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Master's Thesis of International Studies  
국제학석사학위논문

# Deliberate vs Opportunistic Dialogue

A Comparative Analysis of the American Normalization of  
Diplomatic Relations Between China and Cuba

신중한 대화와 기회주의적인 대화  
미국과 쿠바의 국교정상화 비교분석

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Thesis by

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## Abstract

This thesis is a qualitative comparative case study analyzing the United States' normalization of official diplomatic relations between China and Cuba. The research utilizes Kenneth Waltz's three images (the international system, the state, and the individual) from *Man the State and War* as an analytical framework to explore the causes for the successful normalization of Sino-US relations and the failure of the normalization of Cuba-US relations. Findings from this study exhibit that in the circumstance if each of Waltz's three beforementioned influential factors are present when two states are attempting diplomatic rapprochement; efforts towards re-engagement will be deliberate, cognizant, and successful. On the contrary, if two states are attempting to re-establish diplomatic relations and if one of these two states are lacking one or more of these tripartite influences, then normalization efforts will be reactionary, opportunistic, and ultimately unsuccessful. In the first part of this work, three methodical keystone events are identified and examined to uncover the assistance they provided to the Nixon administration in successfully kindling diplomatic relations with China, a historical antagonist. While the latter, explores the absence of individual and state influences, eliciting a passive and opportunistic approach the Obama administration took towards developing the Cuban thaw.

**Keywords:** Sino-US relations, Cuba and US relations, normalization of diplomatic relations, Détente, Barack Obama, Richard Nixon

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# I. INTRODUCTION

In the early morning hours of September 26, 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a Soviet lieutenant colonel had slumped into his commander's chair; anticipating another mundane nightshift governing *Okol*, a Russian air defense system, built to detect nuclear attacks launched by the United States.<sup>1</sup> Abruptly, alarms start howling, lights flashing, and screens displaying warnings that five American missiles armed with nuclear explosives were hurling towards the Soviet Union and should arrive within the next twenty minutes.<sup>2</sup> Recalling from his Soviet training, Petrov knew that in the incident if an attack was detected, the immediate commands were to launch a retaliatory counter-offensive. As every crucial second passed, Petrov hesitated, with his hand on the launch control, and a room full of spectating subordinates, he decided against unleashing a nuclear barrage towards Washington, leaning towards a hunch that there might have been a technical error. His intuition was correct, *Okol* had produced a false alarm and Petrov had saved the world from nuclear destruction. Known to very few, several years after the event, Stanislav Petrov would become known as 'the man who saved the world.'<sup>3</sup> But how did tensions between international states become so strained, giving

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<sup>1</sup> Will Walker, "The Man Who Saved the World," *Pennsylvania Literary Journal* 13, no. 1 (April 1, 2021): pp. 270-271, 270; David Hoffman, "I Had A Funny Feeling in My Gut," *Washington Post Foreign Service*, February 10, 1994.

<sup>2</sup> Greg Myre, "Stanislav Petrov, 'The Man Who Saved The World,' Dies At 77," *The Two-Way* (Washington: NPR, September 18, 2017), <https://www.proquest.com/blogs-podcasts-websites/stanislav-petrov-man-who-saved-world-dies-at-77/docview/1939979906/se-2?accountid=6802>.

<sup>3</sup> Anastasiya Lebedev, "The Man Who Saved the World Finally Recognized," *Association of World Citizens*, May 21, 2004, <https://web.archive.org/web/20110721000030/http://www.worldcitizens.org/petrov2.html>.

rise to such a situation that one individual saved the entire world within the span of five minutes, and the majority of the world knew nothing of it? The short answer, contrasting government ideologies muddled with strategic dialogue in response to tripart stimuli.

According to French scientist Alfred Sauvy, the Cold War had polarized the world into three separate distinctions, 'the first world' the democratic-industrialized nations led by the United States, 'the second world' the communist-socialist nations, headed by the Soviet Union, and finally, 'the third world' which is the remaining states existing within the peripheral influences of the two separate leading worlds competing for global dominance.<sup>4</sup> China and Cuba as independent states within the greater global community are no exception and had subscribed to the Soviet influences of the Second World, which each state and its identification with the Second World would shape history for years to come. Analyzing their relationship with the US and their global impact will be the focus of this research.

The years of the Cold War had greatly tested the diplomacy of the United States, and two of America's most notorious adversaries, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Cuba, both cases present American foreign diplomacy being utilized to achieve détente and establish mutual diplomatic relations. History would yield the results that American efforts to normalize diplomatic relations with the PRC

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<sup>4</sup> Marcin Wojciech Solarz, "'Third World': The 60th Anniversary of a Concept That Changed History," *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 9 (November 9, 2012): pp. 1561-1573, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.720828>, 1561-1562.



successful, while attempts with Cuba would ultimately lead to failure. This presents the central research question:

*What exactly had made diplomatic normalization of U.S. and China relations successful, but failed to mend diplomatic relations with U.S. and Cuba relations?*

This question is raised because both China and Cuba adhere to similar governmental ideologies, controlled by oligarchical governments promoting related values, but more specifically by constructing socialist societies through locally adapted characteristics to produce the modern communist state. Which is the process of blending market-oriented economic policies with traditional communist governance.<sup>5</sup> These two hybrid socialist institutions have had a long thorny relationship with the United States government, which despises communist regimes and invests countless efforts to project its values of democracy and capitalism to the greater global community. This specific outcome of American détente and even cooperation with the PRC is shocking in the perspective of traditional international relations ideology; in which Samuel Huntington declares that states and communities with alike cultures, religions, and morals are more likely to cooperate, while other states and communities with contrasting and unfamiliar cultures religions, and morals tend to produce division

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<sup>5</sup> Xianglin Mao, Adrian H. Hearn, and Weiguang Liu, "China and Cuba: 160 Years and Looking Ahead," *Latin American Perspectives* 42, no. 6 (November 2015): pp. 140-152, <https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/24574819>, 140.

and discord between one another.<sup>6</sup> With the US and Cuba being geographically close, the US assisting Cuba to gain their independence from the Spanish crown, and Cuba thereafter assuming the role as a US satellite state for a quarter-century.<sup>7</sup> One might predict that the US would more likely have positive diplomatic relations with its backyard neighbor, Cuba rather than distant, faraway China.

Through a meticulous qualitative cross-comparison case study of the two selected states, this thesis examines and identifies the cause of the successful US and Chinese bilateral relation restorations and the prolonged quagmire of US and Cuba diplomatic relations. To accomplish this task, a tripartite theoretical lens, developed by the influential international relations scholar, Kenneth Waltz will be utilized to analyze historical events in the relations between the US and China/Cuba relations. The trilateral analytical theory states that global conflict and politics can be condensed into three primary images: individual influences, state influences, and the global state system.<sup>8</sup> Waltz's lens of analysis is preferred due to its simplicity to comprehend and categorize international politics and state cleavages. Utilizing this theoretical framework, it can be used to test the central hypothesis: providing an answer to the before mentioned research question:

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<sup>6</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Penguin, 2014), 126.

<sup>7</sup> Michael Dunne, "Review Article 'Ending the Hegemonic Presumption'? Recent Writings on US-Cuban Relations," *International Affairs* 89, no. 1 (January 2013): pp. 160-173, 162.

<sup>8</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (Columbia University Press, 1959), 12.

*For a state to successfully establish diplomatic relations, each of the three motivating factors (individual, state, and international influences) are essential prerequisites for normalization success, if the three factors are present, diplomatic maneuvers will be deliberate, cognizant, and successful. In a case, if a state is lacking one or more of these influences, then normalization efforts will be reactionary, opportunistic, and unsuccessful.*

Taking the knowledge from the proposed thesis, and applying it towards historical events, the findings uncover a very straightforward explanation for the before-mentioned research question. Simply put, US and China relations were meticulously planned with careful observations, to achieve a specific goal, whereas the US and Cuba relations were more unprogressive and Machiavellian (insert what this means in foot notes), leading to a prolonged stagnation of bilateral diplomatic relations.

Thus, providing us with the contemporary outcome of the United States and its diplomatic relationships with the PRC and Cuba. When the Nixon administration was attempting to re-establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, the three elements of Waltz's images of influence were present for both the United States and the PRC, therefore normalization efforts were successful. On the contrary, when a state is missing one or more of the three influences, in the case of the Obama administration and their efforts at establishing relations with Cuba, normalization attempts will go unsuccessful. Careful analysis of bilateral diplomatic relations between the two selected nations via the three before-mentioned influential lenses has yielded fruitful results. Providing a

clear answer to the previously mentioned research question, resulting in support to the central thesis statement.

Within academia, a vast amount of scholarly work has been completed on Sino-American rapprochement, and the US Cuban thaw, separately. However scholarly work on comparing the two countries, in an analytical case comparison remains limited in development. This research is necessary within contemporary academia as it can assist in the process of opening relations with Cuba, a feat that 12 presidents have not yet been able to solve. The pariah state is the last remaining artifact from the Cold War era, a painful reminder of the troubled past of American containment diplomacy. Through further exploration of this topic, more attention can be brought to the matter, leading to a more progressive approach to pursuing normalized relations with Cuba.

The scope of this research will be restricted to the time periods of the Richard Nixon presidency (January 20, 1969, to August 9, 1974) for the case of China. While the Cuban analysis period in consideration will be the presidency of Barack Obama (January 20, 2009, to January 20, 2017). These two influential presidents were selected as they had impacted the normalization efforts towards their target nations to the greatest degree. By limiting the research scope to Nixon and Obama, the analysis will stay focused and limited to essential elements that shaped the reestablishment of relations. Another caveat to this dissertation that should be mentioned is the emphasis that this research is based on a United States diplomatic perspective. Meaning that the three-image analysis proposed by Waltz will only consider the three images of analysis from an American diplomatic perspective. This limitation has been established to prevent

scope creep. The primary element within this research is American diplomacy, including detailed interests of other states would only hinder and clutter the yield of fruitful findings.

Information used within this thesis, providing details regarding the historical relationships and political maneuvers the US had conducted to achieve restoration of diplomatic relations will be primarily derived from qualitative sources. These include personal memoirs, books, journal articles, government publications, presidential speeches, and previous dissertations. However, the inclusion of quantitative data is utilized within this research in the form of public opinion polls, which are presented as quantifiable numbers.

This thesis is organized as follows, following the introduction, two tables listing key events and dates which are examined within this work, and section two will discuss the literature review, which covers existing research, applicable theoretical frameworks, and inherent limitations. Part three is comprised of both case studies, US and China relations, and US and Cuba relations. In the following, section four will utilize MSW tripart analytical lens to compare the normalization efforts between the United States and each counterpart, China, or Cuba. Finally, this essay will restate all the findings within section five, the conclusion. Following the concluding remarks, the appendix displays a few figures to support the findings of this research.

## Tables of Key Events

**Table 1. Timeline of Major Events (China & USA)**

Key events China	
November 7, 1972	Nixon successfully wins reelection
January 27, 1973	Nixon Signs Paris Peace Accords, prompting US military withdrawal from Vietnam
Mach 2, 1969	Zhenbao Island border skirmish, exacerbates Sino-Soviet split

**Table 2. Timeline of Major Events (Cuba & USA)**

Key events Cuba	
December 17, 2014	Obama and Castro announce reestablishment relations & prisoner swap
November 4, 2008	Democratic candidate Obama wins over the Cuban American vote in the 2008 election.
October 26, 2016	UN condemning USA trade embargo 25 years, US voting in abstention

## **II. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **1) Existing Research**

The normalization of bilateral relations between different countries is a subject that has been researched and analyzed by a vast number of distinguished scholars. Academia boasts a great number of scholarly works pertaining specifically to the extended and convoluted relations of Cuba and the United States, or Nixon's actions opening relations with the PRC, while the remaining bulk of literature focuses on the cold war and détente with the Soviet Union. Of course, there is the investigation of the interconnection of trilateral diplomatic engagements between The United States, China, and the Soviet Union and how these three world leaders had influenced one another. On the contrary, to the author's knowledge, little scholarly development has progressed within the realm of comparing the curious cases of China and Cuba in relation to The United States. One specific article has been produced analyzing the successful elements found in the success of China-US relations and the failure of early diplomatic efforts of Cuba-US relations.

The piece by Carter and Sugden discussed American diplomacy efforts with China and Cuba via sporting diplomacy. The authors had creatively utilized athletics to assess the normalization attempts made by each side of the diplomatic relationship

reestablishment. With concluding that athletic (ping pong) diplomacy paired with Nixon's security advisor, Henry Kissinger were both paramount elements that had initiated the brokering of diplomatic rapprochement between the US and China, and this opened a communication channel between the two countries for dialogue and to match their concerns and requests towards diplomatic relation restorations.<sup>9</sup> However when this similar tactic of wielding sports and Kissinger as a vessel to open the floor for discussion with Cuba, the outcome was met with disastrous failure. The same key elements of sports (baseball) and the rapprochement being spearheaded by security advisor Henry Kissinger was utilized to recreate the diplomatic success within China. What was the reason for complete failure with Cuba? The authors find that the asymmetrical power disparity weighed remarkably towards the United States, and it was a primary American political interest to isolate Cuba, while the economic interests Cuba presented could not counterbalance the before influence. This led to Cuba which was very interested in reconciliation of relations with America, but a distant and minimally involved USA.<sup>10</sup>

Other scholars who had conducted research on this topic such as Lin, had pointed toward the key element within the normalization of relations was Henry Kissinger, who was the security advisor for President Nixon at the time. Kissinger was hand-picked by Nixon for this position due to their sharing conservative viewpoints

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<sup>9</sup> Thomas F. Carter and John Sugden, "The USA and Sporting Diplomacy: Comparing and Contrasting the Cases of Table Tennis with China and Baseball with Cuba in the 1970s," *International Relations* 26, no. 1 (2012): pp. 101-121, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117811411741>, 107.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, 116-17.



toward China. Which was the belief that a growing Beijing posed a critical threat to the future of global security<sup>11</sup> and it was perceived that dialogue with China would be critical for the future of the world.<sup>12</sup> Soon this would become a tremendous task for Kissinger, as he would set the stage for the USA and China opening as well as Kissinger's attempt, but ultimately fail to reproduce his China victory later, under President Ford with baseball diplomacy within Cuba.

Of course, this literate review would not be complete without a mention of the labors of esteemed US security advisor, Henry Kissinger. Who had created numerous relevant works, while simultaneously paving the path towards rapprochement with the PRC. Upon entering office with President Nixon, Kissinger noticed that the containment strategy<sup>13</sup> proclaimed by American foreign policy had unintentionally placed US soldiers at the frontlines of numerous distant faraway battles; stretching the United States beyond its physical and psychological capacity.<sup>14</sup> Knowing this, Kissinger and Nixon had presented a solution to be known as triangular diplomacy. Which was a critical element that had changed the way that the USA conducted diplomacy. The US wielding a new realpolitik style of diplomacy would be presented to the world. It was

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<sup>11</sup> Nixon had believed that majority of other Asian and Southeast Asian nations would be coerced into Sino sphere of socialist influence, much like the domino theory presented by President Harry Truman. For more information regarding the Nixon and his personal viewpoints towards Vietnam '*Asia after Viet Nam*' by Nixon Richard.

<sup>12</sup> 林 淳宏, "美國「一個中國」政策轉變與內涵(1972-2011): 回顧美中關係正常化歷史並台灣所受之影響," 弘光學報 81 (October 6, 2017): pp. 47-67, [https://doi.org/10.6615/HAR.201803\\_\(81\).0005](https://doi.org/10.6615/HAR.201803_(81).0005), 50.

<sup>13</sup> First presented by George F. Kennan in 1947, the US Containment policy was the central objective of American foreign policy. Its goal was the stop the spread of communist influence spreading to neighboring countries. Originally the policy was focused within Europe, however as Soviet efforts shifted towards different geopolitical locations, soon the communist Chinese civil war victory shifted this policy to be directed towards East and Southeast Asia. (Duiker, William, 1-2)

<sup>14</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperback, 2005), 707.

extremely successful and led to the changing of global order, as the US was continually pushed towards a difficult and unprecedented role, as an eroding sole nuclear superpower; losing the supreme authority it once held directly after World War II and was assuming more of a leadership position within the world. This new tactic of diplomacy was a way for Beijing- Moscow- and Washington to engage in a way to respect other adversaries' goals, while simultaneously cooperating where objectives aligned, a truly dynamic diplomatic feat.<sup>15</sup>

This new style of diplomacy described by Kissinger had been a critical element in the role of reestablishing diplomatic relations with China. Kissinger summarized the event that China was extended a hand by the United States to rejoin the international community via diplomatic dialogue with Washington while simultaneously gaining assurance that the White House would not favor the Kremlin in case of geopolitical upheaval on the Sino-Soviet border.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, the United States was highly interested in reengaging with China not only to gain more coercive diplomatic leverage against the Soviet Union; but also to drive a wedge between the two communist giants, Beijing and Moscow. Which would limit the possibilities of Sino-Soviet harmonization, forming a Communist monolith, a powerful force, and a terrifying obstacle for Washington's security concerns.<sup>17</sup> It had been a nuance towards America's return towards a national interest-focused, realpolitik style of diplomacy.

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<sup>15</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperback, 2005), 729.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, 721 & 727.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, 730.

All the previous works mentioned are significant for this dissertation piece, which had outlined salient concepts and events to lay the foundation upon which the current work can be built. Through constructing upon the existing work regarding this topic, one can uncover the systems which had caused success within reconciliation of US-China relations and failure of US-Cuba relations.

## **2) Applicable Theoretical Frameworks**

The eminent international relations scholar, Kenneth Waltz had contributed to this study immensely with the creation of his work *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (hereafter MSW) which provided a very important foundation for the analysis and moving mechanisms within the study of international relations. MSW had focused on identifying the cardinal factors which give rise to international conflict and assessing how to mitigate these vices. The three principal images Waltz recognizes as localities in which conflict can flourish were: “within man, within the structure of the separate states, within the state system.”<sup>18</sup> The basic structure of examination provides an effective triparted lens of analysis that can be utilized to assess the interstate interactions between the United States & China along with the United States & Cuba.

This analytical lens is critical for comparing the two case studies because it easily allows for the identification of salient factors aiding bilateral state rapprochement between the two nations in question. This is a vital element, in which the task of reestablishing diplomatic relations is very complex and involves countless interactions

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<sup>18</sup>Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (Columbia University Press, 1959), 12.

which can easily become cluttered with innumerable events leading up to the restoration of diplomatic relations in a tense situation. Within this thesis, Waltz's three images will be utilized to assess state relations. Detailed explanations of what each image pertains to within this case study can be found below.

The first image under consideration will be individual influences, which within this study will be defined as the personal motivating factors which create one to act in a specific way. The objective of including this section is to comprehend the individual motivations and how they impact the process and cooperation of American diplomacy. These individual influences can be very subjective and alter discoveries within findings, but to establish a level of consistency within this case study, the individual called into the analysis will be the President of the United States. Which will be Richard Nixon in the case of the United States and China relations and Barack Obama in the opposite case of the United States and Cuba relations.

The second image within this study will be state influences, within this dissertation they will be considered as domestic state pressures that may permit or discourage a nation to behave in a certain way. These different internal state pressures can arise from a myriad of unlike factors being but not limited to historical, socioeconomic, governmental regime type, and even overseas conflicts. All these elements if mobilized effectively have tremendous potential to dictate how a state projects itself within the greater world of nations. Since this study is conducted from an American diplomatic point of view, this study will extensively delve into the most

potent domestic state influences which had shaped US statesmanship while exercising dialogue with China and Cuba.

The third image is the international state system and in the context of this analysis, will embody the concept that the greater global community is comprised of a diversity of individual states. All of which carry their own interests and motivations that can lead nations to conduct diplomacy aggressively or submissively within the greater state system. This study assumes more of a realist perspective, assuming that the composure of the greater global society is anarchic, and thus the absence of a global policeman can result in larger nations casting influence upon smaller or weaker states via coercive tactics. The balance of power in relation to a realist international state system can cast remarkable influences on diplomatic decisions made by states.

Waltz considered the international systemic state system of his three-part analysis framework as the most significant towards impacting a nation's international affairs and decisions to engage in military contact or to isolate another nation-state. The global system is made up of numerous sovereign states, in which there is an absence of a superior world government, enforcing international authority to present conflict among states. The ultimate and most effective means to achieve the hardline goals of a state would be the utilization of force. Making the chance of conflict among states a constant threat, thus making war preparations a prerequisite for survival within the anarchic global state system.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Cornelia Beyer, *Inequality and Violence: A Re-Appraisal of Man, the State and War* (Routledge, 2016), 21.

Waltz identifies that immediate friction points between two states such as geographic location, population size, economic power, political interests, government type, and historical influences can all be classified under the first and second images. While the absence of a global policeman, enforcing international laws results in a global system that is prone to succumbing to violent conflict. This implies that wars inevitably occur because there is nothing to prevent them within the global state system, therefore the third image can be seen as a unique explanation for the rising of conflict.<sup>20</sup>

The international state system that Waltz analyses and describes is a product of the Westphalian world order<sup>21</sup> which is often said to be the creation of the modern diplomatic strategies and the concept of absolute state sovereignty.<sup>22</sup> This modern concept of international order had been a constant dynamic shifting of powers since the creation of the Peace of Westphalia, it has never been so much influenced by the contemporary unprecedented power of the United States of America. With a firm understanding of each of the three images of influences, the following will be utilized as variables within this study as described below.

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 25.

<sup>21</sup> The Westphalian world order refers to the agreement reached in 1648 ending the Thirty Years' War while proclaiming the greater world as sovereign states, with supreme authority over the territory which it had governed. The treaty prioritized international peace via a combination of diplomatic methods and international law which discouraged military disputes with other independent states. For more information regarding Westphalia and its influences on international relations please see: Patton, Steven. *"The Peace of Westphalia and It Affects on International Relations, Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy"*.

<sup>22</sup> G. John Ikenberry et al., "Illusions of Empire: Defining The New American Order," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (March 2004): pp. 144-154, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20033908>, 145.

The *dependent variable* will be the successful normalization of US bilateral relations between China and Cuba.

While the *independent variable* will constitute the analytical instruments of individual influence, nation-state influence, and the international system of influence.

The successful acquisition of the three images of influences, assuming the role of independent variables will dictate the outcome of successful diplomatic relation reestablishment, which will be portrayed as the dependent variable. Through this form of study, the direct connection between the two variables is evident, directly impacting one another. In the case one of the independent variables is absent or has an issue, then the direct impact will arise upon the dependent variable, portraying itself as an unsuccessful bid towards reconciliation of diplomatic relations.

### **3) Inherent Limitations**

Within a highly connected modern world, the significance of each of the three selected lenses from MSW could not be more paramount within this study. Global modernization, transportation improvements, and increasing international trade accelerate the interconnectivity of the greater state system. This leads to a world containing states ever more dependent upon one another while simultaneously increasing border permeability among nations. This interconnectivity through technology inevitably gives rise to an increase in nationalism and transnationalism. With the latter acting as a common dominator, linking states together globally via multinational corporations establishing economic standards, media platforms spreading information in real-time, and extending international technologies. Some idealist scholars such as Marshall McLuhan propose this increasing global connectivity as a



“global village” concept, which nullifies the traditional obstacles of geographical location and communications between states and enhances cooperation efforts among states via the before mentioned shared technological advancements.<sup>23</sup> However, on the contrary, realist critics such as Joseph Nye are quick to point out that this increased awareness and interactions between one another via globalization and technology can bring about a state ripe for conflict, with neighbors within the global village competing for security.<sup>24</sup> While this thesis adopts a more realist perspective, as globalization is pushing states to become reliant upon one another, making the importance of international diplomacy evermore paramount within the contemporary global state system.

The modernization that is constantly occurring often introduces new technology to the global system. Which can often bring about armed conflict between societies. This is caused by the newly introduced technology prompting change within a society. This change is often interpreted as a threat to identity, which motivates societies to utilize any means necessary to defend their identity when felt that it is threatened.<sup>25</sup> These viewpoints complicate the significance of each of the three images of MSW. One might assume that the third image of MSW, the international state system, holds the most importance within this study. But this is not true, as without the two initial lenses,

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<sup>23</sup> Marshall McLuhan and Bruce R. Powers, *The Global Village: Transformations in World Life and Media in the 21st Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 7.

<sup>24</sup> Joseph S. Nye, “What New World Order?,” *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 2 (1992): pp. 83-96, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20045126>, 85.

<sup>25</sup> Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, *War and Peace in the Global Village* (Corte Madera, CA.: Gingko Pr., 2001), 99.

making what a modern state is, there would not be a third lens making the collective global community, the international state system.

Another potential obstacle that has surfaced is the access to information and data. All the details regarding this facet of academia have inevitably faced limitations in fact that socialist states have a reputation for limiting the release of state sensitive information. China and Cuba both are notorious for restricting access to information. To avoid this issue, I have designated the United States as the principal of this study. Meaning that all the following research will hold the perspective of the United States, main events, and influences will derive from American geopolitical inclinations. This viewpoint will allow for a very steady flow of information and limit the scope of research from straying from the focus under discussion. Originally, this research had intended to analyze American and Chinese/Cuban influences concurrently, however, it was soon realized that the inclusion of both motivating images for each respective state would inflate the size of this research task immensely. Therefore, to simplify the findings and limit the possibilities for research scope creep, American diplomatic actions and influences will be the bedrock of analysis within this thesis with a brief inclusion of the opposite state's political objectives.

The selection of each president can be called into question. President Nixon and Obama were strategically selected due to their governmental administrations having the greatest success in establishing normalized relations with China and Cuba. Whereas other presidents such as Gerald Ford had attempted Cuban reconciliation attempts with

Cuba via Kissinger and sporting diplomacy.<sup>26</sup> Kissinger attempted the endeavor and made a limited amount of success, none can compare to the success that the Obama administration had enjoyed while engaging with the Castro government later on within his presidency. While Nixon had opened the door to China and initiated cordial with a once-formidable adversary to American interests. Therefore, both Presidents and their policies have been selected as representatives of US interests during their respected terms of presidency. The author is aware that other US presidents could have been selected for the study, which could vary findings. However, due to the significance, Nixon and Obama had upon their target states, and the historical achievements accomplished, they have been selected as the primaries within this study.

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<sup>26</sup> Thomas F. Carter and John Sugden, "The USA and Sporting Diplomacy: Comparing and Contrasting the Cases of Table Tennis with China and Baseball with Cuba in the 1970s," *International Relations* 26, no. 1 (2012): pp. 101-121, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117811411741>, 106.

### **III. ANALYSIS**

#### **1) USA and China Case**

##### **a. First Image – Nixon’s peace with honor & electoral success**

The two-state leaders of China and the United States had personalities and egos larger than life. Both Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon had been highly interested in reestablishing relations to enhance their self-image toward the greater local populations in an act to gain more popular political favor. Mao Zedong had been interested in leading his new country The People’s Republic of China to the front stage of international politics, defying traditional Western governments, and reestablishing his state back towards the historical ‘Middle Kingdom’ front runner position once held

within the international community.<sup>27</sup> Whereas Nixon had strategically manipulated international relations to further develop his political profile, and attempt to secure America's continued position as a global hegemony.

The key elements that would define Nixon's political career were set into motion well before his role as the US president. One would be the Truman doctrine which had vowed to contain the spread of communism throughout the world and lead to the formal initiation of US military involvement within Vietnam. Further compounded by the Kennedy administration escalating the war and finally, at the height of the battle in 1968 with 540,000 troops serving in the country, the Johnson administration made the first attempt to ease the ever-growing domestically unpopular containment war in Vietnam.<sup>28</sup> Upon domestic political views growing more divided, a distant unpopular war festering in remote Indochina, and the cold war divisions intensifying had created the perfect formula for a fragmented America, which Nixon had vowed to heal the fracturing nation with a 'secret plan' to end the war in Indochina and heal a divided nation.

To deliver upon these promises, Nixon had proposed a path out of Vietnam known as "Peace with honor" which was a five-step process starting with Vietnamization,<sup>29</sup> pacification, diplomatic isolation of North Vietnam, peaceful

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<sup>27</sup> Jian Chen, "From Mao to Deng: China's Changing Relations with the United States," *Cold War International History Project*, November 2019, pp. 1-25, 7.

<sup>28</sup> S. Mergel, *Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon: Rethinking the Rise of the Right* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 33.

<sup>29</sup> Vietnamization was an important feature within Nixon's attempt to leave Vietnam honorably, which was an attempt to gradually return the burden of combat operations to the South Vietnamese people. This concept was not new, as the term derived from the First Indochina war when the French colonists called the process *jaunissement*

negotiations, and gradual withdrawal of American soldiers; to create a divided nation, preventing North Vietnam from conquering South Vietnam.<sup>30</sup> While simultaneously vowing to bring the American public together again. Nixon's exit strategy from Indochina was one that appealed to most of the American public. The exit strategy had covered the ideas of gracefully returning US military personnel home, coupled with the cessation of armed conflict and the initiation of a path towards reestablishing peaceful relations within Asia.<sup>31</sup> As the US majority was ever-growing more intolerant of war and giving rise to political unrest within the United States, Nixon knew that fulfilling the campaign promise of bringing an end to the Vietnam war and mending division at home was essential to his political success, and reestablishing relations with China would aid that process.

Reflecting on the reason why America had decided to engage in the conflict was to halt the spread of communism, specifically, Chinese communism. With each President, Eisenhower, Truman, and Kennedy all firmly opposing and justifying the conflict by halting communist influence, Nixon had been no different and subscribed to the moral crusades to abolish communism in fear that the fall of Vietnam would lead to the remaining of Southeast Asia to fall into communist orbit.<sup>32</sup> However, the viewpoint

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meaning "yellowing" similar to the Vietnam war, this tactic resulted in far greater Vietnamese casualties than French or American soldiers within both wars. (Goscha, 14)

<sup>30</sup> Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams* (London: Allen, 1986), 104-11.

<sup>31</sup> Heather Timmons, "'Peace with Honor,' President Nixon's 1973 Speech Ending US Involvement in the Vietnam War," Quartz, May 23, 2016, <https://qz.com/689961/watch-peace-with-honor-richard-nixons-1973-speech-on-the-end-of-us-involvement-in-vietnam/>.

<sup>32</sup> Peter Van Ness, "Review: Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War, and the American Accommodation with China: A Review Article," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 8, no. 3 (December 1986): pp. 231-245, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25797906>, 232.

Nixon took to the conflict was different from his predecessors. Nixon had believed that establishing positive relations with the PRC would allow the United States more strategic leverage against Northern Vietnam and the Soviet Union which would bring the possibility to lead the United States closer to ending the drawn-out war within Vietnam.<sup>33</sup>

The Geneva Agreements of 1954 had officially divided Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel, the division creating North and South Vietnam.<sup>34</sup> China had supported the North and USA had aided the South, creating yet another proxy war between the two nations. Citing a very familiar battle occurring on the Korean peninsula, Nixon had called the Vietnam war “The Korean War with Jungles”<sup>35</sup> therefore knew that a different approach was needed to end the destructive Indochina conflict.

Along with the before mentioned five-point exit strategy from Vietnam, Nixon had decided to wield a form of realpolitik to court China and the Soviet Union, two of Vietnam’s greatest allies, to create pressure for Hanoi to agree on a conclusion to the conflict. Both nations would become salient aids in promoting peace within Indochina, leading to the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. This had presented itself with the completion of the Paris Peace Accords, Nixon could finally deliver on the previous

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<sup>33</sup> Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, “United States- China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision Making,” ed. Shaiw-chei Chuang, Chih-Yu Wu, and Hungdah Chiu, *Occasional Papers/ Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, 1986, pp. 1-227, 30.

<sup>34</sup> Geneva Agreements 20-21 July 1954, “Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam 20 July 1954,” 1957, pp. 1-42, [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KH-LA-VN\\_540720\\_GenevaAgreements.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KH-LA-VN_540720_GenevaAgreements.pdf).

<sup>35</sup> Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams* (London: Allen, 1986), 47.

campaign promise of withdrawing from Vietnam peacefully and honorably. After five agonizing years of negotiations, it was January 27, 1973, when the Paris Peace Accords were signed, which were to supposedly be the solution to dissolve all violence in Vietnam and bring all active US military personnel back to the United States. Both active soldiers and prisoners of war; a total exodus of all American military presence within Vietnam, something that was of paramount importance to quell domestic pressures within the United States.<sup>36</sup> Bringing the American military back to the US had fulfilled Nixon's campaign promise and had greatly increased his popularity as a president at the time. All his success in achieving world stability, such as his 1972 visits to Beijing and Moscow to limit tensions with communist states and easing the Vietnam conflict had all greatly contributed to his successful reelection during the 1972 presidential elections.<sup>37</sup>

By following through on his promises and successfully simultaneously easing cold war tensions while removing American soldiers from Vietnam, Nixon had powerfully swayed US voters to believe and reelect him for another term as the 37<sup>th</sup> president. Nixon had amassed popularity and influence which was utilized to win an overwhelming electoral victory over his presidential candidate opponent (See figure 1

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<sup>36</sup> Priscilla Mary Roberts, "168. Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam (Paris Peace Accords), January 27, 1973," in *The Cold War: Interpreting Conflict through Primary Documents* (Santa Barbara (Calif.): ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2018), pp. 692-696, 692 -693.

<sup>37</sup> "Richard M. Nixon - The 37th President of the United States," The White House, accessed March 18, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/richard-m-nixon/>; Andrew Glass, "Nixon Reelected in Landslide, Nov. 7, 1972," Politico, November 7, 2018, <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/07/this-day-in-politics-november-7-963516>.



in appendix), George McGovern.<sup>38</sup> Motivated by his desire to become reelected, Nixon utilized his administrative executives and acted accordingly, to pursue his personal desire of reelection in 1972.

### **b. Second Image - the USA involved in Vietnam & domestic turmoil**

The correlation between domestic politics and foreign policy is explicit, and nearly no other country are these two symbiotic influences more in action than the United States. This is primarily since presidents and legislators must undergo reelection if they are to remain within their executive positions.<sup>39</sup> This allows public concerns and opinions to be considered by state leaders who will in response shape foreign diplomacy in favor of the majority of the society they serve. These domestic American pressures had greatly shaped the way in which Nixon and his advisors had conducted

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<sup>38</sup> The official vote totals of the 1972 presidential election was 47,168,963 popular votes (60.7%) for Nixon and 29,169,615 popular votes (37.6%) for McGovern, a complete landslide, winning 49 of 50 US States. (Simons, Herbert, 168)

<sup>39</sup> Melvin Small, "The Domestic Side of Foreign Policy," *OAH Magazine of History* 8, no. 3 (1994): pp. 15-19, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25162960>, 15.

their foreign diplomacy. Growing pressures from the Vietnam war had greatly impacted the Nixon administration which had motivated Nixon to actively engage in the normalization of relations with the PRC, to circumvent the Vietnam war debacle.

Nixon's predecessor Lyndon Johnson had firsthand witnessed the increasing public dissatisfaction with the Vietnam war, the pressure, and divide within America had swelled to a point it had it had forced President Johnson to resign as president, and not run for a second term.<sup>40</sup> Johnson's top security advisor George Bell had warned the late president of the possibility of a rapidly detreating public approval towards the Vietnam conflict. As the US public had just overcome the Korean war which quickly became a lengthy, expensive, and unwinnable faraway conflict.<sup>41</sup> Bell's assumption on public dissatisfaction with the Vietnam conflict would end up developing as predicted, and the Vietnam conflict would become one of the most unfavorable wars in American history.<sup>42</sup> However as a growing number of people were opposing the Vietnam conflict, and expressing their disapproval by protest, there was also nearly an equal number of US citizens who despised the antiwar protestors, labeling them as "Peaceniks". Their opposition had loathed the dovish peacenik protesters because it was seen that the anti-war protests had not only benefited the enemy but were also unpatriotic, as publicly stated by Nixon.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams* (London: Allen, 1986), 101.

<sup>41</sup> Melvin Small, "The Domestic Side of Foreign Policy," *OAH Magazine of History* 8, no. 3 (1994): pp. 15-19, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25162960>, 17.

<sup>42</sup>Melvin Small, "The Domestic Side of Foreign Policy," *OAH Magazine of History* 8, no. 3 (1994): pp. 15-19, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25162960>, 17.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid, 18.

This civil polarization had thrown American citizens into complete political turmoil. The war had divided the American public into two main viewpoints regarding the drawn-out conflict in Vietnam. These two contrasting positions towards the conflict were known as “Hawks” and “Doves”. The conservative Republican hawks, which had advocated and justified the conflict within Vietnam by promoting the Domino theory. They had speculated that if Vietnam succumbed to communism, the rest of Indochina would follow suit.<sup>44</sup> Which would pose a major threat to American security and global stability in the future. While the opposing perspectives were the democratic doves, who had acted as critics of the Vietnam conflict. The people against the war had believed that the conflict within Vietnam was one that is a domestic issue of Vietnam, in which the US had no jurisdiction intervening within. The doves had believed the war only benefited US production companies and elite executives; thus, the conflict was morally wrong.<sup>45</sup>

Throughout the Vietnam conflict, many American citizens had been shifting their hawkish perspectives towards more dovish outlooks, adopting more hesitant views towards further engagement in military conflict. Gallup, Inc had inquired to the American public based on current events if it was a mistake to send soldiers to Vietnam, the first poll conducted in 1965 had the response that 60% of Americans supported

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<sup>44</sup> Gyung-Ho Jeong and Paul J. Quirk, “Division at the Water’s Edge: The Polarization of Foreign Policy,” *American Politics Research* 47, no. 1 (2017): pp. 58-87, 70.

<sup>45</sup> Paul Burstein and William Freudenburg, “Ending the Vietnam War: Components of Change in Senate Voting on Vietnam War Bills,” *American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 5 (March 1977): pp. 991-1006, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2777809>, 991; Allen Guttman, “Protest against the War in Vietnam,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 382 (March 1969): pp. 56-63, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1037114>, 60.

sending troops while 24% thought it was a mistake. This same question was later asked again in 1969 in which 52% had thought the war was a mistake and 39% supporting the conflict. This gap would continue to grow, as 60% disapproved of the conflict while 29% supported it in January of 1973.<sup>46</sup> The Gallup data displays the division along with the souring perspective that the American public had held towards the Vietnam conflict. Knowing that the United States populous was seeking an exit strategy from the Indochina conflict, Nixon had worked this by hastening the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam via the completion of the Paris Peace Accords to satisfy the growingly disgruntled American public at home. Nixon had lost the war in Vietnam, however, his de-escalation of the conflict in Vietnam had initiated engagement with Beijing, leading to eventual détente with China, neutralizing the dangerous Sino threat, which had been America's primary rationale for involvement within Indochina.<sup>47</sup> This would further prove to be more powerful and influential than anything else, as it opened possibilities for the United States to exploit Sino-Soviet cleavages towards its own advantage, a trilateral diplomatic strategy that would be known to the world as Triangular Diplomacy.

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<sup>46</sup> Tom Rosentil, "Polling Wars: Hawks vs. Doves," ed. Jodie T. Allen, Pew Research Center, November 23, 2009, <https://www.pewresearch.org/2009/11/23/polling-wars-hawks-vs-doves/>.

<sup>47</sup> Peter Van Ness, "Review: Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War, and the American Accommodation with China: A Review Article," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 8, no. 3 (December 1986): pp. 231-245, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25797906>, 232.

### **c. Third Image - China and Soviet Split & Triangular diplomacy**

It was evident to the whole international community, that the two prominent global leaders at the time were both the Soviet Union and the United States. During the beginning of the great Russo-American global polarization, China had greatly leaned towards its soviet ally for security and technological cooperation, pitting it against the United States. This was compounded by Sino-American relations under intense strain since the United States and China have been indirectly at war with each other from the

years 1949 to 1972, by engaging <sup>48</sup> with one another through the Korean and Vietnam battlefronts.<sup>49</sup> There were many instances where Western imperialism was the greatest threat to Mao's China and the US took the position as the sworn enemy of the PRC. However as global politics shifted throughout history, Beijing's alliance with the Soviet Union had started to rapidly deteriorate, and an opening for new relations with Washington emerged. Throughout the cold war, the PRC had slowly become ever-increasingly concerned with border security, as it was surrounded by potential adversaries, to the east there was US military presence on the island of Taiwan and upon the Korean peninsula, followed by the Vietnam war occurring near China's southern border, border disputes with India and amassing presence of Soviet troops on China's northern borders; China had been surrounded by threats on all sides.<sup>50</sup> This greatly alarmed the PRC and their geographical security concerns, but continual deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union would come to a height with the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict, known as the Zhenbao Island dispute, which had resulted in a live firefight between the two allies and marked a momentous turning point for China. Which resulted in the eventual loss of China's closest ally, the Soviet Union.<sup>51</sup> This already stressed relationship was further exacerbated by the Soviet Union

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<sup>48</sup> In addition to proxy wars between the two nations, in a bid to isolate the Chinese communist state, the US had decided to not recognize the PRC, barring its entry into the United Nations, and by establishing and maintaining a trade embargo with the PRC. (Dulles, 268) These moves had infuriated Mao and had made him double down on his Anti-American policies and turn more towards the Soviet alliance. (He, 152)

<sup>49</sup> Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 4.

<sup>50</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2012), 132.

<sup>51</sup> Kirby, William C., Robert S. Ross, and Li Gong. *Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History*. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Asia Center, 2007. 56.

amassing more military personnel within Mongolia and the greater Chinese Soviet border.<sup>52</sup> With limited options, the souring Sino-Soviet relations had been a great motivating factor for China to engage in dialogue with the United States.

During the split of Sino-Soviet relations, Mao's China was left vulnerable and with few allies within the complex world of international politics. The international community at the time had comprised of two dominating governmental factions, the first being Western lead democratic states, and the Soviet lead socialist camp, however, China had not conformed to either of the two parties.<sup>53</sup>

Mao was so reassured that the establishment of formal relations with the United States would provide protection within the greater anarchic global community that he compared the United States to an umbrella, providing a deterrent toward Soviet aggression that they had been struggling with on their northern borders.<sup>54</sup> This was a great strategy that could not be ignored by Mao Zedong and his cabinet. It would bring security to China, which was needed more now that one of its greatest allies, the Soviet Union was beginning to overshadow the US as enemy number one.<sup>55</sup>

The growing tensions between Moscow and Beijing had left a void that Washington could easily fill and utilize both advisories towards its own personal

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid, 160.

<sup>53</sup> O. Edmund Clubb, *China & Russia: The "Great Game"* (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 466.

<sup>54</sup> William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, and Li Gong, *Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History* (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Asia Center, 2007), 70.

<sup>55</sup> This realization promoted Chinese officials to conduct a risk assessment of the Soviet Union and the United States. On July 11, 1969, the findings had uncovered that probability of conflict between the Soviet Union and China was greater than the United States and China. While on the contrary, contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union were greatly surpassing the discrepancies between the United States and China. (Kirby, 59)

advantage. This diplomatic maneuver would later be described by Nixon's top security adviser as triangular diplomacy, in which Washington- Beijing- Moscow would enter a trilateral relationship. A diplomatic scheme crafted to attempt to restore America's position as a global hegemon while simultaneously remaining highly active within an increasingly competitive international state system.<sup>56</sup>

The concept of triangular diplomacy had been creatively designed to self-fulfill each state's strategic interests while retaining the balance of power within the greater international system. This typically involves a vulnerable state pursuing alliances or economic partnerships with another state to enhance their own economic productivity, and geographic security or to strategically weaken a competitor state.<sup>57</sup> Gaining geographic security was the primary goal of both China and the United States to contain the aggressive Soviet expansionism and their immense military force which had been the greatest threat to world peace. This was the paramount crisis at the time due to the Soviet Union being an intense rivalry with the United States, as both nations had been grappling for global hegemony. For China, the aggressive and unpredictable neighbor had become the closest and most immediate threat.<sup>58</sup> Through this newfound communal strategic interest of a common adversary, both countries have acknowledged

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<sup>56</sup> Jussi Hanhimaki, "Selling the 'Decent Interval': Kissinger, Triangular Diplomacy, and the End of the Vietnam War, 1971-73," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 14, no. 1 (2003): pp. 159-194, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592290412331308771>, 162. ; Peter Van Ness, "Review: Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War, and the American Accommodation with China: A Review Article," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 8, no. 3 (December 1986): pp. 231-245, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25797906>, 240.

<sup>57</sup> "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972," U.S. Department of State (Office of the Historian, 2009), <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/i/21100.htm>.

<sup>58</sup> Kirby, William C., Robert S. Ross, and Li Gong. *Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History*. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Asia Center, 2007. 161.



that a cooperative effort against the Soviet Union would prove to be most effective at providing global security.

Mao was so reassured that the establishment of formal relations with the United States would provide protection within the greater anarchic global community that he compared the United States to an umbrella, providing a deterrent toward Soviet aggression that they had been struggling with on their northern borders.<sup>59</sup> This was a great strategy that could not be ignored by Mao Zedong and his cabinet. It would bring security to China, which was needed more now that one of its greatest allies, the Soviet Union was beginning to overshadow China's traditional antagonist, America.

President Nixon had been a longtime public opposer of Communist states, and every one of the different concepts of what socialism schemes had represented.<sup>60</sup> However, Nixon had put aside these differences and had progressed toward positive relations with China, while simultaneously engaged in a war against socialist North Vietnam to stop the spreading influence of Communism within Southeast Asia. As international political alliances had shifted, Nixon had noticed increasing tensions between the Soviet Union and China. Looking to increase his own image and be immortalized as the president who established relations with China, Nixon had decided

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<sup>59</sup>Kirby, William C., Robert S. Ross, and Li Gong. *Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History*. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Asia Center, 2007. 161.

<sup>60</sup> Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams* (London: Allen, 1986), 227.

to use the Sino-Soviet split to his advantage, exploiting the weakness of each state for American advantage, a form of realpolitik.<sup>61</sup>

## **2) USA and Cuba Case**

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<sup>61</sup> Peter Van Ness, "Review: Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War, and the American Accommodation with China: A Review Article," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 8, no. 3 (December 1986): pp. 231-245, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25797906>, 231.

### **a. First Image - Obama opening relations with Cuba & Alan Gross**

The relationship between the United States and Cuba is a lengthy bewildering affair, which stretches back to the time in which the original 13 colonies of the United States, first gained independence from the British crown. Cuba was once a subject of US imperialism and exploitation. However, in more recent times, the 1959 Cuban revolution which had ousted the former US-sponsored dictator Fulgencio Batista and placed communist leader Fidel Castro in the power of the Cuban island state. From this point forward was when relations between the two countries became antagonistic. Reflecting upon the relationship between the two nations a few key elements stand out, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, The Bay of Pigs Invasion, and numerous assassination attempts against Fidel Castro, which had all strained the US-Cuban relationship greatly. The soured US-Cuba relations had spanned a stretch of 10 different US presidents, while on the contrary, the United States built relations with other communist nations like China, Laos, and Vietnam; as Cuba remained listed as a state sponsor of terrorism, along with North Korea, Iran and Syria that had limited or no formal ties with Washington.<sup>62</sup>

While Cuba had many different desires which had promoted its inclination to re-establish diplomatic relations with the United States. Some of these motivating factors included an end to the US economic sanctions, the return of Guantanamo Bay, cessation of US aerial surveillance, and an end to violent exile operations enacted upon the

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<sup>62</sup> Bureau of Counterterrorism, "State Sponsors of Terrorism," U.S. Department of State, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/>.

island.<sup>63</sup> While on the contrary, American motivations towards normalization were far less, some of the top concerns included a transition to a democratic government, the release of US political prisoners, human rights improvements, and compensation for expropriated properties.<sup>64</sup> However American authority as a world superpower would later warp efforts for both nations to negotiate a path towards normalization. However great progress was achieved under the guidance of President Barack Obama.

Soon change would begin to wiggle its way into the firm, hardline stance of the American blockade on the Cuban government. On December 17, 2014, President Barack Obama stated that “50 years have shown, that isolation does not work, it’s time for a new approach” and alongside Cuban President Raúl Castro had simultaneously announced plans for diplomatic reconciliation between Cuba and the United States.<sup>65</sup>

This announcement was far from one made in sporadic nature, rather it required months of planning and countless grappling hours of negotiation. Along with the pledge to build diplomatic relations, there had been a very notable prisoner swap between the two countries. Alan Gross was released from a Cuban prison and exchanged for the three remaining ‘Cuban Five’ prisoners incarcerated within the United States.<sup>66</sup> After more than 54 years of hostilities between the two nations this was a groundbreaking achievement for both nations.

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<sup>63</sup> William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, *Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 131.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, 131.

<sup>65</sup> *President Obama Delivers a Statement on Cuba* (The White House of President Barack Obama, 2014), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/12/17/president-obama-delivers-statement-cuba>. (6:07)

<sup>66</sup> Arnold August, Keith Ellis, and Alarcón Ricardo, *Cuba-U.S. Relations: Obama and Beyond* (Black Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 2017), 133.

The case of Alan Gross had presented itself as a sudden opportunity for Obama. Mr. Gross had been one of the primary factors which had spurred the initial diplomatic exchanges between the US and Cuba. The topic of Alan Gross, who was a 63-year-old American USAID subcontractor who was arrested by Cuban police in December 2009, while attempting to deliver communication and satellite equipment to grant internet access to a small Jewish community residing on the island nation.<sup>67</sup> It was during 2013 and 2014, the last two years of his Cuban incarceration when his health, physical, and psychological state were rapidly deteriorating due to a combination of substandard prison facilities and protest via self-inflicted fasting episodes.<sup>68</sup> The declining health of Gross would create an element of urgency in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which had been absent for such an extended period of time.

The prisoner exchange had been secretly brokered by former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, Ben Rhodes, the son of Raúl Castro, Alejandro Castro, and an intermediary, Pope Francis over a few months within an array of venues including Canada and the Vatican.<sup>69</sup> Alejandro had insisted that the exchange could only take place in the event that the remaining three of The Cuban Five (Cuban counterintelligence agents that were sent to collect information on Cuban exile groups residing within Miami<sup>70</sup>) be released and returned from American prisons. The declining health of Mr. Gross had acted as a time motivation that brought productive

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<sup>67</sup> Ben Rhodes, *The World as It Is* (Random House UK, 2018), 315.

<sup>68</sup> Julia E Sweig, *Cuba - What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 294.

<sup>69</sup> For more information regarding the secret diplomatic exchanges between Ben, Alejandro and Pope Francis please see Rhodes, Ben. *The World as It Is*. Random House UK, 2018: 247 – 521.

<sup>70</sup> Julia E Sweig, *Cuba - What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 183.

negations and had made the prisoner exchange possible, but more importantly, this was the foot in the door for many more changes regarding the US and Cuba relations to be implemented. This had brought the two nations together and established communication lines for immediate and fluid communication for future dialogue something that was never present before the cessation of relations after Castro's ascension to authority.<sup>71</sup>

## **b. Second Image - Cuban exiles in Florida**

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<sup>71</sup> Ben Rhodes, *The World as It Is* (Random House UK, 2018), 322.

Despite the American Cuban population comprising less than 1 percent of the combined US population. The Cuban bloc voting tactics, organized political institutions, paired with their physical location residing within Florida, the largest battleground state within the US had often created a significant impact towards regional and presidential politics.<sup>72</sup> This had given the exiled Cubans residing within Florida a powerful voice, that could not be ignored by any politicians. Wielding this influence, the result that followed was an ethnic policy cycle that had continuously reinforced the hawkish foreign policy demands supporting embargos and blocking transportation with Castro's Cuba. These policies have been primarily peddled by the original Cubans who had fled the revolution between 1959 and 1964 who feared that any association or dealings with Castro's government would legitimize the dictator's authority.<sup>73</sup> This had been the status quo of the Cuban vote within the swing state of Florida, until the 2008 presidential elections, when Democratic presidential candidate, Barack Obama had won over 38% of the total Floridian Cuban votes (which had not happened since the 1976 elections with Jimmy Carter) and 51% of all Cuban Americans below the age of 45.<sup>74</sup> This trend among Cuban Americans would continue within the 2012 elections, Obama running for reelection would win 49% of all Cuban American votes.<sup>75</sup> A truly incredible shift in the Cuban American bloc voting which had promised to ease tensions with

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<sup>72</sup> Susan Eckstein, "The Personal Is Political: The Cuban Ethnic Electoral Policy Cycle," *Latin American Politics and Society* 51, no. 1 (2009): pp. 119-148, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2009.00042.x>, 125.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, 139.

<sup>74</sup> "Cuban American Opinions Concerning U.S. Policy Toward Cuba and the U.S. Election" (The Brookings Institution, 2008), [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/1202\\_cuba\\_poll.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/1202_cuba_poll.pdf), 1.

<sup>75</sup> Mark Hugo Lopez and Paul Taylor, "Latino Voters in the 2012 Election" (Pew Research Center, November 2012), <https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2012/11/07/latino-voters-in-the-2012-election/>

Cuba. This change in the American Cuban hardline policy had been due to the gradual generational divide developing within the Floridian Cuban community. As the US-born Cubans tended to be less interested in isolation tactics and more economically motivated and interested in maintaining relations with relatives and family on the island.<sup>76</sup> The shifting Cuban votes are also attributed to the larger Floridian Hispanic populations growing more diverse such as Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Mexicans, Columbians, etc. has been increasing at a rate outpacing the local Cuban population. These various ethnic groups mixing with the American Cuban Hispanics is significant because non-Cuban Hispanic votes are profusely democratic, which dilutes the electoral influence of the habitual anti-Castro Cuban American exile voters.<sup>77</sup> This slow shift in political party preference was predicted by scholars and it has allowed Obama to begin to alter diplomatic relations with the Cuban island nation only 90 miles away.

This change in opinion from a traditional hardline approach spearheaded by the original Cuban exiles has been witnessing continual trends of shifting positive perspectives toward Cuba. A Gallup poll presents data displaying that within the year 2014, 59% of Americans were in favor of reestablishing relations with Cuba, while a mere 30% had been opposed to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations.<sup>78</sup> With such

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<sup>76</sup> Susan Eckstein, "The Personal Is Political: The Cuban Ethnic Electoral Policy Cycle," *Latin American Politics and Society* 51, no. 1 (2009): pp. 119-148, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2009.00042.x>, 139-140.

<sup>77</sup> Chris Girard, Guillermo J. Grenier, and Hugh Gladwin, "Exile Politics and Republican Party Affiliation: The Case of Cuban Americans in Miami," *Social Science Quarterly* 93, no. 2 (March 2012): pp. 42-51, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2011.00544.x>, 54.

<sup>78</sup> Art Swift, "Americans' Opinion of Cuba Highest in Nearly 20 Years," Gallup (Gallup, Inc., February 19, 2015), <https://news.gallup.com/poll/181625/americans-opinion-cuba-highest-nearly-years.aspx>.



a positive public approval, initiating re-engagement with Cuba would not come as a risky endeavor for the Obama administration.

### c. Third Image – The international community and American unipolarism

To the Cuban locals, the notorious US embargo on the island is known as *el bloqueo* and the Cuban government frequently cites *el bloqueo* for the numerous economic dysfunctions modern Cuba faces.<sup>79</sup> With the American trade embargo in place for such an extended period, the greater international community had called upon America to end its outdated Cold-War era trade blockade with its island neighbor.

However, a combination of the global balance of power and historic events has made the process of altering *el bloqueo* a challenging task for American policymakers and politicians to alter.

During the Cold War, a period when the international global order was fractured into a multipolar system comprising both Soviet-led states and Western-led states; Cuba aligned with the Soviet bloc which promoted political objectives that eroded the sphere of influence the United States held over unaligned third-party states. This threat had manifested in Havana's support for Marxist guerrilla movements within Latin America, along with supplying training and aid to pro-Soviet socialist states within Africa. All of which had posed a significant threat to the security and interests of the United States.<sup>80</sup> The Cuban threat eventually came to a climax during the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961 and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. However, an unpredictable collapse of the Soviet

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<sup>79</sup> Nigel D. White, *The Cuban Embargo under International Law: El Bloqueo* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2016), 7.

<sup>80</sup> William M. LeoGrande, "Normalizing US—Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)* 91, no. 3 (May 2015): pp. 473-288, <https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/24539143>, 475.

Union had rapidly shifted world power dynamics and greatly reduced the presence of a Cuban threat and pushed America into a hegemonic position.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union starting in the autumn of 1989 had thrust a new world order upon the global community. The disbandment of the Soviet empire had ended the Cold War-era bipolar international system which had been the status quo for nearly 50 years.<sup>81</sup> The remaining result was an American lead unipolar global system. The collapse and the rise of American power unchallenged within the global system had solidified the marginalized state Cuba would be stuck within. Due to the discontinuation of Soviet military and economic assistance, the security threat that Cuba had once posed towards the United States diminished substantially. By 1996 the Cuban army had shrunk more than 80% with the total number of active troops had fallen from 300,000 to 49,000, with no ability to project force beyond the Cuban border. The only Cuban threat which had concerned the United States from 2000 onward was the worry of a migration crisis initiated by the turning of power from Fidel to Raúl Castro.<sup>82</sup>

Latin American countries, and the greater international community, had condemned the United States over its active policies and efforts to keep Cuba as a pariah state. These examples of international disapproval had been exhibited via Latin American states threatening to boycott the Organization of American States (OAS)

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<sup>81</sup>Joseph S. Nye, "What New World Order?," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 2 (1992): pp. 83-96, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20045126>, 84.

<sup>82</sup> William M. LeoGrande, "Normalizing US—Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)* 91, no. 3 (May 2015): pp. 473-288, <https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/24539143>, 475-476.

meetings, and also the United Nations continually voting for the US to change its isolationist policies towards Cuba. However, due to the American position as a hegemonic state within a unipolar global system, the international community was not willing to take significant actions that could have posed the risk of negatively damaging their own relations with the United States.<sup>83</sup>

Annually from November 24, 1992, the United Nations general assembly votes upon the US ending its embargo with Cuba, in which it has seen overwhelming support from the greater international community; citing that the US embargo is an infringement upon a state's entitlement to fair-trade and access to universal goods; a direct violation of UN and international law.<sup>84</sup> These negatives had been paired with several precise studies analyzing the repercussions of the United States trade restrictions towards Cuba. One of the most extensive reports by the American Association for World Health assessed the impact of the United States embargo on Cuba. The findings from the educational organization included the issues of blockage of life-saving medicine and food products, which produces an unnecessary increase in human suffering and deaths.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> William M. LeoGrande, "Normalizing US—Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)* 91, no. 3 (May 2015): pp. 473-288, <https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/24539143>, 481.

<sup>84</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, "Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of America against Cuba," *Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 26 October 2016* Seventy-first session (November 9, 2016): pp. 1-2, 1.

<sup>85</sup> "The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health & Nutrition in Cuba," *A Report from the American Association for World Health* Executive Summary (March 1997): pp. 1-39, <https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/upload/impact-of-us-embargo-on-health-nutrition-in-cuba-1997.pdf>, 6.

This international condemnation of the United States had continued for twenty-five consecutive years, and the majority of the United Nations members had voted in agreement to abolish the Cuban trade embargo. While in 2016, after Obama's significant progress toward reconciliation with Cuba, the United States abstained in the vote for the first time in the annual vote.<sup>86</sup> The reconciliation between the two states had produced progression out of the Western Hemisphere and manifested itself to the greater United Nations general assembly, a truly historic event. The efforts of the Obama administration had begun to be on display for the international community to witness, but there was still much more work to be completed on the path toward the normalization of relations. Other obstacles such as the trade embargo, which could not be lifted without congressional approval stand as a firm hurdle that cannot be amended without a significant uphill battle, contesting various laws and policies. This was due to previous President Bill Clinton signing the Helms-Burton bill in 1996 which had tightened the embargo while also preventing any future president from arbitrarily lifting the embargo, only congress yielded the power to abolish the embargo.<sup>87</sup>

Without a looming military or economic crisis, the US policy towards Cuba has remained, as local American policymakers tend to shy away from altering long-standing policies due to political and resource hurdles. In other words, the Cuban policy is not impacting the majority of the American public and Cuba does not possess

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<sup>86</sup> "US Abstains for First Time in Annual UN Vote on Ending Embargo against Cuba," UN News (United Nations, October 26, 2016), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/10/543832-us-abstains-first-time-annual-un-vote-ending-embargo-against-cuba>.

<sup>87</sup> William M. LeoGrande, "A Policy Long Past Its Expiration Date: US Economic Sanctions Against Cuba," *Social Research* 82, no. 4 (2015): pp. 939-966, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44282148>, 947.

much international authority within an American-led unipolar international system. This lack of significance both economically, and military create an unbalanced relationship, that favors American interests, which flounders whenever Cuba and American reunification opportunities arise.

## IV. COMPARISON

The peculiar cases of China and Cuba follow similar storylines, such as a coming to formation under the guidance of charismatic leaders using guerilla warfare tactics, to successfully establish their own revolutionary governments, while concurrently exiling their defeated opponents directly across an adjacent strait no more than 100 miles away from their original lands of origin. Which became contemporary Taiwan for China and the exiled Cuban population within Southern Florida for Cuba. Both became strong points of contention, often involving military personnel, and even occasionally presenting a threat of armed conflict. However, the two countries could not be more different in their relations with the United States. China, being home to such a large population coupled with its geopolitical stance had given the middle kingdom an enormous amount of leverage to court American diplomacy. While on the contrary, the Caribbean nation of Cuba was a dwarf compared to its Sinic and Soviet comrades and its location was isolated as the only communist state within the Western hemisphere. The normalization of Chinese relations with the US had enthralled each of the three before-mentioned images of American interests, therefore diplomatic establishment of relations was possible. Whereas Cuba lacked significance within the first and second images; individual and state influences, leading to the failure of the Cuban thaw, further extending the diplomatic quandary for another future presidential team to attempt to solve.

## **First Image Individual influences (Leaving Vietnam & Picking Cuba)**

President Nixon's time within office had been completely dominated by the Cold War and getting the American military out of Vietnam. To be a successful and well-favored president, Nixon had known that his decisions regarding these knotty subjects would dictate his success within the Oval Office and eventually, his chances of reelection for a second term in office. Aware of the challenge, Nixon had worked towards these goals by pushing engagement with China.

Despite being strongly opposed to communism, Nixon had embraced détente with China and had eagerly given the state numerous concessions in return for diplomatic relations. This was because China had acted as a cornerstone of the Nixon administration's foreign policy. By conversing with China, a key state within Asia, Nixon had opened opportunities to quell the Vietnam conflict, fracture and weaken both the Soviet Union and China, two intense communist competitors, and prolong a stable global order for years to come.

Nixon had known that through engagement with Beijing, Moscow would feel pressure to also engage with the United States. This dialogue would then create an influence for Hanoi to assume a more cooperative stance toward treaties with the United States to soothe the conflict within Indochina. Nixon had emphasized this importance in a 160-page congressional report stating: "The Chinese are a great and vital people who should not remain isolated from the international community. In the



long run, no stable and enduring international order is conceivable without the contribution of this nation of more than 700 million people.”<sup>88</sup> Nixon’s sincerity and intensity towards rapprochement were unprecedented which had been the reason for the successful reconciliation with the once bitter enemy. This diplomacy would eventually culminate with Nixon embarking on an eight-day trip to China, and the historical signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, which would act as the charter to the future of Sino-American diplomacy.

The triumph with his China affairs had allowed Nixon to become a favorable US president, who had greatly won over the public through his knowledge and successful application of foreign diplomacy. Motivated by first image influences, retaining his presidential position for another term, Nixon had acted accordingly and completed larger-than-life achievements as a US president and shaped history and global power dynamics. Unfortunately, as history knows, these diplomatic achievements would soon be overshadowed by the infamous Watergate scandal, but nonetheless, Nixon had reconciled with one of America's greatest rivals, China.

The first image of individual influence had been absent in the case of Cuba and the American re-establishment of diplomatic relations. This is because the whole situation presented itself as an opportunistic chance toward Obama. Within the memoir of Obama’s closest aid, Ben Rhodes recalls a situation shortly after Obama had been

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<sup>88</sup> Richard Nixon, “First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's,” The American Presidency Project (Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, February 18, 1970), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/240665>.

elected to serve a second term. In which the two had been reviewing a hefty briefing containing security concerns and diplomatic tasks that the president could pick at his own discretion when suddenly he halted on Cuba and mentioned: “Let’s see what we can do here, but we’ll have to get Alan Gross out of prison.”<sup>89</sup> President Obama eventually allowed Mr. Rhodes to lead the task of rekindling relations with Havana, leading to a slew of policy reforms and eventually climaxing with the historical Obama presidential trip to Cuba.

This notable moment in diplomacy was one that had shaped global history, but it was by all means, not an act of deliberate and methodical precision led by President Obama. Rather, the Cuban thaw happened to be one that was more reactionary, and opportunistic in nature. This is because at the time in early 2013 the White House had other security threats that required a greater deal of attention. Some can include the Iran nuclear deal, deescalating the war on terror, investing in the Benghazi attacks, and several extremist organizations comingling within Syria and announcing the emergence of a new caliphate, professed as the Islamic State.<sup>90</sup>

With the absence of first image influences, President Obama had attempted to change the decades-old, stagnated US-Cuban relationship, but without a significant personal gain or political advancement from the endeavor, the rapprochement efforts were not prioritized and invested within as greatly as other pressing security tasks at the time. The efforts toward Cuban rapprochement were more reactionary and

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<sup>89</sup> Ben Rhodes, *The World as It Is* (Random House UK, 2018), 186.

<sup>90</sup> “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* § (2015), pp. 1-29, 2.

lopsided, with Cuba gaining more from the rapprochement than the US received. This lack of individual influence, paired with an opportunistic chance to save Alan Gross had led to a situation of engagement without embracement.<sup>91</sup> Alan Gross's deteriorating health had been an element to initiate communication but lacking the necessary motivating factors from the perspective of the United States, the diplomacy failed to see normalization efforts fully develop.

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<sup>91</sup> See figure 3 in appendix, engagement without embracement.

## **Second Image (domestic turmoil & Cuban American population)**

The different state influences at the time of Nixon and Obama's tenure in the oval office could have not been more contrasting. Obama had improved the American economy from a severe financial crisis, health care legislation, and budget reforms while simultaneously working towards Cuban rapprochement within his second term in office. In comparison, during Nixon's time as president, he was faced with countless civil unrest movements such as Vietnam antiwar protests, the Civil Rights movement, and Women's Rights demonstrations. All giving rise to tumultuous domestic civil agitation. With so much unrest occurring within the United States, for President Nixon and Kissinger to conduct such groundbreaking détente with China and Russia is a notable achievement. The domestic pressure that had been applied to the Nixon administration had acted as the second image of analysis, state influence. Which was present and functioned as a factor to push normalization efforts with China. This reconciliation with China was a bid to find a way out of the Vietnam war which would ease domestic tensions within the United States.

The domestic turmoil that had arisen from the persistence of the unpopular war in Vietnam had taken many forms, but the biggest and most widespread form it had manifested was in antiwar protests and marches. These protests had started before Nixon had taken office in 1969 and persisted until after he had resigned as president in

1974. These antiwar protests would be later inflamed by Nixon's announcement of the US expanding military involvement in Cambodia and the Kent State shootings of unarmed university students.<sup>92</sup> With so much unrest it had become imperative for the Nixon administration to achieve ceasing conflict involving American soldiers within Indochina. Completing this task gracefully while saving face would prove to be a difficult obstacle. Along with fighting the Viet Cong, Nixon was dealing with a new enemy to the war in Vietnam, the American public at home protesting the fighting.

The antiwar protests held all around the US had not only acted as a method to display dissatisfaction with the Vietnam war; the protests also served as an educational vessel that had turned other people to oppose the war with dovish perspectives.<sup>93</sup> This had moved more people to partake in the ever-increasing peace protests. The ever-increasing death toll of young American soldiers and limited visual progress coupled over an extended amount of time had given rise to the Vietnam war becoming ever more unfavorable among the American public.<sup>94</sup> Creating an even larger ground for the dovish protesters to have their voices heard to bring an end to the war in Vietnam.

The growing pressure from the American public had stressed Nixon to adopt a strategy for honorably exiting Vietnam, the first war that the United States had lost. To complete this task, Nixon had turned toward, Hanoi's greatest ally, Beijing. Through

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<sup>92</sup> Amanda Miller, "Vietnam-Era Antiwar Protests - Timeline and Maps 1963-1975," Mapping American Social Movements (University of Washington, n.d.), [https://depts.washington.edu/moves/antiwar\\_map\\_protests.shtml](https://depts.washington.edu/moves/antiwar_map_protests.shtml).

<sup>93</sup> E. M. Schreiber, "Anti-War Demonstrations and American Public Opinion on the War in Vietnam," *The British Journal of Sociology* 27, no. 2 (1976): pp. 225-236, <https://doi.org/10.2307/590029>, 225.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid, 228

secret negotiations, the two would reach détente, which then had sped the process of Nixon completing peace dialogue with Hanoi.

Nixon's dynamic fast-paced diplomacy would not have been possible without the American public constantly pushing for peace domestically. Through public protests, Nixon had no option but to find a way out of the Vietnam war. These public protests had taken the form of the second lens of influence, it had been this pressure that had pushed Nixon towards engaging with China. Without the domestic public dissatisfaction, prompting Nixon to visit China, the state of diplomatic reconnection could have taken a very different form.

By directly engaging with Beijing, Nixon had contradicted his original objectives leading to a military presence within Vietnam. Which was to contain and seclude Chinese communist influence from seeping into Southeast Asia, but with Washington engaging in direct contact with Beijing, this had marginalized and overshadowed the Vietnam conflict within global affairs.<sup>95</sup> By overstepping Hanoi and negotiating a cooperative partnership directly with China, Vietnam's largest ally. Nixon knew that it would bring a hasty conclusion to the Paris Peace negotiations. China shifted its security interests from its Southern border during the Vietnam conflict to its Northern Soviet border to address growing Soviet aggression. The growing Soviet border concern had amassed more disquiet than the war in Indochina, therefore China had encouraged Hanoi to reach a peaceful agreement with the US in the Paris peace talks. Thereafter, the

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<sup>95</sup> Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 201.

US could support China by deterring Soviet aggression toward China.<sup>96</sup> This had displayed, China's willingness to sacrifice and limit its support towards North Vietnam to achieve her own security goals first

Whereas the Obama administration had less domestic political unrest regarding his Cuban policies during his time within the white house. The Obama administration had fewer state influences motivating the team towards sincere engagement with the Cuban government. When it comes to politics, the majority of politicians are aware of the notorious swing state, Florida, and its great number of Cuban exile voters. The majority of which carry hawkish views towards policies regarding the Castro-led communist state. This voting block had significantly dictated US foreign policy over the past 55-plus years and the span of 11 different US presidents holding office. During the 1960s & 1970s, the time the Cuban exiles had arrived in the United States, fleeing the Cuban revolution they had been welcomed by tumultuous civil unrest occurring domestically, such as Vietnam War protests, Women's Rights movements, and the Civil Rights movement. An environment that had encouraged the Cuban-born exiles to reflect and engage in limited rebellion their selves.<sup>97</sup> After forming a Cuban community within southern Florida, these exiles, once thought to be fleeing to the US temporarily, were soon here to stay, and during their period within the United States have witnessed plenty of scandals and flashpoint events which all have greatly impacted the Cuban communist government. The most consequential event was the collapse and dissolution

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid, 205

<sup>97</sup> Maria Cristina Garcia, "Hardliners v. 'Dialogueros': Cuban Exile Political Groups and United States--Cuba Policy," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 1998, pp. 3-28, 9.

of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, which was Cuba's greatest trading partner. This happening had numerous Cuban exiles and political observers assumed that communist Cuba would soon follow suit and crumble within the shadow of the Soviet Union.<sup>98</sup> Therefore the only logical thing to do was to double down on isolation efforts until the Castro regime had failed. However, this was not the case, the Castro government had remained in power for years to come.

During the Obama administration, political perspectives were shifting. and during the twenty-first century, the demographics of the Cuban voting population had started to change also. The connection between these changing political perspectives and the voting demographics can be traced to the second-generation Cubans, born, and raised within the United States. These younger voters take a more liberal perspective toward rapprochement with Cuba. They note desires to travel freely back to Cuba, without the unnecessary financial burden of inflated plane fares, visa expenses, and taxes that the strained US-Cuban relations have produced.<sup>99</sup> Their discord with the Cuban government is not engrained within the minds of the Cuban American youth, as the government did not purge and murder their peers like the first generation of Cuban exiles.

A growing approval from the Cuban American voting group to reengage dialogue with Cuba had conveniently brought the Obama administration to pick up the

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<sup>98</sup> Maria Cristina Garcia, "Hardliners v. 'Dialogueros': Cuban Exile Political Groups and United States--Cuba Policy," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 1998, pp. 3-28, 20.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid, 23.



task of establishing a line of diplomacy with Cuba. The attempts at dialogue with Cuba to quell hostilities between the two nations had been successful without giving rise to a great domestic uprising, therefore more progress could be made. During this time, the Obama administration had identified Cuba as a project that would not disturb a great majority of the American public or international order, therefore it was easy to act upon.

Symmes states within his narrative short: “It was not Cuba’s strength or power or strategic importance that brought the American president to Havana, but Cuba’s unimportance.”<sup>100</sup> This is a comment which can be seen through the analysis of previously presented historical events. Ben Rhodes, one of Obama’s closest security advisors confirms these statements by recalling an occurrence in which Obama and himself had been casually reviewing a briefing that had contained numerous global concerns at the time when suddenly Obama had paused upon reviewing Cuba and passively suggesting to engage with the island neighbor.<sup>101</sup> Agreeing to accept a challenge in such a casual setting had displayed the low level of concern that Obama held over the situation. This was because, at the time, other national interests had occupied the President’s attention at a greater rate, some being a war in Syria, health care reform, and mounting pressures toward economic recovery. Besides the Cuban American exiles residing in Florida, the topic of Cuba did not raise much concern

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<sup>100</sup> Patrick Symmes, *The Day Fidel Died: Cuba in the Age of Raúl, Obama, and the Rolling Stones* (New York, NY: Vintage, 2017), 24.

<sup>101</sup> Ben Rhodes, *The World as It Is* (Random House UK, 2018), 314.

toward the majority of modern Americans.<sup>102</sup> Therefore, Cuba was low-hanging fruit, which could be acted upon quickly and with minimal repercussions.

### **Third Image (triangular diplomacy & American Unipolarism)**

When comparing the third image, the greater international system, the influences almost imminently make themselves present. This is because the US, as a global leader, will naturally draw criticism from otherworldly states. This had been the exact case for both Nixon and Obama during their attempts to reach détente with China and Cuba. Within the case of Obama, the international community had taken the form of the UN participating members, condemning the American embargo cast upon Cuba and for an end to cold war era policies towards its island neighbor but not acting much further beyond these measures. For Nixon, the challenge had been steering global diplomacy within an era of extreme polarization, due to a rising socialist Soviet influence posing a threat to disturb the balance of the US-led global system. Both had acted within their means and have received different results from their actions.

For Obama the start of the third image; international state influences had been initiated well before his historic visit to Cuba. The state of American unipolarity started with the fall of the Soviet Union, which has cast influences upon American foreign policy decisions. The bedrock of American interests with Cuba lies within the desire to promote democracy while building a positive bilateral relationship proves to be an

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<sup>102</sup> Patrick Symmes, *The Day Fidel Died: Cuba in the Age of Raúl, Obama, and the Rolling Stones* (New York, NY: Vintage, 2017), 74-75.

ever-challenging and outdated endeavor. The lack of international and domestic pressures in conjunction with an American-led unipolar global order has stalled re-engagement with Cuba since 1959; the year Fidel Castro took power within the country. The American-led embargo upon Cuba along with the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, reinforced conservative policies toward Cuban sanctions and embargos. These actions took the executive authority to abolish Cuban embargo policies from the President of the United States and redirected it to the US congress. Therefore, according to US congress, the Cuban trade embargo could not be lifted unless the Cuban government successfully transitions to a democratic government that excluded the Castro brothers.<sup>103</sup> This bill had caused a great amount of criticism from US allies and within Cuba also, as the greater international community agreed upon the idea that the outdated Cuban embargo had limited the crucial supply of goods and medicines to the island of Cuba, exacerbating human suffering upon the island.<sup>104</sup> Global entities such as the European Union along with the United Nations had mentioned that the embargo infringes upon Cuban sovereign equality, and impedes their international affairs and freedom of international trade.<sup>105</sup> The United Nations assembly annually votes upon resolution 68/8, calling for America to lift the embargo; the 2014 report of the Secretary-General included calls to action directed to the US by nearly all United Nations

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<sup>103</sup> “Congress.gov,” Congress.gov § (1996), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/house-bill/927>.

<sup>104</sup> “The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health & Nutrition in Cuba,” *A Report from the American Association for World Health* Executive Summary (March 1997): pp. 1-39, <https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/upload/impact-of-us-embargo-on-health-nutrition-in-cuba-1997.pdf>, 6.

<sup>105</sup> Ralph J. Capio and Christopher J. Capio, “The United States-Cuba Relationship A Time for Change?,” *Air University*, n.d., <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles/cuba2.pdf>.

governments and bodies.<sup>106</sup> Such strong statements opposing the US embargo on Cuba can pose a strain between the US and other key allies and undermines American values which it constantly promotes, such as freedom and equality. International pressure for change had prompted President Obama to approach Cuban relations restoration differently than the presidents before him.

Obama's strategy in re-engagement had proved successful in the sense that the few years of engagement with Cuba had demonstrated to be far more fruitful than the decades of Cuban isolation policies promoted by previous US presidents. Responding to continual international state condemnation, the Obama administration had made unprecedented rapprochement toward the Castro government. Obama's achievements include lifting travel bans to Cuba, reopening an American embassy within Havana, and removing Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list while eroding trade limitations with the island.<sup>107</sup> The Cuban thaw had seemed to be making immense progress in pushing forward with achieving normality with America's oldest foe, Cuba. Obama's years of engagement and call for Congress to lift the Cuban embargo had not only been displayed to the global community in many ways. One historic form of expression was when the US envoy to the UN cast a vote in abstention towards

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<sup>106</sup> To see the original report please see: United Nations, General Assembly, "Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of America against Cuba," *Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 26 June 2014* Sixty-ninth session (June 26, 2014): pp. 1-148, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/446/11/PDF/N1444611.pdf?OpenElement>.

<sup>107</sup> Isabella Oliver and Mariakarla Nodarse Venancio, "Understanding the Failure of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba," Washington Office on Latin America (Washington Office on Latin America, February 4, 2022), <https://www.wola.org/analysis/understanding-failure-of-us-cuba-embargo/>.

resolution 68/8, calling for America to lift the Cuban embargo.<sup>108</sup> For the first time in the history of the vote upon this resolution, the United States abstained and did not vote in opposition to resolution 68/8. All this progress toward Cuban rapprochement had taken place within Obama's final years in office. The greater international state system encouraging the rapprochement of the United States and Cuba had proved to be an influential factor that had called the Obama administration into action. Through equal diplomatic efforts, the US, Cuba, and the greater global community had enjoyed a period of amity and peace despite decades of hostilities.

For the Nixon administration, the global community had been eclipsed by two socialist superpowers, the Soviet Union and China. The emergence of the Soviet-led international communist revolutions had threatened the global order of a world guided by American democratic leadership. To alter the situation for a more positive outcome on behalf of the United States, Nixon and Kissinger attempted to try a perilous idealistic diplomatic exercise, known as triangular diplomacy. It was a risky endeavor since most of Nixon's Soviet expert staff were concerned that strong US and Chinese relations would further sour US and Soviet relations as a side effect, but when rather the opposite had occurred.<sup>109</sup> Both communist superpowers Moscow and Beijing, had been driven

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<sup>108</sup> "US Abstains for First Time in Annual UN Vote on Ending Embargo against Cuba," UN News (United Nations, October 26, 2016), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/10/543832-us-abstains-first-time-annual-un-vote-ending-embargo-against-cuba>.

<sup>109</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperback, 2005), 730.

apart by contrasting assessments of Soviet governmental strategy, historical & cultural elements, and geopolitical concerns.<sup>110</sup>

Moscow had considered itself the center of the communist world because it had been the first state to revolutionize into a socialist government and had assisted other nations within eastern Europe to carry out their own revolutions. After becoming socialist states, the eastern European nations had typically become satellite states dependent upon Soviet aid and military. Therefore, in the eyes of Soviet leaders, it seemed natural that China should assume the same position, inferior and subordinate to Moscow leading the global socialist revolution.<sup>111</sup> Mao Zedong feared becoming like Yugoslavia and falling into Soviet orbit. From a cultural and historical perspective, Mao knew that the middle kingdom was an entity within Asia that knew no competitors and was second to none throughout history.<sup>112</sup> Therefore Mao Zedong knew his China could not play the role of a junior partner, thus the friction between Beijing and Moscow continued to escalate and tensions become increasingly public. This tension between Moscow and Beijing and their drifting concepts of socialism was a lush opportunity for Washington to intervene and inject its own political perspectives and suggestions.

Nixon and Kissinger had been terrified by the concept of a united Soviet and Chinese communist alliance, as the power of both states untied could upset the global equilibrium at the time. Therefore it was essential within American interests to act as a

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<sup>110</sup> For more detailed information regarding to the conditions China and other soviet satellite states that Moscow expected them to adhere to please see Sergius Yakobson, Pg. 194.

<sup>111</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2012), 162-163.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid*, 164.

wedge separating the two states from creating any sort of partnership to threaten America's place within the global order. After successful negotiations during Nixon's visit to China, the US and China had signed the Shanghai Communiqué which had agreed to jointly resist Soviet expansionism.<sup>113</sup> While directly after hearing such news, the Kremlin invited Nixon to Moscow, wasting no time Nixon would also make a state visit to Moscow to engage in dialogue with its most futile adversary, the Soviet Union. Who was also motivated to engage in communications with the US in fear of a Sino-American coalition.

Through the constant shifting of global power dynamics, Nixon and Kissinger had been able to play their own fears along with their adversaries' anxieties against one another. This triangular diplomacy had led to overall success for the United States by avoiding potential catastrophic conflict in the case of a combined Sino-Soviet quarrel against the US. China had also been a winner from the triangular diplomacy, it had survived the cold war, while the Soviet Union had collapsed. The Nixon administration's ability to identify the weakness of each state and exploit it for domestic interest was a type of diplomacy that changed global order and maintained American leadership within greater global politics for many more years to come. Which had been a massive motivating factor to the Nixon administration.

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<sup>113</sup> *President Nixon's Cold War Strategy* (Richard Nixon Foundation , 2019), [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=paw20Tyt3\\_U&ab\\_channel=RichardNixonFoundation](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=paw20Tyt3_U&ab_channel=RichardNixonFoundation).

## V. CONCLUSION

When analyzing the two paths that the United States embarked upon toward the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with pariah states China and Cuba; one can know that both have had severely contrasting contemporary relations with the United States, despite the two nations adhering to similar communist ideologies and authoritarian governmental regimes. This anomalous case of international relations raises the fundamental question, what exactly had made diplomatic normalization of U.S. and China relations successful, but failed to mend diplomatic relations with U.S. and Cuba relations?

To address this question, a tripartite theoretical lens, coined by Kenneth Waltz has been utilized to analyze historical influences and events in the relations between the US and China/Cuba diplomatic relations. Waltz's trilateral analytical theory from MSW



states that global politics can be condensed to three primary images: individual influences, state influences, and the global state system.<sup>114</sup> Using this framework, the answer to the before-mentioned research question presents the central thesis stating: *For a state to successfully establish diplomatic relations, each of the three motivating factors (individual, state, and international influences) are essential prerequisites for normalization success, if the three factors are present, diplomatic maneuvers will be deliberate, cognizant, and successful. In a case, if a state is lacking one or more of these influences, then normalization efforts will be reactionary, opportunistic, and unsuccessful.* This provides a clear answer for the occasion of the US normalization attempts with China and Cuba.

China had been a case that had successfully captured all of Waltz's three images of influence from the United States perspective: individual, state, and greater global state system. The first image had been Nixon's desire to be elected for a second term, which he assumed that opening China could increase his popularity as a president. The second image had been the American anti-Vietnam war domestic political turmoil, specifically the Kent State shootings, which had pushed Nixon to establish relations with China. Through Sino-American diplomacy, Nixon knew he could marginalize Hanoi and wield Beijing to pressure their North Vietnamese allies to accept and give concessions towards the Paris peace negotiations, ending the Vietnam war. Finally, the third image of the global state system had been Nixon and Kissinger's use of triangular diplomacy, by acting on the insecurities of the Soviet Union and the PRC to achieve

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<sup>114</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (Columbia University Press, 1959), 12.

détente with America's greatest adversary at the time, the Soviet Union. With the three fundamental interconnected, geopolitical influential lenses, the United States was able to successfully re-establish diplomatic relations with China. The three levels of influence had brought American diplomacy to act very methodically and intentionally to achieve positive diplomatic developments with China; despite being once considered each other's greatest enemies and even attacking one another within proxy conflicts on the Korean peninsula and within Indochina.

In the case of Cuba, the island neighbor state had failed to achieve satisfying the initial individual and state images but had successfully captured the global state system influences. This background had led to an opportunistic and sporadic attempt that had ultimately failed in normalizing relations with Cuba. The first image of the individual lens had been absent, as it was apparent when deciding to assume the task of reconnecting with Cuba, President Obama passed the assignment directly to Security Advisor, Ben Rhodes to spearhead. Ben then started with the opportunity of rescuing prisoner Alan Gross, while Obama had handled other time-sensitive national concerns. The second image, or state influences, had been identified as the Cuban American community within Florida. The Floridian Cuban community has been experiencing changing demographics, which is resulting in a less hawkish and a more dovish perspective towards Cuba. However, this change has been slow and is expected to further increase as the original pre-1980 Cuban exiles progressively become replaced by the more recent American-born Cuban populations within Florida. Eventually, this new generation of the Cuban American population could have the potential to change the

American policies toward Cuba, overturning the current status quo of conservative policies promoted by the original Cuban exiles. Finally, the third image of the greater international community had persistently and openly expressed its concerns about the unfair and inhumane restrictions that the US has cast over its tropical island neighbor. However, the unparalleled power of American influence had created a unipolar global system, in which other states would condemn US policies toward Cuba but would not engage in any act that could jeopardize relations with the United States.

The passive form of disapproval of American policies had come in the form of European Union condemnation along with an annual United Nations vote on resolution 68/8, calling for America to lift the Cuban embargo. The presence of the continual international influences combined with the emerging opportunities for engagement presented in the forms of Alan Gross's incarceration and the gradual shifting away from traditional hardline policies among the Floridian Cuban populations had culminated in a ripe opportunity for Obama to reengage diplomatic relations with Castro's Cuba. Acting differently from the Cuban hardline approach many presidents before him had implemented. However, since there had been an absence of extreme importance or threat, motivating economic factors for the successful reestablishment of Cuban American relations, and a US unipolar international system aided in the failure of the Cuban thaw. Ben Rhodes the staff in charge of the Cuba mission, even commented on the Obama administration's efforts towards Cuba as one of engagement with

embracement.<sup>115</sup> Cuba ultimately was an opportunistic diplomatic task, not one with extreme priority and purpose like Nixon's reestablishment of relations with China.

Due to the complexity of the selected topic and to prevent scope creep, the focus of research has been narrowed to comparing three salient historical events in the relations between the US and China/Cuba relations through Waltz's tripartite theoretical lens. It is an effective tool for analyzing nonetheless, limitations apply to the MSW three-pronged lens. Through the studies presented in this paper, the author realized that the MSW lens is a straightforward tool to view contemporary global politics, however, this analytical theory tends to overgeneralize state influential factors. Facets such as geography, technology, economy, and historical events all substantially impact the conduct of each state.<sup>116</sup> These factors are misfits, that are difficult to categorize within the three schemes of international politics proposed by Waltz. Future research could possibly add a fourth image to Waltz's theory, which can include the beforementioned outlier elements that are all ever-increasingly casting influences that impact global politics and international relations.

The future of diplomacy between Washington and Havana remains to be troubled and uncertain as the great reconciliation progress that was initiated by the Obama administration has been greatly reversed by the Trump administration. Current US President Joe Biden seems to be addressing other global security concerns rather than pursuing the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba. Experts on

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<sup>115</sup> Ben Rhodes, *The World as It Is* (Random House UK, 2018), 308.

<sup>116</sup> Hidemi Sukanami, "Understanding Man, the State, and War," *International Relations* 23, no. 3 (2009): pp. 372-388, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117809340486>, 382.

Cuban politics predict that the ball is within Washington's court, as it is highly unlikely that the current communist Cuban government, will lose authority within the near future. Having minimal political opposition and surviving the collapse of the Soviet Union twenty-two years ago only legitimizes the Castro government; as the dissolution of the Soviet Union would have been one of the largest threats to the Castro government's grip on authority.<sup>117</sup> It is most likely that Washington will keep its hardline approach toward Havana, in which the action holds the sole purpose of overthrowing the Cuban revolutionary government, and the establishment of a democratic governing society, acceptable to Washington's standards, which would bring Cuba back into the United States sphere of influence.<sup>118</sup> As Cuba is directly in opposition to succumbing to American dominance, the future relations between Havana and Washington will most likely remain strained for some time. Most likely until Cuba can fulfill the remaining images of individual and State influences of the United States, or the current American-led unipolar system shifts towards a multipolar state system which would pressure the US to change traditional hardline Cuban policies.


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<sup>117</sup> Gary Prevost, "The Obama Administration and Cuba: The Clinton Administration Revisited," *International Journal of Cuban Studies* 3, no. 4 (2011): pp. 311-327, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41945955>, 325.

<sup>118</sup> Gary Prevost, "The Obama Administration and Cuba: The Clinton Administration Revisited," *International Journal of Cuban Studies* 3, no. 4 (2011): pp. 311-327, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41945955>, 315.


## **VI. APPENDIX**

**Figure 1: 1972 US Presidential Election Map (Nixon & McGovern)**



Source: GISGeography.com

Figure 2: 2012 US Presidential Election Map (Obama & Romney)



Source: GISGeography.com



**Figure 3: Engaging without embracing**



Source: NPR

Link: <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/21/471337729/obama-and-castro-share-an-awkward-handshake-in-cuba-after-historic-meeting>

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## VIII. 국문초록

### 신중한 대화와 기회주의적인 대화 미국과 쿠바의 국교정상화 비교분석

본 논문은 미중과 미국-쿠바 국교 정상화를 분석한 질적 비교 사례 연구이다. 해당 연구는 케네스 월츠가 인간, 국가, 전쟁 (Man, the State, and War)에서 구분지은 세 가지 이미지(국제체제, 국내 체제, 개인)를 분석틀로 사용하여 미중관계 정상화의 성공의 미국-쿠바 관계 정상화 실패의 원인을 분석하였다. 연구결과는 만약 월츠가 언급한 세 가지 요소들이 두 국가들의 외교 관계 개선 노력 속에 존재한다면 국교 정상화 시도는 능동적이고, 치밀하며, 성공적일 것이라는 것을 보여준다. 반대로, 만약 두 국가가 외교 관계 복원을 위해 노력할 때 한 국가가 세 요소 중 하나 혹은 그 이상이 결여된 상태라면 관계 정상화를 위한 시도는 수동적이고, 기회주의적이며, 궁극적으로 성공하지 못 할 것이다. 연구의 전반부에서는 세 가지의 핵심 사건을 파악하여 해당 사건들이 닉슨 행정부가 역사적으로 적대자였던 중국과 성공적으로 외교 관계를 복원한 것에 미친 영향을 분석하였다. 또한 연구 후반부에서는 쿠바와 국교 정상화에 있어 수동적이고 기회주의적이었던 오바마 행정부의 접근법을 개인과 국내 영향력의 부재를 분석하였다.

주제어: 미·중 관계, 미국-쿠바 관계, 국교 정상화, 데탕트, 버락 오바마, 리처드 닉슨



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