

The Making of Divided Higher
Education Systems in Korea: A
Comparative Analysis on the Rise of
Seoul National University and Kim Il
Sung University, 1945-1948.*

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ABSTRACT

From the presence of Seoul National University in Seoul and Kim Il-Seong University in Pyongyang, we clearly see a case of a divided higher educational system in Korea. This paper addresses a series of questions concerning the educational origins of the divided education system at the university level. Recounting both the traditional and revisionist views on the nature of socio-political movements against the Seoul National University (hereafter, SNU) Plan, this paper makes a claim that, not the imposition of American imperialist intervention, but a division within the variety of scholarly organizations among Korean academics and professors, who failed to keep their promise of Grand Unity, was conducive to the division. The two universities were created in October 1946 within just two weeks of each other. Hardly different were the rationale and procedures behind the making of these two "Supreme Universities". Moreover, seen from the composition of the leading faculty members of each university, they were

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born as an identical twins.

A built in contradiction concerning university autonomy was the moving force behind the keen disputes about the SNU Plan which did not permit any form of self-government of faculty members. A legendary tradition of self-government among professors first became the de facto legitimate practice during the struggle for the freedom of academy in the history of the Japanese Imperial Universities. It was, however, maintained to protect the vested interests of professor privilege and prestige which were never shared with other professors in private universities or colleges. Newly appointed professors, who were mostly graduates of imperial universities and were members of the progressive political parties and leaders of various scholarly organizations wanted to inherit a progressive element of university autonomy, while reform-minded bureaucrats who were graduates of American universities and members of the rightist political parties wanted to remove any reactive element of faculty autonomy which in fact led to the vicious Japanese tradition of school sectionalism. Contrary to the claims made by the revisionists, it was not the movement against the SNU Plan but the Plan itself that failed. The rise of SNU was a compromise between the two competing groups. This group competition facilitated the division. Key members of the former group who were opposed to the SNU Plan went to Pyongyang to actively participate in the making of Kim Il-Seong University and became the backbone of it. Some of the legacies of imperial universities still remain at SNU.

Key words : Higher education, Seoul National University, Kim Ilseong University, division

I. Introduction

South and North Korea have their own "top" universities—Seoul National University (hereinafter referred to as SNU) and Kim Il Sung University (hereinafter referred to as *Kimdae*) respectively. These two universities in Korea clearly demonstrate the "higher education of a divided country", and in this article I have analyzed the rise of both universities after Japan's defeat.¹⁾ These universities had the same purpose, procedure and method of establishment, as well as the same date of establishment. As far as organization of the professorate, the two universities also had a common origin. I call them "identical twins", in the light of such features shared at their inception. In another study, I have presented an analysis of the process of creation of each university. In this study, I will analyze the formation of the educational system in a divided country by focusing on the origin of the division of the universities. First, the origins of both universities are compared and analyzed.

In this article, I have placed Koreans at the center of the history. This is natural, but it has not been so in much of the research on the history of modern education. Existing studies have focused on revealing the manifestation of the educational and occupation policies of the foreign countries who occupied Korea, and the

¹⁾ "A Study on the Establishment of Kim Il Sung University", Educational Theory, Research Committee of Pedagogy of Seoul University, 10th Volume, No.1, 1996; "Study of the Rise of Seoul National University", Nasan Park Yonghun Kyoso Chungnuyun Toim Ginyum Nonmongip, Collection of Papers in memory of Retirement under the Age Limit, recently published.

opposition of Korea to them. Most likely, this was unavoidable because for some time foreign military forces exercised the dominant authority and power in Korea. Such a view of history has been customary. Earlier traditional and the so-called "revisionists' studies"²⁾ primarily addressed the policies of the United States toward Korea and the propulsion of educational reform by the U.S. military government, and analyzed the response of the Korean people. But in this study, the main theme is what Korean people did to rebuild national education after the defeat of Japanese imperialism. The protest against the dominance of foreign occupation forces is also analyzed, but in this case, the efforts of the Koreans as primary actors are placed at the center of the study, in active opposition against the intrusion of foreign power.

The method was guided by a view of endogenous development, as an outgrowth of critical mindedness and reflection based on a series of research tasks spanning the history of modern Korean education. The method has been practically applied to various periods.³⁾ As a result,

²⁾ Revisionists works appeared as a series of theses for the master's degree, addressing Kookdaean in the 1980s. A representative of this trend includes "Progressive Democratic Educational Movement under the US Military Government", by Lee Kil-sang, the 9th Korea-Japan United Academic Seminar, 1996, Tokyo.

³⁾ The result of this method will be evaluated by the following studies. Kim Ki-seok & Ryu Bang-ran, "Origins of Modern Education in Korea", Educational Theory, DOE, Volume 7.8, No. 1, 1994; Ryu Bang-ran, Appearance and development of Modern Education in Korea, Doctoral thesis of Seoul National University, 1995; Oh Seong-chul, A Study on elementary education in 1930s, doctoral thesis of Seoul National University, 1996; Kim Ki-seok, Lee Hyangkyu, "Origin of Socialism education of North, 1945-1950", Hallym Science Institute, Hallym Collection on Thesis (recently

we have confidence in the possibility of its consistent application and use in future studies. In this study, I have extensively used some original material unknown in Korea for a while, which came from the U.S. Military Government in Korea (USMGIK), and so-called "enemy documents"; materials from U.S. National Archives that is classified as Record Groups (hereinafter referred to as RG) 332 and 242, respectively.⁴⁾

II. Literature Review

This study seeks to address the following three questions. "Who suggested *Kookdaean*?" "What is the main cause of the anti-*Kookdaean* movement and its outcome?" and "What relation exists between the anti-*Kookdaean* movement and the establishment of *Kimdae*?" The former two questions are usually dealt with through an analysis of the Proposal for a National Seoul University (hereinafter '*Kookdaean*') that

published).

⁴⁾ Materials published by the force government include Data collection before and after Liberation II: Educational Policy of the US Military Government, Seoul: Lee Kil-sang, Wonju-Munhwa Publishing Company, 1993; other data that is not include in this data collection is referred to as RG332. For information on collecting circumstances or contents of captured Korean documents, see Bang Sun-joo, "Bibliographical Introduction(1) of Plundered North Korean Transcribed Documents", Asian Culture(Asian Culture Research Center at Hallym University), 1986. Curriculum vitae of faculty of *Kimdae* among captured documents, 1946, concerning appointment of faculty, Appointment at Kim Il Sung University, 1947, Captured Korean Documents, RG242, National Archives were used. Classification and analysis of captured documents were made by Dr. Paul Auh and Dr. Jang Ri-wook. During the war, they were dispatched to Far East Army Headquarters as agents of psychological warfare, and assigned to translate and analyze the captured documents. Paul Auh, *Lonely lord of a castle*, Seoul Kwangmyung Publishing company, 1975, p. 122.

created Seoul National University in 1946. Korean education reformers were characterized as being active in suggesting and implementing *Kookdaean*, based on the "New History of Education in Korea", whereas Americans were characterized as being passive.⁵⁾ The outcome of various revisionists' studies can be summarized as follows. *Kookdaean* was conceived by an American officer in the Bureau of Educational of USMGIK. That is, "*Kookdaean* was first made by an American officer, and it was Koreans who played the part of the villains in the process."⁶⁾ With the proposal of "the integrated university plan" made by the U.S. military forces, *Kookdaean* was suggested in an attempt to reorganize the educational system of higher education in line with an American model. A group of reform-minded Korean bureaucrats who cooperated with the U.S. military carried forward *Kookdaean* "with a view to resisting the progressive educational power that was growing through educational activities centering [on] committees of university autonomy." In short, *Kookdaean* was "the result of joint selfish compromise between [the] military government office that [had] experienced [a] failure of bureaucratic governance over higher education for past ten months, and those figures in educational circles who cooperated with the military government in order to maintain power

⁵⁾ Dr. Chun-Seok Auh (Cheonwon) did not indicate that he was the person who suggested *Kookdaean* in writing history of education in Korea, but he merely indicated "*Kookdaean* was devised by a Korean officer in Academic Affairs Department, and the US was in the passive attitude". Paul Auh, *A History of New Education in Korea*, Seoul: Hyundai Kyochong Publishing Company, 1964, p416. But he clearly disclosed in his memoirs that he was the person who devised and sponsored *Kookdaean*. For memoirs, Paul Auh, *op. cit.*, 1975

⁶⁾ Lee Kil-sang, *op. cit.*, 1996; the following are cited from the above thesis.

over the educational world. "Progressive intellectuals in charge of college councils and executives of academic groups started a nationwide movement against *Kookdaean* as they perceived the intention of American officers of the Department of Educational(hereafter DOE) of the USMGIK and the Korean bureaucrats. They resisted for more than one year and "several hundreds of students and some 380 professors" were victimized. As a result, "progressive educators were completely removed from the mainstream of the education circle". The anti-*Kookdaean* movement ended in failure, and Seoul National University was created. The above claim is consistent with the key issue of argument on cultural imperialism.⁷⁾

In the past, the anti-*Kookdaean* movement was thought to have been brought about by order of North Korea's communist movement. It was said that the Chosun Education Association was deeply involved in the movement, and even that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had issued a clandestine order to Namrodang (Labor Party of Souther Korea) to go on strike nationwide, with critical evidence of this found in an order note by Kuzunov of the Soviet Union to Huh Hun, chief of staff of Namrodang, in January 1947.⁸⁾ Revisionists believed that progressive intellectuals resisted *Kookdaean* because it was suggested by a "compromise out of joint egoism" among leading figures in both countries. But, whichever is right, both

⁷⁾ As for theories that education can be part of cultural imperialism, see Martin Carnoy, *Education as Cultural Imperialism*, N.Y.: David McKay Co., Inc, 1974.

⁸⁾ The clandestine order note was published in *Educational Welfare Newspaper*, Feb. 1, 1988 or *50 Years of Education after liberation* written by Song Duk-soo, Seoul: Educational Welfare Newspaper, 1996, pp 284-285.

conventional and revisionist claims seek to find a cause for this series of events with regard to the proposition and execution of *Kookdaean* that will provide a single answer, no matter whether right or left. Thus, those two viewpoints cannot be differentiated as they originated from the Cold War.

Claims in the past were definite and clear, whether they were revisionist or not. So, the issue was regarded as being extremely simple, primarily because it was analyzed in a one-dimensional manner. That is, complicated phenomena were oversimplified. Complicated matters were only considered in terms of confrontation of social status, emphasizing one choice, between right or left. It was underestimated that the key issue of the *Kookdaean* project was realization of the self-administration of universities⁹⁾ in the manner of an

⁹⁾ "Self-rule of universities" refers to exercising personnel management and financial rights, an essential part of management in the Imperial University of Japan. The president and deans of each department of the imperial university were elected directly by professors, and appointment, promotion, retirement and upgrading or reduction of remuneration was carried out through the Professors' Council. The practice, which actually meant autonomy of professors, was publicly announced taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the "Kyoto University, Sawayanagi case" in 1913. Sawayanagi, the dean of Kyoto University, dismissed 7 professors on the ground of reform. And the Professors' Council protested against his act by resolving to resign and skipping lectures with a claim that all the personnel management should be decided by the Professors' Council. The minister of the Ministry of Educational Affairs, who was afraid of spreading of this incident, tried to patch things up by delivering a memorandum to the Professors' Council stating, "It is proper and reasonable that President of the university discuss Professors' Council concerning appointment and dismissal of professors". Later, the right to appoint and dismiss professors was granted to the Professors' Council. For the process and cause of such privilege, see Japanese Education written by Dairoku Kikuchi, London: John Murray, 1909, pp. 365-370 or Study on National Education, A Brief

imperial university. The leadership struggle to establish the university that took place between professors from the imperial universities, who strove to maintain vested rights, and the revisionists did not attract public attention. The self-administration of universities, which was the basis of "educational democracy", was excluded from analysis, with no consideration as to whether it was an object of reform or not. If we do not accept the value implied by the slogan, another issue can be raised. Should the self-autonomy of universities by professors be eliminated as a remaining vestige of colonial education or maintained as part of the essence of a university? These issues have never been deeply examined or addressed so far.

In order to answer these questions, a multi-level analysis method can be applied. National conflict along with social status conflict are considered together. In addition, the conflict between the power to maintain vested rights in the university and the power of revisionists is also reflected. As a way to focus on the force of the reformists, the practices in regard to academic or regional relations, in addition to political beliefs, can be also considered. Let's review unanswered questions by the stratified decision methodology.

III. The Idea of Faculty Republic and Kookdaean Project

The following questions to be reviewed are those for which there are remarkable differences between

History of Japanese Education, Tokyo: Choto Munhwa Publishing company, 1989, pp. 146-147

traditional viewpoints and revisionists' viewpoints. That is, "Why was *Kookdaean* proposed and what was the purpose?" and "Why was there anti-movement and why did it end in failure?" North's *Jongdaean* (literally the comprehensive university plan), which created *Kimdae*, was used as a comparative standard. That is, "Is *Jongdaean* consistent with the ideal of an educational democracy movement?" "Is it possible for those professors who opposed *Kookdaean* and took part in *Jongdaean*, or who transferred to *Kimdae* from SNU, to realize their own intentions at *Kimdae*?" As revealed in my thesis, SNU and *Kimdae* began preparations at the same time to open their doors, and did so, one after the other, at an interval of only two weeks in October 1946. Table 1 shows the main events, from preparation to opening, and from opening and to production of the first graduates.

SNU and *Kimdae* were established as national "top" universities, and existing higher education institutions merged into integrated universities. If any difference exists, it is that *Kimdae* was normally operated from the time of its opening, but SNU's normal operation began one year after its opening due to severe resistance on the part of professors and students. As for faculty structures, professors at these two universities were scholars of the "do-or-die corps", which was voluntarily organized shortly after the defeat of Japanese imperialism. They included the Academy of Chosun¹⁰⁾, which was organized for "the

¹⁰⁾ According to records of the Academic Institute, "Do Bong-seob, Ahn Dong-hyeok, Kim Ryang-ha, Lee Koo, and Huh Dal-jae got together at Junghwa Company Hall at the 2nd fl. of Chongno Christian Youth Society, Seoul" on Aug. 16, and organized a preparatory committee of Chosun Academic Institute. The Academic Institute has 10 departments in addition to Secretariate, and a representative person

grand union of academic fields", a self-autonomy council that voluntarily took over universities and junior colleges, and Jindan Hakhoi¹¹⁾, which was rebuilt as an Academy specializing in Korean history studies.

Most of the executives of those groups were intellectuals who were employed at SNU as professors. Due to aggravation of political conditions, however, the autonomy group and the universities appeared to be divided to a degree such that they were unable to be unified voluntarily. Thus, professors were separated by their own beliefs, right or left. The question at this point is how internal disunion led to the division of the universities.

in each sector became the manager of each department. Dept. of Science (manager : Do Sang-rok), Dept. of Pharmacy (Do Bong-seob), Dept. of Engineering (Choi Kyung-ryul), Technical headquarters (Yoon Il-jung), Dept. of Agriculture (Cho Baek-hyun), Dept. of Economy (Baek Nam-woon), Dept. of Fishery (Jung Moon-ki), Dept. of Historical Philosophy (Lee Byung-do), Dept. of Medical Science (Yoon Il-sun) and Dept. of Literature & Linguistics (Lee Yang-ha). Academic Institute, Hwibo, 1946.

- ¹¹⁾ On Aug. 16, An Dong-suk, Lee Byung-soo summoned a reconstruction meeting, changed executives, and settled future policies. The Standing committee included Lee Sang-baek, Cho Yoon-je, Lee Sung-ryong, Shin Suk-ho, Kim Sang-ki, Son Jin-tae, Yoo Hong-ryeol, Kim Soo-hyang, Do Yoo-ho, Lee Yeo-sung, Cho Myung-ki, and Kim Young-kon. *From Liberation to Today*, written by Kim Jae-won, Jindan Hakhoi Newspaper, Volume 57, 1979, pp. 225-239.

<Table 1> Comparison on History of SNU and *Kimdae*

Date	Main Events	
1945	South (SNU)	North (<i>Kimdae</i>)
Oct 16, 45	Kyungsung Imperial University changed its name to Kyungsung University	
Mid Oct, 45	Appointed deans, division managers and presidents of state junior colleges	
March 23, 46		Announced a university establishment plan in "20 Political Principles"
May 29, 46		Organized preparatory committee for creating the university
July 8, 46		Decided to establish <i>Kimdae</i>
July 13, 46	Announced <i>Kookdaean</i>	
Aug. 22, 46	Promulgated act to establish SNU (Act 102)	
Mid Sept, 46	Anti- <i>Kookdaean</i> demonstration by professors and students	
Sept, 15, 46		<i>Kimdae</i> started
Oct, 1, 46		<i>Kimdae</i> opened
Oct, 15, 46	SNU opened; students resisted registration	
Since Feb, 47	Nationwide strike	
May 6, 47	Promulgated revised bill for SNU (No. 1 public law of interim legislative assembly)	
June 13, 47	New Board of Directors of SNU resolved to reinstate expelled students	
July 13, 47	The first graduation ceremony	
June 50		The first graduation ceremony

Kookdaean was proposed as the result of internal necessity in the academic field. This was strongly expressed by Cheonwon. His evidence that *Kookdaean* was proposed in

order to establish "a grand university" to represent all the academic fields in Korea is consistently shown in relevant documents dating from 1946. Twenty years¹²⁾ after the first organizer of *Kookdaean* was revealed, and thirty years since the start of the *Kookdaean* project,¹³⁾ Cheonwon the Dr. Auh clearly disclosed his role in the proposal for and implementation of *Kookdaean*. From his recollections, it is known that he had a discussion with the bureau director, Mr. Eok-Kyum Yoo about *Kookdaean* after several weeks of consideration, and received his consent, and then got a promise of active support from military governor Ruch via head director Lockhard, and then began to carry the plan forward. This is consistent with other data from the DOE. In particular, it also corresponds with other detailed records on the establishment of SNU.¹⁴⁾ According to those documents, an American officer, Mr. Croft, was newly appointed as a successor to Dean Kyung-sung University, who was then to be in charge of college affairs at the DOE. A concrete plan for *Kookdaean* was mapped out according to the "instructions" of the American officer.¹⁵⁾ His role was at

¹²⁾ Paul Auh, op. cit., 1964, p. 416 note 1

¹³⁾ Paul Auh, "*Kookdaean* case", op. cit., 1975, pp. 99-105

¹⁴⁾ When comparing sources on the Establishment of Seoul National University; its writer and date were unidentified RG332, and History of Bureau of Education, From 11 Sept. 1945 to 28 February, 1946 by Lockhard, RG332, the description about *Kookdaean* was consistent. It was same in the organization and structure of a university to be newly established. But, in the Lockhard's record, it was very vague about names, period, and job duties of relevant people. The above records are more detail than One year of the Ministry of Educational Affairs about period and job duties. The former is the fundamental material that has witnesses about relevant people, and the latter is a historical depiction using the fundamental material and information. Here, the fundamental material has more reliability.

¹⁵⁾ Op. cit., The role of the U.S. officer in organizing *Kookdaean* is as follows. Under his guidance, plans were drawn for a professional

most one of providing "instruction" as, unlike Croft, he did not succeed to an administrative post, even though he took charge of some affairs at Kyung Sung University.

American military officers took great pains to appoint a Korean President of the newly established SNU. They recommended one Korean, who also had the recommendation of the Chosun Education Committee, at the end of January 1946 and with the approval of the Koreans. But the military governor did not accept him on the grounds that he was not eligible for that post. Finally, this candidate and another American officer were recommended to the War Ministry of the U.S. Unexpectedly, Harry B. Anstead was appointed as the new President in February.¹⁶⁾ He was a pastor following

staff of 465 members to care for a future prospective enrollment of 8,000 students. Soon, it was disclosed that the university would have 3 departments of Kyung Sung University, and other 7 junior colleges. The university means SNU. This evidence indicates that he simply helped in the process of organizing SNU, and not as a leader. According to One year of the Ministry of Educational Affairs, one of duties of a U.S. officer who was newly appointed to the university as of Dec. 12, 1946, was to think about devising a plan for the establishment of a university based on American universities. He may have led the project. It was depicted that the officer worked at Kyung Sung University as a dean, which caused us to think that he was Croft. Seemingly, Croft was misunderstood, in that he returned to the Academic Affairs Dept. after resigning Kyung Sung University, and suggested *Kookdae* project. See p. 28 of One year of the Ministry of Educational Affairs. But, Croft worked at the Academic Affairs Dept. until Dec. 7, and he was not in the department when *Kookdae* was suggested. When an officer of 24 troops in charge of military history listened to witnesses about stationing without approval at the Engineering dept. of Kyung Sung University, Croft's post was the Foreign Affairs Dept. He was eligible to that department considering his former post, Intelligence Officer. See One year of the Ministry of Educational Affairs for transfer of Croft, and for interview records, see Interview with Lt. CMDR, A Crofts, USNR, Foreign Affairs Section, MG, 21 January 1946.

the army and had no experience in college administration. The U.S. military, which exercised dominant authority over South Korea, had appointed an absurd person to an absurd post at an absurd place. That is, there was no American officer capable of "devising a grand university to represent [the] entire academic world". Besides lacking manpower resources, the DOE was a much more loose bureaucratic organization than the *Iminwi* (People's Committee) educational bureau of North Korea. Who could devise or proceed with a grand plan for higher education reform in such an agency? There was no officer who had a sense of mission or any affection for university reform, except for Croft.¹⁷⁾ Also, there was a substantial difference of quality in the way activities were carried out among the staffs of the DOE's Americans and Koreans. The former were intent on fragmentary and stopgap work to solve present problems, and the latter were concerned about "directing overall Korean education".¹⁸⁾ In addition, coordination between the central and local agencies of the DOE were not good.¹⁹⁾ Responsible officers in key

¹⁶⁾ See appendix of One year of the Ministry of Educational Affairs for appointment date of Anstead

¹⁷⁾ Philip Shay, who was dispatched to the Academic Affairs Dept. and supervised it, pointed out the problems of the Ministry of Educational Affairs, as follows. "So-called Korean officers did not listen to advice of American advisers. The manpower of the department was poorly organized, and the department has no "overall structure". Without enough training or appropriate experience, the job of advisers did not work properly. What is worse, financial support from the military government is very insufficient. "Report of Activities in Korea", 20 June 1947, Lee Kil-sang, op. cit., 1991, pp. 314-323

¹⁸⁾ Paul Auh, op. cit., 1975, p. 94

¹⁹⁾ The job scope between the Ministry of Educational Affairs and internal and academic affairs division of Seoul was uncertain. This was clearly shown in the dismissal case of adviser Martin of the internal and Educational Affairs Division in Seoul. There was a

departments changed frequently. At the time *Kookdaean* was suggested, Lockhard was director of the Department, but at the time of its implementation, Pittenger was head. In this situation, the entire merger of the 9 professional colleges and a Japanese Imperial University, using U.S. force officers, was next to impossible. The establishment of "the grand university" was a long-cherished desire of all the academic world since the defeat of Japanese imperialism. It was *Jongdaean* that North Korea suggested in order to realize the same desire during the same time period. It was *Kookdaean* in South Korea, and Deputy-Director of the DOE, Dr. Ah (or Cheonwon in Korean pen name) represented this desire.

Kookdaean was a "comprehensive blueprint directing and setting up the overall higher education" of Korea. But the organizer, Cheonwon, added his experience and viewpoint in the process of making it concrete. He knew a lot about higher education in the colonial era, including its bad practices and effects. Furthermore, he was willing to radically reform it with positive expectations.²⁰ What he

confusing policy between Martin and Underwood, who was an adviser of the Ministry of Educational Affairs, concerning punishment of students who were present at Labor Day Ceremony in May 1947. Martin instructed principals of secondary schools to follow the order from his division, but Underwood insisted that Martin was only an adviser not a manager. For its process, see "Clarification of Policy, as result of incident which occurred the 1st week of May, 1947", 12 May, 1947; "Memo on Clarification of Policy-to School Principles", 15 May, 1947, Lee Kil-sang, op. cit., 1991, pp. 286-294.

²⁰ Cheonwon indicated the dual attitude of Koreans toward Japanese education as follows. Koreans were unconsciously influenced by Japan a great deal even though they showed enmity toward Japan". In the education field, as well as other academic fields, things Japanese were regarded as better than things American. When he tried to get a job at Bosung junior college, even though he was an extraordinary scholar who had a doctorate, he was treated worse

was primarily concerned about in devising *Kookdaean* was the elimination of the remaining legacies of colonial education.²¹⁾ In 1947, he said that the greatest advantage of *Kookdaean* was the complete removal factionalism in the professional colleges, a tradition of Japanese colonial education. He expressly disclosed that the National University could not accept Japanese tradition of faculty-autonomy. He knew well that the self-rule allowing professors to exercise the right to enforce personnel management had originated in Tokyo Imperial University or Kyoto Imperial University. To Cheonwon, imperial universities were regarded as a bad practice of colonial slavery education that cultivated ruling classes with privilege. He was not willing to permit the customary practice that special groups of professors governed the colleges they graduated from, with the "exclusive tendency of rivalry of local barons", in the name of university autonomy. It was against the principles of democratic education he had experienced firsthand in America. His beliefs were repeated as follows, twenty years later. That is, *Kookdaean*:

...was no more than the measures [taken] to remove all Japanese tradition and to break [the] Monroe doctrine at each school.²²⁾

Accordingly, Cheonwon made a plan for adopting

than those from Imperial university. Cheonwon experienced the evil influences of colonial education through discrimination and oppression by Japanese and Koreans. Paul Auh, op. cit., 1975, pp74-77.

²¹⁾ Paul Auh, op. cit., 1964, Paul Auh, 1975, Conversation with Dr. Ah, Deputy Dir. Of Education. Mar. 1947, RG332.

²²⁾ Paul Auh, op. cit., 1964, p421.

personnel management and financial rights like those practiced in the public educational institutions of America. However, this was not the entire reason for the establishment of *Kookdaean*. After 20 years, Cheonwon made public his reasons for promoting *Kookdaean*. For one, "there was strong intention to oust incompetent or leftist professors."²³⁾ The more important issue, however, was the eradication of colonial higher education. But the self-administration of universities like that of imperial universities was contradictory and dual from the beginning. The faculty-autonomy of universities that referred to university self-rule of professors included enjoying exclusive privilege, along with freedom of thought and study. Cheonwon tried to eliminate this latter form, regarding it as being "University Fractionalism" or "Monroe Doctrine".

It was not merely Cheonwon who wanted to do away with colonial education through *Kookdaean*. The report of the legislative committee about the *Kookdaean* project was of the same opinion as Cheonwon, represented by congressman Jang, Myun, who was principal of Dongsung High School. He also thought that the creation of "not joining to SNU professors" occurred simply because it was impossible to realize the autonomy of professors, but that the professors' committee reserving the right of personnel management was "a vestige of Japanese imperialism".²⁴⁾ In the spring of 1947, a parent of a student who watched the national strike, so-called the second

²³⁾ Teachers' Welfare Newspaper, Sept. 28, 1987. Cheonwon thought that the cause of protest against *Kookdaean* of professors lay in the intention to maintain the vested rights of incompetent professors, and their worries about retirement. Such opinion can be found consistently in relevant documents. Paul Auh, op. cit., 1975, p. 103.

²⁴⁾ <Stenographic Records>

Kookdaean project, frankly stated the following:

Jongdaean is absolutely necessary in the establishment of our education system. The reason, concretely expressed, [is that] we have to root out the so-called Kyung-sung Imperial University.²⁵⁾

He saw the cause of the strike generating from the coalition of academia and the merger of colleges by Daejawi. He asserted that the strike was brought about as professors from the imperial university failed to secure exclusive rights of personnel management. He maintained that "complete destruction" of the tradition of Kyung-sung University not only meant liquidation of the vestiges of colonialism but also that it was inevitable in the construction of democracy. Like Cheonwon and Jang, Myun, the parent emphasized the evil of maintaining the privilege, rather than the progressive factor of college autonomy.

The U.S. military officers tried to patch things up as if they were objective mediators, when opponent opinion became strong. Their neutral attitude was clearly shown in the U.S. military analysis report on the *Kookdaean* project.²⁶⁾ The Intelligence Department pointed out the inconsistent attitude of Namrodang (Labor Party of Southern Korea). *Kookdaean* and *Jongdaean* were being advanced for the same purpose and by the same procedures and methods. It is natural to wonder why Namrodang opposed *Kookdaean* even though Namrodang allowed a professor supporting *Jongdaean* to go to North.

²⁵⁾ Cho, Heon-young, op. cit., pp. 57-61. Here the integrated university means SNU.

²⁶⁾ "School Strikes in Seoul Korea: Their Political Implications", April 3, 1947, RG332, Lee Kil-sang, op. cit., 1993, pp. 262-282

They thought the best advantage of *Kookdaean* lay in the effective operation of limited resources. But the intelligence officers thought it would be best to carry out a university reform like *Kookdaean* after Chosun had established its own government. As an alternative, if there was insistence on putting such reform into operation earlier, it should take place with the participation and discussion of relevant professors. Most Chosun officers in the DOE were closely related to Hanmindang (Korean Democratic Party). In contrast, a great number of professors and students were not communists, but had progressive ideas. The Intelligence officers pointed out that the Department should have more clearly recognized the political dynamics. They maintained that if the board of directors came to have the right of personnel management over professors, professors would be greatly concerned about it, even though they varied in political beliefs and opinions. Because "nobody wants one's future to be placed on one's enemy's hand[s]. Professors cannot be excepted."²⁷⁾

The report listed five items of common complaints that professors had. 1) "Self-autonomy of University" enjoyed by professors in colonial universities and colleges and loss of "individual authority" of professors; 2) complaints about unequal treatment of "low level" junior college professors compared with "elite" professors; 3) loss of privileged status of professors in small-size colleges including junior colleges; 4) low wages, lack of housing, inconvenient transportation, lack of provision of food, unequal treatment among same-level public servants; and 5) overburdened workload due to lack of professors. In

²⁷⁾ Ibid., p. 264

addition, the leftist professors' complaints included 6) uncertainty about the future based on the dismissal of leftist professors; 7) infringement of rights on freedom to do research; 8) lack of opportunity to voice individual opinions; and 9) existence of pro-Japanese groups and profiteers.²⁸⁾ But a more essential problem was that of "personnel issues, not finance". Thus, it was recommended to propose a solution admitting their requests, and considering professors, not students. Looking back, the U.S. recognized exactly the reason for the suggestion of *Kookdaean*, and its problems, and the causes of the opposing movement against it.

We can see the excellent ability of the U.S. from a report that shows "ability to collect scientific information".²⁹⁾ This aspect was evidently revealed in the survey report "network of commies" related to the anti-*Kookdaean* movement. Chokong (Korean Communist Party) even executed the "Inchon Letter", a behavior guide that directed student movements, but disclosed that it had no correlation with *Kookdaean*, as it was [dated] March 1946. Minjeon could be supported by the general public by defining *Kookdaeams* "imperialistic" or "anti-democratic". That is, those who opposed *Kookdaean* also included other professors in addition to leftist

²⁸⁾ Ibid, p. 272. Pro-Japanese meant head director and vice head director of the Academic Affairs Department. The head director even participated in mobilizing student soldiers, and executives of Hanmindang. The vice head director was suspected of being associated with the Hwashin Company, a representative company of pro-Japan inclination. The newly appointed dean of College of Commerce, was called as profiteer as he was a greatly successful enterpriser and anti-communist.

²⁹⁾ Bang Sun-joo, "Information and material of the U.S. force area; Bang Sun-joo and others, op. cit.,

professors. It was disclosed that the well-known document by which Huh Heon was ordered to go on strike, and which the police captured from leftist students on Feb. 16, was not sent by a Soviet Army officer, but invented by a rightist group.³⁰⁾ The fact that the falsification was revealed showed that the U.S. military government analyzed the incident without prejudice; Namrodang controlled the anti-*Kookdaean* movement, but very carefully supported it. It is true that progressive academies including Minjeon, the Federal Union of Culture & Art Groups, the Chosun Educators' Association, and the Professors' Union of Junior Colleges were organized by the instruction of Namrodang.³¹⁾ But, it is uncertain to what extent Namrodang was involved in the movement. The standpoints of Namrodang and the anti-movement organization are all alike, in terms of disturbing the legitimacy of direct governance of the U.S. military government. But, it remains uncertain whether the party was involved in the movement firsthand or whether the academies spread the movement by their own decision.

The U.S. military government officers agreed to the need for establishing a national university, but had no concrete guidance about the type, functions and operation of the university. As they were in a hurry to resolve imminent questions, they were ready to receive conflicting opinions, different from those of Korean officers. According to one report, they agreed to appoint Koreans as directors and president of SNU, at the SNU joint meeting held on Feb. 14,

³⁰⁾ "School Strikes in Seoul, Korea: Their Political Implication", Lee Kil-sang, op. cit., p. 276

³¹⁾ Appointment of Kim Il Sung University, 1947, RG242 or my thesis, 1996

1947, shortly after the strike. But, the compromise was not accepted by professors, on the grounds that it was against "self-administration".³² In the long run, Military Governor Ruch suggested revising Act 102, a basis of *Kookdaean*, on Feb. 27, 1947, and filed it with the legislative committee. More interesting was that the U.S. drew back from it, instead entrusting Koreans with the whole process of mapping out the compromise. As revealed above, the project was settled by passage of the revised bill, and the organization of a new board of directors. The revised bill showed that it was not a one-sided victory or defeat of a group. Kyungsoong University and state universities were closed, while a national university system remained. Thus, the key issue of the anti-*Kookdaean* movement, aimed at abolishing a national university, would prove to end in failure. But if the key issue lies in the autonomy of universities, the organization of a board of Korean directors from representatives of nine universities cannot be regarded as a failure. It should be regarded as a compromise. In addition, the professors still meet at each college, though they are given limited authority. In the case of education colleges, the college council is still directly appointed by professors, as originated by Kyungsoong Educational College.

If the anti-*Kookdaean* movement proved not to have ended in failure, then it was *Kookdaean* that failed. Nine universities have directed their personnel management and finance operations independently for a long time, since their establishment. Each college of Kyungsoong University and the

³² It was based on Feb. 18 issue of Jayoo Newspaper and Feb. 19 of Jungeui Newspaper.

state universities are not "universities". In 1968, 22 years after SNU opened, they intended to build up a really good, integrated university. That is, even after integration was carried out, each college still strove to maintain superiority and leadership. Recently, this issue was brought to public notice in relation to "direct election of college's president".³³⁾

In short, due to influence of the anti- *Kookdaean* movement, some customary practices of autonomy like those found in imperial universities still remain. The price was great. SNU, unlike *Kimdae*, required a long time to develop into a unified university. In some respects, the process is not yet realized.

IV. DIVISION OF UNIVERSITIES

A number of competent and well-respected professors of SNU, graduated from imperial universities, and who were at the center of the anti-*Kookdaean* movement, went North and took part in establishing *Kimdae*. They each held a unique position in the academic disciplines, and were known as "competent teachers" to the students.³⁴⁾ The following discussion will disclose another aspect of

³³⁾ Direct voting for president is a practical system but not a legal system. The actualization of this system is regarded as a great achievement according to public opinion of SNU. It signifies that the system of appointing a president by reinforced government as a device of control over universities was out. But direct voting is not enough to guarantee self-administration of universities. The system is a system of imperial universities, and we should not overlook that their nostalgia or affection for that affected selection of direct voting. In particular, most professors who sought the essence of college thought that it was natural that they elected president directly. The slogan was frequently mentioned in the autonomy movement in SNU.

³⁴⁾ *Kimdae* Curriculum vitae of professors, 1947, RG242

the educational democracy movement, a slogan of the anti-*Kookdaean* movement, to reveal the reason why these professors moved to *Kimdae*. Furthermore, it will show some of the origin of the division of the universities.

Let's re-examine whether the anti-*Kookdaean* movement was literally "democracy of education". The term is a rhetorical expression used in the ideological struggle between leftists and rightists. But, it was not easy to logically maintain this assertion. "Not joining to SNU professors" also knew that well. As was generally known to the public in 1946, the U.S. was a leading democratic country, and Japan was the most villainous, militaristic country. So, it was not easy to condemn "American style" colleges as anti-democratic, and to define the maintenance of "Japanese style" colleges as promoting educational democracy. Prof. Park Keuk-che, from the Law College of Kyungsung University, endeavored to overcome these logically vexing problems in the following way.

Even in Japan, which follows fascism, freedom of study, freedom of learning, freedom of students, the right to decide on the appointment and dismissal of professors have been secured...35)

Prof. Han In-suk said that the autonomy of professors that enabled them to recommend their peers and, through the professors' meeting, to appoint managers and directors of colleges derived from Japanese universities, and it can be

*35) Park Keuk-che, "Settlement of Democratic Academy", Chosun People's Newspaper, July 17, 1946.

maintained for the following reasons.

Even in Japan, an anti-democratic country, professors' autonomy was recognized in order to protect colleges from bureaucracy.³⁶⁾

It held that self-rule was secured even in fascism and in anti-democratic countries, and that no reason existed for it not to be so in democratic countries. In terms of the non-educational aspect, however, professors' self-administration was a unique system in Japanese imperialistic colleges, not "Even in Japan". There is no doubt that the model for the professors' meeting was transplanted from German colleges into the Japanese colleges. But, as to "not joining to SNU professors", this autonomy was considered the product of Japanese "nationalist education". Faculty-autonomy of the college as an organization was not allowed even in private colleges in Japan. Self-administration of professors was not the sole condition to guarantee academic freedom. Universities in other countries, including American universities, guarantee academic freedom without the premise of professors' self-administration. Professors' self-administration, just as in imperial universities, was a premise to guarantee the privilege and authority given to professors. It was a limited and exclusive privilege granted in order to cultivate the ruling classes of Japan. Thus, it was "a vestige of Japanese imperialism". The problem lies in opinion and thoughts on what a college is. People from imperial universities, American universities, or Russian universities varied in their

³⁶⁾ Han In-suk, "*Kookdaseon* and Korean Education", *Our Public Opinion*, Apr. 1947, pp. 18-34.

opinion about other universities. They also presented different opinions on specific and general alternatives for the liquidation of colonial education. Professors from imperial universities who were leading the anti-*Kookdaean* movement to secure self-administration of colleges moved North, but they did not reiterate their assertions. The dispute on self-administration was, in the long run, a struggle to secure the right to appoint professors. The "not joining to SNU professors" endeavored to preserve that vested right, and officers of the DOE struggled to break it.

The "not joining to SNU professors" won superiority in an ideological struggle, by redefining the anti-*Kookdaean* movement as the "educational democracy" movement. The democracy they conceived meant professors' self-administration. As Prof. Han In-suk said, it is the key point of democracy that the deans and presidents of colleges elected by professors represent the opinion of all the professors.³⁷⁾

"Not joining to SNU professors" secured extensive support for the anti-*Kookdaean* movement from the general public by emphasizing the progressive side of both aspects of self-administration. The anti-movement was spread as a systematic social movement with implications beyond the indication of the professors' intentions. In the "educational democracy" movement, the term "education" was merely a rhetorical expression; practically, it meant a political struggle. As the U.S. intelligence authority indicated, Namrodang welcomed Jongdaean in the North, and opposed *Kookdaean* in the

³⁷⁾ Op. cit.

South inconsistently. This policy originated by political determination in an attempt to bring about a crisis in the orthodoxy of the USMGIK that put forward *Kookdaean*. But as they expressed such political intention as "educational democracy", not only professors and lecturers but also almost all students and faculty participated in the movement. Later, at each school, students who had no concern in this matter took part in the strike in order to gain "educational democracy". According to a survey of the legislative committee, this was an unprecedented political movement that instigated an overall strike and operated systematically by unified instruction delivered to every sub-organization in each school with a well-laid plan and agile activities.³⁸⁾ "Not joining to SNU professors" succeeded in mobilizing the masses. The general public harbored suspicion about *Kookdaean* itself. It was thought of as some kind of conspiracy and believed to be the work of Americans. National sentiment amplified the anti-*Kookdaean* movement. The national conflict played as a motive of the project more than as a status conflict implanted by revisionists.

One justification for the anti-*Kookdaean* movement that gained sympathy with the general public lay in the realization of college autonomy. But, as indicated in another thesis on *Kimdae*, *Kimdae* did not accept self-administration of colleges in imperial universities. The self-rule of professors who were against *Kookdaean* meant professors' self-rule, and its essence lay in the right of personnel management to elect the president, deans and professors of the college. But, all the administrative executives,

³⁸⁾ <Stenographic record>

including deans of departments, were elected by the educational bureau of *Iminwi* in order to represent the party and the educational bureau—not "to represent the opinion of all professors". The organization of *Kimdae* did not constitute a professors' committee. The professors' right to decide was very limited in the decision-making process in regard to the main issues of colleges. The college council, same name as in imperial universities, was established, but it was not a supreme organ of resolution. After its establishment, all the main issues were resolved by the educational bureau of the temporary People's Committee. There was no qualitative difference between this situation for *Kimdae* and the fact that the Ministry of Educational Affairs exercised decision-making rights in the preparation and implementation of *Kookdaean*.

When we compare SNU and *Kimdae*, we see that the former allowed more autonomy than the latter. The college council existed and exercised some rights, even though limited. But professors of SNU who were against *Kookdaean* and went North eagerly joined in *Jongdaean*, which did not allow professors' self-administration. They did not instigate students to support an anti-movement that could hamstring the functions of colleges. Here is evidence of lack of consistency. How can this inconsistent behavior be expressed? It is another aspect of educational democracy. The realization of college autonomy is the only justification for the anti-*Kookdaean* movement, and it is not a real reason. The real reason for the anti-*Kookdaean* movement was to maintain the professorship and especially, to maintain exclusive rights. According to higher education standards of the colonial era, only imperial universities were "the

college among colleges", beyond comparison. At the time when the prestiges and reputations of Kyungseong University was still highly strong, to get a professorship at an old imperial university was the symbol of honor and authority. In particular, to those who came from imperial universities, it was to be a lifelong pursuit. So, professors could not admit that such privilege should be shared with others in junior colleges by the standards of *Kookdaean*. They took to the street to oppose *Kookdaean* solely in order to preserve their professorship in reputable colleges that were different from other schools. But, they needed a justification for their behavior, and they selected college autonomy or "educational democracy" as the focus for their actions. They achieved a victory in this struggle, by causing a nationwide strike. As a result, SNU remained paralyzed throughout the year.

The reform group that struggled to clear away all vestiges of colonial higher education grasped the intention hidden in the name of college autonomy. The group could not allow the professors to keep their colleges exclusively to themselves. In this struggle, the group recognized all the Namrodang professors who came from imperial universities, a central force of the anti-*Kookdaean* movement, as leftists. To the reform group, liquidation of colonialism and expulsion of leftist professors were in the same line of thinking. But not all professors who remained in SNU or who went North after the anti-*Kookdaean* movement were leftists, and their opposition of *Kookdaean* was not based on leftist ideology. The three categories of argument—academic clique, ability and political beliefs—seem to be very similar, but do not come within the same sphere: Each is independent and cannot

be assigned to another category. The reform group, however, categorized the anti-*Kookdaean* group as a leftist group. During the Cold War, the most powerful way to incapacitate an opposing power was to unite several movements into one, label it leftist, and condemn it. Under the direct governance of the U.S. military, pro-Japan sentiment was acceptable but pro-Communism was not. The reform group succeeded considerably in simplifying anti-*Kookdaean* power. Accordingly, the *Kookdaean* movement has long been regarded only from a single position, confrontation between right and left. It is an extremely simplified interpretation.

To avoid such simplification, the anti-*Kookdaean* movement should be regarded through a wide spectrum. Seemingly, the ideological strife was symbolic in the real struggle to preserve the vested rights of professorship. In addition, the fundamental reason for preserving these vested rights was the self-realization of scholars. It was the same for both parties. Apart from their ideology, most of the scholars hoped to devote themselves to the liberated country. They were willing to make sacrifices. To make their ambition come true, those scholars required professorship. For them, *Kookdaean* meant depriving them of their chances for self-realization. Namrodang seemed to have power enough to satisfy their desire and demand, and to remove their complaints. So it was that most of the scholars joined the anti-*Kookdaean* movement.

The DOE Affairs did not achieve the practical and material means to realize the initial intent, establishment of "a grand university". What they secured was authority and some limited rights under the dominance of the U.S. military government. Expression of extremely limited

resources and capability was *Kookdaean*. It was merely an administrative order promulgated by Act. It was a documentary reform. There was no faculty or campus that ought to be prepared as a university. No plan was made to invest for facilities to become "the highest university". The Faculty of Science and Engineering of Kyungsoong University, with the best scientific experimental facilities at the time, was devastated by the occupation of the U.S. military.³⁹⁾ Even an imminent budget for preventing leaks in the roof during the rainy season was not secured.⁴⁰⁾ In general, *Kookdaean* was a rough-and-ready plan. The reform group, like *Kimdae*, did not prepare an additional budget, but it also failed in mustering nationwide support and encouragement, unlike *Kimdae's* "Rice for Patriotism". In these circumstances and climate, professors attempted to select a college that guaranteed their self-realization, apart from their political beliefs. Many professors went North to devote themselves

³⁹⁾ For destruction of facilities by the U.S. in the College of Engineering, Kyungsoong University, see Major Lock hard Report, Form 11 Sept. 45 to 28 Feb. 46, or Interview with Lt. CMDR, A. Crofts, USNR., Foreign Affairs Section, MG, 21 January 1946, Interview with Major Lock hard, 9 March, 1946. According to Crofts, "school facilities were thoroughly devastated, and could not be recoverable", and afraid that such reckless destruction probably delays real scientific education in Korea.

⁴⁰⁾ Harry B. Anstead, Progress Report: Seoul National University, 4 Aug., 1947, RG332. The support of a central administrative agency to SNU was poor. The 4/4 quarter budget was not delivered by the end of the year. The budget of 1947 was not settled even by April. "The budget for repairing facilities that require immediate repair" was rejected, and great damage in the summer season was caused. Electricity and waterworks were not properly supplied, and buildings for the College of Engineering could not be used. As a result, establishment of a laboratory was also delayed. Due to lack of finances and irresponsibility, SNU in the beginning could not be supported by the government.

to real study. *Jongdaean* had good insight into the minds of professors as far as research conditions were concerned.

In fact, the role of American officers was not as great as supposed. What, then, did they do, and what was the result? In the past, *Kookdaean* was considered to have been accomplished based on unity in purpose of the U.S. military and Korean officers. However, the idea referred to as "conspiracy" should be reviewed again. U.S. military officers were conducive to the spread of anti-American sentiment in the public in Korea due to their rough handling of businesses. Their measures, including frequent reckless destruction of facilities in the U.S. military, caused anti-American sentiment. As a typical example, American citizens were appointed to the posts of president, dean of academic affairs, dean of students, and all other important positions at SNU. Through a series of tough administrative measures, they expected to emphasize their role beyond the normal scope. In terms of the respect and privilege granted to professors at imperial universities, the authority and dignity of the president would be great. But [as newly appointed SNU dean,] Protestant pastor Anstead began the routine work of the day saying, "Let's pray together". Such practice was probably regarded as religious oppression or national contempt. However, it was the imprudent behavior of the head director Pittenger that led to the deterioration of the situation. In December 1946, when students of the liberal arts, commerce and law colleges resolved to join in the strike, he inspected the campus in military uniform and with an exceptionally large revolver.⁴¹⁾ He also ordered the closing of the school

⁴¹⁾ For behavior of Pittenger, Jang Ri-wook, op. cit., p. 236 or <Stenographic records>

temporarily and punishment of all involved students. He reached the height of his recklessness when he issued a unilateral announcement in a letter to the professors of SNU, in which he used very insulting remarks: There should be something steel in your spine, but now I learn that only mud filled it.⁴²⁾ His impetuous act caused the upsurge of anti-American sentiment among students and professors. The actions of an irrational person like Anstead in the wrong place at the wrong time caused the situation to disintegrate.

However, a collective understanding was more important than the inappropriate behaviors of the U.S. officers. They did not support the rightists in the beginning. When a problem arose, they tried to grasp the situation through objective analysis and take proper action through partial and stopgap measures. But in the end, they turned to the rightists. Thus, the reform group could categorize the anti-*Kookdaean* group as leftist. If an integrated university plan based on a "grand union" had existed, the U.S. officers would have helped it to become a reality. In short, the division of colleges was not merely caused by an attack of cultural imperialism on the part of the U.S. military. It stemmed from internal dissension among scholars and intellectuals. Direct governance by the U.S. military and the appearance of an irresponsible American officer sped up the division. The U.S. military did not impose their beliefs and policies unilaterally like cultural imperialists. They had no power to do so. We had not accumulated sufficient capacity to convert the intervention and interference of the U.S. military, who tried to protect the interests of their own country, into

⁴²⁾ Jang Ri-wook, op. cit.

actions and policies that would ensure the overall interests of Korea. Gradually, the evident Cold War, conflict of national interests of both sides, and lack of coordination between the occupation forces and the U.S. military government caused the ultimate division of the two universities.

V. Conclusion

After the defeat of Japan, there was a struggle among different groups to take leadership of the reform in the process of abolishing Japanese colonial higher education. U.S. military officers in the DOE, Korean senior officers of the rightist party, professors who had graduated from imperial universities or who had not graduated from them, and pro-Japanese and anti-Japanese groups could not but each select a different political line depending on changes in the political situation. Those groups greatly contributed to the division of the higher education system by fierce contention, like elitist competing groups in Western European nations.⁴³⁾

In addition, there was struggle among universities. Their conflict also played a great role in the process of dividing the two universities, SNU and *Kimdae*. From the beginning, there was mutual awareness, struggle, and check, on the part of both professors and educational officers. Professors chose their universities based on the possibility of progress of

*43) As for the motive to form a modern state educational system by struggle of groups in England and France, see Margaret Archer, *Social Origins of Educational Systems*, London: Sage, 1976 or Kim Ki-seok, "Historic and Social conditions and motives of secondary education", *Research on Education and Sociology II*, Seoul: Educational Science History, 1994.

SNU or *Kimdae* and even based on the political situation in the North and the South. The struggle was a "zero-sum game". When one party secured some significant share within the limited material and personnel resources, the other inevitably lost. It was in the process of recruiting professors that very fierce competition existed. Most of the professors against *Kookdaean* moved to *Kimdae* from SNU, and vice versa. Figures critical of *Jongdaean* threw up *Kimdae* and went to SNU. The Two Koreas desperately sought to organize "the best university" respectively in the same period with limited resources. Such struggle also hastened the division of the higher education system.

There was no public support or participation to achieve "the best university in the rise and hope of the nation" in organizing SNU. Unlike *Kimdae*, SNU had insufficient financial support from its central administrative organization. But *Kimdae* was created under the systematic movement as "the Highest Hall of Science". SNU happened to secure relatively excellent human resources by relying on the tradition, customs and fame of an old imperial university. The university grew by itself, by relying on human resources. However, SNU has not been able to eliminate its poor facilities and extremely inferior financial conditions which have existed since its beginning.

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