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Old Foes as New Friends:
State Development through the
Legitimization of Insurgents

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Taegoo Roh

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T. K. Ahn

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Taegoo Roh

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Taegoo Roh

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Chair	Yong Kyun Kim	(Seal)
Vice Chair	T. K. Ahn	(Seal)
Examiner	Brandon Ives	(Seal)

Abstract

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Taegoo Roh

Political Science Major

Department of Political Science and International Relations

The Graduate School

Seoul National University

Under what conditions do incumbent elites invest in state institutions? Unlike bellicist state theories that focus on the role of external threats in the consolidation of state power, this study highlights the importance of aligned interests of key political actors as an alternative logic of a way out of the "weak state trap". Building on studies that shed light on dynamics of intra-elite competition, I develop a theory of state development that centers on incumbent elites' incentives to coalesce with insurgents via peace agreements. The central argument is that an incumbent under high coalitional pressures is incentivized to sign a peace deal with insurgents

(stage 1), and in trying to mitigate its commitment problem the incumbent invests in impartial state institutions against the opposition (stage 2). I use a multi-metho approach on a sample of cases in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Using a quasi-experimental design, I show that investments in state institutions are more likely to be made when civil wars end by striking a peace agreement. With illustrative case studies on El Salvador and Myanmar I provide qualitative evidence on within-case variation in state development outcomes.

Keyword : state development, civil conflict, insurgent groups, peace settlement, weak state trap

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Chapter 1. Introduction

State capacity is conducive to many features of development such as economic growth, rule of law or, even, democracy itself (Olson 1993; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Wang 2015; Slater and Wong 2022). Yet, the emergence of a strong state has historically been a rare event. Development phenomena tend to come in clusters which leads to an equilibrium that is suboptimal but hard to exit. The irony that late state builders must inevitably resort to weak state institutions to pursue higher state capacity yet adds to the difficulty of finding a way out of this "weak state trap" (Kurtz 2013; Fukuyama 2014; Garfias 2018; Fergusson et al. 2022).

Comparative scholars have sought to understand the logic of state development looking for specific historical contexts and scope conditions. A volume of studies in the "bellicist" tradition that emphasizes the role of external threats in the consolidation of state power has focused on the portability of its claim in parts of the developing world outside Europe (Dincecco 2011; Scheve and Stasavage 2012; Schenoni 2021; Gennaioli and Voth 2015; Hui 2017; Soifer 2015). Other researchers have also explored the state investment effects of inter-state threats or inter-state rivalry (Herbst 2000; Besley and Persson 2011; Thies 2005; Lopez-Alves 2001). However, these studies have produced mixed results on whether the bellicist state theories can travel across different time periods and regions. This points to

the divergent preconditions of state development in each country case. Highlighting the fact that large-scale inter-state warfare was rare after World War II, other approaches have turned to endemic civil wars (Centeno 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier et al. 2004).[1] For many developing countries that are characterized by weak state capacity, external threats arguably came from within the territorial boundaries. Their research question has been whether the incumbent government engaged in civil wars has equally strong incentives to extract societal revenues and penetrate into the periphery (Lopez-Alvez 2001; Thies 2005). Yet, these studies have produced mixed results on whether the bellicist state-building theories can travel across different time periods and regions.

This study reflects on theoretical under-specifications in existing bellicist state theories and its applications. First, if war did make the state, it would have done so in only half the cases, namely, the victors (Spruyt 2017).[2]

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[1] State building is thus an on-going project in developing countries given that the use of physical force, in Weberian terms, is not monopolized but oligopolized by multiple authorities like drug cartels, gangs and guerilla groups. These conditions create "quasi-states" or "states-within-states" that are ruled by effective political actors along with the state itself (Lemke 2003; Jackson 1993; Kingston and Spears 2004).

[2] Latin America in the 19th century observed a similar amount of inter-state wars to Europe (8 vs 11) (Sarkees and Wayma 2010; Holsti 1996) and "losers" did not vanish but survived (Schenoni 2021). Mahony (2010) points out that strong states and weak states that had risen as a result of war remained relatively path dependent in the 20th century.

Second, although wars had been equally prevalent, if not more, in pre-modern times, states with commensurate extraction and penetration capabilities did not emerge until 16-18th century. Finally, even if wars lead to state building, in no case can an aggressive war be a policy option for contemporary developing countries.

Under what conditions then do incumbent elites strategically invest in state institutions? How do they leverage influential actors outside the center to make a pro-state coalition? In this study, I build on existing insights on dynamics of intra-elite competition (Mares and Queralt 2015; Besley and Persson 2009; Garfias 2018; Chang 2008) and develop a theory of state development that centers on incumbent elites' incentives to coalesce with insurgents via peace agreements. In contexts where incumbent elites have option to end the civil war either in a peaceful or forceful way, and when insurgent groups can coordinate a homogeneous stance in the negotiations, insurgents can rise as a new strategic partner as old foes can become new friends. I advance this logic by developing a two-staged model of insurgent legitimization where an incumbent under high coalitional pressures is incentivized to sign a peace deal with insurgents (stage 1), and in trying to mitigate its commitment problem the incumbent invests in impartial state institutions against the opposition (stage 2).

I use a multi-method approach to provide quantitative and qualitative evidence on my theory of state development. As a sampling strategy, I

choose country-level cases of civil wars that ended in Latin America and Southeast Asia as an empirical testing ground on two grounds. First, the bilateral nature of peace negotiations that took place in these two regions fits the scope conditions of the theoretical model that postulates a single homogeneous insurgent actor. Second, the increasing trends in conflict resolution especially following the end of the Cold War were most salient in Latin America and Southeast Asia (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Casteñada 1993; Findlay 1996). Additionally, focusing on Latin American and Southeast Asia allows for analysis beyond the temporal and regional contexts of the state development literature that focuses on the experiences of Europe (Tilly 1992; Dincecco 2011; Scheve and Stasavage 2012; Gennaioli and Voth 2015).

As a primary step, I employ a quasi-experimental design to test the central argument of this study. I exploit cross-national variation in how civil wars end – either peaceful or forceful conflict resolution – following an exogenous shock in recent history, the end of the Cold War. In contexts where incumbent governments faced the need of political support, this substantial change disproportionately affected the turn of civil wars leading to peaceful settlement in an as-if random fashion. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, I find an increase in our measures of state capacity in those cases where civil conflicts ended by striking a peace agreement. I then proceed to provide case-studies on El Salvador and Myanmar to explore

within-case variation on state development outcomes at each stage (found in Table 7). I illustrate that in El Salvador where there existed a strong opposition with veto power, the incumbent's commitment problem operated most intensely which led to its decision to invest in state institutions. The qualitative evidence also sheds light on the multi-faceted nature of state capacity in each case that ranges from infrastructure expansion, party strength to judicial reforms.

Chapter 2. A Two-staged Model of Insurgent Legitimization

1. Scope Conditions and Settings

The theoretical model of this study requires several scope conditions. First, it assumes a homogeneous insurgent actor. When rival rebel groups exist and territorial control in the periphery is split among them, the state that is unable to find an appropriate negotiating partner is likely to use police force to end violence, rather than conciliatory measures, reducing the possibility of striking a peace deal (Magaloni, Franco-Vivanco and Melo 2020). A number of insurgent groups may coexist in a single country and collude with and confront one another from time to time. However, it may not be a problem if the state can find the leading faction among them who serves as a representative of the rest. A possible exception, for example, is ethnic-based insurgents in Burma but they too managed to settle a package deal with the central state.

Second, domestic politics maintain higher salience than international politics. That is, there are types of historical events that make the demands of internal elites, and the dynamics between them, become more salient than external pressures. This study is primarily concerned with the end of the

Cold War as an important structural change.[3] An institutional change like state development requires a substantial structural variation, such as global commodity shocks, to depart from an existing equilibrium (Garfias 2018).[4] Nonetheless, unlike other times periods, following the end of the Cold War, international political pressures were likely lessoned and the salience of domestic politics arose, which is one of the foundational building blocks of this study's theorization. This is in contrast to the time during the two World Wars, for example, when domestic politics were less salience because of severe international security concerns.

Third, the organizational capacity of insurgent groups continued to diminish. As most insurgent movements after WWII had close political ties with the communist bloc, economic aid and military support declined as early the 1980s. Aware of the reduced funding, negotiations with state officials had increasingly become a diversification strategy for insurgents. And as speculated by Collier et al. (2004), warring parties may choose to

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[3] In the case of Colombia's peace accords with FARC, Cuba's turn to soft-line policies served as a major relief in international pressures.

[4] Whether the end of the Cold War had negative effects on the termination of civil wars is still disputed in the literature (Byman et al. 2001; Hale and Kienle 1997; Kanet 2006; Herbst 2000) because not all countries succeeded in ending intra-state conflict in this face (see chapter III). In Latin America, for instance, the end of the Cold War was identified as one of the causes of peaceful conflict resolution in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1990s while Peru's Fujimori accelerated its counter-insurgency tactics at the same time eventually resulting in an annihilation of the rebellious Shining Path.

stop fighting if a rebel group that no longer remains a viable combatant force foresees higher post-conflict payoff. Likewise, insurgents that proceed to its downturn at an increasing rate would be more readily responsive to the state's offer to settle a deal.

Next, a political choice can give legitimate status to former insurgents. Constitutions posit that any political organization outside the state's order is deemed illegal. Note, however, that such illegality consists of both general and political criminality. The act of legitimizing insurgents seeks to subject them to criminal prosecution on the former charge but to sign a political deal on the latter that resets the boundaries of legal and illegal. The agreement between the incumbent and insurgents is therefore considered a *lex posterior* that serves as a remedy for the illegal status of insurgents.

Finally, information asymmetry exists between the parties of a peace agreement. The cross-tabulation in Table 1 below shows that although each actor becomes monotonically more informed as negotiations proceed, the incumbent government enjoys informational leverage throughout the stages of conflict resolution. This allows the incumbent government to take the initiative to settle the terms of disarmament in negotiations with insurgents and seek approval of domestic actors in institutionalization stage. I theorize that each actor holds different amounts of information across the stages of conflict resolution as shown in Table 1. The insurgent group as a negotiating partner has more access to the information in the negotiation, while the

insurgent group may have less information. When the opposition intervenes in the institutionalization stage, information is shared within the pro-peace agreement coalition of the incumbent and insurgents.

Table 1. *Information asymmetry*

		Institutionalization		
		High	Medium	Low
Negotiation	High	*Incumbent*		
	Medium	*Insurgents*		
	Low		*Opposition*	

2. The Two-staged Model

The end of civil conflict can take two forms; either one warring party overwhelms the, or the two reach a positive-sum peace deal in which the insurgency is legitimized into the incumbent coalition. I call them the forceful and peaceful conflict resolution cases. In the former scenario, the incumbent government effectively stifles the insurgency, or reversely the insurgency succeeds in establishing a new revolutionary regime. Should a positive-sum arrangement be agreed upon, instead, both the incumbent and

insurgency are mutual beneficiaries of the new peace regime. As old foes rise as new friends, a political bargain legitimizes the insurgents and incorporates them into the coalitional base of the ruling faction. Put differently, the insurgents disarm in exchange for a set of institutional rights granted by the power of the incumbent government.

The theory presented in this study posits that the end of civil wars undergirds a greater likelihood of state empowerment when it takes the form of a peaceful, rather than forceful, conflict resolution. Nevertheless, this proposition is followed by two additional questions. First, under what conditions can the peace agreement be struck between the incumbent and insurgents? The fact that only one out of five intra-state conflicts lead to a peaceful settlement between 1940 and 1990 testifies to the difficulty of achieving such institutional progress (Stedman 1991; Walter 1997). Second, how does this agreement lead to state empowerment? The cease-fire agreement *per se* cannot undergird state empowerment unless it is accompanied by the incumbent's unusual efforts to craft the state's public institutions to mitigate its commitment problem in delivering its promises with insurgents.

The following two-staged model presents an actor-centric explanation that goes beyond approaches using a dyadic interaction between state and non-state actors (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). It centers on three players – the incumbent government, the insurgents, and the opposition.

Stage 1 features the incumbent government and the insurgents, and in stage 2 the role of the opposition as a veto player becomes relevant. One of the major differences between the two stages is that information access is limited in stage 1 as the negotiations are private while the settled peace agreement in turn is public in stage 2. The fact that the effect of a peaceful conflict resolution on state empowerment is necessarily lagged calls for a stage-wise model that reflects a broad elite consensus (Schenoni 2021).[5]

Figure 1. *Scheme of the two-staged institutional change*

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
[5] Schenoni (2021) shows that state formation outcomes are provisioned when peripheral elites strike a bargain with core elites. It resonates with Tilly (1992) that illustrates the collective action between urban elites and rural landed elites.

Stage 1: Coalitional pressures and a positive-sum bargain

In this stage, the incumbent government and insurgents negotiate a bargain in a top-down manner because the information about the bargaining process is exclusive to the two players. They can strategically choose to either maintain the *status quo* of a stalemate situation, or transition to the new peace regime where insurgents are being legitimized. Though it is not uncommon that the stalemate situation has a history spanning over several decades, this equilibrium is sub-optimal in several aspects. Absent the civil conflict, the costs of confrontation would not exist and the state's public goods provision would benefit from an economy of scale with the authorities enjoying a full monopoly of power (Hadfield and Weingast 2014).[6] The key task in stage 1 is to identify which condition allows the payoff for both warring parties to become positive-sum and thus leads them to choose to end the civil war in pursuit of a peace agreement.

I argue that an incumbent who faces high coalitional pressures is more likely to choose to legitimize the insurgents and incorporate them into its coalitional base by striking a peace agreement to end the civil conflict. The incumbent government's calculus of political benefits from the peaceful

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[6] Staniland (2012), and Kim and Slater (2015) underscore that such a stalemate has also been a strategic choice of the legitimate state in post-colonial state-building. The latter calls it a "standoffishness" to complement the study of Scott (2009) on the state-building that took place in *Zomia* region in Myanmar, Southeast Asia.

conflict resolution increases if it faces high coalitional pressures in domestic politics. In this regard, this study points to the literature that highlights the role of elite contestation (Thyne 2012; Chang 2008; Mares and Queralt 2015; Waldner 2018; Garfias 2018).[7] When confronted by a strong opposition and left with little room to maneuver, a political actor may strategically seek to recruit allies from outside domestic politics.[8] Insurgent rebels are an example of an actor that had been previously overlooked as a political partner of the ruling coalition. At the initial stage, the incumbent risks little by pursuing a peace treaty since negotiations are kept in secret to others. Waldner (2018) posits that a ruling faction may coalesce with the populace to increase its survival prospects when elite collective action seems improbable. In a similar vein, this study resonates with Chang (2008) which posits that incumbents struggling from the power transition within the ruling coalition may choose to resolve the civil conflict to avoid a dual challenge from both in- and

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[7] Thyne (2012)'s cross-national analysis illustrates that powerful and stable unified executives that hold information on internal power balance are more apt to end a civil war. However, this analysis centers on institutional variations among democratic regimes, namely, whether parliamentary or presidential.

[8] Elections are more than often the easiest way to measure such contested political landscape. Not only democracies but autocracies as well hold national and local elections for various purposes of political control. It is widely documented in comparative politics that the election results are often the best index for the authorities in these regimes to calculate its survival prospects and prepare co-optation plans accordingly (Lust-Okar 2008; Ghandi and Lust-Okar 2009; Morgenbesser 2016; see also Chen and Xu 2017).

outside the regime.

Other benefits that the peaceful conflict resolution can offer are well documented but their role in incentivizing the incumbent may be marginal. Since an incumbent is hardly a peace pursuer by preference, rulers who want to gain popular support for political survival can appeal to the public by publicizing the peace agreement, especially if they hold elections (De Mesquita et al. 2003). Reduced costs of counter-insurgent activities and infrastructural stretching are material benefits that the incumbent government can achieve by normalizing tax extraction, transportation flows, and logistics control. But such benefits are not exclusive to the incumbent; rather, they are shared by all members of the country. These are rather unintended consequences of pursuing self-interest. How this leads to state empowerment then is primarily the interest of stage 2.

The terms of agreement between the two warring parties include the entitlement of political and legal rights to the insurgents. This is conceptualized as the legitimization cost of the peace agreement that the incumbent has to bear. The legitimization cost is a function of insurgents' bargaining power which is proportionate to their tactical abilities. Given that the organizational capabilities of insurgents increasingly started to fall from the 1980s, this cost was reduced for the incumbent.

The incumbent may rely on additional measures to further avoid this cost – temporal and sectorial shifting. First, disarmed insurgents are allowed to

materialize their political and legal rights that they are given only after a certain amount of time since the signing of the deal. This is because the enforcement of the peace agreement is necessarily lagged to impose real costs to the incumbent. Also, the distributive impact of the agreement may not be affiliated with the incumbent's ruling coalition. When the conferred rights disproportionately change land tenure structure in rural areas, for example, the urban-based industrial elites may be marginally affected from the agreement as was the case in Colombia's peace regime.

Without a proper exit plan to the status quo where insurgent capacity is in decline, striking a deal with the incumbent government could serve as a dominant strategy when and if they can assure the incumbent government's credible commitment to the agreed terms. The 1980s mark a rough period for insurgent movements across the world because support from the communist bloc began to indicate signs of decay. The leverage that these insurgents can exercise in the negotiation table with the incumbent is proportionate to political resources they can mobilize both in- and outside the country. If the warring capacity to orchestrate violent tactics and resistance continues to wane, the net benefit prospectively attainable from the bargain should be maximized at the present point of negotiation. However, the insurgents have historically been hesitant in repeated negotiations because of the commitment problem that they face after the negotiation. Walter (1997; 2002) stresses this saying that, while an act of disarmament deprives them of

means to enforce the terms of agreement, it inevitably constitutes the core subject of the deal itself. It is for this reason that international security guarantees who serve as a third-party neutral, such as the United Nations, neighboring countries, or even religious leadership like the Vatican, engage in negotiations.

The political bargain between the two warring parties resets the boundary between legal and illegal. The entitlement of legal and political rights and the submission of physical force are being exchanged as a result of it. The theoretical prediction in the next stage is that peaceful conflict resolution in turn garners a provision of public institutions that lead to state development in the incumbent's efforts to uphold the deal. This outcome comes as an unintended consequence of a political choice that is intended to pursue self-interest.

Stage 2: Veto players and the state's impartiality

Stage 2 begins with a coalition of the incumbent government and insurgents who share a stake in the peace agreement from stage 1. The incumbent, with the support of former belligerents, has to put forth the institutionalization of this deal through the domestic political process to entail state empowering effects. The information asymmetry is mitigated in this stage as the peace agreement is introduced to the public leading to the introduction of a new player, the opposition. Insomuch as the peace agreement between the two

players in stage 1 serves as a focal point (Schelling 1960), the coalition gains a first mover's advantage in determining, tentatively, the configurations of the institutional change.[9] The challenge in stage 2 is, therefore, to struggle against the new player who possesses a veto power that can potentially topple the peace agreement. Figure 1 outlines the two outcomes that can result from a peaceful conflict resolution – high capacity and medium capacity. I adopt the notion of institutional transformation to define them, where high capacity involves full-blown institutionalization (*displacement*) and medium capacity the implementation of new rules along with existing ones (*layering*) (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen 2005).[10]

A rich volume of the literature documents that elite contestation can lead to (under)investments in state institutions and stresses the role of veto players in toppling down institutional change (Besley and Persson 2011; Chang 2008; North et al. 2009; Arias 2013). The opposition has a preference not to approve the peace agreement and exercise its veto power through

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[9] In case the coalition collapses, the momentum for institutional change is lost and the conflict recurs (see Figure 1). A prominent example of this is Mexico after 1996 where the San Andres Accords were abandoned by both the Zedillo government and Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN). The case then ends without entering the stage 2.

[10] The signing of the peace bargain does not undergird higher state capacity by itself because it requires "interpretation" and "enforcement" by political actors. In line with their theorization, I adopt the concept of *displacement* and *layering* that entail the introduction of new rules.

institutional means like party organizations, the legislature, key state apparatus (e.g., the military) and local patronage system (McCubbins and Cox 2000; Tsebelis 2002; Cunningham 2006). Following the classification by Cunningham (2006), three veto players – government actors, internal insurgents and external actors – can intervene in the conflict resolution process. And as only the government actor qualifies given the scope conditions of this theoretical model, I focus on the role of the opposition in domestic politics (Watanabe 2018).[11] Several large-N studies show that the number of veto players can account for the longer duration of civil wars (Tsebelis 2002; Cunningham 2006; Brown 2016; Ansorg and Strasheim 2019). Mares and Queralt (2015), for instance, illustrate that sectorial conflict among economic elites underpinned the underdevelopment of extractive institutions against the intention of state officials in 19th century Europe.

By outpowering the veto players, the incumbents invest in impartial state institutions to be credibly committed to the agreement that it settled with insurgents. The central logic in stage 2 that connects peaceful conflict resolution to state empowering effects resorts to the incumbent's commitment problem towards the insurgents. The former belligerents are

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[11] These scope conditions include the *entente* coalition from the legitimization of insurgents and the salience of domestic politics after the end of the Cold War that rule out internal insurgents and external actors respectively.

integrated into the existing order in multiple forms such as a new political party, security forces or ethnic-based autonomous communities. Their survival prospects, however, are under threat should an opposing faction newly rise to power and reverse past policies established by its predecessor. To secure the collective action of insurgents in the coalition, the incumbent has incentives to invest in state institutions that are difficult to reverse and, most importantly, impartial to any single faction. The development of the impartial state can take multiple forms such as judicial independence, bureaucratic autonomy and electoral reforms.

There are two conditions that need to be met for this political logic to operate: (a) there should exist an effective veto player and (b) the veto player should be overpowered in stage 2. The state development in stage 2 most likely yields high-capacity outcomes if both conditions are jointly met. Several examples are illustrated below. El Salvador's peace regime is a prominent example that suffices the two conditions leading to state capacity development. It was the challenge of the new democratic incumbent to expanding its ruling coalition against the military faction that ruled its former authoritarian regime. The military faction served as a veto player since they were mainly held responsible for human rights violations during the conflict era. Through well-coordinated measures of judicial prosecution on key figures the incumbent successfully settled the peace agreement of 1992 where former insurgents subsequently rose as the second largest political

party in the legislature (see in more detail in Chapter 5).

The fact that the presence of a veto player is a necessary condition for state development in stage 2 is counterintuitive. This is because without an effective veto player the incumbent does not have to fear its policies prospectively being overturned, which then mitigates its commitment problem with the insurgents. The National League for Democracy (NLD) made a strong leap forward in Myanmar's 1990 electoral campaigns, for example. Nonetheless, the intrinsic institutional weakness of NLD disqualified itself to be an effective veto player giving way to consolidated authoritarian authorities to override the opposition majority in the legislature. Malaysia's internal elite split that drove the ruling faction into a constitutional crisis gives another example of an opposition incapable of placing a veto. The mainstream elites of the ruling party that ended the civil war with communist insurgents succeeded in toppling opposing faction of elites within the same party through court rulings. In both cases, the opposition that initially put coalitional pressures to the incumbent in stage 1 later fails to exercise a of a veto power in stage 2. This suggests that investments in state institutions are made as an unintended consequence of pursuing self-interest, that is, in an effort to make a credible commitment to its important coalition partner. Colombia's peace transition differs in that the opposition party did serve as a veto power but the incumbent government

failed to fully outpower it.[12] The land-based rural elites disagreed with the peace agreement in which the urban industrial elites of the ruling coalition took the initiative. This political dispute continued to remain unresolved before and after the deal. In all above cases, the state empowering effects of a peace settlement were not maximized in stage 2.

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[12] Steele and Schubiger (2018) argues that post-conflict democratic reforms in Colombia have resulted in violent contention among new political factions, a coalition of existing elites and paramilitary organizations at the local level where the state finds its presence particularly weak.

Chapter 3. Research Design

1. Sample

In the empirical section, I test the hypotheses of this study with a sample of conflict resolution cases from Latin America and Southeast Asia. I choose the two regions as an empirical testing ground on the following grounds. First, we can posit a single insurgent actor in the negotiations of each peace agreement in these regions (see Table 3). The theoretical model centers on three homogeneous players – the incumbent, insurgents and the opposition. Communist insurgent movements were mostly led by one major organization associated by other smaller groups. Rebels in Africa and Middle East were predominantly ethnic-based and thus had multiple insurgent groups. The nature of the peace talks remains largely multilateral in this case as the incumbent needs to negotiate with heterogeneous counterparts to end civil conflict.[13]

Second, Latin America and Southeast Asia faced a stark decline in the number of civil wars starting in the 1980s. The research design exploits as-if

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[13] Ethnic insurgents in Myanmar could have been an exception had the military government not decided to settle a comprehensive package deal with 17 ethnic groups in 1993.

random variation in how civil wars ended following an external shock. The pattern of civil wars across the world is coupled with the rise and fall of the Cold War (see upper grey line in Figure 2). Geographically speaking, Latin America and Southeast Asia experienced a distinct trajectory in its trends of civil wars when compared to other regions. It is well-documented in the literature that on-going civil wars become concentrated in Eurasia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Middle East, and away from Latin America and Southeast Asia (Castañeda 1993; Stedman 1996; Cunningham 2006; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010).

Based on the Correlates of War (COW) data and other sources, I have collected 14 cases of insurgent movements after World War II in Latin America and Southeast Asia (see Table 3). I further refine them to seven cases that meet the scope conditions of my theoretical model for more rigorous systematic comparison (see Table 2). First, I rule out Thailand, Philippines and Mexico since insurgent activities continue to effectively confront the state today. Any country that fails to end its civil war, whatever the mode it took, is outside the scope of this research. Second, I also rule out Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam in Southeast Asia, and Nicaragua in Latin America. They satisfy the first order condition in that all experienced a forceful conflict resolution with victorious insurgents seizing central control. However, this process was predominated by external third parties which goes against the scope condition that requires the salience of domestic politics

over international pressures.[14] The United States and the communist bloc of the USSR and China, for instance, were heavily engaged in these battles that were considered a proxy war between the two hegemons of the Cold War.

Table 2. *Classifying insurgent movements in Latin America and Southeast Asia*

Intra-State Warfare	Mode	Latin America	Southeast Asia
Conflict Ended	Positive-Sum	**El Salvador** **Guatemala** **Colombia**	**Malaysia** **Myanmar**
	Winner-Takes-All	**Peru** Nicaragua	**Indonesia** Cambodia Lao PDR Vietnam
Conflict Continues		Mexico	Philippines Thailand

Note: Countries in bold letters indicate principal cases that are used to test the hypotheses elaborated in this research. All cases compiled in Table 3.

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[14] In the case of Colombia's conflict resolution, the security tensions in Latin America were significantly relieved from Cuba's re-engagement in regional politics which underpinned the 2016 Peace Accords with FARCs.

Table 3. *Insurgent movements after the World War II*

Polity	Insurgency	Duration	Negotiation	Accords	Objective
Panel A.	Latin America				
Nicaragua	FSLN	1978–90	NA	1990	Central authority
El Salvador	FMLN	1980–92	1984–92	1992	Central authority
Guatemala	URNG	1960–96	1987–96	1996	Central authority
Mexico	EZLN	1994–	1994–96	1996	Self-determination
Colombia	FARC, ELN	1964–2016	2012–16	2016	Central authority
Peru	PCP, MRTA	1980–	NA	NA	Central authority
Panel B.	Southeast Asia				
Malaysia	CPM, SCO	1968–1989	1988–89	1989-90	Central authority
Burma	17 ethnic groups 8 ethnic groups	1948–	1989–96 2011–15	1993-96 2015	Self-determination
Indonesia	OPM GAM	1963– 1976–2005	NA 2004–05	NA 2005	Self-determination
Thailand	BRN, GMIP PULO	2004–	NA	NA	Self-determination
Philippines	MNLF/MILF CPP/NPA	1972– 1968–	1976– 1986–	1976, 1996 NA	Self-Determination Central authority
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge	1968-75	NA	NA	Central authority
Laos	Pathet Lao	1959-75	1968-73	NA	Central authority
Vietnam	South Vietnam	1949-75	1968-73	1973	Central authority

Note: Singapore is ruled out from Panel A given its political trajectory of achieving independence from Malaysia in 1965, and its unlikelihood of territorially incubating a guerilla warfare. Venezuela's ongoing 2019 Presidential Crisis initiated by Juan Guaido is not counted as it did not accompany physical conflicts nor civilian casualties

Figure 2. *Civil wars after the World War II*

Note: Figure adopted from Kalyvas and Balcells (2010). The authors declare to have modified the Sambanis (2001) data replacing the conventional threshold with 1,000 deaths to be qualified as a civil conflict.

2. Estimation Strategy

The estimation strategy employs a quasi-experimental design that exploits cross-national variation in how civil conflicts ended following the Cold War (see Figure 2). Many existing studies resort to population data across continents for power reasons. In this study, I construct a panel of comparable sample units for quantitative analysis despite some loss of statistical efficiency. I complement this analysis with qualitative evidence on the stage-wise mechanisms in Chapter 5.

I first turn to standard panel OLS regressions with country fixed effects for baseline interpretations of regressors. The unit of analysis is an individual country in a given year. The following is the equation to be estimated:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta D_{i,t-3} + \lambda X_{i,t} + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_{i,t} \tag{1}$$

Where $Y_{i,t}$ is a measure of state capacity in year t for country i, $D_{i,t-3}$ is an indicator of peace accords lagged by three years, $X_{i,t}$ is a vector of time-variant covariates, γ_i are country fixed-effects, and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ is an error term.

I also estimate the effect of a peaceful conflict resolution through a difference-in-differences approach. A foundational logic behind this identification strategy is that countries were quasi-randomly assigned to the treatment condition: the peace agreement would not have taken place in that country-year unit if not for an exogenous shock, the end of the Cold War. In

contexts where incumbent governments faced the need of political support, this substantial change disproportionately affected the turn of civil wars leading to peaceful settlement in an as-if random fashion. The traditional scholarship in war and conflict points out that winners and losers of war are occasionally determined by "chance" (see Weber 1978; Clausewitz 1984). More recent studies resonate with this thinking, positing that predictions on war outcomes may be elusive since they are contingent on a few key battles (Fearon 1994; Henderson and Bayer 2013). Building on this, Schenoni (2021) implements a generalized difference-in-differences method regressing two-dimensional state capacity on war outcomes in the modern history of Latin America.

Using this approach, I now turn to the following specification:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 R_{i,t-3} + \beta_2 P_i + \delta R_{i,t-3} P_i + \lambda X_{i,t} + \gamma_i + \mu_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \tag{2}$$

where $R_{i,t-3}$ is a dummy for conflict resolution for country i in year t lagged by three years, P_i is an indicator of a country group that struck a peace agreement, and μ_t are year fixed-effects. Note that the conflict resolution dummy displays variation in timing among countries. Therefore, I include year fixed-effects for this specification to address the issue of heterogeneous treatment timing in estimating the treatment effect δ.

3. Measures and Data

State capacity is multi-faceted which makes it a contested concept in comparative politics. Conventional approaches to state capacity are in line with the European tradition that centers on the fiscal aspect of the state (Tilly 1979; Mann 1984; Huber 1995; Skocpol 1985; Dincecco 2011). This stream of research predicts that the state's extractive capacity would spill-over to other aspects including infrastructure, regulation, societal penetration and impartial bureaucracy (Mann 1984; Huber 1995; Skocpol 1985; Soifer 2008).[15]

In this study, I focus on the impartiality of state institutions to operationalize its concept. Fukuyama (2004; 2014) explains that merit-based recruitment of public officials allowed the ancient Chinese state to incur factional pressures and obtain bureaucratic autonomy.[16] Likewise, Evans (1995) emphasizes that the developmental states in East Asia asked for strict political neutrality from bureaucratic officials to insulate state institutions from diverging societal interests. The incumbent government therefore has

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[15] Scott (2009) explains that Burman state-building is a process of societal standardization of manpower and uses the number of new registrations by population growth to as a measure of state expansion (see also Brown 1988).

[16] The developmental states of East Asia are a typical example. In the mid to late 20th century, these states asked for strict political neutrality to bureaucratic officials to insulate state institutions from societal interests (Evans 1995).

incentives to invest in impartial state institutions as a means to make credible commitments and earn the trust of insurgents. As far as any incumbent is not forever lasting, investments in the state are expected to allow the peace accords to have long-run state empowering effects.[17]

I rely on three outcome measures to capture the amount of investments made in state institutions. First, I use *government stability* as a primary measure that captures the consolidation of central power using International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data. States that monopolize physical forces over territorial domains have incentives to invest in future public institutions as stationary bandits (Olson 1993; North and Weingast 1989). In contrast, others who are continuously challenged and contested by competing elite factions choose to mobilize resources in perpetuating their hold on power (Garfias 2018). In this regard, stable governments serve as an indicator of whether the incumbent has reduced domestic challenges and made investments in state institutions. Second, *bureaucratic quality* (ICRG) is another measure. I adopt the notion in the literature that puts emphasis on the bureaucratic autonomy when defining a strong state (Fukuyama 2004; 2014; Evans 1995). A robust administrative bureaucracy underpins the state's efforts to overpower partisan interests of political factions. Therefore, it can

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[17] Slater (2010) conceptualizes that state development is a collective action problem. He posits that state capacity is endogenous to a number of political institutions such as robust political parties, military organizations, or state bureaucracy to which many other studies point to as drivers of state empowerment.

capture the incumbent's investments in state institutions in trying to mitigate commitment problems. Lastly, I use the comprehensive state capacity index of O'Reilly and Murphy (2022) to test the robustness across measurement types.

The main independent variable is the settlement type of a peace agreement that resolved the civil conflict in each case. For the first econometric specification, I create a *peace* dummy that has a value of 1 for country units after the year when peace accords were settled by the two warring parties and 0 otherwise. I lag this variable by three years given that the variable of interest has a delay to affect the outcome in the stage-wise model of this study. For the difference-in-differences approach in Equation (2), the countries that achieved peaceful conflict resolution are assigned a value of 1; those without peaceful conflict resolution are assigned 0. I give the years since the end of civil conflict a value of 1 to indicate *intervention* and 0 otherwise.[18]

For covariates, I include GDP per capita to account for the state's fiscal power (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier et al. 2003; Kalyvas and Balcells

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[18] In the case where civil wars were resolved forcefully, I coded as 1 the years when the losing party was both physically and symbolically removed. For example, the Peruvian authorities arrested the leader of the CPC in 1999 after which the guerilla activities starkly declined. In Indonesia, the GAM insurgents of Aceh signed a ceasefire deal with the government after the region was struck by the natural disaster in 2004.

2010) which is a feature distinguishable from impartiality.[19] I then control for levels of ethnic tension and internal conflict from ICRG data in order to not confound the natural effects of ending a civil war with actual increase in state power. On similar grounds, the military presence in politics is controlled as well (Geddes 1994; Slater 2010). Finally, I use a binary regime-type classification of Svolik (2012) to account for possible difference between democracies and autocracies. Concerns over the confounding effects of time invariant rebel characteristics such as distinct insurgent objectives within the sample period are mitigated with country-fixed effects (Ishiyama and Batta 2011) (see Table 3).

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[19] There is a scholarly debate on whether it captures the state's fiscal power (Collier et al. 2003; Hegre et al. 2001).

Chapter 4. Results

1. Parallel Trends

In exploring the causal relationship between peaceful conflict resolution and state empowerment, an important underlying assumption is the parallel trends before the intervention between the two groups in comparison. Should significant pre-trends exist, a change in state capacity cannot be credibly attributed to certain mode of conflict resolution.

I examine the yearly value of government stability, the primary outcome measure, in Figure 3. The upper panel shows indiscriminately adjoined trends between the two groups: the peaceful conflict resolution group displays lower levels of state capacity on average until the mid-1990s. Though the timing varies, the positive-sum group of countries signed peace accords throughout the 1990s after which the trajectories, which had almost been identical, diverge significantly. The lower panel gives the yearly trend of predicted outcome values from Equation (1) (see Figure 4 for residual plots). As of the late 1990s, this group illustrates a substantial increase in state capacity and the gap between the two widens at a statistically significant level. I provide further evidence for parallel trends with the event-study plot (Figure 5) after the main analysis.

Figure 3. *Parallel trends before conflict resolution*

Note: The lower panel plots predicted outcome values from Equation (1). Government Stability (ICRG) is used as a measure of state capacity. Peaceful conflict resolution group of countries ended civil conflict throughout the 1990s.

2. Main Results

Using OLS regression, I find a positive association between peaceful conflict resolution and higher state capacity throughout various model specifications (see Table 4). The peace agreement dummy accounts for an increase of about 2 points in the level of government stability in column 1 and 2 of the upper panel and the coefficient estimates are significant at the conventional level. The effect of the peace agreement dummy on bureaucratic quality was also statistically significant in column 4 and 5. Note that GDP per capita is not correlated with our outcome measures – not at least in the positive direction –testifying to the multi-faceted nature of state capacity.

I now turn to the DiD estimation results from equation 2. To mitigate concerns on heterogeneous treatment timing, I introduce two-way fixed effects in Tables 5 and 6. All controls from previous regressions are included. The countries that signed a peace agreement showed an average of 1.3 points higher level of government stability after the conflict ended. As the model becomes more identified, the magnitude of the DiD estimate becomes smaller. The coefficient in column 3 is smaller than those in Table 4. Using bureaucratic quality as a measure of state capacity, the statistical significance emerges in column 6 when all covariates and two-way FEs are controlled. The size of the point estimate in column 6 is comparable to that of the standard OLS regressions in Table 4.

Table 4. *Regression results using country-fixed effects*

Panel A	DV: Government Stability		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Peace Accord, t-3	2.029**	1.945**	3.105***
	(.694)	(.591)	(.631)
Democratic Regime	1.174***	1.043**	1.017**
	(0.212)	(.345)	(.324)
Peace Accord, t-3 x Democratic Regime			−1.626
			(.950)
Ethnic Tension	.891**	.870**	.634
	(.327)	(.308)	(.347)
Internal Conflict	.297**	.290**	.364*
	(.110)	(.118)	(.155)
Military in Politics	−.655***	−.681**	−.597**
	(.174)	(.203)	(.200)
GDP per capita		.158	−.012
		(.464)	(.494)
Observations	210	210	210
Country Fixed effects	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Adjusted R-squared	.544	.543	.550
Panel B	DV: Bureaucratic Quality		
	(4)	(5)	(6)
Peace Accord, t-3	.606*	.713**	−.426
	(.292)	(.246)	(.283)
Democratic Regime	.866***	1.035***	1.060***
	(.060)	(.100)	(0.086)
Peace Accord, t-3 x Democratic Regime			1.597***
			(.367)
Ethnic Tension	.232*	.259*	.491***
	(.116)	(.108)	(.104)
Internal Conflict	.048	.057*	−.015
	(.036)	(.025)	(.033)
Military in Politics	.203***	.236***	.154**
	(.049)	(.044)	(.051)
GDP per capita		−.203**	−.036
		(.083)	(.086)
Observations	210	210	210
Country Fixed Effects	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Adjusted R-squared	.656	.681	.768

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. GDP per capita is a logarithm scale. Democratic regime is a dummy based on Svolik (2012). $*p < .1$, $**p < .05$, $***p < .01$.

Figure 4. *Residual plots from OLS regressions*

Note: Dotted vertical lines refer to the year accords were settled. Black and grey lines indicate government stability and bureaucratic quality respectively. All regressors on the outcome except the peace accords from Equation 1 were used in regressions to draw the plots.

Table 5. *DiD estimation results using two-way fixed effects*

|	DV: Government Stability			DV: Bureaucratic Quality		
	(1)	(2) OWFE	(3) TWFE	(4)	(5) OWFE	(6) TWFE
Conflict End, t-3 x Peaceful (*DiD estimate*)	4.176* (.878)	2.311* (.806)	1.341* (.291)	.500 (.322)	.795* (.171)	.637* (.188)
Observations	231	231	231	231	231	231
Controls	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Country FEs	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Year FEs	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*No*	*No*	*Yes*
Adjusted R-sq	.398	.559	.731	.431	.695	.711

Note: DiD estimations from equation 2. The same set of controls with equation 1 is introduced in the analysis. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *$p < .05$.

Table 6. *DiD estimation results with alternative measures of state capacity*

	One-Way FE			Two-Way FE		
	(1) State Capacity	(2) Fiscal Revenue	(3) Impartial Admin.	(4) State Capacity	(5) Fiscal Revenue	(6) Impartial Admin.
Conflict End, t-3 x Peaceful (*DiD estimate*)	.607* (.146)	.354* (.131)	.620* (.249)	.444* (.181)	.670 (.700)	.541 (.299)
Observations	231	231	231	231	231	231
Controls	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Country FEs	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Year FEs	*No*	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Adjusted R-sq	.853	.880	.743	.873	.931	.743

Note: Alternative measures of state capacity from O'Reilly & Murphy (2022). DiD estimations from equation 2. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *$p < .05$.

Figure 5. *Trends in state capacity (leads and lags)*

Note: Dots indicate point estimates from DiD estimations with country fixed-effects. 95% confidence intervals in grey lines.

Considering that state capacity is a contested concept in comparative politics, I test my central argument with additional measures of state capacity developed by O'Reilly and Murphy (2022). Relying on the data of Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), the authors claim to have constructed a comprehensive measure of state capacity that covers a wide spectrum of public functions including bureaucratic administration, public goods provision, rule of law, revenue extraction, and others. I estimate equation 2 using three variables in the dataset – comprehensive state capacity, fiscal revenue, impartial public administration – to substitute for the two primary measures (see Table 6). Note that the latter two are sub-components of the first. In the one-way FE model, the estimates are both substantially and statistically significant at a conventional level in all outcome measures in column 1 to 3.[20] In the two-way FE model, the coefficient predicts a statistically significant increase of 0.44 in the comprehensive state capacity index in column 4. Nonetheless, the effect of peaceful conflict resolution, though the sign is correctly estimated in the predicted direction, was not statistically significant using the sub-components as an outcome measure. This statistical insignificance can be partly attributed to the reliability issue

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[20] O'Reilly and Murphy (2022) explains that the fiscal revenue captures the degree of country's fiscal centralization of revenue. In Table 4, the GDP per capita was not statistically significantly associated with our measures of state capacity. This resonates with the state development literature distinguishes the fiscal capacity and the level fiscal centralization of the state (Dincecco 2011).

of using a sub-component as a separate outcome measure, and also to the precision issue where within-country variation is not sufficient in limited observations leading to an overfit in the two-way FE models.

This result is visualized using event-study plots in Figure 5. The DiD estimates of leads and lags on the primary measures of state capacity are plotted. In both panels, the lead values in the years before conflict resolution did not show statistically significant effects which lends further support for the parallel trends between the treated and controlled groups before intervention. The posttreatment effects not only significantly differ from zero but also are incremental with time. [21] Overall, the results are in line with the theoretical prediction in this study that it is not the conflict resolution *per se* but the political dynamics following it that result in state empowering effects. These findings provide empirical support to the central argument that when civil conflict resolves by striking a peace agreement, investments in state institutions are more likely to take place.

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[21] The empirical design does not allow to run placebo tests altering the outcome with its projected future values due to the significant lagged posttreatment effects.

Chapter 5. Illustrative Cases

1. Empirical Strategy

Building on the empirical findings, I turn to illustrative case-study. The mechanism that a positive-sum conflict resolution channels statecraft is not straightforward. I propose Hypothesis 1 and 2 to bridge any gap in the model's causal chain.

> ***Hypothesis 1***. An incumbent under high coalitional pressures is more
> likely to strike a bargain with insurgents in stage 1.

Stage 1 takes place when rebellious insurgent movements are recognized as new friends. It is unfeasible for the incumbent government to make a choice to legitimize these armed forces when it had to fiercely confront them at their peak military capacity. They simply posed too big a threat. However, as their organization power starts to fall and other domestic political challenges newly arise, the rational decision of the incumbent may change. In Malaysia, the Racial Riot of 1969 marked the outbreak of the Second Malaysian Emergency (1968-1989) where communist insurgents returned back in force.[22] The Malaysian officials knew that a complete victory was

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[22] The First Malaysian Emergency took place from 1948 to 1960 following the

not probable but had not pursued a reconciliation with the communist insurgents despite mediatory efforts of Thailand with whom it is bordered. What undergirded Had Yat Agreement of 1989 that ended the civil conflict in the country was the internal elite dispute in 1987. The ruling party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), was then led by Mahathir Mohamad since 1975. Before the triennial party election on April 1987, the in-group opposition faction (Team B) within the ruling coalition led by Mahathir's former Finance Minister, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, challenged his presidency. Though Mahathir's faction (Team A) defended his political reign by a close margin in the party elections (761 vs 718), the elite split within the hegemon party of Malaysia set a condition for the prolonged civil conflict to end in a peaceful manner.

What constitutes a political threat to the ruling incumbent can differ over time. Burma's ruling military faction, the Tatmadaw, faced a remarkable electoral advance of the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi in the campaigns for the 1990 general elections. Her cross-ethnic coalition was unprecedented in the political history of military dictatorship in Burma. The Tatmadaw devasted in the elections and from

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withdrawal of British colonial forces. It was an anti-colonial liberation war which resulted in the independence of the Federation of Malaya in 1957. The Communist leader Chin Peng who led the Marxist-Leninist Malayan Communist Party (MCP) ceased to act in 1960 when the First Emergency ended but reinitiated its anti-government activities following the 1969 Riot.

1993 to 1996 it signed bilateral peace accords with 17 out of 21 ethnic groups in the country. Meanwhile, presidents Alfredo Christiani of El Salvador and Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia were under a similar political challenge. They were either not part of the ruling coalition or, even worse, left the ruling party to win the presidential election. The incumbents found themselves in a disadvantaged position under high coalitional pressures. The debilitated insurgents are likely to be recognized not as foes but as new friends.

On the contrary, countries that ended the civil conflict by force were not under severe political pressures. Alberto Fujimori was elected president in 1990 and consolidated its power ever since. During his term, he almost annihilated the Shining Path (PCP) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). The end of civil conflict in Indonesia was largely unexpected as the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 struck the Aceh region where the local separatist insurgents were based and culminated in the incumbent victory. However, meaningful infrastructural expansion of the state did not follow in this region.

> ***Hypothesis 2***. By outpowering veto players, the incumbent crafts robust state institutions to mitigate its commitment problem in stage 2.

In this section, I illustrate the case of El Salvador and Myanmar to trace the process of state empowerment. In stage 2, nonetheless, the final

institutional outcome of El Salvador is outlined as displacement and that of Myanmar as layering. What makes the difference is the act of veto players in each context. For the democratic government of El Salvador, the military organization who had been at the forefront of the state's counter-insurgency plans, was a major veto player in the phase of institutionalizing the accords. In countering its attempt to topple down the accords, the incumbent empowered the non-military bureaucracy and promoted judicialization. In effect, the robust public institutions that it established mitigated the commitment problem of the incumbent itself. On the other hand, the opposition pressures that the *Tatmadaw* confronted were not equally intense in comparison. The left-wing nationalist coalition held less institutional measures in an authoritarian setting, nor could they propose clear justifications to oppose the accords the ruling regime signed with ethnic minorities. In this sense, the increased taxation and infrastructure building that occurred in the 1990s and afterwards are called military state-building. Malaysia's post-conflict statecraft was much alike, where the UMNO government tactically implemented KESBAN, or Security and Development scheme in the regions in which civil wars came to a lull. In all cases, the incumbents were committed to the institutionalization of the peace accords. But in the two cases in Southeast Asia, they were not particularly tied to it and the statecraft efforts were considered as rather benevolent measures.

Table 7. *Comparative analysis of selected cases by stage*

Country	Stage 1		Stage 2	
	IV1: Coalitional pressures	DV1: Mutual bargain	IV2: Veto players	DV2: Institutionalization
El Salvador	Coalitional weakness in a new-born democracy – *Military intervention in politics*	Chapultepec Accords (1992)	Key military officials prosecuted – *Tandona neutralized in high politics*	Political contestation in high politics, constitutional reforms
Malaysia	Internal elite dispute (1987) – *UMNO's constitutional crisis*	Had Yat Agreement (1989)	Controlled intra-factions within the ruling coalition – *UMNO's Mahatir-Anwar crisis in 1997*	Population-centric 'development as security' project
Colombia	Ruling coalition split – *Santos converted from conservative to center-left*	Colombian Peace Process (2016)	Sectorial elites against the incumbent – *opposing coalition of rural landed elites*	Comprehensive rural development and UN-backed judicialization
Myanmar	Emerging leftist opposition – *NLD' advance in 1990 general elections*	Nation-wide ceasefire pacts (1993)	Opposition unwilling and incapable of a veto – *Tatdamaw's cohesive power*	Military-led, or militarized state building
Peru	Democratic retrocession – *Fujimori consolidated power*	Large-scale military operations against the PCP		
Indonesia	Indonesian Reformasi (1998) – *Tsunami struck the Aceh*	Aceh's ceasefire agreement (2005)		

Note: Guatemala is considered a twin case and therefore not included in the table, as it forms part of the Central American Peace Regime in the 1990s along with El Salvador.

2. State Development in El Salvador and Myanmar

Building on the cross-national evidence presented in the previous section of this study, I now turn to illustrative case studies on El Salvador and Myanmar to investigate the two supporting hypotheses (Hypothesis 1 and 2) that pertain to each stage of the theoretical model. I plan to look for the presence of coalitional pressures as a precondition for a positive-sum bargain between the two warring parties, and then the interplay of the incumbent with veto players who are in opposition to its attempt to invest in the state's impartial institutions.

El Salvador: Judicial empowerment against the military faction

The insurgent guerillas in El Salvador and Guatemala underwent a downscale in the 1980s. Having transitioned to an electoral democracy from military rule in 1980, the elected incumbents in democratic El Salvador were incentivized to effectively contain the intervention of the military, known as the *Tandona*, on domestic political affairs. In the presidential election celebrated in 1989, Alfredo Christiani from the National Republican Alliance (ARENA) was elected president by a margin of 17.3% points against the opposition candidate from the Democratic Christian Party, Fidel Chávez Mena. The new incumbent wanted the military ruled out from decision-making and searched for an alternative partner to form a political coalition with. However, the administrative apparatus of El Salvadoran state was weak by then and therefore the ruling regime was in need of the military's cooperation to execute and implement its desired policies over local districts. In 1992, the fourth year of his presidential term, the incumbent government guided a

successful settlement of the peace agreement that ended the decade-long intra-state warfare. Even before the official signing took place, the government passed two preliminary Constitutional amendments on civilian control over the military, judicial independence, independence of election affairs, among others. This set out legal foundations for a displacement-type institutional change. The El Salvadoran insurgency was incorporated into the post-conflict institutional order as a political party, namely, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). Its legitimization process was a success since the party achieved a vote share of 31.7% winning 21 out of 84 seats in the legislature in the 1994 elections. To the present day, the FMLN continues to be one of the two major parties in El Salvador's domestic politics. Now, the former insurgents do not need to rely on the bargaining counterpart to mitigate the commitment problem as it now possesses own institutional means for self-help.

The incumbent's plans to marginalize the *Tandona* military that possess veto power were upheld in the name of transitional justice. Established in 1992, the United Nations Truth Commission supported by the United States sent a proposal to the president Christiani to prosecute 102 military officials who engaged in serious human rights violations and other related criminal activities during the conflict era. The military's reaction against the recommendations made by the UN was fierce. As a result, the threat of another coup was glooming around the newborn democracy. The breakthrough that the incumbent found on this dilemma was to strike a political deal with general Rene Emilio Ponce, the leading figure of the *Tandona* regarding how to handle the intense political pressure coming from outside the nation. Among the negotiated terms is to keep the UN proposal in strict secret and rule out 15 personnel of including the general Ponce from the list. These

members in the list were tolerated to retire with sufficiently lagged schedule, or else transferred to honorary positions. By delivering this deal, the incumbent became able to broaden its coalition further even to include some members of the *Tandona*. Despite polemics and limitations surrounding this deal, it marked a moment of executive and judicial empowerment of the El Salvadoran state.

El Salvador is a leading figure in the Central American Peace Regime that effectively overpowered the military faction in delivering the institutionalization of the peace accords. The consecutive constitutional amendments the incumbent successfully passed in 1991 and 1992 served as a cornerstone to overpower military strife and incorporate its former insurgents into its coalitional base. It is why the case of El Salvador can be classified as a displacement-type institutional change. This is in contrast to Colombia, a case of institutional layering, given its historic peace accord ending a half-century-long conflict voted against by a remarkably narrow margin in the popular referendum.

Myanmar: The military-led state development

In 1988, Burma underwent a fierce civil unrest, known as the Four Eights Uprising, which led the ruling Myanmar Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) to collapse and be replaced by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). SLORC established a more direct form of military rule and even changed the country's name to Myanmar in June 1989. While the new regime took oppressive measures against the civilians in protest by the martial law declared in the same year, it also prepared a scheme to convene the People's Assembly through national elections. The popular pressure was translated into bottom-up campaigns when the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as a powerful

nation-wide opposition for the upcoming 1990 elections. The NLD carried out successful campaigns and achieved a landslide victory winning 392 out of 492 seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw. It was the *Tatmadaw*, however, that refused to transfer power and relied on physical forces to once again crush pro-democracy movements in Myanmar. The military junta, with its 21% vote share translated into merely 10 parliamentary seats, faced intense coalitional pressures. It first coopted economic elites who run major private enterprises in the country, and went on to initiate cease-fire negotiations with its ethnic insurgencies. In the legislative elections of 1990, ethnic minorities won multiple seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw. During the campaign period, Aung San Suu Kyi visited Myanmar's rural border areas where ethnic insurgents were based. In fear of a cross-regional alliance to rise against the ruling coalition, the representative lieutenant-general Khin Nyunt of the *Tatmadaw* was in charge of running the negotiations with the ethnic insurgency beginning in 1989.

Given that the multi-party terrain of former Burma's insurgent movements establishes adverse bargaining conditions for the regime, ceasefire agreements were bilaterally settled with 17 ethnic insurgencies from 1993 to 1996. Note that this peace package was in no sense a power-sharing agreement but a co-optation measure. The ethnic minorities did not have a stake in decision-making and the military regime remained undisturbed in the post-conflict regime that followed in the 1990s. Callahan (2004) argues in this vein that "the *Tatmadaw* could have unified Burma and ended the civil wars twenty years ago had the BSPP committed the resources to the objective", supporting that cease-fire agreements had been a political choice of the military junta who finds itself under severe popular pressures. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of these events, the ruling regime undertook a series

of national projects to build local infrastructure, often denominated as military state-building, which led to the crafting of public institutions that layers above the authoritarian rule of Myanmar.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

This study adds to the scholarship in comparative politics that addresses the weak state trap of the developing world. Late state builders must resort to a weak state apparatus to craft robust public institutions which makes state development an unusually difficult task for countries in this condition (Kurtz 2013; Garfias 2018). Since syndromes of under-development like clientelism, corruption and insecure property rights are often closely correlated with the state's weak capacity (Fergusson et al. 2022), how to exit from this trap remains a puzzle for both scholars and practitioners in this field.[23]

The traditional bellicist approaches to state development are primarily concerned with the protective role of the state towards in-group members against an existential communal threat from outside. Friends and foes are clearly distinguished and standardized into homogeneous actors (Scott 2009). People then delegate power to the central authority that consolidates order in a hierarchical fashion (Callahan 2003; Kim and Slater 2015). The theory presented in this study, on the other hands, offers an alternative logic of state development in which state institutions are provisioned by a coalition of political actors with aligned interests. If certain conditions are met for coordinated interests, the dichotic distinction becomes weaker and old foes can transform into new friends as if in the Lockean social contract. Often times, investments in state institutions occur as an

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[23] Existing work that tries to account for a way out often suffer from endogeneity issue in that they confound a strong state with its non-independent colinear subsets, such as elite-popular consensus, party machines and historical legacies of collective action (Kurtz 2013; Doner et al. 2005; Dell et al. 2018; see also Slater 2010). These studies should better distinguish explanatory variables from the outcome to draw a causal arrow.

unintended consequence of a political bargain in pursuit of self-interests (Saylor 2014; see also Silverstein 2008; Yadav and Mukherjee 2016). In this study, the incumbent leverages impartial state institutions to make a credible commitment to its coalitional partner. While the two logics of state development are not exclusive to one another, I expect in times when external threats are scarce and internal actors are salient the provision logic of state development can suggest more suitable pathway to exit from the weak state trap.

In this light, I show from empirical evidence that when civil wars end by striking a peace agreement it is more likely to have state empowering effects. How a peaceful conflict resolution channels state development requires a step-wise explanation. I posit that an incumbent under high coalitional pressures is incentivized to sign a peace deal with insurgents (stage 1), and in trying to mitigate its commitment problem the incumbent invests in impartial state institutions against the opposition who can place a veto (stage 2). The research design used in this study aims to establish a systematic comparison despite limited statistical power. The empirical strategy chooses a sample of cases that meets the study's scope conditions, rather than to resort to the population data on civil conflicts as was more typical in many conflict studies in the literature. This directs the future line of research that leverages a sub-national variation within a given country as the effect of a civil war or its termination on state capacity can be heterogeneous to its sub-national units.

This study contributes to the literature of state theories in a couple of ways. First, it presents an alternative logic of state development that challenges traditional approaches that focus on external warfare. Shedding light on internal dynamics of coalition building, the previous overlooked insurgents can offer an opportunity of

partnership as new friends that lead to investments in state institutions as an unintended consequence. Second, this study shows that elite consensus matters for political scientists and policymakers alike. A proactive coordination of interests among key actors can put forth institutional change because state development is a collective action problem between political actors that pursue self-interests. Researchers in this guidance should carefully scrutinize which types of social cleavages and historical antecedents exist in search for local conditions that allow for a contextualized theory of political development.

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국문초록

현직 엘리트는 어떤 조건 속에서 국가제도 발달에 투자하는가? 기존의 전쟁주의 국가 이론들은 국가 권력을 공고화하는 외부 위협의 역할을 강조하였다. 반면, 본 연구는 "약한 국가 함정"을 벗어나는 대안적인 논리로서 동일한 이해관계를 갖는 핵심 정치 행위자들의 연합에 주목한다. 엘리트 간 경쟁의 동학을 설명하는 일군의 연구의 연장 선에서 본 연구는 현직 엘리트가 평화협약을 통해 반란단체와 연합을 형성하는 국가 발전 이론을 전개하였다. 높은 정치적 압력에 직면했을 때 현직 엘리트가 반란단체와 평화협약을 체결할 유인이 발생하고(1단계) 자신의 약속이행의 문제를 완화하기 위해 비당파적인 국가 제도 발달에 투자(2단계)한다는 것이 그 핵심 주장이다. 본 연구는 라틴아메리카와 동남아시아의 표본을 선정하여 다중방법 접근을 취하였다. 먼저 준실험적 설계를 사용하여 내전이 평화협약을 체결하는 방식으로 종결될 때 국가 제도에 대한 투자가 보다 많이 발생함을 보였다. 나아가 엘살바도르와 미얀마에 대한 사례연구를 통해 국가발전 결과의 단일 사례 내 변화를 추적하였다.

주요어 : 국가발전, 내전, 반란단체, 평화협약, 약한 국가 함정

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