



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

Ph.D. Dissertation of Keiran Donald Macrae

**New Right Historiography and
Historical Revisionism
Post-Cold War Reappraisals of
Park Chung Hee**

**뉴라이트 역사인식과 우익 역사수정주의:
탈냉전 시기 박정희 재평가**

August 2023

**Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University
International Studies Major**

Keiran Donald Macrae

New Right Historiography and Historical Revisionism

**Post-Cold War Reappraisals of
Park Chung Hee**

뉴라이트 역사인식과 우익 역사수정주의:
탈냉전 시기 박정희 재평가

지도교수 박 태 균

이 논문을 국제학박사 학위논문으로 제출함

2023 년 8 월

서울대학교 국제대학원 국제학과

Keiran Donald Macrae

Keiran Donald Macrae 의 박사 학위논문을
인준함

2023 년 8 월

| | | |
|---------|----------------|-----|
| 위 원 장 | <u>한 정 훈</u> | (인) |
| 부 위 원 장 | <u>모브랜드 에릭</u> | (인) |
| 위 원 | <u>이 동 원</u> | (인) |
| 위 원 | <u>오 제 연</u> | (인) |
| 위 원 | <u>박 태 균</u> | (인) |

New Right Historiography and Historical Revisionism

**Post-Cold War Reappraisals of
Park Chung Hee**

Advisor: Tae Gyun Park

**Submitting a Ph.D. Dissertation of
International Studies**

August 2023

**Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University
International Studies Major**

Keiran Donald Macrae

**Confirming the Ph.D. Dissertation written by
Keiran Donald Macrae**

August 2023

| | | |
|-------------------|----------------------|---------------|
| Chair | JeongHun Han | (Seal) |
| Vice Chair | Erik Mobrand | (Seal) |
| Examiner | Dongwon Lee | (Seal) |
| Examiner | Je-Yeon Oh | (Seal) |
| Examiner | Tae Gyun Park | (Seal) |

Abstract

New Right Historiography and Historical Revisionism: Post-Cold War Reappraisals of Park Chung Hee

Keiran Donald Macrae

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

Did New Right historiography fail to live up to its promise of a third way between a “mindless” left and right? I argue that an unrealized potential can be found in the work of Kim Iryŏng. Scholars generally associate New Right historiography with Yi Yŏnghun, an apologist for imperialism and authoritarianism in the name of the market. Kim rather espoused a narrative of contemporary Korean history focusing on internal dynamics and consigning authoritarianism to the past. I trace Kim’s development of this narrative to the early 1990s, in the disputes over Park Chung Hee initiated by Cho Kapche. I juxtapose Kim, Cho, and Yi’s narratives of the Park Chung Hee era and analyze them as variants of right-wing historical revisionism through comparison with reappraisals of Chiang Kai-shek and Francisco Franco, which arose around the same time. I thus examine how New Right historiography conforms to and diverges from the conventions of right-wing historical revisionism as a transnational phenomenon that has gained in strength especially since the end of the Cold War. Kim Iryŏng and Yi Yŏnghun each pursued different paths in reimagining conservative historiography in the post-1987, post-Cold War era. This speaks to the

character of New Right historiography not only as a challenge to progressive historiography but also an intra-conservative struggle. Conservatives agreed on the need for a positive historical narrative, but its precise content remained contested. In this context, Yi's emergence as the face of the New Right assumes new significance.

Keywords: New Right historiography, Kim Iryŏng, Park Chung Hee, historical revisionism, reappraisals of dictatorship, Cho Kapche

Student Number: 2014-31480

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Abstract..... | i |
| Chapter 1. Introduction..... | 1 |
| Chapter 2. The History Wars Begin: Cho Kapche’s Reappraisal of Park Chung Hee..... | 22 |
| I. Introduction..... | 22 |
| II. The Life and Work of Cho Kapche..... | 22 |
| III. Cho Kapche and Park Chung Hee..... | 31 |
| IV. Cho Kapche and the Memory Wars of the Early 1990s..... | 38 |
| V. Conclusion..... | 47 |
| Chapter 3. In Search of a Third Way: Kim Iryŏng’s Reappraisal of Park Chung Hee..... | 49 |
| I. Introduction..... | 49 |
| II. The Life and Work of Kim Iryŏng..... | 49 |
| III. Kim Iryŏng’s 1995 <i>Sasang</i> Article and Rightward Turn..... | 55 |
| 1. Overcoming Left-Right Antagonism over Park Chung Hee..... | 60 |
| 2. The Relationship between Industrialization and Democratization..... | 63 |
| 3. The Self-Negation of the Developmental State..... | 67 |
| 4. Summary..... | 70 |
| IV. The Reception of Kim Iryŏng’s “Comparative Historical” Evaluation of Park Chung Hee..... | 71 |
| V. <i>Kŏn’guk kwa puguk</i> | 85 |
| VI. Conclusion..... | 88 |
| Chapter 4. “Old Right” and “New Right” Historiography..... | 90 |

| | | |
|------|---|-----|
| I. | Introduction..... | 90 |
| II. | Kim Iryŏng, Cho Kapche, and Yi Yŏnghun’s Narratives of the Park Chung Hee Era..... | 90 |
| | 1. Revolution..... | 91 |
| | 2. Takeoff..... | 97 |
| | 3. Elections..... | 107 |
| | 4. Yusin..... | 115 |
| | 5. Park Chung Hee..... | 124 |
| | 6. Discussion..... | 130 |
| III. | Conclusion..... | 136 |

Chapter 5. Reappraisals of Dictatorship, Right-Wing

Historical Revisionism, and New Right

Historiography.....137

| | | |
|------|--|-----|
| I. | Introduction..... | 137 |
| II. | Post-Cold War Reappraisals of Dictatorship..... | 137 |
| | 1. Chiang Kai-shek..... | 138 |
| | 2. Francisco Franco..... | 149 |
| | 3. Discussion..... | 162 |
| III. | Reappraisals of Dictatorship and Right-Wing Historical Revisionism..... | 168 |
| | 1. What is Right-Wing Historical Revisionism? | 168 |
| | 2. A Typology of Right-Wing Historical Revisionism..... | 174 |
| | 3. Discussion..... | 181 |
| IV. | Developmental State Theory and Right-Wing Historical Revisionism..... | 192 |
| | 1. Developmental Dictatorship and the Developmental State..... | 192 |
| | 2. Three Views of the “Developmental State”..... | 199 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| 3. Kim Iryŏng, the Developmental State, and Right-Wing Historical Revisionism..... | 207 |
| V. Kim Iryŏng, Yi Yŏnghun, and New Right Historiography..... | 212 |
| 1. The Colonial Modernization Thesis..... | 212 |
| 2. The Activistic-Idealistic and Passivistic-Materialistic Views of Historical Change..... | 218 |
| 3. Diffusionist and Evolutionary Narratives of Modernity..... | 219 |
| 4. Discussion..... | 222 |
| VI. Conclusion..... | 223 |
| Chapter 6. Conclusion..... | 226 |
| Bibliography..... | 231 |
| 국문 초록..... | 312 |
| Acknowledgements..... | 313 |

Chapter 1.

Introduction

Korea's New Right movement began in 2004 purportedly as an alternative to “mindless” (*kkolt'ong*) conservatives and progressives.¹ It particularly coalesced around the issue of historical interpretation.² The *Tonga ilbo* ran

¹ See Yun Chonggu and Chŏn Yŏnuk, “[Nyu rait'ŭ, ch'immuk esŏ haengdong ŭro] (1): Wae umjigi sijak haenna” [(New Right, From silence to action, part 1) Why the movement has begun],” *Tonga ilbo*, November 7, 2004, <https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20041107/8125288/1>. For the details of this series, published over several months, see Patrick Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration of the New Right's Formative Period (2003–2008): Conservative Experiences, Mass Media and Cultural Memory in Post-Authoritarian South Korea,” *European Journal of Korean Studies* 20, no. 1 (2020), 72–73n55, 73–74n58–60. The movement technically commenced with the founding of the Alliance for Liberalism (*Chayujuŭi yŏndae*) on November 23, 2004. See Na Ki'ch'ŏn, “486-chudo chungdo nosŏn p'yobang... ‘Chayujuŭi yŏndae’ ch'ulbŏm” [Claim to advance 486-generation-led moderate line... Launch of the “Alliance for Liberalism”], *Segye ilbo*, November 24, 2004, <https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/article/022/0000065226?sid=100>. There is a vast literature on the question of “conservatism without conservative ideology” in Korea. See Yang Sŭng'tae, “Han'guk posujuŭi yŏn'gu rŭl wihan pangbŏmnonjŏk siron” [A methodological sketch for research on Korean conservatism], *Han'guk chŏngch'ihak hoebo* 28, no. 2 (May 1995): 7–32; Kang Chŏngin, “Chŏnhwan'gi e sŏn Namhan ŭi posujuŭi” [South Korean conservatism at a crossroads], *Kyŏngje wa sahoe* 37 (March 1998): 98–117; Jung In Kang, “The Dilemma of Korean Conservatism,” *Korea Journal* 45, no. 1 (March 2005): 202–232; Kim Yongmin, “Sŏgu posujuŭi ŭi kiwŏn kwa palchŏn” [The origins and development of Western conservatism], in *Han'guk ŭi posujuŭi* [Korea's conservatism], ed. Kim Pyŏngguk et al. (Koyang-si: In'gan sarang, 1999), 11–52; Kim Pyŏnggon, “Han'guk posujuŭi ŭi inyŏmjok t'ŭkchŏng: Kŭndaehwa wa ŭi kwan'gye rŭl chungsim ŭro” [The ideological characteristics of Korean conservatism: The relationship with modernization], *Yŏksa pip'yŏng* 95 (May 2011): 8–35. For a critique of this discourse, see Cho Hyŏnggŭn, “Hamnijŏk posu nŭn ŏnje ol kka? Han'guk up'a ŭi hyŏksin kanŭngsŏng e taehan t'amsaek” [When will rational conservatism emerge? Exploring the potential for innovation of the Korean right], *Munhwa kwahak* 91 (September 2017): 160–184.

² The following is a sample of New Right materials: Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk: hyŏndae Han'guk chŏngch'isa kangŭi* [Founding a nation and enriching a nation: A lecture on contemporary Korean political history] (Saenggak ŭi namu, 2004); Kyogwasŏ p'orŏm, “Ch'angnip sŏnŏnmun” [Founding statement], in *Han'guk hyŏndaesa ŭi hŏgu wa chinsil: Kodŭng hakkyo kŭn.hyŏndaesa kyogwasŏ rŭl pip'an handa* [Fictions and truths of Korean contemporary history: A critique of modern and contemporary high school history textbooks], ed. Kyogwasŏ p'orŏm (Kuri: Ture sidae, 2005), 219–221; Kyogwasŏ p'orŏm, ed., *Han'guk hyŏndaesa ŭi hŏgu wa chinsil: Kodŭng hakkyo kŭn.hyŏndaesa kyogwasŏ rŭl pip'an handa* [Fictions and truths of Korean contemporary history: A critique of modern and contemporary high school history textbooks] (Kuri: Ture sidae, 2005); Kyogwasŏ p'orŏm, (*Taeam kyogwasŏ*) *Han'guk kŭnhyŏndaesa* [(Alternative textbook) Modern and contemporary Korean history] (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2008); An Pyŏngjik, “Nyu rait'ŭ undong ŭl chŏn'gae hamyŏ” [As the New Right movement begins] *Sidae chŏngsin chaech'anggan ho* (2006); Sin Pongnyong, Yu Yŏngik, Ch'oe Munhyŏng, Chŏn Yongu, and Kang Kyuhyŏng, “Taadam: Minjung undongsa esŏ Taehan min'guksa ro” [Conversation: From *minjung* history to a history of the Republic of Korea], *Sidae chŏngsin chaech'anggan ho* (2006); Pak Chihyang et al., eds., *Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaesik* [A new understanding of

a piece in February 2005 in which founding member Kim Iryōng and progressive historian Pak T'aegyūn debated the major events and figures of contemporary history.³ While the two scholars agreed on very little, their debate itself at least suggested a basis for dialogue. Nonetheless, the New Right soon became mired in acrimonious disputes over history.⁴ Did New

history before and after liberation], 2 vols. (Seoul: Ch'aek sesang, 2006); Yi Yōnghun et al., *Pan-Il chongjokchu'i: Taehan min'guk wigi ūi kŭmwŏn* [Anti-Japanese tribalism: Origins of the crisis in the Republic of Korea] (Seoul: Miraesa, 2019). *Sidae chōngsin* can be accessed at <https://web.archive.org/web/20111009014807/http://www.sdjs.co.kr/index.php>.

³ Kwōn Chaehyōn, "[Nyu rait'ū] 4-bu (4): Hyōndaesa ottōk'e pol kōt in'ga" [(New Right) Part four series, number four: How to think about contemporary history], *Tonga ilbo*, February 20, 2005, <https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20050220/8161316/1>.

⁴ Some scholars initially welcomed the New Right movement. Sociologist Yi Yunhūi, for example, wrote that "on the surface, because [the New Right] champions conservatism, it may appear to progressives as a social reaction or a force of resistance to reforms. Yet one may confirm the revitalization of the whole of social discourse relevant to Korean society's ideological horizon through the fostering of debate between both sides." Yi Yunhūi, "Taegyūng sahoe undong (countermovement) ūi sahoejōk yōkhal: Han'guk ūi 'Nyu rait'ū undong' sarye rūl chungsim ūro" [The social role of countermovements: The case of South Korea's "New Right movement"], *Tamnon* 201 8, no. 1 (2005), 28: 표면적으로는 보수적 성향을 표방하고 있어서 진보 진영의 관점에서 보자면 사회변동이나 개혁에 저항하는 세력으로 비추일 수 있다. 그러나 실제로는 양 진영 간의 논쟁을 불러일으킴으로써 한국사회의 이념적 지평에 관한 사회 전체의 담론을 활성화시키고 있음을 확인할 수 있었다. See also Yuna Han, "The New Right: Political Winds in South Korea," *Harvard International Review* 29, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 9–10. Political scientist Kang Chōngin evaluated the New Right more or less as a "step forward" (*chinilbo*) for Korean conservatism, although more in terms of a more consistent and systematic representation of existing conservatism than a substantive innovation. Kang Chōngin, "Posujuūi: Pidongsōng ūi tonggisōng kŭrigo moho han chōngsanghwa" [Conservatism: The simultaneity of the non-simultaneous and ambiguous normalization], in *Han'guk chōngch'i ūi inyōm kwa sasang: Posujuūi, chayujuūi, minjokchuūi, kūpchinjuūi* [The ideologies and thought of Korean politics: Conservatism, liberalism, nationalism, and radicalism], Kang Chōngin et al. (Seoul: Humanit'asū, 2009), 117–118. Some, like sociologist Kim Hogi, were cautious but not dismissive, offering constructive criticism. Kim Hogi, "Pip'anjōk sigak esō pon Nyu rait'ū undong" [The New Right movement viewed from a critical perspective], *Kwanhun chōnōl* 45, no. 4 (2004), 155. See also Kim Hogi, "2000-nyōn ihu ūi posu seryōk: Sugujōk posu wa Nyu rait'ū sai esō" [Conservatives since 2000: Between hardline conservatives and the New Right], *Kiōk kwa chōnmang* 12 (2005): 68–79. Kim later evaluated the movement as a failure, however. Kim Hogi, "Nyu rait'ū nonjaeng" [The New Right debate], in *Nonjaeng ūro ingnūn Han'guk hyōndaesa* [Reading contemporary Korean history through the debates], Kim Hogi and Pak T'aegyūn (Seoul: Medich'i midio, 2019), 277–283. By contrast, political scientist Im Hyōkpaek was pessimistic about the prospects of the New Right from the outset. Im Hyōkpaek, "Han'guk Nyu rait'ū paegyōng kwa chōnmang" [The background and outlook of the Korean New Right], *Kwanhun chōnōl* 45, no. 4 (December 2004): 157–169. Political scientist Chōn Chaeo, while generally critical of the New Right, acknowledged that it was "slightly new" for Korean conservatism in terms of its advocacy of postnationalism and patriotic globalism. Chōn Chaeo, "2000-nyōndae Han'guk posujuūi ūi inyōmjōk t'ūksōng e kwanhan yōn'gu: Nyu rait'ū rūl chungsim ūro" [A study on the ideological characteristics of Korean conservatism in the 2000s: The New Right], *Hyōndae chōngch'i yōn'gu* 7, no. 1 (April 2014), 189. See also Son Hoch'ōl, "Nam-Nam kaltūng ūi Nam-Nam kaltūng ūl nōmō sō: Nyu rait'ū wa pundan ch'ejeron ūi pip'anjōk koch'al" [Beyond South-South conflict over the South-South conflict: A critical review of the New Right and the division system thesis], *Chinbo p'yōngnon* 30 (December 2006):

216–230. Historians, however, were generally antagonistic. See Im Taesik, “Kwagōsa naejōn ūl aptu ko: Kōdae han ūmmo wa yakhan kori yōtpogi” [The looming civil war over matters of the past: Jottings on a great conspiracy and the weak link in the chain], *Yōksa pip’yōng* 71 (May 2005): 16–31; Im Taesik, “Yōksa munje yōn’guso ch’angnip 20-chunyōn ūl majūmyō: *Haebang chōnhusa ūi chaeinsik ūl p’yōlch’ō* pon kandan han sohoe” [On the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Institute for Korean historical studies: A brief impression upon perusing *A new understanding of history before and after liberation*], *Yōksa pip’yōng* 74 (2006): 10–18; Sin Chubae, “Kyogwasō p’orōm ūi yōksa insik pip’an: Han’guk kūnhyōndaesa kyogwasō pip’an e taehan pallon” [A critique of the historical consciousness of Textbook Forum: A critical response to the critique of the *Modern and Contemporary Korean History* textbooks], *Yōksa pip’yōng* 76 (August 2006): 181–214; Yi Sinch’ōl, “Kuksa kyogwasō chōngch’i toguhwa ūi yōksa: Yi Sūngman.Pak Chōnghūi tokchae chōngkwōn ūl chungsim ūro” [The history of the political instrumentalization of national history textbooks: Focusing on the dictatorships of Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee], *Yōksa kyoyuk* 97 (March 2006): 177–209; Yi Sinch’ōl, “Saeyōngmo wa kyogwasō p’orōm i kkum kunūn sesang” [The world dreamed of by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform and Textbook Forum], *Hwanghae munhwa* 54 (March 2007): 287–300; Kim Sōngbo, “Kaltūng kwa pulsūn ūi sidae e Nam-Buk hyōndaesa rūl tasi ingnūnda” [Re-reading South and North Korean contemporary history in the age of conflict and distrust], *Ch’angjak kwa pip’yōng* 35, no. 1 (March 2007): 388–402; Pak T’aegyūn, “Nyu rait’ū ūi tūngjang kwa yōksa insik nonjaeng” [The emergence of the New Right and conflicts over historical perceptions], *Hwanghae munhwa* 56 (September 2007): 285–302; Yi Yun’gap, “Han’guk yōksahak ūi saeroun kil ch’atki: Minjokchuūi yōksahak ūi chōnmang” [Toward a new path for Korean historiography: The prospects for nationalist history], *Han’gukhak nonjip* 35 (December 2007): 27–72. This initial antagonism only intensified after the publication of *Kyogwasō p’orōm*, (*Taeon kyogwasō*). Ch’oe Kapsu, “Kukka, kwagō ūi him, yōksa ūi hyoyong: Irūnba yōksa kyogwasō kaltūng e puch’ō” [The state, power of the past, and use of history: On the so-called “history textbook controversy”], *Yōksa pip’yōng* 85 (November 2008): 14–26; Chu Chino, “Nyu rait’ū ūi singmin sagwan puhwal p’ūrojekt’ū: Kūndae ch’ogi sōsul ūi munjechōm” [The New Right’s project to revive colonial historiography: The problems in depictions of the early modern period], *Yōksa pip’yōng* 83 (May 2008): 297–320; Hong Sōngnyul, “‘Taeon kyogwasō’ ūi an’gam han yōksōl: Hyōndaesa sōsul punsōk” [The unendurable paradoxes of the *Alternative textbook*: Analysis of the narrative of contemporary history], *Yōksa pip’yōng* 83 (May 2008): 335–349; Kim Kibong, “Yōksa kyogwasō nonjaeng ōttōk’e hal kōt in’ga: Yōksa ūi chōngch’ihwa esō chōngch’i ūi yōksahwa ro ūi chōnhwan ūl wihayō” [How should we deal with the history textbook disputes? For a transition from the politicization of history to the historicization of politics], *Yōksa hakpo* 198 (June 2008): 379–406; Kim Kibong, “Miguk ūi yōksa chōnjaeng e pich’wō ponūn Han’guksa kyogwasō nonjaeng” [The Korean history textbook disputes in light of history wars in the United States], *Ch’ōrhak kwa hyōnsil* 90 (September 2011): 32–45; Kim Kihyōp, *Nyu rait’ū pip’an* [Critique of the New Right] (P’aju: Tolbegae, 2008), 167–176, 227–235; Pak Ch’ansūng, “Singminji kūndaehwaron e maemol toen singminji sigi sōsul” [Narratives of the colonial period buried under colonial modernization theory], *Yōksa pip’yōng* 83 (May 2008): 321–334; Pak T’aegyūn, “Han’guk hyōndaesa ūi nonjaeng e taehan chaep’yōngka wa kyogwasō surok pangan” [A reevaluation of the debates over contemporary Korean history and a proposal for textbook approval], *Yōksa hakpo* 205 (March 2010): 77–117; Pak T’aegyūn, “Segyehwa sidae Han’gukchōk inyōm chihyōng ūi kiwōn: T’allaengjōn sigi chōnhu yōksa insik pyōnhwa rūl chungsim ūro” [Origins of the Korean ideological terrain in the globalization era: Changes in historical perceptions around the end of the Cold War], in *T’allaengjōnsa ūi insik: Segyehwa sidae Han’guk sahoe ūi munje ūisik* [Perceptions of post-Cold War history: Critical awareness in Korean society in the globalization era], ed. Pak Inhwī et al. (P’aju: Han’gilsa, 2012), 495–524; Pae Yōngsun, “Segyehwa ihu Han’guksa insik ūi t’alminjokchuūijōk kyōnghyang: Kūnhyōndaesa insik ūi posu ugyōnghwa rūl chungsim ūro” [The postnationalist tendency in Korean cognition since the onset of globalization: Focusing on the conservative and rightward turn in modern and contemporary historical consciousness], *Minjok munhwa nonch’ong* 40 (2008): 58–92; Ryu

Sŭngnyŏl, “Kunsa chŏngkwŏnsik nollŭ rŭl tabsŭp han ‘Tae’an kyogwasŏ’” [The *Alternative textbook* that imitates the logic of the military regimes], *Naeil ūl yŏnŭn yŏksa* 32 (June 2008): 25–36; Sin Chubaek, “Ilbon uik ūi Husosya kyogwasŏ wa ‘tae’an kyogwasŏ’” [The Japanese right’s Husosha textbook and the *Alternative textbook*], *Naeil ūl yŏnŭn yŏksa* 32 (June 2008): 37–45; Han Honggu, “Nyu rait’ū ui yŏksa ūisik, muŏt i munje in ‘ga?’” [The New Right’s historical consciousness: What is the problem?], in *Tae’an min’guk ūi chŏngt’ongsŏng ūl mutta: 5-in 5-saek Han’guk hyŏndaesa t’ŭkkang* [Questioning the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea: Five different lectures on contemporary Korean history by five different people], Han Honggu, Chŏng T’aehŏn, Yi Manyŏl, Sŏ Chungsoŏk, and Chŏng Yŏngch’ŏl (Seoul: Ch’ŏlsu wa Yŏnghŭi, 2009), 19–66; Pak Kwimi, “Nyu rait’ū ūi yŏksa insik” [The New Right’s historical consciousness], in *Nyu rait’ū wihŏm han kyogwasŏ, paro ilkki* [Reading the New Right’s dangerous textbook], ed. Yŏksa kyoyuk yŏndae hoeŭi (Paju: Sŏhae munjip, 2009), 47–64; Yi Sinch’ŏl, “Han’guksa kyogwasŏ parhaeng ūi kwagŏ wa hyŏnjae” [The past and present of the publication of Korean history textbooks], *Naeil ūl yŏnŭn yŏksa* 35 (March 2009): 93–113; An Hyŏnhyo, “*Haebang chŏnhusa ūi chaeinsik e taehan chinghujŏk tokhae*” [A symptomatic reading of *A new understanding of history before and after liberation*], *Kyŏngje wa sahoe* 86 (2010): 199–232; Chŏn Chaeho, “Han’guk kŭn.hyŏndaesa kyogwasŏ rŭl tullŏsan yŏksa insik kaltŭng yŏn’gu: Han’guk minjokchuŭi ūi ‘kyunyŏl’ ūl chungsim ūro” [A study of the conflicts over historical perception surrounding modern and contemporary Korean history textbooks: The “rupture” in Korean nationalism], *Han’guk kwa kukche chŏngch’i* 26, no. 3 (2010): 159–191; Yi Kihun, “T’alminjok.T’algŭndaejŏk ch’ehŏm kwa yŏksa insik ui pyŏnhwa” [The postnational/postmodern experience and transformation in historical consciousness], in *T’allaengjŏnsa ui insik: Segyehwa sidae Han’guk sahoe ūi munje ūisik* [Perceptions of post-Cold War history: Critical awareness in Korean society in the globalization era], ed. Pak Inhwŭi et al. (P’aju: Han’gilsa, 2012), 525–548. The publication of the *Alternative Textbook* intensified history wars brewing since the new approval system was implemented in 2004. Yun Chŏnggho, “701-gae kogyo ‘minjung sagwan kyogwasŏ’ suŏp” [Seven hundred and one high schools are teaching classes with “*minjung* historiography textbooks”], *Chosŏn ilbo*, October 5, 2004, https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2004/10/04/2004100470308.html. However, conflicts over historical education extend back to 1994, with the disputes over the formulation of the sixth curriculum under the Kim Yŏngsam administration. Yi Sinch’ŏl, “T’alsingmin.t’allaengjŏn. minjujuŭi e taehan tojŏn, ‘Nyu rait’ū’ Han’guksa kyogwasŏ” [A challenge to the postcolonial, post-Cold War, and democracy: The “New Right” *Korean history* textbook], *Yŏksa munje yŏn’gu* 30 (2013), 10–11. Despite the use of “textbook” in the title, this was not a textbook approved by the government and used in schools. Ryu Sŭngnyŏl, “Kunsa chŏngkwŏnsik nollŭ,” 25–26. The disputes intensified with the publication of Kyohaksa’s high school textbook in 2013 and the efforts to re-introduce a nationally standardized textbook under the Pak Kŭnhye administration. See Hong Sŏngnyul, “Naengjŏn yŏksa sŏsul kwa sangch’ŏ padŭn chayujuŭi: Kyohaksa Han’guksa kyogwasŏ hyŏndaesa sŏsul pip’an” [Historical narration from a Cold War perspective and injured liberalism: A critique of the narrative of contemporary history in the Kyohaksa *Korean history* textbook], *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 105 (November 2013): 82–103; Hong Sŏngnyul, “Yŏksa chŏnjaeng ūl sŏngch’al hamyŏ: Chŏngsa.chŏngt’ongsŏngnon ūi hamjŏng” [Reflecting on the history wars: The traps of “authentic history” and “legitimacy”], *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 128 (August 2019): 302–325; Yi Chunsik, “Han’guk yŏksa kyogwasŏ in’ga, ani myŏn Ilbon yŏksa kyogwasŏ in’ga? Kyohaksa Han’guksa kyogwasŏ Ilche kangjŏmgi sŏsul pip’an” [Is it a Korean or Japanese history textbook? A critique of the narrative of the Japanese colonial period in the Kyohaksa *Korean history* textbook], *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 105 (November 2013): 54–81; Yi Chunsik, “Nyu rait’ū Han’guksa kyogwasŏ ūi tongnip undongsa waegok kwa Yi Sŭngman mihwa” [The distorted history of the independence movement and beautification of Rhee Syngman in the New Right *Korean history* textbook], *Naeil ūl yŏnŭn yŏksa* 52 (September 2013): 117–137; Yi Kihun, “Kŭ tŭl ūi Tae’an min’guk yŏksa: Kyohaksa Han’guksa kyogwasŏ ūi yŏksa insik” [Their history of the Republic of Korea: The historical consciousness of the Kyohaksa *Korean history* textbook], *Chinbo p’yŏngnon* 58 (December 2013): 175–186; Kim Chŏngin,

Right historiography fail to live up to its promise of a third way between a “mindless” left and right?

In this dissertation, I argue that an unrealized potential can be found in the work of political scientist and New Right founding member Kim Iryŏng. While the existing literature on New Right historiography generally associates it with Yi Yŏnghun, whose historical perceptions tend toward apologies for imperialism and authoritarianism in the name of the market, Kim rather espoused a narrative of contemporary Korean history focusing on internal dynamics and relegating authoritarianism firmly to the past. I trace Kim’s development of this narrative to the early 1990s, in the disputes over Park Chung Hee initiated by journalist and avatar of Cold War conservatism Cho Kapche. I juxtapose Kim Iryŏng, Cho Kapche, and Yi Yŏnghun’s narratives of the Park Chung Hee era and analyze them as

Yŏksa chŏnjaeng, kwagŏ rŭl haesŏk hanŭn ssaum [History war: A fight over interpretation of the past] (Seoul: Ch’aek sesang, 2016); Chŏng Sŭngjin, “Nyu rait’ŭ ŭi iron kwa sasang: An Pyŏngjik Yi Yŏnghun ŭi ch’oegŭn songkwa rŭl chungsim ŭro” [Theory and thought of the New Right: Focusing on the latest works by An Pyŏngjik and Yi Yŏnghun], *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 106 (December 2017): 325–350; Pak T’aegyŭn, “Yŏksa kyogwasŏ kukchŏnghwa nonjaeng” [Debate over the nationalization of history textbooks], in *Nonjaeng ŭro ingnŭn Han’guk hyŏndaesa* [Reading contemporary Korean history through the debates], Kim Hogi and Pak T’aegyŭn (Seoul: Medich’i midio, 2019), 284–291; and Chŏng Yonguk, “Han’guk ŭi yŏksa kaltŭng kwa kwagŏsa chŏngni: Mugŭn kaltŭng ŭi sohan in’ga sae chŏngch’esŏng hyŏngsŏng ŭi chint’ong in’ga” [Korea’s historical disputes and settlement of the past: Revival of old disputes or growing pains of new identity formation?], *Yŏksa hakpo* 249 (March 2021): 1–41. For a more extensive listing of the literature on the textbook disputes, see Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 66–68n13. There have also been a range of English-language publications more recently. Owen Miller, “The Idea of Stagnation in Korean Historiography: From Fukuda Tokuzō to the New Right,” *Korean Histories* 2, no. 1 (2010): 3–12; Keiran Macrae, “Post-Cold War Conservative Reappraisals of Syngman Rhee: Neoliberalism and the New Right,” *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 29, no. 2 (December 2016): 327–359; Patrick Vierthaler, “How to Place August 15 in South Korean History? The New Right, the ‘1948 Foundation’ Historical View, and the 2008 Kŏn’gukchŏl Dispute,” *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 10 (2018): 137–174; Patrick Vierthaler, “The New Right and the 1948 Foundation View: A Failed Revision of South Korean Cultural Memory,” *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2021): 1–33; Kyung Moon Hwang, “The Irrepressibility of Teleology: The 1980s as Historiography,” in *Revisiting Minjung: New Perspectives on the Cultural History of 1980s South Korea*, ed. Sunyoung Park (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019), 46–61; Namhee Lee, “Social Memories of the 1980s: Unpacking the Regime of Discontinuity,” in *Revisiting Minjung: New Perspectives on the Cultural History of 1980s South Korea*, ed. Sunyoung Park (USA: University of Michigan Press, 2019), 17–45; Vladimir Tikhonov, “The Rise and Fall of the New Right Movement and the Historical Wars in 2000s South Korea,” *European Journal of Korean Studies* 18, no. 2 (2019): 5–36; Jong-Pil Yoon, “Recent History Wars in South Korea,” *Paedagogica Historica* 56, no. 4 (2020): 548–567; Sungik Yang, “An Old Right in New Bottles: State without Nation in South Korean New Right Historiography,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 80, no. 4 (2021): 889–909.

variants of right-wing historical revisionism by comparing them with reappraisals of Chiang Kai-shek and Francisco Franco, which arose around the same time. I thus examine how New Right historiography conforms to and diverges from the conventions of right-wing historical revisionism as a transnational phenomenon that has gained in strength especially since the end of the Cold War.⁵ Furthermore, I show how Kim Iryŏng and Yi Yŏnghun each pursued different paths reimagining conservative historiography in the post-1987, post-Cold War era through historical reinterpretation.

A potential for dialogue over historical interpretation has been lost, however, in Yi Yŏnghun's overshadowing of Kim Iryŏng. This is evident in the existing literature, where Yi Yŏnghun, the "colonial modernization thesis" (*singminji kūndaehwaron*), and New Right historiography have become almost synonymous.⁶ As evident in the following description of

⁵ As Sociologist Jeffrey Alexander writes, "While the hopes of Left intellectuals were dashed by the late 1970s, the intellectual imagination of others was rekindled. For when the Left lost, the Right won and won big. In the 1960s and 1970s, the right was a backlash, reactive movement. By 1980 it had become triumphant and began to initiate far-reaching changes in Western societies.... The most striking 'success' for the Right was, indeed, the defeat of Communism, which was not only a political, military, and economic victory but...a triumph on the level of the historical imagination itself." Jeffrey C. Alexander, "Modern, Anti, Post, and Neo: How Social Theories Have Tried to Understand the 'New World' of 'Our Time,'" *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 23, no. 3 (June 1994), 182–183. In a similar vein, sociologist Göran Therborn notes the rise of "right-wing modernism" in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Göran Therborn, "After Dialectics: Radical Social Theory in a Post-Communist World," *New Left Review* 43 (2007), 71, 74. Historian Giovanni Levi also observes a right-wing zeal for "the political uses of history" since the collapse of socialism. Giovanni Levi, "The Distant Past: On the Political Use of History," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 16, no. 1 (2001), 61. And historian Enzo Traverso notes the emergence of "post-Cold War anti-communism." Enzo Traverso, "The New Anti-Communism: Rereading the Twentieth Century," in *History and Revolution: Refuting Revisionism*, ed. Mike Haynes and Jam Wolfreys (London: Verso, 2007), 138.

⁶ See, for example, Im Taesik, "Kwagösa," 16–31; Sin Chuback, "Kyogwasö p'oröm," 181–214; Pak T'aegyün, "Nyu rait'ü üi tūngjang," 285–302; Yi Yun'gap, "Han'guk yöksahak," 27–72; Kim Kihyöp, *Nyu rait'ü pip'an*; Pae Yöngsun, "Segyehwa ihu Han'guksa insik," 58–92; Ryu Sūngnyöl, "Kunsa chöngkwönsik nolli," 25–36; Miller, "The Idea of Stagnation," 3–12; Yun Haedong, "Nyu rait'ü undong kwa yöksa insik: 'Piyöksajök yöksa'" [The historical perceptions of the New Right movement: "Ahistorical history"], in *T'alsingminjuüi sangsang ui yöksahak üro* [Toward a historiography of the postcolonial imagination] (Seoul: P'urūn yöksa, 2014), 110–140; Kim Chöngin, *Yöksa chönjaeng*; Cho Hyönggūn, "Hamnijök posu nūn," 160–184; Vierthaler, "A Reconsideration," 35–84; Hwang, "The Irrepressibility of Teleology," 46–61; Tikhonov, "The Rise and Fall of the New Right," 5–36; Jong-Pil Yoon, "Recent History Wars," 548–567; and Sungik Yang, "An Old Right in New Bottles," 889–909. The emergence of the "colonial modernization thesis is generally associated with works such as Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The*

Chŏng Sŭngjin, a straight line is drawn between Yi Yŏnghun's (and his teacher An Pyŏngjik's) abandonment of Marxism in favor of neoclassical economics in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the emergence of New Right historiography in 2004: "An Pyŏngjik began to reveal an ideological tendency amid his transition from the old 'semi-feudal colonial society thesis' to the so-called 'colonial modernization thesis.' He established the features of this ideology and a group around it in the late 1980s and early 1990s amid the collapse of real socialism and raised the ideology of the New Right as an intellectual problem. The New Right that began as an academic movement (the colonial modernization thesis) augmented its policy framework and ideological character under the Yi Myŏngbak government (2008–2012)."⁷ Kim Iryŏng also gave up on Marxism around the same time. It was developmental state theory, however, that strongly shaped his historical sensibility moving forward. Furthermore, the theme of colonial continuity, let alone colonial modernization, was peripheral at best in his work, an even more remarkable point considering its centrality to developmental state theory.⁸

Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984); Dennis L. McNamara, *The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprise, 1910–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Carter J. Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014 [1991]).

⁷ Chŏng Sŭngjin, "Nyu rait'ũ ŭi iron kwa sasang," 327–328: 안병직은 구래의 '식민지반봉건사회론'에서 이른바 '식민지근대화론'으로 선회.전향하는 과정에서 이데올로기적 경향성을 드러내기 시작했다. 그는 현실 사회주의가 붕괴하던 1980년대 말, 1990년대 초부터 이념적 지형, 진영을 설정하고, 사상문제로서 뉴-라이트 이데올로기를 제기했던 것이다. 학술운동으로 시작된 뉴-라이트[식민지근대화론]는 이명박정권(2008–2012)하에서 정책체계와 이데올로기적 성격을 한층 강화했다. See also Yi Yun'gap, "Han'guk yŏksahak," 40–44; Miller, "The Idea of Stagnation," 3–12; Tikhonov, "The Rise and Fall of the New Right," 15–17. In his embrace of the colonial modernization thesis, Yi was influenced by his teacher An Pyŏngjik, who underwent a dramatic conversion from left to right after studying in Japan in the late 1980s. On this conversion and much more about An Pyŏngjik's career," see Chŏng Chaejŏng, "An Pyŏngjik: Minjokchŭi esŏ kyŏngje sŏngjangjuŭi ro" [An Pyŏngjik: From nationalism to economic growth], *Yŏksa pip'yŏng* 59 (May 2002): 204–260.

⁸ See Alice H. Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Jung-en Woo, *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); and Atul Kohli, "Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea's 'Developmental State,'" *World Development* 22, no. 9 (1994): 1269–1293; Stephan Haggard has an exception in this regard. See Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Stephan Haggard, David Kang, and Chung-in Moon, "Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development: A Critique," *World Development* 25, no. 6 (1997): 867–881. Of course, emphasis on the continuity between

Outside of a focus on Yi Yŏnghun, there are two general approaches to New Right historiography in the literature.⁹ One tends to focus on the New Right relative to the specific characteristics of Korean society and the other, at a more wide-ranging level, relative to the spread of neoliberalism particularly since the end of the Cold War. Important in the first narrative are political events that galvanized conservatives into action, including the “lost decade” under two progressive governments, engagement with North Korea, and especially the movement to “settle the past” (*kwagŏ ch’ŏngsan*) under President No Muhyŏn. Important in the second is the international conservative turn in politics and academia since the 1970s and discourses of globalization and free trade empowered by the collapse of socialism between 1978 and 1991.

From the first of these two vantage points, scholars typically view the New Right as “nothing new”; the ideology of Cold War conservatives (*naengjŏn posu*), or the “old right,” is discernible in familiar themes of “statism” (*kukkajuŭi*), “anticommunism” (*pan’gongjuŭi*), and South Korea’s “genealogical legitimacy” (*chŏngt’ongsŏng*) vis-à-vis North Korea.¹⁰ They also charge the New Right with beautifying the colonial period.¹¹ Historian Vladimir Tikhonov (Pak Noja) forcefully conveys this perspective in a relatively recent publication, defining the New Right as “one of the attempts by South Korea’s privileged stratum to undermine the very basis for any criticisms against the colonial period behaviour of its

prewar and postwar Japan was also at the core of Chalmers Johnson’s book. See Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982).

⁹ They do, however, often overlap.

¹⁰ Im Taesik, for example, describes the New Right as “no different” from the “old right” because their arguments are “no different” from those of Han Sŭngjo and Cho Kapche. Im Taesik, “Yŏksa munje yŏn’guso ch’angnip,” 14. See also Im Taesik, “Kwagŏsa,” 16–31; Pak T’aegyun, “Nyu rait’ŭ ŭi tŭngjang,” 291–293; Hong Sŏngnyul, “Taean kyogwasŏ,” 342–344; Hong Sŏngnyul, “Yŏksa chŏnjaeng,” 302–325; Ryu Sŭngnyŏl, “Kunsa chŏngkwŏnsik nolli,” 26–27; Yi Kihun, “T’alminjok.T’algŭndaejŏk ch’ehŏm,” 532; Kim Chŏngin, *Yŏksa chŏnjaeng*, 178–182; Kim Sŏngbo, “Kaltŭng kwa pulsŭn ŭi sidae,” 390; Miller, “The Idea of Stagnation,” 10; Henry H. Em, *The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea* (Duke University Press: Durham and London, 2013), 17; Vierthaler, “How to Place August 15,” 146–148; and Sungik Yang, “An Old Right in New Bottles,” 889–909.

¹¹ See, for example, Chu Chino, “Nyu rait’ŭ ŭi singmin sagwan puhwal,” 319.

institutional—and in many cases familial—forefathers.”¹² In other words, the New Right is viewed as the latest effort to preserve a social and political structure formed through the colonial and Cold War periods.¹³ I do not reject this perspective per se. I argue, however, that by differentiating among historiographical sensibilities within the New Right—in other words, by viewing it also as a manifestation of *intra-conservative* conflict—an effort to overcome Cold War conservatism is discernible in the work of Kim Iryōng.¹⁴ Recognizing the differences in New Right

¹² Tikhonov, “The Rise and Fall of the New Right,” 8.

¹³ See Kim Sōngbo, “Kaltūng kwa pulsŭn ūi sidae,” 388–402; Chōng Yonguk, “Han’guk ūi yōksa kaltūng,” 1–41; Namhee Lee, “Social Memories of the 1980s,” 17–45; Tikhonov, “The Rise and Fall of the New Right,” 5–36. Much of this literature understands the New Right as a kind of “right-wing Gramscism,” a project to seize control of the cultural sphere in Korea to buttress the domination of the ruling class. See Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, *Far-Right Politics in Europe*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2017), 120. In this regard, some Korean historians follow Harvey Kaye’s analysis of history wars under the Reagan and Thatcher governments. Notably, the Korean translation of this text, *The Powers of the Past*, originally published in 1991, was published in late 2004, just in time for the emergence of the New Right movement. See Harvey J. Kaye, *The Powers of the Past: Reflections on the Crisis and the Promise of History* (Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Habi K’ei, *Kwagō ūi him: Yōksa ūisik, kiōk kwa sangsangnyōk* [The powers of the past: Reflections on the crisis and the promise of history] (Seoul: Samin, 2004).

¹⁴ In focusing on this aspect of intra-conservative struggle, I take some inspiration from Kim Kihyōp’s offhand remark, “The New Right’s objective is not to challenge the progressives but the containment of rational conservatism. One could say it is the seizure of what Gramsci calls ‘cultural hegemony’ within the conservative camp. A system of ‘common sense’ is needed to establish this cultural hegemony. If there was any intent of competing with progressives for the heart and minds of the people, they would have to work to establish a shared common sense with progressives. The New Right has achieved cultural hegemony, however, only within the Grand National Party, the organizational center of conservatives.” Kim Kihyōp, *Nyu rait’ū pip’an*, 213: 뉴라이트의 목적은 진보 진영에 대한 도전이 아니라 합리적 보수의 봉쇄다. 그렇기가 말한 ‘문화 헤게모니’를 보수 진영 내에서 장악한 것이라 할 수 있다. 문화 헤게모니의 구축을 위해서는 ‘상식’ 체계의 확립이 필요하다. 진보와 경쟁해 국민을 설득하려는 것이라면 진보와 공유할 수 있는 상식을 확보하려는 노력이 있어야 한다. 그런데 뉴라이트가 실제로 문화 헤게모니를 획득한 것은 보수 진영의 기존 조직인 한나라당 내에서일 뿐이다. His evaluation of the New Right’s objective as “containment” of rational conservatism, however, is based purely on readings of Yi Yōnghun and An Pyōngjik. I argue for an alternative in the work of Kim Iryōng. Meanwhile, Ōm Hangjin points out the links between the organization of the “anti-nuclear weapon, anti-Kim” (*panhaek pan-Gim*) rallies of 2003—in which Cho Kapche played a leading role—and the urgent calls for a “new right” that emerged the following year. Ōm Hanjin, “Ugyōnghwa wa chonggyo ūi chōngch’ihwa: 2003-nyōn ‘ch’in-Mi pan-Buk chiphoe’ rŭl chungsim ūro” [The rightist turn and the politicization of religion: The 2003 “pro-US, anti-North Korea rallies”], *Kyōngje wa sahoe* 62 (June 2004): 80–117. Chōng Haegu’s important article on the organizational structure of the New Right around the time of its founding is also important in this context. There were at least two broad currents within this movement, discernible in the intellectually driven New Right Foundation (*Nyū rait’ū chaedan*) and politically driven New Right National Union (*Nyu rait’ū chōn’guk yōnhap*). Chōng Haegu, “Nyu rait’ū undong ūi hyōnsil insik e taehan pip’anjōk kōmt’o” [A critical examination of the New Right movement’s perception of reality], *Yōksa pip’yōng* 76

historiography could be the key not only to cultivating a new kind of conservatism in Korea but also strategic dialogue between left and right.

Despite his centrality to New Right historiography, Kim Iryŏng has received scant scholarly attention.¹⁵ He represented the New Right in the field of contemporary history in the well-publicized *Tonga ilbo* series introducing the New Right to the Korean public in late 2004 and early 2005.¹⁶ He was a founding member of the think tank *Nyu rait'ŭ ssing'ŭ* net'ŭ (Newrightthink.net), the first (now defunct) association to adopt “New Right” in its title, and Textbook Forum.¹⁷ He was an editorial member of *Sidae chŏngsin* (Zeitgeist), the New Right's flagship journal.¹⁸ He was a key figure in the New Right history education movement.¹⁹ And

(August 2006): 215–237. Meanwhile, as Patrick Vierthaler has recently argued, it was not until 2006 that An Pyŏngjik and Yi Yŏnghun emerged as the intellectual faces of the movement. This suggests a potential for the movement to have turned out differently. Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 63.

¹⁵ His work is most often cited in passing. Im Taesik notes how Kim Iryŏng received funding from the conservative Pang Iryŏng Culture Foundation (*Pang Iryŏng munhwa chaedan*) to write *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk* and describes a run-in with him at a conference in which he derided his “eighties-style” (*80-nyŏndae sik*) historical views. Im Taesik, “Kwagŏsa,” 31n4; Im Taesik, “Yŏksa munje yŏn'guso ch'angnip,” 11. Yun Haedong mentions how, with respect to “ROK-centrism,” Kim Iryŏng adopts a more neutral position regarding the respective plans of Kim Il Sung and Rhee Syngman for unifying the peninsula by force—viewing them as “functionally equivalent—than that represented by the New Right in the (*Tae'an Kyogwasŏ*), which distinguishes between Kim's “leftist” policy and Rhee's “nationalist” policy. He adds, however, that Kim Iryŏng shares the New Right emphasis on the continuity between the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee eras (i.e. *kŏn'guk* and *puguk*). Yun Haedong, “Nyu rait'ŭ undong kwa yŏksa insik,” 120–121, 226n27. This assessment is consistent with that of Vierthaler, who notes Kim Iryŏng's “more moderate tone” when discussing the establishment of the North Korean state. Vierthaler also notes that Kim is “an exception” among New Right scholars in his focus on the internal over external factors leading to the foundation of the Republic of Korea. Vierthaler, “The New Right and the 1948 Foundation View,” 18n29, 17n27. In literature on the Park Chung Hee era, Kim Iryŏng is chiefly categorized as a developmental state theorist. Kim Kapsik, “Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn'gu kyŏnghyang kwa chaejomyŏng” [Research trends, and a reexamination, of the Park Chung Hee era]. *Han'guk chŏngch'i yŏn'gu* 16, no. 1 (2007), 88–89; Pak T'aegyŏn, “Pak Chŏnghŭi chŏngbu sigi rŭl t'onghae pon palchŏn kukka tamnon e taehan pip'anjŏk siron” [A critique of developmental state discourse through an examination of the Park Chung Hee government era], *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 74 (2009), 18; Yi Kwangil, ““Pak Chŏnghŭi ch'ejeron' pip'an” [Critique of the “discourse on the Park Chung Hee regime”], *Chŏngch'i pip'yŏng* 3 (1997), 125.

¹⁶ Kwŏn Chaehyŏn, “[Nyu rait'ŭ] 4-bu (4).”

¹⁷ Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 49.

¹⁸ Kim Ch'igwan, “Nyu rait'ŭ, kŭ tŭl ūn nugu in'ga?” [The New Right: Who are they?], *T'ongil nyusŭ*, May 15, 2006. <https://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=64970>.

¹⁹ As Kim Yŏnggho describes, “When it was revealed that high school textbooks were filled with distorted historical perceptions and arguments implying ‘the Republic of Korea should

he authored, edited, and contributed to many New Right publications into the late 2000s.²⁰ When scholars do pay him attention, they tend to focus on his political motivations.²¹ It is undoubtedly true that Kim Iryŏng sought to establish a positive historical narrative, and in this regard his work resonated with other conservatives like Yi Yŏnghun. Important differences, however, are overlooked by focusing on this single dimension. Accounting for Kim's journey from the mid-1990s to New Right scholar and his

not have been born' and 'contemporary Korean history is a history of injustice,' it was Professor Kim Iryŏng who first called for this problem's rectification." Kim Yŏngho, "Ko Kim Iryŏng kyosunim yŏngjŏn e" [In honor of the late Professor Kim Iryŏng], in *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk: Yi Sŭngman. Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae ŭi chaechomyŏng* [Founding a nation and enriching a nation: Shedding new light on the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee eras], Kim Iryŏng (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2010), 486–487: "대한민국은 태어나서는 안 될 나라", "한국현대사는 정의가 실패한 역사"라는 왜곡된 역사인식과 주장들이 나오고 이런 주장이 그대로 반영된 교과서를 고등학생들이 배우고 있다는 사실을 알았을 때 제일 먼저 이 문제를 바로 잡아야 한다고 주장하신 분도 김일영 교수님이셨습니다. There are two different versions of Kim Iryŏng's *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk*, one published in 2004 and the other in 2010. All references in this dissertation are to the 2004 version unless otherwise specified. In any case, page numbers for content in the main body are the same.

²⁰ See Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk*; Kyogwasŏ p'orŏm, *Han'guk hyŏndaesa ŭi hŏgu*; Pak Chihyang, *Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaeinsik*; and Kyogwasŏ p'orŏm, (*Tae'an kyogwasŏ*). See also Kim Yŏngho, ed., *Tae'an min'guk kŏn'guk 60-nyŏn ŭi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of the sixty years since the founding of the Republic of Korea] (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2008); Kang Kyuhyŏng et al., *Kŏn'guk 60-nyŏn: Widae han kungmin, saeroun kkum* [Sixty years since the founding of a nation: Great citizens, a new dream] (Seoul: Munhwa ch'eyuk kwan'gwangbu, 2008); Yi Inho, Kim Yŏngho, and Kang Kyuhyŏng, eds., *Tae'an min'guk kŏn'guk ŭi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of the founding of the Republic of Korea] (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2009); Yi Sŭnghun, *Sŏnjinhwa kyosil* [Advancement classroom] (Seoul: Han'guk sŏnjinhwa p'orŏm, 2009). Central works by An Pyŏngjik and/or Yi Yŏnghun include An Pyŏngjik and Yi Yŏnghun, *Tae'an min'guk yŏksa ŭi kiro e sŏda: An Pyŏngjik. Yi Yŏnghun taedam* [Standing at a crossroads for the history of the Republic of Korea: A conversation between An Pyŏngjik and Yi Yŏnghun] (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2007); Yi Yŏnghun, *Tae'an min'guk iyagi: Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaeinsik ŭi kangŭi* [The story of the Republic of Korea: A lecture on *A new understanding of history before and after liberation*] (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2007); Yi Yŏnghun, *Tae'an min'guk yŏksa: Nara mandŭlgi palchach'wi 1945–1987* [History of the Republic of Korea: The footprints of nation making, 1945–1987] (Seoul: Kip'arang). Kim was also politically active through scholarly associations, civil associations, and as a government advisor. Kim Yŏngho, "Ko Kim Iryŏng kyosunim," 484.

²¹ Sin Chubaek, for example, points out his marginalization of the democracy movement. However, he does admit that Kim Iryŏng at least acknowledges the democracy movement more than Yi Chuyŏng, another contributor to the New Right volume in question. Sin Chubaek, "Kyogwasŏ p'orŏm," 147, 205. An Hyŏnhyo notes his unfounded portrayal of Rhee's political prowess and critique of revisionist understandings of the land reforms ignoring existing research. An Hyŏnhyo, "*Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaeinsik e taehan chinghujŏk tokhae*," 219–220. See also Kim Wŏn, *Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae ŭi yuryŏng tŭl: Kiŏk, sakŏn, kŭrigo chŏngch'i* [Specters of the Park Chung Hee era: Memory, event, and politics] (Seoul: Hyŏnsil munhwa, 2011), 62–65.

significantly different historical sensibility sheds new light on the character of New Right historiography and its missed potential.

Tracing Kim's pursuit of such a third way—a conservative, affirming historiography that also sought to keep a distance with the old regime—requires discussing Cho Kapche, another important figure for post-Cold war conservative historiography. Cho is generally regarded as representative of “Cold War conservatism” (*naengjŏn posu*), what might also be termed the “old right.”²² Progressive scholars and journalists, through magazines like *Kil* (Path), *Mal* (Talk), and *Inmul kwa sang* (Figures and thought) have decried his anti-democratic and anticommunist tendencies as well as close ties with the security establishment.²³ In this

²² Pak T'aegyŏn, “Segyesajŏk chŏnhwan'gi wa No T'aeu chŏngbu” [A world-historical transitional period and the No T'aeu government], in *No T'aeu sidae ūi chaeinsik: Chŏnhwan'gi ūi Han'guk sahoe* [Reconsideration of the No T'aeu era: Korean society in a transitional period], ed. Kang Wŏnt'aek (P'aju: Nanam, 2012), 150; Woo-young Chang, “The Cyber Balkanization and Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in Korea,” *Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia* 7, no. 2 (2008), 41. Yun Kŏnch'a refers to Cho as a “far-right reactionary” (*kŭgu pandong*). Yun Kŏnch'a, *Hyŏndae Han'guk ūi sasang hŭrŭm: Chisigin kwa kŭ sasang 1980–90-nyŏndae* [Intellectual currents in contemporary Korea: Intellectuals and their thought in the 1980s and 1990s], trans. Chang Hwagyŏng (Seoul: Tangdae, 2000), 19. A *Kyŏnggyang sinmun* series attempting to identify and map Korean intellectuals across the spectrums of left and right and between the poles of nationalism and postnationalism labels Cho an “anticommunist intellectual,” and places him farthest to the right and just toward the nationalist pole. Chang Kwansun, “Minjuhwa 20-nyŏn, chisigin ūi chugŭm 1(2): Chigŭm, kŭ tŭl ūn ŏdi e sŏ inna” [Twenty years since democratization, the death of intellectuals: Where do they stand now?], *Kyŏnggyang sinmun*, April 25, 2007, 4–5. The diagram can also be found in *Kyŏnggyang sinmun t'ŭkpyŏl ch'wijaet'im, Minjuhwa 20-nyŏn, chisigin ūi chugŭm* [Twenty years of democratization: The death of the intellectual] (Seoul: Humanit'asŭ, 2008), 49.

²³ Ko Sŏngguk, “Cho Kapche pujang, wae tangsin kŭl i munje in'ga” [Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche, why are your articles a problem?], *Kil* (June 1994): 80–91; Ko Sŏngguk, “Cho Kapche pujang ūi Pak Chŏnghŭiron ūl haebu handa (1): ‘Hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi' puhwal ūn sangŏpchŏk sŏnjŏngjuŭi wa ūi kyŏlt'ak iŏtta” [Analyzing Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche's Pak Chŏnghŭi, part 1: The resurrection of the “revolutionary Park Chung Hee” as a commercialist, sensationalist plot], *Kil* (July 1994): 48–69; Ko Sŏngguk, “Cho Kapche pujang chŏnmyŏn pip'an (3): Kŭ ūi Pak Chŏnghŭiron ūn Chŏn Tuhwan.No T'aeu rŭl tto yŏngung ūro mandŭrŏtta” [A full-on critique of Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche, part three: His discussion of Park Chung Hee also made Chŏn Tuhwan and No T'aeu into heroes], *Kil* (August 1994): 158–177; Ko Sŏngguk, “*Wŏlgan Chosŏn* Cho Kapche pujang ūl pip'an handa: Kim Yŏngsam taet'ongnyŏng ūn 7-gong ch'ŏngmunhoe e Cho Kapche pujang kwa hamkke sŏl su ŏpta” [Criticizing *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche: President Kim Yŏngsam cannot stand together with Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche at the Seventh Republic hearings], *Kil* (September 1994): 81–100; Ko Sŏngguk, “Yŏksa nŭn *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* kwa Cho Kapche pujang ūl tamŭl sigan i ŏpta: Kaehyŏk kwa t'ongil sidae, sugu seryŏk ege ponaeŭn man'ga” [History has no time for the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* or Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche: The age of reform and unification, an elegy for the reactionaries], *Kil* (October 1994): 92–115; O Tongnyŏl, “Sugu seryŏk chŏnwi, uik non'gaek tŭl ūi inmaekto:

Chosŏn ilbo wa *Han'guk nondan* i kŭ wŏnch'ŏn" [Vanguard of the reactionaries: A map of the networks of right-wing media commentators; *Chosŏn ilbo* and *Han'guk nondan* are the source], *Kil* (September 1994): 64–100; An Yŏngbae, "Tae kija Cho Kapche ūi 'oman kwa p'yŏn'gyŏn'" [The "pride and prejudice" of eminent reporter Cho Kapche], *Mal* 94 (April 1994): 126–133; Sin Chinhwa, "Tŭdiŏ Wŏlgan Chosŏn e massŏgi sijak han saram tŭl" [The people who have finally begun to stand up to the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*], *Kil* (June 1994): 77–79; O Yŏnho, "Chŏngbo kigwan kwa kija: Cho Kapche wa Chŏng Hyŏnggŭn ūi kyŏngu" [An intelligence agency and a reporter: The case of Cho Kapche and Chŏng Hyŏnggŭn], *Mal* 150 (December 1998): 70–80. Cho sued *Mal* for libel over this article, and the court eventually ruled in his favor, stating there was insubstantial evidence that Cho had received financial compensation for his assistance. Hwang Pangyŏl, "O Yŏnho wa Cho Kapche ka mannada" [O Yŏnho and Cho Kapche meet], *Midiŏ onŭl*, May 3, 2001, <http://www.mediatoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=13630>. *Mal* published a series of articles following up on the initial report and the ensuing legal battle. See O Yŏnho, "'Cho Kapche nŭn An'gibu an'ga esŏ nawa hamkke susa palp'yomun sonbwatta'" ["Cho Kapche touched up the investigation statement with me at an ANSP safehouse"], *Mal* 151 (January 1999): 52–59; Pak Yŏngnyul, "Ŏllon'gye simin tanch'e 'Cho Kapche ūihok kyumyŏng' han moksori" [Calls to investigate "allegations of suspicion against Cho Kapche" by a media civil society organization], *Mal* 151 (January 1999): 60–61; O Yŏnho, "'Cho Kapche Wŏlgan Chosŏn p'yŏnjipchang ūi sosong naeyong kwa Mal ūi pallon: 'Cho Kapche ssi ege ponaenŭn p'yŏnji'" [The content of *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche's lawsuit and *Mal*'s objection: "A letter to Mr. Cho Kapche"], *Mal* 152 (February 1999): 92–101. Kang Chunman, another prominent public intellectual, began to take issue with Cho's work in 1994, coining the term "national-security commercialism" (*kukka anbo sangŏpchuŭi*) to accuse him of sensationalizing issues of national security for commercial gain amid the first nuclear crisis. See Kang Chunman, "'Kukka anbo' rŭl p'anŭn sangŏpchuŭi: Sanghwang ttara pyŏnsin kŏdŭp hamyŏ 'sae sangp'um' kaebal" [Commercialism selling national security: Developing "new products" by repeatedly changing according to the situation], *Han'gyŏre* 21 16 (July 7, 1994): 18–19; Ko Sŏngguk, "*Wŏlgan Chosŏn* Cho Kapche pujang," 81. Kang observes in Cho a "fact fetishism" (*sasil mulsinjuŭi*) leading him to completely overlook the interpretive aspects of his own work. As an extension of this, he regards Cho as a product of the conservative environment of the *Chosŏn ilbo* media group; Cho believes he is reporting the unmitigated truth, in other words, without recognizing his own interpretive frame. Kang Chunman, "Cho Kapche ūi 'sasil mulsinjuŭi': 'Chok'un' ūl asimnikka?" [Cho Kapche's "fetishism of facts": Do you know the "Chocoon"?], in "Kang Chunman ūi in'ganhak sajŏn" [Kang Chunman's anthropological dictionary], *Inmul kwa sasang* (July 2005), 158–160. Journalist Chŏn Yŏnggi makes a similar assessment, observing Cho's "shallow historical consciousness" and "narrow epistemology" due to an "excessive self-conviction" lending his writing the air of a "sermon." Chŏn Yŏnggi, "Cho Kapche ūi p'ongnyŏkchŏk int'ŏbyu nŭn wae pullyangp'um in'ga: Naengjŏn sidae ūi yumul in pan'gong cheiljuŭi rŭl mugi ro 'p'ongnyŏkchŏk int'ŏbyu' rŭl hae on Cho Kapche ssi. Kŭ ūi int'ŏbyu sangp'um ūl ilgŏ on han ilganji kija ka *Mal* e pullyangp'um kobal ūl hae watta" [Why Cho Kapche's violent interviews are a defective product: Mr. Cho Kapche who has conducted "violent interviews" armed with the weapon that is the Cold War relic of anti-communism-supremacism; A daily reporter who has read his interviews charges in *Mal* that they are defective products], *Mal* 97 (July 1994), 224–225. A less generous assessment would be that Cho intentionally twists the facts for political purposes. Ko Sŏngguk, "Cho Kapche pujang," 83–89. Another particularly vocal critic has been Chin Chunggwŏn, who emphasizes Cho's affinity with the Japanese far right, and for this reason regards him as an anachronism. Chin Chunggwŏn, "Chugŭn tokchaeja ūi sahoe: Pak Chŏnghŭi sindŭrom ūi chŏngsin punsŏkhak" [The dead dictator's society: A psychoanalysis of the Park Chung Hee syndrome], in *Kaebal tokchae wa Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae: Uri sidae ūi chŏngch'i kyŏngjejŏk kiwŏn* [Developmental dictatorship and the Park Chung Hee era: The political-economic origins of our times], ed. Yi Pyŏngch'ŏn (P'aju: Ch'angbi, 2003), 339–364. An English-language version of this essay is available, but there are many differences between it and the original. Jung-kwon Chin, "The Dead Dictator's Society: An Analysis of the 'Park

dissertation, I show how Cho Kapche played a role in provoking debate among conservatives over history with his November 1993 *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* article, in which he argued it was a president's explicit duty to uphold a positive historical narrative.²⁴ It had not yet even been a year since the inauguration of the "civilian government" (*munmin chŏngbu*) under Kim Yŏngsam, and critics saw this as a deliberate attempt to obstruct reform and perhaps even threaten a return to authoritarianism.²⁵ What is most

Chung-hee Syndrome," in *Developmental Dictatorship and the Park Chung-hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea*, ed. Byeong-cheon Lee, trans. Eungsoo Kim and Jaehyun Cho (Paramus, New Jersey: Homa & Seka Books, 2006), 294–311. See also Chin Chunggwŏn, *Ne mudŏm e ch'im ūl paet'ū ma* [I'll spit on your grave], rev. ed. (Koyang-si: Kaemagowŏn, 2013). This emphasis on the similarity between Cho Kapche and the Japanese far right constitutes a conventional understanding of Cho Kapche and his work. Journalist Chŏng Chihwan, for example, observes the similar tone of Cho's reporting on North Korea and that of far-right Japanese media like the *Sankei shinbun*. Chŏng Chihwan, "Cho Kapche *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* sajang ege ponaeun p'yŏnji: Ŭsim, chŭngo, ulbun ūl pŏri ko kija chŏngsin ūro tora osipsio" [A letter to *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* CEO Cho Kapche: Please abandon suspicion, hatred, and rage and return to the spirit of a reporter], *Mal* 177 (March 2001), 180–181. Above all, the association of Cho Kapche with the Japanese far right was strengthened through the so-called "Han Sŭngjo controversy" (*Han Sŭngjo p'amun*), an episode in which conservative scholar Han Sŭngjo ignited a scandal over remarks he made in the Japanese magazine *Seiron* describing the colonization of Korea as a "blessing." Cho Kapche was one of Han's few defenders. See Pak T'aegyŭn, "Han'guk posu ideollogi ūi t'ŭkching kwa tillema: Han Sŭngjo p'amun ūi yŏksajŏk ūimi" [The characteristics and dilemma of Korean conservative ideology: The historical meaning of the Han Sŭngjo controversy], *Hwanghae munhwa* 47 (June 2005), 206–207; Ha Chongmun, "Pan-Il minjokchuŭi wa Nyu rait'ŭ" [Anti-Japanese nationalism and the New Right], *Yŏksa pip'yŏng* 78 (February 2007), 183, 188, 194n15. Cho is still a prominent conservative figure today, even if his influence has waned since the 1990s. He has mainly published since 2006 through his website (founded in 2000) chogabje.com, which is also the name of his publishing company (Cho Kapche tat'ŏm).

²⁴ Cho Kapche, "Pak Chŏnghŭi wa Kim Yŏngsam ūi hwahae: Kim Yŏngsam taet'ongnyŏng ūi yŏksagwan munje" [Reconciliation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Yŏngsam: The problem with President Kim Yŏngsam's view of history], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (November 1993): 104–127.

²⁵ See Sŏ Chinyŏng, "Wŏlgan Chosŏn 11-wŏl ho 'Pak Chŏnghŭi wa Kim Yŏngsam ūi hwahae' e iŭi itta: 'Pan'gachyŏkchŏk sago' rŭl kyŏnggye handa" [An objection to "Reconciliation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Yŏngsam" in the November edition of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*: Beware "anti-reform thought"], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (December 1993): 221–225; Ko Sŏngguk, "Cho Kapche pujang," 80–91; and Ko Sŏngguk, "Cho Kapche pujang ūi Pak Chŏnghŭiron," 48–69. Journalist Yi Chŏnghun notes that the October 29 edition of the *Chosŏn nobo*, a bulletin for the *Chosŏn ilbo* labor union (*Chosŏn ilbo sa nodong chohap*), carried an article censuring Cho Kapche for exceeding the bounds of proper journalism. I have been unable to track down this article myself. See Yi Chŏnghun, "Pan'gol kija ūi hyŏndaesa: 'Sasil ūn inyŏm e usŏn handa'" [The contemporary history of a contrarian reporter: "Facts take precedence over ideology"], in *Hanbando ūi modŭn kwollyŏk e tojŏn hae on 'pan'gol kija' Cho Kapche: Int'ŏbyu moŭm*; Chungang ilbo, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahu, Paek Chiyŏn ["Contrarian reporter" Cho Kapche who has challenged all powers on the Korean Peninsula: Collected interviews; *Chungang ilbo*, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahoo, and Paek Chiyŏn], ed. Cho Kapche tat'ŏm (Seoul: Cho

significant about this article, however, was its reconciliatory frame in which each president had a role to play in history. The nation's history, Cho argued, had smoothly progressed from "nation-founding" (*kŏn'guk*) rooted in anti-communism (Rhee Syngman [Yi Sŭngman]) to economic development (Park Chung Hee and Chŏn Tuhwan) and democratization (No T'aeu and Kim Yŏngsam). This narrative privileged the succession of Korean presidents while marginalizing the democratization movement, asserting the achievement of democracy on the foundation of industrialization and economic growth.²⁶ Thus, Cho effectively inaugurated a new kind of conservatism appropriate to post-1987 Korean society, one that had to rely on persuasion over the use of force.²⁷ It was this very article that galvanized Kim Iryŏng's pursuit of a third way.

From the second vantage point, scholars understand the New Right in the broader context of neoliberalism and neoconservatism.²⁸ As Chŏng

Kapche tat'ŏm, 2010), 65. This interview was originally published in *Sindonga* (August 2006).

²⁶ Pak T'aegyun implies the links between this stagist perspective and Pak Seil's well-known conceptualization of nation-founding—industrialization—democratization—advancement (*kŏn'guk—sanŏphwa—minjuhwa—sŏnjinhwa*). He also describes this article as the "bible" of conservative historiography. Pak T'aegyun, "Yŏksa kyogwasŏ kukchŏnghwa nonjaeng," 290–291; Pak T'aegyun, "Segyehwa sidae Han'gukchŏk inyŏm chihyŏng," 512–513. See Pak Seil, *Taehan min'guk sŏnjinhwa chŏllyak* [Strategy for the advancement of the Republic of Korea] (Paju: 21-segi poksŭ, 2006). Chŏng Yonguk also emphasizes Cho's portrayal of the "legitimate lineage" of the South Korean state and characterizes the article as representative of the *Chosŏn ilbo*'s attempts to reinterpret contemporary history in the 1990s. Chŏng Yonguk, "Han'guk ŭi yŏksa kaltŭng," 21, 21n35.

²⁷ This is what political scientist Jang-Jip Choi (Ch'oe Changjip) calls "the substitution of the authoritarian state by the press." Jang-Jip Choi, *Democracy After Democratization: The Korean Experience* (Stanford, California: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Books, 2012), 177–179.

²⁸ Here, however, there is considerable overlap with the understanding of the New Right as "nothing new." As Kim Kihyŏp writes, "Neoliberalism is not without appeal to the reactionary establishment, the objective of which is the protection and strengthening of its vested interests." Kim Kihyŏp, *Nyu rait'ŭ pip'an*, 9: 기독교의 수호와 강화에 목적을 둔 수구과 정권 입장에서 신자유주의에 매력을 느낄 만한 측면이 없지는 않다. There is also an especial emphasis on the similarity with American and Japanese neocons, related to the perceived rootedness of the conservative establishment in strong ties to Japan and the United States. Im Taesik, for example, describes the New Right as the "Korean version of the neoconservative current, in step with the American neocons and Japanese far right." Im Taesik, "Kwagŏsa," 25: 이들은 미국의 네오콘, 일본의 극우 등과 보조를 같이하는 신보수주의 흐름의 한국적 산물이다. See also Ch'oe Kapsu, "Kukka, kwagŏ ŭi him," 14–26; Kim Kibong, "Miguk ŭi yŏksa chŏnjaeng," 32–45; Kim Chŏngin, *Yŏksa chŏnjaeng*, 163–169, 217–241; and Hong Sŏngnyul, "Yŏksa chŏnjaeng," 302–325. Much has also been made of the similarities between the Textbook Forum and Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (*Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai*). See Im Taesik, "Kwagŏsa," 26–29; Ha Chongmun, "Pan-Il minjokchu'i wa

Sŭngjin writes, “The rise of the New Right in Korean society evinces a contemporaneity with the world-historical dissemination of neoliberalism. It emerged as a more refined theory and crystallized ideology of conservatives responding to the demand for a rightist ideology entailed by the late twentieth-century wave of globalization and neoliberalism.”²⁹ There is, however, almost no systematic comparative research in this regard.³⁰ I aim to enrich this approach to understanding New Right

Nyu rait’ŭ,” 175; Yi Sinch’ŏl, “Saeyŏngmo wa kyogwasŏ p’orŏm,” 287–300; Chu Chino, “Nyu rait’ŭ ŭi singmin sagwan puhwal,” 319; and Sin Chubaek, “Ilbon uik ŭi Husosya kyogwasŏ,” 37–45. Kim Kihyŏp’s comparison of New Right historiography with that of collaborator Hyŏn Yŏngsŏp (Amano Michio) can also be understood in this context. See Kim Kihyŏp, *Nyu rait’ŭ pip’an*, 119–129. The New Right’s use of the term *chahak sagwan*, typically translated as “masochistic view of history,” is also regarded as a verbatim translation of the Japanese term *jigakyu shikan*. Im Taesik, “Kwagŏsa,” 16–31; Ha Chongmun, “Pan-Il minjokchuŭi wa Nyu rait’ŭ,” 184–187; Tikhonov, “The Rise and Fall of the New Right,” 14. However, I would suggest the term “self-flagellating view of history” to be more accurate. This was the term the Thatcher and Reagan governments used when they began to attack history textbooks in the 1980s. It has also been used freely in the German context. See Jacob Heilbrunn, “Germany’s New Right,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 6 (November/December 1996), 82, 87. It is not unlikely that Japanese commentators borrowed and translated the term. On Japanese right-wing historical revisionism, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Truth, Postmodernism and Historical Revisionism in Japan,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 2, no. 2 (2001): 297–305; Julia Yonetani, “The ‘History Wars’ in Comparative Perspective: Australia and Japan,” *Cultural Studies Review* 10, no. 2 (September 2004): 33–50; Minoru Iwasaki and Steffi Richter, “The Topology of Post-1990s Historical Revisionism,” trans. Richard F. Calichman, *positions: east asia cultures critique* 16, no. 3 (Winter 2008): 507–538; Steffi Richter, “Historical Revisionism in Contemporary Japan,” in *Contested Views of a Common Past: Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia*, ed. Steffi Richter (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008), 47–72; Daqing Yang, “Historical Revisionism in East Asia: What Does Politics Have to Do with It?” in *Contested Views of a Common Past: Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia*, ed. Steffi Richter (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008), 25–46; Gyu Soo Yi, “The Historical Recognition of Japanese Neo-Nationalism,” *International Journal of Korean History* 17, no. 2 (August 2012): 109–131; and Peter Duus, “Introduction: History Wars in Postwar East Asia, 1945–2014,” in *History Wars and Reconciliation in Japan and Korea: The Roles of Historians, Artists and Activists*, ed. Michael Lewis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 1–16. I translate *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai* (following Yonetani, Richter, and Yang) as “Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform,” but there are several variations of this translation: Iwasaki and Richter (via Calichman) use “Society for History Textbook Reform,” Gyu-Soo Yi uses “Japanese Society for Textbook Reform,” and Peter Duus uses “Society for Textbook Reform.” Alternatively, Tessa Morris-Suzuki uses “Association for History Textbook Reform,” adding that “Association for Orthodox History Education” is also used.

²⁹ Chŏng Sŭngjin, “Nyu rait’ŭ ŭi iron kwa sasang,” 327: 한국 사회에서 뉴-라이트의 출현은, 신자유주의의 세계사적 조류와 동시대성을 확보하고 있다. 20 세기 후반 세계화, 신자유주의의 파고 속에서 우파 이데올로기의 정치적 수요가 발생하고, 이에 대응하는 보수진영의 보다 세련된 이론이자 결정화된 이데올로기로서 뉴-라이트가 등장했던 것이다. See also Pae Yŏngsun, “Segyehwa ihu Han’guksa insik,” 58–92; Miller, “The Idea of Stagnation,” 10; Kim Chŏngin, *Yŏksa chŏnjaeng*, 174; and Namhee Lee, “Social Memories of the 1980s,” 17–45. I also adopt this perspective in Macrae, “Post-Cold War Conservative Reappraisals,” 327–359.

³⁰ I make this point specifically regarding New Right historiography. Political scientists have carried out comparative studies of the New Right movement. See, for example, Im

historiography by analyzing it in the context of historical revisionism and history wars.³¹ History wars are not limited to Korea—nor the United States or Japan, for that matter. The German *Historikerstreit* is often treated as archetype, but they have become particularly common since the end of the

Hyökpaeck, “Han’guk Nyu rait’ü,” 157–169; Kim Hogi, “Pip’anjök sigak,” 148–156; Kim Hogi, “2000-nyön ihu üi posu seryök,” 68–79; Chöng Sangho, “Miguk üi neok’on kwa Han’guk üi Nyu rait’ü e tachan pigyo yön’gu: Chöngch’æk inyöm, net’üwök’ü, chöngch’æk üi hyöngsöng mit palchön kwajöng üi chungsim üro” [A comparative study of American neoconservatives and the Korean New Right: Focusing on policy ideology, networks, and policy formation and development process], *Han’guk chöngch’ihak hoebo* 42, no. 3 (September 2008): 167–189; Sin Chonghwa, “Sinbosujuüi wa taebi han uri nara posujuüi üi t’üksöng” [The characteristics of conservatism in Korea compared with neoconservatism], *Han’guk chöngch’æk yön’gu* 12, no. 2 (June 2012): 187–206.

³¹ Tony Taylor and Stuart Macintyre observe that “conservative/nationalist ideologues” typically initiate history wars. Tony Taylor and Stuart Macintyre, “Cultural Wars and History Textbooks in Democratic Societies,” in *Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture and Education*, ed. Mario Carretero, Stefan Berger, and Maria Grever (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 613. As I discuss in chapter five, there are varying definitions of “historical revisionism.” See also Ronald Hutton, “Revisionism in Britain,” in *Companion to Historiography*, ed. Michael Bentley (London: Routledge, 1997), 364–376; R.J.B. Bosworth, “Explaining ‘Auschwitz’ after the End of History: The Case of Italy,” *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999): 84–99; Daniel Levy, “The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel,” *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999): 51–66; Stephen Howe, “The Politics of Historical ‘Revisionism’: Comparing Ireland and Israel/Palestine,” *Past and Present* 168 (2000): 227–253; Levi, “The Distant Past,” 61–73; Yonetani, “The ‘History Wars’ in Comparative Perspective,” 33–50; Girogos Antoniou, “The Lost Atlantis of Objectivity: The Revisionist Struggles between the Academic and Public Spheres,” *History and Theory* 46, no. 4 (2007): 92–112; Traverso, “The New Anti-Communism,” 138–155; Iwasaki and Richter, “The Topology of Post-1990s Historical Revisionism,” 507–538; Daqing Yang, “Historical Revisionism in East Asia,” 25–46; Giovanni C. Cattini, “Historical Revisionism: The Reinterpretation of History in Contemporary Political Debate,” *Transfer: Journal of Contemporary Culture* 6 (2011): 28–37; Daniel Woolf, *A Global History of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 500–502; and Duus, “Introduction,” 1–16.

Cold War.³² This situation calls for more concrete comparative analysis.³³ To do so, I draw on the concept of historical revisionism. To differentiate from the use of “revisionism” (*sujŏngjuŭi*) in the Korean context, I append the term “right-wing.” Drawing from existing scholarship, I define right-wing historical revisionism as a form of history writing that seeks to change

³² See, for example, Woolf, *A Global History of History*, 500–502; Taylor and Macintyre, “Cultural Wars and History Textbooks,” 613–635; Tony Taylor, “Disputed Territory: The Politics of Historical Consciousness in Australia,” in *Theorizing Historical Consciousness*, ed. Peter Seixas (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 217–239; Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark, *The History Wars* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003); and Norman J. Wilson, *History in Crisis? Recent Directions in Historiography*, 3rd ed. (USA: Pearson, 2014). On the *Historikerstreit*, see, for example, Peter Baldwin, ed., *Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians’ Debate* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990); Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997); and Chris Lorenz, “Historical Knowledge and Historical Reality: A Plea for ‘Internal Realism,’” in *History and Theory: Contemporary Readings*, ed. Brian Fay, Philip Pomper, and Richard T. Vann (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 342–376. There is of course a great deal written on the Korean history wars, much of which I discuss in this chapter. See Im Taesik, “Kwagōsa naejŏn,” 16–31; Kim Sōngbo, “Kaltūng kwa pulsŏn ŭi sidae,” 388–402; Pak T’aegyūn, “Nyu rait’ū ŭi tūngjang,” 285–302; Kim Chōngin, *Yōksa chōnjaeng*; Hong Sōngnyul, “Yōksa chōnjaeng,” 302–325; Tikhonov, “The Rise and Fall of the New Right,” 5–36; Jong-Pil Yoon, “Recent History Wars,” 548–567; and Sungik Yang, “An Old Right in New Bottles,” 889–909. Active right-wing intellectual movements have been observed in Europe, Japan, and the United States at least since the 1960s. Hayashi Fusao’s *Daitōa sensō kōtei ron* (Affirmation of the Greater East Asian War), published in 1964, is paradigmatic in Japan. Iwasaki and Richter, “The Topology of Post-1990s Historical Revisionism,” 507–538. In Europe, one may observe Alain de Benoist and the *Nouvelle Droite* in France in the late 1960s, Renzo de Felice in Italy in the 1970s, and Ernst Nolte in Germany in the 1980s. Camus and Lebourg, *Far-Right Politics in Europe*; Bosworth, “Explaining ‘Auschwitz,’” 84–99; Maier, *The Unmasterable Past*; Heilbrunn, “Germany’s New Right,” 80–96. Of these intellectuals only Benoist is not explicitly concerned with history. In the United States, the invigoration of right-wing think tanks in the 1970s is well documented. Jon Wiener, “The Olin Money Tree: Dollars for Neocon Scholars,” *The Nation* (January 1, 1990): 12–14; Jane Mayer, *Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires behind the Rise of the Radical Right* (New York: Doubleday, 2016); Nancy MacLean, *Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America* (New York: Viking, 2017). Regarding historiography specifically, see Kaye, *The Powers of the Past*.

³³ Some of the more recent literature on the New Right raises the issue of historical revisionism. Jong-Pil Yoon and Patrick Vierthaler do not identify New Right historiography as revisionist because it adheres to basic methodological standards. See Vierthaler, “The New Right and the 1948 Foundation View,” 1–33; and Jong-Pil Yoon, “Recent History Wars,” 548–567. I discuss in chapter five two definitions of historical revisionism differentiated by methodological and normative criteria. Vierthaler and Yoon follow the first definition, I follow the second. Finally, Namhee Lee analyzes New Right views of 1987 in relation to the discourse of failed revolutions associated with historian François Furet, whom I also discuss in chapter five. See Namhee Lee, “Social Memories of the 1980s,” 17–45. I also find Furet’s brand of liberal triumphalism an important current in reevaluations of dictatorship.

fundamental aspects of national identity, and create a typology based on four variants.³⁴

It is in this context that I compare post-Cold War reappraisals of dictatorship.³⁵ To be sure, academic support for dictatorship, just as with historical revisionism, is not strictly a post-Cold War phenomenon. American scholars such as Samuel Huntington and some modernization theorists are paradigmatic in this regard.³⁶ Also relevant are American political scientist A. James Gregor and historian Jeane Kirkpatrick. In the

³⁴ I discuss these points in greater detail in chapter five.

³⁵ What I propose can be described as comparative historiography. See Chris Lorenz, "Comparative Historiography: Problems and Perspectives," *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999): 25–39; Chris Lorenz, "Towards a Theoretical Framework for Comparing Historiographies: Some Preliminary Considerations," in *Theorizing Historical Consciousness*, ed. Peter Seixas (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 25–48; Chris Lorenz, "Double Trouble: A Comparison of the Politics of National History in Germany and Quebec," in *Nationalizing the Past: Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe*, ed. Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 49–70. Prominent examples of comparative historiography include Michael Bentley, ed., *Companion to Historiography* (London: Routledge, 1997); Georg G. Iggers and Q. Edward Wang, with Supriya Mukherjee, *A Global History of Modern Historiography* (London: Routledge, 2008); Woolf, *A Global History of History*; Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf, eds., *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, vol. 5: 1945 to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Eckhardt Fuchs and Benedikt Stuchtey, eds., *Across Cultural Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002). A 1999 theme issue of *History and Theory* provides several examples on a smaller scale. Jürgen Kocka, "Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German *Sonderweg*," *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999): 40–50; Levy, "The Future of the Past," 51–66; Sebastian Conrad, "What Time is Japan? Problems of Comparative (Intercultural) Historiography," *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999): 67–83; Bosworth, "Explaining 'Auschwitz,'" 84–99. Studies seeking to understand historical revisionism from a comparative perspective are also relevant. Yonetani, "The 'History Wars' in Comparative Perspective," 33–50; Daqing Yang, "Historical Revisionism in East Asia," 25–46; Duus, "Introduction," 1–16; Antoniou, "The Lost Atlantis of Objectivity," 92–112; Howe, "The Politics of Historical 'Revisionism,'" 227–253.

³⁶ Huntington, who challenged modernization-theory optimism about the developing world in the late 1960s, had advocated for the military as a stabilizing force since the 1950s. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006 [1968]); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967 [1957]). Nils Gilman counts Daniel Lerner and Edward Shils among the modernization theorists who supported authoritarianism in the developing world but credits Lucian Pye most of all for developing this thesis, whom he groups together with Walt Rostow as representative of "authoritarian high modernism." Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003), 185–190, 301n93–96, 10. See also Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," *World Politics* 13, no. 1 (1960): 19–44; and John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962).

1970s, Gregor declared Italian fascism a form of “developmental dictatorship” and Kirkpatrick argued for explicit support for (non-totalitarian) authoritarianism in developing countries before going on to become US ambassador to the UN under Reagan.³⁷ Also like historical revisionism, such positive appraisals of dictatorship proliferated after the Cold War, examples of which involve Lee Kuan Yew, Pinochet, Salazar, and Stalin.³⁸ In the Korean context, I focus on reappraisals of Park Chung Hee, who neatly connects Kim Iryŏng, Yi Yŏnghun, and Cho Kapche and who was at the heart of the disputes over history in the early 1990s initiated by Cho Kapche and taken up by Kim Iryŏng. I compare this case with those

³⁷ A. James Gregor, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979); Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” *Commentary* (November 1, 1979): 34–45. On Kirkpatrick, see J. David Hoeveler, Jr., *Watch on the Right: Conservative Intellectuals in the Reagan Era* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 143–176. On Gregor, see Philip Becher, “Apartheid, Authoritarianism, and Anticolonial Struggles Viewed from the Right: Critical Perspectives on A. James Gregor’s Search for Fascism in the Global South,” *Acta Academia* 54, no. 3 (2022): 108–130.

³⁸ In the case of Lee Kuan Yew, this was hardly a “rehabilitation.” Yet there is still a striking similarity with the other cases insofar as an outpouring of celebratory content, including Lee’s own memoirs, in the 1990s. On Lee Kuan Yew, see Loh Kah Seng, “Within the Singapore Story: The Use and Narrative of History in Singapore,” *Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 12, no. 2 (1998): 1–21; Hong Lysa, “The Lee Kuan Yew Story as Singapore’s History,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 33, no. 3 (2002): 545–557; Albert Lau, “Nation-Building and the Singapore Story: Some Issues in the Study of Contemporary Singapore History,” in *Nation-Building: Five Southeast Asian Histories*, ed. Wang Gungwu (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 221–250; Ernest Koh Wee Song, “Ignoring ‘History from Below’: People’s History in the Historiography of Singapore,” *History Compass* 5, no. 1 (2007): 11–25; Nicole Tarulevicz, “History Making in Singapore: Who is Producing the Knowledge?” *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 11, no. 1 (2009): 402–425; Ezra F. Vogel, “Nation Rebuilders: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Lee Kuan Yew, Deng Xiaoping, and Park Chung Hee,” in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 513–541; Cheng Guan Ang, “Biography and History: The Historiography of Lee Kuan Yew,” *Asian Studies Review* 43, no. 3 (2019): 544–561; and Terence Chong, “The Bicentennial Commemoration: Imagining and Re-imagining Singapore’s History,” *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2020): 323–333. On Pinochet, see Steve J. Stern, *Remembering Pinochet’s Chile: On the Eve of London 1998* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Steve J. Stern, *Reckoning with Pinochet: The Memory Question in Democratic Chile, 1989–2006* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); and Lessie Jo Frazier, *Salt in the Sand: Memory, Violence, and the Nation State in Chile, 1890 to the Present* (USA: Duke University Press, 2007). On Stalin, see Sarah E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber, “Failing the Stalin Test: Russians and their Dictator,” *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 1 (2006): 2–8. I also compare post-Cold War reevaluations of Rhee Syngman, Chiang Kai-shek, Stalin, and Lee Kuan Yew. Macrae, “Post-Cold War Conservative Reappraisals,” 327–359. On Salazar, see Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, “Slander, Ideological Differences, or Academic Debate? The ‘Verão Quent’ of 2012 and the State of Portuguese Historiography,” *E-Journal of Portuguese History* 10, no. 1 (2012): 62–77.

of Chiang Kai-shek and Francisco Franco, both Cold War dictators that presided over tremendous economic growth. To be sure, each case is related to a specific internal context—political developments and competition and the dynamics of public memory as well as cognitive developments in the field of history—but it is significant that each arose at around the same time.³⁹

The dissertation is broadly organized into two parts. In chapters two and three I trace the origins of Kim Iryŏng's pursuit of a third way between what he perceived as excessively negative and unjustifiably positive views of the past—what would eventually crystallize in New Right historiography—to the early 1990s. I discuss the important role of Cho Kapche in initiating these debates, at the heart of which was Park Chung Hee. I thus shed new light on the historical origins and varied character of the New Right as an intra-conservative power struggle. In chapters four and five, I focus on the character of New Right historiography. I compare Cho Kapche, Yi Yŏnghun, and Kim Iryŏng's narratives of the Park Chung Hee era with each other and with reappraisals of Chiang Kai-shek and Francisco Franco, which arose at around the same time. I analyze these narratives in the context of right-wing historical revisionism, suggesting ways in which Korean New right historiography accords with and differs from a transnational historiographical phenomenon increasingly prevalent since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, I emphasize the significantly different historical sensibilities of Kim Iryŏng and Yi Yŏnghun. In the final chapter, I discuss the unrealized potential of New Right historiography and the prospects for left-right dialogue over disputed history.

³⁹ Each may be understood as a “Cold War dictator,” although Chiang and Franco's historical legacies certainly extend further back. See, for example, Jeremy E. Taylor and Grace C. Huang, ““Deep Changes in Interpretive Currents”? Chiang Kai-shek Studies in the Post-Cold War Era,” *International Journal of Asian Studies* 9, no. 1 (2012): 99–121; Cattini, “Historical Revisionism,” 28–37; and Sebastian Balfour, “The Concept of Historical Revisionism: Spain since the 1930s,” *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 21, no. 3 (2008): 179–186.

Chapter 2.

The History Wars Begin:

Cho Kapche's Reappraisal of Park Chung Hee

I. Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the contestation over historiography that began in the early 1990s. Conservative journalist Cho Kapche played a key role in this regard with his public remonstrance of Kim Yŏngsam for his “negative view of history” in 1993. I explore Cho’s transition from progressive to conservative journalist, highlighting a shift in perception of Park Chung Hee in the late 1980s. I analyze his 1993 *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* article challenging Kim Yŏngsam’s view of history and discuss its significance for initiating public debates over history in the 1990s. These details provide important context for Kim Iryŏng’s reconsideration of Park Chung Hee, which I explore in the following chapter.

II. The Life and Work of Cho Kapche

Cho Kapche (b. 1945) began his career as a journalist in 1971 writing for the society and culture section of the *Kukche sinbo* (later the *Kukche sinmun*), the mostly widely read Pusan newspaper at the time. He opposed the Yusin regime through his work in the Media Liberalization Movement (*Ŏllon chayuhwa undong*) and reporting, focusing on social issues like air pollution and human rights abuses. In 1976 he was fired under pressure by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (*Chungang chŏngbobu*, KCIA) for questioning the economic viability of an oil survey off the coast of Pohang. Although he eventually regained his job, he was fired again in 1980 for his reporting on the Kwangju massacre.¹

¹ The *Kukche sinbun* changed to the *Kukche sinmun* in 1976. Publication of reporting on the Kwangju massacre began in 1985, in which Cho’s reporting played a part. These reports would eventually serve as the basis for the investigations into Kwangju and the Fifth

This second dismissal was an important turning point in Cho's career. He moved to Seoul in 1981 and began working at the monthly magazine *Madang* before moving over to the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* in 1983.² He sustained a progressive orientation into the late 1980s, focusing on the likes of Korean Airlines safety issues, inter-generational conflict, unjustly convicted criminals on death row, government torture and manipulation, the production and sale of methamphetamines (philopon), and so forth.³

Republic under President No T'aeu in 1988. Yi Chŏnghun, "Pan'gol kija ūi hyŏndaesa: 'Sasil ūn inyŏm e usŏn handa'" [The contemporary history of a contrarian reporter: "Facts over ideology"], in *Hanbando ūi modŭn kwŏllyŏk e tojŏn hae on 'pan'gol kija' Cho Kapche: Int'obyu moum*; Chungang ilbo, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahu, Paek Chiyŏn ['Contrarian reporter' Cho Kapche who has challenged all power on the Korean Peninsula: Collected interviews; *Chungang ilbo, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahoo, and Paek Chiyŏn*], ed. Cho Kapche tat'ŏm (Seoul: Cho Kapche tat'ŏm, 2010), 26, 31–34, 38. This interview was originally published in *Sindonga* (August 2006). As Nak-Chung Paik (Paek Nakch'ŏng) points out, "During the 1970s, when South Korea's environmental movement made a cautious start in the name of 'studying pollution problems,' the very mention of industrial pollution would invite charges of siding with 'the Reds.'" Nak-Chung Paik, "How to Think about the Park Chung Hee Era," in *Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961–1979: Development, Political Thought, Democracy, and Cultural Influence*, ed. Hyung-A Kim and Clark W. Sorensen (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011), 90. Cho was awarded the seventh Korean Journalism Award (*Che-7-hoe Han'guk kija sang*) in 1974 for his series on air pollution. His other awards include one for magazine writing in 1990 (*Han'guk chapchi hyŏphoe chejŏng chapchi kija sang*), the fourth Asia Pacific Award in 1991 (*che-4-hoe Asia-T'aep'yŏngyangsang t'ŭkpyŏlsang*), and the Kwanhun Club Media Award in 1994 (*Kwanhun k'ŭllŏp ŏllonsang*). This last one was for reporting on human rights issues in North Korea. See Cho's biography on his homepage, http://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=84919&C_CC=AZ.

² He became editor in chief of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* in 1991. In 2000, the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* separated from Choson Ilbo Company, Ltd, with Cho taking on the position of CEO as well as editor in chief until 2004, when he ceded the position of editor in chief to Kim Yŏn'gwang. According to Yi Chŏnghun, it appears there was tension over Cho's involvement in public demonstrations, blurring the line between reporter and activist. His personal website (chogabje.com), which he founded in 2000, has functioned as his base of operations since leaving the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*. Yi Chŏnghun, "Pan'gol kija ūi hyŏndaesa," 42–45, 59, 16, 69–70.

³ See, for example, Cho Kache, "Hiroppong chiha cheguk t'amhŏm: K'oria k'ŏneksyŏn; Paeksack ūi kongp'o; 'Hwait'ŭ t'ŭraiaenggŭl' ūl kada [Delving into the underworld of philopon: Korea connection; White terror; Going to the "white triangle"], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (December 1983): 254–294; Cho Kapche, "KAL e k'al ūl taenda: 'Uri ūi nalgae' e taehan ch'oech'o ūi anjŏn chindan" [Putting the knife to Korean Airlines: The first ever safety assessment of "our wings"], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (April 1984): 144–179; Cho Kapche, "20-tae kungmin i anŭn munjechŏm: Kwamil kwa kyŏngjaeng ūl mul ko taninŭn 55–61-nyŏn saeng peibi pum sede 5-baek 70-man myŏng ūi ch'osanghwa" [The problems faced by people in their twenties: A portrait of the 5.7 million baby boomers born between 1955 and 1961 driving overcrowding and competition], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (July 1984): 364–388; Cho Kapche, "Mulchŭng ŏmnŭn sahyŏng chiphaeng" [Execution without evidence], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (September 1984): 368–394; and Cho Kapche, "Komun kwa kongjak 1: Ko Sukchong ūi kyŏlbaek chŭngmyŏngsŏ" [Torture and fabrication (part one of five): Certification of Ko Sukchong's innocence], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (January 1987): 432–455. Cho's reporting on the "Korea connection" would provide material for the 1990 film *K'orian k'oneksyŏn* (Korean

This, of course, is quite a different image from that associated with Cho today as a representative of “Cold War conservatism” (*naengjön posu*), what might also be termed the “old right.”⁴ Somewhere Cho made a transition from progressive scholar to embodiment of Cold War conservatism.

Yi Chõnghun, who worked under Cho at the *Wõlgan Chosõn* and has incidentally written the best biographical piece on him, explains this

connection), for which he also wrote the script. Cho’s articles on the Kim Kũnha murder case published in *Wõlgan Madang* (1981–1982) also became the basis for a play and a television drama series. See https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0188776/?ref=fn_al_tt_2; Yi Chõnghun, “Ollon chõn’gong haksang ũi Cho Kapche kija yõn’gu: Hogisim kwa chibyo ham i mandũrõ naen kija” [A journalism student’s study of Cho Kapche: A reporter created through curiosity and tenacity], *Chogabje.com*, April 2, 2015, https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=60951&C_CC=AJ. Much of Cho’s early books also reflect a progressive orientation. See Cho Kapche, *Sõgyu sajõng chom hwanhi apsida: Segye sõgyu ũi changnae wa Han’guk saram ũi moksum* [Let’s openly understand the oil situation: The prospects for oil in the world and the lives of Korean people] (Republic of Korea: Ppuri kip’ũn namu, 1980); Cho Kapche, *7-gwanggu ũi taedobak: Chimnyõm ũi oilmaen kwa haejõ sich’u tũrama* [The great gamble of Sector Seven: An obsessive oilman and undersea drilling drama] (Republic of Korea: Taragwõn, 1981); Cho Kapche, *Komun kwa chojak ũi kisulja tũl: Komun e ũihan in’gan p’amyõl kwajõng ũi silchũngjõk yõn’gu* [Experts of torture and fabrication: An empirical study of the process of human destruction by torture] (Seoul: Han’gilsa, 1987); Cho Kapche, *Sahyõngsu O Hwiung iyagi* [The story of death-row inmate O Hwiung] (Seoul: Han’gilsa, 1987); Cho Kapche, *K’oriõn k’õneksyõn* [Korean connection] (Seoul: Chosõn ilbosa, 1988); Cho Kapche, *Kukka anjõn kihoekpu* [Agency for National Security Planning] (Seoul: Chosõn ilbosa, 1988); Cho Kapche, *Kunbu* [The military] (Seoul: Chosõn ilbosa, 1988); Cho Kapche, *Taep’okpal* [Big bang] (Seoul: Chosõn ilbosa, 1988); Chõng Sũnghwa and Cho Kapche, *12.12 sakõn: Chõng Sũnghwa nũn mal handa* [The December 12 incident: Chõng Sũnghwa speaks] (Seoul: Kkach’i, 1987). It is interesting to note that some Cho’s early books (including *Yugo!* which I discuss below) shared a publisher (Han’gilsa) with the *Haebang chõnhusa ũi insik* (History before and after liberation) series. See, for example, Song Kõnho et al., *Haebang chõnhusa ũi insik* [An understanding of history before and after liberation] (Seoul: Han’gilsa, 1980).

⁴ Pak T’aegyũn, “Segyesajõk chõnhwan’gi wa No T’aeu chõngbu” [A world-historical transitional period and the No T’aeu government], in *No T’aeu sidae ũi chaeinsik: Chõnhwan’gi ũi Han’guk sahoe* [Reconsideration of the No T’aeu era: Korean society in a transitional period], ed. Kang Wõnt’aek (P’aju: Nanam, 2012), 150; Woo-young Chang, “The Cyber Balkanization and Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in Korea,” *Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia* 7, no. 2 (2008), 41. Yun Kõnch’a calls Cho a “far-right reactionary” (*kũgu pandong*). Yun Kõnch’a, *Hyõndae Han’guk ũi sasang hũrũm: Chisigin kwa kũ sasang 1980–90-nyõndae* [Intellectual currents in contemporary Korea: Intellectuals and their thought in the 1980s and 1990s], trans. Chang Hwagyõng (Seoul: Tangdae, 2000), 19. A *Kyõnghyang sinmun* series attempting to identify and map Korean intellectuals across the spectrums of left and right and between the poles of nationalism and postnationalism labels Cho an “anticommunist intellectual” and places him farthest to the right and just toward the nationalist pole. Chang Kwansun, “Minjuhwa 20-nyõn, chisigin ũi chugũm 1(2): Chigũm, kũ tũl ũn õdi e sõ inna” [Twenty years since democratization, the death of intellectuals: Where do they stand now?], *Kyõnghyang sinmun*, April 25, 2007, 4–5. The diagram can also be found in *Kyõnghyang sinmun t’ũkpyõl ch’wijaet’im, Minjuhwa 20-nyõn, chisigin ũi chugũm* [Twenty years of democratization: The death of the intellectual] (Seoul: Tosõ ch’ulp’an humanit’asũ, 2008), 49.

turn in terms of two key events, namely, Cho's newfound disdain for North Korea and admiration for Park Chung Hee, both traceable to the 1980s.⁵ While fleshing out these two dimensions, I add a third in his reaction to the changing circumstances of Korean society after 1987. I first focus on this point and on Cho's anti-North Korean turn, leaving discussion of Cho's Park Chung Hee research for the following section.

Following the 1987 presidential election and the opening of the public sphere, Cho began to comment on politics in earnest, paying particular attention to the divided opposition and regionalism. In an article written for the January edition of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*, the first following the December 1987 presidential election, he expressed a bitter disappointment. "The expectations of supporters of the two Kims turned to frustration as soon as the election was over, and this frustration is turning into hatred. The twelve million Koreans who cast their votes for these two candidates in the name of democratization will never forget the absurd powerlessness of the will of the absolute majority of the people brought on by their mutual betrayal. Those who complained most bitterly about the two Kims on the morning of the seventeenth had been their most passionate supporters just the night before."⁶ This disappointment with the opposition soon grew into a general apprehension about the direction of post-1987 Korean society. In a 1989 article, he particularly singled out intellectuals' "blind criticism" of the regime, which he associated with their unconditionally negative historical views.

It has become a trend to refer to Korean history after liberation as a "history of disgrace" and the media of that era as "handmaidens of power."...

What is the reality? At the starting line in 1945, nations already far ahead of Korea, including Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, the Philippines, Thailand, and

⁵ Yi Chŏnghun, "Pan'gol kija ūi hyŏndaesa," 48, 54–56.

⁶ Cho Kapche, "Chiyŏk kamjŏng e millin chŏngkwŏn kyoch'e" [Change of government delayed over regionalist sentiment], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (January 1988), 173:

선거가 끝나자마자 양 김씨에 걸었던 지지자들의 기대는 좌절감으로, 이 좌절감은 증오심으로 변질하고 있다. 민주화를 염원하면서 두 후보에게 표를 던졌던 1천 2백만 명의 한국인들은 절대다수의 민의가 두 사람의 배신에 의하여 허무하게 사라져버린, 이 어이없는 사실을 결코 잊을 수 없는 것이다.

17 일 아침 양 김씨에 대해서 가장 심하게 분통을 터뜨린 사람들은 간밤까지만 해도 가장 열렬히 양 김씨를 응원하던 이들이었다.

China, are now in 1989 far worse off economically and politically. Due to the direct transition from the feudal era to colonial rule, Korea was bequeathed a divided fatherland with no experience of managing a modern nation state. In a national territory devastated by fratricidal war, haunted by the looming threat of further war, and with virtually no indigenous capital, Koreans achieved both the most rapid economic and political development in the world.⁷

By 1990, Cho was describing a “Korea in Crisis” due to a newly ascendant left. “The 1988 Seoul Olympics,” writes Cho, “laid bare the great potential of Korea but quickly vanished like a flash of light. As soon as the temporary political reprieve passed, Korea was once again caught up in the furor over Fifth-Republic corruption, labor-management disputes, and the emergence of the Chusap’a.”⁸ Over the course of the democratic transition, then, Cho became disappointed in the squabbling opposition and apprehensive about the general direction of Korean society, particularly the emergence of an openly radical left.

This apprehension coincides with another important turn in Cho’s career at this time, namely, the sudden emergence in 1989 of North Korea as one of the most important subjects of his writing.⁹ The closest Cho had

⁷ Cho Kapche, “Han’guk sahoe ūi ‘munhwa taehyŏngmyŏng’: Kaltŭng kwa yokku ūi taep’okpal sok e kaehyŏk seryŏk i chudokwŏn ūl chabŭn Han’guk sahoe nŭn ōdi ro ka ko inna?” [Korean society’s “great cultural revolution”: Whence Korean society now that reformers have taken power amid an explosion of conflict and appetites?], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (February 1989), 223–224:

해방후 한국현대사를 ‘오욕의 역사’, 그 시대의 언론을 ‘권력의 시녀’라고 표현하는 것이 유행어가 되고 있다....

실제는 어떤가. 1945 년의 출발선에서 우리보다 훨씬 앞에 있었던 멕시코, 브라질, 아르헨티나, 필리핀, 태국, 중국 등은 1989 년 현재 경제나 정치면에서 한국보다 훨씬 처져 있다. 한국은 봉건시대에서 바로 식민통치로 넘어가는 바람에 근대국가의 경영경험을 갖지 못한 채 분단된 조국을 넘겨 받았다. 동족상잔의 전란으로 폐허가 된 국토에서, 전쟁의 위협이 지속되고 있는 상황에서, 민족자본이 거의 없는 조건에서, 한국인들은 세계에서 가장 빠른 고도성장과 정치발전을 동시에 이룩하였다.

Cho also adds a quote by an anonymous economist. “One economist has also stated: ‘Abroad, Korea’s achievements are evaluated as a monumental accomplishment of contemporary world history. Every Korean alive today is a hero, and this era should be called an age of heroes.’” Ibid., 224: 한 경제학자는 “외국에서는 한국의 성취를 현대 세계사의 금자탑으로 평가하고 있다. 오늘을 사는 한국민은 모두 영웅이며, 이 시대는 영웅시대여야 마땅하다.”...고 말하기도 했다.

⁸ Cho Kapche, “1990-nyŏndae ūi wigi kudo: Han’guk, ch’immol inya pusang inya” [Crisis-structure of the 1990s: Will Korea sink or float?], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (January 1990), 156–157: 88 서울올림픽은 섬광처럼 한국의 위대한 잠재력을 순간적으로 노출시키는 데 그쳤다. 한국은 이 짧은 정치휴전이 끝나자 다시 5 공비리, 노사분규, 주사파 등장이란 복새통 속으로 들어갔다. “Chusap’a” refers to the *Chuch’e sasangp’a*, or “followers of Chuch’e thought.” See, for example, Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 139–142.

⁹ O Yŏnho, “Chŏngbo kigwan kwa kija: Cho Kapche wa Chŏng Hyŏnggŭn ūi kyŏngu” [An intelligence agency and a reporter: The case of Cho Kapche and Chŏng Hyŏnggŭn] *Mal* 150

come to reporting on North Korea previously had been a piece on the Rangoon bombing in 1983, but now appeared five articles in a single year.¹⁰ Particularly notable here was Cho's argument that North Korea was using democratization as a pretext to advance the cause of communist unification.¹¹ In the wake of the scandal over Kim Taejung's Peace Democratic Party (PDP; *P'yŏnghwa minju tang*) member Sŏ Kyŏngwŏn's secret visit to North Korea, he wrote the following:

The nation has been clamoring for the past month over Assemblyman Sŏ Kyŏngwŏn's secret visit to the North. This is because he snuck into Pyongyang and embraced Kim Il Sung.

[Reverend] Mun Ikhwan did the same thing last March to April, causing a fever in the political world that spread even to the two leaders of the opposition parties. Party leader Kim Yŏngsam's reception of an invitation to visit Pyongyang from North Korea's National Fatherland Peaceful Unification Committee Chairman Hŏ Tam in Moscow on June 6 and Hyundai Group Chairman Chŏng Chuyŏng's visit to the North early this year also caused a media furor.

Almost every big news story this year has been related to Pyongyang or Kim Il Sung. At one point, it was as if leaders of both the political opposition and

(December 1998), 73. Cho states in an interview, "For a while I thought there must also be some good aspects about North Korea. From 1988, as I began to approach North Korea factually, I realized what kind of place it was after meeting and talking with Kim Hyŏnhŭi. I naturally came to despise Kim Il Sung." O Tongnyŏl, "Kyŏktol int'ŏbyu: *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* Cho Kapche ŭi wihŏm han sosin; 'Nam-Buk taehwa to chot chiman Pukhan ŭi punggoe ka tŏ chotta'" [Combative interview: The dangerous conviction of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*'s Cho Kapche; "South-North talks are good but the collapse of North Korea would be better"], *Kil* 94 (April 1994), 115: "나도 한동안 북한이 좋은 면이 있지 않은가 하는 생각을 하고 있었는데 88년부터 북한을 사실로 접근하면서, 김현희를 만나서 이야기해보니까 이런 나라가 있었구나 하는 생각을 하게 되었다. 그러면서 자연히 김일성에 대한 증오심을 가지게 되었다."

¹⁰ Cho Kapche, "Unmyŏng nap'al sori: Pŏma Aung San kungnip myoso amsal p'okpal sakŏn" [A fated bugle call: Assassination incident at Burma's Martyr's Mausoleum for Aung San], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (November 1983): 76–93; Cho Kapche, "Kim Hyŏnhŭi nŭn mal handa (sang): 5-baek il e kŏlch'in Kim Hyŏnhŭi chŭngŏn" [Kim Kyŏnhŭi speaks, part one: Kim Hyŏnhŭi's testimony given over five hundred days], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (May 1989): 300–347; Cho Kapche, "Kim Hyŏnhŭi nŭn mal handa (chung): Kim Chŏngil chiryŏng ŭi naemak" [Kim Hyŏnhŭi speaks, part two: The behind-the-scenes story of Kim Chŏngil's order], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (June 1989): 302–331; Cho Kapche, "Kim Hyŏnhŭi nŭn mal handa (wan): Kukche kongchak chŏnsŏn ŭi nat kwa pam" [Kim Hyŏnhŭi speaks, conclusion: Days and nights on the frontline of international espionage operations], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (July 1989): 470–489; Cho Kapche, "An'gibu susa ŭi makhu: Sŏ Kyŏngwŏn mirip-Puk sakŏn susa rŭl tullŏsan kongan kigwan, yŏkwŏn, yadang, ŏllon ŭi sungappŭn umjigim ŭl ch'ujŏk handa" [Behind the scenes of an ANSP investigation: Tracing the chaotic movements of security agencies, ruling and opposition members, and journalists regarding the investigation of Sŏ Kyŏngwŏn's secret visit to North Korea], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (August 1989): 232–256; Cho Kapche, "Pak Ch'ŏrŏn, P'yŏngyang ch'ukchŏn ch'amgwan misŭt'ŏri" [Pak Ch'ŏrŏn, Pyongyang festival observance mystery], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (September 1989): 156–179. See also Cho Kapche and Chŏng Hosŭng, *Kim Hyŏnhŭi ŭi Hanŭnim* [Kim Hyŏnhŭi's God] (Seoul: Kosigye, 1990).

¹¹ Here Cho was echoing a common sentiment of conservatives at the time, as encapsulated in Yi Ch'ŏlsŭng's October 1987 inaugural speech for the Liberal Democracy Federation (*Chayu minju ch'ongyŏnmaeng*). See Nam Siuk, *Han'guk posu seryŏk yŏn'gu* [A study of conservatives in Korea] (Paju: Nanam ch'ulp'an, 2005), 479–480.

ruling party, including the president, were in competition with each other to meet with Kim Il Sung. It seems Kim Il Sung is in a position to throw South Korean society into disarray simply by meeting with and embracing South Korean officials. Behind the Sō Kyōngwŏn incident are none other than Kim Il Sung and Kim Chōngil, the overseers of espionage operations in the South.¹²

He added to this a warning not to underestimate North Korea; even while it had fallen greatly behind Korea economically, he argued, the Kim family was still confident in its ability to influence the South through its espionage operations.¹³

Cho particularly focused on one such operation among these articles, namely, the bombing of Korean Air flight 858 on November 29, 1987, killing 115 people. Kim Hyōnhŭi, one of the agents who planted the bomb, had caused a media sensation by defecting to South Korea after her capture. Cho saw in Kim an opportunity for a glimpse into the “real life” of North Korea and “psychology” of North Koreans. The key issue in this story, he claimed, was determining Kim Hyōnhŭi’s personal guilt despite her obvious brainwashing by and blatant worship of Kim Il Sung.¹⁴

A particularly notable feature of this new reporting on North Korea and its espionage operations in the South was how it reflected Cho’s access to the security establishment. His reporting on the Sō Kyōngwŏn incident, for example, focused on the internal operations of the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP; *Kukka anjŏn kihoeoku, An’gibu*) investigation,

¹² Cho Kapche, “An’gibu susa ūi makhu,” 232–233:

서경원 의원 밑 입북사건으로 온 나라가 근 한달 간 시끄럽다. 평양으로 몰려 들어가 김일성과 포옹하고 왔기 때문이다.

지난 3-4 월에는 문익환 씨가 같은 일을 했다가 두 야당 총재까지 몰려 들어가 정치권이 한바탕 열병을 앞섰었다. 지난 6 월 6 일에 모스크바에서 김영삼 총재가 북한의 허담 조국 평화 통일 위원회 위원장과 만나 평양방문 권고를 받은 것이 떠들썩하게 보도되었었고, 연초에는 정주영 현대그룹 명예회장이 북한을 방문, 뉴스거리를 제공하였다.

올해의 큰 뉴스는 거의가 평양이나 김일성과 관계가 있다는 얘기다. 한때는 대통령을 비롯한 여야의 정치지도자들이 김일성과의 회담에 경쟁이 붙은 것같은 모습을 보이기도 하였다. 김일성은 남한의 인사를 껴안고 만나주는 것만으로도 남한사회를 뒤흔들 수 있는 자리에 있는 셈이다. 서경원 의원 사건의 막후연출가야말로 대남공작의 2 대 주체인 김일성과 김정일인 것이다.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 236: 외교면이나 경제면에서 북한은 남한에 비해 크게 열세로 물리고 있지만 대남 심리전과 군사력에서 우월하다는 자신감으로 그런 약점을 극복하고 있는 것이 김 부자 체제이고, 이런 정치·군사적 우월감을 바탕으로 두 사람이 직접 사령탑이 되어 추진하고 있는 것이 남한 인사들을 끌어들이는 김일성 면담 공작이란 것이다.

¹⁴ Cho Kapche, “Kim Hyōnhŭi nŭn mal handa (chung),” 304.

and Kim Hyŏnhŭi was an ANSP detainee.¹⁵ This was related to an important—if not the most important—aspect of Cho’s turn toward North Korea in the 1980s, which was a newly forged relationship with the security establishment. Much has been made in this regard specifically of Cho’s association with ANSP agent Chŏng Hyŏnggŭn, which apparently began in 1986 after Cho was detained and questioned for writing an article on the history of American CIA operations in Korea.¹⁶ Chŏng Hyŏnggŭn was director of the Anti-Communist Investigation Unit (*Taegong susadan chang*) and in charge of questioning Cho.¹⁷ The following are his comments on the incident: “I talked with him and decided he was a person of sound judgement. I thought, ‘Here is a person who will write the truth about North Korea and the security situation on the Korean Peninsula given accurate information.’ From then on, I tried to properly inform Cho of the situation

¹⁵ The ANSP was the successor of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (*Chunggang chŏngbobu*, KCIA). It is currently known as the National Intelligence Service (*Kukka chŏngbowŏn*, *Kukchŏngwŏn*, NIS), which succeeded the ANSP through reforms carried out under Kim Taejung.

¹⁶ Specifically, the article focused on the personal details of the successive branch chiefs. Cho Kapche, “Han’guk nae ūi Miguk CIA: Han’guk hyŏndaesa ūi twiankil esŏ makkang han yŏnghyangnyŏk ūl haengsa hae on yŏktae chibujang 12-myŏng ūi iryŏksŏ” [The American CIA in Korea: The professional histories of twelve branch chiefs, who have exercised tremendous influence on contemporary Korean history behind the scenes], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (February 1986): 246–287. On Cho’s association with Chŏng Hyŏnggŭn, see, in particular, O Yŏnho, “Chŏngbo kigwan kwa kija,” 70–80. Cho sued *Mal* for libel over this article. The court eventually ruled in his favor, citing insubstantial evidence that Cho had received financial compensation for assisting Chŏng with his statement pertaining to the Yi Sŏnsil incident. Hwang Pangyŏl, “O Yŏnho wa Cho Kapche ka mannada” [O Yŏnho and Cho Kapche meet], *Midiŏ onŭl*, May 3, 2001, <http://www.mediatoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=13630>. *Mal* published a series of articles following up on the initial report and the ensuing legal battle. See O Yŏnho, “‘Cho Kapche nŭn An’gibu an’ga esŏ nawa hamkke susa palp’yomun sonbwatta’” [“Cho Kapche touched up the investigation statement with me at an ANSP safehouse”], *Mal* 151 (January 1999): 52–59; Pak Yŏngnyul, “Ōllon’gye simin tanch’e ‘Cho Kapche ūihok kyumyŏng’ han moksori” [Calls to investigate “allegations of suspicion against Cho Kapche” by a media civil society organization], *Mal* 151 (January 1999): 60–61; O Yŏnho, “Cho Kapche *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* p’yŏnjipchang ūi sosong naeyong kwa *Mal* ūi pallon: ‘Cho Kapche ssi ege ponaeŭn p’yŏnji’” [The content of *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche’s lawsuit and *Mal*’s objection: “A letter to Mr. Cho Kapche”], *Mal* 152 (February 1999): 92–101. See also Yi Chŏnghun, “Pan’gol kija ūi hyŏndaesa,” 52–56.

¹⁷ Yi mentions the speculation that Chŏng Hyŏnggŭn “struck” Cho, which both Cho and Chŏng deny. Yi Chŏnghun, “Pan’gol kija ūi hyŏndaesa,” 52, 54. In this respect, Cho Kapche is perhaps a candidate for what Kim Chŏngin describes as a typical case of rightward “conversion” going back to the colonial period, involving detainment, torture, and release on newfound “friendly” terms. See Kim Chŏngin, “Chŏnhyang uik punsŏk: ‘Puk’ e kŭn’gŏ han p’ŭreim kwa kwŏllyŏk yongmang” [Analysis of rightist converts: A frame based on the “North” and desire for power], *Munhwa kwahak* 91 (September 2017): 84–105.

on the Korean Peninsula, and this changed his thinking. He became ‘anti-Kim Il Sung.’”¹⁸

In any case, from 1989 onward, North Korea and North Korean “operations” (*kongjak*) in the South emerged as one of the defining features of Cho’s writing. Cho was promoted to editor-in-chief of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* in 1991, and the magazine became a powerful outlet for anti-North Korean discourse. A key development here was the 1992 defection of Kang Chŏrhwan from North Korea, who would later author the well-known exposé of North Korean prison camps, *The Aquariums of Pyongyang*.¹⁹ Also notable were articles on the “Yi Sŏnsil spy incident” and “Kimp’o tunnel” published in 1992, which alleged, just ahead of the presidential election, that an extensive spy ring was being run out of Cheju and that a North Korean tunnel had been dug all the way to Kimp’o Airport.²⁰ This kind of reporting helped to solidify support for Kim Yŏngsam and the

¹⁸ Yi Chŏnghun, “Pan’gol kija ŭi hyŏndaesa,” 54: “그와 이야기를 나누다 보니 그는 매우 판단이 정확한 사람이라는 생각이 들었다. 그래서 ‘이런 사람에게 북한의 실상과 한반도 안보상황은 정확히 알려주면 제대로 쓰겠구나’라는 생각을 했다. 그 후 나는 조갑제씨에게 한반도 상황을 제대로 알려주도록 했는데 이것이 그의 사상을 변하게 했다. 엔티 김일성이 된 것이다.” Cho Kapche briefly comments, “I never reveal my sources. He and I shared a national sensibility. We both believed the values of liberal democracy to be supreme.” Yi Chŏnghun, “Pan’gol kija ŭi hyŏndaesa,” 55: “내 취재원에 대해서는 절대 말하지 않겠다. 그는 나와 비슷한 국가관을 갖고 있었다. 우리는 자유민주주의적 가치관이 최고라는 생각을 공유했다.”

¹⁹ According to Yi Chŏnghun, since the support and demand for democracy had been a central issue for monthly magazines in the 1980s, the June 29 declaration led to a decline in magazine sales. Cho turned the attention of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* toward North Korea as a way of filling this issue vacuum, establishing human rights as the basic interpretive frame and particularly focusing on prison camps. Yi Chŏnghun, “Pan’gol kija ŭi hyŏndaesa,” 59–64. See, for example, Yi Tonguk, “Angma wa chiok, kŭrigo in’gan: Kŭ tŭl ŭn chugŏ to chiok e kaji annŭnda. Paro kŏgi ka chiok inikka” [The Devil, Hell, and a human being: They will not go to Hell when they die, because they are already there], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (June 1994): 642–645. See also Chol-Hwan Kang and Pierre Rigoulot, *The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag*, trans. Yair Reiner (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

²⁰ See Cho Kapche, “Kimp’o chiha saram moksori: Segyejŏgin Ilbon ūmyang chŏnmun’ga Sujŏk’i Mach’ŭmi paksa ŭi punsŏk” [Underground voices in Kimp’o: Analysis by world-renowned Japanese audio expert Dr. Suzuki Matsumi], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (December 1992): 28–34; Cho Kapche, “Pukhan kongjak ch’ongch’aek: Yi Sŏnsil yŏin ŭi chŏngch’e” [Director of North Korean espionage operations: The identity of Ms. Yi Sŏnsil], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (October 1992): 16–20; Cho Kapche, “An’gibu ŭi chŏngch’ikwŏn susa: Taesŏn chŏngguk ŭi noegwan, Chosŏn nodong tang susa ŭi chinhaeng panghyang” [The ANSP investigation of politicians: The direction of investigations of the detonator of the political situation surrounding the presidential election, the Korean Worker’s Party], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (November 1992): 100–103; Cho Kapche, “An’gibu susagwan kwa haedang chŏngch’in, kŏmsa wa pyŏnhosa turu int’ŏbyu: Kanch’ŏptan sakŏn kwa chŏngch’in” [Extensive interviews with ANSP investigators and relevant politicians, lawyers, and prosecutors: The spy ring incident and politicians], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (December 1992): 228–231.

newly united conservatives under the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP; *Minju chayū tang*) in the 1992 elections against the more liberal Kim Taejung.²¹ And it was with such coverage that the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* gained a reputation as South Korea's most conservative magazine.²²

The themes of disdain for the conservative (not to mention progressive) opposition and anticommunism that emerged in Cho's work in the late 1980s defined it moving forward. It is in this respect that Cho came to be considered a representative of the "old right." This change in political orientation, moreover, is important for understanding his extensive work on Park Chung Hee.

III. Cho Kapche and Park Chung Hee

Cho has composed several biographies on Park Chung Hee over the years. The first notable work is *Yugo!* (1987).²³ This was not a biography of Park, but it discussed many personal details. Its primary focus was Park's assassination and the Pusan-Masan demonstrations that unfolded over the final days of the Yusin era. Cho's earliest official biography of Park was *Pak Chŏnghŭi 1* (1992), the first of a planned multi-volume set never

²¹ O Yŏnho, "Chŏngbo kigwan kwa kija," 72–73.

²² Yi Chŏnghun, "Pan'gol kija ŭi hyŏndaesa," 64, 69–70.

²³ Cho Kapche, *Yugo! Pu-Ma sat'ae esŏ 10.26 chŏngbyŏn kkaji Yusin chŏngkwŏn ŭl punggoe sik'in hamsŏng kwa ch'ongsŏng ŭi hyŏnjang* [Deceased! On the scene of the shouts and gunfire that toppled the Yusin regime, from the Pusan-Masan affair to the October 26 coup d'état], 2 vols. (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1987). Namhee Lee translates *yugo* as "the posthumous work." Namhee Lee, "Social Memories of the 1980s: Unpacking the Regime of Discontinuity," in *Revisiting Minjung: New Perspectives on the Cultural History of 1980s South Korea*, ed. Sunyoung Park (USA: University of Michigan Press, 2019), 28. The title, however, is written not as 遺稿 but 有故, which can be translated as "accident" or perhaps "misfortune" (albeit used only in relation to a very important person); hence, the use of an exclamation point. That said, the word is somewhat ambiguous even in the original Korean. It seems the bereaved could not bring themselves to simply say "Park is dead," although this was probably also due to anxiety over reactions to such information. As Cho describes in another work, Park Chung Hee's first daughter (by his first marriage) Pak Chaeok was confused by the news of her father's "accident," wondering if perhaps he had been kidnapped or injured. It is not until an official categorically uses the word "deceased" (*sŏgŏ*) that she accepted he was dead. See Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndae-hwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ŭi pijang han saengae 1; Ch'oin ŭi norae* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 1; Song of the *Übermensch*] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1998), 263. Nevertheless, I translate *yugo* as "deceased."

completed.²⁴ He began anew in a 1998 multivolume biography, the well-known *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŏ ra* (hereafter *Nae mudŏm*).²⁵ Finally, he published a thirteen-volume biography of Park in 2006.²⁶

²⁴ In the preface, Cho mentions a planned five volumes. He also mentions the book was rushed to print due to pressure by the publishers eager to get the book to market, especially in Japan. Cho Kapche, *Pak Chŏnghŭi 1: Pulman kwa purun ūi sewŏl, 1917–1960* [Park Chung Hee, vol. 1: The years of discontent and misfortune, 1917–1960] (Seoul: Kkach'i, 1992), 5. In fact, the Japanese version came out first. See Chō Kapuchie, *Boku Seiki: Kankoku kindai kakumeigo no jitsuzō* [Park Chung Hee: A true depiction of the Korean modern revolutionary] (Tokyo: Aki shobō, 1991). It is interesting to note the Japanese version includes the term “modern revolutionary” in the title. Although Cho describes Park as a “revolutionary” in the book, he did not use it in the title until *Nae mudŏm*. See Cho Kapche, *Pak Chŏnghŭi 1*, 25. This could simply be the publisher's choice, but one might speculate it was also a calculation with respect to audience. Two other of Cho's early publications also found an audience in Japan. See Chō Kapuchie, *Kankoku o shinkan sa seta jū ichi-kakan* [Eleven days that shook Korea] (Tokyo: JICC shuppan kyoku, 1987); and Chō Kapuchie, *Kunika anzen kikakubu: Kankoku gendai-shi no kage no kenryoku!* [Agency for National Security Planning: The power in the shadows of contemporary Korean history!] (Tokyo: JICC shuppan kyoku, 1990).

²⁵ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm 1*; Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 2; Chŏnjaeng kwa sarang* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 2; War and love] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1998); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 3; Hyŏngmyŏng chŏnya* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 3; Revolution's eve] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1998); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 4; Kukka kaejo* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 4; National remodeling] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1999); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 5; Kim Chongp'il ūi ulbun* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 5; Kim Chongp'il's pent-up anger] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1999); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 6; Maengho nŭn kanda!* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 6; The fierce tigers go!] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 2001); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 7; Sŏngjang sok ūi kūnŭl* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 7; Shade amid growth] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 2001); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 8; Hanbando ūi chŏnun* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 8; War clouds over the Korean Peninsula] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 2001). This biography began as a serialized publication in the *Chosŏn ilbo* amid the “Park Chung Hee syndrome,” running from October 20, 1997 on an almost daily basis until December 30, 1999. The first and last article are as follow: Cho Kapche, “Che-1 pu: Ch'oehu ūi 24-sigan; (1) Hyojason, k'abin soch'ong, pyŏktol” [Part one: The final twenty-four hours, number one: Back scratcher, carbine rifle, brick], *Chosŏn ilbo*, October 20, 1997, 19; Cho Kapche, “Che-17 pu: Toyak ūi sidae; (15) Oe samch'on ūi chugŭm” [Part seventeen: Age of the takeoff, number fifteen: Death of a maternal uncle], *Chosŏn ilbo*, December 30, 1999, 21. The series then moved over to the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*, recommencing in the June 2000 and concluding in the February 2002 issues. The following are the first and last articles: Cho Kapche, “Che-19 pu: Kim Taejung ūl ūisik hagi sijak hada” [Part 19: Becoming aware of Kim Taejung], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (June 2000): 204–219; Cho Kapche, “Minjok ūi taesŏsasi: Pohang chonghap chech'ŏl kŏnsŏl; Pak T'aejun, Ilbon ūl sŏltŭk hada” [Epic of the nation; Construction of POSCO; Pak T'aejun persuades Japan],

Cho's scattered publications on Park Chung Hee can be traced to at least 1984, beginning with an article on the American plan to remove Rhee Syngman (Yi Sŭngman) involving Park Chung Hee and his friend and mentor General Yi Yongmun in a coup plot.²⁷ Cho would begin to publish

Wŏlgan Chosŏn (February 2002): 396–410. There does appear to be a missing volume 18 here, however. Regarding the “Park Chung Hee syndrome,” Chŏng Haegu provides the best account. He traces it to a March 1997 article in *Kodae sinmun*, the Korea University newspaper, in which students listed Park among historical figures they would like to “resurrect.” The results of the survey were picked up by the mainstream media and “remembering Park” soon became a pressing public issue. The sensation intensified with the publication of Kim Chŏngnyŏm’s latest memoirs and Yi Inhwa’s novelization of Park Chung Hee’s life. Chŏng Haegu, “Pak Chŏnghŭi sindŭrom ŭi yangsang kwa sŏngkyŏk” [Features and character of the Park Chung Hee syndrome], in *Pak Chŏnghŭi rŭl nŏmŏ sŏ* [Overcoming Park Chung Hee], ed. Han’guk chŏngch’i yŏn’guhoe (Seoul: P’urŭn sup, 1998), 51–71. See Kim Chŏngnyŏm, *A, Pak Chŏnghŭi: Kim Chŏngnyŏm chŏngch’i hoegorok* [Ah, Park Chung Hee: The political memoirs of Kim Chŏngnyŏm] (Seoul: Chugang M&B, 1997); and Yi Inhwa, *In’gan ŭi kil*, 3 vols. [Way of the human being] (Seoul: Sallim, 1998). Scholars tend to understand the “Park Chung Hee syndrome” as a response to the Asian Financial Crisis. Hyung-A Kim and Clark W. Sorensen, “Introduction,” in *Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961–1979: Development, Political Thought, Democracy, and Cultural Influence*, ed. Hyung-A Kim and Clark W. Sorensen (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011), 7–8; Guy Podoler, “‘Who Was Park Chung-hee?’ The Memorial Landscape and National Identity Politics in South Korea,” *East Asia* 33 (2016), 277; James B. Palais, “Democracy in Korea: An Optimistic View of Korea’s Democratic Development,” in *Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961–1979: Development, Political Thought, Democracy, and Cultural Influence*, ed. Hyung-A Kim and Clark W. Sorensen (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011), 108; Seungsook Moon, “The Cultural Politics of Remembering Park Chung Hee,” *The Asia Pacific Journal* 19, no. 5 (May 09, 2009), 3; Jung In Kang, *Contemporary Korean Political Thought and Park Chung-hee* (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017), xxii. Considering that Park Chung Hee nostalgia preceded and has outlasted the crisis, however, there is a need for research on Park Chung Hee nostalgia in general. On Park Chung Hee nostalgia before the financial crisis, see Chŏng Unhyŏn, “Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae ka kŭriun saram tŭl: Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’umo tanch’e ŭi hwaltong kwa sŏngkyŏk” [Those who miss the Park Chung Hee era: The activities and character of Park Chung Hee commemorative organizations], *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 23 (1993): 168–179; Chŏng Sangho, “Pak Chŏnghŭi sindŭrom ŭi chŏngch’ijŏk kiwŏn kwa kŭ silsang” [The political origins and true nature of the Park Chung Hee syndrome], in *Pak Chŏnghŭi rŭl nŏmŏ sŏ* [Overcoming Park Chung Hee], ed. Han’guk chŏngch’i yŏn’guhoe (Seoul: P’urŭn sup, 1998), 72–105; and Im Kyŏngsŏk, “Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae rŭl ponŭn nun” [Perspectives on the Park Chung Hee era], *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 74 (2009): 3–12.

²⁶ Cho Kapche, *Pak Chŏnghŭi: Han kŭndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga ŭi pijang han saengae* [Park Chung Hee: The resolute life of of a modernization revolutionary], 13 vols. (Seoul: Cho Kapche tat’ŏm, 2006). On his website, this is described as “Reporter Cho Kapche’s life’s work” (*Cho Kapche kija ŭi raip’ŭ wŏk’ŭ*). http://www.chogabje.com/shop/shop_viw.asp?sBidx=19.

²⁷ Cho Kapche, “Yi Sŭngman taet’ongnyŏng chegŏ kyehoek: 52-nyŏn 6-wŏl ch’o ŭi Yukpon simya hoeŭi [Plan to remove President Rhee Syngman: Midnight Army Headquarters meeting in early June 1952], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (June 1984): 251–281. See also Cho Kapche, *Chŏlmŭn kŏin ŭi ch’osang* [A portrait of a young giant] (Seoul: Saemt’ŏ kan, 1988). This content would also make it into later biographies. Yi Yongmun died not long after in a plane crash. Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch’im ŭl paet’ŏ ra* 3, 56–59.

on Park's assassination the following year and his biography in 1987.²⁸ This early work evinced a critical distance, markedly different from the hagiographic approach with which he is associated today. In other words, just as with the democratic opposition and North Korea, Cho also underwent a "turn" regarding Park Chung Hee.²⁹ Cho himself tends to explain this transition in terms of simple facts; he came to see Park more objectively through his research.³⁰ He likens Park to a "great tree that only grows bigger no matter how much it is cut."³¹

²⁸ Cho Kapche, "Kim Chaegyu wa Ch'a Chich'öl üi amt'u: Pu-Ma sat'ae rül chungsim üro han tu kwöllyökcha üi p'awö keim" [Kim Chaegyu and Ch'a Chich'öl's feud: A power game over the Pusan-Masan uprising], *Wölgan Chosön* (May 1985): 210–241; Cho Kapche, "Kim Chaegyu ch'oe hu üi nal: 'Yasu üi maüm üro Yusin üi simjang ül ssoatta' nün Kim Chaegyu üi sarhae simni" [Kim Ch'aegyu's final day: The psychology of Kim Chaegyu's murder, saying, "I shot the heart of Yusin with the mind of a wild beast"], *Wölgan Chosön* (June 1985): 350–401; Cho Kapche, "10.26 simya pisang kungmu hoeüi: Sin Hyönhwak chön ch'ongni, Kim Ch'iyöl chön pommu üi chüngön" [October 26 midnight emergency cabinet meeting: Accounts of former prime minister Sin Hyönhwak and minister of justice Kim Ch'iyöl], *Wölgan Chosön* (June 1985): 402–408; Cho Kapche, "Kim Chaegyu chaep'an üi twinmudae: 10.26 esö 12.12 kkaji üi him üi kongbaekki tak'yument'öri" [Backstage at Kim Chaegyu's trial: A documentary of the power vacuum from October 26 to December 12], *Wölgan Chosön* (July 1987): 294–325; Cho Kapche, "Manju esö tora oda" [Return from Manchuria], *Wölgan Chosön* (January 1987): 222–254; Cho Kapche, "Purun kwa pulman üi kyejöl" [Season of misfortune and discontent], *Wölgan Chosön* (February 1987): 354–383; Cho Kapche, "Panjöng chakchön üi chwajöl" [Failed restoration], *Wölgan Chosön* (November 1987): 448–479. As Yi Chönghun notes, this reporting was part of a "magazine renaissance" (*chapchi rünesangsü*) in the 1980s in which monthlies like the *Wölgan Chosön* and *Sindonga* gathered a mass readership by digging up heretofore unknown details of Park Chung Hee and the Park Chung Hee era. Yi Chönghun, "Pan'gol kija üi hyöndaesa," 51. See also Cho Kapche, *Yugo!*; and Cho Kapche, *Pak Chönghui* 1.

²⁹ Yi Chönghun, "Pan'gol kija üi hyöndaesa," 48–49.

³⁰ Kim T'aejin and Ch'ae Ryöng, "'Irül ke kajang manün Kim Chöngil ün chönmyönjön mot'ae... Küröna chönjaeng chunbi haeya" [Kim Chöngil, who has the most to lose, cannot afford an all-out war... But we have to prepare for war], in *Hanbando üi modün kwöllyök e tojön hae on 'pan'gol kija' Cho Kapche: Int'öbyu moüm*; Chungang ilbo, *Sindonga*, KBS, MBC, *Yahu*, *Paek Chiyön* ["Contrarian reporter" Cho Kapche who has challenged all powers on the Korean Peninsula: Collected interviews; *Chungang ilbo*, *Sindonga*, KBS, MBC, Yahoo, and Paek Chiyön], ed. Cho Kapche *tatk'öm* (Seoul: Cho Kapche *tatk'öm*, 2010), 178–180. This interview originally aired on *Yahu! Show* [Yahoo! Show], "'Isyu meik'ö' Cho Kapche rül chikchöp mannada!" [Meeting "issue maker" Cho Kapche directly], May 24, 2010.

³¹ Kim Chonghyök, "'Kungmin ül soginün köi ro mök ko sanün saram tül i nömu mant'a'" ["There are too many people making a living off of lying to the people"], in *Hanbando üi modün kwöllyök e tojön hae on 'pan'gol kija' Cho Kapche: Int'öbyu moüm*; Chungang ilbo, *Sindonga*, KBS, MBC, *Yahu*, *Paek Chiyön* ["Contrarian reporter" Cho Kapche who has challenged all powers on the Korean Peninsula: Collected interviews; *Chungang ilbo*, *Sindonga*, KBS, MBC, Yahoo, and Paek Chiyön], ed. Cho Kapche *tatk'öm* (Seoul: Cho Kapche *tatk'öm*, 2010), 126: 아무리 깎아 내려도 커지기만 하는 거목. This interview between *Chungang ilbo* culture and sports editor Kim Chonghyök and Cho Kapche was originally published as "Chwau kükhan taegyöl, haeböp ül mutta / öllonin Cho Kapche" [Asking about the way to resolve the extreme conflict between left and right: Journalist Cho Kapche],

Scholars have especially emphasized *Nae mudŏm* as watershed in Cho's career. Kang Chunman, Yun-gi Hong, and Chin Chunggwŏn, for example, decried Cho's transition from investigative reporter to "novelist," "deification" of Park Chung Hee, and "fascism" at the time.³² And Chŏn Chaeho particularly notes a dramatic shift in Cho's work between *Yugo!*

Chungang ilbo, August 7, 2009. The metaphor here is that Cho had first set out to "cut down" Park with his reporting, only to discover this was impossible.

³² Kang Chunman, "'Pak Chŏnghŭi sindŭrom' ŭl haebu handa" [Diagnosing the "Park Chung Hee syndrome"], *Inmul kwa sasang* (February 1999), 31, 29; Yun-gi Hong, "Park Chung-hee in the Age of Democratization: A Critical Analysis of Deification Discourse on Park Chung-hee," in *Developmental Dictatorship and the Park Chung-hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea*, ed. Byeong-cheon Lee, trans. Eungsoo Kim and Jaehyun Cho (Paramus, New Jersey: Homa & Seka Books, 2006), 315; Chin Chunggwŏn, "Chugŭn tokchaeja ŭi sahoe: Pak Chŏnghŭi sindŭrom ŭi chŏngsin punsŏkhak" [The dead dictator's society: A psychoanalysis of the Park Chung Hee syndrome], in *Kaebal tokchae wa Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae: Uri sidae ŭi chŏngch'i kyŏngjejŏk kiwŏn* [Developmental dictatorship and the Park Chung Hee era: The political-economic origins of our times], ed. Yi Pyŏngch'ŏn (P'aju: Ch'angbi, 2003), 339–364. In a similar vein, sociologist Seungsook Moon regards Cho's biography as an example of a hagiographic representation of Park Chung Hee. Moon, "The Cultural Politics of Remembering Park Chung Hee," 5, 26n27, 26n34. Meanwhile, the biography is also well cited in scholarship on Park Chung Hee and the Park Chung Hee era. Chong-Sik Lee compliments the extensive use of primary sources and Carter Eckert describes this "fascinating multi-volume work" as "an essential source for anyone working on the person or the period." Chong-Sik Lee, *Park Chung-Hee: From Poverty to Power* (Seoul: Kyung Hee University Press, 2013), xi; Carter Eckert, *Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 6. Yu Sangsu, who rejects Cho's "excessively positive" view of Park, nevertheless concedes its basis in a vast number of sources. Yu Sangsu, "'Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae' yŏn'gu wa nonjaeng" [Research on and debates about the Park Chung Hee era], *Hansŏng sahak* 27 (2012), 125. And political scientist and fellow Park Chung Hee biographer Chŏn In'gwŏn goes as far as to declare obsolescent all biographies of Park prior to Cho's. He especially compares Cho's work with that of Chŏng Chaegyŏng, evaluating the former as superior, if not without shortcomings. Chŏn In'gwŏn, *Pak Chŏnghŭi p'yŏngjŏn* [A critical biography of Park Chung Hee] (Seoul: Ihaksa, 2006), 398. See also Chŏng Chaegyŏng, *Han minjok ŭi chunghŭng sasang: Pak Chŏnghŭi taet'ongnyŏng ŭi chŏngch'i ch'ŏrhak* [The restoration thought of the Korean nation: The political philosophy of Park Chung Hee] (Seoul: Silla ch'ulp'ansa, 1979); Chŏng Chaegyŏng, *Pak Chŏnghŭi sasang sŏsŏl: Hwiho rŭl chungsim ŭro* [Introduction to the thought of Park Chung Hee: Focusing on his writings] (Seoul: Chimmundang, 1991); Chŏng Chaegyŏng, *Wiin Pak Chŏnghŭi* [Great man Park Chung Hee] (Seoul: Chimmundang, 1992); Chŏng Chaegyŏng, *Taet'ongnyŏng ŭi kyŏngje ridŏsip* [The economic leadership of the president] (Seoul: Han'guk kyŏngje sinmunsa, 1994); Chŏng Chaegyŏng, *Pak Chŏnghŭi sil'gi: Haengjŏk ch'orok* [A factual record of Park Chung Hee: A summary of his accomplishments] (Seoul: Chimmundang, 1994). Hyung-A Kim provides an account of Park Chung Hee's life that, while brief, is probably the best biography of Park Chung Hee available in English. Hyung-A Kim, *Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961–79* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 13–31. The only full-length biography in English is Chong-Sik Lee's, but this focuses only on Park's life only during the colonial period. Much biographical information can also be found in Carter Eckert's work (also limited to the colonial period).

and *Nae mudŏm*.³³ I would emphasize a much greater gap between *Yugo!* (1987) and *Pak Chŏnghŭi I* (1992). Although not without sympathy, Cho harshly judges Park in the former work. He emphasizes his lack of philosophy, for instance, and discusses his increasing drinking and womanizing toward the end of his life. Descriptions of Park as a “revolutionary,” moreover, are conspicuously lacking.³⁴ Above all, Cho portrays Park Chung Hee’s historical legacy in *Yugo!* as something to be overcome, expressing his hope of a way forward through the democratization movement.

On November 3, 1979, the day President Park Chung Hee’s body was interred in the military cemetery, a newspaper ran the headline, “Taking with Him an Era into History.” Eight years later, however, Park Chung Hee is still a “reality,” not “history.”... We remain in the shadow of Park Chung Hee and October 26....

The democratization movement is a struggle to escape this shadow. Only when the people escape it—in other words, when the first step toward democratization has been taken, allowing them to choose their government—may they look upon Park Chung Hee squarely, with a calm mind and cool head.³⁵

Cho revisited this theme of democratization and historical interpretation in *Pak Chŏnghŭi I*, this time with a marked pessimism.³⁶ Where he was hopeful about the future he is now disappointed, and where he was bitter about the past he is now triumphal.

The situation that has unfolded since June 1987 has allowed for a somewhat clearer view of Park Chung Hee. With the presidency before them, Kim Yŏngsam and Kim Taejung made the foolish error, laughable even to a child, of running against each other. The inauguration of the No T’aeu administration, ruckus over Fifth Republic corruption, and eruption of society’s appetites in 1988 revealed that democracy too is not without its flaws, that human beings are

³³ Chŏn Chaeho, *Pandongjŏk kŭndaejuŭija Pak Chŏnghŭi* [Reactionary modernizer Park Chung Hee] (Seoul: Ch’aek sesang, 2000), 140.

³⁴ Cho refers to May 16 as the “5.16 kŏsa” (May 16 revolt). He even encloses the term *choguk kŭndaeŭhwa* (fatherland modernization) in quotations. Cho Kapche, *Yugo!* vol. 1, 9–58, especially 57–58, 42.

³⁵ Cho wrote this introduction in June 1987. Cho Kapche, *Yugo!* vol. 1, 3, 6:

1979년 11월 3일 고 박정희 대통령의 육신이 국군묘지에 묻히던 날, 어느 신문은 “한 시대를 이끌고 역사 속으로”라는 제목을 달았다. 그러나 8년이 지난 지금도 박정희는 아직 ‘역사’가 아니고 ‘현실’이다.... 우리는 지금도 박정희와 10.26의 그늘 아래에 있다....

오늘날 민주화운동은 박정희의 그늘로부터 벗어나려는 몸부림인 것이다. 그늘에서 뛰쳐나와야, 즉 국민이 정권을 선택할 수 있게 되는 민주화의 첫걸음이 내디딘 뒤에라야 사람들은 박정희를 차분한 마음과 냉정한 머리로써 찬찬히 바라볼 수 있을 것이다.

³⁶ Cho’s newfound respect for Park Chung Hee is enthusiastically summed up in an opening essay, “Park Chung Hee in my life” (*Nae sam sok ŭi Pak Chŏnghŭi*). Cho Kapche, *Pak Chŏnghŭi I*, 11–26. Whereas Cho thought Park philosophically bankrupt in 1987, he now celebrates his “samurai-like view of life and death” and constant deep thinking about the nation’s fate. Cho Kapche, *Pak Chŏnghŭi I*, 22–23.

fundamentally selfish, and that the democratic liberty championed by politicians is different on the interior from the exterior. As heroic champions of democracy revealed themselves shameful incompetents and supposed devils revealed a sympathetic side, my perception of the past and Park Chung Hee brightened, and the people's historical consciousness and judgement of character matured.

Meanwhile, amid the great transition begun in 1989 with the collapse of communism, we came to view Park Chung Hee from yet another perspective. Judging a little more objectively the situations he faced, people he had to deal with, and worries that beset him, we came to ask the question, "If I had been Park Chung Hee at the time, would I have made a different choice?"

Lenin, Nasser, Ayub Khan, Castro, Ceaușescu, Kim Il Sung..... These names that once offered a new model of national development and inspired a revolutionary passion among the people of the Third World have wavered, crumbled, and been trampled on, but the name of Park Chung Hee takes on an ever clearer meaning as it passes through this transition. The phrase "Park Chung Hee's top pupil is Deng Xiaoping" no longer sounds like a joke. We came to realize, the basic institutions and material foundation of the land upon which we stand were mostly established under Park Chung Hee. We came to realize that most of the glory we enjoy and problems over which we worry are the legacy of Park Chung Hee. The Park Chung Hee era was neither purely an age of glory, as regime-sponsored scholars might have had it, nor of disgrace, as some scholars claim. It was an age of glory and disgrace, but one in which glory outweighed shame.³⁷

All the elements of Cho's transition from progressive to conservative are highlighted in this passage—his disappointment with democracy, disdain for North Korea, and newfound respect for Park Chung Hee. What is also particularly notable, however, is an emphasis on the end of the Cold War. Cho's admiration for Park is thus colored by a shifting understanding of the history of the twentieth century, in which there are clear "successes" and

³⁷ Ibid., 19–20:

1987년 6월 사태 뒤의 사태 발전은 박정희를 보는 눈을 다소 맑게 해주었다. 정권을 눈앞에 두고 김영삼과 김대중은 어린 아이도 웃을 동시 출마란 바보짓을 감행하였다. 1988년 노태우 정권의 출범과 5공비리 소동, 그리고 사회의 욕구 분출은 민주화가 진전진미한 것만은 아니며 인간은 기본적으로 이기적이고 정치인들이 말하는 민주화 자유는 겉과 속이 다르다는 것을 알게 하였다. 영웅적인 민주 투사가 치졸한 무능력자임이 판명되고 악인으로만 알려져 있었던 사람에게서도 이해할 만한 구석이 있음을 알게 되면서, 과거를 보는 그리고 박정희를 보는 나의 눈도 밝아지게 되었고 국민들의 역사의식이나 인물관도 성숙해지게 되었다.

그리고 1989년부터 시작된 공산주의 붕괴의 대전환기에서 우리는 또 다른 시각에서 박정희를 이해할 수 있게 되었다. 그가 처했던 상황, 그가 상대해야 했던 사람들, 그의 고민들을 좀더 냉정하게 판단하면서 "내가 그때 박정희였다면 다른 선택이 있었을까" 하는 자문도 할 수 있게 되었다.

레닌, 낄셋, 아유브 칸, 카스트로, 차우셰스쿠, 김일성..... 한때 국가 발전의 새 모델을 제시하고 제 3 세계 사람들 속에서 혁명적인 열정을 불러일으켰던 이름들은 무너지고 깃뚫히고 흔들렸지만 박정희란 이름은 이런 전환기를 거치면서 더욱 뚜렷한 의미로서 드러나고 있다. '박정희의 수제자는 등소평이다'라는 말도 이제는 우스개처럼 들리지 않는다. 우리가 딛고 있는 이땅의 이 제도와 이 물질적 토대가 대부분 박정희 시대에 그 틀이 짜여진 것임을 깨닫게 되었다. 우리가 누리고 있는 영광과 우리가 고민하고 있는 문제점의 대부분이 박정희의 유산이었음을 알게 되었다. 박정희 시대는 어용학자들의 표현처럼 영광의 시대만도 아니었고 일부 지식인의 비난처럼 오욕의 시대만도 아니었다. 그것은 영광의 시대였으되 영광이 오욕을 덮고도 남을 만한 시대였다.

“failures.” This perception would also feature prominently in the conflict over historical interpretation that erupted not long after Cho’s publication of his first biography of Park.

IV. Cho Kapche and the Memory Wars of the Early 1990s

While Korea’s “history wars” are generally considered to have arisen after the emergence of the New Right in 2004, in many ways they rehash the conflict that erupted in 1993.³⁸ Kim Yöngsam enjoyed an unprecedented level of popularity at this time. In a *Tonga ilbo* survey, teenagers selected him as Korea’s number-one “star,” ahead even of popular singer Sö T’aeji and Olympic gold medalist Hwang Yöngjo.³⁹ Yet his presidency was characterized by significant tension. On the one hand, he declared his the “civilian government” (*munmin chöngbu*), signifying a rupture with the past. Vowing to “set history straight” (*yöksa paro seugi*), he announced plans to demolish the Government-General Headquarters and reform education, enlisting the *minjung* historian Sö Chungsök in the plan for contemporary history, whereby events such as the April 3 Cheju Uprising,

³⁸ See, especially, Pak T’aegyun, “Segyehwa sidae Han’gukchökh inyönm chihyöng üi kiwön: T’allaengjön sigi chönhu yöksa insik pyönhwa rül chungsim üro” [Origins of the Korean ideological terrain in the globalization era: Changes in historical perceptions around the end of the Cold War], in *T’allaengjönsa üi insik: Segyehwa sidae Han’guk sahoe üi munje üisik* [Perceptions of post-Cold War history: Critical awareness in Korean society in the globalization era], ed. Pak Inhwí et al. (P’aju: Han’gilsa, 2012), 495–524; Yi Sinch’öl, “T’alsingmin.t’alnaengjön.minjujuüi e taehan tojön, ‘Nyu rait’ü Han’guksa kyogwasö” [A challenge to the postcolonial, post-Cold War, and democracy: The “New Right” *Korean History* textbook], *Yöksa munje yön’gu* 30 (2013): 7–50; Yi Sinch’öl, “Han-Il yöksa kyogwasö nonjaeng üi haebu handa” [Analyzing the Korea-Japan textbook disputes], in *Chaengchöm Han’guksa: Hyöndae p’yön* [Issues in Korean history: Contemporary history], Pak T’aegyun, Yu Chia, Chöng Pyöngjun, Kim T’aeu, Hong Söngnyul, Han Honggu, O Cheyön, and Yi Sinch’öl (P’aju: Ch’angbi, 2017), 251–277; Kim Chöngin, *Yöksa chönjaeng, kwagö rül haesök hanün ssaum* [History war: A fight over interpretation of the past] (Seoul: Ch’aek sesang, 2016); and Chöng Yonguk, “Han’guk üi yöksa kaltüng kwa kwagösa chöngni: Mugün kaltüng üi sohwan in’ga sae chöngch’esöng hyöngsöng üi chint’ong in’ga” [Korea’s historical disputes and settlement of the past: Revival of old disputes or growing pains of new identity formation?], *Yöksa hakpo* 249 (March 2021): 1–41. If there is a key event dividing the 1993 historiographical conflict from that after 2004, it would be the inauguration of the textbook approval system in 2003.

³⁹ Chöng Sangho, “Pak Chönghui sindürom,” 83, 83n22. Chöng cites the survey as appearing in the April 18, 1993 edition of the *Tonga ilbo*

October Taegu Uprising, April 19 Revolution, and May 16 coup d'état were treated as requiring revision. He also replaced the unitary government-mandated history textbook system with a pluralist approval system (eventually implemented in 2003).⁴⁰ On the other hand, Kim was still very much tied to the past through his alliance with No T'aeu and Kim Chongp'il. This tension came to a head at a press conference marking one hundred days since Kim's inauguration. When a reporter pressed Kim for his opinion on Park Chung Hee, he declared, once and for all, "I think May 16 was clearly a coup d'état. It was a major cause of historical regression."⁴¹

Cho Kapche fired back in the pages of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* later that year, calling for "reconciliation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Yŏngsam."⁴² The article provoked a forceful response, with critics accusing Cho of exceeding his mandate as a journalist, purposefully seeking to obstruct reform, and even threatening Korea's yet fragile democracy. Yet some welcomed an alternative to the *minjung* historiography ascendant in academia since the 1980s and poised for institutionalization through Kim Yŏngsam's proposed educational reforms.⁴³ Cho's article thus provoked a public debate over history.

⁴⁰ Yi Sinch'ŏl, "T'alsingmin.t'allengjŏn.minjujuŭi," 9–11; Yi Sinch'ŏl, "Han-Il yŏksa kyogwasŏ nonjaeng," 256. Furthermore, toward the end of his term, Kim initiated prosecution against the former presidents Chŏn Tuhwan and No T'aeu. See Chŏng Yonguk, "Han'guk ŭi yŏksa kaltŭng," 10.

⁴¹ Hwang Hŏn, "Kim Yŏngsam taet'ongnyŏng, 5.16 k'udet'a ro kyuŏng" [President Kim Yŏngsam defines May 16 as a coup d'état], *MBC nyusŭ*, June 3, 1993, https://imnews.imbc.com/replay/1993/nwdesk/article/1756021_30684.html: 5.16 은 분명히 쿠데타라고 생각합니다. 우리의 역사를 얼마나 후퇴시킨 하나의 큰 시작이었다고 생각합니다. See also Sŏ Pomi, "Yŏksa paro seugi" [Setting history straight], *Han'gyŏre*, November 23, 2015, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/718694.html.

⁴² Cho Kapche, "Pak Chŏnghŭi wa Kim Yŏngsam ŭi hwahae: Kim Yŏngsam taet'ongnyŏng ŭi yŏksagwan munje" [Reconciliation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Yŏngsam: The problem with President Kim Yŏngsam's view of history], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (November 1993): 104–127.

⁴³ Sŏ Chinyŏng, for example, published an explicit reply to Cho's articles in the following issue of *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* arguing that Cho's logic allowed for the rationalization of authoritarianism in general, not just that of Park Chung Hee, and that the article represented a blatant attempt to stymie the reform efforts of the recently inaugurated Kim Yŏngsam government. Sŏ Chinyŏng, "Wŏlgan Chosŏn 11-wŏl ho 'Pak Chŏnghŭi wa Kim Yŏngsam ŭi hwahae' e iŭi itta: 'Pan'gachyŏkchŏk sago' rŭl kyŏnggye handa" [An objection to "Reconciliation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Yŏngsam" in the November edition of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*: Beware "anti-reform thought"], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (December 1993): 221–225. Ko Sŏngguk wrote a series on Cho with a similar emphasis on the "reactionary"

Such historiographical disputes had been building since the 1980s, symbolically encapsulated in the *Han'guk minjungsa* incident. In February 1987, the government banned the book *Han'guk minjungsa*, which adopted a critical perspective of Korean history all the way up to the Kwangju uprising, and arrested those involved in its publication. Among its various claims, it was asserted that Park Chung Hee's May 16 "revolution" was in fact little more than a "coup d'état" carried out by soldiers trained at Japanese military academies. The ensuing trial dramatically overlapped with the June 29 declaration, reportedly provoking an abrupt attitudinal change among the prosecutors, who now acknowledged the historical subjectivity of the *minjung*. The trial offered publicity to the book, and it became a bestseller.⁴⁴ As critical historiography found new outlets in various newly founded journals, newspapers, and magazines and in

(i.e., anti-reform) nature of the article. I shall list only those articles pertaining to Cho's historical writing here: Ko Sŏngguk, "Cho Kapche pujang, wae tangsin küi i munje in'ga" [Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche, why are your articles a problem?], *Kil* (June 1994): 80–91; Ko Sŏngguk, "Cho Kapche pujang ūi Pak Chŏnghŭiron ūl haebu handa (1): 'Hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi' puhwal ūn sangŏpchŏk sŏnjŏngjuŭi wa ūi kyŏlt'ak iŏtta" [Analyzing Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche's Pak Chŏnghŭi, part 1: The resurrection of the "revolutionary Park Chung Hee" was a commercialist, sensationalist plot], *Kil* (July 1994): 48–69. Journalist Yi Chŏnghun notes that the October 29 edition of the *Chosŏn nobo*, a bulletin for the *Chosŏn ilbo* company labor union (*Chosŏn ilbo sa nodong chohap*), carried an article censuring Cho Kapche for exceeding the bounds of proper journalism. See Yi Chŏnghun, "Pan'gol kija ūi hyŏndaesa: 65. Pak T'aegyŭn describes the article as a "bible" for conservative historiography. Pak T'aegyŭn, "Yŏksa kyogwasŏ kukchŏnghwa nonjaeng" [Debate over the nationalization of history textbooks], in *Nonjaeng ūro ingnŭn Han'guk hyŏndaesa* [Reading contemporary Korean history through the debates], Kim Hogi and Pak T'aegyŭn (Seoul: Medich'i midŏ, 2019), 290. Chŏng Yonguk describes the article as representative of the *Chosŏn ilbo*'s attempts to reinterpret contemporary history in the 1990s. Chŏng Yonguk, "Han'guk ūi yŏksa kaltŭng," 21n35.

⁴⁴ The two-volume book published the previous fall involved future prominent historians such as To Chinsun and Han Honggu. The trial began later that year, on May 29, involving such prominent activists as Pak Wŏnsun as defense lawyers. Historian Kang Man'gil was also called upon as a witness in the trial. According to the *Kyŏnggyang sinmun*, this incident "occupied a monumental position among the countless examples of publication suppression throughout the 1980s." "Sillok minjuhwa undong 77: 'Han'guk minjungsa' sakŏn" [Record of the democratization movement, part seventy-seven: The *Han'guk minjungsa* incident], *Kyŏnggyang sinmun*, November 14, 2004. <https://www.khan.co.kr/article/200411141731091>. See also Pak Ch'ansŭng, "Pundan sidae Namhan ūi Han'guk sahak" [Korean historiography in division-era South Korea], in *Han'guk ūi yŏksaga wa yŏksahak (ha)* [Korea's historians and historiography, vol. 2], Cho Tonggŏl, Han Yŏngu, and Pak Ch'ansŭng (P'aju: Ch'angbi, 1994), 350–351; and Han'guk minjungsa yŏn'guhoe, ed., *Han'guk minjungsa* [History of the Korean *minjung*], 2 vols. (Seoul: P'ulpit, 1986).

universities after 1987, *minjung* historiography ascended in academia and the public imagination.⁴⁵

Cho's accusation that Kim Yöngsam subscribed to such a "*minjung* view of history" echoed the anxieties expressed by conservatives amid the transition to democracy, opening state power to competition and debate. The opposition took control of the National Assembly through the April 1988 general election and called for investigation into the corruption of the Chöon Tuhwan government.⁴⁶ And the movement to "know North Korea" (*Pukhan paro algi*) arose as prominent student activists and assemblymen made clandestine visits to North Korea.⁴⁷ Adjusting to these new

⁴⁵ See Yonung Kwon, "Korean Historiography in the 20th Century: A Configuration of Paradigms," *Korea Journal* 40, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 33–53; Pak T'aegyün, "Han'guk hyöndaesa yön'gu üi ch'ui wa chaengchönm" [Trends and debates in contemporary Korean history research], in *Han'guksa yön'gu 50-nyön* [Fifty years of Korean history research], ed. Ihwa yöja taehakkyo Han'guk munhwa yön'guwön (Seoul: Hyeon, 2005), 384–385; Pak T'aegyün, "Segyehwa sidae Han'gukchök inyönm chihyöng," 495–524; Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung*, 1–20; Baek Yung Kim, "Korean Studies between the Social Sciences and Historical Studies: Debates over Modern and Contemporary History," *Korea Journal* 51, no. 3 (Autumn 2011): 104–139; Won Kim, "Changes in the 1980s Nationalist *Minjung* Academic Communities and the Alternative Academic Communities," *Korea Journal* 51, no. 3 (Autumn 2011): 140–168; and Kim Chöngin, *Yöksa chönjaeng*, 203–206. Intellectual historian Yun Köñch'a describes the 1980s as an "age of revolution" (*hyöngmyöng üi sidae*). Yun Köñch'a, *Hyöndaes Han'guk üi sasang hürüm*, 31. Important forerunners for this kind of critical historiography were Kang Man'gil, *Pundan sidae üi yöksa insik: Kang Man'gil saronchip* [Historical understanding of the age of division: A collection of the historical essays of Kang Man'gil] (Seoul: Ch'angjak kwa pip'yöngsa, 1978); Song Köñho, *Haebang chönhusa üi insik*; and Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981). Important publications that followed were Kuro yöksa yön'guso, ed., *Paro ponün uri yöksa* [Our history seen firsthand], 2 vols. (Seoul: Körm, 1990); Pak Segil, *Tasi ssünün Han'guk hyöndaesa* [Rewriting contemporary Korean history] (Seoul: Tolbegae, 1993); Yun Taewön, *Il hanün saram üi wihan Han'guk hyöndaesa* [Contemporary Korean history for the workers] (Seoul: Körm, 1990); and Kang Man'gil, *Koch'ö ssün Han'guk hyöndaesa* [Rewritten contemporary Korean history] (Seoul: Ch'angjak kwa pip'yöng, 1994).

⁴⁶ These demands snowballed into the Kwangju hearings (*Kwangju ch'öngmunhoe*) that began following the conclusion of the Olympics in October later that year. The hearings were televised and garnered ratings even higher than the Olympics, stirring among the public the desire for historical justice. Chöng Yonguk, "Han'guk üi yöksa kaltüng," 9.

⁴⁷ See Pak T'aegyün, "Segyehwa sidae Han'gukchök inyönm chihyöng," 506–511; Yi Haengsön, "1988–1994-nyön Pukhan pangmun'gi wa tae-Bukkwan: Pukhan paro algi undong – Kim Il Sung samang" [Travel diaries on visits to North Korea between 1988 and 1994 and views of North Korea: From the Know North Korea movement to Kim Il Sung's death], *Han'guk munhak yön'gu* 64 (2020): 325–363; Yi Chehun, "P'yöngyang ch'ukchön üi Im Sugyöng kwa Pak Ch'örön, kürgo Kukka poanpöp" [Im Sugyöng and Pak Ch'örön of the Pyongyang festival and the National Security Law], *Han'györe*, December 6, 2021, <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/1022176.html>.

circumstances, conservatives began a “rally of the right” (*uik ch’onggwŏlgi*). New Democratic Party member Yi Ch’ŏlsŭng formed the Liberal Democracy Federation (*Chayu minju ch’ongyŏnmaeng*) in October 1987. He warned in his inaugural speech that Kim Il Sung was using democratization as a pretext to press for communist unification and that “pro-communist forces” (*yonggong seryŏk*) were growing like “poison mushrooms” (*tok pŏsŏt*). Conservative intellectual and Academy of Korean Studies professor Yang Tongan echoed this sense of crisis in the August 1988 edition of *Hyŏndae kongnon*, in which he asked, “Is the right dead?” Conservative periodicals *Han’guk nondan* and *Mirae Han’guk* were also founded at this time. Meanwhile, as I discuss above, Cho Kapche and the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* began to report on the “reality” of North Korea. With this rally, and especially with the three-party merger of 1990, forming the DLP, conservatives manage to regain control of the National Assembly as well as the presidency. This shaky alliance, however, became strained with Kim Yŏngsam’s election.⁴⁸ And it is in this context that Cho wrote his admonition of Kim’s view of history.

In this article, Cho points out several of Kim’s problematic historical perceptions—for example, his plan to demolish the former Government-General Headquarters—but his primary grievance is of course Kim’s denial of the historical significance of Park Chung Hee. In contrast to Kim’s narrative weaving together the March First Movement, April Revolution, May 18 Kwangju Uprising, and June Uprising, Cho asserts a progression from the independence movement, anticommunist nation founding, the Korean War, and economic development to democratization.⁴⁹ In effect, these are two different histories, one highlighting progress through popular struggle and the other through

⁴⁸ Nam Siuk, *Han’guk posu seryŏk yŏn’gu*, 479–480; Pak T’aegyun, “Segyehwa sidae Han’gukchŏk inyŏm chihyŏng,” 512–513; Pak T’aegyun, “Segyesajŏk chŏnhwan’gi,” 133–166. See also Yang Tongan, “Uik ūn chugŏnnŭn’ga?” [Is the right dead?], *Mirae Han’guk*, May 30, 2016, <http://www.futurekorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=31706>. First published in *Hyŏndae kongnon* (August 1988).

⁴⁹ Cho Kapche, “Pak Chŏnghŭi wa Kim Yŏngsam ūi hwahae,” 104–126, especially 108–110.

modernization. Much has been made of this point in the literature on conservative historiography.⁵⁰ While this is an undoubtedly important aspect—and this emphasis on Korean history as fundamentally a story of gradual progress is a foundational part of conservative historiography—I would like to highlight the layered character of Cho’s narrative. At one level, Cho argued that a modernization narrative of contemporary Korean history was more “factual” than one of struggle, but at another, he argued it was simply more useful.

Cho begins his critique of Kim Yöngsam’s view of history by attacking it as “unscientific,” citing various statistics pertaining to Korea’s economic growth during the Park era.⁵¹ He then describes a “general principle of world history” that changes in ideological superstructure follow from changes in material substructure. It is not Marx (or even Rostow, for that matter) whom he quotes in this regard but Machiavelli. “Whereas it has been observed by the Magnificent and Exalted Signors that all republics which in times past have preserved and increased themselves have always had as their chief basis two things, to wit, justice and arms, in order to restrain and to govern their subjects, and in order to defend themselves from their enemies.”⁵² Just as “justice” is established on the basis of “arms,” argues Cho, so is democracy established on the basis of economic development. He refers to the Soviet Union and the Philippines as examples of countries that tried to pursue justice and strength

⁵⁰ Pak T’aegyun also implies the links between this stagist perspective and Pak Seil’s later well-known conceptualization of nation-founding—industrialization—democratization—advancement (*kön’guk—sanöphwa—minjuhwa—sönjinhwa*). Pak T’aegyun, “Segyehwa sidae Han’gukchök inyöm chihyöng,” 512–513; Pak T’aegyun, “Yöksa kyogwasö kukchöngghwa nonjaeng,” 290–291. See Pak Seil, *Taehan min’guk sönjinhwa chölyak* [Strategy for the advancement of the Republic of Korea] (Paju: 21-segi puksü, 2006). Chöng Yonguk also emphasizes Cho’s portrayal of the “legitimate lineage” of the South Korean state. Chöng Yonguk, “Han’guk üi yöksa kaltüng,” 21.

⁵¹ Cho Kapche, “Pak Chöngghüi wa Kim Yöngsam üi hwahae,” 108.

⁵² Niccolo Machiavelli, “A Provision for Infantry [A selection from the Preamble],” in *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others*, vol. 1, trans. Allan Gilbert (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 3. For Cho’s quotation, see Cho Kapche, “Pak Chöngghüi wa Kim Yöngsam üi hwahae,” 114: 역사에 남을 정도의 국가라면 두 가지 요소에 기반을 두어야 정책을 추진할 수 있다. 그것은 정의와 힘이다. 정의는 국내에 적을 만들지 않기 위해서, 힘은 국외의 적을 막기 위해서 필요한 것이다. Cho does not cite the quotation, but I believe this to be the correct one.

simultaneously and Korea and China as examples of countries that prioritized strength over justice.⁵³

Cho's packaging of a rather blatant regurgitation of modernization theory as a piece of philosophical wisdom from Machiavelli is rather curious. Perhaps this was a rhetorical strategy to frame his claim as a "perennial truth." In any case, when read against the second part of Cho's critique of Kim Yŏngsam, Machiavelli's presence makes more sense. This time, Cho quotes from *The Prince*.

A prince should concentrate on avoiding everything that may make him hated or despised. As long as he has done that, he will have executed his duty and will encounter no risk from his other infamous deeds. As I have mentioned, what makes him particularly hated is being predatory and pre-emptory toward the property and the women of his subjects: he must keep himself away from these. Whenever they are not deprived of their property or their honor, most men remain satisfied; a prince has to contend only with the ambition of a few, which can easily be curbed in a variety of ways. He arouses contempt if he is considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, or indecisive.⁵⁴

Calling on Machiavelli once again, Cho warns Kim that his negative historical perceptions and combative policies jeopardize his popularity. And here emerges arguably the true significance of the essay, which is less about a "general principle of world history" than historiography as public relations. In this respect, the article is written in very much the same spirit as that of *The Prince*.

This point becomes clearer by considering Cho's admiration for Deng Xiaoping.⁵⁵ Kim and Deng are comparable, says Cho, because Deng was a victim of Mao just like Kim was of Park. Yet Deng ultimately chose to venerate Mao for pragmatic reasons. At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, on June 27,

⁵³ Cho Kapche, "Pak Chŏnghŭi wa Kim Yŏngsam ŭi hwahae," 114.

⁵⁴ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. James B. Atkinson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2008), 287. For Cho's quotation, see Cho Kapche, "Pak Chŏnghŭi wa Kim Yŏngsam ŭi hwahae," 125:

군주제에 있어서 가장 피해야 할 것은 (국민들로부터) 증오심을 사는 것과 경멸당하는 것이다. 증오는 국민의 사유물에 손을 댔을 때 일어난다. 동서고금을 통해서 인간은 재산과 명예만 빼앗기지 않으면 대체로 큰 불만 없이 살아간다. 경멸은 군주가 경박하고 번덕장이며 여성적이고 소심하며 결단력이 부족할 때 발생한다.

⁵⁵ The two historical figures Kim is not to learn from are Krushchev and Gorbachev, who supposedly undermined their own legitimacy by criticizing their own predecessors.

1981, the CCP officially adopted a positive appraisal of Mao's legacy, which can be found in "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China." Cho describes this document as a "model" for judging contemporary history. He mentions that a Korean translation was published under the title *Chǒngt'ong Chungguk hyǒndaesa* (Official contemporary Chinese history) in 1990 and that reading it left with him with a "solemn feeling" (*sugyǒn han nŭkkim*).⁵⁶ The evaluation of Mao can be summed up as follows:

Comrade Mao Zedong was a great Marxist and a great proletarian revolutionary, strategist and theorist. It is true that he made gross mistakes during the "cultural revolution", but, if we judge his activities as a whole, his contributions to the Chinese revolution far outweigh his mistakes. His merits are primary and his errors secondary. He rendered indelible meritorious service in founding and building up our Party and the Chinese People's Liberation Army, in winning victory for the cause of liberation of the Chinese people, in founding the People's Republic of China and in advancing our socialist cause. He made major contributions to the liberation of the oppressed nations of the world and to the progress of mankind.⁵⁷

A key phrase in this passage is "his merits are primary and his errors secondary." One many recall how Cho wrote in *Pak Chǒnghŭi 1* that the Park Chung Hee era was "one of both glory shame but in which glory outweighed shame."⁵⁸ Viewed in this context, however, the statement appears less about the content of the Park era and more a political formula.⁵⁹ What is important are not the historical details but the final judgement, which, for practical reasons, must be positive. This sentiment is also palpable in the closing paragraph of Cho's article.

At a Kwanhun Club debate ahead of the election last year, candidate Kim received a question on historically evaluating Kim Il Sung, he who commanded the North Korean spy that killed his mother. Kim Yǒngsam answered prudently, he would "defer evaluation." Kim Yǒngsam plausibly possesses a murderous

⁵⁶ Cho Kapche, "Pak Chǒnghŭi wa Kim Yǒngsam ŭi hwahae," 110.

⁵⁷ "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," June 27, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, translation from the *Beijing Review* 24, no. 27 (July 6, 1981): 10–39, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121344>.

⁵⁸ Cho Kapche, *Pak Chǒnghŭi 1*, 20: 영욕의 시대였으되 영광이 오욕을 덮고도 남을 만한 시대였다.

⁵⁹ The concept is Gaetano Mosca's. As N. Jayapalan writes, "In every society the ruling elite tries to find a moral and legal basis for survival. Such a basis is provided by the political formula. Mosca uses the terms political formula to a set of doctrines and beliefs propagated by the ruling elites. The political formula may not embody absolute truth. It may even be a myth." N. Jayapalan, *Comprehensive Modern Political Analysis* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2002), 156.

hatred [of Kim Il Sung] in his heart, yet he made this politically calculated remark. There is no reason why such political calculation cannot be extended to Park Chung Hee. Instead of rupture with the past, reconciliation with Park Chung Hee may symbolically signify “rupture with struggles over the past.” President Kim may then turn the direction of the nation and concerns of the people toward the future, the world, the economy, and science. Might not this be the social change desired by the people and the philosophical basis for a great transformation in state administration?⁶⁰

In sum, Cho presents a narrative of gradual progress that is also reconciliatory, where each generation has a role to play; to Rhee Syngman fell the task of anticommunist nation-building, to Park and Chōn the task of economic development, and to No and Kim the task of democratization. The underlying principle here is that democracy can only be achieved on the foundation of a sound economy. Even if the authoritarianism and oppression of the past were unjust, then, they were necessary on the journey to the present. As is revealed in the article’s primary focus, however, the truth of the past is less important than conveying a certain narrative to the public. True or not, Cho implies, affirmation of the past is prudent for a leader seeking to consolidate his power, especially in a period of uncertain transition—even more so for one such as Kim Yōngsam, who has tied his political fate to the old regime.⁶¹ In this regard, Cho’s treatment of history corresponds to Machiavelli’s treatment of religion. As philosopher and theorist of the right James Burnham writes, “Machiavelli believes that religion is essential to the well-being of a state. In discussing religion, as in discussing human nature, Machiavelli confines himself to political function. He is not engaged in theological dispute, nor inquiring whether religion, or some particular religion is true or false, but trying to estimate the role that religious belief and ritual perform in politics. He is analyzing, we might say

⁶⁰ Cho Kapche, “Pak Chōnghŭi wa Kim Yōngsam ūi hwahae,” 127: 지난해 대통령 선거기간 중 관훈클럽 토론회에서 김후보는 자신의 어머니를 살해한 북한간첩의 수령 김일성에 대한 역사적 평가를 질문받고 ‘평가를 유보하겠다’는 신중한 답변을 한 적이 있다. 내심으로는 죽이고 싶도록 밟겠지만 정치적으로서 그런 말을 한 것으로 이해되었다. 그런 정치적 고려를 박정희에게 못할 이유도 없다. 박정희와의 화해는 과거와의 단절이 아니라 ‘과거사 논쟁과의 단절’이란 상징적 의미가 있다. 김대통령은 그런 뒤 국가의 진로와 국민의 관심을 미래와 세계로, 경제와 과학으로 돌려 놓을 수 있을 것이다. 이것이 많은 국민들이 바라는 사회분위기의 일신, 그리고 국정 대전환의 철학적 기초가 아닐까.

⁶¹ In this respect, Cho’s article can be read as more threat than advice.

in a general sense, ‘myth,’ and myth he finds to be politically indispensable.”⁶²

This emphasis on the management of public opinion neatly ties Cho’s article to the spirit of the “rally of the right” inaugurated in the late 1980s, which sought a new, more persuasive approach to governance appropriate to the democratic era.⁶³ Drawing on post-Cold War triumphalism, Cho turned this rally toward history. Cho’s second point—that contemporary Korean history should be treated as a story of success in public discourse—would be one around which conservatives could unite, especially against a critical left, and it would draw together otherwise very different interests and personalities. Cho’s first point, however—about the actual content of this narrative—would serve as a space for ongoing intra-conservative conflict.

V. Conclusion

With his challenge to Kim Yöngsam over historical interpretation in 1993, Cho Kapche initiated a public debate over history that would continue into the 2000s, culminating in “history wars.” At the heart of these disputes was the question of whether Korean history should be narrated as a story of

⁶² James Burnham, *The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom* (New York: The John Day Company, 1943), 66. Historian of political theory Maurizio Viroli also points out Machiavelli’s recognition of the “rhetorical power of history,” that is, “the idea that history is not only a source of political wisdom which helps to understand what should be done, but also incites men to do what should be done.” Maurizio Viroli, *Machiavelli* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 111. The so-called “double truth doctrine” may also be relevant here. Historian and philosopher of science Steve Fuller writes describes the double truth doctrine as “Plato’s original idea that social order is maintained by the promulgation of two truths, one for the elites who determine the rule of the games and one for the masses who obey the rules.” Steve Fuller, *Post-Truth: Knowledge as a Power Game* (London, UK: Anthem Press, 2018), 185. For more on the double-truth doctrine, see Martin Pine, “Double Truth,” in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, vol. 2, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973), 31–37; and Malcolm Schofield, “The Noble Lie,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic*, ed. G.R.F. Ferrari (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 138–164.

⁶³ Jang-Jip Choi’s (Ch’oe Changjip) point about “the substitution of the authoritarian state by the press” is relevant here. Jang-Jip Choi, *Democracy After Democratization: The Korean Experience* (Stanford, California: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Books, 2012), 177–179.

success or, if not outright failure, serious failings. This was the context out of which New Right historiography emerged.

Cho Kapche's journey from progressive to conservative is an important part of this story. He was a champion of justice and human rights up until around the 1980s, when he turned this focus toward North Korea. Around this time, he developed a pessimism about democracy in the wake of the two Kims' division in the 1987 elections and was drawn closer to the security establishment through reporting on North Korea. His 1993 article synchronized with the "rally of the right" initiated amid the democratic transition, which sought a new, intellectually and public-relations-driven approach to consolidating the power of the conservative establishment. In this article, Cho raised the agenda of persuading the public that Korean history was generally a story of success. While conservatives agreed on this point, however, they differed over the precise content of this story. New Right historiography was also colored by this aspect of intra-conservative conflict. Indeed, as I will show in the following chapters, New Right historiography itself revealed such internal conflict.

Chapter 3.

In Search of a Third Way:

Kim Iryōng's Reappraisal of Park Chung Hee

I. Introduction

In this chapter, I focus on the work of political scientist Kim Iryōng. In response to Cho Kapche's 1993 *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* article and the conflicts over memory and historiography it provoked, Kim proposed a third way between what he saw as overly critical and commendatory appraisals of Park Chung Hee. This third way, I argue, would eventually crystallize in the New Right. Along the way, however, Kim would become increasingly critical of the left, and the resulting emphasis on Korean history as a "story of success" would ostensibly blur the line between his "third way" and the historiography of established conservatives like Cho Kapche.

II. The Life and Work of Kim Iryōng

Among New Right members, Kim Iryōng (b. 1960) belonged to a relatively small group of scholars, also including An Pyōngjik and Yi Yōnghun, who completed their entire education in Korea.¹ Unlike An and Yi, however, Kim was also a member of the "386 generation" shaped by the tide of "revisionism" (*sujōngjuŭi*) sweeping through Korean universities in the 1980s.² He graduated from Sungkyunkwan University, majoring in

¹ Examples include Chŏn Insang, Kang Kyuhyōng, Kim Yōngho, Pak Chihyang, Yu Yōngik, Yi Inho, Pak Hyojong, and so forth. The *Kyōnghyang sinmun*'s map of Korean intellectuals, which I mention in chapter two regarding Cho Kapche, groups New Right scholars in the lower right quadrant (post-nationalist right). Kim's specific grouping with Chŏn Insang, Pak Chihyang, and Pak Hyojong especially highlights his character as a domestically educated scholar. Chang Kwansun, "Minjuhwa 20-nyŏn, chisigin ūi chugŭm 1(2): Chigŭm, kŭ tŭl ūn ōdi e sŏ inna" [Twenty years since democratization, the death of intellectuals: Where do they stand now?], *Kyōnghyang sinmun*, April 25, 2007, 4–5. The diagram can also be found in *Kyōnghyang sinmun t'ŭkpyŏl ch'wijaet'im, Minjuhwa 20-nyŏn, chisigin ūi chugŭm* [Twenty years of democratization: The death of the intellectual] (Seoul: Tosŏ ch'ulp'an humanit'asŭ, 2008), 49.

² Kim Yōngho writes, "Many young scholars like Kim Iryōng and I were baptized in revisionism in research on contemporary Korean history in our university days.

political science, in 1983 and completed his master's thesis in 1985, the focus of which was the "state derivation debate" (*Staatsableitungs-debatte*).³ In his PhD thesis, completed in 1991, he turned toward the Rhee Syngman (Yi Sŭngman) administration and an analysis of its behavior in terms of international regime theory.⁴ Here also began his interest in the

Nevertheless, I think Professor Kim Iryōng's intellectual courage and scholarly accomplishments were a great help in overcoming this." Kim Yōngho, "Ko Kim Iryōng kyosunim yōngjōn e" [In honor of the late Professor Kim Iryōng], in *Kōn'guk kwa puguk: Yi Sŭngman.Pak Chōnghŭi sidae ūi chaechomyōng* [Founding a nation and enriching a nation: Shedding new light on the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee eras], Kim Iryōng (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2010), 483; 김 교수님과 저를 비롯한 수많은 젊은 학자들이 대학시절 한국현대사 연구에서 수정주의의 세례를 받았음에도 불구하고 이를 극복해낸 데에는 김 교수의 지적 용기와 뛰어난 연구 성과의 도움이 매우 컸다고 생각합니다.

³ This was a debate between Marxists in 1970s West Germany attempting to "logically derive the essence of the modern capitalist state." Matthias Dapprich, "The Historical Development of West Germany's New Left from a Politico-Theoretical Perspective with Particular Emphasis on the *Marxistische Gruppe* and Maoist *K-Gruppen*" (PhD diss., University of Glasgow, 2013), 42. See also Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 128–152. Judging from Kim's master's thesis, it seems he was also proficient in German. He includes a German-language abstract and cites many German sources. One may speculate that this was related to his interest in Marxist theory. It seems he was also proficient in Japanese, as many Japanese sources are also cited. See Kim Iryōng, "Kukka toch'ul nonjaeng: Kŭ sōngkwa wa munjechōm mit haegyōl palsang" [The state derivation debate: Its fruits, problems, and a proposed solution] (Master's thesis, Sōnggyun'gwan taehakkyo taehagwōn, 1985). See also Kang Kyuhyōng, "Ch'umosa: Kūdae nŭn kŭ saram ūl kajōnnŭn'ga? Kim Iryōng kyosu rŭl ponamyō" [Eulogy: Doth thou have that one? Bidding farewell to Professor Kim Iryōng], in *Kōn'guk kwa puguk: Yi Sŭngman.Pak Chōnghŭi sidae ūi chaechomyōng* [Founding a nation and enriching a nation: Shedding new light on the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee eras], Kim Iryōng (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2010), 473.

⁴ In addition to contemporary history, Kim's other scholarly interests include the history of Korea's foreign relations, the East Asian political and economic development model, and international relations theory. Kang Kyuhyōng, "Ch'umosa," 476. Kim's doctoral thesis advisors were Yun Kŭnsik and Chang Ŭlbyōng. Kim Iryōng, "Yi Sŭngman t'ongch'igi chōngch'i ch'eje ūi sōngkyōk e kwanhan yōn'gu" [A study on the character of the political regime under Yi Sŭngman] (PhD diss., Sōnggyun'gwan taehakkyo, 1991). An overview of Yun Kŭnsik's scholarly background and a list of his works can be found in Yun Kŭnsik, ed., *Hyōndae kukche chōngch'iron: Kukche kwan'gye ūi chōngch'i kyōngjahak* [Theory of contemporary international politics: The political economy of international relations] (Seoul: Taewangsa, 1991), i–xviii. Parts of chapter six in Kim's dissertation focus on the land reforms, Korean War, and Pusan Political Crisis, respectively. Notably, his dissertation went beyond the liberation period and the Korean War and into the 1950s. He continued to insist throughout his career that the 1950s are overlooked in historical research. See, for example, Kim Iryōng, "'Yi Sŭngman sujōngjuŭi' e taehan sujōng" [A revision of "Rhee Syngman revisionism"], *Han'guk hyōndaesa yōn'gu ch'anggan ho* (1998), 384. This article is a review of Yi Chōngwōn, *Higashijia reisen to Kan-Bei-Nichi kankei* [The Cold War in East Asia and Korea-USA-Japan relations] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shubbansha, 1996). See also Kim Iryōng, "Pusan chōngch'i p'adong ūi chōngch'isajōk ūimi" [The significance of the Pusan Political Crisis for political history], *Han'guk kwa kukche chōngch'i* 9, no. 1 (1993): 31–66; Kim Iryōng, "Nongji kaehyōk, 5.30 sōn'gō, kŭrigō Han'guk chōnjaeng" [The land reforms, May 30 election, and Korean War], *Han'guk kwa kukche chōngch'i* 11, no. 1 (1995): 301–335; Kim Iryōng, "Yi Sŭngman taet'ongnyōng kwa kūndae kungmin kukka ūi kōnsōl" [President Rhee Syngman and the construction of a modern nation state], in *Han'guk*

liberation era, land reforms, Korean War, and 1952 Pusan Political Crisis (*Pusan chŏngch'i p'adong*), which would carry through his career. Kim remained a professor in the Department of Political Science at Sungkyunkwan University until he passed away in 2009.⁵

In his dissertation, Kim is clearly sympathetic to a “revisionist” perspective of the liberation period. He engages with rather than rejecting outright, as he later would, the historical perceptions of *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik* (Understanding history before and after liberation).⁶ He is also

Hyŏndaesa: Chinsil kwa haesŏk [Contemporary Korean history: Truth and interpretation], ed. Chŏn Sangin (P'aju: Nanam ch'ulp'an, 2005), 13–62; Kim Iryŏng, “Chŏnsi chŏngch'i chaejomyŏng: Pusan chŏngch'i p'adong ūi tach'awŏnsŏng e taehan pokhapchŏk ihae” [A reconsideration of wartime politics: A complex understanding of the multidimensionality of the Pusan Political Crisis], in *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi chaeinsik* 2 [A new understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 2], ed. Pak Chihyang et al. (Seoul: Ch'aek sesang, 2006), 215–257; Kim Iryŏng, “Nongji kaehyŏk ūl tullŏssan sinhwa ūi haech'e” [Dissolution of myths surrounding the land reforms], in *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi chaeinsik* 2 [A new understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 2], ed. Pak Chihyang et al. (Seoul: Ch'aek sesang, 2006), 295–343; Kim Iryŏng, “Yi Sŭngman chŏngbu ūi sanŏp chŏngch'aek kwa rent'ŭ ch'ugu kŭrigo kyŏngje palchŏn” [The Rhee Syngman government's industrial policy, rent-seeking, and economic development], *Segye chŏngch'i* 8, no. 2 (2007): 171–202; Kim Iryŏng, “Taehan min'guk kŏn'guk ūi yŏksajŏk kwajŏng” [The historical process of the founding of the Republic of Korea], in *Taehan min'guk kŏn'guk 60-nyŏn ūi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of the sixty years since the founding of the Republic of Korea], ed. Kim Yŏngho (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2008), 39–73; Pak Chihyang and Kim Iryŏng, “Taehan min'guk kukka mandŭlgi wa kŭ ūiui: Indo wa ūi pigyo” [The making of the nation of the Republic of Korea and its significance: A comparison with India], in *Taehan min'guk kŏn'guk ūi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of the founding of the Republic of Korea], ed. Yi Inho, Kim Yŏngho, and Kang Kyuhyŏng (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2009), 695–723. A purportedly complete list of Kim Iryŏng's works is included in Kim Iryŏng, *Han'guk hyŏndaeh chŏngch'isaron* [History of contemporary Korean politics], ed. Kim Tojung (Seoul: Nonhyŏng, 2011), 484–495. The list is inflated, however, with many edited volumes to which Kim contributed listed twice, once with Kim as “co-author” (*kongjŏ*) in the “books” section and again in the “articles” section. Some of the dates also appear to be incorrect.

⁵ His scholarly credentials also include fellowships with the Harvard-Yenching Institute and Kyushu University Department of Law. Kang Kyuhyŏng, “Ch'umosa,” 473; <https://www.harvard-yenching.org/person/kim-il-young>. Incidentally, Kim was a Yenching Fellow at precisely the same time Cho Kapche was a Niemann Fellow at Harvard.

⁶ He supports the expanded conceptualization of the liberation period from 1945–1948 to 1945–1953, which appeared in later volumes, but argued for a more precise periodization of 1945–1952, which would better encapsulate the decisive events that would shape Korean history going forward. Kim Iryŏng, “Yi Sŭngman t'ongch'igi chŏngch'i ch'eje,” 100–101. See Song Kŏnho et al., *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik* [An understanding of history before and after liberation] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1980); Kang Man'gil et al., *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik* 2 [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 2] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1985); Pak Hyŏnch'ae et al., *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik* 3 [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 3] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1987); Ch'oe Changjip et al., *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik* 4 [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 4] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1989); Kim Namsik et al., *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik* 5 [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 5] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1989); Pak Myŏngnim et al., *Haebang*

notably sympathetic to Bruce Cumings.⁷ The same can more or less be said for Kim's other works on contemporary history at this time.⁸ In one such work, he portrays the April Revolution as yet "unfinished" and emphasizes the "anti-minjung-ness" (*panminjungŏng*) of the May 16 coup d'état that brought an end to the Second Republic inaugurated through the April Revolution.⁹ Prior to finishing his PhD, he also published several works on Marxist state theory¹⁰

chŏnhusa ūi insik 6 [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 6] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1989).

⁷ Contrasting with his later emphasis on Cumings' negative influence on Korean historiography, here he simply refers to Cumings as a valuable source. In addition, he cites other "revisionists" such as John Merrill and Gabriel Kolko. See, for example, Kim Iryŏng, "Yi Sŭngman t'ongch'igi chŏngch'i ch'eje," 100, 100n8, 166, 171n142.

⁸ Kim Iryŏng, "4.19 hyŏngmyŏng ūi chŏngch'isajŏk ūimi" [The political-historical significance of the April 19 revolution], in *Hyŏndaesa rŭl ottŏk'e pol kŏt in'ga 3* [How to think about contemporary history, vol. 3], ed. Tonga ilbosa chosa yŏn'gusil (Seoul: Tonga ilbosa, 1990), 87–112; Kim Iryŏng, "Pusan chŏngch'i p'adong," 31–66; Kim Iryŏng, "Nongji kaehyŏk," 301–335.

⁹ Kim Iryŏng, "4.19 hyŏngmyŏng," 87–89.

¹⁰ Kim's early work can be largely divided into works pertaining to Marxism and state theory, contemporary history (with overlap between these first two categories), and translations. First, Marxism and state theory: Kim Iryŏng, "Kukka toch'ul nonjaeng"; Kim Iryŏng, "Kŭrisŭ e issŏ sŏ chŏngch'i ch'eje ūi pyŏndong kwa minjuhwa ūi chŏnmang" [Changes in the political regime and the outlook for democratization in Greece], *Sahoe kwahak* 27, no. 2 (1988): 95–127; Kim Iryŏng, "Marŭk'ŭsŭjuŭi wa chŏngch'aek" [Marxism and policy], in *Hyŏndae sasang kwa chŏngch'aek* [Contemporary thought and policy], ed. Sŏnggyŭn'gwan taehakkyo sahoe kwahak yŏn'guso (Seoul: Taeyŏng munhwasa, 1989), 101–149; Kim Iryŏng, "Pokchi kukka wa chŏngch'i" [The welfare state and politics], in *Chŏngch'ihak kangjwa 1: Hyŏndae chabonjuŭi chŏngch'i iron* [Lecture in political science, no. 1: Political theory of contemporary capitalism], ed. Han'guk chŏngch'i yŏn'guhoe (Seoul: Paeksan sŏdang, 1989), 201–222; Kim Iryŏng, "Marŭk'ŭsŭjuŭi chŏngdang nonŭi" [The Marxist debate over political parties], *Chung-So yŏn'gu* 14, no. 2 (1990): 187–218; Kim Iryŏng, "Han'guk kukka sŏngkyŏk nonŭi e kwanhan pangbŏmnonjŏk chaego: Kukka e kwanhan kijon nonŭi tŭl ūi ch'usang sujun kubun munje rŭl chungsim ūro" [A methodological reconsideration of the debate over the character of the South Korean state: Focusing on the problem of differentiation at the abstract level in existing debates regarding the state], *Kyŏngje wa sahoe* 17 (1993): 195–250; Kim Iryŏng, "Kyegŭp kujo, kukka, chŏnjaeng kŭrigo chŏngch'i palchŏn: B. Moore t'eje ūi Han'guk chŏgyong kanŭngsŏng e tachan yebijŏk koch'al" [Class structure, the state, and war and political development: A preliminary analysis of the applicability of Barrington Moore's thesis to the Korean case], *Han'guk chŏngch'ihak hoebo* 26, no. 2 (April 1993): 215–239; Kim Iryŏng, "Kukka iron kwa Han'guk kukka yŏn'gu ūi tonghyang kwa chŏnmang: Ch'usang sujun kubun munje rŭl chungsim ūro" [State theory and trends and prospects in research on the South Korean state: Focusing on the problem of differentiation at the abstract level], in *Sahoe kwahak ūi tonghyang kwa chŏnmang* [Trends and prospects in social science], ed. Sŏnggyun'gwan taehakkyo sahoe kwahak yŏn'guso (Seoul: Hanul, 1994), 59–125. See also Kim Iryŏng, "Chungguk kongsanjuŭi ūi palsaeng kwa chŏn'gae: Mo T'aektong sidae" [The emergence and development of Chinese communism: The Mao Zedong era], in *Maksŭjuŭi wa minjujuŭi* [Marxism and democracy], ed. Yun Kunsik, Kim Iryŏng, and Pak Hyŏngjung (Seoul: Sŏnggyun'gwan taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 1996), 294–334; Kim Iryŏng, "Segi ūi chŏnhwan'gi ūi chabonjuŭi insik kwa kukka: Chojikhwa toen chabonjuŭiron kwa tokchŏm

Like many scholars on the New Right, not to mention Cho Kapche, Kim underwent a change in political orientation following democratization in 1987 and the collapse of socialism in 1989–1991.¹¹ In his case, this

chabonjuũiron” [Perception of capitalism and the capitalist state at the turn of the century: The theories of organized capitalism and monopoly capitalism], in *Maksũjuũi wa minjuũi* [Marxism and democracy], ed. Yun Kunsik, Kim Iryõng, and Pak Hyõngjung (Seoul: Sõnggyun’gwan taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1996), 103–157; Kim Iryõng, “Hyõndae chabonjuũiron ũi chejoryu: Hugi chabonjuũi, (t’al)chojikhwa toen chabonjuũi, kukka tokchõm chabonjuũi kũrigo p’osũt’ũ P’odũjuũi” [The currents in contemporary theory of capitalism: Late capitalism, (post-)organized capitalism, state-monopoly capitalism, and post-Fordism], in *Maksũjuũi wa minjuũi* [Marxism and democracy], ed. Yun Kunsik, Kim Iryõng, and Pak Hyõngjung (Seoul: Sõnggyun’gwan taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1996), 158–190. Each of these articles is a revised version of articles published between 1988 and 1991. Yi ũnbong and Kim Iryõng, “Chungguk kongsanjuũi” [Chinese communism], in *Hyõndae sajo ũi silsang kwa hõsang: Sahoejuũi sasang ũi yõksa* [The reality and delusions of contemporary thought: The history of socialist thought], Yi ũnbong and Kim Iryõng (Seoul: Hyõngsõl ch’ulpansa, 1990 [1988]), 139–174; Kim Iryõng, “Tokchõm chabonjuũi wa chõngch’i” [Monopoly capitalism and politics], in *Hyõndae chabonjuũi chõngch’i iron* [A political theory of contemporary capitalism], ed. Han’guk chõngch’i yõn’guhoe (Seoul: Paeksan sõdang, 1989), 155–199; Kim Iryõng, “Hyõndae chabonjuũi e kwanhan t’eje tũl” [Theses on contemporary capitalism], in *Hyõndae kukche chõngch’iron: Kukche kwan’gye chõngch’i kyõngjehak* [Theory of contemporary international politics: The political economy of international relations], ed. Yun Kũnsik (Seoul: Taewangsa, 1991), 151–170. See also Yi ũnbong and Kim Iryõng, *Hyõndae sajo ũi silsang kwa hõsang: Sahoejuũi sasang ũi yõksa* [The reality and delusions of contemporary thought: The history of socialist thought] (Seoul: Hyõngsõl ch’ulp’ansa, 1990 [1988]). Second, contemporary history: Kim Iryõng, “4.19 hyõngmyõng,” 87–112; Kim Iryõng, “Yi Sũngman t’ongch’igi chõngch’i ch’eje”; Kim Iryõng, “Pusan chõngch’i p’adong,” 31–66; Kim Iryõng, “Nongji kaehyõk,” 301–335. Finally, translations: Hansũ T’amõ, *Tohae chõngch’i kyõngjehak 1: Chabonjuũi p’yõn* [Capitalist political economy in diagrams, vol. 1: Capitalism], trans. Kim Iryõng (Seoul: Tongnyõk sõnsõ, 1989), originally published as Hans Tammer, *Politische Ökonomie: Kapitalismus, Anschauungsmaterial* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1981); Gavan McCormack and Mark Selden, *Nam-Bukhan ũi pigyo yõn’gu* [Korea North and South: The deepening crisis], trans. Chang ũlbyõng, Kim Iryõng, and Mun Sõngho (Seoul: Irwõn sõgak, 1988); Kerũharũt’ũ K’ũraik’õ, “Maksũ wa Engelsũ ũi kukka mit simin sahoe iron” [Marx and Engels’ theory of the state and civil society], trans. Kim Iryõng, in *Maksũjuũi wa minjuũi* [Marxism and democracy], ed. Yun Kũnsik, Kim Iryõng, and Pak Hyõngjung (Seoul: Sõnggyun’gwan taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1996), 45–99, originally published as Gerhard Kraiker, “Theorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft bei Karl Marx und Friederich Engles,” in *Handbuch politischer theorien und ideologien*, ed. Franz Neumann (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1977), 295–336. Here one can discern Kim’s efforts to introduce Marxism and “revisionist” scholarship to Korean academia. Overall, the influence of the academic environment of the 1980s on Kim’s early career is palpable not only in his interest in contemporary history but also Marxism and state theory. On the surging interest in state theory among political scientists following Chõn Tuhwan’s seizure of power in 1980, which suggested that military dictatorship was a deeper political problem than just the hunger for power of a single dictator, see Ryu Sangyõng, “Pak Chõnghũi wa kũ sidae rũl nõmgi wihayõ: Yõn’gu chaengchõm kwa p’yõngka” [Toward overcoming Park Chung Hee and his era: Controversies in existing research and evaluation], in *Pak Chõnghũi rũl nõmõ sõ* [Overcoming Park Chung Hee], ed. Han’guk chõngch’i yõn’guhoe (Seoul: P’urũn sup, 1998), 19–21.

¹¹ On former left-wing activists among the New Right, see Namhee Lee, “Social Memories of the 1980s: Unpacking the Regime of Discontinuity,” in *Revisiting Minjung: New Perspectives on the Cultural History of 1980s South Korea*, ed. Sunyoung Park (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019), 35.

change is best understood, I argue, by examining a key article written for the periodical *Sasang* (Thought) in 1995, titled “How to Think about the Eighteen-Year Park Chung Hee Regime,” through which Kim also explicitly entered the “history wars” initiated by Cho Kapche in 1993.¹²

¹² Kim Iryōng, “Pak Chōnghŭi ch’ejje 18-nyōn, ottōk’e pol köt in’ga” [How to think about the eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime], *Sasang* 27 (December 1995): 208–256. As a response to Cho Kapche’s 1993 *Wōlgan Chosōn* article, it is perhaps not a coincidence that it was published in *Sasang*, a publication of the Sahoe kwahagwōn (Institute of social sciences), with which the political scientist Sō Chinyōng, one of the first to respond critically to Cho Kapche’s 1994 *Wōlgan Chosōn* article, was also affiliated. See Sō Chinyōng, “*Wōlgan Chosōn* 11-wōl ho ‘Pak Chōnghŭi wa Kim Yōngsam ūi hwahae’ e iūi itta: ‘Pan’gachyōkchōk sago’ rŭl kyōnggye handa” [An objection to “Reconciliation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Yōngsam” in the November edition of the *Wōlgan Chosōn*: Beware “anti-reform thought”], *Wōlgan Chosōn* (December 1993): 221–225. An introduction to the Sahoe kwahagwōn is available at <http://www.iss88.kr/niabbs4/inc.php?inc=sub1>. Other notable figures involved in its founding include the philosopher Sin Ilch’ōl, who would go on to become a central voice of the New Right as a political movement in the early 2000s. <http://www.iss88.kr/niabbs4/bbs.php?bbstable=pic&call=read&page=4&no=31>. *Sasang* was published between 1989 and 2004. <http://www.iss88.kr/niabbs4/bbs.php?bbstable=sasang>. Kim presented an early version of this article at a conference in 1994. Kim Iryōng, “Pak Chōnghŭi ch’ejje 18-nyōn ottōk’e pol köt in’ga” [How to think about the eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime], paper presented at the 1994 Yōllye haksul taehoe [Annual academic conference] of the Han’guk chōngch’i hakhoe [Korean political science association], 1994, as cited in Im Hyōkpaek, “Pak Chōnghŭi e taehan chōngch’ihakchōk p’yōngka: Ridōsip, kŭndaehwa, Yusin, kŭrigo mollak” [A political-science evaluation of Park Chung Hee: Leadership, modernization, Yusin, and downfall], *P’yōnghwa yōn’gu* 20, no. 2 (2012), 70. An almost identical version of the article was published simultaneously. Kim Iryōng, “Pak Chōnghŭi ch’ejje 18-nyōn: Palchōn kwajōng e taehan punsōk kwa p’yōngka” [The eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime: An analysis and evaluation of the development process], *Han’guk chōngch’i hakhoebō* 29, no. 2 (December 1995): 181–215. There is also considerable overlap between this article and some earlier works: Kim Iryōng, “Kye-gŭp kujo, kukka, chōnjaeng,” 215–239; Kim Iryōng, “Han’guk e issō sanōphwa wa minjuhwa ūi sanggwān gwan’gye: Han’guk ūi palchōn kyōnghōm i ch’aji hanŭn segyesajōk wisōng kyūmyōng ūl chungsim ūro” [The relationship between industrialization and democracy in the Korean case: Focusing on identifying the world-historical status of Korea’s development experience], *Sahoe kwahak* 34, no. 2 (1995): 83–133. An identical version of this last article was published as Kim Iryōng, “Han’guk ūi chōngch’i.kyōngjejōk palchōn kyōnghōm kwa kŭ segyesajōk wisang: Sanōphwa wa minjuhwa ūi sanggwān kwan’gye rŭl chungsim ūro” [The Korean experience of political and economic development and its world-historical status: Focusing on the relationship between industrialization and democratization], in *Hyōndae Han’guk chōngch’iron* [Theory of contemporary Korean politics], ed. Yi Ujin and Kim Sōngjin (Seoul: Sahoe pip’yōngsa, 1996), 453–512. Between the *Sasang* and *Han’guk chōngch’i hakhoebō* versions, the latter is more frequently cited, according to DBpia. As of July 27, 2023, the *Sasang* article has been cited 377 times while the *Han’guk chōngch’i hakhoebō* has been cited 2,444 times. <https://www.dbpia.co.kr/journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE00106154>; <https://www.dbpia.co.kr/journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE00763690>. The latter was also the version included in the collected volume of Kim Iryōng’s articles. Kim Iryōng, “Pak Chōnghŭi ch’ejje 18-nyōn” [The eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime], in *Han’guk hyōndae chōngch’isaron* [Korean contemporary political history], ed. Kim Tojong (Seoul: Nonhyōng, 2011), 227–274. The differences between the two versions are basically cosmetic: The *Han’guk chōngch’i hakhoebō* version includes one additional note and removes the epigraphs. Finally, iterations of these (virtually identical) articles continued to be published

III. Kim Iryŏng's 1995 *Sasang* Article and Rightward Turn

Foreshadowing the emergence of the New Right, in his 1995 *Sasang* article, Kim sought a “third way” between what he saw as excessive criticism of and admiration for Park Chung Hee on the left and right, respectively. Notably, at this time it was the “conservative establishment” (*posu kidŭkkwŏnch'ŭng*) for whom he reserved his sharpest criticism. Scholars needed to advance an academically grounded, affirmative narrative of the Park Chung Hee era, he argued, because the collapse of socialism had created conditions favorable for the hegemonic offensive of the conservative establishment, represented by the likes of Cho Kapche; a concerted effort, in other words, was needed to wrest initiative away from the conservative media in reinterpreting contemporary history. When it came to Park Chung Hee, this could be accomplished only by acknowledging his accomplishments in a rational and academically defensible manner. Kim accordingly proposed the Park Chung Hee era be understood as a process of industrialization. The spirit of this proposal is encapsulated in the article's opening paragraphs, which are worth quoting in full.

after 1995. Most notably, an abridged version would appear in the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* the following year. Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi 18-nyŏn kŭngjŏng haeya handa: ‘Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eye 18-nyŏn ōttŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga’ (*Sasang* 1995-nyŏn kyŏul ho kejae) yoyak” [The eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime must be affirmed: Summary of “How to think about the eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime” (featured in the fall 1995 issue of *Sasang*)], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (March 1996): 552–559. Also, a summary of the article's main argument would appear in the *Chosŏn ilbo* and on Chogabje.com. Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi, ōttŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga” [How to think about Park Chung Hee], *Chosŏn ilbo*, October 26, 1999, 6; Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi-sik kaebal model ūn segyesa ūi wŏlli” [Park Chung Hee's development model was a principal of world history], *Chogabje.com*, October 16, 2005, https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=7898&C_CC=AZ. A later, revised version was published as Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn’gu ūi chaengchŏm kwa kwaje” [Controversies and tasks of research on the Park Chung Hee era], in *Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn’gu ūi chaengchŏm kwa kwaje* [Controversies and tasks of research on the Park Chung Hee era], ed. Chŏng Sŏnghwa (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2005), 11–40. This version is basically the same as the epilogue included in *Kŏn’guk kwa puguk*. Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn’guk kwa puguk: Hyŏndae Han’guk chŏngch’isa kangŭi* [Founding a nation and enriching a nation: A lecture on contemporary Korean political history] (Seoul: Saenggak ūi namu, 2004), 443–457.

All human beings, consciously or not, must live with the burden of history. One may thus declare the understanding of history and value judgement in history among the most important problems in the world of ideas. Furthermore, considering that a common history is the basis of a national community, severe division over interpretation or normative judgement of a common history signifies the crumbling of a national community's ideological foundation.

We have recently witnessed just such a situation. It is evident in the conflicts over the naming of events for the proposed contemporary history textbook, the issue of evaluating President Park Chung Hee that arose around the fifteenth anniversary of his death, and more recently the problem of evaluating the December 12 and May 18 incidents about which the current administration is clamoring. Yet such conflict is not all that recent. One can say it has been building at least since the beginning of the civilian government or perhaps as far back as the collapse of the socialist bloc in the late 1980s.

When the newly inaugurated civilian government emphasized a rupture with the former authoritarian regimes, positioning itself as an extension of the March First Movement, provisional government, April Revolution, May 18 democratization struggle, and June uprising, some in the media began an open counterattack with the silent sympathy of the conservative establishment. This was a manifestation of such conflict and debate. The objection can be summed up as follows. As history affords no omission, one must view the lineage of the Republic of Korea in terms of the independence movement, anticommunist nation building and defense (Rhee Syngman), economic development (Park Chung Hee and Chŏn Tuhwan), and democratization (No T'aeu and Kim Yŏngsam). Today's democratization would have been impossible without nation-founding and economic development. Therefore, the selective, stepping-stone logic of succession advanced by the current government is illogical.

Such historiographical disputes have naturally arisen now and then in the past. The fundamental reason for their most recent occurrence, however, is the dramatic changes that have taken place in the world over the past few years. Particularly, it seems the collapse of socialism and tide of globalization have considerably impacted values.

While North Korea, which adhered to autonomous and isolationist development, has landed in trouble with the collapse of the socialist bloc, South Korea, which adhered to open development dependent on foreign capital, is enjoying relative prosperity. Indeed, some now hold up South Korea's developmental dictatorship as a model for Eastern Europe, China, Southeast Asia, and other late developers. Due to these changes, the old balance of power in the field of history between the empiricist, nationalist, and *minjung* approaches, and by extension opposition between modernization theory and self-reliant development theory in the social sciences, has collapsed. In other words, due to a dramatic transformation of reality, the existing balance of power has shifted in favor of the former over the latter, enhancing the position of the establishment and its ideologue sympathizers. Furthermore, it seems the recent emphasis on globalization has led to the misunderstanding that nationalism and all arguments based on it are anachronistic and should be discarded.

We thus must realize that the recent conflict and collision over historical interpretation is essentially a consequence of the conservative establishment's hegemonic offensive capitalizing on world-historical changes since the late 1980s. This is a practical issue of who will seize the initiative over the world of ideas and the understanding of history particularly important therein. Of course, the outcome of this hegemonic struggle will be decisive for the future, determining the outcome between progress through reform or regression through compromise.

In responding to the conservative establishment's hegemonic offensive, it would be unwise to unconditionally negate and condemn the past. This point is even more relevant regarding the eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime, for which much of the older generation possesses a peculiar nostalgia. Furthermore,

at a time when the establishment media uses this nostalgia to “cast out the living Kim Yŏngsam by calling forth the deceased Park Chung Hee,” negation and denunciation of the Park era may be ineffective for establishing a counter-hegemony. Naturally, one may object that such negation and denunciation are not for their own sake but for criticizing and exposing the fictitiousness of the ruling ideology of the Park Chung Hee regime. It is also true, however, that most criticism excessively focuses on exposing such fictitious and negative aspects and overlooks those aspects that must be evaluated theoretically, scientifically, and impartially.

Therefore, in this article, I situate the Park Chung Hee regime in the context of Korea’s industrialization, proposing a way to assess his eighteen years in power. The Park Chung Hee regime should not be evaluated apart from its temporal coordinates in the early phase of industrialization. One might question how this is different from the logic of politicians who try to mythologize this era using such terms as “necessary evil” and “methodological reservation.” What they seek is to strengthen their present position through the beautification of the past. My intention, however, is to reveal how the temporal relevance of the Park Chung Hee regime has expired by understanding it in relation to the industrialization process. What I want to show is the very senility of raising the dead in the name of “reevaluation” now, when a high degree of industrialization has already been achieved. I think this could be a way of academically and impartially evaluating the achievements and failures of the Park Chung Hee regime as well as responding to the peculiar nostalgia of the older generation.¹³

¹³ Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eye 18-nyŏn, ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga,” 208–211:

모든 인간은 그의 의식 여부와 무관하게 역사의 하중을 감내하고 살 수밖에 없다. 따라서 역사관 또는 역사에서 가치판단은 인간의 관념세계에서 가장 중요한 문제들 중 하나라고 할 수 있다. 더구나 동일한 역사적 경험을 지녔다는 점이 민족공동체의 주요 구성요소임을 생각할 때, 같은 역사적 경험에 대한 해석이나 가치판단이 심각하게 분열된다는 것은 곧 민족공동체의 관념상의 기반의 축이 무너져내린다는 말이 된다.

그런데 근자에 우리는 그러한 사태를 자주 목도하고 있다. 국사교과서 시안에서 현대사의 몇몇 사건에 대한 용어선정 문제라든지 박 대통령 서거 15주기를 전후하여 있었던 그에 대한 평가문제, 그리고 최근 정치권을 시끄럽게 하고 있는 12.12 및 5.18 에 대한 평가문제 등을 둘러싸고 벌어진 대립이 바로 그것이다. 그러나 이러한 대립이 최근 들어 비로소 나타난 것은 아니다. 그것은 가깝게는 문민정부 등장 이후부터, 그리고 멀리는 1980 년대 말 사회주의권의 붕괴 이후부터 내연되어 온 문제라고 할 수 있다.

새로 출범한 문민정부가 기존 권위주의 체제와의 단절성을 강조하고 자신을 3.1 운동—임시정부—4.19 혁명—5.18 광주민주화투쟁—6 월 민주항쟁의 연장선상에 놓자, 일부 언론이 보수적인 기득권층의 암묵적 동조를 등에 업고 공개적인 반격에 나섬으로써 이러한 대립과 논쟁은 이미 표면화된 바 있다. 당시 반론의 요지는 이러했다. 역사에 있어서 생략이란 있을 수 없으므로 대한민국의 정통성은 독립운동—반공—기초한 국가건설과 보위(이승만)—경제발전(박정희와 전두환)—민주화(노태우와 김영삼)로 이어지고 있다고 보아야 한다. 건국과 경제발전이 선행하지 않았다면 오늘날의 민주화도 불가능하다. 그러므로 현정부에서 말하는 정경다리 식의 선택적 계승이란 논리에 맞지 않는다는 것이다.

물론 이런 식의 사관논쟁은 과거에도 종종 있었다. 그러나 최근 그것이 재연된 근본 이유는 지난 몇년 사이 세계적으로 진행된 급격한 현실변화 때문이다. 특히 사회주의의 붕괴와 세계화의 물결이 기존의 가치관에 미친 충격은 상당한 것 같다.

사회주의권이 몰락하고 그 와중에 자주적, 독립적 발전노선을 걸어왔던 북한이 곤경에 빠진 반면, 외자의존적, 개방적 발전노선을 취했던 남한은 상대적으로 변명을 구가하고 있고, 더 나아가 남한의 개발독재형 발전노선이 동구나 중국, 동남아 등의 후발국들에 의해 하나의 모델로까지 추켜지고 있는 것이 작금의 현실이다. 이런 현실변화에 인해 역사학계에서 그동안 진행되어온 실증사관, 민족사관, 민중사관 사이의 대립구도와 그것의 연장선상에서 사회과학계에서 이루어진 근대화론과 자립적 발전론 사이의 대립구도가 보여왔던 오랜 평형관계가 깨어지게 되었다. 즉, 그간의 균형적 대립구도가 급격한 현실변화로 인해 후자에 비해 전자가 우세한 쪽으로 기울어지게 되었으며, 이런 시류에 편승하여 구기득권층 및 그에 동조하는 이데올로그들의 발언권이 한층 높아지고 있는 것이다. 그리고 최근의 세계화추세에 대한 강조는 민족주의의 내지 그에 기초한 모든 주장들을 마치 시대착오적이고 적결의 대상이나 되는 것인 양 오해하게 만드는 감도 없지 않다.

따라서 역사해석을 둘러싼 최근의 갈등과 충돌이 사실은 그 본질에 있어서 1980 년대 말 이후의 세계사적 변화에 편승한 보수기득권층의 해계모니적 공세와 연관되어 있음을 우리는 알아야 한다. 그것은 단순히 학문공동체 내에서의 이론적 논쟁에 그치는 문제가 아니다.

As reflected in this passage, Kim's article constituted an explicit response to Cho Kapche's 1993 article; and even while he decries excessive criticism of Park, Cho is the primary target of criticism.¹⁴ To reinforce this point, one may observe a subsequent interview pertaining specifically to this article, in which Kim stated more explicitly,

Honestly speaking, refuting the *Chosŏn ilbo*'s logic was one of the article's objectives. Specifically, I read Editor-in-Chief Cho Kapche's article "Reconciliation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Yŏngsam," published in the November 1993 edition of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*, and found the logic quite courageous, with much to accept. Yet I also thought it was considerably dangerous and ultimately wrote this article after ruminating on the subject of "democracy and development" for some time. I was concerned that a linear development logic could be misused, and metaphors can be easily misleading.¹⁵

그것은 인간의 관념세계—그중에서도 특히 중요한 역사관—에서의 주도권을 누가 잡느냐는 문제와 결부된 현실적인 문제인 것이다. 그러므로 이러한 해계모니 투쟁의 결과가 향후 우리의 진로를 정함에 있어 결정적인 요소가 됨은 두말할 나위 없다. 개혁을 통한 전진이나 타협을 통한 후퇴냐의 선택이 바로 이 문제와 관련해 정해질 수 있다.

이런 보수기득권층의 해계모니적 공세에 대응함에 있어 무조건 과거를 부정하고 단죄하는 것만이 능사는 아니다. 이 점은 특히 박정희 체제 18년의 경우에 더욱 해당된다. 기성세대의 대부분이 박정희 체제에 대해 야릇한 향수를 지니고 있고 또 그것을 이용해 기성언론이 '죽은 박정희를 불러내 산 김영삼을 쫓는 듯한 분위기' (고성국, 1994)를 조장하고 있는 시점에서 무조건 그 시대를 부정하고 단죄하는 것은 대항해계모니 마면에 효과적이지 않을 수도 있다. 물론 이에 대해 그것이 단순한 부정과 단죄가 아니라 박정희 체제 지배이데올로기의 허위성에 대한 폭로와 비판(임현진, 송호근, 1994)에 기초한 부정과 단죄임을 들어 항변을 제기할 수도 있다. 그러나 그럴 경우에도 대부분의 비판적인 글들이 지나치게 허위성과 부정적 측면의 폭로에만 초점을 맞추다보니 이론적, 과학적으로 정당하게 평가해주어야 할 부분에 대해서도 지나치게 소홀하게 되는 우를 범한 것이 사실이다.

따라서 이 글에서 필자는 박정희 체제의 위상을 한국 산업화과정의 연장선상에서 정당하게 자리매김하고 그에 입각해 그의 집권 18년을 평가해줄 것을 제안한다. 다시 말해 박정희 체제는 산업화 초기단계라는 시점과 분리시켜 평가되어서는 안된다는 것이다. 그럴 경우 '필요악'이라든지 '방범론적 유보' 등의 용어를 써가며 당시를 신화화하려는 정치세력들의 논리와 무엇이 다르냐는 반문이 제기될 수도 있다. 그들이 노리는 것은 과거의 미화를 통한 현재 자신들의 위상강화이다. 그러나 필자가 의도하는 바는 박정희 체제의 위상을 산업화과정과 관련하여 자리매김해 줌으로써 이제 그것의 시효가 만료되었음을 보여주려는 데 있다. 이미 고도산업화 단계에 돌입한 현시점에서 재평가라는 명분하에 당시의 망령을 다시 불러내는 것은 그야말로 망령에 지나지 않는다는 점을 보여주고 싶은 것이다. 이렇게 하는 것이 현실적으로 기성세대가 젖어 있는 야릇한 향수에 적절하게 대응하는 방안일 뿐 아니라 학문적으로도 박정희 체제의 공과를 정당하게 평가하는 길이라 생각한다.

Kim refers to the following in this passage: Ko Sŏngguk, "Cho Kapche pujang, wae tangsin kŭl i munje in 'ga'" [Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche, why are your articles a problem?], *Kil* (June 1994): 80–91; Im Hyŏnjŏn and Song Hogŭn, "Chiyŏn toen 'chŏnhwan' kwa sijang ūi hwansang" [A delayed "transition" and illusions of the market], in *Simin sahoe ūi tojŏn* [Civil society's challenge], ed. Ch'oe Changjip and Im Hyŏnjŏn (Seoul: Nanam, 1993), 237–274.

¹⁴ In a footnote appended to the phrase "some in the media" in the passage above, Kim describes Cho Kapche's 1993 article in the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* as "representative" of the conservative counterattack launched against Kim Yŏngsam and his efforts toward "setting history straight" (*yŏksa paro seugi*). He refers to Cho's article once more as an example of the recent efforts to reevaluate Park Chung Hee in a more positive light. Kim Iryŏng, "Pak Chŏnghŭi ch'ejje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk'e pol kŏt in 'ga,'" 248n1, 212.

¹⁵ Kim Tŏkhan, "Int'ŏbyu: Sŏngdae Kim Iryŏng kyosu; 'Chŏngkwŏn ūi chŏngt'ongsŏng ūn hyoyulsŏng kwa yŏn'gye hayŏ p'andan haeya hamnida'" [Interview: Sungkyunkwan University Professor Kim Iryŏng: "The legitimacy of the ruling administration must be

A key phrase in this regard, one hinted at in Kim's introductory passage above and used repeatedly in the article, is "*mangnyŏng* 亡靈 *ül pullŏ naenŭn mangnyŏng* 妄靈."¹⁶ While it is impossible to preserve the wordplay in translation, it basically means "madman raising the dead," evoking an image of a shamanistic ritual.¹⁷ This phrase conveys Kim's regard for Cho Kapche's appraisal of Park Chung Hee and speaks to the essential objective of the article, which is to develop a way of positively appraising Park (and contemporary history) *in the past* without supporting the remnants of his regime *in the present*. This was precisely the "third way" Kim sought.

Like Cho Kapche's 1993 article, Kim's article can be read at two levels. On the one hand, he presents a theoretical framework for interpreting the Park Chung Hee era, namely, the "temporal coordinates of the early phase of industrialization." This is analogous to Cho's claim that "arms precede justice" but significantly different when coupled with the idea of "temporal relevance." On the other, Kim unreservedly declares the pragmatism of evaluating Park Chung Hee positively. Whereas he and Cho differ in terms of interpretive framework, they agree on this point, albeit for diametrically opposed reasons. To facilitate discussion, I divide the article into the following three parts: 1) overcoming left-right antagonism over Park Chung Hee; 2) the relationship between industrialization and democratization; and 3) the self-negation of the developmental state. I then summarize and relate these parts.

judged in relation to its efficacy"], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (March 1996), 560: 솔직히 말씀드리면 월간조선의 논리를 깨는 것이 이 논문의 목적 중 하나였습니다. 좀더 구체적으로는 조갑제 부장께서 월간조선 93년 11월호에 쓴 기사 '박정희와 김영삼의 화해'를 읽고 상당히 용기있는 논리고 받아들이는 것이 많다고 판단했죠. 그러나 이 논리가 가지고 있는 위험성도 크다는 생각이 들어, '민주와 발전'이라는 주제를 오랫동안 고민하다가 이 글을 쓰게 된 것입니다. 단선적인 발전 논리는 잘못 이용될 우려가 있고 부정확한 비유는 본질을 놓치기 쉽기 때문이죠.

¹⁶ See, for example, Kim Iryŏng, "Pak Chŏnghŭi ch'eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk'e pol kŏt in'ga," 208. *Mangnyŏng* 妄靈 literally means "senility" or "senile person," but I think the effect of "madman" suffices in context. Another option might be the more archaic "dotard." I translate this phrase variously depending on the context.

¹⁷ Later in the article, Kim explicitly associates this phrase with a "shaman's ritual" (*kutp'an*). Ibid., 242.

1. Overcoming Left-Right Antagonism over

Park Chung Hee

Kim asserts in the opening passages of the article that “excessive” conflicts over history can threaten the very fabric of the nation and thus proposes a way between “excessively” critical and commendatory perceptions of Park Chung Hee. The conflict between these perceptions, he says, is fundamentally one of values.¹⁸ On the one hand, Park’s proponents espouse a consequentialist logic, asserting the inevitability of prioritizing economic development over democratization.¹⁹ On the other, Park’s detractors challenge the legitimacy of the Park regime, whether in terms of his pro-Japanese collaboration or seizure of power through a coup d’état, and assert the foreign dependency, imbalance, and “anti-*minjung*-ness” (*panminjungsŏng*) of his development strategy and “anti-nation-ness” (*panminjoksŏng*) of delaying unification. Above all, they question the delay of democracy in the name of economic development.²⁰ According to Kim, these positions correspond to what Weber termed the “antimonies of action,” following either the “ethics of responsibility” (*verantwortungsethik*) or “ethics of conviction” (*gesinnungsethik*). Action according to an ethics of

¹⁸ Kim refers to Kim Yŏngsam and articles by Kim Taehwan, Son Hoch’ŏl, and Ko Sŏngguk as representative of the critical perspective of Park Chung Hee and articles by Cho Kapche, Kim Chŏngsu, Yi Sŏkche, and Kim Sŏngjin as representative of the positive perspective. Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga,” 209, 248n1, 212. See Kim Taehwan, “Pak Chŏnghŭi chŏngkwŏn ŭi kyŏngje kaeal: Sinhwa wa hyŏnsil” [The economic development of the Park Chung Hee regime: Myth and reality], *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 23 (1993): 48–63; Son Hoch’ŏl, “Pak Chŏnghui chŏngkwŏn ŭi chŏngch’ijŏk sŏngkyŏk” [The political character of the Park Chung Hee regime], *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 23 (1993): 34–47; Ko Sŏngguk, “Cho Kapche pujan,” 104–127; Kim Chŏngsu, “Pijŏn innŭn maejil ro surŏng e ppajin nara kŏnjoyŏtta” [A nation in a quagmire was saved through a visionary remonstrance] *Wŏlgan chungang* (November 1994): 128–137; Yi Sŏkche, “Kukka kŭndaehwa rŭl wihan kwŏllyŏgyok ŭi hwasin” [Embodiment of the hunger for power in the name of national modernization], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (June 1994): 578–604; Kim Sŏngjin, ed., *Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae* [The Park Chung Hee era] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1994). Kim would later interview Kim Yŏngsam in 2007 about contemporary history, but they would not discuss Cho Kapche. See Kim Yŏngsam and Kim Iryŏng, “Taedam: Kim Yŏngsam chŏn taet’ongnyŏng; Kim Iryŏng Sŏnggyun’gwan kyosu” [Conversation: Former President Kim Yŏngsam; Sungkyunkwan University Professor Kim Iryŏng], *Sidae chŏngsin* 37 (2007): 88–123.

¹⁹ Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga,” 212.

²⁰ Kim says these two positions reproduce the regime-resistance antagonism of the 1960s and 1970s. *Ibid.*, 212–213.

responsibility is “goal-rational.” Action according to the ethics of conviction focuses on the fulfillment of an ideal. In other words, the former considers the consequences and the latter the intent of an action.²¹ There is no way to “objectively” overcome these differences, says Kim.²²

²¹ Kim later cites two reasons as to why Weber’s antimonies of action are useful for analyzing the debate over Park Chung Hee: It can help in overcoming the zero-sum, black-and-white logic of the debate and settle the question of whether the “sacrifices” of the Park Chung Hee era are reducible to Park or a consequence of modernization. Ibid., 213, 215–216. As Kim notes, Raymond Aron conceptualizes these two systems of ethics as Machiavellian versus Kantian ethics. Kim Iryōng, Ibid., 248n4. Aron writes, “The fundamental antimony of action, according to Weber, is the antimony between the morality of responsibility and the morality of conviction, *Verantwortungsethik* and *Gesinnungsethik*. These two terms might be illustrated by referring to Machiavelli on the one hand and Kant on the other.” On the ethics of responsibility, he writes, “The ethic of responsibility is one that the man of action cannot ignore. It consists in placing oneself in a situation, imagining the consequences of possible decisions, and trying to introduce into the fabric of events an act that will lead to certain desired results of consequences. An ethic of responsibility governs a means-ends interpretation of action. If it is necessary to convince officers in an army to accept a policy they do not like, the man who must convince them will present the policy to them in terms they do not quite understand, or in terms that imply the exact opposite of his real intention or goal. Some day the officers may have the feeling that they have been deceived, but if this was the only way to attain the desired end, have we the right to condemn the man who deceived others for the good of the state? As a symbol of the politics of responsibility, Weber liked to use the man cited by Machiavelli who sacrificed the salvation of his soul for the salvation of the city. This means that there is a higher morality, which is not the morality of the ordinary man, governing the action of the statesman—always provided this public man really has a supra-individual object, i.e. the good of the collectivity.” Aron also points out the limitations of this ethic in terms of determining objectives. “Let us add that the morality of responsibility is not self-sufficient, since it is defined as the search for means suitable to a goal; the goal itself remains indeterminate. But—and here we see what some people have called nihilism of pessimism—Weber did not believe that men and societies could agree on goals to be attained or values to be realized.... He denied the existence of a universally valid hierarchy of values, and furthermore he thought that each of us is obliged to choose because in the last analysis values are incompatible with one another.” It is here where ideologues like Cho Kapche differ with Weber in viewing the survival and empowerment of the state as a value that is given, or predetermined, and it is in this context that the actions of “national heroes” are perceived as ultimately good. Finally, on the ethics of conviction, Aron writes, “The ethic of conviction is the morality that urges each of us to act according to his feelings, without explicit or implicit reference to the consequences. The example of the absolute pacifist will illustrate the point.” Raymond Aron, *Main Currents in Sociological Thought 2: Durkheim, Pareto, Weber*, trans. Richard Howard and Helen Weaver (England: Penguin Books, 1971), 212–213, 213, 213–214, 215.

²² Kim Iryōng, “Pak Chōnghūi ch’eje 18-nyōn, ottōk’e pol köt in’ga,” 215–216. Kim places two epigraphs at the front of his article, the first of which is relevant here (the second, from Marx, is relevant for the self-negation of the developmental state, which I discuss below). The quote from Max Weber, to translate directly from the Korean, reads, “The gods of Olympus ever do fight.” Ibid., 208: 올림푸스의 신들은 본래부터 싸우고 있다. Kim does not cite the quotation. Nor is it easily traceable since translations of the original German vary. For that matter, it could very well be Kim’s own translation from the original German. Nevertheless, a likely candidate is the following: “The assumption that I am offering you here is based on a fundamental fact. This is that as long as life is left to itself and is understood in its own terms, it knows only that the conflict between these gods is never-

Overcoming the left-right antagonism over history, then, requires a normative choice. In Kim's view, an ethics of responsibility is more appropriate to judging the Park Chung Hee era. "No one can guarantee which choice might mitigate this sacrifice. It is not a problem that can be quantitatively measured. At the time, the value-choice of the Park Chung Hee regime was development. In my view, this was realistic."²³ This does not, however, simply signify his siding with Park's supporters over his critics. This point requires a bit of unpacking, but suffice it to say for now that Kim recognizes the *utility* of a consequentialist evaluation of the Park era but seeks to package it in a more academically grounded and hegemonically effective manner. It is not that an ethics of responsibility is superior to an ethics of conviction but that either may be more appropriate depending on the situation. In this spirit, Kim calls for evaluating Park's

ending." Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in *The Vocation Lectures*, ed. David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 27. Alternatively, Kim's quotation might be a paraphrasing or slightly different translation of part of the following passage:

And it is a truism that something can be true although and because it is neither beautiful nor sacred, nor good. But these are merely the most basic instances of this conflict between the gods of the different systems and values.

I do not know how you would go about deciding 'scientifically' between the *value* of French and German culture. Here, too, conflict rages between different gods and it will go on for all time. It is as it was in antiquity before the world had been divested of the magic of its gods and demons, only in a different sense. Just as the Greek would bring a sacrifice at one time to Aphrodite and at another to Apollo, and above all, the gods of his own city, people do likewise today. Only now the gods have been deprived of the magical and mythical, but inwardly true qualities that gave them such vivid immediacy. These gods and their struggles are ruled over by fate, and certainly not by 'science.'

Ibid., 23. In any case, more important than the exact wording of the quotation is the idea behind it, which is that conflicts over values are irresolvable through academic discourse. As scholar of religion Roger Friedland puts it, "Weber...asks us to think of the social order as composed of a multiplicity of 'value spheres,' each a domain of a 'god.'" Roger Friedland, "The Gods of Institutional life: Weber's Value Spheres and the Practice of Polytheism," *Critical Research on Religion* 1, no. 1 (2013), 16.

²³ Kim Iryŏng, "Pak Chŏnghŭi ch'eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk'e pol kŏt in'ga," 223:

그것은 회생을 동반할 수밖에 없다. 그 경우 어느 쪽을 선택하는 것이 보다 회생을 줄일 수 있을지는 아무도 장담할 수 없다. 그것은 양적으로 계산될 수 있는 문제는 아니다.
이 때 박정희 체제의 가치선택은 발전이었고 필자가 보기에 그 선택은 현실성이 있었다.

Basically, the idea is that accepting the desirability of industrialization negates to a certain degree any denunciation of Park Chung Hee. Here Kim dismisses out of hand "naïve romanticists" who might reject modernity itself. "Of course...some might raise the issue of quality of life, espousing values that reject the very industrialization achieved at that time [under Park Chung Hee]. I will not, however, discuss such anachronistic and naïve romanticists here." Ibid., 250n25: 물론 이 경우 삶의 질을 들먹이며 당시 이루어진 산업화 자체를 거부하는 가치관을 가진 사람도 있을 수 있으나, 그런 시대착오적이고 소박한 낭만주의자는 여기서 논외로 하겠다.

adherence to an ethics of responsibility relative to the specific historical circumstances in which he was situated.²⁴ This requires addressing the grand historical question of the relationship between industrialization and democratization.

2. The Relationship between Industrialization and Democratization

Park chose industrialization over democratization (and unification). The validity of this choice, argues Kim, cannot be settled on abstract or theoretical grounds but requires comparative historical analysis. Conducting such comparison, however, first entails dispelling an important historical myth, which has to do with the sequencing of the industrialization process. According to Kim, a commonly held misperception, based on a misreading of the histories of early industrializers like Britain, the United States, and France, is that the industrial revolution arose in the wake of political ones.²⁵ Here Kim refers particularly to the Marxist historians David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley.²⁶ In 1980, they published *The Peculiarities of German History* to challenge the *Sonderweg* (“special path”) thesis dominant in the field of German history.²⁷ The conventional

²⁴ Ibid., 217. The question then becomes, what or who is to blame for the “sacrifices and side effects” of this era? Were they attributable to Park Chung Hee or to the process of industrialization? Kim answers that they were attributable to both: “Of course, I am not saying that all criticism of Park Chung Hee is meaningless in the context of industrialization. Yet I do wish to point out the fact that the process of industrialization was an unavoidable fate divorced from any value judgement of whether it was liked or disliked and to urge that the mistake not be made of reducing all the problems of the era to the Park Chung Hee regime, which assumed this fateful undertaking.” Ibid., 225: 물론 산업화현상을 고려했다고 해서 박정희 체제에 대한 여러 비판이 의미를 잃는 것은 아니다. 다만 산업화가 호오의 가치판단을 떠난 피할 수 없는 운명과도 같은 과정이라는 점과 그러한 운명적 과정을 떠맡아 추진한 박정희 체제에 그 시대의 모든 문제를 귀속시키는 오류를 범하지는 말자는 것이 필자가 말하고자 하는 바이다.

²⁵ Ibid., 220.

²⁶ See, for example, Ibid., 249n16.

²⁷ The original in German was published in 1980. David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung: Die gescheiterte bürgerliche Revolution von 1848* (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein Materialien, 1980). A revised and expanded English-language version, incorporating responses to criticism of the original 1980 publication, was published in 1984. David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). Some may also be interested to know that a Japanese translation was published in 1983. See Blackbourn and Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History*, v. As historian Helmut Waler

understanding was that Germany had tread a “distorted” path to modernity, culminating in fascism, compared to the “normal” liberal-democratic development of countries like Britain, which, argued Blackbourn and Eley, reflected a misunderstanding of Britain’s historical development; in effect, Germany’s history had been judged “abnormal” against a straw man.²⁸ In the words of philosopher of history Chris Lorenz, who provides a good overview of the debate this book provoked, Blackbourn and Eley argued that

political modernization did not occur in the Empire because Germany had not undergone its liberal political revolution in 1848, and...that the liberal bourgeoisie in the Empire had capitulated politically to a feudal aristocracy. According to these authors, both these assumptions are based on mythical representations borrowed from English and French history. By this they mean the notion that the aristocracy is inherently feudal and the bourgeoisie by nature liberal and the idea associated with this view that a non-liberal bourgeoisie thus ‘missed’ its revolution and must be ‘feudalized’....

Here the myth is at play that a bourgeois revolution can only be made by a class-conscious (=liberal) bourgeoisie and that this has to be a dramatic event. According to these English historians, this myth derives from simplistic interpretations of English and French history long ago refuted by modern historical research. In their eyes, it is, moreover, historically speaking nonsense to call German history special, based on an idealized view of Western European history, and to explain its special course—its *Sonderweg*—on the basis of what did not occur there, in other words, the non-occurrence of a bourgeois revolution and the absence of a parliamentary democracy.

Eley and Blackbourn maintain that the fundamental mistake in the Bielefeld interpretation is the insufficient distinction made between the introduction of a parliamentary system in politics and the introduction of a capitalist mode of production in the economy. Both matters are designated by the concept ‘bourgeois revolution’, when in fact they are anything but identical. The capitalist mode of production can, as it turns out, flourish under non-parliamentary-democratic political systems, as the experience under fascism, among others, amply proves. Eley reserves use of the term ‘bourgeois revolution’ for politics that make the capitalist mode of production possible and consequently arrives at the curious conclusion that the Empire cannot have not

Smith observes, Blackbourn and Eley’s book was largely a response to German Bielefeld School historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s *Das deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871–1918*, published in 1973. Helmut Walser Smith, “When the *Sonderweg* Debate Left Us,” *German Studies Review* 31, no. 2 (2008), 228. See also Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire, 1871–1918*, trans. Kim Traynor (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1985).

²⁸ See Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997), 102–108; Jürgen Kocka, “Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German *Sonderweg*,” *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999), 40–50; Georg G. Iggers and Q. Edward Wang, with Supriya Mukherjee, *A Global History of Modern Historiography* (London: Routledge, 2013), 408; and Chris Lorenz, “‘Won’t You Tell Me, Where Have all the Good Times Gone?’ On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Modernization Theory for Historical Study,” in *The Many Faces of Clío: Cross-cultural Approaches to Historiography: Essays in Honor of Georg G. Iggers*, ed. Q. Edward Wang and Franz L. Fillafer (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 104–127.

gone through its bourgeois revolution since capitalism blossomed there as it did in few other places. The Bielefeld historians did not recognize this bourgeois revolution since it did not appear in its mythical form: in Germany, after all, in contrast to England and France, no kings were deposed and decapitated.²⁹

Blackbourn and Eley's work met with heavy criticism, but the ensuing debate ultimately signaled the end of the *Sonderweg* thesis.³⁰

With Britain's path to modernity apparently demystified, Kim asserts, there remains no historical example of democracy preceding or coinciding with industrialization.³¹ It follows from this that the political economy of early and late developers amid the early phase of industrialization differs only by degree and not in kind, with the authoritarianism of the latter slightly more pronounced.³² There are, Kim declares, elective affinities between authoritarianism and capitalist

²⁹ Chris Lorenz, "Beyond Good and Evil? The German Empire of 1871 and Modern German Historiography," *Journal of Contemporary History* 30, no. 4 (1995), 737–738.

³⁰ In a review, Paul Kennedy commented that the "revisionist manifesto...attracted more animosity and provoked more controversy in German historical circles [over] the past two years than almost any other work." Paul Kennedy, Review of *Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung: Die gescheiterte bürgerliche Revolution von 1848*, by David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Journal of Modern History* 54, no. 1 (1982), 176. Historians such as Kocka, an original proponent of the *Sonderweg* thesis, have continued to defend it. See Jürgen Kocka, "Germany before Hitler: The Debate about the German *Sonderweg*," *Journal of Contemporary History* 23, no. 1 (1988): 3–16; and Kocka, "Asymmetrical Historical Comparison," 40–50. As historians like Maier and Kocka point out, the German right effectively appropriated Blackbourn and Eley's revisionism in their efforts to "normalize" German history. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past*, 105–106; Kocka, "Germany before Hitler," 7, 15n8. Kim Iryōng does the same for the Korean right, although in 1995 it is possible his Marxist sympathies had not completely dissipated.

³¹ Kim Iryōng, "Pak Chōnghŭi ch'ejje 18-nyōn, ottōk'e pol köt in'ga," 220. The objection might be raised at this point that Kim rather naively (or perhaps even cynically) accepts Blackbourn and Eley's controversial argument. Lorenz points out the work is more important for its questions than answers and that "few historians have adopted their neo-Marxist view." Chris Lorenz, "Beyond Good and Evil?" 739–740. It is nonetheless the case that the *Sonderweg* thesis fell out of favor in the wake of Blackbourn and Eley's work. Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past*, 105–109.

³² The difference of degree correlates to the "lateness" of development. Kim Iryōng, "Pak Chōnghŭi ch'ejje 18-nyōn, ottōk'e pol köt in'ga," 221. This means that the "developmental state," in Kim's view, is a universal form of capitalist political economy, not one unique to East Asia. I take up this point in chapter five. For now, suffice it to say that Chalmers Johnson's notion of the developmental state accorded with an understanding of "multiple paths" to modernity, whereas Kim's aligns with the understanding of one (linear) path to modernity. Here he also refers to Japanese economist Yasusuke Murakami, who sees Britain as the prototype of developmentalism. Ibid., 250n17. See Yasusuke Murakami, *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis: A Vision for the Next Century*, trans. Kozo Yamamura (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996); and Murak'ami Yasūsūk'e, *Pan'gojōn ūi chōngch'i kyōngjehak* [An anticlassical political-economic analysis], 2 vols. (Seoul: Samsōng ch'ulp'ansa, 1994). I also discuss this in chapter five.

economic development in the early stage of industrialization.³³ Kim argues that the Park Chung Hee era corresponded to this “developmental stage” of industrialization; this was Korea’s “developmental state.”³⁴

³³ Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’ejŏ 18-nyŏn, ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga,” 221, 223. As sociologist Richard Robert Howe describes, the term “elective affinities” was first used in the field of chemistry in the eighteenth century. The Latin “*attractio electiva*,” as used by Swedish chemist Toborn Bergman, was rendered into German as *die wahlverwandschaften*, also the title of Goethe’s 1809 novel exploring the idea of human relationships as a kind of chemical reaction, and it was via Max Weber’s reading of Goethe that the term arrived in the social sciences. Richard Robert Howe, “Max Weber’s Elective Affinities: Sociology within the Bounds of Pure Reason,” *American Journal of Sociology* 84, no. 2 (1978), 367, 370–371. On Goethe’s novel, see Peter D. Smith, “Elective Affinity: A Tale of Two Cultures,” *Kafka’s Mouse*, <http://www.peterdsmith.com/elective-affinity-a-tale-of-two-cultures>. On Max Weber’s use of the term, see H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, “Introduction: The Man and His Work,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 62–63. Richard Swedberg and Ola Agevall observe that “elective affinities” is “not a carefully defined concept in Weber’s writings but rather a key phrase.” “Weber’s use of the term ‘elective affinity,’” they elaborate, “ultimately rests on an analogy from chemistry. In its literal sense, the term refers to the mutual attraction of elements that combine to form chemical compounds and derives from the eighteenth-century Swedish chemist Torbern Bergman (1735–84) and his work *De attractionibus electivis*.... Bergman’s affinity tables are arranged as columns, showing how the substances heading the columns are able to combine with each substance below. The relative ability of two substances to combine is their degree of elective affinity. Bergman’s concept reached a mass audience when Goethe used it in his novel *Die Wahlverwandschaften* (1809; trans. as *Elective Affinities*), where Weber and other German readers of his day would have encountered it.” The authors also point out that “Talcott Parsons translates *Wahlverwandschaften* as “correlation” in [his translation of] *The Protestant Ethic*.” Richard Swedberg and Ola Agevall, “Elective Affinities,” in *The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, California: Stanford Social Sciences, 2016), 114, 115. In a later article, Kim adds a note explaining his use of the term, which accords with Parsons’ usage. “‘Elective affinities’ is a concept used in the social sciences when a close correlation between two social phenomena is observed but it is difficult to determine a causal relationship.” Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn’gu,” 26n18: 선택적 친화성이란 사회과학에서 두 사회적 현상 사이에 밀접한 상관성이 관찰되지만 그것을 인과관계로까지 보기는 어려울 때 사용하는 개념이다. He adds that this claim is similar to that of Woo-Cumings. Ibid., 250n21. What he is referring to in Woo-Cumings seems to be the following: “What all this means is that authoritarianism in East Asia is an integral part of development strategy, useful not just for steadying societies in developmental flux but for creating the class that carried all before the modern world—the entrepreneurial class—and in the shifting resources to that class. Authoritarian politics is not something genetically encoded in Confucian civilization, but a tried-and-true political arrangement in East Asia in its rush to industrialize.” Meredith Woo-Cumings, “The ‘New Authoritarianism’ in East Asia,” *Current History* 93, no. 587 (1994), 416.

³⁴ An extensive part of the article is devoted to the characteristics of the developmental state, which, as they are relatively peripheral to the article’s main point and, for that matter, omitted in Kim’s later work, I shall only deal with briefly here. He focuses on two broad explanations for Korea’s economic development, namely, “leadership” versus “freeriding.” To overcome this impasse, he proposes an interactional understanding of structure and agency. Explaining Korea’s economic development, in other words, requires examining the interactions between the state and social classes and between the state and world system. In terms of structural conditions setting the range of available choices and actions available to the state, Kim focuses on the role of American empire, which he views as distinct from its colonial forebears; specifically, it is defined by openness to competition from below. Second,

3. The Self-Negation of the Developmental State

As the developmental state is a manifestation of the transition to industrial society, it undergoes “dialectical self-negation” (*pyŏnjŭngpŏpchŏk chagi pujŏng*) as this transition concludes.³⁵ What this basically means is that developmental states are victims of their own success. The problem, says Kim, is that vested interests can intervene to “artificially extend” the life of

in terms of society, the main actors are the landed class, capitalists, and workers and farmers. Third, it is the state’s task to mediate between the differing interests of these actors and the conditions of the world system. A “developmental state,” in this context, is a state endowed with the autonomy, strength, and capability (*chayulsŏng, kangdo, nungnyŏk*) necessary to fulfil this task. It sets goals and implements policies independent of the interests of the ruling class; it must rely on coercion over consent; and above all it must produce results. He presents eight forms of the state to highlight these characteristics. There are four types of authoritarian states: Developmental Authoritarian Regime (for State Elite enrichment) ([*kukka ellit’ŭ e ūihan*] *palchŏn chihyangjŏk kwŏnwijuŭi ch’eje*, DAR[SE]); Authoritarian Regime for State Elite enrichment (*kukka ellit’ŭ wihan kwŏnwijuŭi ch’eje*, ARSE); Developmental Authoritarian Regime (for Traditional Elite enrichment) ([*chŏnt’ong ellit’ŭ e ūihan*] *palchŏn chihyangjŏk kwŏnwijuŭi ch’eje*, DAR[TE]) and Authoritarian Regime for Traditional Elite enrichment (*chŏnt’ong ellit’ŭ rŭl wihan kwŏnwijuŭi ch’eje*, ARTE). The four authoritarian regimes can be further divided into the categories of “soft” and “hard.” And there are four types of democratic states: Social Democratic Regime (*sahoe minjujuŭijŏk ch’eje*, SDR)—in the main body, Kim describes this as a Welfare Democratic Regime (*pokchi minjujuŭi ch’eje*); Populist Democratic Regime (*minjungjuŭi ch’eje*, PDR); Fragile Democratic Regime without social bases (*sahoejŏk kiban pujae ūi ch’wiyak han minjujuŭi ch’eje*, FDR); and Neo-Conservative Democratic Regime (*sinbosujŏk minjujuŭi ch’eje*, NCDR). The South Korean regimes over time are as follow: Rhee Syngman (ARSE); Chang Myŏn (FDR); Park Chung Hee 1960s (soft DARSE); Park Chung Hee 1970s (Yusin) to early Chŏn Tuhwan (hard DARSE); late Chŏn Tuhwan (hard DARSE in transition); and No T’aeu (soft DARSE in transition). See Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga,” 226–239, 251–256n28–67. Kim first presents this framework for understanding the relationship between state and society in Kim Iryŏng, “Kye-gŭp kujo, kukka, chŏnjaeng,” 215–239.

³⁵ Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga,” 240–242. There has been much debate on this very point, which Kim takes to be self-evident, in the literature on the developmental state, specifically over whether the Korean developmental state ever really went away or if it has made a comeback since the 2000s. See, for example, Mark Beeson, “The Rise and Fall (?) of the Developmental State: The Vicissitudes and Implications of East Asian Interventionism,” in *Developmental States: Relevancy, Redundancy or Reconfiguration*, ed. Linda Low (Hauppauge, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2004), 29–40; Richard Stubbs, “What Ever Happened to the East Asian Developmental State? The Unfolding Debate,” *The Pacific Review* 22, no. 1 (2009): 1–22; Yin-wah Chu, “The Asian Developmental State: Ideas and Debates,” in *The Asian Developmental State: Reexaminations and New Departures*, ed. Yin-wah Chu (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 18–20; and Elizabeth Thurbon, *Developmental Mindset: The Revival of Financial Activism in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).

the developmental state.³⁶ He argues that this is what fundamentally differentiates the Park Chung Hee and Chŏn Tuhwan eras.

When did this temporal juncture arrive in Korea? Was it the early 1970s, 1980, or late 1980s? Arguing for the late 1980s, the process of self-negation beginning in 1987 appears well timed. Arguing for the early 1970s (Yusin) or 1980 (Chŏn Tuhwan), however, signifies the artificial extension of a development model whose temporal relevance had already expired for individual gain.

This is not a question for which there is a ready objective answer. Nevertheless, I would suggest 1980 as appropriate. At the core of the growth model pursued by the developmentalist authoritarian regime until the 1970s were a dependence on foreign capital, export orientation, state leadership, and developmental dictatorship. Among these elements, the first two have persisted into the present, albeit with changes in content. State leadership, however, has gradually broken down since the early 1980s, when the Chŏn Tuhwan regime began to pursue economic liberalization, and more rapidly since the late 1980s. This began also because of United States pressure, but it was also a response to the social sectors that had emerged through the process of industrialization and especially to the demands of capital. The problem is that political change did not accompany this relaxation of state leadership in the economic sector. An imbalance ultimately emerged, in which the breakdown of state leadership in the economy conformed to the demands of the world system and society, but politics remained mired in the character of developmental dictatorship.³⁷

In other words, the authoritarianism of the Park Chung Hee era, corresponding to the early phase of industrialization, was “temporally appropriate,” whereas the authoritarianism of the Chŏn era, corresponding to a period of economic liberalization, was “temporally inappropriate” (artificial) to the temporal juncture of the 1980s (economic liberalization). Whereas one is authoritarianism in the name of a genuine historical calling, the other is purely for the sake of vested interests.

³⁶ Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’ŕje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga,” 240.

³⁷ Ibid., 240–241:

한국의 경우 이러한 시점은 언제인가? 1970년대 초인가, 1980년인가, 아니면 1980년대 후반인가? 만약 1980년대 후반으로 본다면 한국에서 자기부정과정인 1987년에 시작된 것은 적기였다는 긍정적 평가가 이루어질 수 있다. 그러나 그 시점을 앞당겨 잡으면 유신체제(1970년대 초로 볼 경우)나 전두환 체제(1980년으로 볼 경우)는 모두 이미 시효가 만료된 발전모델을 개인이익을 위해 인위적으로 연장시켰다는 평가를 받아야 한다.

이것은 객관적으로 증명하기가 어려운 문제이다. 그러나 필자는 다음과 같은 이유에서 1980년을 그 시점으로 보고자 한다. 1970년대까지의 발전주의적 권위주의 체제가 추진한 성장모델의 요체는 외자의존, 수출지향, 국가주도, 그리고 개발독재였다. 그중 앞의 두 가지는 내용상의 변화는 있지만 현재까지도 이어지고 있는 요소들이다. 그러나 국가주도는 1980년대 말 이후 그 해체가 가속화되고 있는 요소인데, 그 시발은 이미 1980년대 초부터였다. 당시 전두환 체제는 경제적으로 자유화조치들을 취하기 시작하는데, 그것은 미국의 압력 탓도 있지만 그간의 산업화과정에서 성장한 사회 제부문, 특히 자본으로부터의 요구에 부응하는 측면도 있었다. 그런데 문제는 당시 경제부문에서의 이런 국가주도성의 완화에 상응하는 정치적 변화는 나타나지 않았다는 점에 있다. 세계체제와 사회로부터의 요구에 따라 경제에 있어 국가주도성의 해체는 시작되었으나 정치의 여전히 개발독재적 성격을 벗어나지 못하는 불균형이 초래되고 말았던 것이다.

This point well encapsulates Kim's strategy for confronting the "spirit-rousing madman": one may positively evaluate Park Chung Hee without endorsing the remnants of his regime in the present; furthermore, a favorable assessment of the Park Chung Hee regime does not necessarily translate into a positive a favorable assessment of all the military regimes.³⁸ Here Kim wades into the then-pressing debate over "Asian values." In a 1994 interview with political commentator Fareed Zakaria, Lee Kuan Yew urged Americans "not to foist their system indiscriminately on societies in which it will not work."³⁹ Kim Taejung defended democracy in Asia,

³⁸ By extension, Kim rationalizes and accepts the prosecution of Chŏn Tuhwan and No T'aeu while exempting the Park Chung Hee regime. It is here that he draws on the second epigraph placed at the beginning of the article, namely, Marx's idea that important historical events repeat themselves, occurring first as tragedy then as farce. Marx writes, "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce." Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 10. Kim writes, 헤겔은 어디선가 세계사에서 지극히 중요한 사건이나 인물은 모두 두 번 일어나거나 등장한다고 말했다. 그러나 그는 그것이 첫번째는 비극으로, 두번째는 소극으로 나타난다는 말을 덧붙이는 것을 잊었다. Kim Iryŏng, "Pak Chŏnghŭi ch'eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk'e pol kŏt in'ga," 208. Kim amends this idea, however, to incorporate the recent "spirit-rousing madman," which he sees as a second repetition.

In my view, there is no more appropriate expression of the relationship between Park Chung Hee and Chŏn Tuhwan than that made by Marx roughly one hundred years ago. Recently their remaining supporters have attempted a shamanistic raising of the dead to strengthen their political position. This raising of the dead whose temporal relevance already expired fifteen years ago is an indicator of senility. I would therefore like to amend Marx's expression as follows:

"All facts and personages of great importance in world history occur three times, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce, and finally as burlesque. Such are Park Chung Hee, Chŏn Tuhwan, and the yet living remnants of the May 16 and December 12 coup d'état forces, who dream of enhancing their political status through a shamanistic spirit summoning."

Ibid., 242:

필자가 보기에 박정희와 전두환의 관계를 나타내기 위해 100 여 년 전 맑스가 한 이 말보다 적절한 표현은 없을 것 같다. 그런데 최근 이들의 잔당들이 자신들의 정치적 입지를 강화하기 위해 망령을 불러내는 꾀를 벌이고 있다. 그것은 이미 15 년 전에 시효가 만료된 유령을 들먹인다는 점에서 망령에 해당된다. 따라서 필자는 맑스의 위의 표현을 다음과 같이 고치고 싶다.

"역사에서 유사한 사건이나 인물은 모두 세 번 일어나거나 등장하는데, 그것이 첫번째는 비극으로, 두번째는 소극, 그리고 마지막에는 광란극으로 나타난다. 박정희, 전두환, 그리고 아직도 살아남아 망령을 불러내는 꾀를 벌이면서 정치적 위상의 제고를 꿈꾸는 5.16 및 12.12 쿠데타의 잔당들이 그들이다."

³⁹ Fareed Zakaria and Lee Kuan Yew, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (1994), 110. As historian Michael D. Barr describes, the Asian values debated can be understood as one over cultural relativism, "that many of the hegemonic political, social and cultural norms of the late twentieth century are western, rather than universal, norms and no more legitimate than alternative norms that could be considered Asian." Michal D. Barr, "Lee Kuan Yew and the 'Asian Values' Debate," *Asian Studies Review* 24, no. 3 (2000), 310.

arguing that Lee's view was "self-serving" and that Asia in fact "has a rich heritage of democracy-oriented philosophies and traditions."⁴⁰ Kim Iryōng regards Kim Taejung's view as the correct one: "The economic growth without democracy of some countries is but a transitional phenomenon."⁴¹

4. Summary

The purpose of Kim's 1995 *Sasang* article was to aid in a hegemonic counteroffensive against the conservative establishment, represented by Cho Kapche, and seize the initiative in the interpretation of the Park Chung Hee era and contemporary history. The key to this strategy was a framework allowing for a positive interpretation of Park Chung Hee regime but neither Chŏn Tuhwan nor the "remnants" of their respective regimes. The idea here was that the Park Chung Hee era corresponded to the developmental stage of industrialization, a universally observable phenomenon, for which there was an "elective affinity" with authoritarianism. He developed this argument in three parts. First, he argued that evaluations of Park Chung Hee were normatively rooted. To evaluate the regime, one had to decide whether an "ethics of conviction," seeking "justice" in democracy, or an "ethics of responsibility," seeking economic development, were appropriated for the time. Second, he argued that looking at the relationship between industrialization and democratization from a comparative historical perspective revealed a clear sequence, with the former preceding the latter,

⁴⁰ Kim Taejung also writes, "Culture is not necessarily our destiny. Democracy is." Kim Dae Jung, "Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (1994), 190, 191. His criticism of Lee Kuan Yew's comments echoes Sŏ Chinyōng's criticism of Cho Kapche: "The biggest obstacle is not [Asia's] cultural heritage but the resistance of authoritarian rulers and their apologists." Kim Dae Jung, "Is Culture Destiny?" 194. See Sŏ Chinyōng, "*Wŏlgan Chosŏn* 11-wŏl ho," 221–225.

⁴¹ Kim Iryōng, "Pak Chŏnghŭi ch'eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk'e pol kŏt in'ga," 240: 일부 국가에서의 민주주의 없는 경제성장은 단순히 과도기적 현상에 불과하다. No page number is given, but Kim appears to paraphrase the following: "Some people conclude that the Soviet demise was the result of the victory of capitalism over socialism. But I believe it represented the triumph of democracy over dictatorship. Without democracy, capitalism in Prussian Germany and Meiji Japan eventually met its tragic end. The many Latin American states that in recent decades embraced capitalism while rejecting democracy failed miserably. On the other hand, countries practicing democratic capitalism or democratic socialism, despite temporary setbacks, have prospered." Kim Dae Jung, "Is Culture Destiny?" 189.

and that the Park Chung Hee era corresponded to this developmental stage of industrialization. Finally, he argued that this developmental stage was completed by 1980 but that the Chŏn Tuhwan regime artificially extended its lifespan in the name of vested interests. Furthermore, “spirit-rousing madmen”—like Cho Kapche—are attempting to revive it once again in the present, supported by world historical changes since 1989. To counter this hegemonic offensive, a comparative historical evaluation of Park Chung Hee is needed, one that acknowledges his historical contribution in overseeing Korea’s industrialization but also relegates that achievement firmly to the past.

With this article, Kim entered the history wars in pursuit of a third way, proposing an affirmative view of Park Chung Hee that maintained critical distance with conservative commentators like Cho Kapche. Tracking the reception of this proposal, however, one encounters a curious outcome: It was precisely the conservative establishment—specifically, none other than Cho Kapche—that welcomed it.

IV. The Reception of Kim Iryŏng’s “Comparative Historical” Evaluation of Park Chung Hee

The response from the left to Kim’s article was muted.⁴² Certainly there was no backlash of the kind provoked by Cho Kapche’s 1993 *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* article. This is to be expected to a certain degree, as Kim wrote mainly for an academic audience where Cho wrote for the public. In any

⁴² To gauge the immediate response to Kim’s article, aside from articles I came across over the course of my research, I surveyed materials published in 1996 in political science journals, including *Sasang* and *Han’guk chŏngch’i hakhoebo* (where the original two articles had been published), *Han’guk chŏngch’i oegyosa nonch’ong*, and *Kukche chŏngch’i nonch’ong*; progressive history journals, including *Yŏksa pip’yŏng*, *Yŏksa munje yŏn’gu*, *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil*, and *Yŏksa yŏn’gu*; progressive periodicals, including *Han’gyŏre 21*, *Kil, Mal*, *Inmul kwa sasang*, and *Ch’angjak kwa pip’yŏng*; and newspapers, including the *Han’gyŏre*, *Tonga ilbo*, *Chungang ilbo*, and *Chosŏn ilbo*. Furthermore, I specifically looked through the publications of Kim Taehwan, Son Hoch’ŏl, and Ko Sŏngguk, critical scholars whom Kim directly cites in his article, to see if they responded. I found nothing. The point can at least be made that if there was a critical response to Kim’s article, it was by no means conspicuous.

case, the left clearly did not take up Kim's call to understand the Park Chung Hee era as the developmental stage of industrialization.

A March 1996 academic conference provides a little more context for this subdued response.⁴³ In attendance were Kim Iryŏng and progressive political scientist Son Hoch'ŏl, whom Kim had singled out among scholars advancing an excessively negative assessment of Park Chung Hee.⁴⁴ As reported in the *Han'gyŏre*, "The majority of the discussion fixated on the relationships between economic growth and democracy and between industrialization and authoritarianism."⁴⁵ Here occurred a notable exchange between the elderly conservative political scientist Kim Sejung and Son Hoch'ŏl. "Professor Kim Sejung thought 'authoritarianism was inevitable to a certain degree for the development of industry,' arguing for an 'elective affinity' between authoritarian government and economic development. Professor Son Hoch'ŏl responded that 'some exaggerate development under the Park government' and that 'the connections with the fruits of internal industrialization achieved in the 1950s and labor suppression as a factor also require thorough review.'"⁴⁶ Kim Sejung thus echoed Kim

⁴³ The conference was held on March 30, 1996 at Konkuk University (*Kŏn'guk taehakkyo*) under the title *Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn'gu: Chaengchŏm kwa kwaje* (Research on the Park Chung Hee era: Issues and tasks). See Kang Hŭich'ŏl, "'Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae' hakkye p'yŏngka sŏngjang-minjuhwa sai 'ch'ungdol'" ["Collision" between the growth and democratization evaluations of the "Park Chung Hee era" in academia], *Han'gyŏre*, April 2, 1996, 15.

⁴⁴ See Kim Iryŏng, "Pak Chŏnghŭi ch'eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk'e pol kŏt in'ga," 212. Kim cites Son Hoch'ŏl, "Pak Chŏnghŭi chŏngkwŏn," 564.

⁴⁵ Kang Hŭich'ŏl, "'Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae,'" 15: 토론의 대부분은 경제성장과 민주주의, 산업화와 권위주의의 관계에 불박한 채 진행됐다.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 15: "산업의 발전을 위해 어느 정도의 권위주의가 불가피했다고 생각한다"며 김세중 교수가 권위주의 정권과 경제발전 사이의 '선택적 친화성'을 주장하자 손호철 교수는 "박 정권 하의 발전을 과장해 보는 견해가 존재한다"며 "50 년대에 이루어진 내포적 공업화의 성과를 이은 사실과 노동 억압적인 측면도 충분히 검토해야 한다"고 맞받았다. The reporter mistakenly describes the idea of an elective affinity between authoritarianism and development as Kim Sejung's idea, mentioning that Kim Iryŏng "agreed" with it. See also Kim Sejung, "5.16: Sanŏphwa minjokchuŭi hyŏngmyŏng [May 16: Industrialization-nationalism revolution], in *Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn'gu ŭi chaengchŏm kwa kwaje* [Controversies and tasks of research on the Park Chung Hee era], ed. Chŏng Sŏnghwa (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2005), 41–98. I may be mistaken, but I have not come across any work by Kim Sejung in which he applied Weber's idea of the antimonies of action prior to Kim's application in 1995. In any case, Kim Sejung discusses Kim's use of this idea in a commemorative article and does not mention that he himself also applied it to understanding the Park Chung Hee era. See Kim Sejung, "'P'osŭt'ŭ sujŏngjuŭi' ŭi kisu, Kim Iryŏng kyosu ŭi hangmun segye rŭl hoego handa: *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk, Han'guk hyŏndae chŏngch'isaron ŭl chungsim ŭro* [Remembering the scholarship of Professor Kim

Iryŏng's argument almost verbatim, and Son Hoch'ŏl explicitly rejected it. Kim Sejung and Kim Iryŏng would later stand as allies in the New Right movement.⁴⁷ This vignette encapsulates the response to Kim's article. The left ultimately rejected a positive appraisal of Park Chung Hee while the right accepted it purely on the grounds that it was positive.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Cho Kapche's warm reception of Kim's proposal. This is somewhat puzzling considering that Cho had been the primary target of Kim's 1995 *Sasang* article. Nevertheless, an abridged version found its way into the pages of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* in March 1996, the same month in which Kim Iryŏng and Kim Sejung had stood together against Son Hoch'ŏl. Despite its abridgement, the article features all the major points of the original, including the criticism of Cho Kapche. A clue as to its positive reception, however, is offered in a new title: "The

Iryŏng, flag bearer for post-revisionism: Focusing on *Founding a nation and enriching a nation and History of contemporary Korean politics*], in *Ko Kim Iryŏng kyosu sŏgŏ ch'umo semina mit Chosŏn chŏngch'i ŭi saeroun ihae* [Seminar in remembrance of the late Professor Kim Iryŏng and a new understanding of Chosŏn politics], materials for the seminar held by Han'guk chŏngch'i oegyosa hakhoe on November 30, 2019, 1–8.

⁴⁷ Kim Sejung was born in 1946 and entered university in the late 1960s. Once a member of the student movement, he says he had a change of heart while studying abroad in Japan in 1977 and continued this transition while completing a PhD in political science at McGill University in Canada, where he encountered students from lesser developed countries who envied what was going on in Korea. A *Chugan Chosŏn* article reports the following: "Departing come hell or high water, the fatherland he viewed from Japan was the complete opposite [of what he knew]. Abroad, [Korea] was regarded as the 'top student of Third World economic development.' 'If I had remained in Korea,' he stated, 'maybe I would have ended up as part of the *Chusap'a*.... I still remember well how Indian and Pakistani students viewed Korea enviously when I went to study at McGill University in Canada.'" Yi Tonghun, Kim T'aehyŏng, and Cho Sŏnggho, "'Nae ka t'ŭllyŏt ko Pak Chŏnghŭi ka oratta': Undongkwŏn ch'ulsin 5-in ŭi p'yŏngka" [I was wrong and Park Chung Hee was right: The evaluation of five who were student activists], *Chugan Chosŏn*, November 12, 2017, https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/11/10/2017111001816.html: 천신만고 끝에 떠난 일본에서 바라본 조국 한국은 정반대였다. 외국에서는 정작 '제 3 세계 경제발전의 우등생' 평가를 받고 있었던 것이다. 그는 "내가 한국에만 있었으면 아마 '주사파'가 되어 있었을 것"이라며 "캐나다 맥길대에 유학 갔을 때는 당시 인도와 파키스탄 학생들이 한국을 부럽게 바라보던 기억이 지금도 생생하다"고 말했다. Regarding Kim Sejung's involvement in the New Right, see Kim Sejung, "Taehan min'guk ŭi pparŭn minjuhwa" [The Republic of Korea's rapid democratization], in *Taehan min'guk kŏn'guk 60-nyŏn ŭi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of the sixty years since the founding of the Republic of Korea], ed. Kim Yŏnggho (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2008), 225–252; and Kim Sejung, "Han'guk ŭi apch'uk minjuhwa: Yŏksa kujŏk chŏpkŭn" [Korea's compressed democratization: A structuralist-historical approach], in *Taehan min'guk kŏn'guk ŭi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of the founding of the Republic of Korea], ed. Yi Inho, Kim Yŏnggho, and Kang Kyuhyŏng (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2009), 749–805. Kim Sejung would also write a commemorative article for a conference marking the tenth anniversary of Kim Iryŏng's passing. Kim Sejung, "'P'osŭt'ŭ sujŏngjuŭi' ŭi kisu," 1–8.

Eighteen-Year Park Chung Hee Regime Must be Affirmed” (*Pak Chŏnghŭi 18-nyŏn kŭngjŏng haeya handa*).⁴⁸ Another is offered in the brief editor’s introduction.

Sungkyunkwan University Professor Kim Iryŏng’s article published in the fall 1995 issue of the periodical *Sasang*, “How to Think about Park Chung Hee,” is greatly different from most discussion of Park Chung Hee up until now. Rejecting the premises that “both sides are wrong” and “both sides are right,” he makes a normative choice, declaring Park Chung Hee’s strategy of industrialization before democratization to have been “reasonable” compared with other cases of development in world history.

Professor Kim also develops a unique analytical framework while comparing cases from world history, presenting the Park Chung Hee regime as a “state-elite-directed developmental state” (a soft authoritarian system prior to Yusin).⁴⁹

Stripped away are the nuances of Kim’s argument, leaving only the fact of his “positive assessment.”⁵⁰

The publication of this article was accompanied by an interview with Kim Iryŏng, which is useful for exploring his intellectual journey around this time as well as the positive reception from the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*.⁵¹ It begins with an exchange about Kim’s motivation for writing the article.

“I Actually made every effort to avoid the logic of the *Chosŏn ilbo* and *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*. I was a bit taken aback, then, by the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*’s request for an interview. I don’t think my general point agreed with that of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*.”

When I asked him if, putting aside the Fifth and Sixth Republics and just focusing on the Park Chung Hee era, there was not a considerably similar logic, he replied,

⁴⁸ The editor’s note introducing the article mentions that the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* has added a new title and section titles. Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi 18-nyŏn kŭngjŏng haeya handa,” 552.

⁴⁹ Whoever wrote the editor’s note is unspecified, so it is not clear whether Cho Kapche wrote it himself. Ibid., 552:

성균관대학교 김일영 교수가 제간 “사상”지 1995년 겨울호에 기고한 “박정희 체제 18년 어떻게 볼 것인가”라는 논문은 지금까지의 박정희론과 크게 다르다. 양비론이나 양시론을 배격하고 박정희의 선 산업화, 후 민주화 전략을 세계사의 발전 레에 비추어 “정당했다”는 가치선택을 하고 있기 때문이다.

김교수는 또 세계사의 사례와 비교하면서 독특한 분석틀을 개발, 박정희체제를 “국가엘리트에 의한 발전지향적 권위주의체제”(유신 이전은 연성 권위주의체제)로 자리매김하기도 했다.

⁵⁰ Furthermore, it is stated that Kim Iryŏng described Park Chung Hee’s development strategy as “reasonable” (*chŏngtang haetta*), as if this is a direct quote, but Kim used the more careful term “realistic” (*hyŏnsilsŏng i isŏtta*). Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga,” 223.

⁵¹ The interview begins with the heading, “The Park Chung Hee Affirmation of One who Entered University in 1979” (*79-nyŏn taehak iphaksaeng ūi Pak Chŏnghŭi kŭngjŏng*), highlighting Kim’s uniqueness among those of his generation, who attended university in the 1980s. Kim Tŏkhan, “Int’ŏbyu,” 560.

“Honestly speaking, refuting the *Chosŏn ilbo*’s logic was one of the article’s objectives. Specifically, I read Editor-in-Chief Cho Kapche’s article “Reconciliation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Yŏngsam,” published in the November 1993 edition of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*, and found the logic quite courageous, with much to accept. Yet I also thought it was considerably dangerous and ultimately wrote this article after ruminating on the subject of “democracy and development” for some time. I was concerned that a linear development logic could be misused, and metaphors can be easily misleading.”

He thus intended to respond with an academic logic to the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*’s 1993 journalistic proposal regarding reevaluation of the Park Chung Hee era.⁵²

Notably, interviewer Kim Tŏkhan sees the primary difference between Kim Iryŏng and Cho Kapche’s articles in their evaluation of Chŏn Tuhwan and No T’aeu, *not* their evaluation of Park Chung Hee; totally lost is the point that one could affirm the past without necessarily affirming the present. Furthermore, the way Kim Tŏkhan interprets Kim Iryŏng’s response, he seems to understand the article as providing a scholarly underpinning for Cho Kapche’s original “journalistic” argument, which was the opposite of the Kim Iryŏng’s professed intention. This point is once again highlighted when Kim Tŏkhan brings up Kim Yŏngsam’s campaign to “set history straight” (*yŏksa paro seugi*). Kim Iryŏng approves the investigations into Chŏn Tuhwan and No T’aeu but argues that this “settling of the past” should not extend to Park Chung Hee.⁵³ This has to do with the “dialectical self-negation” of the developmental state, but Kim Tŏkhan does not take up this idea. Instead, he brings up the issue of “genealogical legitimacy” (*chŏngt’ongsŏng*), which he says is “the core issue.” While Kim did not

⁵² Ibid., 560:

“그런데 실은 어떻게 하면 조선일보와 월간조선이 내세우는 논리를 비켜갈 것인가를 고심하면서 썼던 것인데 월간조선의 인터뷰 요청을 받고 보니 좀 당황스럽네요. 전체적인 제 논지는 월간조선과 일치하지 않는다고 생각하거든요.”

5.6 공은 유보해 두고 박정희 시대에만 한정해서 본다면 결과적으로 상당히 일치하는 논리이지 않느냐고 묻자 그는 이렇게 답했다.

“솔직히 말씀드리면 조선일보의 논리를 깨는 것이 이 논문의 목적 중 하나였습니다. 좀더 구체적으로는 조갑제 부장께서 월간조선 93년 11월호에 쓴 기사 ‘박정희와 김영삼의 화해’를 읽고 상당히 용기있는 논리고 받아들일 것이 많다고 판단했죠. 그러나 이 논리가 가지고 있는 위험성도 크다는 생각이 들어, ‘민주와 발전’이라는 주제를 오랫동안 고민하다가 이 글을 쓰게 된 것입니다. 단선적인 발전 논리는 잘못 이용될 우려가 있고 부정확한 비유는 본질을 놓치기 쉽기 때문이죠.”

93년 당시 월간조선이 내놓았던 박정희 시대 재평가에 대한 저널리즘적 문제제기를 학문적인 논리로 대응하고자 했다는 것이다.

⁵³ Ibid., 561.

discuss it in his article—let alone treat it as a “core issue”—he nevertheless takes this opportunity here to share some thoughts about it.

I think that legitimacy should be viewed in relation to efficacy, but that an atmosphere should not prevail in which formal-logical legitimacy is treated as a supreme good. The basis for evaluating the Park Chung Hee era is also related to the collapse of socialism, which offers meaningful implications for comparing the legitimacy of the South and North Korean regimes. The North has claimed vastly superior legitimacy in terms of the establishment of its government. It also showed many limitations, such as its subordination to Russia, but there were ways in which it showed this to be true according to a formal logic.

What is far more important is the fact that the North's efficacy was superior to the South until the late 1960s. The Park government thus experienced an all-the-more intense sense of crisis. A turning of the tables began at that point, however, and now North Korean efficacy is not even worthy of comparison. We cannot discuss legitimacy and completely ignore this problem.⁵⁴

Kim thus reemphasizes the point he made in his article that the ethics of responsibility were appropriate to the Park era. Ignoring the condition of “temporal relevance” (*sihyo*), it is possible to see why the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* saw considerable overlap between it and Kim's positions.

This disregard for the point of temporal relevance is also apparent when Kim Tŏkhan brings up the point that the Korean developmental state was led by a state elite (*kukka ellit'ŭ*).⁵⁵ He tries to extend this logic into the present, asking whether Kim Yŏngsam is representative of the “traditional elite” and Kim Chongp'il of the “state elite.” Kim Iryŏng completely dismisses this comparison, emphasizing this is exactly what he

⁵⁴ Ibid., 561:

정통성은 효율성의 문제와 결부시켜 보아야 한다고 생각합니다. 형식논리적 정통성이 지상선처럼 취급되는 분위기가 되어서는 안됩니다. 박정희 시대를 평가하게 된 근거도 사회주의권의 몰락과 관계가 있는데 이것은 남과 북 정권의 정통성을 비교해봐도 의미있는 시사점을 던져 줍니다. 북쪽에서는 정권의 성립과정에서의 정통성이 자기들이 훨씬 앞선다고 주장해 왔습니다. 러시아에 심하게 종속되어 있는 등 그들의 한계도 많았지만 형식논리적인 측면에서 맞는 면도 있었습니다.

더욱 중요한 것은 60년대 말까지 그들의 효율성이 남쪽에 비해 오히려 앞서 있는 측면이 있었다는 것이죠. 그러니까 박정희는 더욱 위기감을 느낀 것입니다. 그러나 그때부터 역전이 되기 시작해서 이제는 효율성 측면에서는 비교의 대상이 될 수조차 없습니다. 이런 문제를 완전히 접어 두고 정통성만을 따질 수는 없을 것입니다.

Incidentally, this comment about viewing legitimacy in relation to efficacy would serve as the article's subtitle.

⁵⁵ Specifically, this has to do with Kim's differentiation between an “authoritarian regime for traditional-elite enrichment” (*chont'ŏngjŏk ellit'ŭ rŭl wihan kwŏnwijuŭi ch'eje*) and “authoritarian regime for state-elite enrichment” (*kukka ellit'ŭ rŭl wihan kwonwijuŭi ch'eje*). See Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch'eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk'e pol kŏt in'ga,” 233–234.

means by the phrase “madmen raising the dead.”⁵⁶ Nevertheless, it seems Kim’s differentiation between “traditional” and “state” elites, besides the fact of his positive appraisal of Park Chung Hee itself, particularly caught Cho Kapche’s attention, as evident in his reference to Kim Iryōng in *Nae mudōm e ch’im ŭl paet’ōra* (Spit on my grave).

As a British reporter wrote, “Waiting for democracy in Korea is like waiting for a rose to bloom out of a garbage can.” When that garbage has sufficiently rotted, however, it can turn into the fertilizer out of which a rose may blossom. Around the time of the April Revolution, the “garbage can” known as the Republic of Korea was writhing feverishly in a tangle of contradictions. These were the birth pangs of a new dream and era.

It was two organized groups of young people in Korean society—about one hundred thousand university students and seven hundred thousand soldiers—who, while experiencing the extremes of these contradictions, dreamed of revolution as way to change reality. Their energy sources were the innocent sense of justice of those in their twenties, passion of those in their thirties, and ambition of those in their forties. Consisting of strong young men in their twenties and military officers in their thirties and forties, these were new Koreans educated since liberation in the ways of democracy and American-style managerial techniques.

The politicians who governed them were independence fighters like Rhee Syngman, former bureaucrats of the Japanese colonial administration like Chang Kyōnggūn, and landowners like many members of the Democratic Party. They were in their sixties, seventies, and eighties. In 1960, Rhee Syngman was eighty-five, Chang Myōng sixty-one, Yun Posōn sixty-three, and Hō Chōng sixty-four. By comparison, Park Chung Hee was forty-three, Song Yoch’an forty-two, Chang Toyōng thirty-seven, and Kim Chongp’il thirty-six. These young people, while retaining a respect for Rhee Syngman, despised the decrepit opposition and ruling-party politicians alike as “incompetent, corrupt, flunkeyist, feudal, and factional.”

Sungkyunkwan University professor of political science Kim Iryōng classifies the Liberal Party and Democratic Party group as a traditional elite rooted in traditional society and the military group that emerged after May 16 as a state elite. In general, a traditional elite is defined in terms of its fixation on factional interests whereas a state elite is defined in terms of its focus on the national interest and national development.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Here, one can observe that Kim Tōkhan completely misses Kim Iryōng’s emphasis on “temporal relevance” (*sihyo*). Kim Tōkhan, “Int’ōbyu,” 562.

⁵⁷ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudōm e ch’im ŭl paet’ōra: Kūndaehwa hyōngmyōngga Pak Chōnghūi ūi pijang han saengae 3; Hyōngmyōng chōnya* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 3; Revolution’s eve] (Seoul: Chosōn ilbosa, 1998), 153–154:

영국 기자가 썼던 대로 ‘한국에서 민주주의를 기대하는 것은 쓰레기통에서 장미가 피어나기를 기다리는 것’과 같았다. 하지만 그 쓰레기가 충분히 썩을 때는 장미를 피워 내는 거름으로 변할 수도 있었다. 1960 년 4.19 혁명을 전후하여 대한민국이란 쓰레기통은 모든 모순덩어리가 뒤죽박죽되어 뒤엎히고 발표하고 발열하면서 몸부림치고 있었다. 그것은 새로운 꿈과 시대를 낳으려는 산통이었다.

이 모순의 극치를 경험하면서 현실 타파의 방법으로서 혁명을 꿈꾸고 있었던 것은 한국 사회의 두 조직된 젊은 집단-약 10 만의 대학생들과 약 70 만의 군대였다. 이들은 20 대의 순진한 정의감과 30 대의 정열과 40 대의 야망을 에너지원으로 삼고 있었다. 20 대 장청과 30, 40 대 장교들로 구성된 이들은 해방 후 민주주의 교육과 미국식 조직관리술을 배운 신한국인이었다.

이들을 다스리고 있던 정치인들은 이승만 같은 독립투사, 장청군 같은 일제 시대 관료 출신, 많은 민주당 의원 같은 지주 출신들이었다. 나이도 80 대에서 60 대에 걸쳐 있었다. 1960 년 현재

Evidently, Cho had no problem picking out the parts of Kim's article of which he could make use, regardless of the harsh criticism he had received therein. He seems to view Kim's use of the term "state elites" as corroborating his evaluation of the May 16 coup d'état as a revolution. Noticeably absent, however, is the point about "temporal relevance." Cho would extend this distinction between "traditional" and "state" elites into the present in his frequent criticism of professional politicians. By this time, the disdain for the opposition politicians he had developed through the transition to democracy, as I discuss in chapter two, had only become more severe.

Cho Kapche has also posted a piece written by Kim Iryŏng on his website.⁵⁸ Reiterating the core ideas of Kim's 1995 *Sasang* article, this

이승만이 85세, 장면이 61세, 윤보선이 63세, 허정이 64세였던 데 대해 박정희는 43세, 송요찬은 42세, 장도영은 37세, 김종필은 36세였다. 이들 젊은 집단은 이승만 대통령에 대한 존경심을 간직하면서도 노쇠한 여야 정치 지도자들을 싸잡아 '무능하고 부패한 사대적, 봉건적, 당파적 정치 세력'으로 경멸하고 있었다.

성균관대학교 정치학과 김일영 교수는 자유당·민주당 세력을 전통사회에 기반한 전통 엘리트로, 5.16 이후에 새로 등장한 군부 세력을 국가 엘리트로 분류한다. 통상적으로 전통 엘리트는 파당적 이해 관계에 집착하는 반면, 국가 엘리트는 국익과 국가 발전의 측에 힘쓴다는 것으로 정의된다.

⁵⁸ The article is posted twice under two different headings grouped together with two other pieces on Park Chung Hee, one by sociologist Cho Ije and the other by Cho Kapche. Kim Iryŏng, "Pak Chŏnghŭi-sik kaebal model ūn segyesa ūi wŏlli"; Cho Kapche tatŭ'ŏm, "Pak Chŏnghŭi e taehan se kaji sigak: Kim Iryŏng, Cho Ije, Cho Kapche ūi nonp'yŏng" [Three perspectives regarding Park Chung Hee: Remarks by Kim Iryŏng, Cho Ije, and Cho Kapche], *Chogabje.com*, December 30, 2015, https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=54154&C_CC=BJ. See also Cho Kapche, "Nonmun pigyo: 1-lyu wa 3-nyu ūi Pak Chŏnghŭi p'yŏngka" [Paper comparison: First-rate and third-rate evaluations of Park Chung Hee], *Chogabje.com*, October 27, 2005, https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=8126&C_CC=AZ. Cho Ije's piece is a transcript of a lecture given for the President Park Chung Hee Commemoration Association (*Pak Chŏnghŭi tae'tongnyŏng kinyŏm saŏphoe*) and Cho Kapche's is taken from the preface he wrote for the 1997 reprint of *The Nation, the Revolution, and I*. It is revealed only in the second posting that Kim's piece was originally published in the *Pak Chŏnghŭi tae'tongnyŏng kinyŏm saŏphoe hoebo* (The President Park Chung Hee commemoration association bulletin). It was an abridged version of Kim Iryŏng, "Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn'gu," 11–40, itself a later version of Kim Iryŏng's 1995 *Sasang* article. It is not explicitly stated that Kim Iryŏng gave his permission for the posting. In any case, it is clear he moved closer to right-wing pundits like Cho Kapche through his work on the Park Chung Hee commemoration project. See also Cho Kapche, "Chaebalgan e puch'ŏ" [Preface to the new edition], in *Kukka wa hyŏngmyŏng kwa na* [The nation, the revolution, and I], Pak Chŏnghŭi (Seoul: Chiguch'on, 1997), 5–19. For more by Cho Ije, see Cho Ije and K'at'ŏ Ek'ŏt'ŭ [Carter Eckert], ed., *Han'guk kundaehwa, kijŏk ūi kwajŏng* [Korean modernization: The process of the miracle] (Seoul: Wŏlgan Chosŏnsa, 2005). As for the Park Chung Hee Commemoration Association, it was established in 1999, with then President Kim Taejung as honorary chairman. See Chŏn Pyŏngdŭk, "'Pak Chŏnghui

piece emphasizes that “Park Chung Hee’s development model conformed to a world-historical principal.” Conspicuously missing, however, is any discussion of “madmen raising the dead,” “temporal relevance,” or “dialectical self-negation.” Yet what is probably even more significant is its grouping with two other pieces, one by sociologist Cho Ije and the other by Cho Kapche himself. In this context, Cho treated Kim’s evaluation of Park Chung Hee as categorically similar to those of celebrants like himself. What mattered for Cho was only Kim’s portrayal of contemporary history as a story of success. This point is drawn into relief by considering Cho’s disregard for Ko Söngguk, who had written a series of articles in 1994 criticizing Cho and his view of Park Chung Hee and calling him out for a public debate.⁵⁹ By the fourth article in the series, Ko bitterly remarked, “Cowardly *Wölgan Chosön*, I no longer wish for an answer.”⁶⁰

To be sure, Kim Iryöng would likely reject any association with Cho Kapche. When asked his thoughts on Professor Han Söngjo’s controversial description of colonialism as a “blessing” in a Japanese magazine in 2006—comments which Cho had publicly defended—for

taet’ongnyöng kinyörm saöphoe’ palchok” [Commencement of the Park Chung Hee Commemoration Association], *Maeil kyöngje*, July 27, 1999, 7; and Yö Hyönhö, “Taegyumo ch’umo umjigim chöngch’i sanghwang p’yönsüng ittan kihöek haengsa” [Series of events involving large-scale memorial activities following bandwagoning on the political situation], *Han’györe*, October 26, 1999, 7.

⁵⁹ See Ko Söngguk, “Cho Kapche pujang,” 80–91; Ko Söngguk, “Cho Kapche pujang üi Pak Chöngghüiron üi haebu handa (1): ‘Hyöngmyöngga Pak Chöngghüi’ puhwal ün sangöpchök sönjöngjuüi wa üi kyölt’ak iötta” [Analyzing Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche’s Pak Chöngghüi, part 1: The resurrection of the “revolutionary Park Chung Hee” was a commercialist, sensationalist plot], *Kil* (July 1994): 48–69; Ko Söngguk, “Cho Kapche pujang chönmöyön pip’an (3): Kü üi Pak Chöngghüiron ün Chön Tuhwan.No T’aeu rül tto yöngung üro mandörötta” [A full-on critique of Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche, part three: His discussion of Park Chung Hee also made Chön Tuhwan and No T’aeu into heroes], *Kil* (August 1994): 158–177; Ko Söngguk, “*Wölgan Chosön* Cho Kapche pujang üi pip’an handa: Kim Yöngsam taet’ongnyöng ün 7-gong ch’öngmunhoe e Cho Kapche pujang kwa hamkke söi su öpta” [Criticizing *Wölgan Chosön* Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche: President Kim Yöngsam cannot stand together with Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche at the Seventh Republic hearings], *Kil* (September 1994): 81–100; Ko Söngguk, “Yöksa nün *Wölgan Chosön* kwa Cho Kapche pujang üi tamül sigan i öpta: Kaehyök kwa t’ongil sidae, sugu seryök ege ponaenün man’ga” [History has no time for the *Wölgan Chosön* or Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche: The age of reform and unification, an elegy for the reactionaries], *Kil* (October 1994): 92–115.

⁶⁰ Ko Söngguk, “*Wölgan Chosön* Cho Kapche pujang üi pip’an handa,” 81: 비겁한 ‘월간조선’, 더이상 답변을 바라지 않겠다. Ko declared that Cho’s use of fortune tellers’ “predictions” pertaining to North Korea disqualified him as a worthy interlocutor.

example, he stated, “Han Sŭngjo and Cho Kapche’s way of thinking has absolutely nothing to do with us,” and insisted on the unjustness of the very question.⁶¹ Meanwhile, the New Right itself serves as an example of the ongoing pursuit of a third way Kim proposed in his 1995 *Sasang* article closely aligned.⁶² Examining Kim’s work over time after 1995, however, there is a clear shift in his main target of criticism from right—“madmen raising the dead,” like Cho Kapche—to left.

In this regard, one may look at Kim’s career as a columnist beginning in 1998.⁶³ His second column ever published was none other than a second abridged version of his 1995 *Sasang* article. This time, it appeared in the *Chosŏn ilbo*, with whom he had once considered himself at odds, marking the twentieth anniversary of Park Chung Hee’s death on October 26, 1999.⁶⁴ What is important about this article is that it signified a change in audience. The publication of the abridged article in the *Wŏlgan*

⁶¹ Cho T’aesŏng, “‘Taedonga kongyŏngkwŏn’ panbak hal nollŭ innŭn’ga” [Is there a logic to refute the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”], *Sŏul sinmun*, March 10, 2005, <https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/seoulPrintNew.php?id=20050310026003>: “‘교과서포럼’의 성균관대 김일영 교수는 ‘우리와 한승조-조갑제식 논리와는 아무런 상관이 없다.’면서 비교되는 것 자체에 강한 불쾌감을 나타냈다.”

⁶² See, for example, Na Ki’ch’ŏn, “486-chudo chungdo nosŏn p’yobang... ‘Chayujuŭi yŏndae’ ch’ulbŏm” [Claim to advance 486-generation-led moderate line... Launch of the “Alliance for Liberalism”], *Segye ilbo*, November 24, 2004, <https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/article/022/0000065226?sid=100>. Han Sŭngjo argued that Japanese colonialism had been a “blessing” insofar as “saving” Korea from becoming a Russian colony and thus, in his view, shielding Korea from communization through the Russian revolution. See Ha Chongmun, “Pan-Il minjokchuŭi wa Nyu rait’ŭ” [Anti-Japanese nationalism and the New Right], *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 78 (February 2007): 175–197; Pak T’aegyŭn, “Han’guk posu ideollogi ŭi t’ŭkching kwa tillem: Han Sŭngjo p’amun ŭi yŏksajŏk ŭimi” [The characteristics and dilemma of Korean conservative ideology: The historical meaning of the Han Sŭngjo controversy], *Hwanghae munhwa* 47 (June 2005): 205–233.

⁶³ His first article was published in the *Chungang ilbo*, marking fifty years since the founding of the Republic of Korea and discussing the position of the prime minister (*ch’ongni*) in the history of South Korean politics. See Kim Iryŏng, “Taehan min’guk 50-nyŏn: Ch’ongni wisang” [Fifty years of the Republic of Korea: The status of the prime minister], in *P’umkyŏk innŭn posu rŭl kkum kuda: Ko Kim Iryŏng kyosu k’allŏmchip* [Dreaming of a dignified conservatism: Collected columns of the late Professor Kim Iryŏng] (P’aju: Idam poksŭ, 2010), 178–181, originally published in the *Chungang ilbo*, August 19, 1998. A purportedly complete list of Kim Iryŏng’s columns and interviews can also be found in Kim Iryŏng, *Han’guk hyŏndae chŏngch’isaron*, 490–495. I also searched the Naver News Library database (newslibrary.naver.com), which includes articles from the *Kyŏnggyŏng sinmun*, *Tonga ilbo*, *Maeil kyŏngje*, *Chosŏn ilbo*, and *Han’gyŏre* up to 1999.

⁶⁴ Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi, ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga,” 6. One may recall Kim had stated his intention to refute the logic of the *Chosŏn ilbo* in his 1995 *Sasang* article. Kim Tŏkhan, “Int’ŏbyu,” 560.

Chosŏn had also meant a shift to a more popular forum, but now Kim was publishing in Korea's most popular—not to mention most conservative—daily. Furthermore, entirely absent from this version was any call to counter the “hegemonic offensive” of the “conservative establishment,” while the description of “madmen raising the dead” was softened. “To emphasize this point once more, let us evaluate the Park Chung Hee of that era. Let us not try to revive him. Even the slightest blind nostalgia or political opportunism can become a madman raising the dead.”⁶⁵ Above all, with this article Kim began a relationship with the *Chosŏn ilbo*. Along with the *Tonga ilbo*, Korea's second most popular daily, this newspaper would become an important outlet for his social, political, and historical commentary. In fact, a survey of his newspaper publications reveals the overwhelming dominance of these two dailies (table 3.1). With the *Chungang ilbo* in a distant third, it is clear Kim wrote almost exclusively for Korea's three most popular, most conservative dailies.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi, ottŏk'e pol kŏt in'ga,” 6: 제삼 강조하건대 그 시절의 박 대통령을 평가하자. 그러나 오늘에 되살리려 하지는 말자. 맹목적 향수나 정략적 이용은 자칫하면 망령을 불러내는 망령이 될 수도 있다.

⁶⁶ Another important development around this time was the concerted effort to overcome “revisionism” (*suŏngjuŭi*). Several key scholars in the New Right movement, including Yu Yŏngik (Young Ick Lew), Son Insang, and Kim Yŏngho, not to mention Kim Iryŏng, would first coalesce around this effort. Yu Yŏngik is a prominent scholar of modern as well as contemporary history. See, for example, Young Ick Lew, “The Conservative Character of the 1894 Tonghak Peasant Uprising: A Reappraisal with Emphasis on Chŏn Pong-jun's Background and Motivation,” *The Journal of Korean Studies* 7 (1990): 149–180; Yu Yŏngik, “Kabo nongmin ponggi ŭi posujŏk sŏngkyŏk” [The conservative character of the Kabo peasant uprising], *Han'guk chŏngch'i oegyosa nonch'ong* 12 (1995): 353–381; Yu Yŏngik, *Tonghak nongmin ponggi wa Kabo kyŏngjang: Ch'ŏng-il chŏnjaeng (1894–1895) Chosŏn chidoja tŭl ŭi sasang kwa haengdong* [The Tonghak peasant uprising and the Kabo reforms: The Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and the imagination and actions of Korean leaders] (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1998). On his life and scholarship, see Yu Yŏngik, “Kabo kyŏngjang yŏn'gu” [A study of the Kabo reforms], *Simin kangjwa* 9 (1991): 176–189; and Michael Finch, “An Interview with Professor Young Ick Lew,” *Acta Koreana* 12, no. 2 (2009): 205–223. Henry Em also discusses Yu Yŏngik's career in his profile of Korean Studies in the United States. Im Helli, “Miguk nae Han'guk kŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn'gu tonghyang” [Trends in overseas academia: Trends in modern and contemporary Korean history research in the United States], *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 23 (March 1997): 189–202. Yu began his extensive work on Rhee Syngman in the mid-1990s, of which the following is just a sample: Yu Yŏngik, “Yi Sŭngman ŭi kŏn'guk isang” [Rhee Syngman's nation-founding ideal], *Simin kangjwa* 17 (1995): 1–24; Yu Yŏngik, “Semok e ch'ŏlchŏ hamyŏ kŏsjŏk hyŏngan kubi han” [An eye for the big picture as well as detail], *Han'guk nondan* 84 (1996): 128–135; Yu Yŏngik, *Yi Sŭngman ŭi sam kwa kkum: Taet'ongnyŏng i toegi kkaji* [The life and dreams of Rhee Syngman: Up until becoming president] (Seoul: Chungang ilbosa, 1996); Yu Yŏngik, *Yi Sŭngman yŏn'gu: Tongnip undong kwa Taehan min'guk kŏn'guk* [A study of Rhee Syngman:

The independence movement and founding of the Republic of Korea] (Seoul: Yōnse taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2000); Yu Yōngik, *Chōlmūn nal ūi Yi Sūngman: Hansōng kamok saenghwal (1899–1904); Okchung chapki yōn'gu* [Rhee Syngman's younger days: His time in Hansōng Prison (1899–1904); A study of his prison writings] (Seoul: Yōnse taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2002); Yu Yōngik, ed., *Yi Sūngman taet'ongnyōng chaep'yōngka* [A reevaluation of President Rhee Syngman] (Seoul: Yōnse taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2006); Yu Yōngik, *Kōn'guk taet'ongnyōng Yi Sūngman: Saengae.sasang.ōpchōk ūi saeroun chomyōng* [Nation-founding president Rhee Syngman: Shedding new light on his life, thought, and accomplishments] (Seoul: Ilchogak, 2013); Young Ick Lew, *The Making of the First Korean President: Syngman Rhee's Quest for Independence, 1875–1948* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014); Yu Yōngik, *Yi Sūngman ūi saengae wa kōn'guk pijōn* [The Life of Rhee Syngman and his nation-founding vision] (Seoul: Ch'ōng midio, 2019). He began this research in earnest with the founding of the Institute for Modern Korean Studies (*Hyōndae Han'gukhak yōn'guso*) in 1997. As its first director, Yu declared one of its main purposes to serve as a center for research on Korea's past presidents. Yi Hanu, "'Han'guk hyōndaesa ch'egye-hwa ponkyōk sidong" [Full-fledged start to the systematization of contemporary Korean history], *Chosōn ilbo*, August 14, 1997, 17. One of the bases for founding the center was Rhee Syngman's adopted son Rhee Insu's entrustment of Rhee Syngman's vast personal papers to Yu. Yun Sūnga, "Hyōndae Han'gukhak yōn'guso Yu Yōngik sojang: 'Yi Sūngman.Pak Chōnghūi tūng kaekkwanjōk yōn'gu Han'guk ūi 'taet'ongnyōnghak sent'ō" ro'" [Institute of Modern Korean Studies Director Young Ick Lew: "A 'center for Korea's presidents' and objective research on Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee"] *Kyōnghyang sinmun*, August 21, 1997, 19; Finch, "An Interview with Professor Young Ick Lew," 216–218. See the institute's homepage at <https://imks.yonsei.ac.kr/modernkorean/index.do>. Among its first initiatives was a conference with the heading "A New Start after Revisionism (*Sujōngjuūi ihu ūi sae ch'ulbal*)" to address the perceived negative influence of "revisionism" over the field of contemporary Korean historiography. Yun Sūnga, "Hyōndae Han'gukhak yōn'guso," 19. Yu had also published a paper earlier that year criticizing the influence of "revisionism" in contemporary historiography. Yu Yōngik, "Sujōngjuūi wa Han'guk hyōndaesa yōn'gu" [Revisionism and research in contemporary Korean history], *Simin kangjwa* 20 (1997): 58–78. This conference would become the basis for the 1998 volume, Yu Yōngik, ed., *Sujōngjuūi wa Han'guk hyōndaesa* [Revisionism and contemporary Korean history] (Seoul: Yōnse taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 1998). Yu, whom historian Yi Chunsik describes as the "godfather" (*taebu*) of the New Right, was involved in Textbook Forum and various New Right publications, but perhaps his most controversial role was as chairman of the National Institute of Korean history (*Kuksa p'yōngch'an wiwōnhoe*) in the 2013 controversy over the New Right textbook published by Kyohaksa. Yi Chunsik, "Han'guk yōksa kyogwasō in'ga, ani myōn Ilbon yōksa kyogwasō in'ga? Kyohaksa Han'guksa kyogwasō Ilche kangjōmgi sōsul pip'an" [Is it a Korean or Japanese history textbook? A critique of the narrative of the Japanese colonial period in the Kyohaksa Korean history textbook], *Yōksa pip'yōng* 105 (November 2013), 76, 60. Chōn Sangin underwent a scholarly journey similar to that of Kim Iryōng. Both finished their PhDs in 1991 although Chōn did so in the United States. Their dissertation topics also overlapped, and Chōn took an interest in the developmental state even earlier than Kim. Sang-In Jun, "State-Making in South Korea, 1945–48: U.S. Occupation and Korean Development (PhD diss., Brown University, 1991); Chōn Sangin, "Sūk'ach'ip'ol ūi hyōngmyōng, T'illi ūi chōnjaeng, kūrigo Han'guk ūi kukka (I)" [Skocpol's revolution, Tilly's war, and the Korean state, part one], *Yōnse sahoehak* 12 (1991): 129–155; Chōn Sangin, "Sūk'ach'ip'ol ūi hyōngmyōng, T'illi ūi chōnjaeng, kūrigo Han'guk ūi kukka (II)" [Skocpol's revolution, Tilly's war, and the Korean state, part two], *Yōnse sahoehak* 14 (1994): 33–69; Sang-In Jun, "The Origins of the Developmental State in South Korea," *Asian Perspective* 16, no. 2 (1992): 181–204 (this article is also based on Chōn's dissertation). The two were also influenced by Bruce Cumings, as evident in their early work. Chōn, however, would offer an early critique of Cumings and his influence in Korean academia. Chōn Sangin, "Pūrusū Kōmingsū ūi Han'guk sahoe.Han'guksa ūi insik [Bruce Cumings' understanding of Korean society and history], *Han'guk kwa kukche chōngch'i* 8, no. 1 (1992): 239–280. To hazard a guess, this

may have been related to his having received his PhD in the United States, where the critique of “revisionism” in the field of diplomatic history proceeded ahead that of Korea. Another example of Chon’s early critiques of a “revisionist” perspective regarding the contemporary period can be found in Chŏn Sangin, “5.10 sŏn’gŏ wa 5.30 sŏn’gŏ rŭl ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga? Kang Chŏnggu ŭi ‘5.10 sŏn’gŏ wa 5.30 sŏn’gŏ ŭi pigyo yŏn’gu’ e taehan pallon” [How to think about the May 10 and May 30 elections: A critical response to Kang Chŏnggu’s “A comparative study of the May 10 and May 30 elections”], *Han’guk kwa kukche chŏngch’i* 10, no. 1 (1994): 283–288. Chŏn would also contribute to Yu’s edited volume on revisionism. Chŏn Sangin, “Kogae sugin’ sujŏngjuŭi: Han’guk hyŏndaesa yŏn’gu ŭi saeroun sijak” [Revisionism “in retreat”: A new start for contemporary Korean history research], in *Sujŏngjuŭi wa Han’guk hyŏndaesa* [Revisionism and contemporary Korean history], ed. Yu Yŏngik (Seoul: Yŏnse taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1998), 259–298. He would develop this into Chŏn Sangin, *Kogae sugin’ sujŏngjuŭi: Han’guk hyŏndaesa ŭi yŏksa sahoehak* [Revisionism in retreat: The historical sociology of contemporary Korean history] (Seoul: Chŏnt’ong kwa hyŏndae, 2001). Political scientist Kim Yŏngho also contributed to Yu’s volume. Kim Yŏngho, “Han’guk chŏnjaeng wŏnin ŭi kukche chŏngch’ijŏk chaeaesŏk: Sut’allin ŭi ‘rolbaek’ iron” [An international-political reinterpretation of the origins of the Korean War: Stalin’s “rollback” theory], in *Sujŏngjuŭi wa Han’guk hyŏndaesa* [Revisionism and contemporary Korean history], ed. Yu Yŏngik (Seoul: Yŏnse taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1998), 223–258. See also Kim Yŏngho, *Han’guk chŏnjaeng ŭi kiwŏn kwa chŏn’gae kwajŏng: Sŭt’allin kwa Miguk ŭi rolbaek* [The origins and development of the Korean War: Stalin and the United States’ rollback] (Seoul: Ture, 1998); and Young-ho Kim, “International Dimensions of the Korean War,” *Korean Journal* (1998): 130–146. As part of the postrevisionist movement, the journal *Han’guk hyŏndaesa yŏn’gu* (Contemporary Korean history research) was founded in 1998, not long after the Institute for Modern Korean Studies. The journal was a publication of the Institute for Contemporary History Research (Hyŏndaesa yŏn’guso, established in 1997) of the Academy of Korean Studies (*Han’guk chŏngsin munhwa yŏn’guwŏn*, which changed its name to the *Han’gukhak chungang yŏn’guwŏn* in 2005). See Han’gukhak chungang yŏn’guwŏn, “Yŏnhyŏk” [Organization history], [https://www.aks.ac.kr/com/cmm/EgovContentView.do?menuNo=5010120000](https://www.aks.ac.kr/com/cmm/EgovContentView.do?menuNo=5010120000&lang=kor) &lang=kor. Upon founding the Institute for Contemporary History Research, the first director, political scientist Han Hŭngsu, stated, “Korean contemporary history has been bound up in ideology and factional interests, unable to establish itself as an object of objective research.” Yun Sŭnga, “Int’ŏbyu: Hyŏndaesa yŏn’guso Han Hŭngsu ch’odae sojang, ‘Chŏngkwŏn e min’gam han uri hyŏndaesa saryo pojon”” [Interview: Institute of contemporary history research Visiting Chairman Han Hŭngsu, “Preserving the historical materials of our contemporary history, which are sensitive to (changes in) administration”], *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, April 17, 1997, 13: 한국 현대사는 이데올로기와 당파적인 이해관계에 얽매여 객관적인 연구대상으로 정립 되지 못했습니다. The inaugural issue of *Han’guk hyŏndaesa yŏn’gu* featured articles such as Chŏn Sangin, “Pŭrusŭ K’ŏmingsŭ ŭi Han’guk hyŏndaesa ihae” [Bruce Cumings’ understanding of Korean contemporary history], *Han’guk hyŏndaesa yŏn’gu ch’anggan ho* (1998): 153–208; and Kim Iryŏng, “‘Yi Sŭngman sujŏngjuŭi’ e taehan sujŏng,” 383–393, a review of Yi Chongwŏn, *Higashijia reisen*.

Table 3.1 Kim Iryŏng’s Newspaper Publications, 1998–2009

| | <i>Chosŏn ilbo</i> | <i>Chungang ilbo</i> | <i>Tonga ilbo</i> | Other | Total |
|--------------|--------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------|-----------|
| 1998 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 1999 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 2000 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 4 |
| 2001 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 8 |
| 2002 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 10 |
| 2003 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 9 |
| 2004 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 12 |
| 2005 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| 2006 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| 2007 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 10 |
| 2008 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| 2009 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Total | 29 | 14 | 28 | 4 | 75 |

Source: Data compiled from Kim Iryŏng, *P’umkyŏk innŭn posu rŭl kkum kuda: Ko Kim Iryŏng kyosu k’allŏmchip* [Dreaming of a dignified conservatism: Collected columns of the late Professor Kim Iryŏng] (P’aju: Idam poksŭ, 2010).

Note: The category “other” includes a 2001 *Chugan Tonga* article, 2001 *Taehan maeil* article, 2004 *Sŏul taehakkyo Haengjŏng daehagwŏn Han’guk chŏngch’aek chisik sent’ŏ konggiŏp p’orŏm* article, and 2007 *Wik’ŭlli Chosŏn* article.

The turn toward criticism of the left over the right is even more marked in Kim’s work in the early 2000s, after the inauguration of the No Muhyŏn administration and moving toward the founding of the New Right. Even while he wrote his 1995 *Sasang* article in direct response to the “hegemonic offensive” of the “conservative establishment” initiated by Cho Kapche in 1993, the fact alone of his positive appraisal of Park Chung Hee was enough to endear him to the very people he criticized. Completely ignoring the critical aspects of Kim’s article, the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* re-published it the following year. And Cho Kapche directly referred to Kim in his biography of Park Chung Hee and periodically posts a piece by him on his website. Meanwhile, as the critical historiography of the left came increasingly under Kim’s crosshairs, criticism of right-wing commentators like Cho became increasingly marginal. Nowhere is this clearer than in Kim’s *Kŏn’guk kwa puguk*.

V. *Kõn'guk kwa puguk*

Kim Iryõng published his most important full-length work on Korean history, *Kõn'guk kwa puguk* (Nation founding and nation enrichment), in 2004, just as the New Right movement got underway.⁶⁷ The book was the fourth in the five-volume series, the Pang Iryõng Culture Foundation Korean Contemporary History Lectures (*Pang Iryõng munhwa chaedan Han'guk hyõndaesa kangjwa*).⁶⁸ The other four volumes are as follow: *38-sõn esõ hyujõnsõn ũro* (From the Thirty-Eighth Parallel to the ceasefire line), by Yang Homin; *Pukhan chuch'e sasang ũi hyõngsõng kwa soet'oe* (The formation and deterioration of North Korean *chuch'e* thought), by Sin Ilch'õl; *Pukhan ũi sahoejuui: Kõnsõl kwa chwajõl* (Socialism in North Korea: Construction and breakdown), by Yu Hyoyõl; and *Han-Mi tongmaeng 50-nyõn* (Fifty years of the ROK-US alliance), by Ch'a Sangch'õl.⁶⁹ Based on such titles, the series appears to rehash traditional

⁶⁷ Kim Iryõng, *Kõn'guk kwa puguk*. A second edition was published in 2010. Kim Iryõng, *Kõn'guk kwa puguk: Yi Sõngman.Pak Chõnghui sidae chaejomyõng* [Founding a nation and enriching a nation: Shedding new light on the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee eras] (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2010). Kim mentions that he originally conceived of the plan for the book while a fellow at the Harvard-Yenching Institute from 1996–1997. Kim Iryõng, *Kõn'guk kwa puguk*, 16. Short of a word-for-word comparison, the two works are virtually identical in terms of content. The subtitles, of course, are different. Incorrectly listed page numbers in the index of the 2004 version are corrected in the 2010 version. And there is a curious difference in the dating of the introductions, stated as December 2004 and January 2005, respectively. Since the contents of the introductions are identical and considering that the 2004 version came out in December, the latter appears a mistake. The most significant differences between the two versions are the replacement of the Pang Iryõng Culture Foundation (*Pang Iryõng munhwa chaedan*) foreword by a publisher's preface, written by Kim Tojong, chairman of the Committee for the publication of the works of Kim Iryõng (*Kim Iryõng yugo kanhaeng wiwõnhoe*). The 2010 version also appends condolences written by friends and colleagues of Kim Iryõng, who passed away in 2009. I cite the 2004 version, but all page numbers from the main body correspond to the 2010 version.

⁶⁸ Pang Iryõng was the chairman (*hoejang*) of the *Chosõn ilbo* from 1964–1993. He founded the Pang Iryõng Culture Foundation after stepping down. See the homepage at <http://www.bangfound.org>. Historian Im Taesik has also emphasized the significance of Kim Iryõng's reception of funding from the foundation. Im Taesik, "Kwagõsa naejõn ũl aptu ko: Kõdae han ũmmo wa yakhan kori yõtpogi" [The looming civil war over matters of the past: Jottings on a great conspiracy and the weak link in the chain], *Yõksa pip'yõng* 71 (May 2005), 31. The publisher Kip'arang, founded in 2005 by then *Chosõn ilbo* president (and son of Pang Iryõng) Pang Sanghun, would also become a key outlet for New Right publications, including the 2010 edition of Kim's *Kõn'guk kwa puguk*.

⁶⁹ Yang Homin, *38-sõn esõ hyujõnsõn ũro* [From the Thirty-Eighth Parallel to the ceasefire line] (Seoul: Saenggak ũi namu, 2004); Sin Ilch'õl, *Pukhan chuch'e sasang ũi hyõngsõng kwa soet'oe* [The formation and deterioration of North Korean *chuch'e* thought] (Seoul: Saenggak ũi namu, 2004); Yu Hyoyõl, *Pukhan ũi sahoejuui: Kõnsõl kwa chwajõl* [Socialism

Cold War themes of anticommunism and pro-Americanism, while also extolling the virtues of South Korea's presidents. Here the topic of North Korea appears particularly important, a subject to which three of the five volumes are dedicated. Indeed, the series preface, authorship of which is attributed to the Pang Iryŏng Cultural Foundation, appears oblivious to any subject matter other than North Korea. Observing the great changes sweeping the globe since 1991 and emphasizing the former Soviet Union's democratization and fundamental change in the PRC, the author laments a corresponding lack of progress in South-North relations, particularly since the inauguration of Kim Taejung and his "sunshine policy," which has only produced a more belligerent, ardently nuclearized North Korea. "Why is this happening?" the author asks. The question is not rhetorical. "The intention of the Korean Contemporary History Lectures is to discover the cause in the circumstances surrounding the Korean Peninsula and particularly in the character of the North Korea regime of Kim Il Sung and Kim Chong Il."⁷⁰ Clearly the author sees the series as an exposé of North Korea. Whether or not Kim Iryŏng's book accords with this objective at all, noting the context in which it was written is itself noteworthy.

With this point in mind, it is interesting to observe how Kim himself introduces his book.⁷¹ He begins with the question of how to think

in North Korea: Construction and breakdown] (Seoul: Saenggak ŭi namu, 2004); Ch'a Sangch'ŏl, *Han-Mi tongmaeng 50-nyŏn* [Fifty years of the ROK-US alliance] (Seoul: Saenggak ŭi namu, 2004).

⁷⁰ Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn 'guk kwa puguk*, 4–6, 6: 한반도를 둘러싼 주변 정세와 특히 북한의 김일성-김정일 체제의 성격에서 그 원인을 찾아보자는 것이 이 '한국현대사강좌'의 의도이다." The author then states that the series was thus planned to look at South-North relations since 1945. Readers may wonder if the author has actually observed the content of the series.

⁷¹ The book's introduction is similar in content to a chapter in an edited volume published around the same time. Kim Iryŏng, "Han'guk, sŏnggong ŭi yŏksa" [Korea, a history of success], in *21-segi Han'guk: Chayu, chinbo kŭrigo pŏnyŏng ŭi kil* [Twenty-first-century Korea: The path to liberty, progress, and prosperity], ed. Pok Kŏil, Kim Chŏngho, and Pak Hyojong (P'aju: Nanam ch'ulp'an, 2005), 129–145. Notice the title here, which is perhaps a more honest reflection of the content. Similar in tone is one of Kim Iryŏng's final publications, which opens with statistics alluding to the various achievements of the South Korean state before criticizing "revisionist" historiography that has spread since the 1980s through the "386 generation" that condemns the South while remaining silent about the North, spreading its views through the media, the teacher's union, and history textbooks. Adopting a pragmatic line, Kim argues that such historiography is a barrier to "advancement" (*sŏnjinhwa*). This is a position much closer to that of Cho Kapche. Indeed, the following passage is one that seems like it could have been written by Cho himself: "It would have

about contemporary history, much as he did with Park Chung Hee almost a decade earlier in his 1995 *Sasang* article. Here, however, the concern with seizing the initiative over contemporary history away from conservatives like Cho Kapche is entirely absent.⁷² Kim had also argued against “unconditional denunciation” of Park Chung Hee in his 1995 article, but at this point the left was still a worthy interlocutor. This call for dialogue is no longer present. In place of the “conservative establishment” and “madmen raising the dead” is an Oedipus-complex-stricken, revisionist left—which he also refers to as “Cumings and his children”—that seeks to commit “patricide” (*abŏji chugigi*) with its critical historiography.⁷³ “Burke once compared the French Revolution to a fever,” writes Kim, “and our society is now in the grips of just such a fever. The causes are many, but it is clear the obsession of the revisionists with paternal erasure and the understanding of history of the 386 generation are among them.”⁷⁴ Clearly Kim’s agenda had shifted since 1995. Even while he rejected comparison with Cho, then, it seems fair to conclude they had found common ground by the time of the New Right’s founding.

been nice if the tasks of founding a nation, enriching a nation, and democratization could have been pursued simultaneously, but reality did not allow for this. Rhee Syngman, Park Chung Hee, and the two Kims (Kim Yŏngsam and Kim Taejung) each accepted the respective tasks of founding a nation, enriching a nation, and democratization, successfully seeing each through.” Kim Iryŏng, “Kyunhyŏng chaphin yŏksagwan ūn sŏnjinhwa ūi chŏnje” [A balanced view of history is a prerequisite for advancement], in *Sŏnjinhwa kyosil* [Advancement classroom], ed. Yi Sŭnghun (Seoul: Han’guk sŏnjinhwa p’orŏm, 2009), 88–89, 91: 건국, 부국, 민주화라는 과제는 동시에 추구될 수 있었으면 좋았겠지만 현실은 그렇지 못했다. 따라서 이승만, 박정희, 그리고 양김씨(김영삼, 김대중)는 각각 건국, 부국, 민주화라는 과제를 나누어 맡아 성공적으로 수행했다.

⁷² Cho is present in the book only when his biography is cited as a source.

⁷³ The futility of “trying to erase one’s father,” says Kim, is well conveyed in Yi Munyŏl’s novel *Siin* (The poet). The protagonist spends his entire life trying to deny and erase his father but ultimately accepts and understands him. Driving home this point about filiality to history, Kim devotes the book to his maternal grandmother, “who clasped her son to her bosom amid the chaos of contemporary history.” The dedication is missing from the 2010 version. Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn’guk kwa puguk*, 9–10, 8: 격동의 현대사 속에서 아들을 가슴에 묻고 사시다 가신 외할머니께 이 책을 바칩니다. Of course, Kim takes it as given that historical figures such as Rhee and Park represent “the father.” He does not appear to consider that revisionist history might be just as filial only with different father figures. Nor does he see any irony in describing revisionists historians as “Cumings and his children.”

⁷⁴ Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn’guk kwa puguk*, 12: 일찍이 버크는 프랑스혁명을 열병에 비유했는데, 지금 우리사회도 유사한 열병을 앓고 있다. 병인은 여러 가지겠지만, 아버지 지우기에 치우친 수정주의자들과 386 세대의 역사관도 그중 하나임은 분명하다.

The book's scope spans the period of 1945–1972. The content is neatly divisible into two parts, with the first, longer part of the book focusing on the founding of the Republic of Korea, the Korean War, and the Rhee Syngman Era, and the second covering the Park Chung Hee era up to the Yusin declaration, with a brief sketch of the Yusin era provided in the final chapter. Kim mentions a planned second volume to cover the Yusin period and into the present, but it was never completed.⁷⁵ The book concludes with an epilogue on “how to think about Park Chung Hee,” a reiteration of Kim's 1995 *Sasang* article.⁷⁶

Kim's narrative of the Park Chung Hee era focuses on the following events and themes: the May 16 coup d'état; junta period; 1963 presidential and general elections; advent of Korean development (normalization with Japan, dispatch of combat troops to Vietnam, and transition to an export-oriented economic policy); 1967 presidential and general elections; constitutional revision; crises of the developmental state; Yusin declaration and Yusin era; and an overall evaluation of the Park Chung Hee era. I examine this content in detail while comparing it with Cho Kapche and fellow New Right scholar Yi Yŏnghun's narratives of the Park Chung Hee era in the following chapter.

VI. Conclusion

In his 1995 *Sasang* article, Kim waded into the history wars triggered by Cho Kapche two years earlier. Arguing for a third way between “excessively” critical and approving perspectives of Park Chung Hee, Kim

⁷⁵ Ibid., 421. One striking characteristic of the work in this regard is that it lacks a conclusion tying together the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee eras. Instead, Kim concludes with an “epilogue” about how to think about the Park Chung Hee era, which, a reiteration of Kim's 1995 *Sasang* article, reads more like an appendix. Perhaps such a conclusion was deferred for the planned second volume that never materialized.

⁷⁶ The epilogue is very similar in content to Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn'gu,” 11–40. This was a chapter in a volume that was a product of a 2005 forum of the same name. Chŏng Sŏnghwa, “Kanhaengsa” [Publisher's note], in *Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn'gu ŭi chaengchŏm kwa kwaje* [Controversies and tasks of research on the Park Chung Hee era], ed. Chŏng Sŏnghwa (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2005), 6. A second volume was published the following year. Chŏng Sŏnghwa, ed., *Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae wa Han'guk hyŏndaesa* [The Park Chung Hee era and contemporary Korean history] (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2006).

possibly made the first step toward what would crystallize into New Right historiography. In the meantime, however, the agenda of his proposal edged away from what might be seen as a middle ground, away from the left and toward the right. By 2004, when he published *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk*, “madmen raising the dead” had been completely supplanted by the Oedipus-complex-, revolutionary-fever-stricken left. Even while Kim never completely abandoned his criticism of the “conservative establishment,” they each clearly found common cause in writing Korean history as a “story of success,” as most dramatically highlighted in Cho Kapche himself enthusiastically embracing Kim Iryŏng’s appraisal of Park Chung Hee. In this regard, it is little wonder that New Right historiography is often treated as “nothing new.” As I argue in the following chapter, however, comparing the actual contents of these otherwise similarly positive narratives reveals significant differences. While Cho and Kim as well as Yi Yŏnghun agreed on a practical agenda of positive historiography, they differed as to the contents of this narrative.

Chapter 4.

“Old Right” and “New Right” Historiography

I. Introduction

In this chapter, I compare conservative narratives of the Park Chung Hee era between Cho Kapche, Kim Iryŏng, and Yi Yŏnghun. If Kim and Yi represent New Right historiography, Cho can be said to represent “old right” (Cold War conservatism) historiography. Other well-known key differences between them are Kim’s focus on the developmental state, Cho’s on Park and his mentality, and Yi’s on the power of the market. Comparison nonetheless reveals important differences irreducible to these overarching frames. The three historians share a positive reading of contemporary Korean history. It is thus often said there is “nothing new” about New Right historiography, a mere regurgitation of Cold War ideas. Yet these historians significantly differ in terms of the precise content of their narratives.¹

II. Kim Iryŏng, Cho Kapche, and Yi Yŏnghun’s

Narratives of the Park Chung Hee Era

I compare the narratives of the Park Chung Hee era of Kim Iryŏng, Cho Kapche, and Yi Yŏnghun, focusing on their respective works *Nae mudŏm e ch’im ŭl paet’ŏ ra* (1998–2001), *Kŏn’guk kwa puguk* (2004), and *Taehan min’guk yŏksa* (2013).² There are of course significant differences in the

¹ For the sake of simplicity, I shall refer to these three as “historians.” Cho Kapche is a journalist, Kim Iryŏng was a political scientist, and Yi Yŏnghun is an economic historian.

² Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch’im ŭl paet’ŏ ra: Kŭndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ŭi pijang han saengae 1; Ch’oin ŭi norae* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 1; Song of the *Übermensch*] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1998); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch’im ŭl paet’ŏ ra: Kŭndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ŭi pijang han saengae 2; Chŏnjaeng kwa sarang* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 2; War and love] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1998); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch’im ŭl paet’ŏ ra: Kŭndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ŭi pijang han saengae 3; Hyŏngmyŏng chŏnya* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 3; Revolution’s eve] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1998); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch’im ŭl paet’ŏ ra: Kŭndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ŭi pijang han saengae 4; Kukka kaejo* [Spit on my grave: The

content of these books. Cho Kapche's is a biography covering roughly the period 1917–1979. Kim Iryŏng's covers from about 1945 to the early 1970s. Yi Yŏnghun's covers the period from 1945–1987 (also including a chapter on North Korean history). They nevertheless overlap in their coverage of the Park Chung Hee era. How do each of the works narrate and connect the major events of the Park Chung Hee era? I compare the works across five categories of “revolution,” “takeoff,” “elections,” “Yusin,” and “Park Chung Hee,” which help to organize the different events, figures, and processes they discuss.

1. Revolution

Evaluating Park Chung Hee's coup d'état is of course greatly significant for evaluating the Park Chung Hee era itself. It was, after all, President Kim Yŏngsam's description of the coup as “setting back” Korean history that ignited the history wars in the early 1990s. As is well known, Park Chung Hee himself referred to this event as a “revolution,” a stipulation that Cho Kapche had already begun to revive prior to this debate. Two perspectives also emerge among our three historians regarding the coup, but these do not adhere to these initial parameters.

tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 4; National remodeling] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1999); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ūl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae* 5; Kim Chongp'il ūi ulbun [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 5; Kim Chongp'il's pent-up anger] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1999); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ūl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae* 6; *Maengho nŭn kanda!* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 6; There go the fierce tigers!] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 2001); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ūl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae* 7; *Sŏngjang sok ūi kūnl* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 7; Shade amid growth] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 2001); Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ūl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae* 8; *Hanbando ūi chŏnun* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 8; War clouds over the Korean Peninsula] (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 2001); Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk: Hyŏndae Han'guk chŏngch'isa kangŭi* [Founding a nation and enriching a nation: A lecture on contemporary Korean political history] (Seoul: Saenggak ūi namu, 2004); Yi Yŏnghun, *Taeahan min'guk yŏksa: Nara mandŭlgi palchach'wi 1945–1987* [History of the Republic of Korea: The footprints of nation making, 1945–1987] (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2013).

Cho's account of Park's May 16 coup d'état spans more than two hundred pages, pouring over the minutiae of its planning, execution, and aftermath.³ Above all, his account focuses on the mentality, decision-making, and determination of Park and his fellow coup-makers ensuring the coup's success. On the "eve of revolution," for example—the title of the third volume in the biography—Cho depicts some tender moments between Park and his family, related by fellow coup-maker Chang T'aehwa, before he sets out to risk his life for "revolution."

Night had fallen. Yuk Yöngsu put the three children, Künhye, Kün्यों, and Chiman, to bed along with [her mother] Yi Kyöngnyöng. She neatly pressed each piece of laundry with an iron. When it was past ten, she entered the room where Park Chung Hee was standing with Chang T'aehwa, Kim Chongp'il, and Yi Nakson as they prepared to move out. She called to her husband, "Chö poseyo." When she called to her husband, she never said "Yö poseyo" but always "Chö poseyo."

"Have a look at Künhye's homework before you leave."

"Okay," Park replied without hesitation. He followed his wife [out of the room]. Künhye, then a fifth-grade elementary student, was sitting at her desk doing homework. Park bent over her. He glanced at Kün्यों and Chiman, asleep beside his grandmother, before leaving. "What was she working on?" Chang T'aehwa asked.

"Oh, she was just drawing a picture."

Chang T'aehwa would long remember this moment: Yuk Yöngsu's presence of mind, making sure her husband had a chance to say goodbye to their children before he went out for what might be the last time, and Park's humanity, displaying such composure despite the tense circumstances.⁴

Soon, in the "darkness of midnight" (*yöngsi üi amhük*), the coup's success is cast into doubt. The struggle climaxes as Park and company

³ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudöm* 3, 341–385; Cho Kapche, *Nae mudöm* 4, 19–180.

⁴ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudöm* 3, 378–379:

밤이 되었다. 육영수는 근혜, 근영, 지만 3 남매를 이경령이 데리고 안방에서 주무시도록 했다. 육영수는 빨래를 한 가지씩 다리미로 다리 차곡차곡 챙기고 있었다. 밤 10 시가 지났다. 육영수가 박정희가 있던 방으로 건너왔다. 박정희는 장태화, 김종필, 이낙선과 함께 일어나 출동 준비를 하고 있었다. 육영수는 "저보세요"라고 불렀다. 육영수는 남편을 부를 때 "여보세요"라고 하지 않고 항상 "저 보세요"라고 했다.

"근혜 숙제 좀 봐주시고 나가세요."

박정희는 서슴없이 "어, 그러지" 하고 아내를 따라 나갔다. 박정희는 책상에 앉아 공부를 하고 있던 국민학교 5학년생 근혜를 굶어보고, 뒷목 외할머니 곁에서 잠들어 있는 근영, 지만에게 눈길을 주고는 나왔다.

장태화가 "무슨 숙제니까" 하고 물었다.

"어, 뭐 그림 그리는 거야."

장태화는 이 순간의 육영수와 박정희 모습을 오랫동안 기억했다. 남편이 지금 나가면 마지막이 될지도 모른다고 생각하여 자녀들과 자연스럽게 인사를 나누도록 한 육영수의 기지와 긴박한 순간에도 그런 여유를 보여 준 박정희의 인간성 때문이었다.

attempt to cross the Han River Bridge with bullets whizzing by their heads.

The following is soldier Han Ungjin's account, as related by Cho:

"General Park took hold of the handrail amid the exchange of gunfire [over the bridge]. Staring vacantly into the river, he uttered in Japanese, 'The die is cast.'"

"Hyōngnim," [Han] later asked, "what were you thinking as you gazed into the river?"

He replied, "I saw the faces of my family."

Many [of the coup-makers] testify that Park's resolute attitude steadied his wavering troops at this moment. Encountering such unforeseen resistance, the revolutionary troops carefully watched Park, and his conduct instilled in them courage and confidence. Such decisive action at such a pivotal moment would be the wellspring of Park's leadership and authority over the next eighteen years, which would receive no outright challenge.⁵

This is the decisive moment at which the coup's success becomes assured.

Cho's account of the subsequent junta period is also extensive.⁶

Essentially, he views this as a "revolutionary" period, marking the transition from a "feudal" to a "modern" political elite, as the coup-makers' military training meant their better suitedness to the task of modernization than the old politicians.⁷ Furthermore, he emphasizes the "reemergence" of

⁵ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudōm* 4, 47:

한웅진은 "박 장군은 총격전이 오고 가는 상황에서 난간을 잡고 물끄러미 강물을 내려다보더니 일본말로 '주사위는 던져졌어'라고 말했다"고 증언했다. 나중에 한웅진은 "형님, 그 때 강물을 바라보면서 무슨 생각을 했습니까" 하고 물었다고 한다. 박정희는 "가족들 얼굴이 강물에 떠오르더군"이라고 말하더라는 것이다.

순간 박정희의 결연한 태도가 흔들리는 장교들의 마음을 다잡아주었다는 증언은 많다. 예기치 않은 저항을 받은 혁명군 장교들 모두가 박정희를 주시하고 있었고 박정희는 그들에게 용기와 확신을 심어 주는 행동을 보였다. 결정적 순간의 이런 결정적 행동이 그 뒤 18 년 간 단 한 번도 정변도전을 받지 않은 그의 지도력과 권위의 원천이 되었다.

In this account, Park Chung Hee's coup resembles Caesar's "crossing the Rubicon." The river crossing also marks a repetition in Cho's narrative; in the early days of the Korean War, Park had crossed the river southward as the North Korean army approached Seoul. For Cho, this settled any suspicion over his communist past. He overlooks (or omits), however, the likely scenario that the North would have regarded Park as an informant and traitor. See Cho Kapche, *Nae mudōm* 2, 280–283. "Rivers" are also significant in Cho's description of Park as a Nietzschean *Übermensch*: "Truly, mankind is a polluted stream. One has to be a sea to take in a polluted stream without becoming unclean." Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, ed. Adrian Del Caro and Robert Pippin, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 6. See Cho Kapche, *Nae mudōm* 1, 10: 인간이란 실로 더러운 강물일 뿐이다. 인간이 스스로를 더럽히지 않고 이 강물을 삼켜 버리려면 모름지기 바다가 되지 않으면 안 된다.

⁶ Among other things, it covers the parading of "hooligans through the streets; the rounding up of businessmen; establishment of the KCIA; factionalism within the junta and eventual consolidation of power around Park and others from North Kyōngsang Province; initial negotiations to normalize relations with Japan; the Hwang T'aesōng episode; Park's visits to Japan and the United States; the "four scandals"; creation of the Democratic Republic Party (*Minju konghwa tang*, DRP); and Kim Chongp'il's first period of exile. See Cho Kapche, *Nae mudōm* 4, 181–390; Cho Kapche, *Nae mudōm* 5, 19–286.

⁷ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudōm* 4, 131.

the military in Korean politics after six hundred years, the last instance being the period of military rule under the Koryŏ Dynasty, especially contrasting with Chang Myŏn's "civilian rule."⁸ "The most striking characteristic of the group of military officers around Chairman Park Chung Hee," he writes, "is that they accomplished the economic development that civilian intellectuals could not."⁹

Yi Yŏnghun's account, like Cho, also narrates the unfolding of the coup, but not in so much detail.¹⁰ And like Cho, he asserts its significance as the commencement of Korea's "modernization revolution."¹¹ In terms of explaining the coup's success, he emphasizes its popularity, noting that it was an "open secret" and emphasizing the ineptitude and lack of support for Chang Myŏn. "The reason for the success of a coup that could not succeed was the state of the Chang Myŏn government, which, amid the chaos of Korean politics and society, had already collapsed within itself over factions and political strife."¹²

When it comes to the junta, Yi particularly emphasizes its suppression of the left, while appearing to sympathize with its more puritanical measures, paying attention to the arrests of various "leftists" (*chwaik seryŏk*) and "lawbreakers" (*pŏmpŏpcha*).¹³ He recognizes some of

⁸ Ibid., 234–235; Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 5, 20–23. Cho articulates more explicitly the idea of the historic return of the Korean military on his website. See Cho Kapche, "Han chang ūro yoyak han Han'guk hyŏndaesa hŭrŭm" [A summary of contemporary Korean history], *Chogapje.com*, March 28, 2006, https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=12548&C_CC=BB.

⁹ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 5, 23: 박정희 의장을 주체로 한 장교 집단의 가장 특이한 점은 민간 지식인들이 해내지 못한 경제 발전을 해냈다는 점일 것이다. Cho also covers a debate between Yi Naksŏn and Ham Sŏkhŏn in the pages of the *Chosŏn ilbo*, what he portrays as a representative debate between a soldier and civilian intellectual. Ibid., 308–311.

¹⁰ Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan min 'guk yŏksa*, 285–292.

¹¹ Ibid., 304–305.

¹² Ibid., 302–303, 289: 박정희의 쿠데타는 언필칭 대놓고 한 쿠데타였다. 성공할 수 없는 쿠데타가 성공한 것은 당시 한국의 정치와 사회가 극도로 혼란스러운 가운데 장면정부가 당파와 정쟁으로 내부에서 이미 붕괴한 상태였기 때문이다.

¹³ Ibid., 293–298. Briefly stated, the principles of the junta pledges can be summed up as anticommunism, pro-Americanism, and anti-corruption and commitments to economic development, unification, and restoring civilian government once these other pledges had been fulfilled. Alternatively, Hyung-A Kim sums them up in terms of "anti-Communism; strengthening international relations, anti-corruption, economic reconstruction, unification and returning power to a civilian government." Hyung-A Kim, *Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961–79* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 70. The pledges in their entirety can be found in Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 4, 57–58.

its shortcomings, including the currency reform and rural debt cancellation but views them more as “lessons,” in a class different from the outright incompetence of the Chang government. “Through repeated failures,” he writes, “they bore witness to the grim economic reality and cultivated the capacity by which to approach it precisely and pragmatically.”¹⁴ Above all, Yi emphasizes the new constitution devised under the junta, marking the return to a presidential system and particular its endorsement of a new economic system; the original constitution had adopted a mixed or social-democratic economic system, whereas the new constitution, “based on the respect for the economic freedom and creativity of the individual,” explicitly adopted the system of a free-market economy.¹⁵

What is most striking about Kim’s account of May 16 is the absence of the coup’s unfolding itself; indeed, the agency of Park and the coup-makers is almost completely omitted. Also unlike Cho and Yi, he distances himself from describing May 16 as a “revolution,” careful always to enclose this term in quotation marks. To explain the coup’s success, he focuses on responses of Chang Myŏn and Yun Posŏn’s responses. He describes how Washington initially adopted a “wait and see” approach, observing whether the Chang Myŏn government was worth preserving. Chang made a crucial error in hoping for US intervention, he says, misunderstanding the US preference for clandestine and action in such matters. Meanwhile, Yun Posŏn opposed suppressing the coup in the name of avoiding bloodshed, which General Magruder interpreted as political opportunism. With Chang in hiding and Yun seemingly in favor of the coup, the United States ultimately came down on the side of the coup-makers.¹⁶

When it comes to the Junta, Kim focuses on the foundations laid for the developmental state. He divides these foundations into three categories: physical, ideational, and material. The junta achieved a physical

¹⁴ Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan min ’guk yŏksa*, 298: 실패를 거듭하는 과정에서 그들은 냉엄한 경제 현실을 직시하고 그에 정확하게 실용적으로 접근하는 능력을 키웠다.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 299, 300: 개인의 경제상의 자유와 창의를 존중함을 기본으로 한다.

¹⁶ Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn ’guk kwa puguk*, 324–327.

basis by purging and asserting control over the military, establishing the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (*Chungang chǒngbobu*, KCIA), and passing legislation including the new constitution and election and party laws. It established an ideational basis through its “populist” (*inki yǒnghapjōgin*) policies, including a roundup of “deviants,” imposition of severe media restrictions, crackdown on “extravagant luxuries,” and redistribution of food in the countryside. He points out, however, that this honey-moon phase was short-lived; the junta became mired in scandals and the economy continued to flounder. The junta’s descent into crisis thus compelled a firmer material basis, that is, the considerable finance allowing a transition to electoral politics. It formed the Democratic Republican Party (*Minju konghwa tang*, DRP) and passed laws to shape the rules of the electoral game (e.g., election and party laws). It also sought to establish a two-party system by introducing severe restrictions for party registration and limiting the number of seats in the National Assembly available to independents, intending to leverage divisions among the opposition. “This,” writes Kim, “was essentially a system of politics designed to guarantee stable seats to the ruling party in an uncompetitive manner.”¹⁷ The pursuit of financing, meanwhile, embroiled the junta in controversies such as the “four scandals” and (eventually substantiated) allegations of receiving funding from Japanese companies.¹⁸

Altogether, regarding Park Chung Hee’s “revolution,” Cho emphasizes Park’s personal agency and the emergence of a group of military modernizers in contrast with Korea’s old civilian elites. Yi emphasizes the popularity of Park’s coup and the junta’s maintenance and strengthening of Korea’s market economy. And Kim Iryōng finds the success of the coup in the missteps of Chang and Yun, while emphasizing the junta’s preparation of the basis for the developmental state amid frequent crises.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 338: 이 제도는 여당에게 비경쟁적 방식으로 안정 의석을 확보해 주기 위해 고안된 장치라고 할 수 있다.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 332–339.

2. Takeoff

The question of how Korea achieved its economic miracle is of course one of the key questions in the literature on the Park Chung Hee era. All our historians emphasize the transition to export-oriented growth and the significance of normalization and the dispatch of troops to Vietnam, though in differing ways and for different reasons.

As is well known, the Park junta initially opted for an autarchic economic policy, as reflected in the initial version of the First Five-Year Economic Plan. The transition to an export orientation, sometimes simply referred to as “openness” (*kaebang*), is thus often pointed to as a watershed in the history of Korean economic growth.¹⁹ In Cho’s account, Park’s “economics tutor” (*kyŏngje kajŏng kyosa*) Yi Pyŏngch’ŏl deserves the lion’s share of the credit for the revision of the plan.²⁰ It was Yi Pyŏngch’ŏl, says Cho, who persuaded Park to make use of rather than punish Korea’s businessmen after rounding them up at the junta’s outset. “The meeting between Park Chung Hee and Yi Pyŏngch’ŏl served to open the eyes of a revolutionary who dreamed of fatherland modernization to the importance of businessmen. Of poor peasant stock and accustomed to a simple life, Park had a natural aversion to the rich, but his pragmatic and flexible way of thinking turned him toward the need to manage businessmen to make the nation rich and strong.”²¹ Cho argues that the origins of Korean’s economic

¹⁹ See, for example, Byung-Kook Kim, “The Leviathan: Economic Bureaucracy under Park,” in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 210. Neoclassical accounts of Korea’s economic growth typically single out the year 1965 as the denouement of this transition and thus the beginning of Korea’s takeoff. See Ha-Joon Chang, “The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea,” *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 17 (1993), 132. Jung-en Woo rather points to the year 1960, marking the shift in US foreign policy toward a modernization-theory-oriented support for Third World development, as the decisive moment for the Korean miracle. Jung-en Woo, *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 73.

²⁰ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 5, 68. Cho’s account of the Korea’s economic takeoff is eclectic and lengthy. See, at the very least, Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 4, 181–390; Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 5; Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 6; Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 7, 19–178.

²¹ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 4, 193: 박정희와 이병철의 만남은 조국 근대화를 꿈꾸던 한 혁명가가 기업인들의 중요성에 대해 눈을 뜨는 계기를 만들어 주었다. 가난한 농민 출신이고 질박한 생활이 몸에 밴 박정희는 부자들에게 대해서는 생애적인 거부감을 가졌으나 그의 실용적이고 유연한 사고는 그런 기업인들을

growth can be traced to this fateful meeting, which ultimately laid the basis for the strong government-business relations of the Park era.

In early 1962, Park Chung Hee's economic policy was characterized by two contradictory orientations: reinvigoration without outside help and opening the country to the outside. If the secret currency reform to mobilize domestic capital and the construction of a state-run oil refinery represented the former, the introduction of foreign capital, industrialization, and nurturing export industries represented the latter. Park gave up his reinvigoration-through-self-effort orientation for an open-door policy of industrialization and imports and exports amid the turmoil of 1962, when currency reform failed and the plan to construct an oil refinery with domestic capital was revised to allow the involvement of Gulf Oil Corporation. This change in Park Chung Hee's orientation marginalized radical figures like Supreme Committee for National Reconstruction member Yu Wönsik and Seoul National University professor Pak Hüiböm. Instead, businessmen like Yi Pyöngch'öl and working-level bureaucrats like Pak Ch'unghun and Kim Chöngnyöm joined the revolutionaries, with Chairman Park Chung Hee at the center, in "seeking truth from facts" [*silsa kusi*]. Park Chung Hee's trial and error and meandering for the first year or so after May 16 was also a process of a revolutionary learning about the economy.²²

Cho also credits banker and economist Kim Chöngnyöm, who would go on to work in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (*Chaemubu*, MIC) and as presidential secretary, for pressing Park to enact liberalizing economic reforms.

At the time, Kim Chöngnyöm, who would exercise a tremendous influence over the economic policy of development coalition, was uniquely qualified in international finance. He had worked at the Federal Reserve in New York and as a founding staff member of the New York Office of the Bank of Korea before completing his Master's degree in economics at Clarke University. Mr. Kim also had a background in Japan. After graduating from Oida Commercial High School, he attained employment at the Bank of Chosen (predecessor of the Bank

부러서 국가를 부강하게 만들어야 한다는 쪽으로 선회하게 만들었다. Cho also portrays Yi Pyöngch'öl as persuading Park to defer the fines imposed on the businessmen, having them build factories in accordance with the economic plan instead, and to abandon balanced growth focusing on the countryside to pursue unbalanced growth focusing on industry and exports. Cho Kapche, *Nae mudöm* 5, 68, 71.

²² Cho Kapche, *Nae mudöm* 5, 88–89: 1962 년 초 박정희의 경제 노선에는 자력갱생과 대외 개방이란 엇갈린 방향성이 공존하고 있었다. 민족 자본을 동원하기 위한 통화개혁의 비밀 추진, 민족 자본에 의한 국영 정유공장 건설의 추진이 대표적인 자력갱생 노선의 표현이라면 외자도입 추진과 공업화 및 수출사업육성은 개방정치의 표현이었다. 1962 년에 큰 소동을 겪으면서 박정희는 자력갱생 노선을 버리고 대외 개방적 공업화-수출입국 정책을 선택하게 된다. 그 소용돌이 속에서 통화개혁은 실패하고 민족 자본에 의한 정유공장 건설계획은 메이저(걸프)를 불러들이는 방향으로 수정된다. 이런 박정희의 궤도 수정에 따라 유원식 최고위원과 박희범 서울대 교수로 대표되는 급진적 성향의 인물들이 퇴장한다. 반면에 이병철 같은 기업인들과 박충훈-김정렴 같은 실무 관료들이 박정희 의장을 중심으로 한 혁명주체들의 실사구시 노선과 흐름을 함께 하게 된다. 5.16 이후 약 1 년에 걸쳐 이루어진 박정희 의장의 시행착오와 방향은 이 혁명가가 경제를 배워 간 과정이기도 했다. Cho also includes a section celebrating Chöng Chuyöng. Ibid., 296–299. One may also contrast Cho's account of Yi Pyöngch'öl's persuasiveness with that of Hyung-A Kim, who emphasizes that Ambassador Samuel Berger opened Park's eyes to the utility of the *chaeböl*. See Hyung-A Kim, "State Building: The Military Junta's Path to Modernity through Administrative Reforms," in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 95–96.

of Korea) before graduating from Kumamoto Army Reserve Academy and going to work for the Hiroshima District Army Headquarters. He suffered burns when the atomic bomb was dropped.

Kim Chŏngnyŏm worked for a year at the Tokyo branch of the Bank of Korea and was also involved in the negotiations for the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan. Well informed about the economic circumstances of the United States and Japan, he kept in mind the issue of “which development model Korea had to follow between those of the United States and Japan.” His conclusion was that Korea had to follow the model of Japan, which had succeeded through an import-export policy with a superior workforce without natural resources.

He devised and submitted a plan to [EPB Director] Chang Kiyŏng in which he advised “not to settle for import-substitution industrialization but liberalize import-substitution protections to strengthen international competitiveness while carrying out export-oriented industrialization aimed at heavy chemical industrialization and active development of the high-tech industry.”²³

All three of our historians note the importance of the normalization of relations with Japan and the dispatches of troops to Vietnam for Korea’s economic development. For Cho, however, these issues were more about security. He also emphasizes Park’s pragmatism in foregoing historical wrongs to focus on making a deal with Japan, an attitude he sharply contrasts with that of the opposition and protestors.²⁴

The [old politicians symbolized by sexagenarian Yun Posŏn] who put aside Confucian values and treated democracy, which emerged as the most powerful ideology after liberation, as a golden rule were reactionaries relative to the developmental phase of our national history. It was the university students who saved them as they plunged into crisis amid the great tide of national modernization. Through the demonstrations against a Korea-Japan summit meeting in the spring of 1964, the sexagenarian-led old politicians successfully brought university students in their teens and early twenties over to their side with persistent propaganda and demagoguery, extending their hold on life.

The students’ ultimate favoring of elderly established politicians demanding comprehensive (and unconditional) implementation of Western democracy over the young Park Chung Hee and Kim Chongp’il, who championed nationalism and fatherland modernization, would create a lasting divide in the politics and

²³ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 6, 222–224:

개발연대의 경제정책에 크나큰 영향력을 행사하게 되는 김정렴은 당시로서는 드물게 국제금융에 밝은 사람이었다. 그는 미국 뉴욕 연방준비은행에서 연수, 한국은행 뉴욕사무소 개설요원으로 근무한 뒤 클라크대학에서 경제학 석사과정을 마쳤다. 김 씨는 일본통이기도 했다. 일본 오이다고상을 졸업하고 조선은행(한국은행의 전신)에 들어갔다가 구마모토 육군예비사관학교를 나와 히로시마 소계 군관구 사령부에 근무 중 원폭 투하 때 화상을 입었다. 김정렴은 한국은행 도쿄 지점에서 1 년간 근무했고 한일회담에도 관계했다. 미·일의 경제 사정에 밝은 그는 ‘한국이 따라야 할 개발 모델이 미국식과 일본식 중 어느 쪽인가’하는 화두를 풀고 다녔다. 그가 내린 결론은 자원이 빈약한 대신 우수한 인력을 가진 일본의 수출입국정책으로 성공한 모델을 한국이 따라야 한다는 것이었다.

그는 ‘수입대체산업에 안주 하지 말고 수입대체를 위한 보호적 요소를 자유화해서 국제 경쟁력을 강화하는 동시에 수출 지향적 공업화에 착수하고 나아가서는 중화학공업, 그리고 적극적으로는 고도기술산업으로 발전해 나가야 한다’는 요지의 건의서를 만들어 장기영에게 주기도 했다.

²⁴ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 4, 242, 325, 335–338.

intellectual history of our nation characterized by conflict, anguish, containment, and tension.²⁵

Cho devotes particular attention to the dispatch of troops to Vietnam.²⁶ He emphasizes that the dispatches were Park's initiative,

²⁵ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 5, 404–405:

해방 후 우리 나라에서 유교적 가치관을 밀어내고 가장 강력한 정치 이념으로 등장한 민주주의를 급파속조로 삼고 있었던 이들[60 대의 윤보선으로 상징되는 구정치 세력]은 민족사의 발전 단계상으로는 수구 세력을 대표하고 있었다. 국가 근대화의 대세 속에서 떠내려가 버릴 위기에 처한 이들을 구해준 것은 대학생들이었다. 1964년 봄 한일회담 반대 시위를 거치면서 60 대가 이끄는 구정치 세력은 집요한 선전.선동술로써 10 대 후반~20 대 초반의 대학생들을 야당 편으로 돌려 놓는데 성공하면서 생명력을 연장한다.

학생 세력이 민주주의와 조국 근대화를 내세운 젊은 박정희-김종필 세력을 밀지 않고 서구식 민주주의의 전면적(또는 무조건적) 실시를 요구하는 늙은 구정치 세력 편에 서게 되었다는 것은 그 뒤 우리 나라의 정치와 지성사에 갈등, 고뇌, 견제, 긴장의 불연속선을 만들어 낸다.

When it comes to the June uprising, moreover, Cho emphasizes propaganda in the media, which misjudged the uprising as representative of general discontent regarding Park: “The media seemed to regard the situation as analogous to that immediately prior to April 19, as a kind of revolution’s eve. However, this was a misjudgment. The military and most of the people supported the Park government, and Park Chung Hee summoned the resolve to put down the violent demonstrations through confidence in his legitimacy and through military power.” Thus, Cho emphasizes that the demonstrations were “easily suppressed” (*kandan hage chinap*) because the majority of the people were against such “riotous protests” (*nandonghwa toen siwi*), recognized the “inevitability” (*pulgap’isŏng*) of normalization of relations with Japan, and did not view the Park regime as an authoritarian government. Cho’s view of the June uprising is summed up in the following sentence: “Through the declaration of martial law, Park Chung Hee was able to overturn in one fell swoop the situation that had persisted over the past five months, in which he had been on the defensive, and seize the initiative in suppressing the opposition, media, and students.” Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 6, 102–103, 110: 언론은 상황을 4.19 직전, 일종의 혁명 전야로 인식하고 있는 듯했다. 그러나 이것은 오판이었다. 군부와 다수 국민들은 박정권을 지지하고 있었고 박정희는 자기 정당성에 대한 확신과 무력으로 폭력 시위를 누르겠다는 의지를 다지고 있었다.... 계엄령 선포로 박정희는 취임 이후 다섯 달 동안 수세로 물리던 상황을 일거에 반전시키고 야당.언론.학생들을 압박할 수 있는 주도권을 쥐게 되었다. In this particular incidence, Cho emphasizes the significance of the June uprising not so much as a seminal moment in resistance to the Park regime, although that too figures in his narrative, but in terms of the transition in Park’s thinking from leaning toward a pledge not to run in the next presidential election to committing to martial law. In other words, Cho portrays this moment as a kind of “fork in the road” in contemporary history to praise Park’s decision to put down the demonstrations. One may contrast this with Myung-Lim Park’s emphasis on the June uprising as a seminal event for contemporary history in terms of the emergence of a coalescence of groups united against Park Chung Hee that would evolve into the democratization movement after the Yusin declaration. See Myung-Lim Park, “The Chaeya,” in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 373–400.

²⁶ This is well reflected in the title of the sixth volume. Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 6. “Fierce tigers” refers to the Fierce Tiger Division (*Maengho pudae*), which was the first army infantry division dispatched to Vietnam in September 1965. The phrase “the fierce tigers go” refers to a popular song released in the 1960s about this dispatch. See Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 7, 80–81. The Blue Dragon Division (*Ch’ŏngnyong pudae*), a marine infantry division, was dispatched along with the tigers, and a song was written about them as well, titled “We are the Blue Dragons” (*Uri nŭn ch’ŏngnyŏng ida*). Both songs were written by Yi Hüimok. Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 8, 222. Each of the songs can be listened to at the following links. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5nv-l33aLAs>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OfftsLt2MJo>.

referring to the 1961 meeting between Park and President Kennedy.²⁷ Here he is especially concerned with refuting the charge that Korean troops were “mercenaries.” “There were some in Korea at this time who saw the Korean troops dispatched to Vietnam as mercenaries of the United States, intending to disparage their significance. This is propaganda totally divorced from historical fact: The deployment of Korean troops to Vietnam was carried out as part of the Park Chung Hee government’s active strategy and under Korean not American leadership.”²⁸ Meanwhile, he emphasizes the benefits accrued from Park’s “grand strategy.”

Through the Vietnam troop deployment, not only did Park Chung Hee stymie the American plan to withdraw troops from Korea and deploy them in Vietnam but also procure tremendous aid from the United States for the modernization of the Korean military. The three hundred thousand Korean troops deployed in Vietnam attained real battlefield experience. Those in the private sector, including businessmen in the construction industry, followed behind, entering the South Vietnam market and attaining many foreign dollars. Ultimately, they would also draw on this experience of doing business overseas when they entered the Middle East market in the 1970s. In this respect, Park Chung Hee’s deployment of Korean troops in Vietnam was a grand strategy that significantly changed the direction of the country.²⁹

Korean troop deployment was thus rooted in subjectivity (*chuch’esŏng*) not flunkeyism (*sadaejuŭi*, in this case, subservience to US wishes).³⁰ This ultimately signified the recovery of Korean masculinity lost through the shameful Chosŏn period and Japanese rule.³¹

²⁷ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 4, 365. Cho takes another opportunity, further on in the biography, to describe an episode in which Park sent a “secret letter” (*milsŏ*) to US Ambassador Kim Chŏngnyŏl in early spring 1964 informing him he would dispatch German Ambassador Ch’oe Tŏksin, who “knew the situation in Vietnam well,” to the United States to impress upon American officials Vietnam’s importance. Upon arriving in the United States, say Cho, Ch’oe Tŏksin conveyed to Kim Chŏngnyŏl the following special order: “Assert to important US government officials the importance of defending South Vietnam and offer to dispatch Korean troops should the United States actively intervene in South Vietnam.” Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 6, 50: “미국 정부 요인들에게 월남 방어의 중요성을 역설하고 미국이 적극적으로 월남에 개입한다면 한국군을 파견하겠다고 제의하라.”

²⁸ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 6, 154: 요사이 국내의 일부 세력은 한국군의 월남파병을 미국의 용병으로 해석하여 그 의미를 깎아 내리고 하는데 이는 역사적 사실과 전혀 부합되지 않는 선동이다. 월남파병은 박정희 정부의 주체적 전략하에 미국이 아니라 한국의 주도하에 이뤄졌기 때문이다.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 154: 박정희는 국군을 월남에 파병함으로써 주한 미군 병력을 빼내 월남전선으로 보내려는 미국의 구상을 중단시켰을 뿐 아니라 파병에 따른 대가로서 한국군의 현대화를 위한 미국 측의 막대한 원조를 얻어냈다. 월남에 갔다 온 연 30 만 명의 국군은 실전 경험으로 쌓았다. 건설업자들을 비롯한 우리 민간인들은 군인들을 따라 월남 시장에 진출하여 많은 외화 가득을 이루었고, 해외 사업의 경험을 얻어 1970 년대의 중동 진출 때 써먹게 되었다. 그런 점에서 박정희의 월남파병은 국가의 방향을 크게 바꾼 대전략이었던 셈이다.

³⁰ Later Cho also emphasizes the “morality” of the war for the reason that the “invasion” of South Vietnam by the North was a violation of international law and basically because fighting communism in and of itself was justified. *Ibid.*, 364–367.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 356–359, 372–374.

For Yi Yŏnghun, an economic historian, Korea's economic takeoff naturally demands special attention. He recognizes the significance of the transition to export-led growth but rather focuses on the conditions of the world economy. Here he notes the global postwar economic boom underpinned by the United States and an important shift in the structure of the world economy in the 1950s as advanced countries began to buy manufactured goods from developing countries. In this context, Korea was able to attain a comparative advantage in the world economy, which Yi says it achieved in 1963. At the regional level, changes in the Japanese economy were also essential. Japan had initiated its heavy and chemical industrialization (HCI) drive in 1956, leaving a vacuum in the light manufacturing sector for Korea to fill. Furthermore, Japan had become flush with capital and was looking to invest abroad. These were decisive opportunities for Korea.³²

Like Cho, Yi also emphasizes the role of Korean businessmen in the Korean takeoff as teachers to Park in the realm of business and the economy and as visionary policy advisors. "Yi Pyŏngch'ŏl's development plan was something creative which no economist, either in Korea or abroad, had suggested. His design, as if out of the daydream of young child in a fairy tale, was perfectly realized in the rapid growth of the Korean economy."³³ He also emphasizes the role of businessmen when it comes to the issue of normalization. "The businessmen requested that President Park Chung Hee rapidly normalize diplomatic relations with Japan. Only then, by linking Korea's abundant labor and Japan's superior technology, could competitive manufactured goods be exported to international markets."³⁴ Furthermore, he emphasizes the significance of normalization not just in

³² Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan min 'guk yŏksa*, 310–321.

³³ *Ibid.*, 323–324, 324–325: 이병철의 이 같은 개발구상은 당시 국내외의 어느 경제학자도 제시한 적이 없는 창의적인 것이었다. 마치 동화에 나오는 소녀의 백일몽과 같은 그의 구상은 이후 한국경제의 고도성장과정에서 그대로 현실화하였다. Yi is referring to Yi Pyŏngch'ŏl's five-part editorial, "Uri ka chal sanŭn kil" [The road to us living well], published in the *Han'guk ilbo* in 1963.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 325: 기업가들은 박정희 대통령에게 일본과의 국교를 조속히 정상화할 것을 주문하였다. 그래야 한국의 풍부한 노동력과 일본의 우수한 기술력을 결합하여 외국시장에 경쟁력 있는 공산품을 수출할 수 있었다.

terms of linking Korea to Japan but also the “global free-trade regime” (*segye ūi chayū muyŏk ch’eje*); essentially, he extols the relationship between Korea’s pursuit of normalization of relations with Japan, the reform of its exchange rate system, and its joining of the GATT.³⁵ As for the opposition to the treaty, he regards it as little more than the “sentiment” (*chŏngsŏ*) of anti-Japanese nationalism.³⁶

On Vietnam, Yi follows a standard account concerned with preventing US troops stationed in Korea from relocating to Vietnam and extracting economic benefits. Beyond that, he notably emphasizes the relationship between the dispatches and Korea’s pursuit of comparative advantage.³⁷ In this regard, both normalization and the Vietnam dispatches were part of a grand strategy.

The signing of the Korea-Japan Treaty and the Vietnam dispatches in and around 1965 fostered an environment of international politics and international economy appropriate to the export-oriented development strategy of the Park Chung Hee government. Korea not only solidified its political and military solidarity with its main ally the United States but also secured the various market conditions necessary for economic development. The Korean economy turned the raw materials and intermediate goods imported from Japan into finished goods and exported them to the United States. This manner of international market relations was the chief driver of the high-degree growth of the Korean economy until 1972.³⁸

Kim pays particular attention to Korea’s transition to export-oriented growth. The revision of the First Five Year Economic Plan, he says, was a consequence of the junta’s initial failures to generate economic growth and US pressure.³⁹ His description of the new relations between the

³⁵ Ibid., 328. In this regard, Yi follows closely neoclassical accounts of Korea’s economic miracle. See Ha-Joon Chang, “The Political Economy of Industrial Policy,” 132.

³⁶ Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan min ’guk yŏksa*, 376.

³⁷ Ibid., 328–330.

³⁸ Ibid., 330: 1965 년을 전후한 한일협정의 타결과 베트남 파병으로 박정희정부는 수출주도형 개발전략에 상응하는 국제정치와 국제경제의 환경을 조성하였다. 한국은 그의 주요 우방국과 정치적 군사적 유대를 확고히 하였을 뿐 아니라, 경제개발에 필요한 제반 시장조건을 확보하였다. 한국경제는 일본에서 수입한 원료와 중간재를 국내에서 완제품으로 가공하였으며, 그것을 미국으로 수출하였다. 이 같은 국제적 시장연관은 1972 년까지 한국경제의 고도성장을 이끈 가장 중요한 동력으로 작용하였다.

³⁹ Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn ’guk kwa puguk*, 355–356. Kimiya Tadashi, Jung-en Woo, and Stephan Haggard each also find US pressure as decisive in the transition to export-oriented growth. See Kimiya Tadashi, “The Cold War and the Political Economy of the Park Chung Hee Regime,” in *Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961–1979: Development, Political Thought, Democracy, and Cultural Influence*, ed. Hyung-A Kim and Clark W. Sorensen (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011), 71; Woo, *Race to the Swift*, 73; Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 61.

government and business, as observable in the following passage, is quite different from that of Cho and Yi:

The junta originally planned to acquire eighty billion *hwan* through the measures to recover fraudulently acquired wealth. Yet this plan also eventually faltered after successive degradations, and the amount to be recovered gradually decreased. Meanwhile, a plan was devised where *chaebŏl* once charged as guilty of illicit wealth accumulation would build factories and share the dividends with the state, yet even this was not effectively carried out. Ultimately, it is reported that about forty billion won was recovered by the end of 1964, an amount inadequate to meet the goal of mobilizing domestic capital for the pursuit of economic development. If there was any success, however, it was that the junta's attitude regarding the *chaebŏl* changed from initial antagonism to good will. Now, the junta began to consider the *chaebŏl* as partners not only in politics but also economic development.

Here the connection between the newly established ruling political class (junta) and capital (the *chaebŏl*) was one in which the state presided over the economy to certain degree. This superiority of the state primarily derived from the junta's physical power, but just as important was the nationalization of the banks. Originally, the US military government had passed ownership of the commercial banks to the government, endowing it with more than seventy percent of the shares. Through the public selling of shares from 1954 to 1957, however, commercial banks devolved into the private purses of a small number of *chaebŏl*. Following the coup d'état, the junta confiscated *chaebŏl*-owned commercial bank shares as part of the illicit-accumulation-of-wealth measures, and government ownership of banks once again climbed to as high as twenty-three to thirty-one percent. Furthermore, through measures such as the 1961 "temporary measures regarding financial institutions," which restricted the voting rights of major civilian shareholders owning more than ten percent of shares in commercial banks, and an amendment to the Bank of Korea law passed the following year, which made the Bank of Korea subordinate to the Ministry of Finance, banks came under de facto government control.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk*, 357–358:

군부는 본래 부정 축재 환수조치를 통해 총 800 억 원을 거두어들여야 했다. 그러나 이 계획 역시 중간에 수차례의 변질과정을 겪으면서 환수액이 점차 축소되어 갔다. 그리고 한때는 부정 축재자로 지목된 재벌들이 경제개발계획에 따른 공장을 지어 그 주식을 국가에 헌납하는 방안도 나왔으나, 그것마저도 실효성 있게 지켜지지 않았다. 결국 1964 년 말경 약 40 억 원 정도가 환수된 것으로 알려졌는데, 이 정도로는 경제개발을 추진하기 위한 내자의 동원이란 목표를 충족시키기에는 역부족이었다. 다만 성과가 있었다면 그것은 재벌에 대한 군부의 태도가 집권 초기의 적대적인 것에서 호의적인 것으로 바뀌었다는 점이다. 이제 군부는 재벌을 자신들이 정치를 해나가는 것뿐 아니라 경제를 발전시켜 나가는 데 있어서의 파트너로 인식하기 시작했다.

그런데 이렇게 확립된 새로운 정치지배층(군부)과 자본(재벌) 간의 연결은 어디까지나 국가가 경제에 대해 우위에 선 연결이었다. 이러한 국가의 우위성은 일차적으로는 군부가 지난 무력으로부터 나온 것이었지만, 그것 못지않게 자본에 대한 국가의 우월성 확립에 공헌한 것은 은행을 실질적으로 국유화한 조치였다. 본래 시중은행은 미군정으로부터 귀속재산으로 넘겨받아 정부가 그 주식의 70% 이상을 소유하고 있었다. 그러나 1954~1957 년에 이루어진 수차례에 걸친 주식공매를 통해 1957 년이 되면 시중은행은 소수 재벌의 사금고로 전락하고 말 것이었다. 그러던 것이 쿠데타 이후 군부가 부정 축재 환수조치의 일환으로 재벌이 소유했던 시중은행 주식을 몰수하면서 다시 은행에 대한 정부지분율은 23~31%에 이르게 되었다. 그리고 1961 년 시중은행 주식의 10% 이상을 소유한 민간 대주주의 의결권을 제한한 "금융기관에 관한 임시조치법," 이듬해 한국은행을 재무부에 종속시킨 한국은행법 개정 등의 조치들을 통해 은행은 사실상 정부의 통제하에 놓이게 되었다.

In this account, the benevolent businessman schooling the innocent but sincere country boy in the ways of the world is replaced by a power game in which the state has the leverage over business to compel its cooperation. For Kim, this signified the emergence of a new export-led new ruling coalition.⁴¹

When it comes to normalization and Vietnam, Kim emphasizes the junta's pressing financial need. "Ultimately, the entirety of the government's diplomatic efforts at the time could not but concentrate on the introduction of foreign capital, and within the dynamics of international politics (particularly when considered in light of US East Asia policy) the most accessible source of foreign capital was Japan."⁴² He also discusses the opposition to the treaty, but mainly in terms of how it served as the only useful tool possessed by the opposition, not a "remnant of feudalism" or manifestation of "sentiment."⁴³

Much like our other historians, Kim focuses on the security and economic benefits of deploying troops in Vietnam, recognizing Park's concern that US troops in Korea might redeploy to Vietnam. Yet to this he adds that deployment was also a means of mitigating severe unemployment and in this respect shared a character with the dispatches of nurses, minors, and ship crewmen to Germany.⁴⁴ In the final analysis, Kim interprets both the normalization of relations with Japan and "special procurement" (*t'ŭksu*) gained through dispatches to Vietnam in terms of securing the "material basis" (*mulchŏk kich'o*) of Korea's developmental state.

In short, the Park Chung Hee government also knew that the normalization of Korea-Japan relations and dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam would bring side effects and become a considerable political burden. The negative effects and political burden were great: subordination to Japan intensified; moral high ground was lost, and the excessive pursuit of utility led to Korea's diplomatic isolation; criticism arose over the fact that 4,960 had died and sixteen thousand had been injured in an unjustified war fought by innocent young men; and deep wounds were inflicted upon the Vietnamese people through the excessive conduct of Korean soldiers in the field. Nevertheless, the government judged

⁴¹ Ibid., 372–377.

⁴² Ibid., 364: 결국 당시 정부의 모든 외교적 노력은 외자도입에 집중될 수밖에 없었는데, 당시의 국제정치적 역학구도에서(특히 미국의 동아시아 정책구상과 관련시켜 보았을 때) 가장 손쉬운 외자도입원은 바로 일본이었다.

⁴³ Ibid., 360–365.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 369–371.

that the economic and military benefits would outweigh these costs with the state's developmental orientation having shifted toward openness. Particularly through the one billion dollars earned and more than 3.5 billion dollars in loans procured in the Vietnam War, together with the six hundred million dollars in claims compensation (three hundred million in grants, two hundred million in credit assistance, and one hundred million in private commercial loans) and other loans that had begun to flow in from Japan via the normalization of Korea-Japan relations, the government largely resolved the initial problem of chronic insufficiency of foreign currency. These financial resources, primarily invested in the government's economic plan, helped to realize Park Chung Hee's intention to stabilize and sustain the regime through economic achievement. Furthermore, they served as a new source of political funding.⁴⁵

Altogether, related to Korea's economic takeoff, Cho emphasizes the role of businessmen and Park's flexibility and pragmatism in accepting their wisdom and advice. Yi emphasizes the principle of comparative advantage. Paying attention to the world economy, he describes how Korea managed to seize the grand opportunities of the postwar economic boom and the changing structure of the global economy with advanced countries beginning to buy manufactured goods from developing countries, coupled with Japan's shift away from light and into heavy manufacturing. Kim emphasizes the emergence of a new ruling coalition based on export-led growth. A key move by the state in this regard was the nationalization of the banks, which attracted businessmen to participate in the economic plan. When it comes to normalization and Vietnam, Cho emphasizes Park's pragmatic foregoing of historical wounds and is particularly contemptuous of the opposition and the students. He especially emphasizes that Vietnam was Park's initiative, signifying the restoration of Korean masculinity lost in the Chosŏn period. Yi emphasizes the significance of normalization in terms of its relationship to Korea's exchange-rate reform and entry into the GATT. He makes a similar point regarding Vietnam as contributing to an

⁴⁵ Ibid., 372: 요컨대 박정희 정부도 한일국교정상화와 한국군의 베트남 파병이 많은 부작용을 초래하고 자신들에게 상당한 정치적 부담을 가져다줄 것이라는 사실을 잘 알고 있었다. 대일 종속이 심화되었고, 지나친 실리추구로 인해 명분을 잃음으로써 국제사회에서 한국의 외교적 고립을 초래했으며, 명분 없는 전쟁에 무고한 우리의 젊은 이들을 내몰아 4,960 명이 죽고 1 만 6,000 명이 다치게 했다는 비난, 전투수행과정에서 한국군이 벌인 무리한 행동으로 인해 베트남 국민들이 받은 깊은 상처 등 그 부작용과 정치적 부담은 상당히 컸다. 그럼에도 불구하고 정부는 일단 국가의 발전방향을 대외개방으로 선회한 이상 그것이 가져올 경제적 및 군사적 이득이 훨씬 크다고 판단했다. 특히 베트남전 참전으로 얻은 10억 달러에 달하는 수입과 35억 달러가 넘는 차관, 그리고 한일관계정상화로 일본에서 들어오기 시작한 6억 달러의 청구권 자금(무상원조 3억, 유상원조 2억, 민간상업차관 1억) 및 각종 차관이 합쳐져서 정부는 출범 초기 직면했던 만성적인 외환부족문제를 상당히 해결할 수 있었다. 이 재원은 정부가 추진하던 경제개발계획에 우선적으로 투입됨으로써 경제적 성과를 토대로 정권의 안정과 연속을 기하려는 박정희의 의도를 실현시키는 데 기여했다. 또한 이것은 새로운 정치자금원으로써 정권의 안정화에 공헌하기도 했다.

international environment conducive to Korea's comparative advantage. Kim emphasizes the Park government's pressing need for foreign capital, not just to carry out its economic plan but also as funding to sustain itself, regarding both normalization and Vietnam. Yi and Cho share a disdain for the opposition and students and admiration for Korea's businessmen that is lacking in Kim's account.

3. Elections

Elections are prominent in Cho and Kim's narratives but not so much in Yi's. This itself is a significant point. I discuss the 1963 and 1967 elections successively. I briefly discuss the 1972 elections in the section on Yusin.

There were presidential and general elections in 1963, held on October 15 and November 26, respectively, to which Cho pays substantial attention.⁴⁶ He attributes Park's victory in the presidential election to his common touch and effective campaign. The election race was characterized by an "ideological debate." Park denounced "old politicians" such as Yun Posŏn as "flunkeyist" (*sadaejuijŏk*) and "superficial liberal democrats" (*ch'ŏnbak han chayu minjujuŭija*). Yun focused on Park's communist record, that is, his imprisonment and dismissal from the army in the wake of the Yŏsu-Sunch'ŏn uprising for his involvement with the Korean Worker's Party.⁴⁷ According to Cho, Yun's anticommunist rhetoric backfired, and Park managed to use it against him.

Park waged a counterattack, promising to "rectify the system of guilt by association hindering the careers of innocent people due to the ideological problem of a relative." Park's response to candidate Yun Posŏn's ideological offensive stemmed from the difference between he and Yun's reading of the hearts and minds of the people. To aides who intended to fight back in the media against Yun Posŏn's attack on Park concerning suspicion over his being a communist tool, he rather ordered, "Tell them to make a bigger deal of it." It seems that, having returned from hell's threshold over an ideological problem, Park correctly read the hearts and minds of the Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla Provinces, where there were many unjustly massacred in the early days of the June 25 War for belonging to the Bodo League, an organization of former leftists.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ See, in general, Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 5, 287–412.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 316, 320.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 320, 322–323: 박정희는 역공으로 나왔다. '근친자의 사상 문제로 결백한 사람의 출세를 막고 있는 연좌제를 시정하겠다'고 공약한 것이다. 윤보선 후보의 사상 공세에 그렇게 대응한 데는 박정희가 잃은 민심과 윤보선의 그것이 달랐기 때문이었다. 박정희는 자신에 대한 용공 의혹을 제기하는 윤보선의 공격

In terms of the elections results, Cho emphasizes a two-tier voting cleavage between city and countryside and north and south, arguing that the north voted for Yun because it was closer to the ceasefire line and thus more predisposed to his ideological campaign while the south was more receptive to Park's counterattack as victims of anti-communists massacres and suppression during the Korean War. Another significant aspect of the election was the marked support Park received in the Chōlla Provinces.⁴⁹ He writes, "The fundamental meaning of the fifth presidential election was that the modernization group represented by Park Chung Hee that had received the support of the countryside, progressives, reformers, and leftists defeated the conservative group of Yun Posŏn that had received the support of the landlord class. It was as if a military elite had been given a historical calling to seize political power and lead the tide of history based on the discourse of "rich country, strong army."⁵⁰ For Cho, this support signified the overcoming of petty factional interests in favor of the grand project of modernization.

The proposition was that between modernization or democracy, national democracy or Western democracy, flunkeyism or independence, prioritizing state rights or human rights, economic development or political development—those [issues] encapsulating and representing the two currents of our society. With this historical proposition in mind, our citizens made an excellent (and sagacious) choice. While handing power to Park Chung Hee's modernization group by one hundred fifty thousand votes, they offered a "spiritual victory" to the democratization group. Allowing these two groups to compete with and check each other within the "ring" known as the Republic of Korea ultimately facilitated competition over loyalty to the people and state. In this respect, the fifth presidential election, decided by a meager number of votes, was a historic election determining the path and protagonists of contemporary Korean history.⁵¹

내용을 축소 보도하도록 언론계에 작용하려는 측근들을 제지하면서 '그거 더 크게 내라고 해'라고 했다. 사상 문제로 지옥의 문턱까지 갔다가 생환한 박정희는, 좌익 전력자의 단체인 보도연맹에 소속되었다고 해서 6.25 개전 초기에 억울하게 학살된 사람들이 많은 경상도, 전라도 지역 민심을 정확히 읽었다고 평가된다.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 361–367.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 364–365: 5대 선거의 핵심적 의미는 다수의 농민과 진보.개혁.좌파 세력의 지지를 얻은 박정희로 대표되는 근대화 세력이 지주 계층의 지지를 모은 윤보선의 보수적 정치 세력을 눌렀다는 점이다. 군인 엘리트가 부국강병론의 국가주의에 기초하여 정치적 주도권을 잡고 역사의 흐름을 이끌도록 역사적 소명을 부여받은 셈이었다.

⁵¹ Ibid., 366: 그 명제란 근대화냐 민주화냐, 민족적 민주주의냐 서구식 민주주의냐, 사대냐 자주냐, 국권이 우선인가 인권이 우선인가, 경제 발전인가 정치 발전인가로 요약.상징되는 우리 사회의 양대 흐름이었다. 이 역사적 명제를 놓고 우리 국민들은 절묘한(또는 슬기로운) 선택을 했다. 15만여 표 차로 권력을 박정희의 근대화 세력에게 넘겨주는 대신에 민주화 세력에게는 "정신적인 승리"를 안겨 주었던 것이다. 이는 양대 세력이 대한민국이란 울타리 안에서 서로 견제, 경쟁함으로써 결과적으로는 국민과 국가를 위한 충성 경쟁을 벌이도록 한 셈이었다. 그런 점에서 근소한 표 차로 승부가 갈린 5대 대통령 선거는 한국 현대사의 진로와 주인공을 결정한 역사적 선거였다.

Cho pays comparatively less attention to the subsequent general election. To explain the DRP's achievement of an overwhelming majority, he mentions the release of US aid money. Above all, he emphasizes its signification of a "generational change" in Korean politics.

Voters who participated in the sixth general election granted to president-elect Park Chung Hee safe seats and realized a good portion of the generational change he advocated. Among elected National Assembly candidates, one percent were in their twenties, twenty-one percent in their thirties, and forty-six percent in their forties, meaning that about two thirds of National Assembly members were now young or middle-aged adults (twenty-one percent were in their fifties, ten percent in their sixties, and one percent in their seventies). Through two elections, the young state elite group symbolized by Park Chung Hee in his forties and Kim Chongp'il in his thirties had emerged at the very heart of our society.

The group that opposed this consisted of the old politicians symbolized by the sexagenarian Yun Posŏn.⁵²

Yi Yŏnghun discusses the 1963 elections only briefly, with little discussion of why Park and the DRP emerged victorious.⁵³ Regarding the presidential election, he does not mention the division of the opposition, instead asserting that Hŏ Chŏng's withdrawal turned the election into a two-man race.⁵⁴ He perfunctorily concludes, "Park Chung Hee defeated Yun Posŏn by the narrow margin of 156,000 votes. In the following general election, the ruling DRP won 110 seats, almost two-thirds [of the National Assembly], achieving an unexpectedly great victory."⁵⁵

Both these accounts are strikingly different from that of Kim. Regarding Park's victory in the presidential election, he rejects outright the "ideological debate" explanation.

Clearly the ideological dispute was an important election issue, and its influence was also manifest in the southern regions. Yet this cannot completely explain

⁵² Ibid., 404:

제 6 대 선거에 참여한 유권자들은 박정희 대통령 당선자에게 안정 의식을 주었고 그가 주창해 온 세대교체를 상당 부분 실현시켜 주었다. 국회의원 당선자들 가운데 20 대가 1%, 30 대가 21%, 40 대가 46%로서 청장년층이 전체의 약 3 분의 2 나 되었다(50 대는 21%, 60 대는 10%, 70 대는 1%). 40 대의 박정희-30 대의 김종필로 상징되는 젊은 국가 엘리트 집단이 두 차례의 선거를 통해서 우리 사회 중심부에 등장한 것이다.
이에 반대하는 세력은 60 대의 윤보선으로 상징되는 구정치 세력이었다.

⁵³ Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan min 'guk yŏksa*, 300-303.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 301.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 301-302: 박정희는 윤보선에게 15 만 6,000 표라는 근소한 차이로 승리하였다. 이어서 치러진 국회의원선거에서는 여당인 민주공화당이 거의 3 분의 2 에 해당하는 110 개 의석을 차지하여 예상 밖의 대승을 거두었다.

the distribution of votes. First, the north-south divide overlapped with the urban-rural divide. In the case of the Chŏlla Provinces, where Park received a high number of votes, Yun won out over Park by a considerable margin in the cities of Kwangju, Sunch'ŏn, and Mokp'o. The same can be said for North Kyŏngsang Province. It would be difficult, then, to jump to the conclusion that this issue decisively determined the election outcome without clearly stipulating this overlapping structure of the votes. Furthermore, acknowledging the influence of ideological voting in this election raises the problem of explaining why this voting tendency suddenly disappeared in the 1967 presidential election.⁵⁶

For Kim, the most decisive factor in Park's victory was the division of the opposition; seven candidates ran against Park.⁵⁷ Although this advantage weakened when Hŏ Chŏng and Song Yoch'an gave up their candidacies and announced support for Yun Posŏn, the remaining plurality of opposition candidates was likely decisive in Park's narrow margin of victory, as the cumulative votes for O Chaeyŏng, Pyŏn Yŏnt'ae, and Chang Isŏk outweighed this margin quite considerably (831,924 vs. 156,026).⁵⁸ Park also had the advantage of a superior campaign in terms of spending—DRP spending was three times greater than that of the Civil Rule Party (*Minjŏng tang*, CRP)—organizational competence, and pro-regime organizational activities.⁵⁹ Other factors included the election's character as an unprecedented contest between a “progressive” ruling party and “conservative” opposition—even while the students and intellectuals had

⁵⁶ Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk*, 347:

사상시비가 이 선거의 중요한 쟁점이었던 것만은 분명했으며, 남부 지방의 일부에서 그 영향이 나타나기도 했다. 그러나 이것을 전체적인 득표율 분포와 그대로 연결시키기에는 아직 해명되어야 할 문제들이 많이 남아 있다. 우선 이 선거에서는 표의 남북분할 현상과 여촌야도 현상이 중첩되어 나타났다. 박정희가 표를 많이 얻은 전남의 경우 광주, 순천, 목포 등의 도시에서는 윤보선이 큰 차이로 박정희를 눌렀으며, 경북에서도 유사한 현상이 일어났다. 따라서 이러한 표의 중첩성이 구조가 명확히 규명되지 않는 한 이 문제를 선거의 승패를 가름한 결정적 요인으로 선불리 단정 짓기는 어렵다. 만약 이 선거에서 이념적 투표성향의 영향력을 인정할 경우, 우리는 다음 선거인 1967 년 대선에서는 왜 이러한 투표성향이 갑자기 소멸되었는가를 또 하나의 난제에 봉착하게 된다.

In terms of “existing analyses,” Kim refers to a report in the *Tonga ilbo* directly after the election and the memoirs of Kim Hyŏnguk, who was KCIA director at the time of the election. Ibid., 406n54. He does not refer to Cho Kapche.

⁵⁷ The candidates included Park Chung Hee for the DRP, Yun Posŏn for the Civil Rule Party (*Minjŏng tang*, CRP), Hŏ Chŏng for the People's Party (*Kungmin ūi tang*, PP), Song Yo Ch'an for the Liberal Democratic Party (*Chayu minju tang*, LDP), Pyŏn Yŏngt'ae for the Righteous People Party (*Chŏngminhoe*, RPP), O Chaeyŏng for the Autumn Wind Party (*Ch'up'unghoe*, AWP), and Chang Isŏk for the New Ascension Party (*Sinhŭng tang*, NAP). Ibid., 342.

⁵⁸ This of course assumes that those who voted for O Chaeyŏng, Pyŏn Yŏnt'ae, and Chang Isŏk would have voted for Yun, as Kim himself points out. Ibid., 342–344.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 405n48.

largely turned on the coup makers by now, the two groups still overlapped more than the opposition in terms of a nationalist orientation—and the shipment of two hundred fifteen thousand tons of flour from Canada and Australia distributed in southern regions as part of relief efforts in the wake of Hurricane Shirley.⁶⁰

On the general election, Kim cites the DRP's institutional advantage, securing 110 of the 175 seats (62.86 percent) in the National Assembly with just 32.4 percent of the vote. This was a clear indication that the electoral reforms carried out by junta, meant to capitalize on opposition divisions, were working just as planned.⁶¹ Campaign funding was once again important, with the DRP making 32.4 percent and CRP 19.3 percent of total expenditures.⁶² Another important factor was US assistance. One of the main election issues was the US withholding of fifteen million dollars in aid to leverage its demand for economic stabilization, which the opposition portrayed as a failure of the Park Chung Hee government's diplomacy. Responding to the Park government's entreaties, the United States ultimately released ten million dollars in subsidies just before the election. The assassination of President Kennedy on November 22 also influenced voters, says Kim—campaigns were suspended out of respect, and Park paid a visit to the United States to pay his condolences—stimulating a desire for stability. Above all, however, his most significant point is the impact of the DRP's incorporation of former Liberal Party (*Chayu tang*, LP) and other “old politicians” (*kujŏngch'iin*). He observes that old politicians made up fifty-one of the DRP's 162 candidates, or about one third. Twenty-eight were former LP members, most of whom won their

⁶⁰ Ibid., 347–348.

⁶¹ Votes were divided as follows: the CRP attained forty-one seats with 19.3 percent of the vote; Democratic Party (*Minju tang*, DP) thirteen seats with 13.2 percent of the vote; PP two seats with 8.6 percent of the vote; LDP nine seats with 7.6 percent of the vote; and “other” (*kita*), including other minor parties and independent candidates, no seats with nineteen percent of the vote. Ibid., 348–351.

⁶² Ibid., 350, 351.

districts.⁶³ This is greatly different from the “generational change” Cho emphasizes.

It is no accident that Kim pays so much attention to the 1963 election, as he evaluates these electoral victories as a decisive moment for the Korean developmental state and Korean history.

Nineteen sixty-three was an important year for the formation of the developmental state. Through victory in the two elections of this year, Park Chung Hee and the military group, which had established political institutions and rules advantageous to them and an organizational basis through the institutionalization of the “revolution” over the previous two years, attained procedural legitimacy. The developmental state thus attained a basis for legitimacy in addition to a material one. Park Chung Hee, who referred to himself as an “unfortunate soldier,” dismounting his horse and successfully metamorphosized into a civilian politician, elected president through relatively fair elections. His group also effectively breached the unfamiliar world of politics through a decisive victory in the general election. Also through the general election, the political class was reorganized into a ruling party composed of military officers and a number of “old politicians,” centering on former LP members, and an opposition divided among politicians hailing from the old DP. It was a “new evil” [*sinak*] united with an “old old evil” [*kuguak*] against an utterly fragmented “old evil.” Until 1972, when politics was reduced to a skeleton, Korea’s political class would not greatly deviate from this configuration.⁶⁴

Cho and Kim also devote much attention to the 1967 elections, carried out on May 11 and June 8, which barely appear in Yi Yŏnghun’s account; he only mentions that Park easily won the presidential election and the DRP achieved more than a two-thirds majority in the general election due to popular support for the Park regime’s economic performance.⁶⁵ Cho emphasizes that the presidential election was not very trying for Park, as he had the confidence in the economic performance of his first term.⁶⁶ He pays attention to how these elections represented a straightforward two-party

⁶³ Ibid., 351–353.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 353–354: 1963 년은 발전국가의 형성에 중요한 한 해였다. 지난 2 년간 “혁명”의 제도화 작업을 통해 자신들에게 유리한 정치체도와 규칙 및 조직 기반을 만든 박정희와 군부세력은 이 해에 있었던 두 차례의 선거에서 승리함으로써 이제 절차적 정당성을 획득하게 되었다. 이로써 발전국가는 물리적 기반 외에 정당성의 토대까지 갖추게 되었다. 스스로를 “불운한 군인”으로 자처하며 말 위에서 내려온 박정희는 비교적 공정한 서거를 통해 대통령에 당선됨으로써 일단 민간 정치인으로 화려한 변신에 성공했다. 그의 세력 역시 총선에서 압승을 거둬들여서 낡은 정계에 성공적으로 발을 들여놓았다. 그리고 총선을 거치면서 정치권은 군부와 자유당계를 중심으로 한 일부 “구정치인”들이 여당이 되고, 구민주당 출신의 정치인들이 분열된 재야권을 이루는 모습으로 재편되었다. 그것은 마치 “구구악”과 야합한 “신악”이 사분오열된 “구악”과 맞서는 형상이었다. 1972 년 유신체제의 출범과 함께 정치가 형제화되기 전까지 한국의 정치권은 이 형상을 크게 벗어나지 않았다.

⁶⁵ See Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 7, 249–355; Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 8, 19–48; Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn ’guk kwa puguk*, 378–385; Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan min ’guk yŏksa*, 330, 379.

⁶⁶ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 7, 329–330.

competition, making Park's victories more meaningful.⁶⁷ He acknowledges the corruption involved in the general election, focusing on the minister of the interior and KCIA chief and the use of vote-buying. The DRP thus won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly but only at the cost of incurring severe recriminations, with the opposition crying foul and students taking to the streets.⁶⁸

Kim emphasizes DRP spending. It had registered about eleven percent of the voting population as members by the end of 1966 and carried out an active and expensive local campaigning. Rather than mudslinging, the candidates focused on evaluating the main policies of the Park administration (economic development, agriculture, normalization, Vietnam, etc.). The DRP proclaimed its successful economic policy while the New Democratic Party (*Sinminju tang*, NDP) decried the increasing wealth disparity and exclusion of the farmers, declaring its intention to pursue balanced growth. It also pledged to revise the content of the normalization treaty and clarify aspects of the agreement with the United States over deploying Korean troops in Vietnam.⁶⁹

Like Cho, Kim also recognizes the significance of the 1967 election victories as solidifying the legitimacy of the Park regime. In the presidential election, this time Park achieved a solid victory outweighing any opposition division; this was an effective two-candidate competition, where Park won 51.4 percent to Yun Posŏn's forty-one percent of the vote. Even while campaign finance was a factor, most decisive was the success of the First Five-Year Economic Plan. This is why Park made gains in the cities in this election, even in Seoul.⁷⁰ Kim also emphasizes the urban-rural

⁶⁷ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 8, 33. The opposition (New Korea Party [*Sin Han tang*, NKP] and Massess Party [*Minjung tang*, MP]) united in the New Democratic Party (*Sinmin tang*, NDP) with Yun Posŏn as presidential candidate and Yu Chino as party leader. Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn 'guk kwa puguk*, 379–380.

⁶⁸ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 8, 35–36.

⁶⁹ Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn 'guk kwa puguk*, 379–380.

⁷⁰ Also important for Park's victory was an east-west divide, contrasting with the north-south divide of the 1963 election. Park won Pusan, the Kyŏngsang Provinces, North Ch'ungch'ŏng Province, and Kangwŏn Province, while Yun won Seoul, Kyŏnggi Province, South Ch'ungch'ŏng Province, and the Chŏlla Provinces. *Ibid.*, 381–383.

divide in the general election; twenty-five of the NDP's twenty-eight constituency candidates were elected in big cities, while the countryside was dominated by the DRP. This contrasts with Cho's ultimate emphasis on the dominance of the opposition and their intellectual supporters. Meanwhile, Kim is more critical of the corruption in the general election, which secured the DRP a crucial two-thirds majority allowing for constitutional revision. It aroused the fury of the of opposition and students and undermined the legitimacy the Park regime had painstakingly accrued.⁷¹

Altogether, there is a striking contrast between our three authors' portrayals of the 1963 and 1967 elections. For the former, Cho emphasizes Park's successful "reading of the hearts and minds of the people" (*minsim ilkki*) and a generational change in Korean politics. Yi is relatively unconcerned with explaining the election results; the only notable point is Park's victorious result (the same goes for the 1967 elections). The 1963 elections are a particularly dramatic point in Kim's narrative, which is why he devotes so much attention to explaining why Park won. His description is different from Cho's, emphasizing institutions established under the junta that gave Park and the DRP an edge in the election game and the incorporation of "old politicians," mainly from the old Liberal Party, signifying a new ruling coalition and establishing the character of the political game that would last until Yusin. The coverage of the 1967 elections among the two historians varies less. They both emphasize Park's now decisive (rather than marginal) victory. Both also acknowledge the corruption diluting Park's victory, but Cho emphasizes that this occurred among Park's underlings while Kim focuses on the eroded legitimacy of the developmental state.

⁷¹ In the general election, among the eleven parties, only candidates from the DRP, NDP, and MP attained seats in the National Assembly. The DRP attained 129 (70.6 percent) of the seats with 50.6 percent of the vote while the NDP attained forty-five seats with 32.7 percent of the vote. The MP attained just a single seat. This, says Kim, signified the reemergence of the two-party system present in the 1958 general election but absent in the 1960 and 1963 elections Ibid., 384–385.

4. *Yusin*

None of our historians cover the Yusin period itself in detail in their books but devote considerable attention to its origins. These narratives can be divided into description of and commentary on the 1969 constitutional revision and crises of the late 1960s, followed by some general remarks on the Yusin regime itself.

Cho's treatment of the constitutional revision is extensive but intermittent.⁷² He emphasizes the wastefulness of democracy, North Korean belligerence, and US abandonment. First, Park's experiences in the 1960s reinforced in him an already strong aversion to democracy.

President Park was one who had raged against the corruption of politicians and military officers as the son of a poor tenant farmer and incorruptible military officer. This simple and honest President Park agonized over the reality in which he had to give money to political enemies, supporters, and high-ranking military officers for the preservation of his administration and offer every possible benefit to businessmen to produce this money. The main associates involved in this moneymaking, such as Yi Hurak and Kim Sönggon, increased their influence through their use of financial resources. Even while holding them in low regard, Park knew he absolutely needed their cooperation for the preservation of his administration and, furthermore, amending the constitution to allow him to run for a third term, and turned a blind eye to their gathering of government slush funds.

President Park believed that democracy was the cause of his need for tremendous political funds. He regarded as problematic his need of money for elections and to maintain a political party as an organization for elections. His Yusin declaration was a resolution rooted in this critical awareness. This was the restriction of political liberty to eradicate the corruption that was a side effect of democracy.⁷³

⁷² Scattered discussions can be found in Cho Kapche, *Nae mudöm* 7; Cho Kapche, *Nae mudöm* 8.

⁷³ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudöm* 7, 141–142:

박 대통령은 가난한 소작농의 아들로 태어나 청렴한 장교 생활로 일관하면서 정치인과 군 장성들의 부정부패에 분노했던 사람이다. 소박한 박 대통령은 정권을 유지하기 위하여 정적, 지지자, 군 지휘관들을 상대로 돈을 써야 하고 그 돈을 만들기 위하여 기업인들에게 온갖 이권을 제공해야 하는 현실 속에서 고민했다. 그런 돈을 만드는 데 중심 역할을 한 이후락, 김성곤 등 측근들은 자금 동원력을 이용해서 한 층 영향력이 커졌다. 박 대통령은 이들을 못마땅하게 생각하면서도 정권 유지, 나아가서는 3선 개헌을 위해 이들의 협조가 절대적으로 필요하다는 점을 알고 있었고 그들이 정권 비자금을 모집 관리하는 것을 눈감아 주었다.

박 대통령은 막대한 정치자금이 필요한 원인이 민주주의 때문이라고 생각했다. 선거를 위해 돈이 필요하고 선거 조직으로서의 정당 유지를 위해 또 돈이 드는 것에 대하여 박정희는 문제의식을 느끼고 있었다. 이런 문제의식에서 그는 유신 선포를 결심하게 된다. 이는 민주주의의 부작용인 부정부패를 일소하기 위해서 정치 자유를 제약한 셈이다.

Cho also references elsewhere Park's natural and acquired aversion to elections as an inherently honest and straightforward person. *Ibid.*, 141–142. The passage is a recollection

Park also learned of the “flaws” of democracy through President Johnson’s downfall in the United States, which he saw as caused by protestors and the media.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, he was convinced of the danger should the opposition ever manage to recapture power.⁷⁵

Second, Cho emphasizes the North Korean threat. Often referred to as the security crisis of the late 1960s, he calls it the “Second Korean War” (*che-2 Han’guk chŏnjaeng*).⁷⁶ His account reaches back to 1965 and tracks a steady increase in North Korean provocations and spy incidents.⁷⁷

of Chu Kwanjung, who was a professor and advisor to the government. On his background, see Ibid., 295–298.

⁷⁴ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 8, 195–196.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 218–220. Cho also points out the relationship between the marginalization of Kim Chongp’il and the eventual emergence of Yusin. Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 7, 56–59, 140.

⁷⁶ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 8, 288–330.

⁷⁷ The years 1968–1969 marked the tensest on the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War. Notable incidents included the attempted raid on the Blue House by a North Korean commando unit on September 21, 1968, the capture of the *USS Pueblo* and its crew by North Korea two days later in the East Sea, a North Korean guerilla incursion in Ulchin and Samch’ŏk in November, and the shooting down of US spy plane EC-121 by North Korea in April 1969. Amid this tense atmosphere, the newly inaugurated President Nixon shocked the Korean people with his speech in Guam on July 25 calling on Asian countries to take responsibility for their security. Furthermore, in June the following year, he suddenly informed Park he would withdraw one third of US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula without even extending the courtesy of pretending to debate the matter, increasing the sense of insecurity among Koreans. This feeling was only exacerbated in 1971 with his visit to and effort to improve relations with communist China. The tension in ROK-US relations also manifested in trade. Following the dollar crisis that arose in 1968, the United States and the world economy plunged into a long-term recession. The US invoked protective measures, including the imposition of a ten percent import tariff and quota system for imports of certain products in 1971. This was quite a shock for the Korea economy, for which forty percent of exports went to the United States, and particularly for the textile industry. The special procurement from the Vietnam War long enjoyed by the Korean economy was also poised to end with Nixon’s plan for withdrawal. Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn’guk kwa puguk*, 392–394. Tae Gyun Park (Pak T’aegyūn), however, shows how it was Park Chung Hee who increasingly provoked North Korea after 1965 toward extracting greater gains from the United States. Tae-Gyun Park, “Beyond the Myth: Reassessing the Security Crisis on the Korean Peninsula during the mid-1960s,” *Pacific Affairs* 82, no. 1 (2009): 93–110. Meanwhile, several of these “spy incidents” were KCIA operations. See Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2007), 93–101. See also Cho’s coverage of the 1967 East Berlin incident (*Tongbaengnim sakŏn*). Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 8, 49–108. Much of Cho’s account relies on the testimony of Im Sŏkchin, who was directly implicated in the incident but repented and confessed, taking on a key role in bringing the incident to light. Cho compares Im’s conversion with the well-known cases of Arthur Koestler and André Gide. Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 8, 68. He also connects the construction of the Seoul-Pusan Highway (*Kyŏng-Bu kosok toro*) and the founding of the Homeland Reserves (*Hyangt’o yebigin*) to the security crisis. Regarding the highway, he quotes O Wŏnch’ŏl: “Modern wars are also wars of maneuver. President Park well understood that the autobahn in Western Germany was built strategically in preparation for Hitler’s *blitzkrieg*, and he was ever dissatisfied with the

According to Cho, such provocations had averaged twenty a year since 1946, increasing to forty-eight in 1965 and fifty-nine in 1966 and peaking at 140 in 1967, a consequence of North Korea's attempt to "open a second front" in the Vietnam War.⁷⁸

Coupled with North Korean aggression was US abandonment.⁷⁹ As reflected in the following passage, Cho emphasizes the necessity of the authoritarian Yusin regime—the pursuit of "independent national security" (*chaju kukpang*) and HCI—in the face of North Korean belligerence and US abandonment:

As President Park confronted the security crisis caused by North Korea's continuous armed attacks and the United States' policy of appeasement toward North Korea, he chose a policy of "independent national security" and directly responded to the United States and North Korea. As a result, President Park was able to attain comprehensive national solidarity within South Korean society, the complete opposite of what Kim Il Sung had intended. Park took advantage of this and converted it into the impetus for national development while extending his rule through the constitutional amendment allowing him to run for a third term and Yusin.⁸⁰

Cho also describes how Park perceived the US response to the *USS Pueblo* incident as a "betrayal."⁸¹ He emphasizes a Johnson-era United States "weakened" by liberals and protestors and that Korea was able to extract gains from this on the road toward independent national security.

The strife between Korea and the United States ignited by the January 21 incident and capture of the *USS Pueblo* soon yielded to the Korean side the gifts of an amended Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, an additional one hundred million dollars in military support, construction of an M16 factory, introduction of F-4 Phantom planes, supplementing of security along the ceasefire line with barbed wire, and the installation of automated electronic barriers along anticipated key infiltration routes.

securing of roads for rapid troop deployments when armed North Korean guerrillas appeared." Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 8, 221–225, 160–161: "현대전은 기동전이기도 합니다. 서독의 고속도로 아우토반은 히틀러의 전격전에 대비한 전략 도로였다는 점을 박 대통령은 잘 알고 있었고, 우리도 북한의 무장 공비가 출몰할 때 신속히 부대를 투입하기 위한 도로 확보에 박 대통령은 늘 아쉬워하고 있었습니다."

⁷⁸ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 8, 50. Cho also provides a detailed account of the Blue House raid. Ibid., 109–151. It is interesting to note that Park's "battle" with opposition resistance reignited over corruption in the 1967 general election is treated in the same context of the "Second Korean War." Ibid., 52.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 153–225.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 181–182: 박정희 대통령은 북한의 계속적인 무력 도발과 미국의 대북 유화 정책으로 안보 위기에 직면하자 "자주국방" 노선을 선택, 미국과 북한에 정면으로 대응했다. 그 결과 박 대통령은 김일성의 의도와는 정반대로 남한 사회 내에서 광범위한 국민적 단합을 이끌어낼 수 있었다. 이를 활용한 박 대통령은 3선 개헌과 유신을 통해 집권을 연장하면서 국가 발전의 동력으로 전용한다.

⁸¹ Ibid., 158–161.

US conduct over the roughly twenty days between late January and mid-February 1968 showed the inability even of a great power to promote government stability let alone fulfill its promises to its allies should public opinion fail to be managed. At the time, the United States was showing signs of a severe division in national opinion amid the confrontation between progressives bandwagoning on the anti-war mood and orthodox conservatives.

President Johnson announced about two months later, on March 31, “In consideration of the unity of the United States, I shall not run in the upcoming presidential election.” The Johnson administration could but retreat to a policy of narrowly protecting American interests alone through negotiations with the Viet Minh while placating its disappointed allies. Americans would have to wait until the 1980s for the restoration of national power, when President Reagan emerged advocating orthodox conservatism.⁸²

Overall, “independent national security” is the key frame though which Cho interprets the Yusin period. Profoundly changed by the security crisis—particularly the three attempts on his life between 1968 and 1974, the last resulting in the death of his wife Yuk Yŏngsu—Park ultimately came to understand the true nature of Kim Il Sung and absolute need to defeat his regime.

Until then [1968], Park had no reason to hold a grudge against Kim Il Sung. Theirs was an antagonism based in politics, a professional duty with little room for emotions.

On January 21, 1968, a North Korea special forces unit penetrated the heart of Seoul to carry out a surprise attack on the Blue House and kill Park Chung Hee. This so-called January 21 incident led Park Chung Hee to despise Kim Il Sung.

Two years later (June 22, 1970), Kim Il Sung once again made an attempt on Park Chung Hee’s life. Three armed North Korean commandos entered the National Cemetery in Tongjak-tong, Seoul and mistakenly exploded the remote-controlled bomb they had installed on the roof of Memorial Gate, and one of the commandos died. The gate led to a courtyard with an altar for lighting incense. The commandos had intended to hide in the nearby woods and detonate the bomb via remote control when Park Chung lit some incense on June 25. This was a method similar to that of the bomb incident of January 9, 1983 at the Martyr’s Mausoleum for Aung San in Myanmar (through this incident in which North Korea operatives attempted to kill President Chōn Tuhwan, seventeen ministers and vice-ministers died).

In 1974, Mun Segwang, who had been coopted by a North Korean espionage organization in Japan, killed the president’s wife Yuk Yŏngsu, who was sitting

⁸² Ibid., 195:

1.21 사태에 연이은 푸에블로호 납북사건으로 시작된 한미 간 갈등은 한국 측에 한미상호방위조약의 보완과 군원 1 억 달러 추가 지원 및 M16 공장 건설, F-4 팬텀기 도입, 휴전선 철책선 보완, 주요 예상 침투로의 자동 전자방책 설치 등 선물들을 안겨주었다.

1968 년 1 월 하순부터 2 월 중순까지 이어지는 약 20 여 일 동안 미국이 보여준 행동은 강대국조차 자국 내 여론을 통제하지 못하면 동맹국과의 약속은 물론 정권의 안정도 도모할 수 없다는 것을 보여주고 있었다. 당시 미국은 만전 무드에 편승한 진보 세력과 정통 보수 세력이 대치하면서 심각한 국론 분열 현상을 드러내고 있었다.

존슨 대통령은 약 두 달 뒤인 3 월 31 일 ‘미국의 단결을 위해 차기 대통령 선거에 불출마한다’고 선언했다. 존슨 행정부는 실망한 동맹국들을 달래며 월맹과의 협상을 통해 미국의 이익만을 겨우 지키는 선으로 후퇴해야 했다. 미국인들은 정통 보수 노선을 표방하는 레이건 대통령이 등장하던 1980 년대까지 국력 회복을 기다려야만 했다.

next to Park in the National Theater, as he fired upon Park Chung Hee amid his August 15 commemorative speech.

Even an adult and a gentleman cannot help but hold a grudge against one who persistently attempts to take his life in this manner. This was the nature of Park Chung Hee's relationship with Kim Il Sung.⁸³

Therefore, Cho continues, "President Park declared, 'Kim Il Sung believes me the greatest barrier to communist unification. That's why he tries to get rid of me.' Within these words lay the idea, 'I am the only one who can match Kim Il Sung. This is my historical role.'"⁸⁴

Yi, like Cho, locates the origins of Yusin in the security crisis of the late 1960s, which he also describes in terms of North Korean belligerence and US abandonment.⁸⁵ He claims that "Park Chung Hee could not but take personal responsibility for Korea's security, and he believed heavy chemical industrialization to be urgent for the pursuit of autonomous national security."⁸⁶ He also emphasizes Korea's loss of competitiveness in light manufacturing and the ongoing political conflict with the opposition, especially the latter's economic platform of "mass economics" (*taejung kyŏngjeron*). As the antithesis of Park's development strategy focusing on

⁸³ Ibid., 285–286:

이 무렵까지 박정희로서는 김일성과 개인적인 원한을 가질 이유는 없었다. 정치적 상황에 의해서 맞대결하는 관계였지만 그 직무를 떠나선 인간적인 감정이 개재될 계기가 없었던 것이다.

1968년 1월 21일, 북한의 특수부대가 청와대를 기습하여 박정희를 죽이기 위해 서울 중심부까지 침투한 이른바 1.21 사태는 박정희로 하여금 김일성을 증오하도록 만들었다.

그 2년 뒤(1970년 6월 22일) 김일성은 또다시 박정희의 목숨을 노린다. 북한의 무장특공대 3명이 서울 동작동 국립묘지에 들어가 현충문 지붕에 무선식 기폭장치로 폭파되는 장치를 설치하던 중 실수로 폭발이 있었고, 한 특공대원이 죽었다. 이 현충문 안뜰에는 분향대가 있었다. 박 대통령이 6월 25일 이곳에서 분향할 때 근처 숲 속에 숨어 있던 특공대원이 무선 원격조종장치를 누르면 터지도록 할 작정이었다. 1983년 1월 9일 미얀마 아웅산 묘소에서 있었던 폭파사건(주-북한 공작원이 전두환 대통령을 노린 이 사건으로, 17명의 장·차관급 고관들이 사망)과 같은 수법이었다.

1974년엔 제일 북한 공작 조직에 포섭된 문세광이 국립극장에서 8.15 기념 연설을 하고 있던 박정희를 저격하는 과정에서 옆 자리에 있던 대통령 부인 육영수를 살해했다.

이런 식으로 자신의 암살을 끈질기게 추진하는 자에게는 성인군자라도 원한을 갖지 않을 수 없게 된다. 박정희의 김일성에 대한 관계가 바로 그러하였다.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 287: 박 대통령은 '김일성은 적화통일에 가장 큰 장애물은 나라고 보고 있는 것이야. 그러니 나를 없애자는 것이지'라고 말했다. 이런 말 속에는 '김일성과 대적할 수 있는 인물은 나뿐이며 이것은 나의 역사적 역할이기도 하다'는 생각이 깔려 있었을 것이다.

⁸⁵ Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan min'guk yŏksa*, 341.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 341: 박정희는 한국의 안보는 스스로 책임질 수밖에 없으며, 자주국방을 위해서는 중화학공업화가 시급하다고 생각하였다.

exports and big companies at the expense of labor and the countryside, this was a policy with which there could be no compromise.⁸⁷

According to mass economics, Korea's economy at the time was dependent, with foreign capital and big business oppressing small and medium-size businesses, farmers, and workers. It was argued that export industrialization, which had failed to take root in the national economy, was driving economic growth without distributing its fruits to the masses. Exports were based on low wages and low-priced domestic grain. Workers and farmers were thus unable to escape poverty, it was argued, and the achievement of a self-reliant economy would be impossible as long as an export-led development policy prevailed.

As an alternative, mass economics called for curbing the extravagant spending of the wealthy class, getting rid of financial waste, and raising national savings to mobilize domestic capital as much as possible, which would then be predominantly invested in the development of agriculture and small and medium-size businesses for the expansion of the domestic market. This was a plan of internal industrialization for a so-called self-reliant economy. Furthermore, it called for the development of mass democracy based on the political solidarity of small and medium-size business owners, conscientious intellectuals, farmers, and workers. Mass democracy would recognize the right of the working class to participate in business management.⁸⁸

Ultimately, says Yi, this was a plan doomed to fail, as demonstrated by many other developing countries, and the opposition's embrace of it ignited a "fundamentalist conflict" (*kŭnbonjuŭijŏk taerip*) with the Park government.⁸⁹ In this manner, Yi implies the ultimate justification of Park's Yusin declaration.

Yi's interpretation of the transition to HCI is different compared to Cho's emphasis on "independent national security." For him, this represented a new, "dynamic" pursuit of comparative advantage.

The transition to an export-led development strategy around 1964 was more pragmatic than creative. The export-led development strategy accorded faithfully with the international comparative advantage endowed upon the Korean economy without being bound by existing ideas. By comparison, the 1973 HCI plan demonstrated not even a hint of comparative advantage.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 341–343.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 377:

대중경제론은 당시 한국경제를 외국자본과 국내 대기업이 중소기업, 농민, 노동자를 억압하는 종속경제라고 규정하였다. 국민경제에 뿌리를 박지 못한 수출공업이 경제 성장을 주도하여 대중은 성장의 과실로부터 소외되고 있다고 하였다. 수출은 국내의 저임금과 저곡가를 기반으로 한 것이며, 그로 인해 수출주도형 개발정책을 취하는 한 노동자와 농민은 빈곤에서 벗어날 수 없고 자립적인 국민경제의 성취도 불가능하다고 하였다.

대중경제론은 그 대안으로서 부유층의 사치적 소비를 억제하고 제정의 낭비를 없애고 국민저축을 높여 국내자본을 최대한 동원한 다음, 그것을 농업과 중소기업의 발전에 우선적으로 투자하여 국내시장을 확대해 가야 한다고 주장하였다. 이른바 자립경제를 위한 내포적 공업화의 노선이었다. 나아가 대중경제론은 중소기업가, 양심적 지식인, 농민, 노동자의 정치적 연대를 통한 대중민주주의의 발전을 주장하였다. 대중민주주의는 노동자 계급이 기업 경영에 참가할 권리를 인정하였다.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 378–379.

Advanced countries had monopolized heavy industries including steel, machinery, shipbuilding, and chemicals (although not electronics) since the industrial revolution. It thus looked impossible for an undeveloped country like Korea to jump in and compete. This was an excessively adventurous investment that could have led to great sacrifices. Yet Park Chung Hee charged forward, and to do so, carried out another coup d'état known as the October Yusin. The resulting political resistance was difficult to overcome. The costs were just as considerable as the investment was adventurous. Ultimately, Park Chung Hee would perish seven years later.

Nonetheless, the world economy at the time was changing dramatically, in ways economists, prone to short-term analyses, could not predict. The cause of this was rapid technological innovation. Thus, even if steel, shipbuilding, and the like could be called traditional industries, the comparative advantage of advanced countries was not absolute. This was even more so the case for newly emerging industries like electronics. The comparative advantage of such heavy and chemical industries fluctuated dramatically among advanced countries depending on technological innovation and industrial policy. Park Chung Hee's heavy and chemical industrialization boldly leapt into this world economy in which the international distribution of comparative advantage was so in flux, pursuing a kind of comparative advantage for Korea. In other words, this was not comparative advantage secured statically but sought after dynamically. This adventurous investment ultimately succeeded. History has attested to this since Park's death. This was a destination that if Korea had waited a few more years the gap with advanced countries would have widened to such a degree that Korea could not have caught up on its own. Park Chung Hee succeeded in loading Koreans on the last train of the world economy bound for this destination.⁹⁰

Putting aside the fact that Yi's remarks could easily be mistaken for those of a critical scholar saying that Park came very close to ruining the economy but got lucky, the point here is that Yi believes that even Park's HCI drive is understandable in terms of the principle of comparative advantage, once

⁹⁰ Ibid., 343–344:

1964 년을 전후한 수출주도형 개발전략으로의 전환은 창의적이라기보다 실용적인 것이었다. 기존의 관념에 매이지 않고 한국경제를 찾아온 국제적 비교우위에 충실히 대응한 것이 수출주도형 개발전략이었다. 그에 비해 1973 년의 중화학공업화 계획에는 어떤 형태의 국제적 비교우위도 가시적이지 않았다. 전자를 제외한 철강, 기계, 조선, 화학 등은 중후장대의 공업으로서 산업혁명 이래 오랫동안 선진국이 독점해 온 것이다. 거기에 한국과 같은 후진국이 뛰어들어 경쟁력을 확보하기는 거의 불가능해 보였다. 그것은 지나치게 모험적인 투자로서 자칫하면 큰 희생이 따를 수 있는 것이었다. 그렇지만 박정희는 그 길로 돌진하였으며, 그를 위해 10 월유신이라는 또 한 차례의 정변을 불사하였다. 그에 따른 정치적 저항은 감내하기 힘든 것이었다. 모험적인 투자였던 만큼 그에 따른 비용도 적지 않았다. 박정희는 결국 7 년을 버틴 뒤에 쓰러졌다.

그렇지만 당시의 세계경제는 단기 분석에 익숙한 경제학자들로서는 도저히 예측할 수 없을 정도로 격동하고 있었다. 급격한 기술혁신이 그 원인이었다. 그에 따라 철강, 조선 등의 전통공업이라 해도 선진국의 비교 우위는 절대적이지 않았다. 전자와 같은 신흥공업은 더욱 그러하였다. 이들 중화학공업의 비교우위는 기술혁신과 산업정책에 따라 선진국 사이에서 격렬하게 유동하였다. 박정희의 중화학공업화는 그렇게 비교우위의 국제적 재치가 지극히 유동적인 세계경제에 과감하게 뛰어들어 한국 나름의 비교우위를 모색한 것이다. 다시 말해 정태적으로 비교우위를 맞이한 것이 아니라 동태적으로 비교우위를 찾아 나선 것이다. 그 모험적인 투자는 결국 성공하였다. 그의 죽음 이후의 역사가 그것을 증명해 주고 있다. 몇 년을 더 지체했다면 선진국과의 격차가 너무 벌어져 한국인의 자력으로는 도저히 따라갈 수 없는 목적지였다. 박정희는 그곳으로 향하는 세계경제 열차의 마지막 칸에 한국인들을 올려 태운에 성공하였다.

again emphasizing the shifting structure of the world economy in explaining Korea's economic success.⁹¹

Kim's account of Yusin begins with the 1969 constitutional amendment. Rather than the challenge from the opposition, Kim focuses on Park-regime infighting, at the center of which was Kim Chongp'il. On one side, the "four-man system" (*4-in ch'eje*) of Kim Sönggon, Paek Namök, Kim Chinman, and Kil Chaeho, chief presidential secretary Yi Hurak, and KCIA chief Kim Hyönguk sought to pass the amendment and sustain Park's rule, and on the other, Kim Chongp'il and his group sought to stymie it and compel a succession. The ultimate passing of the constitutional amendment, then, signified not only the first step toward Yusin—what Kim describes as the replacement of parliamentary and party politics by administrative rule—but also the demise of Kim Chongp'il's political career (until after 1987) and DRP intraparty democracy. Henceforth, Park exercised complete control over the party through political finance and the KCIA. Meanwhile, the NDP shifted from dialogic partner to KCIA target.⁹²

Kim's analysis of the crises of the late 1960s is particularly nuanced. He acknowledges the security crisis in 1968 but insists that the Park regime faced a far more severe challenge from within, in the form of economic and social crises. Economic growth peaked in 1969 at 15.9 percent and then began to ebb, falling to 8.9 and 10.2 percent in the years 1970 and 1971, respectively. The economy was mired in a debt trap and plagued by insolvent companies. The logic of development in the 1960s had been to import foreign capital, build factories, and pay off the debt through exports. Since Korea also had to rely on imports for raw materials, intermediate goods, and machines, however, increasing exports also meant

⁹¹ The rest of Yi's account of the Yusin era focuses on the Middle East construction boom (another stroke of good luck for the Korean economy in the wake of the oil crisis), the growth of the *chaeböl* in the 1970s, reforestation efforts carried out under Park Chung Hee, and the Saemaül movement. Later in the book, he also discusses the resistance to Yusin. Ibid., 346–361, 384–389.

⁹² Kim Iryöng, *Kön'guk kwa puguk*, 384–392, 416n118.

increasing imports, which led to a deteriorating balance of payments. In addition to paying off loans and the interest on loans, then, foreign capital was needed to make up for account deficits, leading to a dramatic increase in foreign debt. This situation only worsened when it came out that most companies built on foreign loans were insolvent; a May 1969 government survey revealed almost half among eighty-three loan-dependent companies to be insolvent.⁹³

Worse than this was the social crisis. Labor disputes gradually emerged beginning with the strike by the National Union of Textile Workers (*Chŏn'guk sŏmyu nojo*) in October 1969, symbolically culminating in Chŏn T'aeil's self-immolation on November 13, 1970. In 1971, the Media Liberalization Movement (*Ŏllon chayuhwa undong*), the movement by judges to demand an independent judiciary (*sabŏp p'adong*), and the uprising of poor slum dwellers in Kwangju, Kyŏnggi Province (*Kwangju taedanji sakŏn*) followed. These incidents involved mistreated workers who were the backbone of industrialization, farmers and the urban poor excluded from the industrialization process, and intellectuals seeking to restore democratic rights suppressed by the prioritization of economic growth. These were consequences of the uneven development pursued by the developmental state.⁹⁴

Amid these crises, Park faced another challenge in the 1971 elections, when Kim Taejung made a strong showing and the NDP stripped the DRP of its two-thirds majority, disallowing any more constitutional amendments. To overcome these crises, Park announced the July 4 Joint Statement and August 3 measure freezing curbside loans. If the former was meant as an adjustment to the changing international context, the latter was an attempt to alleviate the worsening economic crisis. Neither of these policies were sufficient. Park ultimately responded with authoritarianism and HCI dependent on Japanese capital (despite US opposition).⁹⁵

⁹³ Ibid., 392–395.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 395–396.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 396–397, 423–424.

Altogether, Cho and Yi portray Yusin as a response to a security crisis and continuing challenges from the opposition. Yi adds an emphasis on the changing structure of the world economy and Korea's pursuit of comparative advantage. Meanwhile, Kim emphasizes the domestic factors behind Yusin, in the form of economic and social crises.

5. Park Chung Hee

To varying degrees, each of our historians discusses the specific character of Park Chung Hee in explaining the “successful” development of the Park Chung Hee era. Little surprising, nowhere is this more prominent than in Cho's biography. Cho's understanding of Park Chung Hee is eclectic but consistently positive. The biography's introduction features a cacophony of positive descriptors and associations, including *Übermensch* (*ch'oin*), “shy” (*pukkūrōm t'anŭn*), “tearful” (*nun mul i manŭn*), “commoner” (*sōmin*), “pragmatism” (*siryong*), “subjectivity” (*chuch'esōng*), “seeking truth from facts” (*silsa kusi*), “glory and shame” (*yōngyok*), “indigenous Korean” (*t'ojong Han'gugin*), “revolutionary” (*hyōngmyōngga*), “first-rate thinker” (*l-gŭp sasangga*), “discernment” (*anmok*), “literary and military talent” (*munmu kyōmjōn*), “pioneer” (*sōn'gakcha*), “martial spirit” (*sangmu chōngsin*), “rich nation, strong army” (*puguk kangbyōng*), “patriotism” (*aeguksim*), “statist” (*kukkajuŭija*), and “diligent” (*kunmyōn han*).⁹⁶ If there is one consistent emphasis within the biography itself, however, it is on a particular *mentality* rendering Park an especially capable leader. Observe, for example, the following passage:

The possessor of a simple and honest spirit evades imprisonment by useless thoughts and hypocrisy, able to see things as they are, pragmatically and honestly. [Park] tried to critically digest trends in advanced foreign thought, such as Zhuxiism, democracy, and market economy, in consideration of the national interest and the welfare of the people. At the heart of Park's subjectivity was an attitude trying to face fact-based reality and distinguish between right and wrong based on the national interest. This was precisely the political philosophy of “seeking truth from facts.” This is also the reason why I try to understand Park as continuing the tradition of pragmatism and independence in our national history. Park Chung Hee's philosophy of fatherland modernization, continuing

⁹⁶ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudōm 1*, 10–14. The introduction can be found in any of the eight volumes.

[in the tradition of] Kim Yusin's resolve to go to war with Tang, King Sejong the Great's creation of Han'gŭl, Prince Kwanghae's national-interest-based foreign policy, the Sirhak scholars "seeking truth from facts," and Rhee Syngman's policy of anticommunist nation-founding, is rooted in his honest and simple humanity.⁹⁷

At times, this mentality even verges on a kind of religious or mystical power. The following anecdote is related by Ch'oe Yŏng'taek, who accompanied Park on his first trip to Japan as SCNR chairman on the way to the United States in 1961.

"I'm going to prepare for the meeting. I'll have to quietly arrange my thoughts. I'll need some time alone. Please wait outside, Ch'oe *kun*."

"Yes, sir."

Guard Ch'oe recalls somehow being swept up in a solemn, silent religious atmosphere as he waited quietly in the hallway.

"Park's appearance that morning was completely different from that of the day before.... It was that of a religious man intending to pray before undertaking a great task. I think that he prayed after sending me outside. I still believe that."⁹⁸

Impressive as Park's almost superhuman mentality may be, it is perhaps best defined by its negative features. In the introduction, Cho also lists a number of important characteristics *against which* Park is defined:

⁹⁷ Ibid., 11: 소박한 정신의 소유자는 잡념과 위선의 포로가 되지 않으니 사물을 있는 그대로, 실용적으로, 정직하게 본다. 그는 주자학, 민주주의, 시장 경제 같은 외래의 선진 사조도 국가의 이익과 민중의 복지를 기준으로 하여 비판적으로 소화하려고 했다. 박정희 주체성의 핵심은 사실에 근거하여 현실을 직시하고 시비를 국가 이익에 기준하여 가리려는 자세였다. 이것이 바로 실사구시의 정치 철학이다. 필자가 박정희를 우리 민족사의 실용-자주 노선을 잇는 인물로 파악하려는 것도 이 때문이다. 김유신의 대당 결전 의지, 세종대왕의 한글 창제, 광해군의 국익 위주의 외교 정책, 실학자들의 실사구시, 이승만의 반공 건국 노선을 잇는 박정희의 조국 근대화 철학은 그의 소박한 인간됨에 뿌리를 두고 있다.

⁹⁸ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 4, 334:

"내, 회담 준비를 하는데, 회담하기 전에 조용히 머리 속을 정리 좀 해야겠어. 나 혼자 조용히 있어야 할 것 같은 데, 최군은 좀 나가서 기다려 주게."

"예, 알겠습니다."

조용히 복도로 나온 최 참사관은 자신도 모르게 종교적인 엄숙한 분위기에 휩싸이게 됐다고 회고한다.

"그 날 아침 박 의장의 모습은 전날...와는 완전히 판판이었습니다. 마치 큰일을 앞두고 종교인이 기도를 하려는 듯한 자세였습니다. 아마도 저를 밖으로 내보낸 뒤 기도를 했을 줄 압니다. 저는 지금도 그렇게 믿고 있습니다."

Passages such as these can also be read as an effort to endear Park to the Christian right despite his not being religious, let alone Christian. In any case, Cho clearly saw Park as exercising a certain "spiritual power." In another piece written around the same time, he explicitly argues that Chosŏn Korea had fallen to colonialism due to its ideology of Zhuxiism (*Chujahak*), which he says lacked a spiritual component, present in Shamanism, Buddhism, and Shinto, capable of fostering subjectivity, namely, the "conversation with the absolute" (*chŏltaeja wa ūi taehwa*) achieved through prayer, meditation, and silent contemplation. He particularly emphasizes the example of Kim Yusin as depicted in the *Samguk sagi* (Record of the Three Kingdoms), who he says, in a way reminiscent of the Japanese samurai, gathered superhuman strength through prayer. See Cho Kapche, "Cho Kapche kija ūi Habōdŭ yŏnsu pogo 5: Sadaejŏk munmin tŭl ūi Taehan min'guk chugigi" [Reporter Cho Kapche's Harvard study report, part five: The murder of the Republic of Korea by flunkyst civilian politicians], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (January 1998), 317–321.

“idle thinking” (*chamnyŏm*); “hypocrisy” (*wisŏn*); “Zhuxiism” (*Chujahak*); “feudal system” (*ponggŏn ch’eje*), “flunkeyism” (*sadaejuŭi*), “literary effeminacy” (*munyak*); “second and third-rate intellectuals” (2, 3-*ryu chisigin*), “doctrine of status distinction” (*myŏngbullon*), “doctrine of unconditional peace” (*mujokŏnjŏgin p’yŏnghwaron*), “retrograde customs” (*pokkop’ung*), “factions” (*tangp’a*), and “communism” (*kongsanjuŭi*).⁹⁹

These are the characteristics of the opposition and North Korean regime.

The essence of the revolutionary view of history possessed by the modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee was his view of the Yun Posŏn and the KDP-DP group as a feudal vestige that had inherited the physiology of Chosŏn Dynasty Yangban and civilian politics (factionalism, flunkeyism, and hypocritical Confucian dogmatism)—in other words, as a reactionary political force. After establishing the core May 16 group as a modern state elite, Park Chung Hee swept away the vestiges of these feudal forces, culpable for the very first instance of national ruin in our history through the degeneration into colonialism, and defined as modernization the construction of a truly independent nation on the foundations of the spirit of self-help, a self-reliant economy, and independent national security. The problem was that the old civilian politicians, whom Park had labelled as feudal, flunkeyist, and factional political forces, occupied the hearts and minds of the people on the pretext that they were the strongest advocates of Western democracy.¹⁰⁰

What Cho means when he calls Park Chung Hee a “modernization revolutionary,” then, is rooted in an extremely disparaging view of Chosŏn

⁹⁹ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 1, 10–14. On the concept of *myŏngbun*, what I translate as the “doctrine of status” here and “hypocritical Confucian dogmatism” in the passage that follows to capture Cho’s derogatory usage (*myŏngbullon*), see Seung B. Kye, “Confucian Perspectives on Egalitarian Thought in Traditional Korea,” *International Journal of Korean History* 12 (August 2008): 57–88. The basic idea is that everyone in society (just as in nature) has their natural place. Cho portrays Park as a “pragmatist” who attains legitimacy through performance, in contrast with what he sees as the “feudal” opposition that claims legitimacy based on “status,” a born right to rule. Even more importantly, however, is the way in which Cho’s usage of *myŏngbun* places the opposition and the North Korean regime in the same category. See Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 5, 364; Cho Kapche, “Cho Kapche kija ŭi habŏdŭ yŏnsu pogo 1: Han’guksa ŭi siryeong kwa chaju e taehan hwaksin; Minjujuŭi nŭn Hanŭnim i anida” [Reporter Cho Kapche’s Harvard study report, part one: Faith in the pragmatism and autonomy of Korean history; Democracy is not God], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (September 1997), 282.

¹⁰⁰ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudŏm* 5, 50–51, 365: 근대화 혁명이 박정희가 지녔던 혁명적 역사관의 핵심은 한민당-민주당 계열의 윤보선 세력을 조선조 양반.문민정치의 생리(당파성, 사대성, 위선적 명분론)를 이어받은 봉건적 잔재, 즉 수구적 정치세력으로 본 점이다. 박정희는 5.16 주체세력을 근대적 국가 엘리트라고 규정한 뒤 나라를 식민지로 전락시킴으로써 우리 민족사상 최초의 망국을 초래했던 이런 봉건적 정치 세력의 잔재를 청산하고 자조 정신, 자립경제, 자주국방에 기초한 진정한 독립 국가를 건설하는 것을 근대화라고 정의했던 것이다. 문제는 그가 봉건적.사대적.파당적 정치 세력으로 규정했던 구미간 정치 세력이 서구 민주주의의 가장 강력한 주창자라는 명분을 확보하여 국민들 마음 속에 자리잡고 있었다는 점이다.

history, perhaps justifying claims of his espousing the “colonial view of history” (*singminji sagwan*).¹⁰¹

While all but impossible to outdo Cho’s enthusiasm, a remarkably similar emphasis on Park’s mentality can be found in Yi’s work. This is captured in a section in his book on Park’s “dream and revolution.”¹⁰² The details of this account follow very closely Cho Kapche’s biography.¹⁰³ He describes, for example, Park’s childhood dream of becoming a soldier; his membership in the South Korean Workers’ Party for “private, family-related,” not ideological, reasons (*kaejŏk kajŏngsa*, i.e., the murder of his brother Pak Sanghŭi by police); his subsequent arrest and eventual acquittal in the wake of the Yŏsu-Sunch’ŏn Rebellion, euphemistically mentioning how Park “actively cooperated with the investigation”; his southward retreat amid the North Korean invasion, clearly affirming his abandonment of communism; and so forth.¹⁰⁴ His thoughts on Park’s character are summed up in the following passage:

Born under Japanese imperial rule, receiving a militaristic education, and living as a soldier through the Second Sino-Japanese War, Pacific War, and Korean War, the mental world of Park Chung Hee surged with tension over a fundamental vexation with history and reality. He loathed the ills of flunkeyism,

¹⁰¹ Chin Chunggwŏn, for example, argues that Cho Kapche is a successor to the fascist ideology of Kita Ikki via Park Chung Hee. See Chin Chunggwŏn, “Chugŭn tokchaeja ūi sahoe: Pak Chŏnghŭi sindŭrom ūi chŏngsin punsŏkhak” [The dead dictator’s society: A psychoanalysis of the Park Chung Hee syndrome], in *Kaebal tokchae wa Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae: Uri sidae ūi chŏngch’i kyŏngjejŏk kiwŏn* [Developmental dictatorship and the Park Chung Hee era: The political-economic origins of our times], ed. Yi Pyŏngch’ŏn (P’aju: Ch’angbi, 2003), 339–364. Relatedly, one might also view the following passage written by diplomat and scholar Pyong-choon Hahm (Ham Pyŏngch’un): “Many observers of the Korean scene, especially Japanese, have tended to equate the Confucian elites (such as those who ruled the Yi Korea) with moral effeminacy and political decadence in contrast to the military castes of Japan and the Occident which, as political rulers of those civilizations, imparted moral vitality and political progress to their polities.” Pyong-choon Hahm, “Toward a New Theory of Korean Politics: A Reexamination of Traditional Factors,” in *Korean Politics in Transition*, ed. Edward Reynolds Wright (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), 323. Hahm was killed in the terror incident at Aung San Martyr’s Mausoleum in 1983. See a tribute written by his son, also a reputed scholar, Ham Chaebong on the thirtieth anniversary of the incident. Ham Chaebong, “Aung San t’erŏ 30-nyŏn, Ham Chaebong Asan chŏngch’aek yŏn’guwŏnjang ūi sabugok” [Thirty years since the Aung San Martyr’s Mausoleum terror incident: Asan Institute for Policy Studies Director Ham Chaebong’s eulogy for his father], *Maeil kyŏngje*, October 6, 2013, <https://www.mk.co.kr/news/society/5737142>.

¹⁰² Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan min’guk yŏksa*, 389–395.

¹⁰³ While there are no in-text citations for this biographical section, Cho Kapche’s eight-volume *Nae mudŏm* is listed in the “selected biography.” *Ibid.*, 482.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 389–391.

laziness, and lack of autonomous spirit and ardor for glory of the Korean nation, which had fallen to colonialism, and raged at the resulting suffering and poverty of the people. His fierce critical awareness of and sense of obligation toward history and reality formed the unchanging foundation of all his political choices. He emphasized the role of a leading minority elite in reclaiming the nation's history. He believed Western democracy completely guaranteeing individual freedom and human rights to be yet inappropriate for a poor developing country under threat by communist forces. He thought that Korea's democracy had to be a "national democracy" or "guided democracy," which would help with reclaiming the nation's history. For him, the individual was an "individual of the nation" or an "individual of the state," the development of which was synonymous with the development of the nation and state.¹⁰⁵

While perhaps less ornamented, this reads like a passage Cho could have written himself. His account is ultimately distinguished, however, by an emphasis on Park's role as guarantor of the market. When it comes to the normalization treaty and Vietnam dispatches, for example, as I discussed in the section on Korea's economic takeoff, Yi emphasizes that "the Park Chung Hee government promoted an environment of international politics and international economy conducive to an export-oriented development strategy."¹⁰⁶ Similarly, he emphasizes how the transition to HCI reflected a "dynamic" pursuit of comparative advantage.¹⁰⁷

Kim's evaluation of Park Chung Hee in *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk* is much the same as that he proposed in his 1995 *Sasang* article, emphasizing the relationship between industrialization and democratization.¹⁰⁸ He begins with the myth of Britain's "simultaneous" development; like all countries, it proceeded through a sequence of industrialization then democratization. He points out that it was not until 1918 that workers

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 392–393: 일제 치하에서 태어나 군국주의 교육을 받고 중일,태평양전쟁과 6.25 전쟁을 거치면서 군인으로 입신한 박정희의 정신세계는 역사와 현실에 대한 근본적인 불만에 기인하는 팽배한 긴장으로 가득 찼다. 그는 식민지로 전락한 한국 민족의 사대주의의 병폐, 자주정신의 결여, 게으름과 명예심의 결여를 증오하였으며, 그 결과로 빚어진 민족의 고난과 가난에 분노하였다. 역사와 현실에 대한 그의 강렬한 비판의식과 소명감은 그의 모든 정치적 선택에 있어서 변함없는 기초를 이루었다. 그는 민족의 역사를 새롭게 개척함에 있어서 소수 엘리트의 지도적 역할을 중시하였다. 그는 공산주의 세력의 위협을 받고 있는 가난한 후진국에서 개인의 자유와 인권을 완전하게 보장하는 서구의 민주주의는 시기상조라고 생각하였다. 그는 한국의 민주주의는 민족의 역사를 새롭게 개척하는 데 도움이 되는 '민족적 민주주의' 또는 '행정적 민주주의'이어야 한다고 생각하였다. 그에게서 개인은 민족과 국가의 발전을 자신의 발전과 일치시키는 '민족적 개인' 내지 '국가적 개인'이었다.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 330: 박정희정부는 수출주도형 개발전략에 상응하는 국제정치와 국제경제의 환경을 조성하였다.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 343–344. This aspect of Kim's account highlights a fundamental ambiguity pertaining to historical agency. He does not question the relationship between Park's specific intentions and their consequences (as Yi perceives them), rather treating them as interchangeable.

¹⁰⁸ Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk*, 443–463.

attained the right to vote, only through much struggle, and that universal suffrage was not achieved until 1928. Historically, then, there has been an elective affinity between authoritarianism and the early stage of industrialization.

Almost none among the nations of the world avoided the social transformation from a traditional agricultural to an industrial society over the past two hundred years....

Such industrialization in Korea began in earnest precisely in the 1960s and 1970s under Park Chung Hee. The question thus naturally emerges, who or what should be blamed for all the problems and negative effects of this era? Were they the fault of the Park Chung Hee government or were they inevitable by-products of industrialization? I think that each should share the blame. There were problems in this period that inevitably arose because it was the early phase of industrialization—such as low wages, long working hours, an undemocratic political system—but one can also say they were aggravated due to the unique compressed industrial development strategy pursued by Korea at the time, amid which phenomena such as distorted resource distribution and extended one-man rule arose.

To consider the inevitable sacrifices of the industrialization process does not mean to preclude any criticism of the Park Chung Hee government. Essentially, I would like to say that industrialization is an unavoidable fate beyond value judgement and that one should avoid the mistake of reducing all the problems of the era to the Park Chung Hee regime, which set out to fulfil this fateful task.¹⁰⁹

Park Chung Hee's prioritization of economic development over democracy, in other words, was typical of the process of industrialization.

Altogether, our three historians demonstrate two general perspectives of Park Chung Hee. Cho and Yi emphasize Park's specific character and mentality and how this contributed to Korea's economic success. Kim's account is impersonal, focusing on the suitability of

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 446–453, 320, 455–457:

지구상의 국가들 중 지난 200 년 동안 전통적인 농업사회로부터 근대 산업사회로의 사회변동과정으로부터 자유로울 수 있는 나라는 거의 없었다....

한국에서 이런 산업화가 본격적으로 시작된 것이 바로 박정희 정권하의 1960–1970 년대이다. 그렇다면 여기서 당연히 제기되는 의문이 이 시대에 발생한 여러 문제들과 부작용들의 원인을 과연 어디로 귀속시켜야 하는 가이다. 박정희 정권 탓인가 아니면 산업화의 불가피한 부산물인가? 필자는 양자가 공유해야 할 문제라고 생각한다. 당사가 산업화 초기 단계였기 때문에 발생할 수밖에 없었던 문제들—예컨대 저임금, 장시간 노동, 정치체제의 비민주성 등—이 있었지만, 그것이 당시 한국이 추구했던 독특한 압축형 산업발전전략으로 인해 가중되었고 그 와중에서 자원의 왜곡배분이나 일인 장기집권과 같은 현상도 낳았다고 볼 수 있다.

이렇게 산업화 과정의 불가피한 희생의 측면을 고려했다고 해서 박정희 정권에 대한 여러 비판의 의미를 잃는 것은 아니다. 다만 산업화가 호오의 가치판단을 떠난 피할 수 없는 운명과도 같은 과정이라는 점과 그러한 운명적 과정을 떠맡아 추진한 박정희 정권에게 그 시대의 모든 문제를 귀속시키는 오류를 범하지는 말자는 것이 필자가 말하고자 하는 요체이다.

authoritarianism to the early phase of industrialization, which he proposes as a frame for understanding and judging Park Chung Hee.

6. Discussion

While Kim Iryŏng, Yi Yŏnghun, and Cho Kapche all narrate the Park Chung Hee era as a story of success, their texts differ by analytical framework. Cho focuses on Park's historical agency (thought processes and decision making). Yi focuses on the pursuit of comparative advantage (global economic conditions). Kim focuses on social and political structures. Yet there are also significant differences in the details of these account irreducible to the overarching frames. The comparisons across the categories of "revolution," "takeoff," "elections," "Yusin," and "Park Chung Hee" are represented in table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Kim, Cho, and Yi's Narratives of the Park Chung Hee Era

| Kim Iryŏng | Cho Kapche | Yi Yŏnghun |
|--|--|---|
| Revolution | | |
| May 16: Failures of Chang and Yun. | May 16: Park's agency. | May 16: Popular support. |
| Junta: Institution building, political/financial designs to consolidate power. | Junta: Emergence of military modernizing elite. | Junta: New constitution, presidential system and free-market economy. |
| Takeoff | | |
| Export-oriented growth: Failure of self-reliance; need capital; US pressure; new ruling coalition. | Export-oriented growth: Businessmen like Yi Pyŏngch'ŏl, bankers like Kim Chŏngnyŏm. | Export-oriented growth: Structure of world economy, pursuit of comparative advantage. |
| Normalization: Controversial but need capital; congruity with US policy. | Normalization: Security and economy. Park's pragmatism. Petty opposition. | Normalization: Crucial for joining GATT, global free-trade regime. |
| Vietnam: Controversial but need capital and security; congruity with US policy. | Vietnam: Park initiative. Recover Korean masculinity. | Vietnam: International environment conducive to export orientation. |
| Elections | | |
| 1963 presidential: Opposition division, better campaign resources | 1963 presidential: Park reads hearts and minds. | 1963 presidential: Park won. |
| 1963 general: new election laws; opposition division; finance; US help; old politicians. | 1963 general: generational change. | 1963 general: DRP won. |
| 1967 presidential: Recognition of regime performance. | 1967 presidential: Park's confidence, vision, and popularity. | 1967 presidential: Park won easily. |
| 1967 general: Corruption scandal means pyrrhic victory. | 1967 general: Victory over unified opposition. Corruption among Park underlings. | 1967 general election: DRP won. |
| Yusin | | |
| Constitutional revision: End of DRP factionalism, intraparty democracy (Kim Chongp'il). Erosion of developmental state legitimacy. | Constitutional revision: Park's disappointment with democracy, faced with petty opposition and Johnson's "defeat" by protestors. | Constitutional revision: Passed with popular support. |
| Crises: Economic, social. Authoritarianism and HCI needed to overcome. | Crises: Security. Independent national security needed to defeat Kim Il Sung. | Crises: Security, opposition's mass economics. HCI as pursuit of dynamic comparative advantage. |
| Park Chung Hee | | |
| Elective affinities between early industrialization and authoritarianism. | Mentality, modernization revolutionary. | Mentality, made markets work. |

Regarding “revolution,” Kim’s narrative stands out for its complete lack of attention to the actual unfolding of the coup. The most important factor here was Chang Myŏn and Yun Posŏn’s response, encouraging American approval. Park Chung Hee thus appears marginal in the coup’s ultimate success. Kim and Yi’s narrative overlap here somewhat compared to Cho’s, which depicts all the coup’s dramatic and heroic details while emphasizing Park’s personal agency, because Yi also assigns to Park a relatively passive role in emphasizing the coup’s popular support (his emphasis on Park’s popularity is also a recurring theme in his book). Yet the contingency of Kim’s account is lacking, with the coup more or less a foregone conclusion. Emphasis on Park’s popularity, moreover, is closer in spirit to Cho’s biography.

These differences carry over into the junta period. Kim pays greater attention to the military government’s failures and focuses on institution building in terms of its successes. Here there is some overlap with Cho’s narrative, as they both recognize the emergence of a new ruling class, but the differences are more significant. Kim emphasizes a balance of power between the bourgeoisie and the state, which has seized control of the banking sector but needs the support of business. Cho rather emphasizes the emergence of a new group of “military modernizers” in contrast to the “effeminate” civilian elites who have dominated Korea since the Chosŏn period and who failed to save the nation from Japanese subjugation. Yi, while highlighting the new constitution’s formal recognition of Korea’s “market economy,” narrates the events of this period in a manner similar to Cho.

When it comes to the “takeoff,” Kim focuses above all on the Park regime’s urgent need for capital not only for its development plans but also survival. He highlights the constraints and precariousness of the Park regime, fumbling from one crisis to the next. He also shows that Park had little choice in the matter of switching to export-oriented growth, if he

wished to stay in power, because all his efforts up that point had utterly failed. Similarly, normalization and Vietnam appear as the only options for a capital-hungry regime greatly constrained by US policy objectives. This account overlaps somewhat with Yi's in terms of a structural focus, but the level of analysis differs; it is the global and regional economies—a postwar economic boom and Japan's HCI transition—to which Yi pays attention. Furthermore, Yi does not let a structural emphasis take away from Park's agency. Points like this one evince the tension in Yi's narrative between glorifying both “the market” and Park Chung Hee. Both Yi and Cho single out Yi Pyŏngch'ŏl as a kind of visionary teacher. They also display a palpable disdain for the opposition and their petty resistance to the normalization treaty. Their narratives depart, however, when Yi emphasizes the significance of normalization primarily in association with Korea's joining of the GATT and the Vietnam conflict in terms of creating an international environment conducive to export-oriented growth. Meanwhile, picking up a recurring theme in his biography, Cho emphasizes most strongly the restoration of Korean masculinity. The Vietnam war, in other words, was an opportunity to revive Korea's “martial spirit” lost under effeminate literati rule. Above all, he emphasizes that these soldiers were *not* mercenaries, as the troop deployment was a Park initiative. This, in other words, was a demonstration of subjectivity (*chuch'esŏng*) and not flunkeyism (*sadaejui*).

Kim and Cho pay so much attention to elections in their narratives, that it is hard to discuss either of these works with this topic left out. This would seem the chief commonality between their work. Beyond this superficial overlap, however, it is Cho and Yi that share an emphasis on elections as a sign of Park's popularity; Cho simply does so in more detail. Indeed, Kim's analysis of the elections one of the defining features of his narrative compared to those of Cho and Yi. The key theme here is the Park regime's institutional rigging and collusion with business (both domestically and in Japan). Kim shows how the junta established new laws that decisively shaped the rules of the electoral game in their favor,

particularly when it came to the general elections; the DRP's superior funding and organizational capacity facilitated by the KCIA and grassroots associations created in the wake of the coup; how US approval worked in the regime's favor; how the regime "sold out" the revolution by integrating old politicians for the sake of securing seats in the National Assembly; and so forth. When it comes to the 1967 elections, all three historians agree they signified approval for the Park regime's economic performance, particularly with improved results in the cities, but Kim particularly emphasizes the pyrrhic character of the general election victory, which mired the regime in scandal and squandered its painstakingly accrued legitimacy. Cho emphasizes Park's insulation from this corruption, while for Yi it does not even register.

Kim's narrative of Yusin is also strikingly different compared to the other two. The road to Yusin begins with the constitutional amendment. Cho emphasizes Park's disappointment in and disdain for democracy and growing apprehension over an intransigent resistance, which gave him little choice but to carry on as president. Yi takes this opportunity to hammer away once again at the theme of Park's popularity, noting the successful referendum ahead of the amendment. Kim, however, focuses on the factionalism within the Park regime. The constitutional amendment was a decisive step toward Yusin not because it found popular support or provoked stubborn protests but because it signified the end of DRP intraparty democracy in the defeat of Kim Chongp'il, removing a decisive barrier to Park's pursuit of long-term rule.

Above all, the differences between the three historians over Yusin arise in their descriptions of the crises out of which it arose. Cho and Yi focus on the security crisis, characterized by North Korean provocations and US abandonment. Cho especially emphasizes Yusin's essential character as a pursuit of "independent national security" in the ongoing war with North Korea, for which strengthened authoritarianism was necessary. Yi adds a few varying elements to his narrative by emphasizing what he sees as the delusional economic policy of the opposition (*taejung*

kyōngjeron, or “mass economics”), which meant that Park could no longer risk subjecting the sacred task of economic growth to elections. Furthermore, he makes sure to analyze the transition to HCI in terms of the principle of comparative advantage, as he did for the transition to export oriented growth. Whereas the export transition was an example of “static” comparative advantage, he says, which means identifying a comparative advantage and then putting it into practice, the HCI transition was an example of “dynamic” comparative advantage, which essentially means comparative advantage that comes to exist after the fact; the former is *found* and the latter *created*. For Kim, however, Yusin was above all a response to domestic crises, both economic and social. Yi also discusses this economic crisis, but he merely mentions that Korea had lost its comparative advantage in light manufacturing (something Cho also notes). For Kim, this was a crisis of debt and insolvent companies, one that Park would only resolve by striking a deal with big business and calling a moratorium on payments of curbside loans, an affront to the logic of market economy that surely Yi would have to acknowledge (he does not). Kim asserts that the challenge from labor, symbolized in Chŏn T’aeil’s self-immolation, was an even more pressing crisis for the regime. For Kim, North Korean belligerence and US abandonment are peripheral to Yusin’s emergence compared to the chaos engendered by rapid social change.

The distinctiveness of Kim’s account of the Park Chung Hee era is sustained in his evaluation of Park Chung Hee himself. In Cho’s narrative, Park’s intentions and mentality clearly matter. This also holds for Yi, who likewise delves into Park’s background as a Japanese soldier and so forth to explain his role as a “modernization revolutionary.” Yet Yi also emphasizes the conditions of the world market at pivotal moments through the Park Chung Hee era, evincing a tension between glorification of Park and the market, I point I shall revisit in the following chapter. Meanwhile, Kim’s evaluation of Park is distant, framed within a grand narrative of world history where all nations traverse a developmental (authoritarian) stage before passing into industrial maturity. This evaluation certainly

exonerates Park Chung Hee, but compared to those of Yi and Cho, it is notable for its lack of concern with Park Chung Hee himself. If there is one defining characteristic of Kim's narrative of the Park Chung Hee era compared to those of Yi and Cho, this is it.

III. Conclusion

In this chapter, I compared three conservative narratives of the Park Chung Hee era, all of which evaluate the man and his era positively. Kim Iryŏng and Yi Yŏnghun are associated with New Right historiography, while Cho Kapche is associated with the "old right" (Cold War conservatism). The differing perspectives of these three historians are well known: Kim focuses on the developmental state, Cho on a "heroic" Park, and Yi on the market. Nevertheless, by comparing the content of their works across five categories ("revolution," "takeoff," "elections," "Yusin," and "Park Chung Hee"), I showed important differences irreducible to their overarching frames. Above all, I showed how Kim Iryŏng's work stood out against the other two, which considerably overlapped. Both Cho and Yi endeavor to paint Park as a hero, something completely lacking in Kim Iryŏng's narrative. These differences will be relevant in the following chapter, when I discuss these three historians in the context of right-wing historical revisionism.

Chapter 5.

Reappraisals of Dictatorship, Right-Wing Historical Revisionism, and New Right Historiography

I. Introduction

In this chapter, I compare and discuss reappraisals Park Chung Hee, Chiang Kai-shek, and Francisco Franco. I focus on the characteristics of the history wars in Korea, Taiwan, and Spain and the content of the respective appraisals. I then analyze the findings in the context of right-wing historical revisionism, focusing on four models in the work of Ernst Nolte, François Furet, Stéphane Courtois, and Renz De Felice. I conclude by contrasting the right-wing historical revisionism of Kim Iryŏng and Yi Yŏnghun toward demonstrating the varied nature of New Right historiography prior to Yi Yŏnghun's emergence as its dominant personality.

II. Post-Cold War Reappraisals of Dictatorship

I discuss the history wars and reappraisals of dictatorship with respect to two case studies: 1) Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek; and 2) Spain and Franco. I focus on two dimensions in each case study, namely, the characteristics of the history war and the main scholars and/or journalists involved in the reappraisals of dictatorship. After describing the characteristics of the two case studies, I compare them with the Korean case and discuss the similarities and differences. These sections also provide material for discussion in the subsequent section, in which I analyze the cases in terms of right-wing historical revisionism.

1. Chiang Kai-shek

A “Taiwan-centered history” arose in Taiwan in the 1980s in association with the opposition to the mainlander Kuomintang (KMT) regime.¹ With the end of martial law and democratization, a space opened to further develop this historiography. “As people in Taiwan gained some freedom of speech,” writes historian Q. Edward Wang, “some of them began to cast doubt on the once taken-for-granted Chinese identity, especially because that identity had been associated closely with the KMT autocratic rule. In response to the public desire for a new identity reflecting the island’s unique historical experience, a group of historians began plowing the field of Taiwan history, a field that has since borne as its fruit the most popular genre among all historical writings in today’s Taiwan.”² In this context, the questioning of Chiang Kai-shek’s place in public memory began, with some calling for the removal of statues, portraits, and so forth from public. When Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) member Chen Shui-bian was elected as Taipei mayor in 1994, he changed the name of the road in front of the Presidential Palace from Jieshou Road (“Road of Chiang Kai-shek’s Longevity”) to Ketagalan (the name of a Taiwanese aboriginal tribe) Boulevard. With his election as president in 2004, he declared the need for “de-Chiang-ification” (*quJianghua*), the most prominent consequence of

¹ Lung-chih Chang, “Re-imagining Community from Different Shores: Nationalism, Post-colonialism and Colonial Modernity in Taiwanese Historiography,” in *Contested Views of a Common Past: Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia*, ed. Steffi Richter (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008), 140; Damien Morier-Genoud, “Taiwanese Historiography: Towards a ‘Scholarly Native History,’” *China Perspectives* (March 2010), 82; Q. Edward Wang, “Taiwan’s Search for National History: A Trend in Historiography,” *East Asian History* 24 (2002), 93.

² Wang, “Taiwan’s Search for National History,” 95. There has also been much debate around textbooks. See Lung-chih Chang, “Telling Histories of an Island Nation: The Academics and Politics of History Textbooks in Contemporary Taiwan,” in *Designing History in East Asian Textbooks: Identity Politics and Transnational Aspirations*, ed. Gotelind Müller (London: Routledge, 2011), 117–134; and Fu-chang Wang, “Why Bother about School Textbooks? An Analysis of the Origin of the Disputes over Renshi Taiwan Textbooks in 1997,” in *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua*, ed. John Makeham and A-chin Hsiao (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 55–99.

which involved the name change of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall to National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall.³

While conflicts over public memory have been intense in Taiwan, a “history war” over Chiang at same level of intensity as those in Korea and Spain over Park Chung Hee and Franco, involving prominent scholars in public debates, is lacking.⁴ The defining feature of reappraisals of Chiang Kai-shek, in fact, is their concentration overseas, in the United States and (mainland) China, more than Taiwan itself. The United States and China have seen the most dramatic changes in Chiang’s image, from “devil” to nationalist hero and “the man who lost China” to “the man who brought China into modernity.”

In mainland China, interest in the republican era arose as historiography took a nationalist turn in the 1980s, and the space for a more positive evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek emerged.⁵ As historian Madhavi Thampi writes, “One of the most dynamic areas in terms of research and re-interpretation today in modern Chinese history is Republican-era history, i.e., the period from 1911 to 1949. Not only is material coming to light all the time, but the views too are changing. Two of the personalities who are being studied in great depth are Yuan Shikai and Chiang Kai-shek.... Chiang Kai-shek is seen as a nationalist and a man with a modern vision. Many of his failures are blamed on his advisers and his family members who are believed to have obstructed his efforts.”⁶

³ Jeremy E. Taylor, “*QuJianghua*: Disposing of and Re-appraising the Remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s Reign on Taiwan,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 45, no. 1 (2010), 186–187. The Kuomintang changed the name back after regaining power. See Ko Shu-ling, “National Democracy Hall Reopens,” *Taipei Times*, January 2, 2008, <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/01/02/2003395260>; Chen Yu-fu and Jonathin Chin, “Memorial’s Fate undecided,” *Taipei Times*, September 7, 2018, <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/09/07/2003699953>.

⁴ Historiographical conflict has tended to focus on the colonial era. See, for example, Lung-chih Chang, “Island Memories: Postcolonial Historiography and Public Discourse in Contemporary Taiwan,” *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity* 2, no. 3 (2014): 229–244.

⁵ Lloyd E. Eastman, “New Perspectives on the History of Nationalist China,” *The History Teacher* 19, no. 4 (1986), 554.

⁶ Madhavi Thampi, “Current Historical Thinking in the PRC,” *China Report* 45, no. 4 (2009), 347. See also So Wai Chor, Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor, *The China Review* 12, no. 1 (2012), 127; Chunjuan Nancy

The reforms in communist China, which began in 1978, also provoked a historiographical shift in the United States. Up until the 1970s Chiang was typically regarded as “the man who lost China.”⁷ More recent commentary displays a logic along the lines of the following, written by pundit Robert Kaplan:

Upon his retreat to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang reorganized his party to stress enlightened authoritarianism: dictatorship plus good, responsive governance. He promulgated a wide-ranging land reform program, emphasizing a sharp reduction in rural rents. Chiang’s land reform contrasted with Mao’s revolutionary land confiscations that led to over a million deaths in the early 1950s alone. This period really demonstrated the vast gulf between Mao’s utopian Marxist-Leninist precepts and Chiang’s Confucianist ones: rarely was the chasm wider between one form of dictatorship and another.

Taiwan’s path from that point forward was toward prosperity and eventual democracy. Meanwhile, China today becomes increasingly less autocratic (albeit in fits and starts) and increasingly less centralized, having long ago discarded Mao’s Marxist-Leninism in all but name. If China continues in this direction, even as it forges closer economic and cultural ties with Taiwan, Chiang will turn out to be a more important historical figure than Mao. While the regime in Beijing may dial up nationalism—with a nod to Mao—as a response to increasing economic disarray, the larger narrative is one of Chinese civilization devolving into informal geographical regions, with Taiwan providing the superior working model.

History is a battle of ideas. Confucianism has triumphed over communism. Democracy and enlightened authoritarianism has triumphed over totalitarianism. And Chiang’s humanity, however imperfect, will triumph in Chinese minds over Mao’s epic cruelty.⁸

More recently, Chiang Kai-shek has been seen not only as a successful modernizer but also as providing a model for rising China.⁹

Wei, Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor, *Canadian Journal of History* 45, no. 2 (2010), 424; Jeremy E. Taylor and Grace C. Huang, ““Deep Changes in Interpretive Currents”? Chiang Kai-shek Studies in the Post-Cold War Era,” *International Journal of Asian Studies* 9, no. 1 (2012), 101–102, 107–108; and Rana Mitter, “Old Ghosts, New Memories: China’s Changing War History in the Era of Post-Mao Politics,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, no. 1 (2003): 117–131.

⁷ See, for example, Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, *Thunder Out of China* (New York: Sloane, 1946); Brian Crozier, with Eric Chou, *The Man Who Lost China: The First Full Biography of Chiang Kai-Shek* (London: Angus and Robertson, 1977). Lloyd Eastman even evaluated Chiang as a fascist. See Lloyd E. Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974). This is not to say, however, that “the man who lost China” has totally disappeared. See, for example, Jonathan Fenby, *Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the China He Lost* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2005).

⁸ Robert D. Kaplan, “Mao Won the Battle, Chiang Kai-shek Won the War,” *Foreign Policy*, March 24, 2014, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/24/mao-won-the-battle-chiang-kai-shek-won-the-war>.

⁹ See also Charles Horner, “Rising China’s Forgotten Father,” *Naval War College Review* 64, no. 4 (2011): 142–145. Whether China *should* follow or already is following Taiwan, however, is another question.

A key event for research on Chiang Kai-shek was his family's decision to entrust his closely guarded diaries to the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, galvanized by the election of Chen in 2004.¹⁰ The first work to take advantage of these new sources was Jay Taylor's (1931–2022) biography *The Generalissimo*.¹¹ Taylor served as the China desk officer for the US State Department and in other capacities in Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s.¹² By his own account, he did not think very highly of Chiang at the time, but his research into his life changed this.

At the time of his death, my view of Chiang was similar to that of many China specialists. He was best known as a brutal dictator who ruled for almost fifty years and as a failed military leader who, in a grand reversal of fortune, lost the mainland to Mao Zedong. As far as I knew he had no redeeming qualities except for being considered personally honest; even so, he tolerated widespread corruption among his supporters. He seemed like a man who had possessed no authentic principles or ideals and had few if any achievements....

In the course of my travel, research, and interviews for this project, I came to see Chiang as a highly contradictory figure. He was a modernizing neo-Confucian who supported women's rights and had no trouble with an openly cross-dressing lesbian who was his wife's niece and close companion. He was a strong nationalist, extremely bitter about Western humiliation of China in the past, yet he was not bothered a bit by the fact that all his grandchildren—except two born out of wedlock—were Eurasian. He had little charisma and was generally not liked by his peers, but his determination, courage, and incorruptibility led at times to wide popularity. He was an inhibited man, yet one with a commanding personality—a staid, seemingly humorless individual who had a terrible temper but also smiled easily, sobbed deeply at times, and, judging by his diary, was a devout Christian. Yet in response to a threat to the nation's survival, its unity, or his own rule, he could justify atrocious acts—and in his journals he at times fell into paranoid rants. But during times of crisis he was usually calm and analytical, reflecting an understanding of the dynamics and possibilities of the matter at hand. At certain times on the mainland he had an impressive military record, but in 1948–1949 it ended in a debacle.

¹⁰ Taylor and Huang also point out that the death of Madame Chiang Kai-shek (Soong Meiling) in 2003 at the age of 105 as playing a part in stimulating popular memory around the same time. Taylor and Huang, “‘Deep Changes in Interpretive Currents’?” 99. Taiwanese and US courts recently ruled that the Hoover Institution must return the diaries to Academia Historica in Taiwan. Eddie Sun, “Diaries of Taiwan's First President to be Returned after Legal Battle with Stanford,” *The San Francisco Standard*, July 18, 2023, <https://sfstandard.com/2023/07/18/chiang-kai-shek-diaries-stanford-returning-taiwan>.

¹¹ Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009). See David D. Buck, “Jay Taylor Finds Rehabilitating Chiang Kai-shek's Reputation No Small Task,” *China Review International* 17, no. 1 (2010), 4. Jay first wrote a biography of Chiang's son and successor Chiang Ching-kuo. He relates in the book that Harvard approached him to do a biography of Chiang Kai-shek. Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo*, 1–2. See Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000).

¹² Taylor, *The Generalissimo*, 1.

Unconsciously or not, he also set the stage for Taiwan's development of a vigorous democracy.¹³

Taylor's work met with favorable reviews as a welcome rehabilitation of Chiang's image and for its original use of the newly available diaries.¹⁴ Such praise is captured in the following passage of one reviewer:

As a former top American diplomat and writer of several books, Jay Taylor dealt with primarily Communist China in much of his professional life....

For decades most Western images of Chiang Kai-shek have been consistently negative. From Theodore White's *Thunder out of China* (1946) to the treatises of Lloyd Eastman (1970–90s), to two biographies with similar titles, Brian Crozier's *The Man Who Lost China* (1976) and Jonathan Fenby's *Chiang Kai-shek, China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost* (2004), Chiang has been portrayed as a corrupt and incompetent dictator giving China away fortuitously to his Communist rivals.

Taylor had these images before embarking on the present study. His research on Chiang Ching-kuo, however, opened for him a new vista on the elder Chiang. With further extensive inquiry on the subject, he gained perspective on the Chinese leader vastly different from that of the mentioned books. He did not refute the negative images of Chiang; indeed, he recorded them all in his volume. But he adhered to Chiang's "Struggle Modern China" as his main theme rather than focusing on the man's faults and defeats. In doing so he brought to light the redeeming qualities Chiang's leadership. What stands out as Taylor's seminal contribution to the biographical studies of Chiang are his reasoned, objective, and balanced interpretations of the events Chiang encountered and the policies the Chinese leader followed. He has portrayed the man in full dimension—perhaps in fuller dimension than what was done by others.¹⁵

Aside from its rehabilitation of Chiang as a modernizer, there are two further remarkable features of this biography. One is the same theme expressed by Robert Kaplan above, which is that Chiang and his Taiwan provide a model for mainland China moving forward. As a reviewer describes,

¹³ Ibid., 1–3.

¹⁴ See, for example, Buck, "Jay Taylor," 1–8; So Wai Chor, Review of *The Generalissimo*, 127–129; and Wei, Review of *The Generalissimo*, 424–426.

¹⁵ Paul H. Tai, Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor, *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 16, no. 2 (October 2009), 171. The following are also similarly positive reviews: Chloe Sageman, Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor, *International Affairs* 87, no. 3 (2011): 733–734; Andrew J. Nathan, Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor, *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 5 (2009): 165; Robert Green, Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor, *Far Eastern Economic Review* (May 2009): 62–64; Edmund S.K. Fung, Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor, *The American Historical Review* 115, no. 2 (2010): 517–518; Shao-Kang Chu, Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor, *Pacific Affairs* 83, no. 4 (2010): 765–766.

Taylor finds Chiang Kai-shek vindicated as a leader who understood how to achieve a strong, modern China. Taylor sees present-day China as reflecting much more Chiang Kai-shek's vision than Mao Zedong's. The abandonment of Maoist policies, including economic self-sufficiency and collectivist economic organization, as well as setting aside many fundamentals of socialism in practice, has led Taylor to think Chiang would see the present-day leaders of the People's Republic of China "as modern Confucianists, dedicated as he was to making China a well-regulated, harmonious, stable and prosperous society" (p. 594). Taylor's conclusion is reasonable.¹⁶

A second important theme can be found in the emphasis on Chiang's mentality. Here is the idea, in other words, that Chiang possessed the "right" ideology compared to Mao's "wrong" (left) ideology. Taylor expresses this idea in passing the biography, but it is perhaps best encapsulated in a later piece on "Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Modernization."

There is or was something called "Mao Zedong Thought," but no one has heard of the "Thoughts of Chiang Kai-shek." Yet, there is a striking historical irony. Chiang was devastatingly defeated in China in 1949 and his relevance to China's future was seemingly thrown into the dustbin of history. However, Chiang's pragmatic but authoritarian Confucian vision of modernization is much more closely and immediately relevant to China today than the Chairman's grand view of governance. It was not and is not uniquely Chiang's vision. Wide variations of hard and soft authoritarianism as distinct from totalitarianism are of course still commonplace. Over time, Chiang led both versions. But despite the brutality of his early reign on Taiwan, he fostered the stability and profound social changes that created the conditions for a future economic takeoff and—unconsciously—a dynamic democracy.¹⁷

Taylor traces this "ideology" to Sun Yat-sen, whose Three Doctrines of the People provided a "blueprint for a modern China" and Chiang's "vision."¹⁸

Two of these themes are also present in the most recent biography of Chiang by Alexander Pantsov, already well known for his work on Mao.¹⁹ Pantsov clearly depicts Chiang as a modernizer and emphasizes the roots of his modernization project in Sun Yat-sen ideology.²⁰ His evaluation

¹⁶ Buck observes that Taylor does not engage with Huang's perceptions and interpretations of Chiang's diaries. Buck, "Jay Taylor," 2, 4–5. In any case, Taylor does frequently refer to Huang's research.

¹⁷ Jay Taylor, "Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Modernization," in *Makers of Modern Asia*, ed. Ramachandra Guha (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 40.

¹⁸ Taylor, "Chiang Kai-shek," 42.

¹⁹ Alexander V. Pantsov, *Victorious in Defeat: The Life and Times of Chiang Kai-shek, China, 1877–1975*, trans. Steven I. Levine. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023); Alexander V. Pantsov, with Steven I. Levine, *Mao: The Real Story* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012).

²⁰ See, for example, Pantsov, *Victorious in Defeat*, 50–70, 213.

of Chiang's intentions, however, is ambiguous compared to that of Taylor, who portrays Taiwan's democratization as an "unconscious" consequence of Chiang's rule. This ambiguity is discernible in the following passage:

[Chiang Kai-shek] drew lessons from the defeat on the mainland and laid the social, economic, and cultural-ethical foundations on Taiwan for its current democracy. In the end, he broke with oligarchy and implemented agrarian and other economic reforms, secured a very high rate of economic growth, and encouraged the growth of the middle class that constitutes the majority of Taiwanese society. He led Taiwan to the top among developing countries with respect to the standard of living, implemented Sun Yat-sen's Principle of People's Livelihood, equalized property rights for all citizens, and guaranteed national security for the country and its people. In sum, it was he who pointed the Taiwanese to the path that led to their political freedom. Perhaps he would even have accepted democracy in its current form? Who knows?²¹

At the very least, Pantsov implies that Taiwan turned out more or less as Chiang envisioned. Meanwhile, the theme of Taiwan as a model for China is absent; the idea that he was "victorious in defeat," then, appears limited to the island of Taiwan.²² Perhaps this is a sign the expectation China will "inevitably" adhere to Taiwan's historical path is waning.

While the new accessibility of Chiang's diaries in the mid-2000s has certainly facilitated such research, positive reappraisals of Chiang can

²¹ Pantsov, *Victorious in Defeat*, 489.

²² His book closes on a defeatist note, lamenting the lack of recognition commensurate to Chiang's deserved historical status on Taiwan.

For the majority of young Taiwanese today, Chiang Kai-shek is a bloody dictator who, at best, deserves to be forgotten, if not hated. Youth looks to the future, creating new heroes. And they ignore the fact that without Chiang not only would there not be a prosperous Taiwan, but also there would have not been a successful Northern Expedition of 1926–28; suppression of the militarists; unification of the country; victory in the national revolution; abolition of the unequal treaties; restoration of Chinese control over customs; liquidation of the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction of the foreign powers; safeguarding of China's independence and organization of resistance to a superior foe during the fourteen years of Japanese aggression; establishment of alliance relations with the leading countries of the West during the Second World War; and universal recognition of China as one of the five Great Powers. To be sure, Chiang did not transform China into one of the geopolitical centers of the world. That was done by his historic adversary Mao Zedong, who, in the 1960s, situated China equidistant from the two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. But what Chiang did accomplish was enough for one lifetime.

Thus, with or without monuments, Chiang Kai-shek will always remain in the history of China and Taiwan as a great national revolutionary. One can judge him on many counts; he committed mistakes and crimes, but he was a man of his times and of his society. He battled throughout his life. First, with the Manchus, then with the militarists, with the Communists, and with the Japanese. He ruled China longer than anybody else in the twentieth century—nearly half a century, but until his move to Taiwan he rarely had a single day of peace. Even after fleeing to Taiwan, he always had to prepare for war, to strengthen the defense of the island, and take a stand against communism.

He wanted very much not to go down in history as an ordinary dictator. "If I die as a dictator," he said to Ambassador Hurley in May 1945, "I will go down in history, like all dictators, but if I can establish peace, democracy, and unity in the country, I will die as a great leader." Nonetheless, not all of Chiang's descendants publicly take pride in the late Generalissimo, often not wishing to advertise their kinship with him. They live in a different world, many of them in the West, in a liberal environment where dictators are not much liked.

be traced to the 1980s. In particular, the year 1986, marking the one hundredth anniversary of Chiang's birth, was an important catalyst. Chinese American historian Ray Huang (1918–2000), a nationalist army officer in the resistance against Japan who would eventually pioneer (and champion) the use of Chiang Kai-shek's diaries as a historical source, asserted the need for a "macrohistorical" view of Chinese history at one of the commemorative conferences held that year.²³ In its reconciliatory tone, refusing to privilege the historical path of Taiwan over that of mainland China, his evaluation of Chiang is unique among the scholars discussed in this section, apart from a shared emphasis on the importance of Wang Yang-ming's (1472–1529) philosophy—via Sun Yat-sen—for Chiang's mentality. He argued, from a macrohistorical vantage point, that Chiang and Mao had each played *complementary* roles in modern Chinese history unbeknownst to themselves. "Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping may have remained adversaries to one another personally," he writes, "yet in developing history's continuity and fullness we see them in a relay movement. It must be so. Otherwise, would not China in the 1990s remain exactly what she used to be in the 1920s, or even moving backward?"²⁴ He expands upon this idea in the following passage:

The story of establishing a new national and social order over the ruins of the old can be illustrated with the Chinese character *li* [立].

The dot and the horizontal stroke on the top stands for the new superstructure, erected by the effort of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists. The organization of a new national army starting from the founding of the Whampoa Military Academy, the prosecution of the war against Japan, the abolition of unequal treaties, and the confirmation of China's position as an independent nation with territorial integrity completed the top of this character.

Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party worked for the renewal of the nation's bottom structure. The land reform and the rural

²³ Ray Huang, "Chiang Kai-shek and His Diary as a Historical Source: Proposals for the Revision of Modern Chinese History," *Chinese Studies in History* 29, no. 1-2 (1995–1996): 3–176; Ray Huang, "Chiang Kai-shek and His Diary as a Historical Source, Part II," *Chinese Studies in History* 30, no. 1-2 (1996–1997): 3–185. A Korean translation of these texts is also available. Rei Hwang, *Chang Chesŭ ilgi rŭl ilka: Rei Hwang ŭi Chungguk kŭnhyŏndaesa sasaek* [Reading Chiang Kai-shek's diary: Ray Huang's meditation on modern and contemporary Chinese history], trans. Ku Pŏmjŏn (Seoul: P'urŏn yŏksa, 2009). See the book jacket (written in Korean) for a brief biography. As for the centenary, Chiang was actually born in 1887, and the year 1986 technically marked his ninety-ninth birthday. The centenary thus followed the East Asian tradition in which a baby's age is counted from one at birth.

²⁴ Ray Huang, "Chiang Kai-shek and His Diary," 174.

reorganization provided this horizontal stroke at the bottom of the character. In Taiwan, the Land to the Tillers Act of 1953 had a similar effect.

The focusing on commercial expansion of both shores of the Formosan Strait at present aims not only at the improvement of the standard of living, but also at creating a plural society, in which institutional links function properly to correspond to the requirement between the top and bottom. In other words, they stand for the two vertical strokes in the middle of the character *li*.

Only a social structure based on a system of commercial principles can render all its components mathematically manageable. While everything within this organic body becomes institutionalized, China will be modernized as a result.

Since 1986, I have been trying to publicize this scenario, at first in newspapers, periodicals, and books, and recently with TV appearances. Most of the presentations are made in Chinese; on some occasions the message is delivered in English. I have disseminated the idea in New York, Taipei, and Hong Kong. The prologue of the latest edition of *1587* carrying the same general idea has appeared in Beijing. The overall reaction to my proposal adds to my fervent hope. Suffice it to say that nothing discouraging has blocked my path.²⁵

Rather than praising Taiwan's historical development at the expense of China, then, Huang asserted ultimate harmony between them. This would likely have resonated with developments in mainland China over United States historiography. While this distinguishes Huang, he nonetheless treated Chiang as unconscious of this historical destiny, and in this regard, he is at least closer to Taylor than Pantsov.

Also in 1986, a grand conference sponsored by the Historical Commission of the Kuomintang, Institute for Modern History of Academia Sinica, Academia Historica (RC), and Association for Chinese History was

²⁵ Ibid., 157–158. Huang's "proposals for revisions" can be summed up as follow: 1) More primary-source research; 2) deferral of moral judgement; 3) a "macro-perspective"; and 4) contextualization of events in terms of a macro-perspective. Ibid., 159–170. This passage is strikingly similar to the following written by Cho Kapche in his 1992 biography of Park Chung Hee: "If a nation is compared to a house, Rhee Syngman was a leader who procured the plot of land and determined the house's architectural style. Park Chung Hee created a detailed design and constructed the framework. And Chŏn Tuhwan put on the roof. Sheltered from the rain, snow, and wind, No T'aeu now papers, paints, and hangs pictures on the walls, allowing for human living." Cho Kapche, *Pak Chŏnghŭi 1: Pulman kwa purun ūi sewŏl, 1917–1960* [Park Chung Hee, vol. 1: The years of discontent and misfortune] (Seoul: Kkach'i, 1992), 25: 나라를 집에 비유한다면 이승만은 집터를 잡고 집의 건축양식을 결정한 지도자였다. 박정희는 구체적인 설계를 하고 집의 뼈대를 세웠으며 전두환은 지붕을 얹었다. 비와 눈과 바람을 피하게 된 노태우는 이제 인간답게 살기 위해 도배를 하고 칠도 하면서 그림까지 가져다 걸고 있다. He expressed essentially the same idea in his 1993 remonstrance of President Kim Yŏngsam, only articulated somewhat differently. See Cho Kapche, "Pak Chŏnghŭi wa Kim Yŏngsam ūi hwahae: Kim Yŏngsam taet'ongnyŏng ūi yŏksagwan munje" [Reconciliation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Yŏngsam: The problem with President Kim Yŏngsam's view of history], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (November 1993): 104–127. The crucial difference, however, is that Huang sought reconciliation between communist China and capitalist Taiwan, whereas Cho sought reconciliation only between the opposition politicians of the democratic movement and the "forces of industrialization" (*kūndaehwa seryŏk*).

held in Taipei.²⁶ As historian and conference participant Ramon Myers observed, many of the papers submitted focused on Chiang Kai-shek and his “leadership style and place in history.”²⁷ Notable participants at this conference were political scientists A. James Gregor (1929–2019) and Maria Hsia Chang (b. 1950).²⁸ Since the early 1980s, the two had co-authored a series of publications arguing that the real Chinese revolution could be found in Taiwan, its ideology rooted in the thought of Sun Yat-sen, not Mao. All three of the themes that later came to characterize reappraisals of Chiang—that he was a modernizer, a follower of Sun Yat-sen ideology, and produced a model for China’s ongoing reforms—could be found in this body of work.²⁹ The argument is summed up in the following passage:

Now that the economic failures of mainland China have become apparent, the command economy model of economic development and industrialization has lost the unqualified appeal it had for more than a generation among the less developed nations. Correlative to that loss has been the increasing attractiveness of an alternative model best exemplified by the economic history of Taiwan. The substance of Taiwan’s accomplishment is to be found in large part in the programmatic suggestions outlined in some of the earliest writings of Sun Yat-

²⁶ The conference on Chiang Kai-shek and modern China was held at the National Central Library in Taipei. The papers presented were later collected in *Proceedings of Conference on Chiang Kai-shek and Modern China*, 5 vols. (Taipei: Compilation Committee, 1987). An overview of the conference can be found in Ramon H. Myers, “The Conference on Chiang Kai-Shek and Modern China,” *Republican China* 12, no. 2 (1987): 86–90. Myers divides the conference papers into four categories: 1) “evaluations of Chiang Kai-shek—the man and his thought”; 2) “views and interpretations Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership style and place in history”; 3) “studies of Chiang Kai-shek’s role in key historical events”; and 4) “analyses and discussions of major historical events.” Considering the papers would fill five volumes, this amounted to considerable attention to Chiang.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 86. Particularly notable in this regard was historian Guy Alitto’s diagnosis of negative perceptions of Chiang in Western historiography and call for a reappraisal. See Guy Alitto, “Chiang Kai-shek in Western Historiography,” in *Proceedings of Conference on Chiang Kai-shek and Modern China*, vol. 1 (Taipei: Compilation Committee, 1987), 719–807. The essay can also be found in Guy Alitto, “Chiang Kai-shek in Western Historiography,” in *Xifang shixue lunzhu zhong de Jiang Jieshi* [Chiang Kai-shek in Western historiography], Ai Kai (n.d.), 115–201.

²⁸ Myers, “The Conference on Chiang Kai-Shek,” 88. See A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, “Chiang Kai-shek, China, and the Concept of Economic Development,” in *Proceedings of Conference on Chiang Kai-shek and Modern China*, vol. 3. (Taipei: Compilation Committee, 1987), 614–635.

²⁹ A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, “Wang Yang-ming and the Ideology of Sun Yat-sen,” *The Review of Politics* 42, no. 3 (1980): 388–404; A. James Gregor, with Maria Hsia Chang and Andrew B. Zimmerman, *Ideology and Development: Sun Yat-sen and the Economic History of Taiwan* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1981). It seems that Gregor evaluated Deng Xiaoping as ignoring his and Chang’s advice, however, as in a more recent work he argued that Deng had followed a path closer to that of Mussolini than Sun. A. James Gregor, *A Place in the Sun: Marxism and Fascism in China’s Long Revolution* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), 142.

sen. Among other things, he saw economic development as a collaborative enterprise that involved intimate and extensive cooperation between the less developed and the advanced industrial states. Almost every other part of his proposed program is equally suggestive and merits consideration by those charged with the responsibility of guiding less developed countries through the stages of economic modernization and growth. For a generation events obscured the relevance of Sun's vision, but the advent of the 1980s seems to have placed them, once again, on the agenda—and Sun Yat-sen, an 'antiimperialist' and 'third world theoretician, enjoys a significance in our own time that he perhaps never did in his own.³⁰

It is remarkable that such triumphalism regarding the Taiwanese "model" was present even before the transition to democracy. These two scholars, however, firmly believed Taiwan on a path to modernization, foreshadowing much of the recent commentary on China.³¹ Finally, even more explicitly than Pantsov, they emphasize the intentionality of Chiang's modernization reform; that the destination, in other words, was built into Chiang's (and Sun Yat-sen's) historical vision at the outset.³²

In sum, the defining feature of the Taiwanese case is the absence of history wars over Chiang Kai-shek and the concentration of reappraisals overseas, in mainland China and the United States, where images of Chiang

³⁰ Myers, "The Conference on Chiang Kai-Shek," 88. See Gregor and Chang, "Chiang Kai-shek," 614–635; Gregor, *A Place in the Sun*, 93, 99n81; A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, "Nazionalfascismo and the Revolutionary Nationalism of Sun Yat-sen," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 39, no. 1 (1979): 21–37; Maria Hsia Chang, "'Fascism' and Modern China," *The China Quarterly*, no. 79 (1979): 553–567; Maria Hsia Chang, "The Blue Shirts Society: Fascism and Developmental Nationalism" (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1984); Gregor, Chang, and Zimmerman, *Ideology and Development*, 107.

³¹ See, for example, Cecil Findley, Review of *The Republic of China and U.S. Policy: A Study in Human Rights* by A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, *International Journal on World Peace* 3, no. 1 (1986): 110–112.

³² Michael Gasster, Review of *The Chinese Blue Shirt Society: Fascism and Developmental Nationalism* by Maria Hsia Chang, *The China Quarterly* 108 (1986), 715. See, especially, Gregor, Chang, and Zimmerman, *Ideology and Development*, 41–44, concluding with the following passage:

Both Sun and Chiang conceived China's development as proceeding through intensive involvement in the worldwide market economy. Both maintained that China's development would be inspired and directed by the interventionist state controlling private capital and foreign trade through a comprehensive policy that would ensure balanced growth, decentralized industry, substantial equality in income distribution, opportunities for private economic initiative, and competitiveness in the international market. In the process expanded welfare and educational facilities would provide social services that would extend longevity, enhance public health, and make literacy universal.

This was the outline of a plan of industrialization that the Kuomintang brought with it to Taiwan. By 1953 the commitment to the creation of a 'model province' involved all the energies of the government of the Republic of China. By that time it was evident that a return to the mainland, lost to the forces of Mao Tse-tung, would be delayed indefinitely. The only option that remained to the heirs of Sun Yat-sen was to proceed with the development of a min-sheng society on the remnant of the nation that remained under Kuomintang control.

have undergone a dramatic transformation since 1978. In the Chinese context, Chiang has been reborn a nationalist leader. In the American context, Chiang has gone from the “man who lost China” to the “man who brought China into modernity.” I explored these reevaluations in terms of three common themes. First, there were varying emphases on Chiang’s image as a modernizer in terms of his historical intent, with Taylor and Huang emphasizing Chiang’s “unconscious” historical role and Gregor and Chang (and Pantsov to a degree) emphasizing his historical intentions. Among all these reappraisals, there was a consistent emphasis on Chiang’s mentality, rooted in the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming transmitted through Sun Yat-sen. Finally, there was an almost consistent emphasis on Chiang’s Taiwan as a model for China, excepting Pantsov’s recent ostensible pessimism.

2. *Francisco Franco*

History wars in Spain have been intense, with controversy over Francisco Franco (1892–1975) especially heated in recent years.³³ In 2019, his body was exhumed from the Valley of the Fallen (*Valle de los Caídos*), a monument to soldiers killed in the civil war.³⁴ This was hotly debated, with one poll finding forty-three percent of the Spanish population supporting it, 32.5 percent against it, and significant portion ambivalent.³⁵ More recently, the socialist-led government passed the Democratic Memory Law intended as a measure to settle the past and remove from public spaces all symbols

³³ Alex W. Palmer writes, for example, that “how Spain chooses to memorialize Francisco Franco and the victims of his authoritarian regime is tearing the nation apart.” Alex W. Palmer, “The Battle Over the Memory of the Spanish Civil War,” *Smithsonian* 49, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2018), <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/battle-memory-spanish-civil-war-180969338>.

³⁴ According to Raphael Minder, “Franco had the site built, in part with forced labor, to honor those who ‘fell for God and Spain’ in the Spanish Civil War, and it became one of Europe’s largest mass graves, with the remains of at least 33,000 people. Most had fought for Franco in the war, which lasted from 1936 to 1939, but the monument also contains the bones of many of his Republican opponents, dumped there in anonymity.” Raphael Minder, “Franco’s Body to be Exhumed, as Debate over Legacy Grows,” *New York Times*, September 14, 2018, A.10, accessed via proquest.com.

³⁵ “Franco Exhumation: Spanish Dictator’s Remains Moved,” *BBC*, October 24, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50164806>.

of the Franco regime, which has also drawn both criticism and support.³⁶ Journalist Hannah Strange, seeking out the perspective of contemporary Franco supporters, reports the following:

Defenders of Franco—who some on both the left and right claim represent up to half the country, though there’s no good data and the true proportion is likely much smaller—reject comparisons with Hitler. They say Italy’s Mussolini is a fairer analogy, and accuse the “losers” of the civil war of trying to rewrite history. At the Francisco Franco Foundation in Madrid—an organization many would like to see shuttered—its president, retired General Juan Chicharro, painted the historical-memory drive as an attempt by the people he characterized as “socio-communists” now in power to bring back the republic defeated in 1939. “They are not trying to reconcile; they are trying to win a war they lost 80 years ago,” he told me.”³⁷

In the Spanish case, Francisco Franco undoubtedly lies at the very heart of the history wars.

A defining feature of the Spanish case is the “pact of silence” that followed Franco’s death in 1975.³⁸ Historian Ángela Cenaro describes the pact as a “‘tacit agreement’ among the parliamentary elite not to instrumentalise the past for political purposes, and it was to acquire the shape of an ‘explicit pact’ under the Amnesty Act of October 1977. This Act forbade the prosecution of human rights violations hitherto perpetrated by all parties, in other words, by members of the anti-Francoist opposition, leftist groups and nationalists who had resorted to terror, and also by the dictatorship’s security forces, still responsible for keeping order in a State

³⁶ Sam Jones, “Spain Passes Law to Bring ‘Justice’ to Franco-Era Victims,” *The Guardian*, October 5, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/05/spain-passes-law-to-bring-dignity-to-franco-era-victims>.

³⁷ Hannah Strange, “The Politics of a Long-Dead Dictator Still Haunt Spain,” *The Atlantic*, October 14, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/10/franco-exhumation-spain/572929>. And as Aguilar and Humlebæk observe, “There are still many Spaniards who associate Francoism with a period of unprecedented order and economic prosperity, in contrast to the preceding decades of political turbulence. This explains the relatively low negative evaluation of the period and the more significant ambivalence toward this past.” Paloma Aguilar and Carsten Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy: The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War,” *History and Memory* 14, no. 1-2 (2002), 131.

³⁸ Enrique Moradiellos, “Critical Historical Revision and Political Revisionism,” *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 21, no. 3 (2008), 223; Helen Graham, “Writing Spain’s Twentieth Century in(to) Europe,” in *Interrogating Fascism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain*, ed. Helen Graham (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 8; Julián Casanova, “Disremembering Francoism: What is at Stake in Spain’s Memory Wars?” trans. Linda Palfreeman and Helen Graham, in *Interrogating Fascism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain*, ed. Helen Graham (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 207.

that had left Francoism behind a few months earlier.”³⁹ The pact began to unravel in the mid-1990s.⁴⁰ According to historian Julián Casanova, this shift in public memory was in one sense simply a matter of time, as the work of a new generation of historians was now being transmitted to the public sphere.⁴¹ The end of the Cold War, however, was also an important catalyst, as Historian Helen Graham describes.

³⁹ Ángela Cenarro, “Francoist Nostalgia and Memories of the Spanish Civil War,” *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 21, no. 3 (2008), 208. Regarding the democratic transition, historian Helen Graham also observes, “Matters were hugely facilitated in Spain by the intervention of a biological imperative—i.e. the death of the octogenarian Franco himself in November 1975. There then occurred an institutional transition from the structures of the dictatorship to those of a parliamentary democracy. But it was a process entirely supervised by a reformist Francoist elite and without any policy of lustration (the removal of a regime’s political class and officials from power), thus ensuring a virtually total continuity of state and political personnel from the dictatorship to the new democratic system.” Graham, “Writing Spain’s Twentieth Century,” 6–7. Historian Angel Viñas echoes this sentiment: “Franco died of illness and old age in a hospital bed while his dictatorship was highly contested. However, all his political, social, military and administrative support was still in place. Two important forces have long remained impervious to the need to come to terms with a highly controversial past: the PP [*Partido Popular*, People’s Party] and the Catholic Church.” Angel Viñas, “On the 80th Anniversary of the Spanish Civil War,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 52, no. 1 (2017), 122.

⁴⁰ To be sure, the “pact of silence” was limited to the public sphere, and historians remained busy uncovering the brutality of the Franco regime and overturning state-led narratives. As historian Julián Casanova notes, historians Stanley Payne in the United States, Paul Preston in the United Kingdom, and a new generation of Spanish historians that attended university in the post-Franco era were integral in catalyzing research on the Republican, Civil War, and Franco eras. Julián Casanova, “History and Memory: A New Social Dimension,” *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 21, no. 3 (2008), 188–189. See Stanley G. Payne, *The Franco Regime 1936–1975* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); and Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (UK: BasicBooks, 1994). Some historians describe the pact as breaking down in 1996, with the election of the PP. Xosé-Manoel Núñez, “Review: New Interpretations of the Spanish Civil War,” *Contemporary European History* 13, no. 4 (2004): 517–527; Aguilar and Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity,” 132; Sebastian Balfour, “The Concept of Historical Revisionism: Spain since the 1930s,” *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 21, no. 3 (2008), 179. Stanley Payne argues, however, that the pact broke down in 1993 when the socialists warned against voting for the PP, should Francoism be restored. He also claims the “‘pact of silence’ is simply a propaganda slogan. No such thing ever existed. The very opposite characterized the Transition, which was grounded in a keen awareness of the failures of the past and a determination to avoid them.... It is impossible to find another instance anywhere in which such awareness was any greater. What was agreed upon was not ‘silence’ but the understanding that historical conflicts would be consigned to the labors of the historians and journalists, and that politicians would not make use of them in their parties’ mutual competition, which would direct itself to present and future problems.” Stanley G. Payne, *Spain: A Unique History* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 251, 251–252. This is a somewhat strange claim considering nobody argues that historians maintained such “silence”; in fact, they say exactly what Payne says, that the “pact” applied to politicians and not historians.

⁴¹ Casanova, “Disremembering Francoism,” 207.

Internationally, the post-1989 period saw the rise not only of...human rights discourse, but also of an antithetical ultranationalist one which in Eastern Europe first, but also now in the West, has come to plant a right-wing populist banner in the space vacated by the demise of the post-Second World War myth of antifascist consensus. If the Cold War was indeed over, what exactly had emerged victorious? Was it democracy, or something rather more limited and specific in the shape of ultranationalism and right-wing populism? Certainly the ‘foundational’ myth of nations united in antifascist resistance during the Second World War has been shorn of its antifascist qualifier, leaving only the single ‘good’ of nationalism. And everywhere since the 1990s there has occurred a recycling of Cold War myths which has allowed the reinvention across Europe of fascist leaders as patriots and nationalists, purely on the basis of their anticommunism. This process has facilitated similar developments in Spain, with revisionist historians attempting disingenuously to distance the person of Franco from responsibility for the violent wartime repression carried out by Francoist forces, and also the emergence of a vocal neo-Francoism—a reminder that a large portion of the mainstream right (clustered around the Popular Party (Partido Popular)) had always remained Francoist in terms of their political and cultural values. As the modern European historian Dan Stone has recently put it, there is being revealed everywhere a ‘deep-seated resentment’ of the normative social democratic values of 1945–89, ‘when many, so it now seems, had to hold their tongues.’ The Spanish right is a prime example of the phenomenon Stone identifies: the long decades of Francoism meant the layer of conformist interface with the then more uniformly liberal democratic Western Europe was always quite thin. But now Spanish conservatism has ‘lost its shame’, as the rest of Europe comes to be more in its own image. Indeed, many Central and East European ultranationalists and extreme social conservatives explicitly lionize Franco as an anti-communist defender of Christian civilization virtually in the same breath as they ‘explain’ the good reasons behind interwar antisemitism.⁴²

A second notable feature of Spain’s history war is the configuration of constitutional patriotism on the right and ethnic nationalisms, or “peripheral nationalism,” on the left.⁴³ As historian Xosé-Manoel Núñez Seixas notes, this is something that differentiates the Spanish case from the German *Historikerstreit*, where Habermas had advocated a cosmopolitan constitutional patriotism in opposition to the ethnic nationalism of historians like Nolte. In the Spanish context, the right has appropriated this concept as a way of asserting loyalty to the Spanish state in the face of what it sees as fragmentary local nationalisms (such as those of the Basque Country, Catalonia, Valencia, and so forth). Thus, writes Núñez Seixas, it has become “a new cover for a more primordial attachment: a ‘political updating of a form of loyalty to Spain—that integrating and plural Spain of

⁴² Graham, “Writing Spain’s Twentieth Century,” 11–12, see also 8–9; Casanova, “Disremembering Francoism,” 208.

⁴³ Xosé-Manoel Núñez Seixas, “From National-Catholic Nostalgia to Constitutional Patriotism: Conservatism Spanish Nationalism since the Early 1990s,” in *The Politics of Contemporary Spain*, ed. Sebastian Balfour (London: Routledge, 2005), 121–145.

the 1978 Constitution.”⁴⁴ This aspect reflects the unique circumstances of the Spanish context.

The key symbolic figure in this discourse is Franco.⁴⁵ The general claims of the movement since the 1990s to rehabilitate or reassert Franco as a national hero can be summed up as follows:

The group claims that [the Dictatorship’s] victory in the Civil War saved Spain from Communism and the horrors of World War Two, giving the country more than three decades of internal peace and paving the way for a process of economic modernization without parallel, the foundation stone of the peaceful transition towards democracy under the auspices of the Crown from 1975 onwards.

Their basic conclusion, therefore, is that Spanish history during much of the 20th century had been a catalogue of tragedies caused basically by a Left seduced by a revolutionary illusion mixed with a secessionist delirium, against which a patriotic and besieged Right had to react in pure self-defence to survive. They did so, first, by the use of the electoral suffrage in the Republic, then with arms in hand during the Civil War and finally by means of prosperity and welfare under Franco.⁴⁶

Central to this movement is popular journalist Pío Moa (b. 1948), described as the “secret weapon” of the right in Spain’s history wars and the “doyen of pro-Francoist history writing.”⁴⁷ Moa was once a radical leftist—a communist guerrilla—who turned to the right after Spain’s democratic transition.⁴⁸ He is a major media figure and the author of many bestsellers

⁴⁴ Ibid., 133–134, see also 135–136. See also Giovanni C. Cattini, “Historical Revisionism: The Reinterpretation of History in Contemporary Political Debate,” *Transfer: Journal of Contemporary Culture* 6 (2011), 32–34.

⁴⁵ Moradiellos, “Critical Historical Revision,” 219. For an overview of biographies of Franco over time, see Enrique Moradiellos, “Biographies for a Caudillo after a War: A Bibliographical Commentary on Biographies of Franco,” trans. Alison Pinnington and Helen Graham, in *Interrogating Fascism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain*, ed. Helen Graham (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 225–240.

⁴⁶ Moradiellos mentions authors associated with this “group” as Pío Moa, César Vidal, Ángel David Martín Rubio, Federico Jiménez Losantos, and César Alcalá. Moradiellos, “Critical Historical Revision,” 219–220. I discuss Pío Moa below. See also Chris Ealham, “‘Myths’ and the Spanish Civil War: Some Old, Some Exploded, Some Clearly Borrowed and Some Almost ‘Blue,’” *Journal of Contemporary History* 42, no. 2 (2007), 367; and Graham, “Writing Spain’s Twentieth Century,” 9.

⁴⁷ Núñez, for example, assigns Moa a role analogous to an Ernst Nolte in Germany’s *Historikerstreit*. Núñez, “Review,” 519. See also Giorgos Antoniou, “The Lost Atlantis of Objectivity: The Revisionist Struggles between the Academic and Public Spheres,” *History and Theory* 46, no. 4 (2007), 110; and Chris Ealham, “Review: The Emperor’s New Clothes; ‘Objectivity’ and Revisionism in Spanish History,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 48, no. 1 (2013), 193.

⁴⁸ As late as 1976, he “helped found an armed communist revolutionary group.” Giles Tremlett, “Pro-Franco Book a Bestseller in Spain,” *The Guardian*, April 22, 2003, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/22/spain.books>. See also Giles Tremlett, “Pro-Franco History Tops Bestseller List,” *The Guardian*, November 14, 2005, <https://www.theguardian.com>.

among more than thirty books, such as *The Origins of the Spanish Civil War* (*Los orígenes de la Guerra Civil Española*, 1999), *The Myths of the Civil War* (*Los mitos de la Guerra Civil*, 2003), and *Franco: A Historical Balance* (*Franco: Un balance histórico*, 2005).⁴⁹ As Historian Antoniou Giorgos describes, “Although Moa was treated with contempt as a low-quality propagandist, his bestsellers made it clear that he had touched a sensitive nerve in Spanish society.”⁵⁰

Among professional historians, “Moa...is rejected...as a pseudo-historian who has found a publishing goldmine as a modern Franco apologist.”⁵¹ Moradiellos describes Moa as “keen to show only the anticommunist and nationalist elements of the Dictatorship, reducing or even eclipsing its genuine antidemocratic and anti-liberal motives as much as its reactionary and philo-totalitarian tendencies. Everything in order to prove that the only valid explanation was built on the premise ‘Franco versus Communism’, without room for another premise equally present in the historical sphere: ‘Franco versus Democracy’.”⁵² A keyword for Moa’s brand of historiography, then, as further corroborated by historian Giovanni C. Cattini, is anticommunism.

In the name of democracy and liberalism the dictatorship is justified by considering that it halted communist barbarity. The revisionists consider that the republican ideas were about to throw open the gates to pro-Bolshevik totalitarianism, whereby the Francoists saved the Spanish State from tragedy with the Civil War. Likewise, Francoism is presented as the period that brought the stability thanks to which the economic leap forward could be made in the Spanish State in the 1960s. It also allowed the foundations of a welfare state to

theguardian.com/world/2005/nov/14/books.spain; Arnaud Imatz, “Pío Moa: Facing the Myths and Propaganda about the Spanish Civil War—Part I,” *The Postil Magazine*, April 1, 2022, <https://www.thepostil.com/pio-moa-facing-the-myths-and-propaganda-about-the-spanish-civil-war-part-i>; Arnaud Imatz, “Pío Moa: Facing the Myths and Propaganda about the Spanish Civil War—Part II,” *The Postil Magazine*, May 1, 2022, <https://www.thepostil.com/pio-moa-facing-the-myths-and-propaganda-about-the-spanish-civil-war-part-ii>; Pío Moa, “History as Antidote to Propaganda: A Conversation with Pío Moa,” *The Postil Magazine*, April 1, 2022, <https://www.thepostil.com/history-as-antidote-to-propaganda-a-conversation-with-pio-moa>.

⁴⁹ Cenarro, “Francoist Nostalgia,” 206; Imatz, “Pío Moa, Part I”; Tremlett, “Pro-Franco Book”; Tremlett, “Pro-Franco History.”

⁵⁰ Antoniou, “The Lost Atlantis of Objectivity,” 110. Moa’s work tends to focus on the Second Republic and Civil War. See Cenarro, “Francoist Nostalgia,” 205–206.

⁵¹ Tremlett, “Pro-Franco History.”

⁵² Cenarro, “Francoist Nostalgia,” 205–206; Moradiellos, “Critical Historical Revision,” 224.

be laid. In this respect the poverty and wretchedness prior to the economic development during the dictatorship are explained away by the upheavals of the Republic and the Civil War. Moreover, these revisionist texts gloss over the Francoist autarkic policy and the poverty it brought, just as they forget to point out the importance of Western economic growth at the time when explaining the years of “desarrollismo”, which they attribute to the supposedly correct policies of Francisco Franco (1892–1975).⁵³

Such appraisals of Franco have found a scholarly proponent in American historian Stanley Payne (b. 1934), an explicit supporter of Moa who even wrote a prologue to a later edition of his *The Origins of the Spanish Civil War*.⁵⁴ A member of the Royal Spanish Academy of History, in addition to his many academic publications, Payne also regularly writes for the conservative dailies *ABC* and *El Mundo*.⁵⁵ Historian Chris Ealham sums up the important role Payne has played in providing intellectual support and legitimacy for reappraisals of Franco in the following passage:

While it is unsurprising that such views should find an echo within the political culture and society in which they were first constructed, it is perhaps more perplexing that Stanley Payne, Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin and author of numerous studies on modern Iberian history, should seek to invest re-fried Francoist fables with wider respectability and currency. Payne stands alone among Spanish and Anglo-American historians in his support for Pío Moa, a journalist who, prior to his reincarnation as the favourite ‘historian’ of the extreme and mainstream Spanish right, was a leading ideologue of an armed Maoist organization. In addition to writing a prologue to one of Moa’s books, Payne has spiritedly defended his ‘reinterpretation’ (or rather recapitulation) of historical narrative. Indeed, swimming hard against the tide of established opinion once more, Payne has asserted that, with the obvious exception of the ‘innovative’ Moa, Spanish historians lack the requisite maturity to write the history of the civil war. Payne’s idiosyncratic position stems from his hostility to the ‘partisan taboos’ of ‘political correctness’, what he terms the ‘illness of western culture’, which, in Spain, has undermined the credibility of professional historians, making them the agents of a new social-democratic consensus. Payne also rebukes academics for snobbery towards ‘amateur historians’ like Moa and for believing that genuine contributions to historiography can come only from within the academy.⁵⁶

⁵³ Cattini, “Historical Revisionism,” 34.

⁵⁴ Ealham, “‘Myths’ and the Spanish Civil War,” 367; Imatz, “Pío Moa, Part I.” See also Alejandro López, “Spanish Officer Corps Hears Lecture Justifying Franco Coup and Dictatorship,” *World Socialist Web Site*, March 22, 2016, <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/03/22/payn-m22.html>. Payne is also well established not only in the field of modern Spanish history but also fascist studies. On his intellectual background, see Michael Seidman, “Introduction: Stanley G. Payne; An Intellectual Biography,” in *Nation and Conflict in Modern Spain: Essays in Honor of Stanley G. Payne*, ed. Brian D. Bunk, Sasha D. Pack, and Carl-Gustaf Scott (Madison, Wisconsin: Parallel Press, 2008), xi–xviii.

⁵⁵ López, “Spanish Officer Corps Hears Lecture.”

⁵⁶ Ealham, “‘Myths’ and the Spanish Civil War,” 367.

Payne is a highly regarded scholar in the field of fascist studies as well as Spanish history.⁵⁷ His works are numerous, stretching back to the 1960s, but several warrant particular mention.⁵⁸ His first monograph was *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism*, which was followed by *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* and *The Spanish Revolution*.⁵⁹ By his own account, he became convinced through research for this last book, marking a “rupture in his thinking,” that the left had initiated the violence of the 1930s and was primarily to blame for the civil war; in other words, that Franco reacted defensively in the civil war. “Discovering that the left, rather than the right,” he states, “had initiated political violence, both small-scale and large-scale, and was responsible for the initial breakdown of

⁵⁷ See, for example, Brian D. Bunk, Sasha D. Pack, and Carl-Gustaf Scott, *Nation and Conflict in Modern Spain: Essays in Honor of Stanley G. Payne*, (Madison, Wisconsin: Parallel Press, 2008).

⁵⁸ López describes Payne as the author of more than twenty books on Spanish history as of 2016. He gives the following brief biography: “Payne, born in the US in 1934, is a member of the Royal Spanish Academy of History and a regular contributor to the right-wing daily *ABC* and *El Mundo*. He has written more than 20 books on Spanish history. His positions have shifted ever more to the right since the 1939–1978 Franco dictatorship, and particularly in recent years, when he publicly supported Pio Moa.” Lopez, “Spanish Officer Corps Hears Lecture.”

⁵⁹ Stanley G. Payne, *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961); Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967); Stanley G. Payne, *The Spanish Revolution* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970). In the field of fascist studies, see Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1980); and Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism 1914–45* (London: Routledge, 1995). George Mosse, who was a colleague of Payne’s at the University of Wisconsin, called this last book “the most authoritative history of fascism.” George L. Mosse, *The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1999), 6, 201n11. Robert Paxton also states, “The most authoritative narrative history of all fascist movements and regimes is Stanley G. Payne’s prodigiously learned *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*,” with the caveat that “it describes better than it explains.” Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 221. And Roger Griffin counts Payne, along with Zeev Sternhell, as one of fascist studies’ “most famous contemporary theorists,” and credits him with producing “the most successful paradigm of generic fascism,” even if only “in terms of consumer ‘demand.’” Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 6, 7. Peter Davies and Derek Lynch summarize Payne’s contribution to fascist studies as follows: “A specialist in Spanish fascism—the Falange in particular—he has also worked on defining and explaining fascism as a generic concept. Scholars have been especially impressed with his helpful checklist-style ‘typological’ description of fascism that focuses on the ideology’s ‘negations’, ‘ideology and goals’ and ‘style and organisation’. Furthermore, Payne, a US academic, has produced comparative analyses and explored the historiography of West European fascism. One of his most interesting assertions is that Nazism and Communism are closely related.” Peter Davies and Derek Lynch, *The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right* (London: Routledge, 2002), 67.

democracy was the most radically new finding of my entire career, and changed my whole outlook. It also meant that my reputation among the left would begin to go into decline.”⁶⁰ He published what may be regarded as his most comprehensive work on the Franco era in 1987, *The Franco Regime 1936–1975*.⁶¹ The book received favorable reviews. As historian Martin Blinkhorn wrote, “Stanley Payne...is the doyen of American historians of modern and contemporary Spain and the author of a daunting catalogue of important books.... Whilst it may seem ungenerous to say so in the face of such an impressive output, none of Payne’s books has quite achieved classic, magisterial status. Not, that is, until now.”⁶² Yet reviewers also noted the book’s conservatism. “The reader should be cautioned,” wrote historian Robert H. Whealey, “that Payne gives fuller treatment to conservative scholarship on Spain than he does to Marxist and liberal works.... Despite the masterly writing, I must dissent from the apparent underlying philosophical and political theses.... According to Payne, social revolutionaries and their liberal collaborators were and are naive, and the body of Anglo-American scholarship that existed in 1959 on the 1936 Spanish crisis was misguided.... Terms like patriotic, heroic, modernizing, and middle class, although they do not appear in the index, often are used to describe the Spanish fascist movement.”⁶³

⁶⁰ Seidman, however, argues that Payne overestimates this “rupture” and that there is strong consistency across his career. Seidman, “Introduction,” xi.

⁶¹ Payne, *The Franco Regime*.

⁶² Martin Blinkhorn, “Review Article: Franco, Francoism and Anti-Francoism,” *European History Quarterly* 20 (1990), 293. Robert H. Whealey also wrote, “*The Franco Regime* confirms that Payne will remain the leading U.S. authority on twentieth-century Spain for some time to come.” Robert H. Whealey, Review of *The Franco Regime, 1936–1975* by Stanley G. Payne, *The American Historical Review* 94, no. 3 (1989), 788. Historian Julián Casanova refers to this work as among one of the most important early studies of Francoism. Casanova, “History and Memory,” 188. For a more recent review (the book was reissued in 2000), see James J. Dunphy, Review of *The Franco Regime 1936–1975* by Stanley G. Payne, *Military Review* 82, no. 3 (2002): 83.

⁶³ Whealey, Review of *The Franco Regime*, 788–789. Blinkhorn also takes issue with Payne’s conservative numbers in assessing the repressiveness of the Franco regime. Blinkhorn, “Review Article,” 294.

The book's key thesis is that Franco oversaw the modernization of Spain.⁶⁴ "The last twenty-five years of the Franco regime, from 1950 to 1975," he writes, "were the time of the greatest sustained economic development and general improvement in living standards in all Spanish history.... The proportionate rise in living standards and general productivity and well-being was greater than in other right-authoritarian regimes such as that of Portugal or those in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, and it was also greater than in the totalitarian socialist regimes in eastern Europe, Asia, or Cuba. Only Japan made greater proportionate progress than Spain during this period."⁶⁵ He also writes, "The real Spanish revolution was not the defeated struggle of 1936–39 but the social and cultural transformation wrought by the industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s."⁶⁶ And when it comes to the negative aspects of Franco's legacy, he plays them down as typical side effects of modernization, writing, "Most of the problems of the post-Franco era were recognizable as the common problems of west European industrial countries (even though more severe in the case of Spain) and were no longer those of the largely agrarian economy of the early twentieth century."⁶⁷

Finally, Payne credits Franco for Spain's successful transition to democracy. "By the time of [Franco's] death," he writes, "the kind of society and culture on which the regime had primarily been based had largely ceased to exist, and that would make it impossible for the regime to reproduce itself. Ultimately the economic and cultural achievements that took place under the regime, whether or not they were intended to develop as they did, deprived the regime of its reason for being."⁶⁸ Here one may

⁶⁴ On Payne's portrayals of Franco across various works, see, for example, Whealey, Review of *The Franco Regime*, 788–789; Julián Casanova and Carlos Gil Andrés, *Twentieth-Century Spain: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 289; and Moradiellos, "Biographies for a Caudillo," 225–240.

⁶⁵ Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 463.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 483.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 491–492.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 493.

discern his understanding of authoritarian modernization as self-negating process that proceeds independent of human intentions.

One of the most important aspects of Payne's narrative is its emphasis on the distinction between the authoritarianism of a dictator like Franco and totalitarian communism. "That the Spanish regime was obviously authoritarian, not totalitarian," he writes, "is first of all simply an inescapable fact, for it did not attempt to control the entire economy and all social, cultural, and religious institutions."⁶⁹ In this context, he points to the liberalizing reforms 1959 as an example of Franco's rationality and openness to the arguments and evidence of his finance minister; "Franco was never a fanatic," he writes.⁷⁰ To drive this point home, one may view the following passages, where Payne draws comparisons between Franco, Mussolini, Tito, and Hitler:

The similarities between Mussolini's system and the early Franco regime during its first eight years are rather greater than is sometimes thought. Both employed subordinated state fascist parties that were merged with and subsequently incorporated nonfascist elements. Both permitted limited pluralism in national society and institutions under executive dictatorship. In neither case was the institutionalization of the regime developed primarily by revolutionary fascist ideologues but rather by monarchist or semimonarchist figures of the radical right in conjunction with fascist moderates. Though Franco enjoyed much more complete executive authority than did Mussolini, he eventually converted the form of his regime into that of monarchy, which already existed in Italy. In both cases the challenge of militant fascist national syndicalism was soon faced and thoroughly subordinated....

The sequences of development of the two regimes were also somewhat parallel, finally diverging radically at the level of foreign policy. In both cases, an early coalition phase without official institutional structure (Italy, 1922–25; Spain, 1936–37) was followed by a phase of institutionalization (Italy, 1925–29; Spain, 1937–40) that was in turn succeeded by a period of equilibrium which was longer in Italy than in Spain. All this is of course a fairly common pattern for new systems, but should not lead one to overlook some fundamental differences in policies and ambitions. Mussolini made a somewhat greater effort at ideological development, and always harbored certain socially revolutionary goals that required more continuing effort at political mobilization. Foreign policy and international context marked the ultimate points of divergence, for the eventual structure of the Spanish regime was to a large extent dependent on world affairs. Whereas Mussolini tried to play an independent role from 1933 on, Franco accepted the need to wait on events. Had Hitler won the war, there seems little doubt that Franquism would have become less conservative and rightist and more radical and overtly fascist in form. Acceptance of the term *fascist* was fairly common though never official during the first year of the Civil

⁶⁹ Notably, Payne refers here to, among others, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *Dictatorship and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 626, 626–627n10.

⁷⁰ Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 470.

War, and all the trappings of “Franco! Franco! Franco!” in the early period were simply imitations of Italian Fascism (or occasionally National Socialism), including various agencies and institutions of the party and regime such as the Vicesecretaría de Cultura Popular (derived from the Italian MinCulPop) or the Auxilio de Invierno (from Winterhilfe).

For most of his long career Franco was well aware of his status as primary resident ogre of western Europe. It is instructive in this regard to compare attitudes toward Franco with attitudes toward Tito after 1945. Tito, like Franco, had come to power in a civil war in which, propaganda to the contrary, he devoted more energy to fighting Yugoslavs than to fighting Germans and Italians. The bloodbath in Yugoslavia in 1945 was proportionately much greater than that in Spain during 1939 and the new dictatorship much more rigorous and repressive, in fact a direct, self-proclaimed attempt to copy the Stalinist totalitarianism of the Soviet Union. International circumstances prompted moderation and change in Yugoslavia as in Spain, and eventually Tito’s regime emerged as a non-totalitarian, semipluralist dictatorship and major Marxist heresy. It stood in contrast to most Communist states as did Franco’s to the fascist regimes of the World War II era. Yet to the very end of Tito’s life the Yugoslav regime remained more thoroughly controlled and repressive than was the case in Spain (despite its authoritarian quasifederalism and a degree of worker self-management in factories), and it failed to register the economic, social, and cultural progress of Spain. After Tito’s death there followed no democratization, but a more collegial form of dictatorship. Yet Tito was often hailed even in the western press as a great reformer and innovator, a kind of beacon of progressive achievement, and due to specific international circumstances, gained more and earlier foreign assistance from the West.

Measurements differ not simply according to commentators but also according to the kind of question asked. Judgments of Franco and the regime became progressively less negative as the modernization of Spain proceeded apace and its quality of life improved. One of the most widely read biographies of a twentieth-century European dictator, Alan Bullock’s *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, closes with a view of Germany in ruins and concludes by quoting the Latin aphorism, “If you seek his monument, look around.” Applying such a method to Franco, the observer finds a country raised to the highest level of prosperity in its history, converted into the ninth industrial power of the world (before it slipped later into tenth, then eleventh, place), with the “organic solidarity” of the great majority of its population increased and its society surprisingly well prepared for harmonious coexistence and a remarkable new enterprise in decentralized democracy. By such standards, Franco might be seen not only as one of the most dominant personalities in all Spanish history but also as the definitive modernizer of Spain and leader of the most successful of all the twentieth century’s would-be “development dictatorships.”⁷¹

Franco and Mussolini belong to one category, says Payne, and Hitler and Tito to another. It is interesting to note this contrast particularly with communist leaders even in the Spanish case, where Franco has no ready counterpart analogous to a Kim Il Sung or Mao.

⁷¹ Ibid., 628–629, 634–636. Payne’s more recent evaluations of Franco generally follow the same logic. See Payne, *Spain*, 216–228; Stanley G. Payne and Jesús Palacios, *Franco: A Personal and Political Biography* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2014).

Finally, there is the question of historical intention—whether Spain modernized because of or despite Franco’s intentions. Payne takes up this theme in the following passage:

It will not do to suggest, as have a few, that Franco can be given credit for the tolerant and democratic Spain of the 1980s. A dictatorship is not a school for democracy, and Franco was not responsible for the democratization of Spain. While permitting limited liberalization, he fought any basic alteration to the last, only accepting the prospect to some degree in the very last weeks of his life for lack of personal energy or political alternatives to do otherwise. Despite this, some of his fundamental policies and achievements ironically became indispensable prerequisites for successful and stable democratization without rupture or violence. One of the most important of these preconditions was inherently negative, though quite significant, for the depolarization and depoliticization of Spanish society pursued by the regime after 1945 did leave behind it a situation in which a new start could be made, free of the extremism of the Civil War generation. Other indirect contributions included first of all the basic institutional structure of an “open” and evolving, semipluralistic authoritarian constitution and the framework of evolving liberalization, which created peaceful mechanisms for further change and accustomed many Spaniards to peaceful, gradual, and legalitarian evolution. Restoration of the monarchy was decisive, for only the monarchy held the legitimacy and authority to lead a peaceful process of legal democratization. Only Juan Carlos, of all monarchist candidates, possessed the requisite combination of unusual qualities to undertake the process successfully, and Franco had not only selected him but had always left him a certain amount of freedom and distance with which to develop his own political personality, even though the outcome for which Franco hoped was quite different. Social and economic modernization, finally carried out under the regime, were indispensable, for the middle-class Spain that replaced the old internally antagonistic society of the 1930s provided the necessary base for democracy. Corporative solidarity, despite the numerous frauds committed by the regime in its name, also seems to have made a contribution, but only after authoritarian corporatism was transformed into a kind of consensual corporatism by Adolfo Suárez and his successors. The peculiar structure of demilitarization built by Franco was also of some assistance, though it had to be managed by the leaders of the transition with extreme care.

Franco’s own policies and values represented an end and not a beginning. He managed to liquidate some of the problems of the past, though others were merely suppressed. He could not build the new Spain of the future, either in the form that he had planned or, much less, in that assumed by Spain after his death. His importance to Spanish history lies not in his mere endurance in power for so long, but rather in the enormous changes that took place in Spain during his rule, some of them directly encouraged or even engineered by his regime and others ultimately flying in the face of all that it stood for. Franco shaped the climax to one period and one trend of Spain’s past, but his era became the decisive transition to a very different one in which the new leaders of Spain have shown impressive ability to learn some of the lessons of history, even though not specifically the ones which their didactic Generalissimo endeavored to teach them.⁷²

Like Taylor’s evaluation of Chiang, Payne sees Franco as “unconsciously” building the foundations of Spanish democracy.

⁷² Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 640–641.

In sum, Franco has been at the center of Spain's fierce history wars that show little sign of abating. This antagonism began in the 1990s, after the Cold War. They are characterized by conflicting nationalisms, with the right advocating constitutional patriotism against what it sees as fragmentary local nationalisms. The journalist Pío Moa has been a key figure in this regard, in the media and through his bestselling books. Moa has found an ally in American historian Stanley Payne, who has depicted Franco as a modernizer since the 1980s. Specifically, Payne emphasizes the distinction between the authoritarianism of Franco and totalitarian communism. He also emphasizes that Franco laid the foundations for Spain's successful transition to democracy, albeit unintentionally.

3. Discussion

There are striking similarities and differences between the history wars in Korea, Taiwan, and Spain.⁷³ First, in terms of intensity, Taiwan stands apart from the other cases. Even though public memory of Chiang Kai-shek has been contested in Taiwan, there appears no scholarly debate analogous to the other cases. The defining feature of reappraisals of Chiang Kai-shek is that they are concentrated in mainland China and the United States. This an interesting characteristic of Chiang Kai-shek's legacy, which has gained attention at a transnational level beyond the other two cases. Between Spain and Korea, the former appears a much more severe case, exemplified by the removal of Franco's body from the Valley of the Search Fallen and the recent democratic memory law. However, this better reflects the fact that Franco lies at the heart of Spain's history wars, whereas in Korea it is the colonial period that is most sensitive, and reevaluations of Park Chung Hee can be seen as an extension of this.

⁷³ For the sake of convenience, I refer to the scholars involved in the case studies as "historians." Stanley Payne is a historian. Yi Yŏnghun is an economic historian. A. James Gregor, Maria Hsia Chang, and Kim Iryŏng are political scientists. Cho Kapche and Pío Moa are journalists and popular historians. Jay Taylor is a former diplomat turned amateur historian.

Second, in terms of timing, it is notable that all these reappraisals arose at around the same time. Reappraisals of Chiang appeared first, clearly related to the momentous reforms that began in the People's Republic of China in 1978. The Spanish and the Korean history wars both began in the mid-1990s. In Spain, this signified the unraveling of the "pact of silence" that had prevailed since Franco's death and the writing of a new constitution in 1978. Korea had no pact of silence. Although democratization began in 1987, it was not until 1993 that a civilian government returned to power, whereby the history wars almost immediately commenced. It is interesting to note that democratization in Spain began more than a decade before that in Korea, but the history wars broke out more or less at around the same time. All these cases are related to the collapse of socialism, which can be said to have begun with China's 1978 reforms and culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Third, in terms of the actors involved, each case involved a mix of scholarly and popular authors of varying backgrounds and specialties. In the Korean case, Cho Kapche's public campaign is supported by the scholarly efforts of political scientist Kim Iryŏng and economic historian Yi Yŏnghun. In the Taiwanese case, there are a multitude of popular works, reflecting American interest in China and East Asia, complemented by the scholarly support of political scientists like A. James Gregor and historians like Alexander Pantsov. Meanwhile, the Spanish case is characterized by the explicit alliance between renowned historian Stanley Payne and popular journalist Pío Moa.

Finally, the cases naturally differ in terms of the specific political agendas at stake. In Spain and Korea, one may observe the familiar battlelines of civil wars fought in the twentieth century. These cases also share a political dynamic in which the right emphasizes constitutional patriotism and the left ethnic nationalism. These are essentially arguments

over “healthy patriotism” versus “harmful nationalism.”⁷⁴ In the Spanish case, however, these efforts are directed toward uniting a fragmented nation, whereas in the Korean case they are directed toward excising from Korean identity any association with North Korea.

In the Taiwanese case, the particular interest of Americans in Chiang Kai-shek compels explanation. It is interesting to note how important reappraisals of Chiang have been in the United States. One may recall how the issue of “who lost China” functioned as the pretext for the emergence of McCarthyism in the 1950s.⁷⁵ In the late 1970s, Carter’s plan to give Taiwan’s seat on the UN Security Council to the PRC provoked a backlash among conservatives, and Barry Goldwater filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court (ultimately unsuccessful) over Carter’s unilateral nullification of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty.⁷⁶ Again in the early 1990s, controversy erupted among conservatives over Tiananmen Square, insisting that President George H.W. Bush add human rights conditions to China Most Favored Nation (MFN) status.⁷⁷ In a 1991 hearing of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on renewing China’s MFN status, committee chairman Representative Sam Gibbons brought up the disturbing events of Tiananmen Square.⁷⁸ The conservative think tank Ethics and Public Policy Center also held its own panel on “China in Transition” on May 22, 1989, as protests were ongoing. Maria Hsia Chang, one of the speakers, took on a triumphalist tone: “Recent events in China

⁷⁴ This is a characteristic that separates the Korean and Spanish history wars from the archetypal German case, where the right (Nolte) championed ethnonationalism and the left (Habermas) constitutional patriotism.

⁷⁵ See, for example, Robert P. Newman, *Owen Lattimore and the “Loss” of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 123–184; and Ellen Schrecker, *The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2002), 75–79.

⁷⁶ *Justia*, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/444/996>.

⁷⁷ “Most-Favored-Nation Status of the People’s Republic of China,” CRS Report for Congress, updated July 25, 2001, <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30225.html>; John C. Danforth, “The Most-Favored Nation Status of China: View from the U.S. Senate,” *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)* 87 (March 31 – April 3, 1993): 436–440.

⁷⁸ “U.S.-China Trade and MFN Status,” *C-Span*, June 12, 1991, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?18389-1/us-china-trade-mfn-status>.

have been extraordinary... “We’ve seen on television images of young passionate determined faces of students willing to die for democracy. We’ve seen Chinese people young and old blocking truckloads of troops with their frail bodies. We’ve seen a six-foot homemade Statue of Liberty being paraded in the streets of Shanghai. All of these should remind Americans of our own heritage and perhaps stir us out of our complacency and cynicism, and also to remind us that democracy and liberty are universal values that, Chinese, too, hunger for the same things as we do.”⁷⁹ At a panel held the following year, this time organized by A. James Gregor and hosted by Charles Lichtenstein, her tone was embittered: “To ensure its own survival, the Communist Party has resuscitated radical Maoism and reimposed totalitarian controls. Mao has made a comeback in bookshops and souvenir shops. His birthplace in Hunan Province has become a Mecca for Chinese tourists. More importantly, Mao’s practices have been revived by the government in a deliberate attempt to reassert control over the population.”⁸⁰ Arguably it is no mistake that Gregor and Chang were both at the forefront of reappraisals of Chiang Kai-shek and involved in such efforts to shape US China policy. At the very least, positive assessments of Chiang in the United States can be understood in relation to a tradition of hardline anticommunism and an assertive foreign policy in East Asia.

There are also important differences and similarities in terms of the content of the reappraisals, which are identifiable in terms of several themes. First, there is the consistent theme of modernization; all three cases are

⁷⁹ Ethics and Public Policy Center, “China in Transition,” *C-Span*, May 22, 1989, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?7687-1/china-transition>. See the EPPC homepage at <https://eppc.org>. A. James Gregor also authored a book for the EPPC urging the US to support Marcos against the democracy movement. A. James Gregor, *Crisis in the Philippines: A Threat to U.S. Interests* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1984).

⁸⁰ “U.S.-China Policy,” *C-Span*, June 5, 1990, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?12555-1/us-china-policy>. Recently conservatives have been calling once again for repealing China’s most favored nation status. See Charles Benoit, “Repealing China’s Most Favored Nation Status: A Guide,” Coalition for a Prosperous America, January 11, 2023, <https://prosperousamerica.org/repealing-chinas-most-favored-nation-status-a-guide>. See also Reihan Salam, “Normalizing Trade Relations with China was a Mistake,” *The Atlantic*, June 8, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/06/normalizing-trade-relations-with-china-was-a-mistake/562403>.

essentially about the relationship between authoritarianism and modernization. Here there were differing emphases regarding the actual *intentions* of the historical actors; in other words, the question of whether such modernization was achieved by design or incidentally.⁸¹ Cho Kapche, for example, was clear that Park Chung Hee only meant to defer democracy (although this point is still ambiguous at times), while Jay Taylor was adamant that Taiwan's democratization was an "unconscious" element of Chiang's legacy.

Second, there was the theme of "development models." This idea was absent in the Spanish case but shared by the Korean and Taiwanese cases. It was particularly prominent in the Taiwanese case, where 1978 has been regarded as indicative of China's turn toward the "Taiwanese model." It is also prominent in the Korean case, with Cho Kapche especially emphasizing that Park Chung Hee created a successful model for developing countries.

Third, an undercurrent of anticommunism was present across all the cases. This was most apparent in how the dictators were almost always contrasted with a communist counterpart as an important evaluative criterion. This is perhaps to be expected in the Taiwanese and Korean cases, where national sovereignty is contested between two regimes. This tendency is particularly pronounced among Cho Kapche and Yi Yŏnghun, the former contrasting Park Chung Hee and Kim Il Sung and the latter including a chapter on North Korean history in his book as foil for South Korean history.⁸² It was also present in the Spanish case, with Payne's

⁸¹ I pick up this point in the following section in the context of right-wing historical revisionism.

⁸² See Cho Kapche, *Pak Chŏnghŭi I*, 11–12; and Yi Yŏnghun, *Taeahan min'guk yŏksa: Nara mandŭlgi palchach'wi 1945–1987* [History of the Republic of Korea: The footprints of nation making, 1945–1987] (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2004), 439–478. Kim Iryŏng's anticommunism, however, is less overt. References to Kim Il Sung in *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk* are sporadic, made in passing, and limited to the context of the liberation period and Korean War. Kim does not mention Kim Il Sung at all in the epilogue devoted to evaluating Park Chung Hee. Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk: hyŏndae Han'guk chŏngch'isa kangŭi* [Founding a nation and enriching a nation: A lecture on contemporary Korean political history] (Saenggak ŭi namu, 2004), 443–463. It is of course important to remember, however, that *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk* was published as part of the Pang Iryŏng Culture Foundation (*Pang*

contrasting of Franco and Tito. Indeed, it is Payne who drives home this point most forcefully in his articulate differentiation of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.

Altogether, while the cases vary in terms of conflict intensity and the specific agendas involved, they share common ground in terms of timing. In other words, they all appear closely related to the collapse of socialism between 1978 and 1991. There are also striking thematic similarities in the content of the reappraisals of dictatorship. These include, chiefly, emphases on modernization and anticommunism. To explore these thematic similarities and their relationship to the post-Cold War era, I

Iryŏng munhwa chaedan) contemporary Korean history lecture series. Furthermore, there is at least one passage in Kim's book where he engages in a similar kind of comparison, specifically regarding Rhee Syngman and Kim Il Sung and their respective designs for establishing separate governments.

The end of the Cold War has revealed another difference in the policies of Rhee Syngman and Kim Il Sung. From the vantage point of the end of the Cold War due to the collapse of socialism, the relative merits of the policy to establish a separate government of Rhee Syngman, who sided with capitalism, and the idea of establishing a "democratic base" of Kim Il Sung, who sided with socialism, are now clearly discernible. An overly consequentialist evaluation of history is certainly dangerous. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the result in cases where it is patently clear. Since artificial experiments are difficult for human problems, actual results can substitute for them.

Putting aside agreement or disagreement with Fukuyama's "end of history," today liberal democracy and market economy are undeniable common values and goals. Clearly the Rhee Syngman government did not plant liberal democracy and market economy in the soil of this land. The politics of that time were authoritarian and the market was little more than a partial mechanism moving the economy. Also clear, however, is that authoritarianism is better than totalitarianism and that even a partially functioning market is more effective than total control and planning. At least authoritarianism and a partial market produce the conditions for liberalism, democracy, and the market to flower, but under totalitarianism and a planned economy such conditions are impossible. In this respect, one can say that the poverty of totalitarian North Korea today is rooted in Kim Il Sung's plan to establish a "democratic base" and the democracy and market economy that we enjoy began with Rhee Syngman's policy of establishing a separate government.

Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk*, 82–83:

이승만과 김일성 노선의 또 다른 차이는 냉전의 종언으로 드러났다. 사회주의의 붕괴로 냉전이 끝난 현시점에서 자본주의 진영에 가담한 이승만의 단정 노선과 사회주의 진영에 가담한 김일성의 민주기지론 사이의 우열은 분명하게 판가름이 났다. 물론 역사에 대한 지나친 결과론적 평가는 위험하다. 그러나 명백히 결과가 드러난 경우 그것을 완전히 도외시킬 수도 없다. 인간의 문제는 인위적 실험이 어렵기 때문에 현실에서 나타난 결과가 실험을 대신해 줄 수도 있다.

후쿠야마가 말하는 '역사의 종언'에 대한 동의 여부와 무관하게 오늘날 자유민주주의와 시장경제는 아무도 부인하기 어려운 공통된 가치이자 목표가 되고 있다. 이승만 정부가 이 땅에 자유민주주의와 시장경제를 꽃피운 것은 분명 아니다. 당시 정치는 권위주의적이었고, 시장은 경제를 움직이는 부분적 메커니즘에 불과했다. 그러나 분명한 것은 권위주의가 전체주의보다 나으며, 부분적으로 작동할지라도 시장이 전면적인 통제와 계획보다는 효율적이라는 점이다. 권위주의와 부분적 시장 속에서는 자유주의와 민주주의 그리고 사장이 꽃필 여건이라도 만들어지지만 전체주의와 통제경제 속에서는 그마저도 불가능하다. 이점에서 오늘날 전체주의적 북한의 곤궁은 김일성의 민주기지론에 뿌리를 두고 있고, 우리가 누리는 민주주의와 시장경제는 이승만의 단정 노선에서 출발하고 있다고 할 수 있다.

discuss them in the context of right-wing historical revisionism in the following section.

III. Reappraisals of Dictatorship and Right-Wing Historical Revisionism

In this section, I discuss the reappraisals of dictatorship across the Korean, Taiwanese, and Spanish cases in relation to the concept of right-wing historical revisionism. I draw on the existing literature to define the concept and present a typology consisting of four “model” historians, namely, Ernst Nolte, François Furet, Stéphane Courtois, and Renzo De Felice. I then assess the historians drawn from each case against this typology.

1. What is Right-Wing Historical Revisionism?

In the Korean context, “revisionism” (*sujŏngjuŭi*) is generally used as a proper noun referring to critical history writing that arose in the 1980s, mainly concerned with the origins of Korea’s division and the Korean war and continuity in the ruling class between the colonial and postcolonial periods. In a broader context, it is related to debates in the fields of Soviet Studies and Cold War history.⁸³ Seminal publications were Bruce Cumings’ *The Origins of the Korean War*, the series *Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi insik*, and

⁸³ On Soviet Studies, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Revisionism in Soviet History,” *History and Theory* 46, no. 4 (2007): 77–91; and Antoniou, “The Lost Atlantis of Objectivity,” 105–106. On Cold War history, see Geir Lundestad, “How (Not) to Study the Origins of the Cold War,” in *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (London: Routledge, 2013), 64–80; and Mike Sewell, *The Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 4.

perhaps earlier works such as Kang Man'gil's *Pundan sidae ūi yōksa insik*.⁸⁴ The term is generally applied derogatorily.⁸⁵

Outside of Korea, historians generally use the term “revisionism” abstractly, to designate a particular kind of history writing, but usage varies. Some claim, for example, that historiography is inherently revisionist.⁸⁶ As

⁸⁴ See Pak Ch'ansŭng, “Pundan sidae Namhan ūi Han'guk sahak” [Korean historiography in division-era South Korea], in *Han'guk ūi yōksaga wa yōksahak (ha)* [Korea's historians and historiography, vol. 2], ed. Cho Tonggōl, Han Yōngu, and Pak Ch'ansŭng (P'aju: Ch'angbi, 1994), 327–372; Pak T'aegyūn, “Han'guk hyōndaesa yōn'gu ūi ch'ui wa chaengchōm” [Trends and debates in the contemporary Korean history research], in *Han'guksa yōn'gu 50-nyōn* [Fifty years of Korean history research], ed. Ihwa yōja taehakkyo Han'guk munhwa yōn'guwōn (Seoul: Hyeon, 2005), 381–426; Pak T'aegyūn, “Segyehwa sidae Han'gukchōk inyōm chihyōng ūi kiwōn: T'allaengjōn sigi chōnhu yōksa insik pyōnhwa rūl chungsim ūro” [Origins of the Korean ideological terrain in the globalization era: Changes in historical perceptions around the end of the Cold War], in *T'allaengjōnsa ūi insik: Segyehwa sidae Han'guk sahoe ūi munje ūisik* [Perceptions of post-Cold War history: Critical awareness in Korean society in the globalization era], ed. Pak Inhwi et al. (P'aju: Han'gilsa, 2012), 495–524; Ch'a Hasun, “Han'guk yōksahak ūi yusan kwa 21-segi ūi kwaje” [The legacy of Korean historiography and tasks for the twenty-first century], in *Han'guk yōksahak ūi sōngkwa wa kwaje* [Fruits and tasks of Korean historiography], ed. Yōksa hakhoe (Seoul: Ilchogak, 2007), 17–40; Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); and Henry Em, “Historians and Historical Writing in Modern Korea,” in *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, vol. 5: Historical Writing Since 1945*, ed. Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf (UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 659–677. See also Kang Man'gil, *Pundan sidae ūi yōksa insik: Kang Man'gil saronchip* [The historical consciousness of the division era: The collected Historiographical commentaries of Kang Man'gil] (Seoul: Ch'angjak kwa pip'yōngsa, 1978); Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945–1947* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981); Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, vol. II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947–1950* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990); Song Kōnho et al., *Haebang chōnhusa ūi insik* [An understanding of history before and after liberation] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1980); Kang Man'gil et al., *Haebang chōnhusa ūi insik 2* [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 2] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1985); Pak Hyōnch'ae et al., *Haebang chōnhusa ūi insik 3* [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 3] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1987); Ch'oe Changjip et al., *Haebang chōnhusa ūi insik 4* [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 4] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1989); Kim Namsik et al., *Haebang chōnhusa ūi insik 5* [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 5] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1989); Pak Myōngnim et al., *Haebang chōnhusa ūi insik 6* [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 6] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1989).

⁸⁵ This derogatory usage is traceable at least to Yu Yōngik, “Sujōngjuūi wa Han'guk hyōndaesa yōn'gu” [Revisionism and contemporary Korean history research], *Han'guksa simin kangjwa* 20 (February 1997): 58–78; Yu Yōngik, ed., *Sujōngjuūi wa Han'guk hyōndaesa* [Revisionism and Korean contemporary history] (Seoul: Yōnse daehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 1998); Chōn Sangin, *Kogae sugin sujōngjuūi: Han'guk hyōndaesa ūi yōksa sahoehak* [Revisionism in retreat: The historical sociology of contemporary Korean history] (Seoul: Chōnt'ong kwa hyōndae, 2001).

⁸⁶ As Antoniou writes, “‘Revisionism’ is definitely one of the most controversial terms in the social sciences. A cliché in most accounts of the term occurs at the beginning of analysis when the author claims that the procedure of revision is congenital to historical analysis and writing. Then, suddenly, a ‘however,’ appears; the analysis continues by references to the

historian James Banner writes, “All historians are revisionists—at least in some respects. They are always trying to get a grasp on the past—not only for their simple need and desire to understand that past and for the pleasures and satisfactions such understanding may bring them, but also for their visions and hopes. Thus all works of history should be approached as presumptively revisionist.”⁸⁷ Similarly, James Lewis Gaddis writes that “we are all in the business of *representation*, and because representations invariably reflect the nature and purposes of those doing the representing, there can never be *definitive* histories of anything. Historians, hence, are by their nature revisionists.”⁸⁸

Meanwhile, others use the term as a pejorative, as observable in the Korean context. This second usage is consistent with its historical origins. As commonly known, the term “revisionism” originated in the late nineteenth-century Marxist schism over how best to bring about a socialist society. The revolutionary left referred to Eduard Bernstein and the social democrats as “revisionists.”⁸⁹ This pejorative connotation carried over into the usage of the term in historiography. As Daqing Yang writes, “Revisionism in history is still to a great extent a dirty word.... Very few

deniers of the Holocaust and the negationist trend that caused the term ‘revision’ to be perceived extremely negatively, and it concludes that the term ‘revision’ has been permanently damaged by this use such that cannot be treated as an analytical or even descriptive tool of the social sciences.” Antoniou, “The Lost Atlantis of Objectivity,” 95.

⁸⁷ James M. Banner, Jr., *The Ever-Changing Past: Why All History is Revisionist History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021), 10.

⁸⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, “On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the Cold War,” in *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (London: Routledge, 2013), 27. Still others argue for doing away with the term “revisionism” altogether. Following this logic to its conclusion, historians such as Evi Gkotsaridis, Sebastian Balfour, Jordi Gracia, and Enrique Moradiellos argue for replacing the term “revisionism” with “negationism,” since the former term risks granting extreme claims such as Holocaust denial legitimacy. Evi Gkotsaridis, “Revisionism in the Twentieth Century: A Bankrupt Concept or Permanent Practice?” *The European Legacy* 13, no. 6 (2008), 725; Balfour, “The Concept of Historical Revisionism,” 182–184; Jordi Gracia, “Revisionism, a Necessary Evil,” *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 21, no. 3 (2008), 247; Moradiellos, “Critical Historical Revision,” 219–229.

⁸⁹ Antoniou, “The Lost Atlantis of Objectivity,” 95. See Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein’s Challenge to Marx* (New York: Collier Books, 1962).

historians openly declare themselves to be revisionists.”⁹⁰ Or as Giovanni Cattini puts it, “In common parlance, the word revisionism takes on a pejorative meaning because it is associated with a vulgar use of certain historical events manipulated for political ends and with a complete lack of scientific foundation.”⁹¹ In this negative definition, “revisionism” is regarded as *deviant* (as opposed to “normal”) history writing.

Clearly usage of “revisionism” in the literature varies. I would argue this problem is easily solved, however, by simply substituting the word “revision” for “revisionism” in the sense that Banner and Gaddis use the term—one could say that “all historiography involves revision” rather than “all historiography is revisionist,” and still preserve the essential meaning of the former statement. Philosopher of history Aviezer Tucker usefully distinguishes between historical “revision” and “revisionism” in just this manner.⁹² The problem of demarcation, however, then arises. What separates historical “revision” and “revisionism”?

Tucker suggests an “evidential difference.”⁹³ The basic argument here is that good historians change their narratives based on the presentation of new evidence and criticism from their peers, whereas “revisionist” historians dogmatically cling to theirs.

Revisionist historiography is distinct from revised historiography in being immune to the effects of new evidence. One of the chief revisionist strategies has been to “make fuzzy” epistemological issues, to make the distinction between evidence-based probable knowledge of history and fiction vague and unclear. It blurs the border between historiographic truth and falsehood by

⁹⁰ Daqing Yang, “Historical Revisionism in East Asia: What Does Politics Have to Do with It?” in *Contested Views of a Common Past: Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia*, ed. Steffi Richter (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008), 25.

⁹¹ Cattini, “Historical Revisionism,” 30.

⁹² Aviezer Tucker, “Historiographic Revision and Revisionism: The Evidential Difference,” in *Past in the Making: Historical Revisionism in Central Europe after 1989*, ed. Michal Kopeček (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008), 1–15.

⁹³ Tucker, “Historiographic Revision and Revisionism,” 1–15. Tucker’s distinction between revision and revisionism based on the “evidential difference” is reminiscent of Karl Popper’s distinction between science and pseudoscience based on the principle of falsifiability. See Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Routledge, 2002). The term “pseudohistory” has also been applied in the field of Korean history, but only regarding ancient history. See Kyoung-ryang Ki, “Pseudo-history and Historical Fascism,” *Journal of Northeast Asian History* 14, no. 2 (Winter 2017): 189–214; Andrew Logie, “Diagnosing and Debunking Korean Pseudohistory,” *European Journal of Korean Studies* 18, no. 2 (2019): 37–80; and Chölmün yōksa hakcha moim, *Han’guk kodaesa wa saibi yōksahak* [Ancient Korean history and pseudohistoriography] (Koyang-si: Yōksa pip’yōngsa, 2020).

claiming there can be more than a single “true” historiographic narrative. Historical events like the Holocaust may then be “true” for some people, and “not true” for others. If historiography is reducible to the political, social and other values, interests and affiliations of the people who write it, the Holocaust may be a part of the narratives of some communities, but not of others.⁹⁴

This otherwise useful heuristic, however, ends up limiting right-wing historical revisionism to extreme cases; Holocaust denial, for example. In other words, reducing the distinction between revision and revisionism to methodological criteria precludes any *normative* basis for challenging historical narratives. The case of Ernst Nolte is paradigmatic in this regard. Nolte did not try to *deny* the Holocaust but merely reframe it as a response to “Asiatic Bolshevism.”⁹⁵ It was problematic, in other words, more for its values than its methods.

Observing the literature on right-wing historical revisionism, one can see that this broader normative approach to defining historical revisionism is quite common. As Daqing Yang writes, for example, “It is possible to see [historical revision] as mainly intellectually driven while right-wing historical revisionism is charged with an explicit political agenda. By challenging established or dominant views of the past, historical revisionists typically seek to undermine the fundamental tenets of the political order such consensus supports.”⁹⁶ Similarly, Steffi Richter suggests that revisionists “try to use their particular [historical] interpretations as “weapons” in discussions on current political issues. Simplifying or even falsifying complex relations of history, they make use of the ideological aspects inherent in all historical narratives to serve

⁹⁴ Tucker, “Historiographic Revision and Revisionism,” 3.


⁹⁵ See Minoru Iwasaki and Steffi Richter, “The Topology of Post-1990s Historical Revisionism,” trans. Richard F. Calichman, *positions: east asia cultures critique* 16, no. 3 (2008), 509–510; and Chris Lorenz, “Historical Knowledge and Historical Reality: A Plea for ‘Internal Realism,’” in *History and Theory: Contemporary Readings*, ed. Brian Fay, Philip Pomper, and Richard T. Vann (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 342–376. Evaluations of New Right historiography as not meeting the criteria for “revisionism” adhere to a narrow methodological definition. See Jong-Pil Yoon, “Recent History Wars in South Korea,” *Paedagogica Historica* 56, no. 4 (2020): 548–567; Patrick Vierthaler, “The New Right and the 1948 Foundation View: A Failed Revision of South Korean Cultural Memory,” *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2021): 1–33.

⁹⁶ Yang, “Historical Revisionism in East Asia,” 26–27. Yang actually differentiates between “revisionism” and “historical revisionism.” For the sake of simplicity, I have substituted the term “revision” for “revisionism” in the quote above, with the intended meaning preserved.

populist politics.”⁹⁷ This normative approach is *broad* because it also encompasses extreme cases of historical revision such as holocaust denial, which it classifies as “negationism.”⁹⁸

In sum, I have noted the semantic differences in the use of the term “revisionism” and suggested the terms “revision” versus “revisionism” as clarifications. I also discussed the problem of demarcation. On the one hand, the narrow methodological approach equates right-wing historical revisionism with negationism. On the other, the broader normative approach focuses on historiography as a tool in challenging established characteristics of national identity. In what follows, I use the term “right-wing historical revisionism” in this second sense (table 5.1). Essentially, in the words of Daniel Levy, I treat historical revisionism as an attempt to “debunk those mythical substructures upon which collective identities rely.”⁹⁹

Table 5.1 Definitions of “Revisionism”

| | “Normal” Historiography | “Politically Motivated” Historiography | Negationism |
|---|----------------------------|--|---------------|
| Banner, Gaddis | “Revisionism” | | |
| Tucker | | | “Revisionism” |
| Yang, Iwasaki, Richter | | “Revisionism” | |
|  | | | |
| Narrow Methodological Definition | Revision | | Revisionism |
| Broad Normative Definition | Revision | Revisionism | |

⁹⁷ Steffi Richter, “Historical Revisionism in Contemporary Japan,” in *Contested Views of a Common Past: Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia*, ed. Steffi Richter (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008), 47.

⁹⁸ Antoniou, “The Lost Atlantis of Objectivity,” 95.

⁹⁹ Daniel Levy, “The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel,” *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999), 65.

2. A Typology of Right-Wing Historical Revisionism

Drawing on previous literature, I sketch four “models” of right-wing historical revisionism in the historiography of Ernst Nolte (1923–2016), François Furet (1927–1997), Stéphane Courtois (b. 1947), and Renzo De Felice (1929–1996).¹⁰⁰ If there is a universal characteristic underlying all these cases, it is anticommunism. I differentiate between them by singling out for each a characteristically dominant trope.

Ernst Nolte, a candidate for the archetype of right-wing historical revisionism, serves as a logical starting point.¹⁰¹ Nolte was a renowned historian of fascism going back to the 1960s.¹⁰² He achieved even greater international renown for his role in the *Historikerstreit* (“historians’ debate”) of the mid-1980s, in which he advanced a revisionist interpretation of Nazi history.¹⁰³ To summarize, he argued that National Socialism and its

¹⁰⁰ See for example, R.J.B. Bosworth, “Explaining ‘Auschwitz’ after the End of History: The Case of Italy,” *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999): 84–99; Julia Yonetani, “The ‘History Wars’ in Comparative Perspective: Australia and Japan,” *Cultural Studies Review* 10, no. 2 (September 2004): 33–50; Enzo Traverso, “The New Anti-Communism: Rereading the Twentieth Century,” in *History and Revolution: Refuting Revisionism*, ed. Mike Haynes and Jim Wolfreys (London: Verso, 2007), 138–155; and Iwasaki and Richter, “The Topology of Post-1990s Historical Revisionism,” 25–46. Some historians compare revisionism of both the left- and right-wing variety. Levy, “The Future of the Past,” 51–66; Antoniou, “The Lost Atlantis of Objectivity,” 92–112. Some also compare cases of left-wing revisionism, for instance, Stephen Howe, “The Politics of Historical ‘Revisionism’: Comparing Ireland and Israel/Palestine,” *Past and Present* 168 (2000): 227–253. Nolte’s book, *Der Europäische Bürgerkrieg, 1917–1945: Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus* [The European civil war, 1917–1945: National Socialism and Bolshevism], is not available in English translation. Neither is De Felice’s biography, which, with its eight books totaling over six thousand pages, far surpasses even Cho Kapche’s biography of Park Chung Hee in length. For a review, see Denis Mack Smith, “Mussolini: Reservations about Renzo De Felice’s Biography,” *Modern Italy* 5, no. 2 (2000): 193–210. The major publications of our other two historians can be found in English. François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, trans. Deborah Furet (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999); François Furet and Ernst Nolte, *Fascism and Communism*, trans. Katherine Golsan (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); and Stéphane Courtois et al., eds., *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999).

¹⁰¹ Iwasaki and Richter, “The Topology of Post-1990s Historical Revisionism,” 509–510.

¹⁰² Nolte’s *Three Faces of Fascism* is regarded as a classic in the field. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, 32, 261n22. See Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism*, trans. Leila Vennewitz (New York: The New American Library, 1969).

¹⁰³ The *Historikerstreit* is also often cited as the paradigmatic “history war.” Lorenz, “Historical Knowledge and Historical Reality,” 342–376. See also Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge,

culmination in the Holocaust were *defensive* responses to the “Asiatic barbarism” of Bolshevism—its purges and gulags—in the context of the “European Civil War” sparked by the Russian Revolution in 1917.¹⁰⁴ Critics interpreted this thesis, perhaps reducible to the phrase, “Hitler was not as bad as Stalin,” as an attempt to absolve German guilt and reclaim a proud nationalist history.¹⁰⁵ The dominant trope here is “civilizational war.”

Historian François Furet is best known for his work on the French Revolution. Once a member of the Communist Party, in the 1970s he came to see the revolution, just like its Russian counterpart, as tragically flawed.¹⁰⁶ His pessimism only became more pronounced after 1989, which,

Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997); and Peter Baldwin, ed., *Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians' Debate* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990).

¹⁰⁴ Cattini sums up Nolte's thesis as follows: “For this German historian, Nazi Germany has to be understood from the perspective of a response to the Asian barbarity of the Bolsheviks, who, in the 1920s and 30s, wrote a story of deportations, mass shootings, concentration camps, the wiping out of all alleged enemies, the extermination of millions of people who were innocent yet considered enemies. According to Nolte, it was all written before Hitler came to power, except for the gas chambers. The rhetorical question the German historian asks is: ‘[...] could the national socialists have carried out an ‘Asian’ action because they considered themselves and their people as potential or effective victims of an Asian action? Was not the Gulag Archipelago prior to Auschwitz? Was not the Bolsheviks’ ‘class extermination’ the logical and factual past of the national socialists’ ‘racial extermination’?” Cattini, “Historical Revisionism,” 31. Responding to Nolte's thesis, Traverso argues that if there were any model for Nazism it would have been nineteenth-century colonialism: “The historical laboratory for Nazi crimes was not Bolshevik Russia but the colonial past of Western civilization, in the classical era of industrial capitalism, imperialist colonialism and political liberalism. Formulating it in Nolte's own words, we could appropriately describe this historical background as the ‘causal nexus’ and the ‘logical and factual precedent’ for Nazi violence. But it is not at all surprising that the new anti-communist paradigm completely ignores this historical genealogy.” Traverso, “The New Anti-Communism,” 139–145. One may note the comparability of Nolte's narrative with that of Hayashi Fusao, as both use a frame of “civilizational war.” Fusao claims that Japanese actions must be understood in the context of an East-West war stretching back into the nineteenth century. Just like Nazi Germany, imperial Japan is painted as justifiably on the defense, albeit this time against Western aggression. Iwasaki and Richter, “The Topology of Post-1990s Historical Revisionism,” 522–524. I take up this point below when I discuss Cho Kapche's use of the frame of civilizational war.

¹⁰⁵ In Habermas' words, Nolte sought a “settlement of damages.” Jürgen Habermas, “A Kind of Settlement of Damages (Apologetic Tendencies),” trans. Jeremy Leaman, *New German Critique* 44 (1988): 25–39.

¹⁰⁶ Carol E. Harrison, “Furet, François (b. 1927),” in *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 1, ed. Daniel R. Woolf (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998), 341; Geoff Eley, “What Produces Democracy? Revolutionary Crises, Popular Politics and Democratic Gains in Twentieth-Century Europe,” in *History and Revolution: Refuting Revisionism*, ed. Mike Haynes and Jim Wolfreys (London: Verso, 2007), 248n21. See François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). The original version, *Penser la Révolution française*, was published in 1978. Traverso, “The New Anti-Communism,” 148. Namhee Lee also compares New

for him, marked the “passing of an illusion.” Echoing Fukuyama’s end-of-history thesis, he writes, “The idea of *another* society has become almost impossible to conceive of, and no one in the world today is offering any advice on the subject or even trying to formulate a new concept. Here we are, condemned to live in the world as it is.”¹⁰⁷ The dominant trope here is the “quixotic revolutionary.”¹⁰⁸

Stéphane Courtois, like his teacher Furet, evinces a similar but somewhat narrower focus. Whereas Furet saw “revolution” as tragically flawed, Courtois has homed in on the flaws (tragic or not) of communism itself.¹⁰⁹ A Maoist turned zealous anticommunist, he has devoted his

Right interpretations of Korean history in the light of the “failure” of revolution” as articulated by Furet. Namhee Lee, “Social Memories of the 1980s: Unpacking the Regime of Discontinuity,” in *Revisiting Minjung: New Perspectives on the Cultural History of 1980s South Korea*, ed. Sunyoung Park (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019), 22–24. See also Michael Scott Christofferson, “An Antitotalitarian History of the French Revolution: François Furet’s *Penser la Révolution française* in the Intellectual Politics of the Late 1970s,” *French Historical Studies* 22, no. 4 (1999): 557–611.

¹⁰⁷ Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion*, 502. Giovanni Levi quotes the same passage translated from the original French. Giovanni Levi, “The Distant Past: On the Political Use of History,” *Mediterranean Historical Review* 16, no. 1 (2001), 61. Furet became an ally of Nolte in the 1990s. See Furet and Nolte, *Fascism and Communism*. “With the composure of his blasé liberalism,” says Traverso, “Furet reserved his contempt for other adversaries. when Nolte suggests giving scientific credibility to Holocaust denial, Furet expresses only polite scepticism, a mere shadow of the sarcasm and polemical fury he deployed some years earlier in trying to demolish the ‘populist-Leninist vulgate’ of Claude Mazauric and Albert Soboul concerning the interpretation of the French Revolution.” Traverso, “The New Anti-Communism,” 147.

¹⁰⁸ Furet also adopts a tone emblematic of a “Lockean epistemology,” in other words, the “law of unintended consequences,” in which human actions, but not intentions, drive historical change. See Ronald L. Meek, *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 1; Albert O. Hirschman, *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991).

¹⁰⁹ Nicolas Miletitch, “From Maoist Militance to Exposing the Crimes of Communism,” trans. Natalia Ibrayeva, *Soviet History Lessons*, n.d., <https://www.soviethistorylessons.com/stephane-courtois>. As Traverso points out, Courtois also wrote the preface to the French edition of Nolte’s *The European Civil War*. Compared with Ernst Nolte and François Furet, Traverso judges Courtois most harshly. “He inherited from his mentor [Furet] neither the sense of proportion, nor the erudition, nor even the pleasure in narration that marked the style of the historian of the French Revolution. The only legacy he received from Furet is anti-communism.” He also writes, “In Courtois’ eyes, it is simply meaningless to consider communism as a plural and contradictory phenomenon, distinguishing between Trotsky and Stalin, Bela Kun and Enrico Berlinguer, Robert Hue and Pol Pot. It is also superfluous to separate Stalinism from its communist victims or to make distinctions between the movements and the regimes, between a revolutionary utopia and a ruling bureaucracy, between patterns of liberation and oppression, or between an anti-fascist resister and a KGB agent. Of course, the frontiers that separate the different forms of communism are not always perfectly clear—at times they may even be very ambiguous—but they exist, and should

scholarly career to exposing its crimes. Especially embittering for Courtois is that, in his view, communist crimes have failed to arouse the same kind of enthusiastic condemnation reserved for fascist ones.¹¹⁰ As he writes,

One cannot help noticing the strong contrast between the study of Nazi and Communist crimes. The victors of 1945 legitimately made Nazi crimes—and especially the genocide of the Jews—the central focus of their condemnation of Nazism. A number of researchers around the world have been working on these issues for decades. Thousands of books and dozens of films—most notably *Night and Fog*, *Shoah*, *Sophie's Choice*, and *Schindler's List*—have been devoted to the subject....

Yet scholars have neglected the crimes committed by the Communists. While names such as Himmler and Eichmann are recognized around the world as bywords for twentieth-century barbarism, the names of Feliks Dzerzhinsky, Genrikh Yagoda, and Nikolai Ezhov languish in obscurity. As for Lenin, Mao, and Ho Chi Minh, and even Stalin, they have always enjoyed a surprising reverence. A French government agency, the National Lottery, was crazy enough to use Stalin and Mao in one of its advertising campaigns. Would anyone even dare to come up with the idea of featuring Hitler or Goebbels in commercials?¹¹¹

The dominant trope in Courtois' work, preoccupied like McCarthy with the "evils and "conspiracies" of communism, is the "demonic communist."¹¹²

Finally, there is Italian historian Renzo De Felice. Historian R.G.B. Bosworth describes Felice as "undoubtedly the most expert, the most archivally informed, the most published of scholars who have studied or study the Fascist regime."¹¹³ His voluminous biography of Mussolini was

prevent us from reducing this open 'field of experience' to a monolithic phenomenon. In fact, Courtois scrupulously avoids considering such 'complications'. In his eyes, communism is criminal as both ideology and reality, and always identical at all times and in all places." He also describes Courtois as according with Isaac Deutscher's "ideal-typical portrait" of the ex-communist turned anticommunist. Traverso, "The New Anti-Communism," 138, 149, 150, 151, 242n64.

¹¹⁰ Courtois equates Nazi "racial genocide" with Soviet "class genocide." Traverso, "The New Anti-Communism," 151, 138, 147.

¹¹¹ Courtois also declares the Moscow headquarters of the GPU, a forerunner of the KGB, the functional equivalent of Auschwitz. Stéphane Courtois, "Introduction: The Crimes of Communism," in *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes Terror, Repression*, ed. Stéphane Courtois et al., trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 17; Traverso, "The New Anti-Communism," 147.

¹¹² Traverso, "The New Anti-Communism," 151.

¹¹³ Bosworth, "Explaining 'Auschwitz,'" 90. Similarly describing De Felice as "the foremost historian of Italian Fascism," Payne writes, "He views Italian Fascism as having progressivist and revolutionary origins, stemming from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, while regarding Nazism as antimodernist and regressive. De Felice considers Fascism to have been the vehicle of the emerging lower middle class—a typical product of modernization—and distinguishes firmly between the movement and the regime (the latter being 'the politics of Mussolini'). The Fascist movement was thus revolutionary insofar as it mobilized masses for a 'new society' and a 'new man,' which the Fascist regime also attempted to achieve through the typically modern means of education." Payne, *A History of Fascism*, 458. Stanislaw G. Pugliese provides this brief biographical mention: "Renzo De

published over more than three decades (1965–1997).¹¹⁴ Although he adhered to a dry empiricism in this work, he made explicit his admiration of Mussolini in a 1975 interview with the American historian Michael Ledeen, and the ensuing “De Felice affair” made headlines both in Italy and internationally.¹¹⁵ Chiefly, De Felice emphasizes the distinction between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, calling for evaluation of the former on its own terms.¹¹⁶ As Bosworth describes, he sees Fascism and Nazism as “radically distinct, with Italian Fascism being forward-looking and optimistic, committed to modernization in a way that the German regime utterly rejected.”¹¹⁷ Borrowing from A. James Gregor, whose work

Felice is considered one of the most important historians working today. After works on the Jacobins and a history of Italian Jews, he has turned his attention to a multivolume biography of Mussolini, which has generated considerable controversy, including charges that the author is seeking to ‘rehabilitate’ the Fascist dictator.” Stanislaw G. Pugliese, “Italian Historiography,” in *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 1, ed. Daniel R. Woolf (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998), 477. De Felice ultimately never completed the biography, passing away in 1996. See also Davies and Lynch, *The Routledge Companion to Fascism*, 61.

¹¹⁴ See Smith, “Mussolini,” 193–210.

¹¹⁵ Emilio Gentile, “Renzo De Felice: A Tribute,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 32, no. 2 (1997), 142. According to Bosworth, Ledeen introduced De Felice to a wider American audience through the interview. He lists A. James Gregor as a typical example of Felice’s increasing influence. Bosworth, “Explaining ‘Auschwitz,’” 90, 90n26. The interview was conducted and published in Italian (*Intervista sul fascismo*) and translated to English. See Renzo De Felice, *Fascism: An Informal Introduction to Its Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2017). For Ledeen’s commentary on the fallout, see Michael A. Ledeen, “Renzo De Felice and the Controversy over Italian Fascism,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 11, no. 4 (1976): 269–283. Ledeen described the controversy in a subsequent commentary: “Not since A.J.P. Taylor’s provocative study of the origins of the second world war has a scholarly book provoked the kind of furore which followed the publication of the *Intervista sul fascismo* in Italy in the summer of 1975. This rather academic discussion of the ideas and research of Renzo De Felice, the Italian historian of the fascist period went through five editions and 75,000 copies in the second half of the year, and provoked a heated debate in the national press. In the course of the summer and early fall, close to a hundred newspaper and magazine articles appeared, variously attacking and defending the author of the well-known biography of Mussolini (four volumes of which have appeared to date, covering the period ending with the Ethiopian War). The national television network devoted two lengthy programmes to a discussion of the book, and at least two volumes are currently being prepared which will deal with the debate which De Felice’s comments have generated. Ledeen, “Renzo De Felice,” 269. In general, this controversy is not evaluated as being on the same level as the *Historikerstreit* that occurred roughly a decade later. However, Cattini counts these together as the “two great revisionist battles for contemporary history.” Cattini, “Historical Revisionism,” 30.

¹¹⁶ More specifically, he describes “the ideology of Mussolini as revolutionary in contrast to the reactionary ideas of Adolf Hitler.” Cattini, “Historical Revisionism,” 31.

¹¹⁷ Bosworth, “Explaining ‘Auschwitz,’” 91. See also Cattini, “Historical Revisionism,” 30–31. In terms of De Felice’s emphasis on modernization, another relevant historian is Rainer Zitelmann. Although less renowned, Zitelmann has been an important historian for the

overlaps with De Felice, I call this dominant trope the “developmental dictator.”¹¹⁸

German New Right (*Neue Rechte*) since the 1980s. See Jacob Heilbrunn, “Germany’s New Right,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 6 (November/December 1996): 80–96; Karl Heinz Roth, “Revisionist Tendencies in Historical Research into German Fascism,” trans. Barry McLoughlin, *International Review of Social History* 39, no. 3 (1994): 429–455. Zitelmann approaches Nazi Germany from a different—albeit still apologetic—angle from Nolte. Whereas the latter adopts a negative mode (i.e., “not as bad as Stalin”), Zitelmann’s is positive, declaring the “revolutionary” nature of the Nazi regime. Essentially, Zitelmann emphasizes an image of Hitler as a modernizer. Early versions of this thesis are traceable to sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf and David Schoebaum, the key difference being that these scholars perceived modernization *despite* Hitler’s antimodern tendencies, whereas Zitelmann portrays Hitler as an *intentional* modernizer. Roth, “Revisionist Tendencies in Historical Research,” 433–443. See also Heilbrunn, “Germany’s New Right,” 87–88. This point of view is well captured in the following passage: “The social revolution triggered by National Socialism, whose content was modernism, was not in any way in contrast to Hitler’s intentions. Hitler not only welcomed the process of industrialization and the increase in social mobility but deliberately supported this development, for example by dissolving traditional regional ties through the abolition of the independent states. Hitler believed in a historic trend towards centralization caused by the development of mass communications and transportation technology, which would create the conditions for the advancement of industrial development. Hitler did not reject any of these trends—industrialization, the reduction of class barriers, the dissolution of regional ties—but saw himself as the deliberate executor of this process of modernization. The alleged contradiction between intention and effect, objectives and means, of the revolution set off by National Socialism does not exist, at least as far as Hitler is concerned.” Rainer Zitelmann, *Hitler: The Policies of Seduction* trans. Helmut Böglér (London: London House, 1999), 445. Or, as Roth describes, in Zitelmann’s view, “Hitler was a social revolutionary in a genuine sense; he strove consciously and systematically for a modernization of society and did not do so involuntarily in the prosecution of his backward-looking goals.” Roth, “Revisionist Tendencies in Historical Research,” 441.

¹¹⁸ Historians generally evaluate De Felice’s historiography as an example of “anti-anti-Fascism.” See, for example, MacGregor Knox, “The Fascist Regime, its Foreign Policy and its Wars: An ‘Anti-Anti-Fascist’ Orthodoxy?” *Contemporary European History* 4, no. 3 (1995): 347–365; and Traverso, “The New Anti-Communism,” 146. Bosworth emphasizes that De Felice “equipped anti-anti-Fascists both with academic prestige and with a huge factual armature.” Bosworth, “Explaining ‘Auschwitz,’” 90. In a similar vein, Cattini writes, “The harsh ideological debate of the 1970s led a significant number of Italian historians to accuse De Felice of writing works characterised by ‘afascism’, by the absence of an explicit condemnation of Mussolini’s dictatorship, thus paving the way for a rehabilitation of fascism.” Cattini, “Historical Revisionism,” 31. I use the term “developmental dictator” as it is this aspect of De Felice’s work that best serves comparison with the cases of reappraisals of dictatorship. It was A. James Gregor who coined the term “developmental dictatorship,” as I discuss below. See Zeev Sternhell, *Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France*, trans. David Maisel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 354n116; and Gregory J. Kasza, “Fascism from Above? Japan’s *Kakushin* right in Comparative Perspective,” in *Fascism Outside Europe: The European Impulse against Domestic Conditions in the Diffusion of Global Fascism*, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 189. The general idea, however, can also be found in De Felice’s work. Stanley Payne groups De Felice and Gregor together in their understanding of “Fascism as Modernization or a Stage of Socioeconomic Growth.” Payne, *A History of Fascism*, 456–459. What Michael Latham cleverly describes as “the right kind of revolution” is also relevant here. Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

The four historians all demonstrate a strong commitment to anticommunism, typical of what Enzo Traverso calls “post-Cold War anticommunism.”¹¹⁹ “As many analysts have observed with great astonishment,” he writes, “the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did not usher in a more ‘objective’, less passionately and ideologically oriented approach to the history of the twentieth century, but rather a new wave of anti-communism: a ‘militant’, fighting anti-communism, all the more paradoxical inasmuch as its enemy had ceased to exist.”¹²⁰ Here “anti-communism [is] raised to the status of an historical paradigm, a hermeneutic key to the twentieth century.”¹²¹ The revisionism of these historians piqued after the Cold War with Furet’s *The Passing of An Illusion*, Nolte’s revival (through Furet’s endorsement) in *Fascism and Communism*, Courtois’ *Black Book of Communism*, and the “anti-anti-Fascist orthodoxy” of De Felice’s successors.¹²² Finally, the historians all

¹¹⁹ Traverso, “The New Anti-Communism,” 138–155. Traverso’s concept of post-Cold War anticommunism accords with Geoff Eley’s description of a “recharged anti-Bolshevism” that arose “in the triumphalist neo-liberal climate of the early 1990s.” Eley, “What Produces Democracy?” 177.

¹²⁰ Traverso, “The New Anti-Communism,” 138.

¹²¹ Traverso notes that “in some ways, Paris is its capital.” American historians Traverso also mentions are Richard Pipes and Martin Malia. See Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991); and Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991* (New York: The Free Press, 1996). Traverso, “The New Anti-Communism,” 139, 138.

¹²² Traverso does not extend his concept of “post-Cold War anticommunism” to Renzo De Felice or his disciples, such as Emilio Gentile, but I think it applies. Traverso, “The New Anti-Communism,” 138–139; Bosworth, “Explaining ‘Auschwitz,’” 91, 94; Knox, “The Fascist Regime,” 429–455. Regarding the new anticommunism of Nolte, Furet, and Courtois, Traverso sums up their differences as follows: “For Nolte, [the new anti-communist paradigm] is the key to interpreting the last century, completely subsumed under the sign of civil war (first European, then international). In spite of its limits and its apologetic aims, his vision is not uninteresting, inasmuch as he puts the conflict between fascism and communism at the heart of the century. Furet’s anti-communism is more in keeping with the ruling *Zeitgeist*. After postulating a philosophically and historically debatable equation between capitalism and democracy, he tends to reduce both fascism and communism to a tragic parenthesis on the inescapable path to liberalism. ‘The greatest secret of the complicity between Bolshevism and fascism’, he wrote in *The Passing of an Illusion*, ‘remains their common enemy, which they reduce or exorcise, thinking it as in its death-throes, but which nevertheless constitutes their soil: simple democracy.’ Courtois, the least interesting of our three scholars, does not go beyond the old assimilation of communism to Nazism, two totalitarian regimes based on the same project of exterminating an enemy class (the bourgeoisie) or an enemy race (the Jews). He thus proposes a liberal democracy freed from the legacy of anti-fascism—one of its constituent elements in continental Europe—and directly based on anti-communism. National-conservative resentment (Nolte), the spirit of revenge of a late Cold-War crusader (Courtois), an apology of liberalism and a historical

seek to rehabilitate or reinforce the right. Yet they are also distinguishable by dominant trope, what I have called the “civilizational war,” “quixotic revolutionary,” “demonic communist,” and “developmental dictator” (table 5.2).

Table 5.2 Four Ideal-Typical Variants of Right-Wing Historical Revisionism

| | Ernst Nolte | Stéphane Courtois | François Furet | Renzo De Felice |
|----------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Dominant Trope | Civilizational War | Demonic Communist | Quixotic Revolutionary | Developmental Dictator |

3. *Discussion*

The four tropes are discernible in the reappraisals of dictatorship. There is overlap among the historians in terms of their usage, but I try to highlight which one is dominant. I focus mainly on the Taiwanese and Spanish cases before moving on to discuss the Korean case in detail.

First, the trope of civilizational war is the least relevant to the appraisals of dictatorship, excepting Cho Kapche. There are, however, parallels with conservatism nationalism in terms of the general tendency of seeking out affirmative national narratives. The Korean and Spanish cases provide for interesting comparison with the German case, as the positions of conservative nationalism versus constitutional patriotism are reversed with respect to left and right. This suggests right-wing historical revisionism is more about assertive, affirmative narratives than about ethnic nationalism per se. As commentators often observe, conservatives in these contexts appropriate cosmopolitan discourses toward reinforcing chauvinistic, state-centered historical narratives. In this respect, the “constitutional patriotism” of the Spanish and Korean cases can be seen as but another iteration of nationalism competing with its ethnonationalist counterparts.

farewell to revolution by an intellectual who has accepted capitalism as the impassable horizon of our time (Furet); these are the three variants of the new anti-communist historical paradigm.” Traverso, “The New Anti-Communism,” 154.

Second, the trope of the communist demon is also relatively unimportant for the reappraisals of dictatorship. To be sure, anticommunism itself is a common theme, but this specific fixation on the inherent criminality and constant plotting of communism is limited to Cho Kapche and Pío Moa. Historians in Spain regard Moa as a negationist on par with Holocaust denial.¹²³ The three primary themes of his historiography, according to Ángela Cenarro, are minimizing the number of victims of Francoist forces while emphasizing the brutality of republican and leftist forces; denying that the second Republic was a democracy; and blaming the left for “the break-up of the democratic process in October 1934” and insisting on Soviet interference.¹²⁴ This sensibility is also reflected in Moa’s interview statement, “The historical reality is that Franco defeated a very serious Soviet and separatist threat, maintaining national unity and Hispanic culture. He overcame a murderous international isolation that sought to starve the Spanish people, and he left a prosperous, moderate and reconciled country.”¹²⁵ This is only a tentative categorization, but Moa’s work seems to best reflect the trope of the demonic communist.

Third, the trope of the developmental dictator was prominent across the cases. In the Taiwanese case, the historians consistently emphasized Chiang’s ideology as a factor in Taiwan’s historical transformation, but it was A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang who applied the idea of developmental dictatorship most explicitly. Stanley Payne also applies this idea in the Spanish context.

Finally, the trope of the quixotic revolutionary was most consistently discernible across the cases. The distinction between totalitarianism and authoritarianism was important here, implying the difference between reasoned and measured change and fanatical,

¹²³ Jorge Marco, “Francoist Crimes: Denial and Invisibility, 1936–2016,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 52, no. 1 (2017), 161; Cenarro, “Francoist Nostalgia,” 206. As Imatz points out, however, he also has the support of historians and scholars on the right. Imatz, “Pío Moa, Part I.”

¹²⁴ Cenarro, “Francoist Nostalgia,” 205–206.

¹²⁵ Moa, “History as Antidote to Propaganda.”

ideologically driven change. Payne was representative in emphasizing this distinction. Another important criterion here was the evaluation of whether the historical change was judged a “conscious” choice incidental consequence of the pursuit of other goals. Jay Taylor, for example, stressed that Taiwan’s ultimate destination of democracy was not built in but an emergent property of Chiang’s design. Stanley Payne, too, made essentially this same point with Franco.

Cho Kapche uses all these tropes except for liberal triumphalism. First, the developmental dictator features prominently in his biography, subtitled “The Tragic Life of Modernization Revolutionary Park Chung Hee.” Whereas many of the historians often use the word “revolution” in their accounts, they do so lightly and in passing, merely to emphasize the magnitude of the change; without violating, in other words, Furet’s principle that historical change sought through revolution is tragically doomed to violence and failure. Cho, on the other hand, consistently emphasizes Park’s ideology, intention, and agency; he depicts, in other words, the possibility of just such revolutionary change as along as pursued by the “right” kind of leader, one who is “pure and simple” (*sobak hada*). The image of Park that emerges in Cho’s biography is comparative to that of the “developer” in Marshall Berman’s interpretation of Goethe’s *Faust*. According to Berman, Goethe’s narrative proceeds through three stages as the protagonist progresses from dreamer to lover to “developer.”¹²⁶ In Cho’s biography, Park begins as a young child who dreams of becoming a great general. Fate offers an opportunity in 1939, when the Japanese Empire opens the way for Korean recruits to the military. Infamously, Park is accepted to the Manchurian Military academy after composing his “letter in blood” (*hyŏlsŏ*) swearing allegiance to the empire—what could be seen as Park’s “Faustian bargain.” After his return to Korea in 1946 up to his coup in 1961, he finds “love” in successive relationships with Yi Hyŏllan

¹²⁶ Marshall Berman, *All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), 37–71.

and Yuk Yöngsu (he abandons his first wife with whom he had an arranged marriage). Indeed, the second volume in the series is subtitled “War and Love.”¹²⁷ Finally, the narrative arrives at Park the developer—the “modernization revolutionary”—after the May 16, 1961 coup d’état. Faust’s story culminates in his creation of “a whole new society...in his image,” with only a small plot of land remaining undeveloped. On this land live “a sweet old couple.” Faust resolves to appropriate their land, enlisting Mephisto (the devil) when they refuse to leave. He acquires the land but is horrified to learn that Mephisto killed the couple and burned down their house. Faust insists this is not what he wanted. This, says Berman, is the “tragedy of development,” its self-negating essence.¹²⁸ Likewise, Cho also paints Park as a “tragic” figure who died at just the right time, having fulfilled his historical destiny.¹²⁹

Cho also uses the trope of the civilizational war. This is not, however, the war between communism and fascism that Nolte envisions but something more like the East-West war envisioned by Japanese author Hayashi Fusao. Just like Nolte does for Germany, Fusao depicts imperial Japan as justifiably on the defense, but this time against Western aggression.¹³⁰ This East-West war also looms behind Cho’s historical understanding, manifesting intermittently. Take the following example, an exchange between Cho Kapche and journalist Peter Arnett:

I asked him the following question:

¹²⁷ Cho Kapche, *Nae mudöm e ch'im ül paet'ö ra: Kündae hwa hyöngmyöngga Pak Chönghui üi pijang han saengae 2; Chönjaeng kwa sarang* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 2; War and love] (Seoul: Chosön ilbosa, 1998).

¹²⁸ Berman, *All that is Solid Melts into Air*, 66–69.

¹²⁹ Cho Kapche, “Han chang üro yoyak han Han’guk hyöndaesa hürüm” [A summary of contemporary Korean history], *Chogabje.com*, March 28, 2006, https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=12548&C_CC=BB.

¹³⁰ Iwasaki and Richter, “The Topology of Post-1990s Historical Revisionism,” 522–524. Cho’s use of this trope of the East-West war accords with the commonly levied criticism that he borrows from the Japanese right in his thinking. See Chin Chunggwön, “Chugün tokchaeja üi sahoe: Pak Chönghui sindürom üi chöngsin punsökhak” [The dead dictator’s society: A psychoanalysis of the Park Chung Hee syndrome], in *Kaebal tokchae wa Pak Chönghui sidae: Uri sidae üi chöngch’i kyöngjejök kiwön* [Developmental dictatorship and the Park Chung Hee era: The political-economic origins of our times], ed. Yi Pyöngch’ön (P’aju: Ch’angbi, 2003), 339–364.

“In the twentieth century, the United States carried out wars against three states within the Confucian sphere in East Asia. With one victory against Japan, a draw against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the Korean War, and a defeat in the Vietnam War, it’s struggling significantly. Why is that?”

Reporter Arnett replied without hesitation,

“Autocratic Asian nations can sacrifice hundreds of thousands or millions of lives, but the United States cannot. That’s the difference.”

Inwardly, I was awestruck. The secret to victory was encapsulated in these few, simple words of a veteran reporter, not some complicated academic theory.¹³¹

Passages such as these may appear as nothing more than juvenile fantasizing, but they take on greater meaning when viewed in the context of the consistently anti-American undertones in Cho’s work. In his biography of Park Chung Hee, he frequently celebrates his protagonist’s chafing at Korea’s reliance on and instrumental approach to diplomacy with the United States as well as his disdain for democracy as a “foreign culture.” The clearest expression of such anti-Americanism can be found in Cho Kapche’s preface to the 1997 edition of Park Chung Hee’s *The Nation, the Revolution, and I*, reissued during the “Park Chung Hee syndrome.”

Amid the unification of the Three Kingdoms, Silla stood at a crossroads like that at which Korea stands today. After joining hands with Silla to exterminate Paekche, Tang thought it might as well go ahead and turn Silla into a colony, too. A policy meeting was held at this time. Kim Ch’unch’u, also known as King T’aejong Muyōl, displayed a weak attitude, saying, “How could we possibly fight against Tang, which helped us destroy Paekche?” Kim Yusin, who oversaw the military at the time, then stepped forward and said,

“A dog fears his owner. It shall bite him, nonetheless, if the owner steps on his leg. Are we to but sit idly and suffer?”

¹³¹ Cho Kapche, “Cho Kapche kija ūi Habōdū yōnsu pogo 2: Tari rūl palp kōdūn chuin irado murō ra” [Reporter Cho Kapche’s Harvard study report, part two: A dog stepped on will bite even its owner], *Wōlgan Chosōn* (October 1997), 267:

그에게 내가 물어보았다.

“미국은 20 세기에 들어서 동아시아 유교권 국가들과 세 번 전쟁을 치렀습니다. 일본에 대해서는 1 승, 한국전쟁 때 중국인민해방군과는 1 무승부, 월남전에서는 1 패하여 상당히 고전하고 있습니다. 왜 그렇습니까?”

아네트 기자는 주저 없이 즉답을 했다.

“아시아 전체 국가는 수십만, 수백만의 인명을 희생시킬 수 있습니다. 그러나 미국은 그럴 수가 없습니다. 이 차이이지요.”

나는 속으로 감탄했다. 어떤 복잡한 학설보다도 고참 기자의 간단한 이 한 마디에 승패의 비밀이 다 들어 있기 때문이었다.

See also Cho Kapche, “Cho Kapche kija ūi Habōdū yōnsu pogo 1: Han’guksa ūi siryon kwa chaju e taehan hwaksin; Minjujuūi nūn Hanūnim i anida” [Reporter Cho Kapche’s Harvard study report, part one: Faith in the pragmatism and autonomy of Korean history; Democracy is not God], *Wōlgan Chosōn* (September 1997), 262–263; Cho Kapche, “Cho Kapche kija ūi Habōdū yōnsu pogo 4: Taehan min’guk i kajin illyu kukka ūi tu chokōn; Hancha munhwa wa kima kundān” [Reporter Cho Kapche’s Harvard study report, part four: The two conditions of a first-tier nation possessed by the Republic of Korea; Hancha culture and horse-rider divisions], *Wōlgan Chosōn* (December 1997), 302–303.

There was a major difference in the thinking of Kim Ch'unch'u and Kim Yusin. Kim Ch'unch'u thought of Tang as a friendly great power and argued for preserving the peace. These days, most Koreans see the United States the same way. Kim Yusin, however, argued that if Tang threatened the pride and existence of the Fatherland, even if it were an ally, then we should be prepared to die fighting to preserve our independence. This is precisely the attitude that Park Chung Hee adopted toward the United States. He was ever grateful to the United States but strongly opposed its meddling in the internal affairs of Korea. The practical expression of this was his pursuit of heavy chemical industrialization and independent national security.

In the unification of the Three Kingdoms, ultimately, it was Kim Yusin's resolve to go to war with Tang that prevailed. That many call to mind Kim Yusin over Kim Ch'unch'u in association with the unification of the Three Kingdoms testifies to the fact that the living space of the Korean nation was secured through Kim Yusin's resolve to go to war with Tang. Will a Park Chung Hee-style self-reliant policy vis-à-vis the United States prevail for the unification of South and North Korea? Or will a Kim Ch'unch'u-style policy of peace?¹³²

Finally, Cho Kapche's historiography also reveals the trope of the demonic communist. He is of course well-known for his McCarthy-like witch hunts in Korean society. Who are the communists? Who are the spies? Who are the pawns of the North? These are the questions that are most pressing for Cho in Korean politics. Communist conspiracy thus lies at the heart of his biography of Park Chung Hee, detailing purported spy incidents and North Korean infiltration. This disposition is best epitomized, however, in the *Chong-Buk paekkwa sajŏn*, published by Cho Kapche tatk'ŏm in

¹³² Cho Kapche, "Chaebalgan e puch'ŏ" [Preface to the new edition], in *Kukka wa hyŏngmyŏng kwa na* [The nation, the revolution, and I], Pak Chŏnghŭi (Seoul: Chiguch'on, 1997), 15–16.

삼국통일과정에서 신라도 지금 한국과 비슷한 기로에 섰던 적이 있다. 당은 신라와 손잡고서 백제를 멸망시킨 다음에는 내친 김에 신라까지 쳐서 식민지로 삼으려고 했다. 이때 대책회의가 열렸다. 김춘추, 즉 태종무열왕은 '아무리 그렇지만 우리를 도와서 백제를 멸해준 당을 상대로 어찌 싸울 수가 있겠는가' 하고 약한 태도를 보인다. 이때 병권을 쥐고 있던 김유신이 나서서 이런 취지의 말을 한다.

"개는 주인을 두려워합니다. 그러나 주인이 개의 다리를 밟으면 개는 주인을 물게 되어 있습니다. 우리가 어찌 당하고만 있겠습니까."

김춘추와 김유신의 생각에는 큰 차이가 있다. 김춘추는 당을 우호적 강대국으로 생각하고 평화적 현상유지를 주장하고 있다. 요사이 미국을 보는 대부분의 한국인들이 가진 시각은 이 수준일 것이다. 그러나 김유신을 당이 비록 우방이라고 해도 조국의 자존심과 생존권을 위협한다면 사생결단의 자세로써 대결하여 자주성을 확보해야 한다고 주장했다. 이것은 박정희가 가졌던 미국에 대한 태도와 정확히 일치하고 있다. 그는 미국에 대한 감사를 항상 간직하고 있었지만 한국에 대한 미국의 내정간섭에 대해서는 강력하게 반발했다. 그 정책적 표현이 중화확공업과 자주국방 건설이었다.

삼국통일과정에서는 결국 김유신의 대당 결전의지가 채택되었다. 많은 사람들이 삼국통일이라 하면 김춘추보다는 김유신을 먼저 연상하는 것도 김유신의 대당 결전 전략에 의해서 한민족의 삶터가 확보되었다는 것을 암시한다. 남북한 통일과정에서는 과연 박정희식 대미 자주조선이 계승될 것인가. 아니면 김춘추식 평화론이 선택될 것인가?

2012.¹³³ It is also well encapsulated in the following remarks, made at a public lecture marking the sixtieth anniversary of the Korean War, where Cho implies that democracy itself is a North Korean conspiracy:

Kim Il Sung bragged to East German General Secretary Honecker in 1977 when he visited Pyongyang,

“The students have never demonstrated against North Korea in the South. They fervently support us.”

And then he said,

“We support the democratization of South Korea. Even the election of an anticommunist democrat would be fine. That would be favorable to us.” This is what he said. He believed the situation would be favorable to the North even if anticommunists were in control should but democracy be established. Considering what has transpired...Kim Il Sung correctly grasped the weaknesses democratization would bring. Strategic operations have thus successfully produced problematic citizens in up to forty percent of the population.

Democracy is not a panacea. It does not solve the problem of communism. If implemented incorrectly, a legitimate space is provided for troublemakers, traitors, and spies. Korea serves as a case study for how, if practiced under inadequate rule of law, democracy can devolve into the plaything of politicians, communists, and propagandists, and the nation can fall.¹³⁴

¹³³ Cho Kapche tat’ŏm p’yŏnjipsil, *Chong-Buk paekkwa sajŏn* [Encyclopedia of followers of North Korea] (Seoul: Cho Kapche tat’ŏm, 2012). Pak T’aegyŏn describes how McCarthyism arose in South Korea in the early 1990s, revolving around media pundits like Cho Kapche and especially Sogang University president and reverend Pak Hong’s public pronouncements about communists (or *Chusap’a*) increasingly gaining positions of influence in Korea. Pak T’aegyŏn, “T’allaenjŏn ihu Han’gukchŏk Maek’asijŏm ūi t’ansaeng: Chomun p’adong kwa chusap’a parŏn ūl t’onghae tŭrŏ nan Maek’asijŏm” [The birth of Korean McCarthyism after the Cold War: McCarthyism as revealed in the controversy over offering condolences to North Korea for Kim Il Sung’s death and statements about *Chusap’a*], *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 93 (September 2014): 177–207. Other examples of Cho’s “communist conspiracies” include reporting on an alleged North Korean tunnel extending all the way to Kimpo Airport (1992) and Yi Sŏnsil spy incident (1992), which I discuss in chapter two. One might also add to this the campaign to remove Ch’oe Changjip as chairman of the Presidential Policy Planning Advisory Committee (*Taet’ongnyŏng chamun chŏngch’aek kihŏek wiwŏnjang*) in 1998. On this, see Kang Chunman, “Cho Kapche p’yŏnjipchangnim, chŏngmal Kŭramsi rŭl asimnikka?” [Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche, do you really know Gramsci?], *Inmul kwa sasang* 9 (January 1999): 22–36.

¹³⁴ Cho Kapche, “Kanan kwa ūi chŏnjaeng esŏn igyŏt ūna p’ungyo wa ūi chŏnjaeng esŏ chi ko itta” [Victory in the war on poverty but defeat in the war with affluence], in *Hanbando ūi modŭn kwollyŏk e tojŏn hae on ‘pan’gol kija’ Cho Kapche: Int’obyu moŭm*; Chungang ilbo, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahu, Paek Chiyŏn [“Contrarian reporter” Cho Kapche who has challenged all powers on the Korean Peninsula: Collected interviews; *Chungang ilbo*, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahoo, and Paek Chiyŏn], ed. Cho Kapche tat’ŏm (Seoul: Cho Kapche tat’ŏm, 2010), 248–250:

1977 년에 호네커 동독 서기장이 평양을 방문했을 때 김일성이가 호네커한테 자랑을 해요.

“지금까지 남조선에서는 한 번도 대학생들이 북한 정권을 반대하는 시위를 한 적이 없습니다. 그 사람들은 우리를 열렬히 지지하고 있습니다.”

그러면서 이렇게 이야기합니다.

“한국이 민주화가 되는 것을 지지합니다. 설사 반공 민주주의자가 집권하는 것도 좋습니다. 우리한테 유리하니까요.” 이렇게 이야기합니다. 반공세력이 집권을 해도 민주주의만 되면 북한한테 유리하다고 생각을 합니다. 지금까지의 결과를 보면...김일성이가 한국의 민주화가 가져올 취약점을 정확하게 보고 바로 거기에 초점을 맞춰 대남공작을 편 끝에 드디어 한국사람 중에서 40% 정도를 이런 문제국민으로 만들어놓는 데 성공했다는 것입니다.

Cho Kapche has also actively worked to expose and publicize North Korean human rights violations.¹³⁵ It is no coincidence that one of the contributors to Courtois' *Black Book of Communism*, Pierre Rigoulot, co-authored *The Aquariums of Pyongyang* along with Kang Chŏrhwan.¹³⁶ It was the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*, under the editorship of Cho Kapche, that broke Kang Chŏrhwan's sensational story in the early 1990s.¹³⁷ Cho himself, while spending a year in the United States between 1996 and 1997 as a Niemann Fellow at Harvard University, would carry around and distribute copies of an English translation of a *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* article on the "North Korean gulags."¹³⁸ He once even tried to share a copy with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, who surprised Cho by rejecting his equation of the situation in North Korea and the Holocaust.¹³⁹ It is no surprise, however, to see

민주주의가 만병통치가 아니다, 민주주의가 공산주의 문제까지 해결해주지는 않는다. 민주주의가 잘못 실천되면 갇힌것들하고 반역, 간첩세력들한테 합법적인 활동무대를 제공해준다. 법치가 제대로 되지 않는 상태에서 민주주의를 해버리면 정치가, 공산주의자, 선동꾼들의 노리게로 전락해서 국가가 무너질 수 있다 하는 것을 바로 한국이 사례연구로서 보여주고 있는 것입니다.

These remarks accord with the spirit of Yi Ch'ŏlsŭng's inaugural statement for the Liberal Democracy Alliance (*Chayu minju tongmaeng*), which I discuss in chapter two. See Nam Siuk, *Han'guk posu seryŏk yŏn'gu* [A study of conservatives in Korea] (Paju: Nanam ch'ulp'an, 2005), 479.

¹³⁵ This tendency goes as far back as 1989, when Cho began reporting on the bombing of KAL 858, which I discuss in chapter two.

¹³⁶ See Pierre Rigoulot, "Crimes, Terror, and Secrecy in North Korea," in *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, ed. Stéphane Courtois et al., trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 547–564; and Chol-Hwan Kang and Pierre Rigoulot, *The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag*, trans. Yair Reiner (New York: Basic Books, 2005). The book was originally published in French.

¹³⁷ Yi Chŏnghun, "Pan'gol kija ūi hyŏndaesa: 'Sasil ūn inyŏm e usŏn handa'" [The contemporary history of a contrarian reporter: "Facts take precedence over ideology"], in *Hanbando ūi modŭn kwollyŏk e tojŏn hae on 'pan'gol kija' Cho Kapche: Int'obyu moŭm*; Chungang ilbo, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahu, Paek Chiyŏn ["Contrarian reporter" Cho Kapche who has challenged all powers on the Korean Peninsula: Collected interviews; *Chungang ilbo, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahoo, and Paek Chiyŏn*], ed. Cho Kapche tat'ŏm (Seoul: Cho Kapche tat'ŏm, 2010), 62–64. See, for example, Yi Tonguk, "Angma wa chiok, kŭrigo in'gan: Kŭ tŭl ūn chugŏ to chiok e kaji annŭnda. Paro kŏgi ka chiok inikka" [The Devil, Hell, and a human being: They will not go to Hell when they die, because they are already there], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (June 1994): 642–645.

¹³⁸ Cho Kapche, "Cho Kapche kija ūi Habŏdŭ yŏnsu pogo 2," 254.

¹³⁹ Incidentally, Rabin's last interview before he was assassinated was with Cho Kapche. Cho Kapche, "Cho Kapche kija ūi Habŏdŭ yŏnsu pogo 7: Haksal ūi haebu; Chŭngŏ ūi kwahak kwa Pukhan ūi 'Yut'aein tŭl'" [Reporter Cho Kapche's Harvard study report, part seven: Dissection of genocide; The science of hatred and the "Jews" of North Korea], *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (June 1998), 206–207.

referrals to Courtois and the *Black Book of Communism* on Cho Kapche's website.¹⁴⁰ His work may evince the tropes of the developmental dictator and civilizational war, but the demonic communist is dominant. The most important aspect of the developmental dictator is his struggle against communism, while the East-West war is latent, subordinate to the defeat of communism and the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

Yi Yŏnghun aligns neatly with Furet's liberal triumphalism, making heavy use of the trope of the quixotic revolutionary. "In contemporary anthropology," he writes, "it is argued that the decisive difference between human beings and apes lies in the intelligence to understand the advantageousness of exchange."¹⁴¹ He elaborates on this point as follows:

The communist revolution attempted in the twentieth century ignored and suppressed this simple truth long known and practiced in the history of human civilization. Communists believed in the perfection of the rationality of human reason. They exercised a particular faith in the reason of the communist party that led the revolution. They declared the party incapable of mistakes. They believed in the feasibility of a planned economy in which the government could replace the market to produce and distribute as needed. They believed that the knowledge necessary for the formulation of a plan could be perfectly acquired. The knowledge they acquired, however, was incomplete or distorted. All the useful knowledge accumulated by the common people in their natural environment and traditions was suppressed or discarded. The communist revolution ultimately failed. Plans devised with false information can lead only to waste, want, and inefficiency.¹⁴²

Meanwhile, he emphasizes the *gradual* nature of historical change driven by freedom.

True historical development is a compromising, gradual, and evolutionary process. Disruptive and destructive revolution is not normal historical development. This is because the useful knowledge that moves history forward accumulates implicitly in the labor process and traditional human relations of

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, Cho Kapche, "P'ürangsü chisigin üi Han'guk chisigin pip'an, 'wae "Kobal" üi oemyŏn hanün'ga'" [French intellectuals' criticism of Korean intellectuals: "Why do they ignore *The Accusation*?"], *Chogabje.com*, March 18, 2016, http://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=65864&C_CC=AF.

¹⁴¹ Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan min'guk yŏksa*, 35: 현대 인류학은 인간이 유인원과 결정적으로 구분되는 것은 교환의 유통을 이해하는 지성의 능력에 있다고 주장하고 있다.

¹⁴² Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan min'guk yŏksa*, 36: 지난 20 세기에 시도된 공산주의혁명은 이 같이 인류가 오랜 문명사에서 체득하고 실천해 온 평범한 진리를 무시하고 억압하였다. 공산주의자들은 인간 이성의 합리성, 그 완전성을 신봉하였다. 특히 혁명을 지도하는 공산당의 지성을 신뢰하였다. 당은 오류를 범할 수 없다고 하였다. 그들은 정부가 시장을 대신하여 필요한 만큼 생산하고 분배하는 계획경제가 가능하다고 믿었다. 그들은 계획을 수립함에 필요한 지식이 완벽하게 수집될 수 있다고 믿었다. 그렇지만 그들이 수집한 지식은 불완전하거나 왜곡된 것이었다. 보통사람들이 그의 고유한 환경과 전통 속에서 축적해 온 모든 유용한 지식은 억압되거나 폐기되었다. 공산주의 혁명은 결국 실패하고 말았다. 엉터리 정보로 계획을 짜니 낭비와 부족과 비효율이 생길 뿐이었다.

the common people. As for revolution, which typically destroys the existing state system, it believes itself to be true historical development, but this is a grave misunderstanding. The communist revolutions of the twentieth century failed everywhere, in the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea.

The French Revolution is representative of revolutions that intentionally destroy the established state system. Contemporary historians currently regard this revolution, too, as a failure. The French Revolution caused prolonged, insurmountable chaos. France's imperial system was restored, its democracy drifted aimlessly throughout the nineteenth century, and its industrial revolution was long delayed. True historical development is achieved when human beings display the wisdom to discover, compromise with, and ameliorate the problems of the existing system. Britain, which did not pass through a destructive revolution, is the recognized paradigm.

The same can be said for the history of the Republic of Korea, a nation established not by destroying the existing social system but through reform, maintaining its strengths and discarding its weakness. Upon its founding, for example, the Republic of Korea inherited legislation passed by the Japanese Government-General and the US military government. The market-economy system established by the Japanese Empire for the domination of Korea was preserved in pristine condition. The wisdom to use that which is useful, even if created by empire, ultimately moved history forward.¹⁴³

Aside from the almost perfect channeling of Furet evident in this passage, Yi's treatment of Britain as paradigmatic of gradual (non-revolutionary) change is notable.¹⁴⁴ Whereas Kim evaluates the historical development of Korea and Britain as similar (i.e., “normal”) because both passed through a stage of developmentalism, Yi evaluates them as similar because both developed “gradually,” without revolution.

¹⁴³ Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan min'guk yŏksa*, 37–38.

역사의 진정한 발전은 타협적이며 개량적이며 점진적이며 진화적인 경로로 이루어진다. 단절적이며 파괴적인 혁명은 역사의 정상적인 발전이 아니다. 왜냐하면 역사를 발전시키는 유용한 지식은 보통사람의 노동과정과 전통적 인간관계 속에 암묵적인 형태로 축적되기 때문이다. 흔히들 기존의 국가체제를 때려 부수는 혁명이야말로 역사의 진정한 발전인 줄 알지만 커다란 오해이다. 따지고 보면 성공한 혁명의 예는 거의 없는 편이다. 20 세기의 공산주의혁명은 소련에서, 중국에서, 북한에서 모든 지역에서 실패하였다.

인간의 의지로 기성의 국가체제를 때려 부순 대표적인 혁명이 1789 년의 프랑스혁명이다. 현대의 역사학은 그 혁명도 실패작이었다고 평가하고 있다. 프랑스혁명이 초래한 것은 장기간의 좀처럼 수습되지 않는 혼란 뿐이었다. 프랑스의 황제체제는 다시 복구되었으며, 프랑스의 민주주의는 19 세기 내내 표류하였으며, 프랑스의 산업혁명은 한참 지체되었다. 역사의 진정한 발전은 인간들이 기성체제의 문제점을 발견하고 타협하고 개량하는 지혜를 발휘할 때 이루어졌다. 파괴적인 혁명을 경과하지 않은 영국이 그 모범 사례로 알려져 있다.

대한민국의 역사도 마찬가지이다. 대한민국은 기성의 사회체제를 때려 부수지 않고 좋은 점은 계승하고 나쁜 점을 버리는 개량적인 방식으로 세워진 나라이다. 예컨대 건국 초기 대한민국은 이전의 총독부와 미군정이 제정한 법률을 계승하였다. 일제가 한국을 지배하기 위해 구축한 시장경제 체제는 그대로 온존되었다. 좋은 것은 비록 그것이 제국주의가 만든 것이라도 활용할 줄 아는 지혜가 결국 역사를 발전시켰다.

Compare this passage with the following assertion of Geoff Eley: “The current rewriting of Russian history...bespeaks a more general view of political progress that endorses only gradualism, evolution, and peaceful paths of development, while treating mass actions and direct challenges to authority as always destructively counter-productive.” Eley, “What Produces Democracy?” 178.

¹⁴⁴ Yi does not, however, cite Furet in his selected bibliography.

Kim Iryŏng’s work bears resemblance with that of Furet and De Felice, using the tropes of the quixotic revolutionary and developmental dictator.¹⁴⁵ The first of these may be found in his ironic use of the term “revolution” to describe Park’s coup d’état and depiction of contemporary Korean society as in the grips of a “revolutionary fever.”¹⁴⁶ The developmental dictator is also present in Kim’s work, but this point requires some qualification, as I discuss in the following section.

Table 5.3 Mapping the Cases of Right-Wing Historical Revisionism

| | Ernst Nolte | Stéphane Courtois | François Furet | Renzo De Felice |
|----------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Dominant Trope | Civilizational War | Demonic Communist | Quixotic Revolutionary | Developmental Dictator |
| Taiwan | | | Jay Taylor | A. James Gregor, Maria Hsia Chang |
| Spain | | Pío Moa | Stanley Payne | |
| Korea | | Cho Kapche | Yi Yŏnghun Kim Iryŏng | |

The results of the initial survey of our historians across the Korean, Taiwanese, and Spanish cases are summed up in table 5.3. The tropes of the quixotic revolutionary and development dictator were by far the most common among the historians. Even Cho Kapche and Pío Moa, whom I found to ultimately focus on the demonic communist, also made use of these tropes. The theme of civilizational war was largely absent except in Cho’s work. Cho was also an exception in using every trope except for the quixotic revolutionary. Yi Yŏnghun neatly aligned with Furet in his depiction of the quixotic revolutionary. Finally, Kim Iryŏng evinced a

¹⁴⁵ Yet there is overlap between Kim and Nolte in relation to the debate over the *Sonderweg* thesis, which I discuss above. In denying the “special paths” of Germany and Korea, respectively, they share the intention to “normalize” the past. Kim also has a background in German scholarship, as his Master’s thesis was written on the “state derivation debate” (*Staatsableitungsdebatte*), which I briefly discuss in chapter three.

¹⁴⁶ Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn’guk kwa puguk*, 12: 일찍이 버크는 프랑스혁명을 열병에 비유했는데, 지금 우리 사회도 유사한 열병을 앓고 있다. 병인은 여러 가지겠지만, 아버지 지우기에 치우친 수정주의자들과 386 세대의 역사관도 그중 하나임은 분명하다.

tension in his work between the quixotic revolutionary and developmental dictator related to his use of the developmental state concept. I shall explore this tension before moving on to examine and compare Kim Iryŏng and Yi Yŏnghun's historical sensibilities.

IV. Developmental State Theory and Right-Wing Historical Revisionism

In this section, focusing on the tension in Kim Iryŏng's work between Furet's emphasis on the quixotic revolutionary and De Felice's on the developmental dictator, I examine Kim Iryŏng as a developmental state theorist and the relationship of this theory to his historiography. I thus clarify where Kim belongs in terms of the typology of right-wing historical revisionism presented in the previous section and draw out the features that distinguish him as a historian from both Cho Kapche and Yi Yŏnghun.

1. Developmental Dictatorship and the Developmental State

A. James Gregor and Chalmers Johnson (1931–2010) formulated the concepts of developmental dictatorship and the developmental state at around the same time; *Developmental Dictatorship and Italian Fascism* was published in 1979 and *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* in 1982.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ Gregor first presented his concept in *The Ideology of Fascism*. Johnson developed his idea through the 1970s. See A. James Gregor, *The Ideology of Fascism: The Rationale of Totalitarianism* (USA: The Free Press, 1969); A. James Gregor, "Fascism and Modernization: Some Addenda," *World Politics* 26, no. 3 (1974): 370–384; A. James Gregor, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979); Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982); and Chalmers Johnson, "Introduction," in *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State* (W.W. Norton & Company: 1995), 9. In the Korean context, A. James Gregor and the concept of developmental dictatorship are also relevant to the literature on "mass dictatorship" (*taejung tokchaeron*). Central here is the historian (of Western history) Im Chihyŏn, one of the most outspoken proponents of postnationalism on the left since the early 1990s. See Im Chihyŏn, "Han'guksa hakkye ūi 'minjok' ihae e taehan pip'anjŏk kŏmt'o" [A critical review of the understanding of "nation" among Korean historians], *Yŏksa pip'yŏng* 28 (1994): 114–137. There was a moment in the early 2000s when this postnationalist agenda drew together scholars on the left and right. See Im Chihyŏn and Yi

Perhaps this was more than a coincidence. The two political scientists were similar in age (born in 1929 and 1931, respectively), completed their PhDs in the same year (1961, at Columbia and Berkeley, respectively), and were friends and Berkeley colleagues. In the preface to *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship*, in fact, Gregor thanks Johnson for the “warmth of friendship and the intellectual stimulation necessary for any such effort.”¹⁴⁸ Meanwhile, Johnson chaired the dissertation committee of Gregor’s wife Maria Hsia Chang.¹⁴⁹

In any case, there are striking similarities between the content of these ideas. Gregor’s work, like De Felice’s, is rooted in debates over fascism as a modernizing regime going back to the mid-1960s. These debates originated in the work of sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf and historians David Schoenbaum and Henry A. Turner, who acknowledged modernization taking place under the Nazis only despite, not because of, their intentions. For them, National Socialism was essentially anti-

Söngsi, eds., *Kuksa ūi sinhwa rŭl nŏmŏ sŏ* [Beyond the myths of national history] (Seoul: Humanisūt’ū, 2004). Several of this book’s contributors, including Pak Chihyang, To Myŏnhoe, Kim Yŏngho, and Yi Yŏnghun, would go on to participate in the New Right historiographical movement. Meanwhile, Im would continue work on the mass dictatorship thesis, itself a project extending back to debates over “the fascism within us” (*uri an ūi p’asijŭm*) that erupted in the pages of *Tangdaep’yŏng* following the “Park Chung Hee syndrome.” The project has produced numerous publications mostly in English, aside from a three-volume set published in Korean, perhaps a reflection of its reception. The overlap with “developmental dictatorship” manifests in the distinction between proletarian and bourgeois nations and similarities between fascism and socialism as manifestations of “anti-Western modernization.” Jie-Hyun Lim, “Mass Dictatorship: A Transnational Formation of Modernity,” in *Mass Dictatorship and Modernity*, ed. Michael Kim, Michael Schoenhals, and Yong-Woo Kim (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 13–32. See also Im Chihyŏn, *Uri an ūi p’asijŭm* [The fascism within us] (Seoul: Samin, 2000); Im Chihyŏn, ed., *Taejung tokchae: Kangje wa tongŭi sai esŏ* [Mass dictatorship: Between coercion and consent] (Seoul: Ch’aek sesang, 2004); Im Chihyŏn and Kim Yongu, eds., *Taejung tokchae 2: Chŏngch’i chonggyo wa hegemony* [Mass dictatorship: Political religion and hegemony] (Seoul: Ch’aek sesang, 2005); Im Chihyŏn and Kim Yongu, eds., *Taejung tokchae 3: Ilsang ūi yongmang kwa mimang* [Mass dictatorship: Everyday desire and delusion] (Seoul: Ch’aek sesang, 2007); and Yun-gi Hong, “Park Chung-hee in the Age of Democratization: A Critical Analysis of Deification Discourse on Park Chung-hee,” in *Developmental Dictatorship and the Park Chung-hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea*, ed. Byeong-cheon Lee, trans. Eungsoo Kim and Jaehyun Cho (Paramus, New Jersey: Homa & Seka Books, 2006), 312–338.

¹⁴⁸ Gregor, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship*, xiv.

¹⁴⁹ See Maria Hsia Chang, “The Blue Shirts Society: Fascism and Developmental Nationalism” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1984).

modern.¹⁵⁰ It is precisely this perspective that motivated De Felice to distinguish Italian Fascism from National Socialism. In his interview with Ledeen, he asserted that “the ideology of Mussolini [was] revolutionary in contrast to the reactionary ideas of Adolf Hitler.”¹⁵¹ This idea, while controversial, also found considerable traction.¹⁵²

De Felice found an important ally in A. James Gregor.¹⁵³ Shortly after the “De Felice affair, he wrote in a review of two of De Felice’s works that “it has become impossible, at least in the United States, to deal with Italian Fascism in whatever guise without coming to grips with the work of De Felice.”¹⁵⁴ In particular, De Felice and Gregor commonly emphasized

¹⁵⁰ Roth, “Revisionist Tendencies in Historical Research,” 433–444. See Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1967); David Schoenbaum, *Hitler’s Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933–1939* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967); and Henry A. Turner, Jr., “Fascism and Modernization,” *World Politics* 24, no. 4 (1972): 547–564.

¹⁵¹ Gentile, “Renzo De Felice,” 142, 148; Cattini, “Historical Revisionism,” 31. Gentile, a student of De Felice, describes him as follows: “De Felice effectively marked a decisive turning-point in the historiography of the fascist era, thanks to his reconstructive efforts which either directly or indirectly called into question the traditional interpretations which predominated until the 1970s. He contributed to a radical modification of our vision of fascism and raised questions which have become central to subsequent analyses of fascism, even where the answers are unconvincing or insufficiently argued. Alongside his reconstruction of Mussolini’s biography and many other aspects of fascism and of how it translated into everyday life, based on the interpretation of his documentary research, De Felice explored the problem of the fascist phenomenon, the possibility of the existence of an international global form of fascism, and fascism’s place and significance in contemporary history.” Gentile, “Renzo De Felice,” 148.

¹⁵² Bosworth, “Explaining ‘Auschwitz,’” 90, 90n26.

¹⁵³ References to De Felice can be found in some of his earlier works. Gregor, *The Ideology of Fascism*; Gregor, “Fascism and Modernization,” 370–384. Describing thirteen varying interpretations of fascism, Stanley Payne includes De Felice and Gregor together under the heading, “Fascism as Modernization or a Stage of Socioeconomic Growth.” Payne, *A History of Fascism*, 456–459. Fellow historian of fascism Roger Griffin writes that “Gregor has now become a major spokesperson for the new consensus of on generic fascism which emerged in the 1990s on the basis of extensive groundwork done by Eugen Weber, Juan Linz, Ze’ev Sternhell, George Mosse, Stanley Payne, and Gregor himself in the 1970s. At the core of this consensus...lies the understanding of fascism as a genus of modern, revolutionary, mass politics ‘whose core myth is that a period of perceived national decline and decadence is giving way to one of rebirth and renewal in a post-liberal new order.’” Roger Griffin, “Old Hat, New Bird,” *The Review of Politics* 62, no. 4 (2000), 846. Phillip Becher notes that “A. James Gregor...created an extensive oeuvre on the history of Fascism and its ideology. While personally remaining an *éminence grise*, his ideo-centric approach proved influential in international academic discussions.” Philip Becher, “Apartheid, Authoritarianism, and Anticolonial Struggles Viewed from the Right: Critical Perspectives on A. James Gregor’s Search for Fascism in the Global South,” *Acta Academia* 54, no. 3 (2022), 108.

¹⁵⁴ Gregor also writes, “It seems reasonably clear that generic fascism is perhaps one of the least understood phenomena of the 20th century. Despite all the volumes, monographs, and

the distinctiveness of Italian Fascism in its modernizing orientation; this, claimed Gregor, was a “developmental dictatorship.”¹⁵⁵

Almost everything we know of the original Fascist movement as it collected around Mussolini in 1919 indicates, in fact, that it could not be persuasively characterized as anti-modern—unless the notion of modernization is used in a totally idiosyncratic fashion. The principal constituents that entered into the coalition that became Fascism—Futurism, Italian Nationalism, and Revolutionary National Syndicalism—seem to have all been clearly modernizing in intention. They advocated an industrialized Italy, with flourishing urban centers, secular political control of community life (sometimes with due regard for traditional religious values), and a rationalized bureaucratic (if anti-parliamentarian) infrastructure to govern the peninsula effectively. All three political movements dated from the prewar period and all three seem clearly to have been committed to the modernization of Italy.¹⁵⁶

Added to a fundamentally modernizing orientation, however, was the distinctiveness of having begun this pursuit later than the advanced nations of Europe, as reflected in the following definition:

Fascism is here construed as a developmental dictatorship appropriate to partially developed or underdeveloped, and consequently status deprived, national communities in a period of intense international competition for place and status.... Italian Fascism was historically unique but, insofar as it was a response to the general political and social problems which attend the efforts to establish a developing nation's place in the sun, it has a broader relevance than its brief political existence might suggest.... If this analysis is correct, one might well expect the revolutions in underdeveloped countries facing the same problems and entertaining the same aspirations toward status in international competition to take on some of the criterial attributes of, and provide essentially the same vindications as, paradigmatic Fascism.¹⁵⁷

essays devoted to the subject, we have as yet no comprehensive or generally accepted interpretation. We are, in effect, very much in need of a searching and competent reappraisal of the entire complex sequence we now identify with the fascist period. There are few academics better equipped to assist us in that enterprise than Renzo De Felice.” A. James Gregor, “Review: Professor Renzo De Felice and the Fascist Phenomenon,” *World Politics* 30, no. 3 (1978), 434, 439–440. Philip Becher also notes how Gregor joined De Felice, “Italy’s most important apologetic historian,” in Rome in 1983 to mark the centenary commemoration of Mussolini’s birth. Becher, “Apartheid, Authoritarianism, and Anticolonial Struggles,” 111.

¹⁵⁵ Gregor, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship*, xiii. Gregor writes, “De Felice has ventured to suggest several things that are apparently ideologically unacceptable. Anyone possessed of conventional wisdom simply *knows* that fascism was irretrievably counterrevolutionary, conservative, and reactionary—and uncompromisingly right-wing. To intimate anything else would be to court public disdain and academic opprobrium. Happily, De Felice is supremely independent and has proceeded to suggest that not only did Italian Fascism have ‘modernizing’ and ‘progressive’ features—and that it was a ‘revolutionary phenomenon’—but he has gone so far as to suggest that it shared some affinities with the historic ‘radical left-wing.’” Gregor, “Review,” 440.

¹⁵⁶ Gregor, “Fascism and Modernization,” 373.

¹⁵⁷ Gregor, *The Ideology of Fascism*, xiii–xiv. See also Davies and Lynch, *The Routledge Companion to Fascism*, 63.

In this context, Gregor observed analogues to Mussolini's Italy around the globe, such as in Taiwan, where Sun Yat-sen assumed the ideological role of a Mussolini.¹⁵⁸ As political scientists Roger Eatwell writes, "[Gregor] has argued that there is a link between Italian fascism and a desire in the Third World to achieve a rapid rate of industrialization, an analysis which leads him to see a whole variety of regimes as fascist, including Castro's Cuba, Mao's China, and Nasser's Egypt."¹⁵⁹

These points suggest considerable common ground between "developmental dictatorship" and the "developmental state." The question of whether Japan's regime was "fascist" aside,¹⁶⁰ at the heart of Johnson's work is the thesis of historical continuity between Japan's pre- and postwar

¹⁵⁸ Gregor and Chang, "Wang Yang-ming and the Ideology of Sun Yat-sen," 388–404; Gregor, Chang, and Zimmerman, *Ideology and Development*. Gregor writes, "The similarities...are characteristic of the reactive and developmental nationalism of communities suffering the disabilities that attend late industrialization and modernization in the modern world." Gregor, *A Place in the Sun*, 52.

¹⁵⁹ Roger Eatwell, "Universal Fascism? Approaches and Definitions," in *Fascism Outside Europe: The European Impulse against Domestic Conditions in the Diffusion of Global Fascism*, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 24. Griffin provides a corroborative description: Gregor "sees fascist Italy as the prototype of the many 'developmental dictatorships' of the twentieth century which have attempted to modernize their country through mass mobilization based on a blend of nationalism with socialism. Thus not only Indonesia under Sukarno, Egypt under Nasser, Ghana under Nkrumah, but Russia under Lenin and China under Mao could be treated as members of fascism's extended family." Roger Griffin, "Caught in Its Own Net: Post-War Fascism Outside Europe," in *Fascism Outside Europe: The European Impulse against Domestic Conditions in the Diffusion of Global Fascism*, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 46. Becher also writes, "Gregor collects very different, in some cases opposing political figures as Mussolini's alleged heirs in the second half of the 20th century: Juan Perón (Argentina), Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Fidel Castro (Cuba), Mao Zedong (China), Chiang Kai-Shek (Taiwan), Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Enver Hoxha (Albania), Muammar al-Gaddafi (Libya), and Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana). In another instance, he adds African leaders Léopold Senghor (Senegal), Sékou Touré (Guinea), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), and Modibo Keita (Mali) to the list of possible emulators of the Mussolini model." Becher, "Apartheid, Authoritarianism, and Anticolonial Struggles," 110. And William C. Kirby writes, "Gregor has globalized the concept of fascism and related it directly to modernization. Not only does Gregor see fascism in its original Italian context as 'an industrializing and modernizing movement in both performance and intention,' he characterizes fascism in general as a 'developmental dictatorship appropriate to partially developed or underdeveloped national communities.' Gregor considers as following the 'fascist persuasion' a wide variety of national movements, whose differences he recognizes but whose similarities with what he calls 'paradigmatic fascism' he argues." William C. Kirby, "Images and Realities of Chinese Fascism," in *Fascism Outside Europe: The European Impulse against Domestic Conditions in the Diffusion of Global Fascism*, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 265.

¹⁶⁰ On the question of Japanese "fascism," see, for example, Kasza, "Fascism from Above?" 183–232.

regimes: the Japanese miracle was rooted in the prewar system.¹⁶¹ He professes even to have considered titling the final chapter of the book (admittedly with tongue slightly in cheek), “From the Wonderful Folks Who Brought You Pearl Harbor.”¹⁶² Johnson and other developmental state theorists have also emphasized the power of defensive nationalism as a catalyst for modernizing in a hostile world.¹⁶³ The two works also share an emphasis on the distinction between early and late development, which takes priority over whether a political regime is an empire or colony, capitalist or communist, “Eastern” or “Western,” and so forth.¹⁶⁴ As Gregor writes, “In an impoverished, humiliated, and retrograde nation, the

¹⁶¹ Stephan Haggard, David Kang, and Chung-in Moon point out the similarity between accounts emphasizing colonial continuity in the literature on the Korean developmental state and Chalmers Johnson’s original account of the Japanese economic miracle, which finds the origins of Japan’s developmental state in the prewar period. Stephan Haggard, David Kang, and Chung-in Moon, “Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development: A Critique,” *World Development* 25, no. 6 (1997), 879n2. Vivek Chibber, however, claims that only a minority supports the colonial continuity thesis in the developmental state literature on Korea. He writes, “Within the broader statist school, there are two positions regarding the roots of the developmental state. One is a distinctly minority view, which explains Korean developmentalism as a gift of its history, while the other, the majority camp, sees it as the product of a more or less sharp break with the past.” Vivek Chibber, “Building a Developmental State: The Korean Case Reconsidered,” *Politics & Society* 27, no. 3 (1999), 313. I discuss the main characteristics and theoretical underpinnings of developmental state theory below.

¹⁶² Chalmers Johnson, “The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept,” in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 42.

¹⁶³ As Meredith Woo-Cumings writes, “Like Hirschman, Johnson places the ‘binding agent’ of East Asia development in both the context of ‘late development’ and the East Asian setting of revolutionary nationalism.” Meredith Woo-Cumings, “Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development,” in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 7. See also Yin-wah Chu, “The Asian Developmental State: Ideas and Debates,” in *The Asian Developmental State: Reexaminations and New Departures*, ed. Yin-wah Chu (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 6.

¹⁶⁴ As Leftwich puts it, the developmental state is defined by “the essentially political and nationalist objectives of the late developer, concerned to protect and promote itself in a hostile world,” a characteristic drawing together various otherwise very different cases separated by both time and space: “Johnson echoed precisely the point made by List about Germany, almost 150 years before; by Mussolini about Italy in the inter-war years; by Stalin in 1931 about the urgency of Soviet economic development; by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party after 1949, and by President Park Chung-hee in Korea in 1963.” Adrian Leftwich, “Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State,” *The Journal of Developmental Studies* 31, no. 3 (1995), 404. Essentially, Leftwich is referring to the classification of the nations of the world, in the tradition of Hobson, Lenin, and Mussolini, as either “proletarian” or “bourgeois.” Becher, “Apartheid, Authoritarianism, and Anticolonial Struggles,” 115–119.

individual, no matter what his immediate circumstances, attains only the semblance of humanity. In a world in which proletarian nations must compete for space and resources with plutocratic nations, only the rapid development and modernization of one's nation can provide for meaningful self-realization. The life circumstances of each individual, of whatever class, are inextricably interwoven with the fate of his nation."¹⁶⁵ Johnson expresses a similar sentiment by quoting Ernest Gellner: "The need for economic growth in a developing country has few if any economic springs. It arises from a desire to assume full human status by taking part in an industrial civilization, participating in which *alone* enables a nation or an individual to compel others to treat it as an equal. Inability to take part in it makes a national militarily powerless against its neighbors, administratively unable to control its own citizens, and culturally incapable of speaking the international language."¹⁶⁶

Considering these similarities, it is no surprise to find Gregor also cited in the literature on the developmental state, as if he and Johnson are talking about the same thing only with differing terminologies. Ben Ross Schneider, for example, includes Fascist Italy among his list of states classifiable as "developmental," with a footnote to Gregor.¹⁶⁷ And Adrian Leftwich writes, "Just as Gregor had claimed for Italy, Johnson argued that a further feature of the Japanese developmental state was the power and autonomy of its elite bureaucracy, centred in key ministries such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)."¹⁶⁸ Are "developmental dictatorship" and the "developmental state" just different names for the same thing?

¹⁶⁵ Gregor, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship*, 100–101.

¹⁶⁶ Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, 24–25, 344n51. See Ernest Gellner, "Scale and Nation," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 3, no. 1 (1973), 15–16.

¹⁶⁷ Ben Ross Schneider, "The Desarrollista State in Brazil and Mexico," in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 277, 277n3.

¹⁶⁸ Leftwich, "Bringing Politics Back In," 403, 404. It is also in this context that one may understand journalist Murray Sayles' quip upon reading Johnson's book, "Johnson credits the capitalist development state with being 'a genuine Japanese invention.' With respect I believe that Mussolini holds the patent, although he never got his model to fly." Murray Sayle, "Japan Victorious," *The New York Review of Books* (March 28, 1985), <https://www>

2. Three Views of the “Developmental State”

Answering this question is complicated by the fact that definitions of the “developmental state” vary. As is well known, Chalmers Johnson defined it as a “plan-rational” state, juxtaposed with the “market-rational” (United States) and “plan-ideological” (Soviet Union) states.¹⁶⁹ Peter Evans, however, contrasts between differing kinds of developing states, namely, the developmental state and “predatory state.”¹⁷⁰ Meanwhile, there are varying definitions that list the characteristics of the developmental state. Ziya Öniş, for example, refers to the following: 1) the presence of an industrial policy that prioritizes economic development; 2) eschewal of economic distribution or social welfare; 3) benchmarking; 4) bureaucratic market guidance; 5) a pilot agency; 6) close government-business cooperation; 7) bureaucratic autonomy; and 8) politicians working to legitimate this system.¹⁷¹ Yi Pyŏngch’ŏn offers a differing list of features: 1) developmentally oriented state power (seeking legitimacy through performance); 2) authoritarian politics prioritizing industrialization over democratization; 3) institutional consistency, state autonomy, and a skilled bureaucracy; 4) a developmental partnership between state and the private sector; 5) a state-led market under the banner of economic nationalism; 6) state disciplining of capital; 7) state control of finance in support of strategic industries; and 8) a third way beyond the dichotomy of protection versus openness, involving selective integration into the world economy

.nybooks.com/articles/1985/03/28/japan-victorious/?lp_txn_id=1408782.

¹⁶⁹ Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, 18.

¹⁷⁰ Peter B. Evans, “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State,” *Sociological Forum* 4, no. 4 (1989): 561–587. Johnson, then, defines the developmental state against developed states and Evans against non-developed states.

¹⁷¹ Ziya Öniş, “Review: The Logic of the Developmental State,” *Comparative Politics* 24, no. 1 (1991), 111. Öniş reviews the following works: Alice H. Amsden, *Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Frederic C. Deyo, ed., *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*; and Robert Wade, *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990).

that makes use of the advantages and manages the disadvantages of backwardness.¹⁷²

The overlap between the concepts of developmental dictatorship and developmental state can be understood in terms of such definitional variation. To disentangle these two concepts, I propose three ways of reading the developmental state literature, which can be mapped in terms of temporal-spatial orientation. Along the way, I also identify Kim Iryŏng's character as a developmental state theorist.

First, some scholars view the developmental state as an isolated phenomenon, both in time and space; it can be found in twentieth-century East Asia alone. Ziya Öniş is representative in this regard.¹⁷³ As he writes, "The studies under review demonstrate quite conclusively that the East Asian model of the developmental state is the product of unique historical circumstances with the logical corollary that there exist major constraints

¹⁷² Yi Pyŏngch'ŏn, "Kaeбал tokchae ūi chŏngch'i kyŏngjehak kwa Han'guk ūi kyŏnghŏm: Kŭktan ūi sidae rŭl nŏmŏ sŏ" [The political economy of developmental dictatorship and Korea's experience: Toward transcending an age of extremes], in *Kaeбал tokchae wa Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae: Uri sidae ūi chŏngch'i kyŏngjejŏk kiwŏn* [Developmental dictatorship and the Park Chung Hee era: The political-economic origins of our times], ed. Yi Pyŏngch'ŏn (P'aju: Ch'angbi, 2003), 27–28. Like Öniş, Yi draws on the works of Johnson, Amsden, and Wade but excludes Frederic C. Deyo's edited volume. In addition, he draws on the following works: Chalmers Johnson, *Japan: Who Governs?* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995); Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995); Leftwich, "Bringing Politics Back In," 400–427; Manuel Castells, *The Information Age, vol. 3: End of Millennium*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1998); Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., *The Developmental State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); and Yi Pyŏngch'ŏn, "Kaeбал kukkaron tit ko nŏmŏ sŏgi" [Moving beyond developmental state theory], *Kyŏngje wa sahoe* 57 (2003): 99–124. At least in part, such a diversity of typologies arises from the fact that the characteristics are extracted from different case studies, which are in fact quite different from each other. With such varying definitions, critics have questioned the concept's analytical utility. For example, Pak T'aegyŏn, "Pak Chŏnghŭi chŏngbu sigi rŭl t'onghae pon palchŏn kukka tamnon e taehan pip'anjŏk siron" [A critical essay on the Park Chung Hee era viewed through developmental-state discourse], *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 74 (2009), 19.

¹⁷³ Here it is important to note the term "epochal" focuses on the temporal dimension but does not exclude spatial considerations. The latter are advanced only cautiously, however, in an effort to maintain a distance from culturalist explanations. The key difference here is that a historical explanation recognizes that things could have been different, while a culturalist explanation sees the present as fated. As Öniş writes, "Factors such as traditions of social and political hierarchy and group solidarity have played an important role in East Asian industrialization, but it would be wrong to associate the degree of social consensus and cooperation associated with the East Asian developmental state purely with cultural explanations." Öniş, "Review," 122.

on its transferability to or replicability in alternative national contexts.”¹⁷⁴ Johnson’s developmental state can also be placed in this category. At times, Johnson does hint at a touch more universality. He writes, for example, “I believe that the ‘developmental state’ actually exists in time and space in East Asia and also exists as an abstract generalization about the essence of the East Asian examples. It is both particular and generalizable.”¹⁷⁵ Nonetheless, he essentially insists on the Japan’s “model” non-transferability beyond East Asia; it is theoretically reproducible, but its underlying historical conditions are not.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 120.

¹⁷⁵ Johnson, “The Developmental State,” 43.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 41. Johnson also writes, “The high-growth system, like the basic priorities of the state, was not so much a matter of choice for Japan as of necessity; it grew out of a series of economic crises that assailed the nation throughout the Shōwa era.” Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, 306. Another key account in this regard is that of Manuel Castells, “Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon Head: A Comparative Analysis of the State, Economy, and Society in the Asian Pacific Rim,” in *States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim*, ed. Richard P. Applebaum and Jeffrey Henderson (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1992), 33–70. A number of other authors may be grouped together with Ōniş for varying reasons. Emphasizing the importance of the particular international circumstances behind the East Asian miracle, Meredith Woo-Cumings writes, “Development in East Asia is a temporal phenomenon, which makes it hard to emulate in different times and other countries.” Meredith Woo-Cumings, “The ‘New Authoritarianism’ in East Asia,” *Current History* (December 1, 1994), 415. T.J. Pempel also recognizes the importance of international context but adds to this the uniqueness of the socioeconomic coalitions behind the East Asian miracles. T.J. Pempel, “The Developmental Regime in a Changing World Economy,” in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 137–181. Atul Kohli finds the uniqueness of the East Asian developmental state rooted in Japanese colonialism, dismissing comparisons of Korea with other developing countries as misguided. “Even if South Korea’s low per capita income in the 1950s was similar to that of an India, a Brazil, or a Nigeria,” he writes, “South Korea’s starting point was very different: it had a much more dynamic economy in the half a century preceding the 1950s, and by the 1950s its deeper state-society configurations were relatively unique.” Atul Kohli, “Where Do High-Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea’s ‘Developmental State,’” in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 131. Stephan Haggard and Tun-jen Cheng emphasize uniqueness across even the East Asian cases, while writing, “Development models are not simple packages of policies; they are configurations of political, institutional, and historical events. Although there are certainly economic lessons to be drawn from East Asia, we must keep firmly in mind the peculiarities of development there.” And that “above all, the four countries entered the world trade system at an auspicious moment.” Stephan Haggard and Tun-jen Cheng, “State and Foreign Capital in the East Asian NICs,” in *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*, ed. Frederic C. Deyo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 128. Finally, there are scholars such as Robert Wade, who adopts a somewhat more liberal position without completely parting ways with the epochal perspective. He argues that the lessons from the East Asian cases, even if they do reflect somewhat unique circumstances, are at least more applicable for developing countries than that of early industrializers like the United States. Wade, *Governing the Market*, 381.

Second, some scholars view the developmental state as a phenomenon of late development in general, thus discovering it in contexts beyond East Asia and (potentially) the twentieth century. Coming out explicitly against Öniş, Adrian Leftwich writes, “Some even argue that the developmental state is *sui generis* to East Asia, a product of ‘...its unique historical circumstances.’ But this is far too narrow.”¹⁷⁷ He insists that developmental states may be found in China, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Botswana, Islamic and Buddhist Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe.¹⁷⁸ This conceptualization follows a Gerschenkronian logic, emphasizing the features of “economic backwardness” against the flow of world time.¹⁷⁹ Gregor’s work may be understood in this context, as evident in his emphasis on the relationship between the essential *lateness* of Italian modernization and fascism and his discovery of the same characteristics across the Third World. It is no coincidence, then, that Leftwich treats Gregor as a developmental state theorist.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Leftwich, “Bringing Politics Back In,” 405. One may also observe that Öniş describes a “logic” and Leftwich a “model” of the developmental state.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 400–401, 420. Many scholars, like Leftwich, apply the concept of the developmental state outside East Asia. See, for example, Michael Loriaux, “The French Developmental State as Myth and Moral Ambition,” in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 235–275; Schneider, “The *Desarrollista* State,” 276–305; Ronald J. Herring, “Embedded Particularism: India’s Failed Developmental State,” in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 306–334. Loriaux even argues that “France was, between 1945 and 1985, not only a developmental state but the very paradigm of the developmental state. Japan was a pale second.” Loriaux, “The French Developmental State,” 236. Laura Routley, in her comprehensive survey of the literature on the developmental state, provides a list of case studies in the developmental state literature. Ones not already mentioned include the Philippines, Mauritius, Chile, Costa Rica, Kerala, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and South Africa. Laura Routley, “Developmental States: A Review of the Literature,” ESID Working Paper No. 3 (February 2012), 11–12. David Levi-Faur also applies the concept to Israel. David Levi-Faur, “The Developmental State: Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan Compared,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 33, no. 1 (1998): 65–93. On China’s developmental state, see Young Nam Cho, “Democracy with Chinese Characteristics? A Critical Review from a Developmental State Perspective,” *Issues & Studies* 45, no. 4 (December 2009): 71–106.

¹⁷⁹ See Alexander Gerschenkron, “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,” in *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), 5–30.

¹⁸⁰ Leftwich, “Bringing Politics Back In,” 404.

Third, some scholars view the developmental state as a manifestation of a stage of development and thus universally observable.¹⁸¹ Economist Erik S. Reinert is exemplary in this regard. He writes, “The idea of Developmentalism—and the developmental state—is often referred to as a post-World War II phenomenon. In spite of the novelty of the term ‘developmental state’ itself—it came into general use in the 1980s—there is a high degree of continuity both in theory and in the policy tools used by nations during this transition, starting during the late 1400s and lasting until the post World War II period.”¹⁸² Reinert’s grand narrative of the developmental state juxtaposes two economic traditions, one traceable to the Renaissance and the other to the Enlightenment, what he calls “a production-centered and activist-idealistic Renaissance tradition and a barter-centered and passivist-materialistic tradition of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and neo-classical economics.”¹⁸³ In this context, the

¹⁸¹ For this reason, the developmental state is also viewed as self-negating. Economist Erik Reinert writes, “The developmental state bridges the transition from poverty to industrialization and national economic strength. Once the technological state-of-the-art—the frontier of knowledge—has been reached, the planning-based policies of the developmental state become increasingly irrelevant and inefficient. Once a nation has achieved technological leadership, there is no longer any leading nation or leading technology to aim for and to catch up with, and other less bureaucratically oriented policy tools become the appropriate ones. As the manufacturing sector grows stronger, this sector also needs larger markets and will be interested in freer trade with the rest of the world. So, for more than one reason, a successful developmental state carries the seeds of its own destruction.” Erik S. Reinert, “Developmentalism,” Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics no. 34, December 2010, 1–9, <http://technologygovernance.eu/files/main/2012032710251212.pdf>, 7. Kim Iryŏng of course shares this view (see chapter three), although he points out how the developmental state can be “artificially extended” as which occurred under Chŏn Tuhwan. Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga” [How to think about the eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime], *Sasang* 27 (December 1995), 240–242. Recently debate has arisen over the ostensible demise of the Korean developmental state. See, for example, Mark Beeson, “The Rise and Fall (?) of the Developmental State: The Vicissitudes and Implications of East Asian Interventionism,” in *Developmental States: Relevancy, Redundancy or Reconfiguration*, ed. Linda Low (Hauppauge, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2004), 29–40; Richard Stubbs, “What Ever Happened to the East Asian Developmental State? The Unfolding Debate,” *The Pacific Review* 22, no. 1 (2009): 1–22; Elizabeth Thurbon, *Developmental Mindset: The Revival of Financial Activism in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016); and Chu, “The Asian Developmental State,” 18–20.

¹⁸² Reinert, “Developmentalism.”

¹⁸³ Reinert credits this distinction between “activist-idealistic” Renaissance economics and “passivist-materialistic” classical/neoclassical economics to the German economist Werner Sombart. Erik S. Reinert, “The Role of the State in Economic Growth,” *Journal of Economic Studies* 25, no. 4/5 (1999), 270, 301. He also describes these two traditions as reflecting differing views of human nature, as encapsulated in Adam Smith’s emphasis on

twentieth-century East Asian developmental state is but the latest iteration of industrialization going back to Britain.¹⁸⁴

I conceptualize these three understandings of the developmental state as “epochal,” “late,” and “stagist.” These three definitions vary according to a time-space orientation. The epochal developmental state is limited to East Asia in the twentieth century, a product of specific local and world historical conditions. The late developmental state is a general feature of development initiated “late” relative to world time, thus discernible across a much more extended space. Finally, the stagist developmental state is a manifestation of local time and thus discernible across a universal space (table 5.4).

the propensity to “barter” and Lincoln’s emphasis on the propensity to “build.” Erik S. Reinert and Arno M. Daastøl, “The Other Canon: The History of Renaissance Economics,” in *Globalization, Economic Development and Inequality: An Alternative Perspective* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004), 25.

¹⁸⁴ Reinert also writes, “Perhaps the most important historical role of the State has been to bring the economic activities of the nation into...positive feedback activities. This factor is the fundamental common element between England in 1485 and Korea in the 1980s.” Reinert, “The Role of the State in Economic Growth,” 273, 298. See also Erik S. Reinert, *How Rich Countries Got Rich... and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008); Erik S. Reinert, Jayati Ghosh, and Rainer Kattel, eds., *Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2016); Erik S. Reinert and Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven, eds., *A Modern Guide to Uneven Economic Development* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2023); and Bob Jessop, “The Developmental State in an Era of Finance-Dominated Accumulation,” in *The Asian Developmental State: Reexaminations and New Departures*, ed. Yin-wah Chu (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 27–55. Reinert has especially taken issue with the “historical fallacies” of liberal economics. “Martin Wolf, associate editor and chief economic commentator for the *Financial Times*, recently wrote an article for *Foreign Policy* where he argued the ‘gap’ between rich and poor countries ‘reflects the success of those countries that embraced capitalism and the failure of those that did not’. The fact that mercantilism lies at the root of all successful capitalism is not considered. Harvard economist Robert J. Barro, writing for *Business Week*, recently dismissed worries about unemployment resulting from China’s growing textile exports by arguing ‘we should not be swayed by 17th century mercantilism, which viewed imports as bad and exports as good’. When taken together, these statements, appearing in two of the world’s most influential publications on economic policy matters, frame real historical fallacies fuelling contemporary economic debates: liberalism is always ‘right’ and protectionism is always ‘wrong’. Mercantilism, probably the most contested ‘ism’ in the historiography of economic analysis, is mostly summoned as a straw man of irrational folly representing a system of destructive rent-seekers that supposedly made the fundamental mistake of confusing gold with wealth. The diffusion of this view reflects the extent to which the economics profession is virtually united in a common misconception of its own past, both as regards theory and policy.” Erik S. Reinert, “Mercantilism and Economic Development: Schumpeterian Dynamics, Institution Building and International Benchmarking,” in *How Rich Nations Got Rich: Essays in the History of Economic Policy*, Working Paper No. 2004/01, Centre for Development and the Environment, 2004, 13, <https://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48147>.

| Table 5.4 Varieties of the Developmental State Concept by Time-Space Orientation | | | |
|---|---------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| | <i>Epochal World Time</i> | <i>Late World Time</i> | <i>Local Time</i> |
| <i>Limited Space</i> | Epochal | Late | Stagist |
| <i>Extended Space</i> | | | |
| <i>Universal Space</i> | | | |

These three perspectives correspond to what historian Sydney Checkland identifies as the internally universal, internally unique, and global “idioms” of historical change.¹⁸⁵

The internalised approach suggests that a common paradigmatic ladder of ascent confronts all societies and nation-state, to be climbed as high as resource endowment as mediated by technology, together with national coherence and motivation, permits. Moreover each society can be notionally located on this ladder. The second formulation insists that there is a different, not to say unique ladder of ascent confronting each society. This derives ultimately from basic differences in natural environment and location, but also from cultural elements of outlook inherited from the past, especially those concerned with the nature and role of the state and its bureaucracy. In the case of each nation a conception of societal experience must be formed in its own terms such as to reconcile the generalised with the particularist perspectives. But in terms of globality, each state must locate itself within an evolving world framework. On this basis it must do two things: it must preserve the national interest against other states so far as it is able to do so, and as far as this is legitimate, and it must make its contribution to the obviation of conflicts that could be destructive to all. In these tasks the historical perspective is essential.¹⁸⁶

The internal-universal idiom emphasizes endogenous mechanisms of development that are linear and universal and primarily economic in nature. Representative thinkers in this regard are stagists such as Smith and Marx.¹⁸⁷ This idiom is congruous with the stagist developmental state. The internal-unique idiom emphasizes the importance of local circumstances, such as state character and geography, leading to differing trajectories of historical change. Alexander Gerschenkron is among this idiom’s key thinkers.¹⁸⁸ This idiom is congruous with the late developmental state. Finally, the globalist idiom emphasizes the contingent interactions between

¹⁸⁵ S.G. Checkland, “Stages and the State: How do they Relate?” in *Economics in the Long View: Essays in Honour of W. W. Rostow, vol. 1; Models and Methodology*, ed. Charles P. Kindleberger and Guido di Tella (London: The Macmillan Press, 1982), 64.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 64–65.

¹⁸⁷ By extension, Checkland draws a parallel between Rostow and Wallerstein, whom he sees as the heirs of Smith and Marx, respectively. *Ibid.*, 47–48, 61.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 49–50, 50. This perspective is also associated with the tradition of geopolitics. *Ibid.*, 58.

local and global contexts. A representative thinker in this tradition is J.A. Hobson.¹⁸⁹ This idiom corresponds to the epochal developmental state.

Applications of the developmental state concept to understanding Korean economic development in the twentieth century can also be mapped across these three categories. Atul Kohli, Stephan Haggard, and Jung-en Woo, for example, evince an “epochal” understanding of the Korean developmental state.¹⁹⁰ Alice Amsden (Meredith Woo-Cumings) adheres to a “late” one.¹⁹¹ And Ha-Joon Chang tends toward a stagist one.¹⁹² How might Kim Iryōng’s work be understood in this context?

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 50. A better descriptor for this third idiom might be “interactionist.”

¹⁹⁰ Kohli emphasizes the historicity of the Korean developmental state rooted in Japanese colonialism. Haggard highlights the specific international context whence the developmental state emerged. Meredith Woo-Cumings writes that the “development in East Asia is a temporal phenomenon, which makes it hard to emulate in different times and other countries.” Atul Kohli, “Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea’s ‘Developmental State,’” *World Development* 22, no. 9 (1994): 1269–1293; Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Woo-Cumings, “The ‘New Authoritarianism’ in East Asia,” 415.

¹⁹¹ More specifically, Amsden emphasizes three phases of industrialization in world history, namely, the first and second industrial revolutions and “late industrialization,” which correspond to the industrialization of England and other early industrializers in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Germany and Japan in the late nineteenth century, and Korea in the twentieth century, respectively. Each phase is distinguished by different drivers of industrialization: “invention,” “innovation,” and “learning.” Amsden argues that the subsidy is the key mechanism (paired with state disciplining of the market) of “late industrialization.” See Amsden, *Asia’s Next Giant*, 3–23.

¹⁹² See, for example, Ha-Joon Chang, “The Economic Theory of the Developmental State,” in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 182–199. For Chang, the developmental state concept is defined by “the notion that economic development requires a state which can create and regulate the economic and political relationships that can support sustained industrialization.” Chang, “The Economic Theory of the Developmental State,” 182, 182n1. This is a characteristic not limited to East Asia or late developers but of almost all developing states. As he writes, “An honest examination of the historical record reveals that most of today’s industrialized countries utilized an economic model that was far closer to the East Asian model than it was to the Anglo-American model.... Thus it seems that the East Asian model (in all of its national variants) is closer to a world norm than is the Anglo-American model.” Ha-Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel, *Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic Policy Manual* (London: Zed Books, 2004), 43. In this respect, his position, which he has maintained across various works since the publication of his *The Political Economy of Industrial Policy*, does not go as far as Erik Reinert’s. See Ha-Joon Chang, *The Political Economy of Industrial Policy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). Chang also published a paper under the same title the previous year. Ha-Joon Chang, “The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea,” *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 17, no. 2 (1993): 131–157. See also Ha-Joon Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective* (London: Anthem, 2002); Ha-Joon Chang, *Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008); and Ha-Joon Chang, *23 Things They Don’t Tell You about Capitalism* (London: The Financial Times Limited, 2010). In any

3. Kim Iryŏng, the Developmental State, and Right-Wing Historical Revisionism

Kim Iryŏng clearly demonstrates a “stagist” understanding of the developmental state. Here it is notable that he borrows his definition of the developmental state not from Chalmers Johnson but Japanese neoconservative economist Yasusuke Murakami (1931–1933).¹⁹³ Notably,

case, one may note how very little Chalmers Johnson figures in his account. It is quite apparent that, for him, Johnson is not a central figure when it comes to explaining the concept of the developmental state. In other words, those who emphasize the specific applicability of the developmental state (the “epochal” developmental state) also tend to treat Johnson’s work as a lodestar, whereas those who see a more universal applicability of the developmental-state concept (the “late” and “stagist” developmental states) tend to view it as but a new *terminology* for an already existing concept. As Leftwich writes, “The *implicit idea* [emphasis added] of a developmental state can be traced back a long way and finds expression in the work of theorists of diverse persuasions.” Leftwich, “Bringing Politics Back In,” 401. This brings into question the originality of Johnson’s concept. To be sure, most discussions of the developmental state acknowledge its basis in a broader tradition of developmental economics or the political economy of late development, traceable to Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List, or others. And Johnson himself insisted his work was primarily a historical account, a point Woo-Cumings also emphasizes. Johnson, “The Developmental State,” 42; Woo-Cumings, “Introduction,” 5. See also Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, 17; Chalmers Johnson, “Social Values and the Theory of Late Economic Development in East Asia,” in *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State* (W.W. Norton & Company: 1995), 44–45; and Stephan Haggard, *Developmental States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1–6. In practice, however, the “developmental state” is often treated as an original concept. See, for example, Öniş, “Review,” 111. Meanwhile, there are questions surrounding the originality of the terminology itself. Ben Ross Schneider claims the term was first used in 1960s in Latin America, crediting Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto. Their book was published in 1971 but drafts were circulating as early as 1967. An English-language version was published in 1979 by none other than University of California Press at Berkeley, Johnson’s home university. Schneider does not speculate whether Johnson might have read the book. Schneider, “The *Desarrollista* State,” 277. In any case, Johnson does not cite it. See Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). Technically, the term was translated as “developmentalist state” in this English version.

¹⁹³ Kim first refers to Murakami’s definition of “developmentalism” (*kaebaljuŭi*) in Kim Iryŏng, “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’ŕje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga,” 248n6. The quote here is from Murakami Yasŭsŭk’e, *Pan’gojŏn ŭi chŏngch’i kyŏngjehak* [An anticlassical political-economic analysis], vol. 2 (Seoul: Samsŏng ch’ulp’ansa, 1994), 9. See also Yasusuke Murakami, *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis: A Vision for the Next Century*, trans. Kozo Yamamura (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996). The former omits some of the content included in the original. Particularly, chapter six, on the historical case of British mercantilism, which is crucial to Kim’s account of world history, is omitted from the English edition. As translator Kozo Yamamura describes, “Murakami himself wanted to edit the book rather thoroughly for the English version. Thus, he revised and combined Chapters 1 and 2 and decided to eliminate Chapter 6 in which he offers an extended historical analysis of the English experience to support his analyses of industrialization, democracy, and social changes. (Just before his death, he expressed his

wish to add a shortened version of this chapter as an appendix, but he was not given the time to do so.)” Kozo Yamamura, “Translator’s Preface,” in *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis: A Vision for the Next Century*, Yasusuke Murakami, trans. Kozo Yamamura (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996), xvi. Murakami is often described as the “Max Weber of Japan.” Kozo Yamamura, “Translator’s Introduction,” in *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis: A Vision for the Next Century*, Yasusuke Murakami, trans. Kozo Yamamura (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996), xix. Despite its vague title, *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis* is a sweeping account of the history of industrialization and a program for resolving what Murakami saw as some of the major problems for the world in his day. As renowned Japanese studies scholar Ronald Dore remarks, “Analysis of what? The cosmos, stupid.” Ronald Dore, Review of *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis: A Vision for the Next Century*, by Yasusuke Murakami, *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 24, no. 1 (1998): 163–167. Kozo Yamamura, in his preface and introduction to the English translation, provides an excellent summary of the contents and background of the book’s writing and translation. Yamamura, “Translator’s Preface,” xiii–xvii; Yamamura, “Translator’s Introduction,” xix–xxix. These are valuable additions to the English-language edition, available neither in the original Japanese nor Korean editions. At the heart of the book lies the call for “polymorphic liberalism” as the guiding principle of foreign policy. Basically, this means a combination of *realpolitik* with economic liberalism, resulting in a two-tiered set of rules: one for the advanced nations, emphasizing economic liberalism, and another for the developing countries, allowing for developmentalism. This would involve countries having to shed their developmentalist political economy as they “graduate,” in a sense, from one group to the other. Yamamura, “Translator’s Introduction,” xx–xxiv. As I discuss in chapter four, Kim Iryōng began to apply the concept of the developmental state toward understanding contemporary Korean history in the mid-1990s, prompted by the intense debates over history ignited under the Kim Yōngsam administration. He developed his ideas on the developmental state over several articles, culminating in their application in his 2004 book, *Kōn’guk kwa puguk*. Kim Iryōng, “Pak Chōnghŭi ch’eje 18-nyōn, ottōk’e pol kōt in’ga,” 208–256; Kim Iryōng, “Han’guk ūi chōngch’i,” 453–512; Kim Iryōng, “Naengjon=pundan, palchōn chihyang kukka kŭrigo kyōngje: Han’guk ūi kyōnghōm ūl chungsim ūro” [The Cold War as division, the developmental state, and economic development: Focusing on the Korean experience], *T’ongil munje yōn’gu* 30 (1998): 39–60; Kim Iryōng, “1960-nyōndae Han’guk palchōn kukka ūi hyōngsōng kwajōng: Such’ul chihyanghyōng chibae yōnhap kwa palchōn kukka ūi mulchōk kich’o ūi hyōngsōng ūl chungsim ūro” [The process of the formation of the Korean developmental state in the 1960s: Focusing on the export-orientation-type ruling coalition and formation of the material basis of the developmental state], *Han’guk chōngch’i hakhoebo* 33, no. 4 (February 2000): 121–143; Kim Iryōng, “Han’guk ūi kŭndaesōng kwa palchōn kukka” [Korea’s modernity and the developmental state], *Sahoe kwahak* 39, no. 1 (2000): 37–84; Kim Iryōng, “Han’guk esō palchōn kukka ūi kiwōn, hyōngsōng kwa palchōn kŭrigo chōnmang” [The origins, formation, development, and outlook of Korea’s developmental state], *Han’guk chōngch’i oegyosa nonch’ong* 23, no. 1 (2001): 87–126; Kim Iryōng, *Kōn’guk kwa puguk*; Kim Iryōng, “Pak Chōnghŭi sidae yōn’gu ūi chaengchōm kwa kwaje” [Controversies and tasks of research on the Park Chung Hee era], in *Pak Chōnghŭi sidae yōn’gu ūi chaengchōm kwa kwaje* [Controversies and tasks of research on the Park Chung Hee era], ed. Chōng Sōnghwa (Seoul: Sōnin, 2005), 11–40. Although Kim’s terminology would shift through these works, the essential definition borrowed from Murakami would remain the same. In a 1998 article, he used the term *palchōn chihyang kukka*, while citing roughly the same definition: “The characteristics of this state are ‘sweeping and strategic intervention in the market for the fulfillment of its self-professed goal of a “rich country, strong army” even while taking private property and a market economy as its fundamental principles.’” Curiously, however, the reference to Murakami is not included, replaced by Kim Iryōng, “Naengjon=pundan,” 41–42, 41n4–5: 이 국가의 특징은 ‘사유재산과 시장경제를 기본 원칙으로 하면서도 국가가 스스로 설정한 부국강병이란 목표를 위해 시장에 대해 전략적 개입을 거침없이 행한다는 점이다. Kim Iryōng, “Han’guk ūi chōngch’i,” 495–496. By the 2000s, Kim settled on the commonly used terminology of *palchōn kukka*, offering basically the same definition: “The developmental state is a ‘state

Murakami understood what he called “developmentalism” not only as a universal stage of development but also incompatible with democracy.

In the end, when a preindustrial society aims at rapid industrialization, there is a high possibility that democratic decision making will become a mechanism for rejecting industrialization. Given that industrialization is not the supreme objective of humanity, this is, in a sense, inevitable. This inevitability is perhaps why there is a tendency for parliamentary democracy to be avoided where, for example, the ruling class in a developing country is attempting to promote industrialization in order to raise the position of the country and prevent colonization. Not as a question of good and evil, but as a matter of fact, overcoming the takeoff stage in industrialization through democratic government is usually either impossible or unlikely. At least in the initial period of industrialization, developmentalism achieved results without parliamentary government's being adequately established in relatively backward countries in Europe such as Germany and Italy, or in Japan, the Asian NIEs, and elsewhere. Today, as might be expected, there is no one who denies this fact.¹⁹⁴

Additionally, he described Britain as the “prototype” of developmentalism.

In looking back over the past, there is something vital that everyday historical common sense overlooks. The industrialization democratization pattern—that is, the pattern that resembles developmentalism—has been widespread even within Europe. This fact is frequently pointed out with reference to France and Germany, but even Britain, which is considered the cradle of modernization, is no exception. In the European countries between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, the phenomenon frequently referred to as industrialization before the industrial revolution, or protoindustrialization, made progress under absolute monarchy hand in hand with mercantilism....

Politically, as already mentioned, the period following the sixteenth century in Europe was one of the gradual formation of the nation-state. The absolute

that strategically intervenes in the market toward fulfilling its self-proclaimed purpose of “rich nation, strong army,” even while accepting as fundamental tenets private property and market economy.” Kim Iryōng, “1960-nyōndae Han’guk palchōn kukka, 122: 발전국가란 ‘사유재산과 시장경제를 기본 원칙으로 하면서도 국가가 스스로 설정한 부국강병이란 목표를 위해 시장에 대한 전략적 개입을 거침없이 행하는 국가’를 의미한다. Kim also spends several pages of his 2004 book, *Kōn’guk kwa puguk*, offering a definition of the developmental state similar to that he put forward in 1995: “The developmental state is a state that carries out long-term and strategic intervention in the market toward fulfilling the goal of defensive modernization, even while accepting private property and a market economy as its fundamental tenets.” Kim Iryōng, *Kōn’guk kwa puguk*, 319: 발전국가란 ‘사유재산과 시장경제를 기본 원칙으로 하면서도 방어적 근대화라는 목표를 위해 시장에 대한 장기적이면서 전략적인 개입을 하는 국가’이다. Kim then goes on to list six ways in which the developmental state strategically intervenes in the market: 1) The state determines target industries; 2) for this purpose, the state mobilizes the totality of the nation’s available resources; 3) the state funnels these resources toward target industries; 4) outside of such financial support, the state also supports target industries through instructions and planning for each industry, regulation of excessive price competition, selective protectionism, and subsidies; 5) to ensure the formulation and execution of such policies, the state must take control over financial institutions; and 6) the state uses this control over finance not to distribute privileges to businessmen engaged in target industries but promote economic growth, distributing financial support based on economic performance. Kim Iryōng, *Kōn’guk kwa puguk*, 319–320. In any case, the definition is similar to Johnson’s (a “plan-rational state”).

¹⁹⁴ Murakami, *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis*, 145, 221. For more on Yasusuke Murakami, see Andrew E. Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

monarchies created the nation-state by depriving the nobles, the church, and the medieval towns of the feudal privileges they had enjoyed and, ultimately, allying themselves with the middle class, whose economic base was the new industries (such as sheep-rearing, commercial agriculture, various aspects of the textile industry, and the manufacture of consumer goods). It was not easy to deprive the nobles of their privileges, however, and the vagrant poor rose visibly in number. Democratization under absolute monarchy was slow in coming. But the sudden economic rise of the middle class increased their political influence, and with the English Revolution (referring to the English civil war and the Glorious Revolution), for example, parliamentary democracy was created. In this sense, a movement from protoindustrialization to democracy is clearly visible. Moreover, even after the eighteenth century, during which the European countries had gradually adopted parliamentary democracy, democratization was finally realized in the form of universal suffrage only after the beginning of the twentieth century. To complete the process of democratization, at least a century was needed after the American and French revolutions, and it was a century that saw bloody revolutionary disturbances.

Thus even Europe and North America followed a path from industrialization to democracy, in the form of progressions from protoindustrialization to the political participation of the middle class, and from the industrial revolution to universal suffrage. When Europeans and Americans urge the non-Western countries to democratize quickly, they are being amnesiac about their own past. Over the long term, industrialization and political democratization have advanced in tandem, and there is not much sense in criticizing the precise order in which each is achieved. One cannot explain the tide of history by condemning developmentalism as a distorted pattern of history followed by the late developers.¹⁹⁵

Kim and Murakami thus followed a stagist notion of the developmental state. Here the developmental state was not a form of political economy peculiar to late developers or East Asia or in general but a universal manifestation of the early stage of the transition from agricultural to industrial society. There are thus no “normal” or “abnormal” paths to modernity as there is but one.

In this context, Murakami and Kim belong to the broader tradition of a stagist understanding of history, traceable at least to Enlightenment thinkers like Turgot, Condorcet, and Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith.¹⁹⁶ Here the development of a society is

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 133–134.

¹⁹⁶ The Scottish Historical School, as economist Ronald Meek describes it, divided history into the four stages of hunting, pasturage, agriculture, and commerce. Meek writes, “To each of these modes of subsistence, it came to be argued, there corresponded different sets of ideas and institutions relating to law, property, and government, and also different sets of customs, manners, and morals. For better or for worse, this ‘four stages theory’...was destined not only to dominate socioeconomic thought in Europe in the latter half of the eighteenth century, but also to become of crucial significance in the subsequent development of economics, sociology, anthropology, and historiography, right down to our own time.” Meek describes how this theory was articulated as a reaction to the encounter with the

equated to that of an organism, which passes through discrete, pre-programmed, and clearly discernible stages of development.¹⁹⁷ As Anthony Smith puts it, “Society contains within itself, like a [plant], all its possibilities at its inception. Change is a process of realizing the social potentialities of a given unit, and arises out of the very nature of that unit, requiring little help from outside.”¹⁹⁸

“ignoble savage” in North America. Meek, *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage*, 2, 2–3. This idea of stages, wherein a society’s “mode of subsistence” functioned as the mechanism of historical change, was one among six ideas shared by the Scottish Historical School to which Smith belonged, which were as follow: 1) The social world, much like the natural one, is also dictated by a process of cause and effect, one which is intelligible and it is the task of the historian to uncover; 2) development is blind but not arbitrary, meaning there are laws of history just as there are laws of nature; 3) the key mechanism of historical change is the “mode of subsistence”; 4) types of government vary depending on conceptions and treatment of property; 5) creation of surplus leads to social progress; 6) and history has passed through four consecutive socioeconomic stages based on mode of subsistence, namely, “hunting, pasturage, agriculture, and commerce.” Ronald L. Meek, *Smith, Marx, & After: Ten Essays in the Development of Economic Thought* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1977), 18–19. See also Erik S. Reinert, “Karl Bücher and the Geographical Dimensions of Techno-Economic Change: Production-Based Economic Theory and the Stages of Economic Development,” in *The Visionary Realism of German Economics: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Cold War* (London: Anthem Press, 2019), 289–319.

¹⁹⁷ Michael Ruse calls this the “embryological analogy.” Michael Ruse, “The Philosophy of Evolutionary Theory,” in *A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*, ed. Aviezer Tucker (UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 309. Jan Nederveen Pieterse identifies stagism as one of three theories of social change, the other being “dichotomous” and “critical variable” theories. In his conceptualization, stage theories are reflected in “Comte’s social dynamics, Marx’s ‘economic law of motion of modern society’, Morgan’s reflections on the development of kinship systems, Maine’s views on the family and property, and Taylor’s ideas about culture.” Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions*, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2010), 20. Philosopher Jon Elster points out that stagism need not necessarily imply progress; stages may also be cyclical and dialectical. Jon Elster, *Making Sense of Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 302.

¹⁹⁸ Anthony D. Smith, *The Concept of Social Change: A Critique of the Functionalist Theory of Social Change* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 27–28. In this context, Murakami’s description of the developmentalist worldview is quite striking. “The image of the world that lies behind developmentalism resembles biology or ecology more than mechanics. Its central concern is the lifecycle of each industry and the process of evolution and finding the respective niche of each industry. Each industry is born, experiences rapid growth in its infancy, is vigorous in its youth, and in due course enters adulthood and then old age. Technological and organizational innovations during this period can be compared to mutation or changes in character due to heredity. Industrial policy in developmentalism is intended to foster development during the stage of infancy in this lifecycle (the phase of declining marginal cost), and we can say that distributive policy usually maintains a particular niche for the various ‘species’ (industries and firms). In developing countries, this period of infancy will appear, simultaneously and unmistakably, in a majority of industries. But even in the advanced countries, specific industries (for example, the semiconductor industry at present) are clearly recognized as being in the stage of infancy.” Murakami, *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis*, 227.

One may thus observe a clear difference between A. James Gregor's "developmental dictatorship"—a "late" developmental state—and Kim Iryŏng's stagist developmental state. This speaks to a very important characteristic of Kim Iryŏng's historiography, which can be seen as trying to reconcile developmental dictatorship (as a stage of development) with the liberalism of a mature industrial society. This point, I argue in the following section, is also important for distinguishing Kim Iryŏng's historiography from that of Cho Kapche and Yi Yŏnghun and thus for understanding the character of New Right historiography.

V. Kim Iryŏng, Yi Yŏnghun, and New Right Historiography

In this section, I discuss the differences between Kim Iryŏng and Yi Yŏnghun's historical sensibilities and the implications of this for the character of New Right historiography. I examine their understandings of the colonial modernization thesis—generally understood as the core idea of New Right historiography—historical change, and modernity. I show the varied character of New Right historiography prior to Yi Yŏnghun's emergence as its dominant face.

1. The Colonial Modernization Thesis

Scholars commonly regard New Right historiography as a rehabilitation of the colonial view of history. This conclusion, however, is overwhelmingly based on analyses of Yi Yŏnghun's work. For Yi, colonialism was essentially beneficial because it established in Korea the system of market economy, which would have been impossible under the stagnant Chosŏn system.¹⁹⁹ Where does Kim Iryŏng stand on this colonial modernization thesis?

¹⁹⁹ See Owen Miller, "The Idea of Stagnation in Korean Historiography: From Fukuda Tokuzō to the New Right," *Korean Histories* 2, no. 1 (2010): 3–12. Atul Kohli and Alice Amsden, drawing on James Palais, also support this thesis. Kohli also draws on Peter Evans' distinction between developmental and predatory states. Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant*, 29–32;

A variation of this thesis is important to developmental state accounts of Korea's economic development. Championed perhaps most forcefully by Atul Kohli, it can also be found in the work of Alice Amsden and Jung-en Woo.²⁰⁰ Stephen Haggard was an exception. In his 1991 book, *Pathways from the Periphery*, he raised the issue of colonial legacies only briefly and in relation to the conditions around US military rule after 1945.²⁰¹ Following the publication of Kohli's 1994 article, he (along with David Kang and Chung-in Moon) came out explicitly against the colonial continuity thesis. He, Kang, and Moon emphasized the ruptures between 1945 and 1961, including the period of US military rule, Korean War, and Rhee era.²⁰²

Kim Iryŏng, despite all his work on the developmental state, never really intervened in this debate. In fact, there are only scattered references to the colonial period across his work—which is itself a significant point.

Kohli, "Where Do High-Growth Political Economies Come From?" 97–99, 97n11, 132, 132n113. See James B. Palais, *Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council of East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991 [1975]); and Evans, "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses," 561–587.

²⁰⁰ Criticizing the focus on Korea's policy choices made in the 1960s—particularly singling out Stephan Haggard—Kohli dismissed the idea that a "model" could be drawn from the Korean experience, as it was rooted in the specificity of Japanese colonialism. At the core of this argument was the metaphor of "grooves," in other words, a historical path that Korea returned to under Park Chung Hee. Kohli, "Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From?" 1269–1293. See also Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant*; and Jung-en Woo, *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). It is of course also at the core of Johnson's original formulation. Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*. Stephan Haggard, David Kang, and Chung-in Moon point out the similarity between accounts emphasizing colonial continuity in the literature on the Korean developmental state and Chalmers Johnson's original account of the Japanese economic miracle, which finds the origins of Japan's developmental state in the prewar period. Haggard, Kang, and Moon, "Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development," 879n2.

²⁰¹ Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery*, 52–54, 194–197.

²⁰² Kohli, "Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From?" 1269–1293; Haggard, Kang, and Moon, "Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development," 867–881. At the same time, Haggard (along with Chung-in Moon) is careful to accept a degree of continuity at least generally greater than that of neoclassical accounts of Korean economic development, which tend to disregard the colonial period altogether. Stephan Haggard and Chung-in Moon, "The State, Politics and Economic Development in Postwar South Korea," in *State and Society in Contemporary Korea*, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 52. For more on the argument against the colonial continuity thesis, see Pak T'aegyŏn, *Wŏnhyŏng kwa pyŏnyong: Han 'guk kyŏngje kaebal kyehoek ūi kiwŏn* [Archetype and metamorphosis: The origins of Korea's economic development plans] (Seoul: Sŏul taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2007); and Yi Pyŏngch'ŏn, "Kaebal tokchae," 17–65.

These allusions, however, do suggest a clear position.²⁰³ A good place to start is the discussion between he, Pak Chihyang, Kim Ch'öl, and Yi Yŏnghun appended to the second volume of *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi chaeinsik* (A new understanding of history before and after liberation). When Pak Chihyang raises the issue of “colonial modernity,” Kim states the following:

I would like to share something else about this issue. Moving beyond the question of the degree of colonial modernization or exploitation, one should pay attention to whether a kind of modern sensibility arose within people's minds.... In fact, regarding the origins of the developmental state, scholars such as Eckert, Cumings, and Jung-en Woo all pay attention to the Japanese Empire's developmental policies of the 1930s. What they point out is not that colonial power modernized and developed this or that sector but that the fundamental thinking behind the developmental policies implemented at the time became the model for the developmental policies implemented by the Korean state in the 1960s—that it was revived or imitated in the 1960s.

State control of finance to ensure concentrated investment of capital in preferred sectors, for example, also existed in colonial Korea and Manchuria. Was not this mode reproduced in Korea in the 1960s? One might naturally see this phenomenon as universal among late industrializing nations to a certain degree, but the model in the Korean case is at least discernible in the 1930s. As a second example, when President Park Chung Hee created a government department to oversee economic development after the coup d'état, why might he have named it the “Economic Planning Board”? The term *kihoek*, “planning” in English, was not used for the first time in the 1960s, as the Planning Agency [*Kihoekch'ŏ*] was created under the jurisdiction of the presidential cabinet in 1948, when the Republic of Korea government was founded. Returning to 1930s Japan, one encounters the “Economic Planning Board” among its government agencies. This could just be a coincidence, but for those who pay attention to the relationship between the 1930s and the 1960s, it is a point that is difficult to overlook, even if there is a need to meticulously trace when and by what path the concept of planning gradually took hold in the minds of the Korean people.²⁰⁴

²⁰³ Kim Iryŏng, “Han'guk kwŏnwijuŭi ch'eje ūi sŏngkyŏk kwa pyŏnhwa: Purwanjŏn p'ogwarhyŏng, irin chibae ha ūi kwallyo uwihyŏng, kŭrigo pangŏjŏk kŭndaehwa rŭl wihan tongwŏnhyŏng” [The character of and changes in Korea's authoritarian regime: Incomplete-comprehensive-type, bureaucratic-supremacy-under-one-person-rule-type, and mobilization-for-defensive-modernization-type], in *Tongasia ūi chŏngch'i ch'eje* [The political system of East Asia], ed. Kim Yŏngmyŏng (Ch'unch'ŏn-si: Hallim taehakkyo Asia munhwa yŏn'guso, 1998), 193–233; Kim Iryŏng, “Han'guk ūi kŭndaesŏng kwa palchŏn kukka,” 37–84.

²⁰⁴ Pak Chihyang, Kim Ch'öl, Kim Iryŏng, and Yi Yŏnghun, “Haebang chŏnhusa ūi saeroun chip'yŏng” [A new horizon for history before and after liberation], in *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi chaeinsik 2* [A new understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 2], ed. Pak Chihyang et al. (Seoul: Ch'aek sesang, 2006), 646–647:

그 문제와 관련해서 다른 말씀을 나누어보고 싶은데, 사실 식민지 근대화가 얼마나 발전시키고 수탈했는가 하는 문제를 떠나 사람들의 머릿속에 근대화와 관련해서 어떤 근대적인 개념이 생겨나게 되었는가 하는 것도 주목해야 할 것입니다.... 사실 한국 발전 국가의 기원과 관련해서는 에커트나 커밍스 그리고 우정은 교수 등이 모두 1930 년대의 일제의 개발 정책에 주목하고 있는 게 사실입니다. 이들이 지적하는 것은 그 당시 식민지 권력이 조선의 이러저러한 분야를 근대화 내지 발전시켜주었다는 것이 아닙니다. 그 보다는 그 때 시행된 개발 정책의 기본

One may observe in this passage that Kim expresses a position closer to Amsden, Woo, and Kohli than Haggard. Elsewhere, he also makes clear his acceptance of Chosŏn stagnancy to a certain degree.²⁰⁵ One should also note, however, his emphasis on the “developmentalist” legacy of the colonial economy, not one of “market economy” as emphasized by Yi.

개념이 1960년대 이후 한국의 국가가 시행한 개발 정책의 모델이 되었고 그것이 1960년대 이후 복원 내지는 답습되었다는 것이지요.

예를 들어 국가가 금융을 통제해서 자기가 원하는 분야에 집중적으로 자본이 투자되도록 만드는 방식은 식민지 시대 조선에도 있었고 만주에도 있었던 것으로, 1960년대 이후 한국에서 재현되고 있는 게 아니냐는 것이죠. 물론 그런 현상을 후발 산업 국가에서 어느 정도는 보편적으로 나타난다고 볼 수 있지만 아무튼 우리 경우에는 1930년대에서 그 모델을 찾을 수 있다는 것이지요. 또 다른 예로 박정희 대통령이 쿠데타 이후 경제 개발을 주도해나갈 부처를 만들면서 그 이름을 왜 ‘경제기획원’라고 붙였을까요? 기획, 영어로 planning 이라는 말은 1948년에 대한민국 정부가 수립될 때 내각 직속으로 ‘기획처’라는 부처가 만들어지는 것으로 보아 1960년대에 처음 사용된 말은 아닙니다. 그런데 1930년대 일본에 가보니 정부 부처 중에 ‘경제기획원’이라는 게 있더군요. 우연의 일치일 수도 있는데, 1930년대와 1960년대 이후 사이의 관련성에 관심을 가진 사람들에게는 그냥 지나치기 어려운 점입니다. 물론 이것은 한국인들의 머릿속에 기획이라는 개념이 언제 어떤 경로를 거쳐 점차 자리 잡게 되었는지를 면밀하게 추적해보아야 할 문제입니다만.

Here Kim is likely referring to Bruce Cumings, “The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 478–496; Carter J. Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014 [1991]); Carter J. Eckert, “Total War, Industrialization, and Social Change in Late Colonial Korea,” in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 3–39; and Woo, *Race to the Swift*. Elsewhere, he also agrees with Bruce Cumings and Jung-en Woo that the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan in 1965 signified a revival of the colonial-era regional division of labor, although he cites Herbert Bix and Yi Chongwŏn for this point. Kim Iryŏng, “Han’guk ŭi kŭndaesŏng kwa palchŏn kukka,” 53–55, 55n32. See Herbert P. Bix, “Regional Integration: Japan and South Korea in America’s Asian Policy,” in *Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945*, ed. Frank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), 179–232; and Yi Chongwŏn, *Higashiajia reisen to Kan-Bei-Nichi kankei* [The Cold War in East Asia and Korea-USA-Japan relations] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shubbansha, 1996).

²⁰⁵ Kim Iryŏng, “Han’guk ŭi kŭndaesŏng kwa palchŏn kukka,” 46, 46n15, 47, 47n17. Regarding Chosŏn as a “predatory state,” Kim cites Pak Myŏnggyu, “Han’guk kwa Ilbon ŭi kŭndae kukka hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng e kwanhan pigyosajŏk yŏn’gu” [A comparative-historical study of the modern nation-state formations of Korea and Japan] (PhD diss., Seoul National University, 1991), 35–54. Kim also cites other works supporting the continuity thesis in this section of the article, including Eckert, *Offspring of Empire*; and Dennis L. McNamara, *The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprise, 1910–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). No references are made to any works arguing against this thesis. He does, however, refer to the debate over colonial continuity in another work. See Kim Iryŏng, “Han’guk ŭi kyŏngje palchŏn kwa palchŏn kukka e taehan yŏksajŏk somyo: J. U, *Sokto kyŏngjaeng: Han’guk sanŏphwa esŏ ŭi kukka wa kŭmyung* [Korea’s economic development and a historical sketch of the developmental state: Jung-en Woo, *Race to the swift: State and finance in Korean industrialization*], in *Haeoe Han’gukhak p’yŏngnon 3* [Critical review of Korean Studies abroad, vol. 3], ed. Yŏnse tachakkyo hyŏndaee Han’gukhak y’ŏn’guso (Seoul: Ilchogak, 2002), 76–77, 76–77n4.

Kim's perspective is further differentiated from Yi's in his distinction between the "totalitarian" Japanese colonial developmental state and "authoritarian" Korean developmental state.²⁰⁶ This is a more nuanced understanding of continuity, as reflected in the following passage:

One may sum up the colonial era as one in which the bureaucracy under the all-powerful leadership of the Government-General, free of the influence of any institution to mediate societal input, directed the ruling class with respect to its preferred developmental orientation, on the one hand, and unilaterally ruled over the non-ruling class, on the other. The state was developmental but the political system was near totalitarian. Ultimately, Chosŏn's feeble predatory state transformed into a state with a developmental character under colonialism, but it was realized only through a kind of blended totalitarianism rather than authoritarianism.²⁰⁷

Kim was clearly a proponent of the continuity thesis. Yet he ultimately left room for the Korean developmental state's distinctiveness, which could also explain the peripherality of the continuity thesis in his work.

There may, however, be other explanations for this. I would tentatively suggest three. The first is that Kim thought he had nothing new or significant to say about the topic. This point is implied in the following offhand remark made in a review of Jung-en Woo's *Race to the Swift*: "In the debate over 'colonial exploitation' versus 'colonial modernization,' one can simply say the author's argument that the origins of the Korean developmental state can be found in the colonial period is closer to the latter position. My opinion on this issue is little different, and I have no intention

²⁰⁶ Kim first briefly raised this point in a 1998 piece, also the first in which he broached the subject of colonial continuity, before elaborating it in another article published two years later. Kim Iryŏng, "Han'guk kwŏnwijuŭi ch'eje," 193–233; Kim Iryŏng, "Han'guk ūi kŭndaesŏng kwa palchŏn kukka," 37–84. As I discuss in chapter four, Kim first put forward a framework for understanding the Park Chung Hee era in a conference paper in 1994, which he would later publish as his 1995 *Sasang* article. Kim Iryŏng, "Pak Chŏnghŭi ch'eje 18-nyŏn ottŏk'e pol kŏt in'ga" [How to think about the eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime], paper presented at the 1994 Yŏllye haksul taehoe [Annual academic conference] of the Han'guk chŏngch'i hakhoe [Korean political science association], 1994, as cited in Im Hyŏkpaek, "Pak Chŏnghŭi e taehan chŏngch'ihakchŏk p'yŏngka: Ridŏsip, kŭndaehwa, Yusin, kŭri-go mollak" [A political-science evaluation of Park Chung Hee: Leadership, modernization, Yusin, and downfall], *P'yŏnghwa yŏn'gu* 20, no. 2 (2012), 70.

²⁰⁷ Kim Iryŏng, "Han'guk ūi kŭndaesŏng kwa palchŏn kukka," 50: 식민지시대는 모든 권한을 틀어쥔 총독을 정점으로 한 관료조직이 사회로부터의 투입을 매개하는 어떤 기구의 영향으로부터도 자유로운 상태에서 한편으로는 지배계층을 자신들이 선호하는 발전방향으로 몰아 가고 다른 한편으로는 피지배계층에 대해 일방적인 통치를 행했던 시기로 요약될 수 있다. 이것은 국가의 성격 면에서는 발전적이었지만, 정치체제 면에서는 전체주의에 가까운 모습이라고 할 수 있다. 결국 조선의 취약한 약탈국가는 식민지하에서 발전적 성격의 국가로 변모하지만, 그것의 현실적 발현태는 권위주의보다는 전체주의와 결합하는 모습으로 나타났다.

of reopening it here.”²⁰⁸ A second explanation may have been strategic silence. In his effort to push back against “revisionist” historiography, he may have prudently wished to avoid opening another front over the sensitive issue of colonial modernization. This attitude is perhaps discernible in his comments regarding the “Han Sŭngjo controversy” of 2007, which I mention in chapter three.²⁰⁹ To reiterate, Kim stated, “Han Sŭngjo and Cho Kapche’s way of thinking has absolutely nothing to do with us.”²¹⁰ Foregoing discussion of the colonial continuity thesis thus may have been a strategic choice in the ongoing struggle to carve out a position between progressive (or “revisionist”) and traditional scholarship. In this regard, the colonial issue could be seen as a kind of a taboo in his work. Finally, the third explanation I would suggest is that Kim’s omission of the colonial period was related to his understanding of Korean history as fundamentally driven by internal dynamics. This is a point I will return to below, but suffice it to say for now that, even if Kim agreed with aspects of continuity thesis, his focus on internal dynamics would explain why he thought to distinguish between the totalitarian and authoritarian developmental states as well as why he did not think it warranted significant attention.

²⁰⁸ Kim Iryōng, “Han’guk ūi kyōngje palchōn,” 76–77: 한국 발전국가의 기원을 일제하에서 찾고 있는 저자의 주장은, 단순히 본다면 식민지착취론과 식민지근대화론 사이의 논쟁에서 후자의 입장에 가깝다고 할 수 있다. 이 문제에 관한 논평자의 의견도 저자와 크게 다르지 않다. 따라서 여기서 이 문제에 세심 개입하고 싶은 생각은 없다. However, Kim also suggests some ways to improve Woo’s argument. He asserts that an examination of ideas and institutions, complementing the focus on financial policy, would have strengthened the argument for continuity, incorporating the ideas of List and the German historical school and the links between the Japanese “economic planning board” (*kihoegwōn*) and later analogous Korean institutions. Also, he points out that the origins of the Korean developmental state should be more specifically located in Manchuria and not just the colonial period in general. Kim Iryōng, “Han’guk ūi kyōngje palchōn,” 77–78.

²⁰⁹ Han Sŭngjo argued that Japanese colonialism had been a “blessing” insofar as “saving” Korea from becoming a Russian colony and thus, in his view, shielding Korea from communization through the Russian revolution. See Ha Chongmun, “Pan-Il minjokchuui wa Nyu rait’ū” [Anti-Japanese nationalism and the New Right], *Yōksa pip’yōng* 78 (February 2007): 175–197; Pak T’aegyūn, “Han’guk posu ideologi ūi t’ŭkchŭng kwa tillem: Han Sŭngjo p’amun ūi yōksajōk ūimi” [The characteristics and dilemma of Korean conservative ideology: The historical meaning of the Han Sŭngjo controversy], *Hwanghae munhwa* 47 (June 2005): 205–233.

²¹⁰ Cho T’aesōng, “Taedonga kongyōngkwōn’ panbak hal nollī innŭn’ga” [Is there a logic to refute the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?”], *Sōul sinmun*, March 10, 2005, <https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/seoulPrintNew.php?id=20050310026003>: 우리와 한승조-조갑제식 논리와는 아무런 상관이 없다.

2. *The Activistic-Idealistic and Passivistic-Materialistic Views of Historical Change*

Differing views of the colonial period between Kim Iryŏng and Yi Yŏnghun can be understood as reflections of differing historical sensibilities. I focus on two aspects in this regard, namely, their respective views of historical change and of modernity as a historical process.

To highlight Kim and Yi's view of historical change, I borrow from Erik Reinert, who describes two broad traditions in economics, "a production-centered and activistic-idealistic Renaissance tradition and a barter-centered and passivistic-materialistic tradition."²¹¹ Representative of the former are renaissance thinkers such as Francis Bacon, "who consciously used his Utopian tract *The New Atlantis* as an essay in forecasting the future," and representative of the latter is Adam Smith and the tradition of neoclassical economics.²¹² These two traditions might just as well be applied to history: The former views historical change as a product of human intention and the latter as independent of it.

Yi's view of history neatly aligns with this second view. This is why he emphasizes the role of the market ("invisible hand") in history. Kim evinces a more nuanced position, where activist-idealism is appropriate to an early stage of development and passivistic-materialism to a later stage. Relative to Yi, however, he falls closer to the idealistic-activistic view; indeed, he positively evaluates Park Chung Hee precisely *for not* letting markets do their work.

There may be seen as a paradoxical finding relative to Kim and Yi's view of colonialism. One might expect that Yi, believing in the logic of the

²¹¹ Reinert, "The Role of the State in Economic Growth," 270.

²¹² Reinert also writes, "Bacon's *New Atlantis* (published 1627) and his *Essay on Innovations* (about 1605), describe the development of society as being propelled by new inventions and innovations, and should, in my view, be considered as the earliest tracts of what we today would call 'Schumpeterian economics'." Ibid., 285, 270. Regarding the latter view, see also Ronald Meek's commentary on the "law of unintended consequences" and the Scottish Historical School. Meek, *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage*, 1. See also Hirschman, *The Rhetoric of Reaction*.

invisible hand, would see colonialism as an affront to history. Conversely, for Kim, who recognizes a place for idealism, one might expect a more welcoming view of colonialism. Unraveling this ostensible paradox requires examining their respective views of modernity as a historical process.

3. Diffusionist and Evolutionary Narratives of Modernity

In *The Colonizer's Model of the World*, anthropologist J.M. Blaut presents two views of social change. On the one hand, there is “diffusionism”—the “colonizer’s model of the world”—in which human ingenuity is restricted and change happens rarely. History thus progresses through the ideas and actions of creative minorities reflecting local conditions (culture, geography, or even race). Applied to modernity, this view sees it rooted in Europe and spreading out to the rest of the world. On the other hand, there is “evolutionism,” where human ingenuity is common, and the same changes (e.g., agriculture) may occur spontaneously in different places. A key difference between these two views has to do with the “psychic unity of humankind.” If human beings are basically the same everywhere, then similar patterns of change can be expected in differing places, including the transition to modernity.²¹³

²¹³ Blaut writes, “What would we conceive to be a nondiffusionist world model? This would be a world in which the processes at work in any one sector are expected also to be at work in the other sectors. In essence, this model is driven by a concept of equal capability of human beings—psychological unity—in all cultures and regions, and from this argument it demands that any spatial inequalities in matters relating to cultural evolution, and more specifically economic development, be explained. Stated differently: equality is the normal condition and inequalities need to be explained. Diffusionism, in contrast, expects basic inequality between the Inner and the Outer sectors of the world—and of humanity.” J.M. Blaut, *The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1993), 11–12, 42. See also Smith, *The Concept of Social Change*. Here I leave out the more nuanced interactional view, for which Blaut himself argues. The argument is that modernity emerged not out of a condition or characteristic innate to Europe but through the interactions between it and the rest of the world, especially after 1492. Blaut, *The Colonizer's Model*, 179–213.

Yi Yŏnghun is a well-known, ardent proponent of diffusionism, although he uses the term “transplanted modernity” (*isik kŭndaeron*).²¹⁴ Articulating this thesis in *Taehan min’guk yŏksa*, he writes, “The idea of freedom was...discovered in a particular era. It was Western European civilization that discovered it and developed it into the basic idea of the state between the sixteenth and Eighteenth centuries.... The idea of freedom spread from Western Europe to East Asia.”²¹⁵ Modernity, in other words, is the fruit of European culture spread through imperialism. It is precisely this point that reconciles Yi’s enthusiasm for free markets and imperialism. Since they are a unique product of European culture, their initial establishment requires diffusion by force. This speaks to the profound contradiction at the heart of free-market capitalism, as pointed out by the likes of Karl Polanyi, where it is regarded as a “natural order,” letting the invisible hand do its work, but requires a human hand not only to create but also sustain.²¹⁶

Diffusionism is not a narrative limited to the right (as discernible in Polanyi, for example).²¹⁷ In fact, this is an aspect of Yi’s thought that goes back to his Marxist days.²¹⁸ Originally a historian of the Chosŏn period, he was a proponent of the “Asiatic mode of production” thesis, which saw historical development as irrevocably stagnant in Asia. In this regard, he developed his understanding of Chosŏn in direct opposition to Kim Yongsŏp’s “internal development theory” (*naejaejŏk palchŏllon*) in

²¹⁴ Chŏng Sŭngjin, “Nyu rait’ŭ ŭi iron kwa sasang: An Pyŏngjik Yi Yŏnghun ŭi ch’oegŭn songkwa rŭl chungsim ŭro” [Theory and thought of the New Right: Focusing on the latest works by An Pyŏngjik and Yi Yŏnghun], *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 106 (December 2017), 328.

²¹⁵ Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan min’guk yŏksa*, 32–34: 자유 이념...특정 시대에 발견되었다. 그것을 발견하고 국가의 기초 이념으로까지 발전시킨 것은 16–18 세기의 서유럽 문명이다.... 동아시아에서 자유의 이념은 서유럽에서 전파되어 온 것이다.

²¹⁶ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (USA: Beacon Press, 2001). David Harvey’s discussion of the neoliberal state in theory and practice is also relevant here. David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 64–86.

²¹⁷ Blaut points to Robert Brenner and Perry Anderson as representative diffusionist thinkers on the left. Blaut, *The Colonizer’s Model*, 58. See, for example, Robert Brenner, “The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism,” *New Left Review* 104 (1977): 25–92.

²¹⁸ As Chŏng Sŭngjin points out, it was Polanyi who influenced Yi in this regard. Chŏng Sŭngjin, “Nyu rait’ŭ ŭi iron kwa sasang,” 330–331.

the 1980s. Yi continued in the tradition of Marxist historians Kim Kwangjin, Yi Chŏngwŏn, and Chŏn Sŏktam, while Kim Yongsŏp continued in the tradition of Paek Namun and “devout stagism,” or “Stalinist universalism.” On the one hand, colonialism was seen as a means of bringing Asia back into history, and on the other, a disruption to its internally driven historical development. In Yi’s view, “Nineteenth-century Korea was backward and could not develop without an outside shock, or more bluntly, without colonization by a more advanced nation.”²¹⁹

It is interesting to note, then, that Kim Iryŏng’s narrative of Korean history—especially compared with Yi’s but also with those of other developmental state theorists—is relatively a story of internal development, with a different teleology from that of Kim Yongsŏp. This is not to say that Kim ignores the international environment—he pays particular attention to the role of the United States in contemporary Korean history, for example. It is only to say that he *ultimately* emphasizes an internalist understanding of Korea’s historical development compared to Yi. There are numerous examples of this in *Kŏn’guk kwa puguk*. He highlights the year 1963, for example, as the turning point for the Korean economic miracle, not only due to the revision of the Five Year Economic Plan—which, admittedly, involved considerable American intervention—but also because the Park and the DRP won two elections, securing “procedural legitimacy” for the developmental state, and a new government-business ruling was formed.²²⁰ This point is all the more remarkable when contrasted with Jung-en Woo’s

²¹⁹ Miller, “The Idea of Stagnation,” 9, 3–12. See also Pang Kie-chung and Michael D. Shin, eds., *Landlords, Peasants and Intellectuals in Modern Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Pak T’aegyun, “Nyu rait’ü üi tŭngjang kwa yŏksa insik nonjaeng” [The emergence of the New Right and conflicts over historical perceptions], *Hwanghae munhwa* 56 (September 2007), 289–294; Yun Haedong, “‘Sumŭn Sin’ ŭl pip’an hal su innŭn’ga? Kim Yongsŏp ŭi ‘naejaejŏk palchŏllon’” [Can “the hidden God” be criticized? Kim Yongsŏp’s “internal development thesis”] in *Yŏksahak ŭi segi: 20-segi Han’guk kwa Ilbon ŭi yŏksahak* [The century of historiography: Korean and Japanese historiography in the twentieth century], ed. To Myŏnhoe and Yun Haedong (Seoul: Humanisŭt’ŭ, 2009), 249–284; Cho Hŭiyŏn, *Tongwŏn toen kŭndaehwa: Pak Chŏnghŭi kaebal tongwŏn ch’eje üi chŏngch’i sahoejŏk ijungsŏng* [Mobilized modernity: The political-social duality of Park Chung Hee’s development-mobilization regime] (Seoul: Humanit’asŭ, 2010), 397–402; and Chŏng Sŭngjin, “Nyu rait’ü üi iron kwa sasang,” 325–350.

²²⁰ Kim Iryŏng, *Kŏn’guk kwa puguk*, 353.

emphasis on the year 1960 as the turning point of the Korean miracle, when modernization theory became the new basis of United States foreign policy in the Third World.²²¹ Kim devotes an attention to elections that cannot be found in any other developmental state account of the Park era, not to mention Yi Yŏnghun's. Another good example is Kim's explanation of the Yusin system, which focuses on social and class conflict as byproducts of industrialization as opposed to North Korean belligerence and US abandonment.

Kim's avoidance of the colonial continuity thesis, partial acceptance of the idealistic-activistic view of history, and emphasis on the internal dynamics of Korean history are all related. Conceiving of modernity as a destination to which all nations, including Britain, tread a path from developmentalism to the liberalism of industrial maturity presents history as a story of discrete units each passing through identical developmental stages. In this context, the colonial legacy is relatively marginal.

4. Discussion

One can hardly characterize Kim Iryŏng's historiography, like Yi's, as rooted in the colonial modernization thesis. To be sure, Kim did not support the "exploitation thesis" (*sut'allon*), while he did support the ideas that Chosŏn was a stagnant society and that there were certain continuities between the colonial and postcolonial developmental states. Yet these were peripheral to his work at best. More importantly, he distinguished between the *totalitarian* colonial and *authoritarian* postcolonial developmental states. This is important as totalitarianism is precisely the foil against which the successful authoritarian dictatorships of the twentieth century are described, even in Kim's work. Scholars should consider this key difference between Kim and Yi in assessing the character of New Right historiography.

²²¹ Woo, *Race to the Swift*, 73–74.

Yi views history as driven by the “invisible hand,” imagining everything will work out in the end if human beings are simply allowed to pursue their individual interests. Kim allows a place for human vision and agency to improve society, albeit only through its “childhood,” so to speak. Yi understands modernity as a process of cultural diffusion originating in Europe, whereas Kim understands it as a process that takes place primarily within societies, all of which proceed through universal stages. Yi’s historiography prioritizes capitalism over democracy and views imperialism as necessary for modernization outside Europe. Kim’s historiography understands democracy not only as important but *necessary* for a “mature” industrialized nation, the development of which requires autonomy.

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter, I compared reappraisals of dictatorship in Korea, Taiwan, and Spain. I discovered striking similarities between the Korean and Spanish cases compared to that of Taiwan. The Korean and Spanish cases were more severe. The defining feature of reappraisals of Chiang Kai-shek was their concentration abroad, in mainland China and the United States, speaking to his transnational importance as a historical figure. There were also important differences between the cases depending on the specific agendas involved. The question of serving as a “development model,” for example, was present in the Korean and Taiwanese cases but absent in the Spanish one. Meanwhile, each case involved a division of labor between professional scholars and popular writers and journalists, the former providing intellectual ammunition and the latter pursuing public dissemination. Common themes of modernizing dictatorship and anticommunism were also present, with the distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism consistently highlighted. The most important commonality was timing. For Taiwan, the year 1978, when China began its momentous reforms, was pivotal. In Korea and Spain, the year

1989 was pivotal. Korea's transition to democracy was of course also important, but it is interesting to note that Spain's history wars did not commence until the 1990s even though its transition to democracy began in 1975. This suggests the importance of the gradual abandonment of socialism between 1978 and 1991 for the "historical imagination," the interpretation of twentieth-century history, and the place of dictatorships therein.

With this point in mind, I turned to analyzing the content of these reappraisals as cases of right-wing historical revisionism. I defined right-wing historical revisionism as a particular variant of historiography with the specific, rightward oriented purpose of changing a core element of national identity, presenting four "models" in the work Ernst Nolte, François Furet, Stéphane Courtois, and Renzo De Felice. I conceptualized the dominant tropes of their work as the "civilizational war," "quixotic revolutionary," "demonic communist," and "developmental dictator," respectively. All these tropes were present across the cases but most of all Furet's quixotic revolutionary and De Felice's developmental dictator. This suggests a common historical sensibility among the cases, which attests to the need for their understanding in a transnational context; even if the reappraisals of dictatorship are about protecting vested interests and encouraging the pursuit of economic growth at the expense of egalitarian objectives, there is a common intellectual reservoir out of which these arguments are made.

In the Korean case, Kim Iryŏng, Yi Yŏnghun, and Cho Kapche all showed marked differences. Yi strongly conveyed the trope of the quixotic revolutionary, whereas Cho Kapche evinced every trope but this one, particularly emphasizing the demonic communist. This finding is all the more remarkable considering those of chapter four, in which I highlighted considerable overlap between Yi and Cho's narratives compared to Kim's. This speaks to a common prioritization of economic growth over democracy transcending any differences in historical sensibility. They share

the view, in other words, that important matters such as the national economy should not be left to democracy.

With these points in mind, I concluded with a discussion of the character of New Right historiography. Kim Iryŏng and Yi Yŏnghun have very different views of history. Yi views history as driven by the “invisible hand,” imagining that everything will work out in the end if human beings are simply allowed to pursue their individual interests. Kim allows a place for human vision and agency to improve society, albeit only through its “childhood,” so to speak. These differing sensibilities are drawn into relief in each of their perceptions of the colonial period. In the literature, the colonial modernization thesis (and Yi’s advocacy of it) are regarded as the central features of New Right historiography. Yet this thesis cannot be said to characterize Kim Iryŏng’s historiography. I explained this disparity in terms of two varying historical sensibilities: Kim espouses the activist-idealistic and Yi the passivistic-materialistic understanding of historical change; and Kim espouses an internally driven, evolutionary and Yi a diffusionist understanding of modernity. Summed up, one may say that Yi’s historiography prioritizes capitalism over democracy and views imperialism as necessary in the name of the market, whereas Kim’s historiography (at least relative to Yi’s) understands democracy not only as important but *necessary* for a “mature” industrialized nation, the development of which requires autonomy. Considering this, the fact of Yi’s emergence as the face of the New Right movement is all the more significant.

Chapter 6.

Conclusion

At a 2008 conference on the state of Korean conservatism, citing its compromising association with the incumbent Yi Myōngbak administration, Kim Iryōng declared the New Right “dead.”¹ In fact, the New Right moniker would largely fade from formal usage around this time, but its members would continue to coalesce around the issue of historiography, forming the Contemporary Korean History Association (*Han’guk hyōndaesa hakhoe*), forcing through the approval of the Kyohaksa textbook, and ultimately opting for a return to nationally standardized textbooks under Park Kūnhye.² To a greater degree even than what Kim observed in 2008, the New Right ended up an agent of the “conservative establishment” he had opposed.

Perhaps Kim should have foreseen this, considering the reception of his call for a comparative-historical evaluation of Park Chung Hee. He had sought to counter the “hegemonic offensive” of the “conservative establishment,” but his arguments ended up among its ammunition. If there is a lesson here, it pertains to the severe difficulty, if not outright futility, of writing a positive narrative of Korean history *without* shoring up the legitimacy of established power relations in Korean society. New Right historiography thus clearly failed to live up to its promise of a “third way.”

¹ Chang Yunsōn, “‘Nyu rait’ū nūn chugōtta, chongōn sōnōn haeya’: Posu chisigin Kim Iryōng kyosu chujang... Chajungjiran?” [“The New Right is dead, its end must be declared”: Conservative intellectual Professor Kim Iryōng’s argument... Infighting?], *O mai nyūsū*, November 27, 2008, http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0001020462. Kim would initiate a new movement he would call “procons,” meaning “professional conservatives.” Kim Iryōng, “Nyu rait’ū nōmō ‘p’ūrok’on’ ūro” [Beyond the New Right toward “procons”], in *P’umkyōk innūn posu rŭl kkum kuda: Ko Kim Iryōng k’allōmchip* [Dreaming of a dignified conservatism: Collected columns of the late Professor Kim Iryōng] (P’aju: Idam poksū, 2010), 95–97. Originally published in the *Chosōn ilbo*, December 13, 2008.

² See Pak T’aegyun, “Yōksa kyogwasō kukchōnghwa nonjaeng” [Debate over the nationalization of history textbooks], in *Nonjaeng ūro ingnūn Han’guk hyōndaesa* [Reading contemporary Korean history through the debates], Kim Hogi and Pak T’aegyun (Seoul: Medich’i midio, 2019), 285–291.

It is worth reemphasizing, however, that such a *potential* at least existed in the work of Kim Iryŏng. I traced his pursuit of a third way to the early-1990s disputes over Park Chung Hee initiated by Cho Kapche, whose 1993 *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* article was especially striking not so much for its arrangement of the events of contemporary Korean history in a story of neat and linear progress but insistence on the *necessity* of such a narrative. If there is one point around which conservative historiography has coalesced—New Right or not—it is this one.

The same holds for Kim Iryŏng. His turn to the right was not so dramatic (or well known) as that of an An Pyŏngjik or Sin Chiho, but there is nonetheless a similar story here. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly, but by at least 1995 he had abandoned Marxism in favor of developmental state theory. In any case, crucial to this process was his newfound interest in the relationship between industrialization and democratization provoked by Cho Kapche, culminating in his 1995 *Sasang* article. From a purely instrumentalist point of view, he argued that unconditional negation of Park Chung Hee would only help pundits like Cho, who fed off of public nostalgia for the Park era. Scholars needed to wrest away the initiative of the conservative establishment by advancing their own positive assessment, which was possible through a “comparative-historical” frame. This entreaty, however, met with indifference on the left while warmly received by the right and, notably, Cho Kapche.

Kim Iryŏng and Cho Kapche as well as Yi Yŏnghun were all conservatives espousing a positive interpretation of contemporary Korean history. Nevertheless, the precise contents of their narratives differ in significant ways that go beyond the simple fact that one was a political scientist, another an economic historian, and another a journalist. This cannot explain the striking similarities between Yi and Cho’s work compared to Kim’s, which, above all, is distinguished by its lack of a “heroic” Park Chung Hee. The extent to which Kim pays attention to Park’s personal qualities is limited to the description of his decision to pursue authoritarianism as “realistic” based on a comparative-historical

understanding of industrialization. In this respect, the common charge that New Right historiography is the same as “old right” historiography appears relatively confirmed when comparing Yi and Cho but less so when considering Kim Iryŏng.

These differences are also significant when understanding New Right historiography as a kind of right-wing historical revisionism, a particular kind of history writing that seeks to challenge key aspects of national identity from the right, discernible at the heart of “history wars” especially common since the end of the Cold War. I specifically showed the parallels between reappraisals of Park Chung Hee, Chiang Kai-shek, and Francisco Franco, drawing on four archetypes of right-wing historical revisionism in Ernst Nolte’s “civilizational war,” Francois Furet’s “quixotic revolutionary,” Stéphane Courtois’ “demonic communist,” and Renzo De Felice’s “developmental dictator.” Despite disparate local agendas, there was considerable thematic overlap between the cases, particularly in terms of the tropes of the quixotic revolutionary and developmental dictator. In other words, the reappraisals of dictatorship were mainly colored by liberal triumphalism and an emphasis on the distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Despite the differing interests and agendas in each case, there appears a common intellectual current.

Here I also emphasized the relative uniqueness of Kim Iryŏng’s brand of right-wing historical revisionism, especially compared to that of Yi Yŏnghun, who is generally treated as synonymous with New Right historiography. This difference is well highlighted in their respective attitudes toward the colonial modernization thesis. It is of course central to Yi’s historical understanding, whether concerned with the Chosŏn, colonial, or contemporary periods. Although Kim showed some receptivity to claims of Chosŏn’s stagnancy and continuity between the colonial and postcolonial developmental states, he also emphasized their different character as totalitarian and authoritarian states, while the colonial modernization thesis itself could not be more peripheral in his work.

At a deeper level, each narrative rests on a diffusionist versus stagist understanding of historical change. At the heart of Yi Yŏnghun's historical sensibility is the mystical metaphor of the invisible hand, where history has an inherent purpose that cannot be known or improved upon by human design. Nature should thus be allowed to run its course through respect for the individual (i.e., private property). This principle itself is not natural but unique to European civilization and thus required dissemination through imperialism; a "visible hand" (i.e., imperialism and authoritarianism) is ironically necessary to clear the way for the "invisible hand" to function. And since the people may wish to challenge this order, the potential necessity of imperialism and authoritarianism is ever present. At the heart of Kim Iryŏng's historical sensibility is the biological metaphor of developmental stages. Nations are imagined as individual organisms that must pass through predetermined phases. The "invisible hand" is by no means absent, but it is a spontaneous feature of a society's industrial maturity. Thus, once a society has reached this stage—primarily through its own efforts, not imperialism—there is no further need for authoritarianism. In this respect, Kim Iryŏng also parts somewhat with the conventions of right-wing historical revisionism compared to Cho Kapche and Yi Yŏnghun.

Recognizing this difference between Kim and Yi/Cho allows for a new understanding of the history of New Right historiography. The standard account—somewhat simplified—is that it was conceived in the colonial modernization thesis of the 1980s, gestated in the neoliberal triumphalism of the 1990s, emerged in 2004 in the conflict over textbooks, and colluded with the conservative establishment in a failed attempt to foist its historical narrative on the public. Yet Kim Iryŏng, for all his contempt for the left, consistently resisted these efforts, not only in principle but also practice—in his very historical sensibility. Considering this, the commonalities between Yi Yŏnghun and Cho Kapche I examined in chapter four are even more significant. In Kim Iryŏng a potential for a third way was indeed lost.

This point has implications for both the right and left. On the right, one may observe the difficulty and precariousness of trying to present a positive narrative of Korean contemporary history while maintaining distance from vested interests accrued through the colonial and Cold War (and now post-Cold War) periods. Nuance is the first victim in history wars. On the left, there are advantages in recognizing a plurality of perspectives on the right. Moving beyond the mere fact of a positive perspective, one may find opportunities for dialogue and debate.

Bibliography

- Aguilar, Paloma, and Carsten Humlebæk. "Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy: The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War." *History and Memory* 14, no. 1-2 (2002): 121–164.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C. "Modern, Anti, Post, and Neo: How Social Theories Have Tried to Understand the 'New World' of 'Our Time.'" *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 23, no. 3 (June 1994): 165–197.
- Alitto, Guy. "Chiang Kai-shek in Western Historiography." In *Proceedings of Conference on Chiang Kai-shek and Modern China*, vol. 1., 719–807. Taipei: Compilation Committee, 1987.
- . "Chiang Kai-shek in Western Historiography." In *Xifang shixue lunzhu zhong de Jiang Jieshi* [Chiang Kai-shek in Western historiography], Ai Kai. n.d., 115–201.
- Amsden, Alice H. *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Antoniou, Girosos. "The Lost Atlantis of Objectivity: The Revisionist Struggles between the Academic and Public Spheres." *History and Theory* 46, no. 4 (2007): 92–112.
- An Hyŏnhyo. "Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaeinsik e taehan chinghujŏk tokhae" [A symptomatic reading of *A new understanding of history before and after liberation*]. *Kyŏngje wa sahoe* 86 (2010): 199–232.
- An Pyŏngjik. "Nyu rait'ŭ undong ŭl chŏn'gae hamyŏ" [As the New Right movement begins]. *Sidae chŏngsin chaech'anggan ho* (2006).
- An Pyŏngjik and Yi Yŏnghun. *Taehan min'guk yŏksa ŭi kiro e sŏda: An Pyŏngjik. Yi Yŏnghun taedam* [Standing at a crossroads for the history of the Republic of Korea: A conversation between An Pyŏngjik and Yi Yŏnghun]. Seoul: Kip'arang, 2007.

- An Yŏngbae. “Tae kija Cho Kapche ŭi ‘oman kwa p’yŏn’gyŏn” [The “pride and prejudice” of eminent reporter Cho Kapche]. *Mal* 94 (April 1994): 126–133.
- Aron, Raymond. *Main Currents in Sociological Thought 2: Durkheim, Pareto, Weber*. Translated by Richard Howard and Helen Weaver. England: Penguin Books, 1971.
- Baldwin, Peter, ed. *Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians’ Debate*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1990.
- Balfour, Sebastian. “The Concept of Historical Revisionism: Spain since the 1930s.” *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 21, no. 3 (2008): 179–186.
- Banner, James M., Jr. *The Ever-Changing Past: Why All History is Revisionist History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021.
- Barr, Michal D. “Lee Kuan Yew and the ‘Asian Values’ Debate.” *Asian Studies Review* 24, no. 3 (2000): 309–334.
- Barshay, Andrew E. *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.
- Becher, Philip. “Apartheid, Authoritarianism, and Anticolonial Struggles Viewed from the Right: Critical Perspectives on A. James Gregor’s Search for Fascism in the Global South.” *Acta Academia* 54, no. 3 (2022): 108–130.
- Beeson, Mark. “The Rise and Fall (?) of the Developmental State: The Vicissitudes and Implications of East Asian Interventionism.” In *Developmental States: Relevancy, Redundancy or Reconfiguration*, edited by Linda Low, 29–40. Hauppauge, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2004.
- Benoit, Charles. “Repealing China’s Most Favored Nation Status: A Guide,” Coalition for a Prosperous America, January 11, 2023, <https://prosperousamerica.org/repealing-chinas-most-favored-nation-status-a-guide>.

- Bentley, Michael, ed. *Companion to Historiography*. London: Routledge, 1997.
- Berman, Marshall. *All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity*. New York: Penguin Books, 1988.
- Bix, Herbert P. "Regional Integration: Japan and South Korea in America's Asian Policy." In *Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945*, edited by Frank Baldwin, 179–232. New York: Pantheon Books, 1973.
- Blackbourn, David, and Geoff Eley. *Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung: Die gescheiterte bürgerliche Revolution von 1848*. Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein Materialien, 1980.
- . *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
- Blaut, J.M. *The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History*. New York: The Guilford Press, 1993.
- Blinkhorn, Martin. "Review Article: Franco, Francoism and Anti-Francoism." *European History Quarterly* 20 (1990): 293–299.
- Bosworth, R.J.B. "Explaining 'Auschwitz' after the End of History: The Case of Italy." *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999): 84–99.
- Brenner, Robert. "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism." *New Left Review* 104 (1977): 25–92.
- Buck, David D. "Jay Taylor Finds Rehabilitating Chiang Kai-shek's Reputation No Small Task." *China Review International* 17, no. 1 (2010): 1–8.
- Bunk, Brian D., Sasha D. Pack, and Carl-Gustaf Scott. *Nation and Conflict in Modern Spain: Essays in Honor of Stanley G. Payne*. Madison, Wisconsin: Parallel Press, 2008.
- Burnham, James. *The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom*. New York: The John Day Company, 1943.

- Camus, Jean-Yves, and Nicolas Lebourg. *Far-Right Politics in Europe*. Translated by Jane Marie Todd. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2017.
- Cardoso, Fernando H., and Enzo Faletto. *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
- Casanova, Julián. "History and Memory: A New Social Dimension." *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 21, no. 3 (2008): 187–202.
- . "Disremembering Francoism: What is at Stake in Spain's Memory Wars?" Translated by Linda Palfreeman and Helen Graham. In *Interrogating Fascism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain*, edited by Helen Graham, 203–222. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016.
- Casanova, Julián, and Carlos Gil Andrés. *Twentieth-Century Spain: A History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Castells, Manuel. "Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon Head: A Comparative Analysis of the State, Economy, and Society in the Asian Pacific Rim." In *States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim*, edited by Richard P. Applebaum and Jeffrey Henderson, 33–70. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1992.
- . *The Information Age, vol. 3: End of Millennium*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1998.
- Cattini, Giovanni C. "Historical Revisionism: The Reinterpretation of History in Contemporary Political Debate." *Transfer: Journal of Contemporary Culture* 6 (2011): 28–37.
- Carnoy, Martin. *The State and Political Theory*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Cenarro, Ángela. "Francoist Nostalgia and Memories of the Spanish Civil War." *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 21, no. 3 (2008): 203–217.
- Ch'a Hasun. "Han'guk yöksahak ũi yusan kwa 21-segi ũi kwaje" [The legacy of Korean historiography and tasks for the twenty-first century]. In *Han'guk yöksahak ũi sŏngkwa wa kwaje* [Fruits and

- tasks of Korean historiography], edited by Yöksa hakhoe, 17–40. Seoul: Ilchogak, 2007.
- Ch'a Sangch'öl. *Han-Mi tongmaeng 50-nyŏn* [Fifty years of the ROK-US alliance]. Seoul: Saenggak ūi namu, 2004.
- Chang, Ha-Joon. "The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea." *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 17 (1993): 131–157.
- . *The Political Economy of Industrial Policy*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- . "The Economic Theory of the Developmental State." In *The Developmental State*, edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings, 182–199. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- . *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective*. London: Anthem, 2002.
- . *Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism*. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008.
- . *23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism*. London: The Financial Times Limited, 2010.
- Chang, Ha-Joon, and Ilene Grabel. *Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic Policy Manual*. London: Zed Books, 2004.
- Chang Kwansun. "Minjuhwa 20-nyŏn, chisigin ūi chugŭm 1(2): Chigŭm, kŭ tŭl ūn ōdi e sŏ inna" [Twenty years since democratization, the death of intellectuals: Where do they stand now?]. *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, April 25, 2007, 4–5.
- Chang, Lung-chih. "Re-imagining Community from Different Shores: Nationalism, Post-colonialism and Colonial Modernity in Taiwanese Historiography." In *Contested Views of a Common Past: Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia*, edited by Steffi Richter, 139–155. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008.
- . "Telling Histories of an Island Nation: The Academics and Politics of History Textbooks in Contemporary Taiwan." In *Designing History in East Asian Textbooks: Identity Politics and Transnational*

- Aspirations*, edited by Gotelind Müller, 117–134. London: Routledge, 2011.
- . “Island Memories: Postcolonial Historiography and Public Discourse in Contemporary Taiwan.” *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity* 2, no. 3 (2014): 229–244.
- Chang, Maria Hsia. “‘Fascism’ and Modern China.” *The China Quarterly*, no. 79 (1979): 553–567.
- . “The Blue Shirts Society: Fascism and Developmental Nationalism.” PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1984.
- Chang, Woo-young. “The Cyber Balkanization and Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in Korea.” *Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia* 7, no. 2 (2008): 29–48.
- Chang Yunsŏn. “‘Nyu rait’ŭ nŭn chugŏtta, chongŏn sŏnŏn haeya’: Posu chisigin Kim Iryŏng kyosu chujang... Chajungjiran?” [“The New Right is dead, its end must be declared”: Conservative intellectual Professor Kim Iryŏng’s argument... Infighting?], *O mai nyŏsŭ*, November 27, 2008. http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0001020462.
- Checkland, S.G. “Stages and the State: How do they Relate?” In *Economics in the Long View: Essays in Honour of W. W. Rostow, vol. 1; Models and Methodology*, edited by Charles P. Kindleberger and Guido di Tella, 44–67. London: The Macmillan Press, 1982.
- Chen, Yu-fu, and Jonathin Chin. “Memorial’s Fate undecided.” *Taipei Times*, September 7, 2018. <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/09/07/2003699953>.
- Cheng, Guan Ang. “Biography and History: The Historiography of Lee Kuan Yew.” *Asian Studies Review* 43, no. 3 (2019): 544–561.
- Chibber, Vivek. “Building a Developmental State: The Korean Case Reconsidered.” *Politics & Society* 27, no. 3 (1999): 309–346.
- Chin Chunggwŏn [Jung-kwon Chin]. “Chugŭn tokchaeja ŭi sahoe: Pak Chŏnghŭi sindŭrom ŭi chŏngsin punsŏkhak” [The dead dictator’s society: A psychoanalysis of the Park Chung Hee syndrome]. In

- Kaebal tokchae wa Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae: Uri sidae ŭi chŏngch'i kyŏngjejŏk kiwŏn* [Developmental dictatorship and the Park Chung Hee era: The political-economic origins of our times], edited by Yi Pyŏngch'ŏn, 339–364. P'aju: Ch'angbi, 2003.
- . *Ne mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŭ ma* [I'll spit on your grave]. Rev. ed. Koyang-si: Kaemagowŏn, 2013.
- Chin, Jung-kwon [Chin Chunggwŏn]. “The Dead Dictator’s Society: An Analysis of the ‘Park Chung-hee Syndrome.’” In *Developmental Dictatorship and the Park Chung-hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea*, edited by Byeong-cheon Lee, translated by Eungsoo Kim and Jaehyun Cho, 294–311. Paramus, New Jersey: Homa & Seka Books, 2006.
- Cho Hŭiyŏn. *Tongwŏn toen kŭndaehwa: Pak Chŏnghŭi kaebal tongwŏn ch'eje ŭi chŏngch'i sahoejŏk ijungsŏng* [Mobilized modernity: The political-social duality of Park Chung Hee’s development-mobilization regime]. Seoul: Humanit'asŭ, 2010.
- Cho Hyŏnggŭn. “Hamnijŏk posu nŭn ŏnje ol kka? Han'guk up'a ŭi hyŏksin kanŭngsŏng e taehan t'amsaek” [When will rational conservatism emerge? Exploring the potential for innovation of the Korean right]. *Munhwa kwahak* 91 (September 2017): 160–184.
- Cho Ije and K'at'ŏ Ek'ŏt'ŭ [Carter Eckert], ed. *Han'guk kŭndaehwa, kijŏk ŭi kwajŏng* [Korean modernization: The process of the miracle]. Seoul: Wŏlgan Chosŏnsa, 2005.
- Cho Kapche [Chō Kapuchie]. *Sŏgyu sajŏng chom hwanhi apsida: Segye sŏgyu ŭi changnae wa Han'guk saram ŭi moksum* [Let’s openly understand the oil situation: The prospects for oil in the world and the lives of Korean people]. Republic of Korea: Ppuri kip'ŭn namu, 1980.
- . *7-gwanggu ŭi taedobak: Chimnyŏm ŭi oilmaen kwa haejŏ sich'u tŭrama* [The great gamble of Sector Seven: An obsessive oilman and undersea drilling drama]. Republic of Korea: Taragwŏn, 1981.

- . “Unmyōng nap'al sori: Pōma Aung San kungnip myoso amsal p'okpal sakōn” [A fated bugle call: Assassination incident at Burma's Martyr's Mausoleum for Aung San], *Wōlgan Chosōn* (November 1983): 76–93.
- . “Hiroppong chiha cheguk t'amhōm: K'oria k'ōneksyōn; Paeksaek ūi kongp'o; 'Hwait'ū t'ūraiaenggūl' ūl kada [Delving into the underworld of philopon: Korea connection; White terror; Going to the “white triangle”]. *Wōlgan Chosōn* (December 1983): 254–294.
- . “KAL e k'al ūl taenda: 'Uri ūi nalgae' e taehan ch'oech'o ūi anjōn chindan” [Putting the knife to Korean Airlines: The first ever safety assessment of “our wings”]. *Wōlgan Chosōn* (April 1984): 144–179.
- . “20-tae kungmin i anūn munjechōm: Kwamil kwa kyōngjaeng ūl mul ko taninūn 55–61-nyōn saeng peibi pum sede 5-baek 70-man myōng ūi ch'osanghwa” [The problems faced by people in their twenties: A portrait of the 5.7 million baby boomers born between 1955 and 1961 driving overcrowding and competition]. *Wōlgan Chosōn* (July 1984): 364–388.
- . “Mulchūng ōmnūn sahyōng chiphaeng” [Execution without evidence]. *Wōlgan Chosōn* (September 1984): 368–394.
- . “Yi Sūngman taet'ongnyōng chegō kyehoek: 52-nyōn 6-wōl ch'o ūi Yukpon simya hoeūi [Plan to remove President Rhee Syngman: Midnight Army Headquarters meeting in early June 1952]. *Wōlgan Chosōn* (June 1984): 251–281.
- . “10.26 simya pisang kungmu hoeūi: Sin Hyōnhwak chōn ch'ongni, Kim Ch'iyōl chōn pommū ūi chūngōn” [October 26 midnight emergency cabinet meeting: Accounts of former prime minister Sin Hyōnhwak and minister of justice Kim Ch'iyōl]. *Wōlgan Chosōn* (June 1985): 402–408.
- . “Kim Chaegyu ch'oe hu ūi nal: 'Yasu ūi maūm ūro Yusin ūi simjang ūl ssoatta' nūn Kim Chaegyu ūi sarhae simni” [Kim Ch'aegyu's final day: The psychology of Kim Chaegyu's murder,

- saying, “I shot the heart of Yusin with the mind of a wild beast”]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (June 1985): 350–401.
- . “Kim Chaegyu wa Ch’a Chich’ŏl ūi amt’u: Pu-Ma sat’ae rūl chungsim ūro han tu kwŏllyŏkcha ūi p’awŏ keim” [Kim Chaegyu and Ch’a Chich’ŏl’s feud: A power game over the Pusan-Masan uprising]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (May 1985): 210–241.
- . “Han’guk nae ūi Miguk CIA: Han’guk hyŏndaesa ūi twiankil esŏ makkang han yŏnghyangnyŏk ūl haengsa hae on yŏktae chibujang 12-myŏng ūi iryŏksŏ” [The American CIA in Korea: The professional histories of twelve branch chiefs, who have exercised tremendous influence on contemporary Korean history behind the scenes]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (February 1986): 246–287.
- . “Kim Chaegyu chaep’an ūi twinmudae: 10.26 esŏ 12.12 kkaji ūi him ūi kongbaekki tak’yument’ŏri” [Backstage at Kim Chaegyu’s trial: A documentary of the power vacuum from October 26 to December 12]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (July 1987): 294–325.
- . “Komun kwa kongjak 1: Ko Sukchong ūi kyŏlbaek chŭngmyŏngsŏ” [Torture and fabrication (part one of five): Certification of Ko Sukchong’s innocence]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (January 1987): 432–455.
- . *Komun kwa chojak ūi kisulja tŭl: Komun e ūihan in’gan p’amyŏl kwajŏng ūi silchŭngjŏk yŏn’gu* [Experts of torture and fabrication: An empirical study of the process of human destruction by torture]. Seoul: Han’gilsa, 1987.
- . “Manju esŏ tora oda” [Return from Manchuria]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (January 1987): 222–254.
- . “Panjŏng chakchŏn ūi chwajŏl” [Failed restoration]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (November 1987): 448–479.
- . “Purun kwa pulman ūi kyejŏl” [Season of misfortune and discontent]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (February 1987): 354–383.
- . *Sahyŏngsu O Hwiung iyagi* [The story of death-row inmate O Hwiung]. Seoul: Han’gilsa, 1987.

- . *Yugo! Pu-Ma sat'ae esŏ 10.26 chŏngbyŏn kkaji Yusin chŏngkwŏn ŭl punggoe sik'in hamsŏng kwa ch'ongsŏng ŭi hyŏnjang* [Deceased! On the scene of the shouts and gunfire that toppled the Yusin regime, from the Pusan-Masan affair to the October 26 coup d'état], 2 vols. Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1987.
- . “Chiyŏk kamjŏng e millin chŏngkwŏn kyoch'e” [Change of government delayed over regionalist sentiment]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (January 1988): 156–173.
- . *Chŏlmŭn kŏin ŭi ch'osang* [A portrait of a young giant] Seoul: Saemt'ŏ kan, 1988.
- . *K'oriŏn k'ŏneksyŏn* [Korean connection]. Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1988.
- . *Kukka anjŏn kihoekpu* [Agency for National Security Planning]. Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1988.
- . *Kunbu* [The military]. Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1988.
- . *Taep'okpal* [Big bang]. Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1988.
- . “An'gibu susa ŭi makhu: Sŏ Kyŏngwŏn mirip-Puk sakŏn susa rŭl tullŏsan kongan kigwan, yŏkwŏn, yadang, ŏllon ŭi sumgappŭn umjigim ŭl ch'ujŏk handa” [Behind the scenes of an ANSP investigation: Tracing the chaotic movements of security agencies, ruling and opposition members, and journalists regarding the investigation of Sŏ Kyŏngwŏn's secret visit to North Korea]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (August 1989): 232–256.
- . “Han'guk sahoe ŭi ‘munhwa taehyŏngmyŏng’: Kaltŭng kwa yokku ŭi taep'okpal sok e kaehyŏk seryŏk i chudokwŏn ŭl chabŭn Han'guk sahoe nŭn ŏdi ro ka ko inna?” [Korean society's “great cultural revolution”: Whence Korean society now that reformers have taken power amid an explosion of conflict and appetites?]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (February 1989): 222–255.
- . “Kim Hyŏnhŭi nŭn mal handa (chung): Kim Chŏngil chiryŏng ŭi naemak” [Kim Hyŏnhŭi speaks, part two: The behind-the-scenes

- story of Kim Chǒngil's order]. *Wǒlgan Chosǒn* (June 1989): 302–331.
- . “Kim Hyǒnhŭi nŭn mal handa (sang): 5-baek il e kǒlch'in Kim Hyǒnhŭi chŭngǒn” [Kim Kyǒnhŭi speaks, part one: Kim Hyǒnhŭi's testimony given over five hundred days]. *Wǒlgan Chosǒn* (May 1989): 300–347.
- . “Kim Hyǒnhŭi nŭn mal handa (wan): Kukche kongchak chǒnsǒn ŭi nat kwa pam” [Kim Hyǒnhŭi speaks, conclusion: Days and nights on the frontline of international espionage operations]. *Wǒlgan Chosǒn* (July 1989): 470–489.
- . “Pak Ch'ǒrǒn, P'yǒngyang ch'ukchǒn ch'amgwan misŭt'ǒri” [Pak Ch'ǒrǒn, Pyongyang festival observance mystery]. *Wǒlgan Chosǒn* (September 1989): 156–179.
- . “An'gibu susagwan kwa haedang chǒngch'in, kǒmsa wa pyǒnhosa turu int'ǒbyu: Kanch'ǒptan sakǒn kwa chǒngch'in” [Extensive interviews with ANSP investigators and relevant politicians, lawyers, and prosecutors: The spy ring incident and politicians]. *Wǒlgan Chosǒn* (December 1992): 228–231.
- . “An'gibu ŭi chǒngch'ikwǒn susa: Taesǒn chǒngguk ŭi noegwan, Chosǒn nodong tang susa ŭi chinhaeng panghyang” [The ANSP investigation of politicians: The direction of investigations of the detonator of the political situation surrounding the presidential election, the Korean Worker's Party]. *Wǒlgan Chosǒn* (November 1992): 100–103.
- . “Kimp'o chiha saram moksori: Segyejǒgin Ilbon ŭmhyang chǒnmun'ga Sujŭk'i Mach'ŭmi paksa ŭi punsǒk” [Underground voices in Kimp'o: Analysis by world-renowned Japanese audio expert Dr. Suzuki Matsumi]. *Wǒlgan Chosǒn* (December 1992): 28–34.
- . “Pukhan kongjak ch'ongch'aek: Yi Sǒnsil yǒin ŭi chǒngch'e” [Director of North Korean espionage operations: The identity of Ms. Yi Sǒnsil]. *Wǒlgan Chosǒn* (October 1992): 16–20.

- . *Pak Chŏnghŭi 1: Pulman kwa purun ŭi sewŏl, 1917–1960* [Park Chung Hee, vol. 1: The years of discontent and misfortune, 1917–1960]. Seoul: Kkach'i, 1992.
- . “Pak Chŏnghŭi wa Kim Yŏngsam ŭi hwahae: Kim Yŏngsam taet'ongnyŏng ŭi yŏksagwan munje” [Reconciliation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Yŏngsam: The problem with President Kim Yŏngsam's view of history]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (November 1993): 104–127.
- . “Chaebalgan e puch'ŏ” [Preface to the new edition]. In *Kukka wa hyŏngmyŏng kwa na* [The nation, the revolution, and I], Pak Chŏnghŭi, 5–19. Seoul: Chiguch'on, 1997.
- . “Che-1 pu: Ch'oehu ŭi 24-sigan; (1) Hyojason, k'abin soch'ong, pyŏktol” [Part one: The final twenty-four hours, number one: Back scratcher, carbine rifle, brick]. *Chosŏn ilbo*, October 20, 1997, 19.
- . “Cho Kapche kija ŭi habŏdŭ yŏnsu pogo 1: Han'guksa ŭi siryeong kwa chaju e taehan hwaksin; Minjujuŭi nŭn Hanŭnim i anida” [Reporter Cho Kapche's Harvard study report, part one: Faith in the pragmatism and autonomy of Korean history; Democracy is not God]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (September 1997): 254–285.
- . “Cho Kapche kija ŭi Habŏdŭ yŏnsu pogo 2: Tari rŭl palp kŏdŭn chuin irado murŏ ra” [Reporter Cho Kapche's Harvard study report, part two: A dog stepped on will bite even its owner]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (October 1997): 252–288.
- . “Cho Kapche kija ŭi Habŏdŭ yŏnsu pogo 4: Taehan min'guk i kajin illyu kukka ŭi tu chokŏn; Hancha munhwa wa kima kundan” [Reporter Cho Kapche's Harvard study report, part four: The two conditions of a first-tier nation possessed by the Republic of Korea; Hancha culture and horse-rider divisions]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (December 1997): 300–322.
- . “Cho Kapche kija ŭi Habŏdŭ yŏnsu pogo 5: Sadaejŏk munmin tŭl ŭi Taehan min'guk chugigi” [Reporter Cho Kapche's Harvard study

- report, part five: The murder of the Republic of Korea by flunkeyist civilian politicians]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (January 1998): 314–336.
- . “Cho Kapche kija ūi Habŏdŭ yŏnsu pogo 7: Haksal ūi haebu; Chŭngŭ ūi kwahak kwa Pukhan ūi ‘Yut’aein tŭl” [Reporter Cho Kapche’s Harvard study report, part seven: Dissection of genocide; The science of hatred and the “Jews” of North Korea]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (June 1998): 198–218.
- . *Nae mudŏm e ch’im ūl paet’ŏ ra: Kŭndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 1; Ch’oin ūi norae* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 1; Song of the *Übermensch*]. Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1998.
- . *Nae mudŏm e ch’im ūl paet’ŏ ra: Kŭndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 2; Chŏnjaeng kwa sarang* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 2; War and love]. Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1998.
- . *Nae mudŏm e ch’im ūl paet’ŏ ra: Kŭndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 3; Hyŏngmyŏng chŏnya* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 3; Revolution’s eve]. Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1998.
- . “Che-17 pu: Toyak ūi sidae; (15) Oe samch’on ūi chugŭm” [Part seventeen: Age of the takeoff, number fifteen: Death of a maternal uncle]. *Chosŏn ilbo*, December 30, 1999, 21.
- . *Nae mudŏm e ch’im ūl paet’ŏ ra: Kŭndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 4; Kukka kaejo* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 4; National remodeling]. Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1999.
- . *Nae mudŏm e ch’im ūl paet’ŏ ra: Kŭndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 5; Kim Chongp’il ūi ulbun* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 5; Kim Chongp’il’s pent-up anger]. Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 1999.

- . “Che-19 pu: Kim Taejung ŭl ūisik hagi sijak hada” [Part 19: Becoming aware of Kim Taejung]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (June 2000): 204–219.
- . *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 6; Maengho nŭn kanda!* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 6; The fierce tigers go!]. Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 2001.
- . *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 7; Sŏngjang sok ūi kŭnŭl* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 7; Shade amid growth]. Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 2001.
- . *Nae mudŏm e ch'im ŭl paet'ŏ ra: Kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga Pak Chŏnghŭi ūi pijang han saengae 8; Hanbando ūi chŏnun* [Spit on my grave: The tragic life of modernization revolutionary Park Chung Hee, vol. 8; War clouds over the Korean Peninsula]. Seoul: Chosŏn ilbosa, 2001.
- . “Minjok ūi taesŏsasi: Pohang chonghap chech'ŏl kŏnsŏl; Pak T'aejun, Ilbon ŭl sŏltŭk hada” [Epic of the nation; Construction of POSCO; Pak T'aejun persuades Japan]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (February 2002): 396–410.
- . “Nonmun pigyo: 1-lyu wa 3-nyu ūi Pak Chŏnghŭi p'yŏngka” [Paper comparison: First-rate and third-rate evaluations of Park Chung Hee]. *Chogabje.com*, October 27, 2005. https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=8126&C_CC=AZ.
- . “Han chang ŭro yoyak han Han'guk hyŏndaesa hŭrŭm” [A summary of contemporary Korean history]. *Chogabje.com*, March 28, 2006. https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=12548&C_CC=BB.
- . *Pak Chŏnghŭi: Han kūndaehwa hyŏngmyŏngga ūi pijang han saengae* [Park Chung Hee: The resolute life of of a modernization revolutionary], 13 vols. Seoul: Cho Kapche tat'ŏm, 2006.

- . “Kanan kwa ūi chōnjaeng esōn igyōt ūna p’ungyo wa ūi chōnjaeng esō chi ko itta” [Victory in the war on poverty but defeat in the war with affluence]. In *Hanbando ūi modūn kwollyōk e tojōn hae on ‘pan’gol kija’ Cho Kapche: Int’obyu moūm*; Chungang ilbo, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahu, Paek Chiyōn [“Contrarian reporter” Cho Kapche who has challenged all powers on the Korean Peninsula: Collected interviews; *Chungang ilbo*, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahoo, and Paek Chiyōn], edited by Cho Kapche tat’ōm, 229–266. Seoul: Cho Kapche tat’ōm, 2010.
- . “P’ūrangsū chisigin ūi Han’guk chisigin pip’an, ‘wae “Kobal” ūl oemyōn hanūn’ga” [French intellectuals’ criticism of Korean intellectuals: “Why do they ignore *The Accusation*?”]. *Chogabje.com*, March 18, 2016. http://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=65864&C_CC=AF.
- Cho Kapche and Chōng Hosūng. *Kim Hyōnhūi ūi Hanūnim* [Kim Hyōnhūi’s God]. Seoul: Kosigye, 1990.
- Cho Kapche tat’ōm. “Pak Chōnghūi e taehan se kaji sigak: Kim Iryōng, Cho Ije, Cho Kapche ūi nonp’yōng” [Three perspectives regarding Park Chung Hee: Remarks by Kim Iryōng, Cho Ije, and Cho Kapche]. *Chogabje.com*, December 30, 2015. https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=54154&C_CC=BJ.
- Cho Kapche tat’ōm p’yōnjipsil. *Chong-Buk paek kwa sajōn* [Encyclopedia of followers of North Korea]. Seoul: Cho Kapche tat’ōm, 2012.
- Chō Kapuchie [Cho Kapche]. *Kankoku o shinkan sa seta jū ichi-kakan* [Eleven days that shook Korea]. Tokyo: JICC shuppan kyoku, 1987.
- . *Kunika anzen kikakubu: Kankoku gendai-shi no kage no kenryoku!* [Agency for National Security Planning: The power in the shadows of contemporary Korean history!]. Tokyo: JICC shuppan kyoku, 1990.
- . *Boku Seiki: Kankoku kindai kakumeigo no jitsuzō* [Park Chung Hee: A true depiction of the Korean modern revolutionary]. Tokyo: Aki shobō, 1991.

- Cho T'aesŏng. "'Taedonga kongyŏngkwŏn' panbak hal nolli innŭn'ga" [Is there a logic to refute the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"]. *Sŏul sinmun*, March 10, 2005. <https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/seoulPrintNew.php?id=20050310026003>.
- Cho, Young Nam. "Democracy with Chinese Characteristics? A Critical Review from a Developmental State Perspective." *Issues & Studies* 45, no. 4 (December 2009): 71–106.
- Ch'oe Changjip [Jang-Jip Choi], Chŏng Haegu, Ryu Sangyŏng, Kim Myŏngsŏp, Kim Namsik, Ko Ch'anghun, Han Chunsang, Chŏng Misuk, Im Hŏnyŏng, Ch'oe Yŏl, Yi Hyoin, and Yi Wanbŏm. *Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi insik 4* [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 4]. Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1989.
- Ch'oe Kapsu. "Kukka, kwagŏ ŭi him, yŏksa ŭi hyoyong: Irŭnba yŏksa kyogwasŏ kaltŭng e puch'ŏ" [The state, power of the past, and use of history: On the so-called "history textbook controversy"]. *Yŏksa pip'yŏng* 85 (November 2008): 14–26.
- Jang-Jip Choi [Ch'oe Changjip]. *Democracy After Democratization: The Korean Experience*. Stanford, California: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Books, 2012.
- Chŏlmŭn yŏksa hakcha moim. *Han'guk kodaesa wa saibi yŏksahak*. [Ancient Korean history and pseudohistoriography]. Koyang-si: Yŏksa pip'yŏngsa, 2020.
- Chŏn Chaeho. *Pandongjŏk kŭndaejuŭija Pak Chŏnghŭi* [Reactionary modernizer Park Chung Hee]. Seoul: Ch'aek sesang, 2000.
- . "Han'guk kŭn.hyŏndaesa kyogwasŏ rŭl tullŏsan yŏksa insik kaltŭng yŏn'gu: Han'guk minjokchuŭi ŭi 'kyunyŏl' ŭl chungsim ŭro" [A study of the conflicts over historical perception surrounding modern and contemporary Korean history textbooks: The "rupture" in Korean nationalism]. *Han'guk kwa kukche chŏngch'i* 26, no. 3 (2010): 159–191.
- . "2000-nyŏndae Han'guk posujuŭi ŭi inyŏmjŏk t'ŭksŏng e kwanhan yŏn'gu: Nyu rait'ŭ rŭl chungsim ŭro" [A study on the

ideological characteristics of Korean conservatism in the 2000s: The New Right]. *Hyöndae chöngch'i yön'gu* 7, no. 1 (April 2014): 165–193.

Chön In'gwön. *Pak Chönghui p'yöngjön* [A critical biography of Park Chung Hee]. Seoul: Ihaksa, 2006.

Chön Pyöngdük. “‘Pak Chönghui taet'ongnyöng kinyöm saöphoe' palchok” [Commencement of the Park Chung Hee Commemoration Association]. *Maeil kyöngje*, July 27, 1999, 7.

Chön Sangin [Sang-In Jun]. “Sük'ach'ip'ol üi hyöngmyöng, T'illi üi chönjaeng, kürigo Han'guk üi kukka (I)” [Skocpol's revolution, Tilly's war, and the Korean state, part one]. *Yönse sahoehak* 12 (1991): 129–155.

———. “Pürusü Kömingsü üi Han'guk sahoe.Han'guksa üi insik [Bruce Cumings' understanding of Korean society and history]. *Han'guk kwa kukche chöngch'i* 8, no. 1 (1992): 239–280.

———. “5.10 sön'gö wa 5.30 sön'gö rül ottök'e pol köt in'ga? Kang Chönggu üi ‘5.10 sön'gö wa 5.30 sön'gö üi pigyo yön'gu' e taehan pallon” [How to think about the May 10 and May 30 elections: A critical response to Kang Chönggu's “A comparative study of the May 10 and May 30 elections”]. *Han'guk kwa kukche chöngch'i* 10, no. 1 (1994): 283–288.

———. “Sük'ach'ip'ol üi hyöngmyöng, T'illi üi chönjaeng, kürigo Han'guk üi kukka (II)” [Skocpol's revolution, Tilly's war, and the Korean state, part two]. *Yönse sahoehak* 14 (1994): 33–69.

———. “Kogae sugin' sujöngjuüi: Han'guk hyöndaesa yön'gu üi saeroun sijak” [Revisionism “in retreat”: A new start for contemporary Korean history research]. In *Sujöngjuüi wa Han'guk hyöndaesa* [Revisionism and contemporary Korean history], edited by Yu Yöngik, 259–298. Seoul: Yönse taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 1998.

———. “Pürusü Kömingsü üi Han'guk hyöndaesa ihae” [Bruce Cumings' understanding of Korean contemporary history]. *Han'guk hyöndaesa yön'gu ch'anggan ho* (1998): 153–208.

———. *Kogae sugin sujŏngjuŭi: Han'guk hyŏndaesa ŭi yŏksa sahoehak* [Revisionism in retreat: The historical sociology of contemporary Korean history]. Seoul: Chŏnt'ong kwa hyŏndae, 2001.

Chŏn Yŏnggi. “Cho Kapche ŭi p'ongnyŏkchŏk int'ŏbyu nŭn wae pullyangp'um in'ga: Naengjŏn sidae ŭi yumul in pan'gong cheiljuŭi rŭl mugi ro 'p'ongnyŏkchŏk int'ŏbyu' rŭl hae on Cho Kapche ssi. Kŭ ŭi int'ŏbyu sangp'um ŭl ilgŏ on han ilganji kija ka *Mal* e pullyangp'um kobal ŭl hae watta” [Why Cho Kapche's violent interviews are a defective product: Mr. Cho Kapche who has conducted “violent interviews” armed with the weapon that is the Cold War relic of anti-communism-supremacism; A daily reporter who has read his interviews charges in *Mal* that they are defective products]. *Mal* 97 (July 1994): 224–228.

Chŏng Chaegyŏng. *Han minjok ŭi chunghŭng sasang: Pak Chŏnghŭi taet'ongnyŏng ŭi chŏngch'i ch'ŏrhak* [The restoration thought of the Korean nation: The political philosophy of Park Chung Hee]. Seoul: Silla ch'ulp'ansa, 1979.

———. *Pak Chŏnghŭi sasang sŏsŏl: Hwiho rŭl chungsim ŭro* [Introduction to the thought of Park Chung Hee: Focusing on his writings]. Seoul: Chimmundang, 1991.

———. *Wiin Pak Chŏnghŭi* [Great man Park Chung Here]. Seoul: Chimmundang, 1992.

———. *Taet'ongnyŏng ŭi kyŏngje ridŏsip* [The economic leadership of the president]. Seoul: Han'guk kyŏngje sinmunsa, 1994.

———. *Pak Chŏnghŭi sil'gi: Haengjŏk ch'orok* [A factual record of Park Chung Hee: A summary of his accomplishments]. Seoul: Chimmundang, 1994.

Chŏng Chaejŏng. “An Pyŏngjik: Minjokchŭi esŏ kyŏngje sŏngjangjuŭi ro” [An Pyŏngjik: From nationalism to economic growth]. *Yŏksa pip'yŏng* 59 (May 2002): 204–260.

Chŏng Chihwan. “Cho Kapche *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* sajang ege ponae nŭn p'yŏnji: Ŭisim, chŭngo, ulbun ŭl pŏri ko kija chŏngsin ŭro tora

- osipio” [A letter to *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* CEO Cho Kapche: Please abandon suspicion, hatred, and rage and return to the spirit of a reporter]. *Mal* 177 (March 2001): 176–182.
- Chŏng Haegu. “Pak Chŏnghŭi sindŭrom ŭi yangsang kwa sŏngkyŏk” [Features and character of the Park Chung Hee syndrome]. In *Pak Chŏnghŭi rŭl nŏmŏ sŏ* [Overcoming Park Chung Hee], edited by Han’guk chŏngch’i yŏn’guhoe, 51–71. Seoul: P’urŭn sup, 1998.
- . “Nyu rait’ŭ undong ŭi hyŏnsil insik e taehan pip’anjŏk kŏmt’o” [A critical examination of the New Right movement’s perception of reality]. *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 76 (August 2006): 215–237.
- Chŏng Sangho. “Pak Chŏnghŭi sindŭrom ŭi chŏngch’ijŏk kiwŏn kwa kŭ silsang” [The political origins and true nature of the Park Chung Hee syndrome]. In *Pak Chŏnghŭi rŭl nŏmŏ sŏ* [Overcoming Park Chung Hee], edited by Han’guk chŏngch’i yŏn’guhoe, 72–105. Seoul: P’urŭn sup, 1998.
- . “Miguk ŭi neok’on kwa Han’guk ŭi Nyu rait’ŭ e taehan pigyo yŏn’gu: Chŏngch’aek inyŏm, net’ŭwŏk’ŭ, chŏngch’aek ŭi hyŏngsŏng mit palchŏn kwajŏng ŭl chungsim ŭro” [A comparative study of American neoconservatives and the Korean New Right: Focusing on policy ideology, networks, and policy formation and development process]. *Han’guk chŏngch’ihak hoebo* 42, no. 3 (September 2008): 167–189.
- Chŏng Sŏnghwa. “Kanhaengsa” [Publisher’s note]. In *Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn’gu ŭi chaengchŏm kwa kwaje* [Controversies and tasks of research on the Park Chung Hee era], edited by Chŏng Sŏnghwa, 5–7. Seoul: Sŏnin, 2005.
- , ed. *Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae wa Han’guk hyŏndaesa* [The Park Chung Hee era and contemporary Korean history]. Seoul: Sŏnin, 2006.
- Chŏng Sŏnghwa and Cho Kapche. *12.12 sakŏn: Chŏng Sŏnghwa nŭn mal handa* [The December 12 incident: Chŏng Sŏnghwa speaks]. Seoul: Kkach’i, 1987.

- Chông Sŭngjin. “Nyu rait’ũ ũ iron kwa sasang: An Pyôngjik.Yi Yônghun ũi ch’oegŭn songkwa rŭl chungsim ũro” [Theory and thought of the New Right: Focusing on the latest works by An Pyôngjik and Yi Yônghun]. *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 106 (December 2017): 325–350.
- Chong, Terence. “The Bicentennial Commemoration: Imagining and Re-imagining Singapore’s History.” *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2020): 323–333.
- Chông Unhyôn. “Pak Chônghŭi sidae ka kŭriun saram tŭl: Pak Chônghŭi ch’umo tanch’e ũi hwaltong kwa sŏngkyŏk” [Those who miss the Park Chung Hee era: The activities and character of Park Chung Hee commemorative organizations]. *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 23 (1993): 168–179.
- Chông Yonguk. “Han’guk ũi yŏksa kaltŭng kwa kwagŏsa chôngni: Mugŭn kaltŭng ũi sohwan in’ga sae chôngch’esŏng hyŏngsŏng ũi chint’ong in’ga” [Korea’s historical disputes and settlement of the past: Revival of old disputes or growing pains of new identity formation?]. *Yŏksa hakpo* 249 (March 2021): 1–41.
- Chu Chino. “Nyu rait’ũ ũi singmin sagwan puhwal p’ŭrojekt’ũ: Kŭndae ch’ogi sŏsul ũi munjechŏm” [The New Right’s project to revive colonial historiography: The problems in depictions of the early modern period]. *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 83 (May 2008): 297–320.
- Christofferson, Michael Scott. “An Antitotalitarian History of the French Revolution: François Furet’s *Penser la Révolution française* in the Intellectual Politics of the Late 1970s.” *French Historical Studies* 22, no. 4 (1999): 557–611.
- Chu, Shao-Kang. Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor. *Pacific Affairs* 83, no. 4 (2010): 765–766.
- Chu, Yin-wah. “The Asian Developmental State: Ideas and Debates.” In *The Asian Developmental State: Reexaminations and New Departures*, edited by Yin-wah Chu, 1–25. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

- Conrad, Sebastian. "What Time is Japan? Problems of Comparative (Intercultural) Historiography." *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999): 67–83.
- Courtois, Stéphane. "Introduction: The Crimes of Communism." In *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes Terror, Repression*, edited by Stéphane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panne, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartošek, and Jean-Louis Margolin, translated by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer, 1–31. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- Courtois, Stéphane, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panné, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartošek, and Jean-Louis Margolin, eds. *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*. Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- Crozier, Brian, with Eric Chou. *The Man Who Lost China: The First Full Biography of Chiang Kai-Shek*. London: Angus and Robertson, 1977.
- Cumings, Bruce. *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- . "The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea." In *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, 478–496. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- . *The Origins of the Korean War, vol. II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947–1950*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. *Society and Democracy in Germany*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1967.
- Danforth, John C. "The Most-Favored Nation Status of China: View from the U.S. Senate." *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)* 87 (March 31 – April 3, 1993): 436–440.

- Dapprich, Matthias. "The Historical Development of West Germany's New Left from a Politico-Theoretical Perspective with Particular Emphasis on the *Marxistische Gruppe* and Maoist *K-Gruppen*." PhD diss., University of Glasgow, 2013.
- Davies, Peter, and Derek Lynch. *The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- De Felice, Renzo. *Fascism: An Informal Introduction to Its Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, 2017.
- Deyo, Frederic C., ed. *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- Dore, Ronald. Review of *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis: A Vision for the Next Century*, by Yasusuke Murakami. *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 24, no. 1 (1998): 163–167.
- Dunphy, James J. Review of *The Franco Regime 1936–1975* by Stanley G. Payne. *Military Review* 82, no. 3 (2002): 83.
- Duus, Peter. "Introduction: History Wars in Postwar East Asia, 1945–2014." In "*History Wars*" and Reconciliation in Japan and Korea: *The Roles of Historians, Artists and Activists*, edited by Michael Lewis, 1–16. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- Ealham, Chris. "'Myths' and the Spanish Civil War: Some Old, Some Exploded, Some Clearly Borrowed and Some Almost 'Blue.'" *Journal of Contemporary History* 42, no. 2 (2007): 365–376.
- . "Review: The Emperor's New Clothes; 'Objectivity' and Revisionism in Spanish History." *Journal of Contemporary History* 48, no. 1 (2013): 191–202.
- Eastman, Lloyd E. *The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- . "New Perspectives on the History of Nationalist China." *The History Teacher* 19, no. 4 (1986): 545–557.
- Eatwell, Roger. "Universal Fascism? Approaches and Definitions." In *Fascism Outside Europe: The European Impulse against Domestic*

- Conditions in the Diffusion of Global Fascism*, edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, 15–45. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Eckert, Carter J. [K'at'ō Ek'ōt'ū]. “Total War, Industrialization, and Social Change in Late Colonial Korea.” In *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, edited by Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, 3–39. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- . *Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014.
- . *Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016.
- Eley, Geoff. “What Produces Democracy? Revolutionary Crises, Popular Politics and Democratic Gains in Twentieth-Century Europe.” In *History and Revolution: Refuting Revisionism*, edited by Mike Haynes and Jim Wolfreys, 172–201. London: Verso, 2007.
- Elster, Jon. *Making Sense of Marx*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Em, Henry [Im Helli]. “Historians and Historical Writing in Modern Korea.” In *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, vol. 5: Historical Writing Since 1945*, edited by Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf, 659–677. UK: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- . *The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea*. Duke University Press: Durham and London, 2013.
- Ethics and Public Policy Center. “China in Transition.” *C-Span*, May 22, 1989. <https://www.c-span.org/video/?7687-1/china-transition>.
- Evans, Peter B. “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State.” *Sociological Forum* 4, no. 4 (1989): 561–587.
- . *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995.

- Fenby, Jonathan. *Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the China He Lost*. London: Simon & Schuster, 2005.
- Finch, Michael. "An Interview with Professor Young Ick Lew." *Acta Koreana* 12, no. 2 (2009): 205–223.
- Findley, Cecil. Review of *The Republic of China and U.S. Policy: A Study in Human Rights* by A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang. *International Journal on World Peace* 3, no. 1 (1986): 110–112.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila. "Revisionism in Soviet History." *History and Theory* 46, no. 4 (2007): 77–91.
- "Franco Exhumation: Spanish Dictator's Remains Moved." *BBC*, October 24, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50164806>.
- Frazier, Lessie Jo. *Salt in the Sand: Memory, Violence, and the Nation State in Chile, 1890 to the Present*. USA: Duke University Press, 2007.
- Friedland, Roger. "The Gods of Institutional life: Weber's Value Spheres and the Practice of Polytheism." *Critical Research on Religion* 1, no. 1 (2013): 15–24.
- Fuchs, Eckhardt, and Benedikt Stuchtey, eds. *Across Cultural Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002.
- Fuller, Steve. *Post-Truth: Knowledge as a Power Game*. London, UK: Anthem Press, 2018.
- Fung, Edmund S.K. Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor. *The American Historical Review* 115, no. 2 (2010): 517–518.
- Furet, François. *Interpreting the French Revolution*. Translated by Elborg Forster. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- . *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century*. Translated by Deborah Furet. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999.
- Furet, François, and Ernst Nolte. *Fascism and Communism*. Translated by Katherine Golsan. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.

- Gaddis, John Lewis. "On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the Cold War." In *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, edited by Odd Arne Westad, 27–42. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Gasster, Michael. Review of *The Chinese Blue Shirt Society: Fascism and Developmental Nationalism* by Maria Hsia Chang. *The China Quarterly* 108 (1986): 715–716.
- Gay, Peter. *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx*. New York: Collier Books, 1962.
- Gellner, Ernest. "Scale and Nation." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 3, no. 1 (1973): 1–17.
- Gerschenkron, Alexander. "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective." In *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays*, 5–30. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962.
- Gerth, H. H., and C. Wright Mills. "Introduction: The Man and His Work." In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 2–74. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- Gilman, Nils. *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003.
- Gkotzaridis, Evi. "Revisionism in the Twentieth Century: A Bankrupt Concept or Permanent Practice?" *The European Legacy* 13, no. 6 (2008): 725–741.
- Gracia, Jordi. "Revisionism, a Necessary Evil." *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 21, no. 3 (2008): 247–262.
- Graham, Helen. "Writing Spain's Twentieth Century in(to) Europe." In *Interrogating Fascism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain*, edited by Helen Graham, 1–24. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016.
- Green, Robert. Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (May 2009): 62–64.

- Gregor, A. James. *The Ideology of Fascism: The Rationale of Totalitarianism*. USA: The Free Press, 1969.
- . “Fascism and Modernization: Some Addenda.” *World Politics* 26, no. 3 (1974): 370–384.
- . “Review: Professor Renzo De Felice and the Fascist Phenomenon.” *World Politics* 30, no. 3 (1978): 433–449.
- . *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979.
- . *Crisis in the Philippines: A Threat to U.S. Interests*. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1984.
- . *A Place in the Sun: Marxism and Fascism in China’s Long Revolution*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000.
- Gregor, A. James, with Maria Hsia Chang and Andrew B. Zimmerman. *Ideology and Development: Sun Yat-sen and the Economic History of Taiwan*. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1981.
- Gregor, A. James, and Maria Hsia Chang. “Nazionalfascismo and the Revolutionary Nationalism of Sun Yat-sen.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 39, no. 1 (1979): 21–37.
- . “Wang Yang-ming and the Ideology of Sun Yat-sen.” *The Review of Politics* 42, no. 3 (1980): 388–404.
- . “Chiang Kai-shek, China, and the Concept of Economic Development.” In *Proceedings of Conference on Chiang Kai-shek and Modern China*, vol. 3., 614–635. Taipei: Compilation Committee, 1987.
- Griffin, Roger. *The Nature of Fascism*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.
- . “Old Hat, New Bird.” *The Review of Politics* 62, no. 4 (2000): 844–847.
- . “Caught in Its Own Net: Post-War Fascism Outside Europe.” In *Fascism Outside Europe: The European Impulse against Domestic Conditions in the Diffusion of Global Fascism*, edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, 46–68. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

- Ha Chongmun. “Pan-Il minjokchuŭi wa Nyu rait’ŭ” [Anti-Japanese nationalism and the New Right]. *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 78 (February 2007).
- Habermas, Jürgen. “A Kind of Settlement of Damages (Apologetic Tendencies).” Translated by Jeremy Leaman. *New German Critique* 44 (1988): 25–39.
- Haggard, Stephan. *Pathways from the Periphery*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.
- . *Developmental States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Haggard, Stephan, and Tun-jen Cheng. “State and Foreign Capital in the East Asian NICs.” In *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*, edited by Frederic C. Deyo, 84–135. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- Haggard, Stephan, David Kang, and Chung-in Moon. “Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development: A Critique.” *World Development* 25, no. 6 (1997): 867–881.
- Haggard, Stephan, and Chung-in Moon. “The State, Politics and Economic Development in Postwar South Korea.” In *State and Society in Contemporary Korea*, edited by Hagen Koo, 51–93. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Hahm, Pyong-choon. “Toward a New Theory of Korean Politics: A Reexamination of Traditional Factors.” In *Korean Politics in Transition*, edited by Edward Reynolds Wright, 321–356. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975.
- Han Honggu. “Nyu rait’ŭ ui yŏksa ūisik, muŏt i munje in’ga?” [The New Right’s historical consciousness: What is the problem?]. In *Taehan min’guk ūi chŏngt’ongsŏng ūl mutta: 5-in 5-saek Han’guk hyŏndaesa t’ŭkkang* [Questioning the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea: Five different lectures on contemporary Korean history by five different people], Han Honggu, Chŏng T’aehŏn, Yi Manyŏl, Sŏ Chungsoŏk, and Chŏng Yŏngch’ŏl, 19–66. Seoul: Ch’ŏlsu wa Yŏnghŭi, 2009.

- Han, Yuna. "The New Right: Political Winds in South Korea." *Harvard International Review* 29, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 9–10.
- Han'guk minjungsa yŏn'guhoe, ed. *Han'guk minjungsa* [History of the Korean *minjung*], 2 vols. Seoul: P'ulpit, 1986.
- Ham Chaebong. "Aung San t'erŏ 30-nyŏn, Ham Chaebong Asan chŏngch'aek yŏn'guwŏnjang ŭi sabugok" [Thirty years since the Aung San Martyr's Mausoleum terror incident: Asan Institute for Policy Studies Director Ham Chaebong's eulogy for his father]. *Maeil kyŏngje*, October 6, 2013, <https://www.mk.co.kr/news/society/5737142>.
- Harrison, Carol E. "Furet, François (b. 1927)." In *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 1, edited by Daniel R. Woolf, 341–342. New York: Garland Publishing, 1998.
- Harvey, David. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Herring, Ronald J. "Embedded Particularism: India's Failed Developmental State." In *The Developmental State*, edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings, 306–334. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Hirschman, Albert O. *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991.
- Hoeveler, J. David, Jr. *Watch on the Right: Conservative Intellectuals in the Reagan Era*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.
- Hong, Lysa. "The Lee Kuan Yew Story as Singapore's History." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 33, no. 3 (2002): 545–557.
- Hong, Yun-gi. "Park Chung-hee in the Age of Democratization: A Critical Analysis of Deification Discourse on Park Chung-hee." In *Developmental Dictatorship and the Park Chung-hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea*, edited by Byeong-cheon Lee, translated by Eungsoo Kim and Jaehyun Cho, 312–338. Paramus, New Jersey: Homa & Seka Books, 2006.

- Horner, Charles. "Rising China's Forgotten Father." *Naval War College Review* 64, no. 4 (2011): 142–145.
- Heilbrunn, Jacob. "Germany's New Right." *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 6 (November/December 1996): 80–98.
- Hong Söngnyul. "'Tae'an kyogwasö' üi an'gam han yöksöl: Hyöndaesa sösul punsök" [The unendurable paradoxes of the *Alternative textbook*: Analysis of the narrative of contemporary history]. *Yöksa pip'yöng* 83 (May 2008): 335–349.
- . "Naengjön yöksa sösul kwa sangch'ö padün chayujuüi: Kyohaksa Han'guksa kyogwasö hyöndaesa sösul pip'an" [Historical narration from a Cold War perspective and injured liberalism: A critique of the narrative of contemporary history in the Kyohaksa *Korean history* textbook], *Yöksa pip'yöng* 105 (November 2013): 82–103.
- . "Yöksa chönjaeng üi söngch'al hamyö: Chöngsa. chöngt'ongsöngnon üi hamjöng" [Reflecting on the history wars: The traps of "authentic history" and "legitimacy"]. *Yöksa pip'yöng* 128 (August 2019): 302–325.
- Howe, Richard Robert. "Max Weber's Elective Affinities: Sociology within the Bounds of Pure Reason." *American Journal of Sociology* 84, no. 2 (1978): 366–385.
- Howe, Stephen. "The Politics of Historical 'Revisionism': Comparing Ireland and Israel/Palestine." *Past and Present* 168 (2000): 227–253.
- Huang, Ray [Rei Hwang]. "Chiang Kai-shek and His Diary as a Historical Source: Proposals for the Revision of Modern Chinese History." *Chinese Studies in History* 29, no. 1-2 (1995–1996): 3–176.
- . "Chiang Kai-shek and His Diary as a Historical Source, Part II." *Chinese Studies in History* 30, no. 1-2 (1996–1997): 3–185.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967.
- . *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

- Hutton, Ronald. "Revisionism in Britain." In *Companion to Historiography*, edited by Michael Bentley, 364–376. London: Routledge, 1997.
- Hwang Hön. "Kim Yöngsam taet'ongnyöng, 5.16 k'udet'a ro kyujöng" [President Kim Yöngsam defines May 16 as a coup d'état]. *MBC nyusŭ*, June 3, 1993. https://imnews.imbc.com/replay/1993/nwdesk/article/1756021_30684.html.
- Hwang, Kyung Moon. "The Irrepressibility of Teleology: The 1980s as Historiography." In *Revisiting Minjung: New Perspectives on the Cultural History of 1980s South Korea*, edited by Sunyoung Park, 46–61. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019.
- Hwang Pangyöl. "O Yönho wa Cho Kapche ka mannada" [O Yönho and Cho Kapche meet]. *Midiö onül*, May 3, 2001. <http://www.mediatoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=13630>.
- Hwang, Rei [Ray Huang]. *Chang Chesŭ ilgi rŭl ilkta: Rei Hwang ũi Chungguk kŭnhyöndaesa sasaek* [Reading Chiang Kai-shek's diary: Ray Huang's meditation on modern and contemporary Chinese history]. Translated by Ku Pömjŭn. Seoul: P'urŭn yöksa, 2009.
- Iggers, Georg G., and Q. Edward Wang, with Supriya Mukherjee. *A Global History of Modern Historiography*. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Im Chihyön [Jie-Hyun Lim]. "Han'guksa hakkye ũi 'minjok' ihae e taehan pip'anjökö kömt'o" [A critical review of the understanding of "nation" among Korean historians]. *Yöksa pip'yöng* 28 (1994): 114–137.
- , ed. *Taejung tokchae: Kangje wa tongŭi sai esö* [Mass dictatorship: Between coercion and consent]. Seoul: Ch'aek sesang, 2004.
- Im Chihyön and Yi Söngsi, eds. *Kuksa ũi sinhwa rŭl nömö sö* [Beyond the myths of national history]. Seoul: Humanisŭt'ŭ, 2004.
- Im Chihyön and Kim Yongu, eds. *Taejung tokchae 2: Chöngch'i chonggyo wa hegemony* [Mass dictatorship: Political religion and hegemony]. Seoul: Ch'aek sesang, 2005.
- , eds. *Taejung tokchae 3: Ilsang ũi yongmang kwa mimang* [Mass dictatorship: Everyday desire and delusion]. Seoul: Ch'aek sesang, 2007.

- Im Helli [Henry Em]. “Miguk nae Han’guk kŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn’gu tonghyang” [Trends in modern and contemporary Korean history research in the United States]. *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 23 (March 1997): 189–202.
- Im Hyŏkpaek. “Han’guk Nyu rait’ŭ paegyŏng kwa chŏnmang” [The background and outlook of the Korean New Right]. *Kwanhun chŏnŏl* 45, no. 4 (December 2004): 157–169.
- . “Pak Chŏnghŭi e taehan chŏngch’ihakchŏk p’yŏngka: Ridŏsip, kŭndaehwa, Yusin, kŭrigo mollak” [A political-science evaluation of Park Chung Hee: Leadership, modernization, Yusin, and downfall]. *P’yŏnghwa yŏn’gu* 20, no. 2 (2012): 51–84.
- Im Hyŏnjin and Song Hogŭn. “Chiyŏn toen ‘chŏnhwan’ kwa sijang ŭi hwansang” [A delayed “transition” and illusions of the market]. In *Simin sahoe ŭi tojŏn* [Civil society’s challenge], edited by Ch’oe Changjip and Im Hyŏnjin, 237–274. Seoul: Nanam, 1993.
- Im Kyŏngsŏk. “Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae rŭl ponŭn nun” [Perspectives on the Park Chung Hee era]. *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 74 (2009): 3–12.
- Im Taesik. “Kwagŏsa naejŏn ŭl aptu ko: Kŏdae han ŭmmo wa yakhan kori yŏtpogi” [The looming civil war over matters of the past: Jottings on a great conspiracy and the weak link in the chain]. *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 71 (May 2005): 16–31.
- . “Yŏksa munje yŏn’guso ch’angnip 20-chunyŏn ŭl majŭmyŏ: Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaeinsik ŭl p’yŏlch’ŏ pon kandan han sohoe” [On the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Institute for Korean historical studies: A brief impression upon perusing *A new understanding of history before and after liberation*]. *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 74 (2006): 10–18.
- Imatz, Arnaud. “Pío Moa: Facing the Myths and Propaganda about the Spanish Civil War—Part I.” *The Postil Magazine*, April 1, 2022. <https://www.thepostil.com/pio-moa-facing-the-myths-and-propaganda-about-the-spanish-civil-war-part-i>.

- . “Pío Moa: Facing the Myths and Propaganda about the Spanish Civil War—Part II.” *The Postil Magazine*, May 1, 2022. <https://www.thepostil.com/pio-moa-facing-the-myths-and-propaganda-about-the-spanish-civil-war-part-ii>.
- Iwasaki, Minoru, and Steffi Richter. “The Topology of Post-1990s Historical Revisionism.” Translated by Richard F. Calichman. *positions: east asia cultures critique* 16, no. 3 (Winter 2008): 507–538.
- Jayapalan, N. *Comprehensive Modern Political Analysis*. New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2002.
- Jessop, Bob. “The Developmental State in an Era of Finance-Dominated Accumulation.” In *The Asian Developmental State: Reexaminations and New Departures*, edited by Yin-wah Chu, 27–55. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
- Johnson, Chalmers. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982.
- . “Introduction.” In *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State*, 7–17. W.W. Norton & Company: 1995.
- . *Japan: Who Governs?* New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995.
- . “Social Values and the Theory of Late Economic Development in East Asia.” In *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State*, 38–50. W.W. Norton & Company: 1995.
- . “The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept.” In *The Developmental State*, edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings, 32–60. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Johnson, John J., ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962.
- Jones, Sam. “Spain Passes Law to Bring ‘Justice’ to Franco-Era Victims.” *The Guardian*, October 5, 2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/05/spain-passes-law-to-bring-dignity-to-franco-era-victims>.

- Sang-In Jun [Chŏn Sangin]. “State-Making in South Korea, 1945–48: U.S. Occupation and Korean Development. PhD diss., Brown University, 1991.
- . “The Origins of the Developmental State in South Korea.” *Asian Perspective* 16, no. 2 (1992): 181–204.
- Justia*. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/444/996>.
- Kang, Chol-Hwan, and Pierre Rigoulot. *The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag*. Translated by Yair Reiner. New York: Basic Books, 2005.
- Kang Chŏngin [Jung In Kang]. “Chŏnhwan’gi e sŏn Namhan ŭi posujuŭi” [South Korean conservatism at a crossroads]. *Kyŏngje wa sahoe* 37 (March 1998): 98–117.
- . “Posujuŭi: Pidongsŏng ŭi tongsisŏng kŭrigo moho han chŏngsanghwa” [Conservatism: The simultaneity of the non-simultaneous and ambiguous normalization]. In *Han’guk chŏngch’i ŭi inyŏm kwa sasang: Posujuŭi, chayujuŭi, minjokchuŭi, kŭpchinjuŭi* [The ideologies and thought of Korean politics: Conservatism, liberalism, nationalism, and radicalism], Kang Chŏngin, Kim Suja, Mun Chiyŏng, Chŏng Sŭnghyŏn, and Ha Sangbok, 35–119. Seoul: Humanit’asŭ, 2009.
- Kang Chunman. “‘Kukka anbo’ rŭl p’anŭn sangŏpchuŭi: Sanghwang ttara pyŏnsin kŏdŭp hamyŏ ‘sae sangp’um’ kaebal” [Commercialism selling national security: Developing “new products” by repeatedly changing according to the situation]. *Han’gyŏre* 21 16 (July 7, 1994): 18–19.
- . “Cho Kapche p’yŏnjipchangnim, chŏngmal Kŭramsi rŭl asimnikka?” [Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche, do you really know Gramsci?]. *Inmul kwa sasang* 9 (January 1999): 22–36.
- . “‘Pak Chŏnghŭi sindŭrom’ ŭl haebu handa” [Diagnosing the “Park Chung Hee syndrome”]. *Inmul kwa sasang* (February 1999): 28–43.

- . “Cho Kapche ūi ‘sasil mulsinjuūi’: ‘Chok’un’ ūl asimnikka?” [Cho Kapche’s “fetishism of facts”: Do you know the “Chocoon”?]. In “Kang Chunman ūi in’ganhak sajōn” [Kang Chunman’s anthropological dictionary]. *Inmul kwa sasang* (July 2005), 158–160.
- Kang Hŭich’ŏl. “‘Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae’ hakkye p’yŏngka sŏngjang-minjuhwa sai ‘ch’ungdol” [“Collision” between the growth and democratization evaluations of the “Park Chung Hee era” in academia]. *Han’gyŏre*, April 2, 1996, 15.
- Kang, Jung In [Kang Chŏngin]. “The Dilemma of Korean Conservatism.” *Korea Journal* 45, no. 1 (March 2005): 202–232.
- . *Contemporary Korean Political Thought and Park Chung-hee*. London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017.
- Kang Kyuhyŏng. “Ch’umosa: Kŭdae nŭn kŭ saram ūl kajŏnnŭn’ga? Kim Iryŏng kyosu rŭl ponaemyŏ” [Eulogy: Doth thou have that one? Bidding farewell to Professor Kim Iryŏng]. In *Kŏn’guk kwa puguk: Yi Sŭngman.Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae ūi chaechomyŏng* [Founding a nation and enriching a nation: Shedding new light on the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee eras], Kim Iryŏng, 473–481. Seoul: Kip’arang, 2010.
- Kang Kyuhyŏng, Kim Yŏngho, Kim Iryŏng, Pak Hyojong, An Hyeri, Chŏn Sangin, and Hong Chŏngsŏn. *Kŏn’guk 60-nyŏn: Widae han kungmin, saeroun kkum* [Sixty years since the founding of a nation: Great citizens, a new dream]. Seoul: Munhwa ch’eyuk kwan’gwangbu, 2008.
- Kang Man’gil. *Pundan sidae ūi yŏksa insik: Kang Man’gil saronchip* [Historical understanding of the age of division: A collection of the historical essays of Kang Man’gil]. Seoul: Ch’angjak kwa pip’yŏngsa, 1978.
- . *Koch’ŏ ssŭn Han’guk hyŏndaesa* [Rewritten contemporary Korean history. Seoul: Ch’angjak kwa pip’yŏng, 1994.
- Kang Man’gil, Kim Kwangsik, Hong Insuk, Kim Namsik, Im Chongguk, Pak Hyŏnch’ae, Hwang Hansik, Chang Sanghwan, Sŏng Hanp’yo,

- Im Hŏnyŏng, Kim Yunsik, and Yi Kwnagho. *Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi insik 2* [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 2]. Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1985.
- Kaplan, Robert D. "Mao Won the Battle, Chiang Kai-shek Won the War." *Foreign Policy*, March 24, 2014. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/24/mao-won-the-battle-chiang-kai-shek-won-the-war>.
- Kasza, Gregory J. "Fascism from Above? Japan's *Kakushin* right in Comparative Perspective." In *Fascism Outside Europe: The European Impulse against Domestic Conditions in the Diffusion of Global Fascism*, edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, 183–232. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Kaye, Harvey J. [Habi Kei]. *The Powers of the Past: Reflections on the Crisis and the Promise of History*. Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
- K'ei, Habi [Harvey Kaye]. *Kwagŏ ŭi him: Yŏksa ŭisik, kiŏk kwa sangsangnyŏk* [The powers of the past: Reflections on the crisis and the promise of history]. Seoul: Samin, 2004.
- Kennedy, Paul. Review of *Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung: Die gescheiterte bürgerliche Revolution von 1848*, by David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley. *The Journal of Modern History* 54, no. 1 (1982): 176–179.
- Ki, Kyoung-ryang. "Pseudo-history and Historical Fascism." *Journal of Northeast Asian History* 14, no. 2 (Winter 2017): 189–214.
- Kim, Baek Yung. "Korean Studies between the Social Sciences and Historical Studies: Debates over Modern and Contemporary History." *Korea Journal* 51, no. 3 (Autumn 2011): 104–139.
- Kim, Byung-Kook. "The Leviathan: Economic Bureaucracy under Park." In *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, edited by Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, 201–232. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011.
- Kim Ch'igwan. "Nyu rait'ŭ, kŭ tŭl ŭn nugu in'ga?" [The New Right: Who are they?]. *T'ongil nyusŭ*, May 15, 2006. <https://www.tongilnews>

.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=64970.

Kim Chonghyök. “‘Kungmin ŭl soginŭn kŏl ro mök ko sanŭn saram tŭl i nŏmu mant’a” [“There are too many people making a living off of lying to the people”]. In *Hanbando ŭi modŭn kwollyök e tojŏn hae on ‘pan’gol kija’ Cho Kapche: Int’öbyu moŭm*; Chungang ilbo, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahu, Paek Chiyŏn [“Contrarian reporter” Cho Kapche who has challenged all powers on the Korean Peninsula: Collected interviews; *Chungang ilbo, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahoo, and Paek Chiyŏn*], edited by Cho Kapche tatk’öm, 125–146. Seoul: Cho Kapche tatk’öm, 2010.

Kim Chŏngin. *Yöksa chŏnjaeng, kwagŏ rŭl haesök hanŭn ssaum* [History war: A fight over interpretation of the past]. Seoul: Ch’aek sesang, 2016.

———. “Chŏnhyang uik punsök: ‘Puk’ e kŭn’gŏ han p’ŭreim kwa kwŏllyök yongmang” [Analysis of rightist converts: A frame based on the “North” and desire for power]. *Munhwa kwahak* 91 (September 2017): 84–105.

Kim Chŏngnyom. *A, Pak Chŏnghŭi: Kim Chŏngnyŏm chŏngch’i hoegorok* [Ah, Park Chung Hee: The political memoirs of Kim Chŏngnyŏm]. Seoul: Chungang M&B, 1997.

Kim Chŏngsu. “Pijŏn innŭn maejil ro surŏng e ppajin nara kŏnjoyŏtta” [A nation in a quagmire was saved through a visionary remonstrance]. *Wŏlgan chungang* (November 1994): 128–137.

Kim, Dae Jung. “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values.” *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (1994): 189–194.

Kim Hogi. “Pip’anjök sigak esŏ pon Nyu rait’ŭ undong” [The New Right movement viewed from a critical perspective]. *Kwanhun chŏnŏl* 45, no. 4 (2004), 148–156.

———. “2000-nyŏn ihu ŭi posu seryök: Sugujök posu wa Nyu rait’ŭ sai esŏ” [Conservatives since 2000: Between hardline conservatives and the New Right]. *Kiök kwa chŏnmang* 12 (2005): 68–79.

- . “Nyu rait’ü nonjaeng” [The New Right debate]. In *Nonjaeng ũro ingnŭn Han’guk hyōndaesa* [Reading contemporary Korean history through the debates], Kim Hogi and Pak T’aegyŭn, 277–283. Seoul: Medich’i midiŏ, 2019.
- Kim, Hyung-A. *Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961–79*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005.
- . “State Building: The Military Junta’s Path to Modernity through Administrative Reforms.” In *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, edited by Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, 85–111. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011.
- Kim, Hyung-A, and Clark W. Sorensen. “Introduction.” In *Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961–1979: Development, Political Thought, Democracy, and Cultural Influence*, edited by Hyung-A Kim and Clark W. Sorensen, 3–16. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011.
- Kim Iryōng. “Kukka toch’ul nonjaeng: Kŭ sōngkwa wa munjechōm mit haegyōl palsang” [The state derivation debate: Its fruits, problems, and a proposed solution]. Master’s thesis, Sōnggyun’gwan taehakkyo taehagwōn, 1985.
- . “Kŭrisŭ e issō sō chōngch’i ch’eje ũi pyōndong kwa minjuhwa ũi chōnmang” [Changes in the political regime and the outlook for democratization in Greece]. *Sahoe kwahak* 27, no. 2 (1988): 95–127.
- . “Marŭk’ŭsŭjuŭi wa chōngch’aek” [Marxism and policy]. In *Hyōndae sasang kwa chōngch’aek* [Contemporary thought and policy], edited by Sōnggyŭn’gwan taehakkyo sahoe kwahak yōn’guso, 101–149. Seoul: Taeyōng munhwasa, 1989.
- . “Pokchi kukka wa chōngch’i” [The welfare state and politics]. In *Chōngch’ihak kangjwa 1: Hyōndae chabonjuŭi chōngch’i iron* [Lecture in political science, no. 1: Political theory of contemporary capitalism], edited by Han’guk chōngch’i yōn’guhoe, 201–222. Seoul: Paeksan sōdang, 1989.

- . “Tokchŏm chabonjuŭi wa chŏngch’i” [Monopoly capitalism and politics]. In *Hyŏndae chabonjuŭi chŏngch’i iron* [A political theory of contemporary capitalism], edited by Han’guk chŏngch’i yŏn’guhoe, 155–199. Seoul: Paeksan sŏdang, 1989.
- . “4.19 hyŏngmyŏng ŭi chŏngch’isajŏk ŭimi” [The political-historical significance of the April 19 revolution]. In *Hyŏndaesa rŭl ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga 3* [How to think about contemporary history, vol. 3], edited by Tonga ilbosa chosa yŏn’gusil, 87–112. Seoul: Tonga ilbosa, 1990.
- . “Marŭk’ŭsŭjuŭi chŏngdang nonŭi” [The Marxist debate over political parties]. *Chung-So yŏn’gu* 14, no. 2 (1990): 187–218.
- . “Hyŏndae chabonjuŭi e kwanhan t’eje tŭl” [Theses on contemporary capitalism]. In *Hyŏndae kukche chŏngch’iron: Kukche kwan’gye chŏngch’i kyŏngjehak* [Theory of contemporary international politics: The political economy of international relations], edited by Yun Kŭnsik, 151–170. Seoul: Taewangsa, 1991.
- . “Yi Sŭngman t’ongch’igi chŏngch’i ch’eje ŭi sŏngkyŏk e kwanhan yŏn’gu” [A study on the character of the political regime under Yi Sŭngman]. PhD diss., Sŏnggyun’gwan taehakkyo, 1991.
- . “Han’guk kukka sŏngkyŏk nonŭi e kwanhan pangbŏmnonjŏk chaego: Kukka e kwanhan kijon nonŭi tŭl ŭi ch’usang sujun kubun munje rŭl chungsim ŭro” [A methodological reconsideration of the debate over the character of the South Korean state: Focusing on the problem of differentiation at the abstract level in existing debates regarding the state]. *Kyŏngje wa sahoe* 17 (1993): 195–250.
- . “Kye-gŭp kujo, kukka, chŏnjaeng kŭrigo chŏngch’i palchŏn: B. Moore t’eje ŭi Han’guk chŏgyong kanŭngsŏng e taehan yebijŏk koch’al” [Class structure, the state, and war and political development: A preliminary analysis of the applicability of Barrington Moore’s thesis to the Korean case]. *Han’guk chŏngch’ihak hoebo* 26, no. 2 (April 1993): 215–239.

- . “Pusan chŏngch’i p’adong ŭi chŏngch’isajŏk ŭimi” [The significance of the Pusan Political Crisis for political history]. *Han’guk kwa kukche chŏngch’i* 9, no. 1 (1993): 31–66.
- . “Kukka iron kwa Han’guk kukka yŏn’gu ŭi tonghyang kwa chŏnmang: Ch’usang sujun kubun munje rŭl chungsim ŭro” [State theory and trends and prospects in research on the South Korean state: Focusing on the problem of differentiation at the abstract level]. In *Sahoe kwahak ŭi tonghyang kwa chŏnmang* [Trends and prospects in social science], edited by Sŏnggyun’gwan taehakkyo sahoe kwahak yŏn’guso, 59–125. Seoul: Hanul, 1994.
- . “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eje 18-nyŏn ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga” [How to think about the eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime], paper presented at the 1994 Yŏllye haksul taehoe [Annual academic conference] of the Han’guk chŏngch’i hakhoe [Korean political science association], 1994.
- . “Han’guk e issŏ sanŏphwa wa minjuhwa ŭi sanggwan gwan’gye: Han’guk ŭi palchŏn kyŏnghŏm i ch’aji hanŭn segyesajŏk wisŏng kyumyŏng ŭl chungsim ŭro” [The relationship between industrialization and democracy in the Korean case: Focusing on identifying the world-historical status of Korea’s development experience]. *Sahoe kwahak* 34, no. 2 (1995): 83–133.
- . “Nongji kaehyŏk, 5.30 sŏn’gŏ, kŭrigo Han’guk chŏnjaeng” [The land reforms, May 30 election, and Korean War]. *Han’guk kwa kukche chŏngch’i* 11, no. 1 (1995): 301–335.
- . “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eje 18-nyŏn, ottŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga” [How to think about the eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime]. *Sasang* 27 (December 1995): 208–256.
- . “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eje 18-nyŏn: Palchŏn kwajŏng e taehan punsŏk kwa p’yŏngka” [The eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime: An analysis and evaluation of the development process]. *Han’guk chŏngch’i hakhoebo* 29, no. 2 (December 1995): 181–215.

- . “Chungguk kongsanjuŭi ŭi palsaeng kwa chŏn’gae: Mo T’aekdong sidae” [The emergence and development of Chinese communism: The Mao Zedong era]. In *Maksŭjuŭi wa minjujuŭi* [Marxism and democracy], edited by Yun Kunsik, Kim Iryŏng, and Pak Hyŏngjung, 294–334. Seoul: Sŏnggyun’gwan taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1996.
- . “Han’guk ŭi chŏngch’i.kyŏngjejŏk palchŏn kyŏnghŏm kwa kŭ segyesajŏk wisang: Sanŏphwa wa minjuhwa ŭi sanggwon kwan’gye rŭl chungsim ŭro” [The Korean experience of political and economic development and its world-historical status: Focusing on the relationship between industrialization and democratization]. In *Hyŏndae Han’guk chŏngch’iron* [Theory of contemporary Korean politics], edited by Yi Ujin and Kim Sŏngjin, 453–512. Seoul: Sahoe pip’yŏngsa, 1996.
- . “Pak Chŏnghŭi 18-nyŏn kŭngjŏng haeya handa: ‘Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eye 18-nyŏn ōttŏk’e pol kŏt in’ga’ (*Sasang* 1995-nyŏn kyŏul ho kejae) yoyak” [The eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime must be affirmed: Summary of “How to think about the eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime” (featured in the fall 1995 issue of *Sasang*)]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (March 1996): 552–559.
- . “Segi ŭi chŏnhwan’gi ŭi chabonjuŭi insik kwa kukka: Chojikhwa toen chabonjuŭiron kwa tokchŏm chabonjuŭiron” [Perception of capitalism and the capitalist state at the turn of the century: The theories of organized capitalism and monopoly capitalism]. In *Maksŭjuŭi wa minjujuŭi* [Marxism and democracy], edited by Yun Kunsik, Kim Iryŏng, and Pak Hyŏngjung, 103–157. Seoul: Sŏnggyun’gwan taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1996.
- . “Hyŏndae chabonjuŭiron ŭi chejoryu: Hugi chabonjuŭi, (t’al)chojikhwa toen chabonjuŭi, kukka tokchŏm chabonjuŭi kŭrigo p’osŭt’ŭ P’odŭjuŭi” [The currents in contemporary theory of capitalism: Late capitalism, (post-)organized capitalism, state-monopoly capitalism, and post-Fordism]. In *Maksŭjuŭi wa minjujuŭi* [Marxism and democracy], edited by Yun Kunsik, Kim Iryŏng, and

- Pak Hyŏngjung, 158–190. Seoul: Sŏnggyun'gwan taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 1996.
- . “Han'guk kwŏnwijuŭi ch'eje ŭi sŏngkyŏk kwa pyŏnhwa: Purwanjŏn p'ogwarhyŏng, irin chibae ha ŭi kwallyo uwihyŏng, kŭrigo pangŏjŏk kŭndaehwa rŭl wihan tongwŏnhyŏng” [The character of and changes in Korea's authoritarian regime: Incomplete-comprehensive-type, bureaucratic-supremacy-under-one-person-rule-type, and mobilization-for-defensive-modernization-type]. In *Tongasia ŭi chŏngch'i ch'eje* [The political system of East Asia], edited by Kim Yŏngmyŏng, 193–233. Ch'unch'ŏn-si: Hallim taehakkyo Asia munhwa yŏn'guso, 1998.
- . “Naengjon=pundan, palchŏn chihyang kukka kŭrigo kyŏngje: Han'guk ŭi kyŏnghŏm ŭl chungsim ŭro” [The Cold War as division, the developmental state, and economic development: Focusing on the Korean experience]. *T'ongil munje yŏn'gu* 30 (1998): 39–60.
- . “‘Yi Sŭngman sujŏngjuŭi' e taehan sujŏng” [A revision of “Rhee Syngman revisionism”]. *Han'guk hyŏndaesa yŏn'gu ch'anggan ho* (1998), 383–393.
- . “Pak Chŏnghŭi, ottŏk'e pol kŏt in'ga” [How to think about Park Chung Hee]. *Chosŏn ilbo*, October 26, 1999, 6.
- . “1960-nyŏndae Han'guk palchŏn kukka ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng: Such'ul chihyanghyŏng chibae yŏnhap kwa palchŏn kukka ŭi mulchŏk kich'o ŭi hyŏngsŏng ŭl chungsim ŭro” [The process of the formation of the Korean developmental state in the 1960s: Focusing on the export-orientation-type ruling coalition and formation of the material basis of the developmental state]. *Han'guk chŏngch'i hakhoebo* 33, no. 4 (February 2000): 121–143.
- . “Han'guk ŭi kŭndaesŏng kwa palchŏn kukka” [Korea's modernity and the developmental state]. *Sahoe kwahak* 39, no. 1 (2000): 37–84.
- . “Han'guk esŏ palchŏn kukka ŭi kiwŏn, hyŏngsŏng kwa palchŏn kŭrigo chŏnmang” [The origins, formation, development, and

- outlook of Korea's developmental state]. *Han'guk chŏngch'i oegyosa nonch'ong* 23, no. 1 (2001): 87–126.
- . “Han'guk ŭi kyŏngje palchŏn kwa palchŏn kukka e taehan yŏksajŏk somyo: J. U, *Sokto kyŏngjaeng: Han'guk sanŏphwa esŏ ŭi kukka wa kŭmyung* [Korea's economic development and a historical sketch of the developmental state: Jung-en Woo, *Race to the swift: State and finance in Korean industrialization*]. In *Haeoe Han'gukhak p'yŏngnon 3* [Critical review of Korean Studies abroad, vol. 3], edited by Yŏnse taehakkyo hyŏndae Han'gukhak y'ŏn'guso, 71–89. Seoul: Ilchogak, 2002.
- . *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk: Hyŏndae Han'guk chŏngch'isa kangŭi* [Founding a nation and enriching a nation: A lecture on contemporary Korean political history]. Saenggak ŭi namu, 2004.
- . “Han'guk, sŏnggong ŭi yŏksa” [Korea, a history of success]. In *21-segi Han'guk: Chayu, chinbo kŭrigo pŏnyŏng ŭi kil* [Twenty-first-century Korea: The path to liberty, progress, and prosperity], edited by Pok Kŏil, Kim Chŏnggho, and Pak Hyojong, 129–145. P'aju: Nanam ch'ulp'an, 2005.
- . “Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn'gu ŭi chaengchŏm kwa kwaje” [Controversies and tasks of research on the Park Chung Hee era]. In *Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn'gu ŭi chaengchŏm kwa kwaje* [Controversies and tasks of research on the Park Chung Hee era], edited by Chŏng Sŏnghwa, 11–40. Seoul: Sŏnin, 2005.
- . “Pak Chŏnghŭi-sik kaebal model ũn segyesa ŭi wŏlli” [Park Chung Hee's development model was a principal of world history]. *Chogabje.com*, October 16, 2005. https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=7898&C_CC=AZ.
- . “Yi Sŭngman taet'ongnyŏng kwa kŭndae kungmin kukka ŭi kŏnsŏl” [President Rhee Syngman and the construction of a modern nation state]. In *Han'guk Hyŏndaesa: Chinsil kwa haesŏk* [Contemporary Korean history: Truth and interpretation], edited by Chŏn Sangin, 13–62. P'aju: Nanam ch'ulp'an, 2005.

- . “Chönsi chöngch’i chaejomyöng: Pusan chöngch’i p’adong üi tach’awönsöng e taehan pokhapchök ihae” [A reconsideration of wartime politics: A complex understanding of the multidimensionality of the Pusan Political Crisis]. In *Haebang chönhusa üi chaeinsik 2* [A new understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 2], edited by Pak Chihyang, Kim Ch’öl, Kim Iryöng, and Yi Yöngghun, 215–257. Seoul: Ch’aek sesang, 2006.
- . “Nongji kaehyök üi tullössan sinhwa üi haech’e” [Dissolution of myths surrounding the land reforms]. In *Haebang chönhusa üi chaeinsik 2* [A new understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 2], edited by Pak Chihyang, Kim Ch’öl, Kim Iryöng, and Yi Yöngghun, 295–343. Seoul: Ch’aek sesang, 2006.
- . “Yi Söngman chöngbu üi sanöp chöngch’aek kwa rent’ü ch’ugu kürigo kyöngje palchön” [The Rhee Syngman government’s industrial policy, rent-seeking, and economic development]. *Segye chöngch’i* 8, no. 2 (2007): 171–202.
- . “Taehan min’guk kôn’guk üi yöksajök kwajöng” [The historical process of the founding of the Republic of Korea]. In *Taehan min’guk kôn’guk 60-nyön üi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of the sixty years since the founding of the Republic of Korea], edited by Kim Yönggho, 39–73. Seoul: Kip’arang, 2008.
- . “Kyunhyöng chaphin yöksagwan ün sönjinhwa üi chönje” [A balanced view of history is a prerequisite for advancement]. In *Sönjinhwa kyosil* [Advancement classroom], edited by Yi Söngghun, 88–93. Seoul: Han’guk sönjinhwa p’oröm, 2009.
- . *Kôn’guk kwa puguk: Yi Söngman.Pak Chöngghüi sidae chaejomyöng* [Founding a nation and enriching a nation: Shedding new light on the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee eras]. Seoul: Kip’arang, 2010.
- . “Nyu rait’ü nömmö ‘p’ürok’on’üro” [Beyond the New Right toward “procons”]. In *P’umkyök innün posu rül kkum kuda: Ko Kim Iryöng k’allömmchip* [Dreaming of a dignified conservatism: Collected

- columns of the late Professor Kim Iryŏng], 95–97. P’aju: Idam poksŭ, 2010.
- . *P’umkyŏk innŭn posu rŭl kkum kuda: Ko Kim Iryŏng kyosu k’allŏmchip* [Dreaming of a dignified conservatism: Collected columns of the late Professor Kim Iryŏng]. P’aju: Idam poksŭ, 2010.
- . “Taehan min’guk 50-nyŏn: Ch’ongni wisang” [Fifty years of the Republic of Korea: The status of the prime minister]. In *P’umkyŏk innŭn posu rŭl kkum kuda: Ko Kim Iryŏng kyosu k’allŏmchip* [Dreaming of a dignified conservatism: Collected columns of the late Professor Kim Iryŏng], 178–181. P’aju: Idam poksŭ, 2010.
- . *Han’guk hyŏndae chŏngch’isaron* [History of contemporary Korean politics]. Edited by Kim Tojung. Seoul: Nonhyŏng, 2011.
- . “Pak Chŏnghŭi ch’eje 18-nyŏn” [The eighteen-year Park Chung Hee regime]. In *Han’guk hyŏndae chŏngch’isaron* [Korean contemporary political history], edited by Kim Tojung, 227–274. Seoul: Nonhyŏng, 2011.
- Kim Kapsik. “Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn’gu kyŏnghyang kwa chaejom-yŏng” [Research trends, and a reexamination, of the Park Chung Hee era]. *Han’guk chŏngch’i yŏn’gu* 16, no. 1 (2007): 81–110.
- Kim Kibong. “Yŏksa kyogwasŏ nonjaeng ŏttŏk’e hal kŏt in’ga: Yŏksa ŭi chŏngch’ihwa esŏ chŏngch’i ŭi yŏksahwa ro ŭi chŏnhwan ŭl wihayŏ” [How should we deal with the history textbook disputes? For a transition from the politicization of history to the historicization of politics]. *Yŏksa hakpo* 198 (June 2008): 379–406.
- . “Miguk ŭi yŏksa chŏnjaeng e pich’wŏ ponŭn Han’guksa kyogwasŏ nonjaeng” [The Korean history textbook disputes in light of history wars in the United States]. *Ch’ŏrhak kwa hyŏnsil* 90 (September 2011): 32–45.
- Kim Kihyŏp. *Nyu rait’ŭ pip’an* [Critique of the New Right]. P’aju: Tolbegae, 2008.
- Kim Namsik, Yi Chongsŏk, Kim Chuhwan, Kim Yongbok, Pak Chaegwŏn, Pak Hyŏnsŏn, Im Chinyŏng, and Anna Ruisŭ Sŭt’ŭrong [Anna

- Louise Strong]. *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik 5* [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 5]. Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1989.
- Kim Pyŏnggon, “Han'guk posujuūi ūi inyŏmjok t'ŭkching: Kŭndaehwa wa ūi kwan'gye rŭl chungsim ūro” [The ideological characteristics of Korean conservatism: The relationship with modernization]. *Yŏksa pip'yŏng* 95 (May 2011): 8–35.
- Kim Sejung. “5.16: Sanŏphwa minjokchuūi hyŏngmyŏng [May 16: Industrialization-nationalism revolution]. In *Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae yŏn'gu ūi chaengchŏm kwa kwaje* [Controversies and tasks of research on the Park Chung Hee era], edited by Chŏng Sŏnghwa, 41–98. Seoul: Sŏnin, 2005.
- . “Taehan min'guk ūi pparŭn minjuhwa” [The Republic of Korea's rapid democratization]. In *Taehan min'guk kŏn'guk 60-nyŏn ūi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of the sixty years since the founding of the Republic of Korea], edited by Kim Yŏngho, 225–252. Seoul: Kip'arang, 2008.
- . “Han'guk ūi apch'uk minjuhwa: Yŏksa kujojŏk chŏpkŭn” [Korea's compressed democratization: A structuralist-historical approach]. In *Taehan min'guk kŏn'guk ūi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of the founding of the Republic of Korea], edited by Yi Inho, Kim Yŏngho, and Kang Kyuhyŏng, 749–805. Seoul: Kip'arang, 2009.
- . “‘P'osŭt'ŭ sujŏngjuūi' ūi kisu, Kim Iryŏng kyosu ūi hangmun segye rŭl hoego handa: Kŏn'guk kwa puguk, Han'guk hyŏndae chŏngch'isaron ūl chungsim ūro [Remembering the scholarship of Professor Kim Iryŏng, flag bearer for post-revisionism: Focusing on *Founding a nation and enriching a nation* and *History of contemporary Korean politics*]. In *Ko Kim Iryŏng kyosu sŏgŏ ch'umo semina mit Chosŏn chŏngch'i ūi saeroun ihae* [Seminar in remembrance of the late Professor Kim Iryŏng and a new understanding of Chosŏn politics], materials for the seminar held by Han'guk chŏngch'i oegyosa hakhoe on November 30, 2019, 1–8.

- Kim Söngbo, “Kaltüŋ kwa pulsın üi sidae e Nam-Buk hyöndaesa rül tasi ingnūnda” [Re-reading South and North Korean contemporary history in the age of conflict and distrust]. *Ch’angjak kwa pip’yöŋ* 35, no. 1 (March 2007): 388–402.
- Kim Söngjin, ed. *Pak Chöŋghüi sidae* [The Park Chung Hee era]. Seoul: Chosön ilbosa, 1994.
- Kim Taehwan. “Pak Chöŋghüi chöŋkwön üi kyöŋje kaebal: Sinhwa wa hyönsil” [The economic development of the Park Chung Hee regime: Myth and reality]. *Yöksa pip’yöŋ* 23 (1993): 48–63.
- Kim T’aejin and Ch’ae Ryöŋ. “‘Irül ke kajang manūn Kim Chöŋgil ün chönmyöŋjön mot’ae... Küröna chönjaeng chunbi haeya” [Kim Chöŋgil, who has the most to lose, cannot afford an all-out war... But we have to prepare for war]. In *Hanbando üi modūn kwollyöke tojön hae on ‘pan’gol kija’ Cho Kapche: Int’öbyu moūm*; Chungang ilbo, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahu, Paek Chiyön [“Contrarian reporter” Cho Kapche who has challenged all powers on the Korean Peninsula: Collected interviews; *Chungang ilbo*, *Sindonga*, KBS, MBC, Yahoo, and Paek Chiyön], edited by Cho Kapche tat’öm, 175–228. Seoul: Cho Kapche tat’öm, 2010.
- Kim Tökhan. “Int’öbyu: Söngdae Kim Iryöŋ kyosu; ‘Chöŋkwön üi chöŋgt’ongsöŋ ün hyoyulsöŋ kwa yön’gye hayö p’andan haeya hamnida” [Interview: Sungkyunkwan University Professor Kim Iryöŋ: “The legitimacy of the ruling administration must be judged in relation to its efficacy”]. *Wölgan Chosön* (March 1996): 560–565.
- Kim, Won [Kim Wön]. “Changes in the 1980s Nationalist *Minjung* Academic Communities and the Alternative Academic Communities.” *Korea Journal* 51, no. 3 (Autumn 2011): 140–168.
- Kim Wön [Won Kim]. *Pak Chöŋghüi sidae üi yuryöŋ tül: Kiök, sakön, kürigo chöŋgh’i* [Specters of the Park Chung Hee era: Memory, event, and politics]. Seoul: Hyönsil munhwa, 2011.

- Kim Yŏngho [Young-ho Kim]. “Han’guk chŏnjaeng wŏnin ũi kukche chŏngch’ijŏk chaehaesŏk: Sut’allin ũi ‘rolbaek’ iron” [An international-political reinterpretation of the origins of the Korean War: Stalin’s “rollback” theory]. In *Sujŏngjuŭi wa Han’guk hyŏndaesa* [Revisionism and contemporary Korean history], edited by Yu Yŏngik, 223–258. Seoul: Yŏnse taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1998.
- . *Han’guk chŏnjaeng ũi kiwŏn kwa chŏn’gae kwajŏng: Sŭt’allin kwa Miguk ũi rolbaek* [The origins and development of the Korean War: Stalin and the United States’ rollback]. Seoul: Ture, 1998.
- , ed. *Taehan min’guk kŏn’guk 60-nyŏn ũi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of the sixty years since the founding of the Republic of Korea]. Seoul: Kip’arang, 2008.
- . “Ko Kim Iryŏng kyosunim yŏngjŏn e” [In honor of the late Professor Kim Iryŏng]. In *Kŏn’guk kwa puguk: Yi Sŭngman.Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae ũi chaechomyŏng* [Founding a nation and enriching a nation: Shedding new light on the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee eras], Kim Iryŏng, 482–489. Seoul: Kip’arang, 2010.
- Kim Yongmin. “Sŏgu posujuŭi ũi kiwŏn kwa palchŏn” [The origins and development of Western conservatism]. In *Han’guk ũi posujuŭi* [Korea’s conservatism], edited by Kim Pyŏngguk, Kim Yongmin, Pak Hyujong, Sŏ Pyŏnghun, and Ham Chaebong, 11–52. Koyang-si: In’gan sarang, 1999.
- Kim Yŏngsam and Kim Iryŏng, “Taedam: Kim Yŏngsam chŏn taet’ongnyŏng; Kim Iryŏng Sŏnggyun’gwan kyosu” [Conversation: Former President Kim Yŏngsam; Sungkyunkwan University Professor Kim Iryŏng], *Sidae chŏngsin* 37 (2007): 88–123.
- Kim, Young-ho. [Kim Yŏngho]. “International Dimensions of the Korean War.” *Korean Journal* (1998): 130–146.
- Kimiya, Tadashi. “The Cold War and the Political Economy of the Park Chung Hee Regime.” In *Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961–1979: Development, Political Thought, Democracy, and*

- Cultural Influence*, edited by Hyung-A Kim and Clark W. Sorensen, 66–82. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011.
- Kirby, William C. “Images and Realities of Chinese Fascism.” In *Fascism Outside Europe: The European Impulse against Domestic Conditions in the Diffusion of Global Fascism*, edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, 233–268. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane. “Dictatorships and Double Standards.” *Commentary* (November 1, 1979): 34–45.
- . *Dictatorship and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.
- Ko, Shu-ling. “National Democracy Hall Reopens.” *Taipei Times*, January 2, 2008. <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/01/02/2003395260>.
- Ko Söngguk. “Cho Kapche pujang, wae tangsin küi i munje in’ga” [Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche, why are your articles a problem?]. *Kil* (June 1994): 80–91.
- . “Cho Kapche pujang üi Pak Chönghüiron üi haebu handa (1): ‘Hyöngmyöngga Pak Chönghüi’ puhwal ün sangöpchöck sönjöngjuüi wa üi kyölt’ak iötta” [Analyzing Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche’s Pak Chönghüi, part 1: The resurrection of the “revolutionary Park Chung Hee” was a commercialist, sensationalist plot]. *Kil* (July 1994): 48–69.
- . “Cho Kapche pujang chönmyön pip’an (3): Kü üi Pak Chönghüiron ün Chön Tuhwan.No T’aeu rül tto yöngung üro mandürötta” [A full-on critique of Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche, part three: His discussion of Park Chung Hee also made Chön Tuhwan and No T’aeu into heroes]. *Kil* (August 1994): 158–177
- . “Wölgan Chosön Cho Kapche pujang üi pip’an handa: Kim Yöngsam taet’ongnyöng ün 7-gong ch’öngmunhoe e Cho Kapche pujang kwa hamkke söi su öpta” [Criticizing *Wölgan Chosön* Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche: President Kim Yöngsam cannot stand together

- with Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche at the Seventh Republic hearings]. *Kil* (September 1994): 81–100.
- . “Yōksa nūn *Wōlgan Chosōn* kwa Cho Kapche pujang ūl tamūl sigan i ōpta: Kaehyōk kwa t’ongil sidae, sugu seryōk ege ponaeñn man’ga” [History has no time for the *Wōlgan Chosōn* or Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche: The age of reform and unification, an elegy for the reactionaries]. *Kil* (October 1994): 92–115.
- Kocka, Jürgen. “Germany before Hitler: The Debate about the German *Sonderweg*.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 23, no. 1 (1988): 3–16.
- . “Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German *Sonderweg*.” *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999): 40–50.
- Kohli, Atul. “Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea’s ‘Developmental State.’” *World Development* 22, no. 9 (1994): 1269–1293.
- . “Where Do High-Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea’s ‘Developmental State.’” In *The Developmental State*, edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings, 93–136. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Kraiker, Gerhard. [Kerūharūt’ū K’ūraik’ō]. “Theorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft bei Karl Marx und Friederich Engles.” In *Handbuch politischer theorien und ideologien*, edited by Franz Neumann, 295–336. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1977.
- Kuro yōksa yōn’guso, ed. *Paro ponūn uri yōksa* [Our history seen firsthand], 2 vols. (Seoul: Kōrūm, 1990).
- K’ūraik’ō, Kerūharūt’ū [Gerhard Kraiker]. “Maksū wa Engelsū ūi kukka mit simin sahoe iron” [Marx and Engels’ theory of the state and civil society]. Translated by Kim Iryōng. In *Malksūjuūi wa minjujuūi* [Marxism and democracy], edited by Yun Kūnsik, Kim Iryōng, and Pak Hyōngjung, 45–99. Seoul: Sōnggyun’gwan taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1996.

- Kwon, Yonung. "Korean Historiography in the 20th Century: A Configuration of Paradigms." *Korea Journal* 40, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 33–53.
- Kye, Seung B. "Confucian Perspectives on Egalitarian Thought in Traditional Korea." *International Journal of Korean History* 12 (August 2008): 57–88.
- Kyogwasō p'orōm. "Ch'angnip sŏnŏnmun" [Founding statement]. In *Han'guk hyōndaesa ūi hōgu wa chinsil: Kodŭng hakkyo kŭn.hyōndaesa kyogwasō rŭl pip'an handa* [Fictions and truths of Korean contemporary history: A critique of modern and contemporary high school history textbooks], edited by Kyogwasō p'orōm, 219–221. Kuri: Ture sidae, 2005.
- , ed. *Han'guk hyōndaesa ūi hōgu wa chinsil: Kodŭng hakkyo kŭn.hyōndaesa kyogwasō rŭl pip'an handa* [Fictions and truths of Korean contemporary history: A critique of modern and contemporary high school history textbooks]. Kuri: Ture sidae, 2005.
- . *(Tae'an kyogwasō) Han'guk kŭnhyōndaesa* [(Alternative textbook) Modern and contemporary Korean history]. Seoul: Kip'arang, 2008.
- Kyōnghyang sinmun t'ŭkpyōl ch'wijaet'im. *Minjuhwa 20-nyōn, chisigin ūi chugŭm* [Twenty years of democratization: The death of the intellectual]. Seoul: Humanit'asŭ, 2008.
- Kwōn Chaehyōn. "[Nyu rait'ŭ] 4-bu (4): Hyōndaesa ottōk'e pol kōt in'ga" [(New Right) Part four, number four: How to think about contemporary history], *Tonga ilbo*, February 20, 2005, <https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20050220/8161316/1>.
- Latham, Michael E. *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011.
- Lau, Albert. "Nation-Building and the Singapore Story: Some Issues in the Study of Contemporary Singapore History." In *Nation-Building: Five Southeast Asian Histories*, edited by Wang Gungwu, 221–250. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.

- Ledeen, Michael A. "Renzo De Felice and the Controversy over Italian Fascism." *Journal of Contemporary History* 11, no. 4 (1976): 269–283.
- Lee, Chong-Sik. *Park Chung-Hee: From Poverty to Power*. Seoul: Kyung Hee University Press, 2013.
- Lee, Namhee. *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- . "Social Memories of the 1980s: Unpacking the Regime of Discontinuity." In *Revisiting Minjung: New Perspectives on the Cultural History of 1980s South Korea*, edited by Sunyoung Park, 17–45. USA: University of Michigan Press, 2019.
- Leftwich, Adrian. "Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State." *The Journal of Developmental Studies* 31, no. 3 (1995): 400–427.
- Lerner, Daniel, and Richard D. Robinson. "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force." *World Politics* 13, no. 1 (1960): 19–44.
- Levi, Giovanni. "The Distant Past: On the Political Use of History." *Mediterranean Historical Review* 16, no. 1 (2001): 61–73.
- Levi-Faur, David. "The Developmental State: Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan Compared." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 33, no. 1 (1998): 65–93.
- Levy, Daniel. "The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel." *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999): 51–66.
- Young Ick Lew [Yu Yǒngik]. "The Conservative Character of the 1894 Tonghak Peasant Uprising: A Reappraisal with Emphasis on Chŏn Pong-jun's Background and Motivation." *The Journal of Korean Studies* 7 (1990): 149–180.
- . *The Making of the First Korean President: Syngman Rhee's Quest for Independence, 1875–1948*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014.

- Lim, Jie-Hyun [Im Chihyŏn]. "Mass Dictatorship: A Transnational Formation of Modernity." In *Mass Dictatorship and Modernity*, edited by Michael Kim, Michael Schoenhals, and Yong-Woo Kim, 13–32. UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Logie, Andrew. "Diagnosing and Debunking Korean Pseudohistory." *European Journal of Korean Studies* 18, no. 2 (2019): 37–80.
- Loh, Kah Seng. "Within the Singapore Story: The Use and Narrative of History in Singapore." *Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 12, no. 2 (1998): 1–21.
- López, Alejandro. "Spanish Officer Corps Hears Lecture Justifying Franco Coup and Dictatorship." *World Socialist Web Site*, March 22, 2016. <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/03/22/payn-m22.html>.
- Lorenz, Chris. "Beyond Good and Evil? The German Empire of 1871 and Modern German Historiography." *Journal of Contemporary History* 30, no. 4 (1995): 729–765.
- . "Historical Knowledge and Historical Reality: A Plea for 'Internal Realism.'" In *History and Theory: Contemporary Readings*, edited by Brian Fay, Philip Pomper, and Richard T. Vann, 342–376. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.
- . "Comparative Historiography: Problems and Perspectives." *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999): 25–39.
- . "'Won't You Tell Me, Where Have all the Good Times Gone?' On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Modernization Theory for Historical Study." In *The Many Faces of Clio: Cross-cultural Approaches to Historiography: Essays in Honor of Georg G. Iggers*, edited by Q. Edward Wang and Franz L. Fillafer, 104–127. New York: Berghahn Books, 2007.
- . "Towards a Theoretical Framework for Comparing Historiographies: Some Preliminary Considerations." In *Theorizing Historical Consciousness*, edited by Peter Seixas, 25–48. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.

- . “Double Trouble: A Comparison of the Politics of National History in Germany and Quebec.” In *Nationalizing the Past: Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe*, edited by Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz, 49–70. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Loriaux, Michael. “The French Developmental State as Myth and Moral Ambition.” In *The Developmental State*, edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings, 235–275. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Lundestad, Geir. “How (Not) to Study the Origins of the Cold War.” In *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, edited by Odd Arne Westad, 64–80. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Knox, MacGregor. “The Fascist Regime, its Foreign Policy and its Wars: An ‘Anti-Anti-Fascist’ Orthodoxy?” *Contemporary European History* 4, no. 3 (1995): 347–365.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. “A Provision for Infantry [A selection from the Preamble].” In *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others*, vol. 1, translated by Allan Gilbert, 3. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989.
- . *The Prince*. Translated by James B. Atkinson. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2008.
- Macintyre, Stuart, and Anna Clark. *The History Wars*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003.
- MacLean, Nancy. *Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America*. New York: Viking, 2017.
- Macrae, Keiran. “Post-Cold War Conservative Reappraisals of Syngman Rhee: Neoliberalism and the New Right.” *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 29, no. 2 (December 2016): 327–359.
- Maier, Charles S. *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997.
- Malia, Martin. *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991*. New York: The Free Press, 1996.
- Marco, Jorge. “Francoist Crimes: Denial and Invisibility, 1936–2016.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 52, no. 1 (2017): 157–163.

- Marx, Karl. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972.
- Mayer, Jane. *Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires behind the Rise of the Radical Right*. New York: Doubleday, 2016.
- McCormack, Gavan, and Mark Selden. *Nam-Bukhan ŭi pigyo yŏn'gu* [Korea North and South: The deepening crisis]. Translated by Chang Ŭlbyŏng, Kim Iryŏng, and Mun Sŏnggho. Seoul: Irwŏn sŏgak, 1988.
- McNamara, Dennis L. *The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprise, 1910–1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Meek, Ronald L. *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- . *Smith, Marx, & After: Ten Essays in the Development of Economic Thought*. London: Chapman & Hall, 1977.
- Mendelson, Sarah E., and Theodore P. Gerber. “Failing the Stalin Test: Russians and their Dictator.” *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 1 (2006): 2–8.
- Miletitch, Nicolas. “From Maoist Militance to Exposing the Crimes of Communism.” Translated by Natalia Ibrayeva. *Soviet History Lessons*, n.d. <https://www.soviethistorylessons.com/stephane-courtois>.
- Miller, Owen. “The Idea of Stagnation in Korean Historiography: From Fukuda Tokuzō to the New Right.” *Korean Histories* 2, no. 1 (2010): 3–12.
- Minder, Raphael. “Franco’s Body to be Exhumed, as Debate over Legacy Grows.” *New York Times*, September 14, 2018, A.10.
- Mitter, Rana. “Old Ghosts, New Memories: China’s Changing War History in the Era of Post-Mao Politics.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, no. 1 (2003): 117–131.
- Moa, Pío. “History as Antidote to Propaganda: A Conversation with Pío Moa.” *The Postil Magazine*, April 1, 2022. <https://www.thepostil.com/history-as-antidote-to-propaganda-a-conversation-with-pio-moa>.

- Moon, Seungsook. "The Cultural Politics of Remembering Park Chung Hee." *The Asia Pacific Journal* 19, no. 5 (May 09, 2009): 1–33.
- Moradiellos, Enrique. "Critical Historical Revision and Political Revisionism." *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 21, no. 3 (2008): 219–229.
- . "Biographies for a Caudillo after a War: A Bibliographical Commentary on Biographies of Franco." Translated by Alison Pinnington and Helen Graham. In *Interrogating Fascism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain*, edited by Helen Graham, 225–240. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016.
- Morier-Genoud, Damien. "Taiwanese Historiography: Towards a 'Scholarly Native History.'" *China Perspectives* (March 2010): 71–90.
- Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. "Truth, Postmodernism and Historical Revisionism in Japan." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 2, no. 2 (2001): 297–305.
- Mosse, George L. *The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1999.
- "Most-Favored-Nation Status of the People's Republic of China." CRS Report for Congress, updated July 25, 2001. <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30225.html>.
- Murak'ami Yasūsūk'e [Yasusuke Murakami]. *Pan'gojŏn ŭi chŏngch'i kyŏngjehak* [An anticlassical political-economic analysis], 2 vols. Seoul: Samsŏng ch'ulp'ansa, 1994.
- Murakami, Yasusuke [Murak'ami Yasūsūk'e]. *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis: A Vision for the Next Century*. Translated by Kozo Yamamura. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996.
- Myers, Ramon H. "The Conference on Chiang Kai-Shek and Modern China." *Republican China* 12, no. 2 (1987): 86–90.
- Myers, Ramon H., and Mark R. Peattie, eds. *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

- Na Ki'ch'ŏn. "486-chudo chungdo nosŏn p'yobang... 'Chayujuŭi yŏndae' ch'ulbŏm" [Claim to advance 486-generation-led moderate line... Launch of the "Alliance for Liberalism"]. *Segye ilbo*, November 24, 2004. <https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/article/022/0000065226?sid=100>.
- Nam Siuk. *Han'guk posu seryŏk yŏn'gu* [A study of conservatives in Korea]. Paju: Nanam ch'ulp'an, 2005.
- Nathan, Andrew J. Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor. *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 5 (2009): 165.
- Nederveen Pieterse, Jan. *Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions*. 2nd ed. Los Angeles: Sage, 2010.
- Newman, Robert P. *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Edited by Adrian Del Caro and Robert Pippin. Translated by Adrian Del Caro. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Nolte, Ernst. *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism*. Translated by Leila Vennewitz. New York: The New American Library, 1969.
- Núñez, Xosé-Manoel. "Review: New Interpretations of the Spanish Civil War." *Contemporary European History* 13, no. 4 (2004): 517–527.
- Núñez Seixas, Xosé-Manoel. "From National-Catholic Nostalgia to Constitutional Patriotism: Conservatism Spanish Nationalism since the Early 1990s." In *The Politics of Contemporary Spain*, edited by Sebastian Balfour, 121–145. London: Routledge, 2005.
- O Tongnyŏl. "Kyŏktol int'ŏbyu: *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* Cho Kapche ŭi wihŏm han sosin; 'Nam-Buk taehwa to chot chiman Pukhan ŭi punggoe ka tŏ chotta'" [Combative interview: The dangerous conviction of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*'s Cho Kapche; "South-North talks are good but the collapse of North Korea would be better"]. *Kil* 94 (April 1994): 106–115.

- . “Sugu seryök chönwi, uik non’gaek tül ūi inmaekto: *Chosŏn ilbo* wa *Han’guk nondan* i kü wönch’ön” [Vanguard of the reactionaries: A map of the networks of right-wing media commentators; *Chosŏn ilbo* and *Han’guk nondan* are the source]. *Kil* (September 1994): 64–100.
- O Yŏnho. “Chŏngbo kigwan kwa kija: Cho Kapche wa Chŏng Hyŏnggŭn ūi kyŏngu” [An intelligence agency and a reporter: The case of Cho Kapche and Chŏng Hyŏnggŭn]. *Mal* 150 (December 1998): 70–80.
- . ““Cho Kapche nŭn An’gibu an’ga esŏ nawa hamkke susa palp’yomun sonbwatta”” [“Cho Kapche touched up the investigation statement with me at an ANSP safehouse”]. *Mal* 151 (January 1999): 52–59.
- . “Cho Kapche *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* p’yŏnjipchang ūi sosong naeyong kwa *Mal* ūi pallon: ‘Cho Kapche ssi ege ponaenŭn p’yŏnji’” [The content of *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* Editor-in-chief Cho Kapche’s lawsuit and *Mal*’s objection: “A letter to Mr. Cho Kapche”]. *Mal* 152 (February 1999): 92–101.
- Ŏm Hanjin. “Ugyŏnghwa wa chonggyo ūi chŏngch’ihwa: 2003-nyŏn ‘ch’in-Mi pan-Buk chiphoe’ rŭl chungsim ũro” [The rightist turn and the politicization of religion: The 2003 “pro-US, anti-North Korea rallies”]. *Kyŏngje wa sahoe* 62 (June 2004): 80–117.
- Öniş, Ziya. “Review: The Logic of the Developmental State.” *Comparative Politics* 24, no. 1 (1991): 109–126.
- Pae Yŏngsun. “Segyehwa ihu Han’guksa insik ūi t’alminjokchuŭijŏk kyŏnghyang: Kŭnhyŏndaesa insik ūi posu ugyŏnghwa rŭl chungsim ũro” [The postnationalist tendency in Korean cognition since the onset of globalization: Focusing on the conservative and rightward turn in modern and contemporary historical consciousness]. *Minjok munhwa nonch’ong* 40 (2008): 58–92.
- Pak Ch’ansŭng. “Pundan sidae Namhan ūi Han’guk sahak” [Korean historiography in division-era South Korea]. In *Han’guk ūi yŏksaga wa yŏksahak (ha)* [Korea’s historians and historiography, vol. 2],

- Cho Tonggöl, Han Yöngu, and Pak Ch'ansüng, 327–372. P'aju: Ch'angbi, 1994.
- . “Singminji kũndaehwaron e maemol toen singminji sigi sösul” [Narratives of the colonial period buried under colonial modernization theory]. *Yöksa pip'yöng* 83 (May 2008): 321–334.
- Pak Chihyang, Kim Ch'öl, Kim Iryöng, and Yi Yöngghun, eds. *Haebang chönhusa ũi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of history before and after liberation], 2 vols. Seoul: Ch'aek sesang, 2006.
- . “Haebang chönhusa ũi saeroun chip'yöng” [A new horizon for history before and after liberation]. In *Haebang chönhusa ũi chaeinsik 2* [A new understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 2], edited by Pak Chihyang, Kim Ch'öl, Kim Iryöng, and Yi Yöngghun, 611–684. Seoul: Ch'aek sesang, 2006.
- Pak Chihyang and Kim Iryöng. “Taehan min'guk kukka mandülgi wa kũ ũi: Indo wa ũi pigyo” [The making of the nation of the Republic of Korea and its significance: A comparison with India]. In *Taehan min'guk kŏn'guk ũi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of the founding of the Republic of Korea], edited by Yi Inho, Kim Yönggho, and Kang Kyuhyöng, 695–723. Seoul: Kip'arang, 2009.
- Pak Hyönoch'ae, Yö Hyöndök, Yang Tongju, Kim Namsik, An Chin, Yi Wanböm, Kim T'aesüng, Pak Hyesuk, Hwang Namjun, Im Hönyöng, and Han Chunsang. *Haebang chönhusa ũi insik 3* [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 3]. Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1987.
- Pak Kwimi. “Nyu rait'ũ ũi yöksa insik” [The New Right's historical consciousness]. In *Nyu rait'ũ wihörm han kyogwasö, paro ilkki* [Reading the New Right's dangerous textbook], edited by Yöksa kyoyuk yöndae hoeüi, 47–64. Paju: Söhae munjip, 2009.
- Pak Myönggyu. “Han'guk kwa Ilbon ũi kũndae kukka hyöngsöng kwajöng e kwanhan pigyosajök yön'gu” [A comparative-historical study of the modern nation-state formations of Korea and Japan]. PhD diss., Seoul National University, 1991.

- Pak Myöngnim [Myung-Lim Park], Yi Wanböm, Kim Myöngsöp, Paek Il, and Sin Hyönggi. *Haebang chönhusa üi insik 6* [An understanding of history before and after liberation, vol. 6]. Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1989.
- Pak Segil. *Tasi ssünün Han'guk hyöndaesa* [Rewriting contemporary Korean history]. Seoul: Tolbegae, 1993.
- Pak Seil. *Taehan min'guk sönjinhwa chöllyak* [Strategy for the advancement of the Republic of Korea]. Paju: 21-segi püksü, 2006.
- Pak T'aegyun [Tae Gyun Park]. "Han'guk hyöndaesa yön'gu üi ch'ui wa chaengchöm" [Trends and debates in contemporary Korean history research]. In *Han'guksa yön'gu 50-nyön* [Fifty years of Korean history research], edited by Ihwa yöja taehakkyo Han'guk munhwa yön'guwön, 381–426. Seoul: Hyeon, 2005.
- . "Han'guk posu ideollogi üi t'ükching kwa tillemma: Han Söngjo p'amun üi yöksajök üimi" [The characteristics and dilemma of Korean conservative ideology: The historical meaning of the Han Söngjo controversy]. *Hwanghae munhwa* 47 (June 2005): 205–233.
- . "Nyu rait'ü üi tünghang kwa yöksa insik nonjaeng" [The emergence of the New Right and conflicts over historical perceptions]. *Hwanghae munhwa* 56 (September 2007): 285–302.
- . *Wönhhyöng kwa pyönyong: Han'guk kyöngje kaebal kyehoek üi kiwön* [Archetype and metamorphosis: The origins of Korea's economic development plans]. Seoul: Söul taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2007.
- . "Pak Chönghui chöngbu sigi rül t'onghae pon palchön kukka tamnon e taehan pip'anjök siron" [A critique of developmental state discourse through an examination of the Park Chung Hee government era]. *Yöksa wa hyönsil* 74 (2009): 15–43.
- . "Han'guk hyöndaesa üi nonjaeng e taehan chaep'yöngka wa kyogwasö surok pangan" [A reevaluation of the debates over contemporary Korean history and a proposal for textbook approval]. *Yöksa hakpo* 205 (March 2010): 77–117.

- . “Segyehwa sidae Han’gukchŏk inyŏm chihyŏng ŭi kiwŏn: T’allaengjŏn sigi chŏnhu yŏksa insik pyŏnhwa rŭl chungsim ŭro” [Origins of the Korean ideological terrain in the globalization era: Changes in historical perceptions around the end of the Cold War]. In *T’allaengjŏnsa ŭi insik: Segyehwa sidae Han’guk sahoe ŭi munje ŭisik* [Perceptions of post-Cold War history: Critical awareness in Korean society in the globalization era], edited by Pak Inhwŭi, Kang Wŏnt’aek, Kim Hogi, and Chang Hun, 495–524. P’aju: Han’gilsa, 2012.
- . “Segyesajŏk chŏnhwan’gi wa No T’aeu chŏngbu” [A world-historical transitional period and the No T’aeu government]. In *No T’aeu sidae ŭi chaeinsik: Chŏnhwan’gi ŭi Han’guk sahoe* [Reconsideration of the No T’aeu era: Korean society in a transitional period], edited by Kang Wŏnt’aek, 133–166. P’aju: Nanam, 2012.
- . “T’allaenjŏn ihu Han’gukchŏk Maek’asijŭm ŭi t’ansaeng: Chomun p’adong kwa chusap’a parŏn ŭl t’onghae tŭrŏ nan Maek’asijŭm” [The birth of Korean McCarthyism after the Cold War: McCarthyism as revealed in the controversy over offering condolences to North Korea for Kim Il Sung’s death and statements about *Chusap’a*]. *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 93 (September 2014): 177–207.
- . “Yŏksa kyogwasŏ kukchŏnghwa nonjaeng” [Debate over the nationalization of history textbooks]. In *Nonjaeng ŭro ingnŭn Han’guk hyŏndaesa* [Reading contemporary Korean history through the debates], Kim Hogi and Pak T’aegyŭn, 284–291. Seoul: Medich’i midiŏ, 2019.
- Pak Yŏngnyul. “Ŏllon’gye simin tanch’e ‘Cho Kapche ŭihok kyumyŏng’ han moksori” [Calls to investigate “allegations of suspicion against Cho Kapche” by a media civil society organization]. *Mal* 151 (January 1999): 60–61.
- Paik, Nak-Chung. “How to Think about the Park Chung Hee Era.” In *Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961–1979: Development,*

- Political Thought, Democracy, and Cultural Influence*, edited by Hyung-A Kim and Clark W. Sorensen, 85–91. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011.
- Palais, James B. *Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council of East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991).
- . “Democracy in Korea: An Optimistic View of Korea’s Democratic Development.” In *Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961–1979: Development, Political Thought, Democracy, and Cultural Influence*, ed. Hyung-A Kim and Clark W. Sorensen, 107–121. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011.
- Palmer, Alex W. “The Battle Over the Memory of the Spanish Civil War.” *Smithsonian* 49, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2018), <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/battle-memory-spanish-civil-war-180969338>.
- Pang, Kie-chung, and Michael D. Shin, eds. *Landlords, Peasants and Intellectuals in Modern Korea*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.
- Pantsov, Alexander V. *Victorious in Defeat: The Life and Times of Chiang Kai-shek, China, 1877–1975*. Translated by Steven I. Levine. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023.
- Pantsov, Alexander V., with Steven I. Levine. *Mao: The Real Story*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012.
- Park, Myung-Lim [Pak Myŏngnim]. “The *Chaeya*.” In *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, edited by Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, 373–400. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011).
- Park, Tae-Gyun [Pak T’aegyūn]. “Beyond the Myth: Reassessing the Security Crisis on the Korean Peninsula during the mid-1960s.” *Pacific Affairs* 82, no. 1 (2009): 93–110.
- Paxton, Robert O. *The Anatomy of Fascism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.

- Payne, Stanley G. *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961.
- . *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967.
- . *The Spanish Revolution*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970.
- . *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1980).
- . *The Franco Regime 1936–1975*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987.
- . *A History of Fascism 1914–45*. London: Routledge, 1995.
- . *Spain: A Unique History*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2008).
- Payne, Stanley G., and Jesús Palacios. *Franco: A Personal and Political Biography*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2014).
- Pempel, T.J. “The Developmental Regime in a Changing World Economy.” In *The Developmental State*, edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings, 137–181. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Pipes, Richard. *The Russian Revolution*. New York: Vintage Books, 1991.
- Pine, Martin. “Double Truth.” In *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, vol. 2, edited by Philip P. Wiener, 31–37. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973.
- Podoler, Guy. “‘Who Was Park Chung-hee?’ The Memorial Landscape and National Identity Politics in South Korea.” *East Asia* 33 (2016): 271–288.
- Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. USA: Beacon Press, 2001.
- Popper, Karl. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Preston, Paul. *Franco: A Biography*. UK: BasicBooks, 1994.
- Proceedings of Conference on Chiang Kai-shek and Modern China*, 5 vols. Taipei: Compilation Committee, 1987.

- Pugliese, Stanislao G. "Italian Historiography." In *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 1, edited by Daniel R. Woolf, 474–478. New York: Garland Publishing, 1998.
- Reinert, Erik S. "The Role of the State in Economic Growth." *Journal of Economic Studies* 25, no. 4/5 (1999): 268–326.
- . "Mercantilism and Economic Development: Schumpeterian Dynamics, Institution Building and International Benchmarking." In *How Rich Nations Got Rich: Essays in the History of Economic Policy*, Working Paper No. 2004/01, Centre for Development and the Environment, 2004. <https://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48147>.
- . *How Rich Countries Got Rich... and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2008.
- . "Developmentalism." Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics no. 34, December 2010, 1–9. <http://technologygovernance.eu/files/main/2012032710251212.pdf>.
- . "Karl Bücher and the Geographical Dimensions of Techno-Economic Change: Production-Based Economic Theory and the Stages of Economic Development." In *The Visionary Realism of German Economics: From the Thirty Years' War to the Cold War*, 289–319. London: Anthem Press, 2019.
- Reinert, Erik S., and Arno M. Daastøl. "The Other Canon: The History of Renaissance Economics." In *Globalization, Economic Development and Inequality: An Alternative Perspective*, 21–70. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004.
- Reinert, Erik S., Jayati Ghosh, and Rainer Kattel, eds. *Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2016.
- Reinert, Erik S., and Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven, eds. *A Modern Guide to Uneven Economic Development*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2023.
- "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," June 27, 1981. History

- and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. Translation from the *Beijing Review* 24, no. 27 (July 6, 1981): 10–39. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121344>.
- Ribeiro de Meneses, Filipe. “Slander, Ideological Differences, or Academic Debate? The ‘Verão Quent’ of 2012 and the State of Portuguese Historiography.” *E-Journal of Portuguese History* 10, no. 1 (2012): 62–77.
- Richter, Steffi. “Historical Revisionism in Contemporary Japan.” In *Contested Views of a Common Past: Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia*, edited by Steffi Richter, 47–72. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008.
- Rigoulot, Pierre. “Crimes, Terror, and Secrecy in North Korea.” In *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, edited by Stéphane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panne, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartošek, and Jean-Louis Margolin, translated by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer, 547–564. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- Roth, Karl Heinz. “Revisionist Tendencies in Historical Research into German Fascism.” Translated by Barry McLoughlin. *International Review of Social History* 39, no. 3 (1994): 429–455.
- Routley, Laura. “Developmental States: A Review of the Literature.” ESID Working Paper No. 3 (February 2012), 1–60.
- Ruse, Michael. “The Philosophy of Evolutionary Theory.” In *A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*, edited by Aviezer Tucker, 307–317. UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
- Ryu Sangyŏng. “Pak Chŏnghŭi wa kŭ sidae rŭl nŏmgi wihayŏ: Yŏn’gu chaengchŏm kwa p’yŏngka” [Toward overcoming Park Chung Hee and his era: Controversies in existing research and evaluation]. In *Pak Chŏnghŭi rŭl nŏmŏ sŏ* [Overcoming Park Chung Hee], edited by Han’guk chŏngch’i yŏn’guhoe, 17–48. Seoul: P’urŭn sup, 1998.

- Ryu Sŭngnyŏl. “Kunsa chŏngkwŏnsik nolli rŭl tabsŭp han ‘Taean kyogwasŏ’” [The *Alternative textbook* that imitates the logic of the military regimes]. *Naeil ŭl yŏnŭn yŏksa* 32 (June 2008): 25–36.
- Sageman, Chloe. Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor. *International Affairs* 87, no. 3 (2011): 733–734.
- Salam, Reihan. “Normalizing Trade Relations with China was a Mistake.” *The Atlantic*, June 8, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/06/normalizing-trade-relations-with-china-was-a-mistake/562403>.
- Sayle, Murray. “Japan Victorious.” *The New York Review of Books* (March 28, 1985). https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1985/03/28/japan-victorious/?lp_txn_id=1408782.
- Schoenbaum, David. *Hitler’s Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933–1939*. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967.
- Schneider, Axel, and Daniel Woolf, eds. *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, vol. 5: 1945 to the Present*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Schneider, Ben Ross. “The Desarrollista State in Brazil and Mexico.” In *The Developmental State*, edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings, 276–305. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Schofield, Malcolm. “The Noble Lie.” In *The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic*, edited by G.R.F. Ferrari, 138–164. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Schrecker, Ellen. *The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents*. 2nd ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2002.
- Seidman, Michael. “Introduction: Stanley G. Payne; An Intellectual Biography.” In *Nation and Conflict in Modern Spain: Essays in Honor of Stanley G. Payne*, edited by Brian D. Bunk, Sasha D. Pack, and Carl-Gustaf Scott, xi–xviii. Madison, Wisconsin: Parallel Press, 2008.

- Sewell, Mike. *The Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- “Sillok minjuhwa undong 77: ‘Han’guk minjungsa’ sakŏn” [Record of the democratization movement, part seventy-seven: The *Han’guk minjungsa* incident]. *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, November 14, 2004. <https://www.khan.co.kr/article/200411141731091>.
- Sin Chinhwa. “Tŭdiŏ *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* e massŏgi sijak han saram tŭl” [The people who have finally begun to stand up to the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*]. *Kil* (June 1994): 77–79.
- Sin Chonghwa. “Sinbosujuŭi wa taebi han uri nara posujuŭi ŭi t’ŭksŏng” [The characteristics of conservatism in Korea compared with neoconservatism]. *Han’guk chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu* 12, no. 2 (June 2012): 187–206.
- Sin Chubaek. “Kyogwasŏ p’orŏm ŭi yŏksa insik pip’an: Han’guk kŭnhyondaesa kyogwasŏ pip’an e taehan pallon” [A critique of the historical consciousness of Textbook Forum: A critical response to the critique of the *Modern and Contemporary Korean History* textbooks]. *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 76 (August 2006): 181–214.
- . “Ilbon uik ŭi Husosya kyogwasŏ wa ‘taean kyogwasŏ’” [The Japanese right’s Husosha textbook and the *Alternative textbook*]. *Naeil ŭl yŏnŭn yŏksa* 32 (June 2008): 37–45.
- Sin Ilch’ŏl. *Pukhan chuch’e sasang ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa soet’oe* [The formation and deterioration of North Korean *chuch’e* thought]. Seoul: Saenggak ŭi namu, 2004.
- Sin Pongnyong, Yu Yŏngik, Ch’oe Munhyŏng, Chŏn Yongu, and Kang Kyuhyŏng. “Taedam: Minjung undongsa esŏ Taehan min’guksa ro” [Conversation: From *minjung* history to a history of the Republic of Korea]. *Sidae chŏngsin chaech’anggan ho* (2006).
- Smith, Anthony D. *The Concept of Social Change: A Critique of the Functionalist Theory of Social Change*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.

- Smith, Helmut Walser. "When the *Sonderweg* Debate Left Us." *German Studies Review* 31, no. 2 (2008): 225–240.
- Smith, Denis Mack. "Mussolini: Reservations about Renzo De Felice's Biography." *Modern Italy* 5, no. 2 (2000): 193–210.
- Smith, Peter D. "Elective Affinity: A Tale of Two Cultures." *Kafka's Mouse*. <http://www.peterdsmith.com/elective-affinity-a-tale-of-two-cultures>.
- Sŏ Chinyŏng. "Wŏlgan Chosŏn 11-wŏl ho 'Pak Chŏnghŭi wa Kim Yŏngsam ŭi hwahae' e iŭi itta: 'Pan'gaehyŏkchŏk sago' rŭl kyŏnggye handa" [An objection to "Reconciliation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Yŏngsam" in the November edition of the *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*: Beware "anti-reform thought"]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (December 1993): 221–225.
- Sŏ Pomi. "Yŏksa paro seugi" [Setting history straight]. *Han'gyŏre*, November 23, 2015. https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/718694.html.
- So, Wai Chor. Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor. *The China Review* 12, no. 1 (2012): 127–129.
- Son Hoch'ŏl. "Pak Chŏnghui chŏngkwŏn ŭi chŏngch'ijŏk sŏngkyŏk" [The political character of the Park Chung Hee regime]. *Yŏksa pip'yŏng* 23 (1993): 34–47.
- . "Nam-Nam kaltŭng ŭi Nam-Nam kaltŭng ŭl nŏmŏ sŏ: Nyu rait'ŭ wa pundan ch'ejeon ŭi pip'anjŏk koch'al" [Beyond South-South conflict over the South-South conflict: A critical review of the New Right and the division system thesis]. *Chinbo p'yŏngnon* 30 (December 2006): 216–230.
- Song, Ernest Koh Wee. "Ignoring 'History from Below': People's History in the Historiography of Singapore." *History Compass* 5, no. 1 (2007): 11–25.
- Song Kŏnho, Chin Tŏkkyu, Kim Hakchun, O Ikhwan, Im Chongguk, Cho Tonggŏl, Paek Kiwan, Kim Tohyŏn, Yi Tonghwa, Yu Inho, Yi Chonghun, and Yŏm Muung. *Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi insik* [An

- understanding of history before and after liberation] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1980).
- Stern, Steve J. *Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London 1998*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.
- . *Reckoning with Pinochet: The Memory Question in Democratic Chile, 1989–2006*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.
- Sternhell, Zeev. *Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France*. Translated by David Maisel. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Strange, Hannah. “The Politics of a Long-Dead Dictator Still Haunt Spain.” *The Atlantic*, October 14, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/10/franco-exhumation-spain/572929>.
- Stubbs, Richard. “What Ever Happened to the East Asian Developmental State? The Unfolding Debate.” *The Pacific Review* 22, no. 1 (2009): 1–22.
- Sun, Eddie. “Diaries of Taiwan’s First President to be Returned after Legal Battle with Stanford.” *The San Francisco Standard*, July 18, 2023. <https://sfstandard.com/2023/07/18/chiang-kai-shek-diaries-stanford-returning-taiwan>.
- Swedberg, Richard, and Ola Agevall. “Elective Affinities.” In *The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts*, 2nd ed., 114–115. Stanford, California: Stanford Social Sciences, 2016.
- Tai, Paul H. Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor. *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 16, no. 2 (October 2009): 171–174.
- Tammer, Hans [Hansŭ T’amŏ]. *Politische Ökonomie: Kapitalismus, Anschauungsmaterial*. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1981.
- T’amŏ, Hansŭ [Hans Tammer]. *Tohae chŏngch’i kyŏngjehak I: Chabonjuŭi p’yŏn* [Capitalist political economy in diagrams, vol. 1: Capitalism]. Translated by Kim Iryŏng. Seoul: Tongnyŏk sŏnsŏ, 1989.

- Tarulevicz, Nicole. "History Making in Singapore: Who is Producing the Knowledge?" *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 11, no. 1 (2009): 402–425.
- Taylor, Jay. *The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- . *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.
- . "Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Modernization." In *Makers of Modern Asia*, edited by Ramachandra Guha, 40–64. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014.
- Taylor, Jeremy E. "QuJianghua: Disposing of and Re-appraising the Remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Reign on Taiwan." *Journal of Contemporary History* 45, no. 1 (2010): 181–196.
- Taylor, Jeremy E., and Grace C. Huang. "'Deep Changes in Interpretive Currents'? Chiang Kai-shek Studies in the Post-Cold War Era." *International Journal of Asian Studies* 9, no. 1 (2012): 99–121.
- Taylor, Tony. "Disputed Territory: The Politics of Historical Consciousness in Australia." In *Theorizing Historical Consciousness*, edited by Peter Seixas, 217–239. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.
- Taylor, Tony, and Stuart Macintyre. "Cultural Wars and History Textbooks in Democratic Societies." In *Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture and Education*, edited by Mario Carretero, Stefan Berger, and Maria Grever, 618–635. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- Thampi, Madhavi. "Current Historical Thinking in the PRC." *China Report* 45, no. 4 (2009): 343–348.
- Therborn, Göran. "After Dialectics: Radical Social Theory in a Post-Communist World." *New Left Review* 43 (2007): 63–114.
- Thurbon, Elizabeth. *Developmental Mindset: The Revival of Financial Activism in South Korea*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016.

- Tikhonov, Vladimir. "The Rise and Fall of the New Right Movement and the Historical Wars in 2000s South Korea." *European Journal of Korean Studies* 18, no. 2 (2019): 5–36.
- Traverso, Enzo. "The New Anti-Communism: Rereading the Twentieth Century." In *History and Revolution: Refuting Revisionism*, edited by Mike Haynes and Jam Wolfreys, 138–155. London: Verso, 2007.
- Tremlett, Giles. "Pro-Franco Book a Bestseller in Spain," *The Guardian*, April 22, 2003. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/22/spain.books>.
- . "Pro-Franco History Tops Bestseller List." *The Guardian*, November 14, 2005. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/nov/14/books.spain>.
- Tucker, Aviezer. "Historiographic Revision and Revisionism: The Evidential Difference." In *Past in the Making: Historical Revisionism in Central Europe after 1989*, edited by Michal Kopeček, 1–15. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008.
- Turner, Henry A., Jr. "Fascism and Modernization." *World Politics* 24, no. 4 (1972): 547–564.
- "U.S.-China Policy." *C-Span*, June 5, 1990. <https://www.c-span.org/video/?12555-1/us-china-policy>.
- "U.S.-China Trade and MFN Status." *C-Span*, June 12, 1991. <https://www.c-span.org/video/?18389-1/us-china-trade-mfn-status>.
- Vierthaler, Patrick. "How to Place August 15 in South Korean History? The New Right, the '1948 Foundation' Historical View, and the 2008 Kōn'gukchōl Dispute." *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 10 (2018): 137–174.
- . "A Reconsideration of the New Right's Formative Period (2003–2008): Conservative Experiences, Mass Media and Cultural Memory in Post-Authoritarian South Korea." *European Journal of Korean Studies* 20, no. 1 (2020), 35–84.

- . “The New Right and the 1948 Foundation View: A Failed Revision of South Korean Cultural Memory.” *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2021): 1–33.
- Viñas, Angel. “On the 80th Anniversary of the Spanish Civil War.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 52, no. 1 (2017): 121–128.
- Viroli, Maurizio. *Machiavelli*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Vogel, Ezra F. “Nation Rebuilders: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Lee Kuan Yew, Deng Xiaoping, and Park Chung Hee.” In *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, edited by Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, 513–541. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011.
- Wade, Robert. *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Wang, Fu-chang. “Why Bother about School Textbooks? An Analysis of the Origin of the Disputes over Renshi Taiwan Textbooks in 1997.” In *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua*, edited by John Makeham and A-chin Hsiau, 55–99. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Wang, Q. Edward. “Taiwan’s Search for National History: A Trend in Historiography.” *East Asian History* 24 (2002): 93–116.
- Weber, Max. “Science as a Vocation.” In *The Vocation Lectures*, edited by David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, translated by Rodney Livingstone, 1–31. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004.
- Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. *The German Empire, 1871–1918*. Translated by Kim Traynor. Leamington Spa: Berg, 1985.
- Wei, Chunjuan Nancy. Review of *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* by Jay Taylor, *Canadian Journal of History* 45, no. 2 (2010): 424–426.
- Whealey, Robert H. Review of *The Franco Regime, 1936–1975* by Stanley G. Payne. *The American Historical Review* 94, no. 3 (1989): 788–789.

- White, Theodore H., and Annalee Jacoby. *Thunder Out of China* New York: Sloane, 1946.
- Wiener, Jon. "The Olin Money Tree: Dollars for Neocon Scholars." *The Nation* (January 1, 1990): 12–14.
- Wilson, Norman J. *History in Crisis? Recent Directions in Historiography*. 3rd ed. USA: Pearson, 2014.
- Woo, Jung-en [Meredith Woo-Cumings]. *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
- Woo-Cumings, Meredith [Jung-en Woo]. "The 'New Authoritarianism' in East Asia." *Current History* 93, no. 587 (1994): 413–416.
- . "Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development." In *The Developmental State*, edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings, 1–31. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- , ed. *The Developmental State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Woolf, Daniel. *A Global History of History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Yamamura, Kozo. "Translator's Introduction." In *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis: A Vision for the Next Century*, Yasusuke Murakami, translated by Kozo Yamamura, xiii–xvii. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996.
- . "Translator's Preface." In *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis: A Vision for the Next Century*, Yasusuke Murakami, translated by Kozo Yamamura, xix–xxix. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996.
- Yang, Daqing. "Historical Revisionism in East Asia: What Does Politics Have to Do with It?" in *Contested Views of a Common Past: Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia*, edited by Steffi Richter, 25–46. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008.
- Yang Homin. *38-sŏn esŏ hyujŏnsŏn ũro* [From the Thirty-Eighth Parallel to the ceasefire line]. Seoul: Saenggak ũi namu, 2004.

- Yang, Sungik. “An Old Right in New Bottles: State without Nation in South Korean New Right Historiography.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 80, no. 4 (2021): 889–909.
- Yang Sŭngt’ae. “Han’guk posujuŭi yŏn’gu rŭl wihan pangbŏmnonjŏk siron” [A methodological sketch for research on Korean conservatism]. *Han’guk chŏngch’ihak hoebo* 28, no. 2 (May 1995): 7–32.
- Yang Tongan. “Uik ũn chugŏnnŭn’ga?” [Is the right dead?]. *Mirae Han’guk*, May 30, 2016, <http://www.futurekorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=31706>.
- Yi Chehun. “P’yŏngyang ch’ukchŏn ũi Im Sugyŏng kwa Pak Ch’ŏrŏn, kŭrigo Kukka poanpŏp” [Im Sugyŏng and Pak Ch’ŏrŏn of the Pyongyang festival and the National Security Law]. *Han’gyŏre*, December 6, 2021. <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/1022176.html>.
- Yi Chŏnghun, “Pan’gol kija ũi hyŏndaesa: ‘Sasil ũn inyŏm e usŏn handa’” [The contemporary history of a contrarian reporter: “Facts take precedence over ideology”]. In *Hanbando ũi modŭn kwollyŏk e tojŏn hae on ‘pan’gol kija’ Cho Kapche: Int’ŏbyu moŭm*; Chungang ilbo, Sindonga, KBS, MBC, Yahu, Paek Chiyŏn [“Contrarian reporter” Cho Kapche who has challenged all powers on the Korean Peninsula: Collected interviews; *Chungang ilbo*, *Sindonga*, KBS, MBC, Yahoo, and Paek Chiyŏn], edited by Cho Kapche tatk’ŏm, 7–83. Seoul: Cho Kapche tatk’ŏm, 2010.
- Yi Chŏngun. “Ollon chŏn’gong haksang ũi Cho Kapche kija yŏn’gu: Hogisim kwa chibyoham i mandŭrŏ naen kija” [A journalism student’s study of Cho Kapche: A reporter created through curiosity and tenacity]. *Chogabje.com*, April 2, 2015. https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=60951&C_CC=AJ.
- Yi Chongwŏn. *Higashiajia reisen to Kan-Bei-Nichi kankei* [The Cold War in East Asia and Korea-USA-Japan relations]. Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shubbansha, 1996.

- Yi Chunsik. “Han’guk yōksa kyogwasō in’ga, ani myōn Ilbon yōksa kyogwasō in’ga? Kyohaksa *Han’guksa* kyogwasō Ilche kangjōmgi sōsul pip’an” [Is it a Korean or Japanese history textbook? A critique of the narrative of the Japanese colonial period in the Kyohaksa *Korean history* textbook]. *Yōksa pip’yōng* 105 (November 2013): 54–81.
- . “Nyu rait’ū *Han’guksa* kyogwasō ūi tongnip undongsa waegok kwa Yi Sūngman mihwa” [The distorted history of the independence movement and beautification of Rhee Syngman in the New Right *Korean history* textbook]. *Naeil ūl yōnūn yōksa* 52 (September 2013): 117–137.
- Yi, Gyu Soo. “The Historical Recognition of Japanese Neo-Nationalism.” *International Journal of Korean History* 17, no. 2 (August 2012): 109–131.
- Yi Haengsōn. “1988–1994-nyōn Pukhan pangmun’gi wa tae-Bukkwan: Pukhan paro algi undong – Kim Il Sung samang” [Travel diaries on visits to North Korea between 1988 and 1994 and views of North Korea: From the Know North Korea movement to Kim Il Sung’s death]. *Han’guk munhak yōn’gu* 64 (2020): 325–363.
- Yi Hanu. ““Han’guk hyōndaesa ch’egye-hwa ponkyōk sidong” [Full-fledged start to the systematization of contemporary Korean history]. *Chosōn ilbo*, August 14, 1997, 17.
- Yi Inho, Kim Yōngho, and Kang Kyuhyōng, eds. *Taehan min’guk kōn’guk ūi chaeinsik* [A new understanding of the founding of the Republic of Korea]. Seoul: Kip’arang, 2009.
- Yi Inhwa. *In’gan ūi kil* [Way of the human being], 3 vols. Seoul: Sallim, 1998.
- Yi Kihun. “T’alminjok.T’algūndaejōk ch’ehōm kwa yōksa insik ui pyōnhwa” [The postnational/postmodern experience and transformation in historical consciousness]. In *T’allaengjōnsa ui insik: Segyehwa sidae Han’guk sahoe ūi munje ūisik* [Perceptions of post-Cold War history: Critical awareness in Korean society in the

- globalization era], edited by Pak Inhwí, Kang Wŏnt'aek, Kim Hogi, and Chang Hun, 525–548. P'aju: Han'gilsa, 2012.
- . “Kũ tũl ũi Taehan min'guk yŏksa: Kyohaksa *Han'guksa* kyogwasŏ ũi yŏksa insik” [Their history of the Republic of Korea: The historical consciousness of the Kyohaksa *Korean history* textbook]. *Chinbo p'yŏngnon* 58 (December 2013): 175–186.
- Yi Kwangil. “‘Pak Chŏnghŭi ch'ejeron' pip'an” [Critique of the “discourse on the Park Chung Hee regime”]. *Chŏngch'i pip'yŏng* 3 (1997): 121–140.
- Yi Pyŏngch'ŏn. “Kaebal kukkaron tit ko nŏmŏ sŏgi” [Moving beyond developmental state theory]. *Kyŏngje wa sahoe* 57 (2003): 99–124.
- . “Kaebal tokchae ũi chŏngch'i kyŏngjehak kwa Han'guk ũi kyŏnghŏm: Kũktan ũi sidae rŭl nŏmŏ sŏ” [The political economy of developmental dictatorship and Korea's experience: Toward transcending an age of extremes]. In *Kaebal tokchae wa Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae: Uri sidae ũi chŏngch'i kyŏngjejŏk kiwŏn* [Developmental dictatorship and the Park Chung Hee era: The political-economic origins of our times], edited by Yi Pyŏngch'ŏn, 17–65. P'aju: Ch'angbi, 2003.
- Yi Sŏkche. “Kukka kũndaehwa rŭl wihan kwŏllyŏgyok ũi hwasin” [Embodiment of the hunger for power in the name of national modernization]. *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (June 1994): 578–604.
- Yi Sinch'ŏl. “Kuksa kyogwasŏ chŏngch'i toguhwa ũi yŏksa: Yi Sŭngman.Pak Chŏnghŭi tokchae chŏngkwŏn ũl chungsim ũro” [The history of the political instrumentalization of national history textbooks: Focusing on the dictatorships of Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee]. *Yŏksa kyoyuk* 97 (March 2006): 177–209.
- . “Saeyŏngmo wa kyogwasŏ p'orŏm i kkum kunŭn sesang” [The world dreamed of by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform and Textbook Forum]. *Hwanghae munhwa* 54 (March 2007): 287–300.

- . “Han’guksa kyogwasō parhaeng ūi kwagō wa hyōnjae” [The past and present of the publication of Korean history textbooks]. *Naeil ūl yōnūn yōksa* 35 (March 2009): 93–113.
- . “T’alsingmin.t’allaengjōn.minjujuūi e taehan tojōn, ‘Nyu rait’ū’ Han’guksa kyogwasō” [A challenge to the postcolonial, post-Cold War, and democracy: The “New Right” Korean history textbook]. *Yōksa munje yōn’gu* 30 (2013): 7–50.
- . “Han-Il yōksa kyogwasō nonjaeng ūl haebu handa” [Analyzing the Korea-Japan textbook disputes]. In *Chaengchōm Han’guksa: Hyōndae p’yōn* [Issues in Korean history: Contemporary history], Pak T’aegyūn, Yu Chia, Chōng Pyōngjun, Kim T’aeu, Hong Sōngnyul, Han Honggu, O Cheyōn, and Yi Sinch’ōl, 251–277. P’aju: Ch’angbi, 2017.
- Yi Sūnghun. *Sōnjinhwa kyosil* [Advancement classroom]. Seoul: Han’guk sōnjinhwa p’orōm, 2009.
- Yi Tonghun, Kim T’aehyōng, and Cho Sōngho. “‘Nae ka t’ūlyōt ko Pak Chōnghūi ka oratta’: Undongkwōn ch’ulsin 5-in ūi p’yōngka” [I was wrong and Park Chung Hee was right: The evaluation of five who were student activists]. *Chugan Chosōn*, November 12, 2017. https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/11/10/2017111001816.html.
- Yi Tonguk. “Angma wa chiok, kūrigō in’gan: Kū tūl ūn chugō to chiok e kaji annūnda. Paro kōgi ka chiok inikka” [The Devil, Hell, and a human being: They will not go to Hell when they die, because they are already there]. *Wōlgan Chosōn* (June 1994): 642–645.
- Yi Ŭnbong and Kim Iryōng. “Chungguk kongsanjuūi” [Chinese communism]. In *Hyōndae sajo ūi silsang kwa hōsang: Sahoejuūi sasang ūi yōksa* [The reality and delusions of contemporary thought: The history of socialist thought], Yi Ŭnbong and Kim Iryōng, 139–174. Seoul: Hyōngsōl ch’ulpansa, 1990.

- . *Hyöndae sajo ũi silsang kwa hösang: Sahoejuŭi sasang ũi yöksa* [The reality and delusions of contemporary thought: The history of socialist thought]. Seoul: Hyöngsöl ch’ulp’ansa, 1990.
- Yi Yönghun. *Taehan min’guk iyagi*: Haebang chönhusa ũi chaeinsik ũi kangŭi [The story of the Republic of Korea: A lecture on *A new understanding of history before and after liberation*]. Seoul: Kip’arang, 2007.
- . *Taehan min’guk yöksa: Nara mandŭlgi palchach’wi 1945–1987* [History of the Republic of Korea: The footprints of nation making, 1945–1987]. Seoul: Kip’arang.
- Yi Yönghun, Kim Nangnyön, Kim Yongsam, Chu Ikchong, Chöng An’gi, and Yi Uyön. *Pan-Il chongjokchuŭi: Taehan min’guk wigi ũi kŭnwön* [Anti-Japanese tribalism: Origins of the crisis in the Republic of Korea]. Seoul: Miraesa, 2019.
- Yi Yunhŭi. “Taeŭng sahoe undong (countermovement) ũi sahoejök yökhal: Han’guk ũi ‘Nyu rait’ŭ undong’ sarye rŭl chungsim ũro” [The social role of countermovements: The case of South Korea’s “New Right movement”]. *Tamnon* 201 8, no. 1 (2005): 5–31.
- Yi Yun’gap. “Han’guk yöksahak ũi saeroun kil ch’atki: Minjokchuŭi yöksahak ũi chönmang” [Toward a new path for Korean historiography: The prospects for nationalist history]. *Han’gukhak nonjip* 35 (December 2007): 27–72.
- Yö Hyönho. “Taegyumo ch’umo umjigim chöngch’i sanghwang p’yönsŭng ittan kihoek haengsa” [Series of events involving large-scale memorial activities following bandwagoning on the political situation]. *Han’györe*, October 26, 1999, 7.
- Yonetani, Julia. “The ‘History Wars’ in Comparative Perspective: Australia and Japan.” *Cultural Studies Review* 10, no. 2 (September 2004): 33–50.
- Yoon, Jong-Pil. “Recent History Wars in South Korea.” *Paedagogica Historica* 56, no. 4 (2020): 548–567.

- Yu Hyoyŏl. *Pukhan ŭi sahoejuŭi: Kŏnsŏl kwa chwajŏl* [Socialism in North Korea: Construction and breakdown]. Seoul: Saenggak ŭi namu, 2004.
- Yu Sangsu. “‘Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae’ yŏn’gu wa nonjaeng” [Research on and debates about the Park Chung Hee era]. *Hansŏng sahak* 27 (2012): 121–140.
- Yu Yŏngik [Young Ick Lew]. “Kabo kyŏngjang yŏn’gu” [A study of the Kabo reforms]. *Simin kangjwa* 9 (1991): 176–189.
- . “Kabo nongmin ponggi ŭi posujŏk sŏngkyŏk” [The conservative character of the Kabo peasant uprising]. *Han’guk chŏngch’i oegyosa nonch’ong* 12 (1995): 353–381.
- . “Yi Sŭngman ŭi kŏn’guk isang” [Rhee Syngman’s nation-founding ideal]. *Simin kangjwa* 17 (1995): 1–24.
- . “Semok e ch’ŏlchŏ hamyŏ kŏsijŏk hyŏngan kubi han” [An eye for the big picture as well as detail]. *Han’guk nondan* 84 (1996): 128–135.
- . *Yi Sŭngman ŭi sam kwa kkum: Taet’ongnyŏng i toegi kkaji* [The life and dreams of Rhee Syngman: Up until becoming president]. Seoul: Chungang ilbosa, 1996.
- . “Sujŏngjuŭi wa Han’guk hyŏndaesa yŏn’gu” [Revisionism and research in contemporary Korean history]. *Simin kangjwa* 20 (1997): 58–78.
- , ed. *Sujŏngjuŭi wa Han’guk hyŏndaesa* [Revisionism and contemporary Korean history]. Seoul: Yŏnse taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1998.
- . *Tonghak nongmin ponggi wa Kabo kyŏngjang: Ch’ŏng-Il chŏnjaeng (1894–1895) Chosŏn chidoja tŭl ŭi sasang kwa haengdong* [The Tonghak peasant uprising and the Kabo reforms: The Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and the imagination and actions of Korean leaders]. Seoul: Ilchogak, 1998.
- . *Yi Sŭngman yŏn’gu: Tongnip undong kwa Taehan min’guk kŏn’guk* [A study of Rhee Syngman: The independence movement and

- founding of the Republic of Korea]. Seoul: Yöñse taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2000.
- . *Chölmün nal üi Yi Sŭngman: Hansöng kamok saenghwal (1899–1904); Okchung chapki yön'gu* [Rhee Syngman's younger days: His time in Hansöng Prison (1899–1904); A study of his prison writings] Seoul: Yöñse taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2002.
- , ed. *Yi Sŭngman taet'ongnyöng chaep'yöngka* [A reevaluation of President Rhee Syngman]. Seoul: Yöñse taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2006.
- . *Kön'guk taet'ongnyöng Yi Sŭngman: Saengae.sasang.öpchök üi saeroun chomyöng* [Nation-founding president Rhee Syngman: Shedding new light on his life, thought, and accomplishments]. Seoul: Ilchogak, 2013.
- . *Yi Sŭngman üi saengae wa kön'guk pijön* [The Life of Rhee Syngman and his nation-founding vision]. Seoul: Ch'öng midiö, 2019.
- Yun Chonggu and Chön Yöñuk. “[Nyu rait'ü, ch'immuk esö haengdong üro] (1): Wae umjigi sijak haenna” [(New Right, From silence to action, part 1): Why the movement has begun].” *Tonga ilbo*, November 7, 2004. <https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20041107/8125288/1>.
- Yun Chönggho. “701-gae kogyo ‘minjung sagwan kyogwasö’ suöp” [Seven hundred and one high schools are teaching classes with “*minjung* historiography textbooks”]. *Chosön ilbo*, October 5, 2004. https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2004/10/04/2004100470308.html.
- Yun Haedong. “‘Sumün Sin’ üi pip'an hal su innün'ga? Kim Yongsöp üi ‘naejajök palchöllon’” [Can “the hidden God” be criticized? Kim Yongsöp's “internal development thesis”]. In *Yöksahak üi segi: 20-segi Han'guk kwa Ilbon üi yöksahak* [The century of historiography: Korean and Japanese historiography in the twentieth century], edited

- by To Myŏnhoe and Yun Haedong, 249–284. Seoul: Humanisŭt’ŭ, 2009.
- . “Nyu rait’ŭ undong kwa yŏksa insik: ‘Piyŏksajŏk yŏksa’” [The historical perceptions of the New Right movement: “Ahistorical history”]. In *T’alsingminjuŭi sangsang ui yŏksahak ŭro* [Toward a historiography of the postcolonial imagination], 110–140. Seoul: P’urŭn yŏksa, 2014.
- Yun Kŏnch’a. *Hyŏndae Han’guk ŭi sasang hŭrŭm: Chisigin kwa kŭ sasang 1980–90-nyŏndae* [Intellectual currents in contemporary Korea: Intellectuals and their thought in the 1980s and 1990s]. Translated by Chang Hwagyŏng. Seoul: Tangdae, 2000.
- Yun Kŭnsik, ed. *Hyŏndae kukche chŏngch’iron: Kukche kwan’gye ŭi chŏngch’i kyŏngjehak* [Theory of contemporary international politics: The political economy of international relations]. Seoul: Taewangsa, 1991.
- Yun Sŭnga. “Int’ŏbyu: Hyŏndaesa yŏn’guso Han Hŭngsu ch’odae sojang, ‘Chŏngkwŏn e min’gam han uri hyŏndaesa saryo pojon’” [Interview: Institute of contemporary history research Visiting Chairman Han Hŭngsu, “Preserving the historical materials of our contemporary history, which are sensitive to (changes in) administration”]. *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, April 17, 1997, 13.
- . “Hyŏndae Han’gukhak yŏn’guso Yu Yŏngik sojang: ‘Yi Sŭngman.Pak Chŏnghŭi tŭng kaekkwanjŏk yŏn’gu Han’guk ŭi “taet’ongnyŏnghak sent’ŏ” ro’” [Institute of Modern Korean Studies Director Young Ick Lew: “A ‘center for Korea’s presidents’ and objective research on Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee”] *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, August 21, 1997, 19.
- Yun Taewŏn. *Il hanŭn saram ŭl wihan Han’guk hyŏndaesa* [Contemporary Korean history for the workers]. Seoul: Kŏrŭm, 1990.
- Zakaria, Fareed, and Lee Kuan Yew. “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew.” *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (1994): 109–126.

Zitelmann, Rainer. *Hitler: The Policies of Seduction*. Translated by Helmut Bögler. London: London House, 1999.

국문 초록

뉴라이트 역사인식과 우익 역사수정주의: 탈냉전 시기 박정희 재평가

Keiran Donald Macrae

서울대 국제대학원

뉴라이트 역사인식은 이른바 ‘꼴통 진보와 보수’ 사이에 있는 제 3의 길을 추구한다는 목적을 스스로 내세웠는데 실제로는 어땠을까? 본 논문에서는 그 목적을 이루는 데 정치학자 김일영의 학문에서 잠재력이라도 있었다고 주장한다. 기존 연구에서는 뉴라이트 역사인식이 ‘시장’이라는 명분만 내세우면 제국주의도 권위주의도 옹호하는 이영훈과 연관시켜 이해되는 경향이 있다. 본 논문은 제국주의보다는 내부적 역학에 맞춰 있고, 권위주의 옹호보다는 권위주의를 꼭 과거에 남게 하는, 배제를 당한 김일영의 현대사 인식에 초점을 맞춘다. 김일영의 이 현대사 인식을 전개하는 과정을 90년대 초반에 기자 조갑제가 일으켰던 박정희에 대한 기억 투쟁까지 추적한다. 이어서 김일영과 조갑제, 그리고 이영훈이 보는 박정희 상을 같은 시기에 일어났던 장개석 재평가와 프랭크 재평가와 비교하여 우익 역사수정주의로 해석한다. 이로써 뉴라이트 역사인식은 탈냉전 시기에 힘을 입어 왔던 우익 역사수정주의라는 초국적 현상에 비하면 그 특징이 무엇인지 발견한다. 그리고 이 맥락에서 김일영과 이영훈의 사관은 서로 어떻게 다른지 논의하면서 양자가 1987년, 탈냉전 이후에 보수 역사인식을 어떻게 재상상해 왔는지 보여준다. 본 논문의 의의는 뉴라이트 역사인식은 진보 역사인식에 대한 도전일 뿐만 아니라 한국사를 긍정해야 한다는 의제에 대하여 모두 동의하면서도 그 내용을 어떻게 설정해야 하는지에 대해서는 보수 진영 내에서 일어나는 세력 경쟁이기도 했던 것을 밝히는 것이다. 이 맥락에서는 이영훈이 뉴라이트 역사인식의 대표가 되고 만 것은 새로운 의미를 가진다.

주요어: 뉴라이트 역사인식, 김일영, 박정희, 역사 수정주의, 독재 재평가, 조갑제

학번: 2014-31480

Acknowledgements

I owe a great debt to my advisor, Professor Tae Gyun Park, who encouraged me to pursue my interest but also pushed me to clarify and clearly communicate my ideas. Especially over these last few years, as the work seemed to drag, Professor Park ensured I crossed the finish line. I am also grateful to the other professors on my committee, JeongHun Han, Erik Mobrand, Dongwon Lee, and Je-Yeon Oh, for their interest, insight, and encouragement, which helped me see the dissertation through its final stages.

I am lucky to have made many friends over the years since beginning this project. I would particularly like to thank Boyao Yin, Ben Engel, and Azi Kang, who have been there since the early days. Their company, encouragement, and example were invaluable. Ben and Azi were especially gracious in commenting on early, convoluted drafts of what eventually became chapter two.

To my family in Canada, thank you for your patience and for giving me somewhere to come home to. And to Hyemi and Leo, thank you for precious time, even when the end appeared so elusive. This dissertation would have been hollow without your love and support.