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**Degree of Master's of International Studies**  
**(International Area Studies)**

**THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE'S  
JUDGEMENT ON THE BAKASSI PENINSULA  
BORDER DISPUTE: IMPACT ON THE  
ANGLOPHONE CRISIS IN CAMEROON**

**AUGUST, 2020**

Graduate School of International Studies  
Seoul National University

**BOTE A NDJOKOU IVAHA MAWEDI**

**THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE'S  
JUDGEMENT ON THE BAKASSI PENINSULA BORDER  
DISPUTE: IMPACT ON THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS IN  
CAMEROON**

A thesis presented

By

**BOTE A NDJOKOU IVAHA MAWEDI**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **The International Court of Justice’s judgement on the Bakassi Peninsula border dispute: Impact on the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon**

**BOTE A NDJOKOU IVAHA MAWEDI**

**International Areas Studies  
Graduate School of International Studies  
Seoul National University**

This study analyses the impact of the International Court of Justice’s judgement of 10, October 2002 related to the Bakassi Peninsula border dispute, on the “Anglophone crisis” in Cameroon. Indeed the said judgement has recognized the Cameroon's sovereignty over Bakassi peninsula after a border dispute with Nigeria, which led to a peaceful resolution before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However rather than to definitively restore the peace, this peaceful settlement on an interstate dispute led to an internal conflict in Anglophone regions of Cameroon. To carry out this study, we used the qualitative method combined to a constructivist approach to analyse the ongoing crisis. The products of our work come from books, articles, newspapers, videos and reports on this issue. At the end of our research, we observe that economic stake over the Bakassi peninsula is one of the catalyst which led to the outbreak of the Anglophone crisis, however under control in the past, between Anglophone community and the

Government. This crisis, started by a social claim, has gradually politicized and finally transformed in an armed conflict motivated by secessionist claims. In this respect, its resolution of this crisis should integrate actions both at domestic as well international levels, through the promotion of a peaceful settlement organized around, not only a frank dialogue and reciprocal concessions among the different belligerents, but especially in view to guarantee policies for a fair and equitable redistribution of the country's wealth.

**Keywords:** conflict, crisis, Anglophone.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

- AAC: Anglophone Conference All Anglophone Conference
- ABAKO: Bakongo Alliance
- ACHPR: African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights
- ADF: Ambazonia Defense Forces
- AFD: Agence Française de Développement
- AGC: Ambazonia Governing Council
- API: Adamawa Peacemakers Initiative
- APLM: Ambazonia People's Liberation Movement
- ARA: Ambazonia Restoracion Army
- ARC: Ambazonia Recognition Coalition
- ARCC: Ambazonia Recognition Collaboration Council
- ASC: Ambazonia Security Council
- AU: African Union
- AUN: American University of Nigeria
- BADEP: BAKASSI Peninsula Development Program
- CDC: Cameroon Development Corporation
- CFA: Coopération Financière en Afrique centrale
- CIO: Chief Information Officer

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

EDF: European Development Fund

E.U.: European Union

GICAM: Groupement Interpatronal du Cameroun

ICJ: International Court of JusticeE.U.: European Union

IDPs: Internally Displaced Persons

IG: Interim Government of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia

MINESEC: Ministry of Secondary Education

MINAT: Ministry of Territorial Administration

MORISC: Movement for Independence and Restoration of Southern Cameroons

NIPC: Ndian Indigenous People Council

OAU: Organisation of African Unity

OHADA: Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires

PRC: People's Republic of Congo

SCACUF: Southern Cameroon Consortium United Front

SCAPO: Southern Cameroon People's Organization

SCARM: The Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement

SCNC: Southern Cameroon National Council

SCOOP: Southern Cameroons Congress of People

SCYL: Southern Cameroon Youth League

SDF: Social Democratic Front

SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SOCADEF: Southern Cameroons Defense Forces

SONEL: Société Nationale d'Electricité

TCCM: Technical Committee on Constitutional Matters

TSOA: The Sword of Ambazonia

UN: United Nations

UK: United Kingdom

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWI: World War 1

WWII: World War 2

# **CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

## **1.1. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY**

Africa's history has been peppered with gloomy periods that continue to shatter the chaos observed in today's conflicting environment, wiping out all ambition. Indeed, after having been exploited under the yoke of slavery and colonization, the African countries hoped that their accession to independence would spell the end of the violence that had long weakened them. However, more than half a century after acquiring their autonomy, African countries are more vulnerable due to various conflict that continue to undermine the hopes raised in the aftermath of independence. The reasons for these conflicts are varied as various, they may be economic, such as the possession and exploitation of mineral or petroleum deposits, access to the sea, or cultural factors such as the feeling of a community as marginalized in the management of public affairs; they also may result from a political crisis etc. One of the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on “The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa”, published in 1998, establishes as main causes: the legacy of the past (colonialism, the Cold War); internal factors (nature of political power, neopatrimonialism, multiethnicity); external factors (Cold War); economic motivations; and special cases (like land issues in Central Africa with rampant demography)<sup>1</sup>. A retrospective analysis of this macabre show deals with the balkanization of Africa by the

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations General Assembly, 53rd Session.

Western powers after the Berlin Conference in 1884<sup>2</sup>. Indeed, the sharing of Africa by the colonial powers has resulted in an arbitrary line of African borders that makes these states bring together different ethnic groups. Thus it has introduced crisis between community belonging and allegiance to the new administrative and state borders. The colonial legacy is therefore potentially one of the most sources of inter-state conflicts in Africa. In order to avoid conflicts among new independent African countries, the intangibility of the borders resulting from colonization, was included in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)<sup>3</sup>. However, this principle did not prevent the proliferation of interstate conflicts resulting from an arbitrary delimitation of borders or motivated by land claims. It is in this wake that the border dispute on the Bakassi Peninsula between Cameroon and Nigeria is taking place for which the concerned parties opted for a peaceful resolution of this issue in the ICJ.

The dynamic of the Cameroon's western border delimitation traces back to the colonial era, it has been reorganized during WWI and definitively fixed after the independence.

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<sup>2</sup> The Berlin Conference, held from November 1884 to February 1885, was organized by Chancellor OTTO VON Bismarck to establish the rules of colonization of Africa, since around 1880, the movements related to the explorations became political. According to Article 34 of the Berlin Act states, any European nation that took possession of an African coast, or named themselves as "protectorate" of one, had to inform the other states of the Berlin Act. Only the coast was colonized before this conference, so the Berlin Conference allowed the colonial powers to occupy the inland of the Africa-scramble for Africa

<sup>3</sup> The resolution adopted by the African Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting in Cairo, opted for the "principle of the inviolability" of the borders in Africa on July 21, 1964. According to this principle, all Member States committed to respect the borders established at the moment they achieved independence

Indeed since the Berlin conference, Cameroon became under German protectorate as “Kamerun”. Two main agreements related to the boundary with Nigeria had been signed. The first one was the Anglo-German Treaty on 15<sup>th</sup> November 1893 which delimited the Kamerun’s west boundary from YOLA (in Nigeria) to Lake Chad. The second agreement is the Anglo-German Treaty on 11 March 1913 which is an arrangement of the border’s delimitation from Yola to the sea, it also the agreement on the regulation of navigation on the Cross River. It is through this second treaty that Bakassi peninsula was integrated in Kamerun.

After the defeat of Germany at the end of the First World War through which it lost its colonial power, Kamerun was shared on March 4, 1916 into France and United Kingdom and therefore takes its current name of Cameroon. At that time, the territorial area was about 787840 Km<sup>2</sup><sup>4</sup>, the 1/5 part was put under United Kingdom’s administration and the gigantic one under France’s administration.

Later with the Treaty of Versailles of 28<sup>th</sup> June 1919<sup>5</sup>, Cameroon's administration was entrusted to France and United Kingdom. Moreover in 1923, France modified the size of Cameroon by reintegrating the “Neue Kamerun” into Chad, Central African Republic,

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<sup>4</sup> On November 4, 1911, a new Franco-German convention profoundly changed the boundaries. At the end of the Agadir incident in Morocco, France cedes to Germany part of these territories of the AEF with an area of 275360 square kilometers.

<sup>5</sup> The Treaty of Versailles is the most important treaty of the First World War signed between Germany on the one hand and the allies on the other hand, which put an end to this war. This Treaty included territorial, military and economic clauses. Among the territorial clauses, Germany suffered the loss of all colonies in Africa to the benefit of France and Great Britain: Cameroon, Togo, Tanganyika and Südwestafrika or Namibia.

Gabon and Congo. It should be noted that this part of Cameroon comprised of around 275 360 km territory, was ceded to Germany by France under the Treaty of Fez on 30 March 1912 at the end of the Agadir's incident in Morocco<sup>6</sup>. After the Second World War, the Trusts Agreement of United Nations in 1946 confirmed France and UK as trusts powers of Cameroon.

The internal share of Cameroon was established by the Franco-British declaration of Milner-Simon on 10 July 1919. This agreement fixed the delimitation of Cameroon respectively under French and English authorities, this convention was at the foundation of the territorial partition of Cameroon between France and United Kingdom. For the convenience of its administration, the United Kingdom divided its part into two regions: Northern and Southern Cameroon and administered them as a part of Nigeria that they were established as colonial power.

The evolution of Cameroon status from colony to autonomous state started in 1960 when the former French Cameroon became independent on 1<sup>st</sup> January as the Republic of Cameroon ("République du Cameroun"). Through the Constitution of 4<sup>th</sup> March 1960, the form of unitary state was the legal option of governance adopted by the political power. More than one year later on 1<sup>st</sup> October 1961, the former British Cameroon achieved its independence, not like a state apart, but by joining either Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon. In this regard, through plebiscites, the Southern Cameroon joined the former French Cameroon whilst the Northern Cameroon rallied to Nigeria.

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<sup>6</sup> Adalbert OWONA, Naissance du Cameroun 1884-1914, Racines du présent, l'Harmattan, 1996

During these plebiscite organized in 1959, among the 21 polling stations in Bakassi Peninsula, 73% voted to join the former French Cameroon<sup>7</sup>. By joining the former French Cameroon, they formed together the Federal Republic of Cameroon. However, it should be noted that initially the intention of British Cameroon was to become a state independently of the Republic of Cameroon and Nigeria, but this option was rejected by United Kingdom, hence the previous option. By joining the former French Cameroon, a new constitution was adopted with a new form of state. Indeed, the constitution of 1<sup>st</sup> September 1961 established a federal system with two federated states: the Western Cameroon (former British Southern Cameroon) and the Eastern Cameroon (former French Cameroon). In 1972, the political power makes a turnaround on the form of the state by resorting to the initial form in the Republic of Cameroon. The Unitary State was therefore renewed under the Constitution of 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1972. After almost fifteen years, the unitary system moved to the Unitary Decentralized State under the Constitution on 18<sup>th</sup> January 1996, which is still in force nowadays.

The land and maritime boundary case between Cameroon and Nigeria originated in the early 90s through the occupation of some localities in the Bakassi peninsula, by Nigerian armed forces whose intention was to affirm the sovereignty of Nigeria on this area. In view of the failure of negotiating efforts to settle the crisis following the referral of the central organ of the Organization of African Union (OAU) Dispute Settlement

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<sup>7</sup> Menjo Francis Baye, Implication of the Bakassi conflict Resolution for Cameroon, African Journal on conflict Resolution 2010, ISSN 1562-6997.

Mechanism<sup>8</sup>, Cameroon opted for a peaceful settlement of this border dispute by judicial means before the ICJ. That recourse to the Court by Cameroon was made unilaterally, that is to say without Nigeria's consent; most of time this type of legal recourse is usually used when one of the parties is of bad faith. Moreover, since the Permanent Court of International Justice, the disputes settlement by the Court is "[...] an alternative to the direct and friendly settlement of such disputes between the Parties [...]"<sup>9</sup>.

Bakassi is an area located in the Gulf of Guinea and in the South-west Region of Cameroon, north of Biafra Bay in the heart of the Rio Del Rey estuary. In Cameroon, it is a part of South-West Region and administratively attached to Ndian Division. It encompasses five (5) districts: Kombo-Abedimo, Idabato, Isangele, Bamuso and Kombo-Itindi. Bakassi is also constituted of an insular part made up of the Sub-divisions of Idabato, Kombo Itindi and Kombo Abedimo, and a continental part including the Sub-divisions of Bamuso and Isangele. The stakes around this estuary are of various orders. The Bakassi peninsula is located between the Niger delta and Bioko Island (Equatorial Guinea), two rich oil areas sources of Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea's wealth. It is an area rich in fisheries, forestry and mining resources, having great agricultural and touristic potentials. In terms of energy, this area is a reserve abound with gas and oil deposits. With regard to the fishery resources, it is reputed to be rich in various potentialities, and the population carry out there an exclusive activity of artisanal fishing.

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<sup>8</sup> Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

<sup>9</sup> The case of the free zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), Order of August 19th, 1929.

The oil of Bakassi Peninsula is so important for the government for two main reasons: firstly, without Bakassi, the crude petroleum extracted also from the South-West Region is the most exported product, representing 31.4% of the total exports of Cameroon<sup>10</sup>. Secondly, the oil production being on a decreasing slope, the exploitation of oil reserve in Bakassi would enhance the exploitable stock and restore the national economy long lost balance.

The Bakassi Peninsula is considered to be an important access to the port of Calabar in Nigeria and is the main gateway and exit for the south-east of this Cameroon' neighbor. It is also seen as a strategic area in the sense that that it is a check-point of surveillance for navigation throughout the Gulf of Guinea.

In view of the foregoing, the judicial phase started on 29 March 1994 with Cameroon's request at the Court related to its sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula. The content of that Cameroon's initial request was related on the following points:

- the statement and judgement by the Court that sovereignty over the area is Cameroonian in accordance with the international law;

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<sup>10</sup> UN COMTRADE

- the engagement of the Nigeria's international responsibility since it violated the fundamental principle of intangibility of the boundaries<sup>11</sup>, as well as other Conventional and Customary International Law.

An additional request was introduced later on 6<sup>th</sup> June 1994 by the Cameroon, and had been considered not as a separated request, but an amendment of the original one, since Nigeria had made no objection to that amendment. Hence the both requests were examined by the Court as part of a same request. If the first request was related to the maritime boundary, the second one referred to the land boundary from the sea to the Lake Chad, that is to say that the delimitation of the entire boundary between these two states was the main object of the case submitted to the Court's judgment.

As for Nigeria, it filed preliminary objections, on 1 May 1996. These objections concerned the following points:

- The Court has no jurisdiction to entertain Cameroon's Application;
- The duty of the Parties to settle all boundary questions by means of existing bilateral machinery;
- The exclusive competence of the Lake Chad Basin Commission;
- The Court cannot determine the tripoint in Lake Chad;

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<sup>11</sup> Organization of African Unity's Resolution A.H.G./16-1 on 21 July 1964 which proclaimed that all member states (of the OAU) undertake to respect the borders existing on achievement of independence/ Article 4 (b) in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU).

- There is no dispute concerning boundary delimitation from the tripoint in Lake Chad to the sea;
- There is no basis for a judicial determination that Nigeria bears international responsibility for alleged frontier incursions;
- There is no dispute susceptible of adjudication as to the maritime boundary;
- Maritime delimitation necessarily involves the rights of third States.<sup>12</sup>

From the order of 15 March 1996, the Court indicated a number of conservatory measures primarily aimed at the cessation of hostilities.

The Court' hearings on the preliminary objections raised by Nigeria started from 2 to 11 March 1998. In its decision of 11 June 1998, the Court stated its competence to judge this conflict and confirmed the admissibility of Cameroon' request. At the opposite, the Court rejected seven of the eight preliminary objections raised by Nigeria. The public hearings on the content were held from February 18 to March 21, 2002; and the judgment of 10 October 2002 pronounced was in favor of Cameroon. The Court judged that Cameroon's border with Bakassi is bound by the Anglo-German Agreement of March 11, 1913 (Article XVIII-XX) and that sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula is Cameroonian. With regard to the maritime boundary, the Court has fixed the boundary of the maritime zones of the two States. The Court also ordered Nigeria to withdraw its

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<sup>12</sup> International Court of Justice, Case concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary objections of the Federal Republic of Nigeria volume I, December 1995

administration, armed and police forces from the Bakassi peninsula as soon as possible without conditions. It took note of the commitment made by Cameroon to continue to protect Nigerians living in the Bakassi Peninsula. The second point of the Cameroon's request above mentioned related to the international responsibility of Nigeria, was rejected by the Court, as well as Nigeria's counter-claims.

Normally in international law of conflict, the authority of *res judicata* puts an end to the dispute. Given this, the sentence pronounced by the judge divests the court; it notes the obligations imposed upon States and relies upon them for the execution. Indeed in international Law, there is a separation between the court decision and its execution which is under the responsibility of both parties in conflict. While the Court's mission is to judge inter-state disputes under the basis of international law, the implementation of the Court's judgement is done by the parties themselves. It is in accordance with this feature inherent in international law on conflicts, that Cameroon undertook a process of execution of the ICJ' judgment of 10 October 2002 under the auspices of the United Nations. Apart from that, the Court also ordered Nigeria in the same judgement to withdraw its administration, armed and police forces from Bakassi peninsula as soon as possible without conditions. Cameroon committed to continue protecting Nigerians living in the Peninsula.

The modalities on implementation of the ICJ's judgement have been established by both parties on the supervision of the United Nations, through the creation of a Mixed Commission in one hand and the signature of the Greentree Agreement in other hand.

- The creation of a Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission in November 2002 in Paris. In September 2004, the functioning of this Commission was blocked, through a declaration made by its Minister of Transport dated 23 October 2002, thirteen days after the judgment was delivered, Nigeria had clearly rejected the ICJ's verdict on Bakassi and indicated that it would not shy away constitutional duties to protect its citizens<sup>13</sup>. That impediment was followed by incidents on the field, particularly on June 17, 2005 with the death of a Cameroonian soldier and several material destructions<sup>14</sup>. In view of the divergence observed in the implementation of that judgment, one of the parties willing to implement it and the other rejecting it, the diplomacy appeared as the ideal solution that could solve this problem; this is the foundation of the signing of the Greentree Agreement.

- On June 12, 2006 in GREENTREE in the United States: signing of the agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the terms of withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Bakassi Peninsula. Cameroon and Nigeria recognize the land and sea border between them as defined by the judgment and each of them commit to pursue the implementation process of the judgment. Nigeria undertakes to withdraw all of its armed forces from the Bakassi Peninsula within 60 days from the date of signature of this Agreement.

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<sup>13</sup> OLINGA Alain Didier, L'accord de Greentree du 12 juin 2006 relatif à la presqu'île de Bakassi, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Declaration of the Cameroon's Minister of Communication dated June 22, 2005.

- 14/08/2006: Effective withdrawal of the Nigerian armed forces from the Bakassi peninsula and transfer of authority to the Republic of Cameroon in accordance with the ICJ's judgment of 10 October 2002 and the Agreement of Greentree of June 12, 2006.

While the signature of these agreements and the demarcation process were carried out by the parties and Mixed Commission, the Cameroonian government undertook a development program of the Bakassi peninsula.

With the definitive retrocession of Bakassi to Cameroon, the objective seemed to be achieved on the Cameroonian side. However, this area rich in natural resources is facing an internal violence from the claims made by some natives of the two regions above mentioned formerly administered by the United Kingdom. Indeed since 2017, an internal crisis pitting certain socio-political movements against the government has broken out and paralyzing the government's ambitions in this region.

## **1.2. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS**

Ogden and Richards<sup>15</sup> proposed the figure of a triangle to understand how the meaning of a word or concept works. A concept encompasses three elements: an intension (a name), a connotation (a dimension of comprehension) and an extension denotation (extension dimension). Thus, denomination consists to give a conceptual status to a word, to invent a word or to combine existing words. The understanding refers to the definition

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<sup>15</sup> C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1923.

of the concept; whereas the extension covers the empirical cases to which the concept will apply (and will not apply).

In this regards in the framework of our study, we will define the concepts and to delimit their outlines.

### **1.1.1 The conflict**

The word “Conflict” is the synonymous of “dispute” and comes from Latin words “conflictus”, “confligere” which means shock, strike, fight. According to the legal approach, a dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict, an opposition of legal theories or interests between parties and that to establish the existence of a dispute, it must be demonstrated that the claim of one of the parties meets the obvious opposition of the other.

From the point of view of sociology, a conflict is a social situation in which interdependent actors either aspire to contrasting purposes, defend conflicting values, have diverging or opposing interests, or pursue the selfsame objective at the same time and competitively. As stated by Kevin Avruch (1998)<sup>16</sup>, “Conflict occurs when two related parties (individuals, groups, communities, or nation-states) find themselves divided by perceived incompatible interests or goals or in competition for control of scarce resources”.

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<sup>16</sup> Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict resolution, *US Institute of Peace Press, 1998 - Social Science - 153 pages*

A conflict implies a situation where a State, an ethnic group, a clan or a group is opposed against another group, state, clan or ethnic group, because their objectives, like the war, are incompatible (Charles-Philippe David, 2000<sup>17</sup>).

It is clear from the above definitions that conflict, although opposing the parties involved, can manifest itself in various forms. In this regard, Anne-Laure AMILHAT-SZARY distinguishes four types of conflict: conflictual episodes that do not lead to a long-term confrontation, conflict issues where everyone tries to convince the other of his right, identity conflicts with a broader time frame that can contain serious crises and conflict of subordination where the party because of its superiority legitimizes violence to reduce or eliminate the opponent<sup>18</sup>.

### **1.1.1 The crisis**

The crisis is a process that threatens to disintegrate an organization or universe of references. Caused by a major event, it is manifested by the sudden break of a balance considered stable and questions the survival of a system.

A crisis implies the causes of the past and the consequences of the future, it destabilizes a system and acts as a revealer of new realities.

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<sup>17</sup> Charles-Philippe David, *La guerre et la paix. Approches contemporaines de la sécurité et de la stratégie*, Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2000, p. 133

<sup>18</sup> Anne-Laure AMILHAT-SZARY, *Frontières et conflits : une approche territoriale. (Borders and conflicts : a territorial approach)* Bulletin de l'Association de Géographes Français Année 2012 89-1 pp. 18-33

### **1.1.2 Anglophone**

Generally, the expression “Anglophone” refers to areas where English is spoken or to people who use English as the language of communication.

In our study it will refer to the Regions, movements, people, or anything else from the South-West and Nord-West Regions of Cameroon.

According to the Cameroon’s Constitutional Law on January 18, 1996, English and French are the official languages of equal value, the state guarantees the promotion of bilingualism. As implication, it should not exist neither “Anglophone” nor “Francophone” but bilingual Cameroonians, even as in the practice the achievement of this goal is still low. For the understanding of our topic, we will constantly use “Anglophone” such as above mentioned. As consequence, the natives of others regions who are established in the Anglophone regions or Cameroonians living out from the concerned areas and more comfortable in English speaking are excluded.

### **1.1.3 Ambazonia**

Literally, “Ambazonia” comes from “AMBAS BAY”, “ Where the West African Coast line meets the Southern African coastline, is a bay of the Atlantic Ocean. Geography identifies the territorial zone around Amba Bay as Amba Zone since the 16th and 17th Century. From Amba Zone, we get Ambazonia.”<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> “Fon Fongum Gorji-Dinka ([letter] Written from Cameroon Maximum Security Prison, Brigade Mixte Mobil, BMM, Yaounde, Cameroon, Issued, July 11th, 1985). Reproduced from Original manuscript from the Archives of The Republic of Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons)

Indeed it is an imaginary state made up of the former Southern Cameroon entrusted to the British administration before independence, now called South-West and North-West Regions of Cameroon.<sup>20</sup>

### **1.3. SCOPE OF THE STUDY**

The scope of the subject consists in circumscribing the object of study in a precise geographical area where the phenomenon submitted to our study occurs. It also helps to clarify the temporal demarcation of the said phenomenon: since when does it exist? What is its frequency?

#### **The spatial scope**

The location of our study concerns the former Southern Cameroons, one of the two regions, with Northern Cameroons which joined Nigeria, whose colonial administration had been entrusted to Great Britain. Since 1972, the administrative partition of this part of Cameroon led to the creation of two regions of South-West and North-West Cameroon. The size of the both areas is about 41,871 km<sup>2</sup>, representing around 9.1% of the total area of Cameroon. Its population is approximately 3,484,899 inhabitants which represent 17.4% of the total population of Cameroon<sup>21</sup>. They are bounded to the North and West

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without any serious modifications, whatsoever, by Justice M. Mbuh, Secretary General, Ambazonia Peoples Emancipation Council (APEC), Washington, DC, 8/10/2002.

<sup>20</sup> Before achieving independence around 1960s, African society was not organized in the form of state. Hence for the case of Southern Cameroons, it has never exist as an independent state, but a part of Cameroon-itself non independent- administrated by British.

<sup>21</sup> Central Bureau of the Census and Population Studies.

by the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to the East by the Adamaoua, West and Littoral regions of Cameroon. Regarding the Bakassi peninsula, it is located in the region of South-West Cameroon, where equally the oil production of Cameroon is. Nowadays, the South-West region has become the epicenter of the violence while the North-West Region was the starting point.

As a result, this study will be conducted geographically in the regions of South-West and North-West Cameroon.

#### **The time scope**

Cameroon's application to institute proceedings against Nigeria was filed in the Registry of the Court in 1994, related mainly on the issue of sovereignty over Bakassi peninsula. As regards the Anglophone crisis, it started since the end of 2016 and is still unfolding. Thus, our study will be conducted over the period from 1994 to 2019. However, we can sometimes refer to historic or passed events when it will be necessary, in order to make our analysis better understandable.

### **1.4. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The general objective of this study is to contribute to the improvement of the policy of "living together" within the ethnic diversity that characterizes the Cameroonian society. Hence the interest of analyzing this crisis in order to highlight its veritable multidimensional stakes and consequently to provide adequate solutions.

Our specific objectives are the following:

- Firstly, we intend to tackle one of the main causes of the economic slowdown observed in Cameroon.
- In addition, we purpose to suggest solutions for the restoration of peace in Cameroon in general and in North-West and South-west regions particularly.
- Beyond the above goals, we would like through this study to find means in order to renew the social contract between the population and the central power wherever part of the territory or regardless the divisions that occurred during its colonial history.

### **1.5. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

The conflict has been settled, but the advent of peace in Bakassi, without which stability and development cannot be pursued, is still threatened no more because of an interstate violence, but due to internal troubles. The prospects of oil exploitation and economic development in Bakassi have been followed in Cameroon, as in many African countries in the Gulf of Guinea (secessionist struggles and coups d'etat, especially in the case of offshore operations such as, the secessionism of Cabinda in Angola and the 1997 or in Congo Brazzaville.), by political violence. In the case of Cameroon, since the economic prospects of oil and gas exploitation in Bakassi, the resentment of the Anglophone regions against the government intensified and muted into fighting. There is no doubt that an interstate settlement has been already found, however the achievement to an internal solution still remains.

## **1.6. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The resolution of the Bakassi border conflict came after a long period of a military battle between Nigeria and Cameroon. To achieve this result, both parties have resorted to the peaceful settlement of this dispute through the judiciary mean before the ICJ, the international judicial institution. Its final outcome would not have been possible without the remarkable involvement of the Secretary General of the United Nations and the two Heads of State of the countries concerned. This judicial settlement, which has been accompanied by diplomatic negotiations, is today a reference in term of peaceful conflict resolution, as much as the demarcation process still continues under the auspices of the United Nations.

In view of the foregoing, it would have been expected that after this denouement, Cameroon would be able to develop the Bakassi Peninsula serenely. Unfortunately, this goal is far from being achieved. Indeed, Bakassi and its surrounding areas are once again the scene of violence that undermine its development and threaten social peace in the Anglophone regions.

Given that, our research questions are as follows:

- What could justify this paradox according to which the end of the Bakassi conflict marks the beginning of another conflict of a different and more deadly nature<sup>22</sup> than the previous one?
- Do the modalities of resolution of the first conflict possess themselves the germs of a second conflict? In other words, has the settlement of Bakassi conflict sufficiently integrated all the factors in view of a complete cessation of violence in this area?
- Would the occurrence of the Anglophone crisis, on the contrary, be linked to an endogenous fracture in the collaboration between the central power and the native populations?

### **Hypothesis**

A hypothesis is an advanced guess made in response to a research question.

- **Main hypothesis:** The competition for the management of Bakassi's oil and fish resources would be the source of the Anglophone crisis, especially since most of the oil exploited by Cameroon comes from the same region where Bakassi is located.

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<sup>22</sup> According to a report of the NGO Crisis Group for Central Africa, dated May 2019, the Anglophone crisis caused 1,850 dead, 530,000 internally displaced and tens of thousands of refugees.

➤ **Secondary hypothesis:**

- The Anglophone minority feels absorbed by the Central power that it believes has crippled the peculiarity of its educational and judicial system.
- The reunification of 1972 establishing the unitary state in Cameroon was a step that triggered the feeling of assimilation of a minority people by the majority. Hence, the English reaction could be justified by the fear of being assimilated by the French-speaking majority.

### **1.7. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

Innumerable studies have already focused on the Bakassi conflict, in particular with regard to its judicial phase itself before the international jurisdictional tribunal, as well as in the implementation of its judgment. Negligible studies did not consider or ignore that the stakes issues in the Bakassi Peninsula could further lead to renewed internal violence in this area even after the acceptance of the verdict by the parties. Moreover, an academic rapprochement between these issues and the current crisis in Cameroon has not yet been addressed by any study. What makes our research meaningful is that it analyzes the judicial phase, not to contest the judgement itself, but to by highlight the presence of a conflict within the side of the party for which the verdict was favorable. In addition we will try to understand if the failure by the Court to examine a possible crisis within the plaintiff, did not favor the current Anglophone crisis in Cameroon.

Globally, our study is a contribution to the existing literature related to the everlasting issue of the legitimacy of conflicts due to the break between the state and the nation in Africa.

## **1.8. METHODOLOGY**

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall about 30 years ago, new methods of conflict analysis have emerged in the world as due to the end of the Cold War and its major consequence that is the end of the bipolar conception of the conflict. Nowadays, the world is facing new threats such as international terrorism, hostage-taking and media manipulation techniques for crowds (including issues related to the development of social networks) as revealed by Michel Galy<sup>23</sup>.

Indeed, the end of the bipolarity has brought a complexity in the analysis of International Relations and conflicts. The "constructivist" approach manifests by the irruption of the sociology within the Political Sciences. This method, inspired from the researches of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, refers to the realism and idealism, questioning the primacy of the Nation-state as the sole reference for political analysis.

The constructivist approach is based on sociology and anthropology and integrates new actors in the analysis of International Relations and conflicts. Thus, for Paul Richards<sup>24</sup> (1996) the new conflicts in the world in the midst of a reorganization post-cold war have

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<sup>23</sup> Michel Galy, *Nouvelles visions des conflits : Une politologie des mondes contemporains*, in *Revue internationale et stratégique* N°43 pp. 121-128 ("New visions of conflicts: A politics of contemporary worlds").

<sup>24</sup> Paul Richards *Fighting for the Rain Forest*, London, 1996

generated a renewal of the states' sociology, conflicts between states and conflicts within the state. For James Rosenau<sup>25</sup> (1990), International Relations entered into "turbulence zones" after the break-up of traditional relationships in multiple networks. This is the case for the globalist orientation of James Burton who talks about actors caught in networks woven into "spider web". In addition, the constructivist approach justifies and encourages any questioning of conventional ideas in the conduct of war policies and in strategies.

Constructivism would therefore be the appropriate theoretical approach to better understand and analyze the conflict that is the object of our study.

The conflicts in Africa, as in the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia, become revolts against the State which, rather to be a consensus or the result of a social pact or a contract, is considered more in the angle of exploitation and domination.

It is around the extraction of raw materials, diamond, oil, uranium and other minerals that the model of analysis of local conflicts must be considered. The new authors of these conflicts, who base their legitimacy on the cultural or the ethnic (Case of the Anglophone conflict in Cameroon with a redefinition of ethnicity on the basis of colonial languages). Georges Balandier has demonstrated for this purpose the genealogical character of African societies. The new actors in these new conflicts do not seek a military victory, because of the disproportion of forces (asymmetrical wars), but the negotiation and

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<sup>25</sup> James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: Theory of Change and Continuity*, New York / London, Princeton University Press, 1990

especially their recognition. Among the components of these new actors, we have the Diasporas, networks of combatants, but also migrants and communicators.

In addition, to carry out our analysis, we will use the qualitative method, especially the historical analysis. It will be useful for examining chronologically our problematic starting from the events that preceded the current crisis, especially those included in the period when the Cameroonian request on Bakassi conflict was entrusted to the ICJ, before dwelling on the current crisis. This approach is based mainly on the combined exploitation of various books, articles, documents, websites and videos, related to our problematic.

### **1.9. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

This study is a partial analysis of the ICJ' judgment on Bakassi conflict because it does not take into account the part of the judgement integrating the border beyond the North-West Region until the Lake Chad.

we faced also Difficulties in obtaining primary materials to deal with the analysis of the Anglophone crisis, due to the Scattered information and Anglophone movements from secessionist Anglophone movements. However, the most important actors are included on our analysis.

## **1.10. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS**

From the research questions presented above and the methodological approach chosen, we have drawn up a plan that is divided into two major parts of four additional chapters each organized as follows:

- The chapter II is related to the literature review of existing studies;
- The chapter III is focused to present some alerts of an ineluctable internal crisis in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon;
- The chapter IV will analyse the ongoing Anglophone crisis ;
- The Chapter V will conclude and provide policies recommendations.

Figure 1 : Map of Regions in conflict in Cameroon



**Figure 2 : Map of Bakassi location**





Figure 3 : Bakassi Map



Figure 4 :North-West Region map



Regional Capital: Bamenda


Population: 1 950 667 people

Area: 17,300 km<sup>2</sup>

Number of departments: 07

Density: 98.41 inhabitants / km<sup>2</sup>

Figure 5 :South-West Region map



Source: Jude Ndzifon Kimengs, Amawa Sani Gur & Akhere Solange Gwan, A Model for Sustainable Water Supply in Rural Communities: The Case of Ekondo-Titi, Cameroon, Sustainability in Environment ISSN 2470-637X (Print) ISSN 2470-6388 (Online) Vol. 3, No. 1, 2018

Regional Capital: Buea

Population: 1 534 232 people

Area: 24 571 km<sup>2</sup>

Number of departments: 06

Density: 45.38 inhabitants / km<sup>2</sup>

## **CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW**

In this section, we will analyze the dynamic of conflicts in Africa on the one hand, on the other hand we will critically explore the existing literature on Bakassi conflict and Anglophone crisis in Cameroon.

### **2.1. THE DYNAMIC OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA**

As soon as independence of African countries, the French agronomist René Dumont in his book entitled "L'Afrique noire est mal partie" (Subsaharan Africa is badly off), already predicted the difficulties, probable sources of the rise of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa; from the colonization's stigmas, the disastrous governance or internal rivalries. In this part, we will analyse the dynamic of conflicts before the end of the cold war and that after the cold war until now.

#### **2.1.1. CLASSICAL CONFLICTS IN AFRICA**

We mean by this term the conflicts occurred in Africa until the end of the cold war. We will examine the factors of conflicts on the one hand, and their typology on the other hand.

##### **2.1.1.1. FAVOURABLE CONTEXTS TO CLASSICAL CONFLICTS**

Before the early 1990s, the contexts that have fostered most of the conflict in Africa were slavery, colonization, the Cold War and the crisis of governance.

- **Slavery**

The slavery was a structural element in the old African society and human was the key of wealth, because used as workforce for farming. Thus, the capture and trade of men contributed to conflicts between African kingdoms (Marc Ferro, 2003<sup>26</sup>). It is the same for Conflicts among African tribes which allowed the victorious clan to conquer the lands of the vanquished clan, who was forced to become the slave of his conqueror. This intra African slavery has served to prepare the Arab and the transatlantic slavery (Tidiane N'Diaye, 2006<sup>27</sup>) practiced from the end of the 16th century to the beginning of the 19th century. The seventeenth and nineteenth centuries are considered as the start point of the European rifle's era, thus announcing the end of the political stability of traditional African societies, resulting in massive, deadly, mutilating and traumatic deportations (Tidiane N'Diaye, 2006<sup>28</sup>). Because the slavery was considered as a lucrative activity, the objective implication of Africans during the transatlantic slavery has contributed to the rise violence and humiliation used as response to the insubordination of slaves.

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<sup>26</sup> Marc Ferro, *Le livre noir du colonialisme, XVIe-XXIe siècle : de l'extermination à la repentance*, Robert Laffont, 2003

<sup>27</sup> Tidiane N'Diaye, *L'éclipse des Dieux, Grandeur et désespérance des peuples noirs*, Editions du Rocher/Le Serpent à plumes, mars 2006.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

- **Colonization**

The scramble for Africa is considered as the second cycle of violence in Africa. From the end of the nineteenth century, Europeans engaged in the territorial conquest of the African continent. Technological innovations in armaments provide a decisive military advantage to European colonizers. They had relied on native auxiliaries, ethnic minorities formerly marginalized or those wishing to profit from the power spin-offs established by them, at the expenses of the old power. The relations between colonizers and colonized who refused to be under the domination of an external power, were characterized by violence. This was the case of the King Béhanzin's resistance with the support of the Senegalese riflemen against French; or the fight of Samory Touré between 1885 and 1898 against the expansion of the French colonial troops towards Niger (Julie D'Audurain; 2012<sup>29</sup>). During the Great War, African participated in the battles between the Western powers, especially in German and French colonies. For instance, Liberia participated in WWI for the Allies when the US involved in the war in 1917. African soldiers and porters were either volunteers (The case of Senegalese citizens in the four town-Dakar, Saint-Louis, Rufisque, Gorée) or recruited by force by African chiefs for the colonizer (A. Adu Boahen, 1987<sup>30</sup>). These forced recruitments were the main cause of Africans revolts against the authority of chiefs or the colonizer power. This was the situation of the French colonies and the resistance movement in the colony of Gold Coast.

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<sup>29</sup> Julie d'Andurain, La "petite guerre" africaine, entre conquête, contre-guérilla et contre-insurrection (1880-1900), *Revue historique des armées*, 268 | 2012, p. 23-31

<sup>30</sup> A. Adu Boahen, Histoire générale de l'Afrique, VII: l'Afrique sous domination coloniale, 1880-1935, UNESCO, Vol. VII, 1987

During that era, the struggles for independence that began around 1945 were achieved sometimes by means of bloody wars, repressions, imprisonments and assassinations of opponents. This was the case of the insurrection in Madagascar (1947-1948) between France and the natives, or the situation of conflict between United Kingdom against the peasant rebellion Mau Mau (1952-1956) in Kenya. These resistance movements were spread in Africa. Moreover, the stranglehold of colonialism has profoundly changed the geopolitics of African society by reshaping it, it has created new states, redefined the stakes of power, reoriented economic forms and crystallized new interests (GAZIBO, 2010<sup>31</sup>). The permanence of conflicts and violence was made possible because the new colonial states did not correspond to African society configuration. This what Yves Person qualifies as “the nation-state dichotomy and African cultures<sup>32</sup>”. Thus the number of interstate border conflicts increased due to that arbitrary boundary delimitation. The Ogaden conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea from July 1977 to March 1978 is one of them.

#### - **The Cold War**

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the US deteriorated. The world became divided due to this bipolar rivalry and for African countries, they joined the both sides. The aim of

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<sup>31</sup> GAZIBO, Mamoudou, *L'instabilité en Afrique et ses déterminants In: Introduction à la politique africaine*, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2010

<sup>32</sup> INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, CEMAF, « Yves Person (1925-1982) A historian of Africa engaged in his time” June 20th-21st, 2013

Western colonizers was to avoid the expansion of the communism in African countries. As consequence, Africa became the field of proxy conflicts of the Cold War, with disastrous consequences on its peace. According to some scholars as Thomas, Darryl C., and Ali A. Mazrui<sup>33</sup>, most of this proxy conflicts expanded in Africa in the 80s and 70s, leading to fights between political leaders during the decolonization process and even in the aftermath of independence, resulting sometimes to large-scale conflicts. For the French colonizer, as early as 1959, the foundation for the French struggle against communist access in its colonies was laid by the report of the French secret service entitled “L’action du communisme en Afrique<sup>34</sup>” (The Action of Communism in Africa). That was the case in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with the rivalry between many independentist trends: the trend of Moïse Tshombe, supported by Belgium, who proclaimed the independence of Katanga (a rich area) on July 11, 1960, while Patrice Emery LUMUMBA, suspected of having links with the communists, was deposed by President Joseph KASA-VUBU. On August 8, 1960, Albert Kalondji proclaimed also the independent state of South Kasai; and in September 1960 Antoine Gizenga proclaimed the People's Republic of Congo (PRC) with Stanley city (actual Kisangani) as capital city. The PRC was immediately recognized by about fifteen countries of the communist bloc.

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<sup>33</sup> Thomas, Darryl C., and Ali A. Mazrui. “Africa's Post-Cold War Demilitarization: Domestic and Global Causes.” *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 1, 1992, pp. 157–174. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/24384122](http://www.jstor.org/stable/24384122).

<sup>34</sup> AN, fonds Foccart, 5 AG F/ 329, L’action du communisme en Afrique, SDECE, septembre 1959

As for Somalia, Antonio TORRENZANO in “L’Imbroglia Somalien: Historique d’une crise de succession<sup>35</sup>” (The Somali Imbroglia, History of a Succession Crisis) edifies us about the Soviet’s support to SIYAAD BARRE, who served as President from October 1969 to 1991, in order to fight his adversaries and carry out an expansion of socialist ideas. He got into conflict with Ethiopia for the Ogaden area in 1977 after proclaiming solemnly Somalia as a Socialist State in 1970. However later, the USSR rallied to Ethiopian rebels who, thanks to this new alliance, succeeded in taking over Ogaden in 1978<sup>36</sup>.

– **The crisis of governance**

Some authors emphasize political factors as sources of conflict. the practice of neopatrimonialism in African countries, characterized by, a personification of power practicing the politics of "the winner takes all"<sup>37</sup> , with confusion of public and private property and clientelist redistribution, is a source of conflicts. Generally these conflicts result from the crisis of governance. The example of Zaire of Mobutu demonstrates it in a striking way. John Clark believes that Mobutu has set up the typical paragon of the neo-patrimonial regime by appropriating most of the wealth of the country to build a personal fortune greater than the budget of his country<sup>38</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> Antonio TORRENZANO, « L’Imbroglia Somalien : Historique d’une crise de succession » L’Harmattan, 1995, 122 pages; ISBN-10: 2738423531; ISBN-13: 978

<sup>36</sup> [http://www.irenees.net/bdf\\_fiche-analyse-788\\_en.html](http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-analyse-788_en.html)

<sup>37</sup> GAZIBO, Mamoudou, *Op. Cit*

<sup>38</sup> John Clark, The Extractive State in Zaire, in Leonardo Villalon (dir.), *Critical Juncture, the African State Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 112-115

### **2.1.1.2. TYPOLOGY OF CLASSICAL CONFLICTS IN AFRICA**

The analysis of various conflicts occurred in Africa before the end of the Cold resulted on from actions led by indigenous, nationalist or state leaders, through direct or indirect struggles against the oppressive Western powers in order to change pre-existing power balances in Africa. The conflicts were also characterized by external factors. Among those conflicts, the most important were the following: ethnical conflicts, independence conflicts, border conflicts and secession conflicts.

#### **- Ethnic conflicts**

The ethnic conflicts developed due to the social heterogeneity nature of African countries combined to the particularity of states formation in Africa. Donald Horowitz<sup>39</sup> asserts that colonization has reinforced ethnic identities in Africa; some ethnic groups were more favored over others by the colonizers. This is the case of the Hawiye in Somalia, Kikuyu in Kenya, Baoulé in Ivory Coast, Djerma in Niger. Thus, these conflicts were partly explained by the fact that the favored ethnic groups, wished to preserve their privileges of power after independence. That was contested by the disadvantaged groups who expected to change the established rules by violence. This was the case of ethnic crisis in Rwanda from 1960 to 1964 between Hutu and Tutsi.

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<sup>39</sup> Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, University of California Press, 1985, P. 697

– **The Independence conflicts**

These are conflicts were waged by indigenous populations against the colonial powers for the purpose of political emancipation, to overcome colonial rule and thereby achieve independence. This African awakening began after the Second World War, especially after the defeats of certain colonial powers in Asia. The myth of colonial powers was deconstructed by Africans. Moreover, all these colonial wars erupted at a time when international relations were characterized by a sharp tension between East and West. Therefore the end of some independence conflicts coincided with the end of the cold war although others have continued after independence. As was the case in Angola and Mozambique where, from 1975, the ideological conflicts transformed to a national liberation conflicts<sup>40</sup>. Also the case of Namibia conflict from 1966 to 1990 when it became independent.

– **Border conflicts**

After independence, border conflicts were the most feared, because the delimitation of countries had ignored the ethnic, linguistic, religious and political realities of the African society. In this perspective, we agree with Bouquet that the political division of Africa was made in accordance with the hegemonic ambitions of the European powers in a context of rivalry between them and not in relation to the identities and solidarities of

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<sup>40</sup> Serge LOUNGOU, Économies parallèles et pérennisation des conflits armés en Afrique subsaharienne, Institut de stratégie comparée, Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire, Institut d'Histoire des Conflits Contemporains, [www.stratisc.org/stratégie\\_80\\_Loungou.htm](http://www.stratisc.org/stratégie_80_Loungou.htm)

the African<sup>41</sup>. “As a result, in most African countries a significant fraction (around 40-45%) of the population belongs to groups that have been partitioned by a national border” (Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou, 2011<sup>42</sup>). That was the case of the conflict between Mauritania and Senegal in 1933 leading more than 50,000 refugees between 1989 and 1992<sup>43</sup>; the conflict between Mali and Mauritania from 1961 to 1964 over a part of the Hodh land located in their common boundary; or the conflict between Ghana and Upper Volta (actual Togo) in 1963 and 1964 and against the British Togoland from 1961 to 1990.

#### - **Secession conflicts**

The most part of the secessionist conflicts in Africa began in the aftermath of colonization. The secessionist conflicts question the principle of the inviolability of the borders, laid down by the OAU in 1963. The religious, linguistic and ethnic particularisms of some people were not integrated in the new unitary states, shaped by colonization (AZA Boukhris, 2017<sup>44</sup>). Cases of secessionist crises are as numerous as various, such as the declaration of the autonomy of the province of Katanga, July 11, 1960, the Biafra War or the Eritrea.

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<sup>41</sup> Bouquet C., « L’artificialité des frontières en Afrique subsaharienne, turbulences et fermentation sur les marges », Cahiers d’outre-mer, n°222, avril-juin 2003

<sup>42</sup> Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou, The long-run effects on the Scramble for Africa, NBER Working Papers 17620, National Bureau of Economic Research Inc., 2011

<sup>43</sup> <http://www.academiedegeopolitiquedeparis.com/afrique-frontieres-etatiques-territoires-et-conflits>

<sup>44</sup> <https://mondafrique.com/afrique-etats-unitaires-menaces-declatement/>

In the case of Biafra war in Nigeria from 1967 to 1970, the Igbo's leader Odumegwu Ojukwu proclaimed the "Independent Republic of Biafra" on May 30, 1967 after rejecting the decision of the Head of state Yakubu Gowon to divide the southeastern Nigeria into three federated states. They felt excluded from socio-political life, and even persecuted by the other two main ethnic groups, the Haoussa-Foulani (north) and the Yoruba (southwest). In the Horn of Africa, the UN's refused to grant immediate independence to Eritrea, in order to satisfy the geopolitical interests of Ethiopia and the U.S. this decision aroused discontent of the Nationalists after the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia and the Civil War started on 1960 for that purpose.

It should be recognized that some secessionist crises have led to the separation of the pre-existing state, unlike others have failed and are sometime reactivating nowadays.

#### **- Interstate conflicts**

These conflicts appeared when most African countries gained independence. Among the studies carried out on the evolution of conflicts in Africa, there is no consensus as regards the classification of conflicts<sup>45</sup>. Some argue that the conflicts were much more interstate and others claim the opposite. Deng and Zartman argue that the causes of conflict are almost internal or regional rather than external, the other aspects, such as the means used,

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<sup>45</sup> See studies of James B. Rule, *Theories of Civil Violence*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988 and Ted Robert Gurr (dir.), *Handbook of Political Conflict*, New York, Free Press, 1980

are external<sup>46</sup>. Observed on both sides (internally and externally) conflicts are for many of them resurgences of the past. According to Menjo Francis Baye<sup>47</sup>, the causes of international conflicts are most often: the desire to monopolize the exploitation of the natural resources of the coveted area, the intervention in the internal affairs of another country, the attack of people by nationals of another country or its agents. Fundamentally, the clash between primary social classes is the basis of international conflicts, it result from the disproportionate sharing between the ruling class and the labor class they just use state institutions to push forward their goals.

Nevertheless, a conflict may have a multiface or result of an overlap of several features. This is the case of the conflict in Angola which, for four decades, whose profile has often changed: started with a colonial conflict between 1961 and 1975, then a proxy Cold War between 1975 and 1990, before turning into a civil war based on ethno-political antagonism from 1992.

### **2.1.2. NEW DYNAMIC OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA**

The typology of conflicts after the Cold War has not really changed except for liberalization conflicts, since African states were already independent. About that, Ted Robert Gurr<sup>48</sup> supports that ethnic tensions are one of the major sources of recent internal and international conflicts. That is why the urgency is essential to develop

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<sup>46</sup> Deng, Francis M. and I. William Zartman. *Conflict Resolution in Africa*. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution. 1991, p. 10

<sup>47</sup> Menjo Francis Baye, Op. Cit.

<sup>48</sup> Ted Robert Gurr, « Ethnic Warfar on the Wane », *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, 2000, p. 52-64

comprehensive strategies, better adapted to respond to the threats caused by ethnic conflicts at the regional and international levels. However, the conflicts present a new shape after the Cold War. We will analyze in this section the factors that have been contribute to the emergence of these new form of conflicts and the innovations they brought.

### **2.1.2.1. DETERMINANTS IN NEW CONFLICTS**

The changes in society have greatly impacted the nature of conflict in the world as much as in Africa. The factors that contribute to a new dynamic of conflicts in Africa after the end of Cold War are: the collapse of the State authority, the economic liberalization and democratic transition, the globalization and the manipulation of ethnicity or religion.

#### **- The collapse of State authority**

Many the conflicts arise from the degradation of state's authority on the management of the organized violence whose it has the monopoly<sup>49</sup>. Indeed, after 1990, African States rolled by the economic crisis, are decaying and can no longer carry out their sovereign missions to ensure security. These Political and economic weakness is a key factor that prevents African states from containing conflicts. The perspective that African conflicts are generally connected to the weakness of the African state, "to the crisis of the African state and to unsuccessful or incomplete state building processes" (Ohlson 2012<sup>50</sup>) is still

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<sup>49</sup> Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized violence in a global era*, Polity Press, Cambridge & Oxford, 1999

<sup>50</sup> Ohlson, T., *From Intra-State War to Durable Peace: Conflict and Its Resolution in Africa after the Cold War*, Republic of Letters Publishing: Dordrecht, 2012

ascertainable nowadays. Consequently, the weak political institutions, including those in charge of conflict settlement, contribute to the cyclical nature of conflict observed in Africa.

- **Economic liberalization and democratic transition**

The economic liberalization that followed the end of the Cold War has imposed some reforms on the states. In this new era, economic factors are considered as “the main drivers of conflict” (Collier and Hoeffler; 2004<sup>51</sup>). The constraints applied by international financial institutions in the early 90s, Combined with the pressures exerted by donors in a context of economic liberalization to African countries which were still struggling to stabilize politically and economically, have launched the start of long instability trek in Africans states. According to Jaquet Christophe, it is the internal instability, created by the practice of clientelism during the cold war, which is the source of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 90s<sup>52</sup> as the rivalries maintained by East-West bloc ended. With these liberalization of economy, competition for the control of economic resources has become a key element in conflicts. That justifies the finding that between 1989 and 2000, the majority of conflicts in West and Central Africa are internal conflicts around access to resources<sup>53</sup>.

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<sup>51</sup> Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Greed and grievance in civil war, *Oxford Economic Papers*, Volume 56, Issue 4, October 2004, Pages 563–595

<sup>52</sup> Jaquet Christophe, 2003, Porteous, L'évolution des conflits en Afrique subsaharienne. In: *Politique étrangère*, n°2 - 2003 - 68<sup>e</sup>année. pp. 307-320.

<sup>53</sup> GAZIBO, Mamoudou. 6. *La géographie de l'instabilité post-guerre froide en Afrique* In: *Introduction à la politique africaine* [online]. Montréal: Presses de l'Université de

In a context of a transitional democracy, the state becomes more fragilized and fails therefore to maintain peace facing the emergence of a multiplicity of protagonists. Robert D. Kaplan (2000)<sup>54</sup> explains that democracy is a typically Western concept, which can only be exported to developed countries with a large middle class, a well-functioning education system, well-established borders, a stable economy and relative social peace. He also assures that the Third World countries should have moderate and enlightened autocracies, where a minimum of individual liberties would be guaranteed, that would help them not only to develop and later catch up Western countries, but also to democratize "effectively". He takes as an example the prosperity of Singapore under the authoritarian Lee Kuan Yew regime and the violence perpetrated under democratic regimes in Colombia, Rwanda or South Africa Africa.

- **The globalization**

Under the globalization effect, an internal conflict can very quickly become externalized. The use of violence and the call to ethnic hatred is done now through social networks and New Information and Communication Technology (NICTs). It is what Mary Kaldor<sup>55</sup> qualifies as "a new type of organized violence developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe" or as "new war". Indeed "[these] new wars involve a blurring of the distinction between war (usually defined as violence between state or organized

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Montréal, 2010 (generated 03 octobre 2019). Available on the Internet: <<http://books.openedition.org/pum/6385>>. ISBN: 9782821898097.

<sup>54</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, « The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War », Random House, 2000.

<sup>55</sup> Mary Kaldor, Op. Cit., pp. 1-2

political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals)” .

- **The instrumentalization of ethnical and religious conflicts**

The notion of "ethnic power" is very active in African society (Achille MBEMBE; 1992<sup>56</sup>). Because ethnicity is important in Africa, some conflicts are now the result of the instrumentalization of the ethnicity or religion difference. The case of Rwanda in 1994 illustrate this type of conflict where the opposition of Hutu against Tutsi, two social classes but belonging to the same ethnic group, has been manipulated as an ethnic conflict. Furthermore, in the African society where the same ethnic group is sometimes divided between more than one state, a conflict can easily switch from an internal dimension to an international conflict, through ethnic solidarity involvement. Thus the ethnical conflicts are considered as the “most fashionable term and last resort to explain contemporary social conflicts” (Gomes Porto, 2002, p. 6<sup>57</sup>). In this perspective according to Ascher and Mirovitskaya (2013)<sup>58</sup>, in most of African countries “ethnic, religious, or regional divisions have little relevance in defining the basis for intergroup violence,

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<sup>56</sup> Mbembe, Achille, Provisional Notes on the Postcolony. Africa , 1992, 62:337

<sup>57</sup> João Gomes Porto, Contemporary Conflict Analysis in Perspective, (Chapter One). In Lindet al. (Eds.), Scarcity and Surveil: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts. ACTS. Kenya. 2002

<sup>58</sup> W. Ascher and N. Mirovitskaya, the Economic Roots of Conflict and Cooperation in Africa: Politics, Economics and Inclusive Development, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, ASER CENTER, 2013

although they may be mobilized if conflict arises for other reasons”. These limits come from the weakness on institutionalization of ethnic conflicts settlement, there is not international system to avoid the deadliest conflicts (David A. Hamburg, 1993<sup>59</sup>).

Through the previous analysis related to the factors that lead to the emergence of contemporary conflicts, the collapse of state under economic liberalization and democratic transition in the early 1990s, also the phenomenon of globalization, have further weakened the African state and provoked conflicts. As for ethnicity, it serves henceforth to mobilize people or justify new conflicts whose outlines have considerably evolved.

#### **2.1.2.2. INNOVATIONS OF NEW CONFLICTS**

Since the end of the cold war, the changes that have affected the world have significantly changed the nature of conflict. The war being a true chameleon that changes its nature in each specific case (Clausewitz; 1832<sup>60</sup>), thus it is the nature of war to renew itself. In this perspective, the contemporary conflicts encompass new actors and have a broader scope.

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<sup>59</sup> David A. Hamburg, Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1993

<sup>60</sup> Carl von Clausewitz , On War, “ Vom Kriege”, Dummlers Verlag, Berlin, 1832, from the English translation by Colonel J.J. Graham, 1874

- **Heterogeneity of actors: domestic, external and transnational actors**

The contemporary conflicts are marked by a proliferation, empowerment and diversification of actors whose becomes more complex. With the event on September 2011, “there has been a substantial increase in the number of actors carrying out one-sided violence [which means] violence against civilians by a formally organized group, which can be either the state or a non-state actor<sup>61</sup>”. According to C. Grand and P. Grosser, the contemporary intrastate wars includes the involvement of non-state or pseudo-state actors such as Mafias, clans, armed gangs, self-proclaimed state entities<sup>62</sup>. Thus the failure on settlement of conflicts in the new era is due to that disparity of new actors, their motivations and networks that intermingle and blur substantially the conflict. These actors are both at the domestic level as well at the international level.

At the domestic level, the nature of the conflict has changed since the twentieth century due to the increasing involvement of civilian populations and the emergence of the "total war", mobilizing all the economic, financial and human potential of the belligerent states<sup>63</sup>. So the new actors comprise traditional groups, militias, self-help organizations, religious activists, criminal gangs, diaspora and even businessmen among others.

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<sup>61</sup> Bakken, Ingrid Vik & Siri Aas Rustad, *Conflict Trends in Africa, 1989–2017*, Conflict Trends, 6. Oslo: PRIO, 2018

<sup>62</sup> Grand, C. & Grosser, P. (2000). *12 - Nouvelles crises, nouveaux conflits*. Dans : C. Grand & P. Grosser (Dir), *Les Relations internationales depuis 1945* (pp. 174-191). Vanves, France: Hachette Education

<sup>63</sup> Coutau-Bégarie Hervé, « Guerres irrégulières : de quoi parle-t-on ? », *Stratégie*, 2009/1 (N° 93-94-95-96), p. 13-30

At the external level, the transnational actors have emerged. The wars without borders (Porteus; 2003<sup>64</sup>) are a reality in Africa. Indeed since the end of the cold war, transnational social movements have increased in the world. In Africa, over the past decade, the conflicts have become transnational and the death toll has increased significantly (GAZIBO, Mamoudou; 2010<sup>65</sup>). That justifies the interest of academic and political researchers on these new actors. State and power cease to be absolute in favor of subnational and transnational groups due to the changing nature of conflicts (GAZIBO, Mamoudou; 2010<sup>66</sup>). These movements of physical persons have thus contributed to the emergence of activities by non-state actors. These transnational social movements have developed new forms of cross-border activities such as child trafficking, maritime piracy, drug trafficking, prostitution, currency smuggling, illegal arms trade, etc., and consequently fostered a fertile ground for African state security. A conflict can start in one country, and due to the movement of people and weapons in a context of porous borders and ineffectiveness of security policies, this conflict spreads to other neighboring countries. The case of Boko Haram conflict is a typical illustration, where the violence of the Islamist movement of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad was unleashed in Nigeria; later it has spread throughout the Lake Chad area (Niger, Cameroon and Chad). Also the recent fall of the political regime in 2011 in Libya has fostered an

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<sup>64</sup> Tom Porteus, L'évolution des conflits en Afrique subsaharienne, *Politique étrangère*, 2/2003, printemps 2003

<sup>65</sup> GAZIBO, Mamoudou, *Introduction à la politique africaine*, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2010

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

internal dynamic with repercussions on the proliferation of intrastate conflicts in Africa, due to the development of an illegal market for arms traffic reinforced by porous borders. This heterogeneity observed at the level of the protagonists made more complex the nature of conflicts and the quest for their settlement.

- **The omnipresence of internal asymmetric conflict**

Globally, between 1989 and 1996, only 5 of the 96 armed conflicts that took place in the world were interstate<sup>67</sup> and, in 1999, 25 of the 27 major armed conflicts were infra-state conflicts<sup>68</sup>. The post-cold-war period in Africa is also marked by the resurgence of internal armed conflicts<sup>69</sup>, while interstate conflicts are receding<sup>70</sup>. In its 27th edition devoted to classification of conflicts, the “Heidelberg Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung” concludes that “violent intrastate crises such as the opposition conflicts [...] continued to represent the most common conflict type and shaped the global conflict landscape [...]”<sup>71</sup>. The “Africa is by far the continent with the highest number of non-state conflicts” because inter-state conflicts are already sufficiently

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<sup>67</sup> Steven David, Internal War: Causes and Cures, *World Politics*, vol. 49, n° 4, 1997, p. 552-576.

<sup>68</sup> Victor-Yves Ghebaly, Les guerres civiles de la post-bipolarité : nouveaux acteurs et nouveaux objectifs, *Relations internationales*, n° 105, printemps 2001

<sup>69</sup> EHUENI MANZAN Innocent, Les accords politiques dans la résolution des conflits armés internes en Afrique, Université de La Rochelle, 2011, P 29

<sup>70</sup> TRAN VAN Minh, Les conflits, in Encyclopédie juridique de l’Afrique, tome 2, Dakar, Nouvelles éditions africaines, 1992

<sup>71</sup> l’Heidelberg Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung (HIIK), Conflict Barometer 2018, Heidelberg, February 2019,

regulated and on which the international community is watchful<sup>72</sup>. These internal conflicts since then involve the government and at least one armed group in asymmetric battles, the government is fighting a "non-governmental" armed group using guerrilla tactics<sup>73</sup> due to their inferiority. Asymmetrical war consists in finding the means of not having to bow to the military superiority of the opponent party by detecting its weaknesses and exploiting them to the maximum. With this new tactic, the war can be delivered at different levels (at the level of military tactics, military strategy or politico-strategic level), or take different forms (asymmetry can be measured in terms of power, means, methods, organization, values and time). The rebels from the non-state armed group merge into the civilian population and, in general, they reveal their identity as combatants only during offensive operations proper<sup>74</sup>.

According to Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, there is no satisfactory classification of conflicts<sup>75</sup>. Therefore we would not pretend that the above analysis on the conflict dynamics in Africa would be comprehensive. In sum, whether before or after 1990, the African state presents like as a structural factor of conflicts.

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<sup>72</sup> Bakken, Ingrid Vik & Siri Aas Rustad, Op. Cit.

<sup>73</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross, Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action, International Review of the Red Cross., volume 87, number 857, pp. 149-174

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Les guerres du siècle. Une tentative de classification, *Vingtième siècle*, n° 3, juillet 1984, p. 17-2

## **2.2. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE**

Many studies have been done on the Bakassi conflict and the political frictions between the central government and the Anglophone regions in Cameroon. In this subsection, we will examine in turn the different literature review done on the Bakassi conflict on the one hand and the Anglophone crisis on the other hand.

### **2.2.1. THE BAKASSI CONFLICT**

The Bakassi border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria has been the subject of numerous studies. Historians, legal experts, politicians, politic science experts, defense experts, economists as well in the academic field or independently, addressed this conflict in its different angles. We will present in this part some of these studies.

Justice MULUH MBUH in “International Law and Conflicts: Resolving Border and Sovereignty Disputes in Africa<sup>76</sup>” written in 2004, considers Bakassi conflict as the most dangerous of all conflicts that Cameroon has had with Nigeria. The author agrees that this conflict intensified when the peninsula was recognized as rich in petroleum and natural gas. The demographic advantage of Nigeria was their tactic to claim the sovereignty, the Nigerian army intervening to protect its citizens against the use of taxes by the Cameroonian authorities. The first tensions date back to May 16, 1981, when the Nigerian army violated the Bakassi territory, followed by a Cameroonian riposte that

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<sup>76</sup> Justice Mbuh, Muluh, International Law and Conflicts: Resolving Border and Sovereignty Disputes in Africa, iUniverse, Inc., 2004, ISBN-13: 978-0595297078 ISBN-10: 059529707

resulted in the death of five Nigerian soldiers. But that incident does not affect diplomatic relations. In the early 1990s, Cameroon faced democratic challenges, Anglophone separatist militancy and use of oppression on Nigerians immigrants, traders and fishing vessels in Cameroonian territory. Two incidents led to an escalation of this conflict: the serious incursions of 18 and 19 February 1994 and the strategic economic importance of the peninsula as the core factor. On March 29, 1994 Cameroon resorts to the ICJ for the settlement of this border dispute. France has provided military support to Cameroon in accordance with military agreements signed after independence.

According to the author, the justification for the Bakassi conflict hides behind the intention of Nigeria and Cameroon to obstruct the identity crisis of Southern Cameroon. The author accuses both Cameroon and Nigeria of violation of borders and agreements, denouncing Cameroon's failure on respect of the plebiscite. The reason why Cameroon and Nigeria "blundering into battle" over Bakassi, is because they consider Ambazonia as a "no man's land". By retracing the historical context of this border, the author recognized that the first German-Anglo conflict over the maritime zone of Cameroon and Nigeria occurred after the signing of the German-Douala Treaty of 1884 proclaiming the German Protectorate extending from the Rio Del Rey area to Gabon. As a result of these disputes, exchanges and compensation in territory between the two powers were made on the basis of agreements contained in exchange of letters dated April 29, 1885 and May 7, 1885. New findings had been done on the nature of the Rio del Rey and others surrounding rivers. Buea Agreement on April 1901 is the basis of all subsequent boundary Agreements (1906, 1909, and 1913) with minor amendments. Despite the

events after the end of the WWI, this agreement has never been changed. In 1954, Nigeria had unilaterally and imprecisely redefined the border. The British have suggested to the Southern Cameroon to withdraw from his initiative of tracing that border (British preferential treatment for Nigeria's initiative). The Obudu Cattle ranch case illustrates British complicity in falsifying the border line in favor of Nigeria. The author delivers the contents of several correspondences between Nigeria and the British government for this purpose and British declassified documents.

In his historical approach of this dispute, the author focused his work on the genesis of the conflict since 50s, before independence. By tracing the context in which the delimitation of this border was made and the questionable circumstances on which the Nigerian claims are based, the author argues that Bakassi belongs neither to Nigeria nor to Cameroon, but to the Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia).

Justice MULUH MBUH's argument is not shared by Akinjide R.<sup>77</sup> who stated in an article published by West Africa magazine, in April 1994 that the Anglo-German treaty, which served as reference to determine the Cameroonian sovereignty over Bakassi, is not binding on Nigeria for 2 reasons:

- Firstly, it was signed before the unification of Northern and Southern protectorates of Nigeria in 1914;

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<sup>77</sup> R. Akinjide, *Bakassi, Whose Bakassi?*, West Africa, April, 1994

- Secondly, British denounced that treaty early. «Since something cannot emanate from nothing, the 1913 Treaty cannot therefore be the judicial basis for a claim to the Bakassi Peninsula by Cameroon.»

Francis MENJO BAYE in “Implications of the Bakassi conflict resolution for Cameroon<sup>78</sup>” agrees with most of the studies done on the Bakassi border conflict according to which the roots of this dispute are colonization and post-independence political movements. The escalation of this conflict is due to the presence of oil deposits in this area. His analysis on geopolitics of the Bakassi dispute reveals us about the colonial legacy acts that changed the status of Bakassi passing from a territory part of Nigeria to a Cameroonian territory are the following:

- The agreement between the United Kingdom and Germany signed in London on 11 March 1913 entitled “the Settlement of the Frontier between Nigeria and the Cameroons, from Yola to the sea, and the Regulation of Navigation on the Cross River”;
- The Anglo-German Protocol signed in Obokun on 12 April 1913, demarcating the Anglo-German boundary between Nigeria and Kamerun from Yola to the Cross River (Eight maps accompanied this Protocol);
- The exchange of letters between the British and German governments on 6 July 1914;

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<sup>78</sup>Menjo Francis Baye, Implication of tthe Bakassi conflict Resolution for Cameroon, *African Journal on conflict Resolution* 2010, ISSN 1562-6997

- The endorsement, in April 1961, by both the United Nations General Assembly and the International Court of Justice, of the results of the plebiscites conducted in Northern and Southern Cameroons in 1959 and on 11 February 1961, respectively;
- The Diplomatic Note, accompanied by a map, dispatched to the government of Cameroon by Nigeria in 1962, accepting the results of the plebiscites.

He also extended his analysis on the political evolvement of the historical negotiations on the boundary between the two states already independent and the post-conflict phase. As regards with the implications of the ICJ ruling and the Green-tree Agreement, “The development of projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation monitored by the Mixed Commission included the construction of border markets and roads linking the two countries”. As Socio-economic implications, this conflict contributed to the improvement of bilateral cooperation, in particular in Expenditure-reducing and switching effects (social spending on health, education and infrastructure, military spending) and in Wealth-generating effects (it increased the international credibility of the presidents of Cameroon and Nigeria). The implementation of the Green-tree Agreement dated 14 August 2006 envisaged the following steps: ninety days and a transition period of two years, a Special regime for four years given to Nigerians living in Bakassi and the signature of the Treaty of Calabar between Cameroon and Nigeria on 14 August 2008 after the withdrawal.

MGBALE MGBATOU<sup>79</sup> in explaining the conflict of Bakassi, highlighted its origins and its stakes. He also mentions the failed diplomatic resolution done before escalation of violence. His study is not extended to the post-conflict phase in contrary to the analysis done by TAMBE EBOT.

TAMBE EBOT interested in post-conflict issues including the implications of the conflict, in particular the relations between the belligerents after the judgment of ICJ. The author concludes that, the verdict of October 10 has affected relations between Cameroon and Nigeria. Beyond fears of reprisals among the Nigerians living in Cameroon and vice versa, this conflict has created among Nigerians tensions and an exacerbated feeling of hatred vis-à-vis Cameroonians. In the latter, it has also encouraged an intimidation of Nigerian traders in Cameroon justifying the Nigeria's military presence in the Bakassi area.

Hilary V. LUKONG in “The Cameroon-Nigeria Border Dispute. Management and Resolution, 1981-2011<sup>80</sup>” examines the whole ICJ judgment. Focusing on the specific case of Bakassi, the author explores the genesis of the conflict since the colonial period, its course, its judicial phase as well as the implementation of the Judgment by the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Boundary Commission. The author agrees with previous researchers about the precipitants of the conflict, oil stakes issues over the peninsula in

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<sup>79</sup> MGBALE MGBATOU Hamadou, La Politique Camerounaise de Résolution Pacifique de la crise de Bakassi, Doctorat de 3<sup>ème</sup> Cycle Thesis, University of Yaoundé 2, IRIC, 2001, P. 97

<sup>80</sup> Hilary V. LUKONG, The Cameroon-Nigeria Border Dispute. Management and Resolution, 1981-20011, *Langaa* RPCIG, 2011

a context of development challenges, the acceptance of the verdict by the two states. Her research goes beyond the conflict in the strict sense. Examining the role of the said commission created by the two states since 1970, Hilary V. LUKONG highlights that it was entrusted the issues related to boundary delimitation one year later. It is mentioned that after several failures and stumbled blocks, it really starts to function normally in the early 90s. She also makes a critical analysis on the content of the meetings of this commission since its creation from a diplomatic angle.

Ernest Claude MESSINGA in “Les forces armées camerounaises face aux enjeux militaires dans le golfe de Guinée: le cas du conflit de Bakassi”<sup>81</sup> (The Cameroonian Armed Forces facing military stakes in the Gulf of Guinea: the case of the Bakassi conflict) focused his research on the strategic policy angle used by the armed forces engaged in the border conflict on the Bakassi peninsula. The main points of his study were related to the war theories and military cooperation on the one hand, and to a historical and comparative analysis of the Cameroonian and Nigerian armed forces involved in the Bakassi conflict, as well as the contribution of France to this conflict according to the military cooperation agreements signed between Cameroon and France. The approach of his analysis is oriented on the military strategy defense.

MOHAMED SALAH MOHAMED MAHMOUD in « La Commission mixte Cameroun/Nigeria, un mécanisme original de règlement des différends

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<sup>81</sup> Ernest Claude MESSINGA, Les forces armées camerounaises face aux enjeux militaires dans le golfe de Guinée: le cas du conflit de Bakassi, University of Yaounde II-SOA, 2007

interétatiques. »<sup>82</sup> (Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Boundary Commission, an original mechanism for resolving interstate conflicts) focuses on the mechanism put in place to implement the Court's judgment of 10 October 2002. It teaches us about the non-jurisdictional nature of the said Mixed Boundary Commission, its diplomatic method of negotiation and the active involvement of the United Nations for the success of this judgement's implementation. The post-judicial phase focused on the Mixed Boundary Commission is the main point of his study.

In general, most analyzes of this conflict are focused on the historical evolution, the judicial phase of this conflict and the implementation of the related judgment under the framework of bilateral cooperation or with the involvement of U.N. the singularity of our analysis will be based on questioning the optimism of this judgment domestically. We will analyze which close links this judgment has with the current Anglophone crisis, the second point of our literary review.

### **2.2.2. THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS**

The literature review on this issue is abundant all the more that the intentions of separatist movements dates back to a period prior to the border conflict.

The Cameroonian lawyer Justice M. Mbuh in "International Law and Conflicts: Resolving Border and Sovereignty Disputes in Africa"<sup>83</sup> is one of the authors who tries

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<sup>82</sup> MOHAMED SALAH MOHAMED MAHMOUD, La Commission mixte Cameroun/Nigeria, un mécanisme original de règlement des différends interétatiques, *Annuaire français de droit international*, vol. 51, 2005. pp. 162-184

<sup>83</sup> Justice M. Mbuh, Op. cit.

to link the Bakassi dispute to the Anglophone crisis. According to him, “The Bakassi peninsula dispute is a classic example of a zero-sum game Type”, a Zero-sum games being a situation where the outcomes of negotiation or effort at settling disputes are a win-lose situation (M. Nicholson 1997). The author examines the complaints of Cameroon, Nigeria and also Ambazonia which is also a party involved in this dispute. The Anglophone’s claim during the trial denounce the Cameroonian and Nigerian occupation of Bakassi, which is part of their territory. The writer agrees with Anglophone that the Ambazonia is the owner of Bakassi peninsula, not to Cameroon. Southern Cameroon seeks autonomy from the United Nations in the absence of a federalism. Moreover the Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement (SCRM) contested the existence of any document attesting the border delimitation of Cameroon with Nigeria in Bakassi. Ambazonia’s newspapers have accused Cameroon of being the source of the February 1996 incidents. During the British administration, Nigerian government and the British government accepted maps of Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) including Bakassi in Ambazonia territory; the validity of treaties based on the 1913 Treaty. They criticize the process of independence of Southern Cameroon whereby the United Nations imposed to Southern Cameroons "Two alternatives", and accuse them for this purpose responsible for the Bakassi conflict of Ambazonia against Cameroon. He consider that “the Southern Cameroons (Anglophone regions) nation has become nothing but a mere colony in Cameroun”. As actions in view of their international recognition, the SCRM and the Ambazonian Republic leaders in 1995 visited to the UN in demanding UN membership. Furthermore, the author assumes that

the most difficulty of this conflict is the ambazonia's plea for separation, the ICJ could decide on the status of Ambazonia as a nation. He denounces the rejection of the United Nations to confer Ambazonia the status of U.N. member as an independent state. He concludes that the Court failed because "Not only is it becoming clearer that it is a tough case to decide based only on the evidence submitted by Cameroun and Nigeria, but that any decision that takes into consideration only the first two arguments may increase, rather than reduce tensions in the region".

This independentism's defender of Anglophone regions is also shared by N. N. Susungi, who think that the situation in Cameroon would have been better if the United Nations, instead of uniting the former Cameroon and Ambazonia, separated them; because the unification after federalism was a danger, especially since the constitution was not signed by the representatives of the two federated states. Cameroon could not claim Bakassi because its international borders were no longer certain<sup>84</sup>. He compare the Anglophone regions with Hong Kong case in these words: "even though Hong Kong is full of some of the brightest Chinese...Britain could not have allowed Hong Kong itself to conduct such negotiations on its own behalf with the Beijing authorities. But that is exactly what Britain did in the Southern Cameroons in July 1961." In addition, He accuses the actual political regime to be the author of death of its former collaborators who changed their

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<sup>84</sup> N. N. Susungi, Cameroun-Nigeria: The Bakassi Peninsula Conflict, Foncha and Muna did not Betray Southern Cameroons, @ WWW.africaserv.com/HISTORY/ conflict.html, 1999, p. 4-8

political party or threatened to reveal some atrocities done by that regime. He considers the Reunification between British and French Cameroons as a mistake.

Eric ELONG EBOLO in a paper conference entitled “Sovereignty in the Making: the case of Anglophone Cameroon”<sup>85</sup>, University of Oslo, 2012, analyzes the experiences to secede by Southern Cameroon pressure groups such as: Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM), Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC), Southern Cameroon Peoples Organization (SCAPO), Ambazonia Movement, Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL) and Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement (SCRM). He presents the historical background of the Anglophone problem. According to his research, “The constitutional arrangements that later ensued known as the Fouban Constitutional Conference<sup>86</sup> gave birth to the Anglophone Problem”. But for Nicodemus Fru Awasom, the source of this issue dated 1916 when the Cameroon was shared unequally between France and United Kingdom, which led to an unequal development of the two parts. For the author, the federal state was the best form to preserve their culture and languages of the two parts. He reviewed in his analysis the Fouban conference which resulted in the establishment of a unitary state to replace the federal state. He highlights that the process of democratization in the early 1990s contributed to the emergence of several Anglophone movements with the main goal of claiming their marginalization in comparison with Francophones. Their initial goal change since then from the return to a

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<sup>85</sup> Eric ELONG EBOLO, *Sovereignty in the Making: the case of Anglophone Cameroon*, University of Oslo, 2012

<sup>86</sup> The Fouban conference organized on July 09, 1961 lays the constitutional bases of the future federation of Cameroon Anglophone and Francophone.

federal state to the secession. At that time, the reactions of the government were made of: arrests, imprisonments of many Anglophone activists and adoption of policies weakening Anglophone community (partition of Southern Cameroons into Two provinces, successive appointments of prime ministers natives of the two Anglophones provinces) as mentioned by Nicodemus Fru Awasom. After presenting the reasons of the failure of a statehood by Anglophone pressure groups, He concludes his analysis by suggesting that “[Anglophone] should start preparing for an arm confrontation with the central government. This is the most viable option if they want their voices to be heard.” This analysis is not linking the “Anglophone problem” with Bakassi border dispute and it is also conducted within a framework of a peaceful statehood by Anglophone pressure groups (by means of demonstration, petitions, litigations and propaganda were used to achieve a secession).

Generally, many studies raising the Anglophone crisis either are conducted in isolation, or when they are linked to the Bakassi conflict, are based on the denunciation of the process of independence, the establishment of unitary state or the ICJ’s judgement on the Bakassi border dispute. Furthermore, these writings are marred by emotional analysis and do not always proceed from objective arguments.

Several studies have examined the Anglophone crisis and Bakassi conflict. So we can rightly ask why one more study on these topics? The answer to this question lies in the fact that such a complex subject requires several approaches, because no analysis can claim to study alone a social reality. Unlike the previous authors, we propose, in the

context of this work, to deal with the ongoing Anglophone crisis characterized by a surge violence never happened since the previous crisis and whose an objective study is almost non-existent. Doubtless, the new trajectory of this crisis could contribute to find domestic solutions definitively to the Bakassi conflict and the Anglophone Crisis; hence the importance of this study.

## **CHAPTER THREE: ALERTS OF AN INELUCTABLE INTERNAL CRISIS**

This chapter will revisit the first warnings of a disunion between the Anglophone activists and the government, in the early 90's. This period marks not only the starting point of democratization in Cameroon, but especially coincides with the period of introduction of the request of Cameroon against Nigeria before the ICJ. To do this, our analysis will be devoted, on the one hand, to the signals manifested domestically and, on the other hand, to the internationalization of this rupture.

### **3.1. DOMESTIC DEMONSTRATIONS OF A BREAK**

The domestic manifestations of a break between the Anglophone community and the government escalated in a context that we will present first. Then we will focus on development's perspective strategy in the Bakassi area.

#### **3.1.1. BACKGROUND OF AN INTERNAL BREAK**

In the early 1990s due to the spread of democracy in African countries, Anglophone claims started to expand in favor of an independence referendum.

Indeed from 30 October to 15 November 1991, the government organized a tripartite conference attended by political party leaders, civil society figures and government officials. This meeting was organized following dead cities, acts of civil disobedience, strikes and demonstrations at the national level; among these acts of disobedience, a

political party (Social Democratic Front-SDF) was created by John Fru Ndi, a native from Anglophone region, without the approval of government. It served as a ground for the legal framework on access to the public media and the electoral code in a new democratic context. During this national rendezvous, the Anglophone delegation claimed for a recognition of an “Anglophone problem”. Unfortunately that request was not included in the agenda of the various thematic discussed in the tripartite conference. As consequence, the Anglophone delegation withdrew from these discussions.

Furthermore, one of the highlights of this conference was the establishment of a committee composed of 7 Francophones and 4 Anglophones, to draft the new constitution: the Technical Committee on Constitutional Matters (TCCM)<sup>87</sup>. As a prelude to these meetings, the stand of the Anglophone community was adopted by the Anglophone Conference “All Anglophone Conference” (AAC) in the Buea Declaration on April 1993. Summing up, this declaration was a plea where they accused the government of having destroying the prosperous economy of Anglophone regions in the federal system, of being interested only in the exploitation of their natural resources among others. The return to a federal state was their major suggestion they adopted, to stop their marginalization or domination by Francophones. Also, for the meetings organized to adopt that new constitution, Anglophone leaders requested the involvement of the U.N. and Great Britain. This document on the Anglophone problem was presented to the government in 1993. The involvement of external actors in the new constitution

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<sup>87</sup> [https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/cameroun-ce-qu-il-faut-comprendre-de-la-crise-anglophone-02-10-2017-2161541\\_3826.php#](https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/cameroun-ce-qu-il-faut-comprendre-de-la-crise-anglophone-02-10-2017-2161541_3826.php#)

as well as the return to a federal state were rejected by the government, pushing the Anglophone delegation<sup>88</sup> to abandon the TCCM, that is how the idea of federalism shifted to secession<sup>89</sup>.

One year after, the Anglophone political actors have organized the AAC2 for the same purpose and published the Bamenda declaration, which gave birth to the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC). SCNC was just a social organization, however between 1995 and 1996, it politicized through a clear secessionist stand. In 1996, a part from these political stakes, the SCNC claims took an economic trend like a stand-off around the oil deposits exploited since 1977 in the Ndian division. The idea of Anglophones had been now to ensure part of the management of oil wealth (production, sale, recruitment of labor, redistribution of profits ...) with the establishment of an independent commission for ensure equitable distribution of oil revenue<sup>90</sup>.

On 1<sup>st</sup> October 1999, after hoisting the Southern Cameroons flag at a military base in Buea, the capital of South West Region, their attempt to declare independence failed, despite taking hostage the regional branch of national radio for a few minutes<sup>91</sup>.

Several cases of protest against the government by the Anglophone community have multiplied. In 2001, the 40th anniversary of the unification is marked by Anglophone

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<sup>88</sup> Carlson ANYANGWE, Simon MUNZU and EKONTANG Elad

<sup>89</sup> Konings, Piet, and Francis B. Nyamnjoh. "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 35, no. 2, 1997, pp. 207–229. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/161679](http://www.jstor.org/stable/161679).

<sup>90</sup> [https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/cameroun-ce-qu-il-faut-comprendre-de-la-crise-anglophone-02-10-2017-2161541\\_3826.php#](https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/cameroun-ce-qu-il-faut-comprendre-de-la-crise-anglophone-02-10-2017-2161541_3826.php#)

<sup>91</sup> Elong EBOLO Op. Cit.

demonstrations against the government. In the same perspective, in 2011 during the fiftieth anniversary of reunification of Southern Cameroon and French Cameroon, an Anglophone lawyer Christopher Nsom, interviewed, compared the Anglophone discomfort with the Seleka in Central African Republic, where President Bozize, for not respecting his agreements with the seleka, contributed to an armed rebellion growing in his country in these words:

*« ...First of all, there is no small problem...this celebration is limited because there is no equal regional integration as well as territorial developments. Most Anglophone regions are not really developed in relation to the francophone regions...in the case of Cameroon; there is the minority problem which is the Anglophone problem. There exists a high level of marginalization of Anglophones within the economy. There are over six million of Anglophones in the country and only two ministerial positions have been given to them, that is, the Ministry of Forestry and wildlife and the Ministry of Arts and Culture...at the central African republic, you will notice that the problem started with Francois Bozize dishonoured the accord he signed with the Seleka rebels which had ten clauses. They got angry and started moving towards the capital Bangui which led to the rebellion...There are many Anglophone pressure groups in Cameroon struggling for the Anglophone problem...»<sup>92</sup>.*

It should be pointed out that this Anglophone malaise in question here was reinforced by a strong decision taken by Nigeria concerning the judgment of 10 October 2002.

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<sup>92</sup> *The Post*, Monday 03rd February 2014

Indeed, after the judgment of the ICJ, Nigeria intended to request from the Court to reconsider its judgement, however this idea was finally abandoned<sup>93</sup>. That created a shock for some Bakassi natives and Anglophone political movements in general, who decided to move to a step up by undertaking some concrete initiatives for their separation. Hence in 2012, the SCNC initiated its secessionist strategy by establishing “identity cards, currency and treasury bills for Bakassi and other areas in the two formerly British-administered regions of Northwest and Southwest regions<sup>94</sup>,” that year, about 12,000 people already had that identity card.

It is clear from previous events that, the process of democratization in the early 1990s contributed to the emergence of several Anglophone movements with the main objective of pursuing the claims on their marginalization in comparison with Francophones<sup>95</sup>. Due to the rejection of their claims by the government, their initial goal on the return of federalism changed since then to the secession. The materialization of their secession purpose began since the final acceptance of the ICJ judgment by Nigeria.

### **3.1.2. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN BAKASSI**

Anglophones communities especially the native of South West region have always complained about the insignificant number of Anglophones recruited in the oil societies and in the various decision-making posts in general, while the essential of oil is produced

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<sup>93</sup> <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/depeches/47417/politique/le-nigeria-ne-fera-pas-appel-pour-recuperer-la-peninsule-de-bakassi-cede-au-cameroun/>

<sup>94</sup> <https://unpo.org/article/15206>

<sup>95</sup> Elong Eboho Op. Cit.

in their land. Moreover, the national companies in charge of oil exploitation such as the National Hydrocarbons Corporation (Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures, SNH) and the National Refining Company (Société Nationale de Raffinage-Sonara), have always a francophone as General Manager.

Anyway, the Ndian elites (parliaments, mayors, traditional OROKO chiefs), Division to which Bakassi is attached, have expressed their frustration regarding their uncertainty on benefits from the Oil development prospects' in Bakassi. Indeed, the local communities expect to gain advantages from the Bakassi oil exploitation in prospect. In order their voice echoes with the government, they created an indigenous council (Ndian Indigenous People Council-NIPC) which, through a letter addressed to the President of Cameroon, made known their marginalization in the economic benefits in perspective in Bakassi<sup>96</sup>. They also required the President's intervention so that the benefits of gas and oil should be distributed to local communities. It should be highlight that this NIPC initiative was done in a peaceful way, with the purpose of serving as a communication channel between local populations and the government or its partners.

As we have previously noted, the Bakassi Peninsula is an area rich in oil and fish reserves. The approximate estimation in fishery reveals that Bakassi represents 49.5% of the total

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<sup>96</sup> *The Post*, 12 octobre 2006, [http://www.postnewslines.com/2006/10/ndian\\_indigenou.html](http://www.postnewslines.com/2006/10/ndian_indigenou.html)

*The Post*, 11 mai 2006, <http://www.postnewslines.com/2006/05/index.html>

fish catch for the South West Region (Kimengsi and Lamb; 2015<sup>97</sup>), goes up to 6603206kg. Paradoxically, this area is still isolated, hence the government's efforts to develop the said area through special decennial programs such as the program of priority projects in the Bakassi area from 2007 to 2016 in partnership with the European Union through the European Development Fund (EDF), and the French Development Agency (AFD-Agence Française de Développement); and since 2017 the BAKASSI Peninsula Development Program (BADEP). In 2014, the first oil exploitation agreements in Bakassi were signed between the government and some technical partners: the Co-venturers West PSC are Dana Petroleum Cameroon Ltd (55% and Operator), Madison Cameroon Oil and Gas Limited (35%) and SoftRock Oil and Gas Limited (10%)<sup>98</sup>.

In parallel, Anglophone secessionist organizations are also interested in the prospects in the exploitation of Bakassi's oil. They think unacceptable for the government to exploit oil of Ndian division since four decades and not to worry about the development of that area<sup>99</sup>. Thus, in November 2012, the "Government of the Southern Cameroons" signed a set of agreements with the Canadian company Kilimanjaro Capital Ltd, these agreements to be implemented after achieving the secession project of the two Anglophone regions. They have also planned to sign more contracts for forest

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<sup>97</sup> Jude Ndzifon KIMENCSI & Cornelius Mbifung LAMB, Reflections on the natural-resource development paradox in the Bakassi Area (Ndian Division) of Cameroon, *Journal of African Studies and Development*, Vol. 7(9), pp. 239-249, September, 2015

<sup>98</sup> <https://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/dana-petroleum-starts-seismic-data-acquisition-offshore-cameroon/>, Press Release, January 23, 2014

<sup>99</sup> cited in *The Post Weekender*, No 01201, Friday November 19, 2010, pp4

exploitation and telecom licenses. One of the secessionist leaders, Ebenezer AKWANGA, who is calling for referendums in the Southern Cameroons, Bakassi and Biafra (Nigeria), has been recruited in this firm's Advisory Board<sup>100</sup>. There is suspicion that this company could be funding the Anglophone militias<sup>101</sup>.

By taking contractual initiatives under a fictitious state with a foreign company, the Anglophone political organizations intend to replace the state authority to which they now deny any obedience. In addition, they now receive support from outside, a support that had not yet existed in order to achieve their goal, since the economic stakes over the peninsula are significant.

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<sup>100</sup> <https://www.businessincameroon.com/finance/2406-8140-kilimanjaro-capital-the-canadian-holding-pulling-strings-of-the-cameroonian-secessionist-crisis>

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

**Table 1: Natural resource potentials of the Bakassi Area (Ndian Division)**

<b>RESOURCES</b>	<b>INDICATORS</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>
Agro Potentials	Favourable Tropical Climate	Ndian
	Relatively Fertile Soils Extensive	
	Oil Palm Plantations (Pamol and Small Holder Schemes)	Ekondo-Titi and Mundemba
	Gentle Undulating terrain	Most of Ndian
Forest resources	The Korup National Park	Mundemba
	The Rumpi Forest	Part of Ndian
	Mundemba Council Forest	Mundemba Ekondo-Titi
	Mokoko Forest Reserve	
	Bakassi Reserve	Bakassi
Mineral Resources	Not yet disclosed	Bakassi Peninsula
Petroleum and Crude Oil	Huge Chunks at the Bakassi Peninsula	Bakassi Peninsula
Fisheries	Bakassi Peninsula	Bakassi Peninsula
Border Position	Rich in Exchange or Economic Activities	Ekondo-Titi and Mundemba
	Illor	Illor
WaterFalls	Ngeringe and Kote waterfalls	Mofako Balue
	Meme waterfalls	Betenge Balue
	Befake waterfalls	Dikome Balue
	Mana Waterfalls	Mundemba
	Mundemba Waterfalls	Mundemba

**Source:** Jude Ndzifon KIMENGSI & Cornelius Mbifung LAMB, *Reflections on the natural-resource development paradox in the Bakassi Area (Ndian Division) of Cameroon*, *Journal of African Studies and Development*, Vol. 7(9), pp. 239-249, September, 2015

## **3.2. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ALERTS**

In this part, we mean by internationalization of crisis' alerts, the demonstrations from the Anglophone movements on the international scene. Some of them were undertaken in relation with Bakassi dispute, while others were done to strategic international organizations.

### **3.2.1. THE REJECTION OF BAKASSI JUDGEMENT**

Anglophone political associations have tried to claim the ownership of Bakassi to the fictive state of "Southern Cameroons" since the ICJ ruled on the admissibility of Cameroon's request in the early 90s. The major claims came from SCNC and SCAPO.

The SCAPO opposed to the Court's judgement on the Bakassi conflict and consequently to the Cameroon's sovereignty over this area. since the beginning of the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, One might think that all SCAPO's efforts and activities are only focused on this issue, the restoration of the independence of Southern Cameroons, an state autonomy that has never yet existed apart from their attachment to the French part independent. This group has always denunciate the ICJ 2002 judgement, they claim that Bakassi has never been a part of Cameroon, but of Southern Cameroon. The SCAPO joined the others secessionist movements in the Bakassi peninsula. When the case was still pending in the ICJ, a stronger claim was made by the Cameroonian Anglophone movement SCAPO, consider an independent state including the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon. Although the Greentree Agreement was already signed, SCAPO wrote a

letter to the Secretary of State of the UN and to the Cameroonian and Nigerian Heads of State, a letter in which they expressed his intention to attach Bakassi peninsula to an independent state that was neither Cameroon nor Nigeria<sup>102</sup>.

For the SCNC too, they expressed to the Court that Nigerian presence in Bakassi was more confident than Cameroonian occupation. In this perspective, after the judgement they wrote a letter to the General Secretary of United Nations where they clearly supported the upkeep of Nigerian military troops in Bakassi Peninsula until the recognition of the Southern Cameroon as an independent state<sup>103</sup>. But due to the failure of Nigeria to play its role of guardian of the Peninsula, they declared Bakassi independent.<sup>104</sup>

On the other hand, above the involvement of SCAPO and SCNC to confront the State of Cameroon during the trial at Hague, petitions, litigations against the state and propaganda were also used by them in view to achieve their secession goal.

In this regards, several petitions have already been signed both by SCAPO and SCNC to denounce the presence of the Cameroonian authorities in the Bakassi peninsula. These first Anglophone political associations with secessionist stand considered this presence as illegal and compare it to colonization, as expressed in many of their petitions addressed to the UN<sup>105</sup>. In 2015, they also invited the UN to set up a transitional

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<sup>102</sup><https://unpo.org/article/4861>

<sup>103</sup> Afrik.com Journal, 10 August 2006, <http://www.afrik.com/article10230.html>

<sup>104</sup> <https://www.postnewslines.com/2008/07/rebels-declare.html>

<sup>105</sup> <https://unpo.org/article/15206>

administration in the Anglophone regions. A petition has been initiated for this purpose<sup>106</sup>.

It appears clearly that during the Bakassi trial, Nigeria was not the only Cameroon's adversary, but also the Anglophone secessionist movements that tried in vain to influence the international judge's decision against the interests of Cameroon. Moreover, they demand the intervention of the UN to legitimize the sovereignty of a fictitious state over Bakassi peninsula and Anglophone Regions, whereas in 1961, it was that same international institution which had organized the plebiscite by which they joined the former French Cameroon, of which they now deny legitimacy to justify their secession.

### **3.2.2. THE INTERNATIONAL DENIAL OF STATE'S AUTHORITY**

The denial of state authority by the Anglophone community has been manifested in several ways or during significant events on the international scene. They have tried, not only to discredit Cameroon within international organizations, but they have even constituted themselves as an adversary an opponent against the interests of Cameroon. These actions based on unofficial and parallel diplomacy against the state of Cameroon were mainly brought to the attention of the Commonwealth, AU and the UN. While the activities of political parties are usually confined within a country, Anglophones political

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<sup>106</sup> <https://www.change.org/p/united-nations-organisation-security-council-mr-ban-ki-moon-un-secretary-general-invite-un-to-set-up-transition-administration-in-former-british-cam>

movements transformed in infra-state actors who openly challenged government diplomacy.

This strategy of international mobilizing the Anglophone cause started in 1993 when Cameroon applied for membership of the Commonwealth. The Anglophone leaders attending this summit complained about the marginalization of Anglophone Regions, they invited the members to oppose to the Cameroons request for membership. During the Commonwealth Summit at Auckland (New Zealand) in 1995 too, the SCNC supported the Quebec model of independence for the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon.

As regards the UN, it has become primarily their platform of all kinds of complains:

- In 1995, before the promulgation of the 1996 constitution of Cameroon, which introduced decentralization within the unitary form, an Anglophone delegation of SCNC head by Ngu Foncha and Solomon Tandeng Muna went to UN to contest the new form of Cameroon state<sup>107</sup>.
- At the same occasion, SCNC submitted to the UN “a petition against the annexation and colonization of the Southern Cameroons by the Republic of Cameroon”<sup>108</sup>
- In 2004, SCNC succeed to make the Southern Cameroon a member within the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). Thanks to this new

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<sup>107</sup> Konings, Piet, and Francis B. Nyamnjoh Op. Cit.

<sup>108</sup> Kum Bezeng and 75 others (represented by Professor Carlson ANYANGWE) Vs The Republic of Cameroon

status, they can now strengthen and give weight to their actions against the government, as an entity officially recognized by the UN.

Concerning actions undertaken at regional level,

- In 2003, SCNC and SCAPO brought an action in the African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) against the Cameroonian government.
- On 20 February 2017, another complaint from an Anglophone group, Kum Bezeg and 75 others (represented by Professor Carlson ANYANGWE) against the government<sup>109</sup>, was applied to the ACHPR.

Moreover, apart from the formal framework to the above international institutions, the pro secessionists Anglophone groups like SCAPO, Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL) and SCNC, especially due to the expansion of the internet, have created a virtual state of Southern Cameroons through websites. Their strategy being coordinated abroad, in countries where they were able to establish an efficient strategy for the Anglophone cause, out of government control.

The previous development reveal that the Anglophone community acted in a coordinated way through two main groups, SCAPO and the SCNC although their objectives were not achieved. They initiated the internationalization of the Anglophone cause by means of letters and declarations addressed to the Court during the trial of Bakassi dispute, and to the different international strategic organizations. Their strategy was certainly shy,

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<sup>109</sup> African Union-African Commission on Human & Peoples' Rights, Communication 650/17: Kum Bezeg and 75 others (represented by Professor Carlson ANYANGWE) V The Republic of Cameroon, 21<sup>st</sup> Extra Ordinary Session of the Commission, 23 February to 4<sup>th</sup> March 2017

based on a hope of recovering an independence that never existed, but they have paved the way for new actors gaining advantages from the international context characterized by new forms of conflict.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS OF THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS**

This section will analyze the ongoing Anglophone crisis that has seen an outbreak of violence since the end of 2017 in North west and South west Regions of Cameroon. Firstly we will present an overview of the crisis before analyzing its main actors.

### **4.1. THE PANORAMA OF THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS**

The background of the crisis and the strategy adopted by the Anglophone militias will be presented in this part.

#### **4.1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS**

The ongoing Anglophone crisis started on 11th October 2016 in the Anglophone North west region by a strike of Anglophone lawyers. Peaceful marches were organized in the city of Bamenda, the capital of the North West region. The said lawyers claimed the translation into English of the Uniform Acts OHADA (Organisation for the Harmonisation of Corporate Law in Africa <sup>110</sup>), the African Conference on Insurance Markets<sup>111</sup> and other laws voted by the Cameroonians

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<sup>110</sup> OHADA is an organization created on 17 October 1993 made up of 17 African countries to ensure legal and judicial certainty for investors and businesses in its member states, by adoption of law common to the international economic environment and its member states, training of legal and judicial staff, promoting of diligent, independent justice supported by appropriate procedures; encouraging the arbitration and other methods of amicable settlement of disputes.

<sup>111</sup> The African Conference on Insurance Markets (Conférence Interafricaine des Marchés d'Assurance-CIMA) is

parliament; the preservation of the specificity of Common Law, the judicial system inherited from British and implemented in Anglophone Regions. Thereafter, Anglophone teachers follow the pace of lawyers on 21<sup>st</sup> November for similar reasons, bringing in their wake the students of universities in the Anglophone regions. They demand the Anglo-Saxon educational system in both regions, they also criticized the appointment of Francophones in the Anglophone regions.

These initial corporatist protestations of Lawyers and Teachers shifted from a social movement to a political movement anti-government. Indeed, on 6<sup>th</sup> December 2016 in the framework of a public meeting organized in Buea in South West region by the government, the trade unions concerned expressed to the government the marginalization and discrimination of Anglophone community. They argued that Anglophone people are not appointed at high important functions, thus they felt unsecured in a unitary state with the Francophone community more dominant and privileged. For these reasons, they demand the return to the federal system or secession, better suitable for their protection.

During a rally, Anglophone lawyers announced the creation of a new Anglophone bar, followed by a march repressed by the national police. Meanwhile in social networks, the calls for the partition of the country and the independence of Southern Cameroons are increasing. In early 2017 that contributed to the government decision blocking internet access in these regions for three months. Concurrently, the government banned

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only in French language.

Anglophone activities organized for this purpose and some recalcitrant Anglophone political leaders have been arrested in the two regions concerned. The more the government carried out a repression, the more the radicalization of the Anglophone movements intensified through acts of violence such as the fires on administrative buildings, operations dead cities and punitive operation for people who does not respect their instructions.

In view of this alarming signs, the government adopted conciliation measures to appease the anger over the Anglophone regions, and some measures have been taken in particular the following:

- In January 2017, the government created a National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism. As missions, it aims to maintain peace; consolidate the unity of the country; reinforce the will and the daily practice of the living together among the populations;
- The creation of a Committee devoted to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration<sup>112</sup> on November 2018, to deal with the combatants who voluntary left the militias and can benefit from a process of reintegration into society. For this purpose, this Committee has Regional centres in the capitals of Anglophone Regions, Bamenda and Buea.

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<sup>112</sup> Decree No. 2018/719 of 30 November 2018 to establish the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Committee (NDDRC).

- the creation of a section of Common Law at the Supreme Court to hear appeals against decisions of lower courts in Common Law cases;
- the creation of a Section of the Common Law at the National School of Administration and Magistracy;
- a special recruitment of a thousand (1000) Bilingual Teachers has been implemented in Secondary Education;
- the replacement of some Francophone magistrates by Anglophone in the North west and South west courts;
- the release on December 2017 of 289 of the detained Anglophone activists, arrested during the escalation of the crisis;
- The English translation of the OHADA texts was carried out.

In 2017 with all these measures taken by the government, everything seems to be in order in these regions. However, in the absence of political opening for demands, at the end of the same year, the Anglophone regions witnessed a resurgence of violent clashes between a minority formed by armed activists and the security forces, causing numerous deaths on both sides, displaced persons and refugees. This new turning point in the conflict has since worsened and mutated into armed conflict between several Anglophone militias and the national army.

Moreover, as in the past, Anglophone elites are still divided between those who want federalism, those who want secession and those in favor of the continuity of the current system.

Apart from humanitarian consequences, economic sector is also disturbed. Main state-owned companies in Anglophone regions such as the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) and Pamol Oil are facing considerable economic losses and enduring serious problems due to this crisis. according to the “Groupement Inter-patronal du Cameroun” (GICAM) , the most representative organization of the private sector in Cameroon with more than one thousand members, the value of losses in July 2018 was around USD 450 million ( Francs CFA 269 billion), 6,434 job losses in the formal economy and a further 8,000 jobs were under threat<sup>113</sup>.

Since its independence, despite the discontent of the Anglophone political elites, no demonstration against the government has caused as many casualties or extended like the ongoing crisis. Hence an interest in dwelling on the strategy used by Anglophone militias to make the voices of Cameroon's Anglophone community been heard.

#### **4.1.2. STRATEGY OF ANGLOPHONE COMBATANTS**

The violence perpetrated in Anglophone regions are the result of many militias' armed groups. One of the special features of these militias is their disparity, they are organizations made up of militias who have a same adversary but are fighting in a

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<sup>113</sup>GICAM, *Insécurité dans les régions du Sud-Ouest et Nord-Ouest : conséquences économiques et impact sur l'activité des entreprises*”, GICAM, July 2018.

dispersed way. Thus, the lack of unity, conflict on leadership or internal divisions and poor management of resources remain their major weaknesses.

The militiamen are recruited from the Anglophone population, but also some of them are Nigerian soldiers of fortune, who are utilized as trainers or combatants. Among them, “Some are former combatants or those out of work after agreements between the Nigerian government and political-military groups in the Niger Delta. Others are simply criminals who fled to Cross River state to escape the Delta Safe 1 Operation launched in 2016 by the Nigerian army to fight crime in the Delta<sup>114</sup>. Their equipment is mostly made of locally traditional firearms, but also modern firearms and a few machine guns and Rocket-Propelled Grenades. “Many of these weapons were seized from the security forces, while others were acquired in Nigeria from paramilitary or criminal groups in the Delta”<sup>115</sup>.

The funds allocated for the functioning of these militias were coming initially from Anglophone diaspora through political movements based abroad. They raise funds to buy arms and in the context of the meetings they organize, they discuss about reorganization of strategy to adopt by the armed groups in the field among others<sup>116</sup>. Most of the members of these diaspora movements are no longer Cameroonians since

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<sup>114</sup> Report of the ONG International Crisis Group “Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: how to get to talks?”, Africa Report n°272, 2 May 2019

<sup>115</sup> Report of the ONG International Crisis Group, Op. Cit.

<sup>116</sup> Separatist militants, Official launching of the National AK campaign, Washington, March 2019, YouTube, 3 March 2019

they chose to acquire the nationality of their home country. In addition to this, it has also been observed since a while the increasing number of extortion, kidnapping and taxation as a means to finance these Anglophone militias.

Apart from the armed clashes against the national forces, the operation mode of these militias consist on mutilations, rapes, beheadings, assassination of defenseless civilians, assassinations of administrative, traditional and religious authorities, destruction of public infrastructure and public buildings, fire of schools and hospitals. These acts were qualified as terrorist acts by some conflict experts<sup>117</sup> and also by the government; especially since during the various attacks, the concerned Anglophone group author of attack usually claims its responsibility for it.

We note bitterly that this crisis has continued to change as gradually it evolves. Started from a simple strike of lawyers and teachers, it was used by Anglophone political elites, then by the Anglophone diaspora who through associations, finance local armed militias to fight the national army. As of now, the attacks are no longer directed only against the national army and other local authorities, but also against civilians from the conflicting regions. Indeed the aim of various terrifying techniques whose images are often posted in internet and social networks, is to spread fear and panic within the populations. Paradoxically, these militias also receive a local support of some natives of Anglophone regions.

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<sup>117</sup> Report of the ONG International Crisis Group, Op cit.

At this stage, it should be noted that the initiators of this crisis were far from imagining that the movement they started by strike would turn against Anglophone civilians. At the same time are they consenting that it is the price to pay for their cause to be heard? In others words, the request for secession combined with violence, is it a way for Anglophone regions to be granted at least federalism? Or on the contrary do these new techniques denote the weaknesses of these militias, depleted by this struggle since three years, but are being held hostage by the diaspora? The answers to these questions invite us to identify the major actors in order to better apprehend the contours of the Anglophone crisis.

**Table 2 : Anglophone militias**

<b>Armed militias</b>			
<b>NOUN</b>	<b>CHIEF</b>	<b>STRONGHOLD</b>	<b>NUMBER (estimate)</b>
Manyu tigers	Martin Ashu	Manyu Division (South west)	500
Southern Cameroons Defense Forces (SOCADEF)	Ebenezer Akwanga	Meme Division (South West)	400
Ambazonia Defense Forces	Benedict KUAH	Scattered in the two regions	200 to 500
Red Dragons	Olivier LEKENE FONGUNUEH (alias Field Marshall)	Lebialem Division	200
Seven Kata		Batibo city and Momo Division (North West)	200
The Sword of Ambazonia (TSOA)		Meme Division	200

<b>Small armed groups</b>			
<b>NOUN</b>	<b>CHIEF</b>	<b>STRONGHOLD</b>	<b>NUMBER (estimate)</b>
	“General” Nyambere	Kupe Manenguba (South West)	50
Southern Cameroon restoration Forces	“General” RK	Boyo Division (North West)	100
	“General” Satan	Fundong locality and Boyo Division (North West)	Few dozen
Warriors of Nso	Warriors of Nso	Bui Division (North West)	100
White Tigers		Bafut locality, Bamenda and Mezam Division (North West)	50
Menchum Fall Warriors		Menchum division (North West)	10
Ten-Ten	“General” Ten Ten	Buea and Fako Division (South West)	50
	Eugène	Ekona locality and Fako Division (South West)	50
Dongang Mantung Selfdefense group	“General” Obi	Muyuka locality and Fako Division (South West)	50
Vipers			Few dozen
Ambazonia Restoracion Army (ARA)			Few dozen

**Source:** International Crisis Group, 2019.

## **4.2. ACTORS OF THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS**

The Anglophone crisis is the armed confrontation between two major actors namely the Anglophone groups on the one hand and the government on the other hand.

### **4.2.1. ANGLOPHONE ACTORS**

The Anglophones populations are divided into two tendencies, namely: a secessionist minority and a majority in favor of federalism. The secessionist tendency is the “architect” that perpetuates the violence in the south West and North West Regions of Cameroon. In this respect, a particular attention will be paid to them in this section.

#### **4.2.1.1. THE ANGLOPHONE SECESSIONIST TRENDS: DIRECT ACTORS OF THE CRISIS**

There main secessionist groups are: the Interim Government of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia (IG) and the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGC). There are also smaller separatist entities affiliated or close to the above groups.

##### **Level of analysis of local actors**

Two main groups are conducting the secessionist violence against the government in North West and South West Regions of Cameroon: the Interim Government of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia (IG) and Ambazonia Governing Council (AGC).

- Interim Government of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia (IG)

It was created on June 2017 and grouping several Anglophone associations. Its main objective is to “restore independence of Southern Cameroons voted on 11 February 1961 (UN resolution 1908-XV)<sup>118</sup>”. Its strategy consists in working “with Front Line Leaders and organizations, all the while putting pressure on African Union and UN”<sup>119</sup>. The cessation of violence will be done only after a dialogue in a neutral territorial with the government under the arbitration of the United Nations, the African Union or United States<sup>120</sup>. In the perspective of a failed secession, this group suggests federalism under certain conditions including; the release of all Anglophone detainees, an appointment of

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<sup>118</sup> <https://www.ambazoniagov.org/index.php/states/52-bakassi>

<sup>119</sup> Ibid

<sup>120</sup> Report International Crisis Group Op. Cit.

an Anglophone vice president of the country, the increase of public investment in the Anglophone regions, the reconstructions of conflicted areas. This secessionist group has an online television and a website to broadcast its activities and mobilize the Anglophone community.

They proclaimed independence of Anglophone regions on 1<sup>st</sup> October 2017 within the state of Ambazonia and formed their government. Ambazonia Security Council (ASC) which cooperate with the armed militias (Tigers 2, Red Dragons), Parliament: Ambazonia Recognition Coalition (ARC) and 10 ministerial departments (example of Department of Health and Social Services which helps the refugees from the crisis.

SISIKU Julius AYUK TABE remains the main leader of this group although he was arrested in January 2018 in Nigeria and put in jail in Cameroon. During his absence, IKOME SAKO is the Interim President albeit his management is contested within the group.

Numerous Anglophone associations are either affiliated to IG, or share the same ideology with IG. The organizations affiliated to IG are the follows:

- Southern Cameroon Consortium United Front (SCACUF);
- Movement for Independence and Restoration of Southern Cameroons (MORISC);
- Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC);
- Southern Cameroons Congress of People (SCOOP);
- The Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement (SCARM);

In regards to Organizations close to IG line, there are:

- Ambazonia People's Liberation Movement (APLM), allied to Southern Cameroon Defense Forces (SOCADEF); it is led by Ebenezer AKWANGA;
- Southern Cameroon People's Organization (SCAPO) which is derivate from the Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL) and led by Milan ATAM, erstwhile IG general secretary.

- Ambazonia Governing Council (AGC)

It was created in 2013 and AYABA CHO Lucas is the leader. Its objective is make the Anglophone zones ungovernable until the government realizes that the cost of war is greater than the benefits from exploitation of regions natural resources (Crisis group).

This movement claims the independence of Anglophone Regions (like Northern Ireland's status within UK). Their funds come from diaspora through political movements based abroad but also from extortion, kidnapping and taxation.

Their conditions for conducting a dialogue with the Government are the follows: a recognition by the Government of an Anglophone problem; the release of Anglophones detainees; the reconstruction of places affected by the conflict; a better political representation of Anglophone regions a greater autonomy for Anglophone regions in the education and justice<sup>121</sup>.

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<sup>121</sup> Report International Crisis Group Op. Cit.

The have seven militias and also some Anglophone organizations are affiliated to their group such as:

- Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF) led by Benedict KUAH
- Ambazonia Recognition Collaboration Council (ARCC)

### **Level of analysis of individual actors**

Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe and AYABA CHO Lucas are the leaders of the major secessionist groups.

#### **IG's leader: SISIKU JULIUS AYUK TABE**

Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe was born on May 2, 1965 in Kembong. He is a native from Eyumojock in the Manyu Division (South West Region) in Cameroon. The Manyu Division shares the common border with Nigeria and with Ndian Division whose Bakassi area depends from. He has a Bachelor's Degree in Computer Science and Mathematics in 1988 obtained in Keele University, then graduated in Control Engineering from the University of Sheffield in England since 1990. Sisiku AyukTabe has served as the Chairman of SCACUF and was nominated on the 1<sup>st</sup> October 2016 as the President of IG<sup>122</sup>.

Before his detention in 2018, he was working as “pioneer Chief Information Officer (CIO) and successively Assistant Vice President in-charge of Digital Services and

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<sup>122</sup> <https://www.ambazoniagov.org/index.php/states/52-bakassi>

Marketing & Recruitment in the American University of Nigeria (AUN), Yola, Nigeria”<sup>123</sup>. In the past, he collaborated professionally with the former Electricity Distribution Company in Cameroon SONEL, for the improvement of energy in the Adamawa Region by creating a Customer Management application. He had also contributed in developing an application for the improvement of the examination in Anglophone education sector in Cameroon.

AYUK TABE is a member of the Adamawa Peacemakers Initiative (API) to support IDPs in Northern Nigeria. He is the owner of the AyukTabe Foundation (ATAB Farms), a farm of 40 hectare that empowers the natives of Eyumojock. Unfortunately September 2017, it has been abandoned due to the crisis. Since August 20, 2019, he was sentenced for life by the military court with a fine of around more than USD 422 million (250 billion CFA francs) to be paid for the damage caused<sup>124</sup>.

#### **ACG’S leader: AYABA CHO LUCAS**

AYABA CHO Lucas is born August 1972 in Bamenda the capital of North West Region. He started his academic studies in Chemistry at the University of Buea in the South West Region. In 1993, he was one of the leaders at the University of Buea of the student strike following the increase in tuition fees. That commitment contributed to his expel from all

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<sup>123</sup> <http://cameroonnewsagency.com/profile-meet-the-man-sisiku-julius-ayuktabe-the-ambazonian-revolutionary-leader/> consulted on 10 October 2019

<sup>124</sup> <https://www.jeunefrique.com/817996/politique/cameroun-sisiku-ayuk-tabe-et-neuf-autres-separatistes-anglophones-condamnes-a-la-prison-a-vic/>

the state University in Cameroon. He established in London as a refugee where he specialized in human rights law and international relations. He live now in Norway<sup>125</sup> where he granted citizenship.

He is the commander in chief of Ambazonian Defence Force (ADF) and is the current leader of Ambazonia Governing Council, one of the Anglophone secessionist organization. In the past He occupied the post of Secretary General of the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL). In the earlier 90s, he militated also within the SCNC where he was defending "the argument of force" rather than "the strength of the argument"<sup>126</sup>.

The goals pursued by these secessionist entities are the same. However, there are still some fractures that are constantly weakening them, in particular the lack of collegiality in making decision, conflict on leadership among them, centralized power. They tried to unify in 2017 through four meetings organized in Nigeria between all separatist Anglophone tendencies. But, each claiming a proper popular leadership, no unification was done<sup>127</sup>. Furthermore, the networks and new configurations of the international environment, provide the secessionist groups the means and resources to organize themselves in parallel, beyond any control by the central government.

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<sup>125</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c2k3M1gOJ4Y>, it's been a long struggle for freedom, Ayaba Cho Lucas at "Students at Risk"

<sup>126</sup> [https://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/monde/au-cameroun-anglophone-de-nombreuses-divisions-fragmentent-les-separatistes\\_1986085.html](https://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/monde/au-cameroun-anglophone-de-nombreuses-divisions-fragmentent-les-separatistes_1986085.html)

<sup>127</sup> [https://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/monde/au-cameroun-anglophone-de-nombreuses-divisions-fragmentent-les-separatistes\\_1986085.html](https://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/monde/au-cameroun-anglophone-de-nombreuses-divisions-fragmentent-les-separatistes_1986085.html)

#### **4.2.1.2. ANGLOPHONE FEDERALIST TREND**

The most part of Anglophone community support federalism which will imply a reform of the state. Political elites are indirect actors, they expect that the pressure of violence by the secessionist groups is favorable for them to force the government returning to the federal form.

For political parties whose leaders are from Anglophone regions<sup>128</sup>, this crisis is a springboard that serves them to propagate their federalist cause so much defended in vain. The Social Democratic Front (SDF), which is the most represented political party in the parliament<sup>129</sup>, is the major defender of federalism. The parliaments of SDF tried in vain to introduce the Anglophone crisis in the parliament's agenda since 2017. They boycotted the parliamentary sessions, even the one reserved for the state budget and requested for a special session devoted for the Anglophone crisis. The other claims are the follows: the recognition of “the Anglophone problem” that means the marginalization of Anglophone community and their underrepresentation in decision-making; the return to a federal state; the release of all the Anglophone crisis detainees, the support of victims and the set-up of a peace-truth commission for reconciliation.

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<sup>128</sup> There is no political party exclusively with Anglophone or Francophone in the reality, all of them encompass natives from Anglophone and Francophone regions. But since in the early 90s that it exists, it is formed mostly by the natives of Anglophone Regions.

<sup>129</sup> Social democratic Front (SDF) holds 18 of the 180 seats in the National Assembly and 7 of the 100 seat in the Senate.

They invited the secessionist groups to accept a ceasefire while the secessionists have since convinced them to withdraw from the parliamentary sessions in order to make the secession cause more noticeable. In this respect, it should be emphasized that the secessionist and federalist tendencies observed in the Anglophone community do not evolve in isolation, because they coordinate their actions. This strategy could aim for them to get at least the return of the federal state or to contribute in a huge revolution for their economic advantages.

There is no doubt that Anglophone political leaders are in favor of federalism. However, we note that their demand presents some deficiencies, in particular the number of federal states they suggest. Do they expect the unbalanced federalism with a small Anglophone federal state comparing to the francophone state as it was in the past? Or will they accept new boundary changes so that the federal states should be similar geographically or culturally? They don't suggest also the process of adopting the federalism. Would it be by referendum or it should be imposed to people? And finally the identification of the representor of Anglophone Community is unknown in view of a multiplicity of Anglophone actors oppose to a government whose the issue of representor does not arise.

#### **4.2.2. STATE ACTORS**

The government did not remain insensitive to the outbreak of the Anglophone crisis since the end of 2016 until now. Some immediate solutions have been taken as soon as the government understood that the actors of the current crisis, unlike the previous manifestations, had made armed violence their favorite way to defend their cause. These

solutions that we previously mentioned in the background of the crisis had been taken after a dialogue between the Government and the trade unions with a view to finding suitable answers to the initial demands. Apart from them, additive measures have been taken to reduce the conflicting climate in the Anglophone regions in Cameroon. Some of them are government initiatives, others have been taken under diplomatic influence combined with the intransigence of the secessionists.

#### **4.2.2.1. GOVERNMENTS INITIATIVES**

The solutions taken by the Government initially to the Anglophone crisis are the following:

- Two cabinet reshuffles in one year: the first one was done on March 2018 with the appointment of Anglophone ministers in important ministries such as the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT) and the Ministry of Secondary Education (MINESEC). Moreover, in order to accelerate the decentralization process, a ministerial department dedicated to decentralization and local development has been created. Its mission focus on the elaboration, monitoring, implementation, evaluation of the government program in terms of decentralization and promotion of local development among others.

The innovation of the second cabinet reshuffles made on January 4<sup>th</sup> 2019 is the appointment of a new Prime Minister, a native of Ndian division (where Bakassi is located) in the South West. During his visit to the Anglophone regions on May 2019, he met with local authorities, politicians, religious

leaders and various social groups. He delivered to the Anglophone community the President's offer of dialogue to try to stop the escalation of violence in these regions. Indeed according to his message, apart from secession, the government was opened to discuss about any political issue<sup>130</sup>.

- The emergency humanitarian plan was set up with help of international partners to provide various assistance to the victims of the conflict in the Anglophone Regions. The budget of this plan is about more than 20 million USD (12.7 billion FCFA) for a period of 18 months. In addition, a Humanitarian Coordination Center to implement the emergency plan was created of the country; the collection that officially began on June 21, 2018.

#### **4.2.2.2. THE DIPLOMATIC INCENTIVES**

The diplomatic standpoints have been expressed by various states and international organizations at regional as well as international levels in order resolve the crisis:

- At regional level, Nigeria and African Union are the most important actors involved more or less in the Anglophone crisis. For Nigeria, which receives the refugees from the crisis and also is one of the countries where secessionist diaspora is most concentrated, Nigeria Government has collaborated with Cameroon's authorities for the arrest of one of the most secessionist leaders. The Nigeria' solution is to combine a military and political response to stop the

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<sup>130</sup> <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20190512-cameroun-premier-ministre-deplacement-regions-anglophones>

violence. AU based its standpoint on the principle of noninterference in the internal political affairs of its members.

- At international level, the western countries and IO raise their concern about this crisis.

Among the most important propositions, firstly the case of United States is relevant. Undeniably US condemns human rights violations by the military and secessionists during the conflict. American Congress even asked the Departments of State and Defense to reduce US military aid if the army ignore the human rights. They equally conditioned their security assistance by requesting sanctions of the authors (civil and military) committing violations of human rights during the crisis. The dialogue is the solution the suggested to end the crisis<sup>131</sup>.

Secondly, similarly to US, France is following very closely the development of this crisis. It proposes an effective implementation of decentralization to stop the crisis. It has also suggested to the Cameroonian government to release the 289 Anglophones detainees and the creation of a disarmament committee. A political settlement between actors was proposed by France to resolve the crisis. Moreover like US, France is also condemning the violation of Human Rights; in this perspective on last May 28, this issue was raised in parliament by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs who regretted the number of deaths.

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<sup>131</sup> On March 2019 during a visit to Cameroon of the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, he called for "a dialogue open to all" to resolve the Anglophone crisis.

For UK, Canada and Germany condemn human rights violations and call for a political dialogue between actors. In 2018 UK rejected to recognize the “Ambazonia” as an independent state. Switzerland suggest differently from the previous countries; it supports the regionalism and suggests to be the mediator of this crisis as well as Germany<sup>132</sup>.

In the sphere of international Organizations, the Anglophone crisis was discussed at the United Nations in May 2019 for the first time during an informal consultation, at the request of the United States with the support of the United Kingdom, Germany and the Dominican Republic. Consequently, it did not result to any resolution by UN or any other official announcement from the UN. Beyond this aspect, UN Special Representative for Central Africa suggested an inclusive dialogue and an acceleration of decentralization to resolve the crisis<sup>133</sup>. Netherland and Norway tried also to bring this issue in Security Council agenda but they didn't get the majority voices

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<sup>132</sup> Christoph HOFFMANN statement in the German parliament "[...] And we launched an initiative to ask Chancellor Merkel to visit Cameroon and initiate a start of mediation to resolve the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon".

<sup>133</sup> Security Council Seventy-fourth year, 8538th meeting, Tuesday, 4 June 2019, 3 p.m. New York: LOUNCÉNY FALL's speech to the members of the Security Council «Conducting inclusive dialogue is the best way to preserve the stability of the country, which is vital to the entire Subregion. I therefore encourage the Cameroonian authorities to continue their dialogue efforts and to advance the process of decentralization "

required<sup>134</sup>. Generally, UN is more regarding in the protection of human rights in this conflict.

EU suggested the Cameroonian government “to organize a political dialogue open to all trends, in order to find a [durable and peaceful solution] to the crisis in the English-speaking regions.”<sup>135</sup>

The political solution around a dialogue remains the most suggested by the international community. This opinion of the international community has therefore guided the actions of the Cameroonian government to initiate a major national dialogue.

#### **4.2.2.3-THE MAJOR NATIONAL DIALOGUE**

The major national dialogue was organized from 30th September to 4th October 2019, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, in order to involve all components of society in seeking solutions that can put an end to the crisis in the North West and South West regions but also identify population's expectations. As regards to the Anglophone crisis, it focused on various themes organized under the following commissions on the bilingualism, decentralization and local development, educational system, reconstruction and development of conflict-affected areas, cultural diversity and social cohesion, judicial system, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, the

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<sup>134</sup> China, Russia and France voted against; US voted in favor of the request while UK abstained.

<sup>135</sup> French.xinhuanet.com

education and judicial system, the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, the role of the diaspora in the crisis and country's development. This major dialogue was organized in 2 steps:

- A pre-dialogue consultations between the government in one hand and the main actors of the initial strike (lawyers, teachers), but also the political leaders, trade union officials, civil society, student organizations actors, religious authorities, and independent personalities. It was organized both in central and local level in the ten Regions. In the Anglophone regions, the meeting between the governors and the populations aimed to provide incentives for armed activists to abandon the secession fighting and benefit from the government program on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.
- The major national dialogue: Six hundred (600) people approximately participated coming from traditional authorities, parliamentarians, opinion leaders, politicians, intellectuals, religious authorities, members of the diaspora, economic operators, representatives of the Defense and Security Forces, armed groups and victims were invited by the government. "two-thirds of the participants were drawn from the North West and South West Regions while about 5% came from the Diaspora".

In general, the requests made by the Anglophone community is still divided, a majority suggests the return to federalism as well as the recognition of a special status for the Anglophone regions. However others Anglophone and francophone political leaders

recommend the effective implementation of decentralization, while the regionalism has also proposed by a minority of francophone political leaders.

Furthermore, it should be highlight that separatists were not invited to this major dialogue since the government refuses any discussion on the form of the state, while the secessionists require a dialogue with the government in a neutral territorial on the modalities of separation, under the arbitration of UN, AU or US. On the other hand, the government proposes to reinforce the decentralization process.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: POLICY SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, firstly, we will present a retrospection on our analysis on the Anglophone crisis, which is the main part of our research. Then, we will suggest recommendations for a definitive resolution of this conflict, and finally we will conclude our study.

### **5.1. SUMMARY STATEMENT**

At the end of our analysis, it is necessary to re-specify the questions and evolutions that made the backbone of our study.

We started our research from the identification of a contrast, that after the peaceful settlement by the ICJ on the Bakassi peninsula border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, a new internal crisis raised within the Anglophone regions whose Bakassi is part of this territory.

What could justify this paradox according to which the end of the Bakassi conflict marks the beginning of another conflict of a different and more deadly nature than the previous one?

- Do the modalities of resolution of the first conflict possess themselves the germs of a second conflict? In other words, has the settlement of Bakassi conflict sufficiently integrated all the factors in view of a complete cessation of violence in this area?

- Would the occurrence of the Anglophone crisis, on the contrary, be linked to an endogenous fracture in the collaboration between the central power and the native populations?

Before embracing the analysis itself and in order to guarantee its relevance but also its singularity, we considered important: to carry out a literature review and the theories concerned, then to proceed with some precisions on the theoretical framework useful for our analysis. By analyzing the dynamics of conflicts in Africa, it appears that they adapt to the evolution of society. Nowadays, the conflict should no longer be analyzed solely under the prism of an open confrontation between two clearly distinguished states, but it is necessary to integrate the contemporary practice of so-called asymmetric wars, the involvement of transnational actors, of the instrumentalization of ethnicity, religion or culture, which oppose often diffuse or nebulous factions with unconventional channels and means.

As approach of analysis, guiding us to have an adequate answer to the above-mentioned concern, we opted for the constructivist approach. Constructivism, inspired by Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, refers to realism and idealism, questioning the primacy of the nation-state as the sole reference for political analysis, resulting in the irruption of sociology into political science.

After these theoretical clarifications, it is necessary to consider the chronology of events and the unfolding of facts.

Retrospectively, localized tensions stem from old claims that took shape in the early 1990s during the beginning of the democratization process in Cameroon, and whose strategy has changed drastically, from peaceful claims to an armed conflict. In fact, it appears that some alerts both internally and internationally have been used to detect the rupture between the Anglophone community and the government over Bakassi peninsula and the form of the state in general. Thus, the "Anglophone problem" which is the feeling of economic and political marginalization of the Anglophone minority, is old as Cameroon itself; its acuteness fluctuates over time, according to the events with its recurrent fever outbreaks; but it remains inscribed in time along the history of Cameroon.

The new political claims are combined with historical claims, highlighting the multidimensional nature of the ongoing crisis. It started with a strike by Anglophone lawyers at the end of 2016, challenging "frenchization" or the "francophonization" of law and justice, which paradoxically amounts to making the British colonial legacy of the Common Law an element of their identity. Thereafter, the Anglophone teachers followed the pace of lawyers. From the North West Region, where it was initially confined, the crisis spreads to the South West Region and takes a more violent and overtly political and anti-governmental turn. Since the outbreak of this crisis, the number of secessionist groups has increased, the secessionist slogans are spreading, while violent incidents on both sides are multiplying, undermining attempts at negotiations. The secessionists take the opportunity of the crisis to make the population more hostile to the government, with the encouragement of some Anglophone diaspora. While the achievement of secession is very weak it is now experiencing a medium term

recrudescence of the crisis in a violent form, as some of these groups are now engaged in armed violence and terrorism against administrative, traditional and religious authorities, national army and civilians. Despite the armed forces' response, they are still unable to fully regain control of rural areas, nor to prevent recurrent attacks by separatists in the Anglophone regions.

In many ways Anglophones do not differ substantially from Francophones:

- First culturally, the North-West Region partially “Grassfields” belongs to the same linguistic and ethnic family as the Bamileke of the neighboring francophone region of West; while the Tikar, Fulani, Hausa and Mbororo ethnic groups are from the same linguistic and ethnic group of the francophone Adamawa and North regions. In the same way, the natives of the Anglophone South-West region belong to the Sawa family of the neighbor Littoral region or a part of the South Region.
- Secondly, with regard to the living conditions of populations from Anglophone or Francophone regions, they face the same difficulties.

On the other hand, there is one area where the Anglophone problem is taking root, their mistrust of the central power and public institutions. Indeed this disillusioned feeling about the Central Power reflects a general criticism of the regime in place, particularly with regard to the excessive centralization of power and the management of natural resources; especially since most of Cameroon's oil, which accounts for one-third of Cameroon's exports, is produced in the Anglophone Region of South-West, but the local

populations do not benefit. The Bakassi peninsula, enjoying a strategic position in the Gulf of Guinea, is immensely rich in oil and fishery resources among others. The prospects for exploiting these resources are therefore an important stake for both the government, the natives and even Anglophone community.

Furthermore, the Central power and the separatists stay on their own irreconcilable positions. The separatists believe in the utopia of an upcoming independence while the government has not yet engaged in any dialogue with separatist leaders actors of violence. Moderates and federalists, who nevertheless enjoy the sympathy of a majority of the Anglophone population, are not organized.

## **5. 2. RECOMMENDATIONS**

The combined actions of domestic and international actors are significant to break this impasse. Thus, we will provide the following recommendations for both domestic and international actors.

### **5.2.1. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DOMESTIC ACTORS**

Consideration of the deep causes of this conflict would be a great contribution to achieving the goals of dialogue among the belligerents and peace in the Anglophone regions. Thus, the proposed solutions should be related to the said causes.

To break this impasse and open the way for talks, opponents must make mutual concessions to res-establish a minimum of trust and put an end to the upsurge of violence

in Anglophone regions. Between the separatist secession and the government's proposed decentralization, median solutions need to be explored to give regions more autonomy.

- For Anglophone actors

If there are some inflexible secessionists, others could be willing to engage a dialogue with the government under arbitration of an international mediator, on an effective decentralization or federalism, which would grant a financial autonomy to the regions, and also guarantee the recognition of the singularity of common law and Anglo-Saxon educational system.

Moreover, the Cameroonian moderate political actors who preconize conciliation of parties in conflict must strive to pressure the government and the separatists permanently. Particularly, Anglophone federalists must join their efforts to impact the steps taken since the national dialogue. They should persist in discussions in order to bring the secessionists to moderate their stance, and intensify negotiations with the government so that it opens up to the separatists.

- For the government

Likewise, if the Cameroonian government pretends to reject the federal system, especially since the ongoing Constitution in 1996 adopted the decentralized form not yet effectively implemented, it could accept the regionalism or reinforce the decentralization, which would lead to a change in the legislative framework.

At the same time, the government must continue its efforts to return to normalcy in the Anglophone regions, including:

- Organize a frank dialogue including secessionist Cameroonians in the presence of an international neutral mediator;
- give compensation to the victims of the crisis;
- carry out reconstruction in the destroyed English-speaking regions;
- guarantee the return of refugees;
- guarantee the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs);
- pursue the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants.

Also in order to stop definitively the cyclic occurrence of this crisis, the government should take the following measures:

- make changes in governance and at the institutional in order to consider the particularities of the judicial and education systems in the Anglophone Regions;
- give a wider autonomy to local authorities or greatly reinforce the legal framework of decentralization;
- undertake the functioning of local administrations with a veritable administrative and financial autonomy;
- Enlarge the competences and resources of the municipalities;
- promote policies that make it possible to involve populations in the management of public affairs.

### **5.2.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTORS**

The role of international community has so far influenced the steps taken by the government to resolve this crisis. Arrived at this point, international actors should:

- pursue pressure both on the separatists and the government;
- The International Criminal Court should open preliminary investigations into abuses committed in violation of human rights, as a reminder to the belligerents that the furtherance of violence will give rise to judicial consequences.

In addition, international actors, including the UN, the AU, the European Union (especially France, Switzerland, Germany and the U.K.), the U.S. and the Vatican must continue to incite the government and secessionists to a frank dialogue. They must lead an international campaign for a peaceful settlement to the crisis.

### **5.3. CONCLUSION**

Broadly analyzed, the ongoing conflict between Anglophone community and the government highlights the failures of centralist governance system practiced in Cameroon and challenges government authorities on three key concerns: the colonial legacies and cultural specificities, the need for better consideration of minorities, ; and the need for a more equitable and right redistribution of the country's wealth. The long-term solution lies in an honest dialogue and consensus that are essential to carry out the governance and institutional reforms for a sustainable peace in Anglophone regions, and

consequently in Bakassi peninsula where the government should promote policies development to involve the natives in the management of public affairs.

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## APPENDIX

**Annex 1: Table on Anglophone Crisis**

Initial protests					
Anglophone actors/organism	Date	Strategy	claims	Government response	Government's additive actions
Anglophone lawyers	11 October 2016	Strike in North west region	Translation into English of different laws: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the Uniform Acts OHADA (Organisation for the Harmonisation of Corporate Law in Africa),</li> <li>- African Conference on Insurance Markets</li> <li>- other laws voted by the Cameroonian parliament;</li> </ul> The preservation of the specificity of Common Law,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Translation of the OHADA</li> <li>- Creation of a section of Common Law at the Supreme Court</li> <li>- Creation of a Section of the Common Law at the National School of Administration and Magistracy</li> <li>- Replacement of some Francophone magistrates by Anglophone in the North west and South west courts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- January 2017: creation of a National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism.</li> </ul>
Anglophone teachers	21 November 2016	Strike	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- exclusivity of Anglo-Saxon educational system in Anglophone regions</li> <li>- Critics on the appointment of Francophones teachers in the Anglophone regions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Special recruitment of a thousand (1000) Bilingual Teachers</li> </ul>	

<b>Shift of initial corporatist protestations of Lawyers and Teachers to political claims</b>					
<b>Anglophone actor/organism</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Strategy</b>	<b>claims</b>	<b>Government response</b>	<b>Government's additive actions</b>
Trade unions of Anglophone Lawyers and teachers	Since December 2016	Strike	- protest against marginalization and discrimination of Anglophone community - the return to the federal system or secession,	late 2016 early 2017 - repression by the national police - blockage of internet access in Anglophone regions for 3 months - banning of Anglophone activities with secessionist goal - December 2017: release of 289 detained Anglophone activists	November 2018: creation of National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Committee (NDDRC)
Anglophone lawyers and other Anglophone movements			- project the creation of a new Anglophone bar - calls for the independence of Southern via internet - fires on administrative buildings, operations dead cities and punitive operation for people who does not respect their instructions		
<b>Federalist trend</b>					
Anglophone opposition political elites		Propagation of the federalist cause  Boycott of the parliamentary sessions	- the recognition of "the Anglophone problem" (marginalization of Anglophone community and their underrepresentation in decision-making) - The return to federalism - The release of all the Anglophone crisis detainees - The support of victims - The set-up of a peace-truth commission for reconciliation.	30th September to 4th October 2019: Organization of a Major National Dialogue	

Anglophone secessionist trend					
Group Name	Leader	Strategy	Funding	Operating mode	Conditions to the government
<b>IG</b> & Affiliated movements - SCACUF - MORISC - SCNC - SCOOP - SCARM	SISIKU Julius AYUK TABE	Working with Front Line Leaders and organizations, all the while putting pressure on African Union and UN		Mutilations, rapes, beheadings, assassinations traditional and religious authorities, administrative, destruction of public infrastructure and public buildings, assassination of defenseless civilians, fire of schools and hospitals, terrorist attacks	<b>Secessionist conditions</b> - A recognition by the Government of an Anglophone problem - dialogue in a neutral territorial with the government - arbitration of the United Nations, the African Union or United States  <b>Federalist conditions if secession failed</b> - The release of all Anglophone detainees, - appointment of an Anglophone vice president - the increase of public investment in the Anglophone regions, - The reconstructions of conflicted areas. - A better political representation of Anglophone regions - A greater autonomy for Anglophone regions in the education and justice
AGC & Affiliated movements: - ADF - ARCC	AYABA CHO Lucas	“Make the Anglophone zones ungovernable until the government realizes that the cost of war is greater than the benefits from exploitation of regions natural resources”	Diaspora funding, extortion, kidnapping and taxation		

<b>Recommendations</b>	
Anglophone separatist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Stop the violence;</li> <li>- accept a dialogue with the government on federalism or effective decentralization</li> </ul>
Anglophone federalist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- pressure on the separatists and the government to encourage the dialogue</li> </ul>
The government	<p>Immediate solutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organize a frank dialogue including secessionist Cameroonians in the presence of an international neutral mediator;</li> <li>- give compensation to the victims of the crisis;</li> <li>- carry out reconstruction in the destroyed English-speaking regions;</li> <li>- guarantee the return of refugees;</li> <li>- guarantee the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)</li> <li>- pursue the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants.</li> </ul> <p>long-term solutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- make changes in governance and at the institutional in order to consider the particularities of the judicial and education systems in the Anglophone Regions;</li> <li>- give a wider autonomy to local authorities or greatly reinforce the legal framework of decentralization;</li> <li>- undertake the functioning of local administrations with a veritable administrative and financial autonomy;</li> <li>- Enlarge the competences and resources of the municipalities.</li> <li>- promote policies that make it possible to involve populations in the management of public affairs</li> </ul>

## Annex 2: Withdrawal and transfer of authority form



### CAMEROON-NIGERIA MIXED COMMISSION COMMISSION MIXTE CAMEROUN-NIGERIA

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#### WITHDRAWAL AND TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY FORM FORMULAIRE DE RETRAIT ET DE TRANSFERT D'AUTORITE

Follow-up Committee for the Greentree Agreement  
*Commission de Suivi de l'Accord de Greentree*

Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission  
*Commission Mixte Cameroun-Nigeria*

In conformance with the judgement of 10 October 2002 by the International Court of Justice  
*En application de l'Arrêt de la Cour Internationale de Justice du 10 octobre 2002 et,*

In accordance with the Greentree Agreement of 12 June 2006  
*En conformité avec l'Accord de Greentree du 12 juin 2006*

It is hereby recognized that (a) the withdrawal the Civil Administration and the Police forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the Zone (Annex I (1) and Annex II, Greentree Agreement) and (b) the transfer of authority to the Republic of Cameroon have been completed for the entire Bakassi Peninsula on this day, Thursday 14 August 2008

*Il est reconnu, par le présent acte que (a) le retrait de l'administration civile et des forces de police de la République fédérale du Nigeria de la Zone (Annexe I et Annexe II de l'Accord de Greentree) et (b) le transfert d'autorité à la République du Cameroun sur la totalité de la presqu'île de Bakassi ont été achevés ce jour, jeudi 14 août 2008.*

**Prof. Maurice Kamto**

Minister Delegate at the Ministry of Justice  
Head of the Cameroonian Delegation to the Follow-up Committee  
*Ministre Délégué auprès du Ministre de la Justice, Garde des Sceaux  
Chef de la Délégation du Cameroun à la Commission de Suivi*

**Michael K. Aondoakaa**

Attorney General and Minister of Justice  
Head of the Nigerian Delegation to the Follow-up Committee  
*Ministre de la Justice et Procureur général de la Fédération  
Chef de la Délégation du Nigeria à la Commission de Suivi*

In the presence of / *En présence de*

**Sir Kieran Prendergast**

Chairman of the Follow-up Committee  
*Président de la Commission de Suivi*

For the Federal Republic of Germany  
*Pour la République fédérale d'Allemagne*

For the French Republic  
*Pour la République française*

For the United States of America  
*Pour les Etats-Unis d'Amérique*

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland  
*Pour le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne  
et d'Irlande du Nord*

### Annex 3: PRESS RELEASE

#### The end of the implementation of the Greentree Agreement on Bakassi between



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## COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

### Fin de la mise œuvre de l'accord de Greentree relatif à Bakassi entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria

**Genève, 22 octobre 2013** – La Commission de suivi de la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de Greentree relatif à la Péninsule de Bakassi a tenu sa vingt-troisième et dernière réunion à Genève les 21 et 22 octobre 2013. Les travaux étaient présidés par Said Djinnit, Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest et Président de la Commission de suivi.

Les délégations du Nigeria et du Cameroun étaient conduites respectivement par M. Mohammed Bello Adoke, Ministre fédéral de la justice, et M. Joseph Dion Ngute, Ministre délégué auprès du Ministre des relations extérieures. Les représentants des États témoins de la signature de l'accord - Allemagne, France, États-Unis et Royaume-Uni - ont également pris part à la réunion.

Signé le 12 juin 2006, l'Accord de Greentree régit le transfert de l'autorité du Nigeria au Cameroun sur la Péninsule de Bakassi, en application du jugement rendu par la Cour Internationale de Justice (10 octobre 2002) concernant le conflit frontalier entre les deux pays. Le transfert d'autorité opéré le 14 août 2008 était assorti d'une période spéciale transitoire de cinq ans, venue à expiration le 14 août 2013. Pendant la durée de cette transition, des missions de terrains ont été effectuées dans la zone de Bakassi par un groupe conjoint d'observateurs du Cameroun, du Nigeria, et de l'ONU pour évaluer l'état d'avancement de l'exécution de l'Accord.

Au cours de cette réunion finale, les parties ont examiné le rapport de la dix-neuvième mission d'observation qui s'est déroulée du 18 au 22 Juillet 2013 dans la zone de Bakassi.

A l'issue des délibérations, les trois chefs de délégations à la Commission de suivi ont adopté et signé une déclaration conjointe par laquelle les délégations du Cameroun et du Nigeria "confirment que le régime spécial transitoire d'une durée de cinq (5) ans prévu à l'Annexe I de l'Accord de Greentree a effectivement pris fin le 14 août 2013", et qu'"à compter de cette date, le Cameroun exerce en toute plénitude ses droits de souveraineté sur la Zone délimitée par l'Annexe II de l'Accord". Les deux délégations ont, en outre, réaffirmé la volonté commune de leur pays de renforcer leur coopération bilatérale.

Le Président de la Commission, Said Djinnit, a "salué les deux parties pour leur engagement qui a permis de mener à son terme le processus de mise en œuvre de l'Accord témoignant ainsi de leur attachement à l'état de droit et de l'esprit de bon voisinage qui prévaut à présent entre les deux pays". Il a souligné que "ce processus est un bon exemple en matière de diplomatie préventive."

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*Pour plus d'information: Laurence Gérard, Chargée de l'Information, Bureau des Nations Unies pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest -  
Bureau: +22133-869-8560- Cellulaire: +221-77-332-4928-site internet : unowa.unmissions.org*

## Annex 4: Bakassi peninsula Development Program

REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN

PAIX – TRAVAIL – PATRIE

DECRET N° 2 0 1 7 / 8 8 1 9 /P.M DU 2 1 AOUT 2017

Portant création, organisation et fonctionnement du BAKASSI  
Peninsula Development Program.-

LE PREMIER MINISTRE, CHEF DU GOUVERNEMENT,

- Vu la Constitution ;
- Vu la loi n°2007/006 du 26 décembre 2007 portant Régime Financier de l'Etat ;
- Vu la loi n°2011/008 du 06 mai 2011 d'orientation pour l'aménagement et le développement durable du territoire au Cameroun ;
- Vu le décret n°92/089 du 04 mai 1992 fixant les attributions du Premier Ministre modifié et complété par le décret n°95/145-bis du 04 aout 1995;
- Vu le décret n°2011/408 du 09 décembre 2011 portant organisation du Gouvernement ;
- Vu le décret n°2011/409 du 09 décembre 2011 portant nomination d'un Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement,

### DECRETE :

#### CHAPITRE I

#### DISPOSITIONS GENERALES

**ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>.**- Le présent décret porte création, organisation et fonctionnement du BAKASSI Peninsula Development Program, en abrégé « BADEP », ci-après désigné « le Programme ».

**ARTICLE 2.**- (1) Placé sous la supervision du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement, la BADEP s'exécute dans la péninsule de Bakassi, située dans la Région du Sud-ouest.

(2) La péninsule de Bakassi visée à l'alinéa 1 ci-dessus regroupe les Arrondissements d'Isangele, d'Idabato, de Kombo Abedimo, de Kombo Itindi et de Bamusso

(3) Il a son siège à Isangele.

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**ARTICLE 3.-** La BADEP a pour mission de mettre en œuvre la stratégie de repeuplement de la péninsule de Bakassi.

A ce titre, il est chargé, en relation avec les départements ministériels et organismes concernés, de contribuer à l'exécution des projets contenus dans le document de stratégie de repeuplement de Bakassi, notamment :

- de la facilitation de l'accès dans la zone par voie terrestre et maritime ;
- de la mise en place d'un système permanent de sécurité, en liaison avec les autorités administratives et les forces de sécurité territorialement compétentes ;
- de l'encadrement administratif des populations, en liaison avec les autorités administratives territorialement compétentes ;
- de l'organisation des producteurs en coopératives et comités de développement ;
- de l'identification et de la création des pêcheries ;
- de la construction des campements pour pêcheurs et agriculteurs nationaux à installer dans la péninsule ;
- de la mise en place d'un système viable et fiable d'alimentation en eau potable et en électricité ;
- du suivi des travaux de construction d'une mini centrale électrique sur la rivière « Mana'a » ;
- du développement des infrastructures de production et de transformation des produits de pêche ;
- de la mise en place d'un dispositif de suivi de contrôle et de surveillance des activités de pêches ;
- de la mise en place d'un dispositif de collecte et de commercialisation des produits de la pêche (MIDEPECAM) ;
- du suivi des travaux de construction des points de distribution des produits pétroliers ;
- de la sélection et l'installation des pêcheurs et agriculteurs nationaux ;
- de l'attribution des lots de terrains à usage d'habitation et autres compensations aux populations déplacées ;
- du développement de l'élevage ;
- de l'appui aux activités d'extension des plantations de la PAMOL dans la péninsule de Bakassi ;
- de l'amélioration de la carte sanitaire et scolaire ;
- de l'amélioration des systèmes de télécommunications

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## CHAPITRE II

### DES ORGANES DE GESTION DU PROGRAMME

**ARTICLE 4.-** Les organes de la BADEP sont :

- le Comité d'Orientation ;
- l'Unité Opérationnelle de Gestion.

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### SECTION I

#### DU COMITE D'ORIENTATION

**ARTICLE 5.-** Placé sous l'autorité du Ministre chargé de l'aménagement du territoire, le Comité d'Orientation assure la coordination de la mise en œuvre des activités du Programme, en liaison avec les Administrations et Organismes concernés.

A ce titre, il :

- s'assure que le Programme est exécuté conformément aux objectifs définis ;
- approuve le plan d'action et le budget annuels du Programme ;
- approuve l'organisation interne des unités opérationnelle du Programme ;
- veille à la régularité des contrats et prestations relatifs aux contrats d'études, d'exécution et de suivi évaluation ;
- contrôle la gestion administrative, financière et comptable du Programme ;
- approuve les conventions concernant le Programme ;
- examine et approuve les rapports d'activités et les états financiers du Programme.

**ARTICLE 6.-** (1) Le Comité d'orientation est composé ainsi qu'il suit :

**Président** : le Directeur Général de la Planification et de l'Aménagement du territoire ou son représentant.

**Vice – président** : le Préfet territorialement compétent ou son représentant.

**Membres** :

- un représentant de la Direction Générale de la planification et de l'Aménagement du Territoire ;
- le Commandant d'armes de la place ;
- le Délégué départemental chargé de l'aménagement du territoire ;
- le Délégué départemental chargé de l'eau et de l'énergie;
- le Délégué départemental chargé de l'élevage et de la pêche;
- le Délégué départemental chargé du des domaines pour le NDIAN ;
- le Délégué départemental chargé de l'agriculture ;

- le Délégué départemental chargé des travaux publics ;
- le Délégué départemental chargé des transports ;
- le Délégué départemental chargé de l'environnement ;
- le Délégué départemental chargé du développement urbain et de l'habitat ;
- le Contrôleur Financier Départemental ;
- le représentant départemental des Communes et Villes Unies du Cameroun ;
- un représentant de la SOWEDA, désigné par son Directeur Général ;
- un représentant des autorités traditionnelles de la péninsule, désigné par le Préfet territorialement compétent.

(2) Le Président du Comité d'orientation peut inviter toute personne physique ou morale à prendre part aux travaux du Comité, avec voix consultative en raison de sa compétence sur les points inscrits à l'ordre du jour d'une session.

(3) La composition du Comité est constatée par arrêté du Ministre en charge de l'aménagement du territoire.

**ARTICLE 7.-** (1) Le Comité se réunit en session ordinaire au moins deux (02) fois par an sur convocation de son Président, une fois pour voter le budget et approuver le plan d'action, et l'autre pour arrêter les états financiers annuels et évaluer le fonctionnement du Programme.

(2) Le Comité peut également se réunir en session extraordinaire chaque fois que la situation l'exige.

(3) Les convocations, accompagnées des documents de travail précisant la date, l'heure, le lieu et l'ordre du jour de la réunion sont adressées aux membres quinze (15) jours au moins avant la réunion. En cas d'urgence, ce délai peut être ramené à soixante douze (72) heures.

(4) Le secrétariat des réunions du Comité est assuré par le Coordonnateur de l'Unité Opérationnelle de Gestion du Programme.

(5) A l'issue de chaque réunion, le Président du Comité adresse un rapport qu'il soumet au Ministre chargé de l'aménagement du territoire, à charge pour lui de le transmettre au Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement.

**ARTICLE 8.-** (1) Le Comité ne peut valablement délibérer que si la moitié au moins de ses membres est présente.

(2) Les délibérations du Comité sont adoptées à la majorité simple des membres présents ou représentés. En cas d'égalité des voix, celle du Président est prépondérante.

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## **SECTION II**

### **DE L'UNITE OPERATIONNELLE DE GESTION**

**ARTICLE 9.-** L'Unité Opérationnelle de Gestion est l'organe d'exécution des activités du Programme.

**ARTICLE 10.-** Placée sous l'autorité d'un Coordonnateur, l'Unité Opérationnelle de Gestion est chargée :

- de la planification, de l'organisation et de l'exécution des activités du Programme, en liaison avec les Administrations et les Organismes sectoriels concernés ;
- de la Maîtrise d'Ouvrage des projets à exécuter dans le cadre du Programme ;
- du suivi évaluation de la mise en œuvre du Programme dans toutes ses composantes ;
- du suivi de l'exécution des cahiers de charges des projets des différentes Administrations ;
- de la préparation des sessions du Comité d'orientation ;
- de la préparation des projets de plan d'action et du budget annuels du Programme ;
- de l'élaboration des rapports annuels d'activités techniques, administratives, financières et comptables du Programme ;
- de la préparation des documents techniques du Programme et des protocoles d'entente avec les partenaires ;
- de la coordination des missions de sensibilisation, d'information et de formation des acteurs et autres partenaires du Programme ;
- de l'appui à l'identification, la formulation et la sélection des projets éligibles dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du Programme ;
- de la centralisation des rapports d'activités des missions de suivi évaluation et leur intégration dans le rapport annuel d'activités du Programme ;
- de l'élaboration des documents techniques de planification du Programme pour les phases suivantes sur la base de l'évaluation à mi parcours et de l'évaluation finale du Programme.

**ARTICLE 11.-** (1) Pour l'exécution de ses missions, l'Unité Opérationnelle de Gestion comprend :

- le Département du Développement des Infrastructures et du Repeuplement ;
- le Département du Développement Communautaire et des Activités Socio-économiques ;
- le Département de la Coopération et d'Appui Institutionnel ;

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- le Département des Affaires Administratives et Financières.

(2) l'Unité Opérationnelle de Gestion dispose d'un personnel ne pouvant dépasser un effectif de vingt (20) personnes y compris le personnel d'appui.

(3) Les attributions et les modalités d'organisation et de fonctionnement des Départements visés à l'alinéa 1 ci-dessus sont précisées par le Comité d'Orientation.

**ARTICLE 12.-** Le Coordonnateur de l'Unité Opérationnelle de Gestion est chargé de la mise en œuvre du Programme sous l'autorité du Comité à qui il rend compte.

A ce titre, il:

- élabore le programme d'action et le plan de travail annuels du Programme ;
- prépare le budget, les états financiers et les rapports d'activités et de gestion ;
- assure la direction administrative, technique, et financière du Programme ;
- propose au Comité, l'organisation interne du Programme ;
- élabore les études, les plans et programmes d'aménagement, d'équipement, de renouvellement, de développement et d'investissement du Programme ;
- prépare les dossiers techniques en vue des négociations avec les partenaires ;
- centralise et conserve la documentation et les archives du Comité ;
- ouvre des comptes de dépôt du Programme à la Paierie Générale du Trésor ;
- engage les dépenses du Programme conformément au budget approuvé par le Comité ;
- représente le Programme dans tous les actes de la vie civile et en justice ;
- exécute toute autre mission à lui confiée par le Comité, en rapport avec les objectifs du Programme.

**ARTICLE 13.-** Le Coordonnateur de l'Unité Opérationnelle de Gestion est nommé par arrêté du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement, sur proposition du Ministre en charge de l'aménagement du territoire.

## **CHAPITRE II**

### **DISPOSITIONS FINANCIERES**

**ARTICLE 14.-** Les ressources de la BADEP proviennent :

- des dotations de l'Etat ;
- des financements des partenaires au développement ;
- des produits générés directement ou indirectement par ses activités ;
- des dons et legs.

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**ARTICLE 15.-** (1) Les ressources de la BADEP sont des deniers publics. Elles sont gérées suivant les règles et principes de la comptabilité publique.

(2) Un Contrôleur Financier et un Agent Comptable peuvent, en temps que de besoin être nommés auprès du Programme par le Ministre chargé des finances.

(3) les contributions des partenaires au développement sont domiciliées dans un compte ouvert à cet effet dans un établissement bancaire de premier ordre agréé par l'autorité monétaire.

**ARTICLE 16.-** Le Coordonnateur de l'Unité Opérationnelle de Gestion est l'ordonnateur du budget du Programme.

**ARTICLE 17.-** (1) Le Programme est soumis au contrôle des organes compétents de l'Etat, dans les conditions fixées par les lois et règlements en vigueur.

(2) Le Comité peut, en tant que de besoin, commettre des audits financiers et comptables du Programme.

**CHAPITRE III**  
**DU PERSONNEL**

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**ARTICLE 18.-** (1) La BADEP peut employer :

- le personnel recruté directement ;
- les fonctionnaires et agents relevant du code du travail.

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(2) Les fonctionnaires et agents relevant du code du travail affectés au Programme sont soumis durant toute la durée de leur emploi, selon leurs statuts, aux règles régissant le fonctionnement du Programme, aux dispositions du Statut Général de la Fonction Publique de l'Etat ou à celles du Code du Travail.

**ARTICLE 19.-** (1) Les Chefs de départements visés à l'article 11 ci-dessus sont recrutés par appel à candidatures selon les modalités fixées par le Ministre en charge de l'aménagement du territoire.

(2) Le recrutement du personnel d'appui se fait par le Coordonnateur de l'Unité Opérationnelle de Gestion, en fonction des besoins, profils requis, après approbation du Comité d'Orientation.

(3) Les recrutements visés aux alinéas 1 et 2 ci-dessus, ne sont définitifs qu'après :

- la prise de service, pour les fonctionnaires et les agents de l'Etat relevant du Code du Travail ;

- la signature du contrat de travail par le Président du Comité d'Orientation, pour les personnels recrutés directement par le Programme, après avis des membres dudit Comité ;
- la signature de la décision par le Coordonnateur de l'Unité Opérationnelle de Gestion pour les personnels d'appui.

**ARTICLE 20.**- Les modalités de rémunération des personnels de la BADEP sont fixées par une décision du Ministre chargé de l'aménagement du territoire, après approbation du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement.

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#### **CHAPITRE IV**

#### **DES DISPOSITIONS DIVERSES ET FINALES**

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**ARTICLE 21.**- Les manuels de procédures administrative, financière et comptable sont définis par des documents particuliers du Programme approuvés par le Comité.

**ARTICLE 22.**- (1) Le BADEP produit un rapport annuel des activités qui précise le niveau d'exécution des projets et indique leur impact sur l'amélioration des conditions de vie des populations.

(2) Le rapport visé à l'alinéa 1 ci-dessus est transmis au Ministre chargé de l'aménagement du territoire, à charge pour lui de le transmettre au Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement.

**ARTICLE 23.**- La durée du Programme est de cinq (05) ans éventuellement renouvelable.

**ARTICLE 24.**- (1) Il est mis fin aux activités de toutes les instances ad hoc intervenant dans la péninsule de Bakassi, dès la mise en service effective de la BADEP.

(2) Copies des documents et autres archives tenus par les instances visées à l'alinéa 1 ci-dessus sont transférées à la BADEP, à la demande du Coordonnateur de l'Unité Opérationnelle de Gestion.

**ARTICLE 25.**- Un mécanisme de transfert des acquis du Programme aux Collectivités Territoriales Décentralisées concernées est mis en place pour assurer la reprise et le suivi par ces dernières, des ouvrages, équipements et projets réalisés.

**ARTICLE 26.**- (1) Le Président, les membres et toute personnalité invitée à titre consultatif, bénéficient d'une indemnité de session, et le cas échéant, du remboursement de leurs frais de déplacement et autres charges occasionnées par les réunions sur présentation des pièces justificatives.

(2) Le taux de l'indemnité visé à l'alinéa 1 ci-dessus, est fixé conformément à la réglementation en vigueur.

(3) Les frais de fonctionnement du Comité d'Orientation sont supportés par le budget de l'État.

(4) Le Président du Comité d'Orientation bénéficie d'une indemnité trimestrielle dont le montant est fixé par décision du Ministre chargé de l'aménagement du territoire, après approbation du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement.

**ARTICLE 27.**- Le Ministre en charge de l'aménagement du territoire est chargé de l'application du présent décret qui sera enregistré, publié suivant la procédure d'urgence, puis inséré au Journal Officiel en français et en anglais./-

Yaoundé, 21 AOÛT 2017

**LE PREMIER MINISTRE,  
CHEF DU GOUVERNEMENT**



**Philémon YANG**

SERVICES DU PREMIER MINISTRE  
SECRETARIAT GÉNÉRAL  
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## Annex 6: MAP OF CAMEROON'S RESOURCES



Sources : Atlas de l'Afrique, Les Éditions du Jaguar, 2015 ; Jeune Afrique ; Institut national de la statistique du Cameroun ; Georges Duby, Grand Atlas historique, Larousse, 2011.

## 추상

바카시 반도 국경 분쟁에 관한 국제 사법 재판소의 판결 :

카메룬의 앵글 폰 위기에 미치는 영향

보태아 으족구 이바 하 마 웨디  
국제 분야 연구  
국제학 연구과  
서울 대학교

이 연구는 바카시 반도 국경 분쟁과 관련된 2002년 10월 10일 국제 사법 재판소 판결이 카메룬의 “축구 위기”에 미치는 영향을 분석합니다. 실제로 이 판결은 나이지리아와의 국경 분쟁 후 바카시 반도에 대한 카메룬의 주권을 인정하여 국제 사법 재판소 (ICJ) 이전에 평화적으로 해결되었다. 그러나 평화를 결정적으로 회복시키기보다는 주간 분쟁에 대한 평화로운 정착은 카메룬의 영토 지역에서 내부 갈등을 일으켰습니다. 이 연구를 수행하기 위해 우리는 질적 방법을 구성 주의적 접근법과 결합하여 진행 중인 위기를 분석했습니다. 우리 작업의 결과물은 이 문제에 관한 책, 기사, 신문, 비디오 및 보고서에서 나옵니다. 연구가 끝났을 때, 우리는 바카시 반도에 대한 경제적 지분이 영국 정부 공동체와 정부 사이에서 과거 지배권을 받았지만 영국 정부 위기의 발발을 일으킨 촉매제 중 하나라는 것을 관찰했다. 사회적 주장에 의해 시작된 이 위기는 점진적으로

정치화되었고, 결국 분리 주의적 주장에 의해 유발된 무력 충돌로 바뀌었다. 이와 관련하여, 이 위기의 해결은 각국의 솔직한 대화와 상호 양보뿐만 아니라 특히 정책을 보장하기 위해 주변의 평화로운 정착을 촉진함으로써 국내뿐만 아니라 국제적 차원에서 행동을 통합해야 한다. 국가의 부를 공정하고 공평하게 재분배하기 위해

키워드 : 갈등, 위기, 영어

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