

# Geographic Variation in Social Capital: Media, Government Expenditure, Cultural Capital, and Social Disorganization

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**Abstract:** This paper examines and empirically tests theories of media exposure, cultural capital, government intervention, and social disorganization to predict geographic variation in social capital nationally at the county scale of analysis. Secondary data are derived from Applied Geographic Solutions Inc., the U.S. Census Bureau's Population and Housing Summary Tape Files and Census of Governments, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports. Geographic information systems, bivariate, and multivariate statistical methodologies are used. Results show that county social capital is partially formed by demographic structure, patterns of cultural engagement, government expenditure, media use, and residential settlement. Thus, social capital is made by a complex entanglement of factors with a clearly definable political and geographic logic.

**Keywords:** Social Capital, Cultural Capital, Social Disorganization, Media Use, Government Expenditure

## INTRODUCTION

*Why, beginning in the 1960s ... did the fabric of American community life begin to fray? Why are more Americans bowling alone?*

– Robert Putnam, 1995

Robert Putnam argued that the disappearance of bowling leagues in the United States signaled the weakening of a structure of social connectivity characterized by interpersonal trust, informal sociability, and norms of reciprocity. This structure of social connectivity he called social capital. Social capital is a difficult concept to measure, but Putnam believed that empirical evidence of it is found in civic behaviors

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Manuscript received November 2008; out for review December 2008; review completed January 2009; accepted February 2009.

directed toward the betterment of community. Putnam amassed data on civic engagement, social trust, group membership activities, and formal political participation. These data suggested an illness had come over American social connectedness, and Putnam speculated that it was responsible for geographic variations in crime, economic underdevelopment, government lethargy, and declining voter turnout. Putnam examined a series of factors to explain the decline in social capital—including generational succession, the pervasiveness of television and electronic entertainment, the changing nature of work and the diminution of social time, and new patterns of residential settlement. Of all factors responsible for the presumed downturn in social capital, Putnam devoted a great deal of analytic attention to television. Americans, he argued, simply watch too much television.

Television has been accused of many things with regard to American political and civic life. Minnow (1961) saw television as a vast wasteland of lowbrow entertainment. Robinson (1976) indicted television for fostering political alienation and cynicism. Postman (1985) blamed television for debasing norms of political discourse. Herman and Chomsky (1988) portrayed television as a handmaiden of the ruling class. Bennett, Rhine, Flickinger, and Bennett (1999) held television partially responsible for the erosion of citizens' trust in government and politics. Putnam's argument against television as a major culprit for declining social connectedness is in this tradition of criticism. It is a rhetorically powerful tradition of criticism, but is Putnam correct to place the lion's share of the blame on television?

Social scientists have produced numerous studies verifying the negative relationship between heavy television exposure and social capital. These studies are almost exclusively conducted at the individual unit of analysis. Such studies are generally well-crafted but fall short in two regards: (1) they misplace social capital as an individual possession, and (2) prediction models are underspecified because of a lack of intellectual engagement with related disciplines such as media studies, sociology, criminology, and political science. This study aims to overcome these shortcomings. Regarding the first shortcoming, this paper returns to the original meaning of social capital as an aggregate phenomenon, producing a national portrait of social capital at the county scale. Putnam himself devotes a chapter to the spatial dimension of social capital in *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, but his analysis is at the state level. By moving analysis to the county level, our study uncovers important sub-state variation in social capital that could lead to more effective policy responses to social problems related to weakening social connectivity. Regarding the second shortcoming, this study produces a broader model of geographic variation in social capital by assembling a novel inventory of variables on media exposure, local government direct expenditure, socioeconomic status, cultural capital, and public

order and crime.

This paper is organized as follows. First, it defines the concept of social capital. Second, it discusses theories of media exposure, cultural capital, government intervention, and social disorganization, and distills from these theories testable propositions. Third, it describes this study's methodology, detailing data sources and variable operations. Fourth, it presents results, starting with graphical analysis and ending with multivariate hypothesis testing. Finally, it revisits theories and hypotheses of social capital decline in relation to statistical findings and suggests lines of future inquiry.

## **SOCIAL CAPITAL**

Social capital is an embattled concept. Efforts to clarify its meaning are numerous (see Foley and Edwards 1999; Ostrom and Ahn 2001; Paxton 1999; Portes 1998; Putnam 2000; and Woolcock 1998). Sociologists Pierre Bourdieu (1986) and James S. Coleman (1988; 1990) are credited with originating the modern notion of social capital (Jackman & Miller 1998). Bourdieu defined social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group—which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity" (Bourdieu 1986, 249). For Bourdieu, social capital is a collective good used by individuals and groups of individuals for the accumulation of other forms of capital (for example, monetary capital and cultural capital).

Like Bourdieu, Coleman regards social capital as a collective property, embedded in social networks. Social capital is located, Coleman writes, "in the structure of relations between actors and among actors. It is not lodged ... in the actors themselves" (Coleman 1988, 98). Like Bourdieu, Coleman defined social capital by its function. Social capital is a collective good produced in "relations among persons that facilitate action" (Coleman 1988, 100). He argued that "the function identified by the concept of social capital is the value ... of social structure to actors as resources that they can use to achieve their interests" (1988, 101).

Robert Putnam (1993, 1995, and 2000) took the concept of social capital in a somewhat more altruistic direction. For Putnam, social capital "refers to the collective value of all social networks and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other ... social capital refers to features of social organizations such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (1995, 664-665). Like Bourdieu and Coleman, Putnam views social capital as a group-level phenomenon. For Putnam, social capital is a reservoir of collective good

that is anchored by trust and habits of reciprocity that decrease the transaction costs of social relationships.

Apart from commonly defining social capital as a collective phenomenon, Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam converge on the characteristic of network connectivity in their definitions of social capital. The empirical focus is on other-regarding behaviors like voluntarism, fund-raising, and organizational involvement that build social network connectivity and provide individual and collective goods. The collective and individual goods of network connectivity are numerous (see Ahn and Ostrom 2002). Social connectivity enables the flow of material and symbolic resources, improves individual access to beneficial weak ties, engenders norms of trust and reciprocity, and increases the probability of cooperative collective behavior for the resolution of social dilemmas (Smith 2002). As a collective good, social capital independently predicts variations in democratic participation, crime and juvenile delinquency, human health and life expectancy, payment of taxes, as well as educational attainment and occupational status (Putnam 2000; Paxton 1999).

As a collective good, social capital has qualities of being non-excludable and non-rival. It is non-excludable because the benefits of residing in a social capital-rich locality (such as low crime rates) are enjoyed by all persons regardless of whether or not they helped to produce it (for example, by participating in a neighborhood watch program). It produces positive externalities in which investments in social connectivity by individuals “end up unintentionally benefiting the community at large and democracy in general” (Smith 2002, 3). Social capital is non-rival because enjoyment of the benefits of social capital by an individual does not preclude the enjoyment of others (Ostrom and Ahn 2001). These collective qualities make social capital different from other, more individually centered forms of capital (for example, human capital). In Coleman’s (1988, 119) words: “A property shared by most forms of social capital that differentiates it from other forms of capital is its public good aspects.”

More recently, scholars have strayed from the group-level conception of social capital, searching for it in individual-level behaviors, attitudes, and dispositions (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Moy, Scheufele, and Holbert, 1999; Shah, 1998; Uslander, 1998). A typical methodology involves the distribution of a questionnaire asking respondents to report histories of civic engagement and group participation, as well as their levels of trust in institutions and in other people in general. The sum of these behaviors and attitudes is calculated as an individual’s possession of social capital. Individuals make social capital collectively, and locating social capital at the individual level confuses the meaning of the term. Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam clearly define social capital as a group possession, not easily reducible to the sum of its parts. Lake and Huckfeldt (1998, 581) state unequivocally that “social capital cannot be defined on the basis of

individual characteristics, or even on the basis of individual organizational memberships, because social capital is not possessed by individuals.” Placing social capital at the individual level confuses the actions and attitudes of individuals with the collective outcome of their actions and attitudes. Social capital is a collective outcome. Individual actions are important, and they contribute to the production of social capital in the aggregate, but they are not social capital in and of themselves. This ontological distinction is subtle and simple but necessary to preserve the collective character of the social capital concept.

This level-of-analysis problem in the literature probably has something to do with the availability of good data at the aggregate level for a sufficiently large number of cases. This paper overcomes the data availability problem and returns to the original meaning of the concept of social capital. It defines social capital as it was originally conceived—an aggregate phenomenon (Putnam 1995), consisting of other-regarding behaviors like volunteering, fund-raising, and public involvement that foster local connectivity, trust, and norms of reciprocity.

### **Theories and Correlates of Social Capital**

Scholars in such diverse fields as criminology, sociology, political science, communications, cultural studies, and economics have investigated the correlates of social capital. This literature offers many theories, testable propositions, and measurable concepts that can help build a broader model of social capital theory. They are presented here in four sections. First, social disorganization theory, from the fields of criminology and urban sociology, can help explain the effect of locality on rates of civic engagement and association. Second, political science and political philosophy study the role of government in facilitating or inhibiting civic vitality. Third, the fields of sociology, cultural studies, and communications investigate cultural capital as a predictor of social capital. Fourth, insights from the communications field can help explain the influence of the media in enabling or eroding social capital within delimited political-geographic areas.

### **Social Disorganization and Social Capital**

The question of social order is crucial to social scientists. In his philosophical masterpiece *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes took on the question of order. For Hobbes, humanity is delivered from the brutish state of nature (disorder) by the surrender of certain freedoms, the installation of an absolute sovereign, and the legal enforcement of contractual obligations. It is a coercive conception of order. Social disorganization

theory, in criminology and urban sociology, arrives at a different conception (Shaw and McKay 1942).

Social disorganization theorists acknowledge legal and political constraints as vital, but emphasize informal controls as the primary machinery of order. Society is ordered by norms and values, and the ability of a locality to informally supervise problematic residents (Burski and Gramsik 1993; Sampson and Groves 1989). Norms, values, and techniques of social supervision are anchored by coherently interrelated social institutions (Kornhauser 1978; Bursik 1988). In theory, these elements of order build cohesion and strengthen social ties. However, norms, values, and supervision tactics vary in their capacity to regulate public conduct and deter crime and delinquency (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). This variability in regulatory capacity has a geographic logic. Incidences of delinquency and crime cluster spatially at the local level. According to Markowitz (2003, 149), the ecology of crime and delinquency “is due to variation in the capacity of neighborhoods to constrain [their] residents from violating norms,” and this capacity to constrain residents is “a function of neighborhood cohesion, reflected by the size, density, and breadth of networks ties” and institutional coherence.

Because concepts in social disorganization theory like “neighborhood cohesion” are difficult to measure, researchers use proxies like residential instability, ethnic heterogeneity, vacancy rates, urbanization, vandalism, unemployment rates, and dilapidated housing (Markowitz 2003; Martinez, Rosenfeld, & Mares 2008). These visible signs of neighborhood disorder presumably reflect a neighborhood’s capacity to regulate behavior and appear to affect neighborhood cohesion. In terms of causal order, this study presents a recursive model in which macroeconomic conditions (e.g., urbanization, unemployment, and income) affect structural features of a locality (e.g., residential stability and vacancy rates), which affect patterns of culture (e.g., neighborhood cohesion), which lead to social disorder (e.g., crime and delinquency).

Historically, social disorganization theory suffered from lack of empirical observation of how neighborhood cohesion conditions the effects of neighborhood structure on crime rates and social disorder. This failure occurred because good data on neighborhood cohesion are not readily available (Markowitz, Bellair, Liska, and Liu 2001). More recently, researchers have overcome this problem, conducting large-scale surveys of populations in large enough samples of localities. Results from various studies indicate that neighborhood cohesion buffers structural instability and reduces incidences of crime and delinquency. Bellair (1997) examined sixty urban areas nationally and discovered that frequency of interaction among residents mediated the effects of ecological variables like community socioeconomic status on crime. Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997), in a study of 343 Chicago neighborhoods, show that neighborhood cohesion and collective efficacy among residents significantly blunt the

effects of concentrated disadvantage. Markowitz et al. (2001) investigated feedback linkages between economic structure, neighborhood culture, burglary, and fear by examining data from the British Crime Survey. By empirically linking neighborhood structure to culture, criminologists and urban sociologists have produced persuasive equations of crime variation at aggregate levels.

The concepts of social disorder and neighborhood cohesion are closely related to the notion of social capital. A small group of criminologists and urban sociologists have explicitly addressed this conceptual overlap. Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer (2001) found that social capital directly and significantly affects homicide rates, net the effect of other structural covariates and statistical adjustment for the feedback of homicide rates on social capital. In other words, neighborhoods with depleted social capital exhibit higher rates of homicide. Andrew McCulloch's (2003) analysis of British households clarifies the feedback loop between disorder and social capital. McCulloch discovered that features of community disorganization like residential instability and ethnic heterogeneity undercut features of social capital like community social connectivity. Of the reciprocity between social disorganization and social capital, McCulloch (2003, 1427) wrote: "Social disorganization and social capital may be conceived as overlapping, rather than competing explanations of the social mechanisms hypothesized to account for the effects of neighborhood structural characteristics." These studies suggest that variation in social capital is predictable by community social structure.

The social disorganization literature is replete with good concepts, variables, and logics of analysis for prediction of the geography of social capital nationally at the county scale. This study borrows social disorder measures of ethnic heterogeneity, vacancy rate, and a scale of relatively visible crimes (such as arson, disorderly conduct, and vandalism) that cluster statistically to predict levels of social capital that obtain at the county level of analysis.

**Hypothesis 1:** Local disorganization variables such as ethnic heterogeneity, vacancy rate, and visible crime will be negatively related to levels of local social capital.

## **Government Intervention and Social Capital**

Alexis de Tocqueville, in his landmark treatise *Democracy in America*, observed that Americans possessed a spirit of volunteerism. This spirit expressed itself in the formation of voluntary associations. He wrote: "Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of dispositions are forever forming associations" (de Tocqueville

1988, 515). For de Tocqueville, private associations buffer the relationship between citizen and government and ward off the twin dangers of excessive government intervention and political apathy. Voluntary associations work in this regard because they educate people in the virtues of cooperation and civic life, increase social connectivity, and anchor a society's political culture—what de Tocqueville called “habits of the heart.” In another passage, (1988, 513) he argued: “In every case, at the head of any new undertaking, where in France you would find the government or in England some territorial magnate, in the United States you are sure to find an association.” Implied in de Tocqueville's observation is a structural relationship between government and civic vitality—in countries where one finds government provision of goods and services, one finds a relative absence of private organizations that perform similar functions, and vice versa. Some social scientific evidence supports this observation.

Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001), in a cross-national investigation of the structural contexts of civic engagement, found that statism constrains associational activities. Countries with centralized government and decision-making, highly developed bureaucracies, and absolutist legacies have relatively impoverished civil societies. They wrote (2001, 823): “Polity characteristics strongly influence how people associate in different nations. Statism has a deterrent effect on involvement in associational activities that is especially strong for new social movement activities.” Curtis, Grabb, and Baer (1992) arrived at a similar conclusion in their study of voluntary association membership in more than 30 democratic countries. They discovered that “traditional corporatist” democracies (such as Austria, France, and Italy) lag behind liberal and social democratic countries (such as Canada and the United States) in terms of voluntary association activities. On the inverse relationship between civic protest and government action, Fox-Piven and Cloward (1977, 32) showed that government conciliation of grievances leads to the “demise of the protest movement, partly by transforming the movement itself, and partly by transforming the political climate which nourishes protest.” Other studies have suggested that the relationship between government intervention and civic engagement is more complicated, and in some circumstances positively related.

Putnam (1996; 2000) found that social capital and government expenditure are generally unrelated. He concluded that the effect of state size on social capital is probably negligible. In his words (Putnam 2000, 281): “Examining trends in the size of American Government over the last half century reinforces doubts about the thesis that the welfare state is responsible for our declining social capital.” Warner (1999, 383) was less agnostic, arguing that local government and public sector institutions can and do foster social capital formation through “participatory community based intermediaries.” She showed by case example that cooperative extension programs can create

positive synergy between private and public spheres, enabling vertical and horizontal social connectivity. Akkerman, Hajer, and Grin (2004) discussed a local government practice in the Netherlands called *interactive policy-making* as an example of top-down participatory democracy that builds social capital. Boix and Posner (1998, 691) also saw a positive reciprocity between government and social capital, holding that “social capital promotes good governance by shifting community tastes from particularistic interests ... to more community-oriented concerns.” Lowndes and Wilson (2001, 631) argued that “governments (particularly at the local level) shape the conditions in which voluntary associations—and social networks more generally—thrive (or do not). As well as influencing the creation of social capital, government seems likely to affect its mobilization.”

Theda Skocpol (1996, 25) took this line of argumentation to a logical end, insisting that “organized civil society in the United States has never flourished apart from active government and inclusive democratic politics.” Jason Kaufman’s (1999) study of associationalism in 19th century America empirically tested the linkage between municipal expenditure and civic engagement and found a positive relationship. Kaufman’s results strongly support the social movement perspective on associationalism “that individuals form associations to mobilize support for government appropriations in areas germane to their interests and thus increase government expenditures in those areas.” Likewise, political process theorists show that increased government expenditure positively affects civic movement activity by signaling government receptivity to redress of civic grievances (Kriesi, Koopmans, Dyvendak, and Giugni 1995).

Because the literature is somewhat divided on whether the relationship between government expenditure and social capital is positive or negative, and because no researchers before now have examined this relationship nationally at the county unit of analysis, this study cautiously suggests the following testable hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 2a:** Local government direct expenditure per capita is positively related to levels of local social capital.

**Hypothesis 2b:** Local government direct expenditure per capita is negatively related to levels of local social capital.

## **Cultural Capital and Social Capital**

The concept of cultural capital was popularized by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. He used the concept to explain how variation in cultural literacy accentuates economic class or income divisions. Bourdieu (1984) defined cultural capital as “the disposal of taste” or “consumption of specific cultural forms that mark people as

members of specific classes.” Turner (1998, 495) noted that “Bourdieu combines a Marxian theory of objective class position in relation to the means of production with a Weberian analysis of status groups (lifestyles, tastes, prestige) and politics (organized efforts to have one’s class culture dominate).” For Bourdieu, cultural capital is an individual possession and, like human capital, is acquired and exchangeable for other forms of capital (for example, money capital). As for all acquired possessions, distributions of cultural capital are structured by status hierarchies and social geography. Therefore, possession of cultural capital is partially a function of place and the cultural resources available to a person to skillfully deploy a sense of taste.

Possession of cultural capital is measurable by how closely a person approximates the governing taste of a society—what Bourdieu called the “taste of liberty and luxury.” This aesthetic of liberty and luxury favors ownership of items that signify distance from material insecurity and the *laissez-faire* use of social time. This concept of cultural capital privileges white, middle- to upper-class sensibilities that correspond roughly with structures of political stratification and power. However, this concept of cultural capital is not to be confused with pure consumption, or conceived as something that corresponds perfectly with economic class. In advanced economies, people of similar economic class can and do consume items and use social time in qualitatively different ways. For Bourdieu, cultural capital is an ability to distinguish and classify directions of human activity, and to appropriate for oneself those activities that animate a theory of life. Bourdieu distinguished between two forms of cultural capital—embodied and objectified. This distinction is analytical, not ontological—both forms are intertwined features of a human *habitus*.<sup>1</sup>

The embodied form of cultural capital is found in “long-standing dispositions of the mind and body” (Bourdieu 1986, 243). It is an aesthetic judgment reflected, among other activities, in how a person uses leisure time (for example, art appreciation, travel, and the use of services). Embodied cultural capital is acquired, though economic class inheritance partially predicts the rate at which cultural capital is accumulated. The embodied form of cultural capital is cultivated slowly. Thorstein Veblen, using different terminology, talked about the slow cultivation of this aesthetic faculty. Socially valued aesthetic judgment, Veblen (1899, chapter 4) wrote, “requires time and application, and the demands made upon [a person] in this direction ... tend to change his [or her] life of leisure into a more or less arduous application to the business of learning how to live a life of ostensible leisure in a becoming way.” Persons high in

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1. *Habitus* is defined as the “ensemble of tastes and dispositions that produce actions and practices of individuals and groups toward objects ... practices that are not immediately conscious or reflexive” (Turner and Edmunds 2002, 220).

the embodied form of cultural capital can be conceived as conspicuous consumers of time, and use this time in ways that conform to the governing taste of a society.

The objectified form of cultural capital is enacted in the consumption of material items that define one's sense of taste. In this formulation, aesthetic judgment is reflected in conspicuous consumption. Persons of high objectified cultural capital decorate their lives with consumer items and cultural artifacts that reflect what Immanuel Kant called a *pure gaze*. This pure gaze (as opposed to a naive gaze) searches the intrinsic quality of objects, picking and choosing objects for form rather than function. Bourdieu argued that the intrinsic qualities of a consumable object are hardly intrinsic at all—consumer taste is profoundly socially constructed.<sup>2</sup> Learning good taste is about learning to simultaneously conform to the taste of liberty and luxury and to negate by *symbolic violence* the consumer taste of subordinated groups.

The possession of cultural capital can affect geographic variation in social capital for two reasons, one theoretical and the other empirical. Theoretically, Bourdieu maintained that cultural capital is a socially acquired and convertible skill. Once acquired, it is a vehicle of reputability that enables a person to gain entry into public or civic spheres. Civic spheres are regulated by rules of social conduct that privilege certain cultural understandings. To obey these rules one must possess requisite levels of cultural literacy and good taste. Following from Bourdieu, and because social capital is publicly made, this paper maintains that some level of cultural capital is required to participate in the making of social capital. In this sense, cultural participation is a pathway into civic participation.

Empirically, there is some evidence to suggest a positive relationship between cultural capital and social capital (Jeannotte 2003). Keum, Devanathan, Deshpande, Nelson, and Shah (2004, 376) found that status-conscious consumers are significantly more likely to participate in civic life. They wrote: "Status-conscious consumption and

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2. Consumer behavior is shaped strongly by market science and psychographic research. Psychographic analysis involves categorizing people and markets on the basis of values, attitudes, and lifestyles. These data are used to build end-user profiles for effective marketing communication. More recently, psychographic science has merged with neurology to create (of all things) neuromarketing. With the tools of neuroscience, such as functional magnetic-resonance imaging, market scientists are probing the biological psychology of consumer choice. Imaging technologies can render real-time descriptions of brain activity, in which different areas of the brain illuminate based on blood flow. Blood flow is a clue to subconscious thought. For example, neuroscientists believe that self-concept is associated with a brain region known as the medial prefrontal cortex. Blood flow to that area, as an experimental subject is given a logo, strip of text, or message, may indicate that he or she identifies with the consumer treatment (Economist 2004).

community participation may be rooted in the dispositional characteristic of personality strength—individuals' confidence in leadership roles, their aptitude at shaping others' opinions, and their perceived impact on the definitions of taste." In this formulation, cultural capital and social capital are fastened by a shared set of personality characteristics. Jeannotte (2003, 47) clarified the linkage between forms of capital, showing that "cultural participation helps to connect individuals to the social spaces occupied by others and encourages 'buy in' to institutional rules and shared norms of behavior."

On the geographic linkage of cultural capital to social capital, less is known. The literature on economic geography shows that localities vary considerably by levels of human capital and concentrations of cultural subgroups, like bohemians, that foster regional economic growth, climates of creativity, and political participation (Florida 2002). Aggregations of cultural capital may be distributed geographically in nonrandom ways, with localities rich in cultural capital correspondingly rich in volunteerism and civic engagement.

Hypothesis 3: The level of cultural capital in a locality will be positively related to levels of local social capital.

## **Media Displacement and Social Capital**

In *Bowling Alone*, Robert Putnam boldly states:

Americans at the end of the twentieth century were watching more TV, watching it more habitually, more pervasively, and more often alone, and watching more programs that were associated specifically with civic disengagement (entertainment, as distinct from news). The onset of these trends coincided exactly with the national decline in social connectedness, and the trends were most marked among the younger generations that are distinctively disengaged. Moreover, it is precisely those Americans most marked by this dependence on televised entertainment who were most likely to have dropped out of civic and social life—who spent less time with friends, were less involved in community organizations, and were less likely to participate in public affairs. (Putnam 2000, 246)

In this formulation, television is a key reason for the erosion of social capital in America. The negative relationship between television viewing and civic engagement observed by Putnam is termed by media scholars the media displacement hypothesis. The basic logic of this hypothesis is a zero-sum relationship between television and social capital—hours spent watching television are hours lost for behaviors directed toward the betterment of community. Television takes about 40 percent of the average

American's leisure time (Robinson 1990). In effect, television crowds out other-regarding activities like participating in local meetings and attending town hall gatherings. According to Robinson and Godbey (1997), "television is the 800-pound gorilla of leisure time."

This argument is a time-based interpretation of the television displacement effect. Television also displaces people spatially. Television content is increasingly national, with the same stories, dramas, and comedies transmitted to everyone regardless of place. As television viewers are immersed in national popular culture, they are less likely to know and engage the specifics of their locality. Television atomizes localities by orienting residents to translocal phenomena.

Television is not only responsible for occupying a person's time and displacing his or her sense of locality; it also promotes distrust. Trust is an anchor of social connectedness. As levels of trust are displaced by television, the propensity to engage in civic life is undercut, as is the capacity of associational activities to engender trust. This effect is empirically observable. Heavy television viewers are more likely to see the world as a "mean or scary" place than are light viewers. This "mean world" argument from cultural theory (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, and Signorielli 1980) is based on longitudinal analyses of television content. Studies show that television content is violent with an emphasis on law and order that is out of step with reality. Heavy exposure to television cultivates an affective psychology in viewers more consistent with media accounts of reality than reality itself. The long-term societal effect of television exposure is the displacement of families and schools as primary agencies of socialization (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976).

Television effect studies are usually conducted at the individual level. This study assumes that the negative relationship between television viewing and social capital operates at the aggregate level, perhaps more strongly—based on the following logic. Social capital can be conceived as a macro-level outcome of micro-level willingness to engage in civic life. This willingness can be conceived as a collective-interest dilemma. Propensity to engage in a civic behavior for the making of a public good like social capital is a function of the perceived value of the public good to a person, the perceived increase in the probability of success if a person engages in behaviors directed toward the group, and the selective costs and benefits imposed on a person for participating in a group enterprise (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989). All things held equal, as people withdraw from civic life as a result of high television exposure, the general incentive to withdraw increases, because the probability of group success decreases and the selective costs of participation increase. This sets the possibility of a cascade of defection from civic life, amplifying in the aggregate the observed relationship between television exposure and civic engagement at the individual level.

Scholars have criticized Putnam's concept of television exposure as a predictor of social capital as too simple (Bennett 1998; Norris, 1996; Shah, 1998). Norris (1996) accurately noted that Putnam ignored television content, channel, and programming effects, as well as typologies of television viewers that condition the relationship between television exposure and civic disengagement. This author acknowledges these conditional effects, and intends to explore them in a future paper, but considers a global measure of television use to be sufficient for the current research goal.

The effect of newspaper use on social capital is less disputed. De Tocqueville said: "Newspapers make associations, and associations make newspapers." Studies have consistently found that newspaper reading is positively related to civic engagement (Hooghe 2002; McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy 1999; Putnam 1995; Shar, Kwak, and Holbert 2001). Newspapers inform people of community activities and facilitate interest in civic life (Kang and Kwak 2003). Lee, Cappella, and Southwell (2003) found that newspaper use is positively related to interpersonal and institutional trust—they function as conduits of social connectivity. Putnam went so far to claim that newspaper readership is a vital sign of community health, or a "hallmark of a successful region" (1993, 36).

**Hypothesis 4a:** The percentage of heavy television viewers in a locality is negatively related to levels of local social capital.

**Hypothesis 4b:** The percentage of heavy newspaper readers in a locality is positively related to levels of local social capital.

## METHODOLOGY

### Data Sources and Variable Operations

The dataset is a match of county records on television use, newspaper use, and indicators of social and cultural capital from Applied Geographic Solutions Inc. and Mediamark Inc., 2003; demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Population and Housing Summary Tape Files, 2000; data on local government revenue and direct expenditure from the U.S. Census Bureau's Census of Governments, 1997; and data on incidences of crime and delinquency from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports, 2002. FIPS codes and longitude-latitude coordinates were used to sort data accurately by location. Data were collected at the county level for two pragmatic reasons: (1) financial considerations—civic behavior, media, and cultural consumption data from private vendors at block group or census tract level are cost-

prohibitive; and (2) matching considerations—data for all variables included in this analysis are available at the county, metropolitan, state, or national levels. This study selected the smallest available political geographic level to approximate the effects of locality on social capital behaviors. Below is a brief discussion of secondary data sources and variables used in prediction equations.

As required by law, the U.S. Census Bureau conducts a comprehensive inventory of government finances at five-year intervals. Data are publicly available for the 1997 census and cover a range of government financial activities (including revenue, expenditure, debt, and assets). Data are presented in unadjusted dollars for the fiscal year of 1996/97. This study gathered data on local government direct expenditure per capita for 1996/97 to test the relationship between government intervention and social capital. The “general direct expenditure per capita” measure<sup>3</sup> includes all the money paid by a county government during its fiscal year, less intergovernmental expenditures, divided by the total number of people residing in the county (see table 1 for operational definitions). General direct expenditures shape civic life at the local level. They improve local school quality, infrastructure, and income security for disadvantaged populations, among other things. As discussed in the theory section, the effect of these expenditures on local civic behaviors is contested—it is not known if they enhance, crowd out, or have a neutral effect on social capital.

Criminal arrest data are derived from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports. These reports collect data from more than 16,000 law enforcement agencies at all levels of government on incidences of arson, aggravated assault, motor vehicle theft, disorderly conduct, and vandalism that are known to law enforcement agencies and committed in a definable county area.<sup>4</sup> The data collection and

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3. *General direct expenditures* comprise, but are not limited to, compensation for government employees, payments for supplies, materials, repair and maintenance services, financial assistance, subsidies, and direct cash transfers to private individuals and nongovernmental organizations not in return for goods and services nor in repayment of debt and other claims against the government, education grants, including scholarships to individuals and aid to private schools or colleges, public welfare cash assistance payments, bonuses to veterans, debt payments, outlays for construction, additions, replacements or major structural alterations to fixed works, and acquisitions of land.

4. *Arson* is defined as any willful or malicious burning or attempt to burn, with or without intent to defraud, a dwelling house, public building, motor vehicle, or aircraft, or the personal property of another. Only fires determined through investigation to have been willfully or maliciously set are classified as arson. *Aggravated assault* is an unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. *Motor vehicle theft* is the theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle. This offense category includes

**Table 1.** Variable Labels, Definitions, Directionality (+/-), and Data Sources

	Definition	+/-	Data source
<b>Cultural capital</b>			
Cultural capital scale	Cultural capital is an additive scale of county rates of product ownership, automobile purchases, shopping behaviors, live theater and dance performances attended, cleaning services used, and foreign and domestic travel. Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they engaged in such behaviors in the last 12 months. The estimated number of adults (18 and older) engaging in such behaviors was divided by the number of adults residing in the county to derive percentages for each item.	+	Applied Geographic Solutions Inc. and Media Mark Inc., 2003
<b>Government intervention</b>			
Direct expenditure per capita	General direct expenditure is all money paid out by a county government during its fiscal year, less intergovernmental expenditures, divided by the number of people residing in the county.	-/+	U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Governments, 1997
<b>Media displacement</b>			
Television use (heavy)	The number of adults (18 and older) classified as heavy television users, divided by the number of adults in the county. Heavy users are in the upper quintile nationally in terms of the number of half hours viewed in an average day between primetime periods.	-	Applied Geographic Solutions Inc. and Media Mark Inc., 2003
Newspaper use (heavy)	The number of adults classified as heavy newspaper readers, divided by the number of adults in the county. Heavy readers are in the upper quintile nationally in terms of the number of newspapers read in a 28-day period-derived from a weighted average of daily newspapers read in a week, and the number of Sunday papers read in 4 weeks.	+	Applied Geographic Solutions Inc. and Media Mark Inc., 2003

the stealing of automobiles, trucks, buses, motorcycles, motor scooters, and snowmobiles. The definition excludes the taking of a motor vehicle for temporary use by those persons having lawful access. *Vandalism* is the willful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of any public or private property, real or personal, without consent of the owner or persons having custody or control.

	Definition	+/-	Data source
<b>Social disorganization</b>			
Public crime scale	Public crime is an additive scale of county-level arrest rates for arson, aggravated assault, disorderly conduct, motor vehicle theft, and vandalism.	-	Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 2002
Vacancy rate	The number of vacant housing units in a county divided by the total number of housing units. A housing unit is vacant if no one is living in it at the time of the census interview, unless occupants are only temporarily absent. A vacant unit may be one which is entirely occupied by people who have a usual residence elsewhere. New units not yet occupied are classified as vacant if construction has reached a point where all exterior windows and doors are installed and usable floors are in place.	-	US Census Bureau, Population and Housing Files, 2000
Percent African American	The number of people identifying themselves as black, African American, Haitian, or Nigerian, divided by the number of people residing in a county area.	-	US Census Bureau, Population and Housing Files, 2000
<b>Controls</b>			
Median age	Median age is calculated by ranking the ages of all people in the population and taking the age of the person in the middle.	+	U.S. Census Bureau, Population and Housing Files, 2000
Per capita income	Per capita income is the mean income computed for every man, woman, and child in a county area. It is derived by dividing the total income of all people 15 years old and over in a county area by the total population in that area.	+	U.S. Census Bureau, Population and Housing Files, 2000
Unemployment rate	The unemployment rate represents the number of unemployed people as a percent of the labor force in a county area. The unemployed include all people 16 years old and over who had no employment during the reference week, were available for work (except for temporary illness), and had made specific efforts to find employment sometime during the 4-week period ending with the reference week.	-	U.S. Census Bureau, Population and Housing Files, 2000
Southern state	The following states are classified as southern by the U.S. Census Bureau: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Counties in southern states were assigned a score of 1, and non-southern counties were scored as 0.	-	U.S. Census Bureau, Population and Housing Files, 2000

	Definition	+/-	Data source
Percent urban population	The number of people living in an area defined as urban, divided by the number of people residing in the county. For 2000, the Census Bureau classified as urban all territory, population, and housing units located within an urbanized area (UA) or an urban cluster (UC). It delineated UA and UC boundaries to encompass densely settled territory, which consists of: core census block groups or blocks that have a population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile and surrounding census blocks that have an overall density of at least 500 people per square mile. Under certain conditions, less densely settled territory may be part of a UA or UC.	-/+	U.S. Census Bureau, Population and Housing Files, 2000
<b>Social Capital</b>			
Social capital scale	Social capital is an additive scale of three civic engagement items: addressed a public meeting; engaged in fund-raising; and actively worked as a volunteer. Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they engaged in such activities in the last 12 months. The estimated number of adults (18 years and older) engaging in such behaviors was divided by the number of adults residing in a county area to derive percentages for each item.		Applied Geographic Solutions Inc. and Media Mark Inc., 2003

measurement efforts focus on relatively visible crimes. Publicly visible crimes “unweave the social fabric” (Paras 2003) by eroding standards of civility and confidence and trust in the public sphere—the domain of civic engagement and participation in voluntary associations and formal politics. This relationship between publicly visible crime and the erosion of public space is explicitly understood by agencies of crime control and adherents of social disorganization theory and the “broken windows” theory of crime (Wilson 1982). This article’s public crime scale measure is an additive scale of county-level arrest rates ( $\alpha = 0.733$ ; see table 2 for scale construction statistics). As with other indicators of social disorganization, a negative relationship is expected between public crime and social capital at the county level.

The U.S. Constitution mandates full enumeration of the population every ten years. In theory, a census is a complete enumeration of the population. In reality, content and coverage errors creep into the process. Post-census analyses estimate that 0.96 to 1.4 percent of the population was undercounted in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2001). Minority and poor populations are disproportionately undercounted. From the U.S.

**Table 2.** Scale Constructions

Scale items	Item-total correlation	Cronbach's alpha
<b>Cultural capital scale</b>		<b>0.910</b>
Golf clothing: \$100 or more	0.633	
Tennis clothing: \$100 or more	0.716	
Household owns coffee grinder	0.881	
Household owns espresso/cappuccino maker	0.857	
Purchased or leased BMW	0.817	
Shopped at Banana Republic	0.683	
Attended dance performance	0.809	
Attended live theater	0.948	
Used professional cleaning service	0.851	
Took three or more domestic trips by plane	0.962	
Took three or more foreign trips by plane	0.962	
<b>Public crime scale</b>		<b>0.733</b>
Arson	0.672	
Aggravated assault	0.614	
Vandalism	0.688	
Motor vehicle theft	0.679	
Disorderly conduct	0.426	
<b>Social capital scale</b>		<b>0.802</b>
Addressed a public meeting	0.661	
Engaged in fund-raising	0.702	
Worked as a volunteer (nonpolitical) in the last year	0.802	

Census Bureau, the following subsets of population and housing variables were used in this study: percent African American, vacancy rate, per capita income, median age, unemployment rate, percent urban population, and southern region. Consistent with social disorganization theory, this study predicts the percent African American and vacancy rate variables to behave negatively in prediction models of local social capital. The variable of percent African American is used as a negative predictor of social capital because African Americans face considerably higher selective costs in civic participation due to institutionalized discrimination and structures of racial dominance, lower levels of human capital, and circumscribed access to political and cultural resources (Musick, Wilson, and Bynum 2000, Wilson 1987).

The variables of median age, per capita income, unemployment rate, percent urban population, and southern region are used as statistical controls in prediction models. The median age variable allows commentary on Putnam's claim that the erosion of social capital is partially explainable by a demographic effect.<sup>5</sup> Putnam argued that the

passing of a “long civic generation” is driving down the stock of social capital nationally. The problem is amplified by the replacement of this generation with less civically minded baby-boomers and genXers. According to Goss (1999, 389), older people are the “torchbearers of voluntary activity.” Therefore, this study predicts a positive relationship between median age and social capital.

Per capita income and unemployment rate variables are economic class controls in prediction models. Studies routinely show that economic well-being is positively associated with social capital at both individual and aggregate levels (Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Kang and Kwak 2003; Fedderke, de Kadt, and Luiz 1999). The effect of urbanization on social capital is more complicated. In *The Truly Disadvantaged*, Wilson (1987) argued persuasively that highly urbanized inner cities are plagued by a tangled web of social and cultural pathologies (for example, fractured families and crime) linked to the decline of manufacturing operations and job losses in the secondary sector of the labor market. These structural processes negatively affect stocks of social capital. Similarly, Robert Putnam’s (2000, 206) research suggests that social capital is highest in less urbanized areas with populations of 10,000 people or less. In contrast, political-scientific studies show that people with more education, income, and political knowledge tend to reside in urban areas. Such people generally possess economic, political, and cultural resources and skills that lower the personal costs of participation in civic affairs (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). The last statistical control in this model is whether or not a county is located in the southern census region of the United States. Putnam’s (2000) state ranking of social capital indicates that the southern region has significantly lower levels of social capital, with Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia and Alabama ranked lowest.

This study’s variables of social capital, cultural capital, television use, and newspaper use are derived from the MRI Consumer Behavior data. Consumer behavior, media exposure, lifestyle, and psychographic data on U.S. adults are collected biannually by Mediamark Inc. Adults are selected randomly from a list of more than 90 million households. Each wave consists of more than 12,000 field interviews, totaling 25,000 per year since 1979 (about 550,000 in all). Data are weighted to reflect probabilities in sampling design. Researchers at Applied Geographic Solutions Inc. have

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5. Rates of civic engagement are positively associated with age, with retirees first among age cohorts. Scholars are divided on whether this relationship is a lifecycle or period effect (as Putnam believes). Lifecycle explanations predict that as a person ages he or she becomes more invested in system stability. This induces a person to participate in system decisions because the costs of nonparticipation are potentially higher. Also, as a person reaches the age of retirement, he or she encounters lower selective costs for participation because of time and schedule flexibility.

configured MRI household records to various levels of political, administrative, and statistical scale. A Mosaic coding technology based on a cluster algorithm (iterative relocation) is used to derive geo-demographic profiles of areas. County-level estimates are assembled from surveys conducted in a probability sample of U.S. Census block groups, where block group respondents indicate whether or not they engaged in certain activities in the last twelve months. The sample block group estimates are generalized to other block groups, and then the total estimated number of participants in a particular county is divided by the total number of adult county residents to derive percentages. The underlying logic of geo-demographic segmentation is that people gravitate to localities with people of similar interests, means, and backgrounds. Evidence on residential and political segregation by race, income, employment, household size, family status, education, and religiosity support this logic (see Massey and Denton 1993). The Mosaic system is discussed more thoroughly online at [www.appliedgeographic.com](http://www.appliedgeographic.com).

This study's television use variable is measured as the total number of adults (18 years or older) classified as heavy television users, divided by the total number of adults in the county. Heavy users are in the upper quintile nationally in terms of the number of half hours viewed in an average day between primetime periods. The newspaper use variable is calculated as the total number of adults (18 years and older) classified as heavy newspaper readers, divided by the total number of adults in a county area. Heavy readers are in the upper quintile nationally in terms of the number of newspapers read. The number of newspapers read in an average 28-day period is derived from a weighted average of daily newspapers read in a week, and the number of Sunday papers read in four weeks, based on the number of newspaper issues respondents reported reading.

The cultural capital measure is an additive scale ( $\alpha = 0.937$ ) of leisure and consumption behaviors that conform to Bourdieu's definition of embodied and objectified forms of cultural capital and approximate the "taste of liberty and luxury." The scale includes items such as ownership of an espresso/cappuccino maker, attendance at live theater and dance performances, and frequency of foreign travel. Again, these behaviors privilege middle- to upper-class forms of cultural participation that facilitate civic engagement by lowering the skill-based barriers of entry into civic life. The social capital variable ( $\alpha = 0.848$ ) is an additive scale of three items—fund-raising, volunteerism, and public meeting involvement—that tap the civic participation dimension of the concept.<sup>6</sup> The validity of the civic behavior measure is corroborated by a strong

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6. The author's measure of social capital bypasses the component of social trust for two reasons, one pragmatic and the other conceptual. Pragmatically, no comprehensive data on social trust are available at the county scale. Conceptually, the tight relationship between


correlation ( $r = 0.30$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) with the number of 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations in each county, identified by the National Center for Charitable Statistics, divided by the total number of adult residents. Overall, the constructed hybrid dataset for this study contains more than 3,000 county variables.

## **Graphic and Descriptive Results**

This study produced a series of maps using ArcGIS to visually correlate geographic variation in social capital with predictors. Graph 1 is a visual model of the distribution of social capital nationally. County units are divided equally into quintiles, with darker colors reflecting higher values and lighter colors reflecting lower values. As Graph 1 shows, lower levels of social capital appear in the Southeast, Deep South, and Southwest regions of the United States. Visual examination of predictor maps indicates that the areas with lower social capital also have lower cultural capital, local government direct expenditure per capita, and newspaper readership, and higher percentages of African Americans and persons of heavy television exposure. (The remaining nine graphs are available from the author on request.) Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee are almost fully ensnared in the “light zones” of lower social capital, though a few metropolitan areas in this region contradict the pattern. Parts of other states like southern Illinois, southern Missouri, southern and southwestern Texas, southern New Mexico, southern Arizona, and northern Florida are in the same zone.

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civic engagement and trust means that measurement of one is at least a partial measure of the other (though evidence on the temporal order of the relationship is mixed). It is widely agreed on that trust underwrites social capital (Uslaner 1998; Veenstra 2002). Putnam (1995, 665) argued that civic engagement and trust are interrelated: “the more we connect with other people, the more we trust them, and vice versa.” For Putnam, trust and civic engagement are different, but “mutually reinforcing” phenomena. Another issue with the concept of trust as a proxy for social capital is the temporal order of the relationship. Brehm and Rahn (1997) discovered a tight reciprocity between them, but findings indicated a stronger influence from social capital to trust than from trust to social capital. They argued (1017): “it is probably easier for a community to generate greater levels of participation ... than it is for that community to instill more trusting attitudes in others.” Similarly, Stolle (1998, 500) argued that “membership in voluntary associations should increase face-to-face interactions between people and create a setting for the development of trust.” Finally, Veenstra (2002, 553) noted that “trust is seen to be a product of social interaction and social networks, resulting from social capital (a by-product of relationships) rather than forming a constituent part of social capital (a cause of certain kinds of relationships), an approach that privileges (participation in) social networks over trust.”

**Map 1.** National Distribution of Social Capital at the County Scale, 2003

With the exception of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, the low-social-capital zone coincides with the *Black Belt* of America—a socio-demographic crescent in the Southeast. It is characterized by depressed quality of life, with higher than average rates of poverty and unemployment and lower levels of educational attainment (Wimberley and Morris 1997). These socioeconomic variables correlate significantly with social capital. The Black Belt also has a history of racial hierarchy and economic underdevelopment, with benefits and burdens flowing from a structure of white privilege (Gaventa 1980). Histories and social scientific analyses of this region note how white opposition to desegregation in the 1960s led to an intensification of spatial isolation of African Americans. Though not examined empirically in this study, the region's history undoubtedly influenced the formation of social capital.

The darker zones on the map, representing counties with higher levels of social capital, are located in the Midwest, coastal Northeast, and mountain West. Visual analysis indicates that these regions are comparatively high in social capital for slightly different reasons. The coastal Northeast appears to have higher cultural capital, greater percentages of heavy newspaper readers, and lower percentages of heavy television viewers. The heartland states of Iowa, South Dakota, North Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Kansas seem to have lower levels of crime, a higher median age, and greater racial homogeneity.

Table 3 presents this study's state-level rankings on social capital, as well as Putnam's state rankings for comparison (<http://www.bowlingalone.com/data.php3>). According to the current study's measurements, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire have the highest levels of social capital. Putnam's top four—North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Minnesota—were also in the top

**Table 3.** Social Capital: State Rankings (this study and Putnam)

State	Rank	State social capital scale	County social capital (min.)	County social capital (max.)	Putnam social capital index	Putnam social capital rank
Connecticut	1	0.12611	0.11985	0.13568	0.27	17
Rhode Island	2	0.12510	0.11156	0.13962	-0.06	24
Massachusetts	3	0.12503	0.10019	0.14808	0.22	18
New Hampshire	4	0.12476	0.10834	0.13198	0.77	8
Nebraska	5	0.12327	0.10608	0.16218	1.15	6
Iowa	6	0.12273	0.10967	0.13978	0.98	7
Minnesota	7	0.12242	0.10513	0.13535	1.32	4
Vermont	8	0.12174	0.10850	0.13494	1.42	3
North Dakota	9	0.12149	0.08648	0.13960	1.71	1
Utah	10	0.11998	0.08968	0.18732	0.50	14
Kansas	11	0.11956	0.08673	0.13303	0.38	16
Wisconsin	12	0.11947	0.08257	0.13623	0.59	11
Maryland	13	0.11897	0.09442	0.13599	-0.26	32
New Jersey	14	0.11809	0.08826	0.13919	-0.40	36
Colorado	15	0.11784	0.08107	0.15541	0.41	15
South Dakota	16	0.11776	0.08243	0.14429	1.69	2
Maine	17	0.11705	0.10240	0.12282	0.53	13
Wyoming	18	0.11683	0.10502	0.13664	0.67	9
Illinois	19	0.11680	0.09141	0.13894	-0.22	31
Pennsylvania	20	0.11582	0.09278	0.16462	-0.19	30
Montana	21	0.11529	0.09568	0.13221	1.29	5
Michigan	22	0.11489	0.09363	0.13905	0.00	22
New York	23	0.11439	0.07208	0.14135	-0.36	35
Washington	24	0.11353	0.09107	0.14390	0.65	10
Idaho	25	0.11339	0.09221	0.14088	0.07	20
Indiana	26	0.11311	0.09574	0.13584	-0.08	25
Missouri	27	0.11247	0.07624	0.14459	0.10	19
Ohio	28	0.11243	0.09850	0.14187	-0.18	29
Oregon	29	0.11195	0.09547	0.13471	0.57	12
Nevada	30	0.11093	0.09060	0.12772	-1.43	49
California	31	0.11081	0.08497	0.13983	-0.18	27
Delaware	32	0.11039	0.10530	0.11795	-0.01	23
Alaska	33	0.11007	0.08238	0.16146	-	-
Oklahoma	34	0.10956	0.08561	0.13754	-0.16	26
Virginia	35	0.10952	0.08141	0.17363	-0.32	33
West Virginia	36	0.10939	0.09510	0.13754	-0.83	42
New Mexico	37	0.10709	0.08075	0.14497	-0.35	34
Texas	38	0.10527	0.07843	0.13894	-0.55	39
Kentucky	39	0.10524	0.07864	0.12929	-0.79	40
Florida	40	0.10516	0.08363	0.12993	-0.47	37

State	Rank	State social capital scale	County social capital (min.)	County social capital (max.)	Putnam social capital index	Putnam social capital rank
Arizona	41	0.10366	0.08893	0.11770	0.06	21
North Carolina	42	0.10171	0.08349	0.14061	-0.82	41
Tennessee	43	0.10143	0.08201	0.13066	-0.96	44
Arkansas	44	0.09980	0.08255	0.11581	-0.50	38
Hawaii	45	0.09877	0.08952	0.12568	–	–
Georgia	46	0.09712	0.02058	0.14573	-1.15	47
Louisiana	47	0.09705	0.07427	0.11754	-0.99	45
Alabama	48	0.09676	0.07696	0.12943	-1.07	46
South Carolina	49	0.09670	0.07843	0.11709	-0.88	43
Mississippi	50	0.09379	0.07506	0.12592	-1.17	48
Total		0.11039	0.02058	0.18732		

tier of this study’s ranking scheme. Notable differences between the ranking schemes are also observable. Maryland, Rhode Island, and New Jersey are in the bottom half of Putnam’s ranking scheme, and appear in our top fifteen. This disagreement in ranking is due to measurement. Putnam’s social capital index includes interpersonal relationship items of trust and informal sociability; our scale does not. Different measurements aside, there is strong agreement between the two scales in the bottom ranks. With the exception of Hawaii (excluded from Putnam’s analysis), the bottom states are almost identical. There is strong statistical agreement between this study’s estimate of social capital and Putnam’s ( $r = 0.742$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ,  $N = 48$ ). This increases confidence in our social capital measure.

This study also rated the top and bottom fifty counties in the country in terms of social capital. Table 4 shows that Daggett County, Utah, Lexington, Virginia, and Williamsburg, Virginia have the highest levels of social capital in the country. Colorado leads all states in the number of counties appearing in the top fifty with seven. Gilpin County, Colorado typifies an area rich in social capital. Gilpin has a relatively small population (an estimated 4,757 in 2000), is racially homogenous (94.4 percent white), and has a median family income (\$61,859) above the national average (\$50,046), with only 1 percent of families below or at the official poverty line. On social capital predictors in our model, Gilpin towers over the national average in local government direct expenditure per capita (\$6,650), is higher in terms of heavy newspaper users (20.3), and is way below the national average on television use, with only 11.1 percent of the population classified as heavy users. Gilpin County is routinely ranked as one of the most livable counties in the eight states of the Rocky Mountain region (see Hecox 2004). Gilpin County is only one story taken at random. A check of other counties suggests that Gilpin’s story is common at the top of the social capital

**Table 4.** Social Capital: Counties with Highest and Lowest Rankings

County and state	Rank (highest)	Scale	County and state	Rank (lowest)	Scale
Daggett County, UT	1	0.18732	Chattahoochee County, GA	3,140	0.02058
Lexington city, VA	2	0.17363	Bronx County, NY	3,139	0.07208
Williamsburg city, VA	3	0.16501	Vernon Parish, LA	3,138	0.07427
Forest County, PA	4	0.16462	Jefferson County, MS	3,137	0.07506
Gosper County, NE	5	0.16218	Hancock County, GA	3,136	0.07528
Bristol Bay Borough, AK	6	0.16146	Liberty County, GA	3,135	0.07623
Radford city, VA	7	0.15749	Pulaski County, MO	3,134	0.07624
Rich County, UT	8	0.15656	Clay County, GA	3,133	0.07639
Custer County, CO	9	0.15541	Bullock County, AL	3,132	0.07693
Gunnison County, CO	10	0.15113	Noxubee County, MS	3,131	0.07709
Nantucket County, MA	11	0.14808	New York County, NY	3,130	0.07821
Dukes County, MA	12	0.14785	Loving County, TX	3,129	0.07843
Wayne County, NE	13	0.14684	Lee County, SC	3,128	0.07843
Park County, CO	14	0.14616	Perry County, AL	3,127	0.07844
Fayette County, GA	15	0.14573	Christian County, KY	3,126	0.07864
Los Alamos County, NM	16	0.14497	Calhoun County, GA	3,125	0.07920
Haines Borough, AK	17	0.14489	Greene County, AL	3,124	0.07932
Ouray County, CO	18	0.14485	Wilkinson County, MS	3,123	0.07950
Hinsdale County, CO	19	0.14476	Holmes County, MS	3,122	0.07983
Fall Church city, VA	20	0.14469	Hale County, AL	3,121	0.08007
Lewis County, MO	21	0.14459	Tallahatchie County, MS	3,120	0.08010
Gilpin County, CO	22	0.14432	Stewart County, GA	3,119	0.08050
Clay County, SD	23	0.14429	Kings County, NY	3,118	0.08057
Whitman County, WA	24	0.14390	Issaquena County, MS	3,117	0.08063
Yakutat City and Borough, AK	25	0.14381	Warren County, GA	3,116	0.08063
Nemaha County, NE	26	0.14239	Catron County, NM	3,115	0.08075
Athens County, OH	27	0.14187	Baker County, GA	3,114	0.08094
San Juan County, WA	28	0.14147	Conejos County, CO	3,113	0.08107
Tompkins County, NY	29	0.14135	Kenedy County, TX	3,112	0.08114
Latah County, ID	30	0.14088	Lowndes County, AL	3,111	0.08132
Loudoun County, VA	31	0.14078	Mora County, NM	3,110	0.08138
Watauga County, NC	32	0.14061	Brunswick County, VA	3,109	0.08141
Fauquier County, VA	33	0.14048	Allendale County, SC	3,108	0.08148
Oconee County, GA	34	0.14021	Marshall County, MS	3,107	0.08151
Dawes County, NE	35	0.14018	Cheyenne County, CO	3,106	0.08157
Seward County, NE	36	0.13999	Taliaferro County, GA	3,105	0.08159
Delaware County, OH	37	0.13998	Kinney County, TX	3,104	0.08159
Marin County, CA	38	0.13983	Talbot County, GA	3,103	0.08162
Story County, IA	39	0.13972	Webster County, GA	3,102	0.08177
Winneshiek County, IA	40	0.13972	Lake County, TN	3,101	0.08201

County and state	Rank (highest)	Scale	County and state	Rank (lowest)	Scale
Washington County, RI	41	0.13962	Chickasaw County, MS	3,100	0.08208
Dickey County, ND	42	0.13960	Montgomery County, MS	3,099	0.08213
Clear Creek County, CO	43	0.13928	Clinch County, GA	3,098	0.08220
Hunterdon County, NJ	44	0.13919	Charles City County, VA	3,097	0.08222
Keweenaw County, MI	45	0.13905	Wade Hampton Census Area, AK	3,096	0.08238
Rockwall County, TX	46	0.13894	Shannon County, SD	3,095	0.08243
Jackson County, IL	47	0.13894	Lake and Peninsula Borough, AK	3,094	0.08252
Poquoson city, VA	48	0.13787	Treutlen County, GA	3,093	0.08255
Hanover County, VA	49	0.13762	Philips County, AR	3,092	0.08257
Woods County, OK	50	0.13754	Menominee County, WI	3,091	0.08257

hierarchy.

The counties with the lowest levels of social capital are Chattahoochee County, Georgia, Bronx County, New York, and Vernon Parish, Louisiana. Counties at the bottom of the social capital hierarchy are predominantly southern, with Georgia and Mississippi leading all states with thirteen and eight counties represented in the bottom fifty. The worst-off among counties in Mississippi is Jefferson County. In many ways, Jefferson epitomizes a social capital-impooverished county. On straight demographics, Jefferson is predominantly African-American (86.5 percent) and has a median household income of \$18,447; more than one-third of the population is below the poverty line, and almost 30 percent of households are female headed. On social capital predictors, Jefferson is below average on percent of the population that are heavy newspaper users (0.1447 percent compared to 0.174 percent), local government direct expenditure per capita, and cultural capital, as well as substantially higher than average on percent of population categorized as heavy television users (23.7 percent compared to 20.5 percent). Descriptive data on social capital and predictors for the whole country are presented in table 5.

**Table 5.** Descriptive Statistics for Variables

	N	M	Min	Max	SD
<b>Social capital</b>					
Social capital scale	3,140	0.110	0.0021	0.187	0.014
<b>Cultural capital</b>					
Cultural capital scale	3,140	0.034	0.016	0.085	0.011
<b>Government intervention</b>					
Government direct expenditure*	3,135	2.497	0.018	197.49	3.902

	N	M	Min	Max	SD
<b>Media displacement</b>					
Television use (heavy)	3,140	0.091	0.010	0.154	0.014
Newspaper use (heavy)	3,140	0.174	0.070	0.310	0.033
<b>Social disorganization</b>					
Public crime	3,140	0.002	0.000	0.072	0.002
Vacancy rate	3,140	0.142	0.015	0.770	0.097
Percent African American	3,077	8.924	0.000	86.50	14.578
<b>Controls</b>					
Population median age	3,140	37.35	20.000	58.600	4.013
Percent urban population	3,140	0.401	0.000	1.000	0.310
Unemployment rate	3,139	4.765	0.600	27.600	2.617
Per capita income	3,140	17,509.46	5,213	44,962	3,938.483

\*US\$1,000 dollars

## RESULTS

### Bivariate and Multivariate Results

Bivariate correlations between county social capital and independent variables are presented in table 6. All county variables are significantly correlated with social capital with the exception of the vacancy rate measure ( $r = 0.009$ ,  $p = 0.617$ ). Media use variables are strongly correlated with social capital. Results are perfectly consistent with Putnam's assessment, with television use functioning to erode social capital and newspaper use functioning to build social capital. Heavy newspaper use ( $r = 0.672$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ) is the strongest positive correlate in the variable pool. Heavy television use ( $r = -0.658$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ) performs in the direction expected, and is the strongest negative correlate of the lot. The cultural capital scale ( $r = 0.592$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ) is positively associated with social capital, suggesting that Bourdieu's claim of interchangeability of capital forms is defensible. The local government direct expenditure per capita variable is linked positively to the dependent variable ( $r = 0.058$ ,  $p = 0.001$ ). The relationship is modest but statistically significant. At this point, the politically conservative argument on the crowding-out effects of government intervention is challengeable. The social disorganization measures of public crime ( $r = -0.180$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ) and percentage of African Americans in the population ( $r = -0.519$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ) are negatively coupled with county social capital. Percentage of African Americans is robust among this subset of variables. As for statistical controls, all measures are significant and

operate in hypothesized directions. As the median age of residents increases in a county area, so does the volume of social capital ( $r = 0.206$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ). The variables of unemployment rate ( $r = -0.461$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ) and southern region ( $r = -0.506$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ) are negatively related to county social capital. Overall, bivariate tests provide no surprises (less the government intervention measure), with all variables lining up as proposed in our distillation of hypotheses from theory.

**Table 6.** Correlation between Independent Variables and Social Capital

	N	Social capital	p-value
<b>Cultural capital</b>			
Cultural capital scale	3,140	0.592	0.000
<b>Government intervention</b>			
Government direct expenditure	3,135	0.058	0.001
<b>Media displacement</b>			
Television use (heavy)	3,140	-0.658	0.000
Newspaper use (heavy)	3,140	0.672	0.000
<b>Social disorganization</b>			
Public crime	3,140	-0.180	0.000
Vacancy rate	3,140	0.009	0.617
Percent African American	3,077	-0.519	0.000
<b>Controls</b>			
Population median age	3,140	0.206	0.000
Percent urban population	3,140	0.133	0.000
Per capita income	3,140	0.483	0.000
Unemployment rate	3,139	-0.461	0.000
Southern state	3,140	-0.506	0.000

Table 7 presents results from our OLS regression analysis. Model performance is very strong, with 79.3 percent of variation in county social capital explained by our predictors. This sizable r-square is not uncommon for aggregate data (McClendon 1994). Multicollinearity is not a serious problem, with variance inflation and tolerance statistics falling well within acceptable standards (Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price 2000). All independent variables predict geographic variation in social capital at the  $p < 0.05$  level of significance or better. Media use variables work predictably. What media scholars have discovered at individual and cross-national levels of analysis also obtain at the county scale. The percent of county residents classified as heavy newspaper readers towers above all other predictors of social capital in our regression equation ( $\beta = 0.466$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Newspaper use is a powerful exercise in community connectivity.

As for heavy television use, consistent with Putnam's findings, this study hypothesized a displacement effect or negative relationship (adjusting statistically for other predictors). This hypothesis was confirmed. The higher the percentage of heavy television users in a county area, the lower the volume of county social capital ( $\beta = -0.303$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ).

**Table 7.** Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Social Capital (N = 3069)

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	$\beta$	Tolerance	VIF
<b>Cultural capital</b>					
Cultural capital scale	0.506	0.027	0.395***	0.156	6.394
<b>Government intervention</b>					
Local government direct expenditure	0.000	0.000	0.022**	0.981	1.019
<b>Media displacement</b>					
Television use (heavy)	-0.295	0.013	-0.303***	0.351	2.846
Newspaper use (heavy)	0.193	0.006	0.466***	0.328	3.045
<b>Social disorganization</b>					
Public crime	-0.394	0.057	-0.062***	0.850	1.176
Vacancy rate	-0.003	0.001	-0.021*	0.618	1.617
Percent African American	-0.000	0.000	-0.127***	0.392	2.554
<b>Controls</b>					
Population median age in 2000	0.000	0.000	0.041***	0.511	1.957
Percent urban population	-0.010	0.001	-0.222***	0.392	2.549
Per capita income	-0.000	0.000	-0.302***	0.276	3.617
Unemployment rate	-0.001	0.000	-0.150***	0.688	1.454
Southern state	-0.004	0.000	-0.132***	0.599	1.670

Note: Adjusted  $R^2 = 0.793$

\* $p < .05$     \*\* $p < .01$     \*\*\* $p < .001$

With the application of socioeconomic controls, our cultural capital measure performs nicely. It is positively correlated with county social capital ( $\beta = 0.395$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), finishing second among independent variables in predictive power. Cultural capital is statistically distinguishable from economic class. Our finding is consistent with cultural studies and communications research on the positive effects of leisure and consumption on community connectivity. While this study was completed with as much rigor as possible, more detailed and qualitative works must be conducted to understand how habits and patterns of consumption and leisure cleave and bind socioeconomic collectivities.

Local government direct expenditure per capita is positively associated with county

social capital, adjusting for other variables ( $\beta = 0.022$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). This study's prediction was agnostic. The literature is divided. The few empirical studies that do exist were conducted at the nation-state level. To the author's knowledge, this is the first study to link statistically the role of local government in fostering or inhibiting the formation of county social capital. As with all predictors in this model, there is a good possibility that feedback linkages obtain. For example, it is conceivable that counties rich in social capital are better able to mobilize for collective action and demand from local government increases in direct expenditure for police protection, schools, employment opportunities, parks, and recreation amenities that provide an infrastructure for social capital growth. There is a need for further research to explore such non-recursive linkages.

Social disorganization variables all work negatively on county social capital. Relatively visible crimes such as vandalism and arson (items in the public crime scale) appear to have a corrosive effect on social capital ( $\beta = -0.062$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). The strongest variable of this subset of social disorganization measures is percent African American ( $\beta = -0.127$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). America is a racially organized society. This organization has a profoundly persistent vertical quality, so much so that skin color is a powerful proxy for income, educational attainment, life expectancy, and political participation. The study found that the higher the percentage of African Americans in a county, the lower the volume of social capital, even when adjusting for socioeconomic status.

Last, this study's statistical controls significantly predict county social capital. Consistent with Putnam's demographic and historical observations on the long civic generation, results show that median age is positively associated with social capital ( $\beta = 0.041$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Percent urbanization flipped the mathematical sign in OLS analysis ( $\beta = -0.222$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), as did per capita income ( $\beta = -0.302$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) from bivariate results. This is partially due to the effect of cultural capital. The negative relationship between urbanization and social capital is in line with a well-established tradition in social theory dating to Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) and his observations on the erosion of trust and social bonds (*asabiyya*) as human societies transition from rural to sedentary forms of social organization (see Ibn Khaldun & Rosenthal 1967). As a negative predictor, percent urbanization is stronger than heavy television exposure. Taken with results on percentage of African Americans, and what sociologists have learned about minority spatial isolation (Massey and Denton 1993), the apparent decline of social capital in America may have something to do with racially constituted patterns of urban settlement and human organization of space.

## CONCLUSION

These analyses provide evidence on partial correlates of geographic variation in social capital. Results enrich the pool of ideas for probable causes of social capital decline in the United States (assuming Putnam and others are correct in observing a decline). This prediction model performs soundly. Independent variables are derived logically from a range of theories in a range of academic disciplines. All hypotheses are confirmed.

This study set out to test Putnam's claim that heavy television exposure is a major cause for the decline in American social capital. In *Bowling Alone*, Putnam logically dismisses a range of alternative explanations for declining social connectedness, indicting television as the primary cause. This study suggests that Putnam is partially correct. Television is negatively associated with social capital, adjusting for other variables. The precise reason for this negative association is indeterminable from our data, but this paper theorizes time, space, and affective displacement effects at work. Individual-level analyses on television use in relation to time management, social geography, and affective psychology could pin down these mechanisms empirically. This paper also strongly confirmed Putnam's claim that newspaper use enhances community connectivity. Counties high in social capital have comparatively high rates of newspaper use. Newspapers remain an important medium for transmitting information about local affairs and opportunities for civic engagement.

One drawback to the media component of this analysis is that it measures exposure in global terms. Future research could unpack these television and newspaper use measures to examine content effects like television channel exposure, genre preferences, newspaper type, and sectional preferences. Different television content probably operates differently on a person's willingness to engage civically (see Norris 1996). Still, in light of theory and findings, the measure presented here remains relevant—heavy use of television, like heavy use of anything, will displace activities outside the home.

Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's work and other cultural studies, this paper tested the proposition that cultural capital is positively associated with social capital. Bourdieu's argument on the transferability of forms of capital is probably correct. This study shows that capital transferability may operate in the aggregate, and indicates that counties high in social capital have relatively high levels of cultural capital. This relationship appears strongest in the coastal Northeast. These results lend support to the growing recognition among cultural theorists that leisure and consumption activities are functionally important as projections of individual identity and as centrifugal forces for building communities of spirit. This study adds to that literature the notion that as people organize in consumer and leisure communities, they tacitly acquire the

skills for civic engagement and volunteerism. A consumer community of spirit, in a hyper-consumer society, is a probable pathway into civic life. Therefore, seemingly innocuous communities of spirit that organize around a cultural activity are quite similar functionally to the bowling leagues of yesterday.

This study's findings on cultural capital add momentum to the concept of norms of leisure and consumption as potential social bonding mechanisms. The standard critique of materialism and the leisure class as outcroppings of self-indulgence and corrosive of civic engagement may need refinement. In Thompson's (2000, 71) words, "an effective politics of consumption must ... address the deep connections between personal and communal identity and consumption practices." This study focused exclusively on approximating Bourdieu's "governing taste" of "liberty and luxury." Future studies could probe how different and more varied consumer communities facilitate or undermine norms of civic engagement.

This study also examined the possible effect of local government intervention on county social capital. Political sociologists and political scientists are divided on whether the relationship is positive or negative; this study took a neutral position. It discovered that local government direct expenditure is positively related to county social capital. This finding suggests that a government can marginally boost community connectivity (insofar as one assumes the direction of the relationship is top-down) by investing in human infrastructure. More studies must be conducted before any conclusions are reached. This study is hopefully a step in that direction.

Lastly, this study tested promising claims in social disorganization theory. It created a scale of relatively visible property crimes like vandalism and arson that are known to erode community social cohesion. It hypothesized that social disorganization measures like public crime, ethnic heterogeneity, and vacancy rate are negatively related to county social capital. All measures behaved as anticipated. One interesting possibility is that social capital could be used as an independent variable in crime prediction models. Patterns of social capital formation may be reciprocally related to most predictors in this model.

This study defined social capital as an aggregate phenomenon. It provided a national portrait of social capital at the county level of geographic resolution. It produced a novel ranking of social capital-rich and social capital-deprived counties. It gathered leads from various bodies of social scientific thought in communications, cultural studies, sociology, criminology, and political science for a robust model of social capital prediction. Patterns of social capital cannot be understood as solely or primarily constituted by habits of television viewing. They are also partially formed by patterns of cultural engagement, government expenditure, media use, residential settlement, and demographic structure.

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