“Meiji versus Postwar” in Cold War Japan: The Emergence of Economic Nationalism in the 1960s

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Abstract | In the 1960s, Takeuchi Yoshimi urged a public debate over the “Meiji Restoration centennial.” Concerned about the potential for the marginalized and suppressed “national perspective” to emerge as “ultranationalism,” Takeuchi called on the “pro-West” and “pro-Japan” factions to jointly seize the initiative with respect to the “national issue.”

The discourse surrounding the “Meiji Restoration centennial” in the 1960s initially developed relative to its encounter with American modernization theory, provoking a “Meiji boom,” or the idea that the Meiji era was a “successful case of modernization” (Meiji = modernity). Meanwhile, debates over the Meiji centennial were preceded by those over the “postwar vicennial.” Following declarations of “the end of the postwar” and a progressive “transformation” in the social and economic structure of the nation, the notion of “postwar” became synonymous with “democracy.” Engaging with these developments, the discourse on the Meiji centennial passed into a new phase defined by the question: “Is it [more important to celebrate the] Meiji [centennial] or the postwar [vicennial]?” The debate thus evolved into a conflict between establishment and anti-establishment factions. It was at this time that Takeuchi retracted his comments on the Meiji centennial.

Ultimately, it was economic nationalism, rather than the “ultranationalism” (kageki na nashonarizumu) that had concerned Takeuchi, that emerged as the dominant discourse to accompany the Meiji centennial. This new form of ultranationalism was based upon the intellectual and material developments that accompanied the ascendant contexts of modernization theory, “transformation,” and high economic growth during the 1960s. Takeuchi’s attempt to seize the initiative regarding the national issue through debate over the Meiji centennial was thus interrupted before the effectiveness of his idea to create a more progressive nationalist discourse could be realized. With the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration in 2018, concerns over “ultranationalism” have once again emerged alongside the “intellectually sterile” idea of “Meiji versus postwar.” A return to the unfinished debate of the 1960s thus also holds significance for contemporary Japan.

Keywords | Meiji Restoration centennial, Takeuchi Yoshimi, modernism, the national issue, modernization, modernization theory, Meiji versus postwar, economic nationalism

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Introduction

In 2018, Japan commemorated the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration. As expected, the Japanese government organized events such as the 150th Anniversary of the Meiji Restoration Memorial Ceremony (Constitution Memorial Hall [Kensei Kinenkan], October 23, 2018) to link the future of Japan with the “Meiji ascent.” With publications and plans related to the anniversary of the Meiji Restoration ubiquitous in public forums and the media, a certain dynamic emerged reminiscent of the Meiji centennial commemoration. As critic of the “post-postwar” generation¹ Azuma Hiroki (1971- ) observed, Japan was once again reducing everything to a polarized notion of “postwar or Meiji” (Azuma 2018). Literary critic Katō Norihiro (1948-2019), a member of the “1968 Zenkyōtō generation,”² further emphasized that what Japan needed at this time was not a sense of attempting to trace modern national history through the competitive oppositional dichotomy of “Is it postwar or Meiji?” that had defined the “Meiji centennial,” but a new expansive emphasis on “neither postwar nor Meiji.” To confront the discourse of “revere the emperor, expel the barbarians” (sonnō jōi), which has periodically resurfaced in Japan over the past eighty years, and is arguably bound to resurface in the future, Katō argued for a “three hundred-year perspective.” The aim of this would be to locate the origin of contemporary Japan prior to Meiji and the postwar in the early Edo period (Katō 2017, 62-63). In similar terms, Azuma declared that avoiding the “intellectual sterility” of the “Is it Meiji or the postwar?” debate depended on the creation of a liberal nationalist historical ideology tempered by a “three hundred-year perspective.”

Public debate in the 1960s over the conflict between Meiji and the postwar was initially not adversarial. The discussion began with Takeuchi Yoshimi’s (1910-77) comments regarding the “Meiji Restoration centennial.” Takeuchi called on the pro-West and pro-Japan factions to jointly seize the initiative with respect to the national issue to preempt an extreme nationalist backlash.³ Retracing how the “Meiji versus postwar” problem emerged out of the Meiji centennial discourse is therefore relevant in considering the latest intellectual attempts to deal with the recent problem of extreme nationalism that has resurfaced with the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration.

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1. Here, the “post-postwar” generation refers to Japanese born after 1970 (Katō 1998, 5).
2. The generation that experienced the 1968 student movement led by the “All-Campus Joint Struggle Committee” (Zengaku Kyōtō Kaigi).
3. The conflict between the “pro-West” and “pro-Japan” factions in Japan was analogous to the conflict between the “pro-West” and “pro-Slav” (i.e. nationalist) factions in Russia.
“Meiji Restoration Centennial” Discourse: Seizing the Initiative Regarding the National Issue

Declarations on the end of the “postwar” in Japan began with the publication of the 1956 Economic White Paper. In contrast to its original purpose, the White Paper’s declaration that “it is no longer the postwar” came to hold a place in the collective national memory as a powerful slogan heralding a bright future. As the 1960s began, the Japanese media began to speculate about the prospects for the coming decade. Commissioned by the editorial board of the Weekly Reader (Shūkan dokushojin), Takeuchi Yoshiomi wrote an article discussing the outlook listing the tasks for public discourse in the 1960s. Anxious about the potential for ultranationalism to reemerge if the public discourse excluded or ignored “national things,” Takeuchi (1981b, 60) suggested some preventative measures:

I would like to suggest that public discourse adopt a common agenda with respect to 1968: Should we commemorate the Meiji Restoration centennial or not? If so, how exactly should we carry out this commemoration? Personally, I hope the Meiji Restoration centennial will be an event defining the “golden sixties.” I would like to see a campaign depicting the future of the revolution, correcting the factual distortions and twisted sense of history regarding the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and the US signed one hundred years ago, and dealing with the nostalgia for National Foundation Day…. What are national things? What is tradition? The answers to such questions cannot be left to the nationalists. There is a need for the pro-West and pro-Japan factions to confront each other. (Takeuchi 1981b, 62-63)

Takeuchi thus appealed for public debate regarding “Meiji Restoration centennial” in the 1960s. Of importance was his imperative that the pro-West and pro-Japan factions within the national intelligentsia cooperatively prioritize this matter. This would help to offset historical distortions regarding the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and the US (pro-West faction) and nostalgia for National Foundation Day (pro-Japan faction). Also notable was his recommendation that the “modernist” French literature specialist Kuwabara Takeo (1904-88) lead the campaign to promote the Meiji centennial discourse (Takeuchi 1981b, 63).

According to the author of Modernism (Kindai shugi, 1964) Hidaka Rokurō (1917-2018), “modernist” was at this moment a pejorative term describing “those with modernist tendencies,” while the term “modernism” was synonymous with

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4. Regarding the formation of social memory surrounding the slogan, “It is no longer the ‘postwar,’” see Shimizu (2015).
“westernization.” These conceptions reflected the fact that one of the most important problems with “modernism” in Japanese history since the Meiji Restoration had been the conflation of “modernization and Westernization” (Hidaka 1964, 7, 10). Takeuchi here also used “modernism” in a highly judgmental sense. In his view, “modernism” was a general term for cultural matters that excluded “any consideration of the nation” (Takeuchi 1981a, 32). In that case, why would he have recommended a “modernist” such as Kuwabara?

A representative example of a postwar “modernist” intellectual collective was the “Lectures School” (Kōzaha), an influential group of Marxist historians in postwar Japan. According to the Lectures School, Meiji-era Japanese society was a remnant of feudal society that concluded in the totalitarianism of emperor worship and military dictatorship. At this moment in which the Meiji period was generally viewed as “feudal,” an article entitled “A Reevaluation of Meiji” appeared in the Asahi Newspaper (Kuwabara 1956). In this article, “modernist” Kuwabara presented his theory of why the Meiji period was so negatively evaluated. This theory, presenting a more positive assessment of the period, greatly affected Takeuchi’s perception of Japan’s modernists. He considered that this shift provided an intuitive platform for the “future of the revolution” he imagined.

In terms of elucidating this idea of “revolution,” Kuwabara argued that the Meiji period witnessed a national commitment to independence and desire for modernization that needed to be reevaluated from a “progressive position.” The reason for this was that, although Japan had displayed many flaws and contradictions over its recent history, there was no hope for the future without recognizing the Meiji Restoration as a great national achievement (Kuwabara 1956). Kuwabara had arrived at this theory reconciling a modernist position with a positive view of the Meiji period after visiting the Soviet Union and China in 1955, where he found the Meiji Restoration portrayed as a “revolution.” This experience is also discernible in Kuwabara’s use of certain terms in “A Reevaluation of Meiji,” such as “revolution,” “nation,” and “China”—all terms sympathetic to Takeuchi’s intellectual disposition. In turn, in an article entitled “Meiji Restoration Centennial: Thoughts and Suggestions” (Takeuchi 1980b),

5. According to Wada Haruki’s (1938- ) classification, however, here “modernization” refers to “classical modernization” (i.e. modernism), distinct from “contemporary modernization theory” (i.e. 1960s “modernization theory”) (Wada 1966, 3).

6. Takeuchi was shocked to encounter a modernist evaluation of Meiji that was positive (Kuwabara et al. 1962, 178-79). Kuwabara also stated that he and Takeuchi possessed similar as well as different qualities (Kuwabara and Takeuchi 1970, 155).

Takeuchi insisted that his suggestions went no further than “Kuwabara’s commentary” (Takeuchi 1980b, 236-37). Endowed with an excellent journalistic sense and able to attract the attention of both the pro-West and pro-Japan factions, Kuwabara’s work was widely considered to have ushered in a “golden age of cooperative research” in the 1950s (Suzuki 2014, 120). This was the reason why Takeuchi recommended this “modernist” to lead the Meiji centennial discourse.

1. The Encounter with Modernization Theory: “Meiji as Modernity”

Takeuchi’s public discussion of the Meiji Restoration centennial commenced in a January 1962 *Central Review* (Chūō kōron) article entitled “The Meaning of the Meiji Restoration: Tasks of the Ninety-Fifth Year” (Kuwabara et al. 1962). Matsushima Eiichi (1917-2002) mediated the discussion between Kuwabara, Takeuchi, and Hani Gorō (1901-83). The *Central Review* editorial board declared its aim in the article to devote the year 1962 to reevaluating the Meiji Restoration as the “basis for contemporary Japan’s modernization” (176). In this respect, Takeuchi also elaborated his suggestion to discuss the Meiji centennial in terms of modernization.

Perhaps the danger of yet another surprise outbreak persists because we could not stop the rise of Japanese fascism during the war and relied on some other force…. Modernism [alone] doesn't quite guarantee a positive result. So, in a broad sense, perhaps one might observe the need for more national or nativist aspects. It should essentially be modernization based on these kinds of aspects…. So, occasionally they’re criticized as nationalists and sometimes more severely as fascists, but I argue that perhaps these kinds of people are also necessary. There is the idea that we can forego rediscovering or re-excavating the Meiji Restoration, forget the Meiji Restoration itself, and simply begin in 1945, but I don't think that's quite adequate. In this respect, perhaps we should reconsider the modernization of Japan in terms of continuity with the Meiji Restoration. It was in thinking about this that the term “Meiji Restoration centennial” came to me. (Kuwabara et al. 1962, 177-78)

Here, just as he had two years before, Takeuchi expresses the idea that a focus on modernism, which excluded a nationalist perspective, would be powerless to oppose a fascist nationalist backlash. A more fundamental basis for the “postwar” national discourse was needed, which required the mediation of nationalist and nativist perspectives, and this would require the rediscovery or the creation of continuity with the achievements of the Meiji Restoration.

Hani Gorō, the discussant representing the Lectures School, pointed out the logical ambiguity of Takeuchi’s “nativist aspects”: “Japan’s modernization problem is
not a problem of transistors but of the Japanese people” (Kuwabara et al. 1962, 180-82). Hani, a popular figure and self-acknowledged modernist, here also acknowledged the limits of modernism, and the precise limits he acknowledged were the “people.” Meanwhile, Takeuchi agreed with Hani’s opinion that “modernization” should be measured not in terms of material indices (industrialization, imperialism) but the “freedom of the people.” However, he questioned whether the “people,” as an idealized category, could actually exist as a historical subject (182). Confronted by each other’s logical ambiguity and conceptual uncertainty, then, the critic of modernism Takeuchi and the modernist Hani concluded their discussion without being able to reconcile their notions of “nation” and the “people.”

Kuwabara, the other modernist in the discussion, argued that “one could not discuss modernization without material factors.” Stipulating the various elements of “modernization” as “individualism, democracy, industrialization, capitalism, national education, national army,” and so forth, he declared Meiji modernization “insufficient” in terms of the development of democracy and individualism but “successful overall” (Kuwabara et al. 1962, 177). This echoed the evaluation of Meiji by Edwin O. Reischauer (1910-90), a representative modernization theory historian of the 1960s. Just a year earlier, a special Central Review issue (September 1961) on “Japan’s modernization” featured a well-known discussion between Reischauer and Nakayama Ichirō (1898-1980) entitled “A Reevaluation of Japanese Modernization.” Reischauer argued that modern Japan was characterized by certain problems such as militarism, but that Japan’s modernization was generally a great success (Reischauer and Nakayama 1961, 97). In this respect, Kuwabara was recognized as following Reischauer’s line of reasoning.

In an interview with Takeuchi entitled “One Hundred Years of Japan’s Modernity,” however, Kuwabara objected to modernization theory’s portrayal of Japan’s modernization as a “model” for continental Asia and Africa, denying the claim that “Kuwabara = Reischauer.” He insisted that in continental Asia and Africa, which he simplistically considered to have uniformly long been under colonial rule, there existed no historical development as had been accumulated over three hundred years of Tokugawa Japan. Furthermore, he even argued that the people of these places were “not as diligent as the Japanese” (Kuwabara and Takeuchi 1970, 160-62). Despite the overt flaws of this assessment, 1960s modernization theorists, including Reischauer (1997, 29-35), commonly touted this theory of endogenous modernization, which emphasized the similarity

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8. The interview was conducted in October 1964, three months before its publication in Kyodo News (Kyōdō tsūshin).
Table 1. The elements of modernization (Kuwabara 1964)

(1) Political democracy  
(2) Concentration of capital for the national economy  
(3) Industrial transition from handicrafts to factories (particularly, advancement and mechanization of science and technology)  
(4) Nationwide compulsory education  
(5) Establishment of national army for national defense  
(6) In terms of consciousness, liberation from the community and the maturation of individualism

Table 2. The characteristics of a modernized society (AAS 1960; Hall 1961, 44-45)

(1) A comparatively high degree of urbanization  
(2) Widespread literacy  
(3) Comparatively high per capita income  
(4) Extensive geographical and social movement  
(5) Relatively high degree of commercialization and industrialization within the economy  
(6) An extensive and penetrative network of mass communication media  
(7) Widespread participation and involvement by members of the society in modern social and economic processes  
(8) A relatively highly organized bureaucratic form of government with widespread involvement by members of the society  
(9) An increasingly rational and secular orientation of the individual to his environment based on the growth of scientific knowledge

between the Tokugawa regime and Western feudal institutions and the idea that the Tokugawa era witnessed the sprouting of Japanese modernization. This somewhat reduced the persuasiveness of Kuwabara’s denial of “Kuwabara = Reischauer.”

Meanwhile, Kuwabara had already theorized the elements of “modernization” in his article “Tradition and Modernity” (Dentō to kindai 1964 [originally published in 1957]) (table 1), prior to the listing of the features of modern societies

9. Regarding the relationship between these elements and Japan’s “modernization,” Kuwabara (1964, 211) regarded the first and sixth as “unsuccessful” and the rest as “successful.”
by American scholars at the Hakone Conference (August – September 1960) (table 2). As shown in table 1, by first listing “political democracy,” Kuwabara conformed to the perspective of the Japanese scholars who attended the Hakone Conference. As mentioned above, the public debate over the Meiji centennial began in the January 1962 issue of *Central Review*. Here, the editorial board had declared the focus to be on reevaluating “modernization” and the Meiji, with respect to a planned extension of the 1961 special issue on “Japan’s modernization” (Kuwabara et al. 1962, 176). In turn, the special issue itself had been a continuation of modernization theory introduced through the Hakone Conference held in the summer of 1960. Through these discussions, mediated by the discourse surrounding the Meiji centennial and modernization theory, the mainstream early postwar image of Meiji as “(semi-)feudal” was transformed, and the period was recast as the foundations of Japan’s “modernity.”

2. The Two “Modernizations” of the Postwar Era: “Transformation” and “Modernization”

The term “modernization” began as a methodological concept used by American historians and sociologists (Kawashima 1963, 4). As chair of the Hakone Conference John W. Hall (1916-97) made clear, the concept of “modernization” was essentially a “product of a scholarly system of classification” (Hall 1968, 14-15). It was also American academics who transplanted “modernization theory” to Japan. In the mid-1960s, observing “posters proclaiming ‘lifestyle modernization’ hung at bank tellers’ windows and advertisements with expressions such as ‘the modernization of tofu houses,’” Kaida Ikuo (1966) remarked that “the term ‘modernization’ has been so widely discussed for a number of years now as to have become fashionable [in mainstream society]” (317).

These examples could be explained in terms of the global influence of American modernization theory in the 1960s, but there is room to consider the independent context of “post-postwar” Japan, in which populist sentiment and culture was equally important. Ushering in a new era under the slogan “It is no longer the ‘postwar,’” Japan’s July 1956 White Paper (Keizai Kikakuchō 1956) conveyed a particular conception of “modernization” that preceded the popularization of modernization theory in the 1960s. Declarations of “the end of the postwar” began with literary critic Nakano Yoshio’s (1903-85) article entitled “It is No Longer the ‘Postwar,’” published in the February 1956 edition of *Literary Review*.

10. Fourteen Western scholars, including Reischauer, and fifteen Japanese scholars, including Maruyama Masao (1914-96), attended the conference.
Spring and Autumn (Bungei shunjū). Arguing that the term “postwar” had been used to acquit Japan of its past crimes, Nakano sought to end and historicize the “postwar” (Nakano 1956, 57). Additionally, he argued that in this new era the post-postwar Japan should seek a “wise and rational” approach to international relations and a new generation of leaders, and as a “minor nation,” pursue a new idea of “human happiness” while discarding “imperial delusions” (58-66).

The idea that “it is no longer the ‘postwar’” emerged in this context. Referenced in the 1956 White Paper, this notion developed into a popular and timely slogan for an era that emphasized expansive economic development. Yet, within the White Paper, there was no mention of a “bright future” in the post-postwar era. The document rather described how Japan’s rapid postwar economic recovery was possible due to the revitalizing power of reconstruction and the amicable global situation at the time but that this era was now over, and “modernization” now provided the only path forward for the Japanese economy. The White Paper’s basic conclusion was that “modernization” should be the national goal of the “post-postwar era,” an ambition that would require renewed will and determination.

The notable point here is the association between the “post-postwar” era and “modernization.” The White Paper defined “modernization” as a “process of self-remodeling” and used the term interchangeably with “transformation” (Keizai Kikakuchō 1956). While “modernization” eventually became the dominant term in 1960s Japan, at this point modernization and transformation were widely used interchangeably, and both were often deployed in economic discourses. The 1960s term “modernization” thus naturally succeeded the term “transformation” during the late 1950s. In this respect, it could even be said that “modernization” ushered in the 1960s. Regarding 1960s modernization theory, its most intrinsic characteristic was its transplantation to Japan by American scholars. However, as with the term “modernization,” there is room for examining how the dissemination of modernization theory in Japan was mediated relative to the unique national context.

The Heterogenous Cold War Space: The Distortion of “Meiji Restoration Centennial” Discourse

In the discussion with Takeuchi on “One Hundred Years of Japan’s Modernity” (Kuwabara and Takeuchi 1970), Kuwabara described that it was Takeuchi who

11. This discussion was conducted in October 1964.
had first called for a public debate on the “national issue.” Prompted by this comment, Takeuchi offered the following recollection:

Perhaps this was in 1946 or 1947. While dealing with the nationalism in Asia issue at the IPR [Institute of Pacific Relations], Owen Lattimore’s [Professor at Leeds University and authority on Asian issues] perspective was also introduced to Japan. There was something somewhat disturbing about the idea of nationalism appearing in Asia at a time when it was totally absent from Japan and thought to have completely disappeared from the world…. It was around this time, when the strength to consider nationalism once again was gradually gathering, that Mr. Kuwabara published his essay, “A Reevaluation of Meiji.” I think there was a gradual shift in mood at this time toward viewing nationalism as an unavoidable and undeniable fact. (Kuwabara and Takeuchi 1970, 157-58)

Piecing Kuwabara and Takeuchi’s recollections together, it is possible to discern that discourse on the “nation” reemerged in postwar Japan under the influence of the Institute of Pacific Relations’ (IPR, 1925-61) highlighting of nationalism in Asia. Takeuchi first raised this issue in the early 1950s, followed by Kuwabara in the late 1950s with “A Reevaluation of Meiji,” and Takeuchi again in the 1960s with his proposed “Meiji Restoration centennial” discourse.

The specific event that Takeuchi references in the passage above was the IPR’s eleventh Pacific Conference held October 3-15, 1950: “Nationalism in the Far East and Its International Influence.” Takeuchi (1981a) first referred to the conference as the “Lucknow Conference” in “Modernism and the National Problem” published in the September 1951 issue of Literature (Bungaku), arguing that Japan would be able to reestablish relations within the “proper” nationalism of Asian states only when it had resolved its own “national (minzoku) problem” (34). Here, Takeuchi related the IPR Lucknow Conference to the reopening of postwar “national” discourse to demonstrate the association between the latter and the international movement known as “nationalism in Asia.”12 In linking the Meiji centennial discourse with the much earlier Lucknow Conference of 1951, moreover, perhaps he desired to distance this discourse from the Meiji boom engendered by the popularization of modernization theory in the 1960s. Takeuchi here seemed to perceive that the “Meiji reevaluation” offered by Walt Whitman Rostow (1916-2003)13 and Reischauer’s modernization theory

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12. Regarding Takeuchi’s Asian nationalism and Japanese nationalism, see Lee Kyunghee (2019a, 174-205).
13. Another joint discussion focusing on the modernization of the Japanese economy in light of Rostow’s (1959, 1960) theory of economic growth was held in Japan in the summer of 1960, hosted by the Japan Cultural Forum.
foreshadowed the discourse of “Japan as a great power” (Kuwabara and Takeuchi 1970, 160). However, Takeuchi’s comments in this regard are relatively opaque, and it is therefore difficult to fully extract his position on the matter.

With regards to the continuity between Meiji centennial discourse and those of the “nation,” which had reemerged under the influence of the IPR Lucknow Conference, another aspect of the Japanese context was particularly relevant. Through its publication *Pacific Affairs*, the IPR had begun to display a “pro-China, anti-Japan” partisanship as Japan’s relations with China completely unraveled. After international criticism of Japan mounted following the commencement of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Japan formally seceded from the IPR in 1939 (Nagao 1985, 7-11). However, in the US in the 1950s, the pro-China IPR became a victim of the anti-communist purge that spread in the wake of House Representative Joseph Raymond McCarthy’s (1908-57) speech on February 9, 1950. In 1955, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) revoked the IPR’s tax-exempt status as a non-profit organization, and the IPR struggled with financial difficulties before disbanding in 1961.14 Meanwhile, the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) had established the Modern Japan Research Association in 1958, initiating the Modernization of Japan Research Project (Hakone, 1960). Thus, following the dissolution of the IPR, which had been the dominant American research institute focused on East Asia prior to the war, the core of research on Japan in the US shifted to the AAS, and this suited those scholars in the US seeking to make a more positive assessment of the imperial Meiji Era.

Amidst the anti-communist atmosphere that prevailed in the wake of the Lucknow Conference, the idea that nationalism in Asia was a useful “aspiration for liberation and independence” became all but heresy. Instead, the “red hand of Moscow” was seen as being behind the rising tide of nationalism (Sasaki 1998, 271). In Japan, however, the reemergence of the discourse on “nation” as Japan reestablished its ties with the IPR was relatively free of interference from McCarthyism, ironically due to its disassociation with the organization since 1939. At the same time, there is a need to consider how this dynamic may have assuaged postwar Japan’s sense of historical guilt with respect to Asia. The IPR Asia Conference was held for the first time in fifteen years in Kyoto, Japan in 1954.15 As the first international conference held in postwar Japan (Yamaoka 2010, 6), this could have had the effect of announcing Japan’s readmittance to international society. The reopening of the “nation” discourse in Japan in the

14. The cessation of Rockefeller Foundation (RF) support in the 1950s was also related to suspicion over the IPR’s “leftist bias.” See Sasaki (2003).

15. The theme at this time was “Economic, Political, and Social Problems Related to Improving Living Standards in the Far East.” The IPR conference in Kyoto was the first held since 1929.
1950s under IPR influence therefore developed into the Meiji centennial discourse of the 1960s, and the enthusiasm for reevaluating the Meiji era that arose in turn, then also encountered the modernization theory promoted by the AAS. For this reason, the “nation” discourse that resumed in postwar Japan highlighted the shift from the influence of the IPR to that of the AAS. Therefore, it would be accurate to state that the combined influence of the IPR and AAS led to the Meiji boom of the 1960s. However, for the Meiji boom to occur, it was important that Japan first discovered the “postwar vicennial,” as this experience was an influential component of the discourse surrounding the “Meiji centennial” that emerged in the 1960s.

The Birth of “Meiji versus Postwar” and Economic Nationalism

1. The Preceding “Postwar Vicennial”: The Birth of “Meiji versus Postwar”

In April 1965, the Asahi Newspaper featured eight articles in a series entitled “The Meiji Centennial and Postwar Vicennial.” An advertisement for the article stated the following: “To point out the problems of the book in question, a debate commences between Takeyama Michio, Noma Hiroshi, and eight other critics! Showdown between a leader who says the postwar is a delusion and an intellectual who says he will stand on the side of postwar democracy!” Here, the “book in question” was a bestseller released a month earlier, entitled Dangerous Intellectuals: Those Who Deny Postwar Democracy. In this, the author Yamada Munemutsu (1925- ) described the “dangerous intellectuals” as those who speak of “peace, democracy, and progressivism” as “delusions” (Yamada 1965, 3). Accompanying this accusation was a confrontational statement:

This manner of denying the postwar [denying the previous contexts of despotism and the war] is an attempt to place Japan once again within the frame of the Restoration, which walked the path of despotism and war for one hundred years. 1968, three years from now, corresponds to the Meiji Restoration centennial. Those who deny the postwar intend to band together and use this as an opportunity. Will the Restoration centennial or the postwar vicennial win out? Japan's future indeed depends on this outcome. As for myself, I shall stand on the side of the postwar vicennial. (Yamada 1965, 22)

Interpreting the dismissal of the importance of the “postwar” period as a “delusion” that equated to uncritical advocation of the national developments undertaken during the Meiji, and thus “despotism and war,” Yamada established
In my first article in 1960, I described my hope that the whole of Japanese modernity in the century since Meiji might be jointly confronted in the public
sphere in the 1960s…. At the time, I was unable to foresee how Meiji would become a sensation in the way it has. It strikes me that the effect was somewhat excessive.

However, if it is but memory at the root of this popularity, the creation of new ideas will be impossible. Remembering the Meiji state is a mere reaction to postwar democracy. Here, one cannot extract any immutable values. The search for the origins of the creation of the Meiji state, in other words, is the search to discover a way of objectifying the Meiji state—this is the meaning of commemorating the Meiji centennial.

Postwar democracy has produced its own particular fruits, but it is inadequate for settling history in that way. This means that postwar democracy, in truncating history, renders ambiguous the very basis of its own validity. The failure of postwar democracy to become a general theory is attested to by its performance over the past twenty years. We must seek an alternative. (Takeuchi 1981c, 391-92)

This interim report concerned the progress of the Meiji centennial discourse. Having witnessed the Meiji boom, Takeuchi declared the effect of the Meiji centennial discourse to have been excessive and focused on the unexpectedness of this result. What Takeuchi considered to be an even greater problem than this was the Meiji boom triggering and representing an “outpouring of memory” arising in reaction to the postwar democratic transformation. He declared that this obstructed an objective assessment of the Meiji era, and equally, it was divorced from “immutable values” and prevented the production of “new ideas.” However, he adopted the same critical position with respect to any accepting view of postwar democracy. In diagnosing the failure to critically analyze postwar democracy, he pointed to the false creation of a presumed rupture with the Meiji period. The logic by which Takeuchi had criticized “modernism” is also discernible here: He viewed postwar democracy as simply another form of modernism, namely, postwar modernism.

Japan had already declared the “end of the postwar” in the late 1950s. Yet this declaration had focused on the economic sector. With the end of the “economic postwar,” the rest of the “postwar” was thus now following suit. One may detect a hint of this in Takeuchi’s use of the term “postwar democracy” in the quoted passage above. It was in the 1960s that the term “postwar democracy” emerged (Oguma 2002, 16). Viewing publications at the time, the term “postwar democracy” appeared in magazines before newspapers. *World (Sekai)*, representative of sophisticated postwar general-interest magazines, featured an article entitled “Postwar Democracy and the Parliamentary System” (August 1962). Around the same time, the journal *Science of Thought (Shisō no kagaku)* featured an article entitled “War Responsibility and Postwar Democracy” (October 1962). These were followed by an *Asahi Newspaper* article, “Evaluation
of and Reflections Regarding Postwar Democracy,” published on April 19, 1964. In the 1960s, the expression “postwar” thus came to be paired with “democracy.”

Takeuchi preceded Yamada in referencing the conflict between “Meiji” and the “postwar,” but unlike Yamada, who explicitly advocated the need to evaluate the developments of the “postwar” era as more important relative to the current state and aspirations for Japan, he distanced himself from either side. This was also the case within another important early text regarding the “Meiji versus postwar” question, namely, the 1964 confrontation between Ōkuma Nobuyuki (1893-1977), who declared postwar democracy a “delusion” (Ōkuma 1970, 163), and Maruyama Masao (1969, 585), who responded that the “delusion of postwar democracy” was preferable to a real and existent “Great Japanese Empire.” Takeuchi had thus raised the issue of the conflict between perspectives favoring the Meiji or the postwar prior to the publication of Yamada’s Dangerous Intellectuals, the Asahi Newspaper’s related article series, and Ōkuma and Maruyama’s later debate.

Meanwhile, following the conclusion of the Asahi Newspaper special series, Takeuchi wrote a series of articles for the Tokyo Newspaper under the heading “Reflecting on the ‘Meiji Boom’” (May 17-18, 1965). Takeuchi (1980a, 244) declared that Yamada had demonstrated simplicity, inferiority, inaccuracy, and low standards in submitting his question—“Which will win, the Meiji centennial or postwar vicennial?” Nevertheless, he acknowledged this as a deft and well-targeted journalistic strategy. He emphasized that any celebration of the Meiji centennial discourse, however, had nothing to do with choosing between “either Meiji or the postwar” (244). Declaring himself neither allied with nor opposed, but neutral with respect to Yamada, Takeuchi questioned the dualistic opposition of “Meiji versus the postwar”:

If someone asked whether I belong to the “Meiji” or “postwar” faction, I would not be able to answer. I think that if the postwar is real then Meiji is also real, and if the postwar is a delusion then Meiji is also a delusion. Perhaps this is an ambiguous position, but there is no other way to put it…. Yamada and I differ on this point. To me, the “postwar” is an ambiguous concept.

Likewise, “Meiji” is also ambiguous…. In this sense, I cannot agree with Yamada’s method of representing “Meiji” in terms of despotism and aggression and the “postwar” in terms of peace and democracy…. It is a generally accepted idea that in history the first revolution cannot take root without the second. If the ongoing reaction cannot be reversed, at some point the “postwar” shall indeed become a delusion. (Takeuchi 1980a, 244)

Takeuchi thus questioned Yamada’s binary understanding of the Meiji and the postwar periods. This manner of skepticism came naturally to Takeuchi,
who had long criticized a binary, discontinuous view of history. In the passage, Takeuchi declared that the “first revolution” could not have succeeded without a further “second revolution.” The idea that the “first” Meiji revolution was of any substantial value without the subsequent postwar revolution was a fantasy. In other words, the reality of the “second” postwar revolution was in its consummation of the initial promise of the prior Meiji revolution. He thus argued that any assessment of the fruits of the first revolution and the reality of the second revolution could be established only on the basis of accepting the continuity between them.

2. The Meiji Centennial and Economic Nationalism

In 1965, the *Asahi Newspaper* featured a special series to address Yamada’s accusation against “dangerous intellectuals,” explicitly organizing the articles in terms of “Meiji versus the postwar.” While there were differing opinions on each side of the debate regarding the question, “Is it [more important to celebrate] the Meiji centennial or postwar vicennial?” the basic oppositional structure persisted across the eight articles included in the series. The positions of the interlocutors can be briefly summarized as follows (figure 1): 1) on the side of Meiji, a critique of the postwar “deception”; 2) on the side of the postwar, a critique of Meiji, which caused the war and defeat; 3) connecting the postwar and Meiji as a case of “successful modernization”; and 4) exploring the continuity between incomplete reform (Meiji) and comprehensive reform (postwar). These positions can also be categorized in terms of the emphasis on rupture (1 and 2) versus continuity (3 and 4) between the Meiji and the postwar periods. The last two positions emphasizing continuity were especially opposed in terms of either marked support for Meiji (3) or the postwar (4).

To explore these different positions, it might be helpful to examine their relationship with 1960s modernization theory. Among the authors on the side of the postwar, Tōyama Shigeki and Katō Shūichi had attended the 1960 Hakone Conference. The ideological spectrum of the Japanese scholars who attended the Hakone Conference, including Maruyama Masao, was by no means narrow, but they all generally shared a critical perception of a value-free notion of “modernization theory” focused only on industrialization.¹⁶ In this respect, Tōyama was the most critical of “modernization theory.” He argued that modernization theory was unable to resolve various problems within contemporary Asia, including the recent Vietnam conflict, and therefore he declared

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¹⁶. Regarding Japan’s “modernization theory” in the 1960s, see Lee Kyunghee (2019b).
Reischauer’s modernization theory to be essentially lacking in value. Additionally, he asserted that it was the Japanese people’s wartime experience that led to their urgent demand for democratic reform in the early postwar period. And to emphasize the autonomous development of the postwar democracy, he argued that the intentions and actions of the nation’s people themselves during the postwar period constituted the crucial arena through which the principles of peace and democracy had been observed (Tōyama 1965).

While differentiating between democratic institutions, values, and system of

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17. Cartoons drawn by Yokoyama Taizō (1917-2007)
livelihood, Katō Shūichi argued that to understand postwar democracy it had to be compared and connected to the Meiji Restoration and the problems that had arisen over the century since. The Meiji reforms, he claimed, had been essentially democratically oriented in terms of institutions, values, and livelihood, if perhaps to a lesser degree than in the postwar era. Moreover, despite traversing the rupture and distortions caused by the First Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, and Second Sino-Japanese War, these improvements only became more thoroughly realized in the postwar era. This focus on democracy, which American scholars had largely ignored or neglected in their conceptions, demonstrated a certain distance to the mainstream US 1960s modernization theory.

Meanwhile, standing on the side of Meiji, Hayashi Kentarō represented a historiographical view closest to that of 1960s modernization theory. Hayashi had previously demonstrated an active understanding of Reischauer’s modernization theory two years earlier in an interview with Reischauer (“A new perspective on modern history” [Kindaishin no atarashii mikata], Jiyū [Freedom], March 1963). Unlike the newly independent countries in Africa and Asia, Hayashi argued, Japan (a defeated country) was able to join the ranks of the advanced countries due to it possessing the preexisting basis for a modern state. In other words, Japan’s postwar advance was attributable to the “digestive power” of reforms cultivated through the “great enterprise of the Meiji Restoration” (Hayashi 1965). Yet Hayashi also demonstrated the blind spot of “modernization theory,” in that his focus on industrialization meant praising the “Meiji century” while foregoing any political criticism of the “pre-war ‘old regime’” (Dōke 2015, 114).

Takeuchi had declared the 1950s “the era in which the revival of modernism shall restore the balance to renew [the confrontation with nationalism]” (Takeuchi 1981a, 35, 37). In the 1960s, he argued that the initiative needed to be seized over the national issue, as he feared that a weakened notion of “nation” might lead to ultranationalism. Here, he emphasized a self-regulated, self-initiated political discourse, not one led by transitory trends and sloganeering (Takeuchi 1981b, 60). Nevertheless, he made no protest regarding the congenial relations between

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18. Unlike the Japanese scholars who attended the Hakone Conference in the 1960s, Hayashi Kentarō was quite an active proponent of “modernization theory.” Two months after the Asahi Newspaper series ended, he attended a history conference on “Asia’s Traditional Societies and Modernization.” This conference was part of a larger international academic conference (held at Walker Hill Hotel, June 28 – July 7, 1965) on “The Problem of Modernization in Asia,” which a part of the sixtieth anniversary commemoration for the founding of the Asiatic Research Institute, Koryō University (“Asia e issō sō” 1965). See Kim In-su (2017).

the pro-West and pro-Japan factions that had been occasioned relative to their coalescing of the energies of modernization theory and the reappraisals of the Meiji era in the 1960s.

On April 15, 1966, the Cabinet inaugurated the Meiji Centennial Commemoration Preparation Committee. At its first meeting (May 4), the committee chose October 23, 1968 as the day to commemorate the Meiji centennial (“Muttsu no kisan” 1966). At the second meeting (May 26), sub-committees were established to oversee the various details of the commemoration, such as the pre-ceremony, events, enterprises, public relations, etc. A month later (June 13), Takeuchi announced his withdrawal from the Meiji centennial discourse. A week later, Japan Socialist Party declared opposition to Meiji centennial commemoration (“‘Shin kenpō nijū nen’” 1966). On October 25, 1967, the History Research Association, History and Science Consortium, and History Educators Consortium jointly published an “Appeal for an Opposition Movement against the ‘Meiji Centennial’” in the Asahi Newspaper. As the government began to prepare in earnest for the commemoration, intellectuals raised their voices in criticism (“Meiji hyaku nen” 1967; “Uyokuka aoru” 1967). It was around this time, when Takeuchi withdrew from the “Meiji Restoration centennial” discourse, that the “Meiji boom” of the 1960s adopted the antagonistic configuration of establishment versus anti-establishment.

As mentioned above, October 23 was chosen as the day on which to commemorate the Meiji centennial. This was a logical decision, since this date marked the commencement of the “Meiji era” in 1868. However, the Meiji Centennial Commemoration Planning Committee, composed of government officials, representatives of various private organizations, scholars, historians, and cultural specialists, had considered other dates. Discussions on the topic of a

20. The preliminary 1967 government budget with respect to the commemorative enterprise allocated 403,994,000 yen for the "homeland greening" project, 2,254,000 yen for the "preservation and illumination of history" project, and 142,246,000 yen for the "boat of youth" project (Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai 1967, 83). By comparison, the Ford Foundation research fund for the Modernization of Japan Research Project of the Modern Japan Research Association was 48,600,000 yen (135,000 US dollars).

21. The appeal began as follows: “The government has determined to hold a nationwide celebration of the ‘Meiji centennial’ next year on October 23, planning such events as the ‘homeland greening,’ ‘preservation and illumination of history,’ and ‘boat of youth’ projects. The ‘2,600 years since national foundation’ was commemorated in the past up until the onset of the Pacific War (1940). This played a role in mobilizing the national spirit in the name of fascism and aggressive wars through an ideology of ultranationalism (chōkokka shugi) and slogans such as ‘hakkō ichiu’ (all the world under one roof) and ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.’ Now, for the following reasons, we cannot but regard the approaching ‘Meiji Restoration centennial’ with a similar apprehension” (Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai 1967, 87).
suitable date had also taken place in the national media. According to a March 16, 1966 Asahi Newspaper article, “Six Documents for Determining the Origin, When is the Meiji Centennial?” the six candidates were: 1) the Meiji emperor’s succession to the throne (February 13, 1967); 2) the resignation of the Tokugawa shogun (November 10, 1967); 3) the emperor’s edict declaring the restoration of imperial rule (January 3, 1968); 4) the reading of the Imperial “Charter Oath” (April 6, 1968); 5) the coronation of the Meiji emperor (October 12, 1968); and 6) the formal calendrical inauguration of the “Meiji” era (October 23, 1968) (“Muttsu no kisan shiryō” 1966). “October 23” thus won out among these six competing dates. John W. Hall, another 1960s “modernization theory” historian, expressed surprise at this result—he had expected the third or fourth date to be selected. However, he surmised that October 23 was chosen to avoid controversy and unwarranted suspicion (Hall 1969, 104), as excluding those dates which were directly linked to the implementation of imperial rule, only the sixth candidate remained. The selection of the 23 October could also be considered as a politically “safe” decision, given the objections of the opposition regarding the dangers of celebrating the last imperial era.

While advocates for the “postwar vicennial” were critical of the convenient alliance forged between advocates for the Meiji centennial and those of modernization theory, “for most people, ‘modernization theory,’ which reflected a positive reality, was more persuasive than the left’s denial of reality and their proposed future socialist revolution” (Dōke 2015, 115-16). In this respect, the government’s selection of the 23 October could hardly be considered a decision made out of “generosity.” In the January 10, 1968 edition of the Asahi Newspaper, an article, “Ginza Ondo, Another ‘Tokyo Song’: Shopping District Brimming with Vitality as ‘Meiji Centennial’ Approaches,” introduced the lyrics and announced the release of iconic postwar singer-actress Misora Hibari’s (1937-89) song “Ginza Ondo.”22 The article also described how Ginza had launched a preparatory committee for a festival (matsuri) to be held for ten days beginning on October 11 to celebrate the Meiji centennial. Furthermore, the article stated that the Meiji centennial would be directly commemorated through the work of “our hands.” This was because “Ginza had been the first site of modern buildings, trains, and electric lights and served as the origin point of Meiji culture,” and as such the article declared that 150 million yen would be allocated to stage the “Ginza Festival of the World” (“Ginza ondo ‘Tokyo no uta’” 1968). In this manner, a celebratory atmosphere was voluntarily produced by members of the public on the eve of the government’s Meiji centennial commemoration

ceremony (October 23). A discourse focused on economic nationalism, supported by the success story of “Meiji = modernity,” modernization theory, and the high economic growth of the nation through “post-postwar” (“modernization”), was thus widely stimulated in the public imagination.

**Conclusion**

The Meiji Centennial Commemoration Ceremony commenced as planned at the Nippon Budōkan on October 23, 1968. Three months later, John W. Hall (1969) published an article entitled “The Attitude of Evaluating Modern Japan” in *Central Review*. Upon the occasion of the Meiji centennial, he discussed the Meiji Restoration in terms of commonalities with the 1776 US Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia. The Meiji period and the Philadelphia declaration, he observed, both provided the “origins of new nations formed according to modern principles.” In common, they shared the goal of “nation-building rather than social reconstruction,” due to “international crises provoking concerns over political independence” (103).

Perhaps the most remarkable part of this essay is provided by Hall’s claim that value-free research on Japanese modernization had revealed an optimistic interpretation of modern Japanese history as a success story, “lacking violence, revolution, class, ideology, and other such elements.” Meanwhile, he acknowledged the possible criticism of this approach as a product of “insensitivity, affluence, or ‘bourgeois objectivity’” (Hall 1969, 111).

Ten years later, in an article entitled “Modernization Theory’ and East Asia: The Case of American Scholarly Associations,” Marius B. Jansen (1922-2000), another one of the Hakone Conference attendees, confessed that he had come to understand modernization theory as an “intellectual mushroom cloud” produced for use in the Cold War (Jansen 1978, 28). This belated realization occurred with the generational change in Japanese Studies researchers, yielding the likes of John W. Dower (1938- ) and Harry Harootunian (1929- ). As this third generation of scholars set out to criticize the modernization theory of their predecessors they arrived at a different perspective than their antecessors, not least in positively reappraising the ill-fated Herbert Norman’s (1909-57) approach to the study of Japanese history.23 However, and as discussed within this paper, Japanese scholars had long ago raised such criticism of modernization theory in

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23. A central figure in the IPR who was also well known as the author of *The Establishment of the Modern State in Japan* (1940), Herbert Norman (1909-57) committed suicide after coming under suspicion of being a Soviet spy.
the 1960s. This fact notwithstanding, it was only with the emergence of this
criticism within Japanese Studies research in the US that their voices began to be
heard within an international scholarly arena.

Nonetheless, the myth of Japanese success continued to boom as before. It
was in 1979 that Ezra Vogel published Japan as Number One, a classic that
garnered global attention. Japan’s economic nationalism, which had paved the
way for the Meiji centennial discourse, modernization theory, and the idea of
the “postwar as a delusion” continued to persist after Japan as Number One.
Economic nationalism, which had displaced ultranationalism, was another form
of popular nationalism that Takeuchi had failed to adequately anticipate when
he asserted his idea for a Meiji centennial discourse.

Regarding the intellectual effectiveness of seizing the initiative with respect
to the national issue in the 1960s as a way of obstructing the development of
ultranationalism, the opportunity for any thorough substantiation of this
possibility was precluded by the advent of economic nationalism. Be that as it
may, perhaps revisiting the development of the Meiji centennial discourse may
provide a meaningful point of reference within contemporary Japan. Not least
as apprehensions over the crisis of democracy and an ascending extreme right—
concerns compounded by the “lost three decades” of national economic
stagnation—are once again surging.

To effectively achieve the task of creating the kind of liberal thinking proposed
by Katō and Azuma, and follow Takeuchi’s critical analysis of nationalism, it will
be necessary to first theorize and deconstruct the still pervasive ideology of
“revere the emperor, expel the barbarians.” To complete this substantive task, the
initiative must be seized in political debates both within and without the public
sphere, as well as inside and outside Japan.24

* Translated by Keiran MACRAE

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“Naengjŏngi Ilbon ŭi ‘Meiji vs chŏnhu’: 1960-nyŏndae kyŏngje naesyŏnŏllijŭm ŭi taedu,”
published in Ilbon sasang [Journal of Japanese thought] 36 (2019), with the permission of
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24. Following the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration he had been concerned about, Katō
unfortunately suddenly succumbed to lung cancer on May 16, 2019. He was seventy-one. This
article, as a preliminary work examining the (incomplete) work of Katō Norihiro submitted during
the year of the “Meiji centennial,” was a work reexamining the similar (incomplete) work of
Takeuchi submitted as he viewed the prospects of the “Meiji centennial” year.
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