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Master's Thesis of International Studies

**Israeli-Palestinian Security Coordination as
Peace Conditionality for Peacebuilding in
Palestine**

August 2021

**Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University
International Area Studies Major**

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Abstract

Israeli-Palestinian Security Coordination as Peace Conditionality for Peacebuilding in Palestine

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The purpose of this research is to tie the gap between mixed reports on why some indicate the success of the Israeli-Palestinian security coordination but others have stated detrimental effects of the coordination to the public. Therefore, this research is based on the question of has the security coordination between Israel and Palestine, both respectively represented by the Israeli Defence Force(IDF) and the Palestine Authority Security Forces(PASF), been successful in peacebuilding according to Johan Galtung's two-tier level of negative and positive peace in the different administrative districts of West Bank and Gaza Strip of Palestine by a longitudinal observational study, comparing the presence and absence of the security coordination within borders. Findings indicate that the security coordination of maintaining security checkpoints positively contributed to the creation of negative peace, but it has mixed contributions for creating positive peace, rendering it as a form of structural violence.

Key Words: Peace, Peace Conditionality, Negative Peace, Positive Peace, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Structural Violence

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I. Introduction

1.1. Background of Study

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been an eyesore to world peace since the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948 that nation states and international organizations alike have strived to resolve this conflict as the region of Palestine is of cultural, religious, and political interest to conflicting parties. Despite the multiple but failed attempts at creating peace, a single thread of hope that has seemed to have withstood the test of time since its creation is the security coordination between Israel and Palestine. This security coordination was established through the Oslo Accords as a peace conditionality between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the official representative of Palestine. This security coordination of exchanging discrete information between Israel and Palestine authorities to prevent violence and induce public order has had mixed assessments in which some have hailed it as a success while others deemed it as a tool of continuing Israeli occupation and the Palestinian Abbas administration.

The framework of the security coordination between Israel and Palestine was laid out in the Oslo Accords in 1995, and since then the security coordination was one of the rare but continuous aspects that seemed to uphold peace although the coordination underwent various changes. For instance, the US has provided aid to Palestine since the Oslo Peace Agreements but ended its financial assistance to Palestine earlier in 2019 with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) ceasing its activities in Palestinian territories as well as cutting off funds to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). This termination of financial assistance is connected to the US Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA) passed in 2018 and coming into force in 2019,


which allows US citizens to sue foreign organizations that receive financial aid from the US about claims originating from acts of war, putting the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the legal representation of the Palestinian people, and the Palestinian Authority (PA), the political entity under the PLO, under liability. Therefore, the PA requested the US to end its funding due to potential lawsuits. However, despite this cutoff, the US continued to fund the joint security cooperation between Israel and Palestine, demonstrating the importance of the cooperation.

Despite the efforts and motivation to preserve the security coordination, the security cooperation has not been without threats to dissolve the joint security. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has according to Israeli journalist Khaled Abu Toameh publically threatened to pull out of the joint security cooperation a total of 58 times until October 2014. The Palestinian Liberation Organization announced in March of 2015 that it would suspend security cooperation with Israel due to Israel's retaliation against Palestine Authority's declaration to join the International Criminal Court (ICC) by cutting tax transfers to the Palestinian government. By joining the International Criminal Court, Palestine hoped to indict Israeli personnel for war crimes, but Israel in response to Palestine's decision withheld tax transfers to Palestine. Israel collects taxes on behalf of the Palestinian government. Even though the PLO announced to suspend the joint security cooperation, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas did not approve the decision, so the suspension did not happen.

However, in late 2017 when the Trump-led US administration announced its decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, inciting uproar as both Israel and Palestine contest over their claim of Jerusalem as their respective capital city, the PLO announced in early 2018 again to call for an end to civil and security cooperation. PA President Mahmoud Abbas

only weighed in on May of 2020 to agree to suspend the joint cooperation, and this was in response to the added decision by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to annex parts of occupied West Bank into Israeli territory, which was in-line with Trump’s Middle East Peace Plan also coined the “deal of the century” as revealed in early 2020. Territory disputes are extremely sensitive issues for both Israel and Palestine as both parties contest for ownership of land. Recent polls indicate that the Palestinian public demonstrates that although there is a diverging trend when comparing Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza Strip, an overwhelming majority of Palestinians in both areas believe that Israel aspires to annex all of Palestinian territory.

Figure 1: Palestinian Perception of Israeli Aspiration to Annex Palestinian Territory



Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

This was the first time that the security cooperation was unilaterally and seriously called off by the Palestinians. The security coordination previously faced difficulty during the second *intifada* or Palestinian uprising from 2000 to 2005 as the security coordination between Israel and Palestine broke down during the era.

It was only in November of 2020 that the Palestinian Authority announced it would continue its joint civil and security cooperation with Israel. This decision came after six months of ceasing cooperation with Israel in which Palestinians and Palestinian authority security forces alike faced difficulty financially and in travel due to the breakdown of civil and security cooperation. Israel collects taxes on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, but Israel withheld taxes that amount to more than \$100 million a month in taxes that affected the Palestinian authority's budget that consequently put a financial strain on the Palestinians. Moreover, due to the lack of cooperation, complications occurred for permit issuance for travel that prevented both Palestinian civilians and Palestinian security forces from travelling. The additional COVID pandemic added pressure to the Palestinian Authority for a swift solution, and the 2020 US elections result with Biden's victory and Trump's loss may have motivated the Palestinian Authority to resume cooperation with Israel. During this time Israel did not proceed with its plans to annex areas of West Bank, but instead Israel was able to land peace deals with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in September and Sudan in October. These peace deals with countries within the Middle East occurred after a 26-year gap after the first and second peace deals with Egypt and Jordan in 1979 and 1994 respectively.

Regardless of the current security cooperation, the cooperation, was unequally implemented throughout Palestine due to Israeli's disengagement of Gaza in 2005 and the split of the Palestinian political parties of Fatah and Hamas in 2006. Palestine is divided into the geographical territories of West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Israel unilaterally decided to disengage from Gaza, in which the Israeli defence forces and Israeli settlers left the area in 2005. Thus, there was an absence of Israeli security forces within Gaza. Moreover, the political split resulted in Hamas taking over Gaza Strip in 2007, and Fatah headed West Bank. Because Hamas is considered as a terrorist organization considering Hamas's political

ideology of not recognizing Israel and its use of terrorist activities to achieve its goals, Israel is more avid to cooperate with Fatah that recognizes Israel and condemns terrorist activities. The same goes for the US, especially as the US is known to not negotiate with terrorists, and so US financial support for the security cooperation that is embodied through the establishment of the United States Security Coordinator in 2007 was backed Fatah. In this sense, security cooperation between Israel and Palestine was widespread in West Bank Palestine, not in Gaza Strip.

One main activity of the security coordination is the permit system and the security checkpoints throughout Israel and Palestine. Because West Bank and Gaza Strip are geographically discontinuous in that they are divided by Israeli territory, movement in Israel and Palestine is monitored by the security coordination in an effort to prevent terror and secure order in the said territories. In an attempt to monitor movement for security reasons, permits are necessary to travel between Israel and Palestine as well as West Bank and Gaza Strip. Permits are approved and distributed through cooperation by both the Israeli and Palestinian administration in which permit applications are received by the Israeli end, security clearance is provided by both sides, and permit distribution is done by the Palestinian end. Security checkpoints are operated by the Israeli Defence Forces, and they are situated throughout Israel and West Bank Palestine and densely located along the borders between Israel and Palestine. To travel from one area to another, one must go through such security checkpoints but must have permits to show that his or permission to travel was approved.

1.2. Purpose and Research Question

The purpose of this research is to tie the gap between mixed reports on why some indicate the success of the security coordination but others have stated detrimental effects of

the coordination to the public. Therefore, this research is based on the question of has the peace conditionality of the security coordination between Israel and Palestine, both respectively represented by the Israeli Defence Force(IDF) and the Palestine Authority Security Forces(PASF), been successful in peacebuilding according to Johan Galtung's two-tier level of negative and positive peace in the different administrative districts of West Bank and Gaza Strip of Palestine by a longitudinal observational study and analysis of the activities of the security coordination of monitoring security checkpoints and issuance of travel permits as a form of structural violence.

To understand the security cooperation as peace conditionality, the effects of the security cooperation must be analyzed by measuring how it contributed to peace. Peace itself is also difficult to measure, but defining peace first can ease the process of measuring it, which can be divided into negative and positive peace according to Johan Galtung with negative peace being understood as when personal acts of violence are absent whereas positive peace if the forming of positive relationships towards reconciliation. On this note, the formation of positive peace can be hindered through structural violence, which is violence that has become structurally integrated within a society that prevents people in that society from living their daily lives to the fullest.

Measuring peace in terms of negative peace can consequently be measured through the quantitative measure of casualties due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how Palestinians view their safety as well as positive peace by the Palestinian support for peace and armed attacks against Israeli civilians. These measurements can be viewed as a longitudinal measurement in the two geographically distinct areas of West Bank and Gaza Strip because the implementation of the security coordination has not been equally widespread in Palestine, in which Gaza Strip has seen a drastic pull out of the security coordination since 2005 when

the Israeli Defence Forces disengaged from Gaza and Hamas control over Gaza in 2007 while Fatah-controlled West Bank received more support for security cooperation with Israel from the US by the creation of the United States Security Coordinator in 2007.

The quantitative hard number of the casualties in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Palestinian public's perception of security and safety can provide insight to how the peace conditionality of the security coordination contributed to achieving negative peace. The goal of the security coordination is to provide security and order within the Israeli and Palestinian territories, and this can be measured through the number of deaths caused by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinian public's perception of security and safety is also an important factor when measuring negative peace because if the public feel that they are safe and secure, then they would feel that there was less of personal attacks with ill motivation. On the other hand, if they felt that they were not safe and secure, personal attacks with ill motivation would not be rare. Either way, the effect of the security coordination would be measured.

Positive peace that is the reconciliation of relationships can be measured through the Palestinian public's support for peace and the support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians. If people are more supportive for peace between Israel and Palestine, then it would indicate a less hostile attitude towards Israel whereas if there were a lack of support for peace between Israel and Palestine then that would indicate a lack of motivation to reconcile with Israel. On a more personal level, the Palestinian public's support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians, not Israeli soldiers, can also be used as a measurement for positive peace. This measurement stems from the similar logic of Palestinian public's support for peace but on a more personal level. If people are supportive of armed attacks against Israeli civilians, then it indicates that Palestinians are not ready to reconcile their relationships with Israeli

citizens whereas if the Palestinian public are not supportive of armed attacks against Israeli civilians then it indicates that Palestinians are more willing to reconcile their relationship with the average Israeli citizen.

The logic behind the two different measurements for each negative and positive peace as a result of the security coordination is to see if the security coordination was on a whole effective as a peace conditionality between Israel and Palestine. The exact causal links are not expected to be found through this analysis, but more of a plausible explanatory cause can be further and holistically explained with the combination of the possibility of the security coordination to be a form of structural violence.

Structural violence as aforementioned is violence that is structurally integrated within society so that there are people who are hindered from living their daily lives. This is accentuated due to the system that allows certain people from not being affected by this structural violence as opposed to other certain persons that are not intentionally targeted but nevertheless still affected. On this tangent, the security coordination will be seen as a structural violence despite its goal of bringing security and order to Israel and Palestine. One main activity of the security coordination in which the movement of people traveling through Israel by stopping at security checkpoints with permits in their possession is extremely unfavorable towards the Palestinians as compared to the Israelis that this permit system that is part of the security coordination is a structural violence.

1.3. Hypothesis

The security coordination should have a positive correlation in reducing violence, making strides in negative peace, but positive peace of fostering and reconciling relationships between Israel and Palestine is yet to be achieved. In fact, the security coordination could be

seen as a form of structural violence that hinders the development of positive peace.

1.4. Significance

This research is quite significant in that a longitudinal observational study comparing the West Bank with Gaza Strip in terms of peace and violence is limited. Moreover, pinpointing or merely having explanatory powers that describe the effects of a security coordination on two similar cultural, demographic, and geographic areas can provide great feedback to modify current security coordination programs as well as provide insight to future security coordination programs that are used as peace conditionalities.

It is important to identify structural violence because this type of violence is avoidable (Galtung, Lee). For instance, a study that regarded global inequality that encompasses social, political, and economic equalities as a structural violence analyzed how many lives would be spared of death if global inequality was fixed by bringing all global living standards to that of Sweden's and global wealth was equally redistributed. The results were that 18 million deaths could be reversed (G. Kohler 1976). The actual likelihood that the global living standard to be that on par with that of Sweden's and global wealth redistribution to take place is slim, but it provides motivation and possibility that certain deaths can be avoided if small steps towards raising the global living standard and sharing global wealth were undertaken. In this regards, other types of structural violence should be studied and identified to lessen violence.

II. Literature Review

2.1. Peace, Structural Violence, and Security

Major theories of how security and peace could be gained will be briefly covered in the following section. The traditional realist approach in international relations has the unit of analysis be sovereign nation-states, and war is a natural result of a struggle for survival and power. Due to the anarchy at the international level, modern realists or neorealists further understand that peace on an international level peace was foremost dependent on the balance of powers and deterrence. Nations would take external methods such as seeking allies to balance the power in order to deter the outbreak of war. Even so, cooperation among nation states to ensure peace would not last very long due to the belief of a zero-sum principle and lack of trust. Internal methods such as strengthening military or economic strength are also ways to offset the balance of powers. Relative peace can also be achieved through the concept of mutually assured destruction, calling for deterrence. Thus, an equality of military strength between opposing alliances or opposing parties were a requirement for peace. Nonetheless, it is difficult to understand and evaluate the military strengths of others especially with the continual progress of military weapons, and on top of that, strengthening one's own military capability to secure one's security can lead to a security dilemma that possibly shifts the balance of power (Buzan B 1991).


Liberalist thought on peace again differs from that of realist thought as liberalist ideology has a more positive approach in creating peace by creating collective security or security for all. Liberal institutionalism is set on creating collective security and peace through an international institution that enhances cooperation whereas the hegemonic stability theory proposes that a hegemon with military and economic strength holds in place

international stability and security (Butfov 2007). The democratic peace theory argues that democracies rarely fight against other democracies as nations that are democratic are more peaceful and have less motivation to start wars against each other (Rummel 1997). Therefore, creating more democracies would in effect be creating peace among nations. Commercial liberalism argues that interdependency created through economic exchange can be another factor that prevents countries from going to war due to the possibility of great economic losses if war arose.

At this point, it is important to highlight that while peace may be an objective for many modern nation-states, societies, and individuals alike, it is not the only and prioritized goal. For example, peace is often sought when it seems that it would be more costly to come to a conclusion by sustaining armed conflict. However, peace is often not sought when core disputes have come to the table, especially when it concerns the survival matters (Butfoy 2007).

The different types of peace and the concept of peacebuilding must be at the forefront to understand the idea behind peace conditionalities in peacebuilding, for practitioners and researchers alike should understand what the goals of peace conditionalities are which is to create peace. Peace is a complex idea to grasp however simple it may seem. The idea of peace has been more or less been understood as a state of relations that can be divided into three different categories. The three categories are war, peace, and neither war nor peace.

Figure 2. State of Relations



Source: Xuetong 2004


The first category of war indicates a situation where armed conflict is taking place, and peace is understood as a situation where there is an absence of violence and armed conflict. An important difference between the two states of peace and war is that there is a specifically marked day that start and end war whereas the specifically announced day that ends and begins peace is not as clear-cut. The third category of neither war nor peace is a situation where there is a lack or minimal armed conflict, but just because there is an absence of or minimal armed conflict does not indicate that the state of peace has been achieved. This particular period is further characterized by having armed conflict in a very small geographic area, occasional conflict over an extended period of time, and small-scale casualties (Xuetong 2004).

The father of peace studies Johan Galtung differentiates peace into negative and positive peace that is used for social goals. Negative peace is the “absence of personal violence” and does not bring about a positive situation whereas positive peace is the “absence of structural violence” that brings about a positive situation through overall efforts and institutions in restoring relationships (Galtung 1969).

Positive peace is further described and defined by the Institute of Economics and Peace to have eight different necessary factors that promote holistic positive peace within a territory. They are known as the eight pillars of positive peace that are a well-functioning government, equitable distribution of resources, free flow of information, good relations with

neighbors, high levels of human capital, acceptance of the rights of others, low levels of corruption, and sound business environment (IEP).

Figure 3. Eight Pillars of Positive Peace



Source: IEP


Structural violence was mentioned when defining positive peace in the previous section, but structural violence and violence per say must be understood in relation to peace. Structural violence indicates the “avoidable limitations society places on groups of people that constrain them from achieving the quality of life that would have otherwise been possible” (Lee 2016). Johan Galtung first mentioned this concept of structural violence, asserting that physical violence completed by an actor with intention and with murder as the heaviest form could not be the only type of violence. He argued that if violence could be avoidable but was still present without an intentional actor could still be understood as a form of violence. In other words, if people could not meet their potential of living then that could be regarded as a form of structural violence. Examples of forms of structural violence include

poverty, the caste system, racism, sexism, and so on. All mentioned forms of structural violence do not necessarily hold a specific actor as accountable for the action of violence, but the structure that people are integrated in can unknowingly be violent against others as the receivers of violence are unable to attain their full potential of living because of the violence. For instance, the aforementioned examples of structural violence may hinder certain groups of people from access to basic needs solely due to the caste, race, gender, or financial background that they belong.

Structural violence was further contested to mean “the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above them” (Gilligan 2009). Here, structural violence takes a more concrete form in that a unit of measure of death is brought to compare the group of people that are negatively affected by the structural violence in relation to those who are not negatively affected by the violence.

The two concepts of peace and security are frequently used together, and they seem to have a synonymous feature when they are, in fact, different. Peace and security both are two different circumstances. The state of security can be defined as “free from the threat of war and that a state feels safe from potential aggressors; and that it is able to pursue its national interests and preserve its core values” (EOLSS). Security can be understood to be more of a state for a nation that can be divided into three different degrees of peace, war, and neither peace nor war. This categorization can be easily recalled as it was previously mentioned in how peace is conceptually understood in tandem to the state of relations. During a period of peace, fair security may exist, and during a period of war, no security may exist. During a period of neither war nor peace, partial security may exist (Xuetong 2004).

Figure 4. Different Levels of Security



Source: Xuotong 2004

Furthermore, a country during a period of peace may have different levels of security, for security includes the possibility of threat and danger while peace does not take threat into consideration. For instance, while two parties may be at a state of mutual peace, it is possible for only one party to gain security if it builds of its military, for the other party will feel not be secure but, in fact, be threatened by the other party's military strength. In other words, having security can be understood to have the ability for a certain party to deny demands of another party. If the aforementioned party did not have the ability to deny but give into the demands as the party felt threatened, the previous party does not have security (Butfooy 1997).

Security was classically viewed in terms of security of nation states for national defense. However, other than taking security in terms of the national level, security on the individual level started to take precedence as there was a rise of intrastate conflicts compared to interstate conflicts. Therefore, non-state unit levels of analysis such as ethnic minorities were taken into consideration, and, thus, security was understood to encompass not only nation level security but security for the individual and society that can be understood as human security. Human security has a broad definition of safety from threats of disease and hunger while also protection from interruption from everyday life. This type of security is interrelated to positive peace because the different eight pillars of positive peace provide an environment that provides safety from various threats (Butfooy 1997).

2.2. Peacebuilding and Peace Conditionality

Liberal peacebuilding is relatively a new attempt to bring lasting peace as it focuses more on specific activities that contribute to peace, but it is still based on the thought that through cooperation peace can be attained. Put more specifically, it is understood as aiming to “lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development by promoting measures that seek to reduce the risk of violent conflict,” which can be understood as lessening negative peace and creating positive peace. Peacebuilding comes after peacemaking which is when agreements for peace are brokered (Jantzi 69).

This understanding of peacebuilding indicates that there is an underlying assumption that a social change is needed for improvement of the conflict-ridden situation, and this understanding that a change can bring about peace is where most peacebuilding activities base their theory of change (Jantzi 69). Theories of change in peacebuilding is applicable in multiple areas of society that need change that includes but is not limited to capacity building for institutions, democratic governance, civil engagement, and empowerment of human rights (Jantzi 78).

For instance, capacity building within the security institutions of a region for peacebuilding relies on the basic assumption that the current security sector does not provide security to the state and its people. Therefore, a security sector reform could improve security by providing accountability and by building human capacity (Schnabel 2011). Furthermore, the *conditio sine qua non* for a successful security reform is finding harmony between the imposition of the security and the local ownership (Hanggi 27).

Contact theory is a common theory used to create peace in the academic fields of psychology and society, and simply phrased, peace is positively correlated to contact among different contesting groups of people as people begin to understand and break stereotypes of

the “other.” However, this theory has a risk of igniting even more conflicts if opposing groups that hold grievances towards the other may not yet be ready to have contact (Zuma 45).

Using aid conditionality to ensure peace is relatively new as aid conditionalities were typically used to encourage political and economic reform. Aid conditionalities were first used by the US after World War II with the Marshall Plan to rebuild war-torn Europe as a means to counter the spread of communism by Soviet Russia.

Aid conditionalities as designated by donor countries to recipient countries have changed with time, creating five different generations of aid conditionalities. The first generation of aid conditionalities can be explained with an objective for economic reform within the recipient countries as seen through the conditionalities placed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when providing aid to countries in Latin America in the 1980s. The second generation of aid conditionalities stemmed from political objectives in the 1990s, especially on the democratic conditionality of governance. The third generation of aid conditionalities were peace-oriented as countries in the latter half of the 1990s were rising from violent conditions. The fourth generation took a different turn in the late 1990s and early 2000s as there was a more coercive focus on conditionalities, especially considering the War on Terror declared by the Bush administration which promoted an increase in humanitarian aid to prevent terror. The fifth generation of aid conditionalities can be understood as the absence of conditionalities as conditionalities were often criticized for being disrupting aid efforts, which led to donor and recipient countries to focus on encouraging recipient countries to take more ownership of aid to decrease the need of conditionalities.

Of the conditionalities when administering aid, the definition of peace conditionality is not universally agreed upon. Nonetheless, before diving into the definition of peace

conditionality, the term of aid conditionality must first be defined as the term itself is not yet universally agreed on. A simple definition can be understood as the following: “aid conditionality refers to attempts by donor governments to induce recipient governments to change their policies and behavior, as well as to influence the way aid itself is spent” (Frerks 2006). This definition of aid conditionality can have three interpretations in which all aid has some sort of conditionality in a general sense, aid is used to pressure recipient countries to stay in line with the conditionalities or risk the termination of aid, and the conditionality is used as a carrot to incentivize recipient countries to follow through aid programs. Consequently, the term peace conditionality has several versions of its definition such as “peace conditionality is the use of formal performance criteria or informal policy dialogue to encourage the implementation of peace accords and the consolidation of peace” (Boyce 2002), but the definition provided by the Clingendael Institute seems more fitting for fragile states such as Palestine indicating “peace conditionality is the use of aid as a lever to persuade conflicting parties to make peace, implement a proposed peace accord, and to consolidate peace” (Frerks 2006).

2.3. Measuring and Evaluating Peace


Measuring the developments of peacebuilding and the indicators of peace are not universal although there are several indicators of peace provided by different agencies such as the Global Peace Index, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Failed States Index, and so on. However, evaluating the effectiveness or success of peacebuilding using the different indicators in fragile and conflict-ridden areas is extremely difficult considering the local context where data collection is challenging. Moreover, indicators of peace can fall into the categories of country-level indicators and common indicators, in which the indicators do not

reflect the cultural and historical situation that fragile states since common indicators suggest a more quantitative research method (Mack 2104). Moreover, it is difficult to measure and correlate the effects of a peacebuilding activity to nation-wide effects (Stave). Therefore, the “only sources of robust data” for fragile states are population and perception surveys (Mack 2014).

2.4. Effective Peace Conditionalities

Various requirements to make aid used for peacebuilding effective have been discussed in spite of the complexity of the local fragile states. Peace conditionality can be effectively executed by having “formal performance criteria.” The acceptance of the peace conditionality and enforcement by the recipients in different monitored and compliant stages while battling corruption is also important (Boyce 2002). This acceptance of the peace conditionality resonates with other ideas that the state must be actively involved with the aid program, the local context should make aid receiving possible, and local support of the aid should exist (Gisselquist 2018, Pugh, Barnes). Understanding the local context is certainly integral when providing peacebuilding aid as aid can disrupt the internal balance of power, and this often happens even if there is an absence of conditionality on aid (Boyce 2002). The most effective form of aid with a conditionality is when aid is supported by the locals and recipient ownership is present, instead of coercing aid to the recipients as shown in the figure below.

Figure 5. Flow of Coercive and Voluntary Aid



Source: Boyce 2002

2.5. Assessments of the Palestine Authority Security Forces

Previous assessments of the Palestine Authority Security Forces indicate that there is a lack of performance indicators that makes it difficult to evaluate whether the program has helped improved the peacebuilding process of between Palestine and Israel (Government Accountability Office 2012). The same study stated that a lack of clear objectives also made it difficult to assess whether the PASF was making strides in peacebuilding. The US Office of Inspector General also prepared a performance evaluation of the PASF program but found similarly to the assessment under the Government Accountability Office that the program lacks performance indicators to evaluate the efficacy of the program in general. Another performance evaluation was undertaken which again recommended that clear goals be specifically stated while also recommending the need to build trust between the PASF and the locals due to the conception that the PASF was unable to make independent decisions due to

the peace conditionality of cooperating with the Israeli Defense Force that made it difficult for the locals to follow the leadership of the PASF (NSI 2015).

Despite such assessments of the program, other reports indicate the great strides the Palestinian Authority Security Forces made in reducing violence. A Washington report stated that there has been a “significant reduction in violence, in illegal activity, in the militancy...There’s been a reduction in Israeli incursions in the area” (Sheikh 2008).

III. Research Design

3.1. Theory

Johan Galtung’s understanding of positive peace comes from the fact that negative peace exists. Negative peace is peace that inflicts harm on a personal level whereas positive peace are the efforts of institutions to foster and reconcile relationships. However, structural violence, which is understood as an institutional mechanism that prevents positive peace from forming, can exist, and this theory will be used to draw conclusions that although the security coordination between Israel and Palestine mitigates negative peace, the security coordination with the specific activities of monitoring movement through security checkpoints and permits of travel issuance is actually a structural violence that disrupts the daily lives of Palestinians.

3.2. Data and Methodology

The research will be conducted under the framework of Johan Galtung’s theory of negative and positive peace and structural violence while outlining the history of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces in conjunction to the rivalry between the Palestinian political parties of Fatah and Hamas that resulted in a split in the Palestinian administration

the Palestinian Authority in 2006 and Hamas's takeover of Gaza Strip in 2007. This is an important juncture because the split led to the more Israel-cooperative Fatah party to gain control of West Bank and continue its security cooperation with Israel while Hamas-controlled Gaza does not cooperate internally with Israel for the security cooperation. In other words, the presence of the security cooperation in West Bank and the absence of the security cooperation in Gaza Strip from 2007 can provide great information on how the cooperation contributes to peace in each geographical region. Moreover, analyzing how movement is heavily controlled through the security checkpoints and permits can provide great insight in understanding the security coordination as a structural violence as it hinders Palestinians from access of basic needs.

The methodology used for this research will be a longitudinal observational study of violence and public opinion of security and peace in the different areas of West Bank and Gaza Strip in relation to the development of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces. Yearly data will start from 1995 when the Palestinian Authority Security Forces were first officially mandated by Oslo II Accord until 2019 so that there are 13 years of data before and after the political split of Fatah and Hamas, bringing a total number of 25 years of data.

As a measure of negative peace, the number of casualties due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as reported by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program is used, and to measure positive peace, the Palestinian public opinion of security and peace from both West Bank and Gaza Strip is from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. The impression of the public regarding the Palestine Authority Security Forces was specifically analyzed because they are the agents of the Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation that the Palestinian public have most exposure. Participants of the surveys for the public polls were 18 and above and were randomly selected from all different geographical districts for a total of 1,270

participants per poll. Answers were multiple choice in an ordinal scale. Select survey questions that were screened for this research is in Table 1.

Table 1. Select Survey Questions

Select Survey Questions
<i>Do you support the peace process?</i>
<i>Do you support armed attacks against Israeli civilians?</i>
<i>Do you think that your security and safety as well as your family is secure?</i>
<i>Are you satisfied with the performance of the security sector?</i>
<i>Do you support Hamas?</i>
<i>Do you support Fatah?</i>

Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

Both data sets of violence and public opinion provide insight to the success of the security coordination in peacebuilding.

Information regarding the nature of the security cooperation with its activities of monitoring security checkpoints and issuance of travel permits as a form of structural violence is from media outlets such as Al Jazeera and government data such as the General Authority for Civil Affairs.

IV. Historical Background

4.1. Historical Setting

Tracing the roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essential in understanding the

complex dynamics of this issue, but due to the sheer amount of information related to this topic that goes beyond the scope of this research, a condensed version of the origins of the conflict will be stated.

Tension between the Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians started in the aftermath of the first world war when the geographic region of Palestine was under the British mandate during which the Balfour Declaration of 1917 that stated British support for the creation of Israel in Arab-majority Palestine was announced. It is interesting to note that before Palestine was under the British mandate, Palestine was under the Ottoman Empire, which fought against Great Britain during World War I. During the war, the British government promised Arab independence if the Arabs revolted against the Ottomans, known as the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence that led to the successful Great Arab Revolt, which contributed to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. However, due to the Sykes-Picot Agreement between the British and French, former Ottoman areas were divided among the two countries, in which Palestine fell under the British mandate.

Tensions between the Palestinian Arabs and Jews elevated when the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, calling for a creation of two states of Israel and Palestine located on the geographic region of Palestine after the end of the British mandate, was adopted in 1947, which was accepted by the Jewish community but rejected by the Arab community. With the British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948, tensions erupted with the neighboring Arab countries invading Israel, but resulted in Israeli victory. Conflict between Israel and Arab countries including Palestine continued with major victories for Israel such as the Sinai War in 1956, Six-Day War in 1967, and Yom Kippur War in 1973, resulting in greater land area for Israel and securing peace and recognition from Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994 while Palestine faced greater land losses and a great surge of Palestinian refugees. Israel has

only recently added four more countries from its geographic region to sign peace treaties in 2020 in which the countries are Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, and Morocco. Even such peace deals were heavily criticized by the Arab community as betrayal, but this just exemplifies how peace is an ongoing tricky subject for Israel.

Major obstacles to peace between Israel and Palestine fall into territorial, refugee, and security issues. Territorial issues include the contesting borders of Israel and Palestine as well as the control of the sacred city of Jerusalem that holds religious importance to both Jewish Israelis and Muslim Arab communities alike. The problem of the right to return to Palestine for the now-refugee Palestinians who have fled during the multiple wars and are currently seeking refuting in neighboring Arab countries such as Jordan is also a complex issue. Finally, the securitization of the Palestinians is a concern to both the Israelis and Palestinians as Israelis desire a demilitarized Palestine with the Palestinians desiring more security powers.

In the current situation, it is difficult to state that Israel and Palestine have officially achieved peace despite numerous peace processes such as the Madrid Conference of 1991, Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995, Roadmap for Peace in 2003, and others including the most recent 2020 Trump Peace Plan, for the agreements have failed to be fully implemented by both sides. Nonetheless, despite the backdrop of uncertainty for peace, the security coordination, created through the Oslo Accords, has been sustained for a surprising long time considering the failure of other peace efforts. The Oslo Accords resulted in the Palestine Liberation Organization(PLO) being recognized as representing Palestine by Israel, and the PLO recognizing Israel of its existence. The PLO was founded in 1964 by Arab nations to further the cause of Palestinian nationalism. Major other agreements through the accords were Israeli withdrawal from certain parts of Palestinian territory, creation of the Palestine

Authority, which is a political entity until the establishment of a Palestinian state, and creation of a Palestinian police.

4.2. The Palestinian Authority Security Forces

Of the multiple agreements, this research focuses on the security coordination as a peace conditionality. In the Oslo Accord II Article XII of Arrangements for Security and Public Order, a peace conditionality of security coordination between Israel and Palestine is stated:


A Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes as well as Joint Regional Security Committees and Joint District Coordination Offices are hereby established as provided for in Annex 1.

This security coordination between Israel and Palestine is represented by the Israeli Defence Forces and the Palestinian Authority Security Forces that was created as the police force under the Palestine Authority through the Oslo Accords. The mandated Palestinian Authority Security Forces had particular limitations, in which it was allowed to create security forces to keep public security but was not allowed to create an army. The security forces were limited in size and by the type of weapons they were allowed to use. The main purpose of the security coordination was to improve public order and security in both Israeli and Palestinian territory through cooperation between the IDF and PASF by exchanging confidential information and to prevent and reduce violence.

The security coordination can be further understood by discerning how it is *de facto* being implemented in Palestine. During the Oslo Accords, the West Bank was divided into three areas of Area A, Area B, and Area C that all have different civil and security controls. Area A, which makes up around twenty percent of the geographical land mass in West Bank, falls under the full jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority in civil and security issues

whereas in Area B, also taking twenty percent of the land mass, the Palestinian Authority has civil control, but the security jurisdiction fell under Israeli control. The civil and security issues in Area C, which is sixty percent of all West Bank, fall under all Israeli control. Because the control of different areas is split, security coordination is deemed necessary to ensure that the public safety in Palestine and Israel (Zilber 2018).

Figure 6. Map of West Bank divided into Areas A, B, and C



Source: Zilber 2018

Moreover, because West Bank and Gaza Strip are geographically separated, security coordination is crucial to secure transport and mobility between the two areas while going

through Israeli borders. This is especially true for there are multiple security checkpoints, permits, and restrictions in travel in Israel and Palestine that control movement.

Figure 7. Map of Modern Israel and Palestine



Source: Encyclopædia Britannica

The security coordination has depended on external actors with the United States of America as a particular proponent for peace for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In fact, the United States has carefully mediated and supported the security cooperation through the United States Security Coordinator envisioned in 2005 but established in 2007 through the Roadmap for Peace Agreement. Even the decision of the Trump administration in early 2019 to cut all financial assistance to Palestine through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as well as to end funds to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) did not prevent the US


government from supporting the security cooperation, although there may have been cutbacks. The USSC oversees several different activities, but one of its main focus is to support and train Palestine security forces to commit to the security coordination with Israel. Apart from the US, other external actors such as the European Union Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian Territory also known as the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) and Jordan are actively involved in assisting the security coordination by providing financial support and training to the security forces.

The Palestine Authority Security Forces is under the Palestine Authority which is an interim-government that was mandated under the Oslo Accords. The Palestine Authority consists of several political parties, but the two most popular parties are Fatah and Hamas. The Fatah political party has nationalist social democratic tendencies whereas Hamas has militant Islamic tendencies that has earned the label of a terrorist organization by multiple nations including the US, Canada, EU, and Israel. However, both political parties have been part of the Palestine Authority until 2006 when Hamas won the majority of legislative votes, which led to a conflict between Hamas and Fatah. This conflict led to a split in the Palestine Authority, in which Hamas left the Palestine Authority to take over Gaza Strip. The Palestine Authority, headed by Fatah presidents, has since taken control over West Bank, and has control over the Palestine Authority Security Forces and consequently the Israeli-Palestinian security coordination.

The current Palestinian Authority Security Forces is divided into eight different branches that all report to the President of the Palestine Authority who is at the moment President Abbas. The basic major goal of the PASF is to ensure public security by countering armed attacks by coordinating with Israel. The goal is specialized by the eight different branches of the General Intelligence Service, Presidential Guard, National Security Force,

Military Intelligence, District Coordination Office, Civil Police, Preventive Security Organization, and the Civil Defense. The organization of the PASF is portrayed through the chart below.

Figure 8. PASF Organizational Chart



Source: Zilber 2018

The General Intelligence service has around 3,200 personnel who work with different intelligence services such as the CIA to gather information about attacks on the Palestinian Authority. This branch has full access to Area A but can also gain access to Areas B and C through security coordination with Israel. The Presidential Guard protects high-profile public figures that has around 2,700 personnel. The National Security Force is the largest branch of 10,500 people where people are trained to confiscate weapons from the public and other non-cooperative forces. The Military Intelligence has 1,700 people who undertake internal evaluation of PASF personnel, and the District Coordination Office is the branch that is fully devoted to the security cooperation with Israel. The office shares information when Israeli civilians are in Palestinian territory to be escorted back to Israeli territory and provides

permission for other forces when they need movement outside of Area A. The Civil Police is made of 8,000 personnel that handles public order, crime, and controls traffic. The Preventive Security Forces focuses on internal security for counterterrorism that has 3,400 personnel. Finally, the Civil Defence is the first responder to natural and human emergencies such as fire, search and rescue, and so on.

4.3. Development of the PASF and Security Coordination

4.3.1. Oslo Accords Era

The development of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces can be divided into three major stages. The first stage is the Oslo Accords Era when the Palestinian Authority Security Forces was first created. Prior to the creation of the PASF, Palestine did have its own military called the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) that was established in 1964 with support from Arab states in its fight against Israel. The Palestine Liberation Organization, that headed the PLA was headed by political party Fatah leader Yasser Arafat, and this organization gave orders to the PLA. However, the PLA was “in transition between a rough collection of guerrilla cadres and a regular army.” The military was not well-equipped and eventually lost to Israeli forces during the wars that the PLA soldiers later were dispersed across countries of Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, and Egypt (Zilber 2018).

With the signing of the Oslo II agreement, the Palestinian Authority Security Forces were officially mandated in which the size was limited to 30,000 personnel with a total of six branches. The branches are the civil police, public security, intelligence, emergency services and rescue, preventive security, and the presidential guard. All branches of the security sector reported directly to the President Arafat, and Arafat appointed members of his political party

Fatah into high-profile positions in the security sector to ensure loyalty and support. For this creation, Israel insisted that all members of the security sector would get background checks and all machinery that was permitted to the Palestinian security would go through ballistic checks so that the Israeli Defense Force would have information on all Palestinian weaponry.

The Israeli-Palestinian security coordination during this period was demonstrated with joint patrols of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces and Israeli Defense Forces on Israeli-Palestinian borders. However, these patrols seemed to have little to no “operational reason” (Zilber 2018). The security coordination was, in fact, difficult to maintain due to frequent clashes not between the security forces and the local population but between the Israeli Defense Forces and the Palestinian Authority Security Forces, that did not positively reflect the intentions of the security coordination.

4.3.2. Second Intifada

The escalation of Palestinian uprising known as an intifada occurred after Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited the holy site of the Temple Mount of Al Aqsa, but during the intifada, the Palestinian Authority had no control over the Palestinian Authority Security Forces. Leaders and members of the security forces joined in the uprising against Israel, but also those who did not join the uprising were powerless to prevent violence from occurring. The security coordination between Israel and Palestine dismantled as Israel targeted PASF buildings and headquarters, and Israel ended up proceeding with Operation Defensive Shield to suppress the second intifada in which the members of the Palestinian security forces were detained (Tatir 2015).

This event of the uprising with the Palestinian Authority Security Forces unable to prevent but actually join the cause of rebelling against Israel clearly indicated a failure in

peacebuilding through the security coordination. Therefore, the Roadmap for Peace in 2003 indicated that there was a need to reform the security sector by designating a clear line of authority as President Arafat did nothing to stop the uprising. The Roadmap for Peace suggested that there be a change in the security line of authority in which an interior minister would be in charge of the security, and Mahmoud Abbas who became elected as Prime Minister became in charge of the security forces. It was through this Roadmap for Peace that the US Security Coordinator was established to initiate an organized and comprehensive training for the security forces.

As part of previous agreements, the Israeli Defense Forces decided to withdraw from the Palestinian area of Gaza strip in 2005. However, the PASF were weakened due to Israel's aggressive reaction to the second intifada, and when the Israeli Defense Forces pulled out, the PASF did not have the ability nor capacity to enforce public order. It was during this time that other groups stepped up and provided some sort of security such as from the Hamas, Fatah's rival political party. In the same year, with US support, legislative elections took place in which Fatah political members were sought to be the majority victors. Nonetheless, Fatah's political rival Hamas won the majority of votes. During this time, the PASF struggled to make a decision on who to submit loyalty. According to results, the PASF should have reported to Hamas, but as Hamas is designated as a terrorist for its extremist and anti-Semitic policies against Israel, the PASF would be cut off from financial support if they followed Hamas. Therefore, the chain of command was again changed from the interior minister to the President, who was Fatah member Mahmoud Abbas (Tatir 2015).

4.3.3. Fayyadism

Fayyadism is actually a term for the development period that Palestine has been going

through since the appointment of Fayyad as Prime Minister. Nonetheless, as he was also in charge of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces, and he started a series of reforms for the security sector as well.

In this regards, Fayyad provided a very clear goal to the security sector in which security cooperation with Israel was a must, and any dissatisfaction against this cooperation would not be tolerated. With the additional timing of the creation of the United States Security Coordinator in 2007, the Palestine Authority Security Forces were extremely competent (Tatir 2015).

4.4. Security Checkpoints and Permits

A main activity of security coordination is to maintain the security checkpoints that are throughout Israel and Palestine. Maintaining security checkpoints is prevalent throughout Israel and West Bank, densely located on the borders between Israel and West Bank, but security checkpoints between Israel and Gaza Strip are few and only along the borders. They are in place for security purposes to prevent persons of high-security risk from movement, and permits are required for Palestinians to travel and go through the security checkpoints. The issuance of permits for movement started in 1991, and the permits are provided by the Israeli Civil Administration. While this may seem like a civil matter, this is still in effect a part of security coordination because although the Israeli Civil Administration issues the permits, the permits are delivered to the Palestinian liaison office for distribution. Also, Israeli and Palestinian intelligence services cooperate to identify and single-out persons of high risk when reviewing the applications for permits of travel.

All Palestinians are required a permit to travel; however, Palestinians who reside in East Jerusalem are an exception to this rule because Palestinians have free access to Israel as they


have permanent residency in Israel. From 2015, Palestinian females over 50 years of age and Palestinian male over 55 years of age were able to cross without said permits. Moreover, due to the fact that Palestinian territory is divided so that Israeli territory comes in between such territories, Palestinians need to go through to these checkpoints even if they are travelling from one Palestinian territory to another Palestinian territory.

Prior to the current system of permits for movement in Israel and Palestine, the security measures were enforced by the Israeli government. After the war in 1967, Palestinian areas of West Bank and Gaza Strip were considered to be closed zones, and later in 1972 with the Open Borders Policy, Palestinians were somewhat free in their movement to assimilate with the Israelis (Parizot 2017). Nonetheless, with the first intifada or Palestinian uprising against the Israeli government in 1987, Palestinian movement came to a halt as curfews were enforced and access to certain areas became restricted. Palestinian ID cards also became differentiated in which normal ID cards were red while certain Palestinians who were denied entry to Israel received green ID cards. In 1991, security measures were tightened even further when Palestinians were now required to apply and receive individual permits to travel, and this security system is still in place today although modifications to this system has been made. In 1996, a new rule was passed that indicated that only those who had clean security records were allowed entry into Israel (Wannous 2012). When the second intifada broke out in 2000, certain areas of Israel were completely blocked off from access, and the construction of the infamous Separation Wall started in 2002.

Despite the security concerns and causes that created the separation wall, the wall uprooted the livelihood of Palestinians living near the borders as they now have to go through security checkpoints to work from their home at the other side of the wall. Accessibility to their own land that is divided by the wall is difficult as Palestinians now need to have permits

to travel. A quick look at the map can also indicate that although a number of security crossing checkpoints do exist, multiple Palestinian travelers have to travel a longer route to get to a particular destination on the other side of the wall as the checkpoints are not easily accessible. The combination of the separation wall and the security checkpoints that require permits for travel make movement for Palestinians more restricted and difficult.

Figure 9. Location of Security Checkpoints



Source: Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem

The figure shows that the separation wall borders the West Bank, and permanent security crossing checkpoints represented by the red dots on the map are also along the border. The separation wall was put in place to prevent Palestinian attacks against Israelis, and the wall is usually an electronic fence. In more densely populated areas, the separation wall is a concrete barrier that is around eight to nine meters tall. The security crossing checkpoints are densely located near Jerusalem as it is the heart for both Israelis and Palestinians as contesting capitals of their respective countries.

Figure 10. Separation Wall



Source: Al Jazeera

V. Peace and Structural Violence


5.1. Negative Peace in Palestine

5.1.1. Casualties from Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

To measure negative peace or the absence of violence in West Bank and Gaza Strip, the

number of reported casualties due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in each district were analyzed. The time frame is from 1989 to 2019.

Figure 11. Casualties from Israeli-Palestinian Conflict



Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program

The data is quite clear that there were more deaths in Gaza Strip than in West Bank. The number of deaths in both West Bank and Gaza Strip are similar until 2005, in which the two spikes indicate the death toll due to the second intifada or Palestinian uprising against Israelis from 2000 to 2005. Since then, Gaza has faced a huge number of death tolls whereas West Bank saw a steady decreasing trend to almost minimal number of casualties. The two orange spikes in 2009 and 2014 that indicate a high level of death in Gaza Strip correlate to the 2008-2009 Gaza War also known as Operation Cast Lead and the 2014 Gaza War also known as Operation Protective Edge. Additionally, the drastic drop in casualties in West Bank starting in 2002 matches the timeline of the beginning of the construction of the separation wall of West Bank that lead to more stringent security checks at borders.

Comparing West Bank and Gaza Strip in terms of the number of casualties, West Bank

saw success in combating casualties while Gaza Strip was troubled with bursts of conflicts. Both regions faced a similar number of casualties until the end of the second intifada. However, after the split of Hamas and Fatah in 2006 that resulted in Fatah gaining control of West Bank and continuing its security cooperation with Israel within West Bank that was perhaps for the best interests of security but also for its own political party to maintain legitimacy with the added booster of a better trained security force thanks to the establishment of the United States Security Coordinator in 2007, West Bank's casualties decreased phenomenally. Whereas, in Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, there was a lack of Israeli security coordination within Gaza due to Gaza being controlled by Hamas as well as Israel's disengagement with Gaza in 2005, and without the benefits of US funding to the security service due to US policy to not support terrorist organizations, Gaza's environment could not handle incoming conflict.


The 2008 and 2014 Gaza War were both started by Israel. Israel started the 2008 war to put down Palestinian rockets aimed for Israel and started the 2014 war in retaliation to Hamas kidnapping and murdering Israeli Jews. It is difficult to state that if security coordination between Israel and Hamas existed, Israel would not have started at least the 2008 war as Israel would have cooperated to dismantle rocket operations within Gaza. However, a lack of a joint-cooperation on both sides did escalate the conflict to higher levels.

5.1.2. Perception of Security and Safety

The public perception of security is extremely important as well. Security coordination through its efforts by the Israeli Defence Force and the Palestine Authority Security Forces work together to prevent violence and create order in Palestine in Israel. Therefore, it is only natural that the expected results of the security coordination are greater security for the Israel

and Palestine. The previous section demonstrated by numbers that possibly correlate with the presence and absence of the security coordination in West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, as security includes the absence or presence of threat, and the perception of the public regarding their security is a result of the efforts of the security coordination, the public's perception of security must also be analyzed. A high perception of security and safety would indicate trust in the security coordination and the capabilities of each security actors that are the IDF and PASF. On the other hand, a low perception of security and safety would indicate a lack of trust and capabilities of the IDF and PASF.

Figure 12. Palestinian Perception of Security and Safety



Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

It is surprising to see that Palestinian perception of security and safety in their environment in both West Bank and Gaza Strip follow similar patterns; however, Palestinians in Gaza Strip have a generally more positive outlook regarding their security than those who are in West Bank. In 2006, Palestinians in both West Bank and Gaza Strip perceived their security levels to be similar in that it dropped drastically, likely due to the political conflict

between Hamas and Fatah. However, after the political split in 2006, Palestinians in Gaza Strip had consistently higher levels of security compared to those in West Bank. This is extremely important to note because the security coordination is present in West Bank but not in Gaza Strip. Furthermore, the PASF is highly funded by numerous agencies, and the PASF is active in West Bank not Gaza Strip. It would seem that the security coordination and the PASF are not extremely effective in providing a secure environment for Palestinians in West Bank.

5.2. Positive Peace in Palestine


Public opinion polls were used to measure positive peace in West Bank and Gaza Strip, in which the support for peace between Israel and Palestine and the support of the use of violence against Israelis were singled out in an attempt to identify if security coordination had an effect in creating positive peace in Palestine.

5.2.1. Support for Peace

An issue that must be taken into consideration is if Palestinians are accepting peace with Israelis. Positive peace is restoring of relationships, and supporting peace with years-old conflicting parties is definitely a step towards positive peace. Security coordination is a peace conditionality in which the coordination is trying to promote peace, but if the Palestinians are not supporting peace, then the conditionality of security coordination for peacebuilding may not be an effective. If the support for peace is more prevalent where security coordination is prevalent, then security coordination could be a pivotal conditionality in creating peace. If the support for peace is miniscule where security coordination is present, then security

coordination might actually have a detrimental effect in creating peace.

Figure 13. Palestinian Support for Peace



Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research


It is interesting to note that those in West Bank and Gaza Strip had similar trends in supporting peace since when the survey question was available in 1999, but the trends gradually became divergent starting from 2013. Current trends indicate that Palestinians from West Bank are more supportive for peace than those in Gaza Strip. However, the trends do not provide enough reason of evidence to correlate the presence of security coordination with creating positive peace in either West Bank or Gaza Strip. The support for peace from both West Bank and Gaza Strip had been similar until 2008, but since then, the support has been fluctuating on both ends.

5.2.2. Support for Armed Attacks Against Israeli Civilians

Supporting armed attacks against Israeli civilians can also be used as an indicator for positive peace. This is true because positive peace is restoring relationships with the other,

and if supporting armed attacks against unarmed Israeli civilians can be used as an indicator if positive peace is being formed.

Figure 14. Support Armed Attack Against Israeli Civilians



Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

Though the data is not complete and has missing variables, the figure above shows the support that Palestinians have for armed attack against Israeli civilians. This figure demonstrates the relationship that Palestinians have with their Israeli neighbors. Despite the missing variables, it is safe to infer that Palestinians in Gaza Strip are consistently more supportive of armed attacks against Israeli civilians, and this support seems to be on an overall positive trend. However, while Palestinians in West Bank may have had similar feelings towards Israeli civilians in the late 1990s and early 2000s, they have since become less supportive of such attacks against Israelis.

5.3. Structural Violence

5.3.1. Palestinian Response to Security Coordination

Palestinian response to the security coordination and its activities is important to evaluate to infer if Palestinians have been satisfied. The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research launched three waves of surveys from 2011 to 2012 to collect information regarding Palestinian thought on Palestinian security services as well as the security coordination with Israel. From the survey, five different statements specifically questioned Palestinian thought on the security coordination with Israel. The five different statements are presented below.

Table 2: Survey Statements

Survey Statements
<i>1) Belief that an armed confrontation will take place between PA security services and the Israeli side if armed confrontations erupt between Palestinian citizens and occupying forces</i>
<i>2) Belief that security coordination with Israel serves a national Palestinian goal</i>
<i>3) Belief that security coordination with Israel provides Palestinians with security</i>
<i>4) Extent of satisfaction with security coordination with Israel</i>
<i>5) Belief that Israeli arrest of Palestinians is done without the knowledge of the PA security services</i>

Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

The first statement questions the belief if Palestinians believed that the Palestinian side of the security coordination would fight against the Israeli side there were confrontations between Palestinian civilians and occupying forces that include both the Israeli military and

Israeli settlers. This is an important question because this indicates how much the Palestinians consider the fragility and resilience of the security coordination. If the Palestinian forces fight against the Israeli forces instead of cooperating with the forces to mitigate the conflict, then this would demonstrate the fragility of the coordination. This is a relevant question because when the second intifada broke out in 2000, the Palestinian security forces did not mitigate the uprising but actually instead joined the fight against the Israelis, and this was a shock to the Israeli forces as the Palestinians turned their backs on the Israelis and used their training and arms received for the security cooperation against the Israelis.

Table 3: Statement One Results

Statement 1		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Wave 1	58	65
Wave 2	56	63
Wave 3	52	67

Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

The majority of respondents in both West Bank and Gaza Strip believed that the security coordination would break down in these terms, although Palestinians from Gaza were more confident than their counterparts in West Bank.

The second question deals with the belief that the security cooperation is supports a Palestinian national goal. In other words, the statement delineates the belief if the security coordination is beneficial to Palestinian society. If the Palestinians thought that the security coordination did not serve a Palestinian national goal, then that would indicate that it was not beneficial for Palestinian society.

Table 4: Statement Two Results

Statement 2		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Wave 1	53	51
Wave 2	58	53
Wave 3	56	47

Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

Interestingly, a slight majority of Palestinians from both West Bank and Gaza Strip believed that the security coordination served a Palestinian national purpose. Palestinians from Gaza Strip slightly have less of a positive opinion of the security coordination in relation to the second statement than those in West Bank, and during the third wave, the majority of Palestinians from Gaza Strip did not believe that this coordination supported a national goal.

The third statement is related to the performance of the security coordination in that the Palestinians evaluate if the security coordination has successfully reached its target of providing safety and security. If the Palestinians agree to this statement, then the security coordination has been successful, and if the Palestinians do not agree with this statement, then the coordination has not been successful.

Table 5: Statement Three Results

Statement 3		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Wave 1	51	54
Wave 2	53	52
Wave 3	53	47

Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

Similarly to the second question, a slight majority of Palestinians from both West Bank and Gaza Strip agree to the statement that the security coordination provides Palestinians with security with a non-majority from Gaza Strip indicating on the third wave that security was provided.

The fourth statement indicates the level of overall satisfaction of the security coordination. This statement is different from the previous statements in that it does not point to a particular aspect such as the results of security or serving a national interest.

Table 6: Statement Four Results

Statement 4		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Wave 1	47	40
Wave 2	52	38
Wave 3	49	34

Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

The respondents indicated on a whole a non-majority level of satisfaction with the security coordination from both West Bank and Gaza Strip with Palestinians from Gaza Strip indicating a lower level of satisfaction than those in West Bank. This result is intriguing because even though a majority of respondents indicated that the security coordination served a national purpose and was providing security, they were not satisfied.

The fifth and final statement that Israeli forces arrest Palestinians without the knowledge of the Palestinian security services hints that security cooperation is in reality not performed on a transparent and equal level. Security cooperation is operated on the basis the knowledge is exchanged between the two counterparts of the Israeli Defence Forces and the Palestinian security forces. If Israeli forces arrest Palestinians without Palestinian knowledge,

then that signals that information is not being shared and suggests that Israel is withholding information from the Palestinian forces.

Table 7: Statement Five Results

Statement 5		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Wave 1	40	48
Wave 2	39	37
Wave 3	40	45

Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

However, a majority of the respondents from both West Bank and Gaza Strip disagree with this statement, implying that most respondents believe that information is being well-shared by both the Israeli and Palestinian side.

Overall, the Palestinian response to the security coordination in general was mixed, and there a lack of a drastic difference in opinion from the respondents from West Bank and Gaza Strip of Palestine. Palestinians thought that the security coordination in general served a national goal, provided security to Palestinians, and shared information with both counterparts equally. Nevertheless, they thought that the security coordination could break apart and were overall not satisfied with the security coordination. It must be pointed out that the majority of Palestinians that thought the security coordination served a national goal and provided security to Palestinians were majority by a slight chance.

5.3.2. Permits

Maintaining security checkpoints and the issuance of permits to pass through are one of the main activities upheld by the security coordination between Israel and Palestine.

However, the fact that there is differential treatment based on the nationality of the passerby who are Israeli or Palestinian with the extremely high levels of scrutiny of security that hinder Palestinians living their daily lives can be indicative of the security coordination to be in fact a structural violence for the Palestinians.

Checkpoints are situated to control movement throughout Israel and Palestine, but to go through the checkpoints, an identification card that can attest to your nationality and home address is not enough. Special permits are necessary to go through the checkpoints. Even if one applies for permits, the permits can be denied, and even if one does have permits, permits may be cancelled without prior notification. Moreover, permits do not guarantee safe passage. These security checkpoints that are operated by the Israeli Defense Forces but administratively operated by both Israeli and Palestinian services in part of the security cooperation between Israel and Palestine greatly distinguishes in treatment to Israelis and Palestinians, mostly in part because Israelis are not required permits to travel whereas Palestinians must have the permits.

Different types of permits exist due to the various reasons one needs to travel. For example, there are permits for medical issues, education, tourism, work, and so on. All permits except for work-related permits do not require a monetary fee. According to a survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in 2004, the top three reasons for Palestinians to travel were to visit family, go to work, and receive medical treatment.

Table 8: Reasons for Travel

35%	Visit Family
30%	Work
23%	Medical Treatment
9%	Education
3%	Other

Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

Thirty-five percent of Palestinians travelled to visit family, thirty percent travelled for work purposes, twenty-three percent travelled to receive medical treatment, nine percent travelled for education such as for school or university, and three percent travelled for other reasons. For such reasons, different permits are necessary to allow travel for the different travel purposes.

Table 9: Reasons for Permit Applications

1- Special needs (Managers of institutions, the families of B.M.C. or V.I.B. Bearers, The Governorate of Civil Correlation Officers, and exceptional humanitarian cases).	10- Passage via Ben Gurion Airport, available only for certain humanitarian cases and B.M.C. cards bearers.
2- Medical Treatment includes three types, one for the patient, the escort, the physician, and the visitors). Note: Patients who are rejected because of security reason, they must have to apply for a medical permit two weeks before the medical appointment to decide on the case whether allowing him/her to access the hospital or not.	11- Permanent civilians' permit (issued for civil society organizations and engineers to, first, oversee development projects. Second, coordination to official delegations, ministries and famers to take care of their needs behind the wall).
3-Visiting family, spouses and relatives during the holidays.	12- The Seam Zone or the wall's permits, (harvesting olives, green houses, and residencies). It includes 13 types.
4- Attending courts sessions.	13- Recreational permits.
5- Sorting out different matters at foreign consulates and embassies	14- Family reunification permits (residency in Israel)
6- Travelling via Ben Gurion Airport (Only for B.M.C. card bearers and their families.)	15- Visits from Jordan
7- Business meetings.	16- Building permits especially in area C to build houses, facilities ...etc.
8- Social and humanitarian affairs, Attending weddings, funerals (only for relatives from the first and second degree) for residents of	17- Trade permits, includes (renewing trade permits, new trade permits, and special trade permits).
9-Worshipping at the holy sites in Jerusalem.	18- Searching for employment.

Source: General Authority for Civil Affairs-Palestine

The table indicates the different plausible reasons one might apply for a permit to travel. The permit applications cover all forms of travel that include family visits, work purposes, medical attention, international travel, recreational purposes, and religious purposes. Of the permits, work-related permits are popular as many Palestinians go to parts of Israel for work. It is easier to find jobs in Israel, and work in Israel provides higher wages in comparison to the cost of wages in West Bank or Gaza Strip. The table below indicates the number of work-

related permits applied, issued, and rejected from 2016 to 2017. From 2016 to 2017, 703,037 permit applications for work were submitted in which nineteen percent of 133,537 were rejected and eighty percent of 559,145 applications were approved.

Table 10: Work-Related Permits in 2016-2017

Work-Related Permits in 2016-2017				
No.	The Governorate	The presented	The issued	The denied
1	Ramallah	66985	51714	11897
2	Al-Ram	43132	37730	5402
3	Abu Dis	37567	31647	5920
4	Jericho	24467	21402	3064
5	Bethlehem	108006	49045	13746
6	Halhul	19773	14097	5676
7	Hebron	67940	48400	19540
8	Dura	25662	18423	7239
9	Yatta	18204	14752	3452
10	Salfit	29295	27850	1445
11	Nablus	69993	56456	13359
12	Qalqilyia	56022	45845	10177
13	Tulkarem	53814	38973	14841
14	Jenin	65143	43621	14935
15	Tubas	17034	14190	2844
Total		703037	559145	133537

Source: General Authority for Civil Affairs-Palestine

Each different type of permit requires different documentation to prove one's request for a permit (Gisha 2017). As a matter of fact, according to the Oslo Accords II Article I, due to the transfer of powers, the process of obtaining permits should first start from the Palestinian liaison office that consequently leads to the Israel Civil Administration. However, in reality, most applications for permits are submitted directly to the Israel Civil Administration for approval, and the permits are received by the Palestinian liaison office for distribution. This is due to the wide-spread use of the magnetic biometric card that is issued by the Israeli

Intelligence Service, also known as the Shen Beit. Obtaining this card indicates that the holder of the magnetic card has checks out to be clean on the security record, and this card is a card is a requirement for any type of permit for travel. It is important to note that obtaining this card does not guarantee the approval of a permit (Smeirat 2013). Other required documents for the application of permits include but are not limited to the following: photocopy of an identification card, certificate of ownership, certificate of tax payment, invitation from businesses, doctor's note, certificate of marriage, enrollment record and so on. Original documents of land ownership were previously required for the application of some permits, but due to the possibility of confiscation of the original documents to later complicate legal verification of land ownership, such requirements were dropped (Al-qadi 2018).

Permits also indicate which area the permit holder is allowed to visit for a certain period of time. In other words, permit holder is not allowed to visit areas that is not previously approved and designated as written on the permit. This means that if Palestinians want to travel, they have to plan out prior to their travel and are unable to freely travel to other areas if they wish to on a moment's notice. Additionally, as permits expire due to only having a certain allotted period of time for a permit to be valid, Palestinian travelers have to consistently reapply for new permits (Al-qadi 2018).

The length of the permits all vary, but the approval of permits is usually dependent on the current security situation of Israel and Palestine as well as the personal record of the applicant. The latter holds greater weight than the former. The duration that a permit allows persons to access areas other than their home address can be less than 24 hours such as starting from 8AM to 5PM but it can also be monthly or yearly permit. This may also be due to the Palestinians having different reasons for travel as according to the Palestinian Center

for Policy and Survey Research, twenty-seven percent of Palestinians travelled once a month, twenty-three percent traveled two to three times a month, twenty-one percent traveled two or three times a week, and seventeen percent travelled on a daily basis. Additionally, if permit holders failed to return back home on time and instead return outside permitted hours, permit holders were denied consequent travels (Al-qadi 2018).

The following table is the time period allotted for Palestinian farmers to reach their land to harvest their crops as according to the permits in 2017.

Table 11: Allotted Time for Harvest in 2017

No.↕	The area↕	The date of picking↕	Notes↕
1-↕	Tqua's (Neqodim)↕	25-27 October↕	3 days↕
2-↕	Tqua's (Kfar Eldad)↕	25-27 October↕	3 days↕
3-↕	Tqua\ D↕	1+2+30 November↕	3 days↕
4-↕	Tqua Mitsad↕	18-22 October↕	5 days↕
5-↕	Tqua Beni Kdem↕	18-22 October↕	5 days↕
6-↕	Al-Jaba'a/ Beit Ein↕	6-10 November↕	5 days↕
7-↕	Al-Khadir/ Nabi Daniel↕	13-16 October↕	4 days↕
8-↕	Al-Khadir/Bitar↕	15-31 October↕	16 days↕
9-↕	Nahal Tzoft↕	6-11 October↕	5 days↕
10-↕	Al-Jaba'a checkpoint↕	18-25 October↕	7 days↕
11-↕	Wadi Ahmad↕	25-30 October↕	5 days↕
12-↕	3319 gate Biet Sahour↕	25-30 October↕	5 days↕
13-↕	Gilo↕	25-29 October↕	5 days↕
14-↕	Wadi Al-Shami↕	25-29 October↕	5 days↕

Source: General Authority for Civil Affairs-Palestine

Palestinian land owners received permission from three to sixteen days to visit their land and harvest their crop. This demonstrates that Palestinian land owners face complications to visit their land on the other side of the separation wall.

The process to obtain a permit for medical treatment is extremely confusing as well that contributes to the delay in receiving a treatment for medical reasons. If one has a medical

condition or concern in Palestine, due to better medical treatment available outside of the area, Palestinians apply for permits to seek medical attention in Israel. If one applies for permits, due to the lack of transparency, one is notified of the results without being notified regarding the reason of approval or rejection. The following figure shows the number of medical permits applied, issued, and rejected in 2016 from Palestine. Of the total applications for medical permits in 2016 that totaled to 190,733 applications, eighteen percent of 34,468 applications were rejected, and eighty percent of 153,241 applications were approved.

Table 12: Medical Permits in 2016

Medical treatment permits 2016				
No.	The Governorate	The presented	The issued	The denied
1.	Ramallah	24891	18139	4080
2.	Al-Ram	15638	13076	2562
3.	Abu Dis	23090	19958	3114
4.	Jericho	24467	17777	6699
5.	Bethlehem	28061	24053	3980
6.	Halhul	7017	5486	1531
7.	Hebron	13458	10963	2493
8.	Dura	2020	1690	330
9.	Yatta	4008	3397	611
10.	Salfit	3909	3100	807
11.	Nablus	18244	14867	3198
12.	Qalqilya	5632	4721	915
13.	Tulkarem	8319	6688	1622
14.	Jenin	10060	7854	2095
15.	Tubas	1919	1472	431
Total		190733	153241	34468


Source: General Authority for Civil Affairs-Palestine

It is interesting to note that the approval and rejection rate of work-related permits and permits to seek medical treatment are similar with around eighty percent approval rate and around eighteen to nineteen percent rejection rate.

There are differing ways to respond to the results of the application for medical permits in Gaza Strip. If one receives an initial rejection, one can apply to the Physicians for Human Rights Israel, which is a non-profit organization to provide the right to health for all in Israel. The organization itself will go through an independent process to review the application, and if the application is accepted, the organization will apply on behalf of the individual to the district coordination offices for a permit. The permit may be granted at this point, but if it is not, then this case will be taken up to the High Court of Justice in Israel for final review. The High Court of Justice decision is final.

After an initial review of the permits, before coming to a decision by the Israel Civil Administration, an application for a permit may require a screening by the General Security Services of Israel. A screening by the such services usually indicate an interrogation of some kind. Even if the permit for travel due to medical conditions is approved, the process of further travel is complicated by another screening by the General Security Services of Israel. If the General Security Services of Israel screen the application but reject it, then the previous process of the permit applicant applying to the Physicians for Human Rights Israel will take place. The process of application for medical permits is shown in the following figure:

Figure 15: Process of Responding to Medical Permit Decisions



Source: Physicians for Human Rights Israel

Once permits are attained, they allow passage through security checkpoints, and the security checkpoints are scattered throughout the region and operated on ground by the Israeli Defense Forces except for Area A in West Bank where security jurisdiction is under Palestinian rule. Security jurisdiction in areas except for Area A are all under Israeli discretion (PHRI).

5.3.2. Security Checkpoints

As of September 2019, there are 112 security checkpoints in operation that are mostly dispersed in the areas of Gaza Strip and West Bank but mostly concentrated in West Bank. Security checkpoints vary in size depending on the location of the checkpoint, and not all checkpoints are permanently staffed. The major and permanently staffed checkpoints are

located near densely populated areas (Bethlehem).

For example, checkpoint 300 that is between Bethlehem and Jerusalem has around 15,000 Palestinians go through for work purposes on a daily basis. Palestinians go through multiple screenings within a single checkpoint station where they are filmed, go through metal detectors, body scans, and ID check. They may be singled out and taken to a search room for further screening. The total time for a person to go through a checkpoint again varies for each checkpoint, but a major checkpoint station may take hours, making daily life unpredictable (AlJazeera).

Figure 16: Line at Security Checkpoint 300




Source: Al Jazeera

Travel permits are intended for Palestinians, but security checkpoints are used by both the Israelis and Palestinians. However, there are certain roads that Palestinians are banned due to security reasons that encourage Palestinians to go through certain security checkpoints.

For instance, route 443, which is a main road that connects Jerusalem and settlements in West Bank forbids Palestinians from travelling on this road. This ban was enforced in 2002 after a scuffle between Palestinians and Israelis that lead to six Israeli and one Palestinian casualties. To prevent Palestinians from using this road, roadblocks such as fences, metal gates, wire mesh, barbed wire but also concrete blocks, concrete slabs, and metal plates were placed. Moreover, to improve travel for Palestinians, three other roads were built later in 2007 and 2008 called the fabric of life roads, and these roads are solely for Palestinian use. Other than route 443, route 557, route 5, route 404, route 60, and route 45 are major roads that prohibit Palestinian access (Btselem 2017).

While travel permits do allow access for movement, the security checkpoints are often temporarily closed during Jewish holidays or after heightened tensions between Israelis and Palestinians. Closures of security checkpoints indicates that access to other areas is temporarily restricted, which affects the daily lives of Palestinians as closures may be sudden and the need to travel for Palestinians may be suddenly expectant. The number of closure days a year has dwindled; however, closures of security checkpoints are still in place, which disrupts daily life.

Figure 17: Security Checkpoints Closure Days a Year



Source: Bt'selem

At the early stages of building the separation wall and security checkpoints, Palestinian response to the checkpoints were documented through a survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in 2004. An overwhelming eighty-two percent of Palestinians who have used the checkpoints expressed that their experience were characterized as a hardship, fourteen percent stated that their experience could be characterized as mediocre, and three percent stated that hardship was minimal. Additionally, more than one-third of the survey respondents expressed that they or their family members had to relocate to another area due to the difficulties experienced at the checkpoints or inability to go through the checkpoints.

In summary, the activities of the security coordination since its implementation were analyzed to see if it contributed to peacebuilding in Palestine. One of its main activities of monitoring security checkpoints and issuing permits to pass these checkpoints is extremely meticulous and unpredictable that makes it difficult for Palestinians to live their daily lives. The process of obtaining permits such as to harvest their own land or for medical treatments

is cumbersome. Application for permits do not guarantee permits, nor do permits guarantee safe passage. The permits are also extremely prescriptive in that the area in which where the permit allows the permit holder to go as well the specific time is allotted. Although this encourages Palestinians to plan precisely ahead before their travels, privacy and the plausibility of unexpected reasons to travel make little to no room for flexibility in planning. Moreover, even if plans are well-scheduled, the security environment can call for closures of the security checkpoints that need to open to travel, and the delayed passing of security checkpoints can disrupt the planned daily activities. Such measures make it extremely difficult for Palestinians to live their daily lives, and this type of system makes it a form of structural violence as Palestinians are unable to live their daily lives to the fullest. Israeli citizens are not required permits for travel; thus, the two different people groups based on their nationality have different outcomes under the same security coordination.

The security coordination should not be solely criticized for its structural violence as it has contributed to less casualties due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this way, security coordination does have a positive impact in lessening deaths, which is mitigating negative peace. However, despite the hard numbers of less casualties in West Bank than in Gaza Strip, the perception of public safety is higher in Gaza Strip than that in West Bank. This may be due widespread security coordination of security checkpoints throughout West Bank that make it difficult for Palestinians to live their daily lives as travelling is severely restricted within the region. Moreover, while the Palestinian support for peace with Israelis could not be matched with the security coordination, there is consistently higher support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians in Gaza Strip than in West Bank.

VI. Discussion

5.1. Interpretation

This paper is significant because it provides a well-rounded analysis of the Palestinian view of the security coordination that includes nation-level and personal-level data of the effects of and responses to the security coordination. Additionally, the portrayal of the security coordination and its activity of managing movement within Israel and Palestine by issuing permits as a form of structural violence according to Johan Galtung's definition can hopefully provide policy makers with insight when trying to resolve peace.

The security coordination was analyzed with at a nation-level to understand the effects it had on negative and positive peace. Yet, while the number of casualties were decreased in West Bank where the security coordination was prevalent, West Bank Palestinians did not feel as safe as those in Gaza Strip where the number of casualties did not drastically decrease. While a slight majority in both West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians recognized that the security coordination was providing security and was a national interest of Palestine, West Bank Palestinians were more supportive for reconciliatory efforts with Israel. Despite these perceptions, West Bank Palestinians were not satisfied with the security coordination, and it is extremely worthy to note that they did not feel safer than those in Gaza Strip.

This difference can be attributable to one main activity of the security coordination which is monitor security checkpoints and issue permits to travel. With the security checkpoints and difficulty in obtaining permits for travel make it difficult to live a predictable life in Palestine, and this unpredictability that hinders life for Palestinians as opposed to Israelis make the security coordination a form of structural violence that the Palestinians are

experiencing.

5.2. Limitation

Limitations within this paper exist, in which using nation-wide results such as the number of casualties or the perception of the public of nation-wide situations are used as results from the security coordination, which does not necessarily define a causal role of the security coordination. However, despite the limitations, the effort of this paper is to not provide cause and effect explanations but more of explanatory powers that may prove beneficial. Therefore, the direct activities of the security coordination were analyzed, and the responses of the people to the security coordination were again analyzed.

Data that specifically focused on the Palestinians instead of combining data from both the Palestinian public as well as the Israeli public demonstrates this paper's limitation. However, while the response of the Israeli public would provide greater value to this paper, the paper particularly chose to focus on the Palestinian view.

VII. Conclusion

The security coordination between Israel and Palestine is complex in its origins and developments that the activities and the effects of the coordination as a peace conditionality are also difficult to analyze. Commentators of the peace conditionality have held mixed views regarding the effect of the security coordination in that some found it successful in bringing security and order while others upheld the view that the security coordination was oppressing Palestinians. To investigate this difference in opinion, this paper sought out to see the effects of the security coordination of peacebuilding in Palestine as the security coordination is a peace conditionality between Israel and Palestine as set forth in the Oslo Accords of 1995. In

other words, has the security coordination contributed in creating peace that is understood as both negative and positive peace?

Answering the question if the security coordination represented by the agents of the Israel Defence Forces and the Palestine Authority Security Forces through its activities such as the issuance of travel permits and operation of security checkpoints contributed to negative and positive peace as a clear-cut response is difficult. Negative and positive peace on a nation-level basis as a unit of measurement was taken to answer this question as the security coordination was widespread in West Bank Palestine and minimal in Gaza Strip of Palestine since the pull out of the Israeli Defence Forces in 2005. While the direct causal link of the security coordination may be weak in this sense, a preliminary analysis must be made to see if there are nation-wide effects. The explanatory powers, however weak they may seem, still provide helpful insight.

To see if negative peace of the absence of personal violence was achieved, the number of casualties from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were analyzed in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip region of Palestine. The number of casualties in West Bank is minimal whereas the number is highly unstable, nevertheless, not minimal in Gaza Strip. Moreover, the overall perception of safety and security in Gaza Strip was higher than that in West Bank. This was highly intriguing to note that despite the widespread implementation of the security coordination in West Bank, the public in the area did not feel as safe or more safe than those in West Bank, where West Bank lacks the full-range of the security coordination within their borders.

To see if positive peace of creating reconciliatory relationships was achieved, the Palestinian public's perceptions of support for peace with Israel and support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians were analyzed. Those in West Bank had a higher support for

peace with Israel than those in Gaza Strip while those in Gaza Strip had a support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians than those in West Bank. In other words, West Bank Palestinians were more willing to make reconciliatory relationships with Israelis than Gaza Strip Palestinians.

In an attempt to understand on a closer level, the response of the Palestinians to the security coordination, the Palestinian direct response to the security coordination and one main activity of the issuance of the travel permits as well as the security checkpoints were analyzed. A slight majority of the Palestinians from both West Bank and Gaza Strip overall viewed the security coordination as beneficial to security, serving a national Palestinian goal, and was successfully sharing information with both Israeli and Palestinian forces. However, a majority were still unsatisfied with the security coordination. Despite the ability of the security coordination to bring security and safety to the public, the permit system was analyzed, which showed the complexities of the application system as well as the widespread impact on all areas of travel including but limited to travel for familial purposes, vocational purposes, educational purposes, and medical purposes. The prescriptive characteristic of permits that confine carriers of permits to certain time periods and geographical locations make it difficult for the average Palestinian to live about daily life. The permit system being exclusive for Palestinian citizens hints that the systematic integration of the permit system that is part of the security coordination is a form of structural violence.

To conclude, the activities of the security coordination of maintaining security checkpoints and issuing permits to travel may be reason to pinpoint why developments in peace are not holistically improving as the security coordination does, in fact, provide some form of peace. The system of the security checkpoints and issuance of permits make it extremely difficult for Palestinians live their daily lives unaffected by the checkpoints, which

can make the security coordination a form of structural violence.

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초록

**팔레스타인 평화 구축을 위한
평화 조건으로서의
이스라엘-팔레스타인 안보협력**

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이 연구의 목적은 이스라엘-팔레스타인 안보 협력의 성공과 대중에게 해로운 영향을 나타내는 혼합 보고서 사이의 격차를 연결하는 것입니다. 따라서 본 연구는 각각 이스라엘 방위군(IDF)과 팔레스타인 당국 보안군(PASF)으로 대표되는 이스라엘과 팔레스타인 간의 안보 협력이 요한 갈통의 두 가지 적극적 평화와 소극적 평화 주장에 따라 평화 구축에 성공했는지에 대한 질문에 기초한다. 국경 내 안보 협력의 유무를 비교한 종단 연구를 통해 팔레스타인 요르단 강 서안지구와 가자지구의 적극적 그리고 소극적 평화를 조사한다. 조사 결과에 따르면 보안 검문소를 유지하는 안보 조정은 소극적 평화를 창출하는 데 긍정적인 기여를 했지만, 긍정적인 평화를 창출하는 데에는 복합적인 기여를 하여 구조적 폭력의 형태로 나타납니다.

주요어: 평화, 평화조건부, 적극적 평화, 소극적 평화, 이-팔 분쟁, 구조적 폭력

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