



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

**Master's Thesis of International Studies**

**Maritime Security Cooperation  
between Indonesia and Japan**

**Focused on Maritime Forum**

**인도네시아와 일본의 해양 안보 협력 :**

**해양 포럼을 중심으로**

**February 2020**

**Graduate School of International Studies**

**Seoul National University**

**International Studies Major**

**Desica Ana Nuruljanah**

# **Maritime Security Cooperation between Indonesia and Japan**

## **Focused on Maritime Forum**

**Thesis Advisor Professor Sheen Seong-Ho**

**Submitting a master's thesis of International Studies**

**February 2020**

**Graduate School of International Studies**

**Seoul National University**

**International Area Studies Major**

**Desica Ana Nuruljanah**

**Confirming the master's thesis written by**

**Desica Ana Nuruljanah**

**February 2020**

Chair	<u>Professor Oh Yoon-Ah</u>	(Seal)
Vice Chair	<u>Professor Kim Taek-Yoon</u>	(Seal)
Thesis Advisor	<u>Professor Sheen Seong-Ho</u>	(Seal)

© Copyright by Desica Ana Nuruljanah 2020  
All Rights Reserved

# **Abstract**

## **Maritime Security Cooperation between Indonesia and Japan Focused on: Maritime Forum**

**Desica Ana Nuruljanah**

**International Area Studies**

**The Graduate School of International Studies**

**Seoul National University**

This thesis examines why Indonesia and Japan formed the Maritime Forum and focused on specific islands, especially the Natuna Islands. This thesis suggests that the Maritime Forum, which focuses on the Natuna Islands, is based on interests in the economy and security, particularly encountering China and business to business. Indonesia could use the Maritime Forum in order to encounter China related to the Indonesia's Economic Exclusive Zone issue around the Natuna Islands or the North Natuna Sea, which overlaps with the China Nine-Dash Line. There is also illegal fishing. Japan agreed to the establishment of the Maritime Forum because of its interest in the South China Sea that relates to the freedom of navigation and being against the unilateral expansion of China's territorial claim by helping Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia. In terms of business to business, the Natuna Islands have abundant natural resources, especially fish, oil, and gas. Therefore the Maritime Forum is very

beneficial for Indonesia in terms of regional development in its huge fish market, oil, and gas projects. Japan also will get reciprocity by getting a fish supply or import from Indonesia.

**Keywords : Indonesia, Japan, Maritime Forum, Maritime Security,  
China Nine-Dash Line, Natuna Island**

**Student ID : 2016-25480**

## Table of Contents

Chapter I Introduction .....	1
Chapter II Framework of the Research .....	5
1. Research Question.....	5
2. Purpose of the Research .....	5
3. Existing Literature.....	5
4. Argument.....	14
5. Methodology .....	14
CHAPTER III The South China Sea Issue and Maritime Security Cooperation .....	21
1. The Position of Indonesia and Japan in the South China Sea Issue .....	21
1.1 Natuna Waters' Problem with China's Nine Dash Line .....	24
2. Indonesia – Japan Relations in the Maritime Field .....	28
2-1 Maritime Forum .....	35
CHAPTER IV .....	41
Analysis of the Indonesia – Japan Maritime Forum.....	41
1. Encountering China.....	41
2. Business to Business .....	52
CHAPTER V Conclusion.....	60
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	62
Abstract (in Korean).....	73
Acknowledgement.....	75



## Chapter I Introduction

Japan and Indonesia established the 1<sup>st</sup> Indonesia – Japan Maritime Forum on December 21<sup>st</sup>, 2016.<sup>1</sup> The forum was formed by both countries through a meeting between the Indonesian Coordinating Maritime Affairs Minister, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, and Japanese Counterpart Foreign Minister, Fumio Kishida, in Tokyo, Japan. This forum had become one of the points discussed earlier in a meeting between Joko Widodo and Shinzo Abe at Japan - Indonesia Summit Meeting on March 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2015.<sup>2</sup> Japan and Indonesia agreed with the signing of a memorandum between the two ministers during the meeting. The ministers talked about the importance of cooperating in the maritime field and they also share a point of view regarding the South China Sea issue.<sup>3</sup>

The meeting continued with an official visit by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Indonesia at the invitation of President Joko Widodo from 15<sup>th</sup> to

---

<sup>1</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2016. *Foreign Minister Kishida Meets with the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs of Indonesia*.  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e\\_001427.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001427.html)

<sup>2</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2015. *Japan Indonesia Summit Meeting*.  
[https://www.mofa.go.jp/s\\_sa/sea2/id/page4e\\_000231.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/id/page4e_000231.html)

<sup>3</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2016. *Foreign Minister Kishida Meets with the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs of Indonesia*.  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e\\_001427.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001427.html)

January 16<sup>th</sup>, 2017.<sup>4</sup> The meeting affirmed the cooperation between Japan and Indonesia in the maritime field. Similar to what President Joko Widodo said at the Japan - Indonesia Summit Meeting, some of the things that Indonesia expected in the Maritime Forum were coastal security, followed by the same for its marine vessels and the processing of its fisheries products.<sup>5</sup> After the official meeting in Indonesia, the Japanese government released several points of agreement between both countries as a Japan-Indonesia Joint Statement on Strengthening Strategic Partnership. The most interesting point that the Indonesia – Japan Maritime Forum is focused on is three Indonesian territorial islands; Sabang, Natuna, and Morotai. It is a new point that does not exist in any previous agreement within Indonesia – Japan maritime security cooperation. Japan also stated that Sabang, Natuna, and Morotai are some of the crucial points in the bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and Japan in the Maritime Forum.<sup>6</sup>

As an archipelago <sup>7</sup> country, Indonesia, under Joko Widodo's administration starting from 2015, is very concerned about maritime security issues and it seeks to take firm actions to protect Indonesia's maritime

---

<sup>4</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017. *Japan-Indonesia Joint Statement on Strengthening Strategic Partnership*. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000218457.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2015. *Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting*. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/s\\_sa/sea2/id/page4e\\_000231.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/id/page4e_000231.html)

<sup>6</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2017. *Japan-Indonesia Joint Statement on Strengthening Strategic Partnership*. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000218457.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> "Archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features that are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such. Access: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

[https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/part4.htm](https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part4.htm)

territory.<sup>8</sup> Indonesia has also been more focused on issues on the Natuna Islands. As the maritime forum goes on, Indonesia has renamed the northern areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea as the North Natuna Sea.<sup>9</sup> China responded it by saying that Indonesia should use the international name. Therefore this is considered to be an unnecessary action. China still thinks that Indonesia's new mapping is as the South China Sea.<sup>10</sup> However, Indonesia argues that the North Natuna Sea is part of Indonesia's territory, thus Indonesia has the right to rename the area.<sup>11</sup>

The Japan - Indonesia Maritime Forum raises the following question: 'Why have Indonesia and Japan agreed with the maritime forum and focused on some of its territorial islands, especially Natuna?'

This thesis begins with a research question, the purpose of the research, a brief explanation of the existing literature, the author's argument and their methodology. The author uses some of the literature related to the topic at hand. Besides this, the methodology becomes the tool for analysis in order to answer the research question.

---

<sup>8</sup> Cabinet Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia. 2015. *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Priorities in 5 Years Ahead*. <https://setkab.go.id/en/indonesias-foreign-policy-priorities-in-5-years-ahead/>

<sup>9</sup> Indonesia Institute of Sciences (the Center of Political Studies). 2017. *Laut Natuna Utara dan Respon Tiongkok*. <http://www.politik.lipi.go.id/kolom/kolom-1/politik-internasional/1165-laut-natuna-utara-dan-respon-tiongkok>

<sup>10</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. 2017. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/celv/eng/fyrth/t1477975.htm>

<sup>11</sup> Indonesia Institute of Sciences (the Center of Political Studies). 2017. *Laut Natuna Utara dan Respon Tiongkok*. <http://www.politik.lipi.go.id/kolom/kolom-1/politik-internasional/1165-laut-natuna-utara-dan-respon-tiongkok>

The third chapter discusses the issue concerning the South China Sea and the Japanese - Indonesian cooperation in the field of Maritime Security. It generally explains both Indonesia and Japan's position on the South China Sea issue. Both countries have to deal with China, especially Indonesia, who has a problem with China's nine-dash line in Natuna Waters. It also shows Indonesia-Japan relations in the context of the maritime security issue. It includes history, namely some of the important points of cooperation between the two governments on maritime security issues before the maritime forum, and more detail about the maritime forum itself.

The fourth chapter analyzes as a whole in order to answer the research question. The Indonesia and Japan Maritime Forum focuses on specific islands, including Natuna, due to the national interest in terms of security and the economy. Indonesia and Japan want to encounter China in maritime issues. The Natuna Islands have enormous potential to be developed for the purpose of business.

The last chapter concludes on the results and the information involved and following the analysis, linking it to the arguments that are explained at the beginning of the study. It also includes suggestions and notes for further research.

## **Chapter II Framework of the Research**

### **1. Research Question**

The Maritime Forum, as part of the maritime security cooperation between Indonesia and Japan, raises the following question: why have Indonesia and Japan agreed in the Maritime Forum and focused on some of the territorial islands, especially Natuna? Indonesia and Japan have had some cooperation in the maritime sector before the Maritime Forum. In this forum and for the first time, the governments have agreed to make several islands, including Natuna, the focus of their cooperation.

### **2. Purpose of the Research**

This thesis aims to:

- Analyze the interests of Indonesia and Japan in the Maritime Forum.
- Describe the problems in the Natuna waters.

### **3. Existing Literature**

Indonesia and Japan have a good relationship in many sectors, including that of maritime security. Joko Widodo's administration tends to be nationalist and focused on domestic affairs. He believes that Indonesia should be more concerned with the territory of the sea, and that many Indonesia islands need to

be secured.<sup>12</sup> Japan is very intense in terms of seeking to establish a good relationship with ASEAN<sup>13</sup> member countries, including Indonesia, when dealing with maritime security issues. In this thesis, the author provides some of the literature related to the topic, particularly that which is focused on the importance of maritime security cooperation in Indonesia-Japan Maritime Forum and elaborating on it with arguments from experts.

Part of Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)<sup>14</sup> overlaps with China's Nine - Dash Line<sup>15</sup> in the Natuna Sea. According to Jae Bong Park, this problem has become more complicated in the Joko Widodo era compared to his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). This is due to the impact of

---

<sup>12</sup> Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. 2018. *Jadikan Laut Pemersatu Indonesia Menuju Poros Maritim Dunia*.

<https://kominfo.go.id/content/detail/15670/jadikan-laut-pemersatu-indonesia-menuju-poros-maritim-dunia/0/berita>

<sup>13</sup> ASEAN is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that was established on 8<sup>th</sup> August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand. The signing of the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) was done by the Founding Fathers of ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

Brunei Darussalam then joined on 7<sup>th</sup> January 1984, Vietnam on 28<sup>th</sup> July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1997, and Cambodia on 30<sup>th</sup> April 1999, making up what is today the 10 Member States of ASEAN. Access: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Access: the Association of Southeast Asia Nations. <https://asean.org/asean/about-asean/#>

<sup>14</sup> The Exclusive Economic Zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. Access: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Access: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. [https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/part4.htm](https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part4.htm)

<sup>15</sup> China's Nine - Dashed Line is a "maritime jurisdiction" in the South China Sea that China's claimed. Access: The State Council of the People's Republic of China. [http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/press\\_briefing/2014/12/07/content\\_281475020441708.htm](http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/press_briefing/2014/12/07/content_281475020441708.htm)

the Global Maritime Nexus policy<sup>16</sup> established by Joko Widodo, which is very concerned with the issue of maritime security. SBY's One Thousand Friends Zero Enemy policy<sup>17</sup> is less assertive in territorial security matters in order to obtain investment assistance from great powers such as China. Joko Widodo is concerned with some areas of the seas, chiefly the Natuna Islands. Moreover, Joko Widodo's strict behavior can be seen in the establishment of a new Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA) as Indonesia's equivalent of the Coast Guard. Indonesian Armed Forces seek to counter instability in the South China Sea which is explicitly aimed at China. This is where Indonesian Navy warships pursue and fire warning shots to groups of Chinese fishing trawlers operating within the Indonesian EEZ near to the Natuna Islands.

The South China Sea issue and territorial dispute has become a massive challenge for Joko Widodo in terms of realizing the Global Maritime Nexus policy, especially given the condition of Indonesia as an archipelago. Joko Widodo is aware of the importance of state sovereignty and territorial

---

<sup>16</sup> Global Maritime Nexus policy, or Jokowi Doctrine, *Poros Maritim Dunia* in Bahasa Indonesia, is the main policy established in the first term of Joko Widodo's administration. It aims to make Indonesia a big, powerful, and prosperous maritime country through the restoration of Indonesia's identity as a maritime nation, safeguarding its interests and maritime security and empowering its maritime potential to better Indonesia's economy. Access: Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. 2016. *Menuju Poros Maritim Dunia*. [https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/8231/menuju-poros-maritim-dunia/0/kerja\\_nyata](https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/8231/menuju-poros-maritim-dunia/0/kerja_nyata).

<sup>17</sup> One Thousand Friend Zero Enemy is the basics of Indonesia foreign policy in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration under The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It aims to improve relations with every nation through bilateral ties and multilateral institutions in order to achieve Indonesia's National Interest. Access: Irfa Puspitasari. Indonesia's New Foreign Policy- 'Thousand friends zero enemy'. 2010. *IDSA Issue Brief*. [https://idsa.in/system/files/IB\\_IndonesiaForeignPolicy.pdf](https://idsa.in/system/files/IB_IndonesiaForeignPolicy.pdf), p. 2

integrity. Thus, the territorial disputes that have occurred before are a lesson. This is why China's behavior in claiming the South China Sea significantly affects the priority of the country's security. Regarding the South China Sea issue, Indonesia is in a neutral position and it has never claimed that it is in dispute with China over the nine-dash line map in the Natuna area. In the paper, Natalie Sambhi mentioned two main facts that are a problem for Indonesia due to being neutral. First, a series of confrontations between Chinese fishing vessels and Indonesian authorities in waters off Indonesia's Natuna Islands undermines this neutrality. Second, there have been conflicting policy statements on the South China Sea, signaling discord between the government agencies. The Natuna area has abundant natural resources and it is the one of largest gas producers in Asia. Currently, the problems include that Indonesia's Natuna Islands Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) overlaps with China's nine-dash line and the threat of armed Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels. However, Indonesia has always stated that there is no dispute between Indonesia and China. The government agencies are frustrated but also holding back in order to be neutral. This is because China has mapped part of the Natuna region in its nine-dash line claim. Furthermore, the Jokowi government still thinks that besides Japan, investment from Chinese companies and the Chinese government is still crucial for both infrastructure and business.

The Natuna Islands issue is both crucial and complex for Indonesia. There are abundant offshore natural resources, such as oil, gas, and fisheries. Furthermore, with the vision to become an archipelagic state in the world,

Indonesia needs to maintain its sovereignty and integrity. At present, the EEZ of the island still overlaps with China's nine-dash line, where Indonesia does not recognize the mapping claim. This issue already existed in the previous leadership, but it has become increasingly visible during the administration of Joko Widodo. In his leadership, Joko Widodo directly conducted a large-scale training exercise in the Natuna Seas in 2017, known as *Latihan Perang Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat*. This was a response to the accident in 2016 when Chinese fishing vessels entered the EEZ. Related to the issue, Leo Suryadinata and Mustafa Izzuddin argue that Indonesia did not want to confront China because Indonesia needs Chinese investment as funding for infrastructure development and as a part of realizing Indonesia's vision to be more powerful. Indonesia, however, may fence itself off from China by building good relations with Australia and Japan.

Indonesia has changed its role in the region supported by its naval modernization and expansion. According to Temjenmeren Ao, Indonesia has adopted tactics due to changing territorial threats, such as the overlapping EEZ of the Natuna Islands with China's nine-dash line and the increasing issue of maritime piracy - terrorism. The claim of China's nine-dash line overlapping with EEZ Indonesia on the Natuna Islands makes Indonesia concerned about these issues. There are often accidents and the Indonesia navy has captured many Chinese fishing vessels in recent years in the overlapping area of the Natuna Islands. From this background, Temjenmeren said that renaming waters like the North Natuna Sea are essential indications. Joko Widodo took action by

shoring up the military and law enforcement capacity in the area, including making two trips to the military base at Ranai on Natuna Besar as part of their interest in defending Indonesian sovereignty over the islands and Indonesia itself.

Paryanto argues that security is crucial. Thus the State needs to increase its power in order to create a sense of security and to ward off the threats. Today, one of the significant threats in the Southeast Asia Region is the South China Sea issue. Unlike other ASEAN countries, Indonesia is not involved in a major dispute over the South China Sea. However, the northwest-north part of the Natuna Islands overlaps with China's unilateral nine-dash line map. Lots of marine resources are abundant in the Natuna Islands, such as gas and fish, which are targeted by foreign ships. It is evident that this is a form of threat to Indonesia. Therefore Indonesia must act firmly as the owner of the Natuna Islands.

Cooperation between Japan and the ASEAN countries has intensified since 2010, along with the increasing maritime competition. Maritime issues are very crucial for stability and security in the region and country. Parts of the seas now very much need to be considered, due to what happened in the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait. According to Nguyen Hung Son, ASEAN cooperation with Japan is intense but the effectiveness level of this cooperation is still lacking. This is due to the unclear ASEAN work plans for maritime security. Besides that, Japan also does not have a strategy for engagement in

ASEAN. Japan is maintaining and focusing on bilateral cooperation with countries in Southeast Asia. However, both Japan and said countries in Southeast Asia are the same in that they have interest in maritime security.

In contrast with Nguyen Hung Son, Sheila A. Smith argues that aside from the bilateral cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, Japan's maritime cooperation with ASEAN member countries steadily institutionalizes them. However, limitations in terms of their legal, political, and military conditions mean that Japan's defense capacity building program should be separate from their development program. As the countries need cooperation, Japan has increased their coast guard and naval capacity building. Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines are the most crucial countries who need to improve their maritime law enforcement capabilities through non-traditional security (anti-piracy) to counter the paramilitary and coast guard advancements made by other states, particularly China.

Yasuyuki Ishida has explained Japan's role in ASEAN countries from Fukuda to Abe. Japan, since the Fukuda era, has built partnerships and trust, which is very important for ASEAN countries. The Indo-Pacific region is sought to be, as a whole, within the framework of peace, stability, and prosperity. In the Abe doctrine, Japan's strategic partnership with the ASEAN countries is based on China's behavior. It requires Japan to work more closely with the US and countries in Southeast Asia. Several points have been announced as part of Japanese diplomacy, one of which is the Free and Open

Indo-Pacific Strategy for a rules-based Indo-Pacific Ocean and strengthening cooperation with Asian maritime countries such as ASEAN, Australia, and India. In the maritime sector, Japan is increasing the connectivity within ASEAN's Eastern maritime area, covering Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (BIMP-EAGA). This area focuses on several traditional and non-traditional threats to maritime security, such as international terrorism, transnational crimes, and armed robberies at sea. Japan's integration is not only with ASEAN countries but also with security architecture in Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

Reinhard Drifte, who talks about Japan's diplomacy, explains that Japan wants to help countries that have territorial and EEZ claims in the South China Sea to improve their maritime control and defense capabilities. One form of Japan's desire is to become a member of joint air or naval patrols in the South China Sea. So far, Japan has provided Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the form of loans, technical assistance or grants to the South China Sea coastal countries and ASEAN members. These countries are the primary recipients of Japanese ODA and they are an essential part of Japan's new "minilateral" security partnerships, especially in Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. As mentioned in the ODA white paper, Japan must strengthen the rule of law, maritime security, cybersecurity, and peace-building measures. In realizing its objectives, several forms of assistance have been provided by Japan to Southeast Asian countries. The assistance is in the form of capacity building seminars on maritime security for defense aimed at

introducing Japan security legislation, maritime security assistance, and defense technologies relevant to maritime security. Since 2007, the involved states, one of which is Indonesia, have received the assistance of three patrol vessels, each newly built and measuring 27 meters. They are used exclusively against pirates in the Strait of Malacca, including against terrorists, smugglers and other criminal elements at sea.

Nobuhiro Aizawa argues since political tension has increased along with the Sea Line of Communication (SLOCs)<sup>18</sup>, especially in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Concern over maritime security issues is more serious than ever before. Japan previously did not focus on maritime security, but due to tension in the seas increasing, especially SLOCs in the South China Sea, Japan feels that it needs to maintain free and open maritime orders. These events make the issue of maritime security a major policy, primarily to protect energy stability. Therefore Japan shares a common interest with the Southeast Asian countries. In terms of the cooperation between these countries, Japan is mostly providing technical assistance for the coast guard services, sharing navigation safety information, and ensuring maritime orders based on international law.

---

<sup>18</sup>Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are key maritime passageways that facilitate heavy shipping traffic volumes and hosting the transportation of key maritime trades such as crude oil. Access: Maritime Institute of Malaysia. <http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/wp-content/uploads/sealinesunderstrain.pdf>

## **4. Argument**

This thesis shows that the Maritime Forum, which is part of the maritime security cooperation between Indonesia and Japan, is different from the previous bilateral cooperation in the field of maritime security for both countries. Japan and Indonesia agreed to focus on some of the territorial waters of Indonesia, especially the Natuna Islands, possibly for several reasons. It is related to the national interest in security and the economy. Indonesia and Japan want to encounter China as part of their security interests. Through this cooperation, both countries try to avoid the Chinese threat and domination. On the economic side, there is a huge benefit to business from their cooperation. Indonesia will get benefits from the development activities. Japan has benefited by investing in areas that have good business potential and it gets an imported fish supply from Indonesia.

## **5. Methodology**

This thesis used a qualitative method to analyze and answer the research questions. The qualitative method is a research method that aims to consider several aspects of social life and it generally uses words as the data in

the analysis.<sup>19</sup> In the process of the data collection, the author uses primary and secondary sources to support this research. The primary source is the government's official documents. The official documents were obtained through the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investments and the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The author also interviewed those experts in the field, such as the Deputy of Maritime Sovereignty of Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment and the Diplomat of Directorate East Asian and Pacific Affairs of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These people understand the diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Japan. The interviews were conducted as part of a data comparison. The author also collected the data through secondary indirect sources including books, journals, magazines, and the internet.

In analyzing and answering the research questions, this thesis uses concepts as the analysis tool. The author uses the mainstream concept of national interest and hedging to answer the research questions. In order to analyze the interest in Maritime Forum for both Indonesia and Japan, the concept of national interest will be used. The hedging concept will be used to explain the position of Indonesia when dealing with China, thus showing that the Maritime Forum is very important.

---

<sup>19</sup> Michael Quinn Patton and Michael Cochran. 2002. *A Guide to Using Qualitative Research Methodology*. London: Medecins Sans Frontieres, p.2.

According to Shibley Telhami, the State has tried to improve its national security. Territorial, economic, and military security are involved in the calculation of the State's national interests. At the same time, the state uses its capability as a tool in order to pursue its interests. Finally, the State interests are driven by their level of ability.<sup>20</sup>

All states have national interests and Morgenthau has his own opinion about national interests. Morgenthau indicates that there are six types of national interest.

1. *Primary interest* - an interest in protecting its security, politics, cultural identity, and survival against encroachment from the outside. Interest of all nations.
2. *Secondary interests* - an interest in those falling outside of it but who contribute to it. For example, protecting its citizens abroad and maintaining the proper immunities for the nation's diplomats.
3. *Permanent interest* - those that are relatively constant over long periods of time. They vary with time but only slowly.
4. *Variable interest* - those which are a function of all of the cross currents of personalities, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics, and the political and moral folkway of a given nation.
5. *General interest* - the nation can apply this interest in a positive manner to a large geographic area, to a large number of nations, or in

---

<sup>20</sup> Shibley Telhami. 2006. "The Return of the State Vol. 84." *National Interest* (Summer): 109.

several specific fields (such as economics, trade, diplomatic intercourse, international law etc).

6. *Specific interest* - usually closely defined in time and/or space and they often are the logical outgrowth of general interests.<sup>21</sup>

Based on the concept of national interest as described by Morgenthau, primary interest and general interest will be used in this thesis.

According to Brock and Wojtek, hedging is a concept derived from the balance of power that usually “the second-tier states”<sup>22</sup> engage in as a part of inter-state competition. Brock and Wojtek argue that the traditional concept of the balance of power could not be used by weaker countries that do not have the capability to challenge powerful states with military power in the international system. This is because the balance of power does not include non-military aspects. Thus, this concept also considers the military and non-military aspects. This concept also is more “specific” than balancing behavior. This concept shows that strategic hedging helps States who in uncertainty position in the international system. At some point, a hedging State experiences a security or military crisis but a powerful or dominant State voluntarily or unintentionally assists. Moreover, this behavior can maintain their security position.

---

<sup>21</sup> Thomas W. Robinson. 1967. “A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations”. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Jun.), 135-175, 140.

<sup>22</sup> Second-tier states have been faced with typically complex class structures. They have tended to rely on the continuing importance of resource production. Their natural resource wealth has given rise to agro-based leading sectors in their economies.

Nevertheless, it also has short-term costs that come from either the domestic or international direction.<sup>23</sup>

In the international system, anarchic states try to size up their security. The unipolar system that superpower states have with a high-level of capability make second-tier states inferior. By understanding that their abilities are not comparable to a powerful state, the states try to avoid confrontation with the more powerful state. However, they continue to improve their ability to deal with the stronger ones.<sup>24</sup>

According to Cheng Chwee Kuik, the hedging concept describes how the weaker states choose hedging. The state is in an uncertain situation and does not have an external alliance. A state approaches to maximize their economic interests and diplomatic relations, while still managing strategies or actions for the long term from the emerging powerful state. It is very suitable for non-aligned states.<sup>25</sup>

Kuik also said that hedging states are in the middle position between balancing and band-wagoning. Being a smaller state does not mean that they do not have to choose either balancing or band-wagoning. However, the states are more inclined to use the concept of "mixed strategies" which adopts both

---

<sup>23</sup> Brock Tessman and Wojtek Wolfe. 2011. "Great Powers and Strategic Hedging: The Case of Chinese Energy Security Strategy". *International Studies Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June), 214-240

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 219

<sup>25</sup> Cheng Chwee Kuik. 2008. "The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China". *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (August), 159-185



uncertainty, and concern about their security. Evan said that most hedging states are in Southeast Asia. They maintain good relations with China. No single state in Southeast Asia chooses only China or the United States.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> Evan S. Medeiros. 2005-06. "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability". *The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Washington Quarterly Winter 2005-06*, 29:1 145–167, 146

## **CHAPTER III The South China Sea Issue and Maritime Security Cooperation**

### **1. The Position of Indonesia and Japan in the South China Sea Issue**

Cooperation in maritime security between Indonesia and Japan cannot be separated from the South China Sea issue. Aside from this crucial issue for countries in Southeast Asia, the territorial borders of the oceans belonging to Indonesia and Japan are directly adjacent to the South China Sea. Thus the dispute also becomes one discussed and prioritized by the two governments.

Indonesia and Japan have made official statements regarding the South China Sea issue. They both do not feel that they are involved in the South China Sea issue and they hope that this issue will be solved peacefully. Indonesia states its position towards the South China Sea Issue in that:

*“Indonesia is a non-claimant state in the South China Sea (SCS) dispute, yet Indonesia is of the view on the importance of dialogue and close*

*communication of all parties to work together to keep and maintain the peace and stability of the region.”<sup>29</sup>*

The statement of Japan through Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting is as follows:

- *“We are deeply concerned about recent and continued attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea and South China Sea.”*
- *“Regarding the South China Sea, the award by the Arbitral Tribunal between the Philippines and China is legally binding on the parties to the dispute under the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas. We expect that the parties' compliance with this award will eventually lead to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.”*
- *“The territorial disputes in the South China Sea are issues between the parties concerned, but the South China Sea is a sea lane of critical importance to Japan. It is also important for peace and stability in the region. While welcoming the dialogue between ASEAN and China, the dialogue should be conducted based on international law and on the premise that non-militarization and self-restraint will be secured in the South China Sea.”*

---

<sup>29</sup> Directorate of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, Indonesia and the Dynamics of the East Asian Region (Indonesia dan Dinamika Kawasan Asia Timur) (Government Document)

- *“The ASEAN Member States mentioned the importance of peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law including UNCLOS, self-restraint in the conducting of activities that increase tensions and support and respect for the legal and diplomatic processes.”*<sup>30</sup>

Regarding the South China Sea issue, the two countries have slightly different responses. Japan has no problem with the territorial claims made by China in the South China Sea. However, Japan has the role in the South China Sea issue of helping countries in Southeast Asia. The assistance is through cooperation in the maritime sector, both multilateral and bilateral. Japan does not recognize the China Nine –Dash Line map which is determined unilaterally by China. Generally, Japan is very concerned with the issue related to the freedom of navigation in the waters of the South China Sea, which is very important in international trade.<sup>31</sup>

Indonesia, as a part of the Southeast Asian countries, is more neutral and does not take any position or alignment in relation to the South China Sea issue. Indonesia states that it does not want to be involved in the dispute but it does want to take a significant role in resolving the South China Sea dispute.

---

<sup>30</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2016. *The Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting..* [https://www.mofa.go.jp/a\\_o/rp/page3e\\_000590.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page3e_000590.html)

<sup>31</sup> Ibid

Like the Japanese government, Indonesia does not recognize the China Nine-Dash Line map.<sup>32</sup>

## 1.1 Natuna Waters' Problem with China's Nine Dash Line

Indonesia says that it has no dispute involved in China's Nine-Dash map, which China has claimed unilaterally.<sup>33</sup> There is a complicated issue regarding the EEZ Indonesian territorial waters in that Natuna overlaps with China's Nine-Dash Line. However, Indonesia does not feel that it has a dispute with China because it is clear that these territorial waters are a part of Indonesia's sovereign territory.<sup>34</sup>

In 1993, China provided a Nine-Dash Line map at the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea.<sup>35</sup> It showed that the map also included some of Natuna Island's waters, so the Indonesian government questioned the map and China had no clear response.<sup>36</sup>

---


<sup>32</sup> Raja Eben Lumbanrau, Anggi Kusumadewi. 2016. *Indonesia Nine-Dashed Line China ke Natuna Bak Muncul dari Langit*. CNN Indonesia. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160623113553-20-140352/nine-dashed-line-china-ke-natuna-bak-muncul-dari-langit>

<sup>33</sup> Ibid

<sup>34</sup> Ibid

<sup>35</sup> Ibid

<sup>36</sup> Ibid



**Figure 2. China Nine-Dash Line, South China Sea**

Source: <https://amti.csis.org/>

There is the possibility that Indonesia has begun to feel uncomfortable and wants to avoid conflict in the future. On July 14<sup>th</sup> 2017, the Indonesian government through the Deputy I of Maritime Sovereignty, Coordinating Ministry for Maritime and Investment Affairs, announced that Indonesia had officially renamed the Northern part of Natuna into the North Natuna Sea.<sup>37</sup> The Indonesian government said that Indonesia has the authority to give name its

<sup>37</sup> Rizki Akbar Hasan. 2017. *Indonesia Mengubah Nama Laut China Selatan, Ini Reaksi Beijing*. <https://www.liputan6.com/global/read/3024099/indonesia-mengubah-nama-laut-china-selatan-ini-reaksi-beijing>

national territory. Indonesia is planning to bring it to the United Nations, which it can do through an exclusive forum for recording the name of the sea, the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO). The government has also claimed that the action is intended to be made known to the international community so then they know the territory they are passing through.<sup>38</sup>

The Indonesian government also stated that the renaming of the North Natuna Sea was intended to be the same as the oil and gas processing activities carried out in the area. Throughout the whole activity of managing or exploring the oil and gas in Natuna waters, it has used several names. Giving it a clear name makes it more accessible. Moreover, the government has explained the naming of the Natuna Sea since 2002. Since the 1970s, it has been using the North Natuna Sea to explore the oil and gas resources there.<sup>39</sup>

The renaming of the North Natuna Sea began in Joko Widodo's administration. The government got support from the Indonesian people. Indonesia's relations with China are still going well, especially in the economic sector. The Chinese have made a statement indicating that Indonesia's actions in terms of renaming the North Natuna Sea do not make sense.<sup>40</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> *ibid*

<sup>39</sup> *ibid*

<sup>40</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. 2017. *Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference*. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/celv/eng/fyrth/t1477975.htm>



**Figure 3. The Map of the Republic of Indonesia**

Source: <https://www.indonesia.go.id/archipelago>



**Figure 4. Indonesia renamed the northern areas of the exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea (*Laut China Selatan*) as the North Natuna Sea (*Laut Natuna Utara*).**

Source: <https://www.indonesia.go.id/archipelago>

## 2. Indonesia – Japan Relations in the Maritime Field

In the context of the history of colonialism in Southeast Asia, Japan has a history of colonialism in almost all countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. Thailand is the only country that was not profoundly affected by colonialism. Thailand became Japan's alliance in WWII and it continues to have an alliance with the United States, Indonesia and Burma. The latter is a country that benefited from the Japanese occupation, despite the misery of the colonial militarization. It can be seen that the Japanese way of colonizing is slightly different compared to other countries, such as Northeast Asia.<sup>41</sup>

Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Japan began in 1958.<sup>42</sup> The relations between the two countries began with the signing of the peace agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Japan on January 20<sup>th</sup> 1958, and the ratification of the agreement in April 1958.<sup>43</sup> The intensity of the agreement became stronger in 2006 since the signing of the Strategic Partnership for Peaceful and Prosperous Future on November 28<sup>th</sup> 2006.<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup> Lam Peng Er. 2015. "Japan's Postwar Reconciliation with Southeast Asia". *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, Vol. 3 No. 1, 43-63, 45

<sup>42</sup> Directorate of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia. *Snapshot Hubungan Bilateral Republik Indonesia (RI) dan Jepang* (Government Document)

<sup>43</sup> Ibid

<sup>44</sup> Ibid

The beginning of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Japan focused on post-war compensation. After Japan lost to the United States, through Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951.<sup>45</sup> From this agreement, the United States and its allies - as there was a generous peace – did not need compensation from Japan. On the other hand, through reparation agreements and peace treaties, Japan had to give compensation to several other countries, including Indonesia.

Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Japan are not always smooth but, compared to other countries, the diplomatic relations between the two countries are quite well. On June 2<sup>nd</sup> 2005, Indonesia in the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono era and Japan under the H.E. Mr. Junichiro Koizum administration conducted the Japan-Indonesia Joint Announcement on Maritime Affairs. The two leaders specifically discussed the maritime security issue that had occurred in the Strait of Malacca. According to the two governments, maritime security issues in the Straits of Malacca are very serious, so cooperation from Indonesia as a coastal state that has the territorial authority is needed. Maritime security problems including piracy, armed robbery against ships, and smuggling (arms, goods, persons, drugs, etc.) need to be eradicated because it disturbs the stability of international trade navigation. The meeting

---

<sup>45</sup> Hatano Sumio, translated by Christopher W. A. Szpilman. 2018. “History and the State in Postwar Japan”. *The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus*, Volume 16 Issue 9 Number 1 (May 01), 3

produced several essential points to be immediately carried out by the two countries.

- Maritime law enforcement authorities need to increase their capacity, so increasing the number of patrol vessels and other cooperation is needed. So far, the Japan Coast Guard and JICA support has helped the capacity of Indonesia's maritime law enforcement authorities.
- The two countries have agreed to increase the mechanism of sharing information more effectively.
- One needs to consider the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and its domestic procedures.
- The two countries should work together with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on Maritime Security in order to resolve maritime security issues.
- Cooperation must be carried out based on the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.

On June 16<sup>th</sup>, 2006, Japan announced the “*Gant Aid to Indonesia for the Project for Construction of Patrol Vessels for the Prevention of Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons*”. This assistance is also based on Indonesia's request during the Megawati Seokarno Putri era and through the Republic of Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda.<sup>46</sup> Japan

---

<sup>46</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2006; Section 4. Provision of Patrol Vessels to Indonesia*. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2006/ODA2006/html/honpen/hp202040400.htm>

intends to assist Indonesia in the Construction of Vessels' project in the framework on the Prevention of Piracy, Maritime Terrorism, and the Proliferation of Weapons. The Strait of Malacca is very busy with many vessels passing through it. Japan has focused on maritime security issues in the Strait of Malacca due to the increasing number of piracy cases in the strait, which has reached 10%. Japanese vessels (the tugboat Idaten) have also experienced attacks from piracy, such as in March 2005.<sup>47</sup> Indonesia's internal factors include a "lack of high-speed boats," which are indispensable for pursuing pirate ships. The number of vessels must be more to cover the essential areas.<sup>48</sup>

Regarding “*Grant Aid to Indonesia for the Project for Construction of Patrol Vessels for the Prevention of Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons*”, Japan and Indonesia agreed that the project must include:<sup>49</sup>

1. *“The patrol vessels provided under this project, combined with those already in use, will enable 24-hour patrols in a piracy-prone zone.”*
2. *“The patrol area from each base will be extended to a 250-mile radius from the present 170-miles, thereby enabling the authority to patrol almost all parts of the piracy-prone zone.”*

---

<sup>47</sup> Ibid

<sup>48</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2006. *Grant Aid to Indonesia for the Project for Construction of Patrol Vessels for the Prevention of Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons*. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/6/0616-3.html>

<sup>49</sup> Ibid

3. *“The project will contribute to strengthening the maritime security system in Indonesian coastal areas, especially in the Strait of Malacca.”*
4. *“The project will stabilize shipping (including vessels of Japanese registry) in the Strait of Malacca.”*
5. *“This assistance will promote friendly bilateral relations between Japan and the Republic of Indonesia.”*

The Japanese ODAs do not meet the principles of legal arms exports. Thus, this is a very serious issue that requires an agreement between the two governments in considering the importance of the terrorism and piracy issue in the Straits of Malacca. Japan assisted Indonesia with exporting bulletproof vessels that were not included in the military vessels of the Export Control Trade Ordinance. This category of vessels was therefore banned. However, these vessels are indispensable at protecting the crews from gunfire and piracy attacks.<sup>50</sup>

Japan's interest in the Malacca strait began in 1999. This was not only because of the piracy attack on Japanese vessels in 2015. The Malacca Strait is a crucial route in the import-export of oil for countries all over the world, including Japan. Therefore, maritime security in the Malacca Strait affects the Japanese economy. Japan, as an ally of the United States, has to include the United States' concern over the issue of terrorism, as the Malacca strait is used

---

<sup>50</sup> Ibid

by terrorist groups as a pathway. This problem is also used to show who the superpower can dominate by successfully participating in maintaining the security of the Malacca Strait.<sup>51</sup>



**Figure 5. Map of the Strait of Malacca as a Japanese Vessel Lane**

Source: [https://www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/en/what/projects/safe\\_passage](https://www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/en/what/projects/safe_passage)

According to the data of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Japan are stronger than before due to the signing of the Strategic Partnership for Peaceful and Prosperous Future on November 28<sup>th</sup> 2006. In the Strategic Partnership for Peaceful and Prosperous Future, there are many points discussed. It starts from the progress

---

<sup>51</sup> Joyce Dela Pena. 2009. "Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing Regional and Extra-Regional Concerns". *Stanford Journal of International Relations Spring*, 5

and relations between the two countries for the future. The two countries are still concerned with the progress of the bilateral cooperation in terms of maritime issues. Nevertheless, the cooperation under the Strategic Partnership for Peaceful and Prosperous Future encourages both countries to solve international issues through multilateral organization, like ASEAN or ASEAN + 3, thus strengthening the mutually beneficial partnerships and new development projects.

The Strategic Partnership for Peaceful and Prosperous Future that was established under Shinzo Abe and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, including the Malacca Strait and Singapore which is the territory and EEZ of Indonesia, as well as the strait used for international navigation, are all part of an important discussion. The state's efforts to improve maritime security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore will continue. Japan also continues to support Indonesia in developing patrol vessels. The two governments will do their best to improve safety, security, and environmental protection, especially considering that the strait is one of the most crucial international navigation routes for both Japan and Indonesia.<sup>52</sup>

Cooperation between Indonesia and Japan is present in many fields, and maritime security is one of them. Both governments have talked about maritime issues on many occasions. There is some cooperation in maritime

---

<sup>52</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Japan-Indonesia Joint Statement. "*Strategic Partnership for Peaceful and Prosperous Future*". <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/joint0611.html>

security between the two governments but this is not as much as their cooperation in the economic field. Japan is more active in its maritime security cooperation at a broader level, such as ASEAN. However, bilateral cooperation is mostly pursued nowadays due to bilateral cooperation being more effective, especially in maritime security issues. Moreover, several principles of multilateral organization can complicate access to cooperation in maritime territorial matters.

## **2-1 Maritime Forum**

The Maritime Forum was formed on December 21<sup>st</sup> 2016 in Tokyo through a meeting between the Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, Luhut B. Pandjaitan, and Fumio Kishida, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the meeting, the governments made a memorandum at the core of the agreement between the two countries in order to strengthen cooperation in maritime security. Some of the points from the memorandum are essential to discuss.

The Maritime Forum memorandum is also related to the Joint Statements and dialogue that have been made before, especially in 2006 and 2015. The issues discussed and that are the concern of the two countries are numerous, one of which is the issue of maritime security.

*“REFERRING to the Indonesia-Japan Joint Statement “Strategic Partnership for Peaceful and Prosperous Future”, signed in Tokyo on 28<sup>th</sup> November 2006;*

*ALSO REFERRING to the Indonesia – Japan Joint Statement “Towards Further Strengthening of the Strategic Partnership Underpinned by Sea and Democracy”, issued in Tokyo on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2015 and the Strategic Dialogue between Indonesia-Japan to strengthen and accelerate the roadmap of the strategic partnership on various fields of cooperation ”<sup>53</sup>*

The meeting between the two ministers, which had been prepared for a long time, resulted in several points of cooperation that are not much different from before. The agreement between Japan and Indonesia focuses on maritime cooperation in several scopes. The coverage includes:<sup>54</sup>

- 1. Security and Safety in the Maritime Field*
- 2. Economic Development including Infrastructure and Connectivity in the Maritime Field*
- 3. Training and Education*
- 4. Other areas as may be mutually identified by the two Governments*

---

<sup>53</sup> Coordinating the Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. Memorandum Of Cooperation Between The Government Of The Republic Of Indonesia And The Government Of Japan On Establishment Of “Indonesia – Japan Maritime Forum” To Strengthen And Accelerate Maritime Cooperation (Government Document)

<sup>54</sup> Ibid

5. *Specific cooperative projects under this framework are to be identified by the two Governments through this framework*

The points of agreement above will be implemented within a period of 5 years and there will be a ministerial meeting annually.<sup>55</sup>

After the governments established the Maritime Forum in early 2017, the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, visited Indonesia in order to meet the Indonesian President, Joko Widodo. The meeting of the Heads of the respective states resulted in the Japan-Indonesia Joint Statement on Strengthening Strategic Partnership. In the statement, the governments also talked about the Maritime Forum as an important part of the discussion on the maritime field.<sup>56</sup> With the establishment of the Maritime Forum, the leaders wanted the diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Japan to improve. Maritime security will be maintained, especially with their mutually beneficial cooperation with each other. Moreover, the Maritime Forum will focus more on cooperation concerning the Sabang, Natuna, and Morotai islands. Maritime security and safety, the promotion of two maritime industries, maritime infrastructure, energy, and remote island development are the main objectives to be achieved concerning the islands according to the Maritime Forum.<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>55</sup> Ibid

<sup>56</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Japan-Indonesia Joint Statement on Strengthening Strategic Partnership. 2017. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000218457.pdf>

<sup>57</sup> Ibid

One year after the Maritime Forum was formed, the governments of Japan and Indonesia met again as part of the continuation of the Maritime Forum. The meeting was under the memorandum that stated that there are to be meetings every year.<sup>58</sup> In 2017, the meeting was held through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia in Tokyo, Japan.<sup>59</sup> After the ministerial meeting, the two governments informed the joint press release which had several important points<sup>60</sup>:

1. *Security and Safety in Maritime Field*
2. *Archipelagic and Island States*
3. *Vocational Training*
4. *Economic Development Including Infrastructure and Connectivity in the Maritime Field*
  - a. *Energy Electricity*
  - b. *Infrastructure*
  - c. *Remote Island Development*
  - d. *Other Issues*

---

<sup>58</sup> Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. Memorandum Of Cooperation Between The Government Of The Republic Of Indonesia And The Government Of Japan On The Establishment Of The Indonesia – Japan Maritime Forum To Strengthen And Accelerate Maritime Cooperation (Government Document)

<sup>59</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *The Joint Press Release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on the occasion of the visit of Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Lt. Gen. (Retired) Luhut B. Pandjaitan to Japan.*

<https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000323211.pdf>

<sup>60</sup> Ibid

The points mentioned above are the primary foreign policy from these two states, their reason to cooperate, as well as their interests and objectives.<sup>61</sup> The Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy is the vision currently being promoted by Japan. The Global Maritime Fulcrum is a big goal of Indonesia as the largest archipelago country in Southeast Asia.

The meeting of the two ministers discussed the security of the South China Sea. As an essential sea at the center of global activities, the South China Sea is still one of the core discussions in the Maritime Forum in order to realize maritime security. The parties involved in the dispute actively support the solution of the dispute in the South China Sea. Currently, the two governments are waiting for the progression of the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.<sup>62</sup>

One of the steps taken by the Maritime Forum is that the two countries decided to implement cooperation focused on maritime security and safety from the Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 2018 to JFY 2020.<sup>63</sup> The agreement is based on the basic framework of the JICA / JCG (Japan Coast Guard) - BAKAMLA (Indonesian Maritime Security Agency) cooperation, signed on 17<sup>th</sup> October 2017.<sup>64</sup> The two countries hope to implement their mutual goals as soon as

---

<sup>61</sup> Coordinating the Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. The Joint Press Release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on the occasion of the visit of Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Lt. Gen. (Retired) Luhut B. Pandjaitan to Japan. December 14, 2017 <https://maritim.go.id/joint-press-release-indonesia-japan/>

<sup>62</sup> Ibid

<sup>63</sup> Ibid

<sup>64</sup> Ibid

possible. In addition, there is a need for realization and sustainability in the fishery sector program on the outer islands. The governments have thus agreed to develop the provision of radar systems, patrol vessels, and space technology.

Based on the cooperation between Indonesia and Japan in the maritime sector, in the Maritime Forum and other cooperation activities, the Japanese contribution has led to investment, capacity building, and technology. Japan assists in the form of additional patrol vessels, which are needed to patrol Indonesia's huge seas. The vessels are of an adequate structure and with advanced technology. Capacity building for the authorities is also given, not only in terms of maritime defense but also for the air and land; the contribution of Japan is substantial. Furthermore, investment is also provided by Japan for development in the context of infrastructure and other areas. It can also be said that the assistance from Japan is in the context of securing its business in the maritime sector with Indonesia as well as other cooperation that provides security. These things are crucial for Japan and this can be seen by the inclusion of the assistance in ODA.

.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **Analysis of the Indonesia – Japan Maritime Forum**

This chapter contains the analysis of the cooperation between Indonesia and Japan in the Maritime Forum. As stated in the second chapter, the author also uses the concept of national interests and hedging. National interest is a concept that will be used when generally analyzing the interest in cooperation between Indonesia and Japan. The concept of hedging will be used to describe a Southeast Asian country's position like that of Indonesia when dealing with China and how this makes the Maritime Forum very important. The contents will be discussed in two parts, which includes some of the reasons why the two countries agreed to the Maritime Forum and why their cooperation focused on the Natuna Islands, namely encountering China and business to business.

#### **1. Encountering China**

Indonesia and Japan always make diplomatic statements. Japan has repeatedly said that Japan's concern in the South China Sea issue is related to the freedom of navigation.<sup>65</sup> It might be true that even though Japan did not say

---

<sup>65</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Diplomatic Book 2019: Japan's Foreign Policy that Takes a Panoramic Perspective of the World Map. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2019/html/chapter2/c020107.html> Ch. 2

it directly, it can be seen that China's efforts to control the islands around the South China Sea could have a significant impact. However, Japan's position as an ally of the United States needs to be considered as one of the reasons why it is necessary to be concerned about the issue related to the South China Sea and the China Nine-Dash Line. On the Indonesian side, Indonesia has stated many times that it has no dispute with China regarding the South China Sea.<sup>66</sup> However, there is a territorial waters issue regarding the Natuna Waters. This is overlapped with the China Nine-Dash Line, which then impacts on Chinese illegal fishing as well.

In Indonesia's perspective, the serious problem with China in Natuna Waters includes territorial waters. The claim is considered to be a threat from China over Indonesia's sovereignty. Although Indonesia does not say directly that China's claims and actions are a threat, it can be seen that the Indonesian government has tried several ways to deal with China and to try to prevent Chinese domination in Indonesia's maritime strategic areas, one of which is through the Maritime Forum.

In terms of maritime security, Indonesia has an interest in cooperating with Japan in the Maritime Forum, especially in order to face China. Indonesia feels that it does not have a dispute with China regarding the Chinese Nine-

---

<sup>66</sup> Raja Eben Lumbanrau. 2016. *Indonesia dan China di Pusaran Laut China Selatan*. CNN Indonesia. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160624092606-75-140606/indonesia-dan-china-di-pusaran-laut-china-selatan>

Dash Line issue.<sup>67</sup> This is because Indonesia believes that the EEZ in Natuna Waters, currently known as the North Natuna Sea, is a part of Indonesia's territorial waters.<sup>68</sup> This area is therefore part of Indonesia's maritime sovereignty bordering the South China Sea. Indonesia will continue to strive to maintain Indonesia's borders, to the point of even daring to bring the issue to the International Arbitration Court due to Indonesia uses the UNCLOS. China only uses traditional fishing maps still.<sup>69</sup> In order to strengthen the claim, Indonesia wants to develop the Natuna Islands, namely through the fishing industry, tourism, energy management, and security.<sup>70</sup> These points are contained in both the memorandum and every joint statement of the Maritime Forum.

Beside of the overlapping area issue with the China Nine-Dash Line, Indonesia's interest in the Maritime Forum is intended to solve the problem of illegal fishing at Natuna Waters, especially Chinese illegal fishing. Both foreign and local illegal fishing can be found in Natuna Waters.<sup>71</sup> However, Chinese illegal fishing is problematic to overcome and there is no intention from the Chinese government to be cooperative.<sup>72</sup> It seems that Chinese illegal fishing is

---

<sup>67</sup> Raja Eben Lumbanrau, Anggi Kusumadewi. 2016. *Indonesia Nine-Dashed Line China ke Natuna Bak Muncul dari Langit*. CNN Indonesia.

<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160623113553-20-140352/nine-dashed-line-china-ke-natuna-bak-muncul-dari-langit>

<sup>68</sup> Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investments. 2016. *Indonesia Tak Akan Mundur Sejengkal Pun Pertahankan Natuna*. <https://maritim.go.id/indonesia-tak-akan-mundur-sejengkal-pun-pertahankan-natuna/>

<sup>69</sup> Ibid

<sup>70</sup> Ibid

<sup>71</sup> Poltak Partogi Nainggolan. 2018 *Indonesia dan Rivalitas China, Jepang dan India*. Jakarta: Indonesia House of Representative (DPR RI), 189

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, p.190

also supported by the Chinese government. This is possibly due to the territorial water claim in Natuna Waters.<sup>73</sup>

Many incidents have happened between the Indonesian patrol vessel, KP HIU (*Kapal Pengawas Hiu*) owned by the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries with the Chinese Coast Guards when arresting Chinese illegal fishing vessels.<sup>74</sup> Big incidents have happened in 2003, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2015, and more seriously, in 2016.<sup>75</sup> From the incidents, the Chinese Coast Guard threatened Indonesian officers to release the illegal Chinese fishers. They did not hesitate to chase and crash into the Indonesian patrol vessels.<sup>76</sup>

There have been many incidences but two big incidents in Natuna waters have got public attention. First, on 19<sup>th</sup> March 2016, the Indonesian patrol vessel KP HIU 011 (*Kapal Pengawas Hiu 011*) found the Chinese illegal fishing vessel, Kway Fey 10078, in Natuna waters.<sup>77</sup> When the patrol vessel KP HIU 011 was arresting Kway Fey, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel came to intervene and threatened the Indonesian authorization to release the Kway Fey. They also crashed into the Kway Fey boat while it was still detained by the Indonesian vessel.<sup>78</sup> In addition, the Chinese Coast Guard was a threat because the vessel was bigger than the Indonesia patrol vessel and armed. Second, on 27<sup>th</sup> May 2016, China protested about the Indonesian attitude when conducting

---

<sup>73</sup> Ibid

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, p.189

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, pp. 189-190

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, p. 90

<sup>77</sup> Leo Suryadinata. 2016. "Did the Natuna Incident Shake Indonesia-China Relations?" *Yusof Ishak Institute*, Issue19 (April), 2

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, 2-3

raids on foreign vessels fishing in Natuna Waters.<sup>79</sup> The Chinese government used the term ‘traditional fishing ground’. They believe that the Indonesian government conducted raids in its traditional fishing ground. This term has never been mentioned in UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). Thus, Indonesia does not recognize the Chinese government’s claim about their traditional fishing ground.<sup>80</sup>

The Indonesian government has responded to the Chinese actions. In the case of illegal fishing, Indonesia has asked China to clarify its actions of sending its Coast Guard and trying to threaten the Indonesian patrol officers.<sup>81</sup> After the incident in 2016, the Indonesian Foreign Minister sent a diplomatic note to China. However, the response from the Chinese government was not good. They said that the Natuna Islands are part of Indonesia's territory but they also say that the Chinese fishers catch fish in their traditional fishing grounds.<sup>82</sup> Besides this, the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries has threatened China to bring the cases to the International Arbitration Court.<sup>83</sup> In the end, Indonesia

---

<sup>79</sup> Aaron L. Connelly. 2016. “Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going it alone”. *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, (December), 5

<sup>80</sup> Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investments. 2016. *Indonesia Tak Akan Mundur Sejengkal Pun Pertahankan Natuna*.

<https://maritim.go.id/indonesia-tak-akan-mundur-sejengkal-pun-pertahankan-natuna/>

<sup>81</sup> Poltak Partogi Nainggolan. 2018. *Indonesia dan Rivalitas China, Jepang dan India*. (Jakarta: Indonesia House of Representative (DPR RI), 191

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, pp. 189 - 199

<sup>83</sup> Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investments. 2016. *Indonesia Tak Akan Mundur Sejengkal Pun Pertahankan Natuna*.

<https://maritim.go.id/indonesia-tak-akan-mundur-sejengkal-pun-pertahankan-natuna/>

changed the name of EEZ Natuna to the North Natuna Sea. They have also conducted military exercises in Natuna waters.<sup>84</sup>

Based on these issues in Natuna Waters in terms of security, Indonesia has a higher interest than Japan in the Maritime Forum. Through the Maritime Forum, Indonesia can do more to monitor the situation in Natuna Waters due to the development activities on the island. It has also a significant impact on maritime security. The problem of illegal fishing is difficult to overcome due to the capacity of the institutional supervisors of fisheries when conducting surveillance operations that are still limited in terms of facilities, human resources and operational funds. Therefore, in this cooperation, Japan has agreed to provide aid and patrol vessels and to develop radar systems, space technology and capacity building.<sup>85</sup> This will be useful for Indonesia in combating illegal fishing in Natuna Waters.

The assistance clearly supports Indonesia in emphasizing the claim of the Natuna Islands, both in the water and on the land. So far, a significant effort has been done by Japan in terms of providing financial assistance for the

---

<sup>84</sup> Indonesia Institute of Sciences (the Center of Political Studies). 2017. *Laut Natuna Utara dan Respon Tiongkok*.

<http://www.politik.lipi.go.id/kolom/kolom-1/politik-internasional/1165-laut-natuna-utara-dan-respon-tiongkok>

<sup>85</sup> Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. 2017. The Joint Press Release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on the occasion of the visit of Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Lt. Gen. (Retired) Luhut B. Pandjaitan to Japan. <https://maritim.go.id/joint-press-release-indonesia-japan/>

development of the fisheries sector.<sup>86</sup> The Indonesian government is planning to conduct a development project in 2020.<sup>87</sup>

Indonesia's current position on the Natuna issue is using mixed strategies that adopt military and non-military aspects. This can be said to be hedging as explained by Kuik. This is how Southeast Asia countries have positioned themselves to face powerful countries like China. Indonesia has several ways to deal with China through its capacity on this issue. However, many limitations exist in the capacity that make it impossible for Indonesia to face China alone. In addition, the strength of the economic cooperation with China affects how Indonesia deals with China in the security issue. China is the highest trading partner for Indonesia and many Chinese investors are also investing in Indonesia.


Indonesia continues to maintain its primary interest in territorial waters. So far, Indonesia has never cooperated with China in its maritime security aspects and it has rejected China's offer to invest in very strategic areas, especially in the North and East. The same happened when Indonesia rejected China's offer to invest in East Kalimantan, in which the area would become

---

<sup>86</sup> Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2019. Press Releases Signing of Grant Agreement with Indonesia: Contributing to the Fisheries Activities in Outer Islands by developing Fishing Port Facilities and Fish Markets. [https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2018/180731\\_01.html](https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2018/180731_01.html)

<sup>87</sup> Samuel Pablo. 2018. *Lewat Perikanan, Jepang Bantu Memakmurkan Pulau Terluar RI*. CNBC Indonesia. <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20180801095658-4-26375/lewat-perikanan-jepang-bantu-memakmurkan-pulau-terluar-ri>

Indonesia's new capital and center of government.<sup>88</sup> Indonesia prefers to do bilateral cooperation with Japan, such as in the Malacca Straits, which is a part of serious issues in the area of maritime security.



**Figure 6. Strategic Maritime Border**

Source: National Authority for Border Management

According to the Government Regulation No. 26 of 2008

<sup>88</sup> Rahayu Subekti. *Bangun Ibu Kota Baru, Luhut: Kita tak Butuh Dana Cina*. REPUBLIKA.co.id. September 3, 2019. <https://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/px9622377/bangun-ibu-kota-baru-luhut-kita-tak-butuh-dana-china> (accessed on November 1, 2019).

Although the Indonesia-Japan Maritime Forum focuses on Indonesian territory, Japan has little interest in the security aspect. Japan's interest in the security aspects may be related to the Chinese expansion and the freedom of navigation<sup>89</sup> in the South China Sea. Japan has always expressed support for the freedom of navigation when responding to the South China Sea issue.<sup>90</sup> Freedom of navigation has also been mentioned and become an interest of the United States. The interests of this alliance are deliberately related to one another. Furthermore, China has always unilaterally claimed it as its territory. It will be dangerous if China expands more of its unilateral claim over the maritime area around the South China Sea.

Japan wants to avoid the unilateral expansion of China's territory. Geographically, Natuna waters border the South China Sea.<sup>91</sup> The current problem between Indonesia and China is that China has included the EEZ of the Natuna Islands or the North Natuna Sea in part of the China Nine-Dash Line Map.<sup>92</sup> Indonesia's claim about its territorial water in the North Natuna Sea is

---

<sup>89</sup> Freedom of Navigation is an area where there is no state sovereignty, so all countries (foreign vessels) can navigate freely around the world — usually this refers to busy sea lanes that are used as trade routes. Access: Albert J Hoffmann. 2015. *Oxford Public International Law Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Navigation, Freedom of. Law*. London: Oxford University Press

<sup>90</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2019. *Diplomatic Book 2019: Japan's Foreign Policy that Takes a Panoramic Perspective of the World Map*.

<https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2019/html/chapter2/c020107.html> Ch. 2

<sup>91</sup> Local Government of Natuna Regency. *Selayang Pandang Kabupaten Natuna. Provinsi Kepulauan Riau*. <https://natunakab.go.id/selayang-pandang-kabupaten-natuna-provinsi-kepulauan-riau/>

<sup>92</sup> Raja Eben Lumbanrau, Anggi Kusumadewi. 2016. *Indonesia Nine-Dashed Line China ke Natuna Bak Muncul dari Langit*. CNN Indonesia.

<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160623113553-20-140352/nine-dashed-line-china-ke-natuna-bak-muncul-dari-langit>

firm because it refers to UNCLOS, which is recognized by the ratifying countries. China and Indonesia are also countries that have ratified UNCLOS.<sup>93</sup> However, based on the issues that occur in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, China has always unilaterally claimed it to be its territory.

Indonesia's problem with China is not on the island itself, but in the waters bordering the South China Sea. So far, China has always acted as it pleases and it has claimed the North Natuna Sea as its traditional fishing ground. The problem is also complicated due to the lack of capabilities within Southeast Asia countries, like Indonesia, when facing China. It can be seen from the case of the Kway Fey vessel that they caught fish illegally in Natuna waters and that China's Coast Guard showed dangerous behavior and intervened against Indonesia. Indonesian capabilities are not powerful enough to face China on their own. In addition, Indonesia is also limited in terms of the capability of its air-maritime domain.<sup>94</sup>

The Maritime Forum could be a strategy by Japan against the unilateral expansion of China's maritime territory. This forum can be used as a chance for Japan to spread their concern about maritime security, especially to Indonesia who has a strategic maritime area. Therefore Japan provides the capacity for Indonesia Coastal Guard's by providing patrol vessels, radar systems, and space

---

<sup>93</sup> United Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea. *Declarations and Statements* [https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention\\_agreements/convention\\_declarations.htm](https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm)

<sup>94</sup> Yoji Koda. 2016. "Japan Perception's and Interests in the South China Sea". *National Bureau of Asian Research Asia Policy: Asia Policy*, Number 21 (January), 33

technology.<sup>95</sup> . Through this cooperation, it helps Indonesia to increase their awareness and to better act against aggressive behavior from any nation. The Japanese assistance is significant in terms of the maritime security of Indonesia and securing the Indonesia Maritime area.

Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is a part of Japan's concern. It might well be one of the factors that makes the Maritime Forum important. The Natuna Islands, which are one of the focus points in the Maritime Forum, have no relations with the dispute in South China that is currently ongoing between China and some of the Southeast Asian countries.<sup>96</sup> However, as explained in the previous paragraphs, the location of Natuna waters directly borders with the South China Sea.<sup>97</sup> Indonesia is probably not the only one who is worried about the issue. Japan is as well. This is because if China claims that the area belongs to them and there is an expansion of its territory into Natuna waters, then this will affect the freedom of navigation for Japan in the territorial waters and sea lines of communication (SLOCs).<sup>98</sup> The area has a strategic position and it is very important for international trade, as

---

<sup>95</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. The Joint Press Release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on the occasion of the visit of Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Lt. Gen. (Retired) Luhut B. Pandjaitan to Japan.

<https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000323211.pdf> (accessed on August 30, 2019).

<sup>96</sup> Directorate of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia. *Indonesia and the Dynamics of the East Asian Region (Indonesia dan Dinamika Kawasan Asia Timur) (Government Document)*

<sup>97</sup> Local Government of Natuna Regency. Selayang Pandang Kabupaten Natuna, Provinsi Kepulauan Riau. <https://natunakab.go.id/selayang-pandang-kabupaten-natuna-provinsi-kepulauan-riau/>

<sup>98</sup> Global Conflict Tracker. “*Territorial Dispute in the South China Sea*” <https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea>

well as to the naval forces.<sup>99</sup> Lastly, Japan, as a United States ally, also supports the United States' security strategy of maintaining freedom of navigation.<sup>100</sup>

## 2. Business to Business

The Natuna Islands are part of the Riau province, under Ranai as the administrative center that can be found on Natuna Besar, Indonesia.<sup>101</sup> Geographically, it is directly bordering its neighboring countries at 1016 ' - 7019' North Latitude and 1050 00 ' - 110000' East Longitude. It is part of the larger *Tudjuh* Archipelago, which refers to the group of the Seven Islands located on the international trade lane to and from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan. Thus, Natuna is the gateway to other Southeast Asian countries. It is an archipelago, covering an area of 141,901.20 Km<sup>2</sup> with 138,666.0 Km<sup>2</sup> of ocean surface and 3,235.20 Km<sup>2</sup> of land surface. The island is bordered by Vietnam, Cambodia and the South China Sea (changed to North Natuna Sea) in the north, in the south by the Riau Islands Regency, in the east by East Malaysia and West Kalimantan and in the west by the Malaysian Peninsula and Bintan Island (Riau Islands Regency).<sup>102</sup>

---

<sup>99</sup> Ibid

<sup>100</sup> Yoji Koda. 2016. "Japan Perception's and Interests in the South China Sea", National Bureau of Asian Research Asia Policy: Asia Policy Number 21 (January), 29-35

<sup>101</sup> Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes. *Menyusuri Perbatasan di Laut Natuna Utara*. Indonesia <https://www.pajak.go.id/artikel/menyusuri-perbatasan-di-laut-natuna-utara-indonesia>

<sup>102</sup> Local Government of Natuna Regency. *Selayang Pandang Kabupaten Natuna, Provinsi Kepulauan Riau*. <https://natunakab.go.id/selayang-pandang-kabupaten-natuna-provinsi-kepulauan-riau/>


Natuna waters have a very strategic position and they have the potential to be developed if the authority can manage it well. The Natuna Islands are one of Indonesia's outer islands that have abundant natural resources, especially oil, gas, and fish. Therefore the Indonesian government is focused on conducting development programs in the Natuna Islands. These resources need to be managed well as they are beneficial for the Indonesian people's welfare.

According to the annual report of the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Natuna has a large stock of oil and gas resources. Currently it is one of the areas that is of concern. In 2018, the highest stock of Indonesian gas resources was located in the Natuna Islands and it was confirmed that there was 46.96 Trillion Standard Cubic Feet (TSCF) of the gas stock in Indonesia.<sup>103</sup> The government had confirmed that the oil stock in 2018 reached 117.6 Million Stock Tank Barrels (MMSTB).<sup>104</sup>

---

<sup>103</sup> Directorate General of Oil and Gas. 2018. Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Laporan Tahunan Pencapaian Pembangunan. 45


<sup>104</sup> Ibid. p. 46



**Figure 7. Map of the Gas Stock in Indonesia**

**P1: Confirm, P2: Possibly, P3: Anticipation**

Source: 2018 Annual Report of Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources



**Figure 8. Map of the Oil Stock in Indonesia**

**P1: Confirm, P2: Possibly, P3: Anticipation**

Source: 2018 Annual Report of Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources

On Natuna Island, oil and gas drilling projects are carried out by both Indonesian and foreign contractors.<sup>105</sup> So far, dominance is still held by the contractors within domestic companies. Foreign contractors in Natuna come from various countries and Chevron is the company from the United States that has the most significant contribution.<sup>106</sup> Cooperation with Japanese contractors has also been carried out for a long time in terms of oil and gas projects in Natuna, such as Inpex Natuna Ltd. This company is a contractor in Block b in

<sup>105</sup> Directorate General of Oil and Gas, Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. *Laporan Tahunan Pencapaian Pembangunan 2018*. p. 47

<sup>106</sup> Ibid

the South Natuna region.<sup>107</sup> The project has since been transferred to PT Medco Daya Sentosa (Medco).<sup>108</sup> However, with the principle of trust in Japan, the Indonesian government has offered the oil and gas development project in East Natuna to Japan. Inpex Natuna Ltd. This has left South Natuna interested in the oil and gas development project in East Natuna.<sup>109</sup>

The oil and gas project in the Natuna Islands requires involvement from both local and foreign contractors. Therefore, from the Indonesia perspective, the involvement of the Japanese contractor is very desirable for East Natuna. Japan also sees the business potential and it is interested in being a project holder in the drilling for oil and gas in East Natuna.

Fisheries in the Natuna Islands are very profitable. Coastal waters have a maximum depth of 20 meters. It has a tremendous potential to be developed for marine aquaculture with ± 12,997 ha, while the level of land use is still very small at around 268.25 ha (2.06%). From the explanation, there is a big opportunity for aquaculture businesses.<sup>110</sup>

---

<sup>107</sup> Kompas.com 2017. *Jual Saham ke Medco, Inpex Hengkang dari Blok B Natuna*. <https://money.kompas.com/read/2017/03/28/210000226/jual.saham.ke.medco.inpex.hengkang.dari.blok.b.natuna.> )

<sup>108</sup> Ibid

<sup>109</sup> Directorate General of Oil and Gas, Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. 2016. *Pemerintah Tawari Malaysia dan Jepang Kembangkan Migas di Natuna*. <https://migas.esdm.go.id/post/read/pemerintah-tawari-malaysia-dan-jepang-kembangkan-migas-di-natuna>

<sup>110</sup> Indonesia's Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. 2016. *Kelautan dan Perikanan dalam Angka Pusat Data Kabupaten Natuna, Statistik dan Informasi Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan Kabupaten Natuna*. Jakarta, Indonesia, 23

Before the Maritime Forum was formed, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries conducted research on aquaculture production in Natuna. In 2015, the production reached 754.84 tons and in 2014, it was 2,479.12 tons. Here it can be seen that there was a production decline of 69.55%. Seaweed commodity production was 1,8886.75 tons in 2014 and only 142.80 tons in 2015. The production here also decreased by around 92.43%. This problem came from the production capital not being balanced with the purchase of seeds from outside of the Natuna Regency compared to the sales results. This had an impact on the difficulties encountered while marketing. Therefore, it is necessary to look for a market share in production and to encourage the formation of good cultivators.<sup>111</sup>

With so many natural resources on the Natuna Islands, Indonesia has economic potential in several development programs, particularly in the fisheries sector. Indonesia wants to establish a huge fish market including the port in the Natuna Islands.<sup>112</sup> The fish market is one of the Indonesian government's targets that is often mentioned at every ministerial and head of state meeting. Indonesia needs funding in order to develop in that sector, such as establishing a huge fish market. These are the reasons why Indonesia needs Japan to assist in its economic development aspects, as stated in the memorandum of the Maritime Forum.

---

<sup>111</sup> Ibid

<sup>112</sup> Deputy of Maritime Sovereignty of Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment (Interview)

In the middle of 2018, Japan has allocated grant aid for the development of the fisheries sector in the Natuna Islands.<sup>113</sup> The aid provided by Japan will be used for development projects in the fisheries sector, starting from 2020.<sup>114</sup> Japanese assistance is part of a development program that has allocated a total of 2.5 billion yen to the outer islands, including 983 thousand yen to the Natuna Islands.<sup>115</sup> The assistance was allocated by the Japanese government to the Indonesian government through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) under the authority of the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. The duration of the implementation of the program is 38 months.<sup>116</sup>

Economically, Japan's interest is related to the development of the fisheries sector in Indonesia. Japanese grants used for the development of the fisheries sector in the Natuna Islands with reciprocity from Indonesia must be willing to export fish supplies to Japan.<sup>117</sup> Japan wants to import fish from Indonesia, possibly due to the decline of the fish supply in Japan. The fish

---

<sup>113</sup>Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2018. *Press Releases Signing of Grant Agreement with Indonesia: Contributing to the Fisheries Activities in Outer Islands by developing Fishing Port Facilities and Fish Markets*. [https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2018/180731\\_01.html](https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2018/180731_01.html)

<sup>114</sup>Samuel Pablo. 2018. *Lewat Perikanan, Jepang Bantu Memakmurkan Pulau Terluar RI*. CNBC Indonesia. <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20180801095658-4-26375/lewat-perikanan-jepang-bantu-memakmurkan-pulau-terluar-ri>

<sup>115</sup> Ibid

<sup>116</sup>Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2018. *Press Releases Signing of Grant Agreement with Indonesia: Contributing to the Fisheries Activities in Outer Islands by developing Fishing Port Facilities and Fish Markets*. [https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2018/180731\\_01.html](https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2018/180731_01.html)

<sup>117</sup> Liputan 6. 2019. Menteri Susi Dorong Ekspor Tuna RI ke Jepang. <https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/3882579/menteri-susi-dorong-ekspor-tuna-ri-ke-jepang>

demand of the Japanese people is increasing.<sup>118</sup> It can also be seen that Japan has also agreed to focus on Indonesia's outer islands, especially the Natuna Islands. This is also because the Natuna Islands have great potential related to fish production, but there are many limitations related to development. Thus, the cooperation in the Maritime Forum by Japan is significant in terms of business to business.

Considering the enormous potential resources, such as oil, gas, and fish in the Natuna Islands and how it is strategic geographically, in the economic interest aspect, it is very beneficial for both Japan and Indonesia. Both countries see the potential that exists on the business side and both sides are equally beneficial, including the governments, project holders, investors and people as well.

---

<sup>118</sup> Katsukawa Toshio. 2019. Building a Future for Japan's Fisheries Industry. <https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00455/building-a-future-for-japan%E2%80%99s-fisheries-industry.html>

## **CHAPTER V Conclusion**

The Indonesia-Japan Maritime Forum, formed by Indonesia and Japan, is focused on several outer islands, one of which is the Natuna Islands. Natuna is located in a very strategic position, which is a gateway to other Southeast Asian countries. In addition, there are abundant natural resources, for example, of oil, gas, and fish. However, the EEZ or North Natuna Sea has an issue with China, which overlaps with the China Nine-Dash Line.

Indonesia and Japan both have an interest in the Maritime Forum. These interests enable the two countries to agree to focus on the cooperation in relation to the Natuna Islands. Indonesia and Japan have interests in terms of security and the economy. The interests are encountering China and business to business.

In terms of security, the Maritime Forum can be used by the two countries as a strategy to deal with China. For Indonesia, the problem in the North Natuna Sea is that it overlaps with the China Nine-Dash Line. This is threatening its sovereignty. Indonesia needs to reinforce its territorial claims by engaging in the development activities through the Natuna Islands. This includes establishing a huge fish market and port, which are the primary target. There is also improving everything to deal with illegal fishing and the Chinese

government. Therefore, the establishment of the Maritime Forum is beneficial for Indonesia because of the Japanese assistance in aid, investment, capacity building, radar systems, patrol vessels, and other areas. For Japan itself, this cooperation is needed in order to oppose the unilateral claims of China's territorial expansion. Territorial expansion is related to the freedom of navigation and the sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

In terms of the economic interests involved, this cooperation is business to business. Indonesia is targeting a huge fish market and maximizing its oil and gas exploration. Japan gets a supply of fish from Indonesia as reciprocity, due to the decreasing fish supply in Japan. Japan has also obtained oil and gas projects in East Natuna through an offer from the Indonesian government.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aizawa, Nobuhiro. "Japan's Strategy toward Southeast Asia and the Japan-U.S. Alliance." *Center for Strategic and International Studies* April, 2014
- Ao, Temjenmeren. 2017. "Indonesia's Naval Expansion: A New Dimension to the Existing Security Impasse in the Region." *Indian Council of World Affairs*, 2 November 2017.
- Cabinet Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia. 2015. "Indonesia's Foreign Policy Priorities in 5 Years Ahead." (Accessed on September 27, 2017). <https://setkab.go.id/en/indonesias-foreign-policy-priorities-in-5-years-ahead/>
- Connelly, Aaron L. 2016. "Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going it alone". *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, (December), 5
- Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. 2017. "The Joint Press Release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on the occasion of the visit of Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Lt. Gen. (Retired) Luhut B. Pandjaitan to Japan." (Accessed on September 27, 2018) <https://maritim.go.id/joint-press-release-indonesia-japan/>

Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia.

*Memorandum Of Cooperation Between The Government Of The Republic Of Indonesia And The Government Of Japan On Establishment Of “Indonesia – Japan Maritime Forum” To Strengthen And Accelerate Maritime Cooperation (Government Document)*

Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investments. “Indonesia Tak Akan Mundur Sejengkal Pun Pertahankan Natuna.” (Accessed on November 30, 2019). <https://maritim.go.id/indonesia-tak-akan-mundur-sejengkal-pun-pertahankan-natuna/>

CSIS. China Nine-Dash Line, South China Sea. <https://amti.csis.org/> (accessed on September 27, 2017).

Directorate of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Republic of Indonesia, *Indonesia dan Dinamika Kawasan Asia Timur (Government Document)*

Directorate of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Republic of Indonesia, *Snapshot Hubungan Bilateral Republik Indonesia (RI) dan Jepang (Government Document)*

Directorate General of Oil and Gas, Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral

Resources. “Pemerintah Tawari Malaysia dan Jepang Kembangkan Migas di Natuna.” (Accessed on November 30, 2019).

<https://migas.esdm.go.id/post/read/pemerintah-tawari-malaysia-dan-jepang-kembangkan-migas-di-natuna>

- Directorate General of Oil and Gas, Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. *Laporan Tahunan Pencapaian Pembangunan 2018*. p. 45
- Drifte, Reinhard. 2016. "Japan's Policy towards the South China Sea – Applying "Proactive Peace Diplomacy"?" *Peace Research Institute Frankfurt PRIF* Report No. 140
- Er, Lam Peng. "Japan's Postwar Reconciliation with Southeast Asia" *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding* Vol. 3 No. 1 (2015): pp 43-63, p. 45
- Global Conflict Tracker. "Territorial Dispute in the South China Sea". (Accessed on December 1, 2019).  
<https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea>
- Hasan, Rizki Akbar. *Indonesia Mengubah Nama Laut China Selatan, Ini Reaksi Beijing*. June 16, 2017.  
<https://www.liputan6.com/global/read/3024099/indonesia-mengubah-nama-laut-china-selatan-ini-reaksi-beijing> (accessed on September 1, 2019)
- Hoffmann, Albert J. 2015. *Oxford Public International Law Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Navigation, Freedom of Law*. London: Oxford University Press
- Hung Son, Nguyen. 2013. "ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in Southeast Asia: Maritime Security and Cooperation." In *Beyond 2015: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity in Southeast Asia*, edited by Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya, 214-226. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange

Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes. “Menyusuri Perbatasan di Laut Natuna Utara.” (Accessed on September 10, 2019).  
Indonesia <https://www.pajak.go.id/artikel/menyusuri-perbatasan-di-laut-natuna-utara-indonesia>

Indonesia.GO.ID Portal Informasi Indonesia. “The Map of Republic of Indonesia.” (Accessed on September 10, 2019)  
<https://www.indonesia.go.id/archipelago>

Indonesia.GO.ID Portal Informasi Indonesia. “Indonesia renamed northern areas of an exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea (*Laut China Selatan*) as The North Natuna Sea (*Laut Natuna Utara*).” (Accessed on September 10, 2019).  
<https://www.indonesia.go.id/archipelago>

Indonesia Institute of Sciences (the Center of Political Studies). “Laut Natuna Utara dan Respon Tiongkok” (Accessed on November 25, 2017).  
<http://www.politik.lipi.go.id/kolom/kolom-1/politik-internasional/1165-laut-natuna-utara-dan-respon-tiongkok>

Indonesia's Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries.

*Kelautan dan Perikanan dalam Angka Pusat Data Kabupaten Natuna, Statistik dan Informasi Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan Kabupaten Natuna*. August, 2016 Jakarta, Indonesia. P. 23

Ishida, Yasuyuki. “Japan and ASEAN partnership: From Fukuda to Abe Doctrine.”  
*Jindal Journal of International Affairs* volume 6

- Jae Bong, Park. 2016. "Indonesia's Global Maritime Nexus Policy and the Natuna Islands Incidents." *Southeast Asia Journal*, vol.26, no.2, pp.99 - 126
- Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2019. *Press Releases Signing of Grant Agreement with Indonesia: Contributing to the Fisheries Activities in Outer Islands by developing Fishing Port Facilities and Fish Markets*  
[https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2018/180731\\_01.html](https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2018/180731_01.html)
- Koda, Yoji. 2016. "Japan Perception's and Interests in the South China Sea", *National Bureau of Asian Research Asia Policy: Asia Policy*, Number 21 (January), 29-35
- Kompas.com. 2017. *Jual Saham ke Medco, Inpex Hengkang dari Blok B Natuna*. (Accessed on November 30, 2019).  
[https://money.kompas.com/read/2017/03/28/210000226/jual.saham.ke.medco.inpex.hengkang.dari.blok.b.natuna. \)](https://money.kompas.com/read/2017/03/28/210000226/jual.saham.ke.medco.inpex.hengkang.dari.blok.b.natuna.)
- Kuik, Cheng Chwee. "The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol. 30, No. 2 (August 2008), pp. 159-185
- Liputan 6. 2019. Menteri Susi Dorong Ekspor Tuna RI ke Jepang. (Accessed on November 30, 2019).  
<https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/3882579/menteri-susi-dorong-ekspor-tuna-ri-ke-jepang>

Local Government of Natuna Regency. “Selayang Pandang Kabupaten Natuna, Provinsi Kepulauan Riau.” (Accessed on September 10, 2019)

<https://natunakab.go.id/selayang-pandang-kabupaten-natuna-provinsi-kepulauan-riau/>

Lumbanrau, Raja Eben. 2016. *Indonesia dan China di Pusaran Laut China Selatan*. CNN Indonesia. (Accessed on September 10, 2019)

<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160624092606-75-140606/indonesia-dan-china-di-pusaran-laut-china-selatan>

Lumbanrau, Raja Eben and Anggi Kusumadewi. 2016. *'Nine-Dashed Line China ke Natuna Bak Muncul dari Langit'*.

(Accessed on August 30, 2019)

<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160623113553-20-140352/nine-dashed-line-china-ke-natuna-bak-muncul-dari-langit>

Maritime Institute of Malaysia. (Accessed on November 25, 2017).

<http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/wp-content/uploads/sealinesunderstrain.pdf>

Medeiros, Evan S. “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability”

The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Grant Aid to Indonesia for the Project for Construction of Patrol Vessels for the Prevention of Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons.” June 16, 2006. (Accessed on August 30, 2019).

<https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/6/0616-3.html>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2006; Section 4. Provision of Patrol Vessels to Indonesia." (Accessed on August 30, 2019).

<https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2006/ODA2006/html/honpen/hp202040400.htm>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Japan-Indonesia Joint Statement. 2006. "Strategic Partnership for Peaceful and Prosperous Future". (Accessed on August 30, 2019)

<https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/joint0611.html>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Japan Indonesia Summit Meeting." March 23, 2015. (Accessed on December 21, 2017).

[https://www.mofa.go.jp/s\\_sa/sea2/id/page4e\\_000231.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/id/page4e_000231.html)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "The Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting." September 7, 2016. (Accessed on August 30, 2019).  
[https://www.mofa.go.jp/a\\_o/rp/page3e\\_000590.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page3e_000590.html)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Foreign Minister Kishida Meets with the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs of Indonesia." December 21, 2016. (Accessed on December 21, 2017).

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e\\_001427.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001427.html)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Japan-Indonesia Joint Statement on Strengthening Strategic Partnership." January 15, 2017. (Accessed on September 27, 2017).

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000218457.pdf>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “The Joint Press Release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on the occasion of the visit of Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Lt. Gen. (Retired) Luhut B. Pandjaitan to Japan.” (Accessed on August 30, 2019).

<https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000323211.pdf>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2019. *Diplomatic Book 2019: Japan's Foreign Policy that Takes a Panoramic Perspective of the World Map*.  
<https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2019/html/chapter2/c020107.html> Ch. 2

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference.” July 15, 2017. (Accessed on October 17, 2017).

<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/celv/eng/fyrth/t1477975.htm>

Nainggolan, Poltak Partogi. 2018 *Indonesia dan Rivalitas China, Jepang dan India*. Jakarta: Indonesia House of Representative (DPR RI), 189 - 191

National Authority for Border Management, *Rencana Induk: Pengelolaan Batas Wilayah Negara dan Kawasan Perbatasan di Indonesia* (Jakarta: BNPP, 2011)

Pablo, Samuel. 2018. *Lewat Perikanan, Jepang Bantu Memakmurkan Pulau Terluar RI*. CNBC Indonesia. (Accessed on December 1, 2019)

<https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20180801095658-4-26375/lewat-perikanan-jepang-bantu-memakmurkan-pulau-terluar-ri>

Paryanto. *Indonesian Security Challenges: Problems and Prospect to Improve National Security*. University of Brawijaya, Malang.

Robinson, Thomas W. "A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Jun., 1967), pp. 135-175, p.140.

Sambhi, Natalie. 2015. "Jokowi's 'Global Maritime Axis' Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?" *Security Challenges*, Vol. 11, No. 2, Current Security Issues: Deradicalisation, China's economic influence and maritime developments in South-East Asia (2015), pp. 39-56

Smith, Sheila A. 2019. "Japan's Security Identity in the Indo-Pacific" *In Implementing The Indo-Pacific: Japan's Region Building Initiatives*, edited by Kyle Springer, 86-97. Perth: Perth UsAsia Centre

Subekti, Rahayu. *Bangun Ibu Kota Baru, Luhut: Kita tak Butuh Dana Cina*. REPUBLIKA.co.id. September 3, 2019.

(Accessed on November 1, 2019).

<https://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/px9622377/bangun-ibu-kota-baru-luhut-kita-tak-butuh-dana-china>

Sumio, Hatano translated by Christopher W. A. Szpilman. "History and the State in Postwar Japan". *The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus* Volume 16 Issue 9 Number 1 May 01, 2018, p. 3

- Suryadinata, Leo and Mustafa Izzuddin. 2017. *The Natunas: Territorial Integrity In The Forefront Of Indonesia– China Relations*. Singapore: Yusof Ishak Institute
- Suryadinata, Leo. 2016. “Did the Natuna Incident Shake Indonesia-China Relations?” *Yusof Ishak Institute*, Issue19 (April), 2
- Tessman, Brock and Wojtek Wolfe, “Great Powers and Strategic Hedging: The Case of Chinese Energy Security Strategy” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 2011), pp. 214-240
- The Washington Quarterly Winter 2005-06. 29:1 pp. 145–167, p.146
- Telhami, Shibley. “The Return of the State Vol. 84.” *National Interest* (Summer 2006): 109.
- The Association of Southeast Asia Nations. (Accessed on November 25, 2017).  
<https://asean.org/asean/about-asean/#>
- The Nippon Foundation. Map of Straits of Malacca as Japanese Vessels Lane. (Accessed on November 25, 2017). [https://www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/en/what/projects/safe\\_passage](https://www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/en/what/projects/safe_passage)
- The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (Accessed on November 25, 2017)  
[http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/press\\_briefing/2014/12/07/content\\_281475020441708.htm](http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/press_briefing/2014/12/07/content_281475020441708.htm)
- The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (Accessed on November 25, 2017).  
[https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/part4.htm](https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part4.htm)

The United Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea. *Declarations and Statements*.

(Accessed on November 30, 2019).

[https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention\\_agreements/convention\\_declarations.htm](https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm)

Toshio, Katsukawa. 2019. "Building a Future for Japan's Fisheries Industry."

(Accessed on December 1, 2020).

<https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00455/building-a-future-for-japan%E2%80%99s-fisheries-industry.html>

## 논문 초록

### 인도네시아와 일본의 해양 안보 협력 : 해양 포럼을 중심으로

Desica Ana Nuruljanah  
국제지역학  
국제대학원  
서울대학교

이 논문은 왜 인도네시아와 일본이 해양 포럼을 구성하여 특정한 섬, 특히 나투나 제도에 초점을 맞추게 되었는가에 대하여 다루고 있다. 이 논문은 나투나 제도에 중점을 둔 해양 포럼이 경제와 안보에 대한 이익, 즉 중국 또한 국가 간 B2B (Business to Business)를 다루는 것에 기초하고 있음을 시사한다. 나투나 제도에 위치한 인도네시아의 배타적 경제수역 (Exclusive Economic Zone), 소위 북나투나해에 관한 문제는 남해구단선과 불법 어업 문제와도 관련되는 것인데, 인도네시아는 이러한 문제 때문에 중국을 다루기 위하여 해양 포럼을 이용하였다. 일본은 항행의 자유와 관련이 있는 남중국해에 대한 이익을 구하며 또한 중국의 영토 주장의

일방적인 확대에 반대하면서, 인도네시아를 포함한 동남아시아 국가들을 지원함으로써 해양 포럼 설립에 동의하였다. 또한 국가간 B2B 라는 관점에서 봤을 때, 나투나 제도는 풍부한 천연 자원, 특히 생선, 석유 및 가스를 보유하고 있다. 따라서 해양 포럼은 거대한 어시장, 석유 및 가스 프로젝트에 관한 지역 개발에 있어서 인도네시아에 매우 유익한 것이다. 또한 일본도 인도네시아에서 물고기를 공급하거나 수입함으로써 호혜를 얻을 것이라고 생각된다.

주요어 : 인도네시아, 일본, 해양 포럼, 해양 안보, 남해구단선, 나투나 제도

학번 : 2016-25480

## **Acknowledgement**

First and foremost, my praises and thanks go to Allah SWT, the Almighty, for His blessings and miracles throughout my graduate school life.

I would like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor Sheen Seong-Ho, for providing invaluable guidance throughout this research. I would also like to thank the other committee members, namely Professor Kim Taek-Yoon and Professor Oh Yoon-Ah.

I am extremely thankful to LPDP, who gave me the scholarship to study abroad and to support my research. If I had not got the scholarship, then I probably could not have flown to South Korea and studied at Seoul National University. If I had not got the support that I did, I probably could not have done my research smoothly. I will be return to Indonesia and do something to help my beloved country.

I am really grateful to my parents for their love, prayers, care and the sacrifices made for me, especially by my Mom. I will do everything for you after I finish my study. I am also very much thankful to my brothers and sister for their understanding and prayers.

Lastly, I am so thankful to all of the people who have supported me during my graduate school life. Thanks to my friend Emari Kawase. I know it is so weird to say it here, but I also got support from my favorite 아이돌, 방탄소년단 indirectly. During the hardest points of my life, I have enjoyed their music. It was really helpful. I was able to endure my sadness and become more mature. I count them as one of the important people in my life. Thus, I want to mention them here.