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국제학석사학위논문

**Xi Jinping's anti-corruption policy:**

**Succession and Development from Deng's Era**

시진핑의 반부패 정책 연구: 덩샤오핑 시대의 계승과 발전

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**Xi Jinping's anti-corruption policy:**

**Succession and Development from Deng's Era**

習近平의 反腐敗政策研究 : 鄧小平時代的繼承與發展

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
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## Abstract

### **Xi Jinping's anti-corruption policy:**

### **Succession and Development from Deng's Era**

Chung, Sua

After the year of reform and opening-up in 1978, anti-corruption has been regarded as a very important issue in China. Over the past 40 years, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping all these four leaders in China have been struggling over anti-corruption. Especially after Xi Jinping came into power in 2012, strengthened anti-corruption campaign has gained much attention from all around the world. Numerous scholars began to analyze and research about Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign. However, there are still two major limits in current academia. First, most of the scholars only gave a narrow view by focusing solely on institutionalization aspect. Second, they have only concentrated on Xi Jinping's Era. For understanding China's anti-corruption in an accurate manner, there is a need to analyze the anti-corruption policy of leaders who held on to power during and after the year of reform. In particular, analyzing the change of anti-corruption in three dimensions, mainly China's anti-corruption principle, the strength of the punishment and the institutionalization aspect is necessary for understanding the flow of China's overall anti-corruption policy. The thesis uses comparative analysis to compare the anti-corruption policy in Deng, Jiang, Hu and Xi Era and further looks at the succession and development in Xi's Era. It has a profound academic value as it not only analyses Xi's anti-corruption policy but also makes a comparison with previous leaders by looking at key aspects of China's anti-corruption.

This thesis argues that, firstly, the increased number of punished officials, especially high-

ranking officials during Xi's era is the result of the strengthened Discipline Inspection System and Structural Reform in Discipline Inspection Committee. Secondly, this anti-corruption achievement is not a result made in short period, but the result made by the succession and development from Deng, Jiang, Hu's Era. Deng's modernization construction, Jiang's basic work clearance as well as Hu's beginning of the institutionalization have made up the foundation for Xi's strengthened anti-corruption campaign. Lastly, the direction of China's anti-corruption policy has been changed since its reform. In case of Deng and Jiang, China had focused on the clearance of corrupt activities, that is, the substantial problem; on the other hand, when it comes to Hu and Xi's Era, China has not only focused on substantial issue, but rather more on the fundamental issue, which is in fact the establishment of the institution. It predicts that China will further focus on the institutionalization for China's anti-corruption rather than merely solving the substantial problems. However, still, Xi Jinping's over-dependence on the intra-party institution will restrict the power of judicial authority, and how China solves this problem is still needs to be seen.

**Keywords:** China, anti-corruption policy, reform, succession and development, anti-corruption principle, punishment of corrupt officials, institutionalization, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping

**Student Number:** 2018-24912

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## **List of Acronyms and Abbreviations**

CCDI/CDIC	Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
KMT	Kuomintang
MOS	Ministry of Supervision
SPP	Supreme People's Procuratorate
CAPF	Chinese Armed Police Force
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

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# **I. Introduction**

## **1. Background**

China's corruption is in fact not a surprising matter. Historically, corruption in China had long been a problem even before the establishment of People's Republic of China in 1949. Since Mao's period, China has been struggling over corruption by launching diverse campaigns such as Three and Five Antis Campaigns, Socialist Education Movement for deterring corrupt activities of bureaucrats. After the reform in 1978, bold and drastic reform policies held by CCP, such as decentralization of the local parties, expansion of freedom toward industries resulted in a much more rampant corruption. The corruption issue not only resulted in a serious problem in the party, but also caused a major damage to the mass public. From 1980s, massive demonstration was not ceased, devastating events such as 1989 Tiananmen incident occurred, which was detrimental to the survival of the party.

Corruption can result in serious problems such as economic setbacks, decrease in efficiency as well as formation of factions. Moreover, corruption might break the fundamental trust relationship between the party and the masses. Thus, corruption has been a crucial matter for China which needs to be solved in a timely manner. For gaining the legitimacy of CCP, anti-corruption was essential. In fact, from the early 1980s the party began to recognize the seriousness of the corruption and started major anti-corruption struggles. During Jiang and Hu's Era, the anti-corruption policies were still enforced. Nevertheless, despite the effort party put, the achievement of anti-corruption was little compared to widespread corruption in China, moreover, most of the punished bureaucrats were only at the basic level position.

However, since Xi Jinping came into power in 2012, China's anti-corruption has seen a breakthrough compared to previous eras. Firstly, the number of punished corrupt officials has increased dramatically. Secondly, among the punished corrupt officials, the number of higher-level bureaucrats has increased. One notable thing is that the implicit rule of China's anti-corruption, where top officials are exempted from the investigation were broken, as top officials such as former Polit Bureau Standing Committee Zhou Yongkang, former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou, and former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Guo Boxiong were being investigated and punished harshly. Thus, Since Xi Jinping's era, anti-corruption was strengthened significantly compared to other eras.

## **2. Research Topic& Argument**

As aforementioned, Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign was greatly strengthened compared to previous eras. It has been the strongest anti-corruption campaign since the reform in 1978. The anti-corruption campaign by Xi would also lay the important foundation for the later anti-corruption campaigns and will play an important role for the future generation. Analyzing Xi Jinping's anti-corruption policy, as well as making comparison with previous leaders to find out what Xi has succeeded and developed has a great significance and academic value. The research not only provides the overall view over how China's anti-corruption policy has developed historically, but also provides the key direction of each leader's policy as well as the institutions that were strengthened by looking at the developmental process of China's anti-corruption. Lastly, it can predict the direction of anti-corruption policies in the near future.

Thus, a few questions were raised in this research: How could Xi Jinping strengthen anti-

corruption campaign? What is the difference between Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping's anti-corruption policy? Specifically, what did Xi Jinping succeed and develop from previous eras? Lastly, what can be predicted and what limits does Xi Jinping anti-corruption policy have?

It argues that, firstly, the increased number of punished officials, especially high-ranking officials during Xi's era is the result of the strengthened Discipline Inspection System and Structural Reform in Discipline Inspection Committee. Secondly, this anti-corruption achievement is not a result made in short period, but the result made by the succession and development from Deng, Jiang, Hu's Era. Especially Deng's modernization construction, Jiang's basic work clearance as well as Hu's beginning of the institutionalization have made up the foundation for Xi's successful anti-corruption campaign. Lastly, the direction of China's anti-corruption policy has been changed since its reform. In case of Deng and Jiang, China had focused on the clearance of corrupt activities, that is, the substantial problem; on the other hand, when it comes to Hu and Xi's Era, China has not only focused on substantial issue, but rather more on the fundamental issue, which is in fact the establishment of the institution. It predicts that China will further focus on the institutionalization for China's anti-corruption rather than merely solving the substantial problems. However, still, Xi Jinping's over-dependence on the intra-party institution will restrict the power of judicial authority, and how China solves this problem is still needs to be seen.

### **3. Research Content & Methodology**

This research is a qualitative analysis. Official reports of the National Supervisory Commission and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection from the year of 1997 to 2020

were referred to compare the major policy differences between Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Moreover, modern research on the origin of the corruption as well as overseas materials, including KISS were used to offer the international view and Korean's view about China's anti-corruption. For understanding the viewpoints of China's mainland scholars, CNKI and Modern China Studies were also used as a reference. People's Daily, Xinhua News, BBC News and other media agencies were also referred. Thus, the thesis is based on China's mainland materials as well as overseas research to further provide the objective analysis.

The thesis is composed of Eight chapters in total. First chapter introduces the background, research questions as well as the research methodologies of the research. Chapter 2 will make a review on the existing literature about what methodologies scholars used to approach China's anti-corruption as well as the limits of current academia. Chapter 3 will analyze the change in the characteristics of corruption before and after the reform, that is, during Mao's era and Deng's era. Chapter 4 will look at the anti-corruption policy during Deng Xiaoping Era, Chapter 5 will analyze Jiang Zemin Era, Chapter six will mainly research on Hu Jintao Era and Chapter seven is an analysis of Xi Jinping Era. The research particularly focuses on the anti-corruption principle, punishment of corrupt officials and institutionalization these three major aspects. Lastly, Chapter 8 will explain the major differences between Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping's anti-corruption policy and will further make a conclusion over the succession and development in Xi's era. Limits and prediction on anti-corruption policy will also be given in the last chapter.



## II. Literature Review

Corruption has been regarded as an important problem in China. As it is a crucial matter which is related to party's legitimacy, large number of research have been made regarding China's anti-corruption. When analyzing the existing literature, it is noticeable that scholars have used diverse methodologies to deal with anti-corruption issue in China. Firstly, some of the scholars used comparative methodology to approach China's corruption. For example, Malanie Manion (2004) compares China mainland and Hong Kong to find out the reason behind the success of Hong Kong and failure of mainland China in transforming the widespread corrupt society to clean society. She argues that the act of choosing whether or not to commit corruption is crucially different from the society where corruption is common and uncommon.

<sup>1</sup> A key difference is the role of beliefs of officials about corruption and the accountability of the government as an enforcer constraining corruption.<sup>2</sup> That is, whether government is able to play an effective role as an enforcer who restricts official corruption is a decisive matter for anti-corruption. She further proposes three strategies for increasing anti-corruption efficiency: Education, Enforcement, and Institutional Design. Lastly, she analyzes the enforcement process and institutional design of China's anti-corruption campaign as well as its limits. <sup>3</sup>

In case of Leslie Holmes (2015), he compares China's current anti-corruption approach with both post-communist and other Sinic states and regions. Not only does China has certain systemic similarities with post-communist states such as Central and Eastern Europe as well as

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<sup>1</sup> Melanie Manion, "Taking China's anticorruption campaign seriously," *Economic and Political Studies*, 4:1, 3-18, DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2016.1152094.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

former Soviet Union, but it also shares cultural similarities with Sinic states such as Singapore and China's Hong Kong. In the research, it can be found that nations which have clean society such as Singapore and Hong Kong, share three common features: Firstly, anti-corruption institutions are independent from the government. Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) of Singapore and Hong Kong's ICAC are all independent from the government. Unlike other institutions, anti-corruption agencies are under the direct jurisdiction of the Prime Minister and only obey the words of Prime Minister. Secondly, both institutions have strong authorities for investigation. Lastly, both institutions are the only anti-corruption agency in each nation. Thus, the possibilities of having overlapped jurisdiction were eliminated.<sup>4</sup>

Although the author could not find out any significance from the comparison between China and Central, Eastern Europe, he argues that the success of anti-corruption policy in Soviet Georgia proved anti-corruption is not related to any of the cultural and systemic similarities. Singapore also shows that low level of corruption can exist in country with limited democratization.<sup>5</sup>

Using comparative methodology approach to compare China's mainland and other nations can offer broad international viewpoints and objective analysis in the research of anti-corruption. However, it is also necessary to analyze China's rapid economic development and institutional flaw in order to understand the key reason behind widespread corruption. Thus, scholars began to analyze China's drastic economic reform and institutional flaw. For Example, Ting Gong (1994) categorized China's anti-corruption into three phases: Transformation period

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<sup>4</sup> Leslie Holmes, "Combating Corruption in China: The Role of the State and Other Agencies in Comparative Perspective," *Economic and Political Studies*, 3:1, 42-70, DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2015.11673837, p.53.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p.54.

from 1949 to 1952; Consolidation period from 1954 to 1966; Modernization period from 1978 to date. He argues that China's corruption represents the unintended consequences of the CCP's intended policies. In other words, the spread of corruption, bureaucratism and nepotism were consequences of CCP's intended economic policy. For the solution, he suggests China to conduct economic reform and political reform at the same time. Specifically, two political reforms were mentioned: First, independent social-political institutions need to be established to restrict the authority of the party; Secondly, the expansion of the self-penetrative mechanism, such as freedom of media, active political participation, mass supervision are necessary for successful anti-corruption.<sup>6</sup>

Xiaobo Lu, as Ting Gong argues, points out the problem of organizational corruption as a hidden problem behind China's successful economic development.<sup>7</sup> He explains five patterns of Organizational Corruption, which are Exacting Revenues without Clear Legal Mandates; Irregular Use of Regulatory Power; Unaccounted, Unreported, and Underreported Funds; Generation of Profit through the Spin-off "Economic Entities"; The Disposal of Impounded Revenues. China's economic development that was under the control of the state as well as low efficiency of the bureaucrats can categorize China as 'Market-distorting Bureaupreneurial' state but not developmental state.<sup>8</sup> The author argues that the state needs to have a least intervention toward the market as well as efficient bureaucrats for successful economic

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<sup>6</sup> Ting Gong, *The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: an analysis of policy outcomes* (Westport, Connecticut, London: Prager Publishers, 1994)

<sup>7</sup> Lu, X, "Booty Socialism, Bureau-Preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organizational Corruption in China," *Comparative Politics*, 32(3), 273-294. doi:10.2307/422367

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

transition.<sup>9</sup>

After Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China's anti-corruption has gained great attention not only in China mainland but also from the globe. However, the content of the research has been changed. Unlike previous era focusing on China's economic development and widespread corruption of the bureaucrats, scholars began to draw more attention on the intention of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign as well as strengthened institutions. The point is, although scholars unanimously agree with the strengthened anti-corruption campaign during Xi's era, concern about the rule of law has also been raised up.

Before looking at the rule of law, firstly, many scholars shared their common view about the intention of anti-corruption campaign. Most of the scholars argue that the real purpose behind Xi's anti-corruption campaign is not on the punishment of corrupt officials but the establishment of his own legitimacy. For example, Samson Yuen argues that although the punishment of corrupt officials has been expanded in range as top officials and People's Liberation Army were included in the investigation, but punished officials were mostly belonged to Xi's political rivalries and the investigation as well as punishment were also selective. Thus, the real intention of the anti-corruption campaign is for the political struggle of Xi.<sup>10</sup> He further argues that the reason that party uses intra-party institutions without legal procedures is for controlling and regulating anti-corruption in China. Thus, among corrupt officials, only a few high-ranking officials were transferred to formal legal institutions, and except high-profile arrests who committed serious crime and were certain to be handed to the

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Samson Yuen, "Disciplining the party: Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign and its limits," *cefc News Analysis*, p. 43

courts, others were more likely to receive disciplinary punishment within the party rather than being transferred to judicial organs. Moreover, it is unclear about what exact regulations did officials violate or what is the standard that decides which cases are handed to the courts. Thus, although strengthened CCDI can foster inner-party building, however, in the long term, the continuous expansion of the party institutions in the absence of checks and balances and rule of law might lead to more serious problem of anti-corruption.<sup>11</sup>

Fu Hualing also argues that Xi's anti-corruption campaign is for the establishment of his own legitimacy. As corruption is directly related to the issue of legitimacy, spread of corruption would seriously damage regime's legitimacy. Likewise, successful anti-corruption campaign can help government to recover from the crisis of legitimacy.<sup>12</sup> Thus, although disclosing the results of anti-corruption in some degree can build up its legitimacy, excessive disclosure might in fact lead to the anger of the mass public.<sup>13</sup> He further points out three directions of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign: Transfer of investigation power from local to central government, marginalization of anti-corruption legal institutions as well as clamp down on civil society mobilization against corruption.

He further argues that Xi's anti-corruption campaign is very instrumental and is designed for his own political and economic reform. He explains four reasons behind Xi's anti-

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid.,p.45 .

<sup>12</sup> Bruce Gilley, *The Right to Rules: How State Win and Lose Legitimacy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009; Mitchell Seligson and John Booth, *The Legitimacy Puzzle: Political Support and Democracy in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

<sup>13</sup> Fu Hualing, "Wielding the Sword: President Xi's New Anti-Corruption Campaign," Susan Rose-Ackerman and Paul Felipe Lagunes (eds) *Greed, corruption, and the modern state* (EE, 2015)

corruption campaign: Firstly, political foes are removed through campaign. Most high-profile detention to date was mostly under Xi's rivalries, that is, they were directly or indirectly connected to former Polit Bureau Standing Committee Zhou Yongkang. Secondly, actual supporters of the leader can be elevated to crucial positions. Removing political foes at the same time means Xi could recruit his own supporters to fill the vacancies, further consolidating his political power. Thirdly, political loyalty of powerful officials and leaders in central and provincial regions could be raised through strengthened anti-corruption campaign. Xi's anti-corruption campaign has sent strong messages to bureaucrats that they can be removed if they are disloyal to party. Thus, anti-corruption further strengthened regime's legitimacy as well as the authority of Xi. Lastly, strong anti-corruption campaign became the evidence which proves the competence of the leader and could further improve the positive recognition of mass public toward Xi Jinping.<sup>14</sup> However, on the institutional aspect, Fu Hualing also argues China's anti-corruption campaign's use of intra-party institutions without external agencies has a low sense of sustainability and is not able to solve the fundamental reason of corruption.

Moonki-Lee argues that there are four distinguished features behind Xi's strengthened anti-corruption campaign: firstly, Xi's solemn pledge was an important factor for strengthening campaign. Strengthening anti-corruption campaign means elimination of political rivalries, which might result in a high risk of danger.<sup>15</sup> For example, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao had warned Xi to call off investigation after the arrestment of Zhou Yongkang. According to

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid.,p.6-8

<sup>15</sup> 이문기, “시진핑 시대 반부패 운동의 정치적 함의: 청렴정부 건설인가 강권정치 회귀인가?”, 현대중국연구, vol. 17,no. 1, pp. 62.

JoongAng Ilbo, Xi has went through six times of assassination during his term.<sup>16</sup> Secondly, the range of campaign was greatly expanded. Compared to a total number of 205 removed officials at minister and vice minister level since 1949, Xi has eliminated 68 officials only within two years, which is 15 times more than previous era.<sup>17</sup> Thirdly, Centralization was facilitated through the strengthening of Discipline Inspection Committee, Discipline Inspection and Supervision Office as well as Central Inspection Group.<sup>18</sup> Lastly, under the intensive control of Xi, the freedom of press and intellectuals was greatly restricted.<sup>19</sup> He argues that China is still lacking for reaching clean government, and yet the formation of political rivals due to strengthened campaign is potential factors that might affect the stability of the party.<sup>20</sup>

Unlike previous scholars criticizing Xi anti-corruption campaign, some scholars gave positive view about China's anti-corruption. Melanie Manion is a typical one. She argues that although Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign has similarities with previous leaders, however, there are four distinguished features that differs from the previous eras. Firstly, the sheer duration of the campaign is unusual. The anti-corruption campaign launched by Xi Jinping in late 2012 has been continuing its campaign until 2015. Moreover, the strength of the campaign is not on the decreasing tendency but is in fact increasing drastically. In particular, larger portion of high-ranking officials were being investigated. Secondly,

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<sup>16</sup> 서유진, "궁지 몰린 부패 관료의 역습 ... 시진핑 6차례 암살 모면," 「중앙일보」, 2015년 2월 26일.

<sup>17</sup> “反腐敗數據： 十八大後年均落馬高官爲之前10多倍,” 「檢察日報」, 2015年 1月 13日. <http://www.rmzxb.com.cn/zsq/tj/2015/01/13/430534.shtml>

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.,p.68.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.,p.76.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.,p.84.

according to ‘Tigers and Files’ theory, the investigation of corrupt officials has been strengthened dramatically. In March 2015, the CDIC publicized its list of 99 officials at and above the vice-ministerial level, Among the 99 four mega-tigers were punished, that is, powerful officials at the national level: Su Rong , Zhou Yongkang, Xu Caihou, and Ling Jihua, which brought a great shock to mass public.

Thirdly, structural change has arisen. Conferences CDIC involved has been reduced from 125 to 14, provincial discipline inspection committees also reduced their participation of more than 90 percent. Moreover, the permission required for the investigation is now permitted not from same-level party committee, but from superior discipline inspection committee. In particular, the nomination of the head and deputy heads of discipline inspection committee is now nominated by superior discipline inspection committee and organization department. As a result, the restriction on discipline inspection committee was eliminated and the authority was strengthened. Lastly, the prevention of corruption has been strengthened. The number of permission acquirement has decreased drastically at both national level and local level, which led to the lower possibility of committing corrupt activities. As a result, Melanie Manion argues that Xi Jinping has successfully strengthened discipline inspection committee and punished top-ranking officials, which led to the institutionalization and legitimacy building. Thus, Melanie Manion gave a positive view on Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. <sup>21</sup>

From 1990s, 2000s and to date, the research on China’s anti-corruption has been continued. However, regardless of the time and period of the research, there are three common features of China’s ant-corruption research: Firstly, China’s anti-corruption campaign was

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<sup>21</sup> Melanie Manion , “Taking China’s anticorruption campaign seriously,” *Economic and Political Studies*, 4:1, 3-18, DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2016.1152094.p10



launched not only for punishing corrupt officials, but it is for the legitimacy building of the party as well as power consolidation of leaders. Especially political rivals were being removed from the party. For example, Beijing party secretary Chen Xitong, a main figure of ‘Beijing gang’, who was famous of challenging Jiang’s power publicly, was arrested for corruption in 1995.<sup>22</sup> Shanghai party secretary Chen Liangyu, a core member of Shanghai gang who opposed to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s retrenchment policy was also arrested under the name of corruption.<sup>23</sup> During Xi era, it is well known that former Polit Bureau Standing Committee Zhou Yongkang, former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou, and former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Guo Boxiong were being investigated and punished harshly. Therefore, China’s anti-corruption does not aim merely at punishment, but it was intended for the legitimacy building and gaining positive recognition from the mass public.

Secondly, worry about the rule of law in China has been raised up greatly. As aforementioned, the anti-corruption campaign is a tool not only for the punishment, but also for the party’s legitimacy. Thus, most of the corrupt officials were punished through intra-party discipline without any legal procedures. Moreover, it is unclear about what exact regulations did officials violate or what is the standard that decides what cases are handed to the courts. Thus, although strengthened inspection discipline committee can foster the party building, however, as it ignores the rule of law of the nation, the function of checks and balances of institutions are restricted. As a result, in longer term, the absence of institutions and the loss of checks and balances functions might lead to more serious problems of

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<sup>22</sup> 조영남, 『중국의 엘리트 정치』 (서울: 민음사, 2019), p. 545

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

corruption.

Lastly, scholars argue that China's anti-corruption campaign cannot eliminate the fundamental root of corruption. Although anti-corruption campaign launched by leaders in the previous era including Xi Jinping could lead to the temporary success, however, still in the long term, the absence of institutions, weak legal agencies will worsen China's corruption.

In conclusion, plenty of research about China's anti-corruption have been made through different methodologies. However, limits still exist in current academia. Firstly, research on changing characteristics of anti-corruption has not been fully made. Although the most commonly used definition in the research is the 'use of public power for private gain', however, the definition is too limited for the research of China's corruption.<sup>24</sup> When analyzing China's anti-corruption, it is notable that the characteristics of corruption have been changed in each generation. Thus, there is a need to have a look at the change of the characteristics in each era, especially before and after the reform in 1978. Next chapter will review the changing characteristics of 'corruption' from the perspective of China.

Secondly, the research about anti-corruption in China is limited, especially the research after the reform in 1978. Most of the scholars only focus on China's strengthened punishment toward corrupt officials, that is, they only concentrate on anti-corruption 'campaign', which leads to little research about key anti-corruption policies and the direction of anti-corruption in previous era. In particular, few research about the change of anti-corruption policies from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping were made to understand China's anti-corruption comprehensively. Thus, this research serves to solve these limits.

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<sup>24</sup> Melanie Manion, "Taking China's anticorruption campaign seriously," *Economic and Political Studies*, 4:1, 3-18, DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2016.1152094.p4.

Next Chapter will explain the change of China's characteristics of 'corruption'. In particular, the change of characteristics of corruption before and after the reform in 1978 will be analyzed. Chapter 4,5,6,7 will further analyze the anti-corruption policies under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping Era to find out the succession and development by comparing each leader's policies.

### **III. Characteristics of Anti-corruption campaign**

#### **1. Corruption in pre-reform era (1949-1976)**

'Corruption' has been widely used for over centuries. The origin of so-called corruption can be traced back to Western political theologians Thucydide, Plato and Aristotle. Corruption, at the early moment, was regarded as a common disease of body politics. Although the word corruption was carried on by Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau in the later era, the actors committing corruption has been changed from constitutional, political institutions to individuals.<sup>25</sup> Huntington defines corruption as a behavior which deviated from social norm for private interests; Nye, defines corruption as a behavior which violates lawful responsibility and regulation for gaining private money, position or leverage.<sup>26</sup> In modern society, as the theory of corruption, method of solving corruption as well as the range of corruption differs in each nation, there is still no consensus on what corruption really is. Nevertheless, as corruption has been a great problem for long period, it is agreeable that corruption has greatly affected the

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.,p. 4.

<sup>26</sup> 주형, "시진핑 시대 중국공무원 부패방지 정책 연구", 인문논총, vol. 37,no. 0, pp. 109-110.

politics and economies of a nation and has been regarded as an important issue even to date.

In case of China, a famous Chinese economist once argued that “the entire Chinese history was a history of embezzlement”.<sup>27</sup> As early as during the Western Zhou Dynasty, from 1027 B.C to 771 B.C, there was already some written records about corruption.<sup>28</sup> Thus, the history of corruption has been long enough to make corruption as one of the cultures and historical features in China.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, corruption was even worsened. Mao had strongly criticized so called “sugar-coated bullets,” that is, the penetration of capitalism which led to the widespread corrupt activities of the bureaucrats. Thus, first anti-corruption campaign after the founding of China, so called ‘Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns’ was launched from 1951 December to 1952 June. It was a short-term mass mobilization campaign which aimed at party officials for anti-waste, anti-embezzlement and anti- bureaucratism (Three-antis) as well as anti- capitalists, anti-tax evasion, anti- stealing state property, anti- cheating on workmanship and materials and anti- stealing National Economic Information (Five-antis).

Specifically, Three and Five anti Campaign can fall into four steps. Campaign was carried on through mobilization phase, confession and accusation phase, expansion phase and lastly, disposition phase.<sup>29</sup> Firstly, from December 1 to December 31, 1951, the party fostered the

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<sup>27</sup> Ting Gong, *The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: an analysis of policy outcomes* (Westport, Connecticut, London: Prager Publishers, 1994), p.37.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.,p 37.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.,p 37.

participation of the mass public. Mass public were asked to gather together to study party documents and Mao's work, Bureaucrats, on the other hand, began their self-criticism on corruption and bureaucratism. A month later, from January 1 to 25, 1952, confession of bureaucrats and accusation of the masses were greatly facilitated. Bureaucrats were guaranteed to receive lighter punishment if they confess their crime. People could do it publicly or secretly, speaking orally or writing on papers, reporting anonymously or with their names.<sup>30</sup> At any event, protection against retaliation was guaranteed by the party.

Third step began from January 26 to March, 1952. It is noticeable that the campaign was greatly expanded. Working team and tiger hunting team were newly formed to investigate private industries and enterprises. Lastly, from April to June 1952, punishment on bureaucrats began. However, among 1,203,590 cadres who were exposed as embezzlers, only 3,330 or 3.6 percent were sentenced.<sup>31</sup> It explains how party needed bureaucrats and the fact that they played important functions in running the nation.

One noticeable thing is, Three and Five anti Campaign launched by Mao was not aimed at bureaucrats but capitalists and existing KMT officials. Among the discovered corrupt cases, nearly 80 percent of the cases was related to private industrialists and merchants. The investigation results from nine big cities showed that 76 percent of private capitalists were involved in one or more type of corruption.<sup>32</sup> In particular, when analyzing corrupt officials reported by People's Daily from December 1951 to April 1952, the percentage of the punishment on existing KMT officials (19 percent) and capitalists (57 percent) was much higher

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid.,p 68.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.,p 69.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.,p.69

than existing communist bureaucrats (12 percent) and newly recruited communist bureaucrats (12 percent).<sup>33</sup> It explains that Mao's Three and Five anti campaign was not simply for punishing corrupt officials but the real intention behind the campaign was to remove the bourgeois class and KMT force which might threaten the survival of communist party. Thus, it was a campaign for party's legitimacy building. In other words, Three and Five anti campaign was not a simple anti-corruption campaign but a class struggle to remove capitalists and bourgeois class.

Socialist Education Movement launched from 1962 to 1966 is also similar to the case of Three and Five anti campaign. Although improved economic condition was one of the reasons behind Socialist Education Movement, however, the most decisive motivation behind the movement was the appearance of Soviet Union's revisionism. Political leaders in China, especially Mao regarded widespread corruption in China as a consequence of the revisionism that might further lead to the adoption of the capitalism.<sup>34</sup> Thus, from the year of 1963, Mao began to launch Socialist Education Movement for anti-corruption and ideological education.

Socialist Education Movement was centered at the village and township level. In May 1963, the legislation of the "Draft Resolution of the Central Committee on Some Problems in Current Rural Work," so called 'Early Ten Points' was written. In September 1963, the party issued a new directive: "Some Concrete Policy Formulations of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the Rural Socialist Education Movement." This directive was also in the form of ten points, so called 'Later Ten Points'. One noticeable thing is, unlike the period

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid.,p.72.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.,p.102.

of Early Ten Points in which party formed peasant organization to supervise basic officials to promote the movement, Later Ten Points, on the other hand, emphasized the necessity of dispatching “work teams” from higher levels to guide the movement. <sup>35</sup>

Socialist Education Movement was launched for the punishment on landlord, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and corrupt individuals. The main content of the movement was so called Four Clean-Ups, formerly interpreted as cleaning economic accounting, public granaries, collective properties and work-point assessment. <sup>36</sup> Thus, Socialist Educational Movement was aimed at punishing landlords, rich peasants, and corrupt bureaucrats with the content of Four Clean-Ups.

However, after the release of new party document issued in January 1965, so called “Some Problems Currently Arising in the Course of the Rural Socialist Education Movement”, that is, Twenty-Three Points, the direction of socialist education movement began to be distorted. Like Three and Five anti campaign, the direction of the movement was changed from the punishment on corrupt officials to class struggle against capitalist force.

The second points among the Twenty-Three Points clearly explains the purpose of socialist education movement: “The character of the movement is neither the conflict between Four Clean-up or no clean up, nor the conflict between intra and extra party affairs. It is for solving the conflict between socialism and capitalism. Socialist Education Movement is a movement that features Marxism-Leninism. It is a class struggle since 1949, the struggle between proletariat and capitalism. Thus, the purpose of this movement is to eliminate the capitalist road. In case of lower level, the movement aims to remove landlords, rich peasants

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid.,p.102.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.,p.102.

and counterrevolutionaries. For higher level, officials in bureau, district, county, province as well as anti-socialist officials working in central government need to be removed from the party.”<sup>37</sup> Thus, the direction of the movement was also changed from simple clean-up in the village area to clean-up of capitalism. Furthermore, Socialist Education Movement was facilitated in a much more political direction. The Four Clean-Ups, formerly interpreted as cleaning economic accounting, public granaries, collective property, and work-point assessment, were redefined as cleaning politics, economies, organizations, and ideology in 1965.<sup>38</sup>

In conclusion, as aforementioned Three and Five anti movement and Socialist Education Movement explained, the real intention behind China’s anti-corruption campaign after the founding in 1949 was in fact not for punishing bureaucrats, but to remove and eliminate existing anti-socialist force. The rise of Cultural Revolution after the Socialist Education Movement was also a tool for removing existing anti-socialist force, bourgeois, and capitalists. Therefore, from the time from 1949 to the year of 1976, ‘Corruption’ in China did not simply mean punishing government officials, but in fact anti-socialist ideology and capitalist ideology itself mean corruption. Thus, every anti-corruption movement launched by Mao was a struggle against anti-socialist movement. Ideologies that hinder socialism, that is, capitalism and

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<sup>37</sup>百度百科, “农村社会主义教育运动中目前提出的一些问题,”

<https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%86%9C%E6%9D%91%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E6%95%99%E8%82%B2%E8%BF%90%E5%8A%A8%E4%B8%AD%E7%9B%AE%E5%89%8D%E6%8F%90%E5%87%BA%E7%9A%84%E4%B8%80%E4%BA%9B%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98/6534277?fr=aladdin>(검색일: 2020. 10. 08).

<sup>38</sup>百度百科, “四清运动,”

<https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%9B%9B%E6%B8%85%E8%BF%90%E5%8A%A8/615947?fromtitle=%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E6%95%99%E8%82%B2%E8%BF%90%E5%8A%A8&fromid=6150024&fr=aladdin> (검색일: 2020. 10. 08).



bureaucratism themselves were corruption. Nevertheless, after the death of Mao, following Deng's new reform policy, the characteristic of corruption began to change, especially after the year of 1978.

## **2. Corruption in post-reform era (1978-present)**

At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, China announced its open and reform policy in 1978. From this moment, China successfully started to depart from the existing “continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, also known as the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and decided to build up ‘Socialist Modernization’ as a new party direction.<sup>39</sup> In particular, Deng emphasized privatization, marketization, opening-up and decentralization, so called four modernization as China's new direction and the most prominent historical mission. Therefore, from the year of 1978, China successfully settled anti-socialist struggle and marked the new era for reform and opening.

Compared to pre-reform period, the corruption after 1978 shows two differences. Firstly, the characteristic of corruption has changed. As aforementioned, the main purpose of China from 1949 to 1976 was mainly the establishment of socialist nation. As China was still at the transformation period before 1976, the key purpose of the party was to establish the legitimacy of the nation as well as the party. Hence, although punishing existing CCP bureaucrats was important for Mao, however, the more important mission was to remove the anti-socialist force which might threatened the nation and the party. Thus, the anti-corruption campaign before the reform in 1978 was mainly aimed at bourgeois and the bureaucrats who were related to

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<sup>39</sup> 조영남, 『중국의 엘리트 정치』 (서울: 민음사, 2019), p. 237

capitalists and merchants.

Nonetheless, the direction of China has changed after the reform. The main goal of China was changed from the legitimacy building to economic development. For reaching the Socialist Modernization proposed by Deng, capitalists, industrialists were not the target of punishment, rather, they were important personnel for the nation's economic development. Although ideology building was important for the recovery of party legitimacy in the pre-reform era, after the reform, on the other hand, the campaign was mainly aimed at punishing economic criminals who directly damaged China's economic development. Hence after the reform and opening in 1978, China began to concentrate not on anti-socialist force, but rather on corrupt activities which harmed nation's economic development. Thus, China began to punish bureaucrats who committed economic crimes. Therefore, 'Corruption' in China was changed from removing anti-corruption force to the phase of removing specific corrupt activities.

Secondly, the method of anti-corruption campaign was changed. The campaign in the pre-reform era was promoted through the method of mass-mobilization. For example, in Three and Five anti movement, mass public were asked to study party documents and Mao's work for playing the role of accusing and supervising bureaucrats. Although the method of mass mobilization was also used in Socialist Education Movement, Campaign was held much more orderly through the formation of Rural Grassroots Organization. However, after the reform and opening in 1978, especially from Jiang Zemin's era, China began to deal with anti-corruption gradually from the method of mass mobilization to the use of professional institutions for supervising anti-corruption activities, such as Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDIC), Ministry of Supervision of the People's Republic of China (MOS) and Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP). In 2009, CPC Central Commission

for Discipline Inspection, Ministry of Supervision launched online report website to ask mass public to further report corrupt activities of the bureaucrats. Thus, compared with the wide use of mass mobilization in 1980s and 1990s, the method has gradually been changed to the use of professional institutions especially during Jiang's era. Although mass mobilization was still used after the reform, its frequency was reduced sharply, and the use of institutions has increased.

For understanding China's anti-corruption campaign, it is necessary to first have a look at the change of anti-corruption principle. Anti-corruption campaign has always been a result of China's changing anti-corruption principle. This research will not limit anti-corruption as only a 'campaign' which only focus on the strength of the punishment. As Xi Jinping claimed "Use ideology education to make bureaucrats not want to corrupt; Use systemic reform and institution building, as well as strengthened supervision and strict discipline to make bureaucrats not able to corrupt; Use strong punishment to make bureaucrats not dare to corrupt,"<sup>40</sup> research on China's anti-corruption cannot be limited to only one aspect, but it is necessary to focus on three main aspects, that is, principle of anti-corruption, the strength of the punishment and lastly, the institutionalization aspect. Analyzing anti-corruption principle can help understanding each leader's anti-corruption direction in a more accurate way. The strength of the punishment means the overall achievement of the leader's anti-corruption campaign. Lastly, institutionalization means how leaders have built up a system for deterring corruption. Therefore, chapter 4,5,6,7 will explain how anti-corruption policy has been changed throughout Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping Era.

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<sup>40</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, "十八届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告, "

[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208\\_114169.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208_114169.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.16)

## **IV. Anti-corruption policy in Deng Xiaoping's Era (1978-1991)**

### **1. The beginning of anti-corruption**

When analyzing China's anti-corruption, mainly three aspects have been continued from the past. The first aspect is the development of anti-corruption principle. The appearance of each new political leader has led to the development and change of China's anti-corruption principle. For example, in the year of 1998 when China had stepped into the early stage of socialist modernization, Deng proposed "grasping two key links at the same time." That is, facilitating anti-corruption campaign while at the same time foster economic development. On the other hand, in 2017, when China stepped into the stage of moderately prosperous society, so called "Xiao Kang She Hui", Xi proposed a principle of "Sweep the gangs and get rid of evil" in order to solve social problems surrounding mass public. Thus, the anti-corruption principles have been changed gradually following the different goal of each generation. Therefore, in order to analyze the development of anti-corruption, there is a need to first look at the changing anti-corruption principle.

Secondly, work practices of the party need to be analyzed. Punishing corrupt officials is also one way to improve party's work practices. From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping era, political leaders in China have not only regarded economic crime as a serious issue, but also saw Intra-party discipline as an important factor for legitimacy building. Thus, among the bureaucrats, not only economic criminals were being punished, but bureaucrats who abused their power to help their cousins or families have also been the main target of the party. Historically, not only have work practices changed, the strength of the punishment has also

changed in each era. Thus, analyzing party's work practices is important to understand China's overall anti-corruption work.

Lastly, analyzing the institutionalization process of anti-corruption is necessary. Since the reform and opening in 1978, the anti-corruption campaign has been facilitated from the method of mass mobilization gradually to intra-party institutions. However, the absence of institutionalization led to the spread of corrupt activities in 1980s. Thus, there is a need to analyze how China strengthens and develops anti-corruption institutions. In particular, it is important to have a look at how Xi was able to strengthen anti-corruption campaign. Therefore, this thesis will analyze changing anti-corruption principle, work practices as well as institutionalization since the reform in 1978, specifically during Xi Jinping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping era.

At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, China began to announce its open and reform policy in 1978. From this moment, China successfully started to end the existing “continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, also known as the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and decided ‘Socialist Modernization Building’ as a new party direction.<sup>41</sup> In particular, Deng emphasized privatization, marketization, opening-up and decentralization, so called four modernization as China's new direction and the most prominent historical mission. Therefore, from the year of 1978, China successfully eliminated the “Gang of Four” and marked the new era for reform and opening.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> 조영남, 『중국의 엘리트 정치』 (서울: 민음사, 2019), p. 237

<sup>42</sup> 百度百科, “中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报, ”

<https://baike.baidu.com/item/中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报> (검색일: 2020.07.31 )

From 1978 to 1982 October, commune reform was the main goal of China. In the early stage of the reform, China issued several documents related to commune reform, such as “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Several Issues concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development (Draft)” and “Regulations on the Work of Rural People's Communes (trial Draft)” to further replace the commune with household responsibility system. From 1984 October to 1988 September, China began to focus on enterprises. For example, taxes were reduced, wage, recruitment, trade, and finance management started to be controlled by enterprises alone. Lastly, from late 1988 to 1991 throughout the consolidation process, China began to form the system of market economy.<sup>43</sup>

Since the reform and opening in 1978, rural reform, decentralization of the central and local government, strengthened power of industries and other reform policies successfully led to the rapid economic development. According to the statistics from World Bank, the growth of GDP per year reached 9.5 percent per year from 1978 to 1990. Industrialization and Modernization successfully led to the expansion of manufacturing industries. Total amount of Export increased from 18 billion dollars in 1980 to 52.5 billion dollars in 1989. Poverty rate also decreased from 17 percent in 1981 to 13 percent in 1988. Fetal death rate and Child death rate also decreased substantially. General Education of Five year also started.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, China achieved great success in the economic aspect.

However, on the other side, rapid economic development in China led to unintended problems. One of the serious problems arose was widespread of corruption.

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<sup>43</sup> Ting Gong, *The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: an analysis of policy outcomes* (Westport. Connecticut, London: Prager Publishers, 1994), p.110.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p.111.

Compared with sudden economic reform and decentralization policies, the lack of institutions and policy flaw led to the spread of corrupt activities among bureaucrats within the party. On the intra-party aspect, the expansion of the freedom as well as the strengthened power of local government and industries resulted in abuse of power of the bureaucrats, the formation of Patrimonial relationship as well as Official speculation. Moreover, dual-price system and illegal bargaining resulted in serious hyper-inflation and public anger.

According to the survey of from Sociology Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 1987, among the surveyed 2,348 people from 30 cities, 83.7 percent of the people chose corrupt problem as the most serious problem that hindered the life of citizen.<sup>45</sup> In the survey held in 1988, 12,000 people from 16 cities also recognized embezzlement and bribery as most serious social crimes.<sup>46</sup> Just before the arise of Tiananmen Incident in 1989, the survey investigated by China's official magazine *Ban Yue Tan* also confirmed the anger of the masses: The most worrying issue among the mass public was corruption (78.15 percent) and inflation (65.4 percent).<sup>47</sup>

Therefore, the spread of corruption due to the rapid economic development not only led to the serious problem inside the party, but it also caused a damaging effect to the mass public. As a result, mass demonstrations from college students arose from 1986 to 1987, Tiananmen incident happened in 1989. Hyper-inflation and social unrest again made party to recognize the seriousness of the corruption, and finally strong anti-corruption policies began to be issued

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p.135.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p.135.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p.135.

from 1980s.

On the aspect of anti-corruption principle, Deng Xiaoping proposed the principle of “grasping two links at the same time”. In other words, grasp the reform and anti-corruption, as well as economic development and anti- crime at the same time, aiming for ethical progress on one hand and material advancement on the other. As Deng emphasized economic development as the most important mission after the reform in 1978, Deng was worried that continuing anti-corruption campaign might slow down the pace of economic development and might also distort the overall direction of a nation. Thus, Deng claimed that economic development must be the center of anti-corruption campaign. This principle was continued even after Jiang Zemin era and anti-corruption was continued to be regarded as a tool for improving economic development in the later eras.

On the side of party’s work practices, from 1988 January to 1989 March, for almost fifteen months party government issued thirty documents related to corruption and hence developed anti-corruption policy in three aspects: Firstly, government and enterprises were separated. According to “The Resolution to Clean up Corporations” issued in 1988 October, all government agencies and enterprises were being separated, especially government agencies were banned from using their executive budget or subsidy to invest on enterprises. Moreover, bureaucrats were banned from holding concurrent position within the industries. As a result, in 1990, 96.4 percent of the party officials resigned from the enterprises.<sup>48</sup> Secondly, the disciplines and regulations on party officials were specified. Party began to put strong effort to reduce its overall budget. For example, regulations on gift-giving and use of domestic car, restrictions on travelling were further specified. Lastly, the confession of the party officials and

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p.141.



the accusation of the mass public were mobilized. In 1989 Supreme People's Court (SPC) and supreme people's procuratorate (SPP) began to urge confession of party officials and corruption reporting centers were further established.

In conclusion, the anti-corruption principles, work practices as well as institutionalization were formed from Deng Xiaoping era. The construction of modernization principle proposed by Deng became the key direction for China's anti-corruption policy. Future leaders also began to make effort on work practices and institutionalization. Modernization construction in Deng era became the most basic anti-corruption direction for later leaders in China, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, and it also became the most fundamental reason behind Xi's successful anti-corruption campaign.

## **V. Anti-corruption policy in Jiang Zemin's Era (1992-2002)**

### **1. Anti-corruption principle**

Jiang Zemin succeeded Deng's anti-corruption principle in his first term. According to the report of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the 15th National Congress of the CPC, it was mentioned that as China began to step into new phase of socialist modernization construction and reform process, anti-corruption campaign must be promoted together with economic reform under the condition of socialist market economy.<sup>49</sup> Thus, Jiang succeeded

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<sup>49</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “中央纪委向党的十五大的工作报告,” <http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/20>

Deng's anti-corruption direction in his first term and further promoted anti-corruption campaign based on the modernization construction and economic development.

However, from the year of 2000, the overall direction of anti-corruption in China began to change. Report on the work of the fifth Plenary Session of the 15th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on December 25 mentioned that China begun to enter the developmental stage of modernization construction, and its main goal was to build a moderately prosperous society. In 2000, Jiang Zemin's thought of "Three Represents" was also proposed for the first time.<sup>50</sup> In 2001 September 27, Jiang's "July 1" speech and "Decision" were further proposed as the key content of China's anti-corruption work.<sup>51</sup>

From 1992 to 2002, for the past ten years, it is noticeable that the principle of corruption was expanded from Deng's modernization construction and economic development to Jiang's "Three represents" thought. When analyzing China's political leaders in each era, by the time leaders consolidate their power within the party, they began to propose their own principle to further expand their political power. Therefore, the new thought of "Three represents" means Jiang successfully consolidated his own political power within the party and had a great influence over the decision-making process.

## **2. Intra- party Discipline construction– “Three work”**

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1307/t20130726\_114119.html (검색일: 2020.08.01)

<sup>50</sup>中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第五次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114128.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114128.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>51</sup>中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第六次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114130.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114130.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

## 2.1 The work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline

The distinguished feature in Jiang's era is the newly proposed "Three work" in 1993. For the past ten years, three work was the key content of China's anti-corruption campaign, and they were later decided as a key direction of China's anti-corruption struggle.

The first work was the work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline. It was mainly aimed at banning corrupt activities of the bureaucrats and further build up clean, honest self-discipline within the party. In Jiang's term, the work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline was expanded gradually, and its regulations were specified. Firstly, the main content of the work was settlement on cars and houses. From 1993 January to 1997 June, approximately 21,000 over-standard cars were settled. Over 586,000 bureaucrats at the section level were investigated and housing problems were further revised.<sup>52</sup> Thus, the first term of Jiang era can be seen as a period when party began to control and restrict the basic corrupt activities of bureaucrats.

Compared with first term, from the second term of Jiang in 1998, the work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline was much more diversified and specified. In 1998, ban on using public fee for communication equipment, gift-giving and souvenir as well as the investigation on the entertainment fees were the main content of the work.<sup>53</sup> In 1999, CDIC further specified and restricted holding conference in twelve scenic spots. Ban on office

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<sup>52</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, "中央纪委向党的十五大的工作报告," [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114119.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114119.html) (검색일: 2020.08.01)

<sup>53</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, "十五届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告," [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114122.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114122.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

building, restriction on going abroad and other basic behaviors of bureaucrats were further controlled by the party.<sup>54</sup>

From the year of 2000, following the new direction of building moderately prosperous society, the work began to emphasize the economic aspect of bureaucrat's behavior. Regulations related to companion and offspring of bureaucrats were further specified. According to the report on the work of the fourth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the spouse and offspring of the bureaucrats at the provincial level and prefecture level were banned from working in enterprises that are under the jurisdiction of corresponding bureaucrats. Holding high position in Foreign-owned enterprises and Sino-foreign joint venture enterprises was also banned. Furthermore, gift-giving, receiving negotiable securities and luxuries was also restricted.<sup>55</sup>

In 2001, new regulations were established. Firstly, Family property report system was established. Bureaucrats were required to disclose the property of bureaucrats as well as the property of their spouse and offspring. Furthermore, bureaucrats were banned from receiving cash and securities from specific people such as people who are under the direct management of the bureaucrats or customers who are receiving service from the bureaucrats, including lower-level party officials, individuals as well as private industrialists. Moreover, restriction on receiving subsidiary in the fitness center as well as receiving subsidiary from abroad was established, bureaucrats were banned from working at enterprises which was formerly under

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<sup>54</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114124.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114124.html) (검색일: 2020.10. 02)

<sup>55</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第四次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114126.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114126.html) (검색일: 2020.10. 14)

the jurisdiction of corresponding bureaucrats. Other basic corrupt activities between bureaucrats and enterprises were further being restricted and controlled.<sup>56</sup>

In 2002, regulations on bureaucrats and their spouse as well as offspring were further specified. Spouse and offspring of the bureaucrats at the provincial level, prefectural level and county level were banned from working under the jurisdiction of the bureaucrats after registering company in other areas. Moreover, regions under the budgetary shortage at county and village level were banned from using budget to promote new construction project, such as office construction, purchasing cars and going abroad. Bureaucrats in state-owned enterprises were banned from using company's capital to promote stock buying activities. Enterprises also needed to report the situation of the work of self-discipline regularly at employee representative conference.<sup>57</sup>

From the time of 1993 to 2002, when looking at the first work of China's anti-corruption, the thesis finds out that as China had just entered the new phase of socialist construction process, the work of building party self-discipline was also related to basic corrupt activities such as restriction on purchasing cars and houses, settlement on communication equipment. However, as the direction of China was developed from modernization construction to the construction of moderately prosperous society in 2000, the work of building party self-discipline was further expanded to the activities of bureaucrat's spouse and offspring. In particular, specific regulations which could prevent the potential

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<sup>56</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第五次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114128.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114128.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>57</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第七次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114132.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114132.html) (검색일: 2020.10.14)

corruption between enterprises and bureaucrats were enhanced.

## **2.2 The work of punishing corrupt officials**

The second work among Jiang's "Three work" is the punishment on corrupt officials. The investigation was conducted by Central and local discipline inspection committee, mainly aimed at Party and government organs, administrative law enforcement organs, judicial organs, financial management organs and bureaucrats above the county level. The content of the investigation was mainly composed of corruption, bribery, embezzlement, smuggling, dereliction and neglect of duty, venality and villainy.<sup>58</sup>

According to the report of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the 15th National Congress of the CPC, from 1992 October to 1997 June Disciplinary Inspection and Administrative Supervision organ filed 731,000 cases in total and among them 670,100 cases were settled. A total of 669,300 officials received discipline punishment, 121,500 officials were removed from the party, 37,492 received criminal disposition. Among the punished party officials, there were 20,295 punished officials at the county level, 1, 673 punished officials at the bureau level, and lastly 78 officials at the provincial level were punished.<sup>59</sup>


When looking at the second term of Jiang Zemin, from 1997 October to 2002 September

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<sup>58</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “中央纪委向党的十五大的工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114119.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114119.html) (검색일: 2020.08.01)

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

Disciplinary Inspection and Administrative Supervision organ filed 861,917 cases in total and 842,760 cases were settled. 846,150 officials received discipline punishment, 137,711 officials were removed from the party and 37,790 received criminal disposition. Among the punished party officials, there were 28,996 punished officials at the county level, 2,422 punished officials at the bureau level, and lastly 98 officials at the provincial level were punished.<sup>60</sup>



Source: Numbers are projected based on the released data from the government official central discipline committee and supervision department website: <http://www.ccdi.gov.cn>.

Figure 1 is based on the work report of CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the 15th CPC National Congress “[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114119.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114119.html)” and the work report of CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the 16th CPC National Congress “[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114134.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114134.html)”

<sup>60</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “中央纪委向党的十六大的工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114134.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114134.html) (검색일: 2020.10.14)

As Figure 1 shows, compared with Jiang's first term from 1992 to 1997 and second term from 1997 to 2002, the strength of the punishment was enhanced during Jiang's second term. Cases being filed increased from approximately 730,000 to 840,000; Discipline punishment also increased from nearly 670,000 to 850,000, officials being removed from the party increased from approximately 120,000 to 140,000. Nevertheless, the number of officials receiving criminal punishment only increased from 37,492 to 37,790. Thus, compared with the increase in filed cases and discipline punishment, there was in fact little difference in number of officials receiving criminal punishment. In other words, although intra-party institutions were strengthened during Jiang's era, however, legal institutions showed little effect in case of anti-corruption.

### **2.3 The work of correcting misconduct in departments and industry sectors**

Unlike the first work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline which mainly focused on restricting corrupt activities of bureaucrats within the party, the third work of correcting misconduct in departments and industry sectors focused on the problems in the society. For the past 10 years, Jiang Zemin made effort to correct problems particularly in three sectors: mainly rural sector, industry sector and medical sector.

Firstly, the most serious problem within the rural sector was so called "Three arbitrariness (San Luan)" problem. In other words, arbitrary establishment of road checkpoints, arbitrary charges and arbitrary fines promoted by officials were regarded as serious problems among the mass public. Thus, the party began to make a great effort to correct three arbitrariness problems. From the year of 1992 to 1997, the party successfully eliminated 8700 illegal toll stations and



checkpoints, which was 58 percent of the total road checkpoints in China.<sup>61</sup> From 1997 to 2002, the government further removed 4500 road and waterway checkpoints. The problem of arbitrary charges imposed on primary school and middle school students were also corrected substantially.<sup>62</sup>

From 1992 to 2002, Jiang Zemin made effort to solve the issue of “Three arbitrariness” problem and further began to establish regulations for peasants. In the early year of 1988, the party began to form financial account, supervision card and special audit for reducing burden of peasants.<sup>63</sup> Later in 1999, the party decided to collect taxes no more than five percent of the net income.<sup>64</sup> Thus, it is no doubt that Jiang made a great effort improving peasant life.

After solving peasants’ problems in rural sector, the party started to focus on the second sector, that is, the industrial sector. Unlike Jiang’s first term in which the party was more focused on rural sector, from the second term CCP began to expand the range from rural sector to industrial sector. According to the work report issued by State Council in 1998, so called “Decision on solving arbitrary charges, fund-raising quotas and fines toward enterprises” was issued. The state council not only claimed to remove unjustified charges such as executive fees

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<sup>61</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “中央纪委向党的十五大的工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114119.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114119.html) (검색일: 2020.10.14)

<sup>62</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “中央纪委向党的十六大的工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114134.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114134.html) (검색일: 2020.10.14)

<sup>63</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114122.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114122.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>64</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114124.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114124.html) (검색일: 2020.10. 02)

and fines, but also mentioned that investigation needs to be strengthened regarding fund raising and donation.<sup>65</sup> In 1999, CDIC mentioned that bureaucrats who were working in State Owned Enterprises, cooperative enterprises as well as officials who were owing large proportion of state property must comply with the ‘ Code of Conduct for Building Clean and Honest Government’ and ‘ Eight Regulations’ to examine their own behaviors. <sup>66</sup>

Thirdly, the party began to solve problems arose in medical sector. Specifically, CDIC emphasized that production and operation order of medical sector needs to be established, investigation on medicine market must be strengthened, counterfeit products, gift-giving as well as receiving extra charges must be strictly restricted and controlled. The management of medical treatment and medicine needs to be separated, profit-making behaviors of medical personnel are strongly prohibited. From 1992 to 1997, the government successfully eliminated 110 illegal medicine dealing market and further restricted 7594 unlicensed medicine production enterprises and detected 8745 illegal cases. <sup>67</sup>

Starting from 1998, Jiang Zemin began to promote purchase of medicine through Bid and Tender process, while separation of income and expenditure was also facilitated. Following the conduct of bid and tender purchasing process, public non-profit medical industries above the

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<sup>65</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114122.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114122.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>66</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114124.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114124.html) (검색일: 2020.10. 02)

<sup>67</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “中央纪委向党的十五大的工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114119.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114119.html) (검색일: 2020.10.14)

municipal level purchased over the amount of 16 billion yuan in 2000, which was 15 percent of the total purchase number of hospitals.<sup>68</sup> From 2000 to 2002, for the past two years the total purchase amount of medicine through bid and tender reached over 33.5 billion yuan.<sup>69</sup>

In conclusion, as “Three work”, mainly the work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline, the work of punishing corrupt officials and the work of correcting misconduct in departments and industry sectors were the key content of Jiang’s anti-corruption policy, Jiang was able to solve problems regarding basic corrupt activities and major social issues in China. As China was the in the early stage of modernization during Jiang’s era, the party mainly focused on basic social issues and bureaucrat issues. Firstly, when looking at the work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline, the regulations were further specified and expanded from purchase of domestic cars to restriction on bureaucrat’s corrupt activities, disclosure of property. On the punishment side, compared to first term, the punishment of corrupt officials was strengthened in Jiang’s second term. Lastly, the work of correcting misconduct was also expanded gradually from rural sector to industrial sector and medical sector. Therefore, over the past ten years, Jiang Zemin’s “Three work” was developed gradually and it laid the important foundation for Hu Jintao era.

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<sup>68</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第五次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114128.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114128.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>69</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “中央纪委向党的十六大的工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114134.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114134.html) (검색일: 2020.10.14)

### 3. Institutionalization

On the aspect of institutionalization, Jiang proposed a principle of “Addressing both symptoms and root causes of corruption, preventing corruption from the fundament” and hence began to emphasize the institutionalization aspect: Firstly, the commercial relationship between enterprises and bureaucrats were cut off. In 1988, the relationship between Central party, political institutions and its economic entities were successfully cut off.<sup>70</sup> Commercial activities of Military organizations, Chinese Armed Police Force (CAPF), political-legal organs as well as party and political institutions were strictly prohibited. Moreover, local political institutions and operational enterprises were also separated. According to report of the third Plenary Session of the 15th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, CCP successfully removed 19,458 enterprises, 6494 enterprises and 5615 enterprises subordinated to party were being transferred. Thus, the relationship between enterprises and party institutions was settled.<sup>71</sup>

Secondly, the policy of separation between revenue and expenditure was enforced. In 1998, public securities, prosecutory authorities, industrial and commercial administrative departments in provincial capital cities and deputy provincial cities began to separate the management of revenue and expenditure.<sup>72</sup> In 1999, management and supervision on

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<sup>70</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告, ”

[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114122.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114122.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02 )

<sup>71</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114124.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114124.html) (검색일: 2020.10. 02)

<sup>72</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告, ”

extrabudgetary funds was further strengthened. In 2000, the enforcement of separation between revenue and expenditure was further expanded from 64 provincial fee and fine collecting departments to county level.<sup>73</sup>

Thirdly, tangible construction market was established.<sup>74</sup> The report of CDIC claimed that tangible construction market must be established while at the same time bid and tender strengthened. Open, fair and equal competition of contract work system also needs to be established. In 1999, tangible construction markets were established in 335 municipalities except 14 unpermitted cities. According to the report on the work of the fifth Plenary Session of the 15th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, over 147 tangible construction markets were established at the municipal level.<sup>75</sup> The report of CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the 16th CPC National Congress further announced that except 10 nonpermitted municipalities, tangible construction markets were established in 338 municipalities at the city level<sup>76</sup>

Fourthly, transparency in village affairs, factory affairs and political affairs was further

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[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114122.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114122.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>73</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第四次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114126.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114126.html) (검색일: 2020.10. 14)

<sup>74</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114122.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114122.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>75</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第五次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114128.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114128.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>76</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “中央纪委向党的十六大的工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114134.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114134.html) (검색일: 2020.10.14)

enhanced. In 1998, China began to enhance the transparency in village affairs by forcing local governments to disclose their village affairs. While at the same time, experiments of disclosing factory affairs were also made in some of the State-owned Enterprises.<sup>77</sup> In 1999, the transparency was further enhanced by disclosing not only village affairs, but also factory affairs in SOEs, including cooperative enterprises and industries which had large proportion of state property. For enhancing the transparency of enterprises, important issue such as the operation of capital, reform project was opened to employee. Employees representative conference, on the other hand, could evaluate cadres through system of democratic appraisal of leading officials. According to the work report in 2000 January, 86 percent of political power organs at village and county level disclosed political affairs and 80 percent of SOEs began to disclose the factory affairs.<sup>78</sup> On the political side, state organs on grassroot level must disclose political affairs, except state confidential affairs, to mass public and receive supervision from the masses.<sup>79</sup>

Fifthly, Economic Accountability Audit System and Accountant Assignment System were institutionalized.<sup>80</sup> Following the Economic Accountability Audit System, officials were required to take charge of their own economic responsibilities. Moreover, accountants were dispatched to each region for accurate economic affairs. According to the report on the work

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<sup>77</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114122.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114122.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>78</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第四次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114126.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114126.html) (검색일: 2020.10. 14)

<sup>79</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114124.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114124.html) (검색일: 2020.10. 02)

<sup>80</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114124.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114124.html) (검색일: 2020.10. 02)

of the fourth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, in 2000 January 31 accountants were dispatched to 257 cities and 1029 counties in total.<sup>81</sup>

Sixthly, the system of accountability for improving Party conduct and upholding integrity was enforced. Party committee members, government officials as well as leading cadres must comply with State Council's issuance of "Regulations on implementing the system of accountability for improving Party conduct and upholding integrity" to further take responsibility for improving party conduct and anti-corruption affairs. In early 1999, 6300 officials were blamed for accountability,<sup>82</sup> whereas in November the number was expanded to over 7440 cadres. Among blamed officials, there were nine officials at the provincial level, 177 officials at prefectural level and 1709 officials at county level.<sup>83</sup> From 2001 January to October, over 13,000 officials were blamed for the accountability, whereas over 10,000 received discipline punishment and 3,000 received organizational punishment.<sup>84</sup>

Lastly, government procurement system was institutionalized. According to the report by CDIC in 2000, it was mentioned that all political and party organs at the central level, provincial level, sub-provincial level and city level must establish government procurement system. As a result, in 2000, the total purchase amount of the government reached 14.4 billion yuan, which

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<sup>81</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, "十五届中央纪委第四次全会工作报告," [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114126.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114126.html) (검색일: 2020.10. 14)

<sup>82</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, "十五届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告," [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114124.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114124.html) (검색일: 2020.10. 02)

<sup>83</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, "十五届中央纪委第四次全会工作报告," [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114126.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114126.html) (검색일: 2020.10. 14)

<sup>84</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, "十五届中央纪委第七次全会工作报告," [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114132.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114132.html) (검색일: 2020.10.14)

saved the capital of 1.78 billion yuan.<sup>85</sup> In 2001, the purchase amount of the government was further expanded to 34.16 billion yuan, which saved the capital of 3.7 billion yuan.<sup>86</sup>

In 2000, following the new direction of ‘constructing a moderately prosperous society’, the institutionalization aspect also began to change. Unlike pre-2000 in which there were various reforms, China’s institutionalization began to focus on three major institutional reforms after the 2000, mainly administrative approval system, fiscal system as well as cadre and personnel system.

Firstly, in case of administrative approval system, government began to reduce the number of projects that needed administrative approval. According to the report on the work of the fifth Plenary Session of the 15th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, provincial government cancelled 30 percent of the existing numbers that needs administrative approval and it furthered strengthen the supervision of remaining projects.<sup>87</sup> In 2002, State Council cancelled 789 administrative projects and began to enforce the administrative approval reform.<sup>88</sup>

Secondly, fiscal system was institutionalized. Starting from 2001, central government as well as part of the provincial governments began the experiment to record their income and

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>86</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第五次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114128.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114128.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>87</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第五次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114128.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114128.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>88</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “中央纪委向党的十六大的工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114134.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114134.html) (검색일: 2020.10.14)



outcome into the fiscal budget management. Moreover, method of payment and allocation of government funds were changed to centralized Treasury payment system. Bank accounts were being arranged, making another bank account except existing one was strictly prohibited.<sup>89</sup>

Among the settled 1,160,000 bank accounts, over 260,000 accounts were cancelled or consolidated. Centralized financial accounting system began to be institutionalized in part of the regions and departments; system of national treasury centralized payment was implemented.

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Lastly, system for the cadre and personnel management was enforced. Specifically, three policies for recruiting leading cadres were enforced from 2001: Firstly, Democratic recommendation must be made when recruiting political and party cadres. Cadres who were proposed to be in the position must implement public opinion poll first. If large proportion of the public was negative to the work of cadre, recruitment was banned. If there were over one third of the public claiming cadre's incompetence in democratic appraisal Annual assessment, cadre could be removed from the position.

Secondly, cadres who were planned to serve party committees at prefectural and municipal, counties and cities level or cadres who were proposed to be work in the government must receive nomination from provincial and city Standing Committee of the Party Committee. Nominations were decided in the plenary sessions of Party committees through secret ballot by

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<sup>89</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十五届中央纪委第五次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114128.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114128.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>90</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “中央纪委向党的十六大的工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114134.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114134.html) (검색일: 2020.10.14)

all members. However, during the close session of the meeting, nomination can be decided by the Standing committee of party committee after engaging each member's comment.

Thirdly, prior-to-appointment announcement system must be expanded. From 2001, announcement system began to be implemented when recruiting cadres below prefectural level.<sup>91</sup> In 2001, there were over 190,000 cadres recruited through competition which was 68 percent of the total recruitment number for the last five years. Thus, public announcement system was institutionalized at the prefectural level.<sup>92</sup>

In conclusion, there was a great development in anti-corruption principle, intra-party discipline building as well as institutionalization aspect over the past ten years during Jiang's era. On the aspect of anti-corruption principle, the overall principle was expanded from Deng's existing modernization building to 'Three Represents'. In case of "Three work" proposed by Jiang, restriction on bureaucrat's activities, punishment of officials and correcting party's misconduct all three aspects were strengthened. Lastly, on the institutionalization aspect, three main reforms were proposed after 2000. However, as Jiang era was still at the early stage of the modernization period, it is noticeable that Jiang put more effort on settling existing bureaucrat's activities than institutionalization. Although plenty policies were established, less effort has been made regarding strengthening anti-corruption institutions compared to

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<sup>91</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, "十五届中央纪委第五次全会工作报告," [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114128.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114128.html) (검색일: 2020.08.02)

<sup>92</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, "十五届中央纪委第七次全会工作报告," [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730\\_114132.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130730_114132.html) (검색일: 2020.10.14)

restriction on official's corrupt activities and solving public issues. Thus, Jiang's era can be called the stage of "Settlement of the basic work".

## **VI. Anti-corruption policy in Hu Jintao's Era (2002-2012)**

### **1. Anti-corruption principle**

During the first term of Hu Jintao, anti-corruption campaign was held based on the principle of "constructing moderately prosperous society" and Jiang's principle of "Three Represents". According to the report of CDIC in 2003, it was mentioned that economic construction is the center of development, enriching country and people is the direction of the development, whereas constructing moderately prosperous society is the purpose of the development.<sup>93</sup> Thus, it is notable that since the reform in 1978, Hu, as same as Jiang, emphasized economic construction as the center of anti-corruption campaign. Besides the existing principle of economic development, Hu also strongly emphasized "Three Represents" proposed by Jiang: "The principle of Three Represents is an important principle that needs to be held in long term, it is a strong weapon for building party discipline and anti-corruption struggle. Moreover, anti-corruption campaign must be promoted based on the important principle of 'Three Represents' as it is the fundamental standard for anti-corruption."<sup>94</sup>

In 2005, the principle of "Scientific Outlook on Development" was proposed for the first

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<sup>93</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, "十六届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告," [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114137.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114137.html)(검색일: 2020. 10.16 )

<sup>94</sup> Ibid

time in the report of CDIC. “Scientific Outlook on Development” includes four types of development: The first development is so called people-oriented development: fundamental interests of the mass public need to be the starting point as well as the ending point of all the party and government work. People are at the fundamental position of party’s work.<sup>95</sup> Development of the nation is for the people, by the people and the result also needs to be shared with the people.<sup>96</sup> Secondly, comprehensive outlook on development is necessary. China needs to develop in comprehensive way, including economic construction, cultural construction, social construction and construction of all other dimensions for its modernization.<sup>97</sup> Moreover, cooperative development must be promoted to enhance the production relationship and productivity, as well as the relationship between superstructure and economic foundations.<sup>98</sup> Lastly, sustainable development needs to be made. China not only needs development at the present state, but it also needs to develop sustainably in economic, ecological as well as in social dimension.<sup>99</sup> The principle of “Scientific Outlook on Development” was included in the Constitution of the CPC during the 17th CPC National Congress and was designated as party’s Guiding principle the 18th CPC National Congress.

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<sup>95</sup> 百度百科, “科学发展观, ”

<https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%A7%91%E5%AD%A6%E5%8F%91%E5%B1%95%E8%A7%82/317422?fr=aladdin> (검색일: 2020. 10.20)

<sup>96</sup> Ibid

<sup>97</sup> Ibid

<sup>98</sup> Ibid

<sup>99</sup> 百度百科, “可持续发展, ”

<https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%8F%AF%E6%8C%81%E7%BB%AD%E5%8F%91%E5%B1%95/360491> (검색일: 2020. 10.21)

<sup>100</sup> 百度百科, “科学发展观, ”

During Hu's era, not only "Scientific Outlook on Development", the importance of combating corruption and upholding integrity was also emphasized. In the Party's 17th National Congress, the party for the first time included anti-corruption building into four existing buildings, which are ideological building, organizational building, work style building and institution building, mainly aimed at further strengthening the importance of anti-corruption struggle and construction of clean government.<sup>101</sup> For the past ten years during Hu's era, it is noticeable that Hu in his first term succeeded main principles of political leaders in China, such as existing Deng's principle of modernization construction and economic development as well as Jiang's 'Three Represents'. However, following the consolidation of power, new principle of 'Scientific Outlook on Development' was newly proposed by Hu.

When looking at principles proposed by each leader, there is one distinguished feature regarding the development of China's anti-corruption principle. After the reform in 1978, newly appeared leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao who were lack of political power in the early stage, succeeded the direction of previous leader such as economic development and modernization construction. However, by the time leaders consolidated their own political base and power in the party, each leader began to propose his own anti-corruption principle, such as Jiang's 'Three Represents' and Hu's 'Scientific Outlook on Development' for further strengthening the political position and influence within the party. Thus, the principle proposed by each leader not only means the principle itself, but it plays an important role which represents the political power as well as the legitimacy of leader.

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<https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%A7%91%E5%AD%A6%E5%8F%91%E5%B1%95%E8%A7%82/317422?fr=aladdin> (검색일: 2020. 10.20)

<sup>101</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, "中央纪委向党的十七大的工作报告," [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114149.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114149.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.17)

## **2. Intra-party Discipline construction**

During Jiang's era, as it was still at the early stage of the institutionalization, the effort was mainly put on the aspect of basic corrupt activities of bureaucrats as well as the rising social issues, such as settlement on communication equipment, management of cars, ban on gift-giving as and other small scale corrupt activities. However, from Hu era, the scale of the work on party discipline building was further expanded and strengthened.

One noticeable thing is, Hu Jintao's anti-corruption policy was not only concentrated on existing three work, but effort was also made on the aspect of institutionalization and supervision. In particular, Hu began to establish important institutions such as discipline inspection system and accountability system for strengthening intra-party supervision. Thus, compared to Jiang Zemin era who focused on settling existing corrupt activities, from the period of 2002 to 2012, Hu Jintao began to concentrate mainly on institutionalization aspect and intra-party supervision. The direction of anti-corruption policy was developed from three basic work to institutionalization aspect and intra-party supervision. Therefore, Hu Jintao era can be called as a stage of beginning of institutionalization

Nevertheless, "Three work", mainly the work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline, the work of punishing corrupt officials as well as the work of correcting misconduct in departments and industry sectors was continued and further specified in Hu's era. Thus, this chapter will first examine three work under Hu Jintao era and further analyze the strengthened institutions and intra-party supervision.

## 2.1 The work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline

As aforementioned, the first work of anti-corruption was the work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline. It was mainly aimed at banning corrupt activities of the bureaucrats for the purpose of building intra-party discipline. When looking at the work report of CDIC in the first term of Hu Jintao, it is notable that Hu succeeded Jiang's work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline. Nevertheless, restriction on three dimensions was particularly enhanced: Restriction on bureaucrat's economic activities, restriction on extravagant behaviors and restriction on State-owned enterprises.

Firstly, on the economic side, bureaucrats were banned from inviting bids and entering bids in construction projects, transferring commercial land-use-right or exploiting real estate and other power abusing activities.<sup>102</sup> Moreover, leading cadres were also banned from receiving cash, marketable securities and payment documents from units or individuals related to bureaucrat's authorities. Lastly, regulations regard to spouse and offspring of bureaucrats were continued in Jiang's era.<sup>103</sup>

Secondly, extravagant behaviors of bureaucrats were further restricted. Overseas visiting teams were investigated, conference expense, entertainment expense as well as business study abroad fee were strictly controlled. Travelling at public expense in the name of meetings, visits or training as well as use of cars above official capacity or standard equipment, power abuse for personal gain in housing matters were also strictly prohibited. Newly established offices

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<sup>102</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114137.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114137.html)(검색일: 2020. 10.16 )

<sup>103</sup> Ibid

and training centers were strongly controlled. Investigation on audit and supervision was strengthened. Directly responsible individuals and leading cadres were responsible for violation of the regulations.<sup>104</sup>

Lastly, behaviors of leading cadres in SOEs were restricted. Seeking personal gain by abusing power in the purchase and sale of enterprise materials, project development and other business activities was strongly prohibited. Bureaucrats and their relatives were not allowed to invest or become shareholders of private or foreign-capital enterprises that had affiliated transactions or shared dependent relations with state-owned enterprises. Moreover, entrusting, leasing or contracting state-owned assets to one's spouse, children or other relatives without permission was also forbidden. Bureaucrats were not allowed to make decision on major matters such as overseas investment, lending, financing and guarantee without authorization. Lastly, it was prohibited to use the business secret and business channel to engage in personal profit-seeking activities, or to provide or disclose them to others or other enterprises.<sup>105</sup>

According to the report on the work of the third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 'Four disciplines and Eight requirements' was newly proposed. 'Four disciplines' means political discipline, organizational discipline, economic work discipline and public work discipline, whereas 'Eight requirements' includes complying with the direction of CCP, implementing democratic centralism, executing power by rule of law, enforcing clean official duties, restricting official's relatives' abuse of power, fair recruitment process, prohibition on extravagant activities and execution of work for the mass public.<sup>106</sup> Non

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid

<sup>105</sup> Ibid

<sup>106</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, "十六届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告,"



etheless, The work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline was similar to Jiang as the party continued to work on settling cars, controlling overseas teams, investigating illegal use of public capital, examining receive of illegal cash and securities or illegal building and other corrupt activities.

## **2.2 The work of punishing corrupt officials**

Punishment on corrupt officials has been one of the important anti-corruption works since Deng's era. Compared to Jiang's era, two distinguished features exist in Hu's era. Firstly, anti-corruption campaign was more focused on prevention aspect, especially through gradual institutionalization.<sup>107</sup> Among 109 newly legislated intra-party regulations from 2001 to 2007, 53 regulations were related to anti-corruption, which is 49 percent of the total regulation.<sup>108</sup> Moreover, 'Regulations of the Communist Party on Intra-Party Supervision' was made, the structure of CDIC and MOS was also changed for strengthening authorities. Specifically, Discipline Inspection teams established in party organizations, state institutions, social organizations, state-owned enterprise began to receive vertical leadership instead of existing dual leadership.<sup>109</sup> In other words, inspection team which used to receive supervision from both same-level party committee and higher-level discipline inspection committee could receive supervision only from higher-level discipline inspection committee. In September 2007,

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[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzt/201307/t20130726\\_114139.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzt/201307/t20130726_114139.html) 검색일: 2020. 10.16)

<sup>107</sup> 조영남, 『중국의 엘리트 정치』 (서울: 민음사, 2019), p. 576

<sup>108</sup> 조영남, 『중국의 엘리트 정치』 (서울: 민음사, 2019), p. 576


<sup>109</sup> Ibid., p. 576

Corruption Prevention Bureau was established for supervising high-level party officials. In 2009, Central Inspection work team was further established and ‘Regulations on The Communist Party's Inspection operations’ was legislated, which laid the important foundation for Xi’s anti-corruption campaign.<sup>110</sup>

Despite the strengthened prevention, the number receiving punishment decreased greatly, which is the second distinguished feature in Hu Jintao era. Unlike the continued anti-corruption struggle, ironically, the number of officials being punished decreased gradually. What surprises the most is that the first year of Hu’s presidency was the year which reached highest number of punished officials in Hu’s ruling ten years. Moreover, compared to first term, the number of punished officials were lower in the second term. Unlike Jiang Zemin’s term in which cases being filed increased from previous 730,000 to 860,000, discipline punishment increased from 670,000 to 840,000 and 120,000 officials being removed from the party increased to 130,000, the officials receiving punishment showed decreased number in second term.

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid.,p. 578




Source: Numbers are projected based on the released data from the government official central discipline committee and supervision department website: <http://www.ccdi.gov.cn>. Figure 2 is based on the work report of CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the 17th CPC National Congress “[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114149.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114149.html)”

As Figure 2 shows, during the first term of Hu Jintao, from 2002 December to 2003 November, Disciplinary Inspection and Administrative Supervision organ filed 172,649 cases in total.<sup>111</sup> In 2003 December to 2004 November, 162,032 cases were filed by Disciplinary Inspection and Administrative Supervision organ. From 2004 December to 2005 November, 147,539 cases were further being filed.<sup>112</sup> Lastly, in 2006, 123,489 cases were filed. Thus, it is notable that the number of officials being punished were decreasing from approximately

<sup>111</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114137.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114137.html)(검색일: 2020. 10.16)

<sup>112</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第七次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114147.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114147.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.16)

170,000 in 2003 to 160,000 in 2004, 140,000 in 2005 and 120,000 in 2006, which shows a substantial decrease of the punished officials. Although the number in 2007 is statistics only for six months, however, it is still clear that the number receiving punishment decreased greatly.



Source: Numbers are projected based on the released data from the government official central discipline committee and supervision department website: <http://www.ccdi.gov.cn> Figure 3 is based on the work report of CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the 18th CPC National Congress “[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130719\\_114164.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130719_114164.html)”

In Hu's second term, the strength of anti-corruption was even weakened. According to Figure 2, 128,516 cases were filed in 2008,<sup>113</sup> 134,505 cases were filed in 2009, 139,621 in 2010, which shows a slight increase in the number of cases being filed.<sup>114</sup> However, the


<sup>113</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “中央纪委向党的十七大的工作报告,”

[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114149.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114149.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.17)

<sup>114</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十七届中央纪委五次全会工作报告, ”

[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114157.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114157.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.19)

number began to decrease from 2011 in which only 137, 859 cases that were being filed.<sup>115</sup> Thus, although the number of cases did not show a great decrease compared to first term, however, it neither showed an increase in number.



Source: Numbers are projected based on the released data from the government official central discipline committee and supervision department website: <http://www.ccdi.gov.cn> Figure 4 is based on the work report of CDIC to the 15th CPC National Congress “[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzt/201307/t20130726\\_114119.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzt/201307/t20130726_114119.html)”, and the work report to the 16th CPC National Congress “[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzt/201307/t20130726\\_114134.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzt/201307/t20130726_114134.html)”, the work report to the 17th CPC National Congress “[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzt/201307/t20130726\\_114149.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzt/201307/t20130726_114149.html)” and lastly the work report to the 18th CPC National Congress [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzt/201307/t20130719\\_114164.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzt/201307/t20130719_114164.html)

When looking at the result of the punishment in Hu’s first term and second term, compared to 677,924 cases being filed in first term, the number declined to 643,759 cases in the second term. Thus, it shows a difference result from the strength of punishment in Jiang’s era. As Figure 4 shows, compared to Jiang’s era in which the number increased substantially

<sup>115</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十七届中央纪委第六次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzt/201307/t20130726\\_114160.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzt/201307/t20130726_114160.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.19)

from 730,000 in the first term to approximately 860,000 in the second term, the number was decreased from 670,000 in the first term to 640,000 in the second term during Hu's era.

Although it is vital to have a look at the number of party officials who received criminal punishment for further estimating the strength of anti-corruption campaign, however, statistical information regarding criminal punishment does not exist in the work report of CDIC since 2007.<sup>116</sup> Still, according to the research made in China, there were total of 72 officials at ministerial and provincial-level who received punishment from 2003 to 2011, consisting of 17 officials at ministerial level, 51 officials at vice-ministerial level and 3 military generals.<sup>117</sup> Compared to 176 punished officials during Jiang's era, Hu showed little strength of anti-corruption campaign.

In conclusion, for the past ten years, the strength of anti-corruption punishment was weakened in Hu Jintao era. Although there are multiple reasons behind the weakened anti-corruption campaign, numerous domestic and international issues during Hu's era, such as Sichuan Earthquake, the hosting of Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2008, successful launching of Shenzhou VII manned space flight, seventh Asia-Europe Summit, serious violent crime of beating, smashing, looting and arson occurred on March 14 in Lhasa as well as Financial crisis and other domestic, international incidents became the obstacle in forcing anti-corruption campaign.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid,p. 578

<sup>117</sup> Ibid,p. 578

<sup>118</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十七届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114154.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114154.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.17)

### 2.3 The work of correcting misconduct in departments and industry sectors

Unlike the work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline, the work of correcting misconduct in departments and industry sectors is not for restricting the activities of bureaucrats, but for solving the practical issues that are rising in society. During Jiang's era, the work of correcting misconduct was mainly focused on the rural sector, industry sector and medical sector. One noticeable thing is, although Hu also continued to correct misconduct in these three sectors, the work was particularly promoted in the rural sector.

Firstly, one fee system was established in primary school and middle school in 2003. One fee system is a policy in which schools are required to charge fee for only one time, which could prevent the illegal charge imposed on students. Moreover, new policy of so called 'Three restrictions', that is, restriction on score, restriction on number and restriction on money was enforced to public high schools for further strengthening the fairness and educational level of schools.<sup>119</sup> According to the report on the work of the third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the enforcement of one fee system reduced the students burden of 1.7 billion yuan. 'Three restrictions' was also strongly enforced.<sup>120</sup>

In 2004, policies were further enforced not only in primary school, middle school and high school, China began to solve the practical problem arising in total rural area. Firstly, development area was settled. In accordance with the requirement of the central government, all regions and departments began to carry out special measures to address problems such as

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<sup>119</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114137.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114137.html)(검색일: 2020. 10.16 )

<sup>120</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114139.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114139.html) 검색일: 2020. 10.16 )

land requisition, urban housing demolition, reorganization and restructuring of organization as well as bankruptcy which could harm the interests of the people. In 2004, China successfully settled 4813 development areas, which was 70.1 percent of the total development area.<sup>121</sup> A total amount of 17.54 billion yuan was repaid to the farmers, which amounted for 95 percent of the repaid fee.<sup>122</sup> Secondly, the infringement act during the house demolition process was further corrected. The behaviors of housing demolition were regularized, illegal act and coercive act were further corrected. Thirdly, the problem of infringing fundamental rights of employees in the process of SOE's restructuration and bankruptcy was further corrected. Lastly, supervision of defaulted wage or reduced wage of the rural migrant workers in cities was strengthened.<sup>123</sup>

During Hu's second term, the investigation on food, medicine and potable water was greatly strengthened due to the sanlu milk powder incident happened in 2008. It was the incident in which toxic material, so called melamine was contained in the milk powder, which led to the death of thousand infants. This incident not only gave a great shock in China mainland, but also caused a great trust crisis internationally. Thus, in the second term of Hu, the investigation on food, medicine and potable water was strengthened substantially.

According to the work report in 2009, the administrative accountability system regarding safety issues such as food and medicine was strengthened greatly.<sup>124</sup> Moreover, China began

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<sup>121</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第五次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114143.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114143.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.16)

<sup>122</sup> Ibid

<sup>123</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114139.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114139.html) 검색일: 2020. 10.16)

<sup>124</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十七届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114154.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114154.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.17)



to expand the supervision regarding safety production legislation production accountability. Investigation on corrupt activities behind the incident as well as the punishment was further strengthened.<sup>125</sup> Lastly, problems regarding environmental violations were solved, supervision on environmental administrative approval, permission and enforcement was further strengthened.

In conclusion, when looking at three work implemented by Hu for the past ten years, regarding the first work of building cleanness, honesty, and self-discipline, it showed a similar policy with Jiang Zemin. However, when it comes to the second work of punishing corrupt individuals, it is notable that the strength of corruption was weakened compared to Jiang's era. Moreover, the number of cases filed in the second term was even lower than the first term. The main reason behind the weakened corruption was due to multiple domestic and international issues such as Beijing Olympic and Financial Crisis. Lastly, regarding the work of correcting misconduct in departments and industry sectors, although Hu mainly focused on the problems in the rural area in the first term, the direction of the policy was changed to the safety of food, medicine and potable water in Hu's second term.

When looking at Hu's past policy of Three Work, it can be easily found out that most of the policies were succeeded from Jiang Zemin. Despite the enforcement of new policies, when it comes to restricting bureaucrat activities, punishment of corrupt officials as well as correcting misconduct in society these three aspects, it is notable that Hu's new policies were all based on the existing policies proposed by Jiang. For example, in the aspect of correcting misconduct in society, one fee system was established based on the existing policies on 'Three arbitrariness'

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

and ‘Medicine purchase’. Therefore, Hu succeeded Jiang’s existing policies and developed it in all three aspects. However, it shows a great difference when it comes to institutionalization aspect.

### **3. Institutionalization**

In fact, the most distinguished feature under Hu’s era is the institutionalization aspect, especially intra-party supervision. Since the reform in 1978, Jiang began to settle the basic corrupt activities of bureaucrats over the past ten years. It was the important foundation for Hu’s institutionalization and strengthened intra-party supervision as it laid the base for establishing institutions after cleaning and regularizing all the basic behaviors of the bureaucrats. Moreover, the institutionalization and intra-party supervision under Hu also played the important role in the anti-corruption as it laid the important foundation for later Xi’s strengthened anti-corruption campaign. Thus, the chapter will analyze the enforcement of new policies regarding the institutionalization aspect, especially intra-party supervision during Hu’s era.

According to the report on the work of the second Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, based on the existing reform of administrative approval system, fiscal system and cadre and personnel system, Hu began to promote the reform of judicial system as well as the financial system.<sup>126</sup> Two newly established reform led to the fair execution of judicial powers, strengthened fiscal supervision and construction of internal

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<sup>126</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114137.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114137.html)(검색일: 2020. 10.16 )

controlling system.<sup>127</sup>

Specifically, Hu enforced mainly four important policies. Firstly, the policy of inviting bids and entering bids in construction projects was enforced. It was not only aimed at strengthening the intermediary service function of the tangible construction market, but it also resulted in the total separation of institutions, functions, personnel and financial accounts from government departments.<sup>128</sup> Secondly, the policy of transfer of the right to the use of commercial land was established. Except this policy, transferring the right to the use of commercial land by other means was prohibited. Moreover, transfer of agreement was also standardized and restricted. Thirdly, the policy of Property transactions was enforced. The report claimed that accelerating the development of a market for constructing property rights transactions are needed, property rights transactions needs to be included in the market as soon as possible. Lastly, Government Procurement policy was further strengthened. According to the Regulations on the Enforcement of the Government Procurement Law enforced in June, 2002, It was mentioned that China needs to further expand the scope and scale of government procurement, and all procurement items included in the central procurement catalog or above the procurement quota level shall be subject to government procurement.<sup>129</sup> Moreover, The supervision on government procurement personnel and experts employed should be strengthened, and the government procurement administration organs and executing agencies

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid

<sup>128</sup> Ibid

<sup>129</sup> 百度百科, “中华人民共和国政府采购法”, <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%B8%AD%E5%8D%8E%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E5%85%B1%E5%92%8C%E5%9B%BD%E6%94%BF%E5%BA%9C%E9%87%87%E8%B4%AD%E6%B3%95/1469008?fr=aladdin> (검색일 :2020.10.23)

also need be set up separately. Procurement activities should be strictly regulated.<sup>130</sup>

According to the report on the work of the third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the total purchase amount of government reached over 150 billion yuan, which saved 10 percent of the total government capital.<sup>131</sup>

In 2004, new principle of so called ‘Promoting Four Reforms, Completing four systems and Deepening Three disclosure’ was proposed. It was a combination of principles which contained former principles of Jiang, but it also includes the new direction of Hu Jintao.<sup>132</sup> Four reforms are mainly reform of executive approval system, fiscal management system, cadre and personnel system as well as investment system. Four policies, as aforementioned, are the policy of inviting bids and entering bids in construction projects, the policy of transfer of the right to the use of commercial land, the policy of Property transactions and Government Procurement policy. Lastly, ‘Three disclosures’ include disclosure of rural work, disclosure of factory work as well as political work.

On the aspect of intra-party supervision, based on the existing democratic centralism and the party branch meeting, Hu began to promote the system of persuasion and admonition as well as the discipline inspection system. According to democratic centralism, bureaucrats were required to make decision through collective discussion if there is an important decision, important recruitment and appointment, important project or use of large sum of gover

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<sup>130</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114137.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114137.html)(검색일: 2020. 10.16 )

<sup>131</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114139.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114139.html) 검색일: 2020. 10.16 )

<sup>132</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114139.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114139.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.16)

nment capital.<sup>133</sup> Party branch meeting was promoted for strengthening intra-party supervision.<sup>134</sup> Moreover, the system of persuasion and admonition was promoted, mainly aimed at officials in Discipline Inspection Committee as well as bureaucrats in political-party institutions at the lower level. Specifically, officials in each Discipline Inspection Committee need to exchange their views and analyze the problem for anti-corruption work. Warning will be received if there is a problem discovered. Lastly, discipline inspection system was promoted. According to the report on the work of the second Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, it was mentioned that the work of discipline inspection needs to be institutionalized, regularized and normalized.<sup>135</sup>

When looking at discipline inspection system carefully, it is notable that the range and the scale of the discipline inspection was further strengthened. In 2004, CCDI and Inspection Group conducted inspections on 12 provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government) and six Banks under the administration of the central government. Provincial party committees also began to set up inspection organs and carry out inspection.<sup>136</sup> In 2005, CCDI and Inspection Group further conducted inspections in 10 provinces, five central Banks and two asset management companies. The inspection on provinces was also expanded to 94 municipalities and further expanded to 210 counties.<sup>137</sup> In

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<sup>133</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第二次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114137.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114137.html)(검색일: 2020. 10.16 )

<sup>134</sup> Ibid

<sup>135</sup> Ibid

<sup>136</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第五次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114143.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114143.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.16 )

<sup>137</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第六次全会工作报告,”

2006, CCDI and Inspection Group inspected 31 provinces and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, nine Banks under the administration of the Central government, four state-owned financial asset management companies and part of the insurance companies. The inspection was also carried out in key state-owned enterprises. A total of 150 cities and 507 counties were inspected by each province.<sup>138</sup>

In July 2009, the CPC Central Committee promulgated and implemented the ‘Regulations on Inspection Discipline Work of the CPC (Trial)’ for the first time, which played an important role in institutionalizing and regulating inspection work.<sup>139</sup> In the same year, inspections were conducted in 12 provinces, eight central Banks, part of the state organs and central enterprises also began to carry out inspection work.<sup>140</sup> In 2010, CCDI and Inspection Group conducted inspections on 12 provinces, eight central financial organs as well as key SOEs Banks under the administration of the central government.<sup>141</sup>

Newly issued regulations during Hu Jintao’s era, such as ‘Regulations on the system of discipline inspection(trial)’, ‘Regulations on intra-party supervision’, ‘Regulations on

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[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114145.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114145.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.16)

<sup>138</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十六届中央纪委第七次全会工作报告,”

[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114147.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114147.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.16)

<sup>139</sup> 百度百科, “中国共产党巡视工作条例, ”

<https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%85%B1%E4%BA%A7%E5%85%9A%E5%B7%A1%E8%A7%86%E5%B7%A5%E4%BD%9C%E6%9D%A1%E4%BE%8B/8237193?fr=aladdin> (검색일: 2020. 10.23)

<sup>140</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十七届中央纪委第四次全会工作报告, ”, [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114156.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114156.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.19)

<sup>141</sup> 中央纪委监察部网站, “十七届中央纪委第六次全会工作报告, ”

[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726\\_114160.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201307/t20130726_114160.html) (검색일: 2020. 10.19)

disciplinary punishment of Chinese Communist Party’ and ‘Regulations on the protection of Party member’s Right’ laid the important foundation for later Xi’s successful anti-corruption campaign. In particular, the establishment of discipline inspection system played a decisive rule for punishing corrupt officials. Thus, the institutionalization during Hu Jintao’s era was an important background for later era.

## **VII. Anti-corruption policy in Xi Jinping’s Era (2012-Present)**

Unlike previous eras, anti-corruption during Xi’s era was strongly enforced in all aspects. Various anti-corruption principles have been proposed, the strength of the punishment of corrupt officials also reached an unprecedented record. Especially strengthened discipline inspection system and structural reform are two important factors which directly related to the success of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. From 2002 to 2012, China marked the stage of beginning of the institutionalization. From 2012 to present state, it can be said that Xi Jinping played the role of strengthening and further specifying the existing policies, which led to the successful outcome. Thus, this chapter will focus on mainly four aspects: Anti-corruption principle, punishment on corrupt officials, strengthened discipline inspection system and lastly, structural reform.

### **1. Anti-corruption principle**

After the presidency of Xi Jinping, new principles were proposed for the work of anti-corruption. However, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin who promoted limited principles such as “Three represents” or “Scientific Outlook on Development”, much more strengthened and diverse principles were proposed under Xi. In 2013 and 2014, ‘the Eight Rules’ and ‘Correcting

four forms of decadence' were proposed as main direction for solving bureaucrat corrupt activities. 'The Eight Rules' mainly include the expansion of research and analysis on the mass public, reducing the number of conferences, decreasing unnecessary documents, complying with regulations when going abroad, improvement of security guide work, improving news report, strengthening the rules on the publication of articles, promoting frugality.<sup>142</sup> 'Correcting Four forms of decadence' include correcting formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism and extravagance.<sup>143</sup> These contents are aimed to prohibit every practice routine of official's deviant behavior, which can be seen as a high-strength rectification movement.<sup>144</sup> Unlike Discipline Inspection Group which focus on corruption of high-ranking officials, 'Eight Rules', on the other hand, is intended for middle and low-ranking officials.<sup>145</sup>

After the presidency of Xi, investigation was held upon bureaucrats who infringed on Eight Rules. From 2013 to 2017, a total of 189,000 cases were discovered, which led to the disciplinary punishment on 256,000 party officials. In 2019, a total number of 61,000 cases were discovered and 86,000 party officials were punished or removed from the party. It was a

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<sup>142</sup> 百度百科, “中共中央政治局关于改进工作作风密切联系群众的规定, ”

<https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%B1%E4%B8%AD%E5%A4%AE%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB%E5%B1%80%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E6%94%B9%E8%BF%9B%E5%B7%A5%E4%BD%9C%E4%BD%9C%E9%A3%8E%E5%AF%86%E5%88%87%E8%81%94%E7%B3%BB%E7%BE%A4%E4%BC%97%E7%9A%84%E8%A7%84%E5%AE%9A/261727?fromtitle=%E5%85%AB%E9%A1%B9%E8%A7%84%E5%AE%9A&fromid=285958&fr=aladdin> (검색일: 2020. 10.26)

<sup>143</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “十八届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208\\_114169.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208_114169.html)

<sup>144</sup> 이문기, “시진핑 시대 반부패 운동의 정치적 함의: 청렴정부 건설인가 강권정치 회귀인가?”, 현대중국연구, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 74.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 74.



great advance compared to 24,000 discovered cases and 7600 punished officials in 2013.

On the aspect of the punishment of officials, Xi began to propose strong principles to further strengthen the power of anti-corruption campaign. Unlike Jiang who focused mainly on bureaucrat at or above the county level, Xi's principle of "catching Tigers and Flies" has expanded the range of anti-corruption from basic level to all levels of the party.<sup>146</sup> Furthermore, regarding the strength of anti-corruption, Xi emphasized the attitude of 'zero-tolerance' to curb the spread of corruption, which showed a strong determination on anti-corruption campaign.

On the institutionalization aspect, Xi not only has emphasized the restriction on the power abuse, he also proposed a principle of "confining the exercise of power within an institutional cage."<sup>147</sup> As Xi Jinping claimed "Use ideology education to make bureaucrats not want to corrupt; Use systemic reform and institution building, as well as strengthened supervision and strict discipline to make bureaucrats not able to corrupt; Use strong punishment to make bureaucrats not dare to corrupt."<sup>148</sup>

In conclusion, during Xi' era, anti-corruption principle was greatly strengthened. The principle not only aimed at expanding the range and the strength of anti-corruption, but principles regarding institutionalization aspect were also strengthened. Thus, principles were proposed in all dimensions including correcting bureaucrat's activities, punishment on corrupt

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<sup>146</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, "十八届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告, " [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208\\_114169.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208_114169.html)

<sup>147</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, "十八届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告, " [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208\\_114169.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208_114169.html)

<sup>148</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, "十八届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告, " [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208\\_114169.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208_114169.html)

officials and institutionalization aspect. Therefore, from the principle side, it is already notable that Xi had a great ambition toward anti-corruption campaign.

## **2. The work of punishing corrupt officials**

One of the reasons that anti-corruption campaign promoted by Xi drew the attention not only in China mainland but also internationally, was due to the strength of anti-corruption campaign that had showed a big difference from previous eras. Specifically, there are mainly three distinguished features of Xi's anti-corruption campaign. Firstly, the number of punished officials increased sharply. Compared to previous eras, the number of cases being filed as well as the punished officials showed a great increase. Secondly, the number of punished officials increased gradually in long term. Unlike previous Hu Jintao era in which the number of cases being filed were lower in his second term compared to first term, Xi not only reached a high record of the punished officials, but the number was also increased gradually by the time flows. Thirdly, punishment on high-ranking officials was strengthened. Among the high-ranking officials receiving investigation, some officials were at the highest rank who used to be exempt from the investigation. Nevertheless, after the presidency of Xi, top officials at standing committee or Central Military Commission who used to be exempt from the investigated were being investigated. Lastly, the range of anti-corruption has been expanded through international cooperation. Since 2015, CDIC began to arrest corrupt officials through international cooperation such as multilateral negotiations, bilateral negotiations. Cooperative internet site was formed, the enforcement of law was also strengthened.

When looking at the number of punished officials during Xi's era, in 2013 a total number of 172,000 cases were filed by CDIC, 173,000 cases were settled and 182,000 officials received


disciplinary punishment. More than 9,600 people were transferred to judicial organs.<sup>149</sup> Thus, Xi already showed a higher strength of punishment than Hu Jintao era from the first year of his presidency. In 2014, 226,000 cases were filed by CDIC, 218,000 cases were settled, 232,000 officials received disciplinary punishment. It was the highest record ever since the reform in 1978, which for the first time exceeded the number of 200,000. In 2015, the unprecedented record of 330,000 cases were filed by CDIC, which is more than twice the number of punished officials during Hu Jintao era.<sup>150</sup> In 2016, a total number of 413,000 cases were filed by CDIC and 415,000 officials received disciplinary punishment which showed 25 percent and 24 percent increase respectively from the previous year.<sup>151</sup> During Xi's second term, in 2019 a total number of 619,000 cases were filed by CDIC, 587,000 officials received disciplinary punishment. The number of cases filed in 2019 showed a similar record to the cases filed for five years from 2007 to 2012, which recorded 640,000 cases only.

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<sup>149</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “十八届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208\\_114169.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208_114169.html)


<sup>150</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “十八届中央纪委第七次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201701/t20170120\\_114176.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201701/t20170120_114176.html) (검색일 : 2020.10.24)

<sup>151</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “十八届中央纪委第七次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201701/t20170120\\_114176.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201701/t20170120_114176.html) (검색일 : 2020.10.24)



Source: Numbers are projected based on the released data from the government official central discipline committee and supervision department website: <http://www.ccdi.gov.cn>. Figure 5 is based on the work report of CDIC to the 19th CPC National Congress “[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201710/t20171031\\_114178.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201710/t20171031_114178.html)” and the report on the work of the fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection“ [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/202002/t20200224\\_212152.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/202002/t20200224_212152.html)”

As Figure 5 shows, the number of punished officials increased dramatically. However, another distinguished feature of Xi's anti-corruption campaign was the gradual increase in number. Unlike Hu's era in which the number decreased in the second term compared to the first term, the anti-corruption campaign under Xi not only reached an unprecedented record, but the number has increased gradually. Although there is no accurate report of the CDIC regarding the number being punished in 2017 and 2018, the record in 2019 already shows substantial increase of the punishment compared to Xi's first term. Thus, Xi sustained the high record even in the second term, while the campaign was even strengthened.



Source: : Numbers are projected based on the released data from the government official central discipline committee and supervision department website: <http://www.ccdi.gov.cn> Figure 6 is based on the work report of CDIC to the 15<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup> CPC National Congress. Please refer to the Bibliography.

As Figure 6 shows, the strength of anti-corruption under Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping’s has a significant difference. During the year from 2012 to 2017, a total of 1.54 million cases were filed by CDIC, 1.54 million officials received disciplinary punishment. Among the punished officials, there were approximately 8,900 officials at bureau level, 63,000 officials at county and division-level. 58,000 officials were transferred to judicial organs for suspected crimes.<sup>152</sup> The number of punished officials from 2012 to 2017 during Xi’s era showed the similar number of punished officials with ten years of Jiang’s anti-corruption campaign. Thus, it is clear that anti-corruption campaign held by Xi Jinping was strengthened significantly.

<sup>152</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “十八届中央纪委向党的十九大的工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201710/t20171031\\_114178.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201710/t20171031_114178.html) (검색일 : 2020.10.24)

The third feature of Xi's anti-corruption campaign is the strengthened punishment on high-ranking officials. For the last five years from 2012 to 2016, a total of 440 bureaucrats at ministerial and provincial level were being investigated for corruption, which means 88 bureaucrats received punishment per year under Xi's era. Compared to 17.6 officials under Jiang and 8 officials under Hu, the strength of the punishment under Xi was five times more than Jiang and eleven times more than Hu.<sup>153</sup> One noticeable thing is, among the high-ranking officials receiving investigation, some officials were at the highest rank who used to be exempted from the investigation. However, after the presidency of Xi, members of standing committee as well as the Central Military Commission who used to be exempted from the investigation were being investigated. As a result, top-ranking officials such as former member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau Zhou Yongkang, former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong were strictly punished. Thus, the punishment of top-ranking officials means the break of implicit rule within the CCP and it showed the strong intention upon the anti-corruption work.

The last feature of Xi's anti-corruption campaign is the expansion of investigation range through international cooperation. From 2015, CDIC began to arrest officials who fled abroad after committing corruption. Multilateral negotiations, bilateral negotiations were promoted, law was further strengthened and enforced in diverse countries and regions. Cooperation internet site was further established.<sup>154</sup> In 2015, based on China's < Beijing Declaration on Fighting Corruption> and <United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)>, China

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<sup>153</sup> 조영남, 『중국의 엘리트 정치』 (서울: 민음사, 2019), p. 600.

<sup>154</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “十八届中央纪委第五次全会工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201501/t20150130\\_114172.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201501/t20150130_114172.html) (검색일 : 2020.10.24)

began to cooperate with US, Russia, Britain, Canada, Australia and other nations through diverse bilateral and multilateral negotiations such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), G20, International Criminal Police Organization(ICPO) to further promote international cooperation throughout the world. In 2015, 18 corrupt officials were sent back to the court, 1023 officials were arrested and a total of 3 billion yuan was recovered. In 2016, bilateral cooperation with US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand was further strengthened. From 2014 to 2017, for the last four years 3454 officials were arrested from 90 nations and 9.51 billion yuan was recovered. Among hundred corrupt officials who received red warrant, 48 officials were arrested.<sup>155</sup> Newly escaped officials also reduced from 101 officials in 2014 to 31 officials in 2015, 19 in 2016 and only four in 2017.<sup>156</sup> In 2019 August, <Regulations by Discipline Inspection and Supervision Organ on the handling of anti-corruption criminal chasing and foreign related issue> was passed for the first time. Supervision and Institutionalization were further strengthened. Thus, the range of investigation has been expanded from domestic to the globe since the presidency of Xi.

### 3. Discipline Inspection System

What is the main reason behind Xi's strengthened anti-corruption campaign? How could Xi strengthen anti-corruption campaign? Although there are multiple reasons behind the campaign, the most important one was successful institutionalization. In particular,

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<sup>155</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “十八届中央纪委向党的十九大的工作报告, ”  
[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201710/t20171031\\_114178.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201710/t20171031_114178.html) (검색일 : 2020.10.24)

<sup>156</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “十八届中央纪委向党的十九大的工作报告, ”  
[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201710/t20171031\\_114178.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201710/t20171031_114178.html) (검색일 : 2020.10.24)

strengthened Discipline Inspection System and the restructuration of intra-party supervision had a significant impact on China's anti-corruption. According to the work report of the 18th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the 19th CPC National Congress, 60 percent of the cases being filed came from Discipline Inspection System. Thus, it played a decisive role in anti-corruption campaign.

Firstly, since the presidency of Xi, the operating process of the Discipline Inspection System has been changed. Specifically, Neither the team leaders in the inspection team are fixed, nor the subject of inspection is fixed. The relationship between team leaders and the subject of inspection is also not fixed. Thus, this new regulation could prevent the corrupt relationship between team leaders and the subject of inspection, resulting in clean and effective operating system. In case of team leaders, so called "collection of inspection team's team leaders" was constructed in which the experienced officials are selected to participate in one round inspection.<sup>157</sup> The involvement of experienced officials not only improved the overall performance of inspection, participation of only one round also prevented the unneeded corrupt relationship. As CDIC mentioned that 'Not being able to discover significant problems is dereliction of duty, not telling the truth after the discovery is neglect of duty', Xi has put much pressure on the inspection team so that team members had no choice but to highly concentrate on the inspection work.

As a result, Central Inspection Group began to supervise 20 regions through two rounds of work in 2013, 40 regions and institutions were inspected through three rounds in 2014, 83 regions and institutions were inspected through three rounds in 2015, 103 regions and

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<sup>157</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, "十八届中央纪委第三次全会工作报告," [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208\\_114169.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201402/t20140208_114169.html) (검색일 : 2020.10.24)



institutions were inspected through three rounds in 2016. Thus, among 277 inspection subjects , including the Communist Party committees in provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, central party and government organs, social Party groups under the central administration, party groups within central state-owned enterprises, 85 percent of inspection was done in 2016.<sup>158</sup>

From 2013 to 2017, <Regulations on Inspection of the CPC> was revised by the Central Party for two times. The Leading Group for Inspections of the CPC Central Committee held 115 meetings and conducted 12 rounds of inspections in total, which had covered 277 Party organizations, including provinces, municipalities, central government and state organs, enterprises and institutions under the Central Government, financial institutions as well as universities. It was the first time in the history of the CPC that inspections were all carried out in only one term. Among the cases filed by CDIC, over 60 percent of the cases filed was discovered by the inspection system.<sup>159</sup>

In 2018, The Government has promulgated the <Central Inspection Work Plan (2018-2022)>, further finalizing the road map and tasks for the inspection work of the 19th CPC Central Committee. The central inspection group carried out one round of regular inspections and one round of special inspections on poverty alleviation which covered 27 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, 18 central departments, eight central enterprises and two central financial enterprises. In 2018, four responsible officials, mainly officials in party committee, people congress, government and CPPCC in vice-provincial cities were included

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<sup>158</sup> Ibid

<sup>159</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “十八届中央纪委向党的十九大的工作报告, ”  
[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201710/t20171031\\_114178.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201710/t20171031_114178.html) (검색일 : 2020.10.24)

as the subject of investigation.<sup>160</sup> In 2019, third and fourth round of inspection was completed, including the inspection on 42 central enterprises and three party committees as well as party organs in 37 central and national institutions. <sup>161</sup>Therefore, after the presidency of Xi, the inspection system was greatly strengthened which led to strengthened anti-corruption campaign.

#### **4. Structural Reform in Discipline Inspection Committee**

Unlike Discipline Inspection System which has played the role of finding corrupt officials, the internal structural reform in CDIC aimed to strengthen the power of disciplinary committee, which used to be restricted by party committee. For the past decades, the existing system of Discipline Inspection Committee was operated by party's dual leadership. Specifically, Discipline Inspection Committee was under the leadership of superior Discipline Inspection Committee and same level party committee. Although it seemed that the Discipline Inspection Committee and Party Committee at the same level are in the horizontal relationship, in fact the Discipline Inspection Committee was belonged to the Party Committee. Thus, two problems were raised: Firstly, party committee were mainly focused on the economic aspect. Performance of party committee was evaluated not by anti-corruption but the economic development of the region. Thus, the work of anti-corruption could not be strengthened.

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<sup>160</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “赵乐际在十九届中央纪委三次全会上的工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201902/t20190221\\_188870.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201902/t20190221_188870.html) (검색일:2020.10.24)

<sup>161</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “赵乐际在十九届中央纪委四次全会上的工作报告,” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/202002/t20200224\\_212152.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/202002/t20200224_212152.html) (검색일 :2020.10.24)

Secondly, as Discipline Inspection Committee was belonged to Party Committee, the right of nomination was also belonged to Party Committee. Thus, most of the officials of CDIC could not report the corrupt cases and many of them began to simply ignore the corrupt problems. Some of the officials even committed corruption with members of the Party Committee. As a result, for the last decades Discipline Inspection System was restricted and controlled by the Party committee, which decreased the efficiency of the anti-corruption.

However, after the presidency of Xi, the authority of Discipline Inspection Committee was greatly strengthened. In particular, the vertical relationship of Discipline Inspection Committee was strengthened. Firstly, for corruption investigation, Discipline Inspection Committee is now required to get permission by superior Discipline Inspection Committee. Thus, the permission of the party committee is no longer required.<sup>162</sup> Secondly, authority to nominate and vet heads and deputy heads of discipline inspection committee is now nominated by the higher-level superior discipline inspection committee and organization department.<sup>163</sup> These two structural changes not only strengthened the authority of CDIC, but also led to the much more transparent and brave acts of Discipline Inspection Committee at all level. This latter change is radically different from the normal structure of party's authority. Thus, in the structure of Discipline Inspection Committee, it can be said that the most important power of nomination was taken away from existing party committees.<sup>164</sup>

Thirdly, the decreased participation in the deliberation and coordination agencies was also

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<sup>162</sup> Melanie Manion, "Taking China's anticorruption campaign seriously," *Economic and Political Studies*, 4:1, 3-18, DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2016.1152094

<sup>163</sup> Ibid

<sup>164</sup> Ibid

one of the key reasons behind strengthened anti-corruption campaign. From the year of 2014, CDIC began to clean up deliberation and coordination agencies. In 2014, deliberation and coordination agencies in 31 provinces and Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps were settled. Before the settlement, there were 4919 deliberation and coordination agencies which Discipline Inspection Committees had to attend, which means each Discipline Inspection Committee had to attend 144 deliberation and coordination agencies on average. Some regions were even required to participate in 250 agencies. However, after the reform, deliberation and coordination agencies were reduced over 90 percent to only 460 agencies, thus each Discipline Inspection Committee on average is only required to attend 14 deliberation and coordination agencies.<sup>165</sup>

When looking at Xi's anti-corruption, the anti-corruption principle, punishment of corrupt officials and institutionalization all three aspects were strengthened substantially. Firstly, on the aspect of anti-corruption principle, various principles were newly proposed for expansion of anti-corruption work. On the punishment side, Xi has reached unprecedented record of the punished officials. Since the reform in 1978, total punished officials reached over 200,000 for the first time in 2014. In 2015, the unprecedented record of 330,000 cases were filed by CDIC, which is more than twice the number of punished officials during Hu Jintao era. During Xi's second term, in 2019 a total number of 619,000 cases were filed by CDIC, which is similar to Hu's five years record. Two key reasons behind Xi's strengthened anti-corruption campaign are mainly Discipline Inspection System and Structural Reform in Discipline Inspection Committee. The reform in Discipline Inspection Committee has led to the strengthened

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<sup>165</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “十八届中央纪委第五次全会工作报告, ” [http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201501/t20150130\\_114172.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201501/t20150130_114172.html) (검색일 : 2020.10.24)

authority of restricted CDIC so that it could operate the system effectively.

## **VIII. Conclusion**

In this research, three conclusions were made throughout the comparison of anti-corruption policy since the reform in 1978. Firstly, the increased number of punished officials, especially high-ranking officials during Xi's era is the result of the strengthened Discipline Inspection System and Structural Reform in Discipline Inspection Committee. Secondly, this anti-corruption achievement is not a result made in short period, but the result made by the succession and development from Deng, Jiang, Hu's Era. Deng's modernization construction, Jiang's basic work clearance as well as Hu's beginning of the institutionalization have made up the foundation for Xi's strengthened anti-corruption campaign. Lastly, the direction of China's anti-corruption policy has been changed since its reform.

Firstly, the ruling period of Jiang Zemin can be called as the phase of "settlement of basic work". From the year of 1992 to 2002, the party had continuously worked on bureaucrat's discipline building and practical problems within the society. Thus, basic corrupt activities of officials were being settled, such as settlement of cars, settlement of communications equipment, ban on gift-giving and souvenirs -giving, investigation on entertainment fee, restriction on the location of conference, ban on office construction, regulation on going abroad. However, on the institutionalization aspect, effective anti-corruption institutions were not established. Thus, in Jiang's era, as it was the early stage of modernization construction, the anti-corruption work was also mainly focused on the settlement of basic work.

From the year of 2002 to 2012 during Hu's era, the anti-corruption work began to enter

the phase of “Beginning of Institutionalization”. Jiang’s settlement of basic work laid the foundation for Hu to further focus on the institutionalization aspect. Based on existing Jiang’s Democratic Centralism and the Party branch meeting, Discipline inspection system and the system of persuasion and admonition were further established. The issuance of ‘Regulations on the system of discipline inspection(trial)’, ‘Regulations on intra-party supervision’, ‘Regulations on disciplinary punishment of Chinese Communist Party’, and ‘Regulations on the protection of Party member’s Right’ has laid the important foundation for later Xi’s successful anti-corruption campaign. In particular, the establishment of discipline inspection system played a decisive rule for punishing corrupt officials. However, although the institutions were established for the anti-corruption work, full institutionalization was still incomplete as the policy itself contained many deficiencies and the range of enforcement was also limited to a few regions. Thus, Hu Jintao era can be called as the phase of “beginning of institutionalization.”

Lastly, the period of Xi’s is the phase of “Consolidation of Institutionalization.” Xi not only expanded the existing Discipline Inspection system to the nationwide, but also completed the restructuration over Discipline Inspection Committee’s dual leadership system and existing policies. In particular, by looking the fact that inspections were done in all 31 provinces in 2017 already, it is clear that the existing institutions were strengthened substantially. On the aspect of anti-corruption, strong and diverse principles were proposed for the first time since the reform and opening in 1978. Thus, Xi Jinping has consolidated anti-corruption in all aspects, mainly the anti-corruption principle, punishment on corrupt officials and institutionalization aspect, which led to the successful anti-corruption campaign.

The direction of anti-corruption work has changed since the reform in 1978. In case of Deng and Jiang, China had focused on the clearance of corrupt activities, that is, the substantial

problem; on the other hand, when it comes to Hu and Xi's Era, China has not only focused on substantial issue, but rather more on the fundamental issue, which is in fact the establishment of the institution. It predicts that China will further focus on the institutionalization for China's anti-corruption rather than merely solving the substantial problems.

From the year of 2012 to the present stage, Xi has achieved a great success in anti-corruption work. In particular, the work of anti-corruption was greatly developed in the dimensions of anti-corruption principle, punishment on corrupt officials and institutionalization. Nonetheless, there are still many limitations on anti-corruption policy.

First and foremost, from long term aspect, Xi's anti-corruption campaign will weaken the authority of legal institutions. Since the presidency of Xi, Xi has begun to emphasize 'Four forms', which means that receiving criticism from colleagues should be on a regular basis; Light disciplinary punishment and intra-party restructuration should become majority of the punishments; Heavy punishment and intra-party restructuration should become minority of the punishments; the case in which officials committing specific criminal activities and receiving investigation should be very few.<sup>166</sup> By looking at the intention of CCP which maximizes the disciplinary punishment of officials and thus minimizes the transfer of judicial systems due to the specific criminal activities, it is predictable that China will strengthen the intra-party discipline which would further lead to the restricted authority of legal institutions.

As Samson Yuen argued that the reason that party uses intra-party institutions without legal procedures is for controlling and regulating anti-corruption in China. Thus, among corrupt

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<sup>166</sup> 中央纪委国家监委网站, “十八届中央纪委第六次全会工作报告, ”

[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201601/t20160126\\_114174.html?from=singlemessage](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/hyzl/201601/t20160126_114174.html?from=singlemessage) (검색일: 2020.10.24)

officials, only a few high-ranking officials were transferred to formal legal institutions, and except high-profile arrests who committed serious crime and are certain to be handed to the courts, others are more likely receive disciplinary punishment within the party rather than being transferred to judicial organs. Moreover, it is unclear about what exact regulations did officials violate or what is the standard that decides what cases are handed to the courts. Thus, although strengthened CCDI can foster inner-party building, however, in the longer term, the continuous expansion of the party institutions in the absence of checks and balances and rule of law might lead to more serious problem of anti-corruption <sup>167</sup>

In conclusion, the anti-corruption in China was strengthened in the dimension of anti-corruption principle, punishment on corrupt officials and institutionalization aspect. The direction of Modernization construction has laid the important foundation for anti-corruption policies in the later era, Jiang's settlement of basic work and Hu's beginning of institutionalization were also important base for later Xi's anti-corruption campaign. This thesis predicts that China will further focus on the fundamental side of institutionalization than merely solving the substantial problems. However, in the long term, continuous expansion of the party institutions in the absence of checks and balances and rule of law might lead to more serious problem of anti-corruption. Therefore, China needs to prepare a countermeasure for further strengthening the rule of law of a nation.

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<sup>167</sup> Samson Yuen, "Disciplining the party: Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign and its limits", *cefcNews Analysis*, p. 43



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## 국문초록

1978년 개혁개방 이후 반부패는 중국에게 있어 매우 중요한 문제로 다뤄졌다. 지난 40년동안 덩샤오핑, 장쩌민, 후진타오, 시진핑 네 명의 지도자들은 모두 중국의 반부패를 위해 힘써왔다. 특히 시진핑 집권 이후, 매우 강화된 부패 척결의 강도는 전세계적인 주목을 이끌었으며, 많은 학자들은 시진핑의 반부패 운동에 대한 연구를 하기 시작했다. 그러나 현재 학계에서는 두 가지 한계가 존재한다. 첫째로, 대다수의 학자들은 제도화 측면만 연구했다. 둘째로, 시진핑 시기에만 집중을 한다. 중국의 반부패를 정확히 알기 위해서는 개혁개방 이후 지도자들의 반부패 정책을 알아봐야 한다. 더 나아가, 반부패 사상의 변화, 부패 척결의 강도와 제도화 방면을 모두 포괄적으로 이해해야 중국의 반부패 정책의 흐름을 볼 수 있다. 따라서 필자는 덩샤오핑, 장쩌민, 후진타오와 시진핑의 반부패 정책을 비교 분석함으로써 시진핑이 무엇을 계승하였으며 발전시켰는지 알아볼 것이다. 시진핑의 반부패 정책을 연구하는 것, 더 나아가 이전 시기의 지도자들과 비교하여 계승 및 발전한 부분을 연구하는 것은 매우 큰 학문적 의의를 지니고 있다.

필자는 총 세 가지 주장을 한다. 첫째로, 시진핑의 강화된 반부패 운동은 순시제도의 강화 및 감사기율위원회의 구조적 개혁으로 인한 결과이다. 둘째로, 시진핑의 성공적인 반부패 운동은 결코 일시적으로 얻어낸 결과가 아닌, 덩샤오핑, 장쩌민과 후진타오의 사상과 제도를 계승하고 발전한 결과라고 주장한다. 덩샤오핑의 현대화 건설 이론, 장쩌민의 기본 업무 청산, 후진타오의 제도화의 시작 단계는 모두 시진핑이 성공적인 반부패 운동을 할 수 있었던 바탕이 됐다. 마지막



으로, 중국의 반부패 정책의 방향이 변화했음을 알 수 있다. 덩샤오핑과 장쩌민의 경우, 관료들의 부패 행위를 척결하는, 소위 말하는 표면적인 문제 (治标)에 집중을 했다면, 후진타오와 시진핑에 들어서 점차적으로 표면적인 문제 해결에만 머무는 것이 아닌 근본적인 문제(治本), 즉 제도화를 확립하기 시작한 것이다. 따라서 향후 예측할 수 있는 점은 중국의 반부패 정책은 점차 기본적인 업무에서 더 나아가 제도화를 확립하는 방향으로 발전을 할 것이다. 그러나 시진핑의 지나친 당내기관 의존은 국가의 사법기관의 권한을 제한함으로써 향후 어떻게 해결할 것인지 지켜봐야 할 것이다.

**주요어:** 중국, 반부패 정책, 개혁개방, 계승과 발전, 반부패 사상, 제도화, 부패 척결, 덩샤오핑, 장쩌민, 후진타오, 시진핑

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