Effects of Information Provision on Responses to Opinion Polls on the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement*

Jin Park** and Jong Hun Chae***

Abstract: Two deliberative polls on the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement were conducted in 2006 and 2007. In both experiments, the respondents become more negative toward the agreement after acquiring additional information provided by a panel discussion and a question-and-answer session. In particular, approval for the expected benefits of the agreement dropped significantly, while perception of its costs remained relatively stable. This experiment shows that public support for the agreement may be vulnerable to counterargument. In spite of the current majority support, the government should step up its efforts to convince the public of the benefits of the agreement in a more tangible way.

Keywords: Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), deliberative poll, public opinion.

* This research is based on data from polls on the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement organized by the Center for Conflict Resolution and Negotiation at KDI School of Public Policy and Management in July 2006 and June 2007. The coauthors are deeply grateful for the very helpful comments from anonymous reviewers.

** Jin Park is a Professor at KDI School of Public Policy and Management. He served as a Director for Administrative Reform under the Ministry of Planning and Budget during 1998~2001. He joined Korea Development Institute (KDI) in 1992 after earning his Ph.D. in economics from Univ. of Pennsylvania. His academic interest covers government reform and public conflict resolution. Email: jinpark@kdischool.ac.kr

*** Jong-Hun Chae is an Associate Research Fellow in the Collaboration and Conflict Management Research Center, The Korea Institute of Public Administration (KIPA). He received his Ph.D. in public administration at Sungkyunkwan Univ. in 2007. His research interest includes conflict management, social network, and governance and the role of government. Email: chae@kipa.re.kr

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INTRODUCTION

The Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) was signed on April 2, 2007, and awaits ratification by the legislatures of Korea and the United States. Each government will have to convince elected representatives and the general public of the importance of the FTA. Among Koreans, supporters and opponents were about evenly matched in 2006, but after 2007, supporters began to outnumber opponents, as the following table shows.

Table 1. Opinions on the KORUS FTA in Korea

Date of survey	Organizations	Respondents	Sample size	For	Against
July 2006	MBC	General public	1,000	42.6%	45.4%
July 2006	KBS	General public	1,000	—	52.0%
October 2006	Dong-A Ilbo	General public	1,003	45.1%	41.1%
October 2006	MBC	General public	1,000	48.8%	42.3%
February 2007	SBS	General public	10,000	50.6%	43.0%
25 March 2007	Chosun Ilbo	Lawmakers	204	55.4%	16.2%
3 April 2007	SBS	General public	—	52.6%	34.9%
3 April 2007	KBS	General public	—	51.2%	42.3%
3 April 2007	MBC	General public	—	48.0%	35.0%
6 April 2007	Hankuk Ilbo	General public	1,004	42.4%	29.7%
17 April 2007	KITA	Economists	100	87.0%	11.0%

Note: MBC, KBS, and SBS are Korea's three major television companies. Dong-A Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo, and Hankuk Ilbo are Korea's major newspapers. KITA is the Korea International Trade Association.

Given the complicated arguments about the benefits and costs of the KORUS FTA, opinion polls targeting the general public cannot penetrate deeper than the respondents' surface attitudes. It is doubtful whether most members of the public had enough information on the KORUS FTA to make an educated response. How will poll results change if respondents are provided with full information?

In order to answer this question, coauthors conducted polls on the KORUS FTA in 2006 and 2007, asking the same survey questions before and after providing information during four hours of debate and question-and-answer sessions. This paper analyzes the results of those two experiments. How did participants change their opinions after being exposed to more information? Were there any statistical differences between the 2006 and the 2007 experiments? Which factors were most influential in forming attitudes toward the KORUS FTA? The answers will be useful for any country considering a controversial free trade agreement.

RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

This paper is based on the concept of deliberative polls, in which respondents answer questions both before and after a process of information provision and deliberation. They are compared with general opinion polls in the table below.

Table 2. General opinion polls and deliberative polls

	General opinion polls	Deliberative polls
Purpose	Obtain respondents' aggregate opinions of the subject.	Obtain fully informed responses. Examine opinions before and after providing information.
Methods	Use telephone, mail, and websites. Invite passive participation.	Generally use an on-site survey. Invite active participation through a panel debate, question-and-answer session, and discussion.
Benefits	Make large sample size possible.	Gather educated opinions.
Drawbacks	Gather only superficial opinions.	Are costly and time-consuming.

The first step of a deliberative poll is just like the other ordinary polls: A sample group answers survey questions based on their superficial impressions. During the second stage, however, the sample group is offered four sources of information: written material, explanation and debate by expert panels, a question-and-answer session, and discussion within the sample group.¹ Then in the third stage, the same survey questions are asked to the same sample group, now better informed, to identify any change in opinion caused by the information provision.

The polls given for this study were similar in format to deliberative polls but had two limitations. First, the sample group consisted entirely of only students and thus was not a statistically controlled representation of the Korean population. Second and more important, given time and space constraints, group discussion among the respondents was omitted. Coauthors instead facilitated an active discussion among expert panels and a lively question-and-answer session. Due to these two limitations, the polls were not fully deliberative. However, they can still serve the purpose of investigating changes of opinion before and after information provision.

The most important difference between the 2006 and 2007 polls is that the latter

1. For more effective deliberation, participants are divided into teams, generally consisting of six to ten members, preferably led by a trained moderator.

Figure 1. Elements of a Deliberative Poll

* The study described in this paper differed from a standard deliberative poll in that it did not use statistically controlled respondents or group discussions.

was conducted after the KORUS FTA agreement was signed in April 2007.

In this respect, the research framework of this paper is similar to the Attitude Change Model proposed by Hovland et al. (1953) and Hovland and Janis (1959). In this model, attitude includes opinion, perception, affect, and action. The information provision stage in the previous figure is divided into two sections in this model, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Hovland's Attitude-change Model

* Modified from Hovland and Janis 1959.

The coauthors tried to control the process as follows. First, we tried to control the credibility and persuasiveness of the expert panels by keeping a balance between supporters and opponents of KORUS FTA,² offering equal discussion time for each expert, and alternating the order of discussion. Second, the survey questions were balanced, with seven questions each on costs and benefits. Third, in order to maximize two-way communication, we facilitated question-and-answer sessions between the respondents and the expert panel. Fourth, we selected only students because the topic

2. In the 2006 poll, a director-general in charge of KORUS FTA at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and a professor of economics spoke in favor of the KORUS FTA, while a professor of international relations and a former economic advisor to the president spoke against it. In the 2007 poll, the speakers were a professor in favor of the FTA and a lawmaker opposed to it.

required respondents' intellectual receptiveness. However, this sample group may create a bias in the result, as will be explained in the conclusion. Finally, coauthors tried to understand the internal mediating process of participants through telephone interviews after the debate.

Table 3. Comparison of the Two Experiments

	2006	2007
Time and date	14:00-18:00, 4 July 2006	14:00-18:00, 23 June 2007
Venue	KAIST Auditorium, Seoul	KAIST Auditorium, Seoul
Point in time	After the first round of FTA negotiations	After the first additional round of negotiations after the final agreement
Type of respondents	Undergraduate and graduate students in various universities in Seoul	Undergraduate and graduate students in various universities in Seoul
Number of respondents	177	135*
Expert panelists	Four	Two

* Of these 135 students, 30 also participated in the 2006 poll.

The survey questions were divided into five categories as shown in the following table: general level of understanding, expected costs of the agreement, its expected benefits, the negotiation process, and an overall assessment.

Table 4. Survey Questions in the Deliberative Polls on the KORUS FTA

Category	Do you agree with the following statements? (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, don't know)
I. Level of understanding	1. How well do you know the KORUS FTA?
	2. How interested are you in the KORUS FTA negotiations?
II. Expected costs	1. Dependency on the U.S. economy will increase.
	2. Most industries will suffer, and only a few industries will benefit.
	3. Small and medium-sized companies will suffer.
	4. Overall employment will be reduced.
	5. The agriculture sector will suffer.
	6. The service industry will suffer.
	7. Polarization in income levels will become more serious.

Category	Do you agree with the following statements? (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, don't know)	
III. Expected benefits	1. Consumers will benefit from lower prices and more choices.	
	2. The competitiveness of the service industry will be enhanced.	
	3. Korea's economic and social systems and practices will move closer to global standards.	
	4. The country rating of Korea will be elevated.	
	5. Korea's national security will be strengthened by a reinforced alliance with the United States.	
	6. Foreign direct investments will be facilitated.	
	7. Korea will become more advanced thanks to more rapid growth.	
IV. Negotiation process	1. It is a problem that Korea accepted four preconditions before the FTA negotiations.	
	2. There was no effort at consensus-building among the public.	
	3. The negotiation process was not transparent.	
	4. The government is too optimistic about the results of the FTA.	
	5. Negotiations tend to be dominated by the United States.	
	6. There is no channel for gathering voices of losing sectors.	
	7. There is no discussion on compensation for damages incurred by losing sectors.	
V. Overall assessment	1. The KORUS FTA is good for the overall national interest despite some costs.	
	2. The KORUS FTA is driven by political considerations, not national interest.	
	3. It is good to conclude the agreement as early as possible.	
	4. The National Assembly should ratify the agreement.*	

* This question was asked only in the 2007 poll.

PRIOR DELIBERATIVE POLLING STUDIES

Since James Fishkin originated the concept of deliberative polling in 1988, the fields of public administration and political science have produced ample research outputs. Bradburn (1998) showed the features of the deliberative poll that made differences in public opinion before and after the deliberative process. He emphasized that the deliberative poll is suitable for issues to which the public has not yet been exposed. Hansen (1999) studied four deliberative polls in Norway and Denmark, and suggested thirteen points of interest. Luskin et al. (2002) analyzed a deliberative poll on anticrime measures in the United Kingdom. Fishkin (2004) summarized the results of deliberative polling during 1994-2002, and Elliott (2005) produced a practical manual.

Sturgis (2003) argued that informed public opinion has a strong influence on the expressed preference. Based on five deliberative polls in the United Kingdom, Sturgis

et al. (2005, 30) investigated "the impact of political information and deliberation on attitude constraint." Conover and Searing (2005) suggested that everyday political talk is an important part of the deliberative system. Based on a 2000 deliberative poll in Denmark, Hansen and Anderson (2004) analyzed how deliberative democracy can work in reality. Goodin and Dryzek (2006) proposed deliberative innovation, and Fishkin (2006) advocated deliberative polling by showing how public opinion turns into a policy.

In Korea, relevant studies have flourished in recent years. Based on experiences in other countries, Kim (2003) highlighted the need for deliberative polling in Korea. Nam (2005) suggested the use of a deliberative poll in convincing citizens of tap water safety in Seoul. Bae and Park (2006) emphasized the importance of deliberation as a means to resolve conflicts. Kim (2006) introduced some deliberative polls in Korea and highlighted success factors and improvements to be made. Cho et al. (2006) analyzed the deliberation process and proposed a Korean model for deliberative polling. Through a theoretical and empirical analysis, Cho and Cho (2007) provided defending arguments for the deliberative poll. Oh (2007) pointed out the limitations of conventional ways of deliberation and suggested more effective means to provide information.

The deliberative poll is not just a research topic, but has been widely used for policy-making in countries such as the United Kingdom,³ Australia,⁴ Denmark,⁵ and the United States.⁶ In Korea, the Ministry of Finance and Economy conducted a delibera-

3. A deliberative poll was conducted in the United Kingdom (UK) in 1995 to gather public opinion on the country's entry into the European Union (EU). The results showed that people became more positive about EU membership after deliberative polling. Initially, 45 percent thought that the EU membership would be in the UK's national interest; this number increased to 60 percent after the debate. Regarding the concern that "with a single currency, Britain would lose control of its own economic policy," there was a 12 percent point drop from 62 percent to 50 percent after information provision. For a detailed description, refer to Fishkin (2004).

4. Australia held a deliberative poll in 1999 regarding how the president should be elected. Across the nation, 347 ballot holders were chosen at random and were surveyed before and after a three-day debate. The proportion of those in favor of appointment by the Parliament jumped from 21 to 61 percent, while that of those backing the direct voting system dropped from 50 to 19 percent. The popularity of constitutional monarchy also dropped, from 26 percent to 15 percent, after the debate.

5. In August 2000, Denmark held a deliberative poll on joining the Euro scheme with 364 respondents. A five-hour debate on the issue was broadcast nationwide. Consequently, the number of people who said "yes" to Euro rose from 45 percent to 51 percent; but at the same time, the number of people who said "no" increased from 36 percent to 40 percent. Those who responded "I don't know" decreased from 19 percent to 10 percent.

tive poll on its real estate policy announced 31 August, 2006,⁷ which was benchmarked by the deliberative poll on Busan's North Port Redevelopment Plan in May 2007.⁸ A poll on genetically modified organisms conducted by the Korea Food Industry Association also followed the guidelines of the deliberative poll.⁹

This study is unique in that it is based on polls conducted twice that produced remarkably similar results. It can provide an interesting panel study, since 30 participants of the 2007 poll also participated in the 2006 poll. This study also tried to discover the most important factor in determining the overall attitude towards the KORUS FTA, which will provide important lessons for policy-makers.

6. In August 2003 in the United States, the Nebraska Public Power District carried out a deliberative poll on the development of alternative energy. A total of 109 people were surveyed by telephone and then were asked to sit in an eight-hour debate, participate in a discussion group of 13-15 people, and attend a question-and-answer session with experts. The survey showed that after the debate, more people supported the development of methane and coal while fewer favored wind energy, natural gas, solar, and nuclear energy, or answered "I don't know."
7. The initial survey was done over the telephone. Fifty of those who expressed interest in participating in a debate were selected according to their opinion, sex, and age. They engaged in both small- and large-group debates. The remaining 450 were asked to watch the debate among the experts online or were given a videotape of the debate. The second poll involved all 500 participants and the same set of survey questions as before. The study found that of the four main agendas of the real estate policy-transaction transparency, curbing real estate speculation, increasing the supply of medium- to large-sized apartments, and putting greater emphasis on the housing supply-those who placed importance on transaction transparency grew from 10.6 percent to 27.7 percent after the provision of information.
8. The first-round survey asked 1,000 people whether they preferred ocean-centered development or commercially driven development, and then 100 participants were selected for a deliberation process, which was broadcast to 900 nonparticipating respondents before the second-round survey. The first option was preferred in both surveys, with support growing by 2.6 percent after the deliberation process.
9. The deliberative poll was conducted in September 2008 with 100 participants, statistically selected from 1,518 respondents who answered the first-round telephone survey. The result showed somewhat contrasting changes of views after information provision. The participants became a bit more concerned about the safety of genetically modified organism, but their willingness to purchase them increased.

ANALYSIS OF THE POLLS

The 2006 Poll

In the 2006 poll, after the debate, the level of awareness of the KORUS FTA rose from 55.9 percent to 66.1 percent, and the level of interest increased from 83.0 percent to 96.0 percent, which shows that the debate was effective in providing information to the respondents. However, they became more pessimistic about the KORUS FTA after the debate. The number of those who agreed or strongly agreed with the seven statements about the expected cost of the KORUS FTA jumped by 10.4 percentage points, while the number agreeing with the statements about expected benefits dropped by 16.4 percentage points.

Table 5. Results of the 2006 Poll

		Understanding/ Interest		Costs	Benefits	Negotiation Process	Overall		
		I-1	I-2	II	III	IV	V-1	V-2	V-3
Before	Yes	55.9%	87.0%	59.2%	67.6%	82.4%	65.5%	40.1%	30.5%
	No	42.9%	11.9%	33.9%	24.2%	11.5%	23.2%	48.6%	58.8%
After	Yes	66.1%	96.0%	69.6%	51.2%	83.9%	41.2%	52.5%	23.7%
	No	33.9%	4.0%	26.6%	42.8%	12.4%	46.3%	32.3%	68.9%

Yes: agree or strongly agree. No: disagree or strongly disagree.

Respondents become less favorable toward the KORUS FTA after the debate in most of the questions (see Appendix 1). There were six questions for which respondents' attitudes became more favorable, but not to a statistically significant degree. In six out of seven cost-related questions, the respondents' "agree" and "strongly agree" answers rose significantly after the debate. In four benefit-related items, affirmative answers significantly dropped. In three process-related questions, the respondents became more sympathetic to arguments that the negotiation process was problematic. Accordingly, the number of participants who answered that "the KORUS FTA is still in the overall interest of the country despite some costs" also fell by 24.3 percentage points. In all, the four-hour debate influenced respondents to form a more negative view toward the KORUS FTA, especially in the benefit category.

The 2007 Poll

The results of the 2007 poll were not much different from those of the previous year. The debate induced respondents to take on a more negative view toward the KORUS FTA. The number of those who expressed concern over the expected costs grew from 63.5 percent to 69.4 percent, while the number of those who agreed about the expected benefits decreased from 68.5 percent to 51.6 percent after the debate. Positive answers to the question regarding the national interest in the overall assessment category also fell from 63.0 percent to 49.6 percent. Respondents also expressed more negative opinions about the newly added question on ratification by the National Assembly.

Table 6. Results of the 2007 Poll

		Understanding/ Interest		Costs	Benefits	Negotiation Process	Overall			
		I-1	I-2	II	III	IV	V-1	V-2	V-3	V-4
Before	Yes	56.3%	80.0%	63.5%	68.5%	84.7%	63.0%	54.8%	45.2%	57.0%
	No	43.7%	20.0%	33.0%	25.8%	11.7%	28.1%	35.6%	40.0%	16.3%
After	Yes	62.2%	80.7%	69.4%	51.6%	86.0%	49.6%	60.7%	31.1%	42.2%
	No	30.4%	11.1%	27.6%	43.2%	12.3%	43.0%	33.3%	62.2%	34.8%

Two cost items, five benefit items, and three negotiation-process items showed statistically significant changes, all in a negative direction toward the KORUS FTA. The result shows that a negative view had grown dramatically, especially in the benefit category (see Appendix 2).

Comparison of the 2006 and 2007 Polls

There was no statistical difference between the responses to the two polls. Out of 26 survey questions, there were only three in which the respondents of 2006 and 2007 had different views before the debate.

There was also no difference in the direction of opinion changes after the debate, but the extent of change was generally smaller in 2007. After the debate, the levels of awareness and interest rose in both polls but significantly less so in the 2007 poll. It appears that the respondents had become much more exposed to the issues surrounding the KORUS FTA over the course of one year, making the impact of the debate on them less influential. Concerns about costs grew in both polls but less so in 2007;

belief in benefits fell by almost the same amount in both polls. Also in both polls, opinions on benefits fluctuated significantly more than opinions on costs.

Before the debate in both polls, the respondents agreed on the benefits of the KORUS FTA more than the costs, but after the debate, their opinions reversed, mainly because their agreement on the benefits was significantly lowered, dropping by more than 16 percentage points in both polls from a high of around 68 percent before the debate. The positive view on the benefits turns out to be very vulnerable to attack by opponents. This indicates that the government needs to provide a more convincing argument about the benefit of the KORUS FTA.

Table 7. "Yes" Responses Before and After the Debate

	Understanding/ Interest		Costs	Benefits	Negotiation Process	Overall			
	I-1	I-2	II	III	IV	V-1	V-2	V-3	V-4
2006	10.2%	9.0%	10.4%	-16.5%	1.5%	-24.3%	12.4%	-6.8%	-
2007	5.9%	0.7%	5.9%	-16.8%	1.4%	-13.3%	5.9%	-14.1%	-14.8%

Note: "Yes" includes "agree" and "strongly agree."

Panel Analysis

A panel study of 30 people who participated in both polls may show a change in their opinions during the year. These respondents were statistically identical to the 2007 respondents except for the level of awareness and interest in the KORUS FTA. It is quite logical that those who also participated in the 2006 poll demonstrated a higher level of awareness and interest regarding the KORUS FTA in the 2007 poll.

Table 8. Changes in 30 People's "Yes" Opinion from 2006 to 2007

	Understanding/ Interest		Costs	Benefits	Negotiation Process	Overall			
	I-1	I-2	II	III	IV	V-1	V-2	V-3	V-4
(A) 2006 after debate	70.0%	93.3%	74.8%	46.7%	85.7%	33.3%	63.3%	16.7%	-
(B) 2007 before debate	86.7%	96.7%	62.9%	63.3%	68.6%	60.0%	56.7%	33.3%	53.3%
Change (B-A)	16.7%P	3.4%P	-11.9%P	16.6%P	-17.1%P	26.7%P	-6.6%P	16.6%P	-

Note: "Yes" includes "agree" and "strongly agree."

Table 9. Key Questions in the Four Surveys

Questions	B	Std. error	Beta	t	Sig.	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
2006 before the debate									
I-1	0.525	0.111	0.298	4.744	0.000	0.342	0.273	0.841	1.189
II-14	0.287	0.065	0.288	4.440	0.000	0.322	0.256	0.787	1.270
II-13	0.260	0.076	0.216	3.413	0.001	0.253	0.196	0.828	1.207
II-10	0.167	0.070	0.161	2.377	0.019	0.179	0.137	0.723	1.383
III-2	-0.269	0.098	-0.167	-2.750	0.007	-0.206	-0.158	0.902	1.108
II-2	-0.196	0.068	-0.170	-2.859	0.005	-0.214	-0.165	0.938	1.066
2006 after the debate									
II-9	0.360	0.078	0.325	4.597	0.000	0.333	0.263	0.656	1.524
II-10	0.180	0.077	0.152	2.329	0.021	0.176	0.133	0.775	1.290
II-14	0.158	0.069	0.146	2.298	0.023	0.174	0.132	0.817	1.224
II-11	0.162	0.076	0.139	2.142	0.034	0.163	0.123	0.784	1.276
II-7	-0.270	0.066	-0.243	-4.067	0.000	-0.299	-0.233	0.918	1.089
2007 before the debate									
II-2	-0.465	0.081	-0.359	-5.768	0.000	-0.453	-0.355	0.974	1.027
II-13	0.363	0.076	0.317	4.793	0.000	0.389	0.295	0.867	1.153
II-14	0.279	0.072	0.251	3.878	0.000	0.323	0.239	0.902	1.108
2007 after the debate									
II-14	0.402	0.080	0.381	5.046	0.000	0.420	0.359	0.889	1.125
III-4	-0.340	0.110	-0.221	-3.091	0.002	-0.273	-0.220	0.987	1.014
II-4	-0.209	0.074	-0.203	-2.811	0.006	-0.250	-0.200	0.966	1.035

The following table compares the 30 people's responses after the debate in 2006 and before the debate in 2007, and the panel analysis shows that they become more favorable to the KORUS FTA during the year.

In 8 out of 26 questions, the 30 respondents showed a significant increase in their positive view of the KORUS FTA during the year, and most of the changes were in the benefit category (see Appendix 3). Their agreement on the potential benefits of the KORUS FTA plummeted after the 2006 debate, was restored during the year, and dropped again after the 2007 debate.

There are two possible interpretations for the more positive views of the FTA a year after the initial poll. First, exposure to press coverage for a year, especially after the agreement of April 2007, may have played an important role. Another possible explanation is that changes in views based on participation in the four-hour debate

may have been transient. Regardless of the interpretation, it is clear that perceptions of benefits have been more easily changeable than perceptions of costs.

Factors Shaping Opinions

To find out what is the most important question that shapes the overall assessment of the KORUS FTA, coauthors conducted a standardized regression analysis on other survey questions' impact on the national interest (V-1) regarding four times of surveys in two polls in 2006 and 2007 (see Appendix 4 for the model). As the following table shows, "entry into the advanced country group" has the high beta coefficient in all four times of survey. This suggests that to enhance people's overall approval of the KORUS FTA, the government needs to stress its expected benefits, in particular how much it will expedite Korea's entry into the league of the advanced countries.

CONCLUSION

In both 2006 and 2007 polls, the respondents become more negative toward the KORUS FTA when they acquired more information. In particular, perception of the expected benefits dropped significantly. A panel analysis for thirty people who participated in both polls showed that their approval rate in the 2007 pre-debate survey was higher than their 2006 pre-debate level, but it dropped again in the 2007 post-debate survey. The most influential factor determining respondents' overall approval rating on the KORUS FTA was how much it would expedite Korea's entry into the league of advanced countries. However, it should be noted that the effect of information provision in this paper may exaggerate the reality, since the students who participated in the survey were generally younger and more flexible in their opinions than the general public.

We interviewed the respondents by telephone in 2006 and 2007 to ask why they became more skeptical toward the KORUS FTA after the debate. Those whose views were more negative after the information provision explained that the panelists' arguments supporting the FTA were too general and vague while those of the opponents were much more specific and clear. This may be a fundamental weakness of the pro-KORUS FTA arguments. The benefits¹⁰ of FTA are universal for the country as a

10. Benefits are said to include improvement in consumer benefits, enhanced competitiveness of industries, adoption of global standards, higher country rating, growth of foreign direct investment, improved national security, and earlier entry into the group of advanced countries.

whole, and also hard to quantify. On the other hand, the potential negative impacts of the KORUS FTA in the agriculture and service sectors are tangible and are directed to very specific groups of people. Many respondents said that the expected benefits of the KORUS FTA were just a possibility in the future while its costs were tangible and imminent. More information failed to convince the respondents of the benefits of the KORUS FTA, and many turned against it after the debate.

On the other hand, respondents whose views became more positive toward the FTA after the debate said they found the "anti" arguments too emotional and the "pro" arguments more rational and logical. But on the flip side of this observation, it may be this emotional appeal of the "anti" arguments that directly influenced the audience. The government needs to step up its efforts to highlight the positive dimensions of the KORUS FTA in a more concrete and tangible way to win people's minds.

Even after the agreement is ratified in both countries, opponents in Korea are likely to make a coalition and become stronger, which could have a significant impact on public sentiment about the implementation of the FTA. As demonstrated by the two surveys discussed in this paper, support for the FTA is vulnerable to attack by opponents. Therefore, to maintain firm support from the people, and to ensure the effective implementation of the FTA, the government needs to make an all-out effort to prove the benefits of the KORUS FTA in an easy-to-understand and tangible way, especially how the agreement can help Korea advance to the group of more developed countries. Korea's experience will serve as a benchmark to other countries who are seeking to reach or implement a controversial FTA.

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Appendix 1. Statistical Analysis of the 2006 Poll

Item of study	A. Mean (before)	B. Mean (after)	B-A	p-value
II. Expected costs				
More dependence on the U.S. economy**	2.91	3.11	0.20	0.003
Negative impact on most industries**	2.46	2.74	0.28	0.001
Negative impact on SME	2.46	2.28	-0.18	0.051
Less employment**	2.05	2.43	0.38	0.000
Negative impact on the agriculture sector*	3.44	3.59	0.16	0.020
Negative impact on service industries**	2.35	2.89	0.54	0.000
Further polarization in income levels**	2.70	3.11	0.41	0.000
III. Expected benefits				
Consumer benefits**	2.96	2.72	-0.24	0.007
Competitiveness of the service sector	2.75	2.64	-0.11	0.293
Global standards for Korea*	2.64	2.42	-0.22	0.012
Higher country rating	2.71	2.73	0.03	0.782
Security guarantee effect	2.36	2.36	0.00	1.000
Foreign direct investment**	2.97	2.27	-0.70	0.000
Entry into the advanced country group	2.29	1.92	-0.37	0.000
IV. Negotiations				
Accepting preconditions for negotiation**	2.93	3.29	0.36	0.000
Lack of consensus-building**	3.44	3.70	0.26	0.000
Closed-door negotiations	3.14	2.99	-0.15	0.119
Over-optimism**	3.11	3.33	0.22	0.005
Tendency to be driven by the United States	3.00	2.85	-0.15	0.177
No collection of opinions from the losing sectors	3.10	3.01	-0.08	0.360
No discussion of compensation	2.84	2.79	-0.06	0.618
V. Overall assessment				
Good for overall national interest**	2.53	2.17	-0.36	0.001
Politically motivated	2.20	2.31	0.10	0.371
Early conclusion of the agreement	1.97	1.83	-0.14	0.153

Strongly disagree (1 point), disagree (2 points), agree (3 points), strongly agree (4 points).

* Statistically different by significance level of 5 percent.

** Statistically different by significance level of 1 percent.

Appendix 2. Statistical Analysis of the 2007 Poll

Item of study	A. Mean (before)	B. Mean (after)	B-A	p-value
II. Expected costs				
More dependence on the U.S. economy	2.98	2.97	-0.01	0.918
Negative impact on most industries	2.68	2.80	0.11	0.194
Negative impact on SME	2.62	2.46	-0.16	0.051
Less employment**	2.16	2.49	0.33	0.001
Negative impact on the agriculture sector	3.50	3.61	0.11	0.054
Negative impact on service industries**	2.30	2.69	0.39	0.000
Further polarization in income levels	3.03	3.13	0.10	0.307
III. Expected benefits				
Consumer benefits	2.99	2.94	-0.04	0.635
Competitiveness of the service sector**	2.90	2.48	-0.41	0.000
Global standards for Korea**	2.67	2.41	-0.27	0.005
Higher country rating	2.73	2.61	-0.12	0.210
Security guarantee effect*	2.41	2.17	-0.24	0.016
Foreign direct investment**	2.94	2.51	-0.43	0.000
Entry into the advanced country group**	2.52	2.24	-0.28	0.008
IV. Negotiation process				
Accepting preconditions for negotiation*	3.07	3.27	0.21	0.011
Lack of consensus-building**	3.45	3.60	0.15	0.004
Closed-door negotiations	3.16	3.15	-0.02	0.807
Over-optimism**	3.16	3.42	0.25	0.000
Tendency to be driven by the United States	2.94	2.93	-0.01	0.860
No collection of opinions from the losing sectors	3.13	3.15	0.01	0.858
No discussion on compensation	3.02	3.06	0.04	0.666
V. Overall assessment				
Good for overall national interest*	2.58	2.37	-0.21	0.015
Politically motivated	2.49	2.65	0.16	0.078
Early conclusion of the agreement*	2.18	1.99	-0.19	0.032
National Assembly ratification*	2.21	1.93	-0.27	0.050

* Statistically different by significance level of 5 percent.

** Statistically different by significance level of 1 percent.

Appendix 3. Changes in Opinion, 2007 Poll (before debate), 2006 Poll (after debate)

Questions	Average difference*	Standard deviation	Lower	Upper	t	df	Sig.
I. Level of understanding							
Level of awareness	-0.33	0.71	-0.60	-0.07	2.57	29	0.02
Level of interest	-0.07	0.52	0.13	-0.26	-0.70	29	0.49
II. Expected costs							
More dependence on the U.S. economy	-0.17	1.09	0.24	-0.57	-0.84	29	0.41
Negative impact on most industries	-0.30	0.99	0.07	-0.67	-1.66	29	0.11
Negative impact on SME	0.00	1.05	0.39	-0.39	0.00	29	1.00
Less employment	-0.53	1.20	-0.09	-0.98	-2.44	29	0.02
Negative impact on agriculture sector	-0.17	0.83	0.14	-0.48	-1.09	29	0.28
Negative impact on service industries	-0.37	1.27	0.11	-0.84	-1.58	29	0.13
Further polarization in income levels	-0.17	0.91	0.17	-0.51	-1.00	29	0.33
III. Expected benefits							
Consumer benefits	0.57	1.22	1.02	0.11	2.54	29	0.02
Competitiveness of the service sector	0.67	1.35	1.17	0.16	2.71	29	0.01
Global standards for Korea	0.20	1.00	0.57	-0.17	1.10	29	0.28
Higher country rating	0.43	1.14	0.86	0.01	2.09	29	0.05
Security guarantee effect	0.00	1.11	0.42	-0.42	0.00	29	1.00
Foreign direct investment	0.47	1.17	0.90	0.03	2.19	29	0.04
Entry into the advanced country group	0.80	1.16	1.23	0.37	3.79	29	0.00
IV. Negotiation process							
Accepting preconditions for negotiation	-0.33	0.99	0.04	-0.70	-1.84	29	0.08
Lack of consensus-building	-0.40	0.77	-0.11	-0.69	-2.84	29	0.01
Closed-door negotiations	-0.20	0.96	0.16	-0.56	-1.14	29	0.26
Over-optimism	-0.07	1.14	0.36	-0.49	-0.32	29	0.75
Tendency to be driven by the United States	0.20	1.35	0.70	-0.30	0.81	29	0.42
No opinion collection from the losing sectors	0.23	0.97	0.60	-0.13	1.32	29	0.20
No discussion on compensation	0.27	1.53	0.84	-0.30	0.95	29	0.35
V. Overall assessment							
Good for overall national interest	0.07	1.23	0.53	-0.39	0.30	29	0.77
Politically motivated	0.23	1.17	0.67	-0.20	1.10	29	0.28

Appendix 4. The Model for Table 9

2006 before the debate

$$\hat{Y}_1 = 0.722 + 0.525 \times A_1 + 0.278 \times A_2 + 0.260 \times A_3 + 0.167 \times A_4 + (-0.269) \times A_5 + (-0.196) \times A_6$$

(A₁: I-1, A₂: II-14, A₃: II-13, A₄: II-10, A₅: III-2, A₆: II-2)

2006 after the debate

$$\hat{Y}_2 = 0.870 + 0.360 \times B_1 + 0.180 \times B_2 + 0.158 \times B_3 + 0.162 \times B_4 + (-0.270) \times B_5$$

(B₁: II-9, B₂: II-10, B₃: II-14, B₄: II-11, B₅: II-7)

2007 before the debate

$$\hat{Y}_3 = 1.665 + (-0.465) \times C_1 + 0.363 \times C_2 + 0.279 \times C_3$$

(C₁: II-2, C₂: II-13, C₃: II-14)

2007 after the debate

$$\hat{Y}_4 = 2.725 + 0.402 \times D_1 + (-0.340) \times D_2 + (-0.209) \times D_3$$

(D₁: II-14, D₂: III-4, D₃: II-4)