement and case valuation. Based on the discussion, I will show why unexpected accusative morphology appears only in *there*-BE sentences, but not in *there*-V sentences.

It has been controversial whether *there* has syntactic features like  $\varphi$ -features or Case features (e.g. D-feature only (Chomsky 1995), Case feature only (Travis 1984), person feature only (Chomsky 2000, 2001),  $\varphi$ -features only (Hazout 2004),  $\varphi$ -features and Case feature (Deal 2009)). Obviously, *there* in both of *there*-sentences can satisfy the EPP. It could mean that *there* has D-feature (Chomsky 1995) or *there*, as being phonetically overt element, satisfies the EPP if the EPP is a phonological requirement of having a phonetically realized subject (Landau 2007). However, as I noted in footnote 11, I crucially assume that the EPP satisfaction has nothing to do with  $\varphi$ -features (cf. Chomsky 2000, 2001). With the assumption, I argue that even though

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12) I would like to briefly discuss Hartmann (2008) who argues that *there*-BE and *there*-V have different syntax. Adopting Williams and Hazout, Hartmann suggests a syntactic structure for *there*-BE sentences, similar to the current analysis. The difference between the current proposal and Hartmann's is in the analysis of *there*-V sentences. Hartmann argues that *there*-V sentences are instances of locative inversion. Hartmann shows that locative inversion and *there*-V sentences share many similar behaviors. I would not discuss Hartmann's analysis in detail here, but point out some challenges against the locative inversion analysis for *there*-V sentences. First, it is not clear what motivates *there* to move to SpecIP. In locative inversion, a locative phrase is interpreted as topic, so that it undergoes topic-movement to the specifier of Topic phrase. However, in *there*-V sentences, *there* is, according to Hartmann, semantically null noun phrase, so that it does not move to the specifier of Topic phrase, but stays in SpecTP. However, the reason of such a movement over another DP (a semantic subject of an unaccusative verb, e.g. *train in there arrived a train*, which is assumed to be generated in a higher position than *there* in Hartmann's analysis) is not explicitly provided. Second, in the structure suggested by Hartmann, an accusative verb takes a predication phrase as its complement. However, unaccusative verbs are one-place predicates that take an entity as its argument, rather than a predication phrase. It is not clear how this puzzle can be resolved under the analysis. Therefore, even though there are many interesting similar syntactic behaviors *there*-V sentences share with locative inversion, the locative inversion analysis for *there*-V sentences needs to be more elaborated.



(26) Case assignment rules proposed by Schäfer (2013)

- a. **Dependent case (ACC):** A DP is realized at PF with dependent case if it is not involved in the valuation of the local Voice-head via AGREE.
- b. **Default case (NOM):** A DP not realized with dependent case appears with default case.
- c. Inherent and lexical case takes precedence over default and dependent case.

Crucially, following Sigurðsson's (2000, 2003, 2009, 2011), Schäfer argues that Voice head comes into a derivation with uninterpretable  $\varphi$ -features. The features must be valued by a closest DP and as a consequence of the  $\varphi$ -agreement, the DP cannot get accusative case at PF. The name, "dependent case" is thus based on the intuition that accusative case is dependent on the lack of agreement with the local Voice-head. In the system, accusative case is decided first where to be assigned and then nominative case is assigned to a DP if it is not realized with accusative case. This is why nominative case is called "default case". This system predicts, in English, that accusative case can be observed in the following two environments: one is the canonical object position in transitives because a DP in the object position cannot agree with the local Voice-head due to the subject DP which is closer to the Voice-head (26a). The other is so-called "default case" position defined by Schütze (2001), as in (27). According to Schütze, the pronouns appeared with the "default case" in (28) is not case assigned via a syntactic mechanism including agreement. This environment well fits the situation where accusative case is assigned in (26a): Being unable to get case assigned syntactically means that the DP is not in an agreement relation with the local Voice-head.

(27) The default case forms of a language are those that are used to spell out nominal expressions (e.g., DPs) that are not associated with any case feature assigned or otherwise determined by syntactic mechanisms. (Schütze 2001: 206).

- (28) a. Me/\*I, I like beans.  
b. The best athlete, her/\*she, should win.

Even though "default case" is accusative case (in English) for Schütze whereas it is nominative case for Schäfer, they share the same intuition that default case is assigned to a DP which is free from a syntactic agreement relation. In Schäfer's

system, the default case (i.e. nominative case) is assigned to a DP without any reference to a syntactic agreement. The difference between the two perspectives comes from the scope the default case system applies to. The interpretation of “default case” by Schütze means exceptional cases in a sense as in (28). On the other hand, Schäfer argues that the case valuation system in (26) can be applied across the board. Here I follow Schäfer’s notation of “default case” and the case assignment rules in (26) because this system can uniformly account for the two environments in English where accusative case appears without arbitrary distinction between structural cases and exceptional cases.<sup>13)</sup>

Specifically, I adopt Schäfer’s idea that the local Voice head has uninterpretable  $\varphi$ -features that need to be valued by a closest DP. In a *there*-BE sentence, as in (29b), *there* and the Voice head come into the derivation with uninterpretable  $\varphi$ -features. From the bottom-up, *there* first probes down its goal and agrees with the nominal predicate in  $\varphi$ -features. Next, the Voice head comes into the derivation and probes down to find its goal. It finds *there*, the closest DP with valued  $\varphi$ -features, so that  $\varphi$ -agreement between the Voice head and *there* occurs. This two-step agreement is also suggested by Deal (2009) and Hazout (2004) although details are not the same with the current analysis. In the subsequent derivations, *there* moves to SpecTP to satisfy the EPP. Since the nominal predicate is not involved in the  $\varphi$ -agreement with the local Voice head, accusative case is assigned to the nominal predicate. Due to the two-step agreement, the Voice head eventually gets the same  $\varphi$ -values the nominal predicate bears. However, it is not the case that the Voice head agrees with the nominal predicate by itself. This is why a pronominal associate appears with accusative case in *there*-BE sentences. In addition, *there* is predicted to bear nominative case because it is not realized with accusative case although it is not morphologically attested.

Then, what happens in *there*-V sentences? In *there*-V sentences, *there* comes into a derivation without  $\varphi$ -features (due to its nature as a phonetic place-holder). Thus, when the Voice head probes down to find its goal, *there* cannot be involved in the agreement with the Voice head. Eventually, the Voice head probes all the way down and agrees with the subject argument of the verbal predicate (*a train* in (29a)). Because of the agreement, the postverbal noun phrase cannot get accusative case, but gets nominative case valued at PF<sup>14)</sup>.


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13) I would like to thank anonymous reviewers for pointing out this issue.

14) One reviewer commented that it might not be proper to apply the case system in (26) to English *there* constructions because the English corresponding sentences to Icelandic new passive sentence (21b) is unacceptable, as in (i).

(29) Syntactic structures of *there*-sentences (final version)<sup>15</sup>

- (a) *There-V: There appeared a train*      (b) *There-BE: There is a man.*



This analysis predicts that *there-V* sentences allow a nominative pronoun as a postverbal noun. I found some instances of the case as in (30). However, I admit that such examples sound unacceptable to modern English speakers and could be observed in special documents only, for example, in a poem or a document written in old English.

- (i) \*There was beaten a girl/the girl.

However, I suspect that the ungrammaticality of (i) is due to the impossibility of *there*-insertion to Spec $\nu$ P since the position is already occupied by (the demoted) subject. English transitive verbs require an external argument to be merged into Spec $\nu$ P and it competes with *there*-insertion. Thus, regardless of the case assignment, the ungrammaticality of the sentence in (i) can be accounted for. In other words, I believe that the difference between the English sentence in (i) and the Icelandic sentence in (24b) comes from the difference in their first-merge position of expletives (*there* and *Það*). It has been suggested in literature that *Það* is base-merged into SpecCP since it is appealed to make V2 requirement (Platzack 1983 and many subsequent works). Therefore, I assume that the case-system in (26) is able to be applicable to English as well.

- 15) To account for Icelandic New Passives and Fate accusatives, Sigurðsson (2011) proposes the VP system which has VoiceP and  $\nu$ P as distinct projections so as to show how different Voices change the case licensing properties of  $\nu$  heads depending on the voice property. Here I adopt the structure as I adopt the case assignment system proposed by Schäfer (2013), which is in turn based on Sigurðsson's proposal. Nevertheless, as thankfully pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, I am aware that English *there*-sentences discussed here can also be explained under the traditional T- $\nu$ P-VP system because I have not discussed voice alternations in *there*-sentences in detail. However, unless any counter-evidence to the separation of  $\nu$ P and VoiceP is noticed, I will adopt Sigurðsson's original structure with a hope that the system can be cross-linguistically applicable.

(30) a. And then there came we.<sup>16)</sup>

b. There came they that oppress mountain... (Muss-Arnolt 1894: 115)

For now, I do not have a confirmative analysis for the unacceptability of sentences corresponding to those in (30) in modern, ordinary English. However, what I want to point out is that when a postverbal pronoun might appear in *there-V* sentences, it must be realized with nominative case, but not accusative case, as predicted under the current proposal<sup>17)</sup>.

One puzzle I leave open is the absence of number agreement that is frequently observed in *there-BE* sentences, as in (31). One easy way to resolve this number mismatch is, following Sobin (2014), to assume that *there* can (but not necessarily) bear a gratuitous 3<sup>rd</sup> person, singular feature. If *there* bears a 3<sup>rd</sup> person, singular feature, it does not need to be valued by the nominal predicate via Agree. In that case, T simply agrees with *there* and get the 3<sup>rd</sup> person, singular feature valued. In that case as well, the predicate nominal does not participate in an agreement with the Voice head, it will be assigned accusative case at PF. On the other hand, when *there* does not bear a 3<sup>rd</sup> person, singular feature, it's uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features must be valued via Agree with the nominal predicate and that values will be assigned to the Voice head resulting in the (appearance of) number agreement. I admit that assuming the "gratuitous" feature is just a stipulation. In fact, this optional number mismatch is problematic for any system that assumes a direct or mediated agreement between T and the postverbal nominal. I will leave a thorough investigation on this issue for future works with the note that the issue can be explained under the current system with a stipulation discussed above. However, the system proposed here is well compatible with the asymmetry in number mismatch between *there-BE* and *there-V*, as in (32). Adopting a corpus-driven approach, Martinez Insua and Palacios Martinez (2003) investigate variations in number agreement in *there*-constructions. Being aware that the absolute number of *there-V* sentences in the corpus under investigation is very low, they report that there is no single case of number mismatch in *there-V* sentences, as in (32). This absence of a number mismatch in *there-V*

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16) The sentence comes from a poem *A Shadorma* by Larry Meredith. The full poem can be found in the following website: <http://lemoldman.blogspot.com/2010/05/on-seventh-god-and-poet-rested.html>.

17) This system is naturally able to account for the accusative case in (i). Since *it* bears interpretable values (3<sup>rd</sup> person, singular), the Voice head agrees with *it*. The post copular pronoun does not participate in an agreement relation with the Voice head, the system correctly predicts that the pronoun gets accusative case valued at PF. I thank a reviewer for pointing out this issue.

(i) It is me (who read that book).

sentences is noticeable given that such a number mismatch is observed frequently in *there*-BE sentences.

(31) There <sup>?</sup>is/are a few pages.

(32) \*There arrives a few girls.

The current system can account for the variation as follows. In *there*-V sentences, the Voice head directly agrees with the postverbal noun phrase. Thus, there is no way to have a number mismatch between them. On the other hand, in *there*-BE sentences, the Voice head agree with *there*. Thus, there is a possibility whether the Voice head ends up having 3<sup>rd</sup> person, singular value when *there* bears the “gratuitous” feature or values matched with the nominal predicate through the two-step agreement described in (29). Thus, the difference in the availability of a number mismatch between *there*-BE and *there*-V supports for the multiple-*there* hypothesis proposed here.<sup>18)</sup>

So far, I have discussed how the proposed analysis can account for the unexpected accusative case on a pronominal associate in *there*-BE sentences comparing with *there*-V sentences. The accusative case marking on a pronominal associate appears to violate the nominative priority, suggested in literature. However, adopting Schäfer’s default case approach and taking advantage of the two-step agreement, I successfully account for the mysterious accusative case on a pronominal associate and superficial agreement phenomenon between the verb and the associate. Now, I would like to give some comments on the two long-standing assumptions in literature that make the core phenomenon puzzling at the first sight. I repeated them below.

(5) a. Agreement coincides with case.

(i.e. Any noun phrase that agrees with T gets nominative case from T)

b. T undergoes  $\varphi$ -agreement with the associate (either directly (Chomsky 2000) or through *there* (Deal 2009)).

The first might be true. In Schäfer’s case assignment rules as well, the closest DP that agrees with the Voice head gets nominative case valued (as a consequence of being unable to get accusative case assigned). Thus, it seems that the core intuition (namely, DP that is involved in  $\varphi$ -feature agreement with T is realized with

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18) I thank a reviewer who commented on this issue.

nominative case) remains with the current analysis. The second assumption also might be true once we assume that the agreement between T and the associate is only direct in *there-V* sentences and only through *there* in *there-BE* sentences. The current proposal preserves the intuition suggested in literature and resolve the paradox by applying the default case analysis and distinguishing the two types of *there*-constructions. In the next section, I will discuss further evidence that supports the current proposal.

#### 4. Postverbal DP: predicate vs. argument

In this section, I will show two more pieces of evidence supporting for the proposed syntactic differences between *there-V* and *there-BE*: WH-extraction and Control.

##### 4.1. WH-extraction

It has been noted that *wh*-phrases can be extracted out of a postverbal DP in *there-BE* sentences, as in (33), while such a sub-extraction is not available in *there-V* sentences, as in (33b) (Moro 1997, Hartmann 2008). In (33a), *which wall* is originated within the postverbal predicate in a *there-BE* sentence and extracted out of the nominal predicate. In (33b), *who* is originated within the postverbal argument in a *there-V* sentence and extracted out of the argument.

- (33) a. Which wall do you think there was a picture of t? (Moro 1997:124)  
b. \*Who did there hang on the wall a picture of t? (Hartmann 2008: 93)

The unacceptability of (33b) is particularly interesting because it has been reported that sub-extraction out of an unaccusative subject is much more available than sub-extraction out of a transitive subject, as shown in (34).

- (34) a. ?What did [a cup of \_\_\_ ] appear in the kitchen?  
b. \*What did [a movie about] amuse him?

The contrast in (33b) and (34a) is problematic to many theories on sub-extractions. Many have argued that the better acceptability of (34a) than (34b) comes from the

difference in the base position of the subject DP. Unaccusative subjects are generated as an internal argument, while transitive subjects are generated as an external argument. A traditional explanation is that sub-extraction targets the base position of subjects and sub-extraction out of an internal argument is possible. However, sub-extraction out of an internal argument is not possible in (33b), even though the postverbal noun is merged into the same position with an unaccusative subject.

However, Surányi (2009) argues that the availability of sub-extraction is not solely determined by the base position of a subject DP. Surányi argues that sub-extraction out of a DP is possible when there is a phase edge between the base position of a DP and the destination of the extracted *wh*-phrase. It is because the phase edge serves as an escape hatch before the DP is closed for sub-extraction (I won't discuss a whole argument proposed by Surányi here, since pointing out his core idea is sufficient enough to account for the data in discussion. See Surányi (2009) for details). The configuration suggested by Surányi for sub-extraction well capture the contrast between (34a) and (33b), as well as the contrast between (33a) and (33b).

In a normal unaccusative sentence, the subject DP is base generated within VP. If we assume that unaccusatives have a  $\nu$ P, a phase, following Legate (2003), there is a phase (i.e.  $\nu$ P) between the base position of the subject DP and the final landing site of the extracted *wh*-phrase (i.e. SpecCP). Therefore, sub-extraction out of a normal unaccusative subject is available. On the other hand, in a *there*-V sentence as in (33b), the phase edge is already occupied by the expletive *there*. If we stipulate that  $\nu$ P edge cannot be doubly occupied, Spec $\nu$ P cannot serve as an escape hatch blocking sub-extraction. The analysis well captures the acceptability of sub-extraction in (33a) as well. In *there*-BE sentences, *there* is generated within Predication Phrase, so Spec $\nu$ P is not occupied. Thus, in this case, Spec $\nu$ P serves as an escape hatch for the extracted *wh*-phrase allowing sub-extraction<sup>19</sup>).

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19) One reviewer suggests an alternative analysis for the ungrammaticality of the sentence in (33b). The postverbal DP in (33b) seems to undergo a rightward movement because it follows the PP *on the wall* in the linear word order. If this is the case, the ungrammaticality of (33b) might be due to the improper movement out of an already moved element. However, sub-extraction out of a DP associate in *there*-V is still impossible even when the DP does not seem to undergo a rightward movement, as in (i). Thus, I would suggest the sub-extraction data as an independent evidence for the proposed structure.

(i) \*Who did there arrive a friend of t at the party?

(Hartmann 2005: 97)

## 4.2. Control

Hartmann (2008) points out another difference between *there*-BE sentences and *there*-V sentences as in (35). A postverbal noun phrase in *there*-V allows control into an adjunct phrase (35a), whereas a postverbal noun phrase in *there*-BE does not (35b).

(35) a. There entered two men without identifying themselves.

(Hartmann 2008: 95)

b. \*There are three men in the room without introducing themselves

I believe that this difference is also well captured under the proposed distinction. I argue that postverbal noun phrase in *there*-BE is a predicate, while postverbal noun phrase in *there*-V is an argument. As a predicate, the postverbal noun phrase in *there*-BE is expected not to be able to undergo quantifier raising. However, as an argument, the postverbal noun phrase in *there*-V is expected to be able to undergo quantifier raising. This prediction is born out as follows. As I already discussed, a postverbal noun phrase in *there*-BE has a narrow scope only, as shown in (18) (I repeat it below). By contrast, a postverbal noun phrase in *there*-V can have a wide scope, as shown in (36). Even though the sentence in (36) sounds archaic, it is pretty acceptable to modern English speakers with both readings indicated below. The scope ambiguity in (36) supports the idea that the postverbal argument in *there*-V undergoes quantifier raising.

(18) There weren't many pictures hanging on the wall. (McNally 1997, (128))  
(not > many, \*many > not)

(36) There may arrive three letters.  
(may > three, three > may)

Going back to the control examples in (35), I argue that the difference in allowance of control is a consequence of the difference in the availability of quantifier raising. In (35a), the postverbal DP undergoes quantifier raising at LF, so that it can control into the adjunct phrase. On the other hand, in (35b), the postverbal DP cannot undergo quantifier raising as a predicate, so that it cannot control into the adjunct phrase. Thus, the different syntactic properties of the so-

called associate in *there-V* and *there-BE* proposed in the current paper well capture the difference in control constructions as well.

## 5. Conclusion

This paper proposes a multiple-*there* hypothesis to account for different behaviors of *there-s* in *there-V* and *there-BE*. Since *there-s* in the two types of *there*-sentences are generated in different syntactic positions as bearing different grammatical roles (semantically null expletive vs. subject argument), *there-s* have different feature specifications depending on their roles. The analysis well captures the puzzling accusative case on a pronominal associate in *there-BE* and the lack of such phenomenon in *there-V*. Furthermore, by applying a default case assignment hypothesis to the proposed syntactic structure of *there*-sentences, the proposed analysis maintains the intuitions regarding a close relation between agreement and case assignment in a history of generative grammar. Finally, the proposed analysis can well account for other differences between *there-V* and *there-BE*, like WH-extraction or control.

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