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Master's Thesis of International Studies

**"Analysis of the Paradox of The Enhancement of
2018 CESEDA French Immigration Law"**

2018 년 프랑스 이민법 강화의 역설

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**"Analysis of the Paradox of The Enhancement of
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ABSTRACT

This study critically assesses the 2018 reforms made in the French Code of Entry and Residence of Foreigners and of the Right of Asylum, more precisely, their effects on immigration management in France. These were, in essence, designed to shore up anti-migration measures while, ironically, the post-reform inflow of immigrants into the country has shown substantial growth. Fueled by this research evidence, which draws on official data, and accounts of immigration given by the relevant government agencies, the paper contrasts the new legal measures with the former provisions, particularly the implementation strengths of their enforcement."

The analysis detects some administrative inefficiencies as responsible for keeping the success of these reforms in a way that led to this surprising shift. This paradox of stricter laws and higher immigration also indicates the possibility of wrongly matched policy objectives and administrative capacity. This matter has to be resolved not only if we want to control the influx of immigrants better but also if we want to keep the immigration process coherent and effective.

The research puts forward ideas on policy change and structural reform as a way of gap bridging to the administrative regime. The particular policy that is the focus of the notes has to do with a mind change in policies with a view to better administration thus achieving sound immigration governance as per the new challenges ahead. The rethinking is more practical in the sense that it provides not only the wrong directions of the actual trends but also the directions of the security of the governance in the immigration area.

Keywords : Immigration Policy, Legislative Analysis, Administrative Efficiency, CESEDA Reforms, Policy Effectiveness, Paradoxical Trends

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research Background

In the last few years, France has been redefining its immigration policy quite a few times, to increase the control over the migrant wave. The revision of the CESEDA in 2018 is one of the many regulations that limit the immigration into the country. The mentioned measure brought in more strict initial conditions, tended to prolong the period of detention, and introduced fines for the non-compliant one. Despite these efforts, an opposite effect of more visas issued and not a decline came into existence. This surprising influx happens to be a query on whether the 2018 CESEDA reform's success is real, and the broader role of immigration control is overshadowed.

The other core point of this subject is the concept of *laïcité* that relates to the national identity and political order of France. The *laïcité* model, which does not exist anywhere else but in France, is the living proof of the principle that there is a strict boundary between church and state, and it goes to the extent that this is the primary wing of the secular society and republican values. In the debates about *laïcité*, the main today's discussions are *laïcité* and are the very laws ironed by secularist views. But, for instance, the resulting symbolism usually makes the rules more complicated showing the challenge of matching the ideal to the reality of governance.

This study provides a look at the 2018 CESEDA reform through the laïcité lens, investigating how this concept moulds the formulation and execution of laws and administration. In this vein, it aims to find out whether the compelling effect of laïcité engendered by the French government has contributed to the paradoxical nativism in its immigration policy. From the perspective of a symbolic national entity guided by the imperatives, the law as an act of agency gives an opportunity to discuss the dilemmas coming from national identity, legislative ambitions and the public policies in the immigration law.

1.2 Research Question and Argument

*"Why did the 2018 CESEDA reform fail to reduce
the number of immigrants as intended?
Why does this paradox of increasing immigration
despite stricter laws exist?"*

The major objective of this study is to investigate the reasons of the increase in the numbers of immigrants despite stronger rules and legal barriers. It also verifies the impact of the inefficiency of legislative reform, which as a result have contributed to this phenomenon. One of the key drivers is the lack of administrative support, thus the independent variable required to perform this research is administrative deficiencies.

The study theorizes that the isolation of the CESEDA reform solely through the mentions of strictness of the criteria and the punishment has occluded the fact of it being below the necessary level of administrative support and the resources allocation. The measures undertaken by the French government included, for instance, protracted processing times, more rigorous exclusion regulations, and prolonged periods of confinement under the 2018 CESEDA reform. However, these legally enhanced provisions, on the one hand, did not produce the expected results but they, on the other hand, contributed to the administrative system inefficiency that caused the difference between the intended legislative goals and practical enforcement. Consequently, the paradox of the increased number of immigrants has become apparent as the reform has failed to meet its objectives.

1.3 Review of Existing Literature: Summary of Key Arguments from Prior Studies

Recent studies emphasize the growing public and political demand for more stringent immigration laws in France. McKeever (2024) outlines how the tightening of immigration policies during the Sarkozy era was driven by public concerns related to cultural identity, economic strain, and the influence of far-right political movements. These pressures led to a legislative push for more restrictive immigration controls, despite the complexities involved in managing migration. Similarly, Pape (2024) discusses how the French government responded to rising migration pressures, particularly those resulting from global crises, with increasingly complex laws aimed at

controlling immigration. However, these measures often prove symbolic, serving to address public anxieties rather than achieving actual reductions in migration flows.

A recurring theme in the literature is the symbolic nature of France's immigration laws, which often fail to have a practical impact on migration control. Brun (2013) highlights that while these laws may provide the appearance of stricter immigration control, they often do not lead to tangible reductions in immigration numbers. Similarly, Terrio (2010) examines the ineffectiveness of policies like *Obligation de Quitter le Territoire Français* (OQTF), suggesting that while they are designed to be deterrent, bureaucratic inefficiencies, lack of resources, and the complex nature of the laws themselves hinder their enforcement, contributing to a significant gap between legislative intent and practical execution.

Recent studies highlight significant administrative challenges that impede the enforcement of immigration laws. Fischer (2013) explores the administrative barriers that exist within the French immigration system, particularly the lack of resources and capacity to handle increasing numbers of applications, despite the introduction of more stringent laws. Makaremi (2009) discusses how the discretion granted to local officials within the immigration system complicates enforcement, leading to inconsistent application of the law. The increasing use of digitalized services, intended to streamline processes, has introduced new challenges, as Pape (2024) notes, creating confusion and inefficiencies for both applicants and administrators.

The socio-political context of global migration flows is another critical factor influencing the effectiveness of France's immigration policies. Müller (2014) underscores how geopolitical events, such as the Syrian refugee crisis, have led to increased migration pressures that complicate the French government's ability to control immigration through legislation alone. Carvalho (2016) provides an analysis of how France's participation in the Schengen Agreement limits its ability to enforce national immigration laws effectively, with external factors like the free movement of people within the EU exacerbating domestic challenges. These external socio-political factors highlight the difficulty in achieving legislative goals through national policies alone.

1.4 Research Methodology: Using Literature and National Statistics

This research takes the converging methodological approach of legal statistics, which is the national system, and qualitative data from stemmed testimonies and reports by social rights organizations. The method aims to be comprehensive and to reconcile the contrary results of the changes to French Immigration, specifically the 2018 CESEDA amendment. Therefore, the methodology accomplished a full appraisal of the reasons for such misalignment between the objectives set by law and actual outcomes. This was achieved by the analysis of the regulatory texts, the data of administrative nature, and the social circumstances.

To begin the examination, we go through the source materials, such as laws and statistics that are available. They would be legal texts, and statistical facts, as well as their true reports. The initial sources involve legal provisions that are available through Légifrance, administrative statistics from the French Ministry of the Interior as well as reports from organizations like La Cimade.

Legal analysis at the national level of laws experiencing the changes led to the existence of a new law in 2018 named CESEDA where the close examination of provisions which were already in the law was accompanied by the explanation of the new one. Further, the data collected are related to the quantitative aspects like asylum application numbers, appeal rates, and cases demanding reconsideration. Likewise, a new type of administrative data that has been added offers one perspective on the difficulties of law enforcement, e.g., detention space concerns, enforcement of obligations that lead to eviction from French territory (OQTF), as shown by reports from the Cour des Comptes and the French Ministry of Economy. Consequently, the mentioned datasets have been perfectly complemented by the testimonies and reports that La Cimade has provided on the qualitative experiences of immigrants in these institutions.

The investigation of immigration trends and enactment of substantial legislative provisions are very important elements of this study. The research is based on INSEE and Eurostat data and it involves the change in the outflows of immigration, the dynamics of residency, and the functioning of

the administration of the immigration process, which is what the research examines the record of. Explained, the research outlines the expected and real outcomes.

Principally, the survey gave prominence to the policy targets that failed to hit because of the policies. For instance, in the draft version, the only way to reach this goal is to enforce more severe residency conditions, more succinct application procedures, and faster deportation measures. However, the data at the national level often highlighted that the immigration inflow would get higher or that the rates of violations stayed the same. The extent of this non-correspondence is fundamental to the correct presentation of wrong legislation, which gets mixed up with the administrative obstacles of the adoption of the laws.

A comparative analysis of legal texts can be done showing us the ways by which specific articles within CESEDA have been formed, assuring better control on the immigration field. This analysis highlights the following three areas that were adumbrated in the amendment of 2018:

- Article L624-1: This provision contains stricter penalties and deportation measures, which increase the effectiveness of deportation.
- Article L313-13: This article phrased a tightening of conditions on residence permits making them difficult to obtain and so it essentially meant the reduction in the number of immigrants who were included in priority.

- Article R311-12: This regulation introduces deadlines for processing immigration applications and establishes the principle of implicit rejection, which expedites the handling of cases by assuming rejection if no decision is communicated within a specified timeframe. Through these sections vis-a-vis the past, the study gauges the cumulative impacts of these sectors on immigration regulation. The act of legalizing will be based on both the way of carrying out the project as well as the qualitative data such as turnaround times, and the rate of re-integration.

The methodological approach revolves around filling the gap between the abstract purposes of legislative reforms and their practical outcomes. Legal documents are frameworks for immigration control, the survey takes a critical approach to analyzing whether these measures have reached their goals. In this way, the probable causes of administrative inefficiencies, resource limitations, and the opposition of human rights organizations are studied to comprehend their contribution to the constant problems encountered by the French immigration policy.

This research combines legal, statistical, and qualitative analyses to respond to the basic question of why legislative reforms such as the 2018 CESEDA are not successful in the achievement of the desired reduction of immigrant numbers. By stressing the fact that legal regulations and rules and administrative capacities, as well as social situations, are interdependent, the study provides a thorough assessment of the paradoxical impacts of French immigration law.

Chapter 2: Review of Existing Literature

2.1 Strengthening Immigration Control and the Growing Social Demand

Since immigration reforms in France in the early 2000s, the French immigration laws have undergone great changes in a bid to fortify border control and reduce migration to the country. These changes have been done from time to time, and there have been implementations which have demanded that the application criteria for residence be made better, that detention periods for illegal immigrants be extended and that the penalties for non-compliance with immigration laws be made severe, (Mengès-Le Pape, 2024) be introduced. Key to the changes in the main laws was the call for more stable immigration policies which were strongly voiced by members of the public. Anti-immigrant groups, such as nationalist movements, are concerned about increased immigration rates and their implications for national security, cultural preservation, and social stability.

This phase of legal strengthening is part of the overall response of France to the demands of globalization and the consequences of larger migration numbers. Migration has increasingly become part of public discussions around the world due to the perception of migration-related matters shown by political and media representations. The government should take robust measures that would foster more satisfaction with the state of the borders among the people. A series of opinion polls reveal that France is often split on the issue of immigration. Several of the citizens prefer legislative

arrangements that can secure national welfare. As a result, the policy had been laws amendment to be more responsive to the issues.

The 2018 CESEDA reform is distinctly the most ambitious piece of the latest legislation which at the end was steered towards finding the best possible technique to deal with the major menace of illegal migration in France. A set of measures that would obstruct the illegal practice of migration would be one of the main emphasis areas of the social security systems. These restrictions incorporated the requirement that residency applicants would have to prove their eligibility not just via their Identification cards but with the help of other papers, including the need for stricter eligibility criteria. Similarly, the reorganized immigration laws were clear-cut as it was told that the time for imprisonment facing the illegal immigrants whose deportation was in progress would be extended which means that the authorities would have more time to carry out the deportation. In addition to this, sanctions were tightened with reference to violation of migration laws so that it was clear that the government has stricter controls.

These arrangements are positioned as crucial steps in the protection of the homeland and the handling of the related security concerns, and thus are consistent with global views on the securitization of immigration policies. Academic experts, for example, Fischer (2013) and Brun (2013), are of the opinion that this reform was implemented not only to corral the movement but also to show France as a strong protagonist in not only controlling its borders but also regulating a system of growing world connectivity. The

reforms, therefore, were meant to showcase France's power of the proper management of migration and the preservation of public order at the same time respecting its core democratic values.

Nonetheless, the broad aims of the project also spotlighted the areas of weakness of the conservative policy. France, as a state that exceptionally embraces the *laïcité* principle, has tried to adopt its secular values into immigration management. The laws and social standards motivated, the legislative agenda of 2018 CESEDA with the central idea being the toughening of the migration policy to keep immigrant cultures united and protect the country from external threats. However, these norms were not actually brought into action but rather they were put on a paper. The practical aspect of life experience revealed that there were still gaps, specifically in administration.

The void between legislative purposes and actual administration work has become a common topic whenever immigration governance in France is discussed. Clochard (2014) argues that even though the 2018 CESEDA reform brought about measures which were geared towards solving public grievances the underlying problems were caused by structural inefficiencies within the administrative system. Major problem areas were an imbalanced distribution of resources which due to low funding and shortage of staff in immigration offices resulted in the slow processing of applications and poor enforcement of regulations. Consequently, these constraints contributed to long waiting periods, turning both applicants and staff into

participants in a system overloaded with its procedural demands.

Not only were the resource limitations a difficulty, but the amputation of the CESEDA reform from bureaucratic roadblocks is the other half of the entire story. The involved character of the administrative processes always took up the available time to complete the listed cases because the latter is such multidimensional. The innovation within this process the induction of computerized machines, e.g., the ANEF system, had been done right before the launch where the technology of the platforms was confronted with typical technical and access difficulties, especially for the less privileged peoples. According to the author Papel (2024), who criticizes the dematerialization of the procedures, these digital difficulties adverse the participation of users but also deepen the already overloaded system with the queues.

As the restrictions were the cause of the low practical impact of that reform, and as they pointed to the greater problems concerning displacement of immigrants in the conditions of scarcity of resources and institutional constraints, this was the case. Despite the effort to incept more regulation in the migration process, the overwhelming obstacles in the organization depicted in the status of implementation of the reform have brought up big questions if the remedy works. The reform, which was supposed to be the most control demonstration, it turns out to be the one which brings more confusion and effective implementation, and in short, the legislative intent was merely symbolic.

It is the CESEDA reform of 2018 that manifests the larger difficulty of achieving such control over the immigrants in a coherent way. The middle-of-the-road *laïcité* of France in the formulation of which processes the way French public affairs run and influence the country's policy towards imminences. Thereby such a social city law is more related to migration than to the administrative powers control or general peace. All too often, these actions can be diametrically opposite to the administrative efficiency that is based on the actual nature of governing. Although the laws of the policy environment are usually the package of solutions to myriad issues, unless the stipulated policies are executed with determination the success is ambiguous. Evolving French immigration laws reveal the recurring disparity between the aspiration of policymakers and the capacity for actual action. This very dynamic shows clearly the disadvantages of safety protocols that are mostly based on symbolism without the needed technical resources or the necessary institutional support for the effective implementation. The findings imply that real immigration control is not possible with the only legislative reforms; it needs a comprehensive strategy that supports the legal framework resources of the on-grounds level. This examination of the 2018 CESEDA reform and the trajectory of French immigration policy clarifies the problems and dilemmas of the current migration governance system.

2.2 Symbolic Deterrence with Limited Practical Effectiveness

The French immigration policy has more often geared to the symbolic measures, which aim to present the government's strong migration

control, and it is often utilized as a tool to appease the domestic audience and not address the systemic challenges of implementation. According to scholars such as Müller (2014) and Cohen-Almagor (2022), these legislative actions that are politically convenient, yet frequently lack the appropriate administrative capacity and logistical infrastructure to achieve their intended outcomes. The paradox of legal ambitions and the enforcement side reveals a fundamental disconnection as every restrictive policy face hurdle that may range from resource constraints to bureaucratic inefficiencies.

The evolution of French rules concerning immigration echoes the worries of a wider society about the risk of losing its national identity, the potential threat to its security, and the possibility of a cultural fragmentation. Examples like the CESEDA 2018 reform have been viewed as necessary for the safeguarding of the French nation's republican values. Specifically, it is in the framework of *laïcité* and public order (McKeever, 2020). On the other hand, the increased stress on symbolic deterrence at the expense of operational effectiveness is correctly seen in the form of regulated detention time and severe residency requirements that are scarcely made to work. The political establishment often adopts the strategy of symbolic deterrence as a method directed towards expressing political responsiveness to the public, especially at the time of the increasing polarization of migration issues. Debandi (2018) mentions that the French model underlines the link between migration control and the penal system which is a symbolic indication of the restrictions' weight. But these tactics of government are often the source of failure, as shown by the fact that deportation rates are extremely low and can

reclaim the only 6% of Obligations de Quitter le Territoire Français (OQTFs) (Müller, 2014).

One of the most acute dilemmas France faces in pursuit of its immigration policy is the resource shortage. Under the current administrative arrangement, the French authorities lack the funds as well as the necessary number of personnel which reduces their ability to handle the immigrants' application promptly. Clochard (2014) provides evidence that an acute law enforcement focus led to a substantial increase in detention facilities between 2000 and 2012. However, despite such developments, delays in the regulatory process persist. The personnel tasked with running the administrative activities are inundated with the ever-increasing number of such tasks which are in themselves complicated by the laws of immigration, and according to Pape (2024) it is a "*regulatory labyrinth*." These structural constraints not only impede enforcement but also extend the holdups that the number of delays creates the system's untrustworthiness.

Digital migration is the latest solution to adopt the technology in the manner that migration processes are legal among others and comes in as one of the most focally dealt with problems in most countries' legal processes. While ANEF system, the main representative of such a digital approach, was presented to simplify immigration procedures, it has in fact resulted in the emergence of new barriers. Pape (2024) objects to this dematerialization of adjudicatory acts and thereby emphasizes the friction of the technical level and the lack of availability for the vulnerable strata. At the same time, e-

government tools are usually a breakthrough against the clunky and cumbersome routine of the administration; as a downside though, they may inadvertently add on to the exclusion phenomenon making the tech-retarders relatively worse off. Besides, traditional human-to-human interaction and customer service suffer when electronic platforms are employed, thus further isolating customers and genuinely slowing down the process.

Besides this, the Judicial and the institutional aspects also contribute to reducing the governmental power to implement their strict immigration policies. One of the ways whereby the judiciary exercise a check on the executive excesses is by refusing to adopt policies they feel are infractions of human rights, Fischer (2013). The contemporary political situation is typified mostly by the legislative bodies proposing and the ordinary memory or judicial being the stumbling block to such changes. An Illustration of the case is the Constitutional Council which has, for example, criticized the hasty nature of the immigration policies that are issued contrary to the basic human rights. This has made the enforcement of these laws impossible and the right human-like right to live in a free country takes precedence over political needs. In the perspective of the immigration law recovery and democratic values and the strictest control stands for the tightrope that the judiciary has to walk on. While there is a lingering murk being created, the laws remain in force and their correct implementation is the hardest issue this system faces.

Finally, there are many bureaucratic inefficiencies that are still a major challenge to the effective enforcement. Some of the contributing

factors are excessive paperwork and lack of coordination between the different divisions (interagency coordination) delaying and bottlenecks caused by these are what hinder the smooth functioning of the entire procedure. According to Brun (2013) and Debandi (2018), the extent of these inefficiencies is such that they become the main obstacles to the achievement of policies, which are the most sensitive to these shortcomings. For instance, there are situations when there is no common ground between the subnational authorities and the national agencies that may end up giving out conflicting mandates hence making the process which is already overburdened take longer on the way. These blockages not only obstruct the efficiency in implementation but also the trust in governance at the same time as people applying for and officers being thwarted by inefficiencies.

The French immigration policy will not be a one-way street to the future if it still places the symbolic measures above the actual reform. Resource constraints, digital availability, judicial limitations, and the monstrous bureaucracy all stand as the representatives of the need for a united and sustainable way of immigration management. Unless these are addressed, the disconnection between the policy's purpose and its reality will result not only in the inefficiency causing both the failure and the injustice of the French immigration policy.

2.3 Administrative Challenges Leading to Difficulties in Enforcement

Immigration policies are still facing challenges due to the complexity of issues the administrative apparatus and legislative and digitalization efforts

like the ANEF that were introduced in 2018 CESEDA are facing in France. The reason why the government instituted these new laws is to make the very lengthy and opaque immigration decisions less bureaucratic by moving the process online by introducing automation and digitization. The reforms were mostly meant to implement a digital system which in turn would make the process more much and clear with unforeseen path to the final decision where the question of admission or not is a priori. However, problems of aggravated systemic inefficiencies, lack of access, and cash shortages have been worsened to the point where they cannot proceed which means there is a huge lopsidedness between the policy goals that were set and the actual results.

Administrative processes become digitized, e.g., the ANEF system, to provide facilitation advances in the application of the case and a consequent overall change in the transparency of migration applications. Despite the breakthroughs accomplished with the three goals, the plan suffered serious technical and operational problems. The growing problems encountered in the digital system have been due to technical issues which include consistent faults, decreased features, and uneven application in the prefectures which in turn has failed to facilitate the right of access to spaces for individuals held what their waiting is. Furthermore, the advent of digital administration has made it difficult for the most disadvantaged groups such as those who are poor and non-digital-born to participate. They are the group of people who feel that the online procedures are very complex and therefore do not embark on them. The "digital divide" is one of the ways that the existing disparities have been perpetuated as Pape (2024) observes the segregating effects of digitalization on the poor.

Immigrant authorities are generally clung in the snarls of administration with administrative bottlenecks, whose serious nature is made worse by the scarcity of resources. In addition to the lack of staff in immigration offices, they have neither manning nor enough money. Surprisingly, the limitations to conform to legislation are not the major concern of the staff, but it is a significant attrition factor. By using digital tools like ANEF, this technology is on its way for a better future. However, a more comprehensive technical training pathway should involve the employees. These lacks joined effort confuses the innovative nature of digitalization, thus, employees to air concerns about the new technologies, causing the application process to slow down and the likelihood of errors to increase.

The issues faced in the digitalization process and the lack of resources are the root causes of the systemic disorder of the immigration administration in France. The migration process is unnecessarily buried under a myriad of rules and regulations to red tape and other administrative problems. People without proper documents or those who try to enter the country illegally are the main concern. In addition to this, the legalization of administration has been going on for years and continues to be very hard for all parts to deal with. According to Pape, (2024) "A regulatory labyrinth" is the term that best describes the situations where the reforms invariably do not create the desired outcomes. Furthermore, some bureaucratic challenges like problems in communication and are the excruciating, and vaivode of vehicles are not according to the goal.

What is the real problem of the legislative will against the executive functioning that also worsened the common perception that what is symbolically deterred is more important than what is practically done, is the dissonance between legislative will and executive functioning. Müller (2014) and McKeever (2024) both summarize that the government's heavy-handed approach, the most common to be implemented in such autocracies, consists in policies such as a more demanding control over immigrants or, else, the taking into custody of those who violate the law allowing the society to be in control. And thus, it assures public safety of the citizens. Still, very often these actions are not backed up by any operational means which gives rise to situations of misuse and human rights violations. For example, France's detention centers, which were a 723-person establishment in 2000, had to endure the company of 2280 detainees in 2012; at the same time, the legally binding means such as "OQTF" ("Obligations de Quitter le Territoire Français") disability with average 6% remained almost the same. (Müller, 2014) This is a signal to the fact that imitative policies of government sometimes miss the targets.

These dysfunctions of governance not only have adverse effects on the applicants but also have relevance to the whole policy being applied. The long bureaucracy in the handling of residence permits and asylum applications, for example, at the same time results in roughly two thousand immigrants' living lives out of gear. Employment opportunities, accommodation, as well as financial security are some of those goods that they must endure without being taken care of for a long time. The Lille Prefecture (2023) informs about the suffering side of these delays by the

individuals, which convey the stories of their social and economic vulnerabilities. The information about despair among the beneficiaries and even the officials bring about disbelief within the community over the immigration system; besides this, we see the rising of societal tensions and a lack of government efficiency. Shurts (2022) holds that the authority that the law-bills have counted on the confidence of the citizens it is the people have lost and roadblock the effectiveness of any cure.

The inefficiency of administration and the immigration system limitations in France are, as it were, the symptom of the mismatch between the symbolic legislative measures and the real practice. The solution to these problems is to take a holistic approach which should include technical innovation and capacity-building of the administrative staff. It is necessary to secure the staff, provide training and invest resources to ensure that ANEF system improve works are carried out as well as clear the way of the systemic bottlenecks. Finally, the texts will be produced with greater clarity and simplicity, which will lead to reducing the confusion between the applicants and facilitators. The last point is that one should also worship the contemporary practice of regular checking and evaluation of both the digital tools and the administrative processes in order that the capture of any weak operational positions will be assured.

The first step towards the migration process digitalization is indeed a historic moment for France, it is, in fact, the main stumbling block if it is due to systemic inefficiencies, resource restrictions, and the intricacy of the structure. These issues not only are the main ones of the legislative reforms

but also can be achieved with inclusive and just immigration policy thus being a part of the common good response.

2.4 Socio-Political Context

France's immigration system is different from the one in any other country, as it is influenced by a certain socio-political environment of the country that is built upon the principles of *laïcité* (which means "no religion" in the public domain) and national identity. These basic values are non-negotiable in French republicanism, but they are the main issues in immigrant communities, which in turn see the policies as evidence of exclusion or discrimination. Oh Jung-eun (2021) and Peker (2021) state that *laïcité* was probably first used to stay neutral but later became a tool used by politicians to persecute cultural and religious differences, especially Muslims. This idea is established by the legislature and the executive branch, who are determined to focus on strong monitoring rather than engaging in social inclusion and thus, restrain them.

The problems of high unemployment and the lack of resources in the suburbs exacerbate the alienation of the immigrants. These suburban areas, commonly referred to as *banlieues*, form the nexus of multiple negative forces that establish a perpetual vicious cycle between poverty, social exclusion, and inequality. The fact that these territories have an acute lack of job opportunities for a large part of the population is a sentiment voiced by Astier (2023) who claims that immigrants will have to endure a substantially prolonged period before they will be able to attain a middle-class standard of living and reduce these social disparities. The report also supports

Beauchemin and Descamps (2022) who claim that the root cause of problems in these districts are the structural inequalities that lead to the higher prevalence of migrants that suffer from inadequate housing, education, and health. The bars that these communities cannot cross over, for this reason, are not only the immigrants' possibilities but also the government's illegal immigration reforms, which ought to improve both immigrant participation and standards of life, respectively, will be compromised.

Taking measures against possible threats to security poses obstacles on the road towards these objectives. As per The Economist (2023), French immigration policy is generally built on the principle that immigrants are a source of danger. Based on this narrative, legislative bills have been introduced that enforce the observation of certain activities, the detention of immigrants who violated immigration law, and the deportation of others. The securitization of migration as a way of gaining political glory besides facilitating and joining the rank of outstanding states also diminishes the opportunities to settle in the society and wipe out the undercurrents of the migratory flow. The definitive idea of "the security dispositive," that is a part of the criminal system, which is a central part of migration management in France, and whose priority is the control of the system over the parts of it which are inclusive. While the implementation of this measure satisfies the immediate political and public moments, it doesn't stand to the long challenge of structural injustice and cultural integration.

Policies regulations proposed on behalf of these policies not only demonstrate the discrepancy between the objectives of the law and the result

that could be accomplished. Pape (2024) supports that the French legal system complexity through practically converted it into an administrative labyrinth, which in turn causes difficulty for both the administrators and the migrants to rule it. The fact is made worse even more through the digitization of procedures, as it is also a status that can be affected by digital technologies and web portals like ANEF so that they both are speeded up the process and find ways to deny genuine accessibilities at the same time. Opposite to the concept and model of remote services and automated decisions that were supposed to be a time-saving and cost-effective measure, they have instead been accused of creating fake ways of administrative work and of digital-deprived populations to become marginalized. This mutation alienates the vulnerable category and destabilizes the administrative system as well through the revolt of the Council of State admitting that the fear of management might lead to worthless practices for every public body that would adopt it and the law enforcement agency that would go against such practice.

Europe's geopolitical perspective on immigration is undeniably sound, nevertheless, it certainly complicates more France than any other European nation. The Palestine and Ukraine are situation spots where the migrants have been stuck the most trying to help the global community decide when facing global problems. Researchers Pape and McKeever (2024) cleverly argue the parliament of France that presented more and harder legislative measures, including extending the time spent on the detention centers and tightening the rules on the detainees but still, all efforts were in vain. The government energized to come up with stricter policies among other

issues such as putting them to the country of origin and the development of pro-deterrent and policy affirmation measures are only examples of the 'means-ends' traps that are embedded in these policies. The reason for this one is not even immigration regulations but the lack of proper treatment along the immigration path to deal with economic and political issues. The relationship between the political and legal domains makes the implementation of these policies difficult. McKeever (2024) and Müller (2014), the contributors of Democratic Communications, deal with the lesser-valued roles that voters play in the policy sphere, especially when parties like the National Front (NF) and other far-right entities will use immigration as a political campaign. These types of policies are usually much about demonstrating control of migration by states through law and other unwanted results, such as the one mentioned by Müller (2014) "penal populism." In fact, they tend to be very hard on migrants over the irony of the fact that these migrants are the reasons of the bureaucracy and the courts. They then forget that they are the cause of this bickering being initiated.

Moreover, financial issues have been shown to make the problem of immigration laws even more complex. The authorities' undertakings to limit the movement of people, who are primarily in the service industry focusing on hotel and infrastructure businesses, frequently do not match the real conditions existed. Such practices are aimed at attracting highly skilled professionals from abroad on the one hand but discourage unskilled labor force from coming in on the other. That was observed in the analysis, written in 2023, by The Economist, where the French immigration policies were assessed to be successful in both facilitating undocumented migration to the

country and providing the needed qualification of labor in different sectors. However, such a holistic approach tends to downplay the fact that the proper struggle with immigration requires having a good economic plan and vehement law enforcing corresponding to it. Thus, different implementations by the policymakers and their lack of coordination bring about the public trust and administrative frustration.

The commendation must be that the legal system is restrictedly regulated, making it hard for immigrants to widen the scope of permissible stay from legal to being authorized guests in France. Just as initiatives such as the 2018 CESEDA aim to convey this transformation to the mind of an average citizen, it does not certify, underprovided debate in the public sphere, be it on the parliamentary or municipal level, on the topic of migrants, and the integration policy is just a pipe dream. To clarify, I would suggest that the non-flexible nature of laws, the middle start by equipping the organizational or run the necessary programs and includes society through social-political inclusiveness. The task of simplifying rules, directing budget funds to the administrative components, and drafting a discourse on migration that is inclusive is essential in bridging the gap between policy formation and policy implementation. The absence of these measures will only lead to the continued dialectical hegemony between legal enforcement and practical disenchantment with the state and thus problems with the management of immigration in France will never disappear.

2.4 Socio-Political Context

The overemphasis on deterrence and penalization in the French immigration policy has contributed to enhancing social inequality and increasing tensions within marginalized communities. The policy measures that are aimed at low-income, undocumented populations, i.e., financial penalties or prolonged detention, have deepened economic hardships and turned into a tool for social exclusion (Galbraith et al., 2023). These rules have made things even more unsteady to already vulnerable groups, which has resulted in exposing such groups to exploitation, and at the same time, they have been centralized to be a part of the larger society.

Migration policies that are based on securitization pose a higher risk of separation of immigrant communities along with breeding of distrust in public institutions. Shurts (2022) underlines the fact that these strategies exacerbate cultural and political disagreements beginning from the urban edges where immigrant settlers are concentrated. These conflicts do not only make the rift between groups deeper, but they also weaken the effectiveness of enforcement measures since alienation leads to the disobedience of people to join in with authorities.

The obstacles that France is dealing with in the enforcement of its immigration laws are a reflection of the more general patterns that can be identified all over Europe amidst the imperatives of geopolitics and the fluidity of migration. Smirnova (2022) includes the French policy in this

broad European context and argues that external emergencies such as Syria and Ukraine wars have overwhelmed enforcement systems. Terrio (2010) provides a similar examination of the way that post-9/11 border militarization has led to intensified surveillance but has not really dealt with the main reasons for migration. These external issues bring a lot more complexity to already fragile administrative systems but also accentuate the connectedness of migration policies at national and regional levels.

One of the main tasks of good governance and public administration is to solve the things that cause systematic challenges. In a satisfying and productive way frees staff as well, who would, instead, be even more productive and collaborative. To simplify the business process and eliminate the challenges for accessibility of the digital venue, would allow the paradigm shift that is needed for sustainability and policy capacity (Pape,2024). These attempts will not only help overcome bottlenecks but also will make the immigration system operate more smoothly, thus instilling the public with confidence in the system of its operations.

One more fundamental factor of success over problems of enforcement is to strengthen the inter-agency coordination. A closer connection between each of the organizations could make it happen. Immigration, judiciary, and police officers' relationship would accelerate the enforcement and reduce the same procedures. Practice of sending information and presenting common and essential subjects will give the chance of working smoother and will lead to better the outcomes in policymaking.

Proving that there is a balance between the measures of protection and the rights of individuals is still the central problem of the immigration and asylum policy we have in France. The strategies, therefore, must maintain a middle line between clear binary enforcement and the protection of individual rights. The establishment of transparent procedures and providing fair access to the legal resources must be accomplished while people trust in the system and comply with it. Majcher (2020) argues that the right to a fair trial and the utilization of human rights-centered methods are crucial for the making of a sustainable and just migration framework.

The eradication of the migration root factors is a task that encompasses not only the borders of France but the world. By means of international assistance and developmental strategies, the socio-economic and political problems that cause irregular migration can be mitigated. Through the solution of such fundamental problems, France and its partners in the European Union could ultimately alleviate the lack of self-restraint in migration that causes instability and develop a more sustainable and manageable system.

The fact that French immigration policy fails to keep pace with the legislative intent due to inadequate enforcement exposes the problem of symbolic deterrence. Although the enforcement of these policies, such as CESEDA 2018, is symbolical they are not working properly because of administrative inefficiencies, socio-economic constraints, and lack of comprehensive reform. To overcome these challenges, a more comprehensive

and integrated approach is necessary—one that contains policy targets that can be realized with limited interruptions in the practical sphere and reflects the respect of rights of everyone equally. France can adopt a policy that is characterized by fairness as well as the protection of the rights of migrants, which in turn can provide a more stable and just management of international migration.

2.5 Distinction Between Existing Studies and This Research

A lot of the extant research on migration policies in France gives us a full understanding of the social and global factors influencing legislative reforms and enforcement mechanisms. Many studies are focused on global migration trends, international obligators such as the Schengen Agreement, and socio-political narratives, including public concerns over security, national identity, and economic pressures. In addition, there are a growing number of problems associated with the administrative side, such as delays, resource constraints, and technological limitations. Based on this, administrative shortcomings remain quite an under researched concern both in terms of their empirical specificity and analytical depth in comparison to the well-covered approach to social and international issues.

Nevertheless, while few of them have underlined the legislative objectives versus enforcement outcomes the same argument is hardly ever examined where domestic administrative inefficiencies initially give birth to or make such a problem worse. Such studies predominantly talk about the

shortage of personnel, lack of training, and digitalization-related problems which are being coped with through systems like the ANEF, but nevertheless, they are dealt with separately. Also, issues such as the differences in local governance across different French regions and the struggles of the system are also areas that are very weak in empirical terms. Thus, the lack of a comprehensive analysis that relates directly to the paradoxical outcomes of immigration laws and administrative failures is emphasized.

One way to counter the absences in the clarity of this research is to find out if the problems related to the low level of the CESEDA 2018 implementation are the extremely important issue of the bureaucracy or they are interconnected with the other cluster of difficulties that in turn determine policy outputs. The study scrutinizing the administrative processes brings to the forefront the question of whether the weaknesses of law enforcement add to the inelasticity of the CESEDA 2018 to meet its legislative goals. In this way, the paper not only assesses the relevance of these factors but also adopts a policy angle by discussing them as a faction of policy design and implementation in general terms. By undertaking these initial inquiries, the study seeks to pave the way for a comprehensive understanding of the administrative aspects of the issue of immigration and the law-enforcement officers, and thus, also aims at bringing to light innovative and dim aspects of this topic.

Chapter 3: The Trends in Immigration Law Reform: The Paradox of Stricter Laws and Increased Immigration Numbers

3.1 Trends in Legislative Reforms

The way immigration laws are being changed has been less about providing for the social integration of the population and more focused on the question of how to reduce the immigrants. However, the drop in arriving immigrants that was ensured because of the introduction of new laws to limit immigration has not happened. Instead, a surprising effect of this paradox has materialized: the more rigid the constraints become, the more immigrants come. This scenario points to inherent weaknesses in the legal architecture. They are related to errors in administration, the impact of the international environment as well as the overuse of the exceptional permit system. This study will specifically explore the history of immigration laws in France with consequent attention to affected sections such as R311-12, L624-1 and L313-14. Moreover, we shall go through the difference between the intention and the implementation of the law.

One of the significant parts is the discussion of Article R311-12 that is to compile and get swiftness in automation of immigration applications. This passage offered the detail of asylum seekers that can stay for 90-days maximum while the other residence permit applicants only would be able to last for 60-days, and thus, the aim of reducing bureaucratic delays a reality.

However, the primary objective was to decrease decision times through effective time management and thus bring out a timely processing of applications in other respects as well. This public body chose wastefulness over efficiency, and it was notorious for sending the security units to consume the restaurant supplies instead of enhancing productivity- the opposite way. Instead of lightening the heavy load, these deadlines just served as a tool to change preventive solutions into unnecessary expenses.

Local departments seriously short of staff and cash were not able to cope with the new requirements, which resulted in making late decisions and caused an increase in the number of unattended applications. This fragility was due not only to the really overburdened administration, but also to the fact of lack of administrative resources for the returning refugees. Information gathered from La Cimade and the police headquarters describes these lags as the main reason R311-12 is not implemented properly, and the notion that the gap between efficiency measures and daily functions.

The first Subparagraph of Article L624-1 talks about the commission that would be set up if the objectives were met. The OQTF processes are the focus of the government in their successful operation. That's how the government showed its strong commitment to the policy to deal with unwanted immigrants. On the contrary, the peak in OQTF cases did not allow the removal rate to be increased significantly, it was even less than a two-digit one, 6%, in recent years. The finding of such imbalance in the law and procedures has revealed that the problem lies neither in the shortage of human

resources nor in the institutional errors and traps as the biggest hurdles of deportation. Furthermore, overcrowding in detention centers together with slow takeoffs and improper operational conditions were mentioned as the main reasons that made this policy ineffective. Also, the imposition of prolonged detention on people who violate the law led to overcrowding of detention centers due to the shortage of free spaces that could be used to homestead the already swelling numbers of detainees. This inability is not only indicative of the worn-out state of immigration laws but also it is a mirror of the malfunction of the administrative system that supervises the entire law's implementation in terms of its effectiveness and justice.

One of the contradictions in terms of more immigrants coming forth despite the laws' restrictions on giving easier asylum is the increased portability of humanitarian permits as per the provisions of Article L313-14. This rule was initially introduced to console only the people who are in the most difficult situations. However, in the long run, the policy has become multi-purpose and is applicable for all immigrants, both legal and illegal. The issue of humanitarian permits is the focal point of tension between a strict system of rules and the moral obligations of the nation to assist the neediest people. Although these permits are a quick means to meet the needs of the needy, there are still endless complications in issuing the permits. An exceptional permit can be obtained after a face-to-face interview with the authorities, which is a part of the prefectures' staff shortage, so, one of the side-effects of these whole processes is the lack of manpower in prefectures. The increased use of exceptions is the clear evidence that the legal framework

is quite far from solving the problem, which is quite intricate, that is the modern migration. The implementation of the said policy desired to be achieved by limiting the number of immigrants and it was supposedly done as such; but, on the other hand, it might have known the opposite trend as it may have thus created the new paths of regularization that eventually cause the total number of the immigrants to skyrocket.

It is these laws that are the root cause of the major challenges faced by France's immigration policy. Acts like the 2018 CESEDA, which were implemented with the aim of the restriction of immigration, have even been counterproductive as they have not been able to resolve the administrative issues. The inadequate resources and external pressures, such as unfamiliar procedures and uncoordinated programs, have resulted in system failure that impedes the functioning of any of the tasks. Most of the actions have been carried out to the detriment of the real need which is the improvement of administrative capacity that is already on the verge of collapse as prefectures are not yet capable of processing the increasingly complicated cases of the illegal presence.

The changes of the immigration law reveal a rather characteristic inconsistency in the agreement that new legal rules have been made, which are harsher. They have not only not tried to accomplish the intended purpose of reducing the number of immigrants but have also caused a weakening of systemic inefficiencies in the administration. R311-12, L624-1 and L313-14 are norms that exhibit the gap between legal aims and the actions taken on the

ground under those sections; they, as a matter of fact, do immediate comprehensive improvisation. Tackling these requires, financing, implementing the given laws, and developing the needed capacities of the administration to deliver the required public services in the most effective and efficient way, the interagency cooperation, and building a relationship with the community and addressing political and social aspects that lead to migration.

3.1.1. Duration of Immigration Screenings

Table 1: Evolution of Article R311-12 and Key Changes

Year	Article Number	Added Content	Removed Content
2016	R311-12	New decree modifying conditions of administrative silence, reinforcing implicit rejection rules	Administrative silence considered rejection
2020	R311-12	Article repealed by decree n°2020-1734	None
2021	R432-2	Specified deadlines for implicit rejection: - General: 4 months - Specific permits: 90 days (e.g., asylum) - Residency: 60 days	None

Source : *Légifrance*

The transformation of Article R311-12 of CESEDA, now codified as R432-2, is the epitome of the concept of changes in the French immigration policies during the past two decades. First launched as an instrument to simplify bureaucratic processes, the evolution of it has brought to light the continuous conflicts between the administrative effectiveness and human

rights protection. From the beginning of its application, when it was still operative, the article went through three consecutive reform phases that were the most legally, administratively, and socially changing. These changes underscore the problems that arise when sanctions on the one hand and the right to administrative fairness on the other are ensured.

In the initial stage, Article R311-12 set a time frame of four months for the implicit rejection of a residence permit application. This implies that if the prescribed timeframe elapses without any decision being made, the application is automatically rejected. The measure, which was intended to provide efficiency to administrative processes, soon sparked a heated legal dispute. The measure imposing such a status "was denounced by the Défenseur des droits" who characterized it to create precarity for the rights holders as they had "application (s) implicitly rejected clause, which was unjustly ensuring administrative pressure on applicants of being in prolonged insecurity" (DÉFENSEUR DES DROITS, 2016, p. 23). The scholarly society such as Serge Slama contended that this clause was the principal reason for the litigation in immigration courts with the impugning applicants themselves for the absence of explicit reasoning of the refusal (Slama, 2014). Charles (2011) also claimed that the employment of such an administrative machine by France was not only at odds with European practice but was reflective as well of how the basic aim was to do away with immigrants' right by the process's complexity. While the four-month time frame was meant to bring efficiency by the system, the increase in the number of applications led to a contradiction and hence the reform had completely backfired.

The article underwent a revision in 2016 where the specific period of time, four months was explicitly set, was omitted from the implicit rejection provision. This restructuring supposedly simplified administrative procedures. Still, the lack of a concrete duration of application led to such confusion that both participants and authorities were unsure of the rules. Complaining about the reduction of the initial opportunity of the asylum, La Cimade also blamed the fair and just process, stressing, it's like victims forever without the evening of their probations (La Cimade, 2024). Jean-Pierre was the loss of human rights lawyer when he emphasized the wording of that of reform during the performance of his article (Lochak, 2018). The ruling out of the exact time frame aggravated the procedural delays as the staff was not capable of the complex periods needed and the appeals therefore had to be restarted. An adviser of 2024 has noticed the legal jumble by saying there were questions on the side of the staff and that forced them to face longer working hours as well as the procedural inquiries that went on the backlog (Pape, 2024). Instead of streamlining the processes, the 2016 reform worsened inefficiencies and one of its effects were that the already impromptu immigrants' way was even made harder.

Article R311-12 was made R432-2 by the 2021 reform and along with it the new differentiated deadlines were introduced based on the nature of the application for residency. For the general applications, the timeline was set at four months, while specific residency permits required decisions within 90 or 60 days. The plan was made like this to present an alternative solution to the escalating complexity of cases and afford a clear timetable for

applicants. Despite its objectives, the reform evoked disagreement. The Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme (CNCDH) was of the view that the new deadlines which were intended to specify processing needs actually did the opposite, adding the following "the differentiation of deadlines complicates administrative procedures for both the service and the applicant" (CNCDH, 2024). The very critical stance was also upheld by Human Rights Watch, which highlighted the hypothetical destruction of family bonds and the deprivations of refugee rights (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

The Conseil d'État's legal experts raised their concerns about the procedural complexity aggravated by the reform too. They notice that the lack of administrative capacity necessary to meet the specified deadlines leads to delays and ruins the article's goals (Conseil d'État 2023). The CNCDH also pointed out that the reform was ineffective and failed to solve the big issues such as arrest without a court order, forced expulsion in disregard of the rights of victims, and a lack of legal protection for minorities that were the main contributors to the increase in expulsions and the migrants' hardships (CNCDH, 2024).

This shows how the restrictive immigration policies in France have taken off in line with the evolution of article R311-12. From 1980 onwards, and a total of 20 Immigration-related laws have been passed with each reflecting the transformation of the political endgame and the public's viewpoints (Sénat, 2023). The likes of Marthaler (2008) and Saas (2007) have

backed the increased assimilation of limits to the aggravated migration dilemmas by saying that the immigration issue was mainly the current race ticket in the Sarkozy administration. But the measures did not only get negative feedback as *Le Monde* (2019) pointed out that they had also created a "regulatory maze" that was hindering the immigrants from using their rights or services.

They argue that these policies prioritize the demand for administrative control over human rights, usually concerning the vulnerable. Lochak (2018), for example, pointed out that the reforms more like the Article R311-12 ones most of the time benefit from cohesion but a lot of the time the level of predetermination and inability to act / function wouldn't get decreased and migrants' conditions would get worse. The barriers that emerge in the implementation of these reforms highlight the general shortcomings of France's immigration system in balancing the legislative scope with the concrete activities of government.

The morphing of Article R311-12 from which it made its way to R432-2 is a testimony to the intricacies and incongruities of France's immigration policies. Though the primary goal was to better manage administrative processes, the changes have, on the other hand, often become a source of facilitating inefficiencies and increasing the precarity of the migrants. The assigned time periods have been introduced in 2021 with a view to tackling these issues, but they haven't been quite successful in addressing the bigger systemic problems. As France keeps intertwining

immigration control and human rights, R432-2 weaknesses contribute to the governance discussions that stress a holistic approach needed for a more ever thoughtful policy crafting and implementation. This paradox will be out of the way if public order is still in force, and the problems of corruption and more filled government departments entail, thus bringing about no accountability and effectiveness in the French immigration system.

3.1.2. Immigration Screening Criteria on Residence Permits

Table 2 : Legislative Evolution of Article L313-14

Year	Article Number	Law Number	Reinforced Provisions	Removed Provisions
2006	Article L313-14	Loi n°2006-911	Required submission of annual reports to assess the application of exceptional residence permits for greater transparency and accountability	-
2007	Article L313-14	-	Expanded residence permit options to include temporary residence permits under L. 313-10(1) for humanitarian or exceptional reasons	-
2011	Article L313-14	Loi n°2011-672	Allowed issuance of temporary residence permits under specific conditions. Required committee opinions for exceptional residence permits for individuals residing in France for over 10 years	Removed obligation to submit annual reports, reducing oversight on exceptional residence permits
2021	Article L435-1	Loi n°2021-1109	Added new residence card categories for "employee," "temporary worker," and "family life"; maintained the need for committee opinions for applicants residing in France for over 10 years	Maintained removal of annual report obligations; changed oversight to Article L. 432-14 committee

Source : Légifrance

The transformation from Article L313-14 of the original version to the successor form of Article L435-1 is the French state trying to find a middle ground between humanitarian needs and the regulation of migration. This article was to be originally set up, as it were, for the settlement of a special number of loser situations. But with the years, it has developed through the path of numerous great changes, which were essentially aimed at expanding the control mechanism, the conditions of eligibility, and so on, the procedure specifications. However, these reforms did not miss the chance of being countervailed with fresh administrative barriers, which in turn provide space for questioning the effectiveness of the regularization of illegal migration.

The passage of Law n°2006-911 in 2006 was a primary phenomenon to make the process more transparent with the authority being responsible to submit a yearly to-the-point periodic report about how the National Exceptional Residence Permit Committee is doing. Thus, the law was in part directed towards the control, to scrutinize the good behavior and evaluate the exceptional residence permits, which, during the time emits the accountability. However, these regulations did bring further administrative issues surrounding the issue conceded to by its naysayers that claimed they over-complicated an already over-taxed structure. Nevertheless, despite these trials, the average first residence permits' issues per year were just 188,820 under Sarkozy's governance, pointing out that the policy failed to fully regulate the immigration.

The 2007 adjustments of Article L313-14 referred to the embrace of another criterion which now included the issuance of temporary residence permits for humanitarian or exceptional cases under L. 313-10(1). The fact that this transition was led due to France's strong adherence to moral service could not match the inconsistencies in the execution of this process. Prefectures received an overly broad power to devise the method, hence, the subsequent outcome was the evident regional rift of these drug management spaces. Some therefore, decided to be inclusive, while the smaller number of the prefectures implemented the law more restrictively, thus, the unevenness in the application.

In 2011 and Loi n°2011-672, the presidency of François Hollande witnesses further changes Loi n° 2011-672 in 2011. This alteration necessitated committee opinions for applicants who have been in France for more than 10 years, for example, and at the same time got rid of the annual reporting obligation. The elimination of this control instrument led to the loss of transparency and accountability which were one of the chief objectives of the initial legislation of 2006. Nonetheless, the issuance of first residence permits increased substantially in this period, which averaged 217,463 yearly. The increment in the number of residences permits despite restrictive regulations emphasizes the flaws in the administrative system. By 2012, immigration inflows were all-time high at 296,000, presenting a lack of harmony between the regulatory changes and the anticipated results.

Under the presidency of Emmanuel Macron, the legislative transformation of Article L313-14 into L435-1 led to the introduction of new categories of residence cards in 2021, such as "employee" and "reserved-life". The reforms were promoted as modernizing measures, intending to improve the service's effectiveness and consider developing the migration of people. Notwithstanding these steps, the issuance of first residence permits was at the level of 274,630 annually, which is unprecedented. At the same time, the immigration inflows increased to 331,000 by 2022. During this period, the administrative system showed its inability to comply with regulatory control and at the same time, to consider the actualities of increased migration. The complicatedness of the reformed processes inflamed the already existing weaknesses, hence, both applicants and administrators were the worst off.

The humanitarian focus of Article L313-14 has been subject to considerable legal and social criticism for many years. Initially, the Article was praised for its objective of sheltering the most vulnerable migrants, such as those in need of medical treatment or who live in abject poverty, but when it was practically implemented, the structural faults became more vibrant. Academicians such as Ticktin (2007), though, opined that the discretionary power passage issued to prefectures often thwarted the humanitarian goals of this policy, thus causing imbalances in the way the policy was being put. Advocacy communities lambasted the rigid and non-transparent rules and regulations that made the bar for protection when considering these factors unreachable for many of those who might have made it.

"Valls" circular of 2012 sought to equalize the process of regularization for all who have applied under Article L313-14 by incorporating certain guidelines. Its non-binding nature, which was confirmed by the Conseil d'État, however, was obviously a serious obstacle to its feasibility as a tool for achieving uniformity in decision-making (Mori, 2023). The 2021 amendments, as new asylum residence card groups were introduced, were unable to tackle the main issues. The critics pointed to the fact that the modifications only perpetuated unequal situations in the regions and administrative delays. The Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme (CNCDH) has pointed out that these new regulations firmly placed national control over the rights of migrant people and, for that reason, forced migrants to live with discrimination (Isidro & Math, 2020).

The legislative backstory of Article L313-14 is the proof of French migration policy becoming a battleground for both control and humanitarianism. The fact that more residence permits have been issued despite the tightening of regulations shows the weaknesses of policy interventions that are far from dealing with the main problems. The development of this piece of legislation testifies how hard it is to compromise humanitarian aims with the requirements of regulatory immigration control.

Through the transformation of Article L313-14 to L435-1, we can see the paradox within the French immigration policies. This statute was put forward with the goal of making the process more transparent and requiring accountability to the involved parties. Instead, its application rules and

regulations have caused an increase in the workload of officials and created the already existing complicated and inefficient mechanisms of immigration control and monitoring. The only way to tackle them is to launch a comprehensive reform program that focuses on transparent and consistent working practices as well as on making the administration more efficient. Instead of sacrificing their principles, it is only when these deep-seated deficiencies in the system have been corrected that France would be able to bring the moral and the practical aspects of its immigration into balance and hence, establish a more beneficial and just legal framework.

3.1.3 Penalties for Illegal Stay and OQTF on Article L624-1

Table 3 : Legislative Evolution of Article L624-1

Year	Law Number	Article Number	Reinforced Provisions	Removed Provisions
2005	-	Article L624-1	Maximum 3 years imprisonment for illegal entry and re-entry	-
2006	n°2006-911	Article L624-1	Added a 1-year re-entry ban	-
2011	n°2011-672	Article L624-1	Increased re-entry ban to 3 years	Removed the 1-year re-entry ban provision of 2006
2013	n°2012-1560	Article L624-1	Introduced 1-year imprisonment and €3,750 fine for illegal stay	Removed certain humanitarian exceptions for vulnerable groups
2014	n°2014-1353	Article L624-1	Harmonized penalties for entry ban violations, including imprisonment and fines	Additional humanitarian exceptions were eliminated
2021	n°2021-1109	Article L824-3	Added a 3-year re-entry ban	Granted discretionary authority to avoid forced deportations in minor cases

Source : *Légifrance*

The legislative trajectory of Article L624-1 is representative of France's stricter measures against immigrants' movement over the years. Modifications were made to this article several times since 2005, and each of the amendments was to be of a charge to irregular migration including imprisonment, fines, and longer reentry bans. However, the success of these measures has been continuously debated mainly due to the fact that the enforcement of Obligations de Quitter le Territoire Français (OQTF) remained very low, and the numbers of immigrants kept rising.

From 2005 to 2006, the application of fines was basically reinforced with the introduction of a maximum three-year imprisonment term for illegal and illegal re-entry along with one-year bans for those convicted. The enhancement of OQTF enforcement for a while was seen as a breakthrough when the enforcement rates raised from 24.2% in 2005 to 25.7% in 2006. Only, it was thought that the progress that had very shortly been made again remained in a state of stagnation over the next few years. Over that time, the number of immigrants entering France had gone up from 194,880 in 2005 to 208,000 in 2006, meaning that crimes on the legal side alone would not deal with the social and economic concerns causing migration.

The 2011 modification, which prolonged the ban to three years, is one of the examples of the more stringent immigration policies applied by France to blunt deviating from the migration regulations. The project, however, led to a significant decrease in OQTF enforcement rates proportionately, with a dramatic fall from 23.2% in 2011 to 17.1% in 2012.

This decline made those in power come to the realization that it is unattainable to push through such initiatives by just legislative channel without the sufficient enabling factors such as technology and human resources hitches. In contrast, immigration inflows were even bigger, and reached to 217,000 in 2011 from 211,000 in 2010. The scholars like Lochak (2018) maintained that this outcome was a result of structural inefficiencies including too few staff, procedural bottlenecks, and a lack of communication between agencies.

In 2013, new sanctions were added, and it was possible to be punished with a €3,750 fine or one-year imprisonment for illegal stays, while the humanitarian plea for the most vulnerable population was abolished. They were among the measures included in these changes. Nevertheless, the rate of returns and decisions served to those who did not have the right to stay in France (OQTF) was persistently low with crit. rates of 16.7% in 2013 and 17% in 2014. For example, Majcher (2020) claimed that such measures were mainly affecting the economically disadvantaged migrants without proper consideration of the root causes of irregular migration. These restrictive measures did keep out some, but refugee arrivals were recorded at 236,000 in 2013. Additionally, the annual cost of housing a detained immigrant

In 2014, only violators of the entry ban were in the spotlight for the harmonization of penalties where fines and imprisonment sentences were combined. Though it was a simple amendment to the enforcement regime, it was, unfortunately, the one that took away also the few remaining

humanitarian exceptions, thereby, even more, limiting the protections that the disadvantaged people had. Despite all these, the rate of OQTF did not show a significant leap, but it stayed around 17 percent in 2014. The immigration inflow also continued its growth, which was clear from the results of 253,000 entries in 2015, and 259,000 ones in 2016. The survival of the formulated approach served as a proof of the limited effectiveness of restrictive measures in addressing the underlying complexity of irregular migration.

The 2021 passed laws, which brought in the option of soft eliminating rather than forced evictions only for minor cases, was taken as an initiative to the right direction. But still it was not enough to change the status of immigration management in France. The Cour des Comptes (2024) estimates that more personal should be hired, the processes should be aligned and the coordination between different parts of the government should be improved. These advices clearly point out the gap between the set goals and the real resources at a practical level.


The legal history of Section L624-1 is a story of the country's ongoing study to find a way to tighten immigration's strings through administration and at the same time respect the essential parameters of human rights. Despite the receipt of successive amendments that introduced the legal measures aimed to irk but not to catch illegal immigration, the falling enforcement rates and the increase of the immigration inflows show the shortcomings of using the law's stick only. Depending on harder penalties for regulation has not come with the win of more effective outcome, declaring the necessity of the

entire and balanced system.

Dealing with illegal migration are putting not only a legal framework but reconstructing the entire system in a way that prioritizes administrative efficiency, cooperation internationally, and the protection of basic rights. This Article and its practice in France show the fact that the legislation needs to be on the road of the practical outcome for it to work well because legislation with no practical outcome is not the law.

3.2 Trends in Immigration Growth (Status, International, and Domestic Factors)

Figure 1. Total number of Immigrant arrivals In France from 2006 to 2022



Source: from Statista 2024 and (INSEE), Total number of Immigrant arrivals In France from 2006 to 2022

The graph displaying the total number of immigrant arrivals in France from 2006 to 2022 gives a comprehensive outline of the patterns and

problems encountered by the successive French administrations in handling migration. These fluctuations and upward trends signify a mix of national policy preferences, international crises, and structural deficiencies in the French immigration system. Metrics under Sarkozy, Hollande, and Macron can inform us about how policy reforms, political ideologies, and administrative constraints have influenced immigration numbers.

Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012) led an immigration policy in France that was shaped by a securitization approach. The 2006 CESEDA the act of reformation of the law adapted this case by stricter requirements for residents to meet and more strict conditions for family reunification, in support of Sarkozy's discourse about immigration as a threat to the French state. This after that reinforced in 2011 by legal changes including longer periods of administrative detention and issuing more Obligations de Quitter le Territoire Français (OQTFs). Nonetheless, the graph has only a slight increase in immigration which goes from 208,000 in 2006 to 217,000 in 2011. The number of issued OQTFs was rising importantly while the rates of enforcement that were way under 10% remained. That disconnection points at how the bureaucratic mess undermines some of the measures and the differences in regional capacities. Sarkozy's legislation had the aim to attract the conservative voter base, but their actual effect was not significant. Opponents maintain that the government's preoccupation with symbolism through the legislation passage instead of dealing with administrative bottlenecks or systemic failures that received only expensive fines from its immigration control programs, which failed to prevent the inflow of

immigrants. The moderate growth in immigration during Sarkozy's presidency illustrates the inefficiency of security-led policies in the absence of administrative reforms.

In the period of François Hollande's governance (2012-2017), more importance was given to social integration than to criminalization. His term was concurrent with the 2015 European migration crisis, and this had a significant effect on French immigration policy. As depicted on the chart, migration numbers ascended uniformly throughout Hollande's time, increasing from 236,000 in 2013 to 261,000 in 2017. In this environment where the extreme number of asylum seekers was using up all resources, the state took steps to rehab these institutions like the French Office for Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) and the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII). In that year, the public funding of the integration programs had advanced and gone to a record level of €999 million, demonstrating the government's commitment to making refugee evaluations more efficient, cutting down waiting times, and giving emergency housing. In contradiction to these inputs, Hollande's strategies ended up being criticized for their unpreparedness in the short term. Short-term measures like temporary housing and expedited screening provided some relief on a short-term basis but did not touch the deeper structural problems. The administrative backlogs remained especially in the areas with high demands despite the other regions of France not getting the same number of resources and capacity. Also, social tensions aroused as public opinion came against immigration due to the migration crisis. Hollande's rule that was abundant of

the influx of immigrants shows how problematic humanitarian considerations are as opposed to the practical difficulties of handling the migration burden. Although the management of refugees' situation was generally favorable because of the administrative policies of the government, the lack of the implementation of thorough structural reforms excluded their long-term relevance.

Emmanuel Macron's tenure as president (2017-present) emphasized digitalization and administrative excellence because of the elimination of paperwork everywhere. The shift, through the 2018 amendments of the CESEDA, was a great step in this different direction, an implementation of the Numérique Administration de Étrangers en France (ANEF). This IT tool, which could serve as the digital transformation of the Residence Permit platform and distribution of physical queue at the administrative departments, developed the overall purpose of the project. According to the figures, however, illegal immigration continued to soar during Macron's presidency, with the highest of 331,000 in 2022. The shift to digitalization entangled new challenges particularly for those who do not have access to digital equipment. These critics complained that "digital traffic jam" was the new normal and it led to inequality. At the same time, the uneven allocation of administrative resources in the regions was another obstacle for the high-demand prefectures to cope with the new system.

Moreover, Macron's rearrangements entailed fast tracking of asylum application and making it possible for the authorities to hold undocumented

persons for a longer time. Nevertheless, the projects had several fallouts. Hence, the use of digital gears exposed that inequality is systematic since the applicants who cannot afford the right equipment or possess the necessary skill are the greatest casualties. The wrong provincial staffing levels became the major obstacle of the government to be smoothly conducting these kinds of activities nationwide. Although his policies were a step forward in changing the traditional methods into a more computer-assisted one, the focus to control and manage things quickly and effectively but at the same time neglecting the factors of equity and inclusiveness was too dominant. The graph illustrates more sharply the upsurge in immigration that was experienced during that time, which are the limitations of the migration reforms as far as wider aspects of the problem are concerned.

The general trend that the graph revealed also indicates that the international as well as domestic factors had a serious impact on immigration patterns. Such issues as European migration crisis, the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, and the economic disparities between the developed and developing countries, fueled the increasing number of asylum seekers and the economic migration. Inside the country, France usually pursued policies that made it difficult to recover from the tension between severe measures and social integration. The handling of each government—Sarkozy's securitization, Hollande's catastrophism, and Macron's efficiency-oriented governance—brought to light the inherent difficulties of setting common immigration policies amidst quickening changes at a global level.

3.3 The Paradox Between Strengthened Immigration Control and Rising Immigration Numbers Based on Sections 3.1 and 3.2

The contradiction of tougher immigration rules in the environment of growing immigration numbers shows the weaknesses of the French administrative set. Legislative changes that aimed to prevent irregular migration and to improve efficacy through the transit system often failed due to the system's inefficiencies, resource shortages, and the pressure of external forces. The gradual increment of immigrants does not only identify the necessity to adopt profound comprehensive changes to the current laws and regulations which focus on creativity, transparency, and flexibility as major principles. To succeed in dealing with the modern complications of migration, France needs to put transparency, fairness, and adaptability on its list of priorities. Safety, humanitarian aid, and administrative efficacy must all be approached when the management of immigration problems is being targeted at a balanced level to ensure that everything will work. The arguments are supported by the numbers, given that addressing these issues is quite important since the gulf between the legislative will and the proper execution is getting wider.


Through the scope of the different administrations, the graph proves that migration management in France has so many facets. Every term had different Ascot strategies and priorities, but the general trend of increasing immigration inflows was there. This examination demands the necessity of an integral approach to migration including legislation reform, administrative

capacity building, and international cooperation. Without such measures, the challenges of dealing with immigration in a globalized world will not disappear.

Chapter 4 : Administrative Challenges in the Enforcement of Immigration Law

Even though the rules regarding immigration in France keep being published, for example, through the 2018 CESEDA reform, the country has had very difficult issues to realize its objectives in terms of reduction of immigrants. The changed laws that have elongated screening periods, demanded stricter criteria, and prescribed harsher sanctions have been compromised because of mismanagement, budget limitations, and the logjams in the system. The shortcomings have led to overwhelmed immigration applicants, lopsided resource distribution between the regions, and to the detention facilities that are overcrowded. This is a clear indication of the limitations of administrative execution. The objective of this research is to explore the above administrative issues and to verify their influence on the contra laws.

Figure 2. Survey on Immigration Management in France



Source : from OpinionWay for “Le Parisien”

The survey conducted by OpinionWay for *Le Parisien* reveals that the public is worried about France's immigration system on conditions of asylum, integration of the immigrant way, and its decision over the people it deports as well as the measures it takes to combat illegal immigration. The answers for all categories were pretty bad, rated as “poor” (“assez mal” or “très mal”), which showed that for the most part, people were not satisfied with the policies or their administration. Regarding the right of seeking asylum, only 27% of them thought it was good while 72% were against it.

This is an expression of a general state of worry, as well as complaints about the slowing down, moreover, about an inefficient organization, and an insufficient number of staff to support the people who apply for asylum. In the same way, initiatives to incorporate migrants to the French community received the lowest scores from 77% of the respondents, and only 19% of them supported this. This figure indicates a fundamental failure to address the structural and social impediments, which worsens with the limited fiscal and programmatic resource backdrop.

The deportation management has been particularly shabby, with 80% of participants expressing their dissatisfaction. This failure in this aspect is likely on account of the non-fulfillment of the OQTF (Obligation de Quitter le Territoire Français) orders, whose enforcement rate can be as low as 2% for specific kinds of them. Such discrepancies between the legal statutes and their due enforcement are the ones that contribute to the weakening of the people's confidence in the credibility of the system. The attempts to combat illegal immigration were the ones that got the most negative votes, where 81% of them confirmed their dissatisfaction. This perception has been reinforced by systemic deficits such as long waiting sequences, difficulties in digitalizing as it happened with the ANEF platform and lack of enough enforcement tools that collectively shaped the negative view of the issue.


The predominance of negative opinions in the survey emphasizes the

coordinated nature of these problems. Weaknesses in the process of recognizing, integrating, and deporting asylum, on the administration side, present themselves as the root cause of immigration control becoming discredited. These chain failures illustrate the overarching administrative bottlenecks outlined in this study, thus building on their decisive intervention in the paradoxical outcomes of French immigration legislation. The monitoring findings demonstrate the necessity to urgently fix the deficiencies in the system through the reform of the institutional structure, the reorientation of resources, and the implementation of more effective administrative tools in order to address the dissatisfaction of citizens and to recover faith in the immigration system.

4.1 Increase in Backlogs and Bottlenecks and the Waiting Line

The mounting administrative backlogs in immigration services in France represent a deep-seated problem that contradicts CESEDA 2018s objectives. A clear-cut example of such inefficiencies is the staggering increase in reexamination cases, which can be seen as a reverse indicator of administrative bottlenecks. In the absence of official data on waiting lists, the greater number of repeat procedures is being used to point out the problems posed by procedural mistakes, delays, and lack of personnel (La Cimade, 2008). Growing due to structural issues, these trends illustrate a dire picture of the administrative machine not able to meet the outlined responsibilities.

Figure 3. Asylum in France Since 1992



Source: OFPRA

Most of the cases of administrative mismanagement resulting in reexaminations are due to the self-affidavit of the persons who themselves testify. One such case is the story of a Central African applicant who submitted a reexamination application four times but was denied each time because of the procedural inconsistencies. This case thus clearly proves the connection with lack of resources as well as the rigidity of the procedures and the lack of interagency coordination making the applicant to go through continuous cycles of reexamination. The situation thus adds to the number of cases and in the meantime, it also significantly contributes to the sense of helplessness among applicants who try in vain to make their way through a much too opaque system (La Cimade, 2008).

However, the personal accounts also give insight into the atrocious human costs of this practice. Several narrate numerous occurrences of waiting in line at the department for hours on end without getting any assistance. One person told the following: *"I came first at 9:30, there was no ticket. The second time I was there at 8:30, with no ticket. The third time at 5:30, and still no ticket. We will eventually sleep outside"* (La Cimade, 2008). Another person told an absent request that became a series of traverse crossings over time: "For a simple card change of an address, I have had to come back three times" (La Cimade, 2008). Others loathed the bureaucratic obstacles: "They told me my case was incomplete. After collecting all the paperwork I was supposed to, I was then told that I needed to submit another file because my first one had already passed" (La Cimade, 2008).

Workers also report that the number of cases they must deal with is quite high and that they are restricted by the workflow that is set up by the higher authorities. An agent stated, "We process hundreds of records a week, but our staff is not enough to go through the files. There are situations when I have the feeling that everything, we do is just sorting out some emergencies" (Gourdeau, 2018). The last person said, "We have to follow the manual exactly but the way it is written it does not give us the depth we need to resolve many hard cases" (Gourdeau, 2018). This problem does not only affect applicants but also it is a headache for the staff, who feel they cannot provide the needed support: "We know applicants get frustrated, but we don't have time or resources to give them the attention they need" (Gourdeau, 2018).

Figure 4. Delays in Residence Permit Applications and Renewals in Various French Cities




Source: La Cimade 2017 - PRISE DE RENDEZ-VOUS PAR INTERNET POUR LES TITRES DE SÉJOUR : DES GUICHETS TOUJOURS FERMÉS

The Créteil office, which is the largest administrative center in France, represents the complications arising from the workflow in which many resources are insufficient. Since 2012, Créteil has enforced the online schedule of the appointments for immigration issues. Nevertheless, La Cimade has noted that the page usually does not present the candidate with the time slot, which is free, so they cannot pick it (La Cimade, 2016). The lack of access to legal or advocacy support makes it difficult for these people to find their way through the system, and most of them miss deadlines and must undergo the re-evaluation procedure thereafter (La Cimade, 2016). Most application processors at Créteil also complain of long waiting periods and frequent returns. One of them claimed, "I had to be there at 6 a.m., then waited five hours, and told to come back another day" (La Cimade, 2016). Another threw in, "I am going for the sixth time my latest one is only a receipt as a spouse of a French citizen" (La Cimade, 2016). The facts, such as these,

become the reason for repeated postponements as well as the mind torture experienced by the victims of such situations: "They always treat us as just numbers. They give no information, no reasons, just more waiting around and wasting of time" (La Cimade, 2016).

Besides, the workers at Créteil report their limitations, mentioning that the number of distributors is determined by the number of employees who are, irrespective of the actual need, available for such an assignment. "There are days when we've to tell away so many individuals just seeing them losing their chance to file on time,"--a guard said. "It's so damn difficult, but we don't have to" (La Cimade, 2016). This discrepancy in the size of the staff necessary and the consequent demand does not cause only delays in each individual& undertakings rather it grows whichever wide-reaching inefficiency in the whole system. Not only does La Cimade identify and address inefficiencies but also is at the core of it. With the help of its "À Guichets Fermés" program, the company inspects the discussions and makes decision of the date of the meetings all with automatic systems. The results of the research indicate that there are widespread delays in access to immigration services. For instance, as shown in the image data, most prefectures are severely lack of appointment availability, with many applicants spending waiting times of over 2 months or no slots available at all (La Cimade, 2018). The results of this research, which is collected daily, support the claim that the delays to the system are collective and they expose the broader inefficiencies that exist with ANEF.

Figure 5. Trends and Average Processing Times for Residence Permit and Document Renewals for Foreign Minors (September 2018 - November 2019)



Source: La Cimade 2017 - PRISE DE RENDEZ-VOUS PAR INTERNET POUR LES TITRES DE SÉJOUR : DES GUICHETS TOUJOURS FERMÉS


The delegation of these functions to La Cimade for the supervision and the correction of these gaps underlines the degree of incompetence of the government. By rendering a helping hand where the state mechanisms are falling pressingly short, such nongovernmental organizations (such as La Cimade) stress the fact that the current system is so inadequate that it must be changed at a much deeper level, and they campaign for basic reforms to be made. Further validation of these main points comes from the need for more resources, the streamlining of work processes, and the securing of appropriate digital infrastructure to overcome blockages by enhancing administrative services. Without these institutional changes, the deficiencies presented in

this paper will take their toll on the objectives of CESEDA and weaken even further the confidence in France's immigration system.

4.2 Changes in Immigration-Related Administrative Organizations

The study of France's distribution of the financial plan for the management of the immigration system demonstrates the many systemic inefficiencies at the administrative level that are aggravated by lack of resources and austerity policies. While the French government increased its overall budget by 50% from 2006 to 2022, the part directed to immigration services was not able to chase the rising workload while the Pro 104 trends showed it well. The budget graph certainly exhibits ups and downs in financing, showing deep cuts in the most crucial years, especially after 2015, which was the time when austerity measures were imposed during Macron's presidency. These choices with respect to the budget had a considerable influence on employment, distribution of resources, and the capability for proper law enforcement, as a result, the administrative bottle necks emerged.

Figure 6. Survey on Immigration Management in France



Source: "Ministry of Budget and Public Accounts of France"

The slow development of personnel is one of the vital problems, despite the soaring workload. The reports have shown that the human resources costs in the companies have risen to just a little of 1.5% in 2016, while the employment levels were hardly enough to serve the growing demand for the immigration services. The attempt to upgrade the staff was indeed awkwardly ignored on the part of the appropriate civil services, other than those of the Department of Education and the Defense Sector. This standstill contributed to significant delays in processing residency permits, asylum applications, and enforcement actions. Administrative staff were overworked by many tasks, they could not resolve the wait lists and the requests for permission slips, which even increased. The lack of investment in personnel growth is obvious in the fact that the shortage is very regular and is verified by the information on the distribution of resources among the prefectures.

Also, the introduction of the austerity measures by Macron worsened the situation. The €50 billion reduction plan was established to slow down the public sector and it brought in budget cuts for all departments (*mise en réserve de crédits*), which has reduced the operational ability of immigration officers. Those cuts, in the long run, could decline the portion of people a regional office could effectively and accurately identify and allocate the resources to the correct municipality needed. Unequal distribution of resources to the regions in the country made these problems even harder. Smaller offices, especially those that are outside Paris, reported significant staffing issues and not enough money to recruit the new staff to deal with increased demand. The prefectures found in the congested areas like Val-de-Marne, the common treatment is they had to do the work by themselves, and much extra support was not forthcoming, thus a disproportionate workload distribution was passed on to them.

Pro 104 budget chart demonstrates that the decline of vital funding occurred in between those years, which happened to be the time of harshest austerity measures. Despite some budget increases following 2018, the regulatory shackles from the earlier freezes could not be easily tackled. This resource gap is the main root of the low OQTF enforcement figures. From 2019 to 2022, the number of operations carried out on the OQTFs had minimized to 2% for residency permit denials and asylum rejections. Staff accounts, in addition, indicate the burden caused by systemic delays, with the officers bemoaning the fact of their heavy workloads and the difficulties

arising from the strict procedural requirements. One officer said, "We are consistently overwhelmed with excessive workloads, forced to process cases mechanically" (Pontus, 2020).


Furthermore, apart from the heavy procrastination which takes place due to the procedural inefficiencies, there is also the visual reflection of such significant budgeting decisions on an individual level. Maze-like procedural errors and delays that result from repetitive appeals and reexaminations form the vicious cycle that even further blockages the system. As it is visually depicted in the budget graphics, the underutilization of resources during crucial years was the primary factor contributing to these bottlenecks, which inhibited the implementation of legal measures and eroded public trust in the system.

In connection with this, the construction decision brought about an increase in the budget while a lack of targeted investment in the department of immigration led to a non-operating system unable to meet growing demands. The austerity measures showed that the basic problem of administrative structure was the policy on more tax than long-term administrative attainment. The disproportionate distribution of funds, personnel inertness, and the failure of enforcement mechanisms are the primary reasons for the substantial investment in personnel and infrastructure. The graph that reflects Pro 104 budget implementations is placing resource allocation priorities straightly with administrative outcomes revealed how money is being used in the system visually. In this context, to address the

inefficiencies, we need both reform and enlarging the fund for administration, which will lead to the effective practice of the immigration method.

The static nature of the administrative staff of the French immigration services reflects a systematic failure to adapt to the increasing needs, a phenomenon that is also aggravated by the disparities among the regions and the excessive employment of temporary workers.

Figure 7. Evolution of Public Employment in France (Base 100 in 1997)



Source: 2022 Report on the State of the Civil Service and Insee Quick Information from December 2022; corrected to account for the 140,000 jobs transferred between the state and local civil services from 2006 to 2010; excluding subsidized jobs; FIPECO.

The following chart represents the number of people employed in public service (down to the base of 100 in 1997). As under the État, the main unit for immigration flows, the government had a slight increase in the number of these employees. In fact, from 2010 to 2022, the public employment grew only 5.8%, which is almost negligible and insufficient to

handle the increasing workloads in immigration services. This nominal expansion is in sharp contrast to the rising breakdown of the residency, asylum applications, and deportation orders processing.

The systemic understaffing is even more evident through the increased use of temporary contracts, which has been growing since the migration crisis of 2017. The number of temporary staff in the residency bureau is now almost 31% of the employees, and in the asylum bureau, this number is even higher at 47%, which is a dramatic increase compared to the previous years. Although these employees are solving urgent problems, the lack of their background and special training is sometimes the reason for failure to deal effectively with a complicated issue. The usage of these workers is disrupting the speed and consistency of the process, and due to their presence, the system is frequently subjected to procedural errors and delays. The problems of casual workers are evident in that they keep on complaining about the difficulties they face in the navigation of strict workflows and the adaptation to high-speed demands, which adds to the heavy administrative load.

Regional disparities exacerbate these inefficiencies even further, as resource distribution is quite unbalanced, with most of the resources moving away from the high-demand areas. As indicated in the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, where foreign cases handled per agent were the highest in 2015, the staffing cuts were disproportionately severe, thus creating additional workloads for personnel who were already overburdened. Despite this,

bureaucrats are in low demand in wealthier areas, while other regions that were very well-managed have become very busy. The sheer difference in hiring rates can be seen in the chart, wherein public service staff levels in the federal sector have not changed much, while local governments and hospitals have hired a lot.

Witness statements and applicant accounts bring to light the issue of the human cost of these administrative gaps. One officer expressed his thoughts: *“We are pulling the weight of three persons. Although a small understaffing reduction can be seen, the level of work is still insurmountable,”* illustrating some of the challenges that administrative staff face on a daily basis (Gourdeau, 2018). On the other hand, the applicants mention the same problems of delays and incoherent case handling due to inadequate staff. One of the applicants expressed his frustration by saying, “a cycle of endless waiting, where every visit leads to another roadblock,” which represents his situation. These stories also underline the long-term effect of systematic inefficiency in which slow initial case examining results in more reexamining, thereby breaking the administrative apparatus.

The act of uniting these issues is showcased by the inheritance of a wider range of impracticalities associated with immigration efficiency. Lacking staffing leads to not only delayed processes, but also to the return of papers with incorrect information that must be reviewed again and the beginning of appeal processes that are a waste of time. These errors, which result from this feedback loop are so great that both the credibility and

functionality of the immigration system are decreased. Furthermore, the public sector employment for administrative roles has grown little as the chart clearly depicts the acute shortage of administrative capacity.

France's immigration officials in the regional offices of the municipalities less represented need to be recruited on a priority basis as a solution though for the whole country the workforce should be increased. The capacity of human resources should be optimized by imparting the necessary skills and knowledge to the new and already existing employees who shall be ready to take full-time positions instead of relying on the temporary contracts to make up for the staff deficit. The even distribution of resources in different regions allows only the high-demand areas to do the work which makes the system unfair and inefficient. Therefore, the launched data of employment change graphic makes it more evident that immediate actions such as the structural reforms are required to correspond the administration resources to the increasing immigration rates.


4.3 Changes in Immigration-Related Penalties

The administrative hurdles within the French immigration system mainly related to the detention centers and the implementation of the decree as the Obligation de Quitter le Territoire Français (OQTF) are the ones which reveal the most significant systemic inefficiencies. It is this mismatch of legislative goals and actual working conditions that is most eloquently expressed throughout the underfunding of the detention facilities, and the

overcrowding, the difficulties in law enforcement, and the incredible constraints of resources, as it is seen in the data and the figures presented.

The administrative centers for detention (Centres de Rétention Administrative, CRAs) are the main means for the deportation procedures according to the OQTF.

Figure 8. Evolution of the Average Time for OQTF Enforcement from 1981 to 2019




Source : [Rapport d'information du Sénat](#)

Source: Report of the Senate

However, the application of progressive detention periods, which, in view of the fact that it had initially been the period of a week in 1981, was prolonged for up to 90 days in 2019, brought about no subsequent enlargement of facilities guaranteeing detaining prisoners to face increased workload, this is the facility equivalent of those imposed by these detention changes. Depicting the yearly pace of inclusion and the capability of detention facilities, the graphic displays that even though the stocks of youth placements were constantly growing, they stayed at the most theoretical level

over these years.


Figure 9. Annual Number of Obligation to Leave French Territory (OQTF) Orders Issued and Executed from 2005 to 2022



Source: Statista and Minister of Justice 2024

Investment in infrastructure is required to solve the problem which is aggravating overcrowding, procedural delays, and administrative bottlenecks. While 65,076 OQTFs were issued, in the same year, just 4,474 deportations were carried out, and the enforcement rate was merely 6.8% (Statista 2022). Additionally, overcrowding makes it even more difficult to handle cases related to deportation as scarce resources and difficulties in coordination with consular and judicial bodies are hindering the execution of those orders on time.

Figure 10. Number of Placements in Administrative Detention Centers (CRA) and Theoretical Capacity of the Centers in France from 2002 to 2024



Source: Statista and Minister of Justice 2024

The divergence in OQTF distribution and execution rates, which are the major trends in the French immigration system, is one of the closest possible examples of the systemic drawbacks in the French immigration system. Illustrations in Figure 10 reveal that the issuance of OQTFs grew significantly from about 100,000 in 2006 to 165,000 in 2023. But the enforcement rates have gone down by 24% in 2006 to a lowly 6% in 2023 (Statista, 2023). This disconnection among the bodies in charge shows that the gap between legislative design and implementation capacity is widening. The law apparatus has been revised whereas more stringent policies to control the inflow of immigrants have been brought in, and at the same time, implementing these on the ground has lessened or not moved at all.

Figure 11. Cumulative Number of Forced Removals Between 2019 and 2022 Based on the Reason for Issuance of OQTF

Tableau n° 7 : nombre d'éloignements forcés cumulés réalisés entre 2019 et 2022 en fonction du motif de délivrance de l'OQTF

<i>Motif d'OQTF¹⁰⁵</i>	Nombre d'OQTF prononcées¹⁰⁶	Éloignements forcés réalisés	Taux d'éloignement
<i>Entrée irrégulière sur le territoire</i>	167 322	10 003	6 %
<i>Maintien irrégulier sur le territoire</i>	28 845	2 619	9 %
<i>Refus de titre de séjour</i>	109 925	1 721	2 %
<i>Menace à l'ordre public</i>	27 598	6 305	23 %
<i>Condamnation pénale</i>	7 225	3 273	45 %
<i>Transfert Dublin</i>	19 782	2 782	14 %
<i>Débouté du droit d'asile</i>	139 516	2 999	2 %

Source : Cour des comptes, d'après bases de données AGDREF et GESTEL

Note : le total des éloignements forcés réalisés est inférieur aux données présentées en début de partie. Cet écart s'explique par l'incomplétude du système d'information GESTEL, qui ne couvre pas tous les éloignements forcés.

Source: Court of Auditors, based on AGDREF and GESTEL data

An in-depth analysis of the problems of compliance for 2019-2022, as is shown in the Table, reveals the disturbing fact that the rate of enforcing several categories was quite low. To give an example, just 2% of OQTFs that related to the denial of a residency permit, or the rejection of an asylum application were enforced, although it was clearly prescribed by law that they should be. The wrong management of the department, for example due to lack of proper records or adherence to rigid procedural frameworks, is one of the big factors that have contributed towards affecting low numbers of implementation.

Tributes offer qualitative evidence of this incapacity. For instance, Fadhila, who was a residency permit applicant, was presented with wrong OQTFs because of the administrative errors concerning her suitability. Plus, Issa, an asylum seeker, was the one who was given an OQTF, even though he

had to undergo vital surgical procedures, which were not available in his home country (Lanto, 2024; Campion, 2023). It has been shown by these cases that the administrative hold-ups and processing appeals create a situation where enforcement is held up, which means that the practice of the law is largely ineffective.

Figure 11. Consular Passports Issued Between 2008 and 2012

Laissez-passer consulaires					
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Laissez-passer demandés	14 012	12 219	10 668	8 350	6 515
Laissez-passer obtenus dans les délais utiles	4 524	3 823	3 493	2 460	2 403
Laissez-passer obtenus hors délais	320	404	318	227	177
Laissez-passer refusés	3 806	3 870	3 766	1 787	1 481
Demandes laissées sans réponse (demandes - réponses)	5 362	4 122	3 091	3 876	2 454
Taux de délivrance dans délais	32,3 %	31,3 %	32,7 %	29,5 %	36,9 %
Taux de délivrance global	34,6 %	34,6 %	35,7 %	32,2 %	39,6 %

Source : ministère de l'Intérieur - DGEF

Source: Ministry of the Interior - DGEF

Figure 12. Obligations to Leave French Territory (OQTF) Issued and Effective Expulsions Between January and July 2021



Sources: Ministry of the Interior - Senate

Issuance of laissez-passer documents, which are critical in deportation processes, is severely hampered due to overcrowding, and resource constraints. Enforcing policies gets even more difficult when the needed documentation is not available. From the data in Figure 3, the problem was acute during 2008-2012. A mere 36.9% of the requested laissez-passer were issued within the period stipulated. That means more than a half were minimum processed within the countries (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2012). Today's statistics reveal the continuation of this issue, with countries like Algeria, where only 0.2% OQTF were respected showing very low enforcement rates. The diplomatic problem is not only extending the period of detention, but it also illustrates that the system has failed to properly get the consular authorities to cowing.

Despite the inherent technology that aims to eliminate the bureaucratic drawback, and this being realized, it is digitalization that has encountered the setbacks. Incompatibility issues between GESTEL, a detention logistics' managing system, and ANEF, a digital tool for foreign nationals have led to additional complications. Instead of increasing efficiency, these platforms make it worse by lengths the delays, copy the processes, and increasing the possibility of data omission. This digitalization is proved by the data in the diagram that has not reduced the backlogs or enhanced the accessibility for applicants, and further, admin resources and public trust in the system are more damaged (Cour des Comptes, 2024).

Meanwhile, documents and testimonies function to clear up the fact that the administrative problems are deeply rooted in the French immigration system. On the one hand, the legislative changes, which were thought to cut immigration numbers, were the 2018 CESEDA amendments. On the other hand, many of these measures have not been as successful as anticipated due to a lot of those systemic glitches like overcrowded detention centers, lack of staff, poor infrastructure, and mistakes in providing the digital tool. A comprehensive approach to these problems consists of: expanding physical infrastructure, managing staffing levels, improving system compatibility, and encouraging diplomatic collaboration for proper issuance of these documents. The failure to mandate such structural changes means that the enforcement of the state's migration control policies will remain a difficult matter and paradox of administration will last.

One of the most prominent impediments to the enforcement of France's immigration policies is the people at the top administrative level, who are not able to operate the laws and achieve the desired goals. A vivid example of this is the prelude with the 2018 CESEDA reforms. The report shows that several systemic problems that are caused by inadequate staff, lack of resources, outdated infrastructure, and mismatched digital systems have been arisen, thus leading to an inconsistent situation where the legislative ideals remain on paper rather than the practice. Despite the fact that the strict immigration controls were enforced, and the deadlines were met, the administrative machinery is overloaded and insufficiently provided to meet the growing needs.

One of the most striking limitations is the consistent extension of waiting time in immigration-related processes, including applications for residence permits and for asylum. The reports and facts are evidence that a waiting time of up to a year indeed has been experienced in some areas, even after the introduction of the ANEF system among others. The fully digitalized process does not make things easier, rather it becomes complicated when they are not compatible with the existing ones, such as AGDREF, and slow down other operations. In the long run, these delays not only soured the applicants' experiences, but they also aggravated systemic inefficiencies, as through an increase in the number of reexaminations and appeals.

Thus, the displacement problem was pointed out as well. It's so major, that it comes to the point of saying, quite notably, that the deportation policy offered mere lip service. Only 6% of the 2022 orders of deportations were fulfilled, whereas among the classes like asylum appeals and rejection of residency permits, the rates declined to the lowest, i.e. 2%. Overcrowded detention centers, diplomatic obstacles to issuing laissez-passer, and administrative mishaps are the issues that break their plans. These blockades lay bare a flawed system attempting to meet legislative objectives alongside operational confrontations.

Disparities of resources among regions lead to the compounding of problems. The areas which experience the highest demand, for example, are those in the northern part of France. The citizens applying for the residency

permit are numerous, yet they lack the ability to complete the papers. Temporary staff with the distinctive feature of the inability to sustain the case management were hired due to long time gaps. Usually, these people do not have the necessary background and operating knowledge of the institution to carry out the complicated immigration cases.

The administrative inefficiencies that are the subject of this chapter are the key to the failures of the immigration enforcement by France. These inefficiencies are not just one problem, but they are interconnected and thus one way to curb them is to prevent one while addressing another one. In doing so, the issues like delays, reexaminations, and enforcement failures through the system are dealt with. It includes physical and digital infrastructure, besides the need for more staff, improved coordination between different organizations as well as fair allocation of resources among regions. If lawmakers and administrators do not apply this preventive mechanism, they will hasten the breakdown of the already faltering system. Thereby, any future immigration reforms will be equally non-effective. The significance of administrative capacity-building as a guiding principle of the immigration policy reform is how it requires immediate attention.

Chapter 5: Conclusion Of the Thesis

The dissertation presents a central paradox in French immigration policy: while the administrative methods, particularly the CESEDA 2018 reform, were formulated to impose stricter immigration regulation, the factual results show a noteworthy boost in immigration numbers. This contradiction demonstrates the very complex interaction between legal signs, administrative malfunctions, and wider socio-political developments which, as analyzed throughout the role of this research, are the main story. The analysis clearly shows how this lack of harmony reduces the usefulness of the policy and brings systemic problems that cross the country's frontiers, becoming a matter of ongoing debates about European governance of immigration.

The main paradox of the French immigration policy is its preference for symbolic legislation over the actual implementation of immigration rules. Some specific standpoints of the CESEDA, such as the toughening of residency requirements, elongated detention periods, and automated administrative processes are the parts representing this approach. Even though the measures build an image of tight control and assertiveness in front of domestic political struggles, unfortunately, their reality can be opposite because of between-systems and inadequate resources. This research has brought to light the fact that strikingly symbolism sometimes necessary in the present days, is not a tool sufficient to deal with the structural holes in the French immigration system. Therefore, the impact will not be limited to a

political aim; rather, the success of legislative purposes will be overshadowed by the loss of public trust in the government's claimed capability to direct immigration fittingly.

A very relevant part of the thesis is the fact that administrative inefficiencies play a significant part in the perpetuation of the gap between the idea of the law and the actual practice. The introduction of digital technologies, such as the ANEF system prescribed by CESEDA 2018, underscores this problem. The digitalization of what was supposed to be a process to simplify the immigration procedures is the creation of new obstacles, especially for the people who do not have the required technology. Administrative inabilities causing disparities from area to area only make the problem worse. The prefectures with larger cases cannot keep up with the demand, thereby causing delays, procedural mistakes, and inconsistencies in the application of immigration laws. The over-reliance on digital platforms, albeit a step in the right direction, has underscored the necessity for a more inclusive and fair approach to the administration of the reform.

The gravity of the issue becomes more pronounced when we look at the migration policies in France from one government to the next. Security-centered and deterrent approaches, which were popular during Nicolas Sarkozy's term (2007-2012), led to more and more deportation orders and stricter residence conditions. However, the low enforcement rates forced the relevant authorities to understand that the strategy of control was detrimental to operational feasibility. Besides the humanitarian response, Hollande's

presidency (2012-2017) witnessed the inclusion of the matter of integration, especially of the European Migration Crisis hits. Paradoxically, the lack of being able to provide structural measures to tackle administrative slackness was their weakest point. Whereas Macron's regime (2017-Present) is thus far, more centered on digitalization and efficiency, yet so far, the project has been ineffective because of imbalances and insufficient digital accessibility. The view that the French immigration policy is in turn a chronic problem of the latter along with the other one that all administrations tend to oscillate between the control and integration policies, repeatedly, can easily be grasped from this historical account.

Immigration policy, in turn, also plays a significant role in the legislative outcomes' shaping of national identity. The *laïcité* principle, a deep adherence to French republicanism, may often be used as a cover for more strict immigration checks. However, this stress on secularism and cultural unity has at intervals also appeared as the practice of the so-called 'Othering' that tends to affect more disproportionately recently arrived immigrant groups, mostly of Islamic background. This study illustrates the way the conceptualization of immigration policy in terms of national identity is able to both reflect and reinforce societal uneasiness's, thus, making the installation of fair and forceful governance difficult.

In the international arena, France's immigration conundrums are inexorably accompanied by the general geopolitical environment developments. The problems of the European migration wave, Middle-East

and African crises, and the disparities in the wealth of different countries have all been the factors that upturned the number of the migrants who in search of entering the gateways of France. These outward pressures have possibly aggravated the shortcoming of France's immigration system, thus, uncovering the parallelity of worldwide migratory patterns and the national legislative regimes. The lack of provisions in the CESEDA 2018 Act is a further confirmation of the necessity for a more holistic and flexible approach to immigration governance. The paper contributes to a better understanding of migration management viewed from the perspective of the entire world by way of analyzing France's policy as part of the larger context.

One of the focal points of the study is the social and economic effects of the French immigration policy that were investigated. Strategies that are specified as being driven by deterrence and punishment usually touch on marginalized communities in a way that the latter ends up being oppressed socially and having even greater economic difficulties. To be specific, the introduction of financial penalties, prolonged detention periods, and restrictive residency conditions in an environment that is already unstable has aggravated the precariousness of the undocumented populations as well as made the situation worse for the local governments and other civil society organizations. The administrative overload brought about by measures of this nature does not only render policy effectiveness inadequate but also damages the trust between immigrant communities and public institutions. This situation is a clear indicator of the necessity to strike a balance between law enforcement and inclusivity, as the implementation of only punitive measures

may trigger social division and disrupt the prospects of a good and lasting policy.

When the aforesaid conclusion is arrived at through the application of these substances, the fundamental problem is signaled around which the French immigration measures are not being effectively addressed. The CESEDA 2018 reforms which are innovative in their scope would be a case in point of the failure of symbolic legislation in solving the actual issues of the management of migration. The lack of administrative systems that are efficient, the paucity of resources, and the socio-political environment-varying causatives have caused the gap between the essence of the legal framework and the actual enforcement outcomes. The exploration of the present study clearly points to the necessity that both the lawmakers and the implementers set into operation a more complete and uniform policy that sets out the goals of labor authorization recognized by everybody. The proposed method should involve coming up with domestic as well as international factors that make up a single whole to be certain that immigration laws are both effective and fair.

France experiencing a deeper control of its laws regulating immigration and higher immigration rates is one paradox that is seeing all over the world and is not unique to France but is a bigger ocean where the migration boat is sailing. Therefore, the comments made by the current French dilemma go far beyond the understanding of the French context and the problem provides adequate knowledge for the policymakers and

researchers as well. The thesis refers to both the structural and systemic challenges of migration governance to set afloat the analysis of the phenomenon of migration, which ultimately can be understood as a global process of interconnection, and, consequently, the importance of the way in which migration will be dealt with in the future. The main scenario comes to the front and is pointed to as the main cause of migration. Stepping up international cooperation and government bodies in host countries with the provisions for migrants might signal a trend toward a more people-friendly immigration governing, which could eventually help the concern of displaced people.

In conclusion, this thesis has lightened the many sides of immigration policy and its realization in France, thereby giving an understanding, which is multilayered, of the problems and paradoxes that modern governance contains. The study suggests that a successful immigration policy is not only limited to the legislation in force, but it calls for a comprehensive strategy that combines legislative goals, administrative capacity, and social justice. With France, still, exercising over the intricacies of migration, the teachings accrued from this analysis will always remain key components for realizing a more sustainable future free of discrimination and fostered by diversity.

국문초록

프랑스의 2018 년 CESEDA 개혁은 이민 통제를 강화하고자 하는 법적 개정임에도 불구하고, 법적 목표와 실제 실행 간의 현저한 격차를 드러내며 이민자 유입을 효과적으로 줄이지 못하는 역설을 보여주고자 하였다. 본 연구는 CESEDA 법안의 주요 조항을 심층적으로 분석하고, 입법 의도와 행정적 적용 과정에서 발생한 실행력 부족 문제를 실증 자료와 함께 검토하고자 하였다.

프랑스의 상원과 국회는 이러한 문제를 인식하고 있으나, 각기 다른 관점에서 해결 방안을 모색하고 있었다. 상원은 법적 구조 강화의 중요성을 강조하면서도, 행정적 개혁이 뒤따르지 않을 경우 실질적 성과를 기대하기 어렵다고 보고 있었다. 반면, 국회는 입법 개선과 함께 행정 효율성을 높이는 구조적 개혁이 필요하다고 주장하며, 이민 시스템의 일관성과 실효성 강화를 위해 양자의 통합적 접근을 촉구하고자 하였다.

본 논문은 이러한 입법과 행정 간의 괴리로 인해 CESEDA 개혁이 실효를 거두지 못하고 있는 역설을 실증적으로 규명하고, 프랑스의 이민 정책이 단순한 법 개정으로는 한계를 극복할 수 없음을 강조하고자 하였다. 효과적인 이민 정책 수립을 위해서는 법적 틀의 강화와 이를 뒷받침할 수 있는 강력한 행정 시스템이 통합적으로 운영될 필요가 있음을 본 연구는 제시하고자 하였다.

주요어: CESEDA 개혁, 프랑스 이민 정책, 입법-행정 간 괴리

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