

A Spatial Testing of Fenno's Six Committees: Environmental Constraints Reflected in Spatial Configuration

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*The purpose of this article is to test Fenno's argument on the "environmental constraints" of the House standing committees presented in his *Congressmen in Committees*. The main task of the paper is to see if the "environmental constraints," which are presumed to influence the internal committee politics, are reflected in the spatial configurations of Fenno's six committees. In executing a spatial test, Rosenthal/Poole NOMINATE score was utilized. From the findings of the spatial test, we can conclude that Fenno's observation on the environmental constraints of the six committees is generally supported. The committees under the constraints of parties and party leaders, such as the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means Committee, are also most heterogeneous and polarized in spatial terms. In contrast, the Foreign Affairs Committee, a committee under the influence of non-partisan foreign policy guidelines from the executive branch, and the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, a committee under the constraints of monolithic clientele groups, are most homogeneous and least polarized. The other two committees, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and the Appropriations Committee, lie in between.*

1. INTRODUCTION

It is well established that Richard Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees* counts among the most important trend-setting works on the nature of standing committees in the House. It is one of the works most frequently cited in scholarly articles and books on legislative behavior. Besides, most graduate students majoring in American politics are usually supposed to read parts of the volume as a segment of reading assignments in the gateway courses on legislative behavior. No one doubts that it stands as one of the classics on the U.S. federal legislature.

Among other things, the scholarly reputation of *Congressmen in Committees* can be partly attributed to the research question Fenno decides to answer. In *Congressmen in Committees*, Fenno aims at finding an answer to the question of how to generalize committee differences and similarities. Why do certain committees have particular groups of members in it, while others have different sorts of members? Under what environmental conditions do committees operate, and do the different environmental conditions have different influences on committee workings? How do member goals and environmental constraints in each committee affect the committee decision-making process? These questions are crucial to gain a deeper understanding of the House committee system in general, and Fenno addresses them in *Congressmen in Committees*.

In the course of finding answers to these questions, Fenno introduces two independent variables (member goals and environmental constraints), one intervening variable (strategic premises), and two dependent variables (decision-making processes and decisions)(Fenno, 1973: 15-16). One of the main thrusts of Fenno's argument is that member goals and environmental constraints combine to produce the "strategic premises" in each committee, which in turn constitute a basis on which committee

decision-making takes place. In other words, according to Fenno, committee decisions and decision-making process can be properly understood as a combined outcome of the interaction of member goals and environmental constraints.

One of the interesting components of Fenno's thesis is that not only member goals but also environmental constraints of each committee matter in the committee decision-making process. That is, the committee decision-making process is affected both by committee members and by extra-committee actors such as parties and clientele groups. This thesis means that committee members are not completely independent decision-makers, but work in a way to fulfill the expectations of actors outside the committees. Furthermore, Fenno differentiates the context within which each committee operates (Fenno 1973, chapter 2 "Environmental Constraints"). And Fenno's analysis shows that the contextual differences make committees presumed to have the same kind of goals distinguish one from the other. For example, Fenno argues that, although the members in the Education and Labor Committee and those in the Foreign Affairs Committee pursue the same kind of goals, the internal workings of the two committees are remarkably different due to their environmental constraints. That is, while the Education and Labor Committee works under the strong influence of parties and thus tends to be more prone to partisan conflict, the Foreign Affairs Committee operates under the relatively uniform influence of the executive branch and make its decisions in a bipartisan way.

Given the importance of the external constraints in each committee's decision-making process, this article attempts to see if Fenno's description of the various environmental constraints provided in "Environmental Constraints," chapter 2 of *Congressmen in Committees*, can be confirmed by the spatial configurations of each committee.¹ If the environmental constraints really matter, it will affect the membership composition of each committee, thus resulting in different levels of polarity and homogeneity across committees. Certainly, we can expect the committee members under the influence of parties to be partisans themselves and those under the influences of divided clientele groups to be more prone to conflict.

As a matter of fact, Fenno himself agrees on the close relationship between the committee environments and the committee membership composition in a couple of segments of chapter 2 in *Congressmen in Committees*. For example, he maintains that "[W]hen party leaders make appointments to Ways and Means, they make policy orthodoxy a test of membership. Candidates from both parties are checked to make sure they adhere to the party position on such matters as trade and medicare and to ascertain whether they will follow the party leaders ... (Fenno 1973: 25). In addition, with respect to the Education and Labor Committee, he continues to state that "Education and Labor members face partisan-ideological constraints to a degree unmatched by any of the other five committees ...the AFL-CIO devotes enormous resources of manpower, money, and organization to help elect liberal Democratic Presidents and Congressmen – including members of the Education and Labor Committee"(Fenno 1973: 34). Supporting Fenno's argument, Parker and Parker also say that "factional alignments" within committees derived from the environmental constraints affect each committee's decision-making

¹ In this paper, the "spatial configurations" of the committee refer to the level of homogeneity and polarity of each committee. The spatial configurations of the committees analyzed in this paper are presented in section 4.

(Parker and Parker 1979).

With the aim of seeing if the environment constraints are reflected in the spatial configurations of Fenno's six committees,² this paper will proceed as follows. In section 2, the historical background against which *Congressmen in Committees* can be best understood will be presented first. Among other things, the important roles of the standing committees in legislative process will be briefly described. In addition, the main features of the House of Representatives during the 1950s and 1960s will be presented in a very condensed form.³ Next, the contribution of Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees* will be described by focusing on how his work is related to the other literature on legislative behavior. Among other things, it will be highlighted that, by postulating that a member actually has multiple goals and motivations, Fenno broke fresh ground for more realistic, sophisticated, and nuanced research on members' behavior in the legislative arena. In addition, it will be shown how Fenno's emphasis on the importance of the environmental constraints was supported and criticized by other scholars on legislative behavior.

In section 3, the major characteristics of Fenno's six committees will be pointed out on the basis of the information Fenno himself provides. The purpose of this recapitulation is preliminary. That is, to see if the outcome of spatial analysis to be presented in section 4 fits Fenno's description of the environmental constraints, we need to be familiar with Fenno's discussion on the nature of committee environments. Most of the description on the six committees in this section will be confined to members' expected goals when they seek to be assigned to certain types of committees and to the environmental constraints surrounding each committee.

In section 4, a spatial analysis will be executed to test Fenno's argument on the environmental constraints of the six committees. For the purpose of testing the relationship of the environmental constraints and the level of polarity and homogeneity of each committee, important statistics such as committee medians and committee party medians will be utilized.⁴ And the final section will summarize the whole argument and suggest further research.

² The six committees in Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees* (1973) are: the Post Office and Civil Service, the Interior and Insular Affairs, the Education and Labor, the Foreign Affairs, the Ways and Means, the Appropriations Committees. After the publication of Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees*, there have been a couple of House reforms in which some of the committees investigated in Fenno's work were abolished or renamed. At present (the year 2000), the Post Office and Civil Service Committee is no more in existence. The Education and Labor Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee were renamed the Education and the Workforce Committee, the International Relations Committee, the Resources Committee respectively. There is no change in name to the Ways and Means Committee and the Appropriations Committee.

³ This preliminary description seems necessary, because Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees* was written based on the data collected during this period, which was a modal era of the so-called "committee government." The preliminary description will help to understand the status of Fenno's work on the House committees from a historical perspective.

⁴ I use Rosenthal/Poole NOMINATE score to obtain important spatial data. More information on Rosenthal/Poole NOMINATE score is provided in Appendix. The NOMINATE score used in this article is based on the data of the 87th House (1961-1962).

2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF FENNO'S *CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES* AND ITS CONTRIBUTION

2.1. Historical Context of Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees*

As Woodrow Wilson succinctly described in his *Congressional Government*, Congress at work is "Congress in its committee rooms"(Wilson 1885, 69). Although he argued for the case of British-style party government by revealing the problems of the decentralized committee government, the committee system is one of the most important features of the U. S. House of Representatives compared to other western parliamentary democracies.⁵ Since its inception as an information producer in the early 19th century (Cooper 1970), the House committee system was institutionalized in the late 19th century and early 20th century, responding to the social demands of industrialization and symbolizing the division of labor in the House (Polsby 1968).

The Wilsonian hope of party government in Congress had gradually broken down by the early 20th century, when the despotic Republican Speaker Joseph Cannon was dethroned in 1910. Committee chairmen took the vacancy left over by powerful party leadership, establishing a decentralized, bargaining-oriented committee government, which took its full-blown shape in the 1950s and 1960s (Polsby 1968). Since 1910, under the committee government, the role of the House Speaker was marginalized, while the committee chairmen reigned with the aid of the strong seniority norm.

Although the committee system has been a recurrent target of a series of House reforms from time to time, the roles committees play in the House are crucial. The committees mark up bills; they hold hearings for legislation; they are the factories of legislative information. In comparison to the Westminster-style parliamentary system, in which the cabinet is in charge of managing and overseeing the initial stage of bill-markup, and the whole floor is emphasized as the central stage of legislative process, the committees in the House take legislative initiative, leading the flow of bills up to the conference committee stage. Although there is some controversy why congressional committees are powerful,⁶ students on the U.S. federal legislature tend to agree that the congressional committees are powerful, because they are full of policy experts. In this light, Krehbiel emphasizes the informational role of the committees (Krehbiel 1992).

⁵ There seems to be a general agreement among scholars of comparative legislature that the U.S. Congress is characterized by the policy-making strength of standing committees. See Nelson Polsby's "Legislatures," Michael Mezey's "Classifying Legislatures," and Malcolm Shaw's "Committees in Legislatures" in Philip Norton, ed. 1990, *Legislatures*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁶ The controversy was a debate between Shepsle and Weingast (1987) and Krehbiel (1987). Refuting the deference thesis that committees are powerful, because fellow congressmen respect their expertise, Shepsle and Weingast maintain that congressional committees are powerful due to their institutional position. According to them, the committees are respected, because they play the role of gate-keeper at the initial stage of law-making and, again, because they determine the fate of the bill at the last stage, i.e., at the stage of conference committee. They call the committee power at the conference committee stage "ex post" veto power. Krehbiel, in his critique of Shepsle and Weingast, contends that the "ex post" veto power argument is empirically restricted and, instead, suggests the "deference" the members show to the committee expertise is a true source of committee power.

And Kingdon highlights committee members' role as cue-givers in non-committee members' voting decisions on the floor (Kingdon 1989, 83-88).

In its turn, Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees* is a product of the very period in which the committee power was most visible and the committee chairmen were at the center of the House legislative process. In other words, the work is based on the information and data the author gathered during the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the so-called "committee government" was at its peak. During the period, the institutionalization of committee government took its full-blown shape. Committee chairmen were able to wield enormous power toward the other members of the House. Seniority norm was strong among the members in determining committee chairmanship. The role of House Speaker was minimized as a broker and bargainer among committee chairmen.⁷ The role of freshmen Congressmen was still relegated to that of apprenticeship. The norm of reciprocity, captured in the aphorism "to get along, go along," was almost taken as catechism. If nothing else, Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees* is one of the works which best describe the tides and circumstances of the House in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

2.2. Contribution of Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees*

As a trend-setter, Fenno's work contributed to our understanding of the U. S. House of Representatives in a couple of ways. First, before the publication of Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees*, we did not know in a systematic fashion why a member wants to be assigned (or reassigned) to a certain type of committees for what purpose. We frequently asked, "why does a member of the House seek to be assigned to a certain committee" and "what kind of circumstances around a certain committee determines its policy outcome?" We had some literature such as Manley's "Wilbur D. Mills: A Study in Congressional Influence," which was at best a case study as far as the internal workings of committees are concerned.

In contrast, Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees* successfully fills an important research gap by revealing what each member's goal is when s/he seeks to be assigned to certain types of committees. By comparing various committees, he shows us the relationship of a member's goal in a specific committee, the committee's environmental circumstances, and the nature of policy outcome of the committee. Simply put, Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees* succeeded in generalizing committee differences and similarities by taking "member goals" and "environmental constraints" as important explanatory variables.

Second, in contrast to such a work as Mayhew's *Congress: the Electoral Connection* (1974), Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees* shows that the goals a member can pursue are actually multiple. While Mayhew tends to overemphasize the priority of "reelection goal," Fenno contends that a member of the House seeks multiple goals such as getting reelected, making good public policy and gaining the influence in the House. Rather than taking a member's goal as fixed, as formal theorists often do, Fenno argues that a

⁷ On the weakened status of party leadership in the era of committee government, see Jones 1968 and Cooper and Brady 1981.

member can have multiple goals depending on her or his schooling, constituency, etc.

For the next generations of scholars on legislative behavior, Fenno's explanation on the multiplicity of member goals often times strengthened the positions of empiricists in their criticism of formal theorists. For example, Richard Hall, refuting formal theorists' argument that a member's goal is fixed and singular, contends that a member's goal is not fixed but bill-specific and that a categorical and a priori statement of a member's goal should be more nuanced and cautious (Hall 1987).⁸ In addition, Kingdon's *Congressmen's Voting Decision* also states that members' goals are evoked depending on issues at hand (Kingdon 1989: 247).⁹ Although more sophisticated, conditional, and realistic research on members' behavior does not solely rely on him, it cannot be denied that he broadened research frontier by identifying the multiple goals a member has in the legislative arena.

Finally, Fenno's emphasis on the environmental constraints as well as on member goals opened a new horizon for research on the influence of extra-committee actors. According to Fenno, the decision-making process in each committee cannot be regarded solely as reflecting the goals and preferences of committee members. Rather, the policy outcome is better understood as a result of the interaction of member goals and environmental constraints. Since the publication of *Congressmen in Committees*, Fenno's argument on the environmental constraints received both support and indirect criticism. Taking a cue from Fenno, for example, Parker and Parker highlighted the importance of committee "factions" and concluded that the influence of the House and the party is most heavily reflected in committees' voting patterns (Parker and Parker 1979). In contrast to the supporting tone of Parker and Parker, Price emphasized the level of "issue salience" and "group conflict" as major environmental factors. Rather than associating a particular type of committees with the influence of particular outside actors, as Fenno did, Price contended that the variation of internal committee workings depends on issues at hand (Price 1978). In this way, Fenno's taking of the environmental constraints as an important independent variable provided the soil for the development of the kind of research which takes the extra-committee factors as a major independent variable.

In conclusion, Fenno's *Congressmen in Committees* enriched our understanding of the operation of the House standing committees and paved the way for further research. By comparing various committees on the basis of member goals and environmental constraints, it enabled us to make a generalization about committee politics. The thesis that a member has multiple goals helped us to redirect attention from members' reelection-related activities to their activities for gaining the House influence and for

⁸ Hall's argument is further strengthened in his later work (Hall, 1996). Instead of saying a member has goals in abstract form, he argues that "[W]hat matters is the relevance of one or another kind of interest in the calculation of the behavioral moment, which depends in turn on the issue being considered. The behavioral effect of any abstract purpose, in other words, is contingent on the object of legislative action, subjectively perceived by the actor" (Hall 1996, 75).

⁹ Kingdon, after saying that "[T]heir (members': parenthesis mine) behavior is purposive, and is not simply reaction to external forces. But if they are goal-seekers, we need to identify the goals that seem to affect most legislators most of the time. Adapting categories used by Richard Fenno, representatives can be realistically portrayed as pursuing some combination of the following three primary goals," identifies "satisfying constituencies," "intra-Washington influence," and "good public policy" as the three primary goals members pursue (Kingdon 1989, 245-247).

making good public policy. Besides, Fenno's emphasis on the importance of the environmental constraints showed us that the level of conflict or cooperation in the internal politics of committee decision-making reflects the changes in external factors.

3. CHARACTERISTICS OF FENNO'S SIX COMMITTEES

In this section, the characteristics of Fenno's six committees will be described. The six Fenno committees in the House are the Post Office and Civil Service, the Interior and Insular Affairs, the Education and Labor, the Foreign Affairs, the Ways and Means, and the Appropriations Committees.¹⁰ The "member goals" in each committee addresses the question of "why a member seeks membership on the specific committee," and the "environmental constraints" addresses the question of "which outsiders have the greatest capacity to affect each committee member's pursuing her/his goal." A member may have multiple goals in seeking a committee assignment, and s/he may work under multiple environmental constraints. Fenno, admitting that modal characterization runs the risk of oversimplifications, maintains that these generalizations can be good predictors of the different behavior of members in different types of committees. The important characteristics of the six committees are as follows.¹¹

According to Fenno, the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee count among reelection-oriented committees, and their policy coalitions are largely led by clientele groups. Among other things, members in the two committees seek to serve the interests of their constituents. The members in the Post Office and Civil Service Committee are largely interested in the welfare of federal postal and civil employees and mail users; those in the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee are in the welfare of specific congressional constituencies on project basis.

Despite the similarities of members' goals in each committee and the environmental constraints surrounding each committee, Fenno notes that the two committees also have differences in the nature and composition of clientele groups. Fenno says that the clientele groups of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee are relatively monolithic, composed of mail delivers and mail users, and relatively less prone to possible conflict among them, while those of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee are more pluralistic, much less circumscribing, and more prone to possible conflict.

¹⁰ The jurisdictions of each committee are as follows (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 1962: 48-58).

- a. the Post Office and Civil Service Committee: postal and federal civil services; census, national archives
- b. the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee: public lands, natural resources, territorial possessions of the U.S., Indian affairs.
- c. the Education and Labor Committee: education, labor and welfare matters
- d. the Foreign Affairs Committee: relations of the United States with other nations and international organizations and movements
- e. the Ways and Means Committee: revenue measures generally; tariffs
- f. the Appropriations Committee: appropriation of government revenues; reciprocal trade agreement; social security

¹¹ The characteristics of the Fenno's six committees are based on "Member Goals" and "Environmental Constraints," chapters 1 and 2 in his *Congressmen in Committees*.

The goals of the members in the Education and Labor Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee are making good public policy. The members come to the committee with the aim of marking himself on the policy. Members in the Education and Labor Committee are largely partisans; they attempt to carry the ideology of their parties over into specific policies. Those in the Foreign Affairs Committee want to contribute to the successful implementation of the administration's foreign policy proposals by supporting presidential initiatives.

Goal similarity does not, however, cover up the differences in the environmental constraints of the two committees. The Education and Labor Committee works surrounded by the policy coalitions led by parties, while the Foreign Affairs Committee does surrounded by the policy coalitions led by the executive. In contrast to the Education and Labor Committee, the general mood within the Foreign Affairs Committee is bipartisan; the Committee works not as a partisan reviewer of the executive foreign policy proposals, but as a legitimating and supporting partner of the foreign policy recommendations of the executive.

The primary goal of members in the Ways and Means Committee and the Appropriations Committee is gaining influence in the House. As committees in charge of taxing and spending, the two committees are most powerful committees and are expected to be responsive to the general sentiment of the House. As a result, the members of the House as a whole constrain the two committees as a major institutional environment.

Fenno also notes differences when he talks about the policy coalitions surrounding the two committees. The Ways and Means Committee also works under the policy coalitions led by executive-plus-party. Party leaders such as House party leadership and the President are primarily concerned with electoral relevance of the policy output of the Committee; the Committee deals with policy areas, such as trade, social security, taxation, and Medicare, which are generally regarded as the arena of frequent partisan disagreement. In contrast, the policy coalitions surrounding the Appropriations Committee do not have equally strong partisan tone. Instead, the policy coalitions of the Committee are largely led by the executive. The executive agencies are the primary beneficiary of the funds allocated by the Committee; the executive agencies originate budget requests and aggregate them. The executive agencies, rather than the party, are in a more influential position in the Committee's decision-making process.

4. SPATIAL TEST OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS OF THE SIX COMMITTEES

4.1. Outcome of Spatial Test

The different characteristics of Fenno's six committees in terms of committee member's goal and each committee's environmental constraints (institutional and/or policy coalitions) are presented in Table 1. A summary table of the spatial statistics including the level of homogeneity and polarity of each committee is presented in Table 2. Finally, spatial configurations of each committee are presented in Figure.1.

Table 1. Committee Characteristics

	PC	I	E	FA	W	AP
Member's goal	Reelection	Reelection	Good public policy	Good public policy	House influence	House influence
Environmental constraints: institutional environment and/or policy coalition	Clientele Group	Clientele Group	Party	Executive	House; executive-plus-party	House; executive

PC: the Post Office and Civil Service Committee
 I: the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee
 E: the Education and Labor Committee
 FA: the Foreign Affairs Committee
 W: the Ways and Means Committee
 AP: the Appropriations Committee


Table 2. Summary Table of Spatial Statistics

Committee	XC	XCD	XCR	Degree of homogeneity	Degree of polarity ¹²
The Post Office and Civil Service Committee	.077	-.158	.288	.25	.446
The Interior and Insular Affairs Committee	.112	-.257	.288	.19	.539
The Education and Labor Committee	-.263	-.398	.3125	0	.7105
The Foreign Affairs Committee	-.121	-.355	.155	.24	.510
The Ways and Means Committee	-.08	-.281	.371	0	.652
The Appropriations Committee	.0845	-.161	.377	.16	.538


Figure 1. Spatial Configurations of the Six Committees

¹² I take the distance between the median of the Democratic contingents and that of the Republican contingents in the committee as a measure of polarity.


The Post Office and Civil Service Committee




The Interior and Insular Affairs Committee




The Education and Labor Committee



The Foreign Affairs Committee



The Ways and Means Committee



The Appropriations Committee



XC: the committee median

XCD: the median of the Democratic contingents in the committee

XCR: the median of the Republican contingents in the committee

Before analyzing the spatial test outcome in the next subsection, some remarks are in order with respect to the method to measure the homogeneity(or heterogeneity) of each committee. There are a couple of ways of measuring the level of homogeneity of committee composition. On testing the level of committee homogeneity, Krehbiel says that "to test whether committees are significantly more homogeneous than the House, a median-based approximation is obtained by ascertaining whether, for any given committee, its Democratic and Republican median members are both on the same side of the House median. When this condition holds, the committee is said to be homogeneous since majorities of committee members of both parties have ratings that exceed those of a majority of the House....When this condition does not hold, the committee is said to be heterogeneous since committee members' preferences are sufficiently different from one

another that a committee majority of only one party has ratings that exceed those of a majority of the House" (Krehbiel 1992: 127). Given the House median of .033 and the committee medians presented in Table 2, all the committees I selected are "heterogeneous" if I faithfully follow Krehbiel's method.

Given the fact that Krehbiel's method of measuring the homogeneity of committees is to see if the committees are homogeneous or heterogeneous on the basis of the committee composition around the House median, all the committees I selected can be categorized as heterogeneous, since the medians of Democratic and Republican contingents in each committee are separated with the House median in the middle between them. Although all the committees I selected are heterogeneous in Krehbiel's terms, there is still variance in the degree of heterogeneity of each committee. All I am interested in is not to see whether a committee is categorically homogeneous and heterogeneous, but to see the relative degree of homogeneity and heterogeneity of each committee. Therefore, rather than focusing on whether each committee is categorically heterogeneous or homogeneous as Krehbiel did, I will utilize a different approach on measuring the degree of homogeneity and heterogeneity of each committee.

One such measure is to see the portion of the members in each committee between the most liberal Republicans and the most conservative Democrats. I argue that as this portion increases, the members of Democratic and Republican parties interpenetrate into each other and the committee is more homogeneous. This portion normalized to committee size is as follows: 6/24 \cong 25% (the Post Office and Civil Service Committee), 6/31 \cong 19.4% (the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee), 0/31 \cong 0% (the Education and Labor Committee), 8/33 \cong 24% (the Foreign Affairs Committee), 0/25 \cong 0% (the Ways and Means Committee), 8/50 \cong 16% (the Appropriations Committee). This result makes a clear distinction between the degrees of homogeneity of committees as in the case of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee on the one hand and the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means Committee on the other hand.

4.2. Analysis of the Outcome

After all the important committee statistics are taken into consideration, the six committees show differentiated characteristics in terms of polarity and homogeneity. The spatial configuration of each committee generally fits Fenno's description of the environmental constraints of each committee.

Among other committees, the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means committee, which I regard as partisan committees relying on Fenno's observation on the environmental constraints of the two committees, also show the levels of homogeneity and polarization we can expect of partisan committees. The Education and Labor Committee is most heterogeneous and most polarized among the six committees. The degree of homogeneity of the Committee (= 0) is lowest; the difference between the medians of the Democratic contingents and Republican contingents in the Committee (= .7105) is largest. The Ways and Means Committee is also most heterogeneous and polarized; the degree of homogeneity of the Committee (= 0) is lowest; the difference between the medians of the Democratic contingents and Republican contingents in the

Committee (= .652) is second large.

On the other hand, the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee are the most homogeneous committees, a fact that also strengthens Fenno's description on the environmental constraints of the two committees. The degree of homogeneity of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee (= .25) is highest; the difference between the medians of the Democratic contingents and Republican contingents in the Committee (= .446) is lowest. The degree of homogeneity of the Foreign Affairs Committee (= .24) is second high; the difference between the medians of the Democratic contingents and Republican contingents in the Committee (= .510) is second small. Viewed in light of the spatial information, the Post Office and Civil Service Committee fits Fenno's description in that it is less prone to internal polarity, showing the highest degree of homogeneity. Fenno's observation also works with the case of the Foreign Affairs Committee. According to the spatial configuration, the Committee is not a partisan committee, but a relatively homogeneous one legitimating the foreign policy of the executive branch in the spirit of bipartisanship.

Between the dyad of the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means Committee and that of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee lie the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and the Appropriations Committee. Although the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee belongs to reelection-oriented committees along with the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, Fenno notes the difference in the nature and composition of the clientele groups of the two committees. While the clientele groups of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee are relatively monolithic, those of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee are less monolithic, less circumscribing and more prone to conflict due to their pluralistic nature.

Reflecting Fenno's description of the environmental constraints of the two committees, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee is less homogeneous than the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, but more homogeneous than the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means Committee. The degree of homogeneity of the Committee (= .19) lies between that of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and those of the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means Committee; the difference between the medians of the Democratic contingents and Republican contingents in the Committee (= .539) is higher than that of the Post Office and the Civil Service Committee but lower than those of the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means Committee.

On the other hand, the case of the Appropriations Committee does not need much explanation. As a committee constrained by the House and the executive, its degree of homogeneity and the difference between the medians of the Democratic contingents and Republican contingents in the Committee are roughly in the middle and as expected. Its degree of homogeneity (= .16) is higher than the partisan committees such as the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means Committee, but lower than the reelection-oriented committees (the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee) and the bipartisan Foreign Affairs Committee. The difference between the medians of the Democratic contingents and of the Republican contingents in the Committee (= .538) is smaller than those of the two partisan committees, but larger than that of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and than that of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and almost equal to that of the Interior

and Insular Affairs Committee.

5. CONCLUSION

Given the information provided in sections 3 and 4, we can conclude that Fenno's observation on the environmental constraints of the six committees is generally supported by the spatial test. The committees under the constraints of parties, such as the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means Committee, are most heterogeneous and polarized in spatial terms. On the other hand, the bipartisan Foreign Affairs Committee and the non-divisive Post Office and Civil Service Committee show the highest degree of homogeneity and the least level of polarity. The other two committees, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and the Appropriations Committee, lie in between.

While Fenno's description of the environmental constraints of the six committees is well captured in the spatial configurations, we should not forget his *Congressmen in Committees* is time-bound. That is, his research was conducted during the late 1950s and the 1960s, a year before the House reform of the mid-1970s and about three decades before the Republican capture of Congress in 1994. One of the committees he investigated, the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, is now gone; other committees were renamed and experienced significant changes in nature. The Foreign Affairs Committee, for example, had changed into a partisan committee during the Reagan Presidency (McCormick 1993: 136). Again, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee became more and more prone to internal conflict due to the upsurge of environmentalism.

Given these changes, further research in order is to test again Fenno's observation on the environmental constraints of various committees and to see if there are any significant changes in the nature of the external conditions. There should be some changes. And, if we can, an additional spatial test together with an interview method and qualitative analysis is to be executed in order to have a deeper understanding of the environmental constraints of various committees and of the influence of these constraints on the makeup of the committees' spatial configurations.

APPENDIX
(NOMINATE SCORES)

In this article, I used NOMINATE (Nominal Three-step Estimation) score developed by Poole and Rosenthal to test Fenno's argument on the six committees. The score is not a policy-specific data, but a data measuring the liberalness (or conservativeness) of a member based on all the roll calls in each House (In this article I used the data on the 87th House(1961-1962)). The NOMINATE score taps the degree to which a member of the House is liberal or conservative. The smaller the number is, the more liberal a member is. The liberal/conservative scale generated by NOMINATE is bounded between -1 and 1. If a member's NOMINATE score is -1, s/he is perfectly liberal, while, if a member's NOMINATE score is 1, s/he is perfectly conservative. The primary reason for using NOMINATE score in this article is that the score fits my research purpose, which is to describe the characteristics of the six committees through an inter-committee comparison of the various policy positions of each committee. With policy specific data, it is impossible to compare the preferences of various actors across the committees. In addition, according to Poole and Rosenthal's test, the liberal-conservative dimension, which is NOMINATE score is all about, covers about 80 % of all other dimensions. This performance is not complete, but good enough.

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