

Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China

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Almost five years have elapsed since the demise of Chairman Mao Zedong in September 1976. In spite of his physical absence, however, the late Chairman continues to cast a long and powerful shadow over China's political landscape. No matter how the post-Mao leaders choose to treat Mao's memory, the Maoist legacy (which includes not only his ideological corpus but also the consequences of many of his actions and policies) has structured and will continue for years to structure the policy alternatives of his successors and affect the parameters within which they solve China's problems. Indeed, one most crucial and thorny issue of contention inside the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in recent years has been: how to evaluate Mao's role in history and his legacy. To affirm or negate Mao is by no means an idle intellectual exercise—it makes or breaks political careers and directly impinges on policy.

I. Struggle over Power and Policy

Since Mao's passing and the purge of the "Gang of Four," two broad over-lapping trends have dominated Chinese politics. On the one hand, the Party leadership has embarked on an earnest drive to promote the program of "four modernization," i.e., the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. On the other hand, China's elites have clashed over a wide range of important political and economic

issues which involve not only a conflict over ideology but also a struggle for power.

Although Hua Guofeng succeeded Mao as the Party Chairman in October 1976, in the wake of a coup he staged against the radical leaders one month after Mao's death, he has had great difficulties consolidating his power. Despite his claim that he was Chairman Mao's hand-picked successor, his previous training was limited, and his leadership performance after 1976 has been highly undistinguished. Furthermore, his leadership has encountered a serious challenge from Deng Xiaoping and many other veteran officials who were victimized by Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) as they strongly resent political upstarts like Hua who have benefited from Mao's purges. In fact, Hua's rapid rise to political prominence in the spring of 1976 coincided with Deng's downfall—on April 7, while the CCP Politburo ousted Deng from his leading party, government and military positions, it also named Hua Premier and appointed him First Party Vice-Chairman, thereby putting him in a favorable political position to contend for Mao's mantle.

The duel between Hua and Deng was joined soon after the radicals were placed under arrest. What happened was that Deng wrote a letter to the Party's Central Committee (CC), asking for a reversal of his case, as the first step of his political comeback. To forestall Deng's challenge, Hua blocked the request. A few Politburo members who had voted for Deng's dismissal earlier and feared that he would take his revenge against them, also opposed his reinstatement. One of them, Wu De, mayor of Peking, publicly called for a continuation of the campaign against Deng in accordance with Chairman Mao's previous behest.⁽¹⁾ Wang Dongxing, Mao's former chief bodyguard, contended that the reversal of Mao's decision on Deng would tarnish the late Chairman's memory.⁽²⁾ In these and other

(1) See Wu De's speeches in *Peking Review*, October 29, 1976, p.13 and December 10, 1976, p.11.

(2) Lo Ping, "The Political Eclipse of the 'Whatever Faction,'" *Cheng Ming* (HongKong), no. 16, February 1976, pp.5-8; also Hu Jiwei, "The Struggle at the Higher Circles of the Party," *ibid.*, no. 34, August 1980, p.51.

ways, Hua, Wang, Wu, and their fellow Maoists—subsequently labeled the “whatever” faction, coined and propagated a statement that “whatever policy Chairman Mao has decided upon, we shall resolutely defend: whatever instructions the Chairman has issued, we shall steadfastly obey”—attempted to invoke Mao’s sacred authority to prevent the rehabilitation of Deng and other GPCR victims.⁽³⁾

Nevertheless, Deng’s allies and supporters in the party fought hard on his behalf. Xu Shiyong and Wei Guoqing (two powerful regional leaders in the Politburo) and many provincial officials who had been associated with Deng or had been brought back to power by him in 1975 exerted immense political pressure on Hua to speed up Deng’s rehabilitation.

Eventually, a compromise was arranged by Ye Jianying at a Central Committee work conference in March 1977. Deng was formally reinstated to his three leadership positions in a Central Committee plenum in July 1977, but in return he had to make a major concession. He wrote a letter to the Central Committee in which he pledged his support to Chairman Hua and conceded that he had committed political errors in 1975.⁽⁴⁾ A proud man, Deng neither forgets nor forgives his political tormentors. Thus leadership conflict has intertwined with personal antagonism.

Once back in power, Deng kept up the pressure for a revamping of policy and lost no time in consolidating his position and expanding his base of support. In the past four years, he has pursued a master plan, which consists of three components. The first is to seize initiatives from Hua to institute political reforms and to implement bold, more practical, less ideological measures designed to speed up China’s economic growth.

(3) The first statement appeared first in a joint editorial entitled “Study Well the Documents and Grasp the Key Link,” in *The People’s Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily*, February 7, 1977.

(4) The Communiqué of the July 1977 Central Committee Plenum, *Peking Review*, July 29, 1977, p. 5, gave a brief account of how Deng’s rehabilitation was handled. Although the Communiqué did not disclose the content of Deng’s two letters or Ye’s mediating role, such information had been widely disseminated among cadres through inner party channels.

The second is to eliminate or neutralize officials opposed to his policies, and to replace those he considers to be inept or too old. The third is to install a team of possible successors who are talented, pragmatic, and in their "prime of life"—and thus likely to continue the efforts to modernize China after Deng, now 77 years old, is gone.

While Deng has not accomplished all what he intended, he has since the Third Central Committee Plenum in December 1978 considerably eclipsed Hua's leadership position and emerged as the most powerful Chinese leader and the main architect of China's modernization programs. As I have already detailed in an earlier publication, the power and policy struggle between groups led by Hua and those led by Deng, the issues of their conflict, and the resulting changes,⁽⁵⁾ here I will only summarize the most salient developments up to the fall of 1980. Specifically, his political "score-card" would include:

1. The devaluation of Mao's cult and dilution of Mao's ideological authority;
2. Establishment of a Dengist ideological line—"seek the truth from fact," and "practice is the sole criterion of truth;"
3. The ouster of Hua's hard-core supporters and leaders of the "Whatever Faction" (Wang Dongzong, Wu De, Chen Xilian and Ji Dengkui) from positions of power;
4. Tightening control over economic affairs and curtailing the power of the "Petroleum Faction"—a group of economic planners and technocrats, led by Li Xiannian and Yu Qiuli, who ran China's economy during 1966~1978—and resulted in Li's replacement by a Deng ally Chen Yun as China's economic czar since December 1978, and the transfers of such major "Petroleum Faction" figures as Yu, Gu Mu and Kang Shien from directorships at State Planning Commission, State Capital Construction Commission and State Economic Commission, respectively;

(5) Parris Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1981, pp. 1-21.

5. Cultivation of a team of possible successors committed to Deng's pragmatic line and elevation of them to key positions, including the appointment of Zhao Ziyang as the Premier, Wan Li as the Senior Vice-Premier since September 1980, and especially of Deng's closest comrade in arms Hu Yaobang first as the Party's General Secretary and eventually the Party Chairman as Hua's replacement;

6. A step-by-step political warfare which isolated Hua politically and eroded his power, including his resignation as Premier in September 1980; and finally,

7. Using the trail of the "Gang of Four" and the Lin Biao cohorts to repudiate the GPCR, discredit Mao's legacy and force Hua to step down as Party Chairman.

II. Backlash against Deng's Power Play

Until the opening of the show trial of the radicals and Lin Biao's followers in the second half of November 1980, the Deng forces appeared able to largely preempt policy initiatives and shape events in China according to their script. In a Politburo meeting in late November, Deng also orchestrated an attack on Hua to force him to quit; bowing to the pressure, Hua agreed to tender his resignation as Party Chairman. Soon thereafter, however, Hua stiffened his resistance to Deng's plan to unseat him. He refused to attend a central work conference in the second half of December, which was supposed to endorse his resignation and approve Hu Yaobang as Hua's successor. Hua also boycotted the Party's New Year's Day reception at Peking's Great People's Hall in order to embarrass his opponents who apparently wanted to create an appearance of leadership harmony and orderly transfer of power.

Moreover, behind the scene Hua sought to mobilize the support of his allies and sympathizers in the leadership. One of Hua's powerful defenders is Marshal Ye Jianying, Party-Chairman, who collaborated with Hua to topple the radicals and put Hua at the top in October 1976. To display

his strong opposition to Deng's power play, Ye not only boycotted the December Central Work Conference, but also left Peking and stayed in his native Guangdong province and other places before returning to Peking in the last week of May 1981.

Hua's support has come also from those officials who either owed their positions to Hua (e.g. Mao Zhiyong, first CCP Secretary of Hunan), or those who rose to political prominence during the GPCR (e.g. Bai Rubing, First CCP Secretary of Shandong), and the diehard Maoists in the Central Committee. Moreover not a few officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) who opposed Deng on various grounds also lined up behind Hua. They included those who were disaffected by the cuts in military expenditures; those who were resentful of Deng's repudiation of the GPCR and promotion of de-Maoization and "revisionist" economy policy, and those veteran officers whose careers have been threatened by Deng's plan to retire the aged in favor of the younger officers at the PLA hierarchy.

By the end of 1980, strong opposition to the Deng camp and its pragmatic political and economic reforms appears to have coalesced and forced Deng and his supporters to beat a hasty retreat. Thus the sentencing of the "Gang of Four" was delayed for more than three weeks as a result of bitter debate inside the Party leadership, and the plan to put the radicals' accomplice on trial has been postponed indefinitely, if not altogether abandoned. The Sixth Central Committee Plenum which was originally scheduled for late December 1980, and then early 1981, to formalize Hua's resignation had to be postponed again and again amid the deepening political crisis and other signs of uncertainty. Consequently, China's political pendulum began to swing to the left.

Indeed, since the winter months of 1980~1981, Chinese authorities have once again clamped down on the democracy activists as well as on intellectuals who have enjoyed relative freedom in recent years in Deng's garden of "hundred flowers." Apparently trying to appease his critics inside the Party and undoubtedly worried by the nation's sagging economy, high

inflation and huge deficit, anti-government protests, civil disobedience, and other signs of social and political unrest (including attempts by workers to organize the Polish-style independent labor unions), Deng gave the first signal of a crackdown in a harsh speech at the December 1980 Central Work Conference.⁽⁶⁾ Following Deng's speech, the Party issued a new set of guidelines in February 1981, known as the No. 7 Central Document, that imposed strict restrictions on the intellectual freedom of writers and artists, and prescribed that their writings and artistic creations must confirm to the four basic principles of "party leadership, socialism, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought, and proletarian dictatorship." A subsequent Party directive, the No. 9 Central Document, instructed the authorities to stamp out underground publications and unofficial organizations.⁽⁷⁾ In April 1981 the crackdown was well under way as a number of dissidents including Xu Wenli, the editor of a prominent underground journal, *April 5 Forum*, which had already ceased publication in 1980, and Wang Xize, one of the authors of the "Li Ize" essay in 1974, were placed under arrest.

In addition, Deng has been forced to postpone or call off important reforms which he and his supporters were actively promoting as recent as the summer and fall of 1980. For example, a highly publicized plan to reform the leadership system⁽⁸⁾—to do away with the life-long tenure of cadres and to fix the length of time the leading cadres can serve—has been shelved. Also the program to promote to leadership posts cadres, who are younger, better educated and professionally proficient, has provoked considerable opposition from those affected, especially the PLA cadres, and has not made much progress so far. Moreover since early 1981, the press

(6) Michael Weisskopf, "China Ends a Fling at Free Thinking," *Washington Post*, March 23, 1981, pp. 1, 10; also

Tsai Dan-yeh, "Chinese Communist Literary Policy: From Liberalization to New Clampdown," *Studies on Chinese Communism*, Vol. 15, no. 21, April 15, 1981, p. 78.

(7) Tsai, *loc. cit.*, p. 79.

(8) See Special Commentator, "An Important Reform on the Party and State Leadership System," *The People's Daily*, October 28, 1980.

has become quiet on reforms on economic structure, management and decision-making, and in some cases where decision-making powers were given to enterprises have been rescinded.⁽⁹⁾

Likewise, Deng's efforts at de-Maoization have suffered a severe setback. This is evident from the publication of a highly pro-Mao article in the *Liberation Army Daily* on April 10, by General Huang Kecheng, formerly a PLA Chief of Staff (purged in 1959) and currently the Executive Secretary of the Party's Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline. The article was reproduced by China's major newspaper the following day.⁽¹⁰⁾ It is true that the article did criticize Mao for his mistakes in launching the Great Leap in the late 1950s and the GPCR during 1966~1976, however, the criticisms were quite mild and the article actually tried to minimize Mao's onus by placing the blame of these two major policy disasters either on the entire leadership or the "Gang of Four." Most important, however, is that the article adopted an overall pro-Mao tone—it fervently defended the memory of the late Chairman and strongly reaffirmed his leadership and ideological authority. Placed in context, General Huang's pro-Mao tilt is not in line with the position of Deng and his close associates like Hu Yaobang who have campaigned since 1978 to repudiate the Maoist cult and critically assess Mao's legacy as a necessary step for freeing China from the shackles of Maoist influence, charting the nation's new course and for fashioning pragmatic political and economic reforms.⁽¹¹⁾

Thus the publication of Huang's article (which provided a limited rebuke of Mao) can be construed as a retreat by the Deng forces. Such a retreat seems to be a necessary concession to pave the way to a new leadership

(9) The economic reforms were played up during National People's Congress session in September 1980; see *Beijing Review*, September 8, 15, 1980.

(10) *The People's Daily*, April 11, 1981.

(11) See recent articles expounding views of the Deng camp; Special Commentator, "Rectifying the Guiding Thought on Economic Work—A Discourse on the Leftist Errors in Economic Construction," *The People's Daily*, April 9, 1981; "Correctly Recognize the Situation and Policy, Persist in Four Basic Principles," *Red Flag*, March 1, 1981.

consensus among China's disparate elites—and subsequent developments show that Huang's article did set the tone for the party's definitive evaluation of Mao's history. In retrospect, one also can argue that Deng's retreat is shrewd politics, as it succeeded in breaking political deadlock that had blocked top leadership changes, including Hua's removal as Party Chairman.

Meeting in the second half of June, the Party's Sixth CC plenum approved a series of major leadership changes. Some of these changes are: (1) Demotion of Hua from Party Chairmanship to one of the Vice-Chairmanships; (2) elevation of Hu Yaobang to Party Chairman; (3) promotion of Xi Zhongxun to Party's General Secretary to succeed Hu; (4) Election of Deng to Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission. These developments represent a significant albeit only a partial, victory for political forces led by Deng and Hu—partial victory because they failed to secure other things. For examples, an attempt to create a honorific Party advisory committee and transfer such party elders as Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and others to this honorific body has been shelved; promotion of such Dengist cohorts as Wan Li and Yao Yilin to the Politburo has not materialized; and Deng has not got the nomination for Chairman of Republic.

III. Implications of the Elite Conflict

In some respects, the struggle for power in the Chinese political system in the post-Mao years has become less violent, now that the Chinese leaders try to establish and follow the "rules of the game." Hua's "resignation" provides a good illustration of this point, as well as an important precedent for the future. For the first time in more than three decades of Communist control, the Party Chairman has been toppled in accordance with some procedures, and his exit is accorded courtesy as Hua is allowed to "resign" and stay in the Politburo. In fact, already for a number of years now, it has been a fairly common practice not to totally disgrace the defeated political rivals—high officials ousted from positions of power have been allowed to keep the Politburo or Central Committee membership, or reas-

signed to less powerful or important posts.

Whether or not they still wield any real power would probably vary from one case to another. The point here is that they, unlike those "capitalist roaders" during the GPCR and the "Gang of Four" since October 1976, are not in jail or under house arrest. The effect of this would tend to create a growing body of "counter-elite" who can wait in the wings and plot their political comeback. Take the case of Hua who, at 60, is relatively young in China's political context and still vigorous. In the years to come, he would still be seen as upholding Mao's standard, the logical leader of the Maoists and the beneficiaries of the GPCR (most are "outs" or in eclipse) and as such, will represent a political alternative to Hu Yaobang or whoever in power. The existence of such a "counterelite" not only will place great restraints on the incumbent but also will make it more difficult for him to consolidate his power.

Furthermore, perhaps because the wages of defeat in power struggle is not death as was in Stalin's Russia, nor even a terrible sanction as was under Mao, personal and factional conflict in the post-Mao leadership has intensified. Factions and cliques have existed in the CCP leadership in the course of the Communist movement. During the 1950's, the impact of personal historical associations and of factional conflict on policy was less salient as the leadership was able to maintain a high degree of discipline and coherence. However, Mao's drive to recapture leadership control since the 1960's and his use of the tactics of "divide and rule, check and balance," while permitting him to maximize control, have fostered and intensified the factional cleavage. Such leadership division and rivalry encouraged by Mao's manipulative approach appears to have outlived Mao and is likely to plague his successors for years to come.

One major debilitating development in China's political system in the past decade has been the fragmentation of leadership power. The trend was already evident in the final years of Mao's life but has deteriorated further in recent years. It is quite obvious that today Deng, not to mention

Hua, lacks the authority of Mao to generate personal power, or the power of Mao to create personal authority. Mao was both the ruler and the high priest (chief ideologist) of Communist China—performing several important leadership roles (policy initiation, policy legitimation, conflict resolution and political integration) and the paramount function of a “law giver.” In contrast, in the post-Mao Party Politburo, there is no established ideologist, and no one can combine all of Mao’s roles. However powerful Deng may appear since 1978, he has been only first among the equals and has had to share his leadership roles with, and in turn constrained by, such leaders as Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, Li Yiannian and, to a lesser extent, Peng Chen and Hua Guofeng, at one time or another. Under a collective leadership roles have become increasingly differentiated and political power has become fragmented. This is highly indicative of the decline in power and leadership status of Mao’s successors.

Fragmentation of power can lead to many adverse consequences. It tends to breed leadership disunity and limits its capacity to map out and implement forcefully strong reform measures needed for many of China’s deep-seated problems. The need to accommodate all factions and to compromise on divisive issues on personnel and policy has forced the Chinese leaders to “muddle through” without really taking necessary measures to solve problems. This in turn has adversely affected the ability of the regime to perform services and deliver goods to the society, thereby generating greater popular discontent. Chinese people are experiencing a severe crisis of belief, a crisis of confidence, and a crisis of trust; these in turn contribute to a crisis of authority in Chinese leadership. The deepening of China’s authority crisis has paradoxically compelled the regime to invoke the authority of Mao, even though that authority has already been tarnished and has been dysfunctional for a society striving for modernization. Moreover, the authority crisis diminishes the ability of the regime to elicit policy support and compliance through persuasion, and may (and did) force the regime to turn to coercive means of control and pay special attention.

to the PLA to insure its loyalty to the party leadership.

Many indicators of a praetorian regime are apparent in the Chinese political system today.⁽¹²⁾ One such indicator is the propensity for the military to intervene in political arena. In response to the GPCR, the PLA was deeply and extensively involved in Chinese politics. In October 1976, the PLA thrust itself into the political arena again as it took part in the coup that ousted the radicals and threw its support behind Hua making him Mao's successor. The propensity for the PLA leaders to get involved in leadership conflict resolution or to intervene in political affairs is also evident in the publication of Huang Kecheng's article and several other editorials and commentaries in the *Liberation Army Daily* in recent months which attacked the Party's liberalization policy.

Although Deng has been remarkably successful in recent years in pushing the PLA "back to the barrack" and in keeping the PLA opposition in check, his success seems to be due more to personal factors (e.g. personal ties) and may thus be difficult to duplicate by others. Many precedents have been established for PLA intervention in a political struggle; moreover, the Chinese Communists have been unable or unwilling to maintain strict civil-military institutional boundaries. Thus if the Chinese leadership fails to arrest and remove the trend toward praetorian politics, China's PLA leaders can be expected to intervene more forcefully in future leadership conflict. Like the 1976 coup, some of the PLA leaders could again play the role of "kingmaker," or some may aspire to become king himself.

(12) Some of the indicators are: political participation is "not moderated and channeled toward common goals by the reliable functioning of political institutions;" political institutions are "weak, lacking in the moral authority to work out binding, allocative decisions that will be regarded as legitimate by the society as a whole;" and there is "a tendency for the military to intervene in the political arena." See Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974), p.54. Also see Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp.196-197, for a similar definition.

인도네시아(印尼)의 軍隊와 政治

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印尼의 歷史에서 軍隊가 政治에 介入하기 始作한 것은 상당한 歷史的 背景을 가지고 있다. 約 三百年동안의 「화란」 殖民地統治期間, 그리고 獨立을 선포한 1945年以後의 初期 革命期에 있어서 軍隊는 곧 獨立運動의 최선봉에 선 獨立運動團體였다. 印尼에 있어서의 獨立運動은 政治的 運動이며 同時に 軍事的 活動이기도 하였다. 이것은 軍隊로 하여금 政治와 不可分の 關係를 맺게 한 歷史的 契機가 된다.

1949年 「화란」으로부터 完全한 獨立을 爭取한 直後에 軍隊는 原則적으로 國內의 政治不干渉原則을 堅持적으로 취했으나 그 이후 民間政治人들이 中心이 되어 구성된 議會制度가 혼란에 빠져 派爭과 對立으로 인한 政局의 혼미 상태가 계속되면서 軍隊는 軍隊內部的 여론과 國民들의 기대를 背景으로 서서히 政治表面에 나서기 시작하였다. 결국 議會制度가 붕괴되면서 政府는 1957年에 戒嚴令을 선포하게 되고 이때부터 軍隊는 積極적으로 國內政治 一線에 나오게 된다.

當時의 陸軍總司令官이었던 30代의 「나스티온」(Abdul Haris Nasution)將軍은 有名な 「軍의 中道論」(Middle Way)을 제창하였던 바, 이에 의하면 軍은 “政權을 장악하고자 하지 않으며 그렇다고 政治적으로 無關心하지도 않다”라는 것이다. 이러한 軍의 政治에 대한 態度는 特定 個人的 意思表示라기 보다는 外國의 統治下에서부터 生命을 바쳐 獨立運動의 一線에서 활약해온 全體 軍隊 엘리트의 共通된 意見의 集約으로 보아야 하며 國內政治人에 대한 커다란 不信에서 근거하고 있다고 보아야 할 것이다.

이와 같은 軍의 中道論은 그 이후 軍의 「二重機能論」으로 發展하게 되었던 바 이는, 軍隊는 外部의 침략에 대한 국토방위 및 國內治安維持라는 軍事的・治安維持的 機能을 遂行해야 함과 同時に 또한 社會改革과 政治發展에 대하여도 積極적인 功헌을 해야 한다는 것이다.

이와 같은 軍隊의 政治擔當勢力으로서의 등장은 「화란」 殖民地當局과의

오랫동안의 獨立鬭爭運動過程을 통하여 가능하였다. 즉 獨立運動過程을 통하여 軍事的 活動과 政治的 活動의 重複이 불가피하였던 것에서 그 遠因을 볼 수 있다.

獨立運動에 가담한 젊은 靑年들은 곧 하나의 비밀 軍事組織으로 發展되었으며 이들은 一生을 軍隊에 바칠 職業軍人이 아니라 오직 獨立爭取를 위한 잠정적 手段으로 軍隊를 利用하였고 同時에 이들의 獨立鬭爭 軍事活動은 곧 政治理念集團에 의한 軍事活動이었다고 볼 수 있다. 換言하면 軍事集團에 의한 軍事活動이었다기 보다는 政治集團에 의한 軍事活動이었던 것이다. 이러한 現象은 어느 나라에서나 獨立運動過程에서 흔히 볼 수 있는 것이다.

獨立運動에 가담한 印尼靑年들은 理想的으로 투철하여 낮에는 市民으로 活動하고 밤에는 게릴라軍으로 變身하는 비밀軍事 및 政治活動組織을 가지고 있었으며 私生活와 軍事活動 및 政治活動에 뚜렷한 限界가 없는 狀態였다. 그리하여 이들에게 가장 重要的 目標은 獨立爭取였고 이것은 軍事活動과 함께 政治活動을 의미하는 것이었다.

어떠한 植民地統治下에서도 被植民國民은 자기들의 純粹軍隊組織을 가질 수 없으며 이것은 印尼에서도 例外는 아니다. 軍事活動을 통한 積極의 獨立運動에 가담하는 「강경파」와 非軍事的 活動(政治活動)을 통한 消極의 獨立運動에 가담하는 「온건파」는 어느 國家에서나 있게 마련이고 또 이들간에는 目標은 共通되더라도 手段과 戰略에 현격한 差異를 보여주어 이것은 결국 政治理念自體가 현저히 區別되는 것을 볼 수 있다.

印尼에서도 이것을 똑똑히 볼 수 있다. 軍事活動을 통한 獨立運動에 투신한 初期의 指導者들은 주로 「자바」지역의 가난한 農民出身으로 植民地當局에서 배우는 高等教育을 전연 받아보지 못한 小農出身이었고 그렇기 때문에 華란語도 유창하지 못했다. 이에 反해 都市出身으로서 「화란」式 高等教育을 받고 行政官僚로서 植民地當局과도 協力하였던 經驗을 가진 知識層 乃至 官僚出身의 獨立運動家들과는 根本적으로 그 政治理念이 差異가 있을 수 밖에 없었다. 前者는 鬭爭的이며 後者는 協商의이다. 前者는 가난하고 後者는 가난하지 않았다. 前者는 生命을 걸었고 後者는 生命과는 관계가 없었다.

이와 같이 印尼의 獨立運動軍隊는 無教育・無資產의 農民出身으로 形成되어 있었기 때문에 非暴力的・순수政治的 獨立運動集團과는 文化的・社會的・經濟的 背景이 다르며, 이로 인한 兩者間의 政治理念의 差異는 不可避하였

다고 볼 수 있다. 勿論 都市出身으로서 花란에서 高等教育을 받은 政治家들이 獨立軍事集團과 밀접한 관계를 맺으면서 共同活動을 한 경우도 더러 있으나 一般的으로 보면 兩者는 嚴格히 區分되고 있다. 獨立直前인 1948年은 翁建과 政治人들이 「花란」軍에 의하여 대량 체포되고 난 뒤에도 印尼軍隊는 계속 軍事鬭爭을 계속하였으며 1949年 政權이 正式으로 「花란」으로부터 인계되고 난 뒤에도 軍隊는 소위 翁建과 政治人들을 不信하게 되었던 것이다. 어떻든 이들 兩者들 간에는 政治理念, 出身背景, 鬭爭方式 등에 있어서 相當한 差異를 보여 주었다.

印尼軍隊는 이러한 歷史的背景을 가지고 獨立된 年後에도 계속 政治에 깊은 關心을 가지고 國家發展과 安定의 “保護者”로서 政治에 깊이 干여하기 시작하였다. 獨立後에도 地方軍隊의 反亂, 軍隊內部의 不和, 中央 및 地方軍隊간의 不和등 軍隊內部의 수많은 극절을 겪는 동안 中央軍隊의 통솔·지휘體系를 서서히 確立하고 따라서 軍隊의 政治參與도 이와 더불어 增大되어 간다.

印尼는 수많은 크고 작은 섬들이 1,300개나 있고 文化的으로 相異한 部族이 200餘個나 있어 一個國家로서 獨立하기까지는 相當히 組織된 軍事力을 必要로 한다. 地理的 條件, 種族的·文化的 背景이 다른 各種 部族이 극히 多樣하게 제각기 獨特한 歷史的 背景을 가지고 生存해 온 廣大한 群島를 物理的으로, 또 政治的으로 統一한다는 것은 매우 어려운 課題이며 이를 위한 軍隊의 役割은 매우 큰 것이다. 獨立以前에는 對外的 獨立鬭爭이라는 共同目標하에 軍事的 鬭爭을 통한 團結은 쉬웠으나 獨立된 후에는 各己 地域的·部族的 利害가 相異하여 統一된 國家와 政府를 이루는 데 있어서는 여러가지 갈등과 긴장상태가 많이 있었던 것이다.

獨立을 爭取한 1949년부터 約 10年間에 걸쳐 印尼는 內部統合을 위한 커다란 試練期에 접어 든다. 이동안 政治人들 相互間, 軍隊內部間, 軍隊와 政治人들 간에는 수많은 갈등, 不和, 투쟁이 연속되다가 드디어 1957年 政局 혼란이 극치에 달했을 때 戒嚴令이 宣布되면서 軍隊는 政治와 行政에 直接 參與하게 되는 것이다.

軍隊는 이 때를 계기로 하여 「스카르노」大統領을 中心으로 1945年の 憲法을 再導入하여, 所謂 말하는 教導民主主義(Guided Democracy)體制를 굳히게 된다. 「스카르노」의 教導民主主義體制의 政治的 基盤은 軍隊와 共產黨이

었다.

軍隊가 1957~1963年 사이의 戒嚴令下에서 積極인 政治 및 行政參與를 하면서 政治의 基盤을 굳혔고 이를 배경으로 1964年의 改正된 戒嚴令을 계기로 印尼軍隊는 政治와 行政뿐 아니라 經濟에까지도 적극 參與할 수 있게 되었다. 이동안 共產黨 역시 「스카르노」의 積極의 支持下에 庶民大衆속으로 그 基盤을 擴大해 나갔으며 全國이 거의 共產黨의 組織網속으로 들어갈 程度로 그 政治集團으로서의 勢力과 影響力이 莫强해져서 軍隊와 맞설 수 있는 唯一한 政治集團으로 成長된다. 1965年에 오면 印尼 共產黨員이 非公式 統計에 의하면 300萬名이나 될 정도로 肥大하여졌으며 이때부터 軍隊와 共產黨 間에는 치열한 暗鬭가 시작된 것이다.

軍隊도 그간 正規軍으로 編成되어 外國의 많은 원조를 받아들여 強化되었으나 軍隊 内部의 和合이 완벽하지 못하였고 또 庶民大衆속에 깊이 뿌리를 내린 共產黨의 莫强한 政治的 영향력을 고려하여 軍隊에 의한 共產黨의 직접적 탄압은 볼 수가 없었다. 「스카르노」는 軍隊와 共產黨이라는 두 개의 莫强한 政治集團을 상호견제시키면서 그 自身の 政治基盤을 유지하고 있었으며 「스카르노」個人이 가지고 있는 神話者·카리스마的 指導力을 軍隊와 共產黨은 서로 자기편에 유리하게 利用코자 하였고 「스카르노」自身은 또 個人的으로 軍隊와 共產黨을 各已利用하고 있었다. 말하자면 1965년까지 印尼에는 「스카르노」, 軍隊, 그리고 共產黨이란 세 개의 政治核이 있었으며 이들 三者의 相互견제, 갈등, 그리고 協商과 그 균형에 의하여 「스카르노」의 教導民 主義體制는 存續되고 있었다고 말할 수 있다.

行政과 經濟分野에 먼저 參與하기 始作한 軍隊는 中央政府, 地方政府, 國營企業體, 議會 등 모든 國家 主要機能에 대거 진출하여 實務經驗 및 政治術을 蓄積하는 한편 그들의 政治的 基盤을 確固히 해 나가고 있었다. 軍人들이 政府의 一線에서 활약하고 있는 동안 共產黨 또한 全國의 農村地域과 都市庶民層으로 그 組織을 확대하면서 中國共產黨과 밀접한 관계를 유지하고 「스카르노」大統領의 측근에까지 그 영향력과 기반이 팽창되어 갔던 것이다.

한편 國民의 90%가 「모스렘」教徒인데도 共產黨이 그 基盤을 강력하게 구축할 수 있었던 것은 역시 貧困이 심각한 社會問題로 基本國民生活를 위협하고 있었기 때문이나, 이슬람敎는 基本的으로 共產主義와는 理念上 상치하는 것이다. 그렇기 때문에 1965年의 共產黨反亂事件 때에는 「모스렘」教徒들

이 積極的으로 共產黨 타도에 앞장섰던 것이다.

그리고 軍隊와 「모스렘」간의 關係를 보면 이것 亦時 異質的이라 볼 수 있다. 특히 軍事指導者들의 出身背景이 大多數 「자바」地域의 「프리아이」(Priyayi)* 出身이기 때문에 保守的인 「이스람」宗教勢力層인 「산트리」(Santri) 出身과는 妥協되기 어려우며 極端的이며 保守的인 「산트리」階層에 의한 回教에 의한 政權쟁탈 企圖는 軍隊의 支持를 받지 못하며 軍에 의하여 恒常 制止당하기 마련이다. 90%의 「모스렘」教徒를 가지고도 印尼는 「이스람」을 國教로 認定하지 않고 있으며, 軍事政權은 모든 宗教의 自由를 同等히 認定하고 있는 것이다.

軍隊는 그들의 經濟的 基盤을 튼튼히 하기 위해 各種 主要産業과 企業活動에도 깊이 干여하였으며 政府豫算에 의한 軍事豫算 뿐 아니라 軍隊自體가 運營하는 經濟・産業活動도 獨自的으로 전개하고 있었다. 뿐만 아니라 印尼에 있어서 가장 重要한 企業인 國營石油會社(Pertamina)와 國營米穀收買會社(Bulog)는 完全히 軍人들의 統制下에 놓이게 되었던 것이다.

이러한 軍隊에 의한 政治와 經濟에 대한 積極的인 參與와 統制는 都市勞動者 및 庶民層과 農民下層階級에 압도적인 支持基盤을 가지고 또 「카리스마」의 存在인 「스카르노」의 絶對的인 保護下에 急成長하고 있던 共產黨勢力을 견제코자 했던 원대한 計劃의 一部였다고 해석할 수 있다.

軍隊에 의한 政治・經濟에의 參與를 正當化 乃至 合法化시키는 것은 벌써 現實的으로 받아들여진 것이었지만 1965년의 軍隊指揮官會議에서 한번 더 確認되고 있다. 이들의 決議文에 의하면 軍의 役割을 軍事的, 政治・社會的 勢力으로 規定하고 특히 政治・社會的 勢力의 機能은 理想的, 政治的, 社會的 經濟的, 文化的, 宗教的 領域에까지 擴大되고 있음을 천명하고 있다(Angkatan Darat, 1965).⁽¹⁾ 이것은 初期의 中道論에서 進一步하여 軍隊의 機能을 國家發展의 중추세력으로 擴大規定하고 있는 것으로 볼 수 있다.

1966年 軍事指揮官들이 「스카르노」大統領의 辭任을 要求하면서 채택한 宣言文에서는 이것이 더욱 發展하여 「……軍隊는 國家安定에만 몰두하는 죽은

* 「자바」에서 Santri란 이스람宗教에 全的으로 헌신하며 이스람敎理에 따라 政治와 社會改革을 信奉하는 人들을 말하며 非 Santri는 形式上 「모스렘」으로 표방하지만 「이스람」敎 以前에 「자바」固有의 힌두敎 및 民俗信仰에 더 애착을 가진 非「모스렘」的, 世俗的, 自由主義的 集團이며 이들을 가리켜 「아방간」(Abangan)이라 하고 이들중 上流層의 人들을 「프리아이」(Priyayi)라 한다.

(1) Angkatan Darat, 1965. Doktrin Perjuangan TNI. "Tri Upaya Cakti"

道具가 아니며, 自由의 鬪士인 軍隊는 國家政策의 方向, 政府의 質, “판차실라”(Pancasila)⁽²⁾에 기반을 둔 國家의 安定에 관하여 中立的인 立場만을 취할 수 없다. 軍은 軍事義務만을 가진 것이 아니라 社會生活에도 꼭 같이 干涉해야만 한다」(Angkatan Darat, 1966)라고 외치고 있는 것이다.⁽³⁾

이러한 軍의 立場은 「스하르토」(Suharto) 大統領時代에 오면 소위 말하는 軍의 「二重機能」(Dual function)이란 새로운 用語로 變하면서 軍에 의한 政治, 行政, 經濟 및 社會에 대한 參與는 더욱 노골화하는 것이다. 이제 國家一線에 나선 軍隊는 莫強한 政治集團으로 성장하였으며 이에 맞선 唯一한 強力政治集團인 共產黨과 軍隊의 노골적인 鬪爭은 1965년의 「共產黨 쿠데타」로 發展되었다.

1965년의 「共產黨 쿠데타」는 5名の 핵심 軍將星을 共產黨이 殺害하여 「스카르노」의 保護下에 共產政權을 수립코자 한 데서 발단되었다. 이때 相當한 內部的 不和를 안고 있던 軍隊는 「스하르토」將軍의 指揮下에 共產黨 타도에 일제히 단결하였다. 이 때의 충돌로 死亡者가 數十萬名에 이를 만큼 軍隊와 共產黨과의 충돌은 치열하였으며 이 때를 계기로 모스렘教徒들에 의한 共產黨 숙청도 地方 곳곳에서 일어났으며 이것은 印尼 歷史上 가장 치열한 內戰의 性格을 띠고 있다.

1965~1967年 사이에 軍隊는 共產黨과 이에 야합한 일부 軍將星 및 「스카르노」 측근實力者들을 숙청하는 데 성공하고 나아가 國民들의 神話의 偶像인 「스카르노」를 共產黨으로부터 完全 孤立시켜 軍隊는 名實共히 唯一한 政治集團으로 그 기반을 확고히 하게 되는 것이다. 이젠 軍隊의 唯一한 장애 要因은 國民의 絶對的인 支持를 가지고 있는 個人 「스카르노」를 어떻게 제거 시키느냐는 문제만 남았다. 「스카르노」와 共產黨과의 제휴에 관하여는 많은 논란이 있으나 共產黨을 적극 保護・育成하고 있었다는 點, 그리고 「스카르노」에 의한 經濟의 破탄 등이 明白한 國民의 支持대상이 되고 있는 점을 巧히 利用하여 「스카르노」를 國民으로부터 孤立시키는 作業이 進行된다.

(2) 「판차실라」(Pancasila)는 印尼의 五大國家理念 혹은 目標을 말하는데 이는

① 唯一神에 대한 信仰(信仰主義)

② 民族主義

③ 國際主義(兄弟主義)

④ 全國民을 위한 政府(民主主義)

⑤ 社會正義

(3) Angkatan Darat, 1966. Sumbangan Fikiran TNI-AD Kepada Kabinet Ampera.

이와는 反對로 共產黨타도에, 그리고 共產主義社會에로의 전환을 防止하는 데 있어서 第一線에서 指揮하고 있던 「스하르토」의 地位를 相對적으로 格上시키는 조치들을 취하게 된다. 이 모든 作業을 「스하르토」 指揮下의 陸軍이 주축으로 되어 進行시키게 되었으며 「자바」의 格言처럼 “천천히 그러나 確實히” (alon alon asal kelakon) 인내와 설득을 통하여 이루어졌다. 1968년에 오면 모든 群小政黨은 軍隊의 黨制下에 들어 간다.

「스하르토」將軍은 1966年 마침내 당시 감금되어 있던 「스카르노」大統領으로부터 政權을 正式으로 인양 받았고 1967年 임시로 구성된 國民總會(MPR: People's Consultative Assembly)에서 大統領職務代理로 그리고 1968년에는 正式大統領으로 선출되면서 바야흐로 「스하르토」體制의 구축과 함께 「새로운 秩序(New Order)」時代로 들어 가는 것이다.

「스하르토」의 「새秩序」時代에 오면서 軍隊는 合法的으로, 또 正正當當하게 그들이 일찍 천명한 軍의 「二重機能論」을 앞세워 國家의 모든 主要機關을 직접 운영하게 되었다. 「스하르토」는 1971年 最初로 실시된 총선거를 통하여(여당의 압승) 正式으로 구성된 國民總會에서 1973年 五年任期の 大統領으로 다시 선출되면서 「스하르토」體制는 이제 完全한 기반구축을 보는 것이다. 1971年 총선거가 실시되었을 때에는 이미 政黨改編이 있었고 政府現職官僚들이 中心이 된 골카(Golkar)라는 機能集團이 與黨으로서 全國의인 政黨役割을 遂行하고 있었다.

「스하르토」體制가 일단 자리를 잡기까지는 軍隊內部의 各種 理念的 不和가 있었고 이로 인한 權力鬭爭은 國家經濟의 지속적 발전을 크게 위태롭게 하는 경우도 있었으며(그 좋은 例가 1970年の 國營石油會社의 파산) 이를 계기로 軍隊는 지나친 經濟政策에 대한 간섭에서 서서히 물러나는 경향을 보였는데, 이는 「스하르토」의 「테크노크라트」에 의한 經濟運營의 原則이 일단 실효를 보는 것을 말하며 同時에 이는 「스하르토」體制의 확고한 기반구축을 말해 주는 信號가 되기도 한다. 그러나 軍隊는 國家豫算만으로는 운영되지 못하고 各 部隊가 獨自의 經濟活動을 함으로써 自身들의 部隊를 어느 程度維持하고 나아가 自身들의 정치적 위치를 확보해야 하는 立場에 있는 軍指揮官들을 어떻게 통제하며, 이를 國家經濟의 發展과 軍指揮官들의 상호견제와 어떻게 연결시키는 線에서 調和시키느냐 하는 것은 「스하르토」의 가장 重要的한 「잇슈」라 할 수 있다. 순수民間經濟專門家에 의한 經濟政策을 指向

하면서 軍隊의 利益과 간섭을 어느 정도 용인하지 않을 수 없는 이러한 「딜렘머」는 곧 印尼의 近代化에 있어서 가장 큰 도전이며 課題이다.

軍隊固有의 國防機能을 수행하면서 동시에 軍의 政治勢力으로서의 政治機能을 許用하는 데서 그 기반을 가진 「스하르토」로서는 軍隊의 機能에 어떤 急激한 變化를 가져올 수 없으며, 그렇다고 經濟문제를 經濟專門家에만 맡길 수도 없는 立場이다. 이것은 곧 印尼가 앞으로 어떻게 그 體制를 民主化시켜 나가느냐 하는 문제와 直結된다고 할 수 있다.

〈參考資料〉

1. 印尼의 國家組織

1945년에 제정된 憲法(1959年度에 「스카르노」에 의하여 再導入)에 의하면 國家의 最高權力은 國民總會(People's Consultative Assembly: MPR)에 있고 이는 每五年마다 열리며 여기에서 大統領·副統領을 選出하고 國政施政方針을 채택하게 되어 있다. 또한 憲法에 의하면 國會(People's Representative Council: DPR)를 두어 行政府를 견제하게 하고 있다. 國民總會는 460名の 國會議員과 460名の 政府가 任命하는 代表로서 구성되며(총 920名) 任命議員은 地域代表, 職能代表, 그리고 國會議員當選比率에 따른 政黨代表들로 구성된다. 國會議員은 五年任期로서 1971년의 第一回총선거에 이어 1977年 第二回 總선거가 있었다.

2. 印尼의 軍隊組織

印尼國軍은 陸軍, 海軍, 空軍, 警察로 구성되고 1967年 以前까지는 以上 三個軍과 경찰의 責任者는 國軍總司令官인 大統領 直屬下에 있었다. 그러나 1967年 以後부터는 國軍總司令官이 國防長官으로 되었으며 1969年 地域別司令官制度가 창설되면서 三軍과 경찰지휘권이 地域別로 하나의 指揮體系 밑에 統合되었다. 六個軍團으로 始作되었다가 1973年 以後 四個軍團으로 축소·조정되었다.

陸軍은 司令官(Commander) 아래 副司令官 一名, 그리고 三名의 司領官補(Dputies: 作戰, 行政, 非軍事活動), 七名の 補佐官(Assistants: 情報, 作戰, 人事, logistics, 政治, 非軍事活動, 財政)을 두고 있다. 1969年 以後부터는 司令官 및 副司令官을 Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff으로 改稱하였다.

全國에 十七個 地域司令部(Kodam)가 있으며 이 중 가장 有名한 것은 西部「자바」의 Siliwangi 司令部, 中部「자바」의 Diponegoro 司令部, 東部「자바」의 Brawijaya 司令部이다. 各地域司令部는 3~4個 管轄司令部(Korem)로 분할되고 그 밑으로 郡 및 市單位司令部(Kodim), 面單位部隊(Koramil)가 있다. 이러한 軍隊體制는 廣大한 國土를 效率의으로 방어하고 國內治安을 維持하기 위해 不可避한 編制이겠으나 거의 政府行政體制와 比等할 程度의 肥大한 組織을 말한다.

<참 고 문 헌>

「크라우치」의 著書에서 전재

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