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Ph. D. Dissertation in Engineering

**Exploring the Impact of Knowledge Sharing
on Innovations in Democracy
- The Latin American Experience -**

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Technology Management, Economics and Policy Program

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Seoul National University

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Exploring the Impact of Knowledge Sharing on Innovations in Democracy

- The Latin American Experience -

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Abstract

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Although 200 years have passed since their foundation, Latin American countries (LACS) have not been able to consolidate their democracies. Only two Latin American democracies measure up as full democracies, the rest are classified as faulty, hybrid or failed (The Economist, 2019). Democracies have also shifted from their traditional forms to focus on greater political exchange with unseen active citizen participation.

Countries that have achieved full democratic consolidation such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany adapted to changes early enough reformulating how democratic practices operated in their countries. However, many of these mature countries are also economically developed with rising educational standards and improved access to information which helps mobilize citizens and stimulate higher levels of awareness and participation. Thus, they seem to have successfully innovated their

traditional democratic models. They have effectively strived towards greater political awareness, direct participation, and open discussions.

These changes did not pass undetected in the context of LACs which too have incorporated some of these democratic processes, but they keep failing to reap the benefits visible in other hemispheres.

Innovation depends on knowledge, skills, and experiences, and these are embedded in individuals who need to be triggered to share such knowledge so that new routines and mental processes can be established and problems solved. Simultaneously, the provision and acquisition of knowledge among individuals is proven to contribute to the generation of new ideas and opportunities, thus enabling process innovations. Inspired by findings that have attributed to the success of innovations in knowledge sharing, this study explores the potential implications of knowledge sharing for innovations in a democratic setting with a particular focus on LACs.

A gap was identified when exploring these issues. Only a few researchers have addressed the problems regarding the impact of knowledge sharing in the urgently-needed innovation processes in democracies and they have rarely used an empirical approach using data from a developing region, such as Latin America. Therefore, this work adds to available evidence on the effects of knowledge sharing and innovations, and tests their implications for innovations in democracy.

It does so by addressing three studies. The first study models and tests citizens willingness to share knowledge. It does a thorough literature review of knowledge

sharing and uses econometric techniques to estimate the explanatory variables that represent citizens motivation, opportunities, and abilities to share knowledge. Using panel data for 2001-2016 collected in 18 LACs, the study empirically tests which components influence citizens-driven knowledge provision and acquisition. The econometric estimation shows that while citizens knowledge provision was influenced by trust in the political system and educational attainments, support for democracy and perceptions about corruption influenced their knowledge acquisition.

The second study follows the same lines and models and tests public managers willingness to share knowledge. After a literature review of knowledge sharing, it uses the same econometric techniques and estimates the explanatory variables which represent public managers motivations, opportunities, and abilities to share knowledge. The econometric estimation shows that while public managers knowledge acquisition was influenced by trust in people, support for democracy, and educational attainments; only support for democracy and perception about corruption influenced public managers knowledge provision.

Finally, the last study determines whether knowledge sharing activities between citizens and public managers contribute to innovations in democracy. After considering existing literature on knowledge sharing and innovations, a link between knowledge sharing and innovations in democracy is hypothesized and estimated to explore whether citizens and public managers knowledge sharing contributes to democratic processes. The results show that citizens-driven knowledge sharing feeds public managers-driven knowledge

sharing, and public managers-driven knowledge sharing feeds citizens-driven knowledge sharing. However, while citizens driven knowledge sharing contributes to the production of innovations in a democracy, public managers driven knowledge sharing does not contribute to the production of innovations in a democracy.

Keywords: LACs, direct participation, knowledge sharing, innovations in democracy, panel data

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Background and Motivation

LACs have historically struggled to keep and recover their democracies (Arnsion, 1999; Bowman, 2010; Camp, 2001; De la Cuadra & Paredes, 2017; Eckstein & Wickham-Crowley, 2003; Fleury, 2017; Kaplan, 2016). According to some scholars, the issue resides in the fact that democracy in LACs has been built based on fragile institutional processes (Eberhardt, 2015; Frantz & Geddes, 2016; Follari, 2015, Hermet, 2019; Kaplan, 2016; Mainwaring, 2019; Reveles-Vázquez, 2017; Wiarda, 2019) that usually do not guarantee compliance with democratic principles such as accountability, responsiveness, rule of law, political inclusion, and social equality (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning, & Teorell, 2016; Esmark, 2007; Fuchs & Roller, 2018; Keohane, 2011; McLaverty, 2002; Saxonhouse, 2017; Rivas-Leone, 2015; Warren & Pearse, 2008; Young, 2002). Although more than 200 years have passed, issues with LACs' democratic models have still not reached maturity and consolidation seen in other regions worldwide. For example, one of the most quoted international references in terms of democratic robustness, 'The Democracy Index' (The Economist, 2019) recently said that LACs' democracy was still largely faulted: out of 18 countries only two measured up to a full democracy while the rest were classified as faulty, hybrid or even authoritarian regimes. Additionally, out of the same sub-group, only seven countries were considered free in terms of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2019).

To worsen this struggle for democracy, they have also shifted from their traditional forms to focus on greater political exchange with unseen active citizen participation. Further, democracy has evolved from being organized into centralized ideology-driven parties to more direct and individualized forms of political exchange involving new social movements, community groups or even activism by social networks (Helms, 2016; Newton & Geissel, 2012; Skelcher & Torfing, 2010). Practices that were acceptable even a decade ago, no longer fit modern circumstances. Countries that have achieved full democratic consolidation and maturity adapted to these changes early enough and realized that they could not expect different results while following the same democratic processes. These countries pursued a reformulation of how democratic practices operate (Newton & Geissel, 2012). However, many of these mature countries are also economically developed and show greater prosperity in the higher levels of society raising educational standards and improved access to information which helps mobilize citizens and stimulate higher levels of awareness and participation (Newton & Geissel, 2012). Thus, they seem to have successfully innovated their traditional democratic models. During the last 30 years, these mature democracies have effectively moved towards greater political awareness, direct participation, and open discussions (Dalton, 2013). Their citizens have not only grown closer to their democratic values but have also become more critical and much more active as compared to the older traditional democratic arrangements (Norris, 2002).

These changes did not pass undetected in the LACs' context and as a response, legal

frameworks were updated to incorporate other forms of political exchange using, for example, more direct participation mechanisms. However, despite the region's efforts to keep up with this new paradigm of innovations in democratic processes it seems to keep failing to reap the same benefits visible in other hemispheres. As evidence, what can be seen is LACs citizens strong reactions to the democratic system, with unseen repertoires and unconventional forms of protest behavior, demonstrations, direct action, and boycotts (Aquino, 2019; Bartlett, 2019a; Paúl, 2019; Taub & Munita, 2019). To overcome this, democratic processes need to be innovated, but following the same paths that the mature democracies has proven to be no silver bullet.

Innovations depend on knowledge, skills, and experiences, and these are embedded in individuals who need to be triggered to share their knowledge so that new routines and mental processes can be established and the problems solved (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Leonardi, 2017; Zhou & Li, 2012). Further, the provision and acquisition of knowledge between individuals is proven to contribute to the generation of new ideas and opportunities, thus enabling process innovation (Lin, 2007). Inspired by such findings that have attributed the success of innovations to knowledge sharing (Al-Husseini & Elbeltagi, 2018; Goldberg, Pasher, & Levin-Sagi, 2006.; Raza & Sohaib-Murad, 2008), this study explores the potential implications of knowledge sharing on innovations in a democratic setting with a focus on LACs.

1.2 Problem Definition

This study was inspired by the observation that a possible approach for solving the political crises in LACs could be through knowledge sharing and innovative democratic processes. However, when exploring these two issues, a gap was identified. On the one hand, contributions by Goldberg et al. (2006), Michels (2011), Roberts (2015) and Romanelli (2016) stress the importance and potential impact of knowledge sharing on individuals for innovative outcomes, but through different lenses. Few researchers have addressed the problems encountered in knowledge sharing' impact on the urgently-needed innovation processes in democracies and more so following an empirical approach using data from a developing region such as the LACs. Studying existing literature's contributions, this study realized the need to extend the existing evidence on the effect of knowledge sharing on innovations (Al-Husseini & Elbeltagi, 2018; Goldberg et al., 2006; Raza & Sohaib-Murad, 2008), and test its implications for innovations in a democracy.

Innovations in a democracy in particular have increasingly received the attention of researchers worldwide. A simple database keyword search throws up more than 1,300 matching publication results during a 20-year period (2000-2019). Even after filtering the results to fit the conceptual definition chosen by this study, it can be seen that efforts to explore innovations in democracy have exponentially increased in the last couple of years. Nevertheless, a gap must be pointed out: the problem of innovation processes in a democratic context is still majorly coming from more mature democracies in developed countries' settings (See Figure 1).




Figure 1 Research Trend Analysis on Democratic Innovation

(based on SCOPUS and Web of Science)

Additionally, a preliminary literature review (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Ferraris, Santoro, & Dezi, 2017; Hussein, Singh, Farouk, & Sohal, 2016; Obeidat, Al-Suradi, Masa'deh, & Tarhini, 2016; Ritala, Olander, Michailova, & Husted, 2015; Santoro, Vrontis, Thrassou, & Dezi, 2018; Tassabehji, Mishra, & Dominguez-Péry, 2019; Un & Asakawa, 2015) shows that studies combining knowledge sharing and innovations,

although being a widely explored issue (in particular regarding how to enable effective knowledge sharing) still provide non-empirical non-generalizable results and their data collection approaches are limited.

The approach is applied to different fields of study: education (Al-Husseini, 2015), public administration (Goldberg et al. 2006), business organization, manufacturing, or to one single organization or country and in most of the cases the setting does not reflect the conditions of LACs.

For this study's purposes, knowledge sharing is understood as the process of provision and acquisition of knowledge that increases the common intellectual capital stock, and this capital stock promotes the generation of new ideas and opportunities, thus enabling innovations (De Vries, Van den Hooff & De Ridder, 2006; Lin, 2007; Koohborfardhaghighi, Altmann, & Tserpes, 2017; Van den Hooff & Van Weenen, 2004).

Digging deeper into what triggers and ensures knowledge sharing' outcomes, Kuvaas, Buch and Dysvik (2012), propose that it involves social or collaborative interaction in which individuals exchange experiences, skills, and know-how to help them improve a process, solve problems, and develop new ideas. Ensuring knowledge sharing among individuals is crucial in many settings, particularly under the highly dynamic and interconnected era that the world is facing (Asrar-ul-Haq & Anwar, 2016; Hussein et al., 2016). However, the key challenge is how to achieve this. Prior contributions point out that knowledge sharing can only be achieved if the right triggers exist and some studies even classify these preconditions using the theoretical framework of Motivation, Ability,

and Opportunity (MOA) (Hung & Sirakaya-Turk, 2011; Kang & Kim, 2017; Reinholt, M., Pedersen, T., & Foss, 2011; Siemsen, Roth, & Balasubramanian, 2008). These findings made the present study realize that to be able to extend the implications of knowledge sharing for innovations in a democratic process, it is necessary to also explore what is behind an individual's willingness to share knowledge (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Andreeva, 2012; Becerra-Fernandez & Sabherwal, 2014; Ferraris et al., 2017; Hussein et al., 2016; Obeidat et al., 2016;; Reich, Gemino, & Sauer, 2014; Santoro et al., 2018; Shannak, Ra'ed, & Akour, 2012; Wang, Noe, & Wang, 2014). As several stakeholders exchange knowledge in a democratic setting, the problem needs to be analyzed following a multiple perspective approach. Hence, this research explores the willingness to share knowledge driven by the citizens-perspective and then by the public managers-perspective. Finally, it addresses citizens and public managers knowledge sharing and tests its effects on an innovative democracy. The latter is interpreted as the transformation of processes that build a democracy, making it more accountable, responsible, legal, inclusive and egalitarian (Newton & Geissel, 2012; Smith, 2009; Warren & Pearse, 2008).

1.3 Research Question

Considering the problem stated earlier, three research questions are formulated for this study:

1. What drives citizens willingness to share knowledge in LACs' democratic context?

2. What drives public managers willingness to share knowledge in the LACs' democratic context?
3. Does knowledge sharing between citizens and public managers contribute to innovations in democracy in LACs?

1.4 Research Objectives

This thesis addresses the research problem and questions in three studies. The first study models and tests citizens willingness to share knowledge in LACs. It does a thorough literature review of knowledge sharing and uses econometric techniques to estimate the explanatory variables that represent citizens motivations, opportunities, and abilities to share knowledge. Using panel data for 2001-2016 collected in 18 LACs, the study empirically tests which components influence citizens-driven knowledge provision and acquisition.

The second study follows the same lines and models and tests public managers willingness to share knowledge in LACs. After a literature review, it uses the same econometric technique and estimates the explanatory variables that represent public managers motivations, opportunities, and abilities to share knowledge. It estimates and empirically tests the components that influence public managers-driven knowledge provision and acquisition.

Finally, the last study explores whether knowledge sharing activities between citizens and public managers contribute to innovations in a democracy in LACs. After considering

existing literature on knowledge sharing and the innovation phenomena, it hypothesizes a link between knowledge sharing and innovations in democracy and estimates this link to explore whether citizens and public managers knowledge sharing contributes to democratic processes.

1.5 Research Outline

The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Latin American democratic context along with existing of willingness to share knowledge, and how these knowledge sharing activities among individuals contribute to innovations. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual model as a whole and examines the data used for the analysis. It also discusses the econometric methods and techniques used for estimating the fitness of the model and its robustness. Chapter 4 conceptualizes citizens willingness to share knowledge and econometrically estimates what variables influence their knowledge provision or acquisition activities. Chapter 5 conceptualizes public managers willingness to share knowledge and econometrically estimates what variables influence their knowledge provision or acquisition activities. Chapter 6 describes and estimates the possible contributions of citizens and public managers-driven knowledge sharing activities on innovations in democracy. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the findings and their implications using recent happenings in Chile as an example and summarizes the study's limitations and contributions as well as future research opportunities. Figure 2 gives the structure and overview of the thesis.




Figure 2 Overall Research Framework

Chapter 2. Literature Review

2.1 Latin American Democracies

During the 19th century, Latin American countries became independent from their Spanish and Portuguese colonizers (Drake, 2009; Fowler, 2015; Meade, 2016; Schneider, 2018). However, it was a revolution led by the upper classes, in which power passed from the Europeans to the local aristocracy. The new leaders created states according to their interests and conceptions of the world (Drake, 2009; Grez-Toso, 2009; Williamson, 2015). When it came to the political system there was no inclusion and thus no knowledge was

shared with the lower classes in the democratic processes (Lynch, 2008; Meglio & Di Meglio, 2013; Pinkney, 2003; Quijano, 2000; Valenzuela, 2004).

By the 20th century, Latin American democracies had changed significantly. The possibility of voting was opened up to other sectors of the population (Dix, 1992; Jaquette, 2018; Morgan, 2015; Rice, 2015; Valenzuela, 1994), and the political and economic structures were democratized with the coming to power of progressive movements such as Peronism in Argentina, the Frente Amplio in Uruguay, and Popular Unity in Chile (Di Tella, 2017; Karl, 1990; Lynch, 2008; Palacios, 2007; Pinkney, 2003; Sabato, 2001; Valenzuela, 2004). These made the lower classes take center stage in political decisions and knowledge was more evenly shared which threatened the upper classes (Carothers, 1993; De Mesquita & Downs, 2006; Frantz & Geddes, 2016; Stokes, 2001). Supported in some cases by the United States (Fitch, 1977, 1993; Kirkpatrick, 1981; Thyne, 2010), the military carried out coups, and in the mid-1970s, only four Latin American countries had democratic regimes (Carothers, 1993; Cottam, 1994; Frantz & Geddes, 2016; McSherry, 2002; Pino, 2017; Sorj & Martuccelli, 2008; Valenzuela, 2004; Wiarda, 2019). Till this point in time, historians call the period, the second democratic wave (Weyland, 2009). During the next post-dictatorship stage, also known as the third wave, although some essential political rights were restored (Bowman, 2010; Dagnino, 2003; Eckstein & Wickham-Crowley, 2003; Fleury, 2017; Moreno & Figueroa, 2016; Pérez-Liñán, 2017; Sanhueza & Sánchez, 2015), but they continued to develop processes characterized by corruption and little attention was paid to the growing social inequalities

(Bowman, 2010; Dagnino, 2018; Eckstein & Wickham-Crowley, 2003; Felix, 2019; Fleury, 2017; Hermet, 2019; Lechner, 2015; Ramírez-Nárdiz, 2016; Sikkink, 2019).

At present, democracy in LACs is still majorly classified as 'faulted' and similar struggles and restlessness keep happening. Meanwhile, traditional solutions based on representative democracy models (an increase in participation, voting engagement) do not seem to be enough. To overcome these limitations, the process of democracy needs to be innovated, but following the same paths that mature ecosystems did has not proven to be a viable solution. Based on existing literature (Åström, Jonsson, & Karlsson, 2017; Geissel 2013; Michels 2011; Newton & Geissel, 2012; Pogrebinschi & Ryan 2018; Rivera, 2017; Smith 2005, 2009; Talpin 2012) this study realized that innovations in democracy can be achieved through activities that are an 'improved institutional democratic arrangement, with accountable, responsible, legal, inclusive and egalitarian activities on the one hand (Coppedge et al., 2016; Esmark, 2007; Fuchs & Roller, 2018; Keohane, 2011; McLaverty, 2002; Warren & Pearse, 2008; Young, 2002). and access to knowledge helps in coming up with new ways of solving problems and engaging in further innovative activities on the other (Al-Husseini & Elbeltagi, 2018; Goldberg et al., 2006; Raza & Sohaib-Murad, 2008). At the same time, innovations depend on knowledge, skills, and experiences, and these are embedded in individuals who need to be triggered to share their knowledge so that new routines and mental processes can be established and the problems solved (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Leonardi, 2017; Zhou & Li, 2012). Simultaneously, the provision and acquisition of knowledge between individuals is

proven to contribute to the generation of new ideas and opportunities, thus enabling process innovations (Lin, 2007). Inspired by such findings that have attributed the success of innovations to knowledge-sharing (Al-Husseini & Elbeltagi, 2018; Goldberg et al., 2006; Raza & Sohaib-Murad, 2008), this study explores the potential implications of knowledge sharing for innovations in a democratic setting, with a particular focus on LACs. Table 1 gives a summary overview of the region's democratic situation.

Table 1 Latin America's Democratic Situation Overview

Country	GDP per capita^[1] (2017, Current USD)	Population^[1] (2018, in Million Inhabitants)	Government Type^[1]	Democracy Index^[2]	Political Rights^[3] (1=Most Free, 7=Least Free)	Civil Liberties^[3] (1=Most Free, 7=Least Free)
Argentina	\$20,900	44.7	Presidential Republic	Flawed Democracy	2	2
Bolivia	\$7,600	11.3	Presidential Republic	Flawed Democracy	3	3
Brazil	\$15,600	208.8	Federal Presidential Republic	Hybrid Regime	2	2
Chile	\$24,600	17.9	Presidential Republic	Flawed Democracy	1	1
Colombia	\$14,400	48.2	Presidential Republic	Flawed Democracy	3	3
Costa Rica	\$16,900	5	Presidential Republic	Full Democracy	1	1
Dominican Republic	\$17,000	10.3	Presidential Republic	Flawed Democracy	3	3
Ecuador	\$11,500	16.5	Presidential Republic	Flawed Democracy	3	3

Country	GDP per capita^[1] (2017, Current USD)	Population^[1] (2018, in Million Inhabitants)	Government Type^[1]	Democracy Index^[2]	Political Rights^[3] (1=Most Free, 7=Least Free)	Civil Liberties^[3] (1=Most Free, 7=Least Free)
El Salvador	\$8,000	6.2	Presidential Republic	Hybrid Regime	2	3
Guatemala	\$8,200	16.6	Presidential Republic	Hybrid Regime	4	4
Honduras	\$5,600	9.2	Presidential Republic	Hybrid Regime	4	4
Mexico	\$19,900	126	Federal Presidential Republic	Flawed Democracy	3	3
Nicaragua	\$5,900	6.1	Presidential Republic	Authoritarian Regime	5	4
Panama	\$25,400	3.8	Presidential Republic	Flawed Democracy	2	2
Paraguay	\$12,800	7	Presidential Republic	Flawed Democracy	3	3
Peru	\$13,500	31.3	Presidential Republic	Flawed Democracy	3	3
Uruguay	\$22,400	3.4	Presidential Republic	Full Democracy	1	1
Venezuela	\$16,055 ^[4]	28.870 ^[4]	Presidential Republic	Authoritarian Regime	6	5

Source: [1] Central Intelligence Agency ([CIA],2019), [2] Economist Intelligence Unit ([EIU], 2019), [3] Freedom House (2019), [4] World Bank (2019a, 2019b).

2.2 Willingness to Share Knowledge

According to Kuvaas, et al. (2012), knowledge sharing involves social or collaborative interactions in which individuals exchange experiences, skills, and know-

how that help them do something better, solve problems, and develop new ideas. Knowledge sharing among individuals is crucial for surviving in this dynamic and interconnected era (Asrar-ul-Haq & Anwar, 2016; Hussein et al., 2016), and effective encouragement for individuals to share knowledge leads to higher productivity, better performance, competitive advantages, and more innovative capabilities (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Andreeva, 2012; Ferraris et al., 2017; Hussein et al., 2016; Obeidat et al., 2016; Reich et al., 2014; Santoro et al., 2018; Shannak et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014).

How can knowledge sharing be stimulated? Studies on this aspect highlight a wide variety of factors that drive an individual's knowledge sharing. They mainly deal with motivational aspects associated with social capital issues such as trust, social networks, reciprocity norms, and shared goals (Chung, Cooke, Fry, & Hung, 2015; Hau, Kim, Lee, & Kim, 2013; Holste & Fields, 2010; Lin, Hung, & Chen, 2009; Reinholt et al., 2011; Zhang & Jiang, 2015; autonomous or internal motivational aspects such as enjoyment, learning attitude, and self-efficacy (Hau et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2009; Reinholt et al., 2011; Siemsen et al., 2008; Zhang & Jiang, 2015); and controlled or external motivational aspects such as rewards, reciprocal relationships, and reputation (Hau et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2009; Wang & Hou, 2015; Zhang & Jiang, 2015).

However, motivation is 'an impulse to go towards' that does not necessarily become action (Hausman, 2000; Lo, Lin, & Hsu, 2016; Melsa, Younce, & Rohrs, 1996; Muruganatham & Bhakat, 2013). It can become action when other conditions are met (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Price, 2013; Oudeyer, Kaplan, & Others, 2008; Peters,

2015). Some studies maintain that knowledge sharing goes beyond an impulse and transforms into concrete action by incorporating two additional dimensions: organizational and cultural conditions that generate more or less favorable environments for knowledge sharing such as frequency of interactions, network position, time availability, and IT services' platforms and support (Haile & Altmann, 2016a, 2016b; Kang & Kim, 2017; Kettinger, Li, Davis, & Kettinger, 2015; Kim, Altmann, & Hwang, 2010; Koohborfardhaghighi, Romero, Maliphol, Liu, & Altmann, 2017; Siemsen et al., 2008; Tassabehji et al., 2019), and individual's skills and competencies as indispensable factors for addressing knowledge sharing (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Kang & Kim, 2017; Kettinger et al., 2015; Reinholt et al., 2011; Siemsen et al., 2008; Tassabehji et al., 2019; Zhang & Jiang, 2015). Opportunities represents environmental factors or a determinant situation conducive or not to carry out a particular behavior (Gruen, Osmonbekov, & Czaplewski, 2006; Kettinger et al., 2015; MacInnis & Jaworski, 1989). and abilities involve a combination of several factors that allow identifying relevant information and enriching knowledge sharing processes (Cohen, 2000; Hung & Sirakaya-Turk, 2011; Lee, 2016; Loebbecke, Van Fenema, & Powell, 2016; Roda, Angehrn, & Nabeth, 2001).

The management model which incorporates these three dimensions and which has been widely used for explaining individual behavior in diverse areas (Hung & Petrick, 2016; Li, Xu, Chen, & Menassa, 2019; Yoon, 2017; Zhang & Lang, 2018) is called the 'Motivation, Opportunity, and Ability' (MOA) model. This model emerged from

industrial psychology which focused on the ability to perform certain activities and social psychology interested in the role of motivation in individual performance (Bass, 1958; Haire, 1959; Katzell, 1962; Vroom, 1964). Since this framework turned out to be inconsistent, years later Blumberg & Pringle (1982) proposed including the opportunity dimension as an enabling environment for individual decision-making.

Table 2 Literature Associated with the Willingness to Share Knowledge

Study	Explained variables		
	Motivation	Opportunity	Ability
Chung et al. (2015)	Social capital (trust, social network ties, and shared goals)		
Hau et al. (2013)	Social capital (social trust, ties, and goals) Reciprocity, enjoyment, and organizational rewards		
Lin et al. (2009)	Social capital (trust, and reciprocity norms) Self-efficacy perceived benefits and perceived compatibility		

Study	Explained variables		
	Motivation	Opportunity	Ability
Wang & Hou (2014)	Expect to be rewarded, perceived benefits (control-oriented), altruism for personal satisfaction, and altruism for organizational benefits (Autonomy-oriented)		
Akhavan, Hosseini, & Abbasi (2016)	The motivation for knowledge sharing of individual	Opportunity for knowledge sharing	Knowledge-absorption ability, and knowledge-sharing ability
Kang & Kim (2017)	Close emotional relationship	Frequency of interaction	Appropriate expertise network
Kettinger et al. (2015)	Knowledge-sharing psychological climate	Perceived organizational provided IT support	Perceived individual information management capability
Reinholt et al. (2011)	Autonomous motivation	Network centrality	Extensiveness and diversity
Siemsen et al. (2008)	Autonomous motivation	Time availability	Ability to share knowledge with workers
Tassabehji et al. (2019)	Structure and policy	Availability IT system	Skills and experience

2.3 The Impact of Knowledge Sharing on Innovations

While some available literature highlights internal knowledge sharing capacities among members of an organizational entity (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Hussein et al.,

2016; Obeidat et al., 2016), others appeal to the concept of ‘open innovations,’ (Chesbrough, 2004, 2006) and explore knowledge sharing activities among different entities (Ferraris et al., 2017; Santoro et al., 2018; Tassabehji et al., 2019; Tortoriello, 2015; Un & Asakawa, 2015). Knowledge sharing improves the stock of knowledge available to an organization by promoting the generation of new ideas and opportunities (Lin, 2007).

When it comes to internal knowledge sharing processes, it is possible to highlight two basic practices or knowledge roles: knowledge provision and knowledge acquisition (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Ferraris et al., 2017; Hussein et al., 2016; Tassabehji et al., 2019). Each individual can actively communicate her or his intellectual capital to others or consult other members to encourage them to share their intellectual capital (De Vries et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2009; Van den Hooff & Van Weenen, 2004).

Literature also presents two positions regarding the relationship between providing and acquiring knowledge. According to authors like Hussein et al. (2016), acquisition and provision processes strengthen each other and then separately impact a firm's innovation capacity. Hussein et al., (2016) found evidence of the bidirectional relationship between acquisition and provision. However, while knowledge acquisition positively influences a firm's innovation capabilities, knowledge provision's contribution is not statistically significant. On the other hand, authors like Akhavan & Hosseini (2016) analyzed the effect of knowledge acquisition and provision separately. The results of their partial least squares analysis showed that knowledge acquisition and provision positively and

statistically related to the team's innovation capabilities.

Regarding knowledge sharing practices among organizations, Ferraris et al. (2017) and Santoro et al. (2018) appeal to the 'open innovation' framework (Chesbrough, 2004, 2006) to highlight the relevance of external knowledge sharing in creating new products and processes (Chebbi, Yahiaoui, Thrassou, & Vrontis, 2013; Chebbi, Yahiaoui, Thrassou, & Vrontis, 2015; Ferraris et al., 2017). Firms can acquire external knowledge from different market-based or science-based partners such as customers, suppliers, and competitors or research and academic organizations (Ardito, Messeni, & Albino, 2015; Berchicci, 2013; Bresciani, Thrassou, & Vrontis, 2013; Jones-Evans, Gkikas, Rhisiart, & MacKenzie, 2018; Santoro et al., 2018; Wang, Chang, & Shen, 2015; West, Salter, Vanhaverbeke, & Chesbrough, 2014).

Ferraris et al., (2017) maintain that the relationship between external R&D and innovations is moderated by internal knowledge sharing processes. However, according to Santoro et al. (2018), open innovations contribute to innovation capacities both directly and indirectly.

It is also relevant to consider that knowledge sharing with external partners may bring unwanted effects not only for an innovation but also for revenues, reputation, productivity, and market power (Ahmad, Bosua, & Scheepers, 2014; Martinez-Noya, Garcia-Canal, & Guillen, 2012; Ritala et al., 2015). Firms are more prepared to capture than to share knowledge, so any leakage of knowledge can quickly be used in their favor (Frishammar, Ericsson, & Patel, 2015; Jiang, Li, Gao, Bao, & Jiang, 2013; Kingston, 2012; Olander &

Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2015)

Table 3 Literature Associated with Knowledge Sharing on Innovations

Study	Explained variables	
	Knowledge sharing activities within organizations	Knowledge sharing activities among organizations
Akhavan & Hosseini (2016)	From enablers (Social interaction ties, trust, reciprocity, team identification, shared goals) to intention (collecting or donating)	
Hussein et al. (2016)	from enablers (Employee self-efficacy and top manager support) to donating and collecting	
Obeidat et al. (2016)	Knowledge management approaches (Social networks, codification, and personalization + knowledge management processes (Acquisition, sharing, and utilization)	
Ritala et al. (2015)		External knowledge sharing, accidental and intentional knowledge leakage
Un & Asakawa (2015)		Four types of R&D collaborations (with universities, suppliers, competitors, and customers) in terms of position in the knowledge chain and contextual knowledge distance
Ferraris et al. (2017)	Knowledge acquisition and dissemination as moderator	External R&D

Study	Explained variables	
	Knowledge sharing activities within organizations	Knowledge sharing activities among organizations
Santoro et al. (2018)	Knowledge management capacity (Inventive, absorptive and connective capacities)	Open innovation (Partner intensity, openness variety and readiness to collaborate)
Tassabehji et al. (2019)	Donating and collecting practices	Expert knowledge of external knowledge donors
Tortoriello (2015)	Structural holes in the internal knowledge-sharing network	Industrial external knowledge + scientific external knowledge

Chapter 3. Methodology

3.1 Conceptual Model

Building on the contributions of existing literature summarized in Chapter 2, this chapter describes the conceptual framework that allows readers to understand the concepts that build citizens and public managers willingness to share knowledge, as well as the link between these knowledge sharing activities (whether driven by citizens or public managers) and innovations in a democracy.

Starting with ‘citizens and public managers’ willingness to share knowledge on innovation in democracy,’ this chapter uses existing findings to explain what triggers citizens and public managers to perform knowledge sharing activities; this is built on three major dimensions: motivations (Hausman 2000; Lo et al. 2016; Melsa et al. 1996;

Muruganantham and Bhakat 2013), Opportunity (Bassoli & Lahusen 2015; Hooghe & Marien 2013; Kang & Kim 2017; Kern, Marien, & Hooghe, 2015; Kettinger et al. 2015; Siemsen et al., 2008; Tassabehji et al. 2019) and ability (Kettinger et al. 2015; Reinholt et al. 2011; Siemsen et al., 2008).

The motivational dimension is a critical triggering component of knowledge sharing. However, to transform the impulse to move towards effective action, it is necessary to consider other internal and external conditions that lead individual behavior (Harmon-Jones et al., 2013; Oudeyer et al., 2008; Peters, 2015).

A number of relevant studies (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Kang & Kim, 2017; Kettinger et al., 2015; Reinholt et al., 2011; Siemsen et al., 2008; Tassabehji et al., 2019; Zhang & Jiang, 2015) are based on the MOA behavior model by incorporating two additional dimensions: ‘the opportunities’ offered by the environment surrounding the decision-making and ‘the abilities’ presented by an individual to perform an action.

Although studies show an individual’s willingness to share knowledge (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Chung et al., 2015; Hau et al., 2013; Kang & Kim, 2017; Kettinger et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2009; Reinholt et al., 2011; Siemsen et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2015; Zhang & Jiang, 2015), this thesis represents citizens and public managers willingness to share knowledge separately. Certainly, citizens and public managers should play complementary roles in terms of the knowledge function. When citizens provide knowledge, public managers acquire knowledge and when citizens acquire knowledge public managers provide knowledge (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Ferraris et al., 2017;

Hussein et al., 2016; Reinholt et al., 2011). This study leverages existing findings of studies on knowledge-sharing and democracy to operationalize the application of MOA which was originally used to comprehensively analyze the willingness to share knowledge. The foundations for knowledge-sharing for pursuing innovations in a democracy are summarized in Tables 4 and 5.

Table 4 Citizens Knowledge-Sharing Activities

Operational Definition	References
Citizens Motivation: the citizen's impulse to go towards knowledge-sharing activities, triggered by a common goal (support for democracy) and the trust in the political system.	Hausman (2000); Lo, et al. (2016); Melsa et al. (1996); Muruganatham & Bhakat (2013)
Citizens Opportunity: National environmental conditions that encourage or discourage citizens knowledge-sharing activities, such as perception about corruption, perception about economic performance and the technological environment.	Bassoli & Lahusen (2015); Hooghe & Marien, (2013); Kang & Kim (2017); Kern et al. (2015); Kettinger, et al. (2015); Siemsen et al. (2008); Tassabehji et al. (2019)
Citizens Ability: the necessary skills and competencies to manage internal and external sources for knowledge sharing.	Kettinger et al. (2015); Reinholt et al. (2011); Siemsen et al. (2008)

Operational Definition	References
Citizen's Knowledge-sharing Activities: the process of provision and acquisition of knowledge that increases the common intellectual capital stock to promote the generation of new ideas and opportunities for the improvement of the democracy	De Vries et al. (2006); Lin (2007); Van den Hooff & Van Weenen (2004)

Table 5 Public Managers Knowledge-Sharing Activities

Operational Definition	References
Public Managers Motivation: the citizen's impulse to go towards knowledge-sharing, triggered by a common goal (support for democracy) and the trust in the political system.	Hausman (2000); Lo et al. (2016); Melsa et al. (1996); Muruganatham & Bhakat (2013)
Public Managers Opportunity: Cultural and social values, norms and environmental conditions that encourage or discourage knowledge sharing activities. At national level knowledge sharing between citizens and public managers could be limited by environmental conditions such as perception about corruption, perception about economic performance or technological environment	Bassoli & Lahusen (2015); Hooghe & Marien (2013); Kang & Kim (2017); Kern et al. (2015); Kettinger et al. (2015); Siemsen et al. (2008); Tassabehji et al. (2019)
Public Managers Ability: the necessary skills and competencies to manage internal and external sources for knowledge sharing.	Kettinger et al. (2015); Reinholt et al. (2011); Siemsen et al. (2008)
Public Managers Knowledge-sharing Activities: the process of provision and acquisition of knowledge that increases the common intellectual capital stock to promote the generation of new ideas and opportunities for the improvement of democracy.	De Vries et al. (2006); Lin (2007); Van den Hooff & Van Weenen (2004)

Regarding the relationship between 'knowledge-sharing and innovations in a democracy,' literature highlights the functions of acquiring and providing knowledge within entities and how these two functions contribute to innovation performance (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Hussein et al., 2016; Santoro et al., 2018; Tassabehji et al., 2019). According to Hussein et al. (2016) acquisition and provision processes seem to strengthen each other and then separately impact the entity's innovation capacity. As Akhavan and Hosseini (2016) knowledge acquisition and provision separately influence innovation performance.

Another group of scholars proposes incorporating knowledge sharing activities among organizations (Ardito et al., 2015; Berchicci, 2013; Bresciani et al., 2013; Chebbi et al., 2015; Ferraris, Erhardt, & Bresciani, 2019; Ferraris et al., 2017; West & Bogers, 2014). According to Santoro et al. (2018), organizations can share knowledge with different market-based partners or science-based partners, such as research centers and universities.

However, moving on to a national-level knowledge sharing perspective it is possible to assume that citizens and public managers belong to a big entity (a country), where they provide and acquire knowledge to and from each other. Consequently, based on Santoro et al. (2018), an entity has sub-divisions and these sub-divisions may also exchange knowledge. Leveraging on such a theoretical background, the second part of the problem regarding knowledge sharing activities and their impact on innovations in a democracy is set out to be analyzed.

Based on literature, this work proposes that citizens and public managers carry out knowledge sharing activities in which one provide and the other acquires knowledge; these activities provide feedback and separately contribute to the production of innovations in a democracy (Table 6).

Table 6 Knowledge-Sharing on Innovations in Democracy

Operational Definition	References
Citizens Driven Knowledge-sharing Activities: Citizens knowledge sharing processes where citizens provide knowledge and public managers acquire knowledge	De Vries et al. (2006); Lin (2007); Van den Hooff & Van Weenen (2004)
Public Managers Driven Knowledge-sharing Activities: Public managers knowledge sharing processes where public managers provide knowledge and citizens acquire knowledge	De Vries et al. (2006); Lin (2007); Van den Hooff & Van Weenen (2004)
Innovations in Democracy: The transformation of processes that build a democracy, making it more accountable, responsible, legal, inclusive and egalitarian	Newton & Geissel (2012); Smith (2009); Warren & Pearse (2008)

Based on this theoretical background, the overall conceptual model of this thesis is summarized in Figure 3.




Figure 3 Conceptual Framework

3.2 Data Collection

This study uses panel data for 18 countries that make up the Latin American region (see Table 7) for 2001-2016 but with interruptions in 2012 and 2014.

Table 7 Latin American Countries (LACs)

(1) Argentina	(7) Dominican Republic	(13) Nicaragua
(2) Bolivia	(8) Ecuador	(14) Panama
(3) Brazil	(9) El Salvador	(15) Paraguay
(4) Chile	(10) Guatemala	(16) Peru
(5) Colombia	(11) Honduras	(17) Uruguay
(6) Costa Rica	(12) Mexico	(18) Venezuela

It uses data from two main sources: the LATINNO Project database (LATINNO, 2019) that collected information about innovations in democracy and data on knowledge sharing practices between citizens and public managers, and the Latinobarómetro representative surveys (Latinobarómetro, 2019) that is used for constructing the variables associated with citizens and public managers motivation, ability, and opportunity dimensions. The Network Readiness Index (NRI, 2019) and the Global Competitiveness Index ([GCI],1019) are also used but only to create the technological opportunity variable.

The LATINNO dataset collected information on innovations in democracy from 18 Latin American countries between 1990 and 2016. Each innovation in a democracy or process met at least one democratic principle: accountability, responsiveness, rule of law, political inclusion, and social equality (Coppedge et al., 2016; Esmark, 2007; Fuchs & Roller, 2018; Keohane, 2011; McLaverty, 2002; Saxonhouse, 2017; Warren & Pearse, 2008; Young, 2002). Innovations in democracy are produced through direct participation such as consulting and citizens representation processes (Fung, 2006; Robbins, Simonsen, & Feldman, 2008; Roberts, 2015; Smith, 2009; Warren & Pearse, 2008).

As a measure of citizens and public managers provision of knowledge, this study assumes that direct participation activities fix these processes (De Vries et al. 2006; Tolbert & McNeal, 2003). Direct participation processes are classified according to the year and country of implementation, their geographical coverage (national or local), and the project leader (government or citizens) (LATINNO, 2019).

These direct participative processes are of different types, two of which are used in this study. The first is the consultation process that is usually implemented when public managers do not want or do not feel prepared to take unilateral decisions regarding valuable, sensitive or divisible issues such as the legalization of abortion, gun control, or the revocation of a mandate (LATINNO, 2019; Smith 2009; Warren & Pearse 2008).). In this context, public managers provide and the citizens acquire knowledge for taking a decision. Among Latin American examples are the mandatory recall of a president and vice president; referendums for the approval of the constitution in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia; and popular consultations on education policies, health, and sanitation budgets (LATINNO, 2019).

The second is the citizen representation process (LATINNO, 2019; Smith 2009; Warren & Pearse 2008) that is implemented when public managers maintain that the public sector does not have the specific knowledge required to address a public policy challenge and invoke a group of citizens with specific skills and competencies to provide their knowledge and public managers acquire this knowledge (Warren & Pearse 2008). This mechanism is mainly used for addressing long-term problems that require distance from the current government's issues. Examples from Latin America include the National Committee for Persons with Disabilities in Bolivia and the Technical Advisory Council on Animal Health in Mexico (LATINNO, 2019).

The other dataset is developed by Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2019), a private non-profit organization that conducted its first Latin American surveys in 1995. These are

done annually since 2000 for 17 LACs and since 2004 also for the Dominican Republic. However, the surveys were interrupted in 2012 and 2014. The surveys capture the opinions of ‘the total population over 18 years old.’ Thus, the Latinobarómetro surveys are based on individual probabilistic samples with a weighted factor that guarantees their representativeness at the national level. Almost all the citizens motivation (trust in the political system, support for democracy), opportunity (perception about corruption and economic performance), and ability (educational attainment) variables were constructed with the total population of the Latinobarómetro surveys per year and per country. Almost all public managers motivation (trust in people, and support for democracy), opportunity (perception about corruption and economic performance), and ability (educational attainment) variables were constructed with the total population of the Latinobarómetro surveys in the public sector. Although the representativeness of these variables cannot be guaranteed at the country level, the distribution of this sample according to socio-demographic variables is very similar to the distribution presented by the total sample. The socio-demographic characteristics of all the samples are given in Table 8.

Table 8 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Latinobarómetro Samples

Segment	Citizens (Total population over 18 years old)		Public Managers (Total population that work in the public sector)	
	Number	%	Number	%
Gender				

	Citizens		Public Managers	
	(Total population over 18 years old)		(Total population that work in the public sector)	
Female	155,245	51.43	13,205	56.77
Male	146,618	48.57	10,055	43.23
Total	301,863	100.00	23,260	100.00
Educational Attainment				
Illiterate	25,426	8.42	750	3.22
Incomplete primary	56,261	18.64	1,870	8.04
Complete primary	51,532	17.07	2,690	11.56
Incomplete secondary	47,020	15.58	2,826	12.15
Complete secondary	63,070	20.89	5,856	25.18
Incomplete high	24,577	8.14	2,772	11.92
Complete high	26,310	8.72	6,019	25.88
n.a.	7,667	2.54	477	2.05
Total	301,863	100.00	23,260	100.00
Marital Status				
Married	172,012	56.98	14,193	61.02
Separated	34,386	11.39	2,146	9.23
Single	93,861	31.09	6,789	29.19
n.a.	1,604	0.53	132	0.57
Total	301,863	100.00	23,260	100.00
Age Segment				
18-25	70,576	23.38	3,676	15.80
26-40	101,979	33.78	9,277	39.88
41-60	85,142	28.21	8,283	35.61

	Citizens (Total population over 18 years old)		Public Managers (Total population that work in the public sector)	
61+	43,589	14.44	2,014	8.66
n.a.	577	0.19	10	0.04
Total	301,863	100.00	23,260	100.00

The variable ‘technological opportunity’ was obtained from NRI (2019) and the GCI (2019) annual reports. Both indices are constructed with data available in public sources such as the United Nations and from the Executive Opinion Survey. This survey captures the views of business executives and is developed to get information about critical aspects that are missing because they are either impossible or extremely difficult to measure on a global scale (Browne, Di Battista, Geiger, & Gutknecht, 2014). Although this survey was originally designed to build GCI (2019), today it is also used for calculating NRI, among others.

To construct the technological opportunity variable, NRI’s environment sub-index with a score of 1 to 7 was used. The NRI time series covered the period 2001-2015; therefore, the GCI’ macroeconomic environment and capacity to innovate pillars were used for obtaining the technological opportunities in 2016. Therefore, NRI’s environment sub-index from 2001 to 2015 was estimated with GCI’s macroeconomic environment and capacity to innovate in 2001-2016 to obtain the data in 2016.

NRI’s environment is half composed of political and regulatory environment pillar

(effectiveness of law-making bodies, laws relating to ICTs, judicial independence, efficiency of the legal system in settling disputes, efficiency of the legal system in challenging regulations, intellectual property protection, software piracy rate, % percentage software installed, number of procedures for enforcing a contract and number of days to enforce a contract) and half by the business and innovation environment pillar (availability of latest technologies, venture capital’s availability, total tax rate, percentage profits, number of days to start a business, number of procedures to start a business, intensity of local competition, tertiary education’s gross enrollment rate, quality of management schools, and the government’s procurement of advanced technology products). On the other hand, GCI’s macroeconomic environment pillar is based on two indicators: inflation and debt dynamics. The capacity to innovate pillar is composed of the diversity of the workforce, state of cluster developmental international co-invention applications/million population, multi-stakeholder collaborations, scientific publications, patent applications, applications/million population, R&D expenditure, percentage of GDP, quality of the research institutions index, buyer sophistication, trademark applications, and applications/million population.

All the variables are described in Table 9.

Table 9 Variables Descriptions and Sources

Chapter	Type	Variable	Definition	Source
(Ch. 4)	Response Variable	Citizens Knowledge Provision	All forms of citizens or civil society organizations’ engagement where they either (a) have a seat in a governmental	LATINNO (2019)

Chapter	Type	Variable	Definition	Source
			body or are assigned a role in the policy process (which may or may not involve decision making); or (b) are selected or self-selected (instead of elected) to act in the name of other citizens or organizations, or to speak on behalf of specific interests (e.g. the environment), groups (e.g. minorities) or localities (e.g. neighborhoods).	
	Response Variable	Citizens Knowledge Acquisition	All means commonly referred to as direct democracy instruments, namely referendum, plebiscite and citizens initiatives. These are broadly considered, as to include, for example, recalls, and non-binding plebiscites organized by civil society organizations.	LATINNO (2019)
	Explanatory Variable	Trust in Political System	Average among the percentage of the population over 18 years old per country that declared to fully trust the executive branch, the legislative and judicial branches.	Latinobarómetro (2019)
	Explanatory Variable	Support for Democracy	Percentage of the population per country that declared “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”	Latinobarómetro (2019)
	Explanatory Variable	Perception about corruption	Percentage of the population per country that declared; “there had been little or no progress in reducing corruption”	Latinobarómetro (2019)
	Explanatory Variable	Perception about Economic Performance	Percentage of the population per country that declared: “current economic situation was very good or good”	Latinobarómetro (2019)
	Explanatory Variable	Technological Environment	NRI’s Environment sub-index from, 2001-2015; GCI’s macroeconomic environment and capacity to innovate pillars in 2016.	NRI (2019), GCI (2019)
	Explanatory Variable	Educational Attainment	Percentage of the population per country who completed higher education	Latinobarómetro (2019)
(Ch. 5)	Response Variable	Public Managers	All forms of citizens or civil society organizations’	LATINNO (2019)

Chapter	Type	Variable	Definition	Source
		Knowledge Acquisition	engagement where they either a) have a seat in a governmental body or are assigned a role in the policy process (which may or may not involve decision making); or b) are selected or self-selected (instead of elected) to act in the name of other citizens or organizations, or to speak on behalf of specific interests (e.g. the environment), groups (e.g. minorities) or localities (e.g. neighborhoods).	
	Response Variable	Public Managers Knowledge Provision	All means commonly referred to as direct democracy instruments, namely referendum, plebiscite and citizens initiatives. These are broadly considered, as to include, for example, recalls and non-binding plebiscites organized by civil society organizations.	_LATINNO (2019)
	Explanatory Variable	Trust in People	Percentage of public sector workers per country that declared: “I trust most people”	Latinobarómetro (2019)
	Explanatory Variable	Support for Democracy	Percentage of public sector workers per country that declared: “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”	Latinobarómetro (2019)
	Explanatory Variable	Perception about Corruption	Percentage of public sector workers per country that declared: “there had been little or no progress in reducing corruption”	Latinobarómetro (2019)
	Explanatory Variable	Perception about Economic Performance	Percentage of public sector workers per country that declared: “current economic situation was very good or good”	Latinobarómetro, 2019
	Explanatory Variable	Technological Environment	NRI’s Environment sub-index from, 2001-2015; GCI’s macroeconomic environment and capacity to innovate pillars in 2016.	NRI (2019), GCI (2019)

Chapter	Type	Variable	Definition	Source
	Explanatory Variable	Educational Attainment	Percentage of the public sector workers per country who completed higher education	Latinobarómetro, 2019
(Ch. 6)	Response Variable	Innovations in Democracy	<p>Institutions, mechanisms and processes whose ends aim to strengthen at least one of the following dimensions:</p> <p>(1) Accountability: All non-electoral forms of rendering governments, institutions, elected officials and representatives accountable, i.e. answerable and responsible for their actions and inactions. Democratic innovations aimed at enhancing accountability may carry out activities as diverse as the monitoring of institutional performance, the disclosure of public information, the sanctioning of public agents, and the oversight of public services delivery.</p> <p>(2) Responsiveness: Forms of emission of signals from citizens regarding their policy preferences, and their corresponding reception by governments. Democratic innovations that aim at enhancing responsiveness provide spaces or mechanisms that allow both citizens to formulate and express their preferences and for governments to become aware of and take them into consideration.</p> <p>(3) Rule of Law: Recognize all forms of law and rights enforcement, encompassing individual and public security, crime prevention and control, restraint of potential abuses of state power, independent administration of justice, conflict resolution, and access to justice. The assurance of political rights and civil liberties and the protection of human rights fall</p>	LATINNO (2019)

Chapter	Type	Variable	Definition	Source
			<p>into this category too, which may also entail forms of constitution-making and law-making.</p> <p>(4) Political Inclusion: Forms of recognition and empowerment of individuals, groups, and communities. Democratic innovations aimed at enhancing political inclusion, that provide space or mechanisms for the involvement, engagement, and expression of those that feel underrepresented, discriminated or marginalized.</p> <p>(5) Social Equality: Forms of improvement on the life conditions, wellbeing, and capabilities of individuals, groups, and communities. Different forms of fighting poverty and hunger fall in this category. Democratic innovations that aim at to enhance social equality and provide the space or mechanisms necessary for the inclusion of those who are in a disadvantaged situation. Social equality addresses social policies, economic rights, and primary goods, as well as possible forms of redistribution.</p>	
	Explanatory Variable	Citizens Knowledge Provision and Public Managers Knowledge Acquisition	<p>All forms of citizens or civil society organizations engagement where they either</p> <p>(a) have a seat in a governmental body or are assigned a role in the policy process (which may or may not involve decision making); or</p> <p>(b) are selected or self-selected (instead of elected) to act in the name of other citizens or organizations, or to speak on behalf of specific interests (e.g. the environment), groups (e.g. minorities) or localities (e.g. neighborhoods).</p>	LATINNO (2019)
	Explanatory	Public	All means commonly referred to	LATINNO (2019)

Chapter	Type	Variable	Definition	Source
	Variable	Managers Knowledge Provision Citizens Knowledge Acquisition	as direct democracy instruments, namely referendum, plebiscite and citizens initiatives. These are broadly considered, as to include, for example, recalls, and non-binding plebiscites organized by civil society organizations.	

3.3 Methodological Discussion

It is known that a panel data estimation involves significant advantages over cross-sectional or time-series data (Hsiao, 2007; Nerlove, 2002). However, its structure often generates heteroscedasticity and correlation problems, and the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation produces unbiased parameters but inefficient variance and a covariance matrix. Two methodologies have been proposed to address these problems. The feasible generalized least square (FGLS) method developed by Parks (1967) and made popular by Kmenta (1971), and the panel corrected standard error (PCSE) method developed years later by Beck and Katz (1995). FGLS parametrically models the variance and covariance matrix by assuming group-wise heteroscedasticity and contemporary but no variant time correlation (Reed & Webb, 2010). PCSE preserves the weighting of observations for autocorrelation but uses a non-parametric sandwich estimator to incorporate cross-sectional dependence when calculating standard errors (Moundigbaye, Rea, & Reed, 2018). Monte Carlo exercises that compare FGLS and PCSE found that PCSE is preferred over FGLS when the number of cross-sectional units and time periods are small (Moundigbaye et al., 2018; Reed & Ye, 2011).

The variance and covariance matrix can be written as:

$$Cov(\hat{\beta}) = (X'X)^{-1}\{X'\Omega X\}(X'X)^{-1} \quad \text{Eq. (1)}$$

The PCSE variance and covariance matrix Ω is an NT x NT block diagonal matrix with an N x N matrix of contemporaneous covariances, Σ , along the diagonal.

Since the OLS estimates are consistent, it is possible to use the OLS residuals from that estimation to provide a consistent estimate of Σ . Thus:

$$\hat{\Sigma}_{i,j} = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T_{ij}} e_{i,t}e_{j,t}}{T_{i,j}} \quad \text{Eq. (2)}$$

where e_{it} is the OLS residual for unit i at time t . Thus,

$$\hat{\Omega} = \hat{\Sigma} \otimes I_T \quad \text{Eq. (3)}$$

where \otimes is the Kronecker product.

PCSE is very useful in the presence of heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlations, but not in the presence of endogeneity.

Whether the Latin American panel is assumed to be a dynamic panel or not, the

introduction of the one-period lagged of the dependent variable generates some endogeneity problem among the explained variables' error and explanatory variables (Bun & Sarafidis, 2013; Elhorst, 2010; Flannery & Hankins, 2013). In addition, it is likely that there is the presence of country effects. When country effects represent omitted variables, it is likely that country-specific characteristics are correlated with the other regressors and when the country effects are fixed instead of being random, the introduction of country effects reinforces the problem of endogeneity and is likely to introduce correlation. Therefore, specific variables' transformation is recommended (Judson & Owen, 1999).

Literature presents two types of methods for estimating dynamic panel data and addressing the possible country effects. The generalized momentum methods (GMM) are attractive because of their smooth implementation and unbiased parameters while bias-correction procedures such as the least squares dummy variable correction (LSDVC) that is more difficult to implement but it provides robustness to the variance and the covariance matrix (Kripfganz, 2016). Both methodologies were compared according to bias and efficiency using Monte Carlo simulations. Although these comparisons lean in favor of LSDVC (Elhorst, 2010; Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Judson & Owen, 1999), it does not work when some explanatory is endogenous or when the panel is not dynamic (Bruno, 2005).

The generalized method of moments introduced by Hansen (1982) proposed to increase information by introducing more instruments (L) than explanatory variables (K),

and each instrument gives a moment.

When instruments exceed explanatory variables ($L > K$), there are more unknown equations making it almost impossible to find an estimated parameter $\hat{\beta}$ that satisfies the orthogonality condition at one ($E(z\varepsilon)=0$, E expectation, z instrumental variables, ε error). Therefore, the GMM estimation suggests minimizing the magnitude of the vector $EN(z\varepsilon)$ that is defined through a generalized metric that includes a positive-semi-definite quadratic form. If A is the matrix for such a quadratic form:

$$\|E_N(z\varepsilon)\|_A = \left\| \frac{1}{N} Z' \hat{E} \right\|_A \equiv N \left(\frac{1}{N} Z' \hat{E} \right)' A \left(\frac{1}{N} Z' \hat{E} \right) = \frac{1}{N} \hat{E}' Z A Z' \hat{E} \quad \text{Eq. (4)}$$

and, $\hat{\beta}_A$ the set of parameters that minimize this function:

$$\hat{\beta}_A = (X' Z A Z' X)^{-1} X' Z A Z' Y \quad \text{Eq. (5)}$$

where X , Y , and Z represent matrices of N observations for regressors, explained variables, and instruments respectively and A is a matrix with a quadratic form that weights the moments.

The GMM estimator is consistent regardless of the 'A' chosen but biased in finite samples. Instruments are usually correlated with the endogenous components of the instrumented regressors. However, efficiency is only obtained when the form of A is one

that minimizes the asymptotic variance of the estimator ($\text{Var}(z\varepsilon)$). This is in inverse proportion to its variances and covariances:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Var}(z\varepsilon) &= \text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} N \text{Var} \left(\frac{1}{N} Z' E \right) \\
 \text{Var}(z\varepsilon) &= \text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} N E \left(\frac{1}{N^2} Z' E E' Z \right) \\
 \text{Var}(z\varepsilon) &= \text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} E \{ E (Z' E E' Z | Z) \} \\
 \text{Var}(z\varepsilon) &= \text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} E \{ (Z' E (E E' | Z) Z) \} \\
 \text{Var}(z\varepsilon) &= \text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} (E (Z' \Omega Z)) \tag{Eq. (6)}
 \end{aligned}$$

For instance, when the errors are believed to be homoscedastic, Ω is equal to $\sigma^2 \mathbf{I}$, and the GMM weighting matrix is the inverse of $\sigma^2 \text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} (E (Z' Z))$.

When more complex patterns of variance in the errors are suspected it is possible to use a kernel-based non-parametric estimator for the standard errors and $\hat{\Omega}$ is constructed based on a formula that itself does not converge to Ω , but that has the property that $\frac{1}{N} Z' \hat{\Omega} Z$ is a consistent estimator of $\text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} (E (Z' \Omega Z))$; and $(Z' \hat{\Omega} Z)^{-1}$ is used as the weighting matrix A.

The GMM proposes to obtain the standard errors to build the estimator of Ω from a simple initial estimate of β , and H an estimate of Ω based on a minimally arbitrary

assumption about the errors such as homoscedasticity. From some reasonable but arbitrary H , it is possible to obtain β_1 and the residuals to construct a proxy for Ω calling it $\ddot{\Omega}$. Then, re-running the GMM estimation setting $A = Z'\ddot{\Omega}Z$.

Once the estimation method has been described, it seems pertinent to determine what type of instruments will be considered. The GMM's estimations differ according to the instruments used. While Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggested using the level lagged or differenced lagged as instruments, Arellano and Bond's (1991) suggested to include as much previous lagged levels as possible. Meanwhile, Blundell and Bond (1998), proposed further sophistication of the availability of instruments by not only including all previous lagged but also all previous differenced lagged instruments (Behr, 2003; Flannery & Hankins, 2013).

Blundell and Bond's (1998) instruments are built on the basis of a dynamic panel with fixed effects. Therefore, the equation can be transformed to eliminate the fixed effects and their relationship with the error. The most common transformation is the difference transformation that uses the matrix $I_N \otimes M_\Delta$ to transform the variables. I_N is the identity matrix of order N and M_Δ is a diagonal of -1 s with a sub-diagonal of 1 s just to the right.

The natural instrument for $\Delta y_{i,t-1}$ is $y_{i,t-2}$. However, to improve efficiency we can use longer lags of the dependent variable as additional instruments. Each instrumenting variable generates one column for each time period and lags available for that time period, the number of instruments is quadratic in T :

$$\begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots \\
y_{i1} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots \\
0 & y_{i2} & y_{i1} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots \\
0 & 0 & 0 & y_{i3} & y_{i2} & y_{i1} & 0 & 0 & \dots \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & y_{i4} & y_{i3} & \dots \\
\dots & \dots
\end{bmatrix} \quad \text{Eq. (7)}$$

Moreover, Blundell and Bond (1998) developed an approach outlined in Arellano and Bover (1995). Instead of transforming the regressors to expunge the fixed effects, it transforms the instruments to make them exogenous to the fixed effects ($E(\Delta w_{it}\mu_i) = 0$, for all i and t , w instrument, and μ fixed effects). Thus, the Blundell and Bond instruments are structured as:

$$\begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots \\
\Delta w_{i2} & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots \\
0 & \Delta w_{i3} & 0 & 0 & \dots \\
0 & 0 & \Delta w_{i4} & 0 & \dots \\
0 & 0 & 0 & \Delta w_{i4} & \dots \\
\dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots
\end{bmatrix} \quad \text{Eq. (8)}$$

To exploit the new moment conditions for the data in levels while retaining the original Arellano–Bond conditions from the transformed equation, Blundell and Bond (1998) designed a system estimator. This involved building a stacked dataset with twice the observations; in each individual’s data, the untransformed observations follow the

transformed ones. Formally, an augmented, transformed dataset is produced:

$$M_{\Delta}^{+} = \begin{pmatrix} M_{\Delta} \\ I \end{pmatrix}, \quad X_{\Delta}^{+} = \begin{pmatrix} X_{i\Delta} \\ X_i \end{pmatrix}, \quad Y_{\Delta}^{+} = \begin{pmatrix} Y_{i\Delta} \\ Y_i \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{Eq.(9)}$$

In a system GMM, one can include time-invariant regressors, which will disappear in the difference GMM. Asymptotically, this does not affect the coefficient estimates for other regressors because all instruments for the levels equation are assumed to be orthogonal to fixed effects.

Regarding the instruments, it is possible to generate moment conditions prolifically. However, finite samples may lack adequate information for estimating such a large matrix. It is not uncommon that the matrix becomes singular and a large instrument collection can overfit the endogenous variables. This does not compromise consistency but can move away from asymptotic values (Roodman, 2009).

In the context of GMM, it is possible to test whether the used instruments satisfy the orthogonality conditions by using the GMM objective function evaluated at the efficient GMM estimator that is distributed according to the chi-squared. The overidentified test was developed by Sargan (1958, 1975) for homoscedastic errors (Eq. [10]), and by Hansen (1982) for heteroscedastic errors (Eq. [11]).

$$\frac{\hat{e}'Z(Z'Z)^{-1}Z'\hat{e}}{(\hat{e}'\hat{e})/N} \sim \chi_{L-K}^2 \quad \text{Eq. (10)}$$

$$\hat{e}'Z(Z'\hat{\Omega}Z)^{-1}\hat{e}\sim\chi_{L-K}^2 \quad \text{Eq. (11)}$$

The null hypothesis implies that the instruments are not satisfying the orthogonality conditions required for their employment. This means that the instruments are not truly exogenous, or they are being incorrectly excluded from the regression.

In this sense, the previous tests are also useful for testing the endogeneity of a sub-set of estimators.

According to Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003), under the null hypothesis, the set of exogenous instruments (including exogenous regressors) is big and each of these meets the orthogonality condition imposed by the model. The Sargan-Hansen statistic (Hansen, 1982) would be SH_0 . Under the alternative, a sub-set of the original set of instruments is endogenous and the remaining ones are still exogenous. In GMM terms there is a smaller set of orthogonality conditions for estimating the model. This estimation yields another Sargan-Hansen statistic called SH_1 .

Under the null hypothesis, SH_0 is distributed as chi-square with the instruments minus the regressors' degree of freedom, and SH_1 is also distributed as chi-square with the number of regressors as the degree of freedom.

The endogeneity analysis simply means testing SH_0-SH_1 that is distributed as chi-square with the number of regressors being tested for endogeneity as the degree of freedom.

Chapter 4. Citizens Willingness to Share Knowledge

4.1 Introduction

According to some scholars, Latin American democracies have been built on fragile institutional processes (Frantz & Geddes, 2016; Kaplan, 2016; Wiarda, 2019) that do not guarantee compliance with democratic principles such as: accountability, responsiveness, rule of law, political inclusion, and social equality (Coppedge et al., 2016; Esmark, 2007; Fuchs & Roller, 2018; Keohane, 2011; McLaverty, 2002; Saxonhouse, 2017; Warren & Pearse, 2008; Young, 2002). Assuming the shortcomings of these democracies, it remains to be asked whether it is possible to improve the democratic processes or what some call ‘innovations in democracy’ (Michels, 2011; Newton & Geissel, 2012; Pogrebinschi & Ryan, 2018; Smith, 2005, 2009; Talpin, 2012).

Nowadays, innovative challenges are addressed by stimulating the sharing of the most valued assets in organizations’ ‘knowledge.’ Asrar-ul-Haq and Anwar state, “Knowledge is the lifeblood of an organization and it has been identified as a crucial element for the survival of organizations in today’s dynamic and competitive era” (2016, p.1). Effective encouragement to individuals to share their knowledge will lead to higher productivity, better performance, advantages of competitiveness, and more innovative capabilities (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Andreeva, 2012; Ferraris et al., 2017; Hussein et al., 2016;

Obeidat et al., 2016; Reich et al., 2014; Santoro et al., 2018; Shannak et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014).

To stimulate the provision and acquisition of knowledge, it is necessary to know the factors that lead to knowledge sharing activities between individuals. A significant number of authors have embraced this challenge by describing and estimating some motivational, opportunity, and ability factors that lead to knowledge provision and acquisition among individuals (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Kang & Kim, 2017; Kettinger et al., 2015; Reinholt et al., 2011; Siemsen et al., 2008; Tassabehji et al., 2019; Zhang & Jiang, 2015). The MOA model has been used for explaining individual behavior in diverse areas (Hung & Petrick, 2016; Li et al., 2019; Yoon, 2017; Zhang & Lang, 2018) and today it is widely used for explaining the factors behind knowledge sharing decisions.

Considering a democratic context, this study proposes a new application of the MOA model for identifying the factors that stimulate citizens provision and acquisition of knowledge. Moreover, to empirically test this model, a panel of 18 LACs was constructed for the period 2001–2016, except in 2012 and 2014 using two datasets: LATINNO that provides data on direct participation activities that reflect citizens knowledge sharing, and Latinobarómetro that provides data associated with motivation, opportunity, and ability dimensions.

Embracing all this, the rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The MOA model and hypotheses are developed in Section 2. A description of the variables for 18 LACs

from 2001–2016 is presented in Section 3. Section 4 gives the results of the data analysis.

4.2 Hypotheses

The MOA approach identifies three main dimensions that stimulate citizens knowledge sharing: ‘motivation,’ that describes personality traits and experiences that force individuals to move towards knowledge sharing activities to achieve their goals (Harmon-Jones et al., 2013; Herzberg, Mausner, & Bloch, 2017; Oudeyer et al., 2008; Peters, 2015; Schunk, 2000), ‘opportunity,’ that is defined as the conditions that facilitate or restrict knowledge sharing (Butler, 2006; Marie, 2018; Shane & Nicolaou, 2015; Wihler, Blickle, Ellen, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2017), and ‘ability’ or the necessary skills and competencies for developing knowledge sharing activities (Bell & Kozlowski, 2002; Hidayah & Haryono, 2015; Sun, Yang, & Zhai, 2016; Van Iddekinge, Aguinis, Mackey, & DeOrtentiis, 2018).

4.2.1 The Motivation Dimension

Motivational factors involve personality traits and a cognitive component that drive us towards specific goals (Harmon-Jones et al., 2013; Oudeyer et al., 2008; Peters, 2015). When motivations are based on personality traits, individuals react according to their habitual behavioral patterns or personality domains (Alarcon, Lyons, Christensen, Bowers, Klosterman, & Capiola, 2018; Bansal, Zahedi, & Gefen, 2016; Birk, Toker, Mandryk, & Conati, 2015; Fischer & Boer, 2015; Sung & Kim, 2010), and when motivations are

based on cognitive abilities, individuals can update these according to their capacity for processing and internalizing information and experiences (Cheng, 2008; Erdem & Ozen, 2003; Logan, Lundberg, Roth, & Walsh, 2017; Williams, Nathanson, & Paulhus, 2010).

This work identifies two motivational variables for citizens which it analyzes: trust that is recognized as a critical motivational factor in the generation of a long-term relationship (Moreira & Silva, 2015; Mpinganjira, 2017; Yu, Mai, Tsai, & Dai, 2018), and citizens support for a democratic system that influences their engagement (Bengtsson & Christensen, 2016; Neblo, Esterling, Kennedy, Lazer, & Sokhey, 2010; Webb, 2013).

Numerous studies have linked trust with political engagement. In the 1960s, most of the studies showed that while political distrust increased, political turnout fell (Aberbach, 1969; Almond & Verba, 1963; Kuroda, 1967; Stokes, 1962). More recent studies have incorporated other forms of political engagement in their analyses by finding a positive relationship between low political trust and unconventional forms of participation in some special cases which happens when there is ‘efficacy,’ or citizens beliefs that their actions can change the current political situation (Braun & Hutter, 2016; Carreras & Bowler, 2019; Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Lee, 2017; Li & Marsh, 2008; Pichler & Wallace, 2007).

The relationship between trust and knowledge sharing has also received much attention and many studies have recognized that trust is a very critical factor that influences knowledge sharing (Chen, Lin, & Yen, 2014; Chung et al., 2015; Hau et al., 2013; Le Phong, 2018; Rutten, 2016). For some trust encourages a learning culture, and

this is a critical factor in an individual's decision to share knowledge (Hahn, Lee, & Lee, 2015; Hinds & Pfeffer, 2003; Sabbir, 2015; Singh, 2010). Sankowska (2013) suggests that both knowledge transfer and knowledge creation require organizational trust and through empirical work about Polish companies, she demonstrates that trust influences knowledge transfer and also knowledge creation directly and indirectly through knowledge transfer.

H1: The higher the trust in the political system, the higher the citizens knowledge provision.

H1': The higher the trust in the political system, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.

Citizens support for democracy can be considered a shared goal among people who are involved in political activities (Geissel, 2013; Harell & Stolle, 2010). When citizens and public managers support democracy, they share a goal and this leads to common beliefs about what behaviors are appropriate or inappropriate, right or wrong by facilitating a mutual understanding by reducing possible differences individuals (Chiu, Hsu, & Wang, 2006; Chow & Chan, 2008; Hau et al., 2013). Shared goals act as a norm that aligns different interests, and experiences converge to a common goal (Chen et al., 2014; Chung et al., 2015; Van den Hooff & Huysman, 2009). Shared goals motivate individuals to share and combine their intellectual capital for achieving a common objective (Chow & Chan, 2008; Gittell, 2006; Hau et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2009).

H2: The higher the support for democracy, the higher the citizens knowledge provision.

H2': The higher the support for democracy, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.

4.2.1 The Opportunity Dimension

The opportunity dimension captures all those conditions that facilitate or restrict knowledge sharing (Abbasi & Dastgeer, 2018; Butler, 2006; Lee, Shiue, & Chen, 2016; Marie, 2018; Shane & Nicolaou, 2015; Tong, Tak, & Wong, 2013; Wihler et al., 2017; Zhang, 2018). At the national level, knowledge sharing between citizens and public managers can be limited by environmental conditions such as corruption, the economic situation, and technological development.

Regarding the influence of economic performance and corruption on knowledge sharing, literature presents two theories that arrive at different results (Bassoli & Lahusen, 2015; Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Kern, et al., 2015). The grievance theory argues that bad environmental conditions generate a major incentive for political engagement by citizens and therefore a greater willingness to share knowledge (John & Mayer, 2017; Klandermans, 2004; Klandermans, Roefs, & Olivier, 2001; Wickham-Crowley & Eckstein, 2015). On the other hand, the civic voluntarism theory points out that bad environmental conditions have a negative effect on resources that are required for

political engagement (Oni, Oni, Mbarika, & Ayo, 2017; Skocpol, Ganz, & Munson, 2000; Strömblad & Bengtsson, 2017; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995)

The grievance theory in particular not only points to grievances with respect to a bad environment but also the relative level of perceived deprivations (Giugni & Grasso, 2016; Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg, 2008; Muller & Weede, 1994). Relative deprivations imply the discrepancy between expectations about the surrounding environment or living conditions and the degree to which individuals believe that they can obtain and preserve these conditions (Klandermans et al., 2001; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013)

Civic voluntarism points out that individuals must have time, money, and civic skills to be active in politics. Access to resources, therefore, is associated with higher participation in political issues and knowledge sharing (Berinsky, 2002; Ritter, 2008; Verba et al., 1995). Assuming this last theory

H3: The high the corruption perception level, the lower the citizens knowledge provision.

H3': The high the corruption perception level, the lower the citizens knowledge acquisition.

H4: The better the economic performance perceptions, the higher the citizens knowledge provision.

H4': The better the economic performance perceptions, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.

Technology allows engaging and empowering people (Abouzeedan & Hedner, 2012; Ae Chun, Luna-Reyes, Sandoval-Almazán., Carlo Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2012; Ho, 2012). This involves embedded norms and practices that can play a critical role in encouraging knowledge sharing (Abouzeedan & Hedner, 2012; Harrison & Daly, 2009; Haile & Altmann, 2016a, 2016b; Ho, 2012; Sole & Applegate, 2000; Wagner, 2016). In particular, some scholars argue that the digital implementation of citizens-public managers activities can be carried out in a relatively spontaneous, flexible, and self-governed discussion arena (Dahlberg, 2001; Dahlgren, 2000; Garcia-Alonso & Lippez-De Castro, 2016; Hagendijk & Irwin, 2006; Mukhtarov, Dieperink, & Driessen, 2018).

Kim and Lee (2006) highlight the use of IT applications for improving knowledge sharing capabilities. Using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for a sample of about 300 employees in the public and private sectors, they found that greater use of IT applications positively and significantly influenced workers' knowledge sharing capabilities, and these results were the same for public and private organizations estimated separately.

H5: The better the technological environment, the higher the citizens knowledge provision.

H5': The better the technological environment, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.

4.2.2 The Ability Dimension


Abilities can change how people act by impacting individuals, organizations, and societies (Apaliyah, Martin, Gasteyer, Keating, & Pigg, 2012; Asiaei & Jusoh, 2015; Nafukho, Hairston, & Brooks, 2004; Shulman, 2012; Wardhani, Acur, & Mendibil, 2016).

As Dakhli and De Clercq state, "Those who are better educated have more extensive work experience and invest more time, energy, and resources in honing their skills are better able to secure higher benefits for themselves, and at the same time are better able to contribute to the overall well-being of the society" (2004, pp. 111). Abilities involve a complex combination of several factors that allows identifying relevant information and enriching knowledge sharing processes (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Kang & Kim, 2017; Kettinger et al., 2015; Siemsen et al., 2008; Zhang & Jiang, 2015). According to Reinholt et al. (2011), the ability to learn from others and the ability to communicate knowledge to others is a function of the richness of pre-existing knowledge.

H6: The higher the educational attainment, the higher the citizens knowledge provision.

H6': The higher the educational attainment, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.

To ensure a clear understanding of this part of the study, Figure 4 illustrates the model, and Table 10 the references associated with each hypothesis



Based on: Akhavan et al. (2016); Kang & King (2017); Kettinger et al. (2015); Reinholt et al. (2011); Siemens et al. (2008); Tassabehji et al. (2019)

Figure 4 MOA Model for Citizens Willingness to Share Knowledge

Table 10 Hypothesis Overview for Citizens Willingness to Share Knowledge

Hypothesis	References
H1 The higher the trust in the political system, the higher	Akhavan & Hosseini (2016);
H1' the citizens knowledge provision.	Chung et al. (2015); Hau et al.
The higher the trust in the political system, the higher	(2013); Hussein et al. (2016);
the citizens knowledge acquisition.	Lin et al. (2009)
H2 The higher the support for democracy, the higher the	Chung et al. (2015); Hau et
H2' citizens knowledge provision.	al.(2013); Lin et al. (2009)

Hypothesis	References
The higher the support for democracy, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.	
H3 The high the corruption perception level, the lower the citizens knowledge provision. H3' The high the corruption perception level, the lower the citizens knowledge acquisition.	Bassoli & Lahusen (2015); Hooghe & Marien (2013); Kern et al. (2015)
H4 The better the economic performance perceptions, the higher the citizens knowledge provision. H4' The better the economic performance perceptions, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.	Bassoli & Lahusen (2015); Hooghe & Marien (2013); Kern et al. (2015)
H5 The better the technological environment, the higher the citizens knowledge provision. H5' The better the technological environment, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.	Abbasi & Dastgeer (2018); Butler (2006); Lee et al. (2016); Marie (2018); Shane & Nicolaou (2015)
H6 The higher the educational attainment, the higher the citizens knowledge provision. H6' The higher the educational attainment, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.	Akhavan et al. (2016); Kang & Kim (2017); Kettinger et al., (2015); Reinholt et al. (2011); Siemsen et al. (2008); Tassabehji et al. (2019)

4.3 A Description of the Variables

This study constructed a panel data for 18 countries that make up the Latin American region for the period 2001-2016, with interruptions in 2012 and 2014. The data came from two main sources: the LATINNO (LATINNO, 2019) that collected data on knowledge sharing processes between citizens and public managers, and the

Latinobarómetro representative survey (Latinobarómetro, 2019) that is used for constructing the variables associated with citizens motivations, abilities, and opportunities. NRI (2019), and the GCI (2019) are also used only for constructing a technological opportunity variable.

The LATINNO collected details of direct participation activities from 18 Latin American countries between 1990 and 2016. These direct participation activities reflect citizens provision and acquisition of knowledge, and each of these activities is classified according to the year and country of implementation, their geographical coverage (national or local), and the project leader (government or civil society).

Although direct participation processes are diverse, two of them are used in this work. The first one is the consultation process that is usually implemented when public managers do not want to or do not feel prepared to take unilateral decisions regarding valuable, sensitive, or divisible issues such as the legalization of abortion, gun control, or the revocation of a mandate. In this context, public managers provide and citizens acquire knowledge for taking a decision.

The second is the citizen representation process that is implemented when public managers believe that the public sector does not have the specific knowledge required to address a public policy challenge and invoke a group of citizens with specific skills and competencies to provide their knowledge and public managers acquire this knowledge. This mechanism is mainly used for addressing long-term problems that require distance from the current government's issues.

The two direct participation activities that describe the citizens knowledge provision and acquisition are given in Figure 5.




Figure 5 Citizens Knowledge Provision and Acquisition

(Based on LATINNO, 2019)

The Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2019) is developed by a private non-profit organization that conducted its first Latin American survey in 1995. This became annual in 2000 for 17 LACs and since 2004 the Dominican Republic has also been added. The surveys were not conducted in 2012 and 2014.

Almost all the citizens motivation (trust in the political system, support for democracy), opportunity (perception about corruption and economic performance), and ability (educational attainment) variables were constructed with the total population of the Latinobarometro surveys per year and per country.

Regarding the construction of the citizens motivation variables, it was possible to

obtain trust in the political branches through trust in the executive branch, trust in the legislative branch and trust in the judicial branch. Latinobarómetro asks about how trustworthy are some institutions, among which stand out the three political branches. Thus, the measure of trust in the political branches is the average among trust in each political branch was obtained from the percentage of the population over 18 years old that declare “trust a lot” in the determinate political branch.

Citizens support for democracy was constructed asking to interviewees to choose among the following alternatives “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government,” “under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one,” and “it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime.” Therefore, democracy support for citizens corresponded to the percentage of the population over 18 years old that “democracy was preferable to any other kind of political.”

The citizens ability variable was constructed from the question about the level of education the interviewees had and the last year completed. Thus, the level of education variable was measured as the percentage of the total respondents that completed higher education.

Two opportunity variables were obtained from Latinobarómetro. The first variable was citizens perception about economic performance. This variable was measured as the percentage of the total respondents that declared “that the current economic situation was very good.”

The second opportunity variable was citizens perception about corruption that was measured as the percentage of the total respondents that declared that “there had been little or no progress in reducing corruption.”

To construct the technological opportunity variable, NRI’s environment sub-index with a score of 1 to 7 was used. The NRI time series covered the period 2001-2015; therefore, the GCI’ macroeconomic environment and capacity to innovate pillars were used for obtaining the technological opportunities in 2016. Therefore, NRI’s environment sub-index from 2001 to 2015 was estimated with GCI’s macroeconomic environment and capacity to innovate in 2001-2016 to obtain the data in 2016.

A description of the variables is given in Table 9 in Chapter 3

4.4 Estimation Model and Results

The Latin American panel is a short time-series macro panel (Baltagi, 2008; Hsiao, 2007; Judson & Owen, 1999) with a high probability of describing dynamic behavior in both citizens acquisition and provision of knowledge. The high probability of a dynamic behavior comes from the fact that the chances of sharing knowledge have increased in LACs since 1990 (Azzellini, 2016; Buček & Smith, 2000; Collier, 2009; Fung, 2006; Klesner, 2004; Pearce, 2004; Serdült, 2010; Stoyan & Niedzwiecki, 2018). Therefore, both estimations can be addressed by the least-squares dummy variable correction (LSDVC) (Bun & Carree, 2005) allow including the one-period lagged of the dependent variable, or the Blundell & Bond (1998) generalized moment method (GMM-BB) that

also can be used when there are other sources of endogeneity.

When these two methods are used for estimating the acquisition or provision of knowledge, the one-period lag of the dependent variable is not statistically significant in both estimations. This implies first, that citizens acquisition of knowledge cannot be considered a recurrent activity and second, neither LSDVC nor GMM-BB methodologies can be used. Therefore, the panel corrected the standard error (PCSE) method was selected as the methodology (Beck & Katz, 1995) for both the estimations.

The results for the citizens acquisition or provision of knowledge are presented in Table 11.

Table 11 PCSE's Estimations for the Citizens Knowledge Provision and Acquisition

	Citizens Knowledge Provision	Citizens Knowledge Acquisition
Trust in the Political System	0.167* (1.9)	0.00728 (0.3)
Support for Democracy	0.0125 (1.24)	0.00440* (1.67)
Perception about Corruption	0.00215 (0.29)	-0.00409** (-2.40)
Perception about Economic Performance	-0.0823** (-2.45)	-0.00814 (-1.15)
Technological Environment	0.102 (0.46)	-0.0649 (-1.29)
Educational Attainment	0.0775***	-0.00535

	(3.19)	(-0.72)
Constant	-2.097	0.276
	(-1.43)	(0.91)
Observations	248	248

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

As can be observed in Table 11, estimation (1) the variables that support democracy and the perceptions about corruption are statistically significant for citizens decisions to acquire knowledge. While supporting democracy positively influenced citizens willingness to acquire knowledge, the perception of corruption impacted it negatively. When citizens do not support democracy, they have no interest in relating to the public sector and acquiring knowledge. On the other hand, behavior regarding perception of corruption is closer to the civic voluntarism theory. Bad environmental conditions have a negative effect on individual resources that are required for sharing knowledge and participating in political issues (Oni et al. 2017; Skocpol et al., 2000; Strömblad & Bengtsson 2017; Verba et al., 1995).

Citizens knowledge provisions are positively influenced by trust in political branches and education, but negatively influenced by economic performance. Citizens need to believe that it is worth their effort to provide knowledge because they will be heard and their opinions considered by public managers. In the same vein, if citizens are more educated this helps in their being heard and considered by public managers.

Contrary to corruption, the perception about bad economic performance increases citizens willingness to provide knowledge. In this context, the grievance theory rather

than the civic voluntarism theory explains this behavior. The perception about bad environmental conditions generate a major incentive for sharing knowledge (John & Mayer 2017; Klandermans, 2004; Klandermans et al. 2001; Wickham-Crowley & Eckstein 2015).

Chapter 5. Public Managers Willingness to Share Knowledge

5.1 Introduction

The public sector has always had to ask for external resources to reach its goals (Akintoye, Beck, & Hardcastle, 2003; Delmon, 2017; De los Ríos-Carmenado, Ortuño, & Rivera, 2016; Ertas, 2016; Nesbit, Rimes, Christensen, & Brudney, 2016). To manage this resource exchange, it has created different mechanisms depending on the stakeholders involved, the type or amount of resource being exchanged, and the power distribution among members (Audretsch, Link, & Scott, 2019; Forrer, Kee, Newcomer, & Boyer, 2010; Schaeffer & Loveridge, 2002; Smith & Wohlstetter, 2006; Veselovsky, Gnezdova, Menshikova, Izmailova, & Romanova, 2015).

Today, the most demanded resource is ‘knowledge’ (Al Ahabbi, Singh, Balasubramanian, & Gaur, 2019; Henttonen, 2016; Kang & Kim, 2017; Kettinger et al.,

2015; Massaro, Dumay, & Garlatti, 2015; Tangaraja, Mohd Rasdi, Ismail, & Abu Samah, 2015; Tassabehji et al., 2019). Knowledge is not only considered an essential resource for producing outcomes but is also seen as ‘a strategic productive force’ that directly and indirectly impacts workers and organizations’ performance (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Andreeva, 2012; Becerra-Fernandez & Sabherwal, 2014; Ferraris et al., 2017; Hussein et al., 2016; Obeidat et al., 2016; Reich et al., 2014; Santoro et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2014).

Therefore, how can public managers stimulate knowledge sharing with citizens? The private sector is significantly advanced in conceptualizing, modeling, and understanding knowledge sharing as a way of achieving organizational goals (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Becerra-Fernandez & Sabherwal, 2014; Hussein et al., 2016; Obeidat et al., 2016; Reich et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2014). The motivation, opportunity, and ability model developed by Blumberg & Pringle (1982) is the most used conceptual model for illustrating willingness to provide and acquire knowledge within organizations (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Chung et al., 2015; Hau et al., 2013; Kang & Kim, 2017; Lin et al., 2009; Reinholt et al., 2011; Siemsen et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2015; Zhang & Jiang, 2015). The ‘motivation’ dimension identifies the intrinsic and extrinsic forces that drive managers to share knowledge (Harmon-Jones et al., 2013; Herzberg et al., 2017; Oudeyer et al., 2008; Peters, 2015; Schunk, 2000), ‘opportunity’ considers all those cultural or social values, norms, and practices that facilitate or restrict knowledge sharing (Butler, 2006; Marie, 2018; Shane & Nicolaou, 2015; Wihler et al., 2017), and ‘ability’ involves the necessary skills and competencies to manage internal and external sources and

engage in knowledge sharing (Bell & Kozlowski, 2002; Hidayah & Haryono, 2015; Sun et al., 2016; Van Iddekinge et al., 2018).

This study proposes a new application for the MOA model to explain public managers willingness to share knowledge and for finding out the factors that determine public managers willingness to provide and acquire knowledge. To empirically test this model, a panel of 18 LACs was constructed for the period 2001–2016, except 2012 and 2014 using two datasets: LATINNO that provides data on direct participation activities that reflect public managers knowledge sharing and Latinobarómetro that provides data on public managers who are associated with the motivation, opportunity, and ability dimensions.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The MOA model and hypotheses are developed in Section 2. A description of the variables for 18 LACs in 2001–2016 is presented in Section 3. Section 4 gives the results of the data analysis.

5.2 Hypotheses

The MOA approach identifies three main dimensions that stimulate public managers knowledge sharing: ‘motivation,’ that describes the personality traits and experiences that force individuals to move towards knowledge sharing to achieve their goals (Harmon-Jones et al., 2013; Herzberg, et al., 2017; Oudeyer et al., 2008; Peters, 2015; Schunk, 2000); ‘opportunity,’ that is defined as the conditions that facilitate or restrict knowledge sharing (Butler, 2006; Marie, 2018; Shane & Nicolaou, 2015; Wihler et al., 2017); and ‘ability’ or the necessary skills and competencies for knowledge sharing (Bell

& Kozlowski, 2002; Hidayah & Haryono, 2015; Sun et al., 2016; Van Iddekinge et al., 2018)

5.2.1 The Motivation Dimension

Motivational factors are composed of personality traits and internalized information and experiences that encourage individuals to move towards specific goals (Harmon-Jones et al., 2013; Oudeyer et al., 2008; Peters, 2015). This thesis uses two motivational variables: trust in people and democratic support.

Despite the transcendental role that trust plays in the relationship between public managers and citizens, this has not been commonly addressed in literature (Offe, 1999; Van de Walle & Lahat, 2017; Yang, 2005). Mutual trust is a significant component of democracy and a key factor for promoting knowledge sharing (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Chung et al., 2015; Hau et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2009). According to Peel (1998) distrust of disadvantaged citizens is a rational response to their experiences in distrust of public managers. The problem is not that disadvantaged people are apathetic but that they cannot express themselves because public managers do not trust their proposals regarding problems and solutions. This opens the door to another observation: different citizens enjoy different trust levels when it comes to public managers, and this translates into unequal conditions for providing and acquiring knowledge from public managers. (Braithwaite & Levi, 1998; Peel, 1998). Van de Walle and Lahat (2017) use a European social survey for 13 countries to demonstrate that public managers trust in citizens is

statistically influenced by citizens income, belonging to a minority group and age.

H1: The higher the trust in people, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.

H1': The higher the trust in people, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.

Support for democracy means supporting citizens participation in and commitment to policymaking (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000). Public managers and citizens share ways in which democracy performs (Geissel, 2013; Harell & Stolle, 2010). The existence of shared goals means having common beliefs in what behavior is appropriate or inappropriate, right or wrong by facilitating a mutual understanding them by reducing possible differences (Chiu et al., 2006; Chow & Chan, 2008; Hau et al., 2013). Shared goals act as a norm that aligns citizens and public managers different interests and experiences to converge to a common goal (Chen et al., 2014; Chung et al., 2015; Van den Hooff & Huysman, 2009). Shared goals motivate individuals to share and combine their intellectual capital to achieve a common objective (Chow & Chan, 2008; Gittel, 2006; Hau et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2009).

H2: The higher the support for democracy, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.

H2': The higher the support for democracy, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.

5.2.1 The Opportunity Dimension

All societies must deal to a greater or lesser extent with corruption (Hanley & Sikk, 2016; Huynh & Nguyen, 2019; Kwong, 2015). This is especially critical in democracies such as those in Latin America which are characterized by high levels of corruption that is difficult to address (Arellano-Gault, 2019; Canache & Allison, 2005; Morris, 2004; Tulchin & Espach, 2000; Warf & Stewart, 2016). According to Jain (2001), in corrupted environments, trust is replaced by dependence on and loyalty to a few, and the selection of appropriate knowledge and sources is done by the 'payment of favors.' Thus, public managers can use political power for personal gains and contravene some rules of the game (Gardiner, 2017; Iyanda, 2012; Jain, 2001; Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2017; Michael Johnston, 1996, 2005; Philp, 2017). In such an environment, it is difficult for knowledge which can be considered trustworthy to be provided and acquired. However, this relationship has not been analyzed so far.

H3: The higher the corruption perception level, the lower the public managers knowledge acquisition.

H3': The higher the corruption perception level, the lower the public managers knowledge provision.

According to the economic voting theory, public managers do not devote great efforts for involving citizens in policymaking when critical areas such as crime reduction, improvements in education, and economic performance mean greater chances of being re-elected (Alt, Lassen, & Marshall, 2016; Anderson, 2000; Hansford & Gomez, 2015; Healy, Persson, & Snowberg, 2017; Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007, 2019; Powell & Whitten, 1993). In this context, the probability to be elected is more important than the chance to improve democracy or public policies through knowledge sharing activities (Boyne, James, John, & Petrovsky, 2009; Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2004; Dhillon & Peralta, 2002; Dorussen & Taylor, 2003; Duch & Stevenson, 2006; Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007, 2019) and this means that is likely that in this scenario, public managers reduce their willingness to share knowledge. Using data for the English local government for 2000-2007, Boyne, James, John, and Petrovsky (2009) found a direct relationship between economic performance and re-election of current leaders.

H4: The better the economic performance perceptions, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.

H4': The better the economic performance perceptions, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.

Technology allows engaging and empowering people (Abouzeedan & Hedner, 2012; Ae Chun et al., 2012; Ho, 2012). This involves embedded norms and practices that can play a critical role in encouraging knowledge sharing (Abouzeedan & Hedner, 2012; Harrison & Daly, 2009; Ho, 2012; Wagner, 2016). In particular, some scholars argue that the digital implementation of citizens-public managers activities can be carried out in a relatively spontaneous, flexible, and self-governed discussion arena (Dahlberg, 2001; Dahlgren, 2000; Garcia-Alonso & Lippez-De Castro, 2016; Hagendijk & Irwin, 2006; Mukhtarov et al., 2018).

H5: The better the technological environment, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.

H5': The better the technological environment, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.

5.2.2 The Ability Dimension


Public managers face a new paradigm where all activities become more interconnected (Löffler, 2015; Van Dijk & Hacker, 2018). To take advantage of this, they must initiate, propose, and promote actions not only to share knowledge within the public sector but also with citizens (Donate & Sánchez de Pablo, 2015; Inkinen, 2016; Inkinen, Kianto, & Vanhala, 2015; Tapio, 2015). Thus, public managers are required to effectively manage the flow of knowledge that facilitates its provision and acquisition (Calvo-Mora,

Navarro-García, Rey-Moreno, & Periañez-Cristobal, 2016; Donate & Sánchez de Pablo, 2015) According to Akhavan and Hosseini (2016), when individuals have knowledge sharing abilities, it is possible to share the knowledge associated with their domains of expertise more widely, and even knowledge does not associate with non-expertise.

H6: The higher the educational attainment, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.

H6': The higher the educational attainment, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.

To ensure a clear understanding of this part of the study, Figure 6 illustrates the model, and Table 12 the references associated with each hypothesis



Based on: Akhavan et al. (2016); Kang & King (2017); Kettinger et al. (2015); Reinholt et al. (2011); Siemens et al. (2008); Tassabehji et al. (2019)

Figure 6 MOA Model for Public Managers Willingness to Share Knowledge

Table 12 Hypothesis Overview for Public Managers Willingness to Share Knowledge

Hypothesis	References
H1 The higher the trust in people, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.	Akhavan & Hosseini (2016); Chumg et al.(2015); Hau et al. (2013); Hussein et al. (2016); Lin et al. (2009); Offe (1999); Van de Walle & Lahat (2017); Yang (2005)
H1' The higher the trust in people, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.	
H2 The higher the support for democracy, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.	Chumg et al. (2015); Hau et al. (2013); Lin et al. (2009)
H2' The higher the support for democracy, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.	

Hypothesis	References
<p>H3 The higher the corruption perception level, the lower the public managers knowledge acquisition.</p> <p>H3' The higher the corruption perception level, the lower the public managers knowledge provision.</p>	<p>Hanley & Sikk (2016); Huynh & Nguyen (2019); Kwong (2015)</p>
<p>H4 The better the economic performance perceptions, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.</p> <p>H4' The better the economic performance perceptions, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.</p>	<p>Alt et al. (2016); Anderson (2000); Hansford & Gomez (2015); Healy et al. (2017); Lewis-Beck & Paldam (2000); Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier (2007, 2019); Powell & Whitten (1993).</p>
<p>H5 The better the technological environment, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.</p> <p>H5' The better the technological environment, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.</p>	<p>Abbasi & Dastgeer (2018); Butler (2006); Lee et al. (2016); Marie (2018); Shane & Nicolaou (2015)</p>
<p>H6 The higher the educational attainment, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.</p> <p>H6' The higher the educational attainment, the higher the public managers knowledge provision</p>	<p>Akhavan et al. (2016); Kang & Kim (2017); Kettinger et al. (2015); Reinholt et al. (2011); Siemsen et al. (2008); Tassabehji et al. (2019)</p>

5.3 A Description of the Variables

This study constructs a panel data for 18 countries that make up the Latin American region for 2001-2016, except for 2012 and 2014. Data comes from two main sources: the LATINNO Project database (LATINNO, 2019) that collected data on knowledge sharing processes between public managers and citizens and the Latinobarómetro representative

surveys (Latinobarómetro, 2019) that is used for constructing the variables associated with public managers motivations, abilities, and opportunities. The NRI (2019), and GCI (2019) are only used for constructing a technological opportunity variable.

The LATINNO dataset collected information on direct participation activities from 18 Latin American countries between 1990 and 2016. These direct participation activities reflect public managers provision and acquisition of knowledge, and each of these activities is classified according to the year and the country of implementation, their geographical coverage (national or local), and the project leader (government or citizens).

Although direct participation processes are diverse, this work uses only two of them. The first one is the consultation process that is usually implemented when public managers do not want to or do not feel prepared to take unilateral decisions regarding valuable, sensitive, or divisible issues such as the legalization of abortion, gun control, or the revocation of a mandate. In this context, public managers provide and citizens acquire knowledge for taking a decision.

The second is the citizen representation process that is implemented when public managers believe that the public sector does not have the specific knowledge required to address a public policy challenge and it invokes a group of citizens with specific skills and competencies to provide their knowledge and public managers acquire this knowledge. This mechanism is mainly used for addressing long-term problems that require distance from the current government's issues.

The two direct participation activities that describe the public managers acquisition of

knowledge are given in Figure 7.




Figure 7 Public Managers Knowledge Acquisition and Provision

(Based on LATINNO (2019))

The Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2019) is developed by a private non-profit organization that conducted its first Latin American survey in 1995. This became annual in 2000 for 17 LACs and since 2004 the Dominican Republic has also been added. The surveys were not conducted in 2012 and 2014.

Almost all the public managers motivation (trust in people, support for democracy), opportunity (perception about corruption and economic performance), and ability (educational attainment) variables were constructed with the total population of the Latinobarometro surveys per year and per country.

Regarding the construction of the public managers motivation variables, trust in people were obtained from the percentage of population that work in the public sector

who declared “to trust most people.” Public managers support for democracy was constructed asking to interviewees to choose among the following alternatives “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government,” “under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one,” and “it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime.” Therefore, democracy support for public managers corresponded to the percentage of the population over 18 years old who were working in the public sector, and declared that “democracy is preferable to any other kind of political.”

The public managers ability variable was constructed from the question about the level of education the interviewees had and the last year completed. Thus, the level of education variable was measured as the percentage of the total respondents who were working in the public sector and completed higher education.

Two opportunity variables were obtained from Latinobarómetro. The first variable was the public managers perception about economic performance. This variable was measured as the percentage of the total respondents who were working in public sector and declared “that the current economic situation was very good.”

The second opportunity variable was the public managers perception about corruption that was measured as the percentage of the total respondents who was working in the public sector and declared “there had been little or no progress in reducing corruption.”

To construct the technological opportunity variable, NRI’s environment sub-index with a score of 1 to 7 was used. The NRI time series covered the period 2001-2015;

therefore, the GCI' macroeconomic environment and capacity to innovate pillars were used for obtaining the technological opportunities in 2016. Therefore, NRI's environment sub-index from 2001 to 2015 was estimated with GCI's macroeconomic environment and capacity to innovate in 2001-2016 to obtain the data in 2016.

A description of the variables is given in Table 9 in Chapter 3.

5.4 Estimation Model and Results

The Latin American panel can be considered a short time-series macro panel (Baltagi, 2008; Hsiao, 2007; Judson & Owen, 1999) with a high probability of describing dynamic behavior because of an increase in knowledge sharing activities in Latin America after the implementation of direct participation mechanisms in 1990 (Azzellini, 2016; Buček & Smith, 2000; Collier, 2009; Fung, 2006; Klesner, 2004; Pearce, 2004; Serdült, 2010; Stoyan & Niedzwiecki, 2018). In this context, the least-squares dummy variable correction (LSDVC) (Bun & Carree, 2005), or the (Blundell & Bond, 1998) generalized moment method (GMM-BB) can be used because they allow including the one-period lagged of the dependent variable. Although Monte Carlo simulations have yielded results in favor of LSDVC (Elhorst, 2010; Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Judson & Owen, 1999), the GMM-BB method allows endogeneity among variables or eliminating the one-period lagged of the dependent variable when it is not statistically significant.

Possible endogeneity comes from the chance that public managers use the activities associated with the acquisition and provision of knowledge to achieve personal goals

such as to access to more political power that can be considered corruption act (Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2016, Robert, 2015; Soto & Welp, 2017).

According to Baum et al. (2003), it is possible to test the endogeneity of a variable by comparing the orthogonality between the instrumental variables and the error (Hansen, 1982). If a variable is exogenous its representation will be a better instrument than the use of proxies. Thus, Baum et al., (2003) suggest testing the difference in chi-squared between a variable that is assumed endogenous minus the same variables but assumed to be exogenous. This is distributed as a chi-squared with the difference between the used instruments as degrees of freedom.

A comparison of GMM-BB estimations that assume perception about corruption level as endogenous and those that assume them to be exogenous variables showed that there is no evidence of endogeneity for public managers knowledge provision and acquisition.

Since the existence of endogeneities was not demonstrated, it is possible to use the LSDVC method to estimate the dynamic panel. However, when these two methods are used for estimating public managers provision and acquisition of knowledge, the results show that the one-period lagged of the dependent variable was not statistically significant. This implies first, that knowledge sharing between public managers and citizens is not a defined and recurrent practice and second, neither the LSDVC nor the GMM-BB methodologies can be used. Therefore, the panel corrected standard error (PCSE) is selected as the method (Beck & Katz, 1995) for both estimations

The results of public managers acquisition or provision of knowledge are presented in

Table 13. PCSE estimations were corrected for heteroscedasticity and cross-section correlation problems.

Table 13 PCSE's Estimations for the Public Managers Knowledge Acquisition and Provision

	Public Managers Knowledge Provision	Public Managers Knowledge Acquisition
Trust in People	0.0350*** (2.84)	0.00362 (1.14)
Support for Democracy	0.0150* (1.93)	0.00331* (1.76)
Perception about Corruption	-0.000698 (-0.11)	-0.00415** (-2.44)
Perception about Economic Performance	-0.0654** (-2.05)	-0.00873 (-1.12)
Technological Environment	0.138 (0.61)	-0.0583 (-1.07)
Educational Attainment	0.0752*** (2.95)	-0.00115 (-0.16)
Constant	-2.684* (-1.95)	0.201 (0.67)
Observations	248	248

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

As can be observed in Table 13, public managers willingness to provide knowledge is influenced by support for democracy and corruption. While support for democracy

positively influences public managers willingness to provide knowledge, corruption does so negatively. When public managers do not support democracy, they do not care about citizens participation. Therefore, they do not feel that they ‘have to’ provide knowledge to citizens or at least not in detail. On the other hand, when corruption is high, knowledge provided to citizens is not reliable. Therefore, public managers prefer to dedicate their energy and resources for achieving other objectives. In public managers knowledge acquisition, both motivational variables, general trust and democratic support, were statistically significant. The same happens in the case of education. Economic performance is the only variable that negatively influences public managers knowledge acquisition.

Public managers need a high level of trust and support for democracy to acquire knowledge from citizens. Although education is also necessary, it is noteworthy that this is statistically significant for the acquisition but not for the provision of knowledge.

Like the citizens provision of knowledge, a bad economic performance increases public managers willingness to acquire knowledge; the grievance theory rather than the civic voluntarism theory explains this behavior.

Chapter 6. Impact of Knowledge Sharing on Innovations in a Democracy

6.1 Introduction

Innovations depend on knowledge, skills, and experiences, and these are embedded in individuals who need to be triggered to share their knowledge so that new routines and mental processes can be established and the problems solved (Akhavan & Hosseini 2016; Leonardi 2017; Zhou & Li 2012). Further, the provision and acquisition of knowledge between individuals is proven to contribute to the generation of new ideas and opportunities, thus enabling process innovation (Lin 2007). Inspired by such findings that have attributed the success of innovations to knowledge sharing (Al-Husseini & Elbeltagi, 2018; Goldberg, Pasher, & Levin-Sagi, 2006.; Raza & Sohaib-Murad 2008), this study explores the potential implications of knowledge sharing on innovations in a democratic setting with a focus on LACs.

Many studies have demonstrated a positive relationship between knowledge sharing and innovation performance (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Ferraris et al., 2017; Hussein et al., 2016; Obeidat et al., 2016; Ritala et al., 2015; Santoro et al., 2018; Tassabehji et al., 2019; Un & Asakawa, 2015). Some of them highlight internal knowledge sharing capacities among organizational members (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Hussein et al., 2016; Obeidat et al., 2016) while others also appeal to the concept of ‘open innovations,’ (Chesbrough, 2004, 2006) by including knowledge sharing activities among organizations (Ferraris et al., 2017; Santoro et al., 2018; Tassabehji et al., 2019; Tortoriello, 2015; Un & Asakawa, 2015).

Assuming that new democratic processes are innovations (Åström et al., 2017; Geissel, 2013; Michels, 2011; Newton & Geissel, 2012; Pogrebinschi & Ryan, 2018; Smith, 2005,

2009; Talpin, 2012), this work aims to conceptualize and test the existence of a link between citizens and public managers knowledge sharing activities and innovations in democracy, but assuming that relationships between citizens and public-sector managers and their effects on innovations in a democracy do not occur at organizational , but rather at both local and national.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The definition of innovations in democracy and hypotheses are developed in Section 2. A description of the variables for 18 LACs is given in Section 3. Section 4 gives the results of the data analysis.

6.2 Hypotheses

The definition of innovations in a democracy usually converge to the idea of new processes (Åström et al., 2017; Christensen, Karjalainen, & Lundell, 2016; Geissel, 2013; Newton & Geissel, 2012; Smith, 2005, 2009). For instance, according to Geissel democratic innovations are “new procedures consciously and purposefully introduced to mend current democratic malaise and improve the quality of democracy” (2013, p. 10) while for Newton and Geissel (2012) democratic innovation is “the successful implementation of a new idea that is intended to change the structures or processes of democratic government and politics by improving them” (2012, p.4). However, the number of definitions considerably decreases when it comes to democracy. Democracy can be defined as a form of social organization where common decisions are taken through participative processes. These democratic processes are based on principles

defined by the same social organization (Birch, 2002; Eschle, 2018; Munck, 2016; Perry, 2005; Storm, 2008; Van Dijk, 2000) such as accountability, responsiveness, rule of law, political inclusion, and social equality (Coppedge et al., 2016; Esmark, 2007; Fuchs & Roller, 2018; Keohane, 2011; McLaverty, 2002; Saxonhouse, 2017; Warren & Pearse, 2008; Young, 2002).

The possible contribution of knowledge sharing activities between citizens and public managers to innovations in a democracy is modeled on organizational studies that address this relationship. While some studies analyze knowledge sharing practices within organizations (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Hussein et al., 2016), others also emphasize the relevance of knowledge sharing practices among organizations (Ferraris et al., 2017; Santoro et al., 2018).

This thesis assumes citizens and public managers carry out two main knowledge sharing functions or roles: knowledge provision and knowledge acquisition (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Hussein et al., 2016; Reinholt et al., 2011). Citizens and public managers communicate their intellectual capital to others or consult others to encourage them to share their knowledge capital (De Vries et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2009; Van den Hooff & Van Weenen, 2004). According to Hussein et al. (2016), acquisition and provision processes strengthen each other and then separately impact a firm's innovation capacity. They found evidence of a bidirectional relationship between acquisition and provision of knowledge. However, while knowledge acquisition positively influences a firm's innovation capabilities, knowledge provision's contribution is not statistically significant.

Akhavan and Hosseini (2016) analyzed knowledge sharing intentions of a team of R&D employees in Iran. Their results of a partial least squares analysis showed that knowledge acquisition and knowledge provision related positively and statistically with the team's innovation capabilities. Therefore:

H1: Citizens-driven knowledge sharing feeds public managers-driven knowledge sharing.

H1': Public managers-driven knowledge sharing feeds citizens-driven knowledge sharing.

According to Lin (2007), an environment that fosters the provision of knowledge among employees transforms individual knowledge into collective knowledge thus improving the stock of knowledge available to the entire organization and promotes the generation of new ideas and business opportunities. As Akhavan and Hosseini (2016), maintain the acquisition of knowledge internalizes socialized knowledge facilitating the transformation of organizational knowledge into individual knowledge that significantly influences an organization's innovation capacities.


H2: Citizens-driven knowledge sharing contributes to the production of innovations in a democracy.

H3: Public managers-driven knowledge sharing contributes to the production of

innovations in a democracy.

Citizens and public managers form a big organization or knowledge sector. This knowledge sector can share knowledge with other organizations or knowledge sectors such as industry and academia (Ferraris et al., 2017; Santoro et al., 2018). However, the academia is formed by academics and the industry is made up of employers and employees, all of whom are also citizens. Therefore, academic and industry knowledge is embedded in citizens and it is not necessary to consider knowledge sharing with other organizations. Hence, the only knowledge sharing activities that contribute to innovations in democracy are those carried out between citizens and public managers.

To ensure a clear understanding of this part of the study, Figure 8 illustrates the model, and Table 14 the references associated with each hypothesis



Based on: Akhavan & Hosseini (2016); Hussein et al.(2016); Ferraris et al. (2016); Tassabehji et al. (2019)

Figure 8 Knowledge-Sharing Activities on Innovations in Democracy

Table 14 Hypothesis Overview for the Impact of Knowledge-Sharing on Innovations in Democracy

	Hypothesis	References
H1	Citizens-driven knowledge sharing feeds public managers-driven knowledge sharing.	Akhavan & Hosseini (2016)
H1'	Public managers-driven knowledge sharing feeds citizens-driven knowledge sharing.	Akhavan & Hosseini (2016)
H2	Citizens-driven knowledge sharing contributes to the production of innovations in a democracy.	Akhavan & Hosseini (2016); Hussein et al. (2016); Lin (2007); Reinholt et al. (2011)
H3	Public managers-driven knowledge sharing contributes to the production of innovations in a democracy.	Akhavan & Hosseini (2016); Hussein et al. (2016); Lin (2007); Reinholt et al. (2011)

6.3 A Description of the Variables

This study constructs a panel data for 18 countries that make up the Latin American region in 2001-2016, except in 2012 and 2014. Data comes from the LATINNO Project database (LATINNO, 2019) that collected information on innovations in a democracy and data on knowledge sharing practices between citizens and public managers. Latinobarómetro (2019) was used to obtain the control variables: public sector size, age, and gender.

According to Warren and Pearse (2008) and Smith (2009) innovations in democracy

are designed to foster citizen participation. However, for LATINNO (2019), innovations in democracy could be understood more broadly. LATINNO assumes that different forms of citizen participation is not simply the end, but mainly the means of innovation in democracy. The ends of innovation in democracy would have many dimensions of the quality of democracy, like accountability, responsiveness, political inclusion, social equality, and the rule of law.

Therefore, innovation in democracy would be defined as institutions, mechanisms and processes whose ends aim to strengthen at least one of the five dimensions of the quality of democracy through one some ‘means of participation’

According to means of participation or knowledge sharing activities in the context of this work, LATINNO collected those cases that fulfill with at least three conditions: include citizen participation as a means, pursue one or more democratic ends, and have an institutional design able to impact on at least one of the policy cycle stages: agenda setting, policy formulation and decision-making, implementation, and/or evaluation.

LATINNO classified these means of participation according to the year and country of implementation, their geographical coverage (national or local), and the project leader (government or citizens).

This work uses only two of them. The first is the consultation process that is usually implemented when public managers do not want to or do not feel prepared to take unilateral decisions regarding valuable, sensitive, or divisible issues such as the legalization of abortion, gun control, or the revocation of a mandate. In this context,

public managers provide and citizens acquire knowledge for taking a decision.

The second is the citizen representation process that is implemented when public managers believe that the public sector does not have the specific knowledge required to address a public policy challenge and it invokes a group of citizens with specific skills and competencies to provide their knowledge and public managers acquire this knowledge. This mechanism is mainly used for addressing long-term problems that require distance from the current government's issues.

The exact definitions of innovation in democracy and participative or knowledge sharing processes are presented in Table 9 in Chapter 3.

6.4 Estimation Model and Results

The Latin American panel can be considered a short time-series macro panel (Baltagi, 2008; Hsiao, 2007; Judson & Owen, 1999) with a high probability of describing dynamic behavior because of an increase in knowledge sharing activities in Latin America through the implementation of direct participation activities since 1990 (Azzellini, 2016; Buček & Smith, 2000; Collier, 2009; Fung, 2006; Klesner, 2004; Pearce, 2004; Serdült, 2010; Stoyan & Niedzwiecki, 2018). In this context, the least-squares dummy variable correction (LSDVC) (Bun & Carree, 2005), or the (Blundell & Bond, 1998) generalized moment (GMM-BB) method can be used because these allow including the one-period lagged of the dependent variable. Although Monte Carlo simulations have yielded results in favor of LSDVC (Elhorst, 2010; Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Judson & Owen, 1999),

the GMM-BB model allows endogeneity among the variables and eliminating the one-period lagged of the dependent variable when this is not statistically significant.

The endogeneity test was applied to both the knowledge sharing variables (H1, H1') showing the existence of endogeneity between knowledge sharing variables in both directions. Since there is endogeneity, this model must be estimated by GMM-BB. Table 15 presents the results with a one-period lag of the dependent variable (estimation [1]), and without a one-period lag (estimation [2]).

Table 15 GMM-BB Estimations from Citizens-Public Managers Knowledge Sharing

Activities on Innovations in Democracy		
	Innovations in Democracy (1)	Innovations in Democracy (2)
L. Innovations in Democracy	-0.766 (-0.32)	
Citizens Provision- Public Managers 'Acquisition	-1.27 (-0.21)	0.662** (2.57)
Public Managers Provision - Citizens 'Acquisition	-4.973 (-0.54)	-2.113 (-1.08)
Public Sector Size	-0.174 (-0.59)	-0.0187 (-0.24)
Age	-0.119 (-0.24)	0.00138 (0.01)
Gender	0.0354	-0.0617

	(0.04)	(-0.52)
Constant	5.101	3.44
	(0.08)	(0.41)
Observations	196	249

In a relationship between citizens and public managers knowledge sharing activities and innovations in a democracy, citizens-driven knowledge sharing feeds public managers-driven knowledge sharing, and public managers-driven knowledge sharing feeds citizens-driven knowledge sharing. However, while citizens-driven knowledge sharing contributes to the production of innovations in a democracy, public managers-driven knowledge sharing does not contribute to innovations in a democracy.

Chapter 7. Conclusions

7.1 Summary

This study applied a knowledge sharing theoretical framework for exploring knowledge sharing activities between citizens and public managers and their effects on accountable, responsible, legal, inclusive and egalitarian processes understood in this study as innovations in a democracy. This study was structured into three studies, whose results and implications are now summarized.

The first study focused on the citizens perspectives and determined the factors that encourage or inhibit citizens knowledge provision and acquisition. Knowledge literature

does not suggest considering specific variables and existing findings refer to three general theoretical dimensions: motivations, opportunities, and abilities (Akhavan & Hosseini, 2016; Kang & Kim, 2017; Kettinger et al., 2015; Reinholt et al., 2011; Siemsen et al., 2008; Tassabehji et al., 2019; Zhang & Jiang, 2015) that may provide a deeper understanding about the triggers for an individual's willingness to share knowledge. Thus, building on these dimensions the first study captured trust in the political system and support for democracy (for the motivation dimension); perceptions about corruption, perceptions about economic performance, and the technological environment (for the opportunity dimension); and educational attainment (for the ability dimension).

According to the results, and with reference to the first objective of this study: what are the drives of citizens knowledge sharing in the LACs' democratic context? Table 16 provides a synthesis of the results

Table 16 Results for Citizens Knowledge-Sharing Activities

Hypothesis		Hypothesis Testing Results	
Citizens Knowledge Provision	Citizens Knowledge Acquisition	Provision	Acquisition
H1 The higher the trust in the political system, the higher the citizens knowledge provision.	H1' The higher the trust in the political system, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.	Supported	Rejected
H2 The higher the support for democracy, the higher the citizens knowledge provision.	H2' The higher the support for democracy, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.	Rejected	Supported

Hypothesis		Hypothesis Testing Results		
	Citizens Knowledge Provision	Citizens Knowledge Acquisition	Provision	Acquisition
H3	The high the corruption perception level, the lower the citizens knowledge provision.	H3' The high the corruption perception level, the lower the citizens knowledge acquisition.	Rejected	Supported
H4	The better the economic performance perceptions, the higher the citizens knowledge provision.	H4' The better the economic performance perceptions, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.	Partially Supported	Rejected
H5	The better the technological environment, the higher the citizens knowledge provision.	H5' The better the technological environment, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.	Rejected	Rejected
H6	The higher the educational attainment, the higher the citizens knowledge provision.	H6' The higher the educational attainment, the higher the citizens knowledge acquisition.	Supported	Rejected

Regarding citizens perspectives and their willingness to share knowledge, the econometric estimations showed that citizens knowledge provision was influenced by trust in the political system, perceptions about economic performance, and educational attainment while citizens knowledge acquisition was influenced by support for democracy and perceptions about corruption. These results align with the findings in existing literature in the field of knowledge sharing, in particular when it comes to the motivational dimension: trust in the political system (Lefebvre, Sorenson, Henchion, & Gellynck, 2016) and support for democracy in which this may encourage a productive dialogue and exchange between the citizens and government entities (Bengtsson &

Christensen, 2016; Camacho, 2019).

The effects seen in the results for citizens knowledge provision and knowledge acquisition activities may also be exemplified in the current situation in Chile. Due to a strong wave of protests in October 2019 (BBC News, 2019a, 2019b; Franklin, 2019), the Chilean President suggested that the Congress ‘provides knowledge’ by drafting a new Constitution. However, this idea was rejected by the citizens and political parties all of whom demanded an assembly composed of citizens that could provide knowledge and draft a new Constitution (Associated Press, 2019; Bartlett, 2019b; Hernandez & Gigova, 2019). According to the Latinobarometro (2019) survey, between 2017-2018, Chilean citizens educational attainments (4.19 percentage points) and perceptions about corruption increased (3.8 percentage points) but trust in the political system and support for democracy decreased (-0.26 percentage point and -1.28 percentage points, respectively). Therefore, high perception levels about corruption and low support for democracy may have motivated the citizens to reject the possibility that the Congress will provide knowledge for drafting a new Constitution. On the other hand, the increase in educational attainments could have prompted citizens to suggest that a group of citizens provide knowledge for drafting a new Constitution. However, the decrease in trust in the political system goes in the opposite direction and requires additional research.

The second study followed a similar logic but explored what encouraged or inhibited knowledge provision and acquisition from public managers perspectives. The econometric estimation showed that while public managers knowledge acquisition was

influenced by trust in people, support for democracy, perceptions about economic performance, and educational attainments, public managers knowledge provision was only influenced by support for democracy and perceptions about corruption. These results are summarized in alignment with the hypotheses suggested in earlier chapters in Table 17.

Table 17 Results for Public Managers Knowledge-Sharing Activities

Hypothesis		Hypothesis Testing	
Public Managers Knowledge Acquisition	Public Managers Knowledge Provision	Acquisition	Provision
H1 The higher the trust in people, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.	H1' The higher the trust in people, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.	Supported	Rejected
H2 The higher the support for democracy, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.	H2' The higher the support for democracy, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.	Supported	Supported

Hypothesis		Hypothesis Testing	
Public Managers Knowledge Acquisition	Public Managers Knowledge Provision	Acquisition	Provision
H3 The higher the corruption perception level, the lower the public managers knowledge acquisition.	H3' The higher the corruption perception level, the lower the public managers knowledge provision.	Rejected	Supported
H4 The better the economic performance perceptions, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.	H4' The better the economic performance perceptions, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.	Partially Supported	Rejected
H5 The better the technological environment, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.	H5' The better the technological environment, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.	Rejected	Rejected
H6 The higher the educational attainment, the higher the public managers knowledge acquisition.	H6' The higher the educational attainment, the higher the public managers knowledge provision.	Supported	Rejected

These results coincide with existing findings (Cooper, Bryer, & Meek, 2006; Yang, 2005) regarding the role of public officers as ‘trust initiators’ and the principle that demands that managers implicitly trust citizens (Cooper et al., 2006; Head, 2007; Yang, 2005). The corruption level related results also align with existing studies that explored levels of openness among government officers who are involved in corruption (De Albuquerque, 2019; Gledhill, 2017; Rose–Ackerman, 2008). Coming back to the example of the current Chilean situation, the Latinobarometro (2019) survey in 2017-2018 showed

that Chilean public managers had reduced trust in people (-6.04 percentage points), support for democracy (-3.22 percentage points), educational attainments (-6.58 percentage points), and even perceptions about corruption levels (-1,48 percentage points). Therefore, according to the results of this thesis this means that public managers reduce their willingness to acquire knowledge.

Regarding the relationship between citizens and public managers knowledge sharing activities and its effects on enabling innovations in a democracy, the endogeneity test showed that citizens-driven knowledge sharing fed public managers-driven knowledge sharing, and public managers-driven knowledge sharing fed citizens-driven knowledge sharing. However, while citizens-driven knowledge sharing contributed to the production of innovations in a democracy, public managers-driven knowledge sharing did not directly contribute to the production of innovations in a democracy.

Table 18 Citizens and Public Managers Knowledge-Sharing Activities on Innovations in Democracy

Hypothesis		Hypothesis Testing
Knowledge-sharing on Innovations in Democracy		
H1	Citizens-driven knowledge sharing feeds public managers-driven knowledge sharing.	Supported
H1'	Public managers-driven knowledge sharing feeds citizens-driven knowledge sharing.	Supported

H2	Citizens-driven knowledge sharing contributes to the production of innovations in ademocracy	Supported
H3	Public managers-driven knowledge sharing contributes to the production of innovations in a democracy.	Rejected

To provide an example of how these results may work in a democracy, the Chilean case becomes an example too. The fact that the Congress provides knowledge can produce an accountable innovative process, but it is difficult for this to be seen as an inclusive and legitimate process.

7.2 Implications and Future Research

In light of this study's research questions regarding the exploration of what drives citizens and public managers knowledge sharing in the LACs' democratic context as well as whether knowledge sharing between citizens and public managers contributes to innovations in democracy, the results made it possible to demonstrate the existence of triggering factors for knowledge sharing activities between citizens and public managers in Latin America. The results also show that knowledge sharing activities directly or indirectly contribute to the production of innovations in a democracy as per empirical efforts based on the LACs' context.

These results provide insights into the status of Latin American democracies and the issues of knowledge sharing whether driven by citizens or public managers or viewed as an exchange between the two. For instance, citizens trust in the political system and

public managers trust in people positively influences knowledge sharing activities. However, the confidence levels observed in Latin American democracies are very low (Cohen, 2018; Van der Meer, 2017; Zmerli & Castillo, 2015) and based on this study it is difficult to stimulate knowledge sharing through this mechanism. A similar effect is visible regarding support for democracy (Cohen, 2018; Fuks, Paulino, & Casalecchi, 2018; Wiarda & Kline, 2018). On the other hand, estimations also showed that citizens and public managers perceptions about reduced knowledge sharing activities. LACs present high levels of corruption when compared to the other parts of the world and LACs are only surpassed by the African region (Belgibayeva & Plekhanov, 2019; Bujko, Fischer, Krieger, & Meierrieks, 2016; Gledhill, 2017; Perry, 2018).

However, unlike mature democracies where higher income levels stimulate the willingness to share knowledge (Newton & Geissel, 2012), perceptions of a low economic performance positively influenced knowledge sharing activities between citizens and public managers. The study's results produce inputs for further discussions in the sense that while developed democracies are close to the theory of civic voluntarism please check sentence (Oni, 2017; Skocpol et al., 2000; Strömblad & Bengtsson, 2017; Verba et al., 1995). The behavior of democracies in LACs seems to be more understandable through the grievance theory which explains that bad environmental conditions generate a major incentive for political engagement by citizens and therefore a greater willingness to share knowledge (John & Mayer, 2017; Klandermans, 2004; Klandermans et. al., 2001; Wickham-Crowley & Eckstein, 2015). In this sense, the

question that can be derived from the contributions of this exploratory effort is whether knowledge sharing because of ‘discontent’ contributes as much as knowledge sharing based on the ‘normal’ desire to contribute.

Another relevant conclusion of this study that may produce further discussions is related to the technological environment, which did not yield significant results in terms of its influence on knowledge sharing activities among citizens or public managers. Nevertheless, some scholars argue that even higher implementation of a digital infrastructure and higher adoption rates of digital services can be associated with political activities with low participation narrow interests and discussion, and distrust due to the existence of fake profiles and anonymity (Lidén, 2018; Polat, 2005). An opportunity for further studies relies on the contradictory positions available in existing findings, where some authors maintain that technology allows engaging and empowering people (Abouzeedan & Hedner, 2012; Harrison & Daly, 2009; Ho, 2012) while others stress that it plays a moderating role in citizens and public managers abilities or cultural and organizational contexts (Al Ahababi et al., 2019; Golden & Raghuram, 2010).

Regarding knowledge sharing activities stimulated through educational attainment, although this variable was also low compared to the other regions, it experienced significant growth in recent years in LACs. (Craft, 2018; Randall & Anderson, 2016; Unesco, 2013)

This study applied the knowledge sharing theoretical framework and tested it in the case of LACs to explore whether such elements could become relevant ingredients in the

effects required to pursue innovations in a democracy. In alignment with the proposed overall conceptual framework, the study demonstrated that knowledge sharing activities driven by public managers and citizens feed from each other and the one driven by citizens may impact the production of innovations in a democracy. On the other hand, the results also showed that knowledge sharing activities when driven by public managers do not translate into innovations in a democracy. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that such results should not be misunderstood, although the latter statement may mislead the region's public managers efforts, it is very important to remember that that the effects of knowledge sharing activities on innovations in democracy is conditioned by the feedback that occurs between public manager and citizens driven knowledge acquisition and provision.

What was not possible to elucidate in this study or be used for complementing the analysis with other findings was the differences between the statistically significant variables when citizens acquired knowledge versus providing knowledge. The same goes for public managers. This is left for further efforts along with the possibility of testing the conceptual framework proposed with data from other regions such as more mature or less mature democracies.

7.3 Limitations

Considering the challenge of securing data regarding innovations in a democracy in developing regions, this study used an exploratory approach, thus its limitations provide opportunities for further widening the field of knowledge sharing, in particular its impact

on a democracy.

It seems relevant to ask whether knowledge sharing activities motivated by discontent and those activities motivated by real intentions of contributing to a solution for a problem offer the same results in terms of shared knowledge. Certainly, the first activity will be motivated more by the need to impose the position of the dissatisfied person rather than collaborating in solving the problem together.

Although the citizens and public managers-driven effects are different in terms of their functions as knowledge providers and knowledge acquirers. They present similar statistically significant variables associated with certain knowledge sharing activities. For example, when citizens provide and public managers acquire knowledge, the statistically significant variables are almost the same for citizens and public managers (trust, perceptions about economic performance, and educational attainments). The same happens when citizens acquire and public managers provide knowledge (support for democracy and perceptions about corruption). In this sense, at least in the context of citizens-public managers knowledge sharing, other knowledge sharing dimensions can be considered for providing a comparison and a deeper understanding of this effect.

This work only considered knowledge sharing between citizens and public managers as two unilateral relationships. When citizens acquire, public managers provide knowledge, and when citizens provide, public managers acquire knowledge. However, there is a possibility that citizens and public managers can provide and acquire knowledge at the same time. This is a limitation that arises from the necessary simplification of the

model, and it becomes a task for further research efforts. The direct participation activities only reflect part of the knowledge sharing activities carried out by citizens and public managers. Other activities such as volunteering or public-private partnerships could produce different knowledge sharing measures and effects.

Finally, due to the challenge of lack of data as well as literature that provided a fitting definition, this study adopted the innovation in democracy concept provided by the research group in charge of the primary data collection (the LATINNO working group). A limitation of their methods is that the qualification and classification of innovations in democracy's variables is discretionary which is collected as the perceptions of a triangulation effort of the LATINNO working group. To overcome such limitations, concrete parameters and accurate innovations in democracy measures could have been adopted. If further studies overcome the data availability challenge in LACs or other regions, then this study may be replicated and its determinants and implications measured accordingly.

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Abstract in Korean

지식공유가 민주주의 혁신에 미치는 영 향 분석

- 중남미 국가의 경험 -

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라틴 아메리카 국가들은 건국 이래 200년 가까이 지났음에도 불구하고 민주주의가 자리잡지 못했다. 현재 라틴아메리카 국가들 중 유일하게 두 국가만이 성숙한 민주주의를 달성한 것으로 평가되고 있으며 나머지 국가들은 민주주의가 혼합되어 있거나 실패한 것으로 분류된다 (The Economist, 2019). 각 국가별로 민주주의는 자국의 전통적인 형태에서 시민들의 보이지 않는 참여에 기인한 더 큰 정치적 교류에 초점을 맞추는 방식으로 변화하였다.

미국, 영국, 그리고 독일과 같이 일찍이 민주주의를 달성한 국가들은 자국 내에서 어떻게 민주적 실행이 작동하는지 충분한 개혁을 통해 초기부터 민주주의 이념을 변화시키고 적용해왔다. 그러나 민주주의가 성숙한 나라들의 대다수는 경제적 발전 또한 이루었으며 이는 시민의 참여 의식을 높이는 교육수준 향상 및 정보 접근성 향상과 동반되었다. 그러므로 앞서 언급한 선진국가들은 자국의 전통적인 민주주의 모델을 성공적으로 혁신했다고 얘기할 수 있다. 이

는 해당 국가들이 민주주의 달성을 위해 보다 큰 정치적 인식 함양, 시민의 직접 참여, 그리고 더 개방적인 논의를 향해 노력한 결과로 보여진다. 민주주의를 달성한 국가에서 보여진 이러한 변화들은 라틴아메리카 국가에서는 관찰되지 않았으며 라틴아메리카 국가들 역시 민주주의 도입 가운데 민주적 과정들을 통합하고자 하였으나 민주주의의 한 측면에서 얻을 수 있는 이점들을 얻는데 실패하였다.

혁신은 지식, 기술, 그리고 경험에 따라 다르게 나타나며 이러한 요인들은 개인들에게 내재되어 있다. 개인들은 지식의 공유를 통해 기존과 다른 새로운 루틴을 만들어내고 문제 해결을 능력을 갖추게 된다. 동시에 개인들 사이에서 상호간에 지식을 제공하고 획득하는 과정은 프로세스 혁신을 가능케하는 새로운 아이디어와 혁신 기회 창출에 기여하고 있음이 선행 연구에 의해 실증됐다. 본 연구는 지식 공유 관점에서 혁신 성공을 살펴본 선행 연구에 기반하여 라틴아메리카의 민주적 환경에 초점을 맞춰 혁신과 지식공유의 잠재적인 영향력 사이의 관계를 탐색하고자 한다. 본 연구와 선행연구와의 차이점은 다음과 같다. 소수의 연구자만이 단기간에 요구되는 혁신 프로세스에서 지식 공유가 미치는 영향을 살펴보았으며 민주주의 이념 안에서 라틴아메리카와 같은 개발도상국의 데이터를 이용한 실증 연구는 이루어지지 않았다. 따라서 본 연구는 민주주의 이념 안에서 지식 공유가 혁신에 미치는 영향을 살펴보기 위해 가용한 데이터를 추가하고 이를 실증하고자 한다.

본 연구를 구성하는 세가지 연구는 다음과 같다. 첫 번째 연구는 지식 공유의 의향이 있는 시민들을 대상으로 모델을 구축하고 이를 테스트하였다. 지식 공유에 대한 문헌 연구를 바탕으로 설명 변수인 시민의 동기, 기회, 그리고 지식 공유를 위한 역량을 도출하였고 이를 계량분석을 통해 추정하였다. 라틴아메리카 18개국을 대상으로 2001~2016년까지 수집한 패널데이터를 활용하여 어떤 요인이 시민 중심의 지식 제공 및 획득에 영향을 미치는지 실증연구를 진행하

였다. 계량분석 결과 시민들의 지식 제공은 정치 시스템과 교육 성취도에 대한 신뢰에 영향을 받으나 민주주의에 대한 지원과 부패에 대한 인식은 지식 습득에 영향을 미쳤음을 확인할 수 있었다. 두 번째 연구는 앞선 연구와 같은 모델을 사용하여 지식을 공유할 의향이 있는 공공관리자를 대상으로 테스트를 진행하였다. 설명 변수인 관리자의 지식공유 동기, 기회, 그리고 지식 공유를 위한 역량을 사용하여 첫 번째 연구와 동일하게 계량분석 방법론을 사용하여 추정하였다. 계량분석 결과 공공 관리자의 지식 획득은 사람에 대한 신뢰, 민주주의에 대한 지원과 교육 성취도에 의해 영향을 받았으나 부패에 대한 민주주의와 민주적 인식에 대한 지원만이 공공 관리자의 지식 제공에 영향을 미치고 있음을 확인하였다.

마지막 연구는 시민과 공공 관리자 간의 지식공유 활동이 민주주의 내에서 혁신에 기여하는지 테스트하였다. 지식공유와 혁신에 대한 기존 문헌을 바탕으로 민주주의 내에서 지식공유와 혁신 사이의 연관성을 가정하고 시민과 공공 관리자의 지식 공유가 민주적 프로세스에 기여하는지 탐색하였다. 연구 결과 시민중심의 지식 공유가 공공 관리자 중심의 지식 공유를 지원하였으며 공공 관리 중심의 지식 공유 역시 시민중심의 지식 공유를 지원하고 있음을 확인하였다. 그러나 시민 중심의 지식 공유는 민주주의 내에서 혁신 창출에 기여한 반면 공공 관리자 중심의 지식 공유는 민주주의 내에서 혁신 창출에 기여하지 않고 있음을 확인하였다.

키워드: LACs, 직접참여, 지식 공유, 민주주의 혁신, 패널데이터

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