

【논문】

## A Defense of Free Enrichment from Stanley's Binding Argument\*

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【Subject Class】 Philosophy of Language, Pragmatics

【Keywords】 Contextualism, Semanticism, Free Pragmatic Enrichment, Binding Argument, Jason Stanley

【Abstract】 In this paper, I defend and refine the contextualist thesis that there are processes of 'free' pragmatic enrichment that contribute to the explicitly expressed proposition. First, I closely examine a major argument against the thesis, the so-called Binding Argument (BA), made by Jason Stanley (2000), and, finally, refute it on the grounds that it begs the question. Even if the charge of begging the question were not the case, one of its main assumptions, the Coincidence Assumption, in itself is empirically problematic or at least needs further justification. Finally, I adopt and expand the point briefly made in Section 4.2 of Jung (2010) on how a bindable variable for the bound interpretations of the examples used in the BA is pragmatically introduced in an alternative framework of our language faculty supported by Jackendoff (e.g., 1997), not in the one by Chomsky that the argument assumes.

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\* I would like to thank three reviewers of *Philosophical Ideas* for their helpful comments on the earlier draft; this final paper is a result of my attempts to accommodate, or respond to, the points they raised. And I thank Alison Hall for her helpful comments on several points of the paper.

## I . Introduction

Consider the following examples of ‘unarticulated constituents,’ which are inside brackets<sup>1)</sup> (sentences in (a); possible truth conditions in (b)):

1. a. He is small.  
b. HE IS SMALL <FOR A BASKETBALL PLAYER>.
2. a. Every student passed the examination.  
b. EVERY STUDENT <IN MY CLASS> PASSED THE EXAMINATION.
3. a. John insulted Mary and she left.  
b. JOHN INSULTED MARY AND <AS A RESULT> MARY LEFT.
4. a. The ham sandwich ordered a cup of coffee.  
b. <THE PERSON WHO ORDERED> THE HAM SANDWICH ORDERED A CUP OF COFFEE.
5. a. You are not going to die.  
b. YOU ARE NOT GOING TO DIE <FROM THAT INJURY>.

Semanticists have argued that there are *hidden linguistic indexicals* in the logical form of the sentences used in those utterances whose truth conditional content appears to have an ‘unarticulated’ constituent and that the saturations of the indexicals are the constituents.<sup>2)</sup> For them, they are actually ‘articulated,’ contrary to the appearance. Against this, contextualists have argued that the constituents are provided by *‘free’ pragmatic enrichment processes*: here, the meaning of ‘free’ is

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1) These examples have been used by many theorists (Bach (1994), Hall (2008), Carston (2002), etc.) In this paper, I will focus on the cases of ‘unarticulated’ constituents in fully sentential utterances. The cases of sub-sentential utterances or lexical pragmatics will not be discussed in this paper.

2) Stanley (e.g., 2000, 2002a), Stanley and Szabó (2000)

'not linguistically mandated'.<sup>3)</sup> For them, they are really 'unarticulated'. In this paper, I try to defend and refine this contextualist position on this matter.

However, I attempt to consider this issue from a fundamentally different perspective of our linguistic faculty from that of the semanticists and contextualists. Specifically, I reject an important common picture of the faculty on which both sides of the debate have relied, the Chomskian one where only syntax is generative and other modules such as semantics and phonology are just 'interpretive', and I adopt a relatively new picture of our language faculty, so-called, Representational Modularity (RM), which is mainly supported by Ray Jackendoff (e.g., 1997) in which phonology, syntax and semantics are all generative, having their own constituency. It follows that some portion of the original contextualist position should be given up to the extent that it is related with the old picture. Despite this change, my view remains in the same spirit as the original free enrichment approach. That is, the spirit would be that *the 'unarticulated' constituents are not the results of linguistically mandated pragmatic processes such as saturation, but those of non-linguistically mandated, or 'free' pragmatic ones.*

Now, let me briefly describe how I will defend and refine the contextualist position in this paper. In Section II, after closely examining an argument against the position, the so-called Binding Argument (henceforth, BA), made by Jason Stanley (2000), I argue that its main assumption, the Coincidence Assumption (for short, CA), is derived from Chomskian syntactocentrism and if this is the case, the argument begs the question. Further, I argue that the CA in itself is problematic. In Section III, even if we think that the CA

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3) Robyn Carston (e.g., 1988, 2002), Francois Recanati (e.g., 2004), Hall (2008)

is derived from the principle of compositionality, the BA begs the question. In Section IV, after briefly showing that Chomskian syntactocentrism is empirically seriously challenged, I adopt and expand the point briefly made in Section 4.2 of Jung (2010) on how a bindable variable for the bound interpretation of the examples used in the BA is pragmatically introduced at a non-linguistic representation in Representational Modularity, an alternative picture of language faculty, whose relevant points are outlined.

## II. Binding Argument, Coincidence Assumption, and Syntactocentrism

In this section, I argue that an assumption in the argument, the Coincidence Assumption, is directly derived from the Chomskian ‘syntactocentrism’ of the language faculty (for short, syntactocentrism). And then, I show that if this is the case, the BA is begging the question. Further, I show that even if the charge of begging the question were not the case, the CA in itself is problematic or at least needs much further justification.

First of all, let me formulate the BA into the following standard form:

- 1) Coincidence Assumption: Semantic binding, or a bound interpretation within a clause occurs only when in the logical form of that clause there are both a variable binding operator and a co-indexed variable having a certain structural relation to its binding operator.
- 2) Premise 1: (from Coincidence Assumption) If the interpretations of alleged unarticulated constituents are really the result of free pragmatic enrichment, they cannot be bound by an operator in the sentence since an operator can only interact with a linguistic

variable in the sentence.

- 3) Premise 2: There is a bound interpretation of some alleged unarticulated constituents by an operator. For example, the utterance of (6) has two interpretations, (7) is bound and (8) is not.
  6. Every time John lights a cigarette, it rains.
  7. FOR EVERY TIME T AT WHICH JOHN LIGHTS A CIGARETTE, IT RAINS AT T AT THE LOCATION L AT WHICH JOHN LIGHTS A CIGARETTE.
  8. FOR EVERY TIME T AT WHICH JOHN LIGHTS A CIGARETTE, IT RAINS AT T AT SOME CONTEXTUALLY SALIENT LOCATION.
- 4) Conclusion 1: (by Modus Tollendo Tollens) The interpretations of alleged unarticulated constituents are not the result of free pragmatic enrichment.
- 5) Conclusion 2: (from Premise 2 and CA) There is a bindable linguistic variable in the logical form of the sentence that is responsible for the bound interpretation.

As you can see, the most directly relevant assumption for the BA is the Coincidence Assumption; its main point is that the semantic binding is totally “transparent” into the syntactic binding that occurs in the logical form.

Above all, is the assumption true? Why do we have to infer the existence of a syntactic variable, a linguistic entity, solely from a bound interpretation?

I think that the best justification for it comes from the Chomskian

syntactocentrism. It is the picture of language faculty underlying Chomsky's Government Binding Theory (for short, GB), which Stanley considers as the "best" syntactic theory. Stanley is explicitly committed to syntactocentrism in addition to the CA:

However, the rejection of the account in terms of empty elements is based upon the rejection of a premise that has a high degree of plausibility. The premise in question is that *the objects of semantic interpretation are syntactic logical forms, where these are understood as the final representations produced by the best syntactic theory.* (Stanley, 2000, p. 428, my emphasis)

We can easily see his commitment to syntactocentrism from the italicized sentence in the quotation. Now let me show how the CA is derived from syntactocentrism.

The Chomskian syntactocentrism assumes that only syntax is generative by virtue of recursive rules, and phonology and semantics are only 'interpretive' or 'read off' syntax. In other words, it is only through their syntactic structures that phonological realizations and semantic interpretations could be arrived at. It can be said that the properties of phonology and semantics *supervene* on those of syntax: without any syntactic change, there is no change in phonology and semantics. All semantic elements are traceable into corresponding syntactic ones, even if it is not one-to-one mapping.

This picture can be described as follows:




Fig. 14)

As you can see, in this picture of grammar, first, lexical items are inserted into a syntactic structure from the beginning of its derivation from D-structure to S-structure. Then, syntax generates structures through derivations. Finally, as the last adjustment to the s-structure, PF (Phonological Form) and LF (Logical Form) are derived; however, logical form is still syntactic, where quantifier scope and anaphoric relations are encoded. That is, phonology and semantics are just “interpretive.” Chomsky explicitly endorses this view as follows:

I am assuming throughout that the semantic component of a generative grammar, like the phonological component, is purely interpretive. (Chomsky, 1965, p. 75, Jackendoff, 2002, p. 108)

It is only from this picture that it follows that *all* semantically relevant structures are encoded in the logical form, or, in other words, that semantics is “transparent” to the logical form. This is exactly what Stanley is saying in the quotation above. From this, the Coincidence Assumption is naturally derived where semantic binding coincides

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4) Jackendoff, 2002, p. 109-110.

with syntactic binding.

If one does not accept this syntactocentric assumption, there is no reason to accept the Coincidence Assumption. In other words, *it is only from this picture of our linguistic grammar that the Coincidence Assumption is derived*. For example, if we adopt another possible relationship between syntax and semantics where both systems are independent from each other in terms of their constituency and structural developments, there is no reason to derive the Coincidence Assumption since it doesn't follow only from the existence of semantic binding that there is a corresponding syntactic binding. Also, in this alternative picture, there is no reason to posit that the logical form of a sentence encodes all semantic information. I will illustrate this in Section IV.

If this is the case and we take “the semantic component” in the quotation above to be the intuitive truth conditional content, the BA is begging the question. We can draw its conclusion that there are no unarticulated constituents in the intuitive truth conditional content of the example (6) only from the syntactocentrism assumption. According to syntactocentrism, it is impossible for unarticulated constituents to exist in such content since all semantically relevant elements are encoded in the logical form, a syntactic representation. Then the arguments of contextualists for unarticulated constituents should be seen as attempts to refute the truth of this version of syntactocentrism. Therefore, those who doubt the conclusion doubt the syntactocentric assumption for the same reason; the argument begs the question.

However, it might be objected that the phrase “the semantic component” should be interpreted not as the intuitive truth conditional content but as the standing context-invariant linguistic meaning that is decoded algorithmically, which is far from being truth-conditional.<sup>5)</sup> On this



interpretation, of course, the charge of begging the question can be avoided since such syntactocentrism makes room for unarticulated constituents in the intuitive truth conditional content, not in the linguistic representation. However, I don't think this terminological maneuver is available to Stanley given the fact that the standard semantics in the generative tradition, e.g., a representative work in the area, Heim and Kratzer (1998), which, according to Stanley (2000, p. 412, footnote 23), supports the CA, explicitly announces the target object of the area is the truth conditions of sentences, not their standing context-invariant linguistic meaning. Heim and Kratzer (1998, p. 1) says, "to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth-conditions."<sup>6</sup>

Finally, I will show that even if the BA were not begging the question, the CA in itself is problematic and at least needs justification. I look at direct arguments against the CA made by Jackendoff. With these arguments, he argues that the phenomenon of binding is fundamentally not syntactic but semantic, or that it does not occur not at the level of the logical form, if this level exists.

Let me discuss his first argument (Jackendoff, 1997, p. 75-78). Consider the following sentences:

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- 5) Most contextualists such as Hall, Carston accept this version of syntactocentrism. According to them, the intuitive truth conditional content is the result of adding constituents to the final linguistic representation, or logical form, which is generated as GB suggests, at the level of mental representation (language of thought). Such unarticulated constituents are constituents of mental representation and introduced for pragmatic reasons. Anyway, at least in generating logical form, syntactocentrism works.
  - 6) Contextualists, who Stanley calls "the advocates of truth-conditional pragmatics", reject the theoretical possibility of the truth-conditional semantics: truth conditions should be treated by pragmatics, not semantics. Thus, it is consistent that they accept this version of syntactocentrism and reject the truth-conditional semantics.

9. John took his kids to dinner, but  
 a. Bill didn't.  
 b. Bill would never do so.

In this example, there is a so-called “strict vs. sloppy identity ambiguity” in each interpretation of (9a) and (9b). In the strict identity interpretation, (9a) means that BILL DIDN'T TAKE *JOHN'S KIDS* TO DINNER; in the sloppy one, (9a) means that BILL DIDN'T TAKE HIS *OWN KIDS* TO DINNER. It has been accepted that each interpretation arises, depending on whether a variable in the null VP is bound by “John” or “Bill”. What is at issue is at what level of representation this binding relation is represented. The first suggestion made by Chomsky is that in the case of (9a) the phrase “take his kids to dinner” is not deleted until at Phonological Form. However, this cannot explain the case of (9b) where the phrase “do so” is phonologically realized at Phonological Form. So this suggestion fails. The other suggestions invoke some processes of “reconstruction” at logical form. Consider the following sentence.

10. John patted the dog, but Sam did it to the cat.

With this example, we can see that the anaphor “did it” does not “blindly” copy the VP of its preceding sentence. If it copied in that way, the result would be:

11. \*John patted the dog, but Sam patted (the dog/it) to the cat.

There appears to be a process of reconstruction: after contrasting foci, “John”/ “the dog” and “Sam”/“the cat” are extracted, the reconstruction of the “do it” would be like: x patted y. And the variables “x” and

“y” will be bound by “Sam” and “the cat”, respectively, in the second clause. So far, so good. However, if this explanation is to be successful, the contrasting foci could be extracted from its original place. Look at this example.

12. JOHN wants to ruin his books by smearing PAINT on them,  
but BILL wants to do it with GLUE.

Here, the reconstruction of “do it” would be like: ruin his books by smearing x on them. To arrive at this, the “paint” could be extracted from its own place. However, this is impossible:

13. \*It is PAINT<sub>i</sub> that John is ruining his books by smearing *t<sub>i</sub>*  
on them.

Therefore, this “reconstruction” line of explanations of the “strict/sloppy” ambiguity fails. In other words, this binding phenomenon cannot be properly dealt with by invoking the logical form. The only promising representation for binding is a non-syntactic one, or conceptual structure.

Let me discuss the other more decisive and relevant argument for our present inquiry since it shows that referents introduced by so-called “referential” uses of nouns are relevant with a binding relation, which is impossible within the syntactic or linguistic theory of binding (Jackendoff, 1997, p. 73-74). Consider the following sentences.

14. a. Ringo starts undressing himself.  
b. RINGO STARTS UNDRRESSING THE STATUE OF HIMSELF
15. a. Ringo falls on himself.  
b. RINGO FALLS ON THE STATUE OF HIMSELF

16. a. \*Ringo falls on himself.  
 b. THE STATUE OF RINGO FALLS ON RINGO

The interpretations of these sentences are easily conceivable if their speaker is visiting a wax museum where the statues of the members of the Beatles made with wax are displayed with the living person, Ringo Starr. Jackendoff argues that there is no way of distinguishing (15a) from (16a) in terms of syntax and that the difference between them lies in their conceptual structure, which is supported by the following pair that has the same conceptual structure as (15a) and (16a).

17. a. Ringo fell on the statue of himself.  
 b. \*The statue of Ringo fell on himself.

The conceptual structures of the pairs are as follows:

18. a. [FALL ([RINGO]  $\alpha$ , [ON [VISUAL-REPRESENTATION[ $\alpha$ ]]])]
   
 b. [FALL ([VISUAL-REPRESENTATION [RINGO]  $\alpha$ ], [ON [ $\alpha$ ]])]

Given that the syntactic binding theory can only properly differentiate the pair of (17a) and (17b) but it cannot do that of (15a) and (16a), the binding relation is encoded not entirely at logical form but entirely at conceptual structure. In other words, at least, the logical form that is supposed to explain the relation cannot do the job.

This argument is very significant for our present issue in that it clearly demonstrates the plausibility that non-linguistically pragmatically-introduced elements such as referentially used nouns can stand in a binding relation. Even if semanticists still argue that even such elements

are “semantic”, what it shows is, at least, that the CA where semantic binding must coincide with syntactic binding is not tenable at all.

One might argue that these cases are just “problem cases.” Jackendoff (1997, p. 50) says, anticipating this objection, “the number and variety of different cases that can be attested suggest a larger pattern inconsistent with syntactically transparent composition.” For many other linguistic arguments, refer to Jackendoff (1997, 51-82).

### III. Coincidence Assumption and the Principle of Compositionality

In this section, I respond to the objection that insists that the CA is derived not from syntactocentrism but from the principle of compositionality. I show that even if it is the case, the BA is begging the question.<sup>7)</sup>

One of Stanley's core assumptions presupposed in the discussion of the BA is the principle of compositionality, which is accepted by most versions of semantic theory:

**Principle of Compositionality (PC):** The semantic content of a complex expression is solely determined both by the semantic contents of its simple parts and by the way they are composed.

Intuitively, this principle seems to be appealing and necessary: it seems that without it we cannot properly explain how we could express and understand novel complex expressions that we haven't heard before. Stanley also endorses it as a presupposition for his

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<sup>7)</sup> One reviewer of *Philosophical Ideas* raised this objection. Unfortunately, however, he didn't explain in detail exactly how the assumption is derived from the principle.

discussion against free enrichment in his paper (2000, p. 396), saying “the assumption [principle of compositionality] should be uncontroversial, and I presuppose it in what follows.”

The current form of the principle, however, is too roughly stated to be evaluated properly. To put it another way, to evaluate its truth, we need to clarify the exact meaning of the principle. It is only with a much more explicit interpretation of it that we can judge whether the Coincidence Assumption is derived from it. Since Stanley accepts Chomsky’s Government and Binding Theory (GB) as the “best” syntactic theory, it is very likely that he interprets the principle in accordance with it.

Let me look at what the GB version of the principle looks like. In GB, it is assumed that a lexical item, or, roughly, a word, is an *encapsulated* monolithic entity that contains three distinct kinds of information, syntactic, phonological, and semantic, and it is inserted, as a whole, into terminal nodes of a syntactic structure of a sentence, as illustrated in the Fig. 2 below. The semantic interpretation of a sentence directly originates from the semantic content of each lexical item and the way they are composed, its determinate syntactic structure, i.e., its logical form. The only way the semantic contents of each lexical item are put together is syntactic, as normally construed. For example, according to GB, complex expressions such as ‘a red house’ and ‘a fast typist’ have the same syntactic structure: [DETERMINER [ADJECTIVE+NOUN]]. There is no way of direct interaction between the semantic contents of each lexical item themselves: the interaction between them is only possible through their syntax. In this picture, the essential parts of the principle are interpreted as follows: the ‘parts’ is as ‘lexical items’ and the ‘way’ is as ‘logical form’. The principle, as construed in this way, is assumed to hold in this picture.

The following (a) is an example of the lexical entry for the word, "cat" and (b) illustrates how it is inserted into a simple syntactic structure. Notably, in (b), the whole lexical item is inserted into the terminal node of the syntactic tree, even though other kinds of information except syntactic are not 'visible' to the tree.




Fig. 2<sup>8)</sup>

According to this version of the principle, the meaning of a sentence is solely determined by the meaning of its lexical items and the logical form into whose terminal nodes the items are inserted. It is now easy to see how the Coincidence Assumption is directly derived by the principle: a bound interpretation occurs only when lexical items such as a variable binding operator and a co-indexed variable are (in a certain structural relation) in the logical form of the sentence. In other words, according to the principle, a bound interpretation should be traceable only to linguistic sources, i.e., lexical items and

8) Jackendoff, 1997, p. 84.

the syntactic structure into which they are inserted; this is exactly what the assumption says.

If this is the case and we take “the meaning of a sentence” in the principle to be the intuitive truth conditional content of a sentence, the BA is begging the question. We can draw the conclusion that there are no unarticulated constituents in the intuitive truth conditional content in question, only from the version of the principle, which doesn’t allow any unarticulated constituents.

As in the case of syntactocentrism, if we interpret the phrase “the meaning of a sentence” as meaning the standing context-invariant linguistic meaning, this charge will be avoided. Again, this sounds at most ad hoc: clearly against the mainstream *truth conditional* semantics in the generative tradition.

It might be objected that Stanley doesn’t have to accept this particular version of the principle, just presupposing the roughly stated principle or accepting another version of the principle from which the CA is derived. If he just presupposes the roughly stated principle, the initial insistence that the CA is derived from the principle loses its validity since we can’t derive it from the roughly stated principle. And I can’t see what a version of the principle looks like that the CA is derived from that doesn’t lead to the BA begging the question.

#### IV. Reconsidering the Binding Argument in Representational Modularity

In this section, first, I briefly discuss why I think Chomskian syntactocentrism, on which the debate between semanticists and contextualists is based, is problematic. This justifies the attempt to understand the binding



phenomenon or, more broadly, free enrichment in an alternative picture of language faculty, Representational Modularity (RM), supported by Ray Jackendoff (e.g., 1997). I will adopt and expand the point briefly made in Section 4. 2 of Jung (2010) on how free pragmatic enrichment occurs and how the bound interpretation of the examples in the BA is explained without positing any syntactic elements for the interpretation.<sup>9)</sup>

Above all, surprisingly, Chomskian syntactocentrism has never been linguistically justified in an explicit form of argument. Jackendoff says:

However, *there is no linguistic argument for syntactocentrism*. To be sure, syntactocentrism has successfully guided research for a long time-but it is still just an assumption that itself was partly a product of historical accident. (Jackendoff, 1997, p. 19. His emphasis)

Finally, some people simply see no reason to abandon syntactocentrism despite nearly two decades of evidence for the (relative) autonomy of phonology (I leave semantics aside, on the grounds that I have a personal interest). I urge readers with such inclinations to consider again the possibility that *the syntactocentric model is just a habit dating back to the 1960s*. (Jackendoff, 1997, p. 41. My emphasis)

It is a historical relic from the time when linguists *little* understood the nature of phonology and semantics. In the light of the development of, at least, phonology, which shows it is to a significant extent independent of syntax, setting aside semantics, there is an alternative model which seems to have some advantages over the syntactocentrism, e.g., RM.

Let me illustrate this independence of phonology from syntax. The examples raise quite serious problems of the fundamental assumptions of syntactocentrism on the source of generativity and the lexicon.

First of all, in terms of the types of their constituency and structure,

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9) Note that I am not arguing that RM is a better picture than Chomskian syntactocentrism, which is beyond the scope of the paper.

they are distinct as illustrated as follows:<sup>10)</sup>

19. a. [DP a [NP [AP big] house]]  
 b. [<sub>ϕ</sub> [<sub>ω</sub> a big] [<sub>ω</sub> house]]

While the types of syntactic structure of the phrase, “a big house”, are Noun Phrase, Adjective Phrase, Determiner Phrase, etc., those of phonological structure of it are Prosodic Phrase ( $\Phi$ ) and Prosodic Word ( $\omega$ ). And their constituency is distinct; that is, the constituents that are bracketed in each structure are different.

Also, their conditions of well-formedness are totally different: in phonology, a well-formed phonological structure obeys a condition, Strict Layer Hypothesis, which states that for a phonological structure to be well-formed, a non-terminal unit of the prosodic hierarchy,  $X^P$ , should be exclusively composed of one or more units of the immediately lower category,  $X^{P-1}$ ; conversely, syntax doesn't have such a well-formedness condition.<sup>11)</sup>

These points challenge an important assumption of syntactocentrism that only syntax is generative.

Let's move on to another relevant assumption of syntactocentrism, about the lexicon. In syntactocentrism, the lexicon is a mental dictionary stored in our long-term memory that contains a finite number of items from which phrases and sentences are composed. A lexical item is an encapsulated entity in which semantic, phonological, and syntactic features exist. Each item, *en bloc*, is inserted into a syntactic structure before any derivation originates. Even though other information except syntactic is not “visible” to the structure, it is “dragged” to the end of the derivation

10) Ackema and Neeleman, 2004, p. 135.

11) This issue of the independence of phonology from syntax was discussed in a graduate course at University College London, *Interfaces*, taught by Ad Neeleman, in 2009.

and *then* it is interpreted. This is necessary since each kind of features cannot “act” in its own way. This was illustrated in Fig. 2.

This assumption also, in particular when in combination with syntactocentrism, turns out to be empirically implausible, facing serious challenges.<sup>12)</sup> Let me discuss this. The first challenge is the case of allomorphy. In Dutch, for example, the affix, -ER, which is realized, in most cases, as /-ər/ in English, has two allomorphs, /er/ and /aar/, as follows.

- 20. a. verkop-er  
    sell-er
- b. \*verkop-aar  
        sell-er
- c. \*handel-er  
        trade-er
- d. handel-aar  
        trade-er

The rule for which an allomorph is selected for a certain root is *phonological*: if the root to which the affix is attached ends with /ə/ or /z/, the allomorph, /aar/ is realized for the affix, -ER and, otherwise, the other one, /er/, is realized for the affix. If this is the case, it seems that this phenomenon cannot be properly explained in the picture of syntactocentrism since it assumes that when the lexicon insertion occurs, which is before any syntactic derivations, the phonological form of a lexical item is *determined*: in the example above, on the contrary, it seems that any of the allomorphs have not been selected until the affix is syntactically combined with a root. In other words,

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12) These challenges also were discussed in the *Interfaces* course.

only after the syntactic combination, the phonological rule is applied and, accordingly, one of the allomorphs is decided.

The second challenge is the cases of mismatches of affixes. In English, in most cases, the affix-ER, is phonologically realized *once* as /ər/, e.g., “truck driver”. However, some times, the affix is phonologically realized twice, e.g., “truck filler upper” and “picker upper”. If the lexical item for the affix contained syntactic, phonological, and semantic representations and were, as a whole, inserted into a terminal node of a syntactic structure, how could it be phonologically realized more than once? It seems impossible to explain this in syntactocentrism.

These challenges plus the arguments against the CA in the previous section constitute serious empirical evidence against syntactocentrism.

Stanley expected some line of objection by rejecting syntactocentrism and briefly discussed it, saying:<sup>13)</sup>

However, the rejection of the account in terms of empty elements is based upon the rejection of a premise that has a high degree of plausibility. The premise in question is that the objects of semantic interpretation are syntactic logical forms, where these are understood as the final representations produced by the best syntactic theory. ... Culicover and Jackendoff reject an account in terms of empty elements in actual logical form, because they hold that the objects of semantic interpretation are what they call “conceptual structures” (CCS) ... I find Culicover and Jackendoff’s talk of Conceptual Structure mysterious at best. (Stanley, 2000, p. 428-429)

Contrary to his idea, I hope to have shown that syntactocentrism is flawed seriously enough for it to be reasonable that we discuss the debate at hand in another picture of language faculty. Also, Jackendoff’s conceptual structures are not mysterious at all. Given that we don’t

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13) However, it seems that he doesn’t realize that assuming syntactocentrism leads his BA to begging the question.

think of language of thought as mysterious, we may take the structure to be language of thought, setting aside the detailed differences between them.

Let me outline RM first. Contrary to syntactocentrism, RM assumes that there are three macro-modules: phonology, syntax, and semantics. They are all generative with their own types of constituents, being correlated with each other by linguistic mapping rules. This parallel architecture of our language faculty can be illustrated as follows:




Fig. 3.14)

As you can see, the three macro-modules are generative and they are connected with interfaces into which lexical items are inserted. In RM, however, it should be noted that all these phenomena *except* semantics occur within linguistic faculty: semantics occurs at a level of mental representation, Conceptual Structure (CST), which is not within a language *per se* since it is what language expresses, but a mental representation where sentence meaning is instantiated, general reasoning and connection with world knowledge and perception

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14) This is taken from Jackendoff (2005, p. 18)

happen. It can be said that CST is a language of thought or a central cognitive mode of representation interacting with representations from various sources (e.g., perception modules), as you can see in Fig. 4 below. In other words, CST is the level where thoughts occur: they do so without any help of language as in the cases of animals that have quite complex thoughts but do not have any “language”.





Fig. 4. Architecture of the mind<sup>15)</sup>

The most relevant characteristic of this picture for the present inquiry that makes it distinct from the Chomskian picture of the language faculty is that RM allows semantics to interact with other modules at CST. In the Chomskian one, on the contrary, every semantic composition totally depends on its corresponding syntactic structure; one of the implications of this assumption is that our language faculty is isolated, or encapsulated from other modules. In other words, semantics is a module of grammar, dealing with truth conditions of utterances of sentences. However, in RM, not only semantics but also other modules could contribute to the truth conditional content of utterances, which are determined at CST.

Speaking of the lexicon, as the figure illustrates, it is regarded as

15) This figure is taken from p. 6 of Jackendoff’s paper, forthcoming, Conceptual Semantics.

part of the interface modules. However, it is not “inserted” into them but it *licenses* the correspondence of each symbol in generative modules. A lexical item, “cat” can be represented as follows:



Each representation exists in each corresponding module, independently of each other. But they are connected by a subscripted index, here, “<sub>b</sub>”. This means that they do not constitute a monolithic entity but a correspondence rule. And each representation can have its own internal structure, called *Qualia Structure*, which was impossible in syntactocentrism.

Now, let me get to the point of this section: how free enrichment occurs and the bound interpretation of the examples used in the BA is arrived at. According to Jackendoff, for the sake of the well-formedness of a semantic representation or the satisfaction of pragmatic principles, some element that is not syntactically expressed could be permitted at CST. More specifically, he formulated this conception of composition, called “Enriched composition”, as follows:<sup>16)</sup>

Enriched composition

- a. The conceptual structure of a sentence may contain, in addition to the conceptual content of its LCSs (Lexical Conceptual Structure), other material that is not expressed lexically, but that must be

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16) As you might see, this conception of composition fits well with the picture of contextualists, e.g., in that it allows some materials to be added to a linguistic representation, here, LCS, for a pragmatic reason.

present in conceptual structure either (i) in order to achieve well-formedness in the composition of the LCSs into conceptual structure (*coercion*, to use Pustejovsky's term) or (ii) in order to satisfy the pragmatics of the discourse or extralinguistic context.

- b. The way the LCSs are combined into conceptual structure is determined in part by the syntactic arrangement of the lexical items and in part by the internal structure of the LCSs themselves. (Jackendoff, 1997, p. 49)

As an example of enrichment, he considers an example of metonymy (Culicover and Jackendoff, 2005, p. 227-230):<sup>17)</sup>

22. a. The ham sandwich over in the corner wants another coffee.

b. THE [PERSON CONTEXTUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH] A HAM SANDWICH WANTS ANOTHER CUP OF COFFEE.

Someone might wonder why we have to think (22b) is the truth conditions of (22a) in the first place. Intuitively, it seems to be the case, and, more importantly, both sides in the debate at hand acknowledge that the truth conditions of (22a) is (22b). (Hall 2008, p. 434)

It is clear that in the semantic content of the utterance the bracketed element is not lexically but pragmatically introduced for the well-formedness of semantic content. This process is illustrated as follows: (The X argument should be filled with an agent; otherwise, it must have violated the well-formedness condition. Thus, an adapter is introduced.)

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17) Let me be clear about this. The following point was already made in Section 4.2 of Jung (2010), but the introduction of the point is necessary for the present discussion in that to show a way of making sense of how an unarticulated constituent can be bound is another positive way of rejecting the CA and, in turn, the BA.



23. a. WANT (X , Y)  
           \*\* |                           |  
           SANDWICH                   COFFEE
- b. WANT (X , Y)  
           |                           |  
           [PERSON WITH Z]           COFFEE  
           |  
           SANDWICH

Notably, this kind of ‘adapter’ is conventionalized: it cannot be arbitrarily introduced even if such an ‘adapter’ is needed for the sake of semantic well-formedness.<sup>18)</sup> Another point you should notice is that it contains a variable<sup>19)</sup>. (Jackendoff calls this enrichment “coercion”.)

It should be noted that this enrichment is a kind of a linguistically mandated pragmatic process since a semantic requirement of the verb prompted the process. That is, it is not ‘free’ enrichment. However, this ‘adapter’ analysis could be applied to other examples of metonymy such as “The ham sandwich stinks!” in which the introduction of the adapter is not linguistically mandated but purely pragmatically motivated since there seems no such semantic requirement of “stink” as that of “want”.

From this consideration, we could apply this ‘adapter’ analysis to the examples of free enrichment mentioned in the Introduction in a straightforward way. In the example in which the utterance of “It is raining” means that IT IS RAINING IN LONDON, an ‘adapter’,

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18) What I mean by ‘semantic well-formedness’ is intuitively clear in this case. In the remainder, however, I will not bother about what it exactly means in RM since the types of the examples of free enrichment we are considering are introduced in terms of *purely pragmatic* considerations.

19) Of course, what I mean by “variable” is not a syntactic entity but a conceptual entity at conceptual structure.

[IN X], is pragmatically introduced to the lexically derived semantic structure of the sentence, and then, a contextually relevant value, LONDON, fills the X argument. To conform to the pragmatic principles, e.g., satisfying the expectation of relevance, pragmatics introduces an ‘adapter’ and its variable is saturated as follows:

24. a. IT IS RAINING

b. IT IS RAINING [IN X]  
 |  
 LONDON

If so, we can understand how the bound interpretation arises of the example used in the BA, which is repeated as follows:

6. Every time John lights a cigarette, it rains.
7. FOR EVERY TIME T AT WHICH JOHN LIGHTS A CIGARETTE,  
 IT RAINS AT T AT THE LOCATION L AT WHICH JOHN  
 LIGHTS A CIGARETTE.
8. FOR EVERY TIME T AT WHICH JOHN LIGHTS A CIGARETTE,  
 IT RAINS AT T AT SOME CONTEXTUALLY SALIENT  
 LOCATION.

(7) arises when the variable ‘X’ is bound while (8) arises when the variable is free.<sup>20)</sup>

It might be objected that the ‘ham sandwich’ examples don’t directly show whether *binding* occurs with those adapters introduced

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20) I don’t think that for free enrichment to take place an ‘adapter’ that contains a variable is needed. For example, particularly, in sub-sentential utterances, given that in RM it seems plausible that the constituents coming from other modules such as a visual one could contribute to their truth conditions, there is no need for an ‘adapter’ having a variable in those cases. However, in the example used in the BA, as I have argued, there is a variable in the ‘adapter’ introduced. I think the bound interpretation constitutes evidence for its existence.

pragmatically. However, given that we have seen the possibility of the binding with referential use of nouns such as the 'Ringo' sentences above, this objection can be dismissed.

What matters for our present inquiry is to see that according to this analysis, the phenomenon of binding happens at CST, a non-linguistic representation, and such an 'adapter' containing a variable is pragmatically introduced when it is necessary for the semantic well-formedness or for satisfying the pragmatics of discourse. This indicates that without presupposing the picture of syntactocentrism, a bound interpretation alone can't serve as evidence for the existence of a linguistic variable responsible for a bound interpretation.

Of course, to properly establish this pragmatic analysis, contextualists should answer such questions as, "What do you mean by "the pragmatics of discourse"?", "Where can or can't such a pragmatically introduced 'adapter' be permitted?" To answer these questions is out of the scope of this paper. For suggestions of the answers to these questions, refer to Hall (2008) or Jung (2010).

## V. Conclusion

I hope that I have succeeded in defending and refining free enrichment from Stanley's argument, the Binding Argument. My main reason for the refutation of the BA is that it begs the question. The Coincidence Assumption, its main assumption, leads it to begging the question since assuming it amounts to assuming syntactocentrism, only from which we can draw the conclusion of the argument. Further, I argue that the assumption itself is problematic. Finally, I show a way of making sense of how an unarticulated constituent can be bound at a non-linguistic representation in a non-syntactocentric picture of language faculty.

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투 고 일: 2012. 04. 08.  
심사완료일: 2012. 05. 07.  
게재확정일: 2012. 08. 15.

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## 스탠리의 속박 논변으로부터 자유로운 풍부화 옹호

정지문

이 논문에서 명시적으로 표현된 명제에 기여하는 ‘자유로운’ 화용론적 풍부화 과정이 있다는 맥락주의 논제를 옹호하고 정교화 한다. 우선, 이 논제에 대한 반론으로 제이슨 스탠리 (2000) 논문에서 제시된 속박 논변 (Binding Argument)을 면밀히 검토한다. 그 후논점을 선취하고 있다는 근거로 이 논변을 거부한다. 설령 논점을 선취를 하지 않았다고 가정하더라도, 속박 논변의 핵심 가정인 일치 가정 (Coincidence Assumption) 자체가 경험적으로 문제가 있거나 최소한 더 많은 정당화가 필요하다고 주장한다. 마지막으로 속박 논변이 가정하고 있는 촘스키적 언어 능력에 대한 틀에서가 아니라 제켄도프 (1997)에 의해 지지되는 틀에서 어떻게 속박 논변에서 사용된 예의 속박 해석을 위한 변항이 화용론적으로 도입될 수 있는지를 정지문 (2010) 논문의 4.2장에서 간략하게 언급된 입장을 채택하고 더욱 설명한다.

**주제어:** 맥락주의, 의미주의, 자유로운 풍부화, 속박 논변, 제이슨 스탠리