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Master's Thesis of Arts

**A Comparative Analysis of Primary Education
Projects in Malawi and Uganda:
Focusing on the Accountability Mechanism of the World Bank**

말라위와 우간다의 초등교육사업 비교분석:
세계은행의 책무성 제도를 중심으로

February 2020

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ABSTRACT

A Comparative Analysis of Primary Education Projects in Malawi and Uganda: Focusing on the Accountability Mechanism of the World Bank

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This research explores the accountability mechanism of the World Bank which has been continuously used to provide education Official Development Assistance (ODA) to many developing countries. With growing interest of the World Bank in education ODA, although the Bank is not an education specialized institution that intensively researches and offers only education projects to developing countries, it is necessary to analyze how the accountability mechanism of the World Bank have influenced final outcomes of the education projects the Bank provided for a certain period of time.

To answer this research question, this research takes a meta-evaluation of two African primary education projects which are already implemented by the Bank. The projects of Malawi and Uganda were implemented in a similar period of time for their primary education development, but received the opposite results at the end of the projects. To investigate why the two similar education project provided all by the Bank shows a difference in their final outcomes, the Principal-agent theory is used to describe the actual relationship

between the donor (the Bank) and the recipients (the Governments of Malawi and Uganda) from project design phase to evaluation phase. Also the three components of accountability (United Nations, 2013) are used to analyze whether the Bank as well as the Governments of Malawi and Uganda took a strong accountability and how the accountability mechanism of the Bank affected the projects directly or indirectly to receive the opposite outcomes at the end.

Findings address weak accountability mechanism of the Bank in limited contexts of Malawi and Uganda were the main cause of unsatisfactory project outcomes. The Bank did not fully reflect the highest priorities of the recipients. And it heavily focused on increasing quantitative gains rather than qualitative changes which actually promote sustainability of the education projects. But, the reason why Uganda's Primary Education and Teacher Development Project (PETDP) shows relatively more satisfactory outcome was due to stronger responsibility taken by the Bank than Malawi's Primary Education Project (PEP), especially from project design. However, findings also tell that the unsatisfactory outcomes of the education projects were not caused only by poor accountability mechanism of the Bank. In fact, the highly limited capacity of the Governments of Malawi and Uganda also contributed to their poor achievements in their education projects.

With these findings, the qualitative study would provide practical contributions and theoretical insights on education aid-providers as well as aid-receivers. The study cannot insist that the accountability mechanism of the Bank and other institutions have become or will become more agent-friendly and community-centered in education ODA. However, the study highlights more accountable roles of the principal and the agent, who are the influential actors for quality education at the international level, to promote more sustainable and satisfactory education projects in future.

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Keyword: Accountability Mechanism, the World Bank, Responsibility, Answerability, Education ODA, Primary Education Projects, Sustainability, Principal-Agent Theory

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

When looking back to the history of international development, the number of international institutions have been increased to assist the poor countries that were colonized and devastated economically, politically and socially by severe wars for years. From the past, the largest multilateral organization that has played a role as a ‘leading’ aid provider is the ‘World Bank’. Originally, the World Bank was founded right after the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods in 1944. The major role of the World Bank determined by the Bretton Woods conference, was to provide the poor countries sufficient financial supports in their post-war reconstruction and implementation of development projects (Major, 2012, p.161). Although the Bank provided them low interest loans for their infrastructure development during 1950s, they also started to pay more attention and lend money to social sectors including education from the late 1960s. The Bank was eventually regarded as “the single largest source of development capital” in the field of international education development as well (Heyneman, 2003, p.315).

In spite of the extensive development projects of the Bank in the poor countries, there are still lots of countries that have not made a huge improvement in their development. Especially in the field of education development, the Bank has provided the poor countries with large volume of financial support in constructing school infrastructure, purchasing teaching and learning materials, training local teachers, and so on. Their supports still purpose to expand education opportunities particularly for the disadvantaged children. Many critical comments have been increasing on the Bank’s assistance in developing countries’ public sector development works (includes education sector). The comments mainly tell that the bank’s

supports have brought more education distortions rather than improvements in the poor countries and the reason for their comments was due to the Bank's poor accountability in their development mechanism which has been built with more sanction-based and donor-centered approaches (Harvey, 2005).

For this reason, there are relatively more professional education development institutions like the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) than the Bank. The professional education development institutions also do lots of education projects in the disadvantaged countries. But, this study mainly focused on two World Bank's education projects implemented in Malawi and Uganda. There are two main reasons for choosing those cases. Firstly, there is not sufficient data available for the UNESCO's or other institutions' education projects to analyze their accountability mechanisms in depth. But, the Bank has relatively more sufficient resources available to be used for the study, and the data in their evaluation and other reports are more detailed than the reports of other development institutions.

Secondly, the World Bank's attention on the international education development is growing more and more every year. According to the latest education strategy of the Bank, the *World Bank's Education Strategy (WBES) 2020* (World Bank, 2012), some of its education development projects or assistance in developing countries have actually led many children and youth to leave school without learning much at all. Many of its education projects are still failing to bring meaningful and long-term effects in developing countries' education developments. When those unsatisfactory outcomes of education development in developing countries are compared to the general outcomes of the Bank-financed economic development have "fueled calls for greater opportunity and accountability" (World Bank, 2012).

For this reason, some education development experts might argue that the World Bank is just a bank or ‘money-lending institution’ that tries to make benefits from assisting the poor countries financially to develop their public sector development. Consequently, they might not see a value to study the Bank’s accountability mechanism with education development. However, it is difficult to conclude that the Bank’s education projects (the largest source of development capital) do not give any influence on the international education development since there are enormous number of developing countries that are receiving lots of assistances from the Bank for many years.

Therefore, this study takes a ‘meta-evaluation’ (evaluation for evaluation) on how the Bank and the Governments in Malawi and Uganda took accountability to implement their primary education projects successfully on the basis of principal-agent theory and three components of accountability that will be explained later in chapter 3. Methodology. In so doing, this study tries to find out how the Bank’s general accountability mechanism led the two African countries to achieve opposite results from the Bank-financed primary education projects implemented from mid-1990s and early 2000s.

1.1. Background

After the colonial periods of World War II, many countries were devastated and needed to reconstruct their ruined conditions. Over that time, the World Bank – ‘the largest source of development capital’ – played a great role to help those countries by providing loans and customized advices in the field of international development. Since the Bank realized the need of a steady shift from reconstruction to development, the scale of the Bank has been gradually expanded with comprising five development institutions¹. For this reason, the Bank has also started to work with regional, national governments, private sectors and civil society organizations and other international organizations (IOs) on a wide range of global issues.

They have been providing a great amount of financial and technical assistance to developing countries around the world. With aiming to achieve two primary goals – 1) ending the world extreme poverty, and 2) promoting shared prosperity of all countries by 2030 (World Bank, 2019), the Bank has become a more vital source of development for developing countries. In so doing, the Bank’s constant efforts to promote further development, not just recovery from the wars in all countries portray that the Bank is no longer an ordinary bank. Rather, it is a leading and significant development institution that is capable to connect the needs of the poorest countries and the global financial resources.

As the demand for the Bank’s development assistance has increased over time, they have implemented lots of development projects in many developing countries, regardless of sectors. The Bank’s various projects have actually contributed on making some improvement in developing countries, although the pace of achieving the Bank’s project goals is all at

¹ **Five development organizations managed by their member countries:** The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), The International Development Association (IDA), The International Finance Corporation (IFC), The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)

different pace by each sector. The Bank is constantly striving to reach the expectation and needs of all developing countries (World Bank, 2019).

The results of the Bank's development projects, nevertheless, are showing two different aspects – positive and negative results in the real practice. In so doing, the Bank, as a leading development institution, has been criticized and commented a lot from a few decades. Some downside of the Bank has appeared especially in the way they implement their projects to the developing countries. The Bank's role – lack of mutual accountability in the international development is a major cause of bringing “so much ill and so little good” (Easterly, 2006) in many developing countries.

In history, many international institutions believed that investing lots of finance for development would have helped the developing countries live in better conditions. In so doing, those institutions including the Bank have cared about ‘how much’ money they can provide for development, not about how well the money need to be managed and spent. Too much focus on the volume of financial support has led the Bank as a donor not to be fully responsible for their actions when providing development projects to some recipient countries. The irresponsibility of the donor has been highlighted, especially when the recipient countries faced some challenges during implementing their projects. Besides, they have often requested the recipients to be ‘westernized’ without taking a deep consideration on the local contexts – which is called ‘donor logic’. These downside of the Bank show their misunderstanding on ‘development’ for the disadvantaged countries.

As mentioned above, the mismanaged financial supports of the Bank have done more harm rather than good in development of the agents (Moyo, 2009). The unpleasant experience from the Bank's projects has caused the recipient countries to mistrust in their

donors so that sustainable development could not be accomplished properly. In that situation, the highly limited capacity of the recipients could not handle the large amount of finance alone without depending on their donors. It has become an additional factor which hindered promoting the sustainable development. These matters emphasize a weak accountable relationship between the donor and the recipient. Although the issue on the necessity of providing a large amount of money to developing country is still very controversial, the more important issue in the international development is sustainability of a quality life in developing countries.

The poor development practices, in addition, clearly show that the donor and the recipient countries have never been in an 'equal' position in the past (Mulgan, 2005). Rather, this clear division between them implies that Official Development Assistance (ODA) is simply to show wealthy countries' prestige, sense of greatness and superiority (Allina-Pisano, 2009). Also, the history tells that international aids contain particular intentions of the wealthy countries – like expanding their 'high imperialism' (power of donors) and finding bigger markets where more new investment opportunities and economic benefits can be gained (Allina-Pisano, 2009). Like the past experience, if international aid does not purpose to promote the development of recipient countries, ODA would just play a dominant role for the donors to build their own strategic architecture which controls the recipient countries as they wish. In this point, Mulgan (2003) asserts that such unresponsive actions of the donors are just to cause the recipients to become more underdeveloped (Mulgan, 2003, p.8).

Moreover, as already revealed in the history of international development, 'development' was highly regarded as a universal way to have a better quality life and to bring huge changes especially in the countries traumatized from the wars (Mazzer Barroso, 2002). But if the unequal positions between the donors and the recipients remain fixed, education

development cannot achieve more effective and sustainable development in future. The education development, which has not been considered as a critically important development field, get more disadvantaged and cause a more unbalanced development between external quality and internal quality in education.

In order to recover the weak accountability relationship of the donor and the recipients and to maximize the effectiveness of ODA, several international development conferences have been held from Rome - First High Level Forum in 2002 to Busan - Fourth High Level Forum in 2011. Especially in 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, ‘mutual accountability’ – which means an accountable relationship between donors and recipients also has started to be highly emphasized with ‘ownership’ in international development as one of the five fundamental principles on aid effectiveness. Even if this principle always remains critical questions to both donors and recipients in international development – such as who should be called to account? And who should be held to account? No one knows exactly how to evaluate whether both the principal and the agent are accounting appropriately for their duties in real development practices.

Consequently, as the applications of a strong ‘accountability principle’ into the international education development are being interpreted and implemented differently by development actors, it is making a great confusion in the global society. In so doing, researching on the accountability mechanism of the World Bank is very significant, particularly in the education development since it is directly related to the sustainability, and ultimately the success of education development in the international society.

1.2. Research Aims and Research Question

Pondering on the world's growing interest in 'accountability' relationship between the donor and the recipients in the international education development, this study aims to find out how the accountability mechanism of the World Bank caused Malawi and Uganda to have the opposite outcomes in their primary education projects, which has similar problems. In order to achieve the aims, therefore, the study entails critical thinking and understanding of typical accountability mechanism of the World Bank; external accountability – the performances of the Bank (the principal/ the donor) and the governments (the agent/ the recipient) in their education projects; and the performances of Malawian and Ugandan education departments during all processes of the projects.

Therefore, the research question guiding this study is: How did the accountability mechanism of the World Bank cause Malawi and Uganda to achieve opposite outcomes in their primary education projects?

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

As already mentioned in chapter 1, the demand on effective accountability is growing more and more in the field of international development. Although the term, ‘accountability’ is usually interpreted as “the obligation to be called to account” (Mulgan, 2003), there are diverse mechanisms (the ways to take the obligation) which are practiced by various international institutions and countries. Also the author figured out that there has been little agreement made on many scholars’ studies over the general of accountability or its mechanism especially in the field of education. For this study which deciphers the accountability mechanism of the World Bank in its primary education projects, For this reason, the author carefully views how the other scholars are defining accountability or describing its mechanism in education, and some different perspectives particularly on the Bank²’s accountability mechanism mostly used in its own education projects for many developing countries after the colonial periods.

2.1. Accountability Mechanisms in Education

Originally over three decades, ‘accountability’ has been emphasized as the one of core principles of democratic or good governance which keeps the public informed and the officials checked regularly on public sector (Mulgan, 2003). From the early twenty-first century, applying accountability systems has also become the one of significant trends in world education policy and became a cornerstone of contemporary education policy (Volante, 2007; Smith & Benavot, 2019). For this reason, the accountability system has been applied through

² The World Bank will be called as ‘the Bank’ from this page.

two ways: firstly, 'external monitoring' on the officials' actions and tasks assigned has been increasingly used to improve their accountability for the public; and secondly, putting lots of emphasis on outcomes or results in education (Smith & Benavot, 2019). After the colonial periods, this conventional accountability mechanism has been practiced a lot in many developing countries with weak governance when they needed enormous amount of financial assistance to recover their countries through urgent school infrastructure constructions and teacher trainings. Hursh (2005) argues that the urgent accountability application has raised 'managerialism' among teachers and school leaders.

To be more specific to the managerialism in schools, O'Neill (2013) says that though the evidences gained by assessment systems have been surely used for educational purposes: for example, the results of students have been often used to examine what they have learned or not learned and to hold the students to account for their good or poor achievements. Also the same results are used to judge teaching performance of teachers and to hold the teachers or schools to account. It means that 'testing system' has become a method to evaluate a wider aspect of teachers and schools, contributing to building a 'knowledge economy' which creates 'more competitive' teaching and learning environment in an international society (O'Neill, 2013). Standardizing the performance of students may be an effective way to see their academic progress in education but it may also be a hindrance of improving quality of teaching and learning at schools. UNESCO (2017) thinks that widespread or application of such accountability mechanism may have created other global education trends as well, like massification, marketization, decentralization and increased documentation in education, which may become the main causes of ruining the true aim of education.

Due to the inappropriate application of the original accountability mechanism in past education development, O'Neill (2013) argues the need of more 'intelligent' or appropriate

accountability mechanism to avoid ‘ostensible’ assessments on teachers and schools and creating extremely competitive and complex educational environment. Beside, with the public’s increased interest in ‘accountability’ in education, Smith and Benavot (2019) also tells that ‘structured democratic voice’ from people who actually work, learn and teach in schools should be included to the dominant accountability mechanism in education development. Then it may help the international society overcome shortcomings they had from the past experience of education development.

Many scholars highlight the importance of differentiated democratic evaluation and community participation in education reforms since those mechanisms can redistribute power in decision making and instill mutual accountability between the state and community as well as international institutions and the state (MacDonald, 1976; O’Neill, 2013; Smith & Benavot, 2019). Also the democratic accountability mechanism can provide opportunities to speak out the voices which were not heard properly before to those who were usually dominant in decision making on any education reforms (Brown et al, 2015; Ryan, 2004; Alsbury and Whitaker, 2007). When planning an education project for a developing country, this participatory democratic accountability mechanism may help both aid-providers and aid-receivers set up consensual goals and objectives of the project, and then responsibility for the project can be shared to all key actors, not to a single individual or institution (Smith & Benavot, 2019). UNESCO (2017) states that any education development can be implemented best with a “shared responsibility” which encourages collective engagements of key actors towards their common education goals.

Some scholars, in addition, tell that the shared responsibility between the actors and the state may also help them become more strongly interconnected and trust in each other while proceeding education reforms (Smith & Benavot, 2019; Dewachter et al. 2018). The trust

created between them may help the state or the community have a stronger ownership on the education project supported financially and technically by the actors (Fancy and Razzaq, 2017). In other words, if responsibility for the education project rests excessively with a single actor or state, and if the accountability mechanism does not encourage the state or community to be involved in all the processes of the project, there may be little possibility to bring satisfactory outcomes from it.

Moreover, Fox (2015) in his study differentiated tactical and strategic approaches to accountability in education – the former as a single limited approach which limits the involvement of community or state’s voices; and the latter as a coordinated approach which promotes the voices of the community or the state to be heard by the actors. Since the tactical accountability mechanism can weaken the state or community’s commitment to the proposed education project from key actors, the coordinated accountability mechanism, including all in the decision-making would be more suitable and feasible to implement education projects in the diverse contexts of many developing countries. Fox (2015) also tells that trust made with the coordinated accountability approach may “create incentives for more voices” on education development. Therefore, it is noticed that the meaning of accountability in education has a deeper meaning and should be used to create a shared responsibility and strong trust between the donor and the recipient in any education projects.

2.2. Different Views on The World Bank's Education Projects

The international development aids influenced by Washington Consensus have heavily focused on economic development in developing countries. At that time, education was also regarded as an independent variable for promoting better economic growth. In so doing, lots of money have been spent into the education development as well. It is seemed that many development projects financed by key international institutions have shown highly satisfactory results in all different sectors including education. For example, the World Bank (2011) states that the number of out-of-school primary school aged children has been decreased over the past few years from about 106 million in 1999 to about 69 million in 2008. In spite of a visible change in numeric results, many scholars and researchers have criticized the ways of planning and delivering education ODA to developing countries. A critical question was continuously asked to both the donors and recipients: whose best practices have been implemented in the education ODA?

In the basis of the critical question above, many researchers have increasingly taken studies on 'donor logic' in order to understand fundamentally diverse education strategies of international aid institutions such as the World Bank, UN agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and some world celebrities (Jones, 1998, Alesina & Dallar, 2000; Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008). According to their studies, the past education development projects were heavily planned and implemented from the donors' logic. In so doing, 'best practices' could be practiced within the recipient countries only according to donors' logic. This unequal education ODA has rather caused more education distortions from the past in the recipient countries.

A great number of claims on inequality between the donors and recipients have been raised by the critical scholars and researchers. The claims are mostly made on the importance of children's right to access quality education in all the world (Klees, 2011). Many key international institutions (includes both private and public) have actually started to transform their entire education ODA strategies or programming by reflecting the critiques. For instance, UNICEF (2011) states that their ultimate aim of education ODA is to realize and promote the rights of children; UNESCO also has the same mission with UNICEF. In spite of those key institutions' reflection, the World Bank tried to increase user fees in 1980s and 1990s and took a strong stand on its traditional approach unlike the other institutions. This point shows that the Bank was heading rather to limit the children's access to education. Therefore, Klees (2012) tells that the reason why the Bank is still receiving lots of comments is due to its 'reluctant' attitude to changing its traditional approach into a better- or right-based approach to education development.

On the contrary to the arguments above, some researchers argue that the Bank has reflected the critiques on its reports about the right to education, and the changes can be shown when looking all the Bank education strategies published from 1993 to 2010. However, Klees (2012) found that the Bank has actually added only one or two sentences into its updated education reports. In other words, the Bank has never fully reflected all the comments gathered from its key stakeholders. The Bank's strong will in its traditional approach means that everything related to education just has an instrumental value for economic growth in the world.

Some scholars also say that the Bank is a bank so that it definitely has no business being responsible for the architect of global education policy in the world, and it is better to research other international institutions which are much more expertized in education development in order to improve quality of education ODA. However, the other scholars

counterargue that while the Bank's interest in education ODA is proliferating every year, and many damage cases from its education ODA are being constantly reported from the past. in order to examine whether the Bank is transforming its traditional strategy, it is undeniable that more research on the Bank's education project in developing countries are significantly necessary as many as the research taken on the other international institutions' education projects.

When reading some recent studies on the Bank's supervision and intervention designs for development in developing countries, some researchers tell that the Bank-funded projects are mostly satisfactory, regardless of sectors and countries, and the critiques on its projects are actually made by a few scholars' "institutional bias toward lending at the expense of increased development impact" (Kilby, 2000). But, several studies show the catastrophic results of structural adjustment program (SAP) funded by the Bank in Latin America, East-Asia and African countries in 1980s (Kamat, 2011; Samoff, 1994; Reimer, 1994). These researchers, for example, state that the enrollment rate of Tanzania's primary school students was almost a hundred percent before the Bank's education reform in 1980s, the rate was sharply dropped (about a half percent) within a few years after starting structural reform aggressively on public schools by the Bank. Due to the Bank's reforms and conditionality at that time, the Tanzanian government could no longer provide a financial support to primary education, and inevitably had to charge tuition and other fees to their people. Thereafter, the Tanzania government just had to spend their a third of budget for debt repayment due to the Bank's flawed, neoliberal economic reasoning and advices (Kamat, 2011). Although this case is by no means unique among developing countries, there has not been much sufficient and deep research on examining actual relationships of the Bank and the recipients and questioning how

to account for what the Bank and the recipient have done in their education development projects and after completed them.

Since the Bank is still seemed to have a legacy of traditional or neoliberal mechanism to education ODA even in 2000s, several studies illustrate that the Bank is completely stuck in a “black box”, which means a neoliberal ideology (Klees et al., 2010). The Bank in the black box does not see itself, rather criticizes the recipient governments’ interventions and opinions which reflect their real-life situations and needs. Some scholars argue that the Bank’s excessive pride on the black box means that the Bank plays a dominant role, deciding the global directions for education policy and providing grants and loans so that the recipients who play a minor role must follow the directions (Mundy, 2007). Even though the Bank is a monopoly that directly affect and control the global education policy, there are lots of studies which only criticize its traditional approach to education ODA with statistical data, but no studies which suggest exactly what needs to be corrected (in terms of its quality, not quantity) so as to be out of the black box in future.

For example, the Bank, the largest financial source of international education development, has used the human capital model just for quantifying education impact on development (World Bank, 2011; Heyneman, 2003). This aspect of the Bank implies that the development actors are easy to consider development as the modern or western way of doing things in poor countries. Although many education development projects have been implemented in the poor countries (like East-Asian and sub-Saharan African countries) with the large volume of financial support from the Bank, education is still considered as an investment for economic growth. That is, despite development is a hope and an opportunity to improve the quality of their lives (Mazzer Barroso, 2002) for the poor, education influenced by the Bank’s neoliberal legacy is being disturbed in the process of sustainable human

development. As a result, the dominant roles of donors (the principal) over their recipients (the agents) have resulted in some severe consequences - already mentioned above - in the past international development projects (Heyneman, 2003; Riddell 2008; Haslam et al., 2009; Hjertholm & White, 2000).

Many education projects financed by the Bank still has lots of flaws in promoting education development. Several studies after 2000 still show the increase of poverty, environmental depletions, and an incomprehensible phenomenon (the rich become richer; the poor become poorer) through the unequal relationships with the recipients (Klees et al., 2010). Those problems imply that there has not been a proper revolutionary improvement in transforming the Bank's education strategies from the past. Thus, it ironically indicates what the Bank calls as a 'new emphasis' in its education strategy is not new at all in both theoretic and practical perspectives.

Quite many number of studies done about the Bank's performance and supervision in its education projects do not agree with the critical arguments on the addition of a 'new strategy' to global education policy. Particularly, Harry Anthony Patrinos and Eric Hanushek' studies counterargue that the 2020 World Education Strategy has been thoroughly consulted by holding more than dozens of meetings with the Bank's 1000 key shareholders from over 100 nations. In so doing, they believe that the 2020 World Education Strategy is a newly updated strategy that would bring revolutionary changes into the global education policy, and become a panacea to solve all the problems the world has (Klees et al., 2010). But, their studies are funded by the Bank and they are a staff and a consultant of the Bank. This points implies that the authors' studies eventually contain the Bank's traditional ideology in education (Klees et al., 2010).

When researching many cases of the Bank education projects in Latin America, East-Asia and sub-Saharan Africa after 2000, the projects, particularly determined as ‘unsatisfactory’ have some common problems like a few number of educated local people, many low-income people, lack of capability, too much focus on structural adjustment, lack of qualified teachers and resources, and so on (World Bank, 2010; Klees et al., 2010). The staff do not seriously address the problems the Bank caused on its reports when providing education projects to the recipients. Those problems raised by the Bank staff show that major cause of unsatisfactory projects is usually found from the donor’s perspective. It means that the recipient countries and their local people are difficult to ask the bank for sanctions as they have no power to negotiate and argue with it.

It is evident that some of the Bank-funded studies have lots of limitations and flaws to provide authentic information on its education projects. But, it is undeniable that all the recent studies mentioned above also do have some limitations and flaws. To be more specific, lots of studies are criticizing on the traditional way of the World Bank’ supervision and performance, they do not provide a realistic recommendation even if they already know that the Bank’s interest will be more proliferated in future, and will not be persuaded easily to replace the existing strategy into any other alternative strategies. Besides, several studies done about the Bank’s performance in its education projects have mostly researched their initial preparation phase and implementation phase, not after-implementation phase while they are emphasizing the importance of governance and accountability of both the donor and the recipient. Since quantitative data has mostly been collected and analyzed to examine the quality of the Bank and the recipient’s performance and relationship, a deep analysis on which cannot be expressed in numeric data could not be done properly. Therefore, this study will find out how the accountability mechanism of the World Bank influenced the real primary education

development situations in Malawi and Uganda, and then discuss what needs to be strengthened for better performance and achievement in future education projects.

CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Research Design

The existing reviews and studies have shown that there are contradicted perspectives on the accountability mechanism of international development institutions, even in a single education sector development. As already mentioned above, there is no a well-recognized strategy to measure the extent of the development institutions' accountability in their development projects for developing countries, due to its broad, abstract, slow-moving and invisible characteristic. However, it is still an undeniable fact that the effectiveness of development aids is highly depending on how well the donors and recipients have accounted for their duties given and official actions taken in their own development projects (Pierson, 2003). For this reason, viewing development cases and processes at a less abstract level is necessary especially in the field of international education development, which brings relatively slower effects than other sector developments.

To comprehend the accountability mechanism utilized by the largest aid provider, the World Bank, the research design that is most suitable is 'qualitative research'. Qualitative research is based on understanding the processes and the social and cultural contexts in which various behavioral patterns take place and exploring the "why" questions in the study (Nieuwenhuis, 2007a, p.51). This research methodology fits into the study which focuses on the real neoliberal accountability mechanism emerged by the behavioral patterns of donors and recipients in the implementation of their primary education development projects in Malawi and Uganda. Thus, the study is a qualitative research rather than a quantitative research that observes phenomenon through mathematical, computational and statistical methods (Lombard

et al., 2016, p.32).

This study purposes to find out weaknesses of the World Bank in terms of external accountability when providing education development projects to two African countries, not just to criticize every aspect of them. For this reason, two African cases, which gained opposite outcomes in the Bank-financed education projects with similar conditions, are used to make a meaningful comparison between them. Traditionally, the studies on the Bank's accountability mechanism in education generate too general propositions to explain the real development situation (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003). In so doing, the researcher will use a 'comparative analysis' method as the suitable research method to derive lessons from the past patterns of the Bank's accountability mechanism when providing education development projects to the two African recipients – Malawi and Uganda. Therefore, this study based on the comparative analysis is not to seek typical knowledge that everyone already knows, but to bring significant analytical advantages in the international development.

Moreover, since the African primary education projects are large scale process of development projects between international organizations and states, a method which unfolds the entire development processes over time needs to be used in this study (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003, p.12). The method is a comparative analysis. This method will help the researcher explore the research question more systematically. Therefore, the comparative analysis is a useful method that can be used to investigate the study effectively.

3.2. Case Selection

In order to apprehend more accurate accountability mechanism that the Bank has used to providing its education projects to many developing countries, the researcher selected two cases – Primary Education Project (PEP) in Malawi and Primary Education and Teacher

Development Project (PETDP) in Uganda. This study evaluates the evaluation of the Bank's accountability mechanism applied in those two African cases with similar conditions at the initial stage of the project. According to the OED ICR review reports of the two cases, the reviewer actually suggested to compare Malawi's PEP project with the similar one in Uganda's education projects for meta-evaluation or a part of cluster audit with the following reasons:

- 1. Three or four IDA financed education projects were done before*
- 2. Strong commitment of parent and community to send their children to schools*
- 3. Lots of untrained and uncertified teachers at schools*
- 4. Lack of teaching and learning resources and infrastructures (schools and classrooms)*
- 5. Limited capacity of Governments, poor and unstable administrative and management system*
- 6. had educational crisis Extreme influx of primary school students by sudden introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE) policy and Free Primary Education (FPE) policy*
- 7. Unstable politics and economy*
- 8. A small project of SWAP programs for education development in Malawi and Uganda*

(World Bank, 2001, 2002)

3.2.1. Background of Malawi

During colonial time, Malawi that was a part of the Maravi Empire was colonized and ruled by the British. The country could become a fully independent country as Malawi from the British in 1964. After Malawi's independence, the country was ruled by a single party under Hastings Banda until 1994. During the former president, Banda's long rule for 30 years, there was no much economic, social and political development. Rather, the country started to face a great crisis in their national development. In so doing, a new government was erected from 1994, and new policies were made and applied in Malawi. Especially for their education

sector development, the new government introduced the Free Primary Education (FPE) policy with a great ambition and expectation in June 1994.

Contrary to the government's expectation, they had to face another crisis which was followed by the tremendous increase in enrollment of primary school caused from the new government's ambitious declaration of FPE policy, which aimed to eliminate all tuition fees and extra costs in Malawi's primary education. According to the Malawi's government document and the Bank's Staff Appraisal Report (World Bank, 1995), the crisis in Malawi's education development strongly motivated the government of Malawi to request the financial assistance of the Bank in their primary education project. After going through preliminary pilot study, the government of Malawi and the Bank started to have a principal and agent relationship for the primary education project.

3.2.2. Background of Uganda

In the 1960s, Uganda was known as a country with the strongest economy, good health service and a reputation on the quality of its education system in sub-Saharan Africa. Uganda, but, also had seriously unstable circumstances caused by severe civil wars, mass murder, economic crisis, and political corruption from 1971 to 1985. To be more specific, those problems were arisen due to the Idle Amin and Obote II's mismanagement and civil conflicts in Uganda. Fortunately, with the constant initiatives of parents and communities, the number of primary school students increased a lot by 85 percent between 1980 and 1990. Although schools could be run by the efforts of parents and communities, the entire education sector was shaken and brought lots of problems especially administrative and management systems. For example, the substantially increased number of students could not receive good quality of education since the Government of Uganda did not provide sufficient inputs like instructional

teaching and learning materials, trained teachers, financial assistance to its students. The quality of education could not be ensured like the past in Uganda. During this time, IDA, the Bank provided funding for reconstruction of school infrastructure and improvement of institutional capacity through the Third Education Project. Some other projects were also done by the Bank's financial assistances, such as Fourth Education Project, Project for Alleviation of Poverty and Social Cost of Adjustment, Northern Reconstruction Project, Education Sector Adjustment Credit and Concurrent Programs supported by United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

3.3. Data Collection

Since comparative analysis method is selected as a framework for this study, reliable data are searched and collected from four main sources like the following: Firstly, the following databases are used to elaborate some relevant background issues related to its research topic - books, eBook collections and Google Scholar. Through these databases, the search for secondary sources are conducted to gather information by using the keywords – primary education projects in Malawi and Uganda, the accountability mechanism of the World Bank, the World Bank and education development, and so on.

In order to design the research effectively, secondly, the primary sources of this study are the World Bank's documents related to primary education development cases in Malawi and Uganda. It is because the two African countries gained incompatible outcomes from the Bank's similar education development projects around the same time. In so doing, all the documents related to these two cases will be collected – such as the implementation completion reports, ICR review reports, staff appraisal reports, and the memo of the president of international development association to the executive directors, and so on. These sources

provide reliable and useful information on the two primary education projects completed in Malawi and Uganda with the support of the Bank. Especially, those Bank documents published are actual critical evidences, showing the relationship and roles of the Bank and the two African governments their primary education projects.

The second sources are second reading papers and reports published by the other partners who involved in Malawi and Uganda's primary education projects with the World Bank. Also, some relevant reports published by the governments of Malawi and Uganda are used for this study. Those reports provide reliable and helpful information on the primary education projects recorded from the partners' perspectives. They are going to be used to cross check all the information provided from World Bank's documents. Cross-checking help the researcher provide more valid and trustworthy arguments on her research question when the collected data are analyzed and discussed in chapter 4 and 5.

The third source are collected books – *First Steps in Research* that has a number of chapters and each chapter is written by different authors. The study has used three chapters from this book – chapter 4: Introducing qualitative research; chapter 5: Qualitative research designs and data gathering techniques. The first three chapters are written by Jan Nieuwenhuis. The chapters provide insight of different research designs that can be selected for qualitative research. They also describe possible data collection and data analysis strategies that can be chosen for effective research. Also, another collected book - *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Science* published in 2003 - is used to decide more reliable and useful data analysis strategies for an effective research.

If necessary, lastly, interviews as one of the data collection strategies, will be performed in the study. An interview is “a two-way conversation in which the interviewer asks

the participant questions to collect data and to learn about the ideas, beliefs, views, opinions and behaviors of the participants” (Nieuwenhuis, 2007b, p.87). Open-ended interviews will take place as a form of intentional conversations over a period time and in a series of sessions (Nieuwenhuis, 2007b, p.87). Through the interviews, the researcher will collect data that richly describes the participants’ opinions on outcomes of two cases in Malawi and Uganda in terms of external accountability. All the interviews will be videotaped and clearly labelled. When analyzing the interviews, the researcher will watch the videos several times to obtain more accurate findings from them.

3.4. Data Analysis

Qualitative data analysis comprises of data collection, processing, analysis and reporting as an ongoing and non-linear process that aims at examining and interpreting meaningful and symbolic content of the data” (Nieuwenhuis, 2007c, p.99). The data analysis of this study focuses on a comparative analysis of exploring how the neoliberal accountability mechanism of the World Bank caused Malawi and Uganda to achieve the opposite outcomes in their primary education projects, which have similar problems. The analysis will be performed by analyzing all the relevant evaluation reports, ICR review reports, second reading resources gained from the other partners of the education projects in the process of data collection.


In order to make a meaningful comparison between the two incompatible African cases - *unsatisfactory Case: Malawi’s Primary Education Project (1996-2000)* and *Satisfactory Case: Uganda’s Primary Education and Teacher Development project (1993-2001)*, the following analytical frameworks will be used for this study – (1) Principal-Agent Theory; and (2) The Three Component of Accountability.

3.4.1. Principal-Agent Theory

In order to analyze the structure of the Bank’s accountability mechanism and the relationships between the donor and the recipients effectively, ‘Principal-Agent theory’ will be applied in this study. Its application is not only to avoid prejudiced views on the Bank’s accountability mechanism and the relationships between the donor and the recipients, but also to explore the external accountability between them in depth. The core point of principal-agent theory is that “who is accountable to whom” (Gailmard, 2014; Miller, 2015). In so doing, this theory also states the rights³ both the principal and agent need to adhere in any development projects, especially in terms of accountability.

For a better understanding on the Bank’s primary education projects in Malawi and Uganda, the relevant diagrams of those two cases are thoroughly drawn by using each country’s implementation and evaluation reports published from the Bank. The diagrams are provided in the following:

(a) Unsatisfactory Case: Malawi’s Primary Education Project from 1996 to 2000



<Figure 1> External Accountability Mechanism in Malawi’s Primary Education Project

³ Principals have the right to hold other actors to a set of standard; Principals have the right to judge their fulfillment according to the standard; and Principals have the right to improve sanctions for no fulfillment.

As it is marked in the diagram above, ‘P’ means the principals (the shareholders of the education projects, e.g. World Bank (IDA)) and ‘A’ means the agents (the stakeholders of the education projects, e.g. governments). In the case of Malawi, the principals are the Bank and their partners, GTZ, DFID and CIDA; and the agent is the Ministry of Education, Malawian government. The dotted arrow portrays that there is a relatively weak external accountability built between the principal and the agent. The gray arrow portrays a respectively strong external accountability made between them through implementing the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) project as a follow-up management of their former primary education project. In spite of the principals and the agent’s great efforts, this case was unfortunately evaluated as an ‘unsatisfactory’ case.

(b) Satisfactory Case: Uganda’s Primary Education and Teacher Development project from 1993 to 2001



<Figure 2> External Accountability Mechanism in Uganda’s Primary Education Project

In the case of Uganda, again the Bank is the principal with USAID; and the Uganda government, the Ministry of Education and Sport (MOES) is the agent of their Primary Education and Teacher Development project. When referring to the diagram above, it is easy to see that much simpler and stronger external accountability have been formed between the principals and the agent in Uganda’s primary education project. Therefore, by applying the principal–agent theory in this study, which shows a clear accountability mechanism between

the agents and the principals, those two African education projects will be carefully compared and analyzed in terms of external accountability.

3.4.2. Three Components of Accountability

The three components of accountability are also going to be used to analyze whether the Bank and other partners performed properly as well as whether the borrowers or the agents actively participated in the implementation of their education projects (United Nations, 2013).

(1) Responsibility	Who is going to take a responsibility for what in development projects?
(2) Answerability	Whether the actors fully prepared to answer every little thing they have done during implementing a project
(3) Enforceability	Whether the actors do all the preventative and correct functions

<Table 1> Three Components of Accountability (United Nations, 2013)

The three components of accountability are like the following: the first component, ‘responsibility’ emphasizes the necessity of clear division on who is going to take a responsibility for what in development projects (Kim & Lim, 2017). The persons in charge of some parts in the development project should be able to provide all information about its process and results responsibly so that they can be more accountable for their actions. Although people might regard ‘accountability’ as the same principle with transparency, it is necessary to classify transparency as an ‘ingredient’ of accountability (OECD, 2018); and transparency needs to be reclassified as a part of ‘answerability’, the second component (Fox, 2007). In other words, the principals should be fully prepared to answer every little thing they have done while implementing a project. It is also to assure transparency and to create a strong trustful

relationship with local people of the agent; Lastly, although the third component, ‘enforceability’ is not systematized yet, it is the most essential component which does all the preventative and correct functions by communicating with the local people and civil societies in development projects (Kim, 2017). To satisfy the enforceability, the Bank usually uses the Inspection Panel for people and communities who believe that they have been, or are likely, adversely affected by the Bank funded project (World Bank, 2015). After the Inspection Panel was established in 1993, 123 requests were submitted, but only 35 projects could have undergone the full investigation by the Panel in order to increase the accountability of the Bank for the affected communities during project implementation (World Bank, 2015). Since there has not been a lot of case that went through the Panel’s investigations, the third component of accountability explained above cannot be assessed in depth due to the Panel’s unstable and weak system. For this reason, this study does not take a meta-evaluation on the Bank’s accountability mechanism in terms of ‘enforceability’.

Consequently, the performances of the principals and the agents (external accountability) in those two African education project will be carefully questioned and assessed according to these three components of accountability. And then, the answers from those cases will be compared thoroughly to each other to see whether their performances are satisfying those three components of the accountability or not. Further, the hidden reasons behind the findings will be found out to understand the both the principals and the agents better in the real education development situations.

3.4.3. Reliability and Validity

The value of a qualitative research is determined by its validity and trustworthiness. Validity and trustworthiness can also be referred to as ‘credibility’ and ‘reliability’, meaning

accurate presentation of a certain environment or phenomena by the researcher; the proof that the conclusions of the researcher are drawn from the verified data; the proof that the research results are of true value for readers; and the proof that data analysis is not biased (Nieuwenhuis, 2007b, p.80).

In order to ensure internal validity, the study will try to answer the following questions such as whether the findings are congruent with real contexts of the agents; and whether what needs to be measured are accurately measured or not. However, it is important to question whether the researcher's own perspectives are biased when analyzing the whole processed of the projects. This study views the reality of neoliberal accountability mechanism of the World Bank through comparing its two similar primary education projects implemented in Malawi and Uganda.


Furthermore, for the external validity, the following questions might be asked as well - how the findings of this study can be applied to other education project situations. In fact, this qualitative study cannot generalize findings with the statistical data gained from a relatively small sample to a large population (Merriam, 1995). The ultimate goal of this qualitative research, therefore, is to comprehend how the Bank's neoliberal accountability mechanism caused similar education projects to have opposite results in real-development situations, rather than listing the general information on them.

Consistent with internal and external validity, multiple strategies are also utilized to ensure reliability in reality that is constructed, multidimensional, and ever-changing (Merriam, 1995). According to Nieuwenhuis (2007c), there are numerous strategies for assuring accuracy of findings. This study adopted two main strategies: triangulation and member checking. Firstly, for triangulation, this study took diverse ways to collect data. Instead of relying solely on a type of the Bank report related to those two projects, the data include

information on any external accountability relationships – like the Bank (the principal) and the recipient governments (the agents)’s documents recorded on those two projects. Secondly, this study conducts several times of ‘member checking’ processes by sharing the key themes and written draft with the research advisors. Through this method, the researcher can clearly check whether relevant and useful information is correctly and completely analyzed (Nieuwenhuis, 2007c, p.115). The researcher can also make sure that the analysis in the study is not deviant from the original data. Therefore, this method is to confirm the findings and to ensure that the key findings represent the real accountability mechanism which is continuously used by the Bank in its education projects correctly.

CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS

In order to answer the research question of this study, the researcher has used a ‘meta-evaluation’ with relating to principal-agent theory and three component of accountability to evaluate the evaluations of two Primary Education Projects (PEPs) financed by IDA, the World Bank in terms of accountability. Findings of the study are provided below and presented according to the Bank’s Project Cycle – which are divided into three major phases: project design, implementation and evaluation phases (World Bank, 2019, p.1,2).



<Figure 3> The World Bank Project Cycle (Baum, 1978)

The first phase, project design includes identification, preparation, appraisal, and negotiation and board presentation processes. The second phase contains implementation and supervision processes. The last phase is evaluation of the project. This study also provides its findings by each phase on the basis of a comparative analysis explained in chapter 3.

4.1. Project Design Phase

When identifying and preparing an education project for a developing country, the Bank as a principal of the project needs to take a joint responsibility for feasibility and sectoral context analysis with Government of the agent country (Baum, 1978). Those studies are usually

done to design the project in more agent-centered way since the effectiveness of the project is highly dependent on how well the real context is comprehended and reflected to the project design. This design process requires both the principal and the agent to define what available options they have, the feasibility of each option, and to predict costs and benefits of the project (Baum, 1978).

The World Bank and Malawi

When designing the Malawi's Primary Education Project (PEP), firstly there was an urgent request from the Government of Malawi that needed to make a plan for the educational crisis (the surge in enrollment) of caused by the sudden introduction of Free Primary Education (FPE) policy after 1994. In order to respond the agent's request on primary education project, the Bank as a principal took feasibility and sectoral context analyses willingly agreed to take a 'fast-track operation' which is "focused, simple, ready and capable of being implemented quickly" (World Bank, 2001). With considering the request from the agent, the principal set the two main objectives for the agent who was trying to satisfy the great demand from the public as soon as possible. The objectives are like the following:

- (i) *Ensure that the quantitative gains in enrollments obtained with the introduction of free primary education were maintained through the retention of newly-enrolled children in the system,*
- (ii) *Improve the quality of primary education through providing teaching and learning materials, and pedagogical support to, and in-service training for untrained teachers*

(World Bank, 2001)

In addition, the principal actually insists that the objectives were set up in a responsive manner to some critical challenges the Malawi had at primary education level.

For example, the objectives responded to:

- (i) *Severe financial constraints and the problems of financing the recurrent costs of the education development program*
- (ii) *Shortage of classrooms and acute overcrowding in schools and classrooms*
- (iii) *Poor quality and low efficiency due in large part to the large number of untrained teachers, especially the 20,000 who had been recruited to meet the acute shortage of teachers.*

(World Bank, 1995)

When referring to these quantitative and qualitative objectives responding to the challenges above, it is seemed that the principal was trying to be responsible to accept the agent's demands on school construction and training a number of unqualified teachers into project design.

In actual designing process, however, the principal's shortcomings were appeared. Firstly, despite there were some lessons learnt from the previous education projects were not properly identified and reflected to the project design. In so doing, the agent who was following the instructions of the principal got confused on what they had to be responsible during the project design phase. Also, the principal who had to consider the weaknesses in the agent's capacity did not take a deep consideration on some limitations they had in advance (World Bank, 2001). Thus, it became a major cause of other problems came up during project implementation and evaluation.

As already mentioned, during project identification and preparation, the principal positively agreed to make this project be "focused, simple, ready and capable of being implemented quickly" with the agent. ironically, according to the ICR review report of this project (2001), the independent reviewers state that the design of PEP project was so complicated and beyond the agent's capacity that the rate for PEP project quality at entry was 'unsatisfactory'. They also state that the objectives were unattainable within the

limited life span of the project as well as the context of Malawi. Even specific targets and activities for each objective were not arranged properly beforehand. But it is shown that the principal as a guide of this project's agent were not actually taking a strong and sufficient responsibility to plan a well-contextualized, sustainable and community-friendly primary education project for Malawi.

In spite of those negative comments on the principal's responsibility during project design, some people might also argue that the reason of being rated unsatisfactory in design phase is also due to lack of the agent capacity to be fully responsible for the tasks assigned by its principal. In Malawi's case, there was no active involvement of the agent during the project design (World Bank, 2001) even if there were strong commitment of parents and community on promoting primary education. In so doing, the agent also could not take a full responsibility for designing its education project. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the agent's lack of capacity has never affected the project achievement in Malawi or the agent's lack of capacity is a sole cause of the PEP's unsatisfactory results since the agent's lack of capacity is not a thing which can be immediately improved a lot in a short time. Therefore, to design a more effective education project which can go beyond the agent's limited capacity, it tells the significance of designing a more context relevant and well-reflected project which can be made by taking strong responsibilities at each other.

During project design in Malawi, the principal remembered the unique characteristic of this project – 'fast-track operation' and responsibly reflected it into selecting a scheme and allocating a large volume of finance for 'fast' school and classroom construction. To be more specific, the principal was looking for a fast, but effective construction scheme which could be applied into the context of Malawi (World Bank,

1995). After comparing two different construction schemes during appraisal, the principal decided to apply Ghana's shell construction scheme which was 'successful' at smaller scale in Ghana's context. That is, Ghana's successful construction experience in the Bank-financed education project became a reason to be chosen for Malawi case as well. In appearance, it looks like the principal took a good responsibility to make the first objective of the project successful as well like Ghana.

Contrary to the principal's expectation on its choice, the application of Ghana's construction scheme in larger scale was not satisfactory despite the project was designed to allocate over 58 percent finance to the construction works. It was because both the principal and the agent failed to predict the sudden price increase of the construction materials, check the real contexts of Malawi and not to spend lots of finance on civil works (World Bank, 2001; GOM, 2001). For this work to be done successfully, the agent was responsible to select a few sites according to community's income level and gender and submit the list of sites to the principal in advance. But the unsatisfactory outcome of PEP's construction works tells that sufficient and deep enough feasibility studies were not done by both of them beforehand. This aspect implies that project design was processed more in top-down or principal-centered way.

Moreover, the principal wanted the agent to have a strong ownership in this education project. During negotiation, the agent also responsibly agreed to follow some measure necessary for this project (World Bank, 1995). Accordingly, the principal designed this project to be implemented with active involvement of the agent staff as it asked the agent to staff development units – such as EDMU, PICMO and PIU with its own people. But the agent that was challenged by lack of qualified teachers could not staff the units with qualified teachers until the end of the project (GOM, 2001). It can tell us again

that weaknesses of Malawi were not considered in depth and reflected properly into this project design. And the proposed project assessment which assesses the project's affordability and sustainability might not be done properly by the principal's board members.

When evaluating the principal and the agent's answerability – which means whether the actors fully prepared to answer every little thing they have done during implementing a project (Kim, 2017), it is necessary to examine whether both the principal and the agent took a high quality of monitoring and evaluation during the project. when designing a context relevant education project for Malawi, the principal received some comments on the “oversimplified, unrealistic, unachievable, short-term” objectives (World Bank, 1995). But the objectives were not revised until the end of the project. For this matter, the principal tried to provide the ‘best fit’ project to the agent in appearance, but it looked like the principal did not put lots of efforts to design a best project for the agent (World Bank, 1995). That is, it means that not proper negotiation was made with the agent from the beginning of the project.

Like the principal, the agent's answerability was also not strong during project design because of its weak monitoring and evaluation system which did not have sufficient and reliable information or records to explain every little thing done in the project (GOM, 2001). Basically, the agent was not guaranteed to satisfy the second component of accountability from the beginning since the agent was already incapable of carrying on formative and summative assessment and reflecting actual needs of community in primary education system (World Bank, 1995; GOM, 2001). Therefore, it is found that both the principal and the agent tried to responsibility for the project design, their responsibilities were very weak. Further they were not fully prepared to answer everything done in the

project at all as they had a weak or faulty monitoring and evaluation system. It is assumed that their weak responsibility and answerability from project design may influenced the following processes negatively.

The World Bank and Uganda

As already explained above, the principal and the agent took a joint responsibility to complete feasibility and sectoral context analyses in advances. Through this process, the agent's highest priorities and wishes on this project was clearly told to the principal. In practice, when referring to the letter of Sector Policy and Action Plan, the Government of Uganda responsibly explained the Bank about the objectives and policies it pursued to develop its primary education reform planned first as a 5-years long education project (from 1993 to 1997). The agent as a representative of its people spoke well about the voices of actual local communities about primary education system.

To be more specific, the first objective the government wished at primary level was to achieve Universal Primary Education until 2001/2002. The Government explained that the local authorities would continue to providing physical facilities with receiving aid for structural elements from the central government on a grant basis. Though its highest priority was to improve the quality of education by enhancing teacher performance, increasing teachers' salaries, provision of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials. The last objective was to strengthen the connection between education and jobs through vocational programs. These priorities and wishes tell that the agent believed that reforming the pattern of resource mobilization and allocation would be the best way to achieve those objectives mentioned above. This aspect of the agent explains that it had relatively stronger responsibility to design a more relevant and effective

education project for its people.

After sharing the priorities and wishes of the agent, the principal also set up two major components and four sub-components for each like the following:

Component 1: Improving Primary School Teaching and Management

Sub-1a: Establishing the Teacher Development and Management System (US\$29.8 million);

Sub-1b: Rehabilitating and Constructing Facilities (US\$30.4 million)

Sub-1c: Providing Learning Resources (US\$28.8 million)

Sub-1d: Revitalizing Private Sector Publishing and Printing

Component 2: Enhancing Strategic MOES Functions

Sub-2a: Strengthening Planning and Policy Analysis (US\$3.0 million)

Sub-2b: Upgrading Management and Information Systems (US\$3.3 million)

Sub-2c: Reforming Curriculum and Examinations (US\$4.6 million)

Sub-2d: Building Project Implementation Capacity (US\$3.5 million)

(World Bank, 1993)

Unlike Malawi's case, the principal took a responsibility to breakdown the main components into sub-components and some relevant activities for better implementation and evaluation of the project. Those subcomponents with relevant activities show that the principal took a greater responsibility to make the project design more applicable and realistic than in Malawi's PEP project during the project design. In practice, these subcomponents and activities planned also played essential roles when monitoring and evaluation processes were needed to be done regularly. The brief explanations on activities were also provided to be used to answer some questions – such as why the activities were selected particularly for achieving those subcomponents, who is going to be responsible for each activity, and how the activities would contribute to achieving the subcomponents, ultimately overall objectives of the PETDP project. From the principal's responsible aspects, the researcher found that the stronger responsibility is taken either by the principal or the agent, the more specific plans can be designed and then

the more practical project can be provided to the communities. Thus, although the agent's commitment to Universal Primary Education (UPE) policy was not responded responsibly by the principal who was in charge of designing the project in the beginning, the project was designed a lot more precisely than the PEP project design of Malawi.

In spite of such a precise project design in Uganda, some parts of the principal's responsibility were still weak (World Bank, 1993). To be more specific, when the proposed project design was going through negotiation and board presentation with the agent, the principle was commented that the project objectives are still ambitious, not revised again. Besides, despite there were recommendations from the other IDA-financed education credits previously done and the agent's plan to decentralize all the administrative works related to primary education, the PETDP project was continued to use "a project-financed, centralized, extra-ministerial Project Implementation Unit (PIU)..." at the appraisal. Even the lessons learned from previous construction programs were not reflected to the new PETDP project, and continued to use top-down methods of site selection, which were already know as main causes of reducing community ownership, and centralized procurement procedures which caused delays and demotivation to the agent. Also the agent suggested the principal to include the UPE policy into project design, but the request was underestimated and excluded by the principal in the beginning of project design (GOU, 2002). This weak responsibility of the principal could be a reason why the PETDP project design was not fully applicable and effective in the contexts of Uganda, in spite of 'lengthy' preparation period (1989-1993) of the project. It eventually may hinder increasing the potential for institutional capacity building and post-project's sustainability (World Bank, 1993, p.17).

To make PETDP project successful, there were lots of the agent's efforts as well as the principal's efforts. Although the agent knew that it had a limited capacity to handle the

devastated education conditions caused by the severe civil wars, mass murder, economic and political corruption after 1971, the agent with strong supports from the community took a responsibility for designing the project with considerable policy discussion (GOU, 2001). Also the agent as a representative of its people clearly showed that they wanted this education project to design long-term objectives by reforming its pattern of resource mobilization and allocation and financing teacher training and enhancing its administrative functions in education sector, and to focus more on 'process' than outcome (World Bank, 1993). Trying to tell the agent's requests to the principal shows its strong responsibility to meet great commitment and supports of the communities during project design.

In Uganda's case, it is seemed that both the principal and the agent had respectively stronger responsibility when designing this PETDP project. But, in terms of answerability, Malawi as well as Uganda cases had a very weak and faulty monitoring and evaluation system which could not carry on formative and summative evaluation on a regular basis. Due to this reason, this project also struggled to revise some deficient parts of the project design in the following project phases. The situation tells that enough regular negotiation could not be taken place between the agent and the principal. Thus, answerability which is a second important component of accountability could not be achieved properly in both cases during project design. That is, it means that both the principal and the agent had a weak accountability in this phase.

4.2. Project Implementation Phase

This is the phase when all the plans designed in the previous phase get implemented in the agent country. This part of the study examines whether both the principal and the agent were accountable for their tasks assigned during project implementation to achieve the

objectives of their project successfully. To be more specific, this section analyzes the roles and actions the principal and the agent taken for fulfilling the main components of the two African cases, in terms of responsibility and answerability.


The World Bank and Malawi

As already explained in the previous phase, both the principal and the agent did not had a strong monitoring and evaluation system established for transparent and reflective project implementation. In this sense, it is possible to conclude that both of them were insensitive to recognize the deficiencies from project design. But the more important point is that the principal as a project provider who has better conditions to support the agent, but were not fully responsible to contextualize the project with limited conditions of the agent during project implementation. For example, in order to ensure the quality of construction program and supervise overall civil works – basically doing all the administrative and practical tasks related to construction management, when it was found that the agent is incapable of providing the required level of supervision (GOM, 2001; World Bank, 2001, p.8). Unfortunately, there was the principal's effort to responsible for quality control of construction program by using its existing monitoring system, but it was not properly maintained until the end of the project. This aspect shows that it did not pay lots of attentions on how the unit could be properly staffed despite it knew that the agent was having a problem with hiring enough number of qualified teachers at schools. Therefore, it tells that the principal did not take a deep enough consideration on how the project plans would be implemented effectively when starting actual project works.

As the principal started to implement the project in that way, neither the principal nor the agent could provide the specialized supervision responsibly which were requested by

PICMO during project implementation. In so doing, it is seemed that their negligent or irresponsible actions had influenced the agent to suffer from innumerable irregularities of funding and the sudden increase of costs for construction program (World Bank, 2001, p.8). that is, as the principal was not prepared to offer appropriate measures to supervising PICMO, the quality of construction program become more exacerbated and came to a stop. Thus, this is the reason why the responsibility of the principal was rated ‘unsatisfactory’ during project implementation.

The principal’s weak responsibility on the actual ways to implement project activities well also influenced the other component to be achieved. On specifics, the weak monitoring of the principal on the project progress affected the agent to spend excessive amount of finance mostly on school and classroom construction works – the first component of PEP project in Malawi. Besides When referring to the Figure 4 and Table 2 above, its weak responsibility also affected the agent to achieve unexpected results compared with the large amount of finance spent on the construction work.



<Figure 4> The Estimated Total Base Costs of Primary Education Project in Malawi (1996-2000)

PEP Component.1	Plan	Reality
No. of Classrooms	966	858 (340 unfinished)
No. of New Schools	75	59 (30 remained unclad)

<Table 2> The Number of Classrooms and Schools constructed (World Bank, 2000, p.8)

As shown above, over 59 percent of total finance was spent only for infrastructure construction in PEP project but even the expected number of construction was not completely satisfied during project implementation. For this poor result of the first component in PEP project, the principal also recognized its weak responsibility for the construction work in Malawi. According to the Bank's ICR report, the principal stated that the construction methodology should have "taken account into the cost and time effectiveness and the strengthening of community participation and ownership as key deciding factors" (World Bank, 2001, p.3).

Moreover, due to the lack of the principal's responsibility, it did not consider a very limited conditions of the communities in depth before implementation again. Although the agent agreed with using Ghana's infrastructure construction methodology for strengthening physical capacity of primary education system, the principal was supposed to make a responsible and relevant decision on the construction work and to provide proper monitoring and supervision to the community. But seemingly the lack of responsibility of the principal directly affected the community which was to help the completion of classroom constructions. For this reason, the task for construction was not adequately organized with the community, and the construction program inevitably remained unfinished until the end of the project (World Bank, 2001, p.8). If the principal took a responsibility more from the agent's perspective, the results of the first component would have been more positive and successful. Thus, it shows how important it is to have strong responsibility when planning and implementing an education

project in diverse contexts of developing countries.

Furthermore, the weak responsibility of the principal might have influenced the project to be more dependent on the other principals such as GTZ, KfW, CIDA, DfID in this project. In contrast with the agent's expectation to this component, when another component to be implemented, the Bank could not provide all the funds originally planned and promised due to its excessive expenditure on constructing schools and classrooms (World Bank, 2001, p.9). For this reason, the program was actually finished with an unsatisfactory output as explained above. It is seemed that the main principal's irresponsible actions became a critical trigger which brought another unsatisfactory results in improving teacher performance and made the agent to be more dependent on the other principals.

In real project situation, an extensive collaboration of other principals (MITEP) was highly expected to be ongoing and to sustain the inputs for improving teacher performance with active involvement of the agent (GOM, 1995). The other principals – GTZ, KfW, CIDA and DfID (formerly ODA) actually took an external, strong responsibility to support teacher training, to construct unfinished classrooms and schools and to provide textbooks (World Bank, 2001, p.9). With the other principal's great efforts in 'parallel financing' (refer to table 3 below), 22,000 of new teachers were prepared to participate in teacher seminars which were held three times of a year, and about 315 motorcycle were provided to the Primary Education Advisors (PEAs) who were deployed to support many untrained and unqualified local teachers, especially in recently constructed rural schools.

Parallel Financing	Funds Provided (million)	Activities
GTZ	US\$3.0	Technical assistance
KfW	US\$8.0	Construction of 400 primary classrooms and 20 resource centers
CIDA	US\$7.5	The provision of textbooks
DfID (Formerly ODA)	US\$8.5	Training head teachers, PEAs, and construction of 100 resource centers under TDP
Total Costs	US\$27.0 million	

<Table 3> Parallel Financing for Primary Education Project in Malawi (GOM, 1995, P.43)

When observing the most of activities the other principal did, it is appeared that they responsibly complemented the weaknesses of the project which were caused by the weak responsibility of the principal. Although there was no specific record about ‘intensive’ teacher training courses on both the agent and principals’ reports which tell about whether there was actual teaching improvement by the assistances from parallel financing, one thing that is important is that the second component would have been rated ‘highly’ unsatisfactory without external supports from the other principals in this project. The stronger responsibilities of the other principal complemented the weak responsibility of the Bank, the main principal during project implementation.

In addition, when there was an additional request to provide more student textbooks and teacher’s guides from the community in 1994, the third component, learning materials and textbook-related activities were to be implemented in this project. But the main principal obviously did not have sufficient finance to support it later. However, the basic learning materials like colored chalks, white chalks, lead pencils and boards could also be procured fortunately by UNICEF and distributed to the schools as planned originally. But the point that

matter is that the principal did not organize the way to distribute these materials properly in advance (World Bank, 2001, p.9). At that time, though the principal already knew that the unit members from the agent were not capable to computerize the procurement and distribution services alone. Accordingly, the principal took a better responsibility to provide them two study tour in oversea to strengthen their capacity of them at the end of project implementation.

Unlike the principal, Moreover, when the Supplies Unit (SU) was formed within the agent, Ministry of Education for the third component, the agent was supposed to take a full responsibility to manage the procurement and distribution of textbooks and learning materials. However, the original unit members, who were trained by the principal's assistance, just left their jobs without completing the change-over to new unit members replaced them. When observing the agent carefully during project implementation, consequently, for this reason, it is also difficult to say that the agent did not take part in the results.

According to the principal's Implementation Completion Report (World Bank, 2001), the principal argues that the unsatisfactory achievements in the project was also due to the numerous number of untrained and retired teachers who were recruited suddenly to satisfy not only the community's high demands in primary education enrollment, but also the conditions the principal required from project design. During project implementation, the agent actually recruited about 20,000 untrained primary teachers and retired teachers (World Bank, 2001). Although it is understandable why the agent had to take the decision when there was a great pressure from the community and the principal to develop its education system as fast as possible, still it is seemed that the decision looked very irresponsible from a long-term perspective. Notwithstanding all the facilities were provided for them, their irresponsible actions made an obstacle to achieving the third component of this project.

Notwithstanding all the facilities were provided for them, their irresponsible actions made an obstacle to achieving the third component of this project. Furthermore, the principal who already recognized the agent's lack of capacity intended to develop a guide book for material management as it believed that the book would guide the teachers to extend the usability of the teaching and learning materials they received. In so doing, the agent also agreed with that the book would assist the teacher to use in more effective and creative ways. This activity, but, was not completed at all due to the other activities in troubles (World Bank, 2001, p.9). Therefore, as this last component also shows unsatisfactory results, the overall results of this project are all unsatisfactory. Therefore, it is shown that such unsatisfactory implementation of primary education project could be naturally obtained if the level of the principal and the agent's responsibilities is low as they are all directly related to the level of the project efficiency.

During project implementation, at last, both the principal and the agent did not provide a sophisticated monitoring and supervision to the agent (World Bank, 2001). Because of their poor monitoring and evaluation system, all the processes of the project were not carefully assessed on a regular basis, and naturally some unexpected problems arisen from the actual development field could not be discussed and negotiated between the principal and the agent (World Bank, 2001). Thus, it tells that the accountability of the principal and the agent during project implementation was not fully taken in this project.


The World Bank and Uganda

With relatively more specific components, the principal started to implement the two main components with eight sub-components during project implementation. It is assumed that the principal had a stronger responsibility from project design and continued to bring more

positive influence to achieving some sub-components than Malawi's PEP project. In order to achieve the first main component – which is *Improving primary school teaching and management*, firstly for the subcomponent 1a, establishing the Teacher Development and Management System (TDMS), the principal purchased lots of teaching materials and established TDMS framework. The framework has actually gained lots of attention and supports at international level. Some people commented that only the quantitative objectives of this subcomponent were achieved while the qualitative changes were not appeared properly. Although the principal admitted that the proposed periods of the project were very insufficient to improve the quality of primary education with the enormous increase of student enrollment. Still the efforts to achieve this subcomponent portrays that the principal had a stronger responsibility to make this project successful.

Even though the results of first subcomponent were not a hundred percent satisfactory, the principal and the agent took strong responsibilities to improve the teaching and instruction quality at primary level through linking teacher education institutions and primary schools. Their efforts actually led the TDMS to be more operational and also motivated the original TDMS districts and other districts to demand more access to education (World Bank, 2002, p.10). To respond and satisfy the needs of the community, the principal took a decision to support 10 Primary Teachers Colleges (PTC) and the agent Government, the Royal Netherlands Government and Ireland Aids additionally financed 8 PTCs for nationwide coverage (World Bank, 2002, p.10). The 18 PTCs were connected to 539 Coordinating Centers (CC) and 298 CCs were in turn linked to 5,000 Outreach Schools (OS). The original plan of this project estimated that each CC would be linked to 10 OSs, but in practice each CC was

linked to about 20 OSs (refer to figure.5).



<Figure 5> Teacher Development and Management System established in Uganda. (World Bank, 2002, p.10).

Without the principal and the agent's strong responsibilities on this work, it would have been difficult for them to establish CCs and OSs more than what was originally planned for this component and to motivate the whole country to demand more access to education especially at primary education level.

To support the nationwide TDMS system, the principal and the agent took a responsibility to supervise PTCs to deliver more effective pre-service teacher education and in-service professional development for teachers as well as Head Teachers through providing some primary education curriculum and school management training courses (World Bank, 2002, p.10). In the teacher development of Malawi's PEP, only 2,670 untrained and uncertified teachers (about 3.9%) out of 68,000 teachers attended the teacher training courses opened for six times during the project implementation (GOM, 2001). Unlike the PEP project, 51,007 out of 63,000 teachers (about 81%) participated in professional development courses of the PETDP project, regardless of existence of teaching qualification. In so doing, the principal and the agent's role of supervision in this component changed from inspection to pedagogical support which is more meaningful. The high motivation of Uganda teachers displays that national and local ownership on the TDMS was very strong. Naturally their strong responsibility contributed to narrowing down the gap between the teacher education and real teaching environment. Thus, it is concluded that the more accountable the principal and the agent are, the stronger ownership

can be rooted in the community that actually receive quantitative and qualitative assistances in the project.

Nevertheless, according to evidences gained from the final supervision mission of the principal staff, the results of the standardized tests taken in 1996 and 1999 showed declines in students' learning achievement (World Bank, 2002, p.10). For the poor students' achievements, some head teachers believed that the strict supervision and excessive responsibility of the principal led the local teachers to be against "collegial collaboration" and remained as before in their teaching environments (World Bank, 2002). The agent also mentioned that short-term, top-down nature of the principal in teacher development programs made the TDMS system less effective and friendly to the community at the end of the project in spite of their strong demand on education at the beginning (World Bank, 2002). As a result, it gives a lesson that the principal should have been more friendly and responsive to the demands and nature of the community when providing any developmental projects.

The subcomponent 1b, *rehabilitating and constructing facilities* was delayed at the initial stage of project implementation due to inappropriate application of centralized procurement and implementation method by the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) for outreach classrooms and coordinating centers (World Bank, 2002, p.11). The delay for this subcomponent resulted in increase of construction costs and demotivation of the communities. In spite of its negative effects on the community, the centralized construction system was maintained from 1993 to 1998. Only after 1998, the decentralized construction system was introduced for a more sustainable school and classroom construction in the communities. That is, the response to the communities' complaints on the centralized construction system was made seriously late by the principal and the agent.

Although most educational facilities were constructed and rehabilitated more than what was planned (except the unserved and the poorest areas) like the following table 4,

Subcomponent 1b	Plan	Reality
Primary Teachers College (PTC)	16	10
Coordinating Center (CC)	200	298
Outreach Classroom (OC)	2640	2782
For 100 student teachers, additional dormitory facilities were added		

<Table 4> The number of facilities built or rehabilitated during implementation of the PETDP

Both the principal and the agent did not prepare a plan made for infrastructure maintenance system which is either a community-based or government-based. From this aspect, it is assumed that the principal and the agent did not have strong responsibility to provide a more sustainable teaching and learning environments. Thus, their actions with weak responsibility are pale in comparison with the large amount of finance (US\$ 28.9 million) given for this subcomponent.

In addition, the subcomponent 1c - *providing learning resources* was not accomplished. The desired textbook ratio was 3:1 in core subject at primary schools, but the actual ratio is between 5:1 to 10:1 (World Bank, 2002b, p.2). The financial assistance for learning resources was not sufficient due to the extremely increased number of student enrollment followed after the introduction of UPE policy in PETDP project. Also the principal's the financial plan for textbook did not predict the increased price of papers and exchange rate differentials in advance (World Bank, 2002b, p.2). Unfortunately, additional purchases of learning resources could not be decided by the agent because of its lack of capacity

to make an appropriate library scheme and use the textbooks effectively in teaching and learning environment. It is seemed that the principal's hasty learning resource purchases without proper preparation can rather hamper the agent's primary education development.

Over the periods of project implementation, the subcomponent 1d – *revitalizing private sector publishing and printing* was dropped out since the textbook publishing monopolies were completely ended, and a number of competitive local publishing companies were newly established with increased number of local authors who make new textbooks for education. although local printing and publishing capacity was improved, those companies from the agent refused to take capacity building and training planned by the principal in this project (World Bank, 2002b, p.2). Thus, it is appeared that consistent communication between the agent and the principal is significant to track all the progresses of the project and to prepare themselves for any unexpected events that could happen in anytime during implementation and supervision. Also the constant communication could be made only when both the principal and the agent have strong responsibilities for the tasks assigned to each.

Like the first main component of the PETDP project, the second main component – *Enhancing strategic Ministry of Education and Sports (MOES) functions* was also divided into four subcomponents. The subcomponent 2a – strengthening planning and policy analysis was not successfully achieved. It is because the agent could not staff the Education Planning Unit (EPU) with its own people at the initial stage of project implementation. Only after a few years, the unit was finally staffed by the agent. The agent's effort to it led considerable staff development to be proceeded properly for a short-term. In so doing, planning analysis which was one of the long-term objectives of capacity building in this project was largely accomplished by stronger responsibility of the agent and the principal although there are still

other objectives such as annual school census, financial analysis and budgeting remained behind.

Despite the principal expected the agent to receive a five-year process of ongoing training at project appraisal, the training was not completed properly due to the absence of practical appointments until the end of the project. In so doing, there was a high turnover in the unit during the project implementation. The principal had to use staff extensively who were financed by its institution. All those matters from the agent's lack of capacity and responsibility made it impossible for short-term training to bring long-term outcomes in the project (World Bank, 2002, p.12). Thus, the weak responsibility of the agent became one of the reason why capacity building could not be highly encouraged in project implementation.

In addition, with the agent's delays of staff hiring and high turnover, plans of consistent in-service trainings of MOES staff were not implemented. As the responsibility of the agent became stronger than before, Education Management Information System (EMIS) system started to be operational toward the end of the project and to provide necessary data for policy analysis and planning at the central and community levels. Interestingly, when the agent had a desire to procure more computers for EMIS at central level, the computers for EMIS at community level could not be procured until the end of the PETDP project. The shortage of reliable education data and analyses caused the agent to have seriously negative effects on its national education policies and planning. Therefore, the subcomponent 2b – *Upgrading management and information systems* was not achieved well as expected in the beginning of the project.

The subcomponent 2c – *Reforming curriculum and examination* was achieved at the end of the project implementation, although it was achieved later than planned. Through

training syllabus authors the principal responsibly supported, developing syllabus for grade 1 to 7, about 30,000 copies of the grade 1 to 3 syllabus were purchased and distributed to primary schools. When the principal visited the schools with final supervision mission, 10 to 15 teachers were still sharing the one copy together. The principal who responsibly visited the schools with final supervision mission figured out that the teacher's guidebooks were challenging the local teachers rather than supporting them in teaching and learning environments. With knowing the challenges, the principal did not make any corrections to it.

According to the report on curriculum development, the teacher's guidebooks were never developed and preliminarily tested by either PTCs or CCs that had a significant role in teacher development components of this PETDP project before they were distributed to the schools. Even the principal did not find an effective way to provide appropriate and sufficient textbooks that could support the new syllabus at schools, and no active teacher orientation that can share how to adapt learner-centered methods for large classes (World Bank, 2002, p,13). In so doing, the delayed curriculum development affected the other activities like examination reform and real classroom practices with the new syllabus. Those minimal achievements especially in qualitative aspects of the component shows the hidden sides of the component that was rated satisfactory on the ICR reports of the principal.

In order to achieve the subcomponent 2d - *Building project implementation capacity*, the agent agreed to fully staff the EPU and PIU and to make them operational within three months of the project implementation. But, the EPU was not fully staffed until seven years after the project implementation; and the PIU was fully staffed only after a year of the project implementation by the agent (World Bank, 2002). Staffing these units was the agent's responsibility or duty which needed to be decided with the approvals of the principal. In the principal's perspective, the reason why the principal allowed the agent to staff the units with

its own members was to make it have ownership and be more accountable in the project implementation. Unlike the principal's opinion, the agent felt difficult to appoint eligible staff for the project (World Bank, 2002). The principal-friendly decision rather caused substantial management turnover and difficulties – such as antipathy to the units' command and control approach and hoarding resources. Thus, it tells that understanding and reflecting the agent's contexts and capacity is significant to keep each other's responsibility stronger during project implementation.

For answerability of the principal and the agent, they also did not have a high quality of monitoring and evaluation system carried on during project implementation like Malawi' case. Although the principal took a responsibility to check the project's progress from summative evaluation, the monitoring and evaluation system was not strong enough to reflect all the matters arisen during project implementation. It is true that without a strong monitoring and evaluation system in the project, it is difficult to be answerable to everything that has done when implementing the project. But the principal with stronger responsibility extended the original project period until 2001 so that there could be more sufficient time for the principal and the agent to implement the activities planned for this project. In this sense, it is assumed that the principal and the agent in PETDP had stronger responsibilities to lead this project to success, but still the weak monitoring and evaluation system needs to be enhanced for their better performance in similar education projects later.

4.3. Project Evaluation Phase

After project implementation, the Operation Evaluation Department which is an independent department within the principal, the Bank has a responsibility to assess the overall processes and results of projects. To ensure its transparency and fairness, the OED reports are

reviewed by the board of executive directors and the president of the Bank (Baum, 1978). Basically, during evaluation phase OED compares the project costs, benefits, activities, project period and efficiency with what was suggested and planned with an expectation from project design phase. Also, during evaluation phase, the ways to improve the project implemented better in future are suggested, and recommendations of the president for improving the institution's portfolio management and evaluation processes are also made for future projects (World Bank, 2019, p.2).

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According to the Bank's Implementation Completion Report (World Bank, 2001), the Bank staff critically evaluated the primary education project implemented from the design phase to the implementation phase. This report was reviewed by OED staff in July 2001. The agent, Ministry of Education in Malawi also responsibly completed the project evaluation reports on its primary education project – which are part of summative evaluation. The report was submitted and reviewed by its principal as well. Thus, when observing the list of evaluation reports from the agent and the principal, they all tried to describe and assess all their actions in detail with attaching some relevant evidences to prove their words and actions. From the list of evaluation reports submitted, it is seemed that they were adequately responsible to evaluate and record each phase of their project together on a regular basis.

When observing the actual situation hidden behind those evaluation reports submitted by them, this project was evaluated with a “faulty Monitoring and Evaluation system” which evaluated the inputs they provided more than the outcomes they achieved at the end of the project (World Bank, 2001b, p.2). In other words, the principal and the agent just measured how much money and time they spent to implement the project on their evaluation reports.

Both the principal and the agent did not really focus on what they achieved or failed to achieve the objectives and the reasons why they could not perform better on the project. It means that they had a monitoring and evaluation system built for the project, but the system is not really useful to ensure transparency and answerability of the project. Thus, the use of a faulty monitoring and evaluation system shows that neither the principal was not fully prepared to take any corrective and preventative functions for the difficulties they faced from the project design phase.

According to DFID's report on this project of Malawi, lastly it also states that a weak monitoring and evaluation system formed between the Bank and the Government of Malawi made them feel difficult to make necessary corrections during project implementation (DFID, 2006). Like this, the lack of answerability of the principal and the agent explains the reason why the agent felt difficult and disconnected to communicate with the principal in the project (GOM, 2001). And it also answers the reason why the agent was burdened to submit the many regular reports required within a weak and empty monitoring and evaluation system. For this reason, it can be concluded that the Bank and the Government of Malawi had very weak responsibility and answerability for this project – which means a weak accountability. Their weak accountability contributed the whole project to be rated 'unsatisfactory' at the end of evaluation phase unlike Uganda's project.

The World Bank and Uganda

Since the PETDP project focused more on achieving the desired objectives and components, formative evaluation which usually takes place during the project implementation was not taken actively at all. But summative evaluation was done on a regular basis by both the principal and the agent. According to the Implementation Completion Reports from both

of them, they all submitted reports written from their own perspectives after each summative evaluation taken place – such as ICR reports, Technical Assistance Reports, PETDP Quarterly reports, mid-term review, Status Reports, Semi-Annual reports, Monitoring Reports, TDMS reports, and so on. Those reports were all submitted and shared to each other to make the project more transparent and practical to the actual community. Unlike the PEP project of Malawi, there was no negative remark by OED staff, saying either the principal or the agent’s attitude was negligent to submit regular evaluation reports required on a regular basis.

However, it is difficult to conclude that the PETDP project had a more effective and practical monitoring and evaluation system than the PEP project. It is because lots of issues identified from monitoring and evaluation processes during the project design and implementation were not properly addressed and considered in depth by each other (GOU, 2002). Also the agent’s introduction of decentralized procurement and administrative system in primary education looked very operational for one or two years at the end of the PETDP project. But the decentralized system the agent took also created a cleavage between teacher training system and teacher-related functions in the project (USAID, 2008). It shows that the principal and the agent did not take a deep consideration on their plans and decisions before they implement them in real practice. If more careful plans or long-term solutions cannot be arranged even after reviewing the regular evaluation reports, definitely there is no meaning and worth to spend lots of time and efforts to submit the reports on time. Their lack of answerability – which means reflecting the feedbacks from each phase - caused the project to lose its fundamental direction.

When reading the evaluation reports from the principal and the agent, they tended to shift their responsibilities for satisfactory results they gained during the PETDP project to each other. According to the agent’s project evaluation report (GOU, 2002), It states that delays

and poor outcomes made in some subcomponents were usually caused by the principal's "lengthy, cumbersome and difficult project implementation procedures". Due to the complexity of the principal's procedures, the agent with seriously weak system felt very difficult to follow all of them to its satisfactory standard, and then actual implementations were inevitably delayed. The agent tends to blame the principal's excessive requests on it in the project. However, on the principal's ICR report, it states that all the delays and poor outcomes were made mainly by the lack of capacity in the agent's administrative and technical systems (World Bank, 2002a). Although it is difficult to check which actor largely contributed to causing delays and poor achievement in the real fields of the project implementation, it is clear that either the principal or the agent tended to pass the buck to each other on the matter of poor achievements.

For satisfactory outcomes, on the other hand, the agent's efforts were not usually acknowledged on their evaluation reports. But, the principal's efforts to a few components showed satisfactory results are more emphasized over the unsatisfactory results of the rest components on their project evaluation reports. For instance, the outcome of subcomponent 2b largely financed by the principal was rated satisfactory as the principal insisted that it succeeded in purchasing and distributing 30,000 copies of grade 1 to 4 syllabus and the teachers' guides which were expected to guide teachers' performance at schools. But, the principal actually brought some unsatisfactory results in sustainable and effective use of the guides and syllabus provided for a long-term. In so doing, the quantitative supports for primary education sector became another great challenge to the teachers (World Bank, 2002, p.13). The agent's efforts to make the principal's quantitative supports meaningful were not acknowledged by the principal during evaluation. This aspect portrays that monitoring and evaluation were processed more from the principal's perspective due to an inevitable power relationship existing between them.

Subsequently, during project evaluation, it was already found that no maintenance system was actually planned to be established after the project. And unlike Malawi's case, the principal did not decide to provide follow-up measure for the uncompleted works (especially the uncompleted qualitative objectives) in PETDP project. Without providing intensive supports to the agent's education sector, the principal continued to scaling up the project with larger amount of finances. This aspect tells that the accountability mechanism of the principal has not guaranteed sustainability of the education project, but would cause the agent to be more dependent on the principal's assistance in future.

4.4. Follow-up Measure After the Project

As already illustrated above, the MASAF project was planned and implemented to cover up the uncompleted construction works of the PEP project by the principal. The MASAF project's primary objective was to strengthen and sustain the provision and use of resources funding by beneficiary communities (World Bank, 2004, p.1). And the first aim of the project was to address the need for socio-economic infrastructure development especially in rural areas. US\$ 51.1 million was appraised for this aim but US\$ 50.1 million was spent to support the infrastructure constructions. Through this project, the principal could responsibly construct, rehabilitate and expand about 2,255 (targeted 2,164) infrastructures and show a satisfactory outcome in number (World Bank, 2004, p.1).

However, it was found that the uncompleted construction works of the PEP project were not fully supplemented by the MASAF project until 2003. Because the MASAF project also had a problem in its sustainability and efficiency with the principal like the PEP project. In 2003 Beneficiary Assessment, this construction component was pointed for its poor technical quality and no improvement made comparing to the previous projects (World Bank,

2004, p.2). Besides, the stakeholders stated that MASAF infrastructure construction do not meet strict technical standards due to its low technical quality (World Bank, 2004, p.2). Seemingly, there was no appropriate coordinating, evaluation and monitoring system as well as the maintenance system made with the Government of Malawi for this component. Consequently, this component was critically commented as a major cause of producing a number of 'white elephants' in the agent country.

Notwithstanding the principal's great efforts to supplement the unfinished construction works from the previous PEP project, MASAF also did not bring satisfactory outcomes on it due to lack of capacity to construct quality infrastructure met its high strict standards and to make maintenance system for it. For this reason, it is concluded that careful project planning is the most significant factor which can actually contribute to achieving good outcomes in any education projects. Stronger responsibility should be taken by the principal when it provides follow-up measures after finished the previous education project.

In conclusion, when comparing the whole process of the PETDP project with the PEP project, these two cases show a distinctive difference of the degree of responsibility the principal took. The difference caused them to achieve opposite results from their similar primary education projects. From the project design to the evaluation phase, they all went through similar challenges with vague, ambitious objectives. Due to the Principal's stronger responsibility in Uganda's case, the two projects were assessed differently within similar educational conditions. Consequently, it is found that the PETDP project which achieved relatively stronger responsibility was evaluated as a successful and satisfactory project while the PEP project with weak responsibility was evaluated as a failed and unsatisfactory project.

The following table 5 shows a summary of this study’s findings which are analyzed according to Principal – agent theory and the three components of accountability:

		PEP in Malawi (1996-2000)		PETDP in Uganda (1993-2001)	
		The World Bank (P)	Gov. of Malawi (A)	The World Bank (P)	Gov. of Uganda (A)
Responsibility	D	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Suggested to take a ‘fast-track operation’ responding to A’s educational crisis -Too much focus on construction works (over 58%) -Chosen Ghana’s construction scheme without regarding its context in depth -Requested A to staff units with its own members. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong commitment of parents and community on PE - After FPE, urgently requested WB - Informed its highest priorities and wishes - Submitted lists of construction sites selected 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not reflected the identified wishes and priorities of A and lessons from previous education - Preparation period was too lengthy - Designed sub-components and activities for each main component - Objectives were ambitious, but better than Malawi’s 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Took considerable policy discussions - showed that A wanted long-term objectives - Requested P to design a project focus more on process than outcome - strong supports of parent and community for the project
	I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Insensitive to recognize the deficiencies of project design -Proper supervision and monitoring were missing - no money to support other component- parallel financing used from other donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Over-expenditure on civil works -urgently recruited a number of teachers (but not qualified) - Reluctant to staff PIU and EDMU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relatively stronger responsibility -Not predicted price increase, and gave up to purchase additional learning materials - Not clear division who will be responsible for each sub-component -USAID: purchased a number of syllabus but no teacher OT was held - Extensive use of donor-financed staff: imperil capacity building 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relatively stronger responsibility - Reluctant to staff PIU and EPU but fully staffed after 1998 and became operational - Complained P’s centralized (top-down) approach to the project - Requested decentralized procurement and implementation - better outcomes achieved
	E	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Preferred outcome-based evaluation -Decided to cover up the uncompleted works through MASAF project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Proper supervision and monitoring were missing -DFID comment: a weak monitoring and evaluation process of Malawi – difficult to make correction during implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Proper supervision and monitoring were missing but better than Malawi’s case -Preferred outcome-based evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proper supervision and monitoring were missing but better than Malawi’s case - USAID comments: decentralization of PE created a cleavage between teacher training system and teacher-related functions of the district office
Answerability	D	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Not revised oversimplified objectives -No proper negotiation with A made 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of capacity :to monitor the design process in depth and to speak up their voices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Not revised oversimplified objectives -No proper negotiation with A made 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of capacity :to monitor the design process in depth and to speak up their voices
	I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proper supervision and monitoring were missing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Proper supervision and monitoring were missing -Burdened to submit many reports on a regular basis -Communication was difficult with P 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Proper supervision and monitoring were missing but better than Malawi’s case -Extended the project period until 2001 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Proper supervision and monitoring were missing, later its function improved
	E	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -No maintenance system was planned to be made again - decided to cover up the uncompleted works through MASAF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -No maintenance system was planned 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -No maintenance system was planned to be made again -Blamed A for its lack of capacity -No follow-up measure was made 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Blamed P for its too lengthy, cumbersome, and difficult project procedures -Became highly dependent on P

<Table 5> A summary of the accountability mechanism taken between the principal and the agent

CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION

To comprehend how the accountability mechanism of the World Bank caused the two similar primary education projects to achieve the opposite results, this study explored the external accountability existing between the Bank and the Government of Malawi and the Government of Uganda on the basis of principal-agent theory and the three components of accountability. As explained earlier in the study, the Governments of Malawi and Uganda requested the Bank to provide large amount of financial assistance for their primary education projects, whereby they can overcome the educational challenges made by the sudden introduction of Universal Primary Education policy from 1990s. In so doing, the whole processes of their primary education projects were analyzed in terms of accountability (responsibility and answerability). The findings of this study presents the answers on how the accountability mechanism of the Bank caused the two countries to achieve opposite results within similar conditions. The collected data actually represent that the results of the projects were rated according to the degree of accountability the principal took from project design to evaluation phases.

However, this study presents a few points to be discussed further. This chapter is divided into three sections by drawing critical points revealed from the findings of this study. The first section discusses the needs of capacity measurement before implementing any education projects and scaling up the projects in future since the findings showed that those two African case were implemented without a deep consideration on the agents' limited capacities and scaled up later by the principal without strengthening the actors' accountability and the projects' sustainability properly. The second section asks the standard of success or

failure in education development project financed by the Bank. The third section discusses further on which phase was the most serious phase in two the projects.

5.1. Need of Strong Sustainability in Education Project

From the beginning of Primary Education Projects in Malawi and Uganda, the agent's highest priorities and wishes were shared with the principal so that they can design a context relevant education project for them. Lots of lessons were gained from the several number of education projects and given to the project planners. However as already explained in the findings, the principal with a weak monitoring system did not reflect the actual needs or demands of the communities into the project design and implementation. Its underestimation on the contexts of Malawi and Uganda highly affected the achievements of the projects.

In addition, when deciding some objectives, activities and schemes for the project, there were lots of claims that the agent's opinions and ideas were not carefully considered in depth and did not take a sophisticated capacity measurement of the agents before implementing actual project in their communities. Due to this reason, when analyzing the ICR report of Uganda (World Bank, 2002), the principal easily blamed the agent's lack of capacity to manage what it requested to do during project implementation. The agent, the Government of Uganda also passed the buck to the principal for uncompleted and unsatisfactory works in its project as it says that the project procedure was too lengthy, cumbersome and difficult to follow (GOU, 2002). That is, what the principal requested was beyond the actual capacity of the agent. This aspect shows that the principal did not take critical analysis on the agent's limitations, and eventually resulted in a weak trustful and sustainable relationship with the agents. Therefore, it is essential to take an appropriate capacity measurement of the agent in advance and to make education project implemented in a sustainable and trustful manner with the agent.

Although they received opposite outcomes from their primary education projects financed by the Bank, it is an undeniable fact that their projects are all lack of sustainability. It is definitely expected that the good outcomes from the projects are to be sustained in other future education projects. According to the ICR report, sustainability of project achievement is rated likely – which means a high possibility of sustaining the achievements in the community. The report explains that the financial allocation of the agent to education sector is increasing and the agent has strong commitment to improving education quality and sector management (World Bank, 2002, p.16). Also, the principal has strong commitment to support the agent with its continued IDA-financed projects. In spite of its strong commitments to support the agent education development, the weak accountability mechanism which demotivated the agent's roles in its education sector development caused the agent to be highly dependent on its assistance. If the principal's priorities are shifted or its commitment to support the agent is declined, the agent would not carry on its education development alone. In the PETDP and PEP projects, it is reported that not only no maintenance system was established to use the newly constructed infrastructures sustainably, but also no alternative system to support teacher development was not arranged at all before the projects' completion. Hence there should be much stronger accountability and trust to lead the projects to be with long-term achievement.

5.2. Meanings of Success and Failure in Education Projects

When referring to the World Bank's Implementation Completion Reports, the terms, 'satisfactory' and 'unsatisfactory' have been usually used to rate the overall achievement of the projects provided by the Bank. In general, projects with satisfactory outcomes are regarded as successful projects; projects with unsatisfactory outcomes are considered as failed projects in the field of international development. In so doing, the Primary Education Project

of Malawi is an example of unsatisfactory or failed education project; and the Primary Education and Teacher Development Project of Uganda is a satisfactory or successful education project. In appearance, it is seemed that those two projects had opposite results from their primary education projects.

Throughout the findings, it is found that the projects did not show a big difference when they are compared with each other in the findings of this study. Rather the Governments of Malawi and Uganda, the agents were all affected by the principal-centered and top-down mechanism of the Bank. The Bank's typical accountability mechanism which regards outcomes greater than processes shows some characteristic of neoliberalism in both projects. Even the Bank has heavily focused on accomplishing quantitative gains – like the number of schools and classrooms constructed or rehabilitated and the number of textbooks provided by its financial assistance – rather than qualitative changes – like teachers' teaching performance, application of the developed curriculums, quality improvement of the Governments' administrative and managements. The Bank's emphasis on quantitative gains resulted in unbalanced achievements in all two projects. The PETDP project which achieved more qualitative gains was rated satisfactory while the PEP project which was succeeded in terms of accountability by supplementing the poor achievements with follow-up measures through MASAF.

With this irony in international education development, if education development projects continued to be proceeded and assessed like these two projects of the study, there would not be a project which intensively focus more on qualitative changes in the recipient countries with long-term objectives. Besides, the efforts of the principal to take an accountability for their actions are not sufficiently acknowledged and encouraged more in any

developmental projects, the accountability mechanism of the Bank would become an obstacle which hinders sustainable qualitative development as well as quantitative development in future. As already mentioned above, education is not just a sector made simply for preparing people to satisfy the job requirements, ultimately promoting economic growth in the world. For this reason, any education developments should be approached totally different with traditional approaches used for economic development in the world so that sustainability of education projects can be strengthened in future.

5.3. The Most Serious Phase of Education Project

With observing the whole processes of the two projects in Malawi and Uganda, it is found that the most serious phase was surprisingly the project design phase, not the implementation or evaluation phase. The real contexts of Malawi and Uganda were not really considered carefully during the project design phase. In so doing, the two project received similar comments on unspecific, vague, excessively ambitious objectives and target in common. Even when those unclear objectives were requested to be revised, they were not revised at all during appraisal. Negligence of the Bank and the Governments of Malawi and Uganda in responding to the feedback immediately contributed the projects to be more confusing. When the projects had to be evaluated on their achievements after a few years, the absence of specific objectives and targets limited evaluating qualitative components more than quantitative components of the projects.

In addition, the poorly designed projects provide no specific descriptions on the roles and responsibilities of the principal and the agent in the project. This case makes it really difficult to figure out whose responsibility was for poor achievements in the project. Unclear and oversimplified responsibilities eventually cause the project implementers to pass the buck

to each other. No one wants to take a responsibility especially when something is done wrong or poor in the project. Transparency and sustainability of projects cannot be guaranteed at all if education projects are designed properly and effectively to the real contexts. Then that will directly decrease the efficiency of the project. Therefore, the project design phase should not be looked down. And it is essential to take sufficient time to design a well-contextualized, government-based, specific, community-centered project before actual project implementation takes place. While reading the findings of this study in project design phase, some might think that there cannot be a 'perfect' project design which absolutely satisfies both the principal and the agent's priorities and wishes in any education projects even if they could share what they wanted and how the project to be achieved during project design. But still it is important to design an education project which is very close to 'perfection' from the agent perspective.

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

This research has illustrated how the accountability mechanism caused the primary education projects of Malawi and Uganda to have opposite outcomes within similar conditions. According to the findings, firstly the three components of accountability were not fully satisfied in those two African cases. But as the principal (the Bank) had a relatively stronger responsibility to design and supervise the project contributed the PETDP project to achieve opposite results from PEP project of Malawi. Therefore, the findings emphasize the significance of strong accountability mechanism of the principal.

The research also highlighted a necessity to shift the top-down or centralized approach of the Bank to more the agent-friendly approach when providing education projects to many developing countries like Malawi and Uganda. Throughout the projects, the weak agent and its community tried to satisfy the Bank's excessive and lengthy requirements. Lots of parts in those project were not highly clear and authentic to assess them especially in qualitative changes. In so doing, the components that can be measured easily got mostly prioritized by the Bank. It, eventually, emphasizes the significance of taking 'intensive' project design phase for the efficiency and sustainability of any education projects in future.

With the intensive project design, if the Bank's accountability mechanism is transformed to more community-centered and government-based mechanism (more free from the Bank's neoliberal legacy which is still left in its accountability mechanism), that would increase the efficiency of any education projects, further stronger ownership would be given to the communities. Another important point need to be remembered is finding a way to ensure the sustainability of the good achievements from the projects. Otherwise, the education projects

without ensuring its sustainability can only produce lots of white elephants rather than meaningful changes in many developing countries.

Lastly, there should be more enhanced capacity analysis of the agent before designing and implementing actual education project. It is also to strengthen the sustainability of the projects. If education projects are scaled up into other project without promoting their sustainability and accountability, no education projects can have a true meaning or value of quality education.

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국문 초록

말라위와 우간다의 초등교육사업 비교분석:

세계은행의 책무성 제도를 중심으로

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이은정

본 연구는 이전부터 많은 개발도상국 교육 원조를 제공 할 때 계속적으로 사용되고 있는 세계은행의 책무성 제도(Accountability Mechanism)를 탐구했다. 비록 세계은행은 교육 원조만 제공하는 교육전문기관이 아니지만 그들의 교육 원조에 대한 관심은 성장하고 있기에 그들의 책무성 제도가 일정기간동안 제공되는 개발도상국들의 교육발전을 위한 교육사업의 최종 성과에 어떤 영향을 끼쳐왔는지 분석할 필요가 있다.

이 연구 질문에 답하기 위하여, 본 연구는 세계은행에 의하여 진행되었던 두 아프리카 국가의 교육사업들을 서로 비교하여 메타평가(Meta-evaluation)방식을 택하였다. 말라위와 우간다의 교육사업들은 그들의 초등교육발전을 위하여 비슷한 시기 동안에 실시되었으나, 최종 사업평가에서는 정반대의 성과를 거두었다. 정반대의 결과를 야기시킨 주된 이유를 연구하기 위하여, 원조관계에서 나타나는 실제 세계은행 (공여자)와 말라위와 우간다 정부들 (수혜자들)의 관계를 보다 자

세히 묘사하기 위하여 주인-대리인 이론 (Principal-Agent Theory)이 사용되었다. 또한 책무성의 세 가지 구성요소들(United Nations, 2013)을 사용하여 세계은행과 수혜국가정부들이 강한 책무성을 가지고 있었는지 분석하고 특히 세계은행의 책무성 제도가 직접적으로나 간접적으로 그들의 교육사업 최종 성과에 영향을 끼쳤는지 연구했다.

연구 결과로는 제한된 현지상황 속에 사용된 세계은행의 약한 책무성 제도가 말라위와 우간다의 불만족스런 교육사업 결과들의 주된 원인이었다. 세계은행은 수혜국가들의 우선사항들을 제대로 잘 반영하지 않았다. 그리고 그들은 교육사업의 지속성을 높일 수 있는 교육의 질적인 변화보다 물량주의적 이익을 얻는 것에 과도하게 집중하였다. 그래도 우간다의 초등교육사업이 상대적으로 더 만족스러운 성과를 얻을 수 있던 이유는 우간다의 교육사업 설계 때부터 세계은행이 말라위의 초등교육사업 때 보다 더 강한 책임성(Responsibility)을 보여주었기 때문이었다. 하지만 연구 결과는 세계은행의 약한 책무성 제도가 두 국가의 교육사업의 만족스럽지 못한 결과를 야기시킨 유일한 이유가 아니라고 말한다. 즉, 두 아프리카 정부들의 매우 제한된 역량이 그들의 부족한 교육사업 성과에 어느정도 기여했음을 보여주었다.

이러한 연구 결과들을 통하여 이 질적 연구는 앞으로도 시행될 다양한 교육 원조에 대하여 원조 공여자와 수혜자에게 실질적인 제안과 이론적 통찰을 제공한다. 이를 통해 세계은행이나 다른 국제기구들의 책무성 제도가 대리인 중심적이게 되었다고 혹은 될 것이라고 명백하게 주장할 수는 없다는 한계점을 가

진다. 그렇지만 본 연구는 앞으로 진행될 교육사업들의 더 지속적이고 만족스러운 성과를 위하여 국제적인 수준에서 큰 영향력을 가지고 있는 주인과 대리인의 보다 더 책임이 있는 역할의 필요성이 조명 되었다는 점은 중요한 의의를 갖는다.

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주요어: 책무성 제도, 세계은행, 책임성, 응답성, 교육 ODA, 초등교육사업, 지속성, 주인-대리인 이론

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