

Hallyu, Public Diplomacy, and Development Cooperation: Korea's Cultural Diplomacy Concocted for Africa

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This study examines the concoction of hallyu, public diplomacy and development cooperation in Africa wherein lies dangers and opportunities of Korea's cultural diplomacy. Drawing on policy studies and additional field research in Ghana and South Africa, this study argues that the long-run consequences of hallyu public diplomacy in Africa are not in sync with the proclaimed narrative in development cooperation in the creative industries in the continent. Despite Korea's new strategy of development cooperation in the creative industry, such discrepancy and the pursuit of each diplomacy in a silo fashion may offset the intended outcomes of each diplomacy and lead to a lack of coherence in Korea's foreign policy in Africa. By highlighting both potential risks and opportunities in the triple conjuncture, this study aims to extend understanding of a less studied area of the South-South cultural engagement.

Keywords: *hallyu, public diplomacy, cultural ODA, digitalisation, Africa*

1. INTRODUCTION

The expansion of Korean popular culture indicates growing multi-polarity in global soft power. In the early 1990s, Korea's neighbouring Asian countries with cultural and geographical proximity were the epicentre of hallyu (the craze for Korean cultural and creative products outside Korea). Soon, digitalisation across the Global North accelerated the expansion of hallyu, and Korean entertainment contents disseminated on digital platforms have influenced the local culture and media landscape of culturally hegemonic regions such as North America and Europe (Jin, 2018). Private agencies driven by commercial benefits have mainly initiated the global expansion of Korea's creative products.

A growing number of people in Africa are also watching and listening to Korean screen products and music. In Cape Town, South Africa, one often overhears K-pop being played over earphones of students reading in a university library. In Accra, Ghana, the images of Lee Minho (Korean screen celebrity) are used to facilitate in-class discussion on beauty in a psychology class at a university. However, the commercial drive that explains hallyu in the Global North does not seem appropriate for understanding hallyu's reach to this region; Africa, after all, makes up meagre 0.008% of Korea's total export of broadcasting contents (Korea Information Society Development Institute, 2019). Simply put, Africa is not an attractive market for Korea's business people in the cultural and creative industry at present. Instead, the audiences in Africa watch Korea's TV dramas provided by the Korean government free of charge. Here, the Korean government's long-term strategy of boosting the national image of Korea takes precedence over instant commercial gains (Kim, 2020). In this sense, public diplomacy, "where state and nonstate actors use the media and other channels of communication to influence public opinion in foreign societies", better explains the expansion of Korea's creative products in this part of the world (Gilboa, 2001: 1).

Public diplomacy, however, is not the sole channel through which Korea's entertainment

contents are *purposefully* distributed in Africa. In recent decades, attempts to materialise hallyu's potential and utilise its cultural capital have been made across ministries in Korea. International development cooperation has not been an exception (Han, 2012). Having been through multiple mishaps and learnings from errors, the use of hallyu in Korean cultural official development assistance (ODA), which was as rudimentary as "Visits to Three African Countries: Sows Seed of *Hallyu* with Korea Aid" in Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya, has become as advanced as an attempt to share knowledge in capacity building in the cultural and creative industries with Rwanda based on Korea's own experience of nurturing such industries (Korea TV, 2016; BFIC, 2021).

In this sense, hallyu in Africa appears to be linking Korea's public and developmental diplomacy as a shared diplomatic resource. Simultaneously, however, the institutional promotion of hallyu creates cracks between the goals of the two diplomatic activities. A goal of public diplomacy is to engender favourable images and reputations to audiences abroad. Based on my observation in a number of countries in Africa, including Ghana, Kenya, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, and South Africa, Korea's public diplomacy has been fulfilling its goal as it has been increasingly garnering positive images of the country. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the media landscape and the audience of Korea's public diplomacy in Africa differ from those in the Global North. Korea's screen products are provided for free of charge on traditional media and, increasingly, on digital platforms widening the gap in cultural consumption among different socioeconomic populations in the African context (Kim, 2018).

Such consequences of Korea's public diplomacy in Africa are at odds with the intended outcomes of the ODA projects by the Korean government, particularly in the creative industries. The Korean government claims that "the first and foremost reason why international development cooperation is needed is that Korea can contribute to eradicating global poverty by assisting the economic development of emerging and developing countries" (MOFA). Furthermore, for the first time, Korea's development cooperation in the third five-year ODA plan for 2021-2025 notes the creative industry as one of the strategic sectors of the emerging donor (OGPC, 2021). Accordingly, multiple cultural and creative ODA projects have been carried out backed by this new institutional drive (BFIC, 2021). Given that the Korean government is currently shaping a new development cooperation strategy in the creative industry, the proclaimed narrative resonates even louder.

This study examines the concoction of hallyu, public diplomacy and development cooperation in Africa, wherein lies dangers and opportunities of Korea's cultural diplomacy. Findings from field research indicate that hallyu is an effective means of public diplomacy in Africa. However, the long-run consequences of hallyu public diplomacy are not in sync with the proclaimed narrative of in Korea's development cooperation in the creative industries on the continent. Such discrepancy leads to a lack of coherence in Korea's foreign policy in Africa. By highlighting the paradox and cracks in the triple conjuncture, this study aims to extend understanding of a less studied area of the South-South cultural engagement.

This study is based on desk-based research, which is supplemented by field research. Sources of desk-based research include policy documents, government speeches, press releases, news media, and existing studies. A series of field research was conducted mainly in Ghana and South Africa. The field research was carried out between March 2016 and January 2020.¹ Interviews and focus groups were conducted through the snowball method or chain

¹ I purposefully note months here to indicate the time when the field research was finished in case any

referral sampling, which is widely used in qualitative research. This methodological approach is particularly efficient to recruit subjects on sensitive or undisclosed issues (Birnacki and Waldorf, 1981). In Ghana, a series of semi-structured focus groups and one-on-one interviews were conducted with those who had watched more than ten Korean TV dramas for a year. Interviews and focus groups took approximately two hours on average. In South Africa, together with interviews and focus groups, ethnographic methods such as participation and observation were added in K-pop dance studios and K-pop dance competitions in Cape Town. While the experiences and views of interviewees are infused in the form of findings across this article, I use pseudonyms for the interviewees when direct quotes are included.

Korea's cultural diplomacy in Africa was not tailor-made to the needs and peculiarities of specific African countries but conducted without meaningful differences across the continent except South Africa in which the media industry is far more capitalised than that of other sub-Saharan African countries. Hence, this article uses the term "Africa" to depict Korea's indiscriminate diplomatic practices across the continent including Ghana. Furthermore, although Ghana and South Africa are the two primary venues for the field research, it is not the intention of the present study to compare audience experiences in the two countries, nor does it seek to find the "African" phenomena in this short study. Africa is not monolithic, and the two countries provide varied implications. South Africa has a hegemonic creative industry in Africa; its satellite TV companies and telecommunication companies are operating across the continent. On the other hand, Ghana's creative industry shows more characteristics shared by other sub-Saharan African countries with its local idiosyncrasies. Acknowledging the distinctive media environment of the countries, in this article, the term Africa refers to sub-Saharan Africa, to which the two countries belong.

Additionally, the terms "audio-visual products" and "creative products" in this study include film and video, TV and radio, internet live streaming and podcasting, and video games based on the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation's framework for cultural statistics, (UNESCO, 2009). In the context of Korea's industrial and cultural policy, this industry and its products are referred to as "content industry" and "content/contents" or "cultural content/contents" (Korea Law Information Centre, 2018).

This article is structured as follows. What follows examines the varied views on the role of creative goods. After a section on a brief history of Korea's diplomatic and cultural engagement in Africa, the central part of this paper deals with opportunities and dangers in the triple concoction of hallyu, public diplomacy and development diplomacy. The study concludes with a summary and thoughts for further research.

II. THE ROLE OF THE CULTURAL AND CREATIVE PRODUCTS: VIEWS FROM THE GLOBAL NORTH, KOREA, AND AFRICA

In the Global North, there are two primary contrasting views on the role of creative products: commercial benefits and cultural value. Since the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the debates between cultural identity and commerce have been relentless (Neuwirth, 2004). The United States, the global hegemony in the entertainment

reader may wonder how the field work was conducted during the pandemic in 2020; the first case of COVID-19 in South Africa was reported on 5 March 2020 (National Institute for Communicable Disease, 2020).

industry, has traditionally championed commercial narratives (Wyszomirski, 2008), and the European Union, in contrast, underlines the role of culture in European integration to support the protectionist practices in the cultural and creative industry (Greffé, 2008). While audio-visual products are sold for profits, they encompass cultural and historical traits of the countries in which they are produced. Their commercial aspects allow them to trade freely without discrimination on the one hand, but domestic policies prioritising cultural identity legitimise trade-restrictive measures on the other hand (Voon, 2006).

Korea used to share the view of the European Union supporting the role of creative products in safeguarding national identity, cultural dignity, and traditional values, particularly against the lingering influence of Japanese creative products. However, changes in cultural policies in the mid-1990s reveal that such a stance has shifted in Korea (Parc, 2018). The redirection resulted from the initial success of expanding Korean audio-visual products in East Asia initiated by private sectors; Korean TV dramas became popular and made commercial success in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan. The Korean government soon recognised the potential of audio-visual products in generating substantive monetary values from abroad and began to use its capability and experiences as a developmental state (Kwon and Kim, 2014). For instance, the film industry was reclassified from a service sector to a manufacturing sector in 1993, enabling the film industry to gain better access to public funding and bank loans as electronics and car manufacturers had in Korea. The government has provided institutional support in producing and exporting audio-visual products, and the main part of the subsidy was directed to building infrastructures such as distribution channels or a skilled workforce. It is noteworthy that the institutional support was intended to build up the industry in general. The French government, in contrast, provides direct subsidies to stakeholders such as producers (Messerlin, 2014). In short, this shift reflects Korea's developmental view of the creative industry.

While a developmental state explains the Korean government's self-perceived role in expanding Korea's audio-visual products in general, I would argue there is a critical distinction in its regional strategies. In North America, Asia and Europe, the government's role is primarily restricted to facilitating and supporting export as a "passive developmental state." In contrast, the Korean government takes up the role of an "aggressive developmental state" in Africa as the government operates at the frontlines by providing free samples and bears the initial costs to introduce Korean audio-visual products to create markets for private sectors in the long run. This aggressive strategy includes providing creative products free of charge in Africa, which Kim (2020) refers to as "granted developmentalism". The Korean government leverages varied diplomatic tools that help, including public diplomacy and sometimes development cooperation.

Compared to the Global North and Korea, in most sub-Saharan African countries, the discourse on the role of creative industries has emerged relatively recently, and the perceived roles of creative products are somewhat different; economic growth takes precedence over protection of cultural identity or commercial gains. In Ghana, for instance, the creative industry is considered as "a major catalyst for growth" to get the country out of aid dependency (GBN, 2019). Even the name of an association of moviemakers in Kumasi, a city of Kumahood, or Ghana's equivalent to Hollywood is "Creative Arts for Development" reflecting the self-conceived role of film producers in building the national economy. The economic success of Nollywood from neighbouring Nigeria has become a case to learn and a threat to its local creative industry in Ghana. Furthermore, searching for development in the creative industry comes partly from the disappointment at the national development plan

relying on traditional sectors that did not achieve anticipated trickle-down effects. Instead, industries without smokestacks in general began to emerge as a new source of economic growth in Africa, which is characterised by a fast-growing youthful population and an inadequately educated workforce (Newfarmer et al., 2019). In Rwanda, for instance, whereas the growth in productivity in agriculture and manufacturing industries has been staggering, the service industry, including tourism, information and communication technology, and cultural and creative industry, leads the national economic recovery (Ggombe and Newfarmer, 2019); at present, in the country, which is often considered as the envy of Africa, the service sector accounts for more than half of gross national product laying the foundation for sustained growth since the genocide in 1994. Furthermore, the new view on the role of creative industry appears to be continental in Africa; the African Union established the African Audiovisual and Cinema Commission as a Specialized Agency in 2019 (AU, 2019).

To conclude, this part briefly introduced four diverse views on the creative industries and products. Based on the two established contrasting views between the US and the European Union, which highlight commercial benefits and cultural value for collective identity, I have proposed two fresh views on the creative industry by Korea and Africa. Korea's industrial approach to the creative industries reflects its developmental view based on its proven track record as a developmental state. Africa has been increasingly paying attention to the positive role of the creative industries in national development in the context of economic growth and individual entrepreneurial opportunities for the youth population. Such a narrative has only recently emerged in relatively better-performing sub-Saharan African countries in terms of economic growth and governance, such as Rwanda and Ghana. This growth approach differs from Korea's developmental stance, which, in essence, entails national structural transformation and governmental support intended to build up the whole industry.

While Korea's public diplomacy using creative products is driven by the national development of Korea, its development diplomacy through varied ODA projects is aligned with the narrative of building the creative industry by the states in Africa. The two separate policy directions intersect in hallyu in Africa.

III. KOREA'S CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

A Brief History

Let alone Korea's cultural engagement in Africa, its diplomatic engagement in the region began relatively late compared to its neighbours in East Asia including North Korea. In fact, the inter-Korean geopolitical rivalry has played an instrumental role in Korea's foreign policy in Africa. Initially, Korea's engagement with Africa was dormant and passive. In contrast, North Korea actively engaged with Africa in bilateral and multilateral fashion as a vocal member of the Non-Alignment Movement. Only after the abolition of the Hallstein Doctrine in 1973 did South Korea begin building diplomatic ties with a few African countries. In 1982, the president of Korea, for the first time, visited Africa in the midst of the competition against North Korea for accession to the United Nations, but soon after its membership was confirmed, Korea closed down eleven embassies in Africa.

The re-engagement with Africa, which coincided with Ban Ki-moon's race for the highest position in the United Nations, began with Korea's second presidential visit by Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) in 2006. The second wave is marked by a visible commitment to

development in Africa. With his visit, the government launched Korea's Initiative for African Development, which set out its international development cooperation plan specifically to Africa in highlighted areas: to triple its ODA to Africa by 2018, to establish regular meetings between Korean and African ministerial and heads of state, and to share development experience. Since the pledge, Korea's aid to Africa has been significantly increased both in ratio and volume. In 2019, Korea International Cooperation Agency, a Korean governmental agency in charge of releasing and monitoring foreign aid, transferred about \$167 million to Africa, which accounted for more than a quarter of its total amount of aid, and this increase is a significant rise from 2.7% in 2002 (KOICA, 2021).

In terms of cultural diplomacy, there are few significant cultural exchanges to note except a few one-off cultural events accompanied by rare presidential visits to Africa in the 1980s. However, Korea's cultural diplomacy in Africa, which was dormant in the beginning and then reactive to geopolitical circumstances, has become proactive and even aggressive with the emergence of global hallyu.

The Korean Media Products in Africa

The growing awareness and reception of Korea's creative goods in Africa are initiated by the government. Initially, despite the growing demands and popularity of Korea's creative products in other parts of the world, the audiences in Africa did not show much interest due in part to a geological distance, little historical connection and cultural affinity, and the insignificant size of diaspora communities. Additionally, the disadvantageous business environment in the region, such as poor infrastructures and high marketing costs, keeps Korean entertainment enterprises at bay; African nations of a significant size of economies such as Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, and Nigeria remain at low world ranking on the list of ease of business (World Bank, 2020). In addition, the insignificant size of fandom and the gross purchasing power relative to those of America and Asia do not attract Korea's entertainment enterprises either. In 2018, a handful of African countries imported Korea's broadcasting content of \$11,000, making up 0.008% of the total export of broadcasting content of Korea (Korea Information Society Development Institute, 2019).

In lieu of the hesitant private sector, the government has taken the lead in expanding Korea's creative goods on the continent. The government agencies such as Korea Creative Content Agency and Korea Communications Agency buy copyrights of a number of Korean TV series from producers and provide them in Africa free of charge (KOCCA, 2021). Ghana was one of the first sub-Saharan African countries that aired Korean TV drama with this institutional initiative in 2004 (KCC, 2021). Tanzania and a number of countries in southern Africa including Zimbabwe and Botswana followed suit by airing free Korean TV dramas on public and commercial TV channels (Korean Embassy to Zimbabwe, 2007). Upon the initial positive feedback from local audiences, the Korean government has expanded the strategy across Africa. In an effort to air Korea's screen products in prime time, the government has resorted to buy commercial time in between the shows, an approach replicated by the Chinese government in Africa. The free TV dramas on television created the initial audience and market of Korean screen products. At present, however, a significant share of the viewers who were able to afford digital consumption has moved to digital platforms on which they can consume Korea's digital screen contents on demand.

The transition did not happen in South Africa, however. Instead of the traditional TV channels, the audiences in South Africa were created on digital platforms from the beginning.

Most of the viewing started in file-sharing websites that do not respect intellectual property rights. In comparison to most African countries, South Africa's media industry is highly commercialised and owned by a few giant media companies. This media structure in part explains why Korea's institutional drive to provide free TV contents did not happen in the country. In addition, in contrast to other African countries, locally made creative contents are abundant and generate sufficient revenues in South Africa, and there are functioning regulatory institutions despite financial difficulties (Fourie, 2014; Media Institute of Southern Africa, 2013).

In general, the audiences who are exposed to Korean creative goods develop positive images of Korea; they find Koreans lively, polite, respectful, and modern. Different social structures of Korea fascinate them as well; for instance, a big role and influence of mothers in households depicted in the Korean dramas are intriguing to Ghanaian audiences as Ghanaians live in a patriarchal home environment (Kojo, interview 2016, Accra). Similarly, Korean screen products become windows to see the unknown world outside Africa and the familiar West:

Even poor people eat a lot of meat (in Korea).You check their clothing and their gadget. In the one that I recently watched, the main girl's mother is supposed to be poor and she is using LG G3 phone (Elli, interview 2016, Accra).

The audiences learn, interpret, and create images about Korea from watching Korean screen products as they develop "transcultural digital literacies" (Kim G., 2019). For instance, when local media cite Korea's outstanding economic growth, which once was poorer than most countries in Africa, the Korean media audiences tend to link the national experience with the strong work ethic they observed in Korean celebrities in reality shows (Kisha, interview 2017, Cape Town).

Hallyu and Public Diplomacy

Korea's institutional drive to extend its cultural influence in Africa can be translated as public diplomacy in search of soft power, "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments"(Nye, 2004; x). Traditional public diplomacy required significant financial and physical resources; whereas high-income countries were able to reach out to the audience abroad through operating cultural institutions and airing news in foreign languages around the world, low- and mid-income countries were not able to engage in such costly practices of public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy, however, has been rapidly shifting its venue to online, transforming to digital diplomacy. Digitalisation and digital diplomacy have been levelling the playing field of public diplomacy. Here, "digital diplomacy" is different from "digitalisation of diplomacy." The latter has begun with the advent of the internet, and the range of digitalisation of diplomacy is broad, ranging from the digitisation of data on nationals residing abroad to the use of artificial intelligence and big data in complex foreign policy decision-making. Digital diplomacy, on the other hand, refers to utilising a digital environment for diplomatic communications, and it falls under the umbrella of public diplomacy. The use of social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, is one of the most frequently used forms of digital diplomacy. Digital diplomacy can shake the hierarchy, the top-down decision-making process, and the confidentiality of traditional diplomacy. Backed by emotional story-telling,

images, and algorithms, digital diplomacy can garner a sufficient level of public support, which was unattainable in traditional diplomacy (Spry, 2019).

Since digital diplomacy is not as costly as the tools of traditional public diplomacy, an increasing number of countries in the Global South are moving to the digital platform to reach out to the foreign audience. In Korea, public diplomacy as legislation has emerged only recently, and the first-ever public diplomacy act took effect in 2016, although there had been cultural exchanges that can be called public diplomacy. The Korean government defines public diplomacy as “diplomacy activities through which the State enhances foreign nationals' understanding of and confidence in the Republic of Korea directly or in cooperation with local governments or the private sector through culture, knowledge, policies, etc.” (Public Diplomacy Act, 2016).

Hallyu and public diplomacy are mutually reinforcing. Before the global popularity of Korean audio-visual products, the law of public diplomacy did not exist. The government is relying on hallyu as one of the primary resources of Korea's public diplomacy. At the same time, stakeholders in hallyu are benefitting from the institutional promotion of Korea's entertainment content in reaching the global audience, particularly in the regions where Korea's cultural commercial activities are rare, such as Africa. Furthermore, digitalisation, a native environment of hallyu and the new arena of public diplomacy expedites the mutual reliance and reinforcement. This symbiotic relationship on the digital milieu is noteworthy, particularly in terms of the audience in Africa. The emergence of digital public diplomacy has fundamentally changed the mode of interaction not only between senders and recipients but also among the audiences, turning them to pivotal digital secondary stakeholders.

A stakeholder in public diplomacy refers to “an individual or group that has the ability to enhance or constrain a nation's ability to accomplish its mission” (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 424). There are two types of stakeholders; the primary and the secondary stakeholder. The former refers to domestic constituencies of the home country and local agents working with them in the host country. The primary stakeholders have duties to produce and deliver the message or content in public diplomacy. While the secondary stakeholders play a similar role in production and delivery, they are not obliged. Rather they do so because they want to. These secondary stakeholders often overlap with the local audiences in the host country.

Since the secondary stakeholders are in the game of public diplomacy voluntarily, they are fluid and unreliable; they do not necessarily share the goals of the original senders. However, their voice can add credit and influence to the rest local audience, as compared to the primary stakeholders. Since the secondary stakeholders play such a role of catalysts, in both constructive and destructive ways, it is critical to the success of public diplomacy to identify and understand these local transmitters. Hence, Zaharna (2010) refers these groups as a “strategic stakeholder”.

The digital platforms amplified the role of secondary stakeholders or recipients-cum-producers in public diplomacy. On the digital platform, the influence of the secondary stakeholders grows even bigger in multiple ways; the digital consumption “generate(s) a hunger for knowledge, a point of entry into a larger consideration for cultural geography and political economy” (Jenkins, 2006: 170). The digital fora provide the secondary stakeholders with a window to express their freshly obtained knowledge, thoughts, imagination, and translation.

Regarding the consumption of Korea's screen products, the knowledge-seeking characteristic of the digital audience is well reflected on the issue of the provision of subtitles. The digital audience and the TV audience reveal contrasting views on subtitles and

dubbing which are provided in European languages, such as English or French. In Ghana, where English subtitles are provided, the TV audience prefers Korean TV dramas dubbed in local languages instead of English; a significant share of this audience group is functionally illiterate and struggle to follow the speed of subtitles provided in English (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012). In contrast, the digital audiences in Ghana, who were first introduced to Korean creative products via television and able to move to digital platforms for more Korean screen products, distinguish major Asian languages by sound and characters and narrate a few words in Korean. When asked whether they would prefer to watch Korean TV dramas dubbed in English or local languages, all respondents loudly say “no”, while some added “I love to listen to *Hangeul*”.²

The digital audiences are secondary stakeholders in Korea’s public diplomacy as they proactively disseminate Korea’s audio-visual products and voluntarily learn more about Korea and share the knowledge on digital platforms. They use digital data, which is still a luxury in the African context, for a pastime. They are distinctive from the TV audience who hardly tell that they are watching “Korean” TV shows or any Asian shows. Although the sheer size of the audience in Africa is insignificant relative to the size of hallyu fandom in Asia and North America, the digital audiences are of significance in public diplomacy for the likelihood to become members of an opinion-leading and decision-making managerial group in the region.

IV. THE TRIPLE CONCOCTION: HALLYU, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The Cultural and Creative Industry for Development

The emergence of a developmental narrative around the creative and cultural industry is relatively new. In 1998, the first intergovernmental conference on cultural policies for development took place at Stockholm in which the interdependent relationship between sustainable development and the flourishing of culture was recognised. At the venue, the “vision of African cultural cooperation and development” was discussed as well (UNESCO, 1998). Since the Stockholm conference, the discussion on the link had been dormant till the late 2000s, however. In 2008, a United Nations conference was held in Ghana to discuss the development potential of a creative economy (UNCTAD, 2008), and the creative industries were refocused as “feasible development options” and “one of the best bets for economic development” (UNCTAD, 2010; Schultz and Gelder, 2008). In 2013, the Hangzhou Declaration, the second world congress after the Stockholm conference, called for placing culture as the fourth foundational principle of internationally agreed development strategies along with human rights, equality, and sustainability (UNESCO, 2013). Although none of 17 Sustainable Development Goals is exclusively devoted to culture, the 2030 Agenda includes more explicit references on cultural aspects than the Millennium Development Goals (UCLG, 2018).

The creative industries can provide jobs and incomes targeting women, youth and small- and medium-sized enterprises in particular (UNESCO, 2015). Furthermore, the creative

² Christina who just graduated from University of Ghana a year before the interview said ‘*Hangeul*’ to refer to Korean language (interview, 2016).

industry can play an instrumental role in social cohesion in African countries in which diverse cultural, linguistic and religious groups reside side by side within arbitrary borders. Additionally, in light of Africa's demography characterised by youthful demography, building creative industries for economic growth makes sense. The youth are sensitive to creative products and swift to adapt to and make use of new technologies in the creative industry. In Europe, creative industries hire a larger number of youths, aged between 15 and 29, than any other industries do (UNESCO, 2015), which resonates further in Africa where the continental median age is 19.7 (UN DESA, 2019). Additionally, global digital connectivity offers more opportunities at least to certain socioeconomic groups in Africa.

Korea's Creative ODA: The Mishaps and Lessons

Against this emerging recognition of the positive role of the creative industry in economic and social development in countries in Africa, the Korean government, an emerging donor, is providing the increasing volume of official development assistance in building and strengthening creative industries in the region. Africa is the second-largest destination of Korea's development assistance, to which more than 30% of its official development assistance is directed (KOICA, 2021). Learning from its past mishaps, the Korean government is currently on a path of shaping a fresh development cooperation strategy in the creative industry

It is noteworthy that the creative industry appeared for the first time as one of the strategic sectors in Korea's development cooperation in the third five-year official development assistance strategy for 2021-2025 (OGPC, 2021). Backed by the newly proclaimed strategy in development cooperation, the size and types of ODA in the audio-visual sector have grown. The Korean government's aid in this sector includes the government-built broadcasting centres with advanced information and communications technology, provision of broadcasting systems and contents, and training programmes for local broadcasting staff in a number of African countries such as Uganda, Ethiopia, and Tanzania since 2015 (KRPA, 2019). Additionally, a three-year project of sharing Korea's experience of building creative industries as a locomotive of national economic growth kicked off this year upon a request of the Rwandan government (BFIC, 2021). All in all, Korea's development assistance in creative industries is in line with the Knowledge Sharing Programme, Korea's flagship ODA programme, in light of sharing Korea's own experience and knowledge.

Going back to public diplomacy and its use of hallyu or the creative assets in Korea, I would argue that the hallyu public diplomacy is effective despite its limits and challenges. However, the aggressive promotion of hallyu is perhaps of little benefit to local consumers. Although it is not the case in Africa, Ainslie (2016: 25) argues that hallyu as a blatant use of soft power in Laos is one-directional and commercially directed, and it is based on the "position that constructs South Korea as inherently culturally superior and benevolent in terms of the civilised influence that in can offer the now-Orientalised and much more primitive Laos". Similarly for the African context, in an opinion piece titled "the saga of expanding hallyu to Africa, culturally marginalised region", head of Korea Culture Centre in Nigeria³ notes "although hallyu in Nigeria is still not significant, keeping the potential

³ The Korean Cultural Centre in Abuja, Nigeria is one of 32 such establishments across 27 countries run by Korean Culture and Information Service, a subsidiary of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, and it is the only one open in sub-Saharan Africa (KOICS, 2021). The Abuja centre was

of growth of this country in mind, I think we need to make arduous efforts to sow seeds of Hallyu from now on” (Han, 2017).

Such obsession with hallyu extended to Korea’s ODA projects; one of the most notorious erroneous melanges of Korean popular music and development cooperation was Korea Aid transferred to Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda by the Park Guen Hae regime (Kim, 2021; Kim S., 2019). Park’s regime, which did not show as much enthusiasm about Africa as the two previous administrations, decided to visit the three African countries. The Korea Aid was designed as a gift to the countries in a hasty manner as reflected that it did not appear on the government budget plan submitted to the National Assembly for the fiscal year. Yet, the “spreading seeds of hallyu in Africa” justified the hasty and erroneous ODA project, which barely met the standard of international development cooperation (Korea TV, 2016).

Korea Aid was comprised of ten vehicles delivering K-medic, K-meal, and K-culture to each country; three medical vehicles (one medical check-up truck and two ambulances), four food trucks (three trucks with cooking facilities and one refrigerator vehicle), one truck with a projection screen, and two supporting SUVs. K-medic intended to provide basic medical service, particularly to girls in remote areas. The vehicle with a projection screen played a four-minute exercise video and a video clip to encourage girls to go to school and teach proper ways of washing hands and coughing. The original use of the screen, however, was to promote K-culture by screening K-pop, videos on tourism, and Pyeongchang Winter Olympics to local people; while 30 minutes were allocated to cultural showing, the video for public health and sanitation was played for ten minutes (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2016). Four K-meal vehicles were to introduce Korean food such as *bibimbab* and two different types of rice products to locals: rice cookies for infants and rice powder for pregnant or young women. Originally, the ten trucks were to visit remote areas in each country once a month between 2016 and 2017, and after about ten visits, the Korean government would hand the vehicles over to the partner countries to bolster the sense of ownership (Kim, 2019). This aid project’s misguided melange is caused in part by the confusion between public diplomacy and ODA around the patriotic use of hallyu. Although Korea Aid was a faulty development project contaminated with corruption of insiders and the inevitable poor outcomes, it provided an opportunity for an emerging donor to devise a better way of utilising its creative assets for development cooperation.

The Concoction

While the disharmonious combination of public diplomacy and development diplomacy is rather obvious in this single development project, a longer-term disharmony between these two tools of foreign policy is often less visible despite the potential risks. A more fundamental problem lies in the contrasting goals between public and development diplomacy and the long-term pursuit of each policy in a silo manner. Again, the secondary stakeholders in public diplomacy matters in this problem. Based on my in-depth research in Ghana, due to macro-barriers such as insufficient national purchasing power, inadequate infrastructure, and limited opportunities for education, the share of those who are able to watch Korean screen products is small. A limited number of audiences proactively exchange and recommend Korean screen products within their peer groups resulting in the consumption of Korean creative goods contained within the socioeconomic bracket in the fractured media landscape. Although

open in 2010 marking the 30th anniversary of Korea-Nigeria diplomatic relations.

they are small in number, they are members of households of current and probably future decision-makers, managers, and opinion leaders on the upper ladder of the socioeconomic structure in the country. They have international experiences of travelling or residing abroad and tend to look down upon locally made or African made screen products (Kim, 2018).

While most of those audiences who used to watch Korean creative products on television have moved to digital platforms. Such digital migration, however, is at odds with the goal of international development cooperation, particularly in the creative industry. The digital migration reinforces the fractured mediascape by installing a wall between digital and television viewers. While digital viewers have left television, the TV audiences are forced to stay with this traditional media without options due to their socioeconomic deficits. Besides, the digitally-driven public diplomacy benefitting digital audiences exacerbates existing social and economic inequality further. Although the use of creative assets in public diplomacy is effective in garnering positive images of Korea, the aggressive public diplomacy crowds out emerging local creative industries despite the emerging institutional drive to build up creative sectors in a number of African countries, such as Rwanda, Ghana, and Nigeria. The African Union and international development organisations have been increasingly focusing on the role of the creative industry in the growth of Africa. Furthermore, the Korean government is strategically and actively engaged in this agenda. Yet, the long-run outcome of hallyu public diplomacy obscures Korea's new direction of creative development cooperation.

To conclude, given the emerging focus on creative industries in development cooperation, the impact of Korea's public diplomacy in Africa poses a question on Korea's overall foreign policy coordination in this region. The long-term consequences of Korea's cultural diplomacy in Africa conflict with the intended outcomes of Korea's development cooperation, particularly in creative industries. The audiences with significant consuming power preferred to watch foreign screen products, and Korea screen products appear to be offered as an alternative to the all-too-familiar Western films and series. The strategic use of digital platforms by the Korean stakeholders, both public and private, assists this shift. Simultaneously, however, the local creative industry in Africa struggles to generate sufficient and sustained revenue despite the institutional initiatives to utilise creative industries to accomplish national economic growth (GBN, 2019). Hence, concerns favouring protective measures for local creative industries are observed (Korea Foundation, 2019). The greater soft power of Korea in Africa via hallyu public diplomacy comes at the risk of building sustained local creative industry in the region, which is the goal of Korea's cultural and creative ODA.

V. CONCLUSION

This study has examined the concoction of hallyu, public diplomacy, and development cooperation in Africa. The mixture is sometimes as visible and awkward as Korea Aid and a public speech by a Korean official titled "Korea's Economic Development and Cultural Enrichment" in Nigeria (Park, 2016). At the same time, the combination can be more subtle but faulty in the long run. While both public diplomacy and development cooperation ought to achieve overarching foreign policy goals of the country, the diverse and often conflicting short-and long-term consequences of two diplomatic practices offset anticipated outcomes of each diplomatic activity. Although the field research for this article is limited mainly to Ghana and South Africa, my preliminary field research in Kenya in 2018 and desk-based

research on the mediascapes of Africa in general lead to the cautious conclusion anticipating the similar conflicting outcomes in other parts of the continent.

The argument of this article deepens our understanding of the global and local digital divide in Africa, as part of the milieu of public and development diplomacy. From a global perspective, although the Development Assistance Committee in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development notes that “advancements in science and technology are important drivers of economic growth and have the potential to transform economies and societies” (OECD, 2019: 8), in Africa, the progress in digital connectivity and digital literacy is far slower than in other parts of the world (ITU, 2020). The gap in internet access between the average population in the European Union and that in Africa still exceeds 50 per cent despite some improvement since 2010 (Ndung’u and Signé, 2020). While addressing the global digital divide, we also need to consider the local digital divide in development and development cooperation. The local gap is well reflected in the fractured reception of Korea’s digital public diplomacy, as discussed in this paper. The COVID-19 pandemic, which initially accentuated digitalisation, ironically disclosed the limits of pro-digitalisation reforms, particularly in the regions with inadequate socioeconomic infrastructures. The balance between the digital and the physical varies in different regions. Further research on post-pandemic foreign policy, including public diplomacy and development cooperation, will benefit our understanding of the ever-changing media and digital circumstances that will go beyond the longer-term digitalisation reforms.

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
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
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