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Master's Thesis of Sarah Elizabeth Mack

Waves of Democracy and Party System Novelty

Comparing First, Second, and Third Wave Democracies
Using the Sikk Index

민주화의 물결 및 정당체제 신규성

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Abstract

In this research project, the author examines the effect of democratization “wave” on post-democratization Party System Novelty (PSN) in fourteen first, second, and third-wave democracies. PSN is based on the Sikk Index, which considers changes in political parties’ leadership, candidates, and organization in addition to their proportion of seats or votes in the legislature, making it a potentially more accurate alternative to the Pedersen Index for pre- and post- Cold War democracies alike. The results of this study indicate that democratization does indeed exert a “tidal wave” effect on party system novelty when measured with the Sikk Index instead of the Pederson Index, and that second and third-wave democracies do not seem to differ significantly from first wave democracies in this regard. After the initial “shock wave” that democratization brings, the majority of the countries included in the study exhibited steady decreases in PSN after roughly four election cycles have passed. However, almost all of the countries included in the study experienced an increase in overall, leadership, and ideological party system novelty shortly after 2008, followed by a sharp decline. This trend was especially apparent among first- and second-wave democracies, and could be a reflection of the political system changes brought about by the Great Recession, the spread of social media and information warfare, and the overall increase in populist and illiberal rhetoric observed in the current era.

Keywords: *democratization, party systems, Pedersen Index, Sikk Index, Party system volatility, electoral volatility, waves of democracy*

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Chapter 1. Introduction

In this research project, the author examines the effect of democratization timing and pre-democratization institutions on post-democratization political party systems. To achieve this goal, the author calculated and analyzed Party System Novelty (PSN) for fourteen countries. The data indicates that democratization imposes a “tidal wave effect” on new democracies’ party systems, causing an initial sharp increase in novelty (ideological, leadership, or candidate change), but that this effect fades with times and is a common factor among all democracies – not just second and third-wave democracies, as many scholars have previously thought. The author also uses the case study of South Korea, the unique political history of which allows the author to examine party system novelty levels before and after democratization because the country held regular National Assembly elections despite being a de facto dictatorship. With the PSN data from the fourteen countries and the Korean case study data in hand, the author intends to conduct further research on nondemocratic parliamentary systems that later make the transition to democracy and examine the effect of presidential systems on leadership volatility levels.

Research Significance

The author believes that this research project contributes to the political science literature for the following reasons.

Firstly, this study posits an alternative to the Pedersen Index. This in and of itself is significant; the Pedersen Index has been viewed as the “gold standard” for measuring inter-election political change within countries for decades. The author’s

use of the Sikk Index on first, second, and third-wave democracies, while possibly imperfect, opens the door to further discussion of new methods of calculating the rate of political change within democracies. In the fast-changing post-Cold War era, these new methodologies could yield rich and granular data at the individual party level that could be used to observe worldwide trends.

Secondly, the Sikk index-based methodology used in this project makes possible the comparison of democracies whose party systems differ greatly from one another. Pedersen likely had first- and second-wave democracies located in Western Europe and the Anglosphere when he pioneered his now-nearly universal equation, but most democracies that exist in 2022 belong to the post-Cold War third wave. Political parties in this crop of democracies tend to behave differently than those from the first and second wave. These behavioral differences have great consequences for political science scholars attempting to calculate of Pedersen electoral volatility levels and often lead to very different results. If different scholars researching the same phenomenon continuously

Thirdly, the methodology used in this study does not merely look at the “symptom” of party system or electoral volatility, but is able to investigate its causes. By dividing overall party system novelty into subindices of leadership novelty, candidate novelty, and ideological novelty, the author is able to identify what is driving increases in the rate of party system change during particular election cycles and track how they change over time.

Fourthly, this study uses value-neutral language to describe the rate of change occurring within various democracies’ political party systems. While the word

“volatility” implies that something is out of control, unpredictable, scary, unstable, or chaotic, the word “novelty” simply describes a phenomenon as “new” or “different.”

Lastly, this study is the first that the author knows of which investigates party system change at such a granular level or over such a long period of time.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

Democratic Consolidation

Some academics use the more qualitative concept of “democratic consolidation” to assess and analyze new and established democracies instead of the more quantitative Pedersen Index. However, like the concepts of “party system institutionalization” and electoral volatility, attempts to define and operationalize democratic consolidation has provoked their fair share of debate.

The first debate concerns how to define democratic consolidation in the first place. Some researchers prefer to assess countries according to the “minimalist” definition, which stipulates that a country’s democracy is “consolidated” if it simply holds free and fair elections regularly.¹ The “maximalist” camp, on the other hand, holds that in addition to relatively interference-free elections, consolidated democracies must uphold specific standards of freedom of speech, press, and agreement about and adherence to the “rules” of democracy.²

Both schools of thought have their strengths and weaknesses; it is relatively easy to verify whether a country regularly holds free and fair elections, making the minimalist definition the simplest to operationalize and apply to data sets with a larger n size. Application of the maximalist definition requires a close inspection of the political systems of the countries at hand, making them ideal for case studies. However, every country contains infinite possible combinations of legislative and electoral systems, differing criteria for “appropriate” behavior, idiosyncrasies

¹ Heo, Uk, and Sung Deuk Hahm. "Political Culture and Democratic Consolidation in South Korea." *Asian Survey* 54, no. 5 (2014): 918–40.

² Ibid.

developed within unique political cultures, and historical context. This fact makes it difficult for researchers who prefer a maximalist approach to democratic consolidation to settle on a single set of criteria applicable to all political systems. Some scholars also use the “two turnover test” proposed by Scott Mainwaring to determine whether a country’s democracy has consolidated to the point that it is unlikely to backslide back into autocracy.

Regardless of how the concept is defined, many scholars believe that there is a strong relationship between the amount and quality of change within the political party system and the process of democratization. Some even go so far as to argue that party system institutionalization and democratic consolidation are “necessary, but not sufficient conditions” for the healthy functioning of democracy.³ Such bold statements further underline the importance of avoiding semantics and converging on a definition and operationalization of change within the party system so that scholars can apply them to make predictions and prescriptions that will positively impact the quality and quantity of democracy in the world.

Example: South Korea

South Korea is one example of a country where intra-party-system change’s lack of a universal definition and operationalization results in empirical discrepancy and diagnostic and prescriptive differences. Qualitative and quantitative evaluations of South Korean democratic consolidation – or the lack thereof – vary wildly from author to author. On the one hand, South Korea is frequently praised for its strong

³ Im, Hyug Baeg. Opportunities and Constraints to Democratic Consolidation in South Korea, 1996.

democracy, relatively high voter participation rates, and richly developed civil society.⁴ On the other hand, the unique nature of its political party system and the parties that comprise it lead researchers from around the world to come to different and sometimes even contradictory conclusions.

Academics from various parts of the globe calculate Korea's Pedersen Index of electoral volatility to evaluate and analyze South Korea's unique political party system. However, because South Korean political parties merge, split, change their names, disband, and reemerge with a frequency rarely seen in first and second-wave Western democracies, many authors arrive at very different Pedersen Index scores despite having access to the same data. This has serious implications for analyses of Korea's party system and often guides researchers towards very different conclusions.

In a 1996 evaluation of democratic consolidation and electoral volatility in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and South Korea, Jin Min Chung noted that Korea had "extraordinarily high" electoral volatility in terms of both vote (34.3) and seat shares (23.5).⁵ Chung points to remnants of old dictatorial regimes, weak institutions, the inability of nascent parties to represent the needs and perspectives of a newly democratized public, and lackluster performance by politicians as reasons for high Pedersen Index scores.⁶ Among the four new democracies, South Korea had the highest electoral volatility in terms of votes. This alleged instability is despite Korea's low effective number of parties, the high difficulty of entering the electoral

⁴ Chaibong Hahm, "South Korea's Miraculous Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 19:3 (2008), p. 129.

⁵ Chung, Jin Min. "ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION." *Asian Perspective* 20, no. 1 (1996): 130–131

⁶ Ibid,

market as a newly established Korean party, regionalist and clientelist parties that reduce the number of “swing” districts, and a limited ideological spectrum among parties that could wield meaningful legislative power – all of which are attributes typically associated with low levels of electoral volatility. Chung suggests that South Korea’s single-term presidential system, first-past-the-post voting system, and Henderson’s “politics of the vortex”⁷ may be the root of the personalism, clientelism, and regionalism that cause Korean parties to be simultaneously ideologically static and organizationally turbulent.

Chung also asserts that an “underdeveloped” civil society and weakly established ties between activists, interest groups and organizations, and political parties could prevent party systems in new democracies from fully taking root and facilitating democratic consolidation. However, in the case of South Korea, politicians associated with specific sets of political ideologies and movements have maintained formal and informal ties with nongovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, and ideological movements. For example, NGOs promoting the human rights of North Korean refugees in South Korea enjoy financial and political support from right-wing politicians and the conservative voting bloc due to the Korean right’s history of anti-communism. Meanwhile, Korean progressives have long been associated with feminist, pro-labor, and anti-WAR movements in the country. In other words, although the formal structures, names, banners, and colors that comprise political parties’ outward-facing façades may be short-lived, ties between the politicians and politics promoted by those parties and specific civil society

⁷ Henderson, Gregory., and Harvard University. Center for International Affairs. Korea, *the Politics of the Vortex* / Gregory Henderson., 1968.

organizations seem relatively robust. Additionally, Chung does not explain why low levels of electoral volatility as measured by the Pedersen Index and a “stable” party system are necessary for democratic consolidation in the first place.

In a 2014 examination of South Korea’s party system, Olli Hellman brings attention to the oxymoron seemingly posed by the fact that Korea’s relatively institutionalized party system is comprised of parties so ephemeral that they rarely appear in the same form in two consecutive general elections.⁸ He uses the case of South Korea to illustrate a trend that others had already observed in Latin American and other third-wave democracies; namely, that “[scholars] need to rethink the current practice of aggregating the different attributes of party system institutionalization into a single scale, as these attributes do not seem to be connected in a linear fashion.” Hellman argues that while the patterns of interparty competition in South Korea seem to have stabilized, the parties themselves remain beholden to personalism, regionalism, and clientelism.

Like the author of this study, Hellmann asserts that the dominant players within Korea’s party system have not changed much since Korea’s democratization in 1987 and therefore asserts that elite-driven changes in Korea’s party system should be excluded from Pedersen Index calculations of electoral volatility in the country.⁹ Unlike Hellman, the author of this study has chosen to calculate party leadership novelty as a part of overall party system novelty but separate it from

⁸ Hellmann, Olli. "Party System Institutionalization Without Parties: Evidence from Korea." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 14, no. 1 (2014): 53–84.

⁹ Hellmann, Olli. "Party System Institutionalization Without Parties: Evidence from Korea." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 14, no. 1 (2014): 61

other sources of party system novelty such as the ratio of new candidates, structures, and ideas.

Table 2A – Calculations of South Korean Electoral Volatility

Author	Pedersen Index
Jin Min Chung (1996) ¹⁰	Vote share volatility – 34.3 Seat share volatility – 23.5
Olli Hellmann (2014)	Including elite-driven changes – 76.3 ¹¹ Excluding elite-driven changes – 16.3 ¹²
Lago and Mariano (2020) ¹³	Endogenous volatility – ~10 ¹⁴ Exogenous volatility – ~14 ¹⁵
Mainwaring et al. (2017) ¹⁶	Total volatility – 36.6 ¹⁷ Within-system volatility – 9.9 ¹⁸ Extra-system volatility – 26.7 ¹⁹
Mainwaring and Zoco ²⁰	Total volatility – 24.6 ²¹

¹⁰ Chung, Jin Min. "Electoral Volatility in New Democracies and Democratic Consolidation." *Asian Perspective* 20, no. 1 (1996): 130–131

¹¹ Averages between 1992 and 2012.

¹² Because Hellman did not provide his raw data, the author had to approximate this data based on charts provided in his study.

¹³ Lago, Ignacio, and Mariano Torcal. "Electoral Coordination and Party System Institutionalization." *Party Politics* 26, no. 5 (2020): 570–80.

¹⁴ Lago, Ignacio, and Mariano Torcal. "Electoral Coordination and Party System Institutionalization." *Party Politics* 26, no. 5 (2020): 575

¹⁵ Korea and Bulgaria were the only two countries in a 66–country sample to have higher exogenous volatility scores than endogenous volatility scores.

¹⁶ Mainwaring, Scott, Carlos Gervasoni, and Annabella España–Najera. "Extra– and Within– system Electoral Volatility." *Party Politics* 23, no. 6 (2017): 626

¹⁷ Lower only than Bolivia, Namibia, Macedonia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia, Russia, Latvia, and Moldova

¹⁸ Higher only than Japan (8.6) and Taiwan (3.8) in Asia.

¹⁹ Lower only than Benin (41.8) and Ukraine (31.4).

²⁰ Mainwaring, Scott, and Edurne Zoco. "Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition." *Party Politics* 13, no. 2 (2007): 159

²¹ Average between 1988 and 2000.


While being one of the more extreme cases, South Korea is not the only country affected by wide discrepancies in analyses of democratic consolidation and party system institutionalization; many countries, especially those democratized during Mainwaring's so-called "third wave," suffer from similar levels of disagreement regarding their true levels of volatility. Therefore, to maintain the best aspects of each of these concepts while eliminating those that the author will combine qualitative and quantitative measures in her use of the Sikk Index to measure party system novelty (PSN), which she views as a more value-neutral and objective measure of changes within various countries' political party systems and facilitate more objective comparison between political systems that democratized during different periods.

"Waves" of Democratization and Electoral Volatility

In his 1991 book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Twentieth Century*, Samuel P. Huntington identifies three distinct "waves" of democratization.²² The first "slow wave" occurred throughout the 19th century, beginning in the modern-day United States and spreading to some countries in Western Europe. The second wave resulted from the collapse of fascist and illiberal regimes in the Axis Powers at the end of World War II. The third wave began in the mid-1970s with the democratization of Portugal and Spain, then spread to Latin America in the 1980s, Asia Pacific countries in the late 1980s, Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and continued until the late 1990s.

²² Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave : Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* / Samuel P. Huntington., 1991.

Figure 2B – Waves of Party System Volatility/Novelty



However, the author posits that democratization is not the only thing that takes place in waves. Domestic party system volatility (which the author refers to as “party system novelty,” in more value-neutral language) may also come in “waves” in the period after democratic transition. Democratization is like a submarine earthquake taking place in the middle of the ocean; when the built-up pressure is finally released and democratic transition occurs, waves (party system novelty) are triggered by the seismic shock released from the epicenter. As the waves travel across the ocean, they “decay” or decrease in size and frequency.²³ Land masses that are closest to the epicenter (countries that democratized recently) will be pummeled by huge tidal

²³ “Wave Energy, Decay and Direction,” Surflife, May 10, 2017, <https://www.surflife.com/surf-news/wave-energy-decay-direction/2445>.

waves, while land masses that are far away from the epicenter (countries that underwent democratic transition a long time ago) will experience smaller, more manageable, and more predictable waves.

Additionally, the author suspects that, much like tectonic plates, countries “drift” away from this epicenter with time. This means that although party politics and political party systems in new democracies might seem to be chaotic, unstable, weak, or have low levels of institutionalization, this is not necessarily because there is something fundamentally wrong with them; the country may be right on track for a nation in its current stage of democratization.

If true, this hypothesis could serve as a rebuttal to assertions that new democracies experience higher levels of electoral volatility due to cultural or historical factors that make them infertile soil to grow a strong, deeply institutionalized democracy. Finally, it would enable government officials and democracy activists in future democracies to anticipate and prepare for fluctuations in party system volatility in the post-democratization era, fortifying the budding democratization against illiberalism or extreme volatility before it can get uprooted. With this, political scientists could do away with the often Western-supremacist notion that some countries are just “better” at achieving and maintaining democracy for normative reasons and instead examine the reasons why a country’s party system volatility might increase or decrease regardless of the “wave” during which it underwent a democratic transition. By looking at the data in relative terms instead of chronological terms, it becomes easier to identify similarities between states that underwent a democratic transition instead of fixating on differences.

Chapter 3. Methodology

Explanation

There is a common perception among political scientists that newer democracies are “less consolidated,” have greater electoral volatility, and have overall less institutionalized party systems.²⁴ The Pedersen Index of electoral volatility is the most commonly-used proxy measure for these phenomena.²⁵ However, the Pedersen Index, having been created in the late 1970s to measure the overall amount of partisan change in the legislatures of countries that democratized in the 1940s or earlier, frequently produces inconsistent, contextually inaccurate, opaque measurements of party system novelty in newly democratized countries, which typically belong to the “third wave” of democratization.

For this reason, the author instead uses the Sikk Index to measure party system novelty among democratized countries. Using this new methodology, the author can capture a more accurate, granular, and consistent portrayal of party system change over time. With this new methodology, it becomes easier to identify similarities between countries that democratized during the same “wave,” demystify political party configurations in new democracies and increase the predictability of the changes that are likely to occur when a state democratizes.

²⁴ Randall, Vicky, and Lars Svåsand. "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies." *Party Politics* 8, no. 1 (2002): 5–29.

²⁵ Powell, Eleanor Neff, and Tucker, Joshua A. "Revisiting Electoral Volatility in Post-Communist Countries: New Data, New Results and New Approaches." *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2014): 123–47

Pedersen Index

Many political scientists see the Pedersen Index, which Morgens Pedersen initially proposed in 1979, as the “gold standard” for calculating electoral volatility in political science.²⁶ The Pedersen Index is the absolute value of the change in each party’s share of votes between two elections. Mathematically, the Pedersen Index is expressed as follows:²⁷

$$VT = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n |\Delta p_i|$$

Where Δp_i denotes *the increase or decrease of electoral support* between two elections expressed as a percentage of the vote and VT denotes *aggregate electoral volatility*.

The equation is elegant and straightforward. However, its usage and interpretation vary widely among scholars and schools of thought. Pedersen Index calculations of party systems in countries where “electoral discontinuity²⁸” is more frequent than more “established” democracies like the United States or Britain often produce different results. This could be because Pedersen designed his index to account for first and second-wave, predominantly Western European and Anglophone democracies. When Pedersen published his paper, only two third-wave democracies (Spain and Portugal) even existed, and neither of these countries had completed enough election cycles for researchers to apply the Pedersen Index in a meaningful

²⁶ OECD, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, CAF Development Bank of Latin America, European Commission. *Latin American Economic Outlook 2021 Working Together for a Better Recovery: Working Together for a Better Recovery*. OECD Publishing, 2021.

²⁷ Mogens N. Pedersen, excerpted from 'The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility', *European Journal of Political Research*, 7/1 (1979), 1–26. <https://janda.org/c24/Readings/Pedersen/Pedersen.htm>


²⁸ The merging, splitting, disintegration, and rebranding of electons between elections,

way. The world was not yet aware that the “third wave” of democracy had begun, so, naturally, Pedersen sought to create a measure he and other scholars could apply to the world that existed before him.

However, the third wave of democratization *did* occur, and scholars ultimately failed to converge upon an operationalization of the Pedersen Index that could be applied fairly to all shapes and sizes of democracy. This lack of consensus poses methodological problems for all democratic consolidation scholars but disproportionately affects those who wish to research and compare countries that democratized in the late 1970s and beyond.

To illustrate these discrepancies, let us imagine a fictional nation called Belgravia, which has a two-and-a-half party system comprised of three parties: the Red Party, the Blue Party, and the Green Party. In election t , these parties occupied 50%, 20%, and 30% of seats in the National Assembly, respectively. However, before election $t+1$, the Red Party and the Blue Party merged into the Purple Party and ultimately took 80% of national assembly seats in election $t+1$.

Figure 3A– Belgravian National Assembly Composition



Depending on whether a researcher takes a relaxed²⁹, strict³⁰, or inclusive³¹ approach to categorizing the relationship between the Red and Blue parties, the Pedersen Index measurement of party system volatility be as low as 10% or as high as 80% in the same election cycle.

Coding decisions to accommodate changes in the lists of parties included in national elections and National Assembly rosters become even more complicated in the case of partial party mergers, splits, and superficial changes like adjustments to party name, color, slogan, or symbols. Casal Bartoa et. al pointed this problem out in a 2017 article published in *Electoral Studies*, where they went so far as to say that using the Pedersen Index to measure electoral volatility can “mask as much as it

²⁹ See Mainwaring, España & Gervasoni and Tóka as described in the table on page 32.

³⁰ See Birch and Powell & Tucker on page 32.

³¹ See Bågenholm, Bakke, Bielsiak, Dassonerville & Hooghe, Gwiazdka, Lane & Ersson, Markowski, Sikk, and Tóka on page 32.

reveals.”³²

As is demonstrated in the tables on the following two pages, what may seem like minor differences in coding preferences can have a major impact on the final result of Pedersen Index equations. This lack of consistency erodes the consistency, credibility, and ultimately the predictive power of electoral volatility.

The Pedersen Index can be relatively simple to apply to political systems where mergers, splits, name changes and other changes in the party system are infrequent. However, just because Pedersen Index measurements of less dynamic party systems are simple and consistent does not mean that it provides an accurate or holistic measurement of changes within the party system. Because the Pedersen Index only incorporates changes in partisan seat or vote percentages, it fails to account for qualitative changes within and between the parties themselves. For example, Pedersen Index scores of the United States typically hover between two and five percent, meaning that the legislative bodies produced by one election are only marginally different from the legislative body that preceded it. This should reflect a reality where the United States’ party system and democratic consolidation have barely changed at all for decades. However, the years leading up to and following the 2016 election of Donald Trump have seen far more than a mere five percentage points of change; even between the 2012 and 2016 elections alone, the two major parties’ platforms on immigration, education, foreign policy, LGBTQ+ rights, healthcare, education, security and other issues have changed dramatically in response to the rapidly changing global environment, the spread of social media, and

³² Casal Bértoa, Fernando, Kevin Deegan–Krause, and Tim Haughton. "The Volatility of Volatility: Measuring Change in Party Vote Shares." *Electoral Studies* 50 (2017): pg. 142

the overall global trend towards right-wing populism observed all over the world in recent years. An alternative to the Pedersen Index that can account for ideological and other changes in addition to changes in the composition of the legislature is needed to provide a more accurate reflection of the reality of intra- and inter-party changes seen in recent years.






Table 3B – Method Choices of Authors in Pedersen Index Calculations³³

Author	Dealing with Size			Dealing with Change		
	Inclusion Standards and Method					
	Threshold for Inclusion	Threshold Inclusion Method	Excluded Data Method	How to determine successor in case of party split	How to determine predecessor in case of party merger	Categorization
Bågenholm	Election threshold	Individual points	Aggregated and linked other	Party of same name; if not, no successor	Sum of predecessors	Mixed method (Inclusive aggregation for predecessor, Relaxed linkage for successor)
Bakke	2%	Transitional pairs	Aggregated and linked other	Sum of successors	Sum of predecessors	Inclusive aggregation
Bielsiak	No	...	Aggregated and linked other	Sum of successors	Sum of predecessors	Inclusive aggregation
Birch	No	...	Aggregated and linked other	Party of same name; if not, no successor	Party of same name; if not, merger is new	Strict linkage
Dassonenville & Hooghe	1%	Individual points	Aggregated and linked other	Sum of successors	Sum of predecessors	Inclusive aggregation
Gwiazdka	No	...	None	Largest offspring party	Sum of predecessors	Mixed method (Inclusive aggregation for predecessor, Relaxed linkage for successor)
Lane & Ersson	No	...	Aggregated and linked other	Sum of successors	Sum of predecessors	Inclusive Aggregation
Mainwaring, España & Gervasoni	No	...	None	Party of same name; if not, largest offspring	Party of same name; if not, largest parent*	Relaxed linkage
Meleshevich	No	...	None	Author chooses successor	Author chooses predecessor	Mixed linkage (Relaxed linkage and Strict linkage)
Markowski	No	...	None	Sum of successors	Sum of predecessors	Inclusive aggregation
Powell & Tucker	2%	Individual points	Uncalculated	Party of same name; if not, no successor	All mergers new unless under 5%	Strict linkage
Sikk	No	...	Aggregated and linked other	Sum of successors	Sum of predecessors	Inclusive aggregation
Tóka (raw)	No	...	None	Party of same name; if not, largest offspring	Party of same name; if not, largest parent	Relaxed linkage
Tóka (adjusted)	No	...	None	Sum of successors	Sum of predecessors	Inclusive aggregation

*All authors use an inclusive aggregation approach for electoral coalitions except for Mainwaring, España and Gervasoni, who in this case adopt a relaxed linkage approach by using the largest predecessor party.

³³ Table reproduced from Casal Bértoa, Fernando, Kevin Deegan–Krause, and Tim Haughton. "The Volatility of Volatility: Measuring Change in Party Vote Shares." *Electoral Studies* 50 (2017) pg. 155

Table 3C – Pederson Index Sample Calculations

Total Merger	Statistics			Literalist		Biggest = Same		Proportional		Emph. Similarity	
	Name	Seat % t	Seat % t+1	math	vol	math	vol	math	vol	math	vol
	Red	50%	0%	$ 50\%-0\% /2$	25.0%	$ 50\%-80\% /2$	15%	$ 50\%-10\% /2$	20%	$ 70\%-80\% /2$	5%
	Blue	20%	0%	$ 20\%-0\% /2$	10.0%	$ 20\%-0\% /2$	10%	$ 20\%-10\% /2$	10%		
	Green	30%	20%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5.0%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%
	Purple	0%	80%	$ 0\%-80\% /2$	40.0%	$ 50\%-80\% /2$	15%	$ 70\%-80\% /2$	5%		
	Pederson	=	$v = \frac{\sum v_{pt} - v_{pt+1} }{2}$		80.0%		45%		40%		10%
Partial Merger	Statistics			Literalist		Biggest = Same		Proportional		Emph. Similarity	
	Name	Seat % t	Seat % t+1	math	vol	math	vol	math	vol	math	vol
	Red	50%	40%	$ 50\%-40\% /2$	5.0%	$ 50\%-40\% /2$	5%	$ 50\%-10\% /2$	20%	$ 70\%-70\% /2$	0%
	Blue	20%	10%	$ 20\%-10\% /2$	5.0%	$ 20\%-10\% /2$	5%	$ 20\%-10\% /2$	5%		
	Green	30%	20%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5.0%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%
	Purple	0%	20%	$ 0\%-20\% /2$	10.0%	$ 50\%-20\% /2$	15%	$ 0\%-20\% /2$	10%		5%
	Pederson	=	$v = \frac{\sum v_{pt} - v_{pt+1} }{2}$		25.0%		30%		40%		10%
Total Split	Statistics			Literalist		Biggest = Same		Proportional		Emph. Similarity	
	Name	Seat % t	Seat % t+1	math	vol	math	vol	math	vol	math	vol
	Red	50%	0%	$ 50\%-0\% /2$	25.0%	$ 50\%-0\% /2$	0.25	$ 50\%-50\% /2$	0%	$ 50\%-50\% /2$	0%
	Dark Red	0%	40%	$ 0\%-40\% /2$	20.0%	$ 50\%-40\% /2$	0.05	$ 50\%-40\% /2$	5%		
	Light red	0%	10%	$ 0\%-10\% /2$	5.0%	$ 50\%-10\% /2$	0.2	$ 50\%-10\% /2$	20%		
	Blue	20%	30%	$ 20\%-30\% /2$	5.0%	$ 20\%-30\% /2$	5.0%	$ 20\%-30\% /2$	5.0%	$ 20\%-30\% /2$	5.0%
	Green	30%	20%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5.0%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%
Pederson	=	$v = \frac{\sum v_{pt} - v_{pt+1} }{2}$		60.0%		55%		35%		10%	
Partial Split	Statistics			Literalist		Biggest = Same		Proportional		Emph. Similarity	
	Name	Seat % t	Seat % t+1	math	vol	math	vol	math	vol	math	vol
	Red	50%	30%	$ 50\%-30\% /2$	10.0%	$ 50\%-30\% /2$	0.1	$ 50\%-50\% /2$	0%	$ 50\%-50\% /2$	0%
	Dark Red	0%	5%	$ 0\%-5\% /2$	2.5%	$ 0\%-5\% /2$	0.025	$ 50\%-5\% /2$	23%		
	Light red	0%	15%	$ 0\%-15\% /2$	7.5%	$ 50\%-15\% /2$	0.175	$ 50\%-15\% /2$	18%		
	Blue	20%	30%	$ 20\%-30\% /2$	5.0%	$ 20\%-30\% /2$	0.05	$ 20\%-30\% /2$	5%	$ 20\%-30\% /2$	5.0%
	Green	30%	20%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5.0%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%
Pederson	=	$v = \frac{\sum v_{pt} - v_{pt+1} }{2}$		30.0%		40%		50%		10%	
Party Name Change	Statistics			Literalist		Biggest = Same		Proportional		Emph. Similarity	
	Name	Seat % t	Seat % t+1	math	vol	math	vol	math	vol	math	vol
	Red	50%	0%	$ 50\%-0\% /2$	25.0%	$ 50\%-0\% /2$	0.25	$ 50\%-40\% /2$	5%	$ 50\%-40\% /2$	5%
	"Purple"	0%	40%	$ 0\%-40\% /2$	20.0%	$ 50\%-40\% /2$	0.05	$ 50\%-40\% /2$	5%		
	Blue	20%	30%	$ 20\%-30\% /2$	5.0%	$ 20\%-30\% /2$	0.05	$ 20\%-30\% /2$	5.0%	$ 20\%-30\% /2$	5.0%
	Green	30%	30%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	0.0%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%	$ 30\%-30\% /2$	0%	$ 30\%-20\% /2$	5%
	Pederson	=	$v = \frac{\sum v_{pt} - v_{pt+1} }{2}$		50.0%		40%		15%		15%

Sikk Index

In 2019, Allen Sikk et al. presented a paper that outlined a method of calculating party system volatility (which he instead phrased as the inverse of “party system congruence”) which mitigated some of the inconsistencies exhibited in Pedersen Index calculations for third-wave democracies.³⁴ The paper used the index to make more accurate party system volatility calculations for parties such as Israel’s Kadima Party, the People’s Party in Denmark, the Pro- Patria and Res Publica merger in Estonia, and the dissolution of an electoral coalition in Poland. However, the Sikk Index can be used for first-wave and third-wave democracies alike. Sikk’s original party system congruency index ranges from 0 (zero congruence, or perfect volatility) to 1 (100% congruence, or no volatility), but the method used for calculating it is more complicated. The Sikk Index can be expressed mathematically as follows:

$$SC_{t,t+1} = \left(\frac{OC_{t,t+1} + LC_{t,t+1} + CC_{t,t+1}}{3} \right)$$

Where *System Congruence (SC)* is equal to the mean of *Organizational Congruence (OC)*, *Leadership Congruence (LC)* and *Candidate Congruence (CC)* between elections t and t+ 1.³⁵

³⁴ Sikk, Allan. "How Unstable? Volatility and the Genuinely New Parties in Eastern Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 44, no. 3 (2005): 391–412.

³⁵ Barnea, Shlomit, and Gideon Rahat. "“Out with the Old, in with the “new””: What Constitutes a New Party?" *Party Politics* 17, no. 3 (2011) p. 306

Leadership Congruence (LC) measures total party leadership congruence between elections t and $t+1$ as a proportion of each party's share of national assembly seats. When calculating LC, researchers examine the official leaders of each party during election t and election $t+1$ and give them a score of 0, which would indicate that the party leader in election $t+1$ had no previous political experience, and 1, which would indicate that the party leader in elections t and $t+1$ were the same person. After calculating leadership congruence for each party, the researcher measures the sum of leadership congruence proportional to each party's national assembly seat percentage to calculate the total LC for that election pair. LC can be expressed mathematically as follows:

$$LC_{t,t+1} = \sum \Delta LC_{t,t+1}^{PA}, \Delta LC_{t,t+1}^{PB} \dots$$

Table 3D – Party Leadership Novelty Index

<i>t+1</i> Party Leader's Occupation in election <i>t</i>	Congruence
Party Leader (the same individual is party leader in both elections <i>t</i> and <i>t+1</i>)	1
Party Leader in election <i>t-1</i> or before (the same individual is party leader in nonconsecutive elections)	0.9
High-ranking party member (deputy, vice, or co-leader)	0.8
Non-elected high-ranking party member (appointed minister, chief of staff, etc.) or regular PM	0.6
Mid-rank party member (local politician)	0.4
Full-time political activist or promoter	0.2
Non-political job (businessman, teacher, farmer)	0

The table above can be used to score how “new” a party leader is when there is a change in the upper ranks of a political party.

Candidate Congruence (CC) measures the sum of candidate congruence between elections t and $t+1$ as a proportion of each party’s share of national assembly seats. Researchers can measure this by calculating the percentage of National Assembly members from each party elected during election t reelected in election $t+1$. CC can be mathematically expressed as follows:

$$CC_{t,t+1} = \sum \left[\frac{1}{Electees_t^A - Electees_{t+1}^A} \right], \left[\frac{1}{Electees_t^B - Electees_{t+1}^B} \right] \dots$$

The percentage of new and incumbent candidates can be calculated by obtaining a list of all the legislatures that participated in a particular legislative assembly as well as their corresponding political party. Then, the researcher can use Excel or another spreadsheet software to check whether each parliament member was also a member of the assembly that came before it. Candidates that were reelected to the legislature during election $t+1$ are designated with a “1,” while those who are new to the assembly or who are not participating in a second consecutive legislative assembly are marked with a “0.” The sum of the number of incumbent legislators marked “1” divided by the total number of seats in the legislative body is equivalent to the candidate congruence index.

This methodology can be used for individual political parties, for political parties belonging to the same ideological family, or for entire legislative assemblies.

Table 3E – Leadership Novelty Calculation Example

Election Data

Election t			Election t+ 1			Change
Party	Leader	Seat %	Party	Leader	Seat %	New?
Red Party	Gary Proctor	44%	Red Party	Gary Proctor	36%	No
Blue Party	Ethen Baird	32%	Blue Party	Mattie Glenn	40%	Yes
Green Party	Jimena Merritt	16%	Green Party	Jimena Merritt	16%	No
Independent	N/A	8%	Independent	N/A	8%	No

Example 1 – Totally Novel Leader

Party	Leader (t+ 1)	Occupation before Election t+ 1	Novelty	Prop. LN
Red Party	Gary Proctor	Red Party Leader	0	0
Blue Party	Mattie Glenn	Bartender	1	0.4
Green Party	Jimena Merritt	Green Party Leader	0	0
			Total	40%

Example 2 – Mostly Novel Leader

Party	Leader (t+ 1)	Occupation before Election t+ 1	Novelty	Prop. LN
Red Party	Gary Proctor	Red Party Leader	0	0
Blue Party	Mattie Glenn	Blue Party-Aligned Activist	0.75	0.3
Green Party	Jimena Merritt	Green Party Leader	0	0
			Total	30%

Example 3 – Partially Novel Leader

Party	Leader (t+ 1)	Occupation before Election t+ 1	Novelty	Prop. LN
Red Party	Gary Proctor	Red Party Leader	0	0
Blue Party	Mattie Glenn	Blue Party-Aligned Mayor	0.5	0.2
Green Party	Jimena Merritt	Green Party Leader	0	0
			Total	20%

Example 4 – Marginally Novel Leader

Party	Leader (t+ 1)	Occupation before Election t+ 1	Novelty	Prop. LN
Red Party	Gary Proctor	Red Party Leader	0	0
Blue Party	Mattie Glenn	Blue Party Senator	0.25	0.1
Green Party	Jimena Merritt	Green Party Leader	0	0
			Total	10%

Table 3F – Candidate Novelty Calculation Example

	Election t		Election $t+1$		Change
	Party	Electee ³⁶	Party	Electee	New?
1	Red Party	Gary Proctor	Red Party	Gary Proctor	No
2	Red Party	Ty Cowan	Red Party	Ty Cowan	No
3	Red Party	Darnell Hooper	Red Party	Darnell Hooper	No
4	Red Party	Yosef Hoover	Red Party	Mayra Meza	No
5	Red Party	Vaughn Blevins	Red Party	Noe Carpenter	No
6	Red Party	Destinee Preston	Red Party	Titus Willis	No
7	Red Party	Mayra Meza	Red Party	Mayra Meza	No
8	Red Party	Haylee Huber	Red Party	Brody Camacho	No
9	Red Party	Noe Carpenter	Red Party	Riley Murillo	Yes
10	Red Party	Titus Willis	Blue Party	Mattie Glenn	Yes
11	Red Party	Brody Camacho	Blue Party	Sonia Andersen	Yes
12	Blue Party	Ethen Baird	Blue Party	Ethen Baird	No
13	Blue Party	Jadyn Santana	Blue Party	Frederick Finley	No
14	Blue Party	Frederick Finley	Blue Party	Paul McGregor	Yes
15	Blue Party	Gunner McMahon	Blue Party	Leon Cannon	No
16	Blue Party	Yael McLaughlin	Blue Party	Kyler Carney	No
17	Blue Party	Leon Cannon	Blue Party	Leon Cannon	No
18	Blue Party	Nick Alvarado	Blue Party	Elvis Hodges	Yes
19	Blue Party	Kyler Carney	Blue Party	Keith Preston	Yes
20	Green Party	Jimena Merritt	Green Party	Jimena Merritt	No
21	Green Party	Myles Knapp	Green Party	Myles Knapp	No
22	Green Party	Caleb Burns	Green Party	Caleb Burns	No
23	Green Party	Jewel Richard	Green Party	Gabriel Schmitt	Yes
24	Independent	Carson Meadows	Independent	Carson Meadows	No
25	Independent	Desiree Everett	Independent	Desiree Everett	No

Seat Percentages, Election t		Seat Percentages, Election $t+1$	
Red Party	44%	Red Party	36%
Blue Party	32%	Blue Party	40%
Green Party	16%	Green Party	16%
Independent	8%	Independent	8%

CN for each party, Election $t+1$		Proportional CN, Election $t+1$ ³⁷	
Red Party	11%	Red Party	4%
Blue Party	50%	Blue Party	20%
Green Party	25%	Green Party	4%
Independent	0%	Independent	0%
		Total	28%

³⁶ Electee names generated randomly at “Random Name Generator — Generated Full Names,” Random Lists, 2022, <https://www.randomlists.com/random-names>.

³⁷ Calculated by multiplying the Candidate Novelty for each party by its seat percentage after Election $t+1$.

Organizational Congruence (OC) measures the organizational similarity between elections in elections t and $t+1$. This includes things like party name, party symbol, party ideology, and position on the right-left conservative-to-progressive spectrum.

Organizational Congruence can be expressed mathematically as follows:

$$OC_{t,t+1} = \frac{\sum \Delta NC_{t,t+1}^{PA}, \Delta NC_{t,t+1}^{PB} \dots}{2} + \frac{\sum \Delta KC_{t,t+1}^{PA}, \Delta KC_{t,t+1}^{PB} \dots}{2}$$

Due a lack of available data, the author only used ideology data from the ParlGov database that scored parties on a scale of one to ten on ideological position (with a score of 1 designating “extreme leftist” parties such as a Leninist Communist Party and a score of 10 denoting “extreme rightist” parties), economic policy (with a score of 1 denoting maximum state control of the economy and a score of 10 describing perfectly free market economics), and degree of government control over citizens (with a score of 1 being attributed to parties that promote maximum liberty and free will and a score of 10 being awarded to maximalist authoritarian or totalitarian parties).

To facilitate a more straightforward analysis of the data (so that an increase in the index corresponds with an increase in party system novelty), the author took the inverse of Sikk’s original party system congruence index and refer to it as the *party system novelty index*, the Sikk Index, or PSN.

The Sikk Index is more accurate because it accounts for changes in the things that comprise a political party’s identity, such as ideology, leadership, brand image, and career politicians instead of merely identifying a party’s vote shares. The Sikk Index is

suitable for application to political party systems in (mostly second and third-wave) democracies, where the political party system is constantly evolving to respond to political scandals and changes in voter preferences. It is also applicable to first-wave democracies such as the United States, where the political party system has been comprised of the same two parties since the 1850s. By putting each party's organization, candidature, and leadership under the microscope, the Sikk Index can identify the homogeneity concealed by the constantly-shifting façade of many third-wave democracies' party systems and the heterogeneity masked by the rigidity of the United States' two-party system.

The author used the Sikk Index and its subindices to calculate the party system novelty index for general election years in the fourteen case countries. For countries with unicameral legislative systems, the author looked at data from the national assembly or its equivalent. The author used data from the lower house when examining countries with bicameral legislative systems. Then, the author plotted the time series data for all countries chronologically and analyzed the chart for trends corresponding to extraordinary historical events (such as the Arab Spring, the end of the Second World War, the French Revolution, etc.).

Chapter 4. Cases and Data

Definitions

Political scientists use a wide array of criteria to mark the year of a state's "democratization." These include drafting a constitution that guarantees voting rights to at least some citizens, universal male suffrage, universal suffrage, and the successful free election of a legislative body. However, the author used Polity5 data to determine the democratic transition years of the case studies included in this project.

The "Polity Score" is a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). If the score is maintained for at least five years, the author coded the first year that a country's Polity Score meets or exceeds a "6" which is maintained for at least five years as the year of democratic transition.

Democratic transitions (as well as transitions into autocracy or "anocracy"³⁸) that last for fewer than five years were not regarded as true democratic transitions for this study. Additionally, the author did not consider post-democratization states with Polity Scores that fall below a "6" but above a "2" to have fully transitioned out of democracy.

³⁸ Center for Systemic Peace, "PolityProject," Systemicpeace.org, 2017, <https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

Cases

The author collected data from the following countries for the study.³⁹

Table 4A – Selected Cases

First Wave		Second Wave		Third Wave	
Country	Transition	Country	Transition	Country	Transition
Ireland	1919	Malta	1962	Spain	1976
Norway	1883	Israel	1949	Taiwan	1987
US	1865	Austria	1945	Romania	1990
Australia	1901	Germany	1949	Namibia	1989
		Japan	1946	South Korea	1987

The author retrieved data about these countries from the digital archives of the ParlGov project, described by its creators as a “data infrastructure for political science.” The dataset she selected contains the results of all EU and most OECD parliamentary elections (37 countries) since 1901 – approximately 1700 parties, 1000 elections (9400 results), and 1600 cabinets (3900 parties).⁴⁰

She ultimately narrowed down the dataset to the fourteen countries above because they had complete data going back to the date of democratization, making them

³⁹ Döring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2021. Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies. Development version. https://www.parlgov.org/data/parlgov-development_csv-utf-8/view_election.csv

⁴⁰ “ParlGov Project – ParlGov Website,” ParlGov.org, 2021, <https://www.parlgov.org/about/>.

more suitable for assessing the impact of institution types and democratization timing on electoral volatility in both the short and long term. The fourteen countries above also have official databases providing biographical data of historical legislatures going back to or before the point of democratization. Obtaining such lists was surprisingly difficult for many countries such as South Africa, Argentina, Mexico, Canada, the United Kingdom, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which the author originally intended to include in this study. High-quality partisan ideology data for non-OECD countries was also difficult to obtain, and the author acknowledges that the selection of case studies used for this project may have had some impact on the results.

Some countries have held or currently hold parliamentary “elections” despite a lack of democracy. South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and several other third-wave democracies before the late 1980s are apt examples. While the author has plans to examine these and other countries where authoritarianism and parliamentarism are comingled, that is beyond the scope of this study. For this reason, the author limited the Pedersen Index data into the project to period after year “D,” or the year of democratic transition with the exception of South Korea, which she describes in detail in later sections of this paper.

Data

To calculate party leadership novelty, the author scraped the Wikipedia pages of

lower house legislatures within the case countries before and after democratization.⁴¹

Using the links to the Wikipedia pages of the party leaders captured by the scraping software, the identified the occupation of each party leader before he or she began their campaign for office. If the party leader was a complete political outsider prior to their campaign, the party's leadership novelty will be logged as 1 (perfect novelty). If the party leader remains the same from one election to the next, the party's leadership novelty will be logged as 0 (perfect congruence).

The author also coded the cases that fall in between. For instance, if the new party leader was previously the a) second-in-command in their party, b) an elected member of parliament, c) an appointed minister, or d) a local politician or full-time activist, their party leadership novelty scores would be logged as 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, respectively. In cases where the same individual was appointed as party leader more than once in nonconsecutive elections, the author coded party leadership novelty as 0.1.

To calculate candidate novelty, the author scraped lists of legislator names from each country's respective national assembly website. Then, the calculated the percentage of reelected candidates from each party, which she used as the party's candidate novelty score.

The author used the ParlGov parliaments and governments database's dataset on party name change to track parties' ideological shifts over time and convert them into

⁴¹ "WebHarvy Web Scraper – Easy-To-Use Web Scraping Tool," WebHarvy, 2021, <https://www.webharvy.com/>.

percentages.⁴² The mean of “left-right,” “state-market,” and “liberty-authority” scores were be used to represent overall party ideological novelty. She then used Polity5 data to determine the democratization year of countries included in the study.⁴³

After obtaining all the relevant data, the author created a pivot table mapping the results of every parliamentary election that has taken place in the fourteen countries since 1901. Using a numerical party identifier unique to each party in each country, she then calculated the difference between the performance of each political party in elections t and $t+1$. After dividing the sum of each election’s party-level electoral volatility by two, she widened the dataset, normalized the data around the year of democratic transition, and plotted several time series scatterplots.

⁴² 2020. Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) Dataset V1. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vpartydsv1>

⁴³ Center for Systemic Peace, “PolityProject,” Systemicpeace.org, 2017, <https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

Chapter 5. Hypotheses

The author uses the logic of the “tidal wave” model of democratic party system novelty to propose the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 – Chronological Effect of Democratization

H1: “Third wave” democracies will exhibit higher levels of overall party system novelty than second and first-wave democracies during the same chronological year.

Third-wave democracies necessarily undergo democratic transition later in time than first- and second-wave democracies. Therefore, following the “continental drift” hypothesis posited earlier in this proposal, third-wave democracies will always be closer to the “epicenter” of the democratization “earthquake” and will also experience more significant “aftershocks,” here measured as levels of party system novelty. Likewise, because more time has elapsed since first- and second-wave democracies’ democratic transitions, the countries’ political systems will have had more time to distance themselves from the initial shocks caused by democratization.

This will result in lower levels and narrower ranges of party system volatility.

This would also mean that the party systems of future democracies which undergo transition as part of a “fourth wave” of democratization would experience higher levels of party system volatility than countries which democratized in the third, second, or first democratization waves. This hypothesis is currently beyond the scope of this study but could be tested if and when future waves of democratization take place.

Hypothesis 2 – Tidal Wave Effect

H2A: Party systems will exhibit higher levels of overall novelty in the post-democratization period than in the pre-democratization and long-term post-democratization period.

Nondemocratic regimes tend to go to great efforts to resist change. Such efforts include banning specific figures or political parties from participating in elections, restricting freedom of expression, clamping down on protests, and falsifying election results.⁴⁴ Party system change under nondemocratic regimes tends to be sporadic, intense, and infrequent, prompted by sudden and often violent transfers of power such as coup d'états and civil war. The years between coups tend to have extremely low levels of party system volatility due to the leader's efforts to keep himself in power.⁴⁵

When the dam breaks and genuine democratic transition finally floods a country for the first time, sweeping changes to oust the former dictator and his cronies, usher in individuals and institutions that represent and protect previously persecuted groups, and construct institutions that facilitate liberal democracy. Previously banned politicians and parties are elected to office, dissent and dissatisfaction can be expressed freely, and elections are operated fairly and transparently. In essence, the party system is suddenly restructured to match the electorate's previously repressed true wishes more closely.

⁴⁴ Nondemocratic regimes can and do hold elections, although these elections may not be of the "free and fair" variety required from true democracies. Modern examples include Russia under Vladimir Putin, North Korea under the Kim regime, and Egypt under Mubarak.

⁴⁵ Nearly all nonmonarchical nondemocratic heads of state have been male, with rare exceptions such as Indira Ghandi of India, although this is also disputed.

However, all these phenomena are highly likely to result in a sudden increase in party system novelty as measured by the Sikk Index.

In addition, because democracy is necessarily always open to the possibility of change, overall party system novelty is likely to be higher in the post-democratization era. In moderation, this is not necessarily negative and does not always indicate “weak” or “under-institutionalized” party systems; increased levels of organizational party system novelty indicate the influx of new ideas that expand the menu of options available to the government as it responds to national-level issues.

H2B: Overall party system novelty will sharply increase in the short term, then slowly decrease as the temporal distance between democratization and the current election year increases.

The high levels of party system novelty predicted in H2A are unlikely to last indefinitely in truly democratic regimes. Sustained high levels of party system novelty could leave a country vulnerable to democratic backsliding or even collapse. This makes it unlikely even to remain eligible to remain in the sample selected for this study. Per the “continental drift” theory of party system consolidation, the overall slope of party system novelty will decrease as more time elapses in the post-democratization era.

H2C: Party systems will exhibit a narrower range of overall party system novelty (also known as “the volatility of volatility” as time passes post-democratization.

In addition to having lower “crests,” the waves of party system novelty will also

have higher “troughs.” Predictability of election results, legislature composition, and government policies will increase, and democratic consolidation will be strengthened. In short, the massive, unrelenting waves of party system novelty experienced in the early years of democratization will eventually “expire,” and the margin of error for party system novelty trends will become narrower.

Hypothesis 3 – Gradual vs. Simultaneous Granting of Universal Suffrage

H3: Countries that established democracy and universal suffrage simultaneously will exhibit higher levels of party system novelty than countries that granted universal suffrage in stages or after democratizing.

Many “first-wave” democracies did not grant universal suffrage from the beginning. The United States only granted *de jure* citizenship and voting rights to African American men in 1868 but failed to offer *de facto* suffrage for African Americans until the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. White male Britons who did not own property could not vote until the late 19th century. Switzerland, commonly regarded as one of the world’s most consolidated democracies, did not grant women the right to vote until 1971 – just two years before Portugal kicked off the “third wave” of democratization with the Carnation Revolution of 1974.

Instead of experiencing democratic transition as one big “earthquake,” these countries democratized through a series of intermittent, relatively gentle tremors which produced smaller waves of party system novelty than those experienced by countries that granted universal suffrage all at once. The author predicts that countries where the


years during which female suffrage, ethnic suffrage, and universal suffrage differ are different are likely to experience smaller waves of party system novelty. In addition, the author predicts that countries with more significant gaps between the years that constitutional suffrage and universal suffrage were guaranteed will have lower overall levels and ranges of party system novelty.

In countries where suffrage for those belonging to certain groups (women, ethnic minorities, the unlanded, etc.) had to be granted through the votes of people who did not belong to those groups, voting blocs based on attributes like gender and class are less likely to form; because biting the hand ultimately held power to grant or withhold the right to vote would be antithetical to their goal of achieving suffrage, women, minorities, and the working class have no choice but to form alliances with political parties that might not best represent their individual interests.

Chapter 6. Results

The author calculated the following results using the methodology and data described in chapters 3 and 4:

Figure 6A – Party System Novelty Scores (Overall)



Overall Findings

According to the time series results in Figure 6A, first wave democracies' levels of party system novelty tend to assume a downward slope. PSA levels drop as the temporal distance from democratization increases in almost all observed countries. The most considerable fluctuations in overall party system novelty levels tend to come from leadership changes, while ideology remains relatively stable and candidate novelty drops over time. Low levels of ideological novelty could be related to the logic explained in Hypothesis 3, which posits that countries where all citizens were granted access to suffrage simultaneously would experience greater overall PSN levels than countries where suffrage was granted to different segments of the population at different times. Three of the four first-wave democracies analyzed in this study follow this pattern, with Australia being the only exception. Other than the Australian party system's candidate novelty, all of the indicators in all four democracies assume a gradual downward slope in the long term, indicating that the logic of the "tidal wave" applies to the four democracies included in this study.

The second-wave democracies included in this study (Malta, Israel, Japan, Germany, and Austria) tend to experience relatively high ideological novelty in the period immediately following democratization. Germany, Japan, and Israel experienced exceptionally high ideological novelty during these periods, with PSIV measuring as high as 0.36, 0.35, and 0.54 during the first three election cycles, respectively. Austria appears to have low ideological novelty in the post-WW2 years, but this could be because this was not the first time the country democratized; before Nazi Germany

occupied Austria, it became a democracy in 1926. In Austria's 1927 election, ideological novelty measured 0.53, closer to the novelty levels experienced in Germany, Japan, and Israel. The exception among second-wave democracies appears to be Malta, which maintained low ideological novelty throughout its history; After the elections of 1962 and 1966, in which Malta experienced ideological novelty fluctuations of 0.12 and .09, respectively, PSIN drops to almost zero, never climbing above 5% until 2022

Because third-wave democracies, by definition, offer fewer election cycles, it can be difficult to extrapolate trends from the limited data available. Despite this, some trends are visible in the charts included in Figure 6A. Firstly, overall party system novelty levels remain relatively stable, hovering between 0.20 and 0.30 in all five cases. However, the sub-indicators that comprise overall party system novelty levels do not follow a consistent pattern. In contrast, candidate novelty seems to be the primary (if not sole) driver of party system novelty in Namibia, leadership changes appear to play a more prominent role in the party systems of third-wave democracies like Spain and Romania. Ideological novelty stays low, with Taiwan, Romania, and Namibia exhibiting lower levels of PSIN than their first- and second-wave counterparts. Ideological novelty for these countries hovers at or below 0.10, on par or even below that of countries like Ireland, Norway, and Japan, which democratized decades before Spain, Taiwan, Romania, and Namibia. South Korea is an outlier in this regard; its ideological novelty seems to increase over time rather than decrease. A corresponding decrease in leadership and candidate novelty results in a relatively flat overall party system time

series. The author investigates possible reasons for this in a case study in the last section of Chapter 7.

In nearly all of the countries included in the study, a slight uptick in overall party system novelty can be observed in the immediate aftermath of 2008. This change could be in response to the financial crisis observed worldwide during that era. Otherwise, it could also reflect changes in political preferences in the age of Web 2.0 and social media and the political-ideological shift to the right observed in democracies young and old throughout the world within the past decade.⁴⁶ The fact that overall party system novelty shifts are driven by changes in the included countries' national assemblies' ideology and leadership supports this observation. However, candidate novelty generally takes a downward turn in the post-2008 democracies included in this study, indicating that the candidates and parties are becoming more conservative in response to changes in voters' preferences. Worldwide crises like 2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic could introduce a large enough "shock" to the global political system that new "tidal waves" appear. These then drive increases in the rate of change within party systems. The author looks forward to reviewing election data that will become available within future decades to determine whether this trend continues.

⁴⁶ Lauren Kirschman, "Q&A: From the Philippines to the US, Analyzing a Global Political Shift to the Right," UW News, 2022, <https://www.washington.edu/news/2022/04/04/qa-from-the-philippines-to-the-us-analyzing-a-global-political-shift-to-the-right/>.

Reflections on Hypotheses

In this section, the author will revisit the hypotheses written earlier in the paper.

H1: “Third wave” democracies will exhibit higher levels of overall party system novelty than second and first-wave democracies during the same chronological year.

Third-wave democracies demonstrate higher levels of party system novelty than their first and second-wave counterparts for the first few election cycles. However, their overall novelty levels even out to become relatively comparable with the longer-established party systems. Candidate volatility levels (the percentage of legislators who are not reelectees) are generally higher in third-wave democracies, making up the bulk of the difference. In the early years after democratic transition, leadership and ideological novelty tend to comprise large proportions of third-wave democracies’ total party system volatility, but their predecessors also share this tendency. This phenomenon shows that first, second, and third-wave democracies’ party systems have more in common than is often observable with simplistic statistics like the Pedersen Index of electoral volatility. Because third-wave democracies have generally higher levels of candidate novelty, this tendency will show itself more prominently in Pedersen Index data. Meanwhile, the stabilization of attributes like a party system’s general ideological bent or leadership stability are not incorporated into the calculation. On the other hand, because first-wave democracies tend to have very low levels of candidate novelty (or high incumbent re-election rates), Pedersen Index calculations artificially

deflate the true amount of change occurring within the party system among party leadership or shifting policy and ideological positions.

In short, while Hypothesis 1 is correct, the impact of democratization wave is not as pronounced as expected.

H2A: Party systems will exhibit higher levels of overall novelty in the post-democratization period than in the pre-democratization and long-term post-democratization period.

Due to a lack of high-quality data, the author could only thoroughly investigate South Korea's party system novelty in the pre- and post-democratization eras. Further study on other nondemocratic legislative election systems is necessary before the first part of this hypothesis can be adequately addressed. However, H2A is correct in predicting that the period immediately following democratic transition will exhibit higher overall party system novelty than periods several election cycles later.

H2B: Overall party system novelty will sharply increase in the short term, then slowly decrease as the temporal distance between democratization and the current election year increases.

This trend was observed in countries from all three waves of democracy, but the sources of novelty differed between the waves. First-wave democracies tended to have high levels of candidate and leadership novelty in the early days after their democratization while exhibiting relatively low ideological novelty. Meanwhile, second and third-wave democracies tended to exhibit extremely high ideological volatility and

relatively lower leadership or candidate volatility in the elections immediately following democratization. These discrepancies may be due to the differing circumstances under which the three groups of countries democratized and the menu of ideological choices that were available at the time. Second-wave democracies like Germany, Israel, Austria, and Japan became democracies after perpetrating or becoming the victims of fascist regimes such as the Nazis or the Japanese Empire. Meanwhile, third-wave democracies predominantly underwent a democratic transition after the Cold War. They transformed from dictatorships propped up by the ideologically polarized Soviet Union or the United States into a free state where citizens could choose to elect legislators that would allow them to live in between the two worlds that the Iron Curtain had separated.

On the other hand, the first wave of democracies did not democratize all at once in response to the fallout of ultra-polarized global geopolitics like the second and third waves. Ireland, Norway, the United States, and Australia all democratized in response to domestic rather than international stimuli. While declaring independence or transitioning from a monarchy into a parliamentary democracy necessitated a change in personnel, it did not so much require the development of (or reaction to) national ideology or identity based on a recent existential crisis.


H2C: Party systems will exhibit a narrower range of overall party system novelty in the post-democratization era than in the pre-democratization era.

As can be examined in Figure B, the absolute value of year-on-year party system novelty levels tends to decrease with time. While a certain degree of party system novelty is to be expected (and even desired to prevent over-institutionalization or ideological stagnation, which can stymie legislators' ability to respond to the needs and wants of their citizens), the level of change that can be expected in a single election cycle tends to decrease with time. In other words, party system "instability" itself becomes more stable.

H3: Countries which established democracy and universal suffrage simultaneously will exhibit higher levels of party system novelty than countries that granted universal suffrage in stages or after democratizing.

This trend does seem to exist, but the data indicates that it only exists for ideological party system novelty. This could be because the narrower variety of genders, ethnicities, and socioeconomic backgrounds possessed by early voters in first-wave democracies have the chance to build the political and ideological infrastructure and set the political playing field before other groups can make their voices heard. When women, ethnic minorities, and economically disadvantaged citizens finally become enfranchised, they must vote within the parameters that were already set by the privileged class that exercised voting rights before them. Meanwhile, the wider variety of people permitted to participate in political life in second and third-wave democracies, where all citizens gained the right to vote simultaneously, allowed them to construct a more diverse ideological playing field to suit their needs and desires better.

Figure 6B – Rates of Change in Party System Novelty Scores



Chapter 7. Case-by-Case Analysis

According to the data presented in Figure A, it appears that the first wave democracies included in the dataset (Ireland, Norway, the United States, and Australia) exhibit the most distinct “tidal wave effects,” with overall novelty levels starting higher and following a general downward trend over time. However, the “tidal waves” manifest differently in each case.

First Wave Democracies

The United States exhibits the most pronounced “tidal wave effect” out of the entire dataset. The fact that the United States’ democratic election years go back the furthest (beginning in the aftermath of the Civil War, when universal male suffrage was granted with the passage of the 14th Amendment) and hold House of Representative elections every two years instead of every four or five may have contributed to this. Nevertheless, the period with the highest Party System Novelty overall indices and subindices appear during the Reconstruction and Jim Crow eras. This appears to be partially due to the illiberal policies of the then-antifederalist Democratic Party, which sought to limit the civil rights of non-whites in the Southern states.⁴⁷

Another spike in leadership and ideological volatility occurred between 1931 and 1943, bookending the eras of The Great Depression and the New Deal. During this time, President Franklin D. Roosevelt enacted unprecedented social welfare programs. These

⁴⁷ “Dixiecrat | Political Party, United States | Britannica,” in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dixiecrat>.

programs greatly increased the capacity of the state to impact individual citizens' lives and served an unprecedented four presidential terms in office. Until this point, most Black voters were loyal to the Republican Party, to which former Union president and Emancipation Proclamation issuer Abraham Lincoln had belonged.⁴⁸

However, growing numbers of African Americans began casting votes for the Democratic Party during and after the New Deal era.⁴⁹ The Dixie Democrats, who wished to maintain policies of segregation and discrimination against nonwhites in the Southern states, grew further and further from its Rooseveltian brother. Eventually, the Republican and Democratic parties essentially completely switched platforms, with the Republican Party emerging from World War II as the party of limited government and fiscal responsibility, while the Democratic party advocated increasing the reach of the state through welfare, housing, education, and other programs.⁵⁰

After the New Deal era, overall novelty and ideological novelty exhibits a steady downward trend. Leadership and ideology novelty remain almost completely stagnant throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. This period also happened to be the peak years of the Cold War, during which the United States had to shore up its ideological robustness and lean right to contrast itself with the Comintern based in the Soviet

⁴⁸ "Party Realignment and the New Deal | US House of Representatives: History, Art & Archives," @USHouseHistory, 2022, <https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Essays/Keeping-the-Faith/Party-Realignment--New-Deal/>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Segal, David R. "Partisan Realignment in the United States: The Lesson of the 1964 Election." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 32, no. 3 (1968): 441-44. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2747649>.

Union. Additionally, American politicians had to avoid accusations of being secret communists by people like Joseph McCarthy and risk being publicly disgraced.

Candidate novelty is among the lowest of the countries sampled, and leadership novelty remains relatively low throughout most of the United States Party System Novelty time series. This may be partly because the researcher investigated party leaders in Congress rather than designating presidential candidates as representatives of their relative parties. Since the United States' presidential election cycle typically begins at least two years before Election Day, citizens may view the President or the parties' respective presidential nominees as their parties' true "leaders." Leadership novelty stores might increase if this were accounted for in the PSN data. However, since the vast majority of the countries sampled here are parliamentary and not presidential, the author decided to maintain consistency by using party leadership data from the general elections and not the presidential ones.⁵¹ This period also marked the beginning of the shift of the black votes from the Republican Party (to which President Abraham Lincoln, who was president of the Union during the Civil War and who issued the Emancipation Proclamation), had belonged to the Democratic Party.

Norway and Ireland exhibit visible if less pronounced tidal wave effects compared to the United States. Occasional spikes in ideological and leadership novelty disguise the overall downward trend of the party system in Norway. However, it is

⁵¹ If enough data to perform PSN analyses can be collected for presidential systems such as those that exist in Latin America, it could be beneficial to investigate whether Leadership Novelty exhibits significant differences when presidential candidates or nominees were to replace congressional party leadership in Leadership Novelty calculations

worth noting when the most significant spikes are – One occurred in 1901, not long after the democratic system was established in the country. The second occurred in 1945, marking World War II's end. The third appears between the late 1980s and early 1990s, coinciding with the Cold War's end. Therefore, these massively impactful worldwide events could have caused increases in party system novelty that otherwise would not have occurred in Norway or Ireland.

Second Wave Democracies

Malta has the lowest ideological volatility compared to the other thirteen countries in this study. This phenomenon is likely caused by the fact that the tiny Mediterranean nation has a rigid two-party system. In Malta, the conservative Nationalist Party and the more progressive Malta Labour Party have remained neck-and-neck since Malta's democratization in 1962. Like in the modern-day United States, party leaders tend to remain in their position once promoted to the party leader or Prime Minister. This is reflected in the country's overall low leadership volatility; spikes in this measure only occur when a change in office has taken place. It is worth noting, however, that no one who was not already a legislature member has ever assumed the leadership position of any party in Malta; all party leaders served at least three terms as a legislator before being promoted to a leadership position. This resistance to change and allow political outsiders to represent either of the two dominant parties is likely both a cause and a result of the country's low levels of ideological novelty.

Israel's overall novelty scores surprisingly remained relatively steady and low in the time series data the author collected. The only significant jumps in ideological novelty recorded in the author's data occurred during the 1950s and the late 1990s. This was likely a result of the influx of Jewish immigrants seeking Israeli citizenship in the aftermath of World War II, as well as Israeli politicians' response to shifts in the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestine conflict in the 1990s (namely the Oslo Accords signed in 1993 and the second intifada or Palestinian uprising which occurred in 2000). Leadership novelty has increased steadily from the early 2000s to today, demonstrating the emergence of more populist and Zionist nationalist parties and politicians within the Knesset (the Israeli parliament). Ideological novelty may be artificially decreased in this graph because Israel has a high number of "special interest" parties. These primarily seek to secure a homeland for Palestinian Arabs, increase the influence of Judaic law on Israeli politics, or expand settlements of Israelis in contested territory. Parline data often does not include complete ideological data for "special interest" parties since they typically do not have a comprehensive economic platform, so many of these parties were not included in overall Party System Novelty and Ideological Novelty calculations.

Austria was a tricky case to include in this study because it technically did have a series of democratic elections before succumbing to Nazi occupation during the Second World War, during which elections were suspended. However, the researcher elected to set Austria's democratization year in 1945, placing it in the second wave of democracies rather than the first. The first post-occupation election is marked by relatively high overall novelty, which steadily evens out with time. Beginning in 2008,

there was an increase in ideological and leadership novelty. This reflects a worldwide trend of party systems moving steadily towards the right in the post-Recession era.

Germany exhibits high ideological novelty following World War II, plummets, and stays below ten percent for the remainder of the time series. This is likely due to the country's split into East and West Germany. Most left-leaning political leaders likely defected to East Germany, which resulted in a sudden change in the makeup of West Germany's party system, reflecting a more center-right-based ideological system.

Japan's ideological and leadership novelty is very low for most of the time series collected post-1946 legislative elections. However, there are two marked spikes – one occurs in the late 1950s, and the other takes place in the late 1990s. This is because these two periods mark the only two occasions in Japanese history where the majority party and the minority party have switched places. The Liberal Democratic Party maintains an effective stronghold over the Japanese party system and dwarfs almost any other party in size. Its closest competitor is the Constitutional Democratic Party, which earned 55 House of Representatives seats in the 2017 general election to the LDP's 284. The emergence of a liberal-dominated government is further complicated by the fact that several smaller conservative parties win seats in House of Representatives elections, such as the Kibō no Tō, Innovation, and Komeitō parties, which frequently participate in coalitions with the Liberal Democratic Party. However, because the Liberal Democratic Party is so big, it contains internal ideological factions which sometimes act as defacto political parties. In future research, it could be helpful to separately calculate the ideological, candidate, and leadership novelty scores for the

main factions of the Liberal Democratic Party and see if it impacts overall novelty levels.

Third Wave Democracies

Spain, the first of the third-wave democracies included in this study to democratize, exhibits higher ideological novelty than many other countries. This could be due to its extreme multiparty system and its high number of “special interest” parties populated by Basque and Catalan independence activists. However, unlike in the Israeli Parline data, which frequently did not contain ideological data for Israeli special interest parties, nearly all parties that participated in post-1976 Spanish legislations were listed in the Parline parties database. This enabled the author to incorporate richer ideological data into her final calculations. When more detailed ideology data regarding Israeli and other party system data becomes available, it could be useful to compare the development of these two countries’ party systems. While ideological novelty remains relatively high, leadership and ideological novelty indices seem to adhere to the “tidal wave” pattern. That is, there are higher peaks and lower troughs occurring in the early days of democratization and less extreme partisan novelty in

Unfortunately, candidate data for the first two democratic Taiwanese elections were not included in the dataset provided by the Taiwanese government, so the immediate impact of democratization on party system novelty is not observable in this case study. Later data points do seem to indicate a general downward trend in overall novelty, but this is difficult to verify due to the limited number of data points.

Romania experienced an ideological novelty spike in 1996, just two election cycles after the Soviet Union collapsed and Romania became an independent nation. The 1996 election saw the center-right Christian Democratic National Peasant's Party win the majority of seats in the legislature, taking the majority from the left-leaning Democratic National Social Front, which had maintained over half of the seats since democratization in 1989. 1996 marked the first transfer of power since the fall of Communism and the first time a conservative party comprised the majority party since 1948, the year it became incorporated into the Soviet Union. In the same election year, however, leadership novelty hit zero because both party leaders had maintained their positions since or before the previous election. Greater ideological diversity has been present in the Romanian legislature since this time.


This is the opposite of what occurred in Namibia, the only African nation to be included in this study. Namibia reportedly holds free, fair, and regular elections, but it is effectively a one-party state. The South-West Africa People's Organization (also known as SWAPO) has maintained a staggering 70%+ supermajority in the Namibian National Assembly since Namibia became independent from South African control and parliamentary elections commenced in 1989.

The "tidal wave" effect of democratization can be more clearly seen in Figure 6B, which shows the absolute value of overall party system novelty scores in elections t and $t+1$ in each of the fourteen sample countries. The majority of countries included in the sample exhibit an overall downwards trend from democratization until the present day. However, many sample countries (Ireland, Malta, Spain, Norway, Israel, Taiwan,

Austria, Namibia, Germany, and Japan) experienced a sharp increase in overall party system novelty in the aftermath of the 2008 Great Recession, followed by a sharp decrease. This indicates that these countries experienced notable political shifts in the wake of the financial crisis and that the changes made during those elections are becoming solidified. Two possibilities remain likely; firstly, the overall downward trend of party system novelty will continue, and the post-2008 (and largely more conservative) legislatures and party systems of the sample countries will become solidified. Alternatively, the post-COVID-19 era could send new shockwaves through the political party systems of the sample countries, sparking an increase in novelty levels like that seen at the end of the Great Depression, World War II, the Cold War, and the 2008 Financial Crisis.

South Korean Case Study

Figure 7A – South Korean Sikk Index Time Series (Aggregate)



Among the countries surveyed for this project, South Korea's unique political history provides an opportunity to investigate the impact of democratization on party

system novelty by looking at data from both before and after democratization. South Korean political parties' proclivities towards splits, mergers, name changes, and other behaviors that make identifying "new" versus "old" parties and calculating consistent Pedersen Index scores merit a closer look at the party system novelty changes that occurred from the establishment of the South Korean National Assembly to the modern day.

According to the aggregate party system novelty calculations, overall South Korean political party system novelty as measured by SN has hovered between 20% and 50% from the 2nd National Assembly election to the 21st election held in 2020. However, on its own, the total novelty index level conceals a story of real change. By dividing the total novelty index into categories of leadership, organization, and candidates, one can see that although the total level of novelty has remained somewhat stable since democratization, the levels of leadership novelty have plunged sharply downwards. In contrast, organizational novelty has seen an increase since the 14th National Assembly election. Almost all Korean political parties that had any real power were conservative until the early 2000s when the election of Roh Moo-hyun heralded the first era of South Korean progressivism in the National Assembly. Therefore, it is likely that increasing levels of institutional novelty among South Korean political parties in the post-democratization era reflect increases in the number of ideological choices available to voters. This indicates that South Korean democracy is becoming *more* institutionalized, not less.

The decrease in leadership novelty indicates increasing levels of professionalization in political party leadership and more institutionalized democracy; the extreme jumps observed in elections 6 and 11 occurred due to the military coup d'états of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, respectively. Both Park and Chun were military personnel, not elected officials before they seized control of the Republic of Korea's government, so they both received leadership congruence scores of zero. After their respective coups, both Park and Chung garnered the support of the majority party within the National Assembly, which increased their overall contributions to leadership Novelty and system novelty. The jumps witnessed in elections 6 and 11 are then followed by an extreme downturn in leadership novelty, reflecting the dictatorial nature of their rule, where they went unchallenged within their own party until their removal from office.

Candidate novelty has shown a slight downward trend since democratization. Like decreases in leadership novelty, this slight drop could indicate increases in political party professionalization. Slightly increased reelection rates could also reflect the increase in choices available to Korean voters post-democratization; before democratization, meaningful ideological differences between Korean political parties remained small. This meant that the difference between reelecting one candidate or another from the same or a different party in s t versus $t+1$ likely did not lead to many differences in the lives of individual voters, which may have motivated them to switch up their vote more frequently. However, in the current South Korean political landscape, where ideological differences between parties are more significant, voters could be more


incentivized to reelect candidates from their preferred political party to maximize the chance of their preferred policies going into action.

However, despite the slight downturn, patterns of South Korean electoral turnover remain relatively high. This could indicate that voters are continually dissatisfied and disappointed with the performance of national assembly candidates after they are elected to office. Thus, they select different candidates in election $t+1$ than they did in election t . It is also possible that this phenomenon is caused by high rates of previous National Assembly members choosing not to run for office again after their first term. These two phenomena could also be related; if the chances of being reelected after running for a second term are relatively low due to consistently high levels of voter dissatisfaction or preference change, a National Assembly member could be less motivated to take on the financial and psychological costs of participating in a second, third, or fourth election.

High candidate novelty could be a cause for concern, but low candidate novelty is not necessarily a good thing. For instance, voter dissatisfaction with congressional performance among voters in the United States is currently at an all-time high, yet incumbent candidates' reelection rates remain at or above 90%.⁵² In short, more data is needed to understand and analyze the nature of Korean political party candidate Novelty levels.

⁵² "Election Results, 2020: Incumbent Win Rates by State." Ballotpedia, Ballotpedia, 11 Feb. 2021, https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results,_2020:_Incumbent_win_rates_by_state.

Figure 7C – South Korean Party System Novelty Level Fluctuations



Lastly, overall fluctuations in total system novelty between elections have significantly decreased in the post-democratization era. This is true for both the majority and the opposition parties. The window for the overall amount of change that can be expected in a Korean election has narrowed from between single digits and 40% in the pre-democratization era to consistently under 10% in the post-democratization era. Gone are the days of sudden, massive changes followed by periods of stagnation; the overall predictability of the Korean political party system has increased dramatically since 1987, indicating that the cohesiveness of the party system as a whole has stabilized even when the names and superficial attributes of the parties that comprise it have not.

Chapter 8. Conclusion

This study used a new methodology to measure levels of party system novelty in fourteen countries that underwent democratic transition during the first, second, or third waves of democracy. It finds that Pedersen Index calculations of electoral volatility seem to be overestimating volatility levels in some newer democracies while also underestimating volatility levels in seemingly “established” democracies. The data indicates that while the democratic “wave” that a country belongs to may predict slightly higher levels of party system volatility than that observed in first-wave or more “established” Western European democracies at a given point in time, this is more likely due to the fact that the new democracy in question is closer in time to the “tidal wave” of democratization, which causes steep increases in party system novelty followed by a steady downward trend. When using the number of years or election cycles since democratization instead of chronological year to compare first-, second- and third-wave democracies’ party system novelty levels, these differences largely disappear – and some newer democracies turn out to be more stable than their longer-established counterparts in first wave democracies.

However, democratization is not the only political change that can simulate a seismic event; international and domestic crises also play a role in increasing or decreasing levels of party system novelty. Party systems belonging to the first, second, and third waves alike respond to major world events such as the Great Depression, World War II, the Cold War, and the 2008 economic crisis with increased levels of

political system novelty. As the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic continue to send shock waves through communities around the world more than two years after the discovery of the virus, further increases in party system novelty are to be expected in upcoming election cycles.

The Korean case study, which provides a rare opportunity to investigate party system novelty levels before *and* after democratization, shows that valuable information regarding democratic transition could be discovered if the Sikk Index or the Party System Novelty Index were used to investigate inter- and intra-partisan changes in other non-democratic parliamentary systems, such as Argentina, Mexico, and Taiwan prior to their democratizations in the 1980s. The author was unable to perform this research herself due to the limitations of available data and the scope of this study, but she hopes to research this topic in the future.

The author also hopes to investigate the impact of presidential vs. parliamentary systems on leadership novelty measurements. Third-wave Latin American democracies such as Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru could provide interesting case studies for this kind of research. As richer data for other emerging democracies in Africa, Latin America and Asia becomes available, she would also like to analyze countries like South Africa, Nigeria, and India with Party System Novelty calculations.

The author would also like to investigate whether or not parties belonging to different ideological families (namely parties designated as “conservative,” “liberal,” “social democrat,” “socialist/communist,” or “special interest by the ParlGov dataset)

respond differently to external stimuli like democratic transitions, global crises, and international or civil war.

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Appendix A – Summary Data

Australia

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1901					
1903	0.29	0.02	0.19	0.17	
1906	0.31	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.07
1910	0.53	0.07	0.00	0.20	0.10
1913	0.32	0.03	0.20	0.18	0.02
1914	0.49	0.03	0.00	0.17	0.01
1917	0.54	0.14	0.55	0.41	0.24
1919	0.36	0.05	0.00	0.14	0.27
1922	0.35	0.06	0.35	0.25	0.11
1925	0.38	0.05	0.20	0.21	0.04
1928	0.36	0.06	0.17	0.20	0.01
1929	0.45	0.01	0.00	0.15	0.05
1931	0.36	0.03	0.08	0.16	0.01
1934	0.29	0.01	0.00	0.10	0.06
1937	0.29	0.05	0.17	0.17	0.07
1940	0.36	0.00	0.19	0.18	0.01
1943	0.50	0.07	0.06	0.21	0.03
1946	0.39	0.01	0.32	0.24	0.03
1949	0.55	0.01	0.00	0.19	0.05
1951	0.65	0.43	0.00	0.36	0.17
1954	0.70	0.45	0.31	0.49	0.13
1955	0.61	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.29
1958	0.57	0.02	0.00	0.20	0.00
1961	0.74	0.00	0.16	0.30	0.10
1963	0.44	0.00	0.07	0.17	0.13
1966	0.40	0.03	0.13	0.19	0.02
1969	0.68	0.04	0.15	0.29	0.10
1972	0.69	0.08	0.00	0.26	0.03
1974	0.52	0.01	0.05	0.19	0.07
1975	0.45	0.03	0.02	0.17	0.02
1977	0.68	0.04	0.00	0.24	0.07
1980	0.64	0.06	0.14	0.28	0.04
1983	0.77	0.11	0.65	0.51	0.23
1984	0.69	0.24	0.00	0.31	0.20
1987	0.76	0.24	0.04	0.35	0.04
1990	0.65	0.02	0.00	0.22	0.13
1993	0.66	0.00	0.29	0.32	0.10
1996	0.53	0.11	0.00	0.21	0.11
1998	0.75	0.10	0.32	0.39	0.18
2001	0.43	0.08	0.00	0.17	0.22
2004		0.01	0.48	0.25	0.08
2007	0.77	0.12	0.34	0.41	0.16
2010	0.32	0.07	0.25	0.21	0.20
2013	0.36	0.05	0.06	0.16	0.05
2016	0.48	0.07	0.30	0.28	0.12
2019	0.38	0.14	0.04	0.19	0.09

Austria

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1927	0.33	0.53	0.03	0.30	0.13
1930	0.31	0.01	0.11	0.14	0.15
1945	0.48	0.01	0.50	0.33	0.19
1949	0.35	0.05	0.05	0.15	0.18
1953	0.40	0.03	0.00	0.14	0.00
1956	0.43	0.05	0.20	0.23	0.08
1959	0.43	0.03	0.40	0.29	0.06
1962	0.46	0.01	0.09	0.19	0.10
1966	0.46	0.01	0.10	0.19	0.00
1970	0.47	0.01	0.10	0.19	0.00
1971	0.46	0.04	0.21	0.24	0.04
1975	0.47	0.00	0.21	0.23	0.01
1979	0.43	0.00	0.23	0.22	0.00
1983	0.43	0.00	0.20	0.21	0.01
1986	0.33	0.00	0.32	0.22	0.01
1990	0.31	0.04	0.20	0.18	0.03
1994	0.26	0.05	0.26	0.19	0.00
1996	0.31	0.02	0.12	0.15	0.04
1999	0.28	0.02	0.19	0.16	0.02
2002	0.36	0.02	0.11	0.16	0.00
2006	0.25	0.03	0.11	0.13	0.03
2008	0.20	0.08	0.32	0.20	0.07
2013	0.19	0.00	0.24	0.14	0.06
2017	0.27	0.14	0.41	0.28	0.13
2019	0.22	0.16	0.21	0.20	0.08

Germany

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1953	0.26	0.36	0.30	0.31	0.12
1957	0.33	0.26	0.02	0.20	0.11
1961	0.32	0.08	0.21	0.20	0.00
1965	0.36	0.00	0.05	0.14	0.06
1969	0.38	0.00	0.33	0.24	0.10
1972	0.36	0.01	0.18	0.18	0.06
1976	0.34	0.01	0.50	0.28	0.10
1980	0.33	0.00	0.07	0.13	0.15
1983	0.25	0.02	0.30	0.19	0.05
1987	0.24	0.03	0.25	0.17	0.02
1990	0.31	0.06	0.29	0.22	0.05
1994	0.26	0.07	0.18	0.17	0.05
1998	0.08	0.02	0.30	0.13	0.04
2002	0.26	0.04	0.20	0.17	0.03
2005	0.21	0.01	0.19	0.14	0.03
2009	0.00	0.04	0.21	0.08	0.05
2013	0.30	0.01	0.17	0.16	0.08
2017	0.14	0.07	0.20	0.14	0.02
2021	0.18	0.04	0.36	0.19	0.05

Ireland

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1919		0.00		0.00	
1921	0.49	0.23		0.92	
1922	0.17	0.27		0.96	0.04
1923	0.25	0.26	0.20	0.24	0.72
1927	0.26	0.02	0.04	0.11	0.13
1932	0.38	0.04	0.02	0.14	0.04
1933	0.32	0.02	0.10	0.15	0.01
1937	0.34	0.07	0.00	0.13	0.01
1938	0.34	0.07	0.00	0.14	0.00
1943	0.21	0.08	0.04	0.11	0.03
1944	0.31	0.04	0.21	0.19	0.08
1948	0.19	0.15	0.03	0.12	0.06
1951	0.27	0.13	0.00	0.13	0.01
1954	0.30	0.06	0.00	0.12	0.01
1957	0.35	0.03	0.01	0.13	0.01
1961	0.29	0.04	0.39	0.24	0.11
1965	0.35	0.07	0.00	0.14	0.10
1969	0.39	0.01	0.34	0.25	0.10
1973	0.36	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.12
1982	0.35	0.06	0.39	0.27	0.14
1987	0.32	0.00	0.04	0.12	0.15
1989	0.26	0.04	0.16	0.15	0.03
1992	0.22	0.00	0.14	0.12	0.03
1997	0.28	0.05	0.12	0.15	0.03
2002	0.08	0.01	0.11	0.07	0.08
2007	0.67	0.03	0.02	0.24	0.17
2011	0.23	0.25	0.07	0.18	0.06
2016	0.40	0.09	0.07	0.19	0.01
2020	0.16	0.23	0.15	0.18	0.01

Israel

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1951	0.23	0.02	0.03	0.09	0.05
1955	0.23	0.03	0.03	0.09	0.00
1959	0.25	0.54	0.07	0.28	0.19
1961	0.13	0.49	0.00	0.21	0.08
1965	0.22	0.01	0.08	0.11	0.10
1969	0.26	0.06	0.21	0.18	0.07
1973	0.31	0.05	0.06	0.14	0.03
1977	0.21	0.13	0.15	0.16	0.02
1981	0.34	0.11	0.06	0.17	0.01
1984	0.18	0.19	0.04	0.14	0.04
1988	0.19	0.09	0.06	0.11	0.02
1992	0.21	0.19	0.12	0.17	0.06
1996	0.15	0.01	0.19	0.12	0.06
1999	0.09	0.28	0.14	0.17	0.05
2003	0.19	0.05	0.12	0.12	0.05
2006	0.13	0.45	0.27	0.28	0.16
2009	0.16	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.11
2013	0.12	0.17	0.26	0.18	0.01
2015	0.15	0.15	0.23	0.18	0.01
2020	0.19	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.02
2021	0.08	0.26	0.13	0.16	0.00

Japan

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1947	0.25	0.28	0.35	0.30	0.17
1949	0.33	0.08	0.07	0.16	0.14
1952	0.37	0.29	0.19	0.28	0.12
1953	0.26	0.00	0.03	0.10	0.18
1955	0.26	0.28	0.35	0.30	0.20
1958	0.52	0.82	0.25	0.53	0.23
1960	0.51	0.21	0.40	0.37	0.16
1963	0.49	0.04	0.03	0.18	0.18
1967	0.46	0.00	0.37	0.28	0.09
1969	0.44	0.00	0.15	0.20	0.08
1972	0.42	0.01	0.24	0.22	0.03
1976	0.35	0.02	0.11	0.16	0.07
1979	0.32	0.07	0.36	0.25	0.09
1980	0.37	0.02	0.00	0.13	0.12
1983	0.34	0.03	0.11	0.16	0.03
1986	0.38	0.06	0.04	0.16	0.00
1990	0.40	0.02	0.22	0.21	0.05
1993	0.27	0.05	0.37	0.23	0.02
1996	0.43	0.73	0.38	0.51	0.28
2000	0.45	0.04	0.37	0.29	0.23
2003	0.42	0.05	0.21	0.23	0.06
2005	0.42	0.01	0.11	0.18	0.05
2009	0.37	0.45	0.12	0.31	0.13
2012	0.35	0.28	0.17	0.26	0.05
2014	0.45	0.01	0.11	0.19	0.07
2017	0.44	0.00	0.09	0.18	0.01

Malta

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1962		0.12	0.45	0.19	0.08
1966	0.51	0.09	0.04	0.22	0.02
1971	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.05
1976	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00
1982	0.51	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00
1987	0.41	0.02	0.40	0.27	0.10
1992	0.34	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.16
1996	0.43	0.01	0.20	0.22	0.10
1998	0.18	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.15
2003	0.29	0.02	0.00	0.10	0.03
2008	0.31	0.01	0.10	0.14	0.04
2013	0.38	0.03	0.36	0.26	0.12
2017	0.45	0.02	0.25	0.24	0.02
2022	0.45	0.04	0.71	0.40	0.16

Namibia

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1989		0.46	0.48	0.31	0.13
1990	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.18
1995	0.55	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.05
2000	0.57	0.00	0.04	0.20	0.02
2005	0.60	0.00	0.02	0.21	0.00
2010	0.55	0.00	0.10	0.22	0.01
2015	0.54	0.00	0.02	0.19	0.03
2020	0.30	0.00	0.11	0.14	0.05

Norway

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1886	0.42	0.37	0.05	0.28	
1889	0.00	0.44	0.00	0.15	0.13
1892	0.44	0.06	0.22	0.24	0.10
1895	0.39	0.25	0.13	0.26	0.02
1898	0.57	0.25	0.00	0.27	0.02
1901	0.47	0.01	0.62	0.37	0.10
1904	0.35	0.07	0.33	0.25	0.12
1907	0.39	0.06	0.00	0.15	0.10
1910	0.27	0.00	0.34	0.20	0.05
1913	0.35	0.06	0.03	0.14	0.06
1919	0.27	0.01	0.08	0.12	0.03
1922	0.21	0.01	0.26	0.16	0.05
1925	0.20	0.05	0.12	0.12	0.04
1928	0.27	0.01	0.18	0.16	0.03
1931	0.22	0.03	0.08	0.11	0.05
1934	0.27	0.09	0.00	0.12	0.01
1937	0.30	0.13	0.13	0.18	0.06
1945	0.31	0.13	0.46	0.30	0.11
1950	0.29	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.18
1954	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.04	0.08
1958	0.32	0.02	0.12	0.15	0.12
1961	0.22	0.02	0.01	0.08	0.07
1965	0.26	0.01	0.28	0.18	0.10
1969	0.33	0.03	0.31	0.22	0.04
1973	0.18	0.01	0.18	0.12	0.10
1977	0.20	0.04	0.30	0.18	0.05
1981	0.29	0.16	0.40	0.28	0.11
1985	0.29	0.55	0.07	0.30	0.02
1989	0.20	0.50	0.11	0.27	0.03
1993	0.25	0.00	0.18	0.14	0.13
1997	0.19	0.12	0.38	0.23	0.09
2001	0.18	0.03	0.08	0.10	0.13
2005	0.24	0.09	0.25	0.19	0.09
2009	0.23	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.08
2013	0.22	0.04	0.06	0.11	0.00
2017	0.18	0.01	0.05	0.08	0.03
2021	0.17	0.06	0.10	0.11	

Romania

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1990		0.00	0.47	0.16	0.04
1992	0.17	0.00	0.20	0.12	0.03
1996	0.16	0.47	0.00	0.21	0.09
2000	0.29	0.07	0.11	0.16	0.06
2004	0.20	0.05	0.32	0.19	0.03
2008	0.25	0.06	0.28	0.19	0.00
2012	0.24	0.03	0.35	0.21	0.01
2016	0.26	0.07	0.30	0.21	0.00
2020	0.21	0.05	0.29	0.18	0.03
1990		0.00	0.47	0.16	0.04

South Korea

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1950	0.76	0.03	0.66	0.49	
1954	0.88	0.03	0.27	0.39	0.09
1958	0.49	0.02	0.38	0.29	0.10
1960	0.68	0.04	0.33	0.35	0.06
1963	0.79	0.04	0.71	0.51	0.16
1967	0.55	0.00	0.09	0.22	0.30
1971	0.44	0.04	0.11	0.20	0.02
1973	0.52	0.00	0.11	0.21	0.01
1978	0.56	0.00	0.16	0.24	0.03
1981	0.65	0.04	0.53	0.41	0.17
1985	0.68	0.02	0.05	0.25	0.16
1988	0.72	0.03	0.52	0.42	0.17
1992	0.60	0.04	0.19	0.27	0.15
1996	0.46	0.24	0.07	0.25	0.02
2000	0.49	0.18	0.12	0.27	0.01
2004	0.63	0.23	0.18	0.34	0.08
2008	0.50	0.18	0.28	0.32	0.02
2012	0.62	0.33	0.07	0.34	0.02
2016	0.52	0.12	0.16	0.27	0.07
2020	0.58	0.20	0.12	0.30	0.03

Spain

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1977		0.11	0.48	0.19	
1979	0.29	0.01	0.14	0.15	0.05
1982	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.12
1986	0.27	0.07	0.06	0.13	0.10
1989	0.31	0.04	0.15	0.16	0.03
1993	0.36	0.24	0.03	0.21	0.04
1996	0.36	0.01	0.03	0.13	0.07
2000	0.42	0.04	0.16	0.21	0.07
2004	0.40	0.07	0.41	0.29	0.09
2008	0.44	0.08	0.01	0.17	0.12
2011	0.36	0.11	0.16	0.21	0.04
2016	0.21	0.12	0.31	0.21	0.00
2016	0.30	0.01	0.00	0.10	0.11
2019	0.22	0.10	0.12	0.14	0.04
2019	0.21	0.05	0.22	0.16	0.02

Taiwan

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1996	0.42	0.05	0.12	0.20	
1999	0.36	0.06	0.18	0.20	0.00
2002	0.27	0.02	0.00	0.10	0.10
2005	0.35	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.02
2008	0.47	0.01	0.30	0.26	0.14
2012	0.37	0.00	0.14	0.17	0.09
2016	0.46	0.01	0.13	0.20	0.03

United States

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1859	0.38	0.00	0.45	0.21	0.01
1861	0.50	0.10	0.00	0.27	0.06
1863	0.55	0.23	0.10	0.30	0.03
1865	0.50	0.40	0.23	0.05	0.25
1867	0.55	0.10	0.40	0.30	0.25
1869	0.49	0.46	0.10	0.27	0.03
1871	0.47	0.26	0.46	0.26	0.01
1873	0.52	0.00	0.26	0.28	0.02
1875	0.60	0.25	0.00	0.33	0.05
1877	0.45	0.40	0.25	0.25	0.08
1879	0.38	0.00	0.40	0.22	0.03
1881	0.33	0.42	0.00	0.19	0.03
1883	0.50	0.59	0.42	0.28	0.09
1885	0.38	0.26	0.59	0.22	0.06
1887	0.34	0.00	0.26	0.20	0.02
1889	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.22	0.02
1891	0.44	0.28	0.00	0.27	0.05
1893	0.41	0.00	0.28	0.23	0.04
1895	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.26	0.03
1897	0.36	0.30	0.00	0.21	0.06
1899	0.31	0.39	0.30	0.18	0.02
1901	0.27	0.00	0.39	0.16	0.02
1903	0.34	0.40	0.00	0.19	0.03
1905	0.23	0.00	0.40	0.14	0.06
1907	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.01
1909	0.21	0.18	0.00	0.13	0.02
1911	0.33	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.06
1913	0.35	0.00	0.17	0.21	0.02
1915	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.16	0.05
1917	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.04
1919	0.26	0.22	0.00	0.15	0.02
1921	0.27	0.00	0.22	0.16	0.01
1923	0.27	0.19	0.00	0.16	0.00
1925	0.17	0.00	0.19	0.11	0.05
1927	0.14	0.22	0.00	0.09	0.01
1929	0.19	0.00	0.22	0.13	0.04
1931	0.19	0.40	0.00	0.12	0.02
1933	0.36	0.29	0.40	0.20	0.08
1935	0.24	0.15	0.29	0.15	0.05
1937	0.23	0.31	0.15	0.14	0.01
1939	0.30	0.00	0.31	0.17	0.02

United States (continued)

Election Year	Candidate Novelty	Ideological Novelty	Leadership Novelty	Total Novelty	Novelty Novelty
1941	0.18	0.39	0.00	0.11	0.05
1943	0.25	0.00	0.39	0.15	0.04
1945	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.03
1947	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.03
1949	0.24	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.00
1951	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.04
1953	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.03
1955	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.04
1957	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.00
1959	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.04
1961	0.15	0.08	0.00	0.10	0.03
1963	0.17	0.24	0.08	0.11	0.01
1965	0.21	0.00	0.24	0.13	0.02
1967	0.15	0.17	0.00	0.10	0.03
1969	0.11	0.00	0.17	0.07	0.03
1971	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.02
1973	0.17	0.11	0.00	0.11	0.02
1975	0.22	0.13	0.11	0.14	0.02
1977	0.15	0.00	0.13	0.10	0.03
1979	0.18	0.13	0.00	0.12	0.02
1981	0.18	0.00	0.13	0.12	0.00
1983	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.13	0.01
1985	0.10	0.00	0.20	0.08	0.05
1987	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.01
1989	0.09	0.12	0.00	0.07	0.02
1991	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.01
1993	0.26	0.00	0.12	0.16	0.08
1995	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.03
1997	0.17	0.30	0.00	0.11	0.01
1999	0.10	0.00	0.30	0.08	0.04
2001	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.01
2003	0.13	0.21	0.00	0.09	0.01
2005	0.10	0.11	0.21	0.08	0.01
2007	0.15	0.00	0.11	0.10	0.02
2009	0.15	0.08	0.00	0.10	0.00
2011	0.23	0.00	0.08	0.14	0.04
2013	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.02
2015	0.14	0.23	0.00	0.10	0.02
2017	0.15	0.00	0.23	0.10	0.00
2019	0.21	0.18	0.00	0.13	0.03
2021	0.15	0.00	0.18	0.10	0.03

요약문 – 한국어

본 연구에서 저자는 민주화 후 정당체제 신규성 (Party System Novelty 혹은 PSN)에 대한 민주화의 영향을 살펴보고자 한다. 저자는 14 개 1 차, 2 차, 그리고 3 차 물결 민주주의 국가에서의 PSN 레벨을 측정했다. 정당체제 신규성이란 개념은 국회에서 각 정당의 의석 차지율만 보는 페더슨 지수(Pedersen Index)와 다르다. 저자가 사용한 방법론은 시크 지수 (Sikk Index)을 바탕으로 하며 각 정당에서의 지도자, 후보자, 그리고 조직 변화를 따로 살펴본다. 본 연구의 결과에 따르면 페더슨 지수 말고 시크 지수를 통해서 정당체제 신규성을 측정할 때 민주화가 "물결" 효과를 나타낸다. 또한, 2 차와 3 차 물결 민주주의 국가들에서 발생한 신규성 추세가 1 차 물결 국가와 유의미하게 다르지 않았던 것이 관찰됐다. 민주화란 "쇼크 물결"이 지나간 후, 본 연구에서 포함된 국가들은 4 차례의 선거 기간 이내 정당체제 신규성은 안정된다. 하지만, 그 동시에 거의 모든 국가들이 2008 년 세계 경제 위기 직후 정당체제 신규성 폭등이 발생한다. 이 추세는 1 차와 2 차 민주주의 국가에서 특별히 뚜렷했다. 2008 년 "대침체," 정보전쟁과 소셜미디어의 확산, 그리고 현재 시기에서 관찰되는 포퓰리즘·비자유주의적인 사상의 확산의 결과물일 수도 있다.

키워드: 민주화, 정당체제, 페더슨 지수, 시크 지수, 정당체제 변동성, 선거 변동성, 민주화 물결

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