문학석사 학위논문

The semantics and pragmatics of Polish imperatives:

The case of the Polish auxiliary verb *wziąć*

폴란드어 명령법의 의미론과 화용론:

명령문에서 *wziąć* 보조동사 사용 연구

2022년 8월

서울대학교 대학원

언어학과 언어학전공

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2022년 6월

서울대학교 대학원

언어학과 언어학전공

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Abstract

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This dissertation investigates the semantics and pragmatics of Polish imperatives in the context of an auxiliary verb *wziąć* 'take,' which commonly appears in imperative constructions. At a first glance, the verb *wziąć* 'take' appears to systematically constrain the range of uses associated with an imperative and modulate the resulting implications. However, how exactly 'take' constrains the interpretations of Polish imperatives has not yet been comprehensively examined.

In order to clarify this issue, an experimental study was conducted. The experiment probed the intuitions of Polish speakers regarding the naturalness of double imperatives with 'take' (henceforth 'take'-imperatives) compared to that of standard (bare) imperatives, depending on what types of imperative speech acts they instantiated, and in what context. In addition to judgements about naturalness, three other interpretational parameters were tested as well: (i) the likelihood of ironic (non-literal) interpretations of the imperatives, (ii) the perceived difficulty about realizing the prejacent of the imperatives, and (iii) the perceived addressee preference about the prejacent.

The results of the experiment indicate that imperative type (bare vs.

'take'), speaker/addressee preferences, and the interaction between the two are significant predictors of the naturalness of imperatives. For instance, among the speech acts for which the standard (bare) imperatives were judged to be significantly more natural than 'take'-imperatives were well-wishes, whose interpretations are known to highlight speaker preferences and lack directive (addressee action oriented) flavor. In addition, the naturalness of 'take'-imperatives showed a negative correlation with addressee preferences: the higher the perceived addressee preference, the lower the naturalness of 'take'-imperatives.

These results are shown to be compatible with, and provide a fertile ground for adapting and expanding a preferential theoretic approach to imperatives, according to which imperatives are speaker's commitments to effective preferences (Condoravdi & Lauer 2012).

Building on this framework, I propose a preference-related semantics of the auxiliary *wziąć*, according to which the speaker through *wziąć* expresses a belief that the action *A* over which *wziąć* scopes is not at the top of the addressee's effective preference structure, but if the addressee realizes *A*, they will fulfill a bigger or equal subset of their effective preference structure compared to following the current top effective preference. At an intuitive level, this analysis amounts to the prediction that *wziąć* conventionalizes certain felicity conditions (in particular, the preference condition) for directive speech acts proposed by Searle.

Having proposed the semantics of *wziąć*, the paper examines the auxiliary *wziąć* through the lens of cognitive theories of meaning, in particular, the conceptual metaphor theory and the Neural Theory of Language. Via this approach, it addresses the question of how and why the verb *wziąć* came to perform their function as an auxiliary to imperatives that gives rise to the specific documented effects. I make an analogic comparison between the change of location and change of preferences that motivates the meaning abstraction.

The emerging discussion is shown to provide indirect support for the preferential theory of imperatives (Condoravdi & Lauer 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2017). It also suggests that a preference-oriented operator assumed for *wziąć* lies at the heart of capturing the complex interaction between imperatives and auxiliary *wziąć*. Finally, the paper points to the mechanisms of metaphorical abstraction to account for how *wziąć* came to serve their function as an auxiliary.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Study Background

Imperatives, as a morpho-syntactically marked clause type, have always posed a challenge for semantic and pragmatic theories. It is because syntactically comparable imperative sentences can realize a wide range of different speech acts – extralinguistic events/commitments that arise from utterances of sentences "by the virtue of the conventional force associated with them" (Levinson 1983: 236). This "conventional force" is illocutionary force – a communicative effect associated with an utterance. Examples of speech acts realized by imperatives are given in (1).

(1)   a. Hand in the assignment by Friday.   COMMAND

        b. Pass me the salt, please.   REQUEST

        c. Please, lend me the money.   PLEA

        d. Take the A train.   ADVICE

        e. Have a cookie.   OFFER

        f. Get well soon.   WELL-WISH

                        Condoravdi et al. (2019: 1)

As illustrated by Condoravdi (Condoravdi & Lauer 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2017; Condoravdi et al. 2019), among others, depending on its contents and the context it appears in, an imperative clause may constitute a command, a request, a plea, or other speech acts. Therefore, it has been difficult to come to a uniform representation for the semantics of the imperatives.

In addition to the variety of contextual functions performed by imperatives, imperative clauses can contain other elements that further modify or constrain their usage. In certain languages like Polish, imperative

sentences can contain auxiliary verbs[2] which appear to modify the contextual inferences and constrain the range of speech acts conveyed by the imperatives. *Wziąć*, 'take', is an example of such verb:

(2) Podaj mi sól.

pass-imp me salt

(3) Weź mi podaj sól.

take-imp me pass-imp salt

'Pass me the salt, please.'

In the sentence (2), which is a simple request, the standard imperative is easily interchangeable with a double imperative with 'take' – I will refer to this construction as 'take'-imperative from now on. However, a 'take'-imperative sounds odd in serious or complicated requests that require long-term commitment or change and, therefore, cannot be so readily granted like 'Please, marry me.', illustrated by (4) and (5).

(4) Wyjdź za mnie.

marry-imp for me

(5) #Weź wyjdź za mnie.

take-imp marry-imp for me

'(Please,) marry me.'

Additionally, in the case of well-wishes, which merely express speaker's desires like (6) and (7), the 'take'-imperative can appear, but its implications appear to be slightly different from other uses of 'take'-imperatives – it sounds ironic or humorous. If a boyfriend says (7) to his sick girlfriend at the hospital, it sounds like a joke along the lines of "Stop kidding

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[2] There is a certain debate on whether these verbs should be termed 'auxiliary verbs'. In this paper, I use the term 'auxiliary' in semantic terms – an 'auxiliary verb' is a verb whose meaning can be intuitively describes as 'bleached' and serves complimentary semantic function to the meaning of the main verb. The discussion on the meaning of the term 'auxiliary' reemerges in the chapters 2 and 5.

around and get well already."

(6)   Wyzdrowiej   szybko.
        get well-imp   fast

(7)   ? Weź   wyzdrowiej   szybko.
        take-imp get well-imp   fast
        'Get well soon.'

The most basic intuition on the meaning of 'take' in the sentences above can be formulated as "emotional emphasis" (Zinken 2013: 40). Analogical constructions with 'take' as an auxiliary can be found in Russian, another language from the Slavic group, but also in more distantly related languages like Swedish or Norwegian, which are Germanic languages – a different language group in the Indo-European family. (Zinken 2013: 39)

However, a more complicated picture emerges if we consider the interaction of 'take' with different speech acts realized by the imperative sentences they appear in. There is a certain semantic and pragmatic flavor to this verb that appears to restrict its use compared to the standard imperative clause without 'take'. The details of that "flavor" are discussed in the chapter 2.

One of the main goals of this paper is, therefore, to define the semantic and pragmatic effects of the auxiliary 'take' and find a semantic representation of imperatives that allows us to model the way 'take' interacts with imperative sentences and speech acts they realize.

1.2. Purpose of Research

The first research question is how exactly 'take' constrains the use of imperatives. We could observe above that not every standard imperative sentence is interchangeable with an analogical sentence with a take'-imperative. What contextual restrictions does 'take' impose? Relatedly, what types of speech acts is 'take' compatible and incompatible with?

To answer the first question, I designed an experimental study that measures the intuitions of Polish native speakers on the usage of *wziąć* in imperative sentences. As a native speaker of Polish, I do have intuitions on my own. However, in many papers on the matter (Andrason 2018, Gębka-Wolak 2012), conflicting intuitions on the use of *wziąć* in imperatives were reported and the reported intuitions were sometimes different from my own. To avoid any bias in my analysis or reflecting only my own idiolect, I refer to the judgements of a group of adult Polish native speakers in the dimensions of interest. The details of the experiment are discussed in the chapter 3.

The second research question is what the semantics and pragmatics of the auxiliary 'take' is. A related, more broad question is how we can model the semantics and pragmatics of imperatives (in Polish) and how it interacts with the meaning of 'take'.

To answer the second question, I mostly build on the preferential theory of imperatives, associated mostly with Condoravdi & Lauer (2010, 2011, 2012, 2017). Discourse structures that track public beliefs and preferences appear to be a versatile tool that allows us to analyze the contribution of the semantics of 'take' and how it relates to the core meaning and function of imperatives. I discuss this in detail in the chapter 4.

Finally, the third research question is why 'take', as opposed to other possible auxiliary verbs, has come to serve such a function in the grammar of Polish. Why is 'take' used to modify imperatives in this way? Is the auxiliary meaning of 'take' related to its original meaning as a main verb and how?

To address this issue, I build on the conceptual metaphor theory, attributed mostly to George Lakoff (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 2009). This is a framework which was also productively utilized in e.g., Steciuk (2020) to analyze the meaning of Korean auxiliary verbs. The way Polish *wziąć* modifies the meaning of the main verb in double verb constructions, intuitively, seems remarkably similar to the way Korean auxiliary verbs semantically structure the event described by the main verb. I briefly compare

the two and present my metaphorical analysis of *wziąć* in chapter 5.

To summarize, this paper sets out to answer the following research questions:

(8)   Q1:   How exactly does 'take' constrain the use of imperatives? What types of speech acts and implications is 'take' compatible and incompatible with? [empirical]

        Q2:   What is the semantics and pragmatics of imperatives in Polish and what is the semantics and pragmatics of the auxiliary 'take' in Polish? How do the two interact? [theoretical]

        Q3:   Why is 'take', as opposed to other possible auxiliary verbs, used to modify imperatives in this way? [explanatory]

As a result, this paper outlines the semantics and pragmatics of both imperatives in Polish and the Polish auxiliary *wziąć* and specify the way they interact in an analytic manner. The experiment provides a database of measurable native intuitions on the crucial aspects of the meaning and usage of *wziąć* with imperatives. The preferential theoretic analysis clarifies the meaning of imperatives and auxiliary 'take' and how the two interact. The conceptual metaphor analysis helps to understand the source and the mechanism of the function that auxiliary 'take' came to serve.

Chapter 2. Background

2.1. Imperatives in Polish

2.1.1. The morhpho-syntax of imperative clauses in Polish

In Polish, verbs are syntactically marked for imperative mood. Canonically, imperative forms are formed in a synthetic paradigm and appear in the second person, singular (9) and plural (10).

(9) Przeczytaj-Ø jutrzejszą   gazetę.
   read-imp[2sg]   tomorrow's   paper

(10) Przeczytaj-cie jutrzejszą   gazetę.
   read-imp[2pl]   tomorrow's   paper
   'Read tomorrow's paper.'

The singular imperative form is the least marked one – it is formed by adding a null suffix to the stem of the verb which usually is in the same form as in the third person indicative - see (11a). A small class of verbs containing a nasal vowel or nasal consonant takes the stem extension *-ij-*, like (11b). (Hansen 2010: 349)

(11) a) przeczytaj-ą →   przeczytaj-Ø
     read-ind[prs, 3pl]   read-imp[2sg]
   b) ciągn-ą   →   ciągn-ij- Ø
     pull.ind [prs, 3pl]   pull-stem-imp[2sg]

The plural imperative is formed by adding an agglutinated ending *-cie* to the second-person singular imperative (12a). However, the same grammatical paradigm also extends to form hortative clauses, which can be also conceptualized as "inclusive first-person plural imperatives" (Hansen 2010: 349). An agglutinated ending *-my* is then added (12b).

(12)   a)   przeczytaj + cie →   przeczytaj-cie

read-imp[2pl]

       b)   przeczytaj + my →   przeczytaj-my

read-imp[1pl]

Even though hortative forms are part of the same grammatical paradigm as the second person imperatives, they perform separate functions pragmatically. In the analysis, I will focus on the second-person imperatives that have a comparable range of use with the imperatives in English.

In one of the upcoming subsections, I compare the range of speech acts realized by the second person imperatives in Polish to the range of speech acts realized by English imperatives.

2.1.2. Other grammatical devices that may realize imperative speech acts

2.1.2.1. Niech +V2

Niech is originally an optative marker. Usually sentences with *niech* are translated into English using the verb 'let' or 'may'. (Andrason 2018: 591)

(13)   Niech   się   dzieje,   co   chce.

let   self   happen-ind[1sg]   what   want

'Come what may.' (lit. 'May whatever wants to happen happen.')

The sentence (13) represents the usage of the construction with the *niech* marker in permissions. These constructions also often serve as spells (14) or formal orders (15). They carry meaning that can be paraphrased as "this is my will – somebody shall act upon it".

(14) Niech się stanie światłość!
      let self become-ind[sg] light
      'Let there be light!'

(15) Niech pan spróbuje.
      let sir try-ind[1sg]
      'Please try, sir.' (lit. 'May you try, sir.')

Niech often forms conditional sentences (16). If it appears with the modifier *only*, *niech* has emotionally marked conditional function. Such sentences, like (17), are negatively charged and sound like warnings or ill-wishes.

(16) Niech będzie tak gorąco jak dzisiaj, to wszystkie
      let yet as hot as today so all
      okna pootwierają.
      windows will open-ind[3sg]
      'If it is as hot as today, they'll open all the windows.'

(17) Niech cię tylko złapię, to popamiętasz.
      let you only catch-ind[1sg] so regret-ind[2sg]
      'If I only catch you, you'll regret it."

Some scholars (Linde-Usiekniewicz 1990; Saloni 2000 and Bartnicka et al. 2004; following Hansen 2010) include the *niech* constructions in the imperative paradigm as the first- and third-person imperative (although, to me, *niech* constructions in first person sound a little odd). I will adopt more conservative approach that views *niech* as an unrelated grammatical paradigm.

The difference between *niech* constructions and classic imperatives is that *niech* sentences are not directed towards the intended agent of the action desired by the speaker. The agent of the action in question may even be unspecified whatsoever, meaning that the speaker simply wants the event to happen without caring for who exactly performs the relevant action.

Therefore, I propose that the imperative-like function of these constructions is not inherent to them but rather results from their meaning (parallel to English 'let') and contextual parameters. Since this is not the focus of the paper, I will skip any detailed discussion, but a tentative proposal for why niech-constructions serve imperative-like function will be outlined when discussing my proposal in chapter 4.

2.1.2.2. *Mieć* + V2[inf]

This is a construction that is structurally analogous with the English *have to* + infinitive. It is also semantically related, as both structures address subject's obligations.

However, although similar, *mieć* + V2 has slightly different semantic implications than its English counterpart. The difference becomes known when *mieć* + V2 is used in the past tense.

(18)   Miałam   odrobić pracę domową.
         had-ind[1sg]   to do   homework
         'I was supposed to do my homework.'

Mieć + V2 in past tense cannot be translated into English using the *have* construction. 'Had to' in past tense seems to very strongly imply that the action was in fact performed, like in (19).

(19)   Sorry I couldn't meet you yesterday, I had to do my homework.

A sentence like (19) would sound very odd in Polish if translated directly, because *mieć* + V2 carries the opposite implication of failing to perform the action despite having been obliged to perform it.

Moreover, *mieć* + V2 cannot be used to describe obligations rooted in the needs of the intended agent. Therefore, we can say sentences like (20) in English but not sentences like (21) in Polish – at least not in the intended meaning. The Polish sentences in (21) are technically possible, but they mean

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that somebody else ordered the agent to perform the action rather than the agents acting to satisfy their needs.

(20) a.   I have to drink something.

  b.   She had to go to the bathroom.

(21) a.   Mam   się   czegoś napić.
      have-ind[1sg]   self   something to drink
      * 'I have to drink something.'
      → 'I'm supposed to drink something.'

  b.   Ona   miała   iść   do   toalety.
      she   had-ind[3sg]   to go   to   toilet
      * 'She had to go to the bathroom.'
      → 'She was supposed to go to the toilet'

This difference may come from the fact that *mieć* is strongly limited to describe externally imposed obligations, while *have* is compatible with a wider range of obligation sources.

Such a distinction makes the use of *mieć* + V2 constructions in present tense analogous with imperatives, which are standardly assumed to oblige the listener to perform the action described with the imperative. It can be assumed, therefore, that the sentences in (22) are synonymous – and they do feel synonymous according to my native speaker intuition.

(22) a.   Masz   iść   spać.
      have-ind[2sg]   to go   to sleep
  b.   Idź   spać.
      go-imp[2sg]   to sleep
      'Go to sleep.'

2.1.2.3. *Proszę* + V2[inf]

This construction is formed with an operator that is a particular form of the verb *prosić*.

Scholars (Andrason 2018, Hansen 2010, Poradnia językowa PWN 2009) address this element as an operator instead of an auxiliary verb because it is not grammatically potent – the verb *proszę* only forms this type of construction in the first-person forms of the present tense indicative.

(23) a. Proszę   zachować   ciszę.
          ask-ind[1sg, pres]   keep-inf   silence
      b. Prosimy   zachować   ciszę.
          ask-ind[1pl, pres]   keep-inf   silence
          'Please remain silent.'

Proszę/prosimy (shortened to *proszę*) is not marked for gender and is marked for social distance. (Hansen 2010: 350) It is used to give polite commands, usually is a formal setting or when addressing a crowd.

The verb *prosić* is also used in requests and orders – then it takes a noun as its complement. In some contexts, both constructions may appear, which is illustrated by (24). However, *prosić* + N (22b) sounds more polite than *proszę* + V2 (24a). (Poradnia językowa PWN 2021)

(24) a. Proszę   wypełnić   ankietę.
          ask-ind[1sg, pres]   fill out-inf   survey
      b. Proszę   o   wypełnienie   ankiety.
          ask-ind[1sg, pres]   for   filling out[N]   survey
      c. Proszę, wypełnij   ankietę.
          please   fill out-imp[2sg]   survey
          'Please fill out the survey.'

The form in (24b) can be described as the most elegant one. *Proszę* with infinitives sounds more categorical. (Poradnia językowa PWN 2015) Nevertheless, both constructions are allowed to be used in a formal setting. As illustrated in (24c), *proszę* can be also used with imperatives – then it realizes a request, which contrasts with the commanding *proszę/prosimy* with infinitives. (Poradnia językowa PWN 2020) *Proszę* with imperatives is

separated with a comma and is on its way of becoming an exclamation rather than a verb – it is independent from the imperative and its function is to soften the request expressed by the imperative. (Poradnia językowa PWN 2009)

Proszę with imperatives also implies partnership and is only used to address the person directly and straightforwardly. (Poradnia językowa PWN 2003) Therefore, a sentence like (24c) can only be used in a private conversation where we personally ask our interlocutor to fill out the survey for us. On the other hand, *proszę* with infinitives mark respect and social distance, while preserving the decisiveness of a command.

2.1.3. Speech acts realized by Polish imperatives – a comparison with English imperatives

For the sake of comparison, I will refer to the list of speech acts realized by English imperatives compiled by Condoravdi & Lauer (2012).

The first group of speech acts traditionally realized by imperatives are directives. Directives are realized by the class of imperatives Roberts (2015) called 'practical imperatives' – they denote something that the addressee can do. In other words, the use of these imperatives is only felicitous if "the speaker genuinely believes that it is possible for the addressee to realize the property denoted by the VP." (Roberts 2015: 2)

Directions are the most canonical function of imperatives. Those imperatives are uttered in situations where the speaker urges the listener to do act according to speaker's desires. Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) name five different speech acts belonging to this group, illustrated by (25).

(25) a. Stand at attention.   (command)

   b. Don't touch the hot plate   (warning)

   c. Hand me the salt, please.   (request)

   d. Take these pills for a week.   (advice)

   c. Please, lend me money!   (plea)

All directive speech acts are also realized by Polish imperatives, as can be expected from the most canonical function of imperatives. This is illustrated by (26).

(26) a. Stań   na   baczność.   (command)
         stand-imp[2sg]   at   attention
         'Stand at attention.'

     b. Nie   dotykaj   gorącego   talerza. (warning)
         not   touch-imp[2sg] hot   plate
         'Don't touch the hot plate.'

     c. Podaj   mi   sól.   (request)
         hand   me   the salt
         'Hand me the salt.'

     d. Przyjmuj   te   tabletki   przez
         take-imp[2sg]   these   pills   for
         tydzień.   (advice)
         a week
         'Take these pills for a week.'

     e. Proszę, pożycz   mi   pieniądze!   (plea)
         please   lend-imp[2sg]   me   money
         'Please, lend me the money!'

Another group of practical speech acts realized by imperatives are permission-type speech acts. These speech acts are problematic for some approaches to imperatives, as they seem to appeal to the addressee's wishes rather than the addressee. (Condoravdi & Lauer 2010b)

(27)   a. Okay, go out and play.   (permission/concession)
         b. Have a cookie (if you like).   (offer)
         c. Come to dinner tonight (if you like). (invitation)

Those speech acts are also characteristic to Polish imperatives, which is illustrated in (28).

(28) a. Dobrze, wyjdź   się   pobawić.   (permission/concession)
         okay   go out-imp[2sg]   self   play
      'Okay, go play outside.'

      b. Poczęstuj   się   ciastkiem.   (offer)
         have-imp[2sg]   self   cookie
      'Help yourself with a cookie.'

      c. Przyjdź   do   mnie   wieczorem.   (invitation)
         come-imp[2sg]   to   me   this evening
      'Come to me this evening.'

There is also another type of speech act that depends on the wishes and goals of the addressee rather than the speaker and it is disinterested advice. Contrary to the regular advice, the disinterested advice does not come from the initiative of the speaker and is directly requested by the addressee. Therefore, the speaker has no interest in whether the act he refers to with the imperative will be executed or not, because its execution is in the interest of the addressee, not the speaker.

(29)   A: Excuse me, how do I get to San Francisco?
          B: Take the train from the central station.
                                    adapted from Condoravdi & Lauer (2012: 40)

This speech act, depending on its addressee, is realized slightly different in Polish. First, it is not common to use imperatives towards adult strangers, even in a context like (29). Towards adult strangers, Polish speakers usually resort to impersonal, third person speech and address their interlocutors as *Pan* 'Sir' or *Pani* 'Madam'. For me, as a native speaker, it would be the most natural to utilize a modal verb like *must* or *may* instead of an imperative. A pseudo-imperative with *niech* can be also used, but it sounds

less polite than the modal. *Proszę* with an infinitive is also plausible in this context (iv.).

(30)   A: Przepraszam,   jak   dojechać   do   San
            Francisco?

   'Excuse me, how do I get to San Francisco?'

   B: i. Musi   Pan   pojechać   pociągiem.
         must-ind[3sg] Sir   go-inf   by train

         'You must go by train, sir.'

         ii. Powinien   Pan   pojechać   pociągiem.
         should-ind[3sg] Sir   go-inf   by train

         'You should go by train, Sir.'

         iii. Niech   Pan   pojedzie   pociągiem.
         let   Sir   will go-ind[3sg] by train

         lit. 'May you go by train, sir.'

         iv. Proszę   pojechać   pociągiem.
         please   go-inf   by train

         'Please, go by train.'

The imperative can be used to realize disinterested advice if the interlocutors know each other, even briefly, or the addressee is visibly much younger than the speaker.

(31)   [Two colleagues part ways after first day of work.]

   A: Wiesz,   jak   dojechać   do   centrum?
      know-ind[2sg] how   to go   to   city center

      'Do you know how to get to the city center?'

   B: Weź   tramwaj   numer 13.
      take-imp[2sg] tram   number 13

      'Take the tram number 13.'

The last group of speech acts traditionally realized by imperatives are wish-type speech acts. Those uses are realized by imperatives which Roberts

(2015) classified as 'expressive imperatives' – imperatives that denote properties about which nothing can be done. The issue expressed by the imperative is already settled or the addressee cannot do anything about it. Therefore, expressive imperatives do not induce the addressee to act and, as the name suggests, they are used to express speaker's desire.

Condoravdi and Lauer (2012) name four wish-type speech acts realized by English imperatives.

(32)   a. Get well soon!   (well-wish)

        b. Drop dead!   (curse)

        c. Please, don't rain.   (addressee-less wish)

        d. [on the way to a blind date] Be blond!   (absent wish)

This category is a little more complicated in Polish. For wish-type speech acts, there are other, impersonal constructions that work equally well or even better for each of these speech acts. For well-wishes, imperatives are commonly used to express them, like in (33).

(33)   Wyzdrowiej   szybko!   (well-wish)

        get well-imp[2sg]   quickly

        'Get well soon!'

To express similar wishes, *niech* forms may also be used with a third person subject:

(34)   Niech   Ci   szybko   przejdzie!   (well-wish)

        let   you   fast   will pass-ind[3sg]

        'Get better soon!' (lit. 'May it pass quickly for you!')

Curses also can be expressed with both imperatives and *niech* constructions, depending on whether we refer directly to the addressee of the curse or choose to address an external force to curse our target.

(35) Zgnij   w   więzieniu!   (curse)
      rot-imp[2sg]   in   prison

      'Rot in prison!'

(36) Niech   cię   szlag   trafi!   (curse)
      let   you   blow   will strike-ind[3sg]

      'Go to hell!' (lit. 'May a blow strike you!')

For curses, another form is also available. It is formed from what was originally a connective *ażeby* – 'so that'. This operator might have grammaticalized from sentences in which the subordinate clause was introduced by *ażeby*.

(37) a. Ażebyś   zgnił   w   więzieniu!   (curse)
         so that-2sg rot-ind[3sg, pst] in   prison

         'Rot in prison!' (lit. 'So that you rot in prison')

      b. Marzę,   ażebyś   zgnił   w   więzieniu!
         I wish   so that-2sg rot-ind[3sg, pst] in   prison

         'I wish (so that) you rot in prison!'

For addressee-less wishes, imperative form is not available. Addressee-less wishes are solely expressed with *niech* constructions.

(38) Proszę,   niech   nie   pada!   (addressee-less wish)
      please   let   not   will rain-ind[3sg]

      'Please, don't let it rain!'

Lastly, imperatives are available for absent wishes. The addressee is addressed as if they were present.

(39) Bądź   blondynką!   (absent wish)
      be-imp[2sg]   a blond

      'Please be blond!'

It is worth noting here that certain work, most notably that of

Wierzbicka (1985), contends that the use of imperatives in English appears to be more restrictive, with English speakers utilizing mostly periphrastic forms like whimperatives (requests in forms of questions) to realize the speech acts associated with imperatives. Moreover, she claims that this tendency does not translate to Polish, referring to her own intuition to support her claim. Here, I would like to briefly take a moment to provide some counterarguments to this claim (regarding the comparison of the usage of imperative forms in English and Polish). First, the intuitions she reports very strongly conflict with my intuitions and the intuitions I collected informally from other Polish speakers. Based on these observations, I would like to claim that roundabout alternatives to imperatives are very robust in Polish language and it is Polish that is more restrictive towards the use of imperatives.[3] Let us discuss the biggest disagreements.

One of Wierzbicka's (1985) claims I find controversial is that Polish hosts force their hospitality onto their guests and a symptom of that is predominant use of imperatives towards guests, much more so than in English speaking countries. As an example, she mentions the English construction 'How about N?'

(40)   How about a beer?

                                   Wierzbicka (1985: 147; after Buzo 1979: 64)

She proceeds to claim that utterances in such form cannot serve as offers and can only be interpreted as genuine questions. She states that in such context, only an imperative like (41) can be interpreted as an offer. She also claims that such imperatives cannot be used in English without sounding rude.

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[3] This will be later supported by the data collected from an open question in the experiment, where participants described the attitude of the speaker towards the addressee when using the imperative – majority of the used expressions were negative.

(41)   Napij   się   piwa.
         drink-imp[2sg]   self   beer
         'Have a beer.'

However, having consulted a group of other Polish speakers of similar age, we concluded that the imperative can also sound rude in Polish depending on the relationship between the speaker and the hearer and there are more suitable expressions for offers, analogous to what is used in English. Examples are given in (42).

(42)   a.   Napił-byś   się   piwa?
                 drink-cond[2sg, m] self   beer
                 'Would you like to have a beer?'

         b.   Co   powiesz   na   piwo?
                 what   will say-ind[2sg] for   beer
                 'How about a beer?' (lit. 'What will you say for a beer?')

         c.   Masz   ochotę   na   piwo?
                 have-ind[2sg]   desire   for   beer
                 'Do you want a beer?'

Crucially, Wierzbicka (1985: 148) says about (42c.) that it "would be rather interpreted as a question rather than an offer." To me, however, the Polish sentence sounds no less like an offer than its English counterpart.

Wierzbicka (1985: 151) makes a similar claim about requests where she refuses to acknowledge that requests in Polish can have a whimperative form. She lists a number of English examples to which, allegedly, there is no Polish counterpart.

(43)   a.   Will you close the door, please?

         b.   Would you get me a glass of water?

         c.   Do you want to set the table?

However, I have often heard the exact same whimperatives in Polish. I

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believe, therefore, that it is common to use them in Polish to convey requests. The sentences in (43) can be genuinely translated into Polish and still be whimperative requests.

(44)   a.   Zamkni-esz   drzwi, proszę?
              will close-ind[2sg]   door   please
              'Will you close the door, please?'

        b.   Przyniosła-byś mi   szklankę   wody?
              bring-cond[2sg, f]   me   glass   water
              'Would you bring me a glass of water?'

        c.   Zechciał-byś   nakryć do   stołu?
              want-cond[2sg, m]   set   to   table
              'Would you want to set the table?'

The way speech acts associated with imperatives are realized in Polish and English are much more similar than Wierzbicka (1985) describes it. I wonder if the difference between how I and my peers perceive realization of those speech acts and what was argued in Wierzbicka's paper is a result of a language change that took place from 1985. Alternatively, that paper may be simply biased towards its main thesis that pragmatic mechanisms exhibited by English are not general but language specific.

One of the reasons that the argument against Wierzbicka's claims is elaborated in some detail here is that the current paper will later motivate the use of theoretical framework originally designed to tackle English imperatives to capture the semantics of Polish imperatives as well. Therefore, I want to show in greatest detail possible how analogically we can treat the imperatives and speech acts they realize in those two languages. Since the ways to realize the speech acts in question overlap in most cases in both languages, I will continue to draw parallels between the two and make the distinction when necessary.

2.2. *Wziąć* in double verb constructions (with the focus on imperatives)

Wziąć, used as a standalone, lexical verb, is a transitive, lexically perfective and non-iterative verb. (Góralczyk 2010: 90) In contrast to most aspectual verb pairs in Polish[6], it forms a suppletive pair with an imperfect verb of otherwise the same meaning – *brać*. (Andrason 2018: 595)

The use of *wziąć* in double verb constructions is not limited to imperatives. *Wziąć* can appear in a variety of grammatical contexts and its form is coordinated with the main verb. It appears to be, in principle, unrestricted when it comes to the mood and tense[7] it is used with. (45) illustrates the tense compatibility of *wziąć* in the indicative mood.

(45) a. Wzią-ł   się   zabił.
          took-ind[3sg, m]   self   killed
          'He killed himself.' (lit. 'He took killed himself.')

      b. Jutro   weź-mie   to   zapomni.
          tomorrow   will take-ind[3sg] this   will forget-ind[3sg]
          'He will forget it tomorrow.' (lit. 'He will take forget it tomorrow.')

Its coordinated grammatical form led Andrason (2018) to postulate that the Polish grammatical construction 'take' + V2 is not an auxiliary verb construction, but a serial verb construction. In this paper I use the term 'auxiliary' in its semantic aspect – as a verb that is not semantically independent and its meaning, intuitively, appears to be 'bleached.' The test that can be used to detect this is naming the action described by the double

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[6] In most cases, different aspectual forms of the same verb are marked morphologically.
[7] As all perfect verbs (in Polish), it is only compatible with future and past tense in indicative sentences.

verb construction.

(46)   Wzię-ła   umar-ła.
       took-ind[3sg, f]   died-ind[3sg, f]
       'She died.' (lit. 'She took (and) died.')

(46) can only be described as an act of 'dying', but not an act of 'taking'. The meaning of the second verb is significantly more prominent that the meaning of the first verb, 'take'.

This definition of what it means to be 'auxiliary' appears to be different from the one used by Andrason (though Andrason does not explicitly mention in the paper how he defines auxiliary verbs). Andrason (2018: 587) qualifies modal verbs in Polish like *chcieć* 'want' as auxiliaries, even though they have their independent meaning, and their structure is analogical to the English verb *want* (*want* + infinitive). *Chcieć* also takes noun arguments without significant changes in meaning

(47)   Chcę   spać.
       want-ind[1sg]   to sleep
       'I want to sleep.'

(48)   Chcę   nową   poduszkę.
       want-ind[1sg]   new   pillow
       'I want a new pillow.'

Since the classification of *wziąć* is not the focus of this paper, I intend to use the term 'auxiliary' in its semantic sense. As for the name of the construction, I will call it a 'double verb construction', which I recognize to be neutral.

The use of *wziąć* in 'take'-imperatives appears to be the most common and canonical use of this verb as an auxiliary. The auxiliary *wziąć*, when used with imperatives, intuitively can be described as an 'imperative booster.' Since in the double verb construction *wziąć* shares the TAM (time, aspect,

and modality) specification with the second verb, both verbs appear in their imperative forms. In the paper, therefore, *wziąć* will mostly appear in its second person imperative form, which is *weź* for singular, and *weźcie* for plural form.

When translating 'take'-imperative sentences to English, it is difficult to find a direct translation. *Wziąć*, in the simplest terms, emphasizes the imperative, so it mostly ends up becoming an exclamation in English like 'please' or 'come on' or is simply omitted in the translation. For example, in (49), a 'take'-imperative sentence can be translated as either a., b., or c.

(49) Weź   mi   to   zawiąż.
      take-imp[2sg]   me   this   tie-imp[2sg]
      a.   'Come on, tie it for me!'
      b.   'Please, tie it for me!'
      c.   'You tie it for me.'

'Take' appears to be used mostly to express light orders or requests. A sentence like (50) can contain both a regular imperative and a 'take'-imperative, because the request made by the speaker is a simple one, without burden on the addressee. A sentence in (51), on the other hand, conveys a much more burdensome, difficult request. Using a 'take'-imperative to voice such a request sounds very odd according to my judgement.

(50) a. Skocz   mi   po   papierosy(,   proszę).
      jump-imp[2sg]   me   for   cigarettes   please
      b. Weź   mi   skocz   po   papierosy.
      take-imp[2sg]   me   jump-imp[2sg]   for   cigarettes
      'Go get me some cigarettes (, please).'
(51) a. Wyjdź   za   mnie.
      marry-imp[2sg]   for   me

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b.#Weź   wyjdź   za   mnie.
take-imp[2sg]   marry-imp[2sg]   for   me
'Marry me.'

Another aspect of 'take'-imperatives is that they only appear in informal speech. I assume, therefore, that they are on the earlier stage of grammaticalization(Yang 2016, Mihatsch 2009) and there are no clear prescriptive norms that would systematically constrain their use. Moreover, according to the feedback from the experiment to be discussed in chapter 3, some participants claimed they avoid using these constructions whatsoever to avoid sounding 'rude' or 'uneducated'. The same participants reported that they do occasionally use 'take'-imperatives, but in combination with colloquialisms or vulgarisms, like in (52).

(52)   a. Odczep   się!
        detach-imp[2sg]   self
        b. Weź   się   odczep!
        take-imp[2sg]   self   detach-imp[2sg]
        'Get lost!' (lit. 'Detach yourself!')

When it comes to the function of *wziąć*, intuitively, it implies that the listener can do the thing that the speaker asks for but for some reason they do not. It urges the listener to take action despite their initial inaction, ignorance, or reluctance – to overcome their restraints or lack of knowledge. We can observe this in all the sample sentences with *wziąć* above. This intuition ties very well with what Starr (2020) said about imperatives upon conceptualizing them as abstract models of motivational mental states – and it is that imperatives are, in their essence, motivational. In a sentence like (53), the speaker sounds frustrated with their own inability to overcome some difficulty, so they give up and motivate the listener to **take** action. In my judgement, for (53), the 'take'-imperative b. sounds even more natural than the regular imperative a.

(53)   a. Zrób   coś   z   tym!
       do-imp[2sg]   something with   it
       b. Weź   coś   z   tym   zrób!
       take-imp[2sg]   something with   it   do-imp[2sg]
       '(Come on and) do something about it!'

Wziąć is sometimes also used alone to emphasize an imperative that is already salient in the discourse. Some scholars (Gębka-Wolak 2012, Andrason 2018) categorize this standalone *wziąć* as an element that is closer to a discourse particle than a verb. As an argument for identifying the standalone *wziąć* as a discourse particle, prosody is cited – standalone *weź* or *weźcie* is reportedly pronounced longer, with a falling tone. (Andrason 2018: 620) However, standalone *wziąć* still does show person agreement and, in my judgement, the abovementioned prosody for *wziąć* can be also used when it appears in a double imperative.

The fact that the standalone imperative *wziąć* (in its 'bleached' meaning) and *wziąć* in double imperatives are in fact the same grammatical unit can be illustrated with the following lyrics to Mata and GOMBAO 33's rap track titled *BLOK*. Amusingly enough, the following three sentences from the lyrics happen to represent three different uses of the verb *wziąć*. In (54), an imperative form of *wziąć* is used in its standard meaning 'to take'. Most importantly, (55) and (56) are in fact a wordplay in which at first *wziąć* seems to appear as a stand-alone verb to emphasize the previous imperative mentioned in the discourse, 'Don't call the cops!' in (55). However, another imperative VP appears after *wziąć*, forcing the listener to reanalyze *weź* as forming a double imperative with the newly appearing imperative instead of emphasizing the contextually salient one, yielding (56).

(54)   Łyk   metaksy   weź.
       sip   metaxa   take-imp[2sg]
       'Take a sip of metaxa.'

(55) Nie   dzwoń   na   psy!   No   weź…
     don't call-imp[2sg] for   cops   oh   take-imp[2sg]

'Don't call the cops! Oh, come on…'

(56) No   weź…   się   ogarnij.
     oh   take-imp[2sg] self   manage-imp[2sg]

'Oh come on, get a grip on yourself.'

To conclude this section, *wziąć* appears to strengthen the main imperative it appears with. It is used in informal, casual requests and its purpose is to urge the hearer to take action despite their prior idleness or apparent reluctance. In the following section, I share my initial intuitions on how the meaning of take can be linked with the meaning of imperatives.

2.3. Imperative theories

As mentioned in one of the previous sections, even though auxiliary *wziąć* can appear in variety of different modalities, its usage in imperative mood appears to be the most robust. The meaning of auxiliary *wziąć* must, therefore, exhibit some properties that facilitate its common use in imperatives.

In this section, I will explore the possibility that *wziąć* interacts with or enforces some of the pragmatic conditions imposed on imperatives. I will also establish theoretical framework for the meaning and function of imperatives that will serve as a ground to investigate its interaction with the meaning and function of the auxiliary *wziąć*.

2.3.1. Initial intuitions on the meaning of *wziąć* and the meaning of imperatives

Imperatives standardly function as performatives - sentences whose utterances trigger extra-conversational actions, speech acts. One of the key assumptions of the theory of speech acts is that performatives are subject to

felicity conditions that define what utterance of a performative constitutes a valid speech act. It is assumed that performatives must be uttered by appropriate persons in appropriate circumstances, as specified in a conventional procedure that must be correctly and completely performed. The participants ought to have the requisite mental state and are obliged to comply with consequent conduct if such is specified. (Austin, 1962)

For requests, which may be thought of as one of the fundamental speech acts enacted by imperatives, Searle (1979) proposes the following felicity conditions:

propositional content:	future act A of H
preparatory:	1. S believes H can do A
	2. It is not obvious that H would do A without being asked
sincerity:	S wants H to do A
essential:	counts as an attempt to get H to do A

Table 1: Searle's felicity conditions for requests (Levinson 1983: 240, after Searle 1979)

The preparatory conditions for a successful utterance of an a directive, the most typical interpretation of the imperative clause-type will be of special interest while discussing the usage of *wziąć*. The first preparatory condition formulated by Searle can be called an **ability condition** - a condition requiring that the speaker or the addressee can perform the relevant action. When it comes to requests, commands, and suggestions, it would simply be less than rational to get other agents to do what one knows they cannot. (Levinson, 1983)

Certain types of if-clauses seem to appeal to felicity conditions on the

illocutionary act being performed. In a sentence like (54), the if-clause lifts the ability condition that is normally assumed for directives - without it the speaker cannot felicitously utter a directive if he is uncertain about the speaker's capability to perform the action in question.

(57)   Pass me the wrench if you can.

<div align="right">Levinson (1983: 266)</div>

Downes (1977) proposes an analysis of directives (what he calls "imperatives", but here, we will reserve the term to refer to a morpho-syntactically defined clause-types to avoid confusion, or refer to "implicit imperatives") where all directives are interpreted according to the surface structure and then the directive reading is generated when a set of pragmatic conditions is satisfied – **a surface structure analysis**.

Downes discusses two types of "implicit imperatives" and the way they are derived from their surface structure. One type of such implicit imperatives are predictive sentences. A prediction may be interpreted as a directive if the speaker has authority over the addressee, and the subject is the addressee themselves (as in (58)) or the hearer believes that the future state of affairs is somehow their responsibility. The second option would be e.g., if the (59) was uttered to a teacher by their supervisor.

(58)   You will go home now.
(59)   These scripts will be marked by Thursday.

<div align="right">Downes (1977: 87)</div>

The fact that the hearer is able to recover the implicit directive (which is overtly associated with an imperative clause) behind such utterances can be attributed to cooperation between speakers - if the hearer does not do the act, they put the speaker in an awkward position of having uttered an untrue sentence.

The ambiguity between a prediction and a directive varies depending

on the details of utterance. Without getting into the details of the discourse, the sentences may be biased towards a particular interpretation (prediction vs. directive) based on how probable and dependent on the hearer it is to perform the particular action. If it is obvious that the hearer is capable and responsible of the action, it is more likely for a prediction sentence describing such action to be a directive, as it would be little informative to predict something that is likely to happen. This can be linked to the ability precondition. Therefore, a sentence like (60) which denotes an easy action (carrying out the garbage) is more likely to be interpreted as a directive than a sentence like (61) which denotes a more complicated action (getting a job in Canada).

(60)   You will carry out the garbage.
(61)   You will get a job in Canada next.

<div align="right">Downes (1977: 88)</div>

Downes (1977) further explains that it is also the ability precondition that decides how questions like (62) is interpreted.

(62)   Can you take out the trash?
(63)   Take out the trash.

Since speech acts like orders and directives should satisfy the ability condition, in a situation in which the speaker is genuinely concerned whether the hearer is able to take out the trash (e.g., the speaker is old or disabled), (62) is going to be interpreted as a genuine question. In a usual situation, however, it is obvious that an average person should have no problems with taking out the trash. We assume, therefore, that the speaker knows about the ability of the hearer, which yields a question interpretation redundant and promotes the imperative interpretation (63) instead. Such question-directives are often called **whimperatives**.

Roberts (2015) distinguishes between practical imperatives and expressive imperatives based on whether the speech act conveyed by an

imperative is subject to ability condition. To reiterate, practical imperatives are those in which the intended action is something that the addressee can do and are only felicitous if the speaker believes it is possible for the addressee to realize the property denoted by the VP. Expressive imperatives are those in which nothing can be done, and they are solely grounded in the wishes or desires of the speaker, like imperatives that realize wish-type speech acts (examples repeated below as (64) and (65)).

(64)   Enjoy the movie!
(65)   Please be blond! (Before a blind date)

<div align="right">Roberts (2015: 2)</div>

When describing the general, initial intuitions on the meaning and function of *wziąć* in the previous subsection, I mentioned that *wziąć* sounds odd when combined with verbs that describe actions that are serious, burdensome, or difficult for the addressee. Perhaps then *wziąć* strengthens the ability condition, yielding the double imperative only compatible with actions that are not only possible, but easy to perform for the addressee.

Another preparatory condition formulated by Searle (1979) was that "it is not obvious that the hearer would do the act without being asked." This ties to what Roberts (2015), among others, termed **Epistemic Uncertainty Condition**.

(66)   **Epistemic Uncertainty Condition**

the speaker holds as possible some future courses of events where the imperative prejacent p comes about and some where ¬p does

<div align="right">Roberts (2015: 3)</div>

To conclude this section, there are two conditions that appear in the literature on imperatives that are going to be of major interest in the proposed analysis of *wziąć*. One of them is the ability condition that requires the speaker to assume that the addressee of the imperative is able to perform the

act in question. Another one is the Epistemic Uncertainty Condition which simply secures that to the speaker it must be uncertain whether the desired action will take place – this becomes the motivation for the speaker to utter the imperative.

This condition can be connected with the intuition that *wziąć* emphasizes that the speaker believes the addressee has some reason not to perform the action. This intuition causes the speaker to suspect that the desired action may not be performed by the addressee and motivates the utterance of the imperative.

The interaction between the auxiliary *wziąć* and the pragmatic conditions on imperatives is the main issue to be investigated in the experiment described in chapter 3.

2.3.2. An overview of semantic theories of imperatives

Before I move onto my experiment and analysis, I would like to outline the leading semantic theories of imperatives, focusing on the preferential theory of imperatives (Condoravdi & Lauer 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2017) which motivated the upcoming experiment.

2.3.2.1. Modal operator theory of imperatives (Schwager 2006, Kaufmann & Schwager 2009, Kaufmann & Kaufmann 2012)

The modal theory of imperatives builds on the Kratzer's (1981) theory of modals, according to which modals are underspecified and their function is dependent on the conversational background of the modal. Imperatives are treated as another category of modal operators.

Schwager (2006) argues that modals are a natural starting point for a semantic theory of imperatives, as modals also exhibit some type of performative heterogeneity. Modals can be used as either descriptively (67) or performatively (68) and Schwager assumes that this allowed by the same underlying semantic form.

(67)   You may use a credit card. (They accept all major types.)

(68)   You may pay for this. (*supervisor to student in the cafeteria*)

She proposes, following Kratzer (1991), that there are two conversational backgrounds (i.e., functions from worlds to sets of propositions) relative to which modals are interpreted: modal base (69) and ordering source (70).

(69) MODAL BASE (f)
      assigns each world w a set of worlds to be taken into consideration;
      $\cap f(w)$ (the worlds at which all propositions in $f(w)$ are true)

(70) ORDERING SOURCE (g)
      assigns each world w a set of propositions that are used to induce an
      ordering relation on a set of possible worlds
      $u \leq_{g(w)} v$ iff $\{p \in g(w) \mid v \in p\} \subseteq \{p \in g(w) \mid u \in p\}$

A certain subset of modal base is of importance. It is a set of optimal worlds relatively to the ordering source g at w. There exists a set of minimal or "best" worlds for any modal base and the definition is given below in (71).

(71) $O(w, f, g) := \{u \in \cap f(w) \mid \forall v \in \cap f(w) \, [v \leq_{g(w)} u \rightarrow u \leq_{g(w)} v]\}$

Relative to the optimal worlds set, Kaufmann & Schwager (2009: 241) define a modal operator which they call *human necessity*. The definition is replicated below as (72).

(72) $\boxplus\varphi$ is true with reference to w, f, g iff φ is true at all worlds in $O(w, f, g)$

Kaufmann & Schwager (2009) then continue to define the imperative operator as analogous with the human necessity operator. The difference between the two is that imperative operators can only be used performatively,

while the human necessity operator allows for descriptive uses as well. An example for a command is replicated below as (73).

(73) Give me a call!
$\Box_{!}$[*A* calls *S*] is true w.r.t. *w*, *f*, *g* iff at all worlds in *O*(*w*, *f*, *g*) *A* calls *S*, where for any world *v*, *f* (*v*) is the set of the interlocutors' mutual joint beliefs and *g*(*v*) the set of propositions desired by *S* in *v*.

<div align="right">Kaufmann & Schwager (2009: 243)</div>

The modal operator theory accommodates the variety of imperative speech acts through the under-specification of modals. The imperative operator can take any preference related ordering source (deontic, bouletic, or teological) and, therefore, the speech act realized by the imperative varies depending on that source (e.g., commands for deontic ordering sources, advice for bouletic-teological ordering sources, etc.; cf. Condoravdi & Lauer 2010a)

Unfortunately, this under-specification is the source of problems for the modal operator theory. To account for all speech acts realized by imperatives, the standard modality distinction is not enough and Schwager has appealed to some non-standard ordering sources, e.g., 'what the speaker commands', to accommodate that. Such a solution brings back the artificial division of imperative speech acts like the classical speech-act analyses. (Condoravdi & Lauer 2010a)

Because of the under-specification, the modal operator theory cannot explain why the contextual parameters cannot be freely adjusted to meet the needs of the speaker. Condoravdi & Lauer (2010) provide an example of wish-type uses, which are constrained in distribution to certain context, i.e., the context in which it is taken for granted that the hearer cannot do anything to bring about the action or state that is the target of the imperative.

Therefore, the modal theory does not have a ready answer to why a dialog like (74) sounds odd. Since the hearer can very easily perform the target action of the imperative "Get some work done on the train.", it cannot

be interpreted as well-wish. It will be interpreted as an order even in the company of a well-wish like "Have a good trip!". However, modal theory does not place any valid constraint on the possible ordering sources, so it does not provide a ready answer why speaker's wishes cannot serve as the modal base for that imperative.

(74)   A: Have a good trip and get some work done on the train!
         B: Can you stop micro-managing me? I will do whatever the hell I please on the train.
         A: ??That was not what I meant! I just wanted to say that I hope you get work done on the train.

<div align="right">Condoravdi & Lauer (2010: 7)</div>

The modal operator theory also requires a set of conditions that ensures imperatives, unlike modal declaratives, cannot be used descriptively. The conditions proposed by Kaufmann & Schwager (2009:242-3) are replicated below.

(75)   (i)   the modal base is constituted by the context set (the set of worlds verifying all and only the mutual joint beliefs of the interlocutors) or a subset thereof,

        (ii)   the ordering source is deontic, teleological, or bouletic ("prioritizing," cf. Portner, 2007),

        (iii)   the speaker is taken to have perfect knowledge of both modal base and ordering source, that is, he counts as an epistemic authority on both matters,

        (iv)   the speaker is taken to consider the prejacent possible, and

        (v)   the negation of the prejacent does not follow from what is optimal w.r.t. the speaker's wishes.

The functional difference between the imperatives and other modals is not a natural consequence of the theoretic tool that is used to define the

semantics of imperative. A lot of additional, ad-hoc theoretic mechanisms have to be postulated to accommodate that difference.

Another criticism that can be made against the modal operator theory of imperatives is that it neglects the very important, universal clause-type distinction that languages universally make. As Portner (2012: 5) points out, "imperatives are one of the three major clause types, alongside declaratives and interrogatives, and we should aim for an explanation for why these three are universal." The modal operator theory overlooks the issue of why it is the imperative, unlike other modal operators, that are the more basic grammatical entity – imperatives are most commonly form an inflectional paradigm, while modals mostly appear as verbs and form periphrastic constructions.

For additional critique of the modal operator theory of imperatives, consult Condoravdi & Lauer (2010 and 2012).

2.3.2.2. To-Do List theory (Portner 2007, 2012)

Portner (2012), in the spirit of what he wrote about the necessity for honoring the special status of imperatives, proposes a new dynamic semantic structure to account for the meaning and use of imperatives – To-Do Lists. Portner proposes the following formulation for the meaning of imperatives.

(76)   **Pragmatic function of imperatives**

   a.   The To-Do List function T assigns to each participant α in the conversation a set of properties $T(\alpha)$,

   b.   The canonical discourse function of an imperative clause ϕ_{imp} is to add $[\![\phi_{imp}]\!]$ to $T(addressee)$. Where C is a context of the form $<CG, Q, T>$: $C + \phi_{imp} =$
   $<CG, Q, T[addressee/(T(addressee)\cup\{[\![\phi_{imp}]\!]\})]>$

   Portner (2012: 5)

Portner also proposes the following ordering pragmatics for imperatives. The To-Do Lists serve, therefore, as a "prioritizing" (Portner 2007) ordering

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source (77) that imposes an ordering on the worlds compatible with the Common ground and determines the set of actions that an agent is committed to perform.

(77)   **Ordering pragmatics for imperatives**

    (a)   Ordering of worlds:

        For any w_1, $w_2 \in \cap CG$ and any participant i, $w_1 <_i w_2$ iff for some $P \in T(i)$, $P(w_1)(i) = 1$ and $P(w_2)(i) = 0$, and for all $Q \in T(i)$, if $Q(w_2)(i) = 1$, then $Q(w_1)(i) = 1$.

    (b)   Agent's commitment:

        For any participant i, the participants in the conversation mutually agree to deem i's actions rational and cooperative to the extent that those actions in any world $w_1 \in \cap CG$ tend to make it more likely that there is no $w_2 \in \cap CG$ such that $w_2 <_i w_1$.

To account for heterogeneity of imperative uses, Portner suggests that To-Do Lists have 'sections' (subsets) that correspond to various speech acts that imperatives realize: 'obligations' section for commands, 'desires' section for invitations, etc. However, Portner (2012: 7) does not model these sections and gives just "suggestive" descriptions that "show the point", even admitting that "firm definitions may be impossible." The definitions formulated by Portner include a lot of vague elements in general with expressions like "tend to make it more likely" in the case of the definition of agent's commitment.

The most general problem with the To-Do Lists approach is that it introduces a new discourse entity that has no other function than monitoring the effects of imperatives. On top of that, it cannot even readily account for the whole range of imperative uses. The To-Do List approach necessarily makes references to the addressee and their obligations. Therefore, its capability to accommodate addressee-less uses like *Please don't rain!* or *Be blond!* is limited from the get-go.

Roberts (2015) also points out that it may be problematic for the To-Do Lists approach to account for embedded imperatives. The function of the imperative is supposed to operate on the addressee's To-Do List and it is not clear why or how the pragmatic conditions would be supposed to apply in such embeddings, as the imperative is not used to issue a direction anymore.

For additional critique of the modal operator theory of imperatives, consult Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) and Roberts (2015).

2.3.2.3. Preferential theory of imperatives (Condoravdi & Lauer 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2017)

Lastly, Condoravdi & Lauer (2010a, 2011, 2012, 2017) conceptualized imperatives as speaker's public commitment to a preference. This theory consolidates preference-based ordering source aspect of the modal operator theory with agent's commitment and obligation that characterizes the To-Do List approach.

As for the main, preferential aspect of this theory, Condoravdi & Lauer embrace the idea that at a certain time and place, people can have different, often conflicting preferences that are based on different criteria. However, not all such preferences have the same rank – our level of satisfaction from following different preferences differs for every preference. For example, since humans are programmed to minimalize effort, the majority of people has the preference to do nothing all the time. However, the world is constantly developing, and we do complete some tasks during the day – it is because our preference for performing these activities is given higher priority than the preference for laziness. Those preferences are rooted in different criteria but relate to the same course of action.

Condoravdi & Lauer incorporate this idea into their theory of imperatives by proposing that such preferences are tracked with discourse tools called preference structures. The definition of a preference structure is replicated below.

(78)   A **preference structure** relative to an information state W is a pair $<P,\leq>$, where $P \subseteq \wp(W)$ and $\leq$ is a (weak) partial order on P.

<div align="right">Condoravdi & Lauer (2011: 153)</div>

Agents are expected to act according to their preferences. In principle, an agent can have inconsistent preference structures that reflect different conditions or include conflicting preferences. However, to decide which action to perform, a rational agent must choose one, consistent preference structure. Condoravdi & Lauer (2011) adopt a weaker definition of consistency, which simply requires all the logically and contextually inconsistent propositions to be strictly ranked.

(79)   A preference structure $<P,\leq>$ is **consistent** iff for any $p, q \in P$ such that $p \cap q = \emptyset$, either $p < q$ or $q < p$.

<div align="right">Condoravdi & Lauer (2011, 153)</div>

Such a global, consistent preference structure is called **effective preference structure** in the world W.

Another feature of the preferential theory of imperatives is that it builds on an idea that the main function of utterances is to update speaker's commitments. Commitments are taken not only to constrain future discourse states, but also non-linguistic actions and actions performed after the discourse ends. In other words, commitments exclude possible future states of the world.

For an agent, there are two elements that constitute commitments in the discourse: public effective preferences (80a.) and public beliefs (80b.).

(80)   a.   **Public effective preference**

$PEP_w(A, p)$

A is publicly committed at w to act as though p is a maximal element of A's effective preference structure.

b. **Public belief**

$PB_w(A, p)$

A is publicly committed at w to act as though he believes p.

Condoravdi & Lauer (2012: 46)

Relative to these theoretical devices, the imperative operator is then defined as follows:

(81) $[\![IMP]\!]^C := \lambda p[\lambda w[PEP_w(Sp, p)]]$

Condoravdi & Lauer (2012: 48)

This means that by uttering an imperative, the speaker commits themself to a preference that the addressee performs the action in question.

The preferential theory consolidates preferences with obligations by modelling obligations as resulting from cooperation mechanisms - the interlocutors adjust their preference structures according to their common or respective goals. The cooperation principle is defined in (82).

(82) COOPERATION BY DEAFULT

An agent A is cooperative-by-deafult iff he adds any topical goal g of another agent to his effective preference structure, such as for any preference structure P_A: for no $p \in P_A : p < g$.

Condoravdi & Lauer (2012: 50)

Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) bring up this principle to account for disinterested advice or concession uses, where for the former, the speaker does not really care about the realization of the target action of the imperative, and for the latter, the speaker appears to have preferences conflicting with the preference expressed with an imperative. The preference g of the addressee is added to the speaker's agenda and becomes a common goal for the time of the conversation to the extent delimited by conflicting, self-motivated preferences ranked higher in the preference structure. This is the reason why, if asked by a stranger for directions, people usually give them verbally (using

an imperative) rather than accompanying the addressee on their way to make sure they arrive at their destination. There is a higher, self-motivated preference that makes that option unavailable. (Condoravdi & Lauer 2017)

I would like to go one step further and propose that the cooperative principle is the source of the sense of obligation of the addressee to perform the target action of the imperative. Although the definition above is weak, the level of authority that the speaker has over the addressee or emotional bond between the interlocutors may prompt the addressee to rank the speaker's preferences higher than their own. If the addressee is inferior to the speaker or they care for the speaker, the level of respect, fear, or fondness determines then the respective ranking of the preference of the speaker in the preference structure of the addressee.

This extension does not jeopardize the way the preferential theory accounts for addressee-less imperatives like "Please, don't rain!" because it is based on a pragmatic, conversational principle – if there is no interlocutor, there is no conversation, and the principle does not apply. In such cases, the imperative serves to express the speaker's desire (preference) and since there is no addressee, nobody else is obliged to incorporate that desire into their respective preference structure.

Apart from this novel framework, the preferential theory preserves both the Epistemic Uncertainty Condition and the ability condition, the latter being a predicting factor in whether the utterance of an imperative counts as addressee inducement. The addressee inducement, along with the speaker's and addressee's preferences, was the categorizing criterion in the classification of imperative speech acts outlined in the section 2.1.3.

The experiment described in the next section is, therefore, designed to check how well the preferential theory can account for the acceptability of Polish imperative sentences and their interaction with the auxiliary *wziąć*. There must be a reason why the auxiliary *wziąć* is most used in imperative clauses in comparison with other clause types and perhaps the preferential

theory will allow us to discover that link.

Chapter 3. Experiment

3.1. Purpose of the experiment

In the previous section I provided my evaluation of various intuitions and observations on the meaning and usage of the auxiliary *wziąć*. However, as I mentioned regarding some other research on *wziąć*, my intuitions need not and often do not reflect the intuitions of other native speakers of Polish. Since there are no prescriptive guidelines to the usage of *wziąć* in double imperatives, I decided to conduct a survey on native speakers of Polish to provide myself with a reference point in my analysis of the use and meaning of imperatives and the auxiliary *wziąć*. This way I make sure that I will not solely base my analysis on intuitions that are only an element of my own idiolect or that are biased. Such an experiment provides us with a more reliable set of language intuitions upon which relevant theories can be developed.

Most importantly, I want to check what 'take'-imperative sentences are judged to be significantly less natural than standard imperatives by Polish natives and, therefore, what makes an imperative incompatible with an auxiliary *wziąć*. At the end of the previous section, I talked about my intuition that the reason *wziąć* is robustly used with imperatives is that the meaning of the auxiliary *wziąć* plays into the conditions that facilitate the canonical use of an imperative: ability condition and Epistemic Uncertainty Condition. The experiment was designed in hopes of measurably comparing these factors and checking for any correlation between them.

3.2. Methods

3.2.1. Participants

I recruited 32 adult native speakers of Polish (27 female, 5 male) by

posting a link to the experiment with its description on social media platforms (Facebook and Instagram) and by adopting the 'snowball sampling' method (i.e., by messaging people that would be interested in participation directly and encouraging them to also share the experiment with other potentially interested people). The participants were from diverse age groups and parts of the country, but most of the participants (81,25%) were college educated.

3.2.2. Stimuli

As stimuli, I prepared 72 recordings of 36 imperative sentences – items that are predicted to instantiate 12 different speech acts that can be realized by imperatives, as categorized by Condoravdi & Lauer (2012). For each speech act type, I devised 3 items, resulting in 36 distinct items in total. Out of the original 13 speech acts, I excluded the 'adressee-less wish', which in Polish is realized with the optative particle *niech*. Therefore, the 12 speech acts included were: command, warning, request, advice, plea, well-wish, curse, absent wish, permission/concession, offer, invitation, and disinterested advice. Some target sentences were direct translations of examples provided by Condoravdi & Lauer (2012, 2017), other were analogous sentences designed by the experimenter.

Each of the sentences appeared in one of two versions: either with or without the auxiliary *wziąć*. Each participant was exposed to all 36 items, half of them in the 'take'-imperative variant, and half of them in the standard variant distributed randomly. A full list of target sentences with their translations is available in the Appendix I. A sample item in two versions is given in (83).

(83) i. Nie   baw   się   jedzeniem.
      not   play-imp[2sg]   self   with food

      ii. Weź   nie   baw   się   jedzeniem.
      take-im[2sg]   not   play-imp[2sg]   self   with food

      'Don't play with food.'

Considering the length (36 target items, most with 5 experimental questions) and already complicated design of the experiment (12 x 2 independent variables (or even 36 x 2 considering the possibility of item-by-item analysis) and 4 dependent variables), I only included the singular imperative forms, as they are the more common ones.

I decided to include recordings instead of written sentences because 'take'-imperatives are predominantly used in spoken Polish and, therefore, seeing 'take'-imperatives written could potentially look 'odd' to Polish speakers. The sentences were recorded by the researcher, aiming to maintain similar prosody throughout all the recordings of the same imperative type ('take' and standard).

Each target sentence recording was paired with a short text providing the context for the utterance. The given context was minimal and was supposed to be suitable for the use of the standard imperative. A full list of descriptions with their translations is available in the Appendix A. An English translation of the context for the sample item (83) is given in (84).

(84) 'A mother is sitting at the table with her child. The child is almost done eating and, bored, is playing with their food. The mom says.'

The dialogs took place between interlocutors of different relationships (mother-child, daughter-father, coworkers, etc.), but all the presented situations allowed for the use of the standard imperative according to my native intuition.

Perhaps it would have been beneficial for the analysis of the results to control for the different type of relationships and make it another factor in the experiment but considering again the length and already complicated design of the experiment I have finally decided to not include it as a variable and focus on the variables related to the imperative conditions. I did, however, take into consideration the character of the relationship between the speaker and the listener when analyzing the results item-by-item.

The 36 target items were intertwined with 8 control items, which resulted in the experiment consisting of 44 items in total.

Most of the items will be discussed in detail in section 3.3. Again, for a full list of items and their corresponding context descriptions, please consult Appendix A.

3.2.3. Procedure

The experiment was conducted through an online survey on PC IBEX (Zehr & Schwarz 2018).[8] The participants were only told at the beginning that they will report their judgments on selected sentences from colloquial Polish. The participants first read the consent and instructions to the experiment. Then the experiment proper began. A given trial consisted of the context prompt, the sentence recording, and one to five questions depending on the type of the item, the experimental condition, and the number of the item. The English translations of all questions are given in (85).

(85) i.   How natural does the sentence sound, given the context?
      ii. How ironic, humorous, or metaphorical does the sentence sound? (non-literal speech control)
      iii. Prior to the utterance, how willing do you think the addressee was in performing the action (described by the utterance)?
      iv. How difficult does the action seem to be for the addressee?
      v.   How would you describe the attitude of the speaker towards the addressee?

Participants first read a short description of a situation in which the sentence is uttered and then clicked to move to the next screen where they listened to the target sentence. There was no time limit for either the context

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[8] Link to the demostration version of the experiment: https://farm.pcibex.net/r/rwGmwJ/

prompt or the target sentence recording. Participants were able to listen to the recording once again if necessary. Then they moved on to the next screen to answer the first question.

The first question was a 1 to 7 Likert scale question asking the participants to judge how natural the sentence from the recording was considering given context. This question appeared in all trials. This question was inspired by many other experiments that asked the participants to judge the naturalness of a sentence (e.g., Jeong 2020, Cardillo et al. 2010)

The second question was also a 1 to 7 Likert scale question asking the participants to judge how ironic, humorous, or metaphorical the sentence sounds. This question is formulated this way because different people define irony or jokes differently, so I chose to incorporate all those descriptive words just to generally control for non-literal speech. This question was not included in control trials. This sentence was inspired by how Cardillo et al. (2010) used Likert scale to measure the figurativeness of sentences.

Questions from 3 to 5 are only included for target trials with sentences that have an addressee. These experimental questions are also originally designed as they directly address the research questions posed by this paper[9]. The third question is how willing the addressee was to perform the action prior to the utterance. This question was intended to probe participants' intuitions that relate to the Epistemic Uncertainty Condition, because unwillingness to perform the task is the reason for the speaker to suspect that the action may not be performed. I refer to this as a **preference** for performing the action in the design of the experiment.

The fourth question is how difficult the action seems to be for the addressee. This is supposed to measure the ability condition - the easier the action is judged to be for the addressee, the more likely that the ability condition would be fulfilled. I refer to this variable as **ability**.

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[9] Although the question nr. 5 is so general I assume it could have been utilized before.

There is also a 5th descriptive question about the attitude of the speaker towards the addressee. It is going to be optional and appear in only one item of each speech condition. If I included this question as an obligatory one and attach it to all items, the survey would be considerably too long for the participants, especially considering the voluntary nature of participant recruitment.

The experiment was followed with an exit demographic survey and a brief debriefing, in which an explanation about the real purpose of the study (which is to investigate the use of 'take'-imperatives in comparison with standard imperatives) was provided.

3.3. Results overview

In the analysis, mixed effects ordinal regression models were fitted to the data. Each of the ratings was included as the dependent variable in the relevant model (e.g., naturalness ratings), and speech act (or item) and imperative type (standard/'take') were included as a predictors. Random intercepts were posited for participants to account for difference in ratings baselines depending on the participant.

3.3.1. General results

On average, the participants judged sentences 'take'-imperatives to be significantly less natural than standard imperatives ($\beta = -0.945$[10], SE = 0.112, z = -8.426, p < 2e-16). As can be seen from the box plot below, 'take'-imperatives also showed a wider distribution of scores, meaning that such imperatives are not consistently judged as less natural, but that they receive mixed scores from the participants. It provides some evidence that 'take'-imperatives are more restricted in use than their standard imperative counterparts.

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[10] All the numbers are rounded up to three decimal places, unless smaller than 0.001.

The participants appear to be divided on the evaluation of 'take imperatives. This is something I would expect from a recently grammaticalized unit as a natural consequence of the fact that grammaticalization is a ripple effect - if it only recently started spreading among speakers, there will be less speakers exposed to it and the degree of exposure will vary. (Hopper & Traugott, 2003) Some participants judged 'take'-imperatives to be, generally, equally natural, or even more natural than standard imperatives, while other participants highly penalized imperatives, giving them low or mixed rankings.

Figure 1: A boxplot and jitter of naturalness ratings by imperative type;
i – standard imperative, w – 'take'-imperative

Perhaps in case of those participants who did not make a significant distinction between 'take'-imperatives and standard imperatives, *wziąć* is on a higher degree of grammaticalization and serves a function that is indeed closer to an emphatic particle rather than an auxiliary. Perhaps for some speakers, the meaning of *wziąć* becomes bleached to the point of being a simple emphatic particle for imperatives. Gębka-Wolak (2012) elaborates on how *wziąć* can be viewed from both perspectives. Such speakers would not be as sensitive to the semantic implications of *wziąć*, which would result in a

high overall acceptance rate for the sentences they appear in (e.g., participants 18 or 19 in the boxplot below). The detailed data is given in the Figures 2 and 3 below.

Figure 2: A boxplot and jitter of naturalness scores by participant for standard imperatives (each box represents one participant's answer)

Figure 3: A boxplot and jitter of naturalness scores by participant for 'take'-imperatives (each box represents one participant's answer)

Most importantly for the upcoming analysis, high preference scores significantly correlated with lower naturalness scores for 'take'-imperative sentences than for the standard imperatives. It means that if the participants

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considered the listener to be rather willing to perform the action denoted by the imperative, they also perceived 'take'-imperatives used in that situation to be less natural.

As can be observed in Table 2, the effect was significant for preference scores above the baseline (level 4): level 5 ($\beta = -1.101$, SE $= 0.475$, z $= -2.315$, p < 0.021), level 6 ($\beta = -0.797$, SE $= 0.42$, z $= -1.897$, p < 0.058), and level 7 ($\beta = -1.101$, SE $= 0.431$, z $= -1.679$, p < 0.093).

imperative type : preference	β[11]	Std. Error	z value	p	Significance[12]
'take':1	0.150	0.436	0.343	0.732	
'take':2	-0.118	0.496	-0.237	0.813	
'take':3	-0.385	0.542	-0.711	0.477	
'take':5	-1.101	0.475	-2.315	0.021	*
'take':6	-0.797	0.420	-1.897	0.058	.
'take':7	-0.723	0.431	-1.679	0.093	.
'take' (baseline)	-0.561	0.317	-1.769	0.077	.

Table 2: Interaction between preference and imperative type on naturalness; level 4 preference[13] and standard imperative as baseline

The general trend was the reverse – imperatives were judged to be significantly more natural as the addressee's preference rose (refer to the Table 3 for the data).

The imperatives were judged to be more natural overall when the addressee seemed willing to perform the action - perhaps due to how straightforward the imperative is compared to other forms of realizing directive speech acts (e.g., questions). If the imperative is uttered to order an action that the addressee is unwilling to perform, the imperative has a higher chance of sounding rude and inappropriate. Therefore, we can observe that

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[11] Coefficient value – shows the effect .
[12] I assume the probability must be lower than 0.1 for the result to be significant:
    $0.1 > p > 0.01$ – slightly significant (.)
    $0.01 > p > 0.001$ – significant (*)
    $p < 0.001$ – highly significant (**)
[13] Level 4 as the middle of the scale –likely to indicate that the participant perceives the addressee to be neutral towards the action.

when the participants judged the preference lower (either 1 or 2), they also judged the naturalness to be lower than baseline (the effect being -0.871 and -0.722 respectively).

The reverse pattern (giving lower naturalness rating with higher preference rating) for 'take'-imperatives suggests that 'take'-imperatives do emphasize reluctance or restraint of the addressee of the imperative, which was previously describes as related to the Epistemic Uncertainty Condition imposed on the imperatives.

preference	β	Std. Error	z value	p	Significance
1	-0.871	0.316	-2.755	0.006	**
2	-0.722	0.359	-2.012	0.044	*
3	0.127	0.423	0.300	0.764	
5	0.971	0.368	2.639	0.008	**
6	1.253	0.317	3.956	7.61E-05	**
7	2.568	0.326	7.879	3.30E-15	**

Table 3: Interaction between naturalness and preference for all imperatives; level 4 preference as baseline

Unfortunately, naturalness showed no significant correlation with imperative type and difficulty.

Difficulty	β	Std. Error	z value	p	Significance
'take':1	-0.485	0.38377	-1.264	0.206	
'take':2	-0.433	0.43532	-0.996	0.319	
'take':3	-0.091	0.50895	-0.178	0.859	
'take':5	-0.576	0.46382	-1.241	0.214	
'take':6	-0.088	0.48541	-0.182	0.855	
'take':7	0.247	0.43105	0.572	0.567	
'take' (baseline)	-0.727	0.29922	-2.429	0.015	*

Table 4: Interaction between difficulty and imperative type on naturalness; level 4 difficulty and standard imperative as baseline

Perhaps any effects of the 'take'-imperative were offset by the fact that difficulty showed highly significant negative interaction with imperatives in general, which is represented in the Table 5. Imperatives in general were

judged to be much more natural when the action was the easiest for the addressee (difficulty levels 1 and 2). This supports the ability condition as a crucial factor in the evaluation of legitimate imperative use.

In fact, for the highest level of difficulty, 7, a non-significant but reverse effect can be observed ($\beta = 0.247$, $SE = 0.431$, $z = 0.572$, $p < 0.567$).

Difficulty	β	Std. Error	z value	p	Significance
1	1.938	0.29477	6.576	4.82E-11	**
2	1.126	0.34157	3.297	0.001	**
3	0.465	0.40572	1.145	0.252	
5	0.485	0.34254	1.415	0.157	
6	0.156	0.35825	0.436	0.663	
7	-0.499	0.3235	-1.541	0.123	

Table 5: Interaction between naturalness and difficulty for all imperatives; level 4 difficulty[14] as baseline

This effect becomes marginally significant when level 1 difficulty is taken as baseline ($\beta = 0.732$, $SE = 0.396$, $z = 1.846$, $p < 0.065$). Later I discuss how such a phenomenon may be related to speakers more readily accommodating 'take'-imperatives than standard imperatives in highly unconventional context for imperative utterances due to their emotive characteristics. The context I am talking about are curses where the addressee has neither preference nor the ability to perform the action, but the utterances are negatively charged. I explain below how such a mechanism can work.

3.3.2. Detailed results – discussion

For some speech acts, *wziąć* was judged to be significantly less natural than for others. The details are presented in Table 6.

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[14] Level 4 as the middle of the scale – means that the action is neither particularly difficult nor easy for the addressee.

Speech act	'Take'-imperative		Standard imperative		Mean difference[1]	β	P	S[2]
	Mean naturalness	Standard deviation	Mean naturalness	Standard deviation				
ADVICE	5.440	1.63	5.978	1.65	-0.538	-0.792	0.136	
ABSENT WISH	4.040	2.16	4.761	2.20	-0.721	-0.740	0.153	
COMMAND	5.761	1.64	6.720	0.61	-0.959	-1.597	0.005	**
CURSE	4.261	2.03	4.300	2.17	-0.039	-0.052	0.885	
DISINTERESTED ADVICE	5.280	1.84	5.891	1.72	-0.611	-0.781	0.142	
INVITATION	5.152	1.90	5.080	2.07	0.072	0.021	0.968	
OFFER	5.060	2.05	6.239	1.59	-1.179	-1.527	0.006	**
PERMISSION	4.609	1.91	5.340	2.04	-0.731	-0.821	0.111	
PLEA	4.370	2.18	5.340	1.93	-0.970	-1.038	0.045	*
REQUEST	4.891	2.07	5.900	1.53	-1.009	-1.152	0.028	*
WARNING	5.840	1.71	6.630	1.00	-0.790	-1.202	0.041	*
WELL-WISH	3.840	2.36	6.478	1.22	-2.638	-3.068	9.98E-08	**

Table 6: Naturalness data per speech act: mean, standard deviation, and coefficients among naturalness, speech act, and imperative type (curse[15] and standard imperative as baseline)
1 – 'take'- minus standard imperative mean, 2 – significance marking

The speech act for which the naturalness of 'take'-imperatives was judged to be the lowest was well-wish. It was also judged to be significantly less natural than the standard imperatives, with large effect sizes (β = -3.068, SE = 0.576, z = -5.329, p < 9.88E-08). This finding is consistent with what we previously assumed about *wziąć* – that it is bound to the ability condition. In well-wishes, it is commonly assumed that there is nothing that the addressee can do in relation to the action denoted by the imperative sentence. However, in the case other wish-type speech acts (curses and absent wishes) which also are not subject to the ability condition, the naturalness scores are not significantly lower for 'take'-imperatives. Some other factor must also be at play in the way 'take'-imperatives are perceived by Polish speakers.

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[15] Curse was selected as baseline as a speech act that showed the smallest difference in mean naturalness between the two imperative types.

Speech act	Item	'Take'-imperative		Standard imperative		Mean difference[1]	β	P	S
		Mean naturalness	Standard deviation	Mean naturalness	Standard deviation				
COMMAND	1	6.071	1.14	6.778	0.73	-0.706	-1.616	0.158	
	2	5.667	1.71	6.714	0.47	-1.048	-0.811	0.504	
	3	5.571	1.99	6.667	0.59	-1.095	-0.830	0.421	
WARNING	4	5.167	2.12	6.286	1.64	-1.119	-1.046	0.398	
	5	6.071	1.07	6.833	0.51	-0.762	-1.573	0.172	
	6	6.333	1.50	6.714	0.47	-0.381	0.524	0.676	
REQUEST	7	5.857	1.29	6.333	0.84	-0.476	-0.047	0.961	
	8	5.889	1.28	6.786	0.43	-0.897	-1.188	0.337	
	9	2.643	1.78	4.778	1.93	-2.135	-1.659	0.085	.
ADVICE	10	5.000	1.68	5.857	1.66	-0.857	-0.435	0.709	
	11	6.143	0.95	6.167	1.62	-0.024	-0.703	0.364	
	12	5.333	1.88	5.857	1.79	-0.524	-0.088	0.940	
PLEA	13	4.571	2.06	3.944	2.07	0.627	1.114	0.237	
	14	4.611	2.40	6.286	1.33	-1.675	-1.339	0.259	
	15	3.857	2.07	6.000	1.37	-2.143	-1.667	0.087	.
WELL-WISH	16	4.500	2.09	6.214	1.42	-1.714	-1.416	0.234	
	17	4.929	2.30	6.667	0.97	-1.738	-2.071	0.056	.
	18	2.333	1.94	6.500	1.34	-4.167	-4.663	0.0002	**
CURSE	19	4.000	2.22	3.278	2.19	0.722	1.628	0.088	.
	20	4.944	1.89	6.000	1.11	-1.056	-0.455	0.691	
	21	3.643	1.86	4.000	2.06	-0.357	0.533	0.570	
ABSENT WISH	22	3.833	2.07	5.000	2.39	-1.167	-0.743	0.525	
	23	3.643	2.27	4.611	2.15	-0.968	-0.273	0.776	
	24	4.556	2.18	4.714	2.23	-0.159	0.276	0.813	
PERMISSION	25	4.286	1.90	4.500	2.38	-0.214	0.307	0.747	
	26	4.167	1.76	5.071	1.44	-0.905	-0.007	0.995	
	27	5.500	1.95	6.389	1.65	-0.889	-1.340	0.217	
OFFER	28	4.833	1.86	6.071	2.16	-1.238	-1.950	0.119	
	29	5.143	2.28	6.333	1.46	-1.190	-0.737	0.466	
	30	5.222	2.16	6.286	1.14	-1.063	-0.520	0.666	
INVITATION	31	3.714	1.94	3.444	1.92	0.270	0.955	0.303	
	32	5.500	1.65	5.357	1.82	0.143	0.711	0.540	
	33	6.143	1.29	6.500	1.04	-0.357	-0.088	0.932	
DISINTERESTED ADVICE	34	5.278	1.99	6.429	1.09	-1.151	-0.808	0.499	
	35	5.714	1.27	5.778	2.07	-0.063	-0.103	0.918	
	36	4.944	2.07	5.500	1.70	-0.556	0.183	0.875	

Table 7: Naturalness data per speech act: mean, standard deviation, and coefficients among naturalness, speech act, and imperative type (curse[16] and standard imperative as baseline)

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[16] 11th item was selected as baseline as an item that showed the smallest

'Take'-imperatives received significantly lower scores for four out of five directive speech acts: command, request, plea, and warning. Item nr 9 (request) and 15 (plea) were judged to be significantly less natural in the 'take'-imperative variant.

3.3.2.1. Commands

Commands included the following three items (English translations given for conciseness):

(86)   Don't play with food.

(mother to child at the table)

(87)   Sit straight.

(teacher to the student during piano lesson)

(88)   Do your homework.

(grandmother to her grandchild after coming back from school)

All these sentences are situations in which the person of higher authority is commanding the person subordinate to them. Gębka-Wolak (2012) in her survey on the usage of 'take'-imperatives, reported that the participants often described the 'take'-imperatives as "rude and without respect." Therefore, I avoided contexts in which a command is uttered towards a person who is higher than the speaker in the social hierarchy, as even uttering an imperative sentence to convey a command in such a setting sounds rude on its own. Yet 'take'-imperatives were judged to be significantly lower than standard imperatives in the experiment. There were no significant differences in the naturalness ranking between the items (refer to the Table 7), even though the relation between the speaker in the sentence (87) was an institutional one in contrast with the family relations in (86) and (88).

Commands were given a mean difficulty rating of 2.75 (SD = 1.925), which means that the target actions for the commands were perceived as

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difference in mean naturalness between the two imperative types.

significantly easier than for other speech acts (β = -0.731, SE = 0.257, z = -2.841, p < 0.004[17]). Commands also received quite high preference score of 5.292 (SD = 1.710), but it was not statistically significant (β = 0.396, SE = 0.267, z = 1.484, p < 0.138[18]).

Considering the open question answers that asked to describe the attitude of the speaker and the feedback from the participants, Polish speakers have mixed perception of 'take'-imperatives. Some participants described 'take'-imperatives in commands as expressing 'irritation' or 'resentment'. As mentioned before, one of the participants left a comment that they only use 'take'-imperatives in derogatory sentences. On the other hand, there were also participants that described the 'take'-imperatives as 'caring'.

Perhaps these mixed emotional responses were what contributed to the lower naturalness scores for 'take'-imperatives in commands. All the above commands are addressed towards a much younger person by someone of authority. Just by using an imperative those persons are already authoritative and categorical – even 'admonishing' or 'berating' in the words of the participants. Perhaps to some participants using an emotionally charged auxiliary on top of an already authoritative imperative sounds too harsh to be used towards a child or a student.

However, it is worth mentioning that the naturalness score of 'take'-imperatives in commands is still relatively high (5.761, the second highest mean naturalness for speech acts). Standard imperatives were judged to be the most natural to realize commands out of all speech acts at 6.720 naturalness mean.

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[17] With advice as baseline – as a speech act whose difficulty score was the closest to the neutral 4.
[18] With request as baseline – as a speech act whose preference score was the closest to the neutral 4.

3.3.2.2. Requests and pleas

For another directive speech act, requests, it appears there was one item in particular that received significantly lower naturalness scores in the 'take'-imperative variant – item number 9, for which English translation is given in (89).

(89)   Buy me an apartment.

(girl to her father after an argument over bathroom use)

Because it involves an action that is difficult to grant by the addressee, one of the reviewers raised a concern whether item 9 is a request at all. However, I purposely chose this item for this experiment, as I wanted to check for the difference in how the participants will judge the two imperative variants when the request addresses an action that is difficult or burdensome for the addressee. Departing from whether this item can be defined as a request, what is important is that it this item has received significantly lower naturalness score in its 'take'-imperative variant than the standard-imperative variant.

Since some scholars associate 'take'-imperatives with lack of respect, one may wonder whether the fact that a daughter, being lower in the social hierarchy, uses the 'take'-imperative towards her father is the problem. However, in the item 14, we also have a situation in which a child addresses their parent and, in this case, although the naturalness difference between the standard imperative and 'take'-imperative did favor the standard imperative, it was not significant ($\beta = -1.339$, SE $= 1.187$, z $= -1.128$, p < 0.259).

Item 9 received significantly low preference score at 1.875 ($\beta = -2.834$, SE $= 0.481$, z $= -5.895$, p $< 3.74E-09$). The general analysis pointed to a significant correlation between preference and 'take'-imperatives naturalness, but it was only significant for high preference scores, and it pointed in the opposite direction – high preference scores correlated with low naturalness. Therefore, it is difficult to explain the lower naturalness of 'take'-imperatives for item 9 merely with its low preference score. There must be some other,

perhaps correlated factor at play.

On the other hand, item nine received significantly high difficulty rate compared with other items: 5.906 on the 7-point scale ($\beta = 1.952$, SE $= 0.455$, $z = 4.288$, $p < 1.80E\text{-}05$). Difficulty and 'take'-imperative naturalness did not show any consistent correlation in general, but perhaps there is another factor related to difficulty that makes this request less compatible with the 'take'-imperative.

Zinken (2013: 44) writes that 'take'-imperative requests pertain to matters that the addressee could, or rather should be already concerned with. 'Take'-imperatives then 'dislodge' their addressees from their intended course of action and put them back on the appropriate track – the track of performing the action requested with the 'take'-imperative. Perhaps then it is not directly the difficulty of the action itself that affects the use of 'take'-imperatives, but rather how readily the action can be performed by the addressee and how naturally it fits the situation of the addressee and their following conduct. Such an addressee-oriented definition of difficulty would explain why the interaction between 'take'-imperative naturalness and preference is only significant for high preference scores. If the addressee has significantly low preference for performing the action, it may count as one of the factors that makes it psychologically difficult for them to perform the action, even though action itself may be easy.

This difference can be illustrated with another item, item 15. It's English translation is given in (90). This item was also judged as significantly less natural in its 'take'-imperative variant - 3.857 point mean on the 7-point scale – than in its standard imperative variant – 6 point mean on the 7-point scale ($\beta = -1.667$, SE $= 0.975$, $z = -1.71$, $p < 0.087$).

(90)   Please, don't break up with me. (lit. Don't walk away from me.)
                                        (girl to her boyfriend during an argument)

The participants judged this action neutrally, both in terms of difficulty

(4.125 points; $\beta = 0.049$, SE = 0.425, z = 0.115, p < 0.908) and preference (3.75 points; $\beta = -0.349$, SE = 0.439, z = -0.794, p < 0.427). However, even though the action staying with someone isn't difficult per se, it has high gravity and consequences. The other plea items did receive quite high difficulty rankings: 5.125 points for item 13 ($\beta = 1.083$, SE = 0.430, z = 2.519, p < 1.18E-02) and 5.156 points for item 14 ($\beta = 1.385$, SE = 0.454, z = 3.047, p < 0.002). It did not, however, necessarily correlate with low naturalness for those items (given below as (91) and (92)).

(91)   Please, lend me some money.

<div align="right">(man to his colleague on the phone)</div>

(92)   Please, don't leave me here.

<div align="right">(child to their mother at the kindergarten)</div>

Perhaps then it is then not about the difficulty of an action, but how readily and instantly the action can be performed by the addressee. Breaking up with someone is a much grander choice than lending someone money or dropping your child off at the kindergarten. A break-up has life-long consequences and involves strong emotions. Therefore, you cannot be expecting somebody who wants to break up with you to, paraphrasing Zinken (2013), 'be already attending to staying with you'. This is reflected with lower preference scores for these items: 3.031 points for item 13 ($\beta = -1.114$, SE = 0.432, z = -2.579, p < 0.01) and 3.0 points for item 14 ($\beta = -1.348$, SE = 0.444, z = -3.034, p < 0.002).

3.3.2.3. Warnings

'Take'-imperatives were also judged to be significantly less natural than standard imperatives in the case of warnings. The English translations of three items belonging to this category are given below.

(93)   Don't touch the boiling water.

<div align="right">(girl to her younger sister)</div>

(94)   Move away from the oven.

<div align="right">(father to his son)</div>

(95)   Watch out.

The significant naturalness difference may come from the significantly higher preference associated with these items. Moreover, in the open question about the attitude of the speaker, some participants reported that 'take'-imperative sound relaxed and nonchalant. However, the situations depicted in the above items are urgent – the warning ensures speaker's own or family's safety. Fast reaction is in both parties best interest.

Nevertheless, despite the significant acceptability difference with standard imperatives, 'take'-imperatives received the highest overall naturalness score at 5.840 (β = -1.201, SE = 0.589, z = -2.04, p < 0.041). At the same time, these items were judged to denote significantly easy actions (1.958-point difficulty, β = -1.931, SE = 0.279, z = -6.935, p < 4.06E-12). Here difficulty is not offset by low preference – reluctance or gravity do not serve as psychological drawbacks, making the action psychologically difficult to perform for the addressee. This may be the reason for the overall high naturalness score for warnings.

3.3.2.4. Advice, disinterested advice, invitations & permissions

There is a certain group of speech acts for which 'take'-imperatives were judged to be equally natural with standard imperatives – at least there were no significant differences between the two types of imperatives for these speech acts and for the items belonging to these speech acts.

Advice recorded 5.44 naturalness for 'take'-imperatives compared to 5.978 for standard imperatives (β = -0.791, SE = 0.531, z = -1.490, p < 0.136). Disinterested advice recorded 5.28 naturalness for 'take'-imperatives against 5.891 for standard imperatives (β = -0.781, SE = 0.532, z = 1.467 , p < 0.142). Invitations recorded 5.152 naturalness for 'take'-imperatives against 5.080 for standard imperatives (β = 0.021, SE = 0.521, z = 0.041, p < 0.968) and it is the only speech act for which 'take'-imperatives were judged, although

insignificantly, as higher than standard imperatives. Permissions recorded 4.609 naturalness for 'take'-imperatives against 5.340 for standard imperatives (β = -0.82, SE = 0.515, z = -1.594, p < 0.111).

These acts might have received higher scores due to their care for speaker's interest. The implication that the action is most definitely in the capacity of the speaker and that they perhaps "should already be attending to it" (Zinken, 2013) does not sound so rude when paired with a speech act that has speaker's interest in mind. In these speech acts, auxiliary *wziąć* appears to have similar implications to the Korean auxiliary verb *po-ta* 'see'. The meaning of *po-ta* as an auxiliary is often defined as 'trying' and is often used to 'soften' imperatives and avoid being direct or intrusive when performing imperative speech acts. *Wziąć* appears to have a similar function – while *po-ta* takes the burden of e.g., following the advice from the addressee by suggesting that they only have to try, *wziąć* does so by implying that the action denoted by the imperative is so readily available for the addressee that, in fact, they could be as well doing it already.

The fact that 'take'-imperatives and standard imperatives are equally natural in realization of speech acts catering to speaker's interest may seem counterintuitive considering the negative interaction between high preference and naturalness of 'take'-imperatives. However, speaker working in the addressee's interest does not mean that the addressee already has the preference for performing the action. The addressee may be unaware of this particular way to solve their problems or have some reservations about performing the action in question. In fact, out of all speech acts from this category, only permissions received significantly high preference score (refer to Table 8).

Speech act	Mean preference	SD	Coefficient	SE	z	p	S
ADVICE	4.833	1.873	0.320	0.271	1.180	0.238	
DISINTERESTED ADVICE	4.875	2.027	0.449	0.278	1.614	0.107	
INVITATION	4.854	1.741	0.335	0.269	1.247	0.212	
PERMISSION	5.344	1.752	0.839	0.275	3.057	0.002	**

Table 8: Mean preference and mixed regression model data for practical speech acts realized equally naturally by standard and 'take'-imperatives[19]

Someone may ask what happens in the case of disinterested advice where it is assumed that the speaker has no interest in whether the addressee acts on the imperative. If it does not depend on neither speaker's nor addressee's preferences, what does it depend on? I would like to argue that when 'take' is used speaker does get emotionally involved. In the answers to the experimental question 5, the participants described speaker's attitude for the disinterested advice item as 'friendly' and 'casual' which suggests that the speaker loses the distance with the listener and deals with their concern on a personal level, no different than the standard advice.

Another issue of interest is why permissions received similar naturalness score for both 'take'-imperatives and standard imperatives despite their high preference score. Permissions received relatively high significant irony score: 3.229 points (β = 1.15, SE = 0.2798, z = 4.11, p < 3.96e-05), which is the second highest irony rating among speech acts. The only speech act category that received higher significant irony score is curse with 3.979 points (β = 1.8495, SE = 0.2863, z = 6.461, p < 1.04e-10). Irony was also often reported in case of permissions in the open question regarding the attitude of the speaker. It suggests that we deal with a non-literal or humorous setting for these utterances – like being patronizing towards a child that has

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[19] Request as baseline - as a speech act whose preference score was the closest to the neutral 4.

been nagging for our permission or even a husband that asks for a night out. The most likely situation to use 'take'-imperative to realize permissions is when the person still has not decided to go despite constant nagging or pleading. Again, we get an element of the addressee not attending to the action they are much likely to attend. Perhaps the reported irony is the result of the observed addressee preference being the element that increases the 'readiness' of the addressee to perform the action.

3.3.2.5. Offers vs. invitations

Another puzzling finding is the difference between offers and invitations. While for invitations there was no significant difference between 'take'- and standard imperatives, for offers, standard imperatives were significantly more natural - 6.239 points compared to 5.06 points for 'take'-imperatives (β = -1.527, SE = 0.556, z = -2.746, p < 0.006). This time preference effects can be observed, as offers received significantly high preference score - 6.031 points (β = 1.499, SE = 0.284, z = 5.276, p < 1.32E-07[20]).

Perhaps the difference in preference ratings for invitations and offers resulted from the nature of invitations and offers themselves, as invitations refer to actions in which the speaker is involved in or even participate in, while offers are limited to listener's action.

In invitations, *wziąć* serves as a device to shorten the distance between the speaker and the listener and make the invitation less intrusive and burdensome. Since it involves the speaker's personal space, the reason for the addressee not wanting to perform the action is the burden of breaching someone's private space. Uttering an invitation hints that the speaker does not mind being joined by the addressee in an activity or having their personal space breached by the addressee, so the only reason for not performing the

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[20] With invitation as baseline.

action lies in the restraint of the addressee.

On the other hand, offers concern performing actions external to the speaker, so the reasons for not performing an action may be different than speaker's potential disapproval. Therefore, the speaker cannot directly identify the reason for the addressee not performing the action and cannot possibly know whether the addressee's decision on performing the action or not is dependent on the speaker's opinion. To put it simply, in invitations the speaker can be an epistemic authority on what may potentially constrain the preferences of the addressee, while in offers, the speaker cannot be certain that any such constraints exist.

Let us compare two situations as an example. In one of them, the speaker invites a colleague to sit with them during lunch at the student cafeteria. In the other, a party host sees that none of the guest has touched the food and wants to encourage one of them to take a bite. In the first one, the invitation, sitting together includes breaching the speaker's personal space and that is the most probable reason for the addressee to hesitate on whether to perform the action. In the second one, the offer, however, there may be other reasons independent of the speaker, e.g., waiting for some unarrived guests, politeness towards other guests, shyness, etc.

For now, the intuitive meaning of *wziąć* can be paraphrased as "I see no reason for you not performing the action, so why won't you just perform it?" This suggestion paired with an invitation sounds alright, because the speaker has a bigger authority on the potential reasons to not perform the action – if they say the action should be performed, the main potential reason not to do it is lifted. In offers, on the other hand, this implication may sound rude and intrusive, as there may be other reasons for not performing the action, independent of the speaker – as the action itself is independent of the speaker in contrast to invitations, where the action is a joint one.

3.3.2.6. Well-wishes

Finally, I want to discuss the speech acts for which the ability condition is lifted and either the addressee cannot do anything about the target action of the imperative, or there is no addressee whatsoever.

Well-wishes were a speech act for which 'take'-imperatives received the lowest mean naturalness score: 3.840 points, significantly lower than standard imperatives which for well-wishes received 6.478-point naturalness score (β = -3.06807, SE = 0.57594, z = -5.327, p < 9.98e-08). English translations of well-wish items are given in (96), (97), and (98).

(96)   Get well soon.

(Boy to his sick girlfriend)

(97)   Have fun on your vacation.

(Man to his brother at the train station)

(98)   Sleep well.

(Mom to her child)

Such an effect is expected for well-wishes as the addressee cannot do anything about the target action of the imperative and the function of the imperative is simply expressive, not action-inducing – therefore, they belong to wish-type imperative use category.

There are two reasons why the analysis cannot simply end there. One is that 'take'-imperative naturalness rankings for other wish-type speech acts are not significantly low. For curses, mean naturalness of 'take'-imperatives is non-significantly 0.039 points lower than the mean naturalness of standard imperatives (β = -0.052, SE = 0.359, z = -0.145, p < 0.885). For absent wishes, mean naturalness of 'take'-imperatives is also non-significantly 0.721 points lower than the mean naturalness of standard imperatives (β = -0.740, SE = 0.518, z = -1.429, p < 0.153). Nevertheless, 'take'-imperatives received the lowest naturalness scores for wish-type speech acts compared to other speech acts, all balancing around neutral 4 points: 4.261 points for curses, 4.040 points for absent wishes, and 3.840 for well-wishes.

Another issue is that not for all well-wishes 'take'-imperatives were equally unnatural. For item 16, English translation given in (89), 'take'-imperatives received mean naturalness score of 4.5 points, which was not significantly lower than 6.214-point mean naturalness of standard imperatives (β = -1.416, SE = 1.190, z = -1.190, p < 0.234). The difference for item 17, (90), did reach significance with mean naturalness for 'take'-imperatives equal 4.929 and mean naturalness for standard imperatives equal 6.667 (β = -2.071, SE = 1.086, z = -1.907, p < 0.056). Finally, for the item 18, 'take'-imperative mean naturalness significantly dipped, reaching the lowest score out of all items at 2.333 points, against 6.5-point mean naturalness of standard imperatives (β = -4.663, SE = 1.271, z = -3.669, p < 0.0002).

I consider this effect to be the result of accommodation processes. As is often described in the literature and as we can see from the open responses, take imperatives may be associated with negative emotions, mostly irritation. Some speakers could have accommodated the 'take'-imperatives for their emotive function. Considering the character of the emotion and other implications that 'take'-imperatives convey, this accommodation was not readily available for most well-wishes but was available for other wish-type items.

I will consider two factors for accommodation – one is the character of the emotional charge of 'take'-imperatives and another one is agentivity that allows to preserve the motivational and action-inducing function of 'take'-imperatives.

First, let us look at well-wishes. When 'take'-imperatives are emotionally charged, they usually express irritation or impatience (Andrason 2018, Gębka-Wolak 2012, Zinken 2013). This emotional charge can be, again, traced back to the concept the addressee not performing the action despite being in a favorable position to perform it. In other words, the addressee could or should be already attending to the matter at hand but they hesitate to do so.

This is what connects 'take'-imperatives with speaker's irritation or impatience.

For well-wishes, perhaps the setting of 'impatience' will be more appropriate. Impatience can be overtly expressed with emotionally charged expressions and there is a particular expression that expresses both the speaker's wish and impatience - "I can't wait!". Sentences from (99) to (101) are modified versions of well-wish items that utilize that expression.

(99)   I can't wait for you to get well.

(100)   ?I can't wait for you to have fun on your vacation.

(101)   ?I can't wait for you to sleep well.

I purposely omitted the 'soon' adverb because it is redundant in presence of the 'can't wait' expression which implies desired immediacy. We can observe that the "I can't wait!" expression only sounds natural for the first well-wish item, suggesting that it is the only well-wish that is compatible with expressing impatience.

I assume that the possibility of restoring agentivity is what contributed to why the 'take'-imperative in item 18 received much lower naturalness score than the 'take'-imperative in item 17. According to the feedback from one of the experiment participants, they could conceptualize how the addressee can actively make effort towards 'having fun on their vacation' but not towards 'sleeping well' and because of that 'take'-imperative in item 17 sounded much more acceptable to them. Sleeping is a passive activity, much of which depends on our subconscious. It is easier to accommodate 'having fun' as an agentive action because, as the consulted participant described it, "the addressee may e.g., change their attitude towards the trip or force themselves to act like they are having fun.

3.3.2.7. Curses

Moving on towards curses, this speech act involved the items from 19 to 21, whose English translations are given in (102) to (104).

(102)   Drop dead! (lit. Die!)

(Boy to his classmate during a fight)

(103)   Rot in jail!

(man to a woman he sued)

(104)   Choke yourself!
(girl to her classmate who drew something in the girls notebook without permission)

Curses received the lowest general naturalness ranking with both types of imperatives reaching mean naturalness score of around 4 points – 4.3 for standard imperatives and 4.261 for 'take'-imperatives. Perhaps it is because two out of three curses are uttered by children or teenagers and adult participants found it hard to accept that children can curse other children. Another option is that using imperatives to curse someone is conventionally constrained and not all cruel actions. As a Polish native speaker, I have heard similar curses to the abovementioned ones in my teenage years and they were uttered by many of my colleagues. This was my motivation behind including them in my examples. However, not all of the fellow native speakers agreed with my intuitions, as the mean naturalness of standard imperatives is significantly low for items 19 and 21.

As for item 19, (102), the mean naturalness score for the standard imperative dropped so low (3.278 points) that this item became the only item with slightly significant higher mean naturalness for the 'take'-imperative at 4.571 points ($\beta = 1.628$, SE $= 0.955$, z $= 1.704$, p < 0.088). This item received also slightly significant higher mean irony (or figurative speech) score in its 'take'-imperative variant (5.714 points) than in its standard imperative variant (3.889 points; $\beta = 2.11469$, SE $= 1.217$, z $= 1.737$, p < 0.082).

Among the curse items, the standard imperative received the highest mean naturalness score in the item 20, (103): 6 points, compared to 4.944

points received by the 'take'-imperative ($\beta = -0.455$, SE $= 1.144$, z $= -0.398$, p < 0.691). Here, also the irony trend is reversed with standard imperatives mean irony being significantly higher than 'take'-imperatives mean irony: 4.714 points to 1.833 points ($\beta = -3.235$, SE $= 1.052$, z $= -3.075$, p < 0.002).

Such a pattern suggests that in the case of curses, *wziąć* allows for some ironic or metaphorical accommodation that recovers the naturalness of the utterance. It was previously mentioned that what 'take'-imperatives may convey is that the addressee could and should be already attending to the action in question. Such an implication may be perceived as making the curse more addressee oriented. Among the responses to an open question to item 19, only among the responses to the 'take'-imperative version of the item the term 'insulting' can be found. The responses to the standard imperative version included only terms that focused on the speaker's emotion.

To illustrate with item 19, if the speaker orders the addressee to die with a standard imperative, we get an interpretation that it is simply speakers desire for the addressee to die. This is an oddly heavy thing to be said by a kid to their colleague, which could have contributed to the low mean naturalness for the standard imperative. However, if the speaker uses the 'take'-imperative, it switches the focus to the fact that the addressee is a person that deserves to be 'attending to dying'. This is something different from actually wanting someone to die and may even be perceived as humorous or ironic.

On the other hand, for item 20 there is no need for accommodating an imperative, because standard imperative itself has received high mean naturalness score. In that case, in 'take'-imperatives the negative emotional charge becomes the main focus, which perhaps causes the participants to miss out on the clearly figurative expression 'rot in hell'.

3.3.2.8. Absent wishes

Lastly, let us take a look at the absent wishes. The English translations of items 22-24 (105-107) are given below.

(105)   Be blond!

(Boy before a blind date)

(106)   Let me pass!

(Student right before checking their final grade)

(107)   Win this thing!

(Man refreshing the page with his favorite player's results)

Absent wishes received moderate mean naturalness scores, with a non-significant advantage of standard imperatives: 4.761 points in comparison with 4.040 points for 'take'-imperatives ($\beta = 0.522$, SE $= 0.372$, z $=1.405$, p < 0.16). Mean irony score for absent wishes was significantly higher than average (3.208 points; $\beta = 1.064$, SE $= 0.401$, z $= 2.653$, p < 0.008). Since there was no intended addressee, preference and difficulty were not measured.

I would like to argue that in absent wishes, like in well-wishes, 'take'-imperatives serve as an emotive expression to convey impatience or irritation. Even though they are 'absent wishes', the speaker utters these imperatives as if they directly addressed the target of the imperative. However, instead of actually urging the intended addressees, 'take'-imperatives in absent wishes rather express the urgency of the speaker themself.

Similar phenomenon occurs when a 'take'-imperative addresses an object instead of a person. Such a situation is illustrated by (108).

(108)   Weź   mi   się   nie   psuj.
        take-imp[2sg]   me   self   not   break-imp[2g]
        'Come on, don't break on me.'

(someone addressing a malfunctioning TV)

In such contexts, the object is personified. Even though the TV cannot become an agent of the action embedded in the imperative, the speaker uses the imperative to express their annoyance with the malfunction of the object. It almost sounds as if the speaker holds a grudge against the object, as if the object was purposely 'doing them dirty'.

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A similar thing can be said about the absent wishes. The speaker uses the 'take'-imperative to express their impatience, urgency, or irritation and at the same time state their belief that it is the most optimal and natural course of action for the target of the imperative to grant the speaker's wish. With the sentence (105), it is almost as if the speaker was addressing the fate – it is only rational and fair for their date to be blond.

Chapter 4. Theoretical consequences of the experiment

This section examines the consequences the experiment in chapter 3 has on the theory of imperatives and semantics of auxiliary *wziąć*. First, I look at the results for standard imperatives to settle the issue of how we can model standard imperatives in Polish. I then propose a definition for the meaning of *wziąć* that both accommodates the results of the experiment and answers the question why auxiliary *wziąć* is commonly used in imperatives.

4.1. Polish imperatives as preference-based operators

To evaluate the preferential theory as a framework for the semantics Polish imperatives, I will analyze the pattern of naturalness scores given to standard Polish imperatives in the experiment.

Generally, imperatives received acceptable naturalness scores (4 and above) for all speech acts proposed by Condoravdi & Lauer (2012)[21]. Some speech acts, however, proved to be more prototypical for imperatives than the others. The mean naturalness and mixed regression model analysis[22] data are given in Table 9.

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[21] As mentioned before, addressee-less wishes were excluded as inflection paradigm for imperatives in Polish does not include third person forms.
[22] As mentioned before, addressee-less wishes were excluded as inflection paradigm for imperatives in Polish does not include third person forms.

Speech act	Mean naturalness	Standard deviation	β	SE	z	P	S^2
ADVICE	5.978	1.653	0.108	0.417	0.259	0.796	
ABSENT WISH	4.761	2.203	-1.143	0.398	-2.871	0.004	**
COMMAND	6.720	0.607	1.323	0.458	2.887	0.004	**
CURSE	4.300	2.169	-1.615	0.390	-4.147	3.37E-05	***
DISINTERESTED ADVICE	5.891	1.716	Baseline				
INVITATION	5.080	2.069	-0.859	0.398	-2.161	0.031	*
OFFER	6.239	1.594	0.635	0.439	1.445	0.148	
PERMISSION	5.340	2.037	-0.570	0.402	-1.419	0.156	
PLEA	5.340	1.934	-0.624	0.394	-1.583	0.113	
REQUEST	5.900	1.529	-0.061	0.403	-0.152	0.879	
WARNING	6.630	0.997	1.210	0.469	2.582	9.83E-03	**
WELL-WISH	6.478	1.225	1.047	0.460	2.279	0.023	*

Table 9: Mean naturalness and mixed regression model data for standard imperatives (by speech act, with disinterested advice as baseline)

There are three speech acts for which the standard imperative was judged to be significantly more natural than the average baseline. Most importantly, one of such speech acts were well-wishes. It means that well-wishes were judged to be a more prototypical speech act for standard imperatives than some of the directive uses, even though wish-type speech acts do not involve addressee inducement. For some theories, like Portner's To-Do Lists (2007, 2010) which treat the imperative as an operator updating addressee's list of obligations, that would be extremely problematic to account for. The variability in acceptability of imperatives depending on the speech act they realize would be also problematic for the modal theory of imperatives, as it would have to presume hierarchy among the ordering sources alongside the previously discussed under-specification, which was already introduced as potentially problematic on its own.

The speech acts for which standard imperatives were judged as the most natural were also the ones that are most canonically speaker-preference

related. The other speech acts are either construed as taking into consideration the preferences or goals of the addressee (like advice or offers) or they concern situations in which the speaker does not have authority high enough to potentially impose their preferences onto the addressee (like requests or pleas).

Curses appear to be either contextually restricted or inappropriate when used by kids. Two out of three curses realized by standard imperatives were significantly judged to be rather unnatural – both such curses were uttered by kids. The English translations of the items in question (19-21) are repeated below as (109), (110), and (111).

(109)   Drop dead! (lit. Die!)

(Boy to his classmate during a fight)

(110)   Rot in jail!

(man to a woman he sued)

(111)   Choke yourself!

(girl to her classmate who drew something in the girls notebook without permission)

Perhaps the imperative curses sound too grand and severe to be uttered by kids. Another option is that there is a conventionally constrained set of activities that can be the target of an imperative for it to realize curses. Considering the results, 'rotting in jail' would belong to this set and 'dying' or 'choking' would not. Nevertheless, since all the items were based on real sentences I have heard in real life, it is unsurprising to find that there was a group of participants that found the curses to be more flexible and have given the less-acceptable curses a high naturalness rating, as can be assumed from the naturalness scores distribution in the boxplot below.

Figure 4: A boxplot and jitter of naturalness scores of standard imperatives by item (limited to curses)

Imperatives were also judged to be significantly less natural when realizing absent wishes. Perhaps what some participants could have found odd was the fact that the speaker was uttering the imperative to themselves. Uttering a full sentence that commits us to our preferences without anybody present may seem redundant, as we are already silently aware of our own preferences. What could be checked for in the future is whether the acceptability of absent wishes rises if there is somebody to hear the imperative utterance and e.g., empathize with the speaker.

Standard imperatives also received a significantly lower scores for invitations and pleas. Each of these categories included one item for which the standard imperatives received significantly low naturalness scores. Plea item nr. 13 received 3.944-point mean naturalness, and invitation item nr. 31 received 3.444-point mean naturalness. The English translations for these items are given below as (112) and (113).

(112)   Please, lend me money.

<div style="text-align:right">(man to a colleague on the phone)</div>

(113)   Come over to my place tonight.

(men to a female colleague in the office – planning a party)

I propose that the problem with these examples lies in the distant and perhaps professional relationship between the interlocutors. The answers to the question about the attitude of the speakers revealed that the participants perceive using an imperative to e.g., invite your coworker to your house as 'intrusive', 'rude', and 'inappropriate'. In such a context, a less direct expression like a whimperative would be far more acceptable. Imperatives in Polish are, therefore, also restricted depending on the social setting and authority-based relationships between the parties.

This goes against Wierzbicka's (1985) claims of Polish imperatives being less restricted than English imperatives in realization of speech acts. Imperatives in both languages are restricted in use in their simple form - they must be accompanied by some softening particles or rephrased as, e.g., whimperatives. The use of imperatives in Polish between coworkers appears to be less natural than in English, even though Polish is supposed to be the less restrictive language of the pair

Based on the above, I assume that the imperatives in Polish function as preferential operators in the way described by Condoravdi & Lauer (2010, 2011, 2012, 2017). Considering that the preferential approach enforces speaker's endorsement of the target action of the imperative, I would like to point out a few regularities in the relationship the Polish imperative paradigm with other structures mentioned in section 2.1.2.

It was previously mentioned that the grammatical imperative paradigm in Polish includes a hortative form. An example of that is given below.

(114)   Chodź-my   do   kina.
         go-imp[1pl]   to   the cinema
         'Let's go to the cinema.'

There is a reason why the hortative forms are translated into English

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using the modal 'let'. I previously proposed that the speaker's obligation to act on the imperative is a result of a cooperative principle that gets strengthened into obligation when the speaker has authority over the addressee. When the addressee is 1st person plural, the speaker cannot have strict authority over the addressee because they are also partially the addressee. Therefore, the weak cooperative condition is in force when the preference expressed with the hortative can be accepted as the common goal of the speaker and the addressee to the extent that it does not conflict with any of the preferences of the addressee. Hortative forms come across as encouraging propositions because they express speaker's preferences, but these preferences may be dismissed if they contradict the preferences of the group.

As mentioned before, some scholars (Hansen 2010) include constructions with optative particle *niech* as 3rd person imperatives. This particle is also translated into English with the modal verb let, as exemplified below.

(115)   Niech   się   dzieje   wola   nieba.
        let   self   happen   will   of heaven
        'Let the will of the heavens unfold.'

According to the version of the preferential theory of imperatives I propose, a 3rd person imperative would have comparable semantics with the modal 'let'. Since the subject of the imperative is unspecified or different from the interlocutor, or the use of 3rd person signals the distance with the addressee, the speaker cannot directly force their authority onto the addressee. The 'let' reading arises because the addressee is not addressed directly. Therefore, the weak version of the cooperative principle is in force. The interlocutor is not obliged to do everything to fulfill the content of the imperative – they may as well just 'let it happen' if they have higher ranked conflicting preferences.

Another desirable trait of the preferential approach is the distinction between self-motivated and externally motivated preferences. The difference between the English *have* + infinitive and Polish *mieć* + infinitive can be now explained relative to these terms. I propose to construe *mieć* constructions as necessarily referring to externally motivated preferences. On the other hand, English *have* constructions are not constrained with respect to the type of preferences. When a sentence containing *mieć* + infinitive construction is uttered directly towards the subject as the addressee by a speaker that has authority over the addressee, those externally motivated preferences contextually co-refer with speaker's preferences – that is how the imperative reading emerges.

4.2. *Wziąć* as the speaker's commitment to addressee-oriented beliefs

Since the experiment showed a significant correlation between high preference and low naturalness of 'take'-imperatives, I assume that the meaning of *wziąć* can be formulated by appealing to the theoretical devices of the preferential theory of imperatives.

I propose that while the imperative commits the speaker to preferences, wziąć commits the speaker to the following beliefs:

(116)   1.   The addressee has some restraints from performing the action (it is not on the top of their effective preference structure).

2.   By making the proposition *p* true, the addressee can make a bigger or equal subset of their effective preference structure true compared to acting on their current top effective preference.

In other words, (116b.) means that the speaker believes the proposition *p* is equally or more consistent with the other elements of the addressee's

effective preference structure than the current top effective preference. This definition is a tentative proposal to put the abstract intuition of the speaker believing that the addressee is "in the optimal state" to perform the imperative.

This "optimal state can be associated with Zinken's (2013) formulation of the meaning of *wziąć* in requests as conveying that the addressee should already be already attending to the action in question. It is also associated with "addressee-oriented difficulty" that was mentioned while discussing requests. There appeared to be a difference between the acceptability of some of the items depending on not necessarily how difficult the action itself is (which was the difficulty measured in the experiment), but, for example, how 'uncomplicated' it is for the addressee (whether or not it is an important decision that cannot be taken lightly, something that has long-term consequences, etc.).

Perhaps using spatial terms in will become more justified after Chapter 5, but for now we can say that somebody is in the "position" to do something - the action is at their disposal, and they can readily perform it. Such a term is often used in English to indicate this type of difficulty in sentences like "I'm sorry, I'm not in the position to do that."

Such an interpretation of *wziąć* captures the interaction of preference scores with naturalness of 'take'-imperatives. If it is likely that the addressee already has the said proposition at the top of their effective preference structure, the usage of *wziąć* would be vacuous, as there is no other public effective preference that the speaker can make a comparison to. Zinken (2013) also writes about 'take'-imperatives in the context of requests as "reanimating responsibility" – the addressee is 'displaced' from their current course of action and put on a new track, consistent with their previous responsibilities. This is consistent with my proposal, as these 'previous responsibilities' must be reflected somewhere in the effective preference structure of the addressee and the speaker by uttering an imperative expresses their belief that the target action of the imperative will fulfill those liabilities.

This analysis also models how low preference may be interpreted as a "psychological difficulty" of acting on the imperative. If the top layer of the addressee's preference structure seems to contain propositions that are inconsistent with the target action of the imperative, it is impossible for the addressee to satisfy an equal or bigger subset of their effective preference structure by accepting the proposition conveyed by the imperative as their public effective preference.

Since the usage of 'take'-imperative hinges on the speaker's judgement, it is easy to conceptualize why 'take'-imperatives are compatible with 'light' actions that are easy, fit the current course of action of the addressee, or do not carry any serious consequences. For more complicated issues, it becomes difficult for the speaker to make inferences about the addressee's preference structure and make any suggestions on that ground. When our partner informs us that they are about to go out to a convenience store, it is easy for us to assume that they will not mind getting us a package of cigarettes on the way, i.e., an equal subset of their effective preference structure will be satisfied. However, when it comes to a marriage proposal, it is much riskier for us to make any assumptions about the effective preference structure of the since such a proposition, as a great life decision, will affect a much bigger set of other propositions in the preference structure.

The juxtaposition of the belief that p is consistent with the addressee's effective preferences and the belief that p is not at the top of the addressee's effective preference structure results in the 'irritation' or 'impatience' that is the source of the emotive use of *wziąć*. By uttering a 'take'-imperative, the speaker implies that the addressee is either acting unreasonable or is not fully aware of their situation. If the latter is the case, *wziąć* does not carry the negative emotional charge. It may even soften the imperative along the lines of "it is not going to be a big deal for you."

As suggested by Seungho Nam, the difference in the emotional charge of the 'take'-imperatives may also be a result of a difference in whether the

target action of the 'take'-imperative conflicts with the current top effective preference of the addressee and requires the addressee to override their top effective preference or whether that target action can be simply added to the current top effective preference. When *wziąć* is used to, for example, soften requests, the latter is the case – it suggests that the addressee does not need to override their effective preference structure to fulfill the imperative. On the other hand, for orders and other authoritative speech acts, the 'take'-imperative usually requires the addressee to override their current top effective preferences and is associated with the feelings of impatience or irritation on the side of the speaker. It bears the connotation that the addressee's preference structure is not optimal (it is even irrational) and needs to be altered.

Wziąć is, therefore, a motivation for an immediate adjustment in the preferences of the addressee. In the normal situation, the addressee strives to be rational as an agent and cooperative as an interlocutor. If acting on the speaker's public effective preference does not disrupt the addressee's effective preference structure, the addressee may just as well add it to their agenda to be both rational and cooperative.

To conclude, on top of the speaker's public commitment to the effective preference for the addressee to perform an action introduced by the imperative, *wziąć* adds the commitment to a belief that performing that action is a rational choice for the addressee, despite the addressee neglecting it or having some objections against it. *Wziąć* in combination with imperatives calls for the addressee to be a rational agent and cooperative interlocutor, taking the speaker's public effective preference as a point of reference.

Chapter 5. Analysis of the meaning of *wziąć* in terms of conceptual metaphor theory

As previously mentioned, this section is set out to tackle the grammaticalization of the auxiliary *wziąć* and the cognitive mechanism behind its semantics (with a focus on *wziąć* in double imperatives). Until now, I have defined the meaning and function of the auxiliary *wziąć* in preferential-theoretic terms, but I have ignored the relationship between the original, lexical meaning of *wziąć* and its auxiliary meaning. There must be a reason why *wziąć* serves such a function as an auxiliary and not some other verb or arbitrary marker.

I want to include *wziąć* in the cognitive-semantic framework I adapted to analyze Korean auxiliary verbs. (Steciuk, 2020) I see similarities in the way auxiliary *wziąć* relates to the lexical *wziąć* and the Korean auxiliary verbs relate to their lexical verb counterparts. I want to propose unified tools to analyze and derive semantics of auxiliary verbs.

I begin by introducing the cognitive linguistic framework I utilize, then I give an example of such analysis with the case of Korean auxiliary verb *noh-ta* 'to put', and then I move on to extend such analysis to the auxiliary *wziąć.*

5.1. Conceptual metaphor and Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs) in the Neural Theory of Language (NTL)

I will begin by briefly introducing the core concepts of the cognitive approach to meaning. Cognitive models of knowledge were originally referred to as models of 'encyclopedic knowledge'. The name 'encyclopedic knowledge' embraces the idea that the meaning behind a concept is not just a bundle of sufficient and necessary conditions, but it involves extensive background knowledge and is actively connected to many different meanings of other concepts. It is the main purpose of cognitive linguistics to show that

language does not strictly reflect the outer world in an objective, truth-conditional way. Our language ability is an interplay between our cognitive apparatus and the interactional stimuli it receives from our environment.

George Lakoff (1987, 2013) often explains this nuance by referring to the idea of color. Color is not something that exists there in the world – it only receives its meaning through the color-perceptive 'opponent response cells' that constitute neural pathways connecting our eyes and the brain and get stimulated by light waves of proper frequency. Therefore, depending on the constitution and density of light-perceptive cells, the same light wave reflected by the same object will be perceived differently by an organism with a different vision apparatus. It can be also perceived differently by individual humans if their color perception mechanism is impaired, which is the case for people dealing with color blindness. Cognitive linguists share a common belief that this idea extends to the overall perception of the outer world – meanings behind every single concept bear trace of having been processed by human cognitive and sensual apparatus and must be analyzed accordingly to the way our cognition works.

5.1.1. Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs) and Experiential Gestalts

The beginnings of cognitive linguistics may be tracked down to 1970's when two basic concepts – a frame and a prototype – were introduced to approach the study of meaning without referring to the truth-conditional, formal terms. Charles Fillmore (1975) introduced the idea of 'a frame' to reflect the intuition that our knowledge (including the knowledge of word meaning) is systematical and structural – the abovementioned idea of 'encyclopedic knowledge'. Frames are linked structures build from concepts that conventionally appear together. The meaning of the actual concepts is conceived from its relationships with other concepts in different frames it appears in. One of the most used examples in the idea of a 'waiter'. (Cienki 2007, Lakoff 2013) In order to understand who 'the waiter' is, we need to

evoke the entire schema of 'a restaurant' and all the schematic information on how it works. Such a representation forms with experience, as it is conceived from our usual experiences of visiting restaurants.

Such frames are often referred to as 'conventional' or 'ideal' instances of a particular situation or system. The 'ideal' representations of concepts were a major interest of Eleanor Rosch, who referred to them with a term 'prototype'. Prototype has been covered in many areas of psychology and semantics, but George Lakoff (1987) expresses concern that the reason many linguists might have abandoned the idea of prototypes is because of a distorted idea of what a prototype is. Some linguists, including Rosch herself at the early stage of research, assumed the prototype effects reflected the actual structure of the conceptual category – some scholars, like Murphy (2002), even defining the concepts with numeral weights attached to features associated with the prototype. (Wechsler 2015) A system of 'frames' provides a more natural account of prototype effects, as a 'prototype' can be defined as an intersection of frames that the concept is defined against.

George Lakoff (1987) extended these ideas to a full-blown theory of meaning, introducing the idea of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs). Idealized Cognitive Models are abstractivized (therefore, 'idealized') cognitive structures corresponding to concepts that build the entirety of our understanding. The idea of an ICM is somewhat parallel to the notion of an (experiential) gestalt that Lakoff introduced into the area of linguistics in 1977, borrowing the general idea from psychological studies.

ICM is built based on our multiple experiences with types of objects or situations. During the experience, we collect interactional and sensational data which we translate into an averaged, 'idealized' mental image or schema that will cognitively represent this type of entity. This is done in accordance with other, preexisting cognitive schemas, which are also ICMs. ICMs gain their significance from the relationship they share with other ICMs. They are functional entities on their own, but it is the idiosyncratic set of links they

have with other ICMs that defines them as separate units.

The organization of ICMs is hierarchical, with more schematic ICMs (corresponding to Fillmore's frames) scoping over entity defining ICMs. The entity defining ICMs can subsumed under multiple schematic ICMs with a varying degree of 'centeredness' (defined by the number of links the entity ICM has with other ICMs in the schema). 'Centeredness' is what is responsible for the prototype effects – to be categorized as an instance of a concept, an object or a situation must fit into the most 'central' schemas for the concept's ICM. The probability of an object being classified is defined by the numbers of schematic ICMs it fits. The final categorization is decided according to the rule of 'family resemblance' – an object or a situation is understood as an instance of a concept it shares the most schematic relations with (in comparison with other potentially suitable ICMs).

ICMs are structures used in all types of cognitive processing. Lakoff defines many different types of ICMs, as well as many different relations that link ICMs together. Examining the taxonomy of ICM system is beyond the scope of this paper, so in the following sections I will introduce only those concepts that will be vital to the presented analysis.

5.1.2. Conceptual metaphor

In cognitive linguistics, a much more vital role in language is attributed to metaphor than what is conventionally assumed. The beginning of this "metaphorical renaissance" is usually linked with the release of the book *Metaphors We Live By,* written by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980). The authors extend the idea of metaphor way beyond 'figurative language', claiming that (almost) all abstract concepts are metaphorically derived from concrete, substantial concepts. A metaphor is defined in terms of a mapping from a source domain (embodied domain, accessible by bodily experience) to a target (abstract) domain. Through this mapping, an abstract concept gets structured analogically to the substantial concept – they belong to different

domains, but the relations between the corresponding parts is preserved.

Complex metaphors are built from smaller blocks – primary metaphors. They are basic, primitive metaphorical links, formed in childhood years. For example, there is a metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH that motivates attributing temperature-related terms to people based on how friendly (or 'affectionate') they are (e.g., *He is a warm person.*, *She had this cold look in her eyes.*). This association is attested in most languages, as being affectionate usually involves physical closeness that allows us to feel another person's body temperature. The first such experience usually involves being held and embraced by the mother. (Lakoff 2013)

An example of a more complex, structural metaphor can be found if we look at a description (not a literal representation) of a schema ICM of PLANT GROWTH (extendable to plant cultivation).

(117) **PLANT GROWTH**

Participants:	3 objects
Roles:	- donor (ground)
	- recipient (plant)
	- seed
	- resources
Stages:	I. placing the seed in the donor
	II. the recipient grows out of the seed inside the donor
	III. the recipient emerges as a separate entity
	IV. the recipient absorbs needed resources from the donor
	V. the recipient grows
Linear progression:	- placing the seed inside the donor must precede the emergence of the recipient
	- providing the resources for the recipient is necessary for its growth
Purpose:	creation and development of a healthy recipient

The schema of plant growth is often evoked as a source domain for the metaphor HUMANS AS PLANTS. The experience of placing a seed in the ground and watching it grow is easier to trace with our senses (visual perception), so it serves as a source domain for conception which cannot be

visually attested. This metaphor is visibly prevalent in our language and other cognitive processes. There are many traces of this metaphor in language, e.g., in Polish, where the word for 'semen' *nasienie* is a collateral form of the word for 'seed' *nasiono*. In the conceptual zone, this metaphor can be observed in the depictions of death as a skeleton holding a scythe that originated in medieval Europe (Figure 5).

Figure 5:   Death. From the *Dance of Death by the Master of the Lübeck Bible*, Lübeck, 1489.
(source: http://www.godecookery.com/macabre/gallery2/macbr57.htm**)**

The relation can be reversed, as the process of the mother taking care of her child is more closely related to our experience than different natural factors that condition plant growth. This metaphor motivates such expressions as *Mother Nature*.

Such a perception of metaphor is called 'a conceptual metaphor theory'. The model of a conceptual metaphor will be the tool that will serve later in

the analysis of Korean auxiliary verbs presented in section 5.2.1. and in the final analysis of the auxiliary *wziąć* in section 5.3.2.

5.1.3. Neural Theory of Language

Development of neuroscience shed a new light on our cognitive processes and how neural activity is linked to language. A group of scientists at the University of California, Berkeley (the most prominent figures being Jerome Feldman, George Lakoff and Eve Sweetser) formed a research group whose primary focus was to develop a Neural Theory of Language (NLT). The purpose of NLT is to model exactly how the circuitry of the brain computes thought and language – what neural processes are responsible for language understanding. The cognitive theory of language based on concepts like ICM or conceptual metaphor turned out to fit the actual workings of our brain surprisingly well. What is new about it is that it expresses previously developed ideas of cognitive linguistics in detailed neurobiological terms.[23]

To briefly introduce the core idea of NLT, reasoning is a process of activation of certain neuronal groups in the brain given prior activation of other neuronal groups. Speaking of neural activity, we refer to the flow of ions across synapses – tiny gaps between the neural processes. Neuronal groups are also referred to as 'meaningful nodes' that activate neural simulation and enter higher neural computation.

The firing of a neuron activates each node it is functioning in depending on the strength of connection it has with other neurons in a particular node. Neurons that fire together wire together, meaning that the strength of the connection between the neurons increases every time they get simultaneously activated – more canals open in the synapses joining them to send and receive ions. A node is active to a degree depending on the proportion of neurons in

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[23] more about the project: https://lx.berkeley.edu/news/neural-theory-language-project, http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/icsi/projects/ai/ntl

the node firing at the same time. Activation of neurons and neuronal groups spreads, as all neurons connected to the fired neuron may also potentially fire if the synaptic channel is capable (unobstructed) enough.

An important idea in the Neural Theory of Language is that language is embodied, and processing meaning is mental simulation. In the brain there exist topographical maps corresponding to sensory systems such as vision or touch. For example, our motor activity is possible due to a topographical map of our body with multiple neuronal groups corresponding to each body part. These neuronal groups consist of mirror neurons connecting the pre-motor (SMA) cortex that choreographs actions with the parietal cortex that integrates perceptions. Mirror neurons are multimodal, activated both when an action is perceived or performed and when it is imagined. Therefore, all mental simulation is embodied – uses the same substrate as for the actual action, perception, etc. (Lakoff 2009)

The section 5.1. introduced the basic framework for the core proposal for this paper. In the next section, I will elaborate on the general proposal for the cognitive account on event structures and introduce an example of cognitive approach to verbal meaning with Korean auxiliary verbs.

5.2. Conceptual metaphor approach to the analysis of grammaticalized meanings of Korean auxiliary verbs

One of the core ideas behind verbal meaning in lexical semantics is that the meaning of a particular verb is compositional – it is derived from an interaction of an event template and verbal root. This distinction dates to the observation made by George Lakoff in 1965[24] that verbs can be paraphrased differently depending on their type. Sentences (118b.), (119b.) and (120b.) represent paraphrases for transitive verbs, inchoative verbs and unergative

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[24] Before he started his work in the field of cognitive linguistics.

verbs, respectively.

(118) a. Mary dried the rug.

b. Mary caused the rug to become dry.

(119) a. The rug dried.

b. The rug became dry.

(120) a. Mary jogged/ran.

b. Mary did jogging/running actions.

This regular paraphrase pattern suggests that event structures encoded by a particular surface verb can be broken down into two elements: an event template and a root. An event template introduces primitive, structural notions corresponding to basic event types such as action, causation, or change. A verbal root denotes action or states that constitute the idiosyncratic meaning of a verb. (Beavers & Koontz-Garboden 2020)

In some approaches, such as Distributed Morphology, the distinction between the root and the verb has been even represented structurally, with templatic meaning introduced in the little v-head position of syntactic structure (Figure 6).

a. Mary jogged.

*v*P
├── DP
│   └── Mary
└── *v*
    ├── *v*$_{act}$
    └── √JOG

b. The rug flattened.

*v*P
├── DP
│   └── the rug
└── *v*′
    ├── *v*$_{become}$
    │   -en
    └── √FLAT

c. Mary flattened the rug.

*v*P
├── DP
│   └── Mary
└── *v*′
    ├── *v*$_{cause}$
    └── *v*P
        ├── DP
        │   └── the rug
        └── *v*′
            ├── *v*$_{become}$
            │   -en
            └── √FLAT

**Figure 6: The position of templatic heads in syntactic structure
(Beavers and Koontz-Garboden 2020: 12)**

In the following section, I will argue how aspectual and event-delimiting function ascribed to Korean auxiliary verbs can be traced back to the cognitive model of its lexical meaning.

5.2.1. Metaphorical background of semantics of the Korean auxiliary verbs on the example of *noh-ta*

For argumentative purposes, I will refer to one selected Korean auxiliary verb – *noh-ta* 'to release, to put'. As it was mentioned before, ICMs and metaphorical links are built in our brain by idealization, abstractivization, and averaging of the sensual and interactive experiences we have had with a particular type of entity or situation. Piaget described object manipulation as the most basic experience of causality (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Therefore,

I chose an auxiliary verb whose original meaning is closely related to object manipulation. In this section, using the example of *noh-ta* I will explain the metaphorical link between the non-auxiliary meaning of that verb and its function as an auxiliary. In the next section, I will translate this proposal into terms of NLT and provide some data from experimental study that support the analysis.

Let us first look at the ICM of the action denoted by the non-auxiliary *noh-ta* in (121), represented in terms of experiential dimensions (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) Red-coded content is what constitutes the core meaning of *noh-ta* in the sense of 'put', while the content represented with a thickened font is what constitutes the core meaning of the sense 'release'.

(121) **NOH-TA (putting/releasing)**

Participants:	an agent and a patient
Parts:	- agent (animate) - patient (object) - motoric activity of the agent - change of state of the patient (a release from agent's grip) - a final state (location) of the patient
Stages:	I. the agent has the power to operate on the patient II. the agent performs motoric activity to trigger a change in the patient III. the state (location) of the patient changes **IV. the contact of the agent with the patient breaks off** **V. the new state (location) of the patient is retained after the interaction between the agent and the patient is over** (until another agent or force exerts influence on the patient)
Linear progression:	- the motoric activity of the agent necessarily precedes patient's change of stage (location) - after the agent stops operating on the patient, the new state (location) of the patient is preserved without any intervention from the former agent

Purpose: **breaking off the contact between the agent and the patient**, while causing the patient to change

If we assume that the meaning of the main verb is fitted into the relational structure of the action encoded by the ICM of *noh-ta*, we can explain many phenomena related to the meaning of sentences containing an AVC with *noh-ta*. The sentence (122) represents the most canonical meaning of *noh-ta* in an AVC.

(122) Ciswu-nun   palam-i   tuleo-ci   anh-key
       Ciswu-TOM   wind-NOM   come in-NEG   not-ADV

       changmwun-ul   tat-a   noh-ass-ta.
       window-ACC   close-NF   put-PST-DEC

'Ciswu closed the window so that the wind does not come in (and it is still closed).' (*Hankwuke Kicho Sacen*)

Noh-ta in (122) indicates that the agent (Ciswu) acted upon the patient (the window) that was under his control and changed its state. This state is preserved even after the interaction between the agent and the patient is over. This can easily be interpreted as an abstraction over the fact that if somebody puts away an object in a certain place, they expect to find it in the same place unless some other external force acted upon them. Therefore, this meaning can be understood in terms of a metaphorical mapping of the main verb ICM onto the schema ICM associated with the 'put' meaning of *noh-ta*.

(123) Nalssi-ka   nemwu te-we   noh-unikka   cokum-man
      weather-NOM   too much hot-NF put-CAUS   a little-only

      kel-eto   ttam-i   nan-ta.
      walk-too   sweat-NOM   appear-DEC

'It keeps being very hot, so even if I walk only shortly, I start sweating.'
(*Hankwuke Kicho Sacen*)

A stative meaning of *noh-ta* in (123) can be interpreted as a

metaphorical mapping of a state encoded by the main predicate onto the schema ICM associated with the 'release' sense of *noh-ta*. A derived interpretation is that the theme (the weather) holds a certain state (being hot) for a long time despite no agent acting upon it to preserve it.

(124) Emeni-ka   ai-eykey   cwul   kansik-ul

      mother-NOM   child-DAT   give-FUT   snack-ACC

      mili   mantul-e   noh-ass-ta.

      in advance make-NF   put-PST-DEC

      'The mother prepared the snacks in advance to give it to her children.'

      (*Hankwuke Kicho Sacen*)

The implications of the metaphor are extendable, and the sentence (124) is an example of such metaphorical extension. It was stated previously that if we put something away, we expect to find it in the same place. From there we can further infer that this object will be available for our future use. This inference is presence in a sentence like (124), where it is implied that the event of mother's making snacks is motivated by the intention of using them in the future (i.e., giving them to the child),

A proof for such mapping can be found in the syntactic and semantic behavior of AVCs in which some auxiliary verbs preserve idiosyncrasies of their lexical meaning. As for syntax, it has been observed by Yi (1995) and Kim (2017) that the auxiliary verb *cwu-ta* imposes its lexical argument structure on the AVC it appears in. It means that theta roles assigned to the arguments in the sentence are dispatched by the auxiliary verb, not the main verb – a trait usually assigned to templates in contrast to verbal roots. If we try to assign the same theta roles to the same arguments in a sentence without *cwu-ta*, such structure is either degraded (125) or ungrammatical (126). (Yi 1995)

(125) a. Miwumiwu-nun   na-eykey   chayk-ul
　　　 Miumiu-TOP   me-DAT   book-ACC

　　　 ilk-e   cwu-ess-ta.
　　　 read-NF   give-PST-DEC
　　　 Miumiu read a book for me. (Yi 1995, p. 64)

　　　 b.?Miwumiwu-nun   na-eykey   chayk-ul   ilk-ess-ta.
　　　 Miumiu-TOP   me-DAT   book-ACC   read-PST-DEC

(126) a. Hanpyeli-nun   na-eykey   cip-ul   ci-e
　　　 Hanpyeli-TOP   me-DAT   house-ACC   build-NF

　　　 cwu-ess-ta.
　　　 give-PST-DEC
　　　 'Habpyeli built a house for me.' (Yi 1995, p. 64)

　　　 b. *Hanpyeli-nun na-eykey   cip-ul   ci-ess-ta.
　　　 Hanpyeri-TOP   me-DAT   house-ACC   build-PST-DEC

　　　 Yi (1995) also notes that some semantic connotations are preserved when a particular verb is used as an auxiliary. Aside *noh-ta*, another verb, *tu-ta*, meaning 'to put, to set' can be used as an auxiliary verb that carries the meaning of preserving the result state of the patient after agent's intervention. However, *tu-ta* has an additional implication that Yi defines as "the preservation of the result state being desired by the agent'. The same implication appears to be present in the auxiliary use of *tu-ta* since it is unacceptable as an auxiliary verb with a main verb phrase describing an unwanted result (127b.). *Noh-ta* does not have this restriction, both for the lexical and auxiliary forms.

(127) a. Il-ul   ta   mang-chye   noh-ass-uni   mwel
　　　 issue-ACC all   ruin-NF   put-PST-CONN   something-ACC
　　　 hal   swu-ka   iss-keyss-e.
　　　 do-FUT   possible-NOM   be-FUT-INF

'Nothing can be done, you ruined it all.' (Yi 1995, p. 74)

b. *Il-ul   ta   mang-chye   twu-ess-u-ni   mwel
issue-ACC all   ruin-NF   put-PST-CONN   something-ACC

hal   swu-ka   iss-keyss-e.
do-FUT   possible-NOM   be-FUT-INF

It seems like auxiliary verbs serve as templates onto which the actions or states encoded by main verbs are metaphorically mapped. The fact that under the metaphorical mapping only the structural relations between parts in the source domain are preserved in target domains lead linguists to analyze auxiliary verbs as 'semantically bleached'.

In the next section, I will propose how this analysis may be tentatively described in terms of Neural Theory of Language. I will also introduce a case study whose results support the analysis.

5.2.2. A Neural Binding Approach to Event-Structuring Properties of Auxiliary Verbs

The fact that we perceive the structure introduced by an auxiliary verb and the action or state introduced by the main verb as one event can be easily accounted for in terms of neural binding. It is speculated that neural binding happens when two or more nodes fire synchronically, so that the concepts behind those two nodes are perceived as constituting the same event, e.g., the fact that we perceive some image as a 'blue square' is a result of neural binding of two meaningful nodes – 'blue' and 'square'. (Lakoff 2009)

As it was explained in the section 5.1.3., each ICM corresponds to a circuit in the brain. A metaphor is, therefore, a linking circuit between the circuit corresponding to a concrete object in the source domain (involving e.g., object manipulation, direct sensations) and the one corresponding to an abstract object in the target domain. The abstractivized event frame (template) node activated by the metaphorical circuit of the auxiliary is neurally bound

with the action/state node activated by the main verb.

This makes two predictions about the neural activity related to the processing of auxiliary verbs: it should be just as fast as processing any other event template and it should activate the circuit corresponding to the lexical meaning of an auxiliary verb.

There is an experiment that validates these predictions. Hwang et al. (2009) designed a priming experiment to check if the lexical and the auxiliary meaning of a verb is located in the same place in the 'mental lexicon'. The experiment was supposed to check if a verb used as an auxiliary would cause priming effects in a word recognition task, i.e., if a verb in an AVC primes words related to its lexical meaning. An example of a contrastive pair of sentences from the experiment is given in (128) (for the target word *yehayng* 'trip, travel') – (128a.) is a sentence with a related verb *ka-ta* 'go' in its lexical use, while (128b.) is a sentence with *ka-ta* in its auxiliary use.

(128) a. Chelswu-nun onul   achim   tosekwan-ey   kass-ta.
       Chelswu-TOP   today   morning library-LOC   go-PST-DEC
       'Chelswu went to the library this morning.'

       b. Chelswu-uy   cakphwum-i   tutie   mamwulitoy-e kass-ta.
       Chelswu-GEN   work-NOM   finally   finish-NF   go-PST-
       DEC
       'Chelswu's work finally reached its end.'

Since the meaning of auxiliary verbs is often described as 'semantically bleached', it was expected that priming effects would be weaker or not present at all. However, it proved to be the opposite – verbs as auxiliaries proved to cause priming effects that were no weaker than their lexical counterparts. The most surprising fact about the results is that the effects were visible not only under unconscious processing (with Stimulus Offset Asynchrony (SOA) equal 150ms), but also under conscious processing (SOA 1000ms), where the nodes corresponding to the meanings of the verb unrelated to the context

should have been inhibited. Average processing times for two categories of verbs and related/unrelated words are given in Table (10) and (11).

	lexical verb	auxiliary verb
related word	612.18	608.05
unrelated word	664.20 (126.81)	667.09 (141.44)

**Table 10: Unconscious word processing time (in ms; SOA = 150ms)
(source: Hwang et al. 2009)**

	lexical verb	auxiliary verb
related word	581.25 (112.11)	567.95 (102.18)
unrelated word	657.22 (124.29)	645.27 (119.41)

**Table 11: Conscious word processing time (in ms; SOA = 150ms)
(source: Hwang et al. 2009)**

Such results can be easily accounted for if we assume that the lexical[25] meaning of the verb is active in both cases. The lack of significant difference between priming effects in both lexical and auxiliary use, even when the processing of the word enters the conscious processing phase, suggests that the same mental structure is used to process the verb in both its lexical and auxiliary use - as it has been otherwise proven that irrelevant meanings would have already been inhibited in conscious processing. The meaning of the verb meaning appears 'bleached' if used as an auxiliary because only the structural relations of its lexical meaning are subject to neural binding. This process is equally time efficient in both times because the same process also takes place with other event-templatic words – only a different template is used.

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[25] Lexical as in contrast to grammatical (auxiliary).

5.3. Conceptual metaphor approach to the analysis of *wziąć* as an auxiliary verb

In this section, I begin by discussing the lexical meaning of the verb *wziąć* that serves as the ground for metaphorical abstraction of the auxiliary meaning of *wziąć*. Then, I outline the conceptual metaphorical analysis of the verb *wziąć*.

5.3.1. The lexical meaning of the verb *wziąć*

Great Polish Dictionary (Wielki Słownik Języka Polskiego) lists twenty-two different, related meanings of the verb *wziąć* in its lexical form. I will focus on the most representative or interesting ones and make a generalization to grasp a central, most basic meaning of the verb *wziąć*.

While traditional semantics would require us to list all the variations on the meaning of *wziąć* and treat this verb as polysemous, I will appeal to the cognitive linguistic approach to show a common trope within the various meanings of the verb *wziąć*.

The most basic meaning ('central' or 'core meaning' in cognitive linguistics) of *wziąć* is apparent in the object-manipulation uses – an agent takes an object in its proximity, displaces it, and puts it in their hold or ownership. This kind of use is characteristic of the first meaning of *wziąć* listed in the dictionary – "to enclose an object in one's hand or with a tool of a function analogical to a hand with an intention to move the object from its original spot." (example (129)).

(129)   Podeszła   do   stołu   i   wzięła   szklankę
          came-ind[3sg]   to   table   and   took-ind[3sg]   glass

          w   obie   ręce.
          in   both   hands

          'She came to the table and took the glass into her hands.'

To understand the meaning of take, we must outline where the border

of the agent is and where their proximity is. Here we derive the extended meanings of the verb *wziąć*. The border of the agent may vary depending on the use: it is the physical contact with the agent in the 'hold' uses (like (129)), it may be the body outline of the agent in 'ingest' uses (like in (130)), and it is their influence in the abstract uses (like in (131)). We get slightly different senses of *wziąć* depending on where we draw the line. However, in the end all the uses of *wziąć* can be brought down to 'agent performing action to bring the object in their proximity out of its original position and into the direct influence of the agent'.

(130) Musiałem   wziąć leki   na   uspokojenie.
       had to-ind[1sg]   take   medicine   for   sedation
       'I had to take sedatives.'

(131) Możemy   ich   wziąć na   przeczekanie.
       can-ind[1pl]   them   take   by   waiting
       'We can wait them out.' (lit. 'We can take them by waiting.')

If someone grabs a hold of something, it will follow them wherever they go. This is where meaning of *wziąć* instantiated by (132) comes from. For people as objects of the action denoted by *wziąć*, it can mean that they are 'taken' to form a group with an agent, so they are bound to follow them everywhere. This extension contributes to the example (133).

(132) Marta   wzięła jedzenie   na   drogę.
       Martha took-[3sg] food   for   way
       'Martha took the food for the road.'

(133) Tata   wziął   mnie   na   spacer do   lasu.
       dad   took-[3sg] me   for   walk   in   forest
       'My dad took me for a walk in the forest.'

For actions as objects, it means that the agent performs them – they become the part of the agent, as the body of the agent is involved in

performing them. This corresponds to the meaning of the verb *wziąć* illustrated with the example (134).

(134) Wieczorem   wezmę   kąpiel   w   wannie.
evening   will take-ind[1sg]   bath   in   tub
'In the evening, I will take a bath in the tub.'

Agent's hold of an object can exhibit different level of abstractness: from physical hold (e.g., example (135)), through ownership (e.g., example (136)), influence (example (137)), or responsibility (example (138)), to superiority (example (139)).

(135) Wzięła   wnuczka   na   kolana.
took-ind[3sg]   grandson   on   knees
'She took her grandson onto her lap.'

(136) Wzięli   telewizor   na   raty.
took-ind[3pl]   a TV   in   installments
'They purchased a TV in installments.'

(137) Kadżarowie   wzięli   miasto   szturmem.
Qajars   took   the city   by storm
'The Qajars took the city by storm.'

(138) Możemy   też   wziąć   psa   ze   schroniska.
can-in[1pl]   also   take-inf   dog   from   the shelter
'We can also take a dog from the shelter.'

(139) Musiał   wziąć   pomocnika.
had to-ind[3sg]   take-inf   helper
'He had to get an assistant.'

It can be also reversed when an emotion (140) or an urge (141) is the subject – then the emotion takes hold of the experiencer.

(140) | Wzięła | mnie | straszna | złość | na | tego
| took-ind[3sg] | me | awful | anger | for | that

faceta.

guy

Lit. 'A terrible anger at that guy took over me.'

(141) | Wzięło | mnie | na | wspomnienia.
| took-ind[3sg] | me | for | memories

'I took a trip down memory lane.' (lit. 'It (the urge) took me for memories.')

Mahpeykar & Tyler (2014) define the core meaning of English *take* as 'Get Hold of and Remove'. Looking at the translations of the sample sentences, Polish *wziąć* appears to have a similar range of uses., I will simply refer to the Polish *wziąć* as 'take' verb. However, some sentences needed to be translated using the verb *get* or *purchase.* I assume, therefore, that the component of the object getting into the agent's possession or influence as a result of the action is more central to the meaning of *wziąć* than its English counterpart. As the difference between the two verbs is not the focus of this paper, I will omit any further discussion on that topic.

5.3.2. The conceptual-metaphorical analysis the verb *wziąć*

This subsection shows how and why did auxiliary *wziąć* come to serve its preference-shift motivation function as opposed to other possible auxiliary verbs. My hypothesis is that *wziąć* grammaticalized as an auxiliary verb from its original meaning through the mechanism of metaphor.

I propose that grammaticalization of *wziąć* into an auxiliary begun with a persistent use of conjoined imperatives in which the target action of the second imperative required taking the object into one's hands. An example of such conjoined imperative is given in (142).

(142) Weź   książkę i   połóż   ją   na
       take-imp[2sg]   book   and   put-imp[2sg]   her   on

       stole.
       table

       'Take the book and put it on the table.'

In the sequential imperatives like (142), wziąć contributes the meaning of a simple action that enables performing the second imperative. The agent must first grab the book in their hands first and then they can act upon it. Most importantly, the agent does not have to perform any additional action (e.g., buying or borrowing) to get a hold of the book – it is already in their reach.

With consistent use of a conjoined imperatives like (142), the connective was dropped and *wziąć* lost its noun argument, arriving at its current form in (143).

(143) Weź   połóż   książkę   na   stole.
       take-imp[2sg]   put-imp[2sg]   book   on   table

       '(Come on,) put the book on the table.'

This syntactic change was a direct reflection of a semantic change – *wziąć* became semantically bleached and what was previously conceptualized as two events became one. *Wziąć*, instead of denoting an event of 'taking', became a modifier for the event denoted by the other imperative. In conjoined imperatives, *wziąć* denoted a simple preparatory action. What is its meaning now as a functional entity?

I propose that what once was a location change became a mindset change, with the agent instantaneously choosing to engage with an object. For actions as objects, such a choice requires a shift in preferences.

Since we are talking about structural analogies between events, the change-of-location event denoted by the lexical take becomes a change-of-state event taking place in the agent's mentality for the auxiliary use. The agent 'takes' the action denoted by the other verb onto their agenda - and

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according to the preferential theoretic approach an agent's agenda is defined by their preferences. Taking a new agenda involves, therefore, a shift in preferences.

I will model this analogy on the grounds of the experiential gestalt for the lexical meaning of *wziąć*. The relevant structure is outlined in (144).

(144)   **WZIĄĆ (taking)**

Participants: an agent and a patient

Parts: - agent (animate)
- patient (object)
- motoric activity of the agent
- agent exerting its influence on (=coming into possession of) the patient
- agent's control of the patient

Stages: **I. the agent and the patient are not in contact (no influence) with each other, but the patient is in the reach of the agent**
II. the agent initiates movement to get the control of the agent
III. the agent gains control over the patient
IV. the agent can freely operate the patient and use the patient to agent's benefit

Linear progression: - before the motoric activity of the agent the patient must be outside of the agent's influence, but accessible the agent
- the agent's motoric activity leads to the agent exerting its power over the patient

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Purpose: **taking control over and using the patient**

The fact that something is 'in the reach' of the agent means that they are 'in the position' to grab it. It does not have much to do with the difficulty of the action itself, but different factors that condition the agent to be more likely to get involved in the action – as much as someone is in the position to take the object. Despite the optimal position for grabbing the object, until the agent makes the decision to make a simple move to get the hold of the object, the object remains outside of the agent's influence. The action is effortless and instantaneous, as for the agent it only takes to reach for the object.

Analogy can be drawn between the initial stages of the 'taking' event and the preference shift that the auxiliary *wziąć* denotes. It is the agent's initiative only that makes the object in the agent's reach to come into the agent's field of influence. On the other hand, the preferential shift serves as the initiative for 'taking' the action into ones agenda. Just as before 'taking a bath' was conceptualized as a metaphorical extension from the object coming into the 'zone' of the agent, the action becomes one with the agent just by a simple initiative – change in preferences.

To conclude, this section argued for an extension of the cognitive-based approach to cover the meaning of the auxiliary *wziąć*. It first summarized the background of the selected cognitive approach, which is based on two pillars: conceptual metaphor and Neural Theory of Language (NTL). Then, I illustrated the way this approach can be utilized to study verbal meaning by drawing analogies with a more traditional theory of verb semantics and presenting an example of such a study with Korean auxiliary verbs. Lastly, I proposed a way to extend the theory to the meaning of auxiliary *wziąć* – by drawing an analogy between a change of location (out → in the agent's 'zone') and a change in preferences (out → in the agent's effective preference structure).

Chapter 6. Conclusion

This paper was set out to answer the following three research questions:

(145)   Q1:   How exactly does 'take' constrain the use of imperatives? What types of speech acts and implications is 'take' compatible and incompatible with? [empirical]

       Q2:   What is the semantics and pragmatics of imperatives (in Polish) and what is the semantics and pragmatics of the auxiliary 'take'? How do the two interact? [theoretical]

       Q3:   Why is 'take', as opposed to other possible auxiliary verbs, used to modify imperatives in this way? [explanatory]

As the answer to the first question, it has been found in the experimental study that there were a few types of speech act for which 'take'-imperatives were judged to be significantly less natural. However, as there was not much consistency within the speech act groups, I also referred to the separate rankings of all items used in the experiment. Most importantly, 'take'-imperatives showed a reverse correlation with the addressee preference scores – for high addressee preference scores, naturalness of 'take'-imperatives significantly dropped.

Next, I also examined the results of the experiment in the context of the second research question, especially the meaning of imperatives in Polish. For standard imperatives in Polish, a certain naturalness pattern could be observed that is the most readily explainable in comparison with other pragmatic theories - the modal theory of imperatives (Schwager 2006, Kaufmann & Schwager 2009, Kaufmann & Kaufmann 2012) and To-Do List theory of imperatives (Portner 2007. 2012). Especially characteristic for the preference theory of imperative would be the mean naturalness result achieved by well-wishes – among all the speech acts, well wishes achieved

the third highest mean naturalness, beating some directive uses, which are considered to be the more 'canonical'. Only a preference approach readily accommodates the fact that well-wishes are one of the most basic speech acts realized by imperatives.

Following Condoravdi & Lauer (2010, 2011, 2012, 2017), I assumed that the imperatives contain a preferential imperative operator repeated below.

(146) $[\![\text{IMP}]\!]^C := \lambda p[\lambda w[PEP_w(Sp, p)]]$

I also proposed that the addressee's obligation to perform the action denoted by the imperative is the result of a cooperative principle and the level of authority that the speaker has over the addressee – the higher the authority, the higher the proposition embedded in the imperative must be allocated in the effective preference structure of the hearer.

I also proposed a definition for auxiliary *wziąć* as an operator introducing the following beliefs:

(147) 1. The addressee has some restraints from performing the action (it is not on the top of their effective preference structure).

2. By making the proposition *p* true, the addressee can make a bigger or equal subset of their effective preference structure true compared to acting on their current top effective preference.

Even though I did not deal with other uses of the double verb construction with *wziąć*, I believe that this analysis can be extended to these uses. In non-imperative uses, *wziąć* also can be modelled as a sudden change in preferences that results in acting on the formerly dismissed proposition. Therefore, *wziąć* in double verb constructions often appears with adverbs like 'finally' or 'eventually' – the speaker expects that the subject may potentially do something like the action in question, but the addressee hold restraints

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about it until some point.

(148) a. 　W końcu 　　wziął 　　się 　　ogolił.
　　　　　 finally 　　　　took-ind[3sg] 　self 　　shaved-ind[3sg]
　　　　　 'Finally, he shaved.'

　　　 b. 　W końcu 　　weźmie 　　wszystko 　　szlag
　　　　　 eventually 　　will take-ind[3sg] 　everything 　　blow
　　　　　 trafi.
　　　　　 will strike-ind[3sg]
　　　　　 'Eventually, everything will go to hell.' (lit. 'everything will
　　　　　 be hit by a blow.')

Finally, I went through the cognitive theories of meaning and tried to bridge the gap between the cognitive and logic-based semantic theory by showing the analogical link between the lexical meaning of *wziąć* and the preferential-related meaning I proposed for the auxiliary *wziąć*. The link is that the agent is in the optimal position to pick up the object (action) and by a swift action they bring the object into their 'zone' – the action is change of location caused by e.g., hand movement of the agent in the lexical meaning and the abrupt change in the agent's preferences for the auxiliary meaning.

In the future, I hope to develop a more detailed theoretic implementation of the proposal. Additionally, I believe it would be beneficial to replicate the experiment on a bigger sample of Polish native speakers.

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Appendix A: A full list of experimental items and their English translations

type	item	wziąć (w)	imperative (i)	English translation	context prompt (PL)	context prompt (ENG)
command	1	Weź nie baw się jedzeniem.	Nie baw się jedzeniem.	Don't play with food.	Mama siedzi przy stole z dzieckiem. Dziecko niemalże skończyło jeść i, znudzone, bawi się jedzeniem. Matka mówi.	Mother is sitting at the table with her child. The child is almost done eating and, bored, is playing with their food. The mom says.
command	2	Weź się wyprostuj.	Wyprostuj się.	Straighten up.	Nauczyciel fortepianu jest w trakcie lekcji. Obserwuje, jak uczeń siedzi przy fortepianie i gra. Nauczyciel mówi.	The piano teacher is in the middle of a lesson. He watches the student sit at the piano and play. The teacher says.
command	3	Weź zrób pracę domową.	Zrób pracę domową.	Do your homework.	Babcia opiekuje się wnuczkiem. Wchodzą do domu po powrocie ze szkoły. Babcia mówi.	Grandma is taking care of her grandson. They enter the house after returning from school. Grandma says.
warning	4	Weź nie dotykaj wrzątku.	Nie dotykaj wrzątku.	Don't touch the boiling water.	Starsza i młodsza siostra gotują razem. Młodsza z nich stoi blisko kuchenki i sięga dłonią w kierunku gotującej się wody. Starsza siostra mówi.	The older and younger sister cook together. The younger of them stands close to the stove and reaches with her hand towards the boiling water. The older sister says.
warning	5	Weź odejdź od kuchenki.	Odejdź od kuchenki.	Move away from the oven.	Mężczyzna smaży w kuchni kurczaka na głębokim tłuszczu. Z garnka co chwila tryska gorący olej. Do kuchni wchodzi jego nastoletni syn. Mężczyzna mówi.	A man is deep-frying chicken in the kitchen. Hot oil gushes out of the pot every now and then. His teenage son enters the kitchen. The man speaks.
warning	6	Weź uważaj.	Uważaj.	Watch out.	Chłopak stoi na przystanku. W jego stronę idzie dziewczyna, pisząc wiadomość na telefonie. Nie zauważa chłopaka i wpada na niego. Chłopak mówi.	The boy is standing at the bus stop. A girl walks towards him, typying on her phone. She does not notice the boy and bumps into him. The boy says.
request	7	Weź mi skocz po papierosy.	Skocz mi po papierosy.	Go get me some cigarettes.	Mężczyzna i kobieta kończą oglądać film na kanapie. Mężczyzna wstaje i mówi, że wychodzi wyrzucić śmieci. Kobieta mówi.	A man and a woman finish watching a movie on the couch. The man gets up and says he's going out to throw away the garbage. The woman speaks.
request	8	Weź mi podaj sól.	Podaj mi sól.	Pass me the salt.	Rodzina siedzi przy obiedzie. Mężczyzna widzi, że sól stoi po przeciwnej stronie stołu, gdzie siedzi jego żona. Mężczyzna mówi.	A family is sitting at dinner. The man sees that the salt is standing on the opposite side of the table where his wife is sitting. The man speaks.
request	9	Weź kup mi mieszkanie.	Kup mi mieszkanie.	Buy me an apartment.	Dziewczyna wychodzi z łazienki po ponad półgodzinnym prysznicu. Podchodzi do niej jej ojciec i skarży się, że przez nią długo nie mógł skorzystać z toalety. Dziewczyna mówi.	The girl leaves the bathroom after more than half an hour of showering. Her father approaches her and complains that he could not use the toilet for a long time. The girl says.
advice	10	Weź spróbuj przejść na dietę.	Spróbuj przejść na dietę.	Try going on a diet.	Mężczyzna rozmawia z trenerem personalnym. Omawiają plan treningów. Trener mówi.	The man is talking to a personal trainer. They discuss the training plan. The coach says.

advice	11	Weź napij się ciepłej herbaty.	Napij się ciepłej herbaty.	Drink some hot tea.	Dziewczyna rozmiawia z matką przez telefon. Skarży się, że jest bardzo zimno. Matka mówi.	The girl talks to her mother on the phone. The girl complains that it is very cold. The mother speaks.
advice	12	Weź się wyprowadź od rodziców.	Wyprowadź się od rodziców.	Move away from your parents.	Dziewczyna rozmawia z koleżanką. Opowiada, że ciągle kłóci się z rodzicami. Koleżanka mówi.	The girl is talking to a friend. She says she's constantly arguing with her parents. The friend says.
plea	13	Weź pożycz mi pieniądze.	Pożycz mi pieniądze.	(Please,) lend me some money.	Mężczyzna dzwoni do koleżanki. Chociaż nie są blisko ze sobą, żali się, że ma problemy finansowe. Mężczyzna mówi.	A man calls a friend. Although they are not close to each other, he complains that he has financial problems. The man speaks.
plea	14	Weź mnie tutaj nie zostawiaj.	Nie zostawiaj mnie tutaj.	(Please,) don't leave me here.	Kobieta odwozi swoje dziecko do przedszkola. W szatni pomaga mu się przebrać. Dziecko mówi.	A woman drives her child to kindergarten. In the locker room, she helps them change. The child speaks.
plea	15	Weź nie odchodź ode mnie.	Nie odchodź ode mnie.	(Please,) don't break up with me.	Kobieta rozmawia ze swoim chłopakiem. Kłócą się. Kobieta mówi.	A woman is talking to her boyfriend. They argue. The woman speaks.
well-wish	16	Weź wyzdrowiej szybko.	Wyzdrowiej szybko.	Get well soon.	Mężczyzna odwiedza swoją dziewczynę w szpitalu. Żegnają się na koniec wizytacji. Mężczyzna mówi.	A man is visitng his girlfriend at the hospital. They say goodbye at the end of the visitation. The man speaks.
well-wish	17	Weź baw się dobrze na wakacjach.	Baw się dobrze na wakacjach.	Have fun on your vacation.	Mężczyzna odwozi brata na pociąg. Żegnają się na peronie. Mężczyzna mówi.	A man drives his brother to the train. They say goodbye on the platform. The man speaks.
well-wish	18	Weź śpij dobrze.	Śpij dobrze.	Sleep well.	Matka czyta dziecku bajkę na dobranoc. W pewnym momencie bajka się kończy. Matka mówi.	A mother reads a bedtime story to her child. At some point, the story ends. The mother speaks.
curse	19	Weź umrzyj.	Umrzyj.	Drop dead.	Dwóch chłopców kłóci się ze sobą. Jeden z nich obraża matkę drugiego. Ten drugi mówi.	Two boys argue with each other. One of them insults the mother of the other. The other boy speaks.
curse	20	Weź zgnij w więzieniu.	Zgnij w więzieniu.	Rot in a cell.	Mężczyzna siedzi na sali sądowej jako powód. Kobieta, którą pozwał, została właśnie skazana. Mężczyzna mówi.	A man sits in the courtroom as the plaintiff. The woman he sued has just been convicted. The man speaks.
curse	21	Weź się udław.	Udław się.	Choke yourself.	Uczennica wraca do szkolnej ławki z toalety. Zauważa, że podczas jej nieobecności jej koleżanka z ławki popisała jej zeszyt. Uczennica mówi.	A student returns to the school bench from the toilet. She notices that during her absence, her colleague doodled in her notebook. The girl says.

absent wish	22	Weź bądź blondynką.	Bądź blondynką.	(Please,) be blonde. (about a girl before a blind date)	Chłopak umówił się na randkę w ciemno - nigdy nie widział dziewczyny, z którą ma się spotkać. Tuż przed randką mówi.	A boy is on his way to a blind date - he had never seen the girl he was going to meet. Just before the date, he says.
absent wish	23	Weź daj mi zdać.	Daj mi zdać.	(Please,) let me pass. (about a professor when checking grades)	Student otrzymał powiadomienie, że wystawiono oceny semestralne. Otwiera stronę i loguje się. W międzyczasie mówi.	A student received a notification that semester grades had been issued. He opens the page and logs in. In the meantime, he speaks.
absent wish	24	Weź wygraj to.	Wygraj to.	(Please,) win that thing. (when refreshing to check the scoreboard of a sports tournament)	Chłopak kilkukrotnie odświeża stronę z wynikami meczu swojego ulubionego zawodnika. Chłopak mówi.	A boy repeatedly refreshes the page with the results of the match of his favorite player. The boy says.
permission	25	Dobrze, weź wyjdź z kolegami.	Dobrze, wyjdź z kolegami.	(Okay,) go out with friends.	Mąż z żoną rozmawiają na temat planów na wieczór. Żona mówi.	Husband and wife talk about plans for the evening. The wife says.
permission	26	Dobrze, weź wyjedź do Paryża.	Dobrze, wyjedź do Paryża.	(Okay,) go to Paris.	Matka rozmawia z córką na temat jej planów wakacyjnych. Córka zdradza, że chce wyjechać do Paryża, ale na początku matka jest niechętna. W końcu matka mówi.	A mother talks to her daughter about her vacation plans. The daughter reveals that she wants to go to Paris, but at first her mother is reluctant. Eventually, the mother speaks.
permission	27	Dobrze, weź się nie spiesz.	Dobrze, nie spiesz się.	(Okay,) don't rush.	Dwie dziewczyny były umówione. Jedna z nich dzwoni do drugiej, że uciekł jej autobus i chyba się spóźni. Druga dziewczyna mówi.	Two girls had an appointment. One of them calls the other that she has missed the bus and will be late. The other girl says.
offer	28	Weź się poczęstuj.	Poczęstuj się.	Have a bite.	Dziewczyna zorganizowała parapetówkę. Impreza dopiero się zaczęła. Dziewczyna stoi koło jednego z gości i widzi, że jeszcze nikt nie napoczął jedzenia. Dziewczyna mówi.	A girl organized a housewarming party. The party has only just begun. The girl stands next to one of the guests and sees that no one has yet started eating. The girl says.
offer	29	Weź się napij.	Napij się.	Have a drink.	Mężczyzna przygotował napoje dla odwiedzających go kolegów. Bierze szklankę i podchodzi do jednego z nich. Mężczyzna mówi.	A man prepared drinks for his visiting colleagues. He takes a glass and walks over to one of them. The man speaks.
offer	30	Weź usiądź, gdzie chcesz.	Usiądź, gdzie chcesz.	Sit wherever you'd like.	Mężczyzna czeka na kolację rodzinną w jego domu. Jego siostra przychodzi jako pierwsza i wita się z nim już w jadalni. Mężczyzna mówi.	A man is waiting for a family dinner at his home. His sister comes first and greets him in the dining room. The man speaks.
invitation	31	Weź przyjdź do mnie wieczorem.	Przyjdź do mnie wieczorem.	Come visit me this evening.	Mężczyzna rozmawia z koleżanką z pracy. Organizuje spotkanie dla współpracowników i ta koleżanka nie potwierdziła jeszcze przybycia. Mężczyzna mówi.	A man is talking to a colleague from work. The man is organizing a meeting for co-workers and that colleague has not yet confirmed her arrival. The man speaks.

invitation	32	Weź pojedź z nami na narty.	Pojedź z nami na narty.	Go skiing with us.	Kobieta rozmawia ze znajomym. W rozmowie wychodzi, że kobieta planowała wyjazd na narty z innym wspólnym znajomym. Kobieta mówi.	A woman is talking to a friend. In the conversation, it turns out that the woman was planning a ski trip with another mutual friend. The woman speaks.
invitation	33	Weź usiądź z nami.	Usiądź z nami.	Sit here with us.	Na studenckiej stołówce studentka siedzi z koleżanką z grupy. Widzi inną koleżankę z grupy przechodzącą koło nich z jedzeniem. Studentka mówi.	At the student cafeteria, a student sits with a friend from her class. She sees another classmate walking past them with food. The student says.
disinterested advice	34	Weź pojedź autobusem nr 900.	Pojedź autobusem nr 900.	Take the bus nr 900.	Mężczyzna rozstaje się z kolegą na koniec spotkania. Kolega pyta, czy mężczyzna wie, jak dojechać do centrum. Mężczyzna mówi.	A man is parting ways with his colleague at the end of their meeting. The colleague asks if the man knows how to get to the city center. The man speaks.
disinterested advice	35	Weź kup większy stół.	Kup większy stół.	Buy a bigger table.	Kobieta rozmawia z koleżankami z pracy. Jedna z nich narzeka, że na święta nie może zmieścić wszystkich potraw na stole i prosi pozostałe o rady. Kobieta mówi.	A woman talks to her colleagues from work. One of them complains that for the holidays she can not fit all the dishes on the table and asks the others for advice. The woman speaks.
disinterested advice	36	Weź znajdź prawnika.	Znajdź prawnika.	Look for/find a lawyer.	Mężczyzna rozmawia z matką. Matka opowiada mu, że podejrzewa, że została oszukana i pyta się, co powinna zrobić. Mężczyzna mówi.	A man is talking with his mother. His mother tells him that she suspects she has been scammed and asks what she should do. The man speaks.

Abstract in Korean

폴란드어 명령법의 의미론과 화용론: 명령문에서 *wziąć* 보조동사 사용 연구

본고는 폴란드어 명령문이 보조동사 *wziąć* '집다, 가져가다'와 결합했을 때 그 의미와 화용이 어떻게 변이되는지를 조사하는 연구이다.

보조동사 *wziąć*가 명령문의 의미와 사용을 바꾸고 제한한다는 직관은 이전 연구에서도 언급된 바 있다. 그러나 *wziąć*가 명령문의 운용을 정확히 어떻게 제한하는지에 대해서는 많이 연구된 바가 없다. 본고는 이를 밝혀 내기 위해서 폴란드어 원어민을 대상으로 실험을 진행하였다. 실험에서 참여자들은 다양한 화행을 실현하는 일반 명령문와 *wziąć*가 들어간 보조동사 명령문들의 자연스러움, 비유적임, 명령문 실현의 어려움, 그리고 명령문 실현에 대한 청자의 선호도에 대해 묻는 설문에 대답했다.

실험 결과는 명령문 종류(일반 명령문 대 보조동사 명령문), 화자/청자 명령문 실현 선호도, 그리고 둘 간의 상호작용이(interaction)이 명령문의 자연스러움을 예측하는 유의미한 요인들임을 드러냈다. 예를 들어 일반 명령문은 그 해석에 있어서 청자의 행위보다는 화자의 선호와 직접적인 연결고리를 가지는 소망(well-wish) 화행을 실현할 때 보조동사 명령문보다 유의미하게 높은 자연스러움 점수를 받았다. 이에 비해 보조동사 명령문의 자연스러움 점수는 청자 화행 선호도와 반비례하는 결과를 보여주었다.

이와 같은 실험 결과는 명령문의 선호적 이론과(preferential

theory of imperatives; Condoravdi & Lauer 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2017) 일맥상통하며, 해당 이론을 확장할 수 있는 유형론적 기반을 제공한다.

해당 이론에 따르면 명령문은 화자의 명령문(내용) 실현에 대한 공적 선호(public effective preference)를 야기한다. 이를 바탕으로 본고는 *wziąć* 보조동사의 의미를 선호적 이론의 관점에서 다음과 같이 정의하였다: *wziąć* 보조동사는 명령문이 가리키는 행위 *A*가 *청자*의 공적 선호 구조(effective preference structure)에서 우선순위(1위)를 점유하고 있지 않지만, 현재 선호 구조상 1위를 점유하고 있는 행위를 *A*로 대체한다면 청자의 선호 구조의 똑같거나 더 큰 부분이 실현될 수 있다는 화자의 믿음을 표현한다.

보조동사 *wziąć*의 의미를 밝힌 후 본고는 인지적 의미 이론, 즉 개념 은유론과(conceptual metaphor theory) 신경적 언어 이론을 (Neural Theory of Language) 기반으로 *wziąć* 동사를 분석한다. 이를 통해서 *wziąć* 동사가 '집다, 가져가다'라는 일반 동사에서 위와 같은 의미를 가진 보조동사로 어떻게 변용되었는지를 위치변화가 선호변화로 추상화되는 과정을 상정함으로써 설명한다.

본 연구는 명령문의 선호적 이론을 간접적으로 지지하고 *wziąć* 보조동사를 선호를 기반으로 한 연산자로 기술하여 명령구와 *wziąć* 보조동사의 상호작용을 설명한다. 나아가 *wziąć* 동사가 이와 같은 기능을 가진 보조동사로 변용된 이유를 은유를 기반으로 한 추상화 과정을 통해서 설명한다.