

1. INTRODUCTION

In a syntax-oriented linguistic theory, such as Chomsky's *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, in which the distinction between linguistic competence and linguistic performance is drawn and grammar is concerned with describing and explaining an ideal speaker's knowledge of his language, aspects of language use have been precluded from its domain, as observable in a statement like: 'grammars seek to describe sentences *in isolation from its possible settings in linguistic discourse (written or verbal) or in nonlinguistic contexts (social or physical)*' (Katz and Fodor (1963: 173): emphasis is original). Delimiting the domain of grammar to the sentence as the maximal unit of analysis in isolation and abstraction from the context in a discourse, could be maintained only by shunning linguistic research on meaning and use as something unexplorable at the present stage of what we know about language.¹

However, there is a wide range of linguistically significant phenomena that cannot be adequately accounted for in a theory of sentence grammar—pronominalization, deletion, elliptical constructions, topicalization, and many others. What is called for is a theory of generative grammar whose perspective is broad enough to take into account some aspects of language use or speech acts. In the absence of such a theory, the present study which purports to describe some pragmatic aspects of discourse in a systematic and formal manner is indeed programmatic and tentative.

The general theoretical framework of this study is that of generative semantics as advocated by McCawley, Lakoff, Postal and others. Some basic assumptions underlying the present study may be stated as follows:

- (1) a. Syntactic and semantic representations are of the same formal nature, related by a single system of rules.²
- b. Non-terminal node labels in semantic representations are S, NP, and V, corresponding to the logical proposition, argument, and predicate.³
- c. Lexical items are decomposable into semantic constituents, and semantic constituents in non-terminal nodes can form semantic units through pre-lexical transformations.⁴
- d. Each noun phrase has an index and its content comes from a sentence.⁵

Although the general frame of reference is generative semantics, the present study

departs from this in a significant way: generative semantics, like Chomsky's '(extended) standard theory', makes no recourse to a unit larger than a sentence. Thus it is a semantically (or logically) based sentence grammar.

In this study two discourse operators 'honorific' and 'focus' are introduced, both originating in the structure of discourse; the former in a given discourse situation relative to the speaker and other participants, the latter in the structure of information in a discourse. These two discourse operators will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

The notions 'discourse' and 'context', have normally been used as undefined, prescientific terms. For the purpose of this study, discourse is characterized as follows: a discourse D generates a set of utterances, U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n such that U_i is semantically cohesive with U_j , where U_i (immediately) precedes U_j in D . Such a characterization of discourse still involves an undefined term 'semantic cohesiveness'. Its definition must include, among others, temporal, causal, implicational, and similar relations between U_i and U_j . It is assumed in this study that there exists a set of conditions characterizing the notion of 'semantic cohesiveness.' Context may be divided into two types: linguistic context and nonlinguistic context. The linguistic context of U_i may be defined as coterminous with the domain of the discourse D ; its nonlinguistic context extends over to the beliefs of the speaker and the hearer, social and cultural conventions shared by the members of the speech community, factual knowledge of the world, etc.⁶

The term 'utterance' rather than 'sentence' applies to discourse. What is generally assumed to be a 'sentence' as a unit of analysis is a 'decontextualized' utterance in a given discourse. The process of decontextualization is one of relating utterances to sentences by way of extracting utterances from the context and filling out their structure by adding various elements given in the context, by replacing pro-forms (e.g. pronouns and proverbs) with full-forms used in the previous utterances, and the like.⁷ Thus, in this study it is assumed that every sentence under analysis is superordinated by a discourse frame, which consists of one or more discourse sentences containing a verb of discourse, speaker index, hearer index, time index, place index, and manner index (cf. Chapter 2).

The term 'semantic structure' (or logical structure) refers to 'the level of linguistic structure to which logical rules of inference apply' (McCawley 1971b), and as such there are transformations applying prior to the representation of semantico-logical structure, such as tense formation (cf. Chapter 2), question formation (cf. Chapter 5), vocative formation (cf. Chapter 2), discourse-level formation (cf. Chapter 2) and also subject selection (in

the sense of Fillmore (1968)).⁸

The following notational conventions and abbreviations are used in this study:

- (2) a. Semantic material (not a morpheme) is represented by CAPITAL letters: e.g. 'DO', 'AT'.
- b. Single quotes indicate the meaning of the lexical item; italicizing indicates the form of the lexical item: e.g. *tta* 'time', *kos* 'place'.
- c. Korean forms, based on the current spelling system in Korea, are in the Yale Romanization (cf. Martin 1954; Martin et al 1967, 1969); they are not in morphophonemic or underlying representations.
- d. Spacing and hyphenation indicate morpheme or word boundaries.
- e. A dot (.) is often used in place of a hyphen.
- f. Interlinear glosses are provided to show roughly the way constituents of a sentence are structured in Korean.
- g. A translation is shown in quotes; a literal translation is often given in parentheses.


(3) Abbreviations:

| | |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| NOM(inative) | B(lunt D-level) |
| GEN(itive) | F(ormal D-level) |
| ACC(usative) | Pol(ite marker) |
| TOP(ic) | PST (=past) |
| VOC(ative particle) | COP(ula) |
| D(eclarative) | H(onorific) |
| Q (=interrogative) | HPM (=honorific person marker) |
| IMP(erative) | MOD(iifier) |
| PROP(ositionive) | NMZ (=nominalizer) |
| Pl(ain D-level) | QM (=quotative marker) |
| Int(imate D-level) | RETRO(spective) |
| Fam(iliar D-level) | NEG(ative) |

2. DEIXIS AND DISCOURSE

2.1. Discourse Frame. The notion 'deixis'¹, which in the past has received a peripheral treatment in linguistics, could, it now appears, be treated in grammar formally and explicitly, as evidenced in recent studies of performatives by Ross (1970) and Sadock (1969a,b), or tense and time deixis by McCawley (1971a), Huddleston (1969), and Vanek (1971), or person deixis by Ingram (1971), or deictic categories involved in 'come' by Fillmore (1966), or the study of logical structure by G. Lakoff and others.

Based on the area of linguistic research mentioned above, I assume that every sentence subject to linguistic analysis is superordinated by an abstract frame of discourse, analogous to performative sentences or superhypersentences (in the sense of Sadock 1969 b), or Hetzron's (1971) statement frame. The discourse frame (in short, the D-frame) contains one discourse sentence (in short, D-sentence) and, depending on the complexity of modality of the sentence under analysis, one or more D-sentences subordinate or coordinate to it. The D-frame then may be represented roughly in the form:



The D-sentence consists of: a discourse verb (in short, D-verb), elements of deixis, i.e., speaker NP (as subject), hearer NP (as indirect object), time, place, manner NPs (as adverbials), and direct object NP, which unless another D-sentence is embedded, dominates 'S', the sentence under analysis. The D-verb is performative (in the sense of Austin 1962) and also includes a class of 'parenthetical' verbs (cf. Urmson 1962)² (e.g. 'assume', 'suppose', etc.) and other modals in an embedded D-sentence. In the D-frame, it is noteworthy, every sentence under analysis is described as a quoted S, 'S', that is S in direct quotation. This may be taken as a way of characterizing the utterance as a sentence. We will return to this when we discuss direct and indirect discourse in (2.6). Now, note that we have postulated five elements of deixis as NPs (at a certain level of representation): speaker, hearer, time, place, and manner. For illustration, let the symbols *a*, *b*, *t*, *p*, and *m* stand for the indices of the respective NPs; then a

declarative sentence S may be paraphrased informally as


- (2) The speaker *a* tells the hearer *b* 'S' in a (formal/plain/...) manner *m* in the place *p*₀ at the time *t*₀.

The paraphrase representation of the D-frame in (2) is formally represented as (3).

- (3) a. (V-initial language: English³)

- i. TELL(*a*, *b*, 'S', *m*, *p*₀, *t*₀)


ii.



- b. (V-final language: Korean)

- i. (*a*, *b*, *t*₀, *p*₀, 'S', *m*)TELL

ii.



The near surface structure representations in (3) are presumably derived from semantic structures in (4).⁴


- (4) a. i. (English: cf. 3.a.i)

AT(IN(IN(DO(*a*, TELL(*a*, *b*, 'S')), *m*), *p*₀), *t*₀)

- ii. (Korean: cf. 3.b.i)


((((*a*, (*a*, *b*, 'S')TELL)DO, *m*)IN, *p*₀)IN, *t*₀)AT

b.




Note that the adverbial element of time, place or manner is analyzed as a two-place predicate—a predicate relating the embedded structure to time, place or manner.⁵ Derivation of the near surface structure (3) from the semantic structure (4) includes transformations familiar in generative semantics, such as subject raising, predicate raising, equi-NP-deletion, and tree pruning.⁶ When the derivation reaches surface structure, node-relabeling takes place in such a way that adverbial phrases of time, place, and manner are derived roughly by the process illustrated in (5).

(5) a. (English)



b. (Korean)



The subtree on the left in (5) shows the structure of time NP at the stage where the node S is deleted by pruning; the subtree in the middle shows that the NP is relabeled as AdvP and the predicate 'AT' is lexicalized as *at*, *in*, etc. (in English) or *ey*, ϕ , etc. (in Korean); the subtree on the right shows that the V node is further relabeled as a preposition (in English) or postposition (in Korean).

Each constituent NP in the D-sentence has its index and description; the description contains whatever description is relevant and adequate to the situation of a given discourse, the speaker's and hearer's names, their kinship relationship, their social status, the time and place of utterance, etc. At the last stage of derivation, the D-frame consisting of one or more D-sentences, subordinate or coordinate, is deleted together with the quotation marks around the S under analysis. The manner NP is systematically absent in English, while it is systematically present in languages like Korean and Japanese. I will give a detailed account on the role of the deictic manner NP in the discussion of discourse levels and honorification of Korean in Chapter 3. Throughout this study I will represent D-frames in the form given in (3), that is, near surface structure representation, simply for ease of exposition and illustration.

2.2. Person Deixis. In many languages the speaker and the hearer in a discourse are syntactically specified as first and second person, respectively. The D-frame provides a semantically well-motivated basis for the syntactic notion of person. McCawley (1968a : 158) has proposed first and second person specification in terms of subset relation between the indices in a given NP and the indices of the subject and indirect object of the performative. Ingram (1970) has similarly proposed an analysis of person and number by introducing deictic features of person, e.g. $\langle \pm sp \rangle$, $\langle \pm hr \rangle$, etc. In the following analysis of person and number, I will directly make use of the speaker and hearer indices *a* and *b*, respectively, in the semantic structure of a noun phrase, rather than introducing

a system of deictic features.

2.2.1 Speaker Deixis and First Person. In a given discourse the speaker is a single person, while the hearer is either single or multiple. Several persons may speak to a single person simultaneously in an exactly identical location; yet, such a discourse situation may not be construed as constituting a multiple speaker deixis. Each speaker is engaged in his own speech act, independent of others. In this sense we may say that a speech act is speaker-oriented, which is putatively true. Thus, the configuration in (6.a) is ill-formed, while that in (6.b) is well-formed.

(6) a. $*I_1 + I_2 + \dots + I_n \rightarrow WE$

b. $YOU_1 + YOU_2 + \dots + YOU_n \rightarrow YOU_{p1}$

First person singular is specifiable as the structure of NP which exhaustively dominates an index identical to that of the speaker NP in the D-frame, as represented in the following form:

(7) First Person Singular


$$\begin{array}{c} NP \rightarrow [IP, Sg] \\ | \\ a \end{array}$$

First person plural, or for that matter second and third person plural as well, seems to be rather complex: plurality of syntactic person involves set and subset relations, or more specifically, as observed by McCawley (1968a: 145-6), it involves an operation of set-theoretic union, such as (8)⁷.


(8) $x_1 \cup x_2 = \{x_1, x_2\}$

Plurality of syntactic person is derived from the index of a conjoined NP whose conjuncts have undergone a union operation to form a set. Depending on the constituent structures of the NP, first person plural may be subgrouped as shown in (9). Note that if the highest NP in each subgroup is not given a set reading its conjuncts are individually specified for person and number as marked below the corresponding indices in the tree.


(9) a. Subgroup 1. the speaker and a single hearer. (Inclusive 'we')




- b. Subgroup 2. the speaker and multiple hearers.⁸ (Inclusive 'we')




- c. Subgroup 3. the speaker and a single third person. (Exclusive 'we')




- d. Subgroup 4. the speaker and multiple third persons. (Exclusive 'we')




- e. Subgroup 5. the speaker, a single hearer, and a single third person. (Inclusive 'we')




- f. Subgroup 6. the speaker, multiple hearers, and a single third person. (Inclusive 'we')



g. Subgroup 7. the speaker, a single hearer, and multiple third persons. (Inclusive 'we')



h. Subgroup 8. the speaker, multiple hearers, and multiple third persons. (Inclusive 'we')



Subgroups 3 and 4 are distinct from the rest in that they exclude the hearer(s); hence exclusive 'we'.


2.2.2 Hearer Deixis and Second Person. In a discourse the speaker may speak to one or more persons. The hearer NP in the D-frame is either a single NP or a conjoined NP. Normally, the speaker is distinct from the hearer, but in a certain monolog situation, say when the speaker speaks to himself in front of the mirror, an interesting problem arises with respect to the use of first or second person. Consider a discourse situation in which John talks to himself, either as in (10.a) or in (10.b), that is, either using *you* or *I*.

(10) a. (John,) you are a fool.

b. (*John,) I am a fool.


The vocative *John* can cooccur only with *you*, not with *I*. (10.b) is normal and the following semantic structure will account for it; (Note that the same index *a* is assigned to both the subject and indirect object NPs in the D-frame.)

(11)



The use of *you* in (10.a) may be best accounted for in terms of the counterpart theory such as proposed by G. Lakoff (1970a): the person John talks to—the person in the mirror or his mirror image, may not be regarded or purported by John as identical to himself, the two belonging to different ‘worlds’. Since the purported reference in the mind of the speaker is not the same as the speaker, an index different from that of the speaker may as well be assigned to the indirect object NP. Then the semantic structure underlying (10.a) may be represented as


(12)



The NP under ‘S’ is pronominalized as *you* under identity with the hearer index *b*.


In the same mode of description as that given for first person, the specification of second person may be described as in (13).

(13) a. Second Person Singular




b. Second Person Plural:


(i) Subgroup 1. multiple hearers.




(ii) Subgroup 2. a single hearer and a single third person.




(iii) Subgroup 3. a single hearer and multiple third persons.



(iv) Subgroup 4. multiple hearers and a single third person.



(v) Subgroup 5. multiple hearers and multiple third persons.



As was the case in the first person plural specification, specifying a conjoined NP for the second person plural is based on the set reading of the union of the conjuncts. If the NPs in Subgroups (2-5) are not given a set reading, their conjuncts are individually specified for person and number as marked below the corresponding indices in the trees.

Specifications of NPs for person and number would then proceed in a straightforward manner, as suggested by McCawley (1968a : 158): (a) specify an NP as 'first person' if its index contains the speaker index; further, specify it as 'plural' if it is a conjoined NP; otherwise, 'singular'; (b) specify an NP as 'second person' if it has not been specified for person and its index contains the hearer index; further, specify it as 'plural' if it is a conjoined NP; otherwise, 'singular'. Instead of a set reading, if an individual reading is assigned to each conjunct, then each conjunct is subject to person and number specifications as marked in the subgroupings of first person plural (cf. 9) and second person plural (cf. 13).

2.2.3. Non-pronominal Person Substitutes. The use of non-pronominal forms as substitutes for the second person is systematic in Korean—in part, obligatory and in part, optional, depending on the interrelationship between the speaker and hearer. While such person substitutes are not unknown in English, as examples⁹ like

(14) Substitutes for 'I'

- a. your humble servant
- b. this child
- c. papa, Aunt Mary, etc.
- d. the author, the (present) writer, the reviewer

(15) Substitutes for 'YOU'

- a. Your Highness, Your Majesty, etc.
- b. Monsieur, Madame, Mademoiselle
- c. my darling, my boy, etc.

indicate, they are limited to stereotyped expressions, unlike systematic and productive substitution in Korean. Consider sentences like

(16) a. Oppa-to nayil ka(sey)yo?

brother-also tomorrow go(H)Pol/Q

'Are you (=brother) going tomorrow, too?'

b. Kulay, { Mia }
 { ne } -to ka-keyss-ni?

yeah { Mia }
 { you } -also -will-Pl/Q

'Yeah, would you (=Mia) like to come along, too?'

In (16.a) *oppa* 'female's elder brother' is used obligatorily as a second-person substitute; in (16.b) the girl's name *Mia* is used optionally as such. In English such substitutes are unacceptable unless they are used as vocatives, accompanied by the second person pronoun *you*, as shown in (17). (# indicates 'ill-formed in the intended sense'.)


(17) a. #Is my brother going tomorrow, too?

b. #Yeah, would Mia like to come along, too?

How do we account for this systematic use of non-pronominal forms as substitutes for the second person? I propose that there be a rule of reduplicating NP-description of the hearer NP in the D-frame and inserting the copy into the NP containing the hearer index as its description. The description of the speaker and hearer NPs would then contain information such as: the speaker *a* is called *Mia* and the hearer *b* is *a*'s elder brother, respectively (in the case of (16.a)). The process of NP-description insertion for (16.a)

may be represented roughly by the following tree diagram, ignoring *to* 'also'.

(18)



Following the insertion of the hearer NP's description into the NP bearing an index identical to that of the hearer NP, the resulting relative clause structure would then be reduced to give rise to 'ELDER BROTHER' (\rightarrow *oppa*). If this process of copying and inserting the hearer NP-description takes place prior to pronominalization, the pronominal 'YOU' is blocked. The occurrence of *Mia* in (16.b) is explainable in a similar way. However, in contrast to (16.a), where second person substitution is obligatory, (16.b) may also contain the second person pronoun *ne* 'you'.

There is a set of socio-culturally determined conditions which regulate the use of second person pronouns as well as the level of discourse; for instance, if the hearer is 'higher than' the speaker in kinship relation or in social status, the use of the second person pronoun must be blocked as inappropriate and the level of discourse must be 'formal' or 'polite'. We will discuss more about this set of conditions in Chapter 3.

First person substitution is very much limited in Korean, although there are lexical

items like *so.in* and *so.saying* (literally meaning ‘little man’ and ‘little birth’) used to refer to the speaker himself. The humble form of the first person pronoun, *ce* is used in a discourse situation where the use of the second person pronoun is blocked as inappropriate.

2.3. Vocative and Hearer Deixis. The hearer NP in the D-frame, characterization of the notion ‘hearer deixis’, may be able to account for the structure of the vocative. Putatively, we know the vocative is an expression to address a person by gaining his attention and identifying him as the person addressed. As was noted in the preceding section, English has syntactic constraints on the use of non-pronomial second person substitutes. Such constraints, however, can be removed by using the vocative along with the pronominal *you*. Thus, English sentences corresponding to the Korean sentences in (16) will be, with the appropriate vocative form added, like (19).

(19) a. { ?*Brother¹⁰ }
John , are you going tomorrow, too?

b. Mia, would you like to come along, too?

How can we account for the structure of the vocative? One might suggest, on the basis of the process of NP-description insertion discussed earlier for non-pronomial second person substitution, that the same NP-description of the hearer index inserted already into the coreferential NP be taken out from the tree and placed sentence-initially or sentence-finally, as illustrated informally in

(20)

a. (John) are you [John] going tomorrow, too ?
b. Would you [Mia] like to come along, too, (Mia)?

However, such an analysis would not work: in Korean two identical forms, one as a vocative, the other as a second-person substitute, can occur in a sentence, such as (21).

(21) a. Oppa, oppa-to nayil ka-(sey)-yo? (cf. 16.a)

VOC IIP-

b. Mia-ya, Mia-to ka-keyss-ni? (cf. 16.b)

VOC IIP-

The extraction analysis must be rejected on semantic grounds as well: in such a pseudo-analysis of the vocative the NP containing its description is dominated by a D-verb, of

asking (in our analysis, 'request to tell'), or telling, or any type of performative verbs adequate to the sentence under analysis. But the modality or illocutionary force of the vocative is not the same as that of the sentence under analysis. It must have its own force, say, a force of addressing or calling.

That the vocative is not inside the constituent sentence is also evident from the fact that the vocative element alone can stand for a sentence, similar to exclamatory elements.

- (22) a. Mia(-ya).
 VOC
 b. Yongnam(-a).
 VOC
 c. Apeci.
 father (VOC)

The vocative elements in (22) have also exclamatory force, but they are distinct from purely exclamatory elements like


- (23) a. Aya!
 Ouch!
 b. Ommana!
 Mama mia!

in that the latter have no force of addressing or calling somebody. The structure of the vocative which I propose is that which has its own D-frame containing a D-verb 'ADDRESS'. The semantic structure of the vocative then may be represented as

- (24) ADDRESS(a, b, 'S')


What then will be the constituent structure of the 'S'? It consists of a copy of the hearer NP description, as represented in (25) for the vocative *Mia*.

- (25)



Given the semantic structure of the vocative in (25), which is generated independently of a non-vocative sentence, it will now be shown that the vocative is semantically 'connected' to a non-vocative sentence in a given discourse. The structure underlying (21. b) may be represented as (26), ignoring *to* 'also', *keyss* 'will' and other minor details.

(26)



Given a semantic structure like (26) underlying (21. b), the following observations may be relevant: (a) the two occurrences of *Mia* are both described semantically as originated in the description of the hearer NP in the discourse, one copy being inserted to give rise to the vocative form of *Mia* and another to the non-pronominal second person substitute *Mia*, and (b) a distinct D-frame is provided for the vocative *Mia*, containing the D-verb 'ADDRESS/CALL', distinct from the D-frame of asking. The two D-sentences are 'connected' (in a not well-defined sense) cohesively to each other.

There seem to be some restrictions on the positional distribution of the vocative on the surface. Consider sentences (27).

- (27) a. *Mia-ya, Mia-to ka-keyss-ni?* (=21. b)
- b. *Mia-ya, ne-to ka-keyss-ni?*
- c. *Ne-to ka-keyss-ni, Mia-ya?*
- d. **Mia-to ka-keyss-ni, Mia-ya?*
- 'Mia, are you going, too?'

In the first two sentences of (27), the vocative *Mia* occurs sentence-initially regardless of

whether it is followed by the non-pronominal second person substitute *Mia* or the pronoun *ne*; in contrast, when it occurs sentence-finally it cannot be preceded by the identical non-pronominal form *Mia* (cf. 27.d). This can be accounted for by the output condition proposed by G. Lakoff (1968); in particular, in terms of the hierarchy of NPs: if the coreferential element is phonetically realized as pronoun *ne*, for example, then the sentence-initial vocative can cross over it (cf. 27.c), but not if the coreferential element remains in the non-pronominal form identical to the vocative (cf. 27.d). This account also partially characterizes Postal's (1971) crossover principle. Also note that if the structure of the vocative were posited as following the non-vocative sentence the output condition would not be able to account for the well-formed sentence (27.a). This may justify the semantic structure of the vocative preceding that of a nonvocative sentence as we have postulated in (26).

Now, let us further examine distributional constraints on the vocative. It can occur, as we have described, in sentence-initial or sentence-final position. In sentence-final position, however, the vocative must be regarded as structured outside the sentence for the obvious reason that the vocative is dominated by its own D-frame, distinct from the nonvocative sentence, even though this semantic distinction is not so obvious in the conventional orthographic representation. Just for illustrative purposes, let us consider various ways of orthographic representation of the sentence we have discussed—(27.c).

(28) a. Ne-to ka-keyss-ni, Mia-ya?

b. Ne-to ka-keyss-ni?—Mia-ya.

c. Ne-to ka-keyss-ni? Mia-ya.

(29) a. Are you going too, Mia?


b. Are you going too?—Mia.

c. Are you going too? Mia.

The illustrations in (28) and (29) may indicate the ways in which the vocative is considered as a part of the sentence (cf. the a-forms), or as a separate sentence (cf. the c-forms), or as connected to the sentence preceding it (cf. the b-forms). As postulated in the semantic structure of the vocative (cf. 26), the best account seems to be that the vocative and non-vocative sentences are connected somehow. I suspect that the question of exactly how they are *syntactically* connected is irrelevant since the structure of the vocative is characterizable in part in terms of its intonation contour, as will be discussed in (2.3.1). As to the privileges of occurrence of a vocative in sentence-medial position there appear to be some

Recall now the semantic structure of the vocative (cf. 25), in which the vocative (under 'S') is the copy of the description of the hearer NP and the vocative *Mia* is described as a predicate nominative. This structural analysis may provide an account of the fact that in many languages the vocative is identical to the nominative (cf. Jespersen 1924: 184). In the process of derivation, the copula *i* is inserted (cf. (4.5.2) for copula insertion), the 'plain/intimate manner' is realized phonetically as *a*, and the D-verb 'ADDRESS' as a non-falling terminal contour. Then the vocative *Mia-ya* may be shown as derived by the following process.

(32)




Notice that in this analysis the surface vocative particle *ya* is described as rising from the phonetic contraction of Nominative *i*+Plain/Intimate *a*, and the D-verb 'ADDRESS' as a non-falling terminal contour (→).¹¹ In (31. c, d), which are vocatives in the form of prayers, the particle is realized as *e* in place of *a*. Notice that (31. c) is sentential and the *i* before the honorific *si* is a copula. This may render support to the sentential origin of the vocative. The *ye* functioning as a vocative element in (31. c, d) may be regarded as a variant of *ya* (cf. *Mia-ya*), the Plain/Intimate D-level being realized as *e* in place of *a*. The form *Yongnam-a* in (31. b) is counter to the expected *Yongnam-i-ya*.¹² My speculation at the moment is that the contracted *i* is deleted before *a* (for some reason).

The vocative *ya* in (31. e) is used when the identificational 'tag' of the addressee such as name or title is unknown to the speaker. I venture to speculate that *ya* be accounted for in the following way. Since the identity of the hearer is unknown, that is

to say, the content of the NP-description of the hearer index is empty, only the copula *i* and the D-level marker *a* are realized on the surface. This process may be illustrated roughly as follows:

(33)



In this connection, let me just mention another form *yepo* ‘darling’, the favorite vocative between husband and wife. In place of the common view that it is a contraction of *yeki* ‘here’ + *po(-o)* ‘look’, it may appear tempting to analyze it in a manner similar to that of *ya* (cf. 30. d)—to the effect of ‘Hey, look.’

The main point of discussion about the so-called vocative element *ya/a* is in showing that the vocative particle originates in the predicate nominative of the description of the hearer index, and that the nominative marker *i*, the copula *i* and the plain/intimate DL marker *a/e* undergo a phonetic process of contraction, deletion and/or glide insertion, and that the D-verb ‘ADDRESS’ is realized as a non-falling intonation contour.

2.4 Time Deixis and Tense. It is in reference to the time of utterance that linguistic expressions for time are divided into present, past, and future. Time deixis in discourse thus plays a fundamental role in the tense system of a natural language. Relative to the time of utterance t_0 , the time of event t_1 may be described in three distinctive ways: (a) t_1 is ‘contemporaneous with’ t_0 , (b) t_1 is ‘prior to’ t_0 , or (c) t_1 is ‘posterior to’ t_0 . In addition to the time of utterance and event, the time of reference is also essential in the formation of various tense systems in natural languages, even though there is no one-to-one correspondence between a syntactically defined tense system and a semantic notion of time.¹³ In terms of verbal inflection English may be said to have only two tenses, past and nonpast, while it is possible to include in the tense system the modal *will* and the form

have+past participle and/or *be*+present participle as tense-phrases or 'extended' tenses (cf. Jespersen 1933). Korean may be given a similar analysis: two basic tenses (in terms of inflection or suffixation), past and nonpast, and extended tenses of future, past-past, etc.

In what follows I shall not go into discussing questions such as how many tenses are to be set up in Korean or English, which seems to me rather unilluminating, if not trivial, unless at the same time we take into account aspectual and/or modal meanings such as duration, completion and/or intention, coupled with semantic properties of a predicate such as stativeness or activeness.

Let us briefly illustrate an interaction of the surface 'tense' form and aspectual meaning. Consider (34) and (36), which are translated as (35) and (37), respectively.

(34) Mary-ka bikini-lul ip-ess-e-yo.
wear-PST-Pl-Pol

(35) a. Mary is wearing a bikini.
b. Mary (has) put on a bikini.

(36) Mary-ka bikini-lul ip-ko-iss-e-yo.
-ing-be-Pl-Pol

(37) a. Mary is wearing a bikini.
b. Mary is putting on a bikini.

Notice that (34), which is in the past tense, is ambiguous between (a) description of the present state and (b) description of the completed activity. Likewise, (35), which is in the progressive form, *V-ko-iss* (analogous to *be V-ing*), is ambiguous between (a) description of the present state and (b) that of the activity in progress. Thus (34) and (35) are synonymous in part insofar as they both describe the present state resulting from the completion of an activity. It is not hard to find a parallel or similar case in other languages. (38) may be a parallel case in Japanese.

(38) Mary-ka bikini-o ki-te-iru.
-NOM -ACC wear-ing-be

(38) has two readings: (a) Mary is (in the state of) wearing a bikini; (b) Mary is (in the act of) putting on a bikini. The English sentence in (39) is also ambiguous with respect to its aspectual meaning.

(39) John is $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{lying} \\ \text{sitting} \end{array} \right\}$ (down) on the floor.

In Korean, however, the perfective and progressive readings of (39) can be distinguished formally: the *e*-form in (40.a) indicates the former; the *ko*-form in (40.b) the latter.

- (40) a. John-un malwu-ey $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{nwuw} \\ \text{anc} \end{array} \right\}$ -e-iss-ta.
 floor-at $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{lie-} \\ \text{sit-} \end{array} \right\}$
 b. John-un malwu-ey $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{nwup-} \\ \text{anc-} \end{array} \right\}$ -ko-iss-ta.

Let us now look into expressions referring to future events and consider the tense in Korean.

- (41) a. John-i nayil o-n.ta.
 ‘John comes tomorrow.’
 b. John-i nayil o-l kes-i.ta.
 -MOD thing(=NMZ)-COP-
 ‘John will/is to come tomorrow.’
 c. John-i nayil o-keyss-ta.
 ‘(I suppose) John will come tomorrow.’

The three sentences in (41), formally distinct from each other, reveal different attitudes of the speaker to the event of John’s coming. (41.a), which is in the present, expresses the speaker’s belief or knowledge about the event¹⁴; his attitude is that of certainty not of probability or possibility. Therefore, a sentential adverb like *ama* ‘probably’ cannot be used in this form of expression, as shown in the ill-formedness of

- (42) *Ama John-i nayil o-n.ta.
 (Probably John will come tomorrow.)

The periphrastic construction -l kes-i-ta in (41.b) is the common expression of predicting a future event, corresponding to the English ‘be to’. *Ama* can occur in this construction.

- (43) Ama John-i nayil o-l kes-i.ta.
 ‘Probably John will/is to come tomorrow.’

The *keyss* in (41.c), which is best glossed ‘will’, is a modal, expressing the speaker’s will, supposition, etc. in declaratives or such modalities of the hearer in interrogatives. With the cursory remarks on time and tense made above, we will now turn to the formation of tense in semantic structure.

2.4.1 Tense Formation. McCawley (1971a) has proposed that a tense is formed by plugging a copy of a time adverb into main verb position by the time adverb reduplication transformation; further he has observed that the past tense morpheme, for instance, is a predicate, meaning ‘prior to’. Based on this insightful observation and proposal of

McCawley, I postulate tense formation as a process of (a) copying the predicate of NP-description of the time NP in the D-frame, and (b) inserting the copy into a higher predicate position.


As was described at the outset of this section, the event time t_1 is characterizable, relative to the utterance time t_0 , at least in three ways: to recapitulate them, they may be described as

- (44) a. t_1 is contemporaneous with t_0 (Present)
- b. t_1 is prior to t_0 (Past)
- c. t_1 is posterior to t_0 (Future)

Description of a time NP in 'S' contains one of the temporal statements in (44). For illustrative purposes, consider the sentences in (45), and suppose they are spoken in a discourse situation: the speaker is Bill, the hearer is Mary, the time of utterance is April 19, 1972, and the place of utterance is Chicago.

- (45) a. John came here yesterday.
- b. John will come here tomorrow.

Now, the time NP of the D-frame contains its description: t_0 is April 19, 1972; the place NP contains its description: p_0 is Chicago. The time NP in the complement 'S' contains the description: t_1 is prior to t_0 by one day. Then, the structure of (45.a), at some stage before tense formation has applied, may be represented, roughly and minor details aside, as follows:




Characteristic of NP-description, the description of t_1 is in the structure of a relative clause formation. The predicate of the circled S in (46), i.e. 'PRIOR-TO', is reduplicated and positioned in a higher predicate position, and then it is turned into 'PAST'. The original

NP-description is lexicalized as *yesterday* by the following process.

$$(47) t_i [t_i \text{ is PRIOR TO } t_o \text{ by 1 DAY}] \rightarrow \text{YESTERDAY} \rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{yesterday} \text{ (English)} \\ \textit{ecey} \text{ (Korean)} \end{array} \right\}$$

After tense formation has applied the semantic structure underlying (45.a) may now look like



Notice that tense formation is conceived of as a structure-building transformation: the copy of the predicate 'PRIOR-TO' creates a new node V and its sister NP. Further, notice that this structure-building transformation applies to a structure before logical structure is complete; that is, representation of logical structure is contingent on the tense formation transformation. In this respect, logical structure may be said to represent the semantic structure at the stage where tense formation, subject selection, vocative formation, and the like have already applied. Tense formation may be formulated in the following form:

(49) Tense Formation (English)

$$[S \underbrace{X-[NP [NP t_i]}_1} - [S \underbrace{V-[NP t_i]-[NP t_o]-X}_3]]]$$

$$[S 2 + [NP [S \quad 1 \quad 2 \quad 3 \quad]]]]$$

The future tense in (45.b) is formed by a similar process of tense formation: 'POSTERIOR TO' is copied and the copy is positioned as the predicate 'FUTURE' in the higher S, while the original NP-description undergoes lexical insertion as specified in (50).

$$(50) t_i [t_i \text{ is POSTERIOR TO } t_o \text{ by 1 DAY}] \rightarrow \text{TOMORROW} \rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{tomorrow} \text{ (English)} \\ \textit{nayil} \text{ (Korean)} \end{array} \right\}$$

2.4.2 Reference Time Axis. The form of time expression in indirect discourse is determined by whether the speaker's quoting is relative to his reference time or his utterance time, as illustrated in (51) and (52).

- (51) (Ecey) Bill-i John-ul manna-ss-ul ttay Bill-un ithul-hwu-ey tol.a-o-
 meet-PST-MOD time 2-day-after round-come-
 keyss-ta-ko mal.hay-ss-ta.
 will-D-QM say-PST-PI/D

‘When Bill met John (yesterday), Bill said he would come back two days later.’


In (51), the speaker is indirectly reporting what Bill is supposed to have said and the time reference in the quoted clause is relative to the *ttay* ‘when’-clause, that is, the speaker’s reference time. Alternatively, the speaker may express the same content relative to his utterance time, as in

- (52) (Ecey) Bill-i John-ul manna-ss-ul ttay Bill-un nayil tol.a-o-keyss-ta-ko mal.hay-ss-ta.

‘When Bill met John (yesterday), Bill said he will come back tomorrow.’


In (52), as contrasted to (51), the time adverbial in the quoted clause is shifted from the *then*-axis to the *now*-axis: *ithul-hwu* → *nayil* (two days later (than yesterday) → tomorrow). In English, the tense is also shifted: *would* → *will*. Let us now look into the semantic structure underlying (51) with reference to time relations. At the stage where tense formation has applied, the structure (i.e. logical structure) may be represented as (53), minor and irrelevant details aside.

- (53)




Given the semantic structure in (53), descriptions of the time NPs are lexicalized by the following process.

(54) a. (Description of NP₇: *then*-axis)




b. (Description of NP₁₃)



Now consider (52) once again. As noted already, the time expression in the indirect quotation of (52) is relative to the speaker's utterance time. Thus the description of the time NP, NP₇ must be represented as (55); otherwise, the semantic structure may be nondistinct from that of (51).

(55) (Description of NP₇: *now*-axis)



Tense agreement rules, not needed in Korean, apply in English so as to shift *would* (cf. 51) to *will* (cf. 52). I shall not go into tense agreement rules in English. Suffice it here to note that the two distinct axes, deictic and nondeictic, affect the time expression.

Now let us briefly consider the way the *when*-clause is formed. Notice that the substructure dominated by NP₉ in (53) is a relative clause structure. When relativization

applies to NP₉ and the predicate 'AT' (of S₃) is adjoined to it as a result of subject-raising (i.e. the raising of NP₂), the structure to which *when* is inserted may be represented roughly as

$$(56) \underbrace{[s [v \text{ AT}]-t_r [s t_r \text{ Bill met John}]]}_{\downarrow \text{when}}$$

If the time adverbial *yesterday* in (51) is in apposition to the *when*-clause, then (57) will arise.

(57) Yesterday, when Bill met John, he said he would come back two days later.

The *yesterday* in (57) is what the reference time t_r in (56) stands for. If the *yesterday* is within the time clause, as in

(58) When Bill met John yesterday, he said he would come back two days later. then t_r stands for a subtime of 'yesterday', not directly identifiable with *yesterday*; put differently, t_r is in q_i and q_i is the day which immediately precedes the day which contains t_o .¹⁵

2.5 Place Deixis and Pronominal Substitution. Place deixis is characterizable in terms of distance relative to the speaker's or hearer's place of utterance: the place in question p_i is proximal, medial, or distal to the place of the speaker or hearer p_o . In what follows, I will first discuss three elements of place deixis in Korean—the demonstratives *i*, *ku* and *ce*, and I will describe the process of pronominal substitution.

The three basic demonstratives *i*, *ku*, and *ce* are deictic in their origin; *i* refers to a place proximal to the speaker's place of utterance (inclusive of the place of utterance), *ku* refers to a place proximal to the hearer, and *ce* to a place distal from both the speaker and hearer. Pronominal forms designating locational relations may be shown roughly in the following form (p_a 'speaker's place'; p_b 'hearer's place'; p_o 'both speaker's and hearer's place; p_i 'reference place').

(59) a. p_i proximal to $p_a \rightarrow i + \text{Pro-place NP}$

$$\begin{cases} ki & (\rightarrow ye.ki) \\ kos \\ cangso \end{cases}$$

b. p_i proximal to $p_b \rightarrow ku + \text{Pro-place NP}$

$$\begin{cases} ki & (\rightarrow ke.ki) \\ kos \\ cangso \end{cases}$$

c. p_i distal from $p_o \rightarrow ce + \text{Pro-place NP}$

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} ki \\ kos \\ cangso \end{array} \right.$

These particles are extended to refer to a person deictically as illustrated in (60), or time as in (61).¹⁶

(60) a. $i + \text{Pro-person NP}$

| | | |
|---|--------------|--|
| { | <i>salam</i> | i. speaker; ii. hearer; iii. this person |
| | <i>pun</i> | i. this person (esteemed); ii. hearer |
| | <i>i</i> | i. this person; ii. hearer |
| | <i>nom</i> | i. speaker; ii. hearer; iii. this guy |
| | <i>nyen</i> | i. speaker; ii. hearer; iii. this wench |

b. $ku + \text{Pro-person NP}$ i. the person (proximal to the hearer)

c. $ce + \text{Pro-person NP}$ i. the person over there (distal from the speaker and hearer)

(61) a. $i + \text{Pro-time NP}$

*ttay*¹⁷ i. at that time (proximal/immediate to the reference time)

b. $ku + \text{Pro-time NP}$

ttay i. at that time/then (the reference time)

c. $*ce + \text{Pro-time NP}$ ¹⁸

The deictic *ku* is further extended to function in anaphoric reference, analogous to *the* in English.

(62) a. Ku-i-ka eti-ey sa-p.ni-kka?

the-person- where live-

‘Where does he live?’

b. Ku- kes-ul ilh.e-peli-ess-up.ni-ta.

the-thing- lose-discard-

‘I lost it.’

2.5.1 Place-Pronoun Substitution. The place pronominals *ye.ki* ‘here’, *ke.ki* ‘there’ and *ce.ki* ‘over there’ are substituted on the basis of the distance relation between the place in question, p_i and the deictic NP of place, p_o , in the D-frame. Consider the sentences in (63).

(63) a. (A to B): Koyangi-ka ke.ki-ey iss-ni?


cat there exist-P1/Q

‘Is the cat there?’

- b. (B to A): Ani, ye.ki-ey eps-e.
 nonexistant-Int/D
 'No, she/it is not here.'


The semantic structure underlying (63. a) may be represented, minor details aside, as

(64)




Now look into the subtree of (64) containing the description of the place NP, NP₂: the description 'p_i is proximal to p_b' undergoes pronominal substitution in the manner described below.

(65)



In the case of (63. b) the semantic structure contains substructure (66a), the description of the place NP: 'p_i is proximal to p_a', which yields (66. b) by pronominal substitution.

(66)



Proximity of the place NP in question, p_i to the deictic place NP, p_o is interpreted, as was in the case of the time NP, where t_i was contemporaneous with t_o , as representing the locational relation of p_i being not only proximal to p_o but also (possibly) as p_i including p_o or being identical to p_o . Thus, in the substructure of (66.a) we may as well posit the speaker's place index p_o as the index of the place NP, instead of p_i and its description.

What we have so far described are the place pronominals *ye.ki*, *ke.ki*, etc. Now consider the demonstrative/deictic use of *i*, *ku*, and *ce*, which can be described in the same manner as place pronominals. For our exposition, let us consider the sentences of (67), which are equivalent to (63) in a certain discourse situation.

(67) a. Koyangi-ka ku-pang-ey iss-ni?
 room


‘Is the cat in that room?’

b. Ani, i pang-ey eps-e.


‘No, she/it is not in this room.’

The semantic structures underlying (67) would be identical to those underlying (63) except for the substructures of the place NPs. The substructure of NP₂ for (67.a) may be represented as (68) and the corresponding substructure for (67.b) as (69).

(68) (cf. 65)



(69) (cf. 66)



Notice that the description of the place NP in (68) and (69) consists of two parts, or a conjoined description: the first conjunct describes that p_i is the object ‘ROOM’; the second conjunct describes the locational relation of p_i to p_b (cf. 68) and p_i to p_a (cf. 69). The first conjunct is substituted for the index p_i and the second conjunct gives rise to the demonstratives *ku* and *i*, respectively.

2.6 Direct and Indirect Discourse. Two types of discourse, direct and indirect, are known in grammar. Gallagher (1970) presented arguments against the traditional view of deriving indirect discourse from direct discourse. Sadock (1969 a, b) postulated embedded

hypersentences to account for, among other things, the structure of a direct quotation in a sentence. He distinguished two types of direct quotation, (a) linguistically significant, and (b) linguistically nonsignificant. It is only linguistically significant quotations that can be converted into indirect quotations under certain conditions. Miscellaneous quotatives such as ungrammatical sentences, expressions in a foreign language, exclamations, fragmentary sentences, etc. cannot be converted to indirect quotations. Thus the direct quotation in (70) cannot be put into the form of indirect discourse.

- (70) a. Mia said, 'Me speak no English.'
 b. Mia said to John, 'John, hankuk-mal-ul ha-sey-yo?'
 c. John said, 'Good grief, it's raining again!'
 d. Mia sang, 'do re mi'

In what follows, I will first describe the structure of direct discourse and some characteristics of indirect discourse and echo questions/statements.

2.6.1 Discourse Frame and Direct Discourse. In the D-frame we have postulated that the content of an utterance should be described as a quoted S (i.e. 'S'), with 'S' superordinated by a D-frame. In this mode of analysis the 'S' dominated by the D-frame is only a special case of direct quotation—special in that the D-frame containing deictic elements, speaker, hearer, etc. gets deleted together with the quotation mark. In other words, the sentences in (71) are described as in (72).

- (71) a. I came yesterday.
 b. I like you.
 (72) a. 'I came yesterday.'
 b. 'I like you.'

In (72) the speaker and hearer are 'in the air', and the characterization of what is 'in the air' is the function of the D-frame in D-grammar. Suppose the sentences of (72) are provided with a speaker and a hearer directly on the surface, as shown in (73).


- (73) a. Mary said to Bill, 'I came yesterday.'
 b. Mary said to Bill, 'I like you.'

Given the sentences in (73), the speaker and hearer are not identified with *Mary* and *Bill*, respectively, and other persons are once again in the air. In our structural analysis of (73), the sentences in (73) are described as equivalent to those in (74).

- (74) a. 'Mary said to Bill, "I came yesterday."'

b. 'Mary said to Bill, "I like you."'

The form in direct quotes is a *quotation within a quotation*. The semantic structure underlying (73.b) (or (74.b) equivalently) may be represented as (75), minor details aside.



Two quoted Ss occur in (75): the higher 'S' immediately dominated by an NP in the D-frame and the lower 'S' commanded (in the sense of Langacker 1969) by a verb of saying. As noted earlier, one of Sadock's motivations for postulating nested hypersentences was to capture the structure of direct discourse, i.e. the lower 'S' in our analysis. First and second person pronominalization and tense formation in the lower 'S' proceed in reference to the sister NPs of the lower 'S'. Thus the NP indices x_{17} and x_6 in the lowest S are pronominalized to *I* and *you* under identity with the respective subject and indirect object NPs of the verb 'SAY'. The present tense is also formed in reference to t_r , i.e. Mary's utterance time.

Let us now examine the structure of indirect discourse in contrast to the structure of direct discourse. The sentences in (76) might be considered as being derived from those in (73) by indirectification.¹⁹

(76) a. Mary told Bill that she had come the previous day.

b. Mary told Bill that she liked him.

However, consider the sentences in (77), which are also in indirect discourse and are possible alternatives to (76).

(77) a. Mary told Bill that she came $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{yesterday} \\ \text{three/four/...days ago.} \end{array} \right.$

b. Mary told Bill that she likes him.

Notice that the tense in (77) is shifted to the speaker's utterance-time axis; moreover, in (77.b) the speaker is assuming that Mary still likes Bill at the time of his utterance, while there is no implication of that nature in the original direct quotation in (73.b). She may have stopped liking him any time after her original utterance and before the speaker's utterance time. In order to derive indirect discourse from direct discourse one needs to know all the necessary contextual information about the given discourse, including the speaker's utterance time and his knowledge of the content of the direct discourse. Observations of this sort, as advanced by Gallagher (1970), lead one to the view that the two types of discourse are distinct and not derivable from each other, even in limited cases of linguistically significant quotations, as illustrated in (73), (76) and (77) above. Thus we may conclude that direct and indirect discourse are not derived from each other by transformation.

2.6.2 Indirect Discourse and Echo Question/Statement. I will now discuss some language-specific characteristics of direct and indirect discourse in Korean. First of all, the discourse level, which is obligatorily marked in direct discourse, is absent or nondistinctive in indirect discourse. Honorification, on the other hand, is not subject to this constraint. Consider the sentences of (78).

(78) a. 'Ce-nun Bill-ul coh.a.ha-p.ni-ta.' lako Mia-ka caki apeci-eykey mal.hay-ss-ta.
 I-TOP -ACC like-F/D QM self father-to say-PST-PI/D
 'Mia said to her father, "I like Bill."'

b. Mia-ka Bill-ul coh.a. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ha.n-ta} \\ \text{*hay} \\ \text{*ha-ney} \\ \text{*ha-p.ni-ta} \end{array} \right\}$ ko caki apeci-eykey mal.hay-ss-ta.
 $\left. \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \right\}$ QM

'Mia told her father that she liked Bill.'

The sentence in indirect discourse (78.b) shows that the only D-level allowed in quoting indirectly is the level characterized by *ha.n-ta*, i.e. the Plain D-level. In this sense we may say that the Plain D-level is the unmarked level of discourse. In (79.b) the honorific *si* is marked in indirect discourse.

(79) a. 'Kim-sensayng-nim-i o-si-ess-up.ni-ta.' lako Mia-ka caki
 -teacher-HPM-NOM come-H-PST-F-D QM

‘(Did you tell me to) go?’

- (83) a. Wuli-ka ka-ca ko.
 we- -PI/PROP
 ‘Let’s go. (I proposed that we go.)’
- b. Wuli-ka ka-ca ko?
 ‘Let’s go. (Did you propose that we go?)’

Some characteristics of the sentences in (80)–(83) are: (a) they have the structure of indirect discourse, ending with the quotative *ko*. (b) the terminal contour of the a-sentences is typically that of declarative sentences, i.e. falling, (c) the terminal contour of the b-sentences is typically that of interrogative sentences, i.e. rising, (d) what is understood or deleted is the speaker and hearer NPs and the verbs of reporting, and (e) what is quoted is a statement (cf. 80), a question (cf. 81), a request (cf. 82), or a proposal (cf. 83). The b-sentences are called echo questions: the speaker is echoing the sentence spoken to him in the form of questioning as a means of seeking assurance or showing surprise. The speaker’s modality in echo questions may be represented informally as in (84). (For further discussion on echo questions, see 5.3.6.)

(84)

I request you to tell me whether { you told me that S (cf. 80.b)
 you asked me wh- S (cf. 81.b)
 you requested me to do ... (cf. 82.b)
 you proposed that we do ... (cf. 83.b)

The a-sentences are in the form of declarative sentences and what is characteristic of these sentences is that the speaker is repeating or echoing what he has said in a discourse situation as he might do, for instance, when the hearer has asked an echo question. To illustrate this point, consider the sentences in (85).

- (85) a. (A to B): John-i nayil o-nun.ka?
 ‘Is John coming tomorrow?’
- b. (B to A): John-i nayil o-nun.ka ko?
 ‘(Did you ask me whether) John is coming tomorrow?’
- c. (A to B): John-i nayil o-nun.ka ko.
 ‘(I asked you whether) John is coming tomorrow.’

(85.c) is an echo statement, (86.b) is an echo question, and (85.a) is the original question.

The speaker's modality in echo statements may be shown informally as in (86).

(86)

| | | | |
|-----------------|---|---------------------------|------------|
| I tell you that | { | I told you that S | (cf. 80.a) |
| | | I asked you wh- S | (cf. 81.a) |
| | | I requested you to do ... | (cf. 82.a) |
| | | I proposed that we do ... | (cf. 83.a) |

Notice that the quotative marker (or complementizer) *ko* is overtly present in the echo sentences of Korean, whereas no such marker (e.g. *that* or *whether*) is present in the corresponding echo sentences of English. The surface syntactic structure of English is constrained in such a way that *that* or *whether* must undergo deletion in such constructions. Thus the three sentences in (85)—the normal question, the echo question and the echo statement—are left syntactically indistinguishable, although their terminal contours may well keep them distinct, as shown in

(87) a. Is John coming? { ↗ ↘ } (cf. 85.a)

b. Is John coming? ²³ ↗ (cf. 85.b)

c. Is John coming? ↘ (cf. 85.c)

In Korean, by contrast, both syntactic and prosodic structures are at work so as to keep them distinct from each other.

(88) a. Normal question: rising.

b. Echo question: rising and *ko*.

c. Echo statement: falling and *ko*.

3. DISCOURSE LEVELS AND HONORIFICATION


The linguistic system of discourse levels and honorification is another aspect of deixis in discourse, reflecting the speaker's manner of speaking appropriate to a given discourse situation, relative to the hearer and the subject of discourse. A systematic description of discourse levels and honorification in languages like Korean and Japanese is an essential part of a D-grammar, since the fluent native speaker knows the system of discourse levels and honorification existing in his language and uses it appropriately; moreover, every sentence is obligatorily marked with a D-level and the speaker cannot get by without indicating this D-level in his discourse. One might take the view that the description of discourse levels and honorification is not a proper part of grammar and propose that it be placed in the component of, say, stylistics. However, the nature of discourse levels and honorification is not stylistic in the ordinary sense of the word; an adequate description of discourse levels and honorification must be sought in the structure of discourse, in particular in a discourse frame such as the one proposed in this study.

Our mode of description is such that the initial question we raise is where the system of discourse levels and honorification comes from, rather than how to describe it by taking it for granted. In a different mode of description such as in the *Aspects* model, one may attempt to describe honorifics by elaborating a feature system in the base component as inherent to nouns, such as [+Polite], [+Honored], [+Humble], etc., coupled with a set of agreement rules in the transformational component.¹ In a syntactically based grammar these features of honorifics are treated as syntactic, because the notions of discourse and deixis are not allowed in such a grammar. However, these features are not syntactic, nor even semantic, but they are discourse features. Person deixis, for example, the concept of 'speaker' or 'hearer', cannot be described as a semantic feature in the same way in which 'human' or 'animate' is described as semantic.


A description of D-levels and honorification is most naturally placed in the D-frame. D-levels are characterizable as different manners of speaking, conditioned by the speaker's interpersonal relation with the hearer; honorification as the speaker's manner of speaking toward the participants in the sentence, or specifically toward the subject and object NPs in the sentence. In what follows, I will first describe the system of discourse levels and that of honorification separately, presenting then an overall view in which they are shown to interrelate to each other.

3.1 Discourse Levels. In every speech act, the speaker must show his manner of speaking to the hearer with respect to formality, intimacy, and the like. Such a manner of speaking on the part of the speaker is identified as the D-level in our analysis. By and large, the speaker has little option in choosing a D-level; that is to say, his manner of speaking is predetermined by a set of conditions existing between the hearer and himself, including kinship relation, social status, and age. Before we describe some of the socially and culturally definable conditions imposed on the speech act, we will first look into the five distinct D-levels in current Korean² which are syntactically manifested in sentence-final D-level markers, and their co-occurrence relations with first and second person pronouns.

3.1.1 Co-occurrence Relations between Discourse Levels and Pronouns. Five distinct declarative endings have the following cooccurrence relations with first and second person pronouns.



The D-levels in (1), formally distinct from one another, may be labeled in terms of the 'manner' of speaking, as follows:⁵



The five D-levels semantically labeled are: (a) plain, (b) intimate, (c) familiar, (d) blunt, and (e) formal. In the D-frame, then, the manner NP is interpreted as (the speaker speaking to the hearer in a) plain/intimate/familiar/blunt/formal manner. As one may notice, the term 'manner' is used here to keep it distinct from 'mood', which has an established sense, 'even though there is a related sense in the two terms. There is also another distinction of manner of speaking—indicative vs. retrospective. The indicative manner is regarded as unmarked in declarative and interrogative sentences. The indicative-manner (mood) morpheme *N* (realized as e.g. *nu*, *ni*) are not given any description in the present analysis; the retrospective manner, which is characterized by the morpheme *T* (realized as e.g. *te*, *ti*) is marked and overtly represented in the D-frame, as described in (3.1.6).

3.1.2 Conditions Determining Discourse Levels. The discourse level and honorification are largely determined by a set of interpersonal relations between the participants in the speech act, the speaker and hearer, and the subject and object of discourse. This aspect of linguistic study properly belongs to socio-linguistics. For the purposes of linguistic analysis we may assume as a precondition on D-level analysis that there is a set of D-level determining conditions which regulate the speaker's manner of speaking to the hearer. For expository purposes I shall sketch some of the major determining factors. Two distinct areas seem to be relevant to the discussion of such conditions: status and solidarity.⁶ The former can be subdivided into absolute (or invariable) status and relative (or variable) status; the latter can be further refined in terms of the degree of solidarity.

The absolute-status relation between the speaker and hearer is a kinship relation, such as father-son, husband-wife, or the like; the relative-status relation includes such relationships as officer-enlisted man, teacher-student, or the like. Age is another factor, basically absolute but relative when superimposed by social-status relations; sex is marginal in this respect. In the following partial characterization of D-level determining factors I shall take into account kinship relation, social-status relation, and age difference, as well as solidarity.

(3) D-level Determining Conditions

(Notation: a 'speaker'; b 'hearer'; m 'manner of speaking'; K 'kinship relation'; S 'social-status relation'; → 'if... then'; ∨ 'or'; ∧ 'and'; - 'not'; Higher(a, b, K) 'a is higher than b in kinship relation', etc.)

a. Plain D-level

- | | | |
|--|---|------------|
| i. Higher(a, b, K) | } | → Plain(m) |
| ii. Higher(a, b, S) | | |
| iii. Equal(a, b, S) \wedge Solid(a, b) | | |
| iv. Older(a, b) | | |

b. Intimate D-level

- | | | |
|---|---|----------------------------|
| i. Higher(a, b, S) | } | → Intimate(m) ⁷ |
| ii. Equal(a, b, S) \wedge Solid(a, b) | | |
| iii. Older(a, b) | | |

c. Familiar D-level

- i. Equal(a, b, S) \wedge Adult(a \wedge b) → Familiar(m)

d. Blunt D-level


- | | | |
|---|---|------------|
| i. Equal(a, b, K) \wedge Adult(a \wedge b) | } | → Blunt(m) |
| ii. Equal(a, b, S) \wedge Adult(a \wedge b) \wedge -Solid(a, b) | | |
| iii. Higher(a, b, S) | | |
| iv. Older(a, b) \wedge Adult(a \wedge b) | | |

e. Formal D-level


- | | | |
|--|---|------------------------------|
| i. Lower(a, b, K) | } | → Formal(m) \vee Polite(m) |
| ii. Lower(a, b, S) | | |
| iii. Younger(a, b) | | |
| iv. Equal(a, b, S) \wedge -Solid(a, b) | | |

Note that the conditions in (3) are by no means complementary, one and the same condition applying to more than one D-level. Depending on the degree of solidarity existing between the two speech participants at the time of a speech act, the D-level used by the same speaker may also vary. The polite manner of speaking, which is not regarded as constituting a distinct D-level but rather as a modal marker in this analysis, is determined by the same set of conditions as that of the formal D-level.


3.1.3 Discourse-level Formation in the Discourse Frame. Given a set of conditions such as those partially specified in (3), the D-level is formed in the D-frame roughly as follows. Suppose the speaker *a* bears the relation to the hearer *b* such that *a* is a son of *b*: Son(*a*, *b*).⁸ This kinship relation is part of the NP-description of the speaker NP in the D-frame; further, this kinship relation is interpreted as indicating that *a* is lower than *b* in kinship relation: Lower(*a*, *b*, K). Then, the condition specified in (3.e.i.) applies: Lower(*a*, *b*, K) → Formal(m). In the D-frame the formal D-level is formed as illustrated in (4).



After NP-description substitution the manner NP in the D-frame is represented as (5. b), or simply as (5. c) for ease of exposition. (For the structural analysis of the D-frame, see (2.1).)




The main point to note on the formation of the D-level in the D-frame is that the description of the speaker NP contains a description about his interpersonal relation with the hearer and that an appropriate D-level is filled in to the manner NP on the basis of this description and the set of conditions in (3). Each D-level is represented in the manner NP roughly as follows:




3.1.4 Assignment of First and Second Person Pronominal Forms. With the D-level specified in the D-frame, we are now ready to assign first and second person pronominal forms in a straightforward manner. In (2.2) we described how NPs are specified for person on the subset relation between indices but we did not take into account the pronominal forms of first and second persons in terms of their cooccurrence relations with the D-level. Various pronominal forms of the first and second person may be assigned by the following rules. (I ignore the 'polite' manner of speaking, since it functions similarly to the Formal DL.)

(7) First Person Pronominal Form Assignment (cf. 2.2.1)

a. First Person Singular




b. First Person Plural




(8) Second Person Pronominal Form Assignment (cf. 2.2.2)

a. Second Person Singular



b. Second Person Plural



Notice that in (8) the Formal DL is absent and no pronominal form is assigned to this D-level. As was discussed in (2.2.3), non-pronominal second person substitutes must be inserted in this case. The condition for non-pronominal second person substitution now may be stated as follows.

- (9) Non-pronominal second person substitution is obligatory in an 'S' if and only if it is governed by the formal D-level (or the polite manner); otherwise, optional.

3.1.5 Discourse-Level and Discourse-Verb Realization in 'S'. Now we will examine the way in which the D-level and D-verb in the D-frame are syntactically realized in a given sentence 'S'. For illustration, let us consider the following sentences in (10), where different D-levels are used as appropriate to the discourse situation.

- (10) a. Formal DL (Lower(a, b, K): b is a's mother.)

Emeni, John-i cip-ey iss-up.ni-ta.

mother house-in exist-F/D

'Mother, John is home.'

- b. Plain DL (Higher(a, b, K): a is b's mother.)

Minho-ya, John-i cip-ey iss-ta.

VOC -Pl/D

'Minho, John is home.'

- c. Intimate DL (Equal(a, b, S) \wedge Solid(a, b): a and b are close friends.)

Minho-ya, John-i cip-ey iss-e.

-Int/D

'Minho, John is home.'

- d. Familiar DL (Equal(a, b, S): a and b are acquaintances.)

Minho, John-i cip-ey iss-ney.

-Fam-D


'Minho, John is home.'

e. Blunt DL (Higher(a, b, S): a is b's boss.)

John-un eti-ey iss-o?
 where -B/Q
 'Where is John?'

In order to account for the syntactic process of D-level and D-verb realization in the sentence, let us consider an intermediate structure of (10.a), as shown in (11.b), which is derived from the underlying structure in (11.a).

(11)



At this stage of the derivation the D-level and D-verb in the D-frame, i.e. [Formal m_{NP}] and [TELL_v], are realized *formally* (syntactically and lexically) in the 'S', which may be called the process of 'syntacticalization' or 'lexicalization'. This process may be conceived of as involving either two distinct steps: formative realization and lexicalization or a single step of lexicalization. The two alternatives may be illustrated in the form of rules roughly as follows.

(12) a. Formative Realization of DL and DV

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \underbrace{[X - [X - V \text{ 's'}] - \text{FORMAL} - \text{TELL}]_s}_{1 \quad 2 \quad 3} & \implies & \\ 1 \quad 2 \quad 3 & & \\ 1 \quad 2+F+D \quad 3 & & \end{array}$$

b. Lexicalization of Formatives

$$F+D \longrightarrow \textit{pnita}$$

Alternatively,

(13) Lexicalization of DL and DV

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \underbrace{[X-[X-V \text{ 's'}]-\text{FORMAL}-\text{TELL}]}_1 \text{ s]} & & \underbrace{\text{ s]}]}_3 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 \implies \\ 1 & 2+pnita & 3 \end{array}$$

In (12), the D-level and D-verb are first realized as formatives, F(ormal) and D(eclarative); then the formatives are specified by morphophonemic rules. In (13), in contrast to (12), the morphemic shape is directly assigned to the constituent verb. The two processes may simply be notational variants; the first step in (12) is largely redundant. For convenience of exposition, however, I will take the two-step approach in the following. Now the five D-levels and the D-verb 'TELL' are realized syntactically (cf. the i-rules in (14)) and phonologically (including the terminal contour) (cf. the ii-rules in (14)), as shown below:

(14) a. Formal-Declarative Realization

i. (=12. a)

ii. (=12. b)

b. Plain-Declarative Realization

i. $\underbrace{[X-[X-V \text{ 's'}]-\text{PLAIN}-\text{TELL}]}_1 \text{ s]}_2 \text{ s]}_3 \implies$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 2 & 3 \implies \\ 1 & 2+P1+D & 3 \end{array}$$

ii. $P1+D \longrightarrow ta$

c. Intimate-Declarative Realization

i. $\underbrace{[X-[X-V \text{ 's'}]-\text{INTIMATE}-\text{TELL}]}_1 \text{ s]}_2 \text{ s]}_3 \implies$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 2 & 3 \implies \\ 1 & 2+Int+D & 3 \end{array}$$

ii. $Int+D \longrightarrow e \downarrow^9$

d. Familiar-Declarative Realization

i. $\underbrace{[X-[X-V \text{ 's'}]-\text{FAMILIAR}-\text{TELL}]}_1 \text{ s]}_2 \text{ s]}_3 \implies$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 2 & 3 \implies \\ 1 & 2+Fam+D & 3 \end{array}$$

ii. $Fam+D \longrightarrow ney$

e. Blunt-Declarative Realization

i. $\underbrace{[X-[X-V \text{ 's'}]-\text{BLUNT}-\text{TELL}]}_1 \text{ s]}_2 \text{ s]}_3 \implies$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 2 & 3 \implies \\ 1 & 2+B+D & 3 \end{array}$$

ii. $B+D \longrightarrow o \downarrow$

By this set of rules the sentences in (10) are marked with D-levels and declarative

'(I recall) Bill told Tom that (Bill/*I recalled) John was home.'

In the indirect questions corresponding to those in (17) the retrospective manner refers to that of the hearer reported, i.e. Tom in (18.a), of the speaker in (18.b), and of the speaker and Tom in (18.c).

(18) a. John-i cip-ey iss-te-nya-ko Bill-i Tom-eykey mul-ess-ta.
 -RETRO-PI/Q-QM ask-PST-PI/D

'Bill asked Tom whether (Tom/*Bill/*I recalled) John was home.'

b. John-i cip-ey iss-nu-nya-ko Bill-i Tom-eykey-mut-te-la.
 -P1/Q-QM ask-RETRO-PI/D

'(I recall) Bill asked Tom whether John was home.'


c. John-i cip-ey iss-te-nya-ko Bill-i Tom-eykey mut-te-la.
 -RETRO-PI/Q-QM -RETRO-PI/D

'(I recall) Bill asked Tom whether (Tom/*Bill/*I recalled) John was home.'

There seem to be at least two ways of analyzing the semantic structure of retrospective sentences: (a) analyzing the retrospective manner as originating in the structure of the manner NP in the D-frame; (b) analyzing the retrospective manner as an embedded D-sentence in the D-frame.


According to the first analysis, the structure of the manner NP dominating the 'S' of (15.a) may be represented as in (19).

(19)



Given (19) as the structure underlying the retrospective and plain manner NP, (15. a) may be given the following semantic structure, minor details aside.

(20)




Contrast (20) with (11): the 'S' in (20) contains 'PAST', whereas the 'S' in (11) contains 'PRESENT'. A retrospective-manner realization rule, as formulated in (21), may give rise to the surface sentence of (15. a).

(21) Retrospective-Plain-Declarative Realization

- i. $[X - [X - \text{PAST } 's'] - \text{RETRO \& PLAIN} - \text{TELL } s]$
 $\underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_1 \quad \underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_2 \quad \underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_3 \quad \implies$
 $1 \quad 2 + \text{RETRO} + P_1 + D \quad 3$
- ii. $\text{PAST} + \text{RETRO} + P_1 + D \longrightarrow \text{tela}$

In the second analysis, the retrospective manner is described as a D-sentence roughly of the form 'x recall 'S'', which is embedded in the D-frame of declaratives or interrogatives. The semantic structure underlying (15. a) then may be represented as (22) in this analysis. Given a semantic structure like (22) for (15. a), a retrospective-manner realization rule of the following may yield the surface sentence of (15. a).



(23) Retrospective-Plain-Declarative Realization

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{i. } X - [X - [X - [X - \text{PAST } 's'] - \text{RECALL } s] - \text{PLAIN} - \text{TELL } s] - X \\
 \underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_1 \quad \underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_2 \quad \underbrace{\hspace{3.5cm}}_3 \implies \\
 1 \quad \quad 2 + \text{RETRO} + \text{PI} + \text{D} \quad \quad 3
 \end{array}$$

ii. PAST + RETRO + PI + D \rightarrow *tela*

The second analysis, which has been suggested to me by McCawley, gives the meaning of 'retrospective' more directly. Furthermore, by way of analyzing the retrospective as an embedded clause in the D-frame (i.e. x recall 'S'), we can account for the language-specific surface realizations directly from the same underlying semantic structure. That is, the retrospective manner of speaking is realized as a suffix in Korean, while it is realized as a clause like 'x recall/observed ...' in English. Besides, notice that if the D-verb 'TELL' is further dominated by another D-verb 'REQUEST', it will account for the retrospective questions. In the case of the retrospective in indirect discourse (cf. 17, 18), retrospective realization rule (23) will be modified in such a way that the quoted S, (i.e. 'S') simply turns into an unquoted S.

The semantic description of the retrospective sentences above is not intended to be exhaustive; the semantic structure involved in them seems more complex than what

- d. ϕ_j /**caki_i/*na/*ne/*John* -(n)un kippu-/sulphu- nya-ko Bill_i-i
PI/Q-QM

Tom_j-eykey mul-ess-ta.
ask-PST-PI/D

(Bill_i asked Tom_j whether he_j/**he_i/*I/*you/*John* was pleased/sad.)

- (28) a. Na/**Ne/*John* -(n)un kippu-/sulphu- te-la.
-RETRO-PI/D

((I recall) I/**you/*John* was pleased/sad.)

- b. Ne/**Na/*John* -(n)un kippu-/sulphu- te-nya?
-RETRO-PI/Q

(Do you recall whether you/**I/*John* were pleased/sad?)

- c. (Caki_i)/**Na/*Ne/*John* -(n)un kippu-/sulphu- te-la-ko Bill_i-i Tom-eykey
-RETRO-PI/D-QM

mal.hay-ss-ta.

(Bill_i told Tom that he_j recalled) he_j/**I/*you/*John* was pleased/sad.)

- d. ϕ_j /**caki_i/*na/*ne/*John* -(n)un kippu-/sulphu- te-nya-ko Bill_i-i
-RETRO-PI/Q-QM

Tom_j-eykey mul-ess-ta.
ask-PST-PI/D

(Bill_i asked Tom_j whether (he_j recalled) he_j/**he_i/*I/*you/*John* was pleased/sad.)

Notice that the grammaticality of each retrospective sentence in (28) should have been in reverse if it were subject to the non-identity constraint in (26). In fact, however, the unlike-subject constraint is governed by or subject to the more general like-subject constraint in cases where the expression involves a psychological verb and the retrospective manner of speaking. The way in which the two types of constraint interact in Korean deserves further semantic inquiry in terms of the speaker's role as participant and/or observer. I will not pursue this interesting problem any further in this study.

3.2 Honorification. There are two subsystems of honorification: (a) honorification of the subject NP of the discourse, and (b) honorification of the object NP of the discourse. They are interrelated, as will be shown in the following. The honorific system is linguistically manifested in the morpheme shape of the verbs, nouns, or particles in the given discourse. In this analysis of honorification in Korean, I postulate a discourse

operator, or pragmatic operator (in the sense of Weinreich (1963: 120-3)), 'HONOR' assigned to the human NP(s) relative to the speaker's interpersonal relation with the NP(s) in question; the subject NP assigned [HONOR] then spreads out its copies to relevant constituents, -obligatorily inserting the honorific *si* in the verb or affecting its morpheme shape, or the shape of relevant nouns or particles in the discourse. In the second subsystem, the [HONOR] assigned to the recipient (or indirect object) NP affects the morpheme shape of certain verbs, depending on the recipient's interpersonal relations with the speaker and the subject of discourse.

Conditions for assigning the discourse operator [HONOR] to a human NP may be set up as follows: the speaker *a* 'honors' or 'esteems' a participant x_i if one of the following conditions is met.

- (29) a. Higher(x_i , *a*, *K*)
 b. Higher(x_i , *a*, *S*)
 c. Older(x_i , *a*)

Conditions (29) are necessary but not sufficient. What is necessary is the speaker's intention to honor the participant x_i at the time of his utterance. Honorific assignment then may be stated informally as (30).

- (30) The discourse operator [HONOR] is assigned to the human NP x_i if one of the following conditions is met:
- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| a. Higher(x_i , <i>a</i> , <i>K</i>) | } | ∧ Intend(<i>a</i> , Honor(<i>a</i> , x_i)) |
| b. Higher(x_i , <i>a</i> , <i>S</i>) | | |
| c. Older(x_i , <i>a</i>) | | |

A higher status alone, for instance, does not necessarily bring out an honorific expression, as imaginable in sentences like

- (31) a. Wuli sacang-un kay.casik-i-ta.
 our president- dog-son- COP-P1/D
 'Our president is an s.o.b.'
- b. #Wuli sacang-nim-un kay.casik-i-si-ta. (# 'odd')
 -HPM- -H-

It would be token-odd to say (31.b) with the honorific person marker *nim* and the honorific verb marker *si*, unless the speaker believes that his honorable boss was born of a female canine, which is unlikely, or unless he is making fun of him.

Note that one characteristic of honorification is, as in the system of D-levels, it

is interpersonal and as such the speaker cannot honor himself; thus a subject NP coreferential with the speaker NP never gets [HONOR] assigned to it. This may be regarded as an instance of self-demeaning principle underlying many languages. In what follows I will discuss: (a) honorification of the subject NP, and (b) honorification of the indirect object (recipient) NP in a discourse.

3.2.1 Honorification of Subject NPs. A subject human NP affects the morpheme shape of the verb in a sentence. The general rule may be stated informally as follows: The operator [HONOR] assigned to the subject NP is *spread* to its sister constituents affecting the morpheme shape of the verb, NPs, or particles. The discourse operator [HONOR] is not inherent to any individual lexical items; it originates in discourse and spreads over the entire sentence (cf. McCawley 1968: 138). Honorific spreading may be formulated in a rule in a manner analogous to the phonological rule of assimilation or harmony such as in Makino (1970: 167).¹² In the present analysis, the [HONOR] assigned to the subject NP spreads its copies to its sister constituents as formulated in the following rule.

(32) Honorific Spreading

$$\begin{array}{l} [\quad \text{NP} \quad -X \quad -A \quad -X \quad s] \\ \quad \text{[HONOR]} \\ \quad \quad 1 \quad \quad 2 \quad 3 \quad 4 \quad \Longrightarrow \\ \quad \quad 1 \quad \quad 2 \quad 3 \quad 4 \\ \quad \quad \quad \text{[HONOR]} \end{array}$$

Condition: A varies over V and NP.

When the [HONOR] is spread to a V, the honorific suffix *si* is inserted by rule (33).

(33) Honorific *si* Insertion

$$\begin{array}{l} [X-V \quad s] \\ \quad \text{[HONOR]} \\ \quad \quad 1 \quad 2 \quad \Longrightarrow \\ \quad \quad 1 \quad 2+si \end{array}$$

Let us illustrate honorific spreading and honorific insertion by a few examples. Consider the following discourse situation: A is a girl named Mia; B is her father; C is her grandfather. The sentences in (33) show various D-levels and honorific or nonhonorific expressions, which depend on who talks to whom about whom.

(34) a. (A to B about C)

Apeci, $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{halapeci} \\ \text{halape-nim} \end{array} \right\} \text{-(kkeyse)-nun cwumusi-ko keysi-p.ni-ta.}$
 father grandpa- (NOM_H)-TOP sleep_H-ing exist_H-F-D
 ‘Father, grandpa is sleeping.’

b. (A to C about B)

Halapeci, apeci-nun cwumusi-ko keysi-p.ni-ta.
 ‘Grandpa, father is sleeping.’

c. (B to A about C)

Mia-ya, halapeci(-kkeyse)-nun cwumusi-ko keysi-n.ta.
 ‘Mia, grandfather is sleeping.’

d. (B to C about A)

Ape.nim, Mia-nun ca-ko iss-up.ni-ta.
 sleep- exist-F-D
 ‘Father, Mia is sleeping.’

e. (C to A about B)

Mia-ya, ney aypi-nun ca-ko iss-ta.
 your father- exist-Pl/D
 ‘Mia, your father is sleeping.’

f. (C to B about A)

(Aypi-ya,) Mia-nun ca-ko iss-ta.
 ‘Mia is sleeping.’

Given the data in (34), first observe that *halape-nim*, the honorific form of *halapeci* (cf. 34.a) is optional; the honorific nominative marker *kkeyse* (cf. 34.a, c) is also optional.¹³ The nonhonorific form *ca-ta* ‘sleep’ has the honorific form *cwumusi-ta* (cf. 34.a-c). Also notice that the first three sentences (34.a-c) are cases where the [HONOR] is assigned to the subject NPs and subsequently spread, by rule (32), to their sister constituents. The assignment of [HONOR] to the subject NP is based on the conditions (cf. 30) between the speaker and the subject, not between the speaker and the hearer as was the case in D-level formation. The relationships among the three participants in (34) are C>B>A (where ‘>’ is ‘higher than in kinship relation’). Thus, in (34.c), where B tells A about C, the D-level is Plain-DL, but [HONOR] gets assigned to the subject NP, C. In (34.e), where C is talking to A about B, the subject NP, B, who is C’s son, cannot be honored, and the unique referential term for ‘father’ *aypi*, which is more or less

depreciatory, is used.

In the lexicon, some sort of honorific morpheme specification rules must be provided in order to account for otherwise unpredictable morpheme shapes, including, for example, (a) *kkeyse* (vs. unmarked *i/ka*), (b) *nim* ‘honorific person marker’, (c) *cwumusi-ta* (vs. *ca-ta*) ‘sleep’, (d) *keysi-ta* (vs. *iss-ta*) ‘exist’. The morpheme specification rules must be able to account for the common honorific verbal forms like

| (35) | Unmarked | Honorific | |
|------|---------------------------------|--|-----------------|
| a. | <i>mal.ha-ta</i> | <i>malssum.ha-si-ta</i> | ‘say, speak’ |
| b. | (<i>pap-ul</i>) <i>mek-ta</i> | (<i>cin-ci-lul</i>) <i>capswusi-ta</i> | ‘eat (meal)’ |
| c. | <i>cwuk-ta</i> | <i>tol.a-ka-si-ta</i> | ‘die/pass away’ |

In the process of lexical insertion, then these morphemes will be inserted into the tree as specified below:


| | | | |
|---------|-----------------------|---|-----------------|
| (36) a. | FATHER [HONOR] | → | <i>apnim</i> |
| b. | NOMINATIVE [HONOR] | → | <i>kkeyse</i> |
| c. | SLEEP [HONOR] | → | <i>cwumusi-</i> |
| d. | EXIST [HONOR] | → | <i>keysi-</i> |

Further note that the honorific marker *si* is overtly present in morpheme shapes like *cwumusi-*, *keysi-*, *capswusi-*, while there are no morphemes like **cwumu-*, **key-* and **capswu-*. Moreover, the honorific *si* may occur more than once, which is the natural consequence of honorific spreading, as in

| | |
|------|---|
| (37) | <i>Ape.nim-kkeyse-nun o-si-ci an-h.u-si-e-yo?</i> |
| | -H- not -H- |
| | ‘Isn’t your father coming?’ |


Now we will look into the semantic structure underlying a sentence whose subject is assigned [HONOR]. The semantic structure underlying (34. a), ignoring the vocative and minor details, may be represented as (38).

(38)




Honorific spreading is cyclical and whenever the structural description of (31) is met [HONOR] spreads to the constituents within the same simplex sentence. By the time the derivation draws near to the surface structure, [HONOR] must have spread over all the constituents, as illustrated in (39).

(39)



In the process of lexical insertion, the [HONOR] which has now spread over all the

constituents affects 'SLEEP' and 'EXIST' in (39). After lexical insertion, D-level and D-verb realization (cf. 14), and topicalization, the surface structure of (34.a) will look like



Before moving on to the honorification of indirect object NPs, let us briefly recapitulate the honorification of subject NPs which we have described. It is the subject NP of the sentence that controls honorific expressions, including honorific *si* insertion and a limited number of honorific morphemes. However, there are cases which cannot be accounted for by honorific assignment and spreading such as we have described. Consider (41), in which the honorific *atunim* 'son' (vs. unmarked *atul*) is used.

- (41) a. Cwunghakkyo-ey tani- $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{nun} \\ *si\text{-nun} \end{array} \right\}$ Kim-sensayng-nim atu-nim-un
 middle-school-to attend son-HPM-
 ttokttok.ha- $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ta.} \\ *si\text{-ta.} \end{array} \right\}$
 intelligent-
 'Prof. Kim's son, who attends middle school, is intelligent.'
- b. Sensayng-nim atu-nim-un tayhak-ey tani- $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} si\text{-p.ni-kka?} \\ p.ni-kka? \end{array} \right\}$
 college-to
 'Does your son go to college?'

In (41.a) the subject NP *atunim* has the honorific person marker *nim* attached to it but the sentence is not in the honorific form: the honorific *si* cannot be inserted as the starred form indicates. In contrast, the formally identical *atunim* is treated as honorific in (41.b) and as such the honorific *si* occurs in the sentence. How do we account for the form *atunim* in (41.a) and its non-honorific functioning in the sentence? The best account I can offer is: the discourse operator [HONOR] is not assigned to 'son' directly for the reason that a middle-school boy is hardly regarded as someone esteemable, but after honorific

spreading has applied for the last time in the derivation, the [HONOR] assigned to 'Prof. Kim' derivatively spreads to 'son'.

There is another intriguing case with respect to honorification. Consider the sentences in (42).

(42) a. Kim-sensayng-nim-un khi-ka khu-si-p.ni-ta.
height tall-H-

'Prof. Kim is tall.'

b. Eme-nim-un kenkang-i coh.u-si-p.ni-kka?
mother- health- good-H-

'Mother, are you well?'

c. Apeci-nun saep-i cal toy-si-p.ni-ta.
business- well become-H-

'Father's business is going well.'

These sentences are honorific in that they contain the honorific *si*. Now notice that on the surface each of the sentences has a topic NP, followed by a nonhuman NP with the nominative marker. Which NP would be the subject of the sentence? Honorification has to do with the human subject NP. If we take the second NP marked with the nominative case as the subject, then it would be hard to explain the honorific *si* in the sentence for the reason that the NP in the nominative is nonhuman. One place to seek an explanation would be the topic NP: before topicalization the NP in question could be either in the nominative or the genitive, as shown in (43).

(43) a. Kim-sensayng-nim- $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} i \\ (uy) \end{array} \right\}$ khi-ka khu-si-p.ni-ta.

b. Emenim- $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} i \\ (uy) \end{array} \right\}$ kenkang-i coh.u-si-p.ni-kka?

c. Apeci- $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} kkeyse \\ (uy) \end{array} \right\}$ saep-i cal toy-si-p.ni-ta.

Then, at the time honorific spreading applies, the first NP might be the subject of the sentence. But how do we account for the first NP being in the genitive? Furthermore, in the case in which the first NP is in the genitive, the subject of the sentence is the second NP. At the moment we are not concerned with the 'deep' subject, because such a notion is irrelevant to honorific spreading. The notion 'inalienable possession' may be useful in the case of (43.a, b) but not in the case of (43.c). It must be noted at this point that sentence (43.a) is less natural, if not unacceptable, if its first NP is in the

(46) a. (A to C)

Sensayngnim-i ce-eykey kule.h.key { malssum.ha-si-ess-up.ni-ta.
 { *malssum.hay-ss-up.ni-ta.

‘You told me so.’

b. (A to C)

Sensayng-nim-kkeyse ku ay-eykey kule.h.key { malssum.ha-si-
 child-to { *malssum-tuli-(si)- }
 { *mal.ha-si-

ess-up.ni-ta.

‘You told the boy s.’

c. (A to C)

Sensayng-nim-kkeyse cey apeci-eykey kule.h.key { malssum.ha-si-
 { *malssum-tuli-(si)- }

ess-up.ni-ta.

‘You told my father so.’

d. (A to B)

Apeci-ka Kim-sensayng-nim-kkey kule.h.key malssum-tuli-si-ess-up.ni-kka?

‘Did you tell Prof. Kim so?’

e. (B to A)

Ney-ka na-eykey kule.h-key mal.hay-ss-ni?

‘Did you tell me so?’

f. (B to A)

Ney-ka Kim-sensayng-nim-kkey kule.h.key { malssum-tuli-ess-ni?
 { *malssum.hay-ss-ni?

‘Did you tell Prof. Kim so?’

(47) a. (A to B)

Kim-sensayng-nim-kkeyse ce-eykey kule.h.key { malssum-ha-si-ess-
 { *malssum-tuli-si-ess- }
 { *mal.hay-ss-

up.ni-ta.

‘Prof. Kim told me so.’

b. (A to B)

Kim-sensayng-nim-i apeci-hanthey kule.h.key { malssum-ha-si-
 -to { *malssum-tuli-si- }

ess-up.ni-kka?

‘Did Prof. Kim tell you so?’

c. (A to B)

Kim-sensayng-nim-i ku ay-eykey kule.h.key { malssum-ha-si-ess- } up.ni-ta.
 *mal.hay-ss-

‘Prof. Kim told the boy so.’

d. (A to B)

Ku ay-ka ce-eykey kule.h.key { mal.hay-ss- } up.ni-ta.
 *malssum.hay-ss-

‘The boy told me so.’

e. (A to B)

Ku ay-ka Kim-sensayng-nim-kkey kule.h.key { malssum-tuli-ess- } up.ni-ta.
 *mal.hay-ss-
 *malssum.hay-ss-

‘The boy told Prof. Kim so.’

f. (A to B)

Ku ay-ka apeci-hanthey kule.h.key { malssum-tuli-ess- } up.ni-kka?
 *mal.hay-ss-
 *malssum.hay-ss-

‘Did the boy tell you so?’

The sentences in (45) have the first person subject, the sentences in (46) the second person subject, and the sentences in (47) the third person subject. Note now that there are four different forms for ‘say’ occurring in (45)–(47): *mal.ha-ta*, *malssum.ha-si-ta*, *malssum-tuli-ta*, and *malssum-tuli-si-ta*. Their distribution is as follows:

- (48) a. *mal.ha-ta*: (45. c)
 (46. e)
 (47. d)
- b. *malssum.ha-si-ta*: (46. a), (46. b), (46. c)
 (47. a), (47. b), (47. c)
- c. *malssum-tuli-ta*: (45. a), (45. b)
 (46. f)
 (47. e), (47. f)
- d. *malssum-tuli-si-ta*: (46. d)

The first two forms, i.e. *mal.ha-ta* and *malssum.ha-si-ta* are readily accountable in the frame of subject honorification discussed in (3.2.1): *mal.ha-ta* is unmarked (i.e. nonhonorific); and *malssum.ha-si-ta* is honorific. But *malssum-tuli-ta* (cf. 48. c) and *malssum-tuli-si-ta* (cf. 48. d) cannot be accounted for in that frame of honorification. A close look at the cases

'Prof. Kim gave me the book.'

- d. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Nay-} \\ \text{Mia-} \end{array} \right\}$ ka Kim-sensayng-nim-eykey chayk-ul tuli-ess-e.

' $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{I} \\ \text{Mia} \end{array} \right\}$ gave the book to Prof. Kim.'

- e. Apeci-ka Kim-sensayng-nim-eykey chayk-ul tuli-si-ess-e.

'My father gave the book to Prof. Kim.'

- f. Kim-sensayng-nim-i apeci-eykey chayk-ul cwu-si-ess-e.

'Prof. Kim gave the book to my father'.

The sentences in (51.a, b) are unmarked cases with respect to honorification; the sentences in (51.c) and (51.f) are honorific in that the honorific *si* is inserted in *cwu-ta*. Sentences (51.d, e) are cases of object honorification, parallel to (48.c, d). When the indirect object person is 'higher' (or 'older') than the speaker *tuli-ta* is used; when the indirect object person is 'higher' (or 'older') than the speaker and the subject person is also 'higher' (or 'older') than the speaker, *tuli-si-ta* is used. Lexical insertion of 'GIVE' then may be formulated, as a first approximation, as

(52) 'GIVE'-lexicalization

| | [NP | - NP | - X | - GIVE | s] |
|----|---------|---------|-----|-----------------|----|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | → |
| a. | 1 | 2 | 3 | <i>cwu-</i> | |
| b. | 1 | 2 | 3 | <i>cwu-si-</i> | |
| | | [HONOR] | | | |
| c. | 1 | 2 | 3 | <i>tuli-</i> | |
| | | [HONOR] | | | |
| d. | 1 | 2 | 3 | <i>tuli-si-</i> | |
| | [HONOR] | [HONOR] | | | |

There is one remark to be made with respect to object-NP honorification. Compare (51.e) and (51.f) or (46.d) and (46.c). In the given discourse situation the speaker has to honor two persons, her father and her teacher. One aspect of Korean culture is such that normally it is one's father who is treated as less 'honored' than an esteemed person in the 'outgroup' (in the sense of Martin 1964). This is an extension of the self-demeaning principle. Thus, in (51.e) and (46.d) 'Prof. Kim' is regarded as more honored than 'father'; hence *tuli-si-ta* and *malssum-tuli-si-ta*. In (51.f) and (46.c), *cwu-si-ta* and *malssum-ha-si-ta* are used respectively, reflecting the speaker's attitude that his father (in indirect

object position) is not honored in the presence of his teacher (in subject position). In introspection, however, the foregoing remark on the speaker's honoring both the subject and indirect object needs to be modified, even though the observation on the self-demeaning principle holds true. It would be appropriate to characterize the honorific relation among the speaker, the subject, and the indirect object as that of transitivity: i.e. $\text{HONOR}(a, x_i) \wedge \text{HONOR}(x_i, x_j) \rightarrow \text{HONOR}(a, x_j)$.¹⁵

Let us then examine the rules of lexical insertion of 'SAY' and 'GIVE' in (50) and (52). Note that the use of *si* can be accounted for by the general rule of *si*-insertion (cf. 32). Coupled with this rule, the lexicalization of 'SAY' and 'GIVE' may now be reformulated as follows.¹⁶

(53) 'SAY'-lexicalization (cf. 50)

| | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------------------|---|---|----------------------|----------------|
| | [NP - NP - X - SAY _s] | | | | |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | → |
| a. | 1 | 2 | 3 | <i>mal-ha-</i> | (unmarked) |
| b. | 1 | 2 | 3 | <i>malssum-tuli-</i> | (2 is honored) |

(54) 'GIVE'-lexicalization (cf. 52)


| | | | | | |
|----|------------------------------------|---|---|--------------|----------------|
| | [NP - NP - X - GIVE _s] | | | | |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | → |
| a. | 1 | 2 | 3 | <i>cwu-</i> | (unmarked) |
| b. | 1 | 2 | 3 | <i>tuli-</i> | (2 is honored) |

3.3 An Overall System of Discourse Levels and Honorification. We have so far described discourse levels and honorification separately. But it is evident that discourse levels and honorification are interrelated to each other, originating in the discourse frame, particularly in the person deixis of speaker and hearer. Let us briefly review the interrelated system of discourse levels and honorification, and then make some observations with respect to violations of this aspect of the discourse system.

Firstly, five distinct D-levels are described as five distinct manners of speaking, largely predetermined by a set of socio-culturally imposed conditions on interpersonal relations between the speaker and hearer. Secondly, honorification is described as an aspect of discourse in which the discourse operator [HONOR], originated in the D-frame as predetermined by an analogous set of conditions imposed on interpersonal relations between the speaker and participants in the discourse, spreads to the entire discourse,

thus regulating morpheme shapes. Two subsystems of honorification are set up: subject-NP honorification and object-NP honorification. The former functions in spreading [HONOR] to the sister constituents of the 'honored' subject-NP; the latter functions in modifying morpheme shapes of certain verbs when the indirect-object NP is 'honored' relative to the subject NP and the speaker NP. The principle underlying the system of discourse levels and honorification is the self-demeaning principle; the speaker never honors himself or, in a relative sense, anyone in the 'ingroup'.

In summary, an overall view of the system of discourse levels and honorification is presented in the following diagram.



(R 'relation, HIGHER, OLDER, etc.'; x_i 'person index of the subject NP'; x_j 'person index of the indirect object NP')

In conclusion, let us briefly consider some consequences of the violations of discourse levels and honorification. There are two types of violation: violation of D-levels (including the use of pronouns) and violation of honorification. Consider the sentences in (56) and (57) in the discourse situations provided.

(56) a. (Boy to his father)

#Nay-ka ne-eykey ku kes-ul cwu-keyss-ta.

'I'll give it to you.'

b. (Father to his boy)

#Cey-ka kukes-ul Minho-eykey tuli-keyss-up.ni-ta.

'I'll give it to you, Minho.'

c. (Boy to his teacher)

#Nay-ka ku kes-ul hay-ss-ta.

'I did it.'

d. (Teacher to his boy student)

#Cey-ka ku kes-ul hay-ss-up.ni-ta.

'I did it.'

(57) a. (Boy to his father)

*Cey-ka apeci-kkey cwu-keyss-up.ni-ta.

'I'll give it to you.'

b. (Father to his boy)

*Nay-ka ne-eykey tuli-keyss-ta.

'I'll give it to you.'

c. (Boy to his teacher)

*Cey-ka ku kes-ul ha-si-ess-up.ni-ta.

'I did it.'

d. (Teacher to his boy student)

*Nay-ka ku kes-ul ha-si-ess-ta.

'I did it.'

The sentences in (56), which are marked '#' (token-oddity or discourse-oddity), are well-formed as grammatical sentences as such. There is no violation in agreement between D-levels and pronouns. These sentences are odd only in that the speaker's manner of speaking, relative to the hearer, is inappropriate. The speaker is not in violation of syntax or semantics, but in violation of a pragmatic aspect of the discourse structure of the language involving the interpersonal relation between the speaker and hearer. In contrast, the sentences of (57) involve syntactic violations and in the ordinary sense they are ungrammatical, let alone discourse-oddity. Notice that in (57) the D-levels and pronominal forms are appropriate to the speaker-hearer relation, but the honorific system existing in the language is in violation. The verbs in (57) should have been in the form, respectively: *tuli-keyss-up.ni-ta*, *cwu-keyss-ta*, *hay-ss-up.ni-ta*, and *hay-ss-ta*.

A third type of violation is mixing of the two types mentioned above, such as the following.

- (58) a. (Boy to his father)
 *Cey-ka apeci-eykey cwu-key-ss-ta.
 'I'll give it to you.'
- b. (Father to his son)
 *Nay-ka caney-eykey tuli-key-ss-ta.
 'I'll give it to you.'

The sentences in (58) involve violations of both D-level-pronominal form agreement and honorification, and as such they are syntactically illformed or ungrammatical.

Now note that violations of the second or third type may be and must be described in a syntactically based grammar as violations of agreement rules, but violations of the first type cannot be described in such a grammar. It is only in the domain of a D-grammar that violations of D-levels can be handled properly. Further note that the system of discourse levels and honorification is not stylistic in the ordinary sense of the word.¹⁷ A subsystem of honorification involves syntactic violations. Violation of discourse levels has to do with the structure of discourse, in which the interpersonal role of the speaker and hearer is fundamental in regulating D-levels.

Let us now briefly consider situations in which the same speaker shifts from one D-level to another. Two distinct situations can be thought of in this respect: (1) the speaker intentionally shifts from one D-level to another (e.g. from the formal to plain or vice versa) to reflect his shifting attitude toward the hearer, say friendly to unfriendly or the other way around; (2) the speaker may unintentionally or unconsciously shift from one to another (in particular, from the plain to intimate D-level, or vice versa), indicating that the two D-levels are in variation in the given discourse situation. The latter may further lead one to suggest that in terms of manner of speaking, say formality or intimacy, there be a merger of two levels such as the plain and intimate (or the formal D-level and the polite manner). The number of D-levels may turn out to be reduced in the course of linguistic change; yet, we may assert that, as observed by Martin (1964), 'we shall probably have speech levels in Japanese and Korean as long as we have plurals in English.'

4. INFORMATION FOCUS AND DISCOURSE

When language is viewed as the most effective means of communication, notions such as 'new' and 'given' information play a significant role in the structure of discourse: given information in a discourse undergoes syntactic reduction such as pronominalization, deletion, etc.; new information is given a prominent position in syntactic structure such as predicate position in cleft sentences, or receives emphatic stress in its phonetic realization.

Until the past few years this area of linguistic study was largely overlooked in generative grammar. However, terms like 'theme' and 'rheme' were used in linguistic description by linguists of the Prague tradition such as Firbas (1964, 1966), Daneš (1964), and Sgall (1967). Halliday (1967-8, 1970a, 1970b), modifying and expanding the Praguian notions of 'theme' and 'new/given' information, explicated them in the thematic component which in his theory interacts with the components of transitivity and mood. According to Halliday (1967: 212), the theme is defined as the element in the initial position of a sentence and the rheme as all that follows. Terms like 'topic' and 'comment', roughly corresponding to Halliday's theme and rheme, have also been used (cf. Hockett 1958: 201-3).

In this study I will use the term 'topic' in the sense of 'theme' as used by Halliday in order to avoid ambiguity associated with the latter term, in particular to keep it distinct from Firbas's use of the term. The topic is then positionally definable—the constituent of a sentence positioned sentence-initially. The typical and most general case of topicalization may be subject formation or 'primary' topicalization in the sense of Fillmore (1968), and other topicalizations may be called secondary. I will keep topicalization distinct from subject formation in this study.

I will introduce the term 'information focus' (or simply 'focus') as a discourse operator. It originates in the structure of discourse. The speaker marks one or more constituents of the sentence as informationally focal, parallel to his assigning another discourse operator 'HONOR' to human NPs. Information focus is not necessarily correlated with 'new' elements; the speaker's attitude to the truth value of the proposition, his positive or negative assertions, contrastive elements like 'ONLY', 'ALSO', and 'EVEN' are also focus-bearing. In the following, I will discuss: (a) information reduction,

(b) sentence expansion and reduction, (c) emphatic stress and information focus, (d) sentence clefting and information focus, (e) negation and information focus, and (f) 'ONLY', 'ALSO' and 'EVEN'.

4.1 Information Reduction in Discourse. One of the heuristic principles of discourse structure is the reduction of recoverable information. Information given in the preceding discourse turns out to be redundant in the succession of discourse and as such, given information undergoes processes of syntactic or phonological reduction: pronominalization, stress reduction, equi-NP-deletion, and the like. Such grammatical processes of information reduction may be universal with language-specific constraints on their form: in English or French, pronominalization is prevalent over deletion; in Korean or Japanese, the reverse is the case. Consider the sentences in (1) and (2) for an illustration of structural reduction in Korean and English.

- (1) a. Nayil ka-keyss-ta.
tomorrow go-will-Pl/D
'I'll go tomorrow. (cf. *Will go tomorrow.)'
- b. Nayil ka-keyss-ni?
'Will you go tomorrow? (cf. *Will go tomorrow?)'
- (2) a. John-i Mary-lul manna-ss-ta.
-NOM -ACC meet-PST-Pl/D
'John met Mary.'
- b. Eti-se (manna-ss-ni)?
where-at
'Where (did he meet her)? (cf. *Where met?)'
- c. Encey (manna-ss-ni)?
when
'When (did he meet her)? (cf. *When met?)'
- d. Way (manna-ss-ni)?
why
'Why (did he meet her)? (cf. *Why met?)'

Notice that in (1) the subject is not overtly expressed in Korean, while it is obligatory in English. Similarly, in (2), once discourse referents are established between the speaker and hearer, it is normal in Korean to suppress even the pronominal form of reference to the third person, while the syntactic constraints of English are such that complete suppression or deletion of pronouns is not allowed, as may be seen in the ill-formed

sentences in (2).

The general process of structure reduction may be presented as a gross approximation as follows:

(3) Structure Reduction

$$\begin{array}{cccccc}
 [_{\text{D}} & \text{X} & - & \text{A} & - & \text{X} & - & \text{A} & - & \text{X}] \\
 & 1 & & 2 & & 3 & & 4 & & 5 \implies \\
 & 1 & & 2 & & 3 & & \{ \text{PRO} \} & & 5 \\
 & & & & & & & \{ \phi \} & &
 \end{array}$$

Condition: $2=4$ (A is a variable over S, NP, V.)

This formulation indicates that structure reduction takes place in the second conjunct under identity of the elements in two juxtaposed, not necessarily adjacent, sentences, analogously to forward pronominalization (cf. Ross 1967: 356). Note, however, that the reduction process formulated in (3) is in the structure of discourse, not in the coordinate structure of a sentence, as indicated by the outmost brackets $[_{\text{D}}]$, i.e. the domain of discourse.

4.2 Sentence Expansion and Reduction. One of the recursive rules in the base of an S-grammar is often given in the form (cf. Ross 1967: 165)

$$(4) S \rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{and} \\ \text{or} \end{array} \right\} S^n \quad (n \geq 2)$$

In order to have this general rule schema generate all and only well-formed sentences there must be some constraint in the grammar so that the following ill-formed sentences will be blocked.

- (5) a. *John met Mary yesterday and is he going too meet her tomorrow?
 b. *Did John meet Mary yesterday and Bill did too.
 c. *Meet Mary tomorrow and John met her yesterday.

The relevant question to raise at this point is: why shouldn't there be a rule or rules in grammar such that sentences can be reduced to a single sentence, as well as those expanding one sentence by coordination? Given a rule like

$$(6) S^n \rightarrow S$$

the simple sentences in (7.a) can be conjoined, yielding (7.b).

- (7) a. John got up at six. He went to the office at eight. He came home at six. He had a date in the evening.
 b. John got up at six, went to the office at eight, came home at six, and had a date in the evening.

In the framework of an S-grammar the process of sentence reduction illustrated above is unthinkable. But such a process is equally natural, and possibly more natural than the process of expanding a sentence into a coordinate construction.¹ If one takes into account a child's language acquisition or an adult's second language learning, the process of sentence reduction would be more revealing.

Another matter of relevance in this respect is the notion of coordinate structure. If one takes this as a syntactically definable notion associated with *and*, *or*, and *but*, for example, then a generalized statement like Ross's Coordinate Structure Constraint would run into trouble. In English, *and* functions in conjoining sentences as well as noun phrases. In Korean (also in Japanese) the conjunctive particle *wa* (or *to* in Japanese) has no formal or morphological relation with the element conjoining sentences. The sentence connectives *ko*, *ko(se)* and *se*, which can be glossed as 'and' at first glance have syntactic constraints imposed on them by meaning. Before we discuss the sentence connectives *ko* and *ko-se* with respect to coordinate structure, let us look into Ross's Coordinate Structure Constraint (cf. Ross 1967: 168-71).

(8) The Coordinate Structure Constraint

In a coordinate structure, no conjunct may be moved, nor may any element contained in a conjunct be moved out of that conjunct.

Given such a constraint, the structure underlying (9.a) cannot be construed to be that of coordination, as noted by Ross (*ibid.*), for the well-formedness of (9.b) would be otherwise unaccounted for, unless of course Ross's Coordinate Structure Constraint is incorrect.²

(9) a. I went to the store and bought some whisky.

b. Here's the whisky which I went to the store and bought.

The function of *and* in English must be described at least in terms of a symmetrical (or simultaneous) and asymmetrical (or consecutive) relation between the conjuncts. (9.a) is an asymmetrical case. Then, to save Ross's CSC one may say that a coordinate structure does not underlie (9.a). This obviously follows from admitting that only the symmetrical *and*, not any *and*, can determine the source of a coordinate structure. This simple case may be an argument against the linguistic view that formal devices should be studied independently of their meaning and use (cf. Chomsky 1970c: 57).

Consider now the Korean sentences in (10), the first of which is a translation of (9.a).

- b. John met MARY.
- c. JOHN met MARY.
- d. JOHN MET MARY.
- e. (Yes,) John met Mary.

First, note that (12.e) is the unmarked case with respect to emphatic stress, the last element bearing main stress but not emphatic stress as in (12.b). For our discussion, the stress pattern of (12.e) is irrelevant since we are concerned with emphatic stress, not main stress assigned by Nuclear Stress Rule (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1970). The stress patterns (12.a) through (12.d) indicate that the element(s) emphatically stressed is (are) that (those) which the speaker assigns information focus to, corresponding, as answers, to the following questions:

- (13) a. Who met Mary?
- b. Who did John meet?
- c. Who met who?
- d. Who did what to whom?
- e. (Did John meet Mary?)

The WH-words in (13) are the elements bearing focus, the rest being known or contextually presupposed by the speaker.⁴ Let us now look into the way in which WH-words and indefinite pronouns (e.g. *someone*, *something*, etc.) are functionally related. In generative grammar the WH entity has never been sufficiently described, specifically with respect to its function and origin. It has been, rather, taken for granted that there is a morpheme or syntactic feature WH, which functions in the formation of direct and indirect questions and also relative clauses. Although it is generally agreed that WH+*something* and WH+*someone* are realized as *what* and *who*, respectively, the question of how WH and *some* are functionally related has rarely been raised. In terms of the discourse operator 'focus', we may identify WH as the indefinite 'SOME' receiving focus—WH in the sense of Katz and Postal (1964), not Chomsky's (1971) \pm WH. This process may be shown as in (14).

- (14) SOME x \longrightarrow WH x
 [FOCUS]

(where x is an index for person, object, time, place, etc.)

In Korean, when indefinite pronouns such as *nwukwu* 'someone' and *mues* 'something' receive focus they simply turn out to be phonetically emphatic rather than undergoing

unknown reason) and the interrogative *dare* 'who' results as in (17.c). This observation is rather speculative but not implausible. At any rate, in Japanese the WH-word (e.g. *dare*) would not need emphatic stress, because the absence of *ka* keeps it distinct from the SOME-word (e.g. *dareka*), which contains the disjunctive *ka*. The operator 'focus' then appears to function in these languages as follows: (a) in English it functions to turn SOME *x* to a WH-word; (b) in Korean it functions to yield emphatic stress at the phonetic level; (c) in Japanese it functions to delete the disjunctive particle *ka*.

4.4 Information Focus and Sentence Clefting. There have been a number of analyses proposed on cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences in English.⁶ The analysis I am proposing here is based on information focus, which functions in deriving cleft sentences optionally from unclefted sentences. However, it is not assumed that every unclefted sentence has a clefted version or every clefted sentence has an unclefted version. I use the term 'pseudo-' cleft sentence in a broad sense, not restricted to sentences the subject of which is headed by *what*, as in (18.a), but including sentences like (18.b) and (18.c).

- (18) a. What John bought at the bookstore yesterday was/is a dictionary.
 b. The one who bought a dictionary at the bookstore yesterday was/is John.
 c. The place where John bought a dictionary yesterday was/is the bookstore.

In Korean there are no clefted sentences corresponding to English *it is ... that ...* sentences such as (19); this is evidently due to the fact that Korean is a verb-final language. The Korean sentences in (20) thus bear a structural similarity to (18) rather than to (19).

- (19) a. It was/*is a dictionary that John bought at the bookstore yesterday.
 b. It was/*is John who/that bought a dictionary at the bookstore yesterday.
 c. It was/*is at the bookstore that John bought a dictionary yesterday.
- (20) a. John-i ecey chayk.pang-eyse sa-n kes-un sacen-i-(ess-)ta.
 bookstore-at buy-MOD thing- dict.-COP-(PST)-P1/D
 b. Ecey chayk.pang-eyse sacen-ul sa-n kes-un John-i-(ess-)ta.
 c. John-i ecey sacen-ul sa-n kes-un chayk.pang-eyse i-(ess-)ta.


In the Korean sentences in (20) the pronoun *kes* 'thing' functions in the same way as the *it* does in (19), standing for not only 'thing' and 'event' but 'person' and 'place' as well. In Korean, however, other pro-forms such as *salam*, *pun*, *i* (for 'human'), *kos* (for 'place'), etc. (cf. 2.2.5) also function in clefting, thus (21) paralleling the English pseudo-cleft sentences in (18).

- (21) a. Ecey chayk.pang-eyse sacen-ul sa-n pun/i-(n)un John-i-(ess-)ta.⁷ (cf. 18. b)
- b. John-i ecey sacen-ul sa-n kos-un chayk.pang-i-(ess-)ta. (cf. 18. c)

Consider now the unclefted sentences in (22) or (23), which, with emphatic stress properly assigned,⁸ are equivalent to the corresponding sentences in (18), (19), or (20).


- (22) a. John bought A DICTIONARY at the bookstore yesterday.
- b. JOHN bought a dictionary at the bookstore yesterday.
- c. John bought a dictionary AT THE BOOKSTORE yesterday.
- (23) a. John-i ecey chayk.pang-eyse SACEN-UL sa-ss-ta.
- b. JOHN-I ecey chayk.pang-eyse sacen-ul sa-ss-ta.
- c. John-i ecey CHAYK.PANG-EYSE sacen-ul sa-ss-ta.

What is characteristic of cleft sentences is that they are in the form of equational sentences, the topic (or the subject) being what is informationally known and the predicate being what is informationally focal — the ‘identified’ and the ‘identifier’ (in the sense of Halliday 1967), respectively. In the present analysis focus-clefting takes place in the following manner: the focus-bearing element of S is raised to the next higher predicate position and the rest of the structure is changed into a relative clause structure with a copy of the index of the focused NP as the head noun. Let us look at the Korean sentence (20.a) for illustration of the focus-clefting transformation. The derived constituent structure at the time focus-clefting applies may be represented roughly, details aside, as follows:⁹




The focus-clefting transformation as formulated in (25) applies to (24) to give rise to structure (26).

(25) Focus Clefting




(26)




The structure of the circled NP meets the structural description for relativization, as formulated in (27), and the head noun, containing only an index, is realized as *kes* 'thing'; the modifier (or 'relativizer') is specified as *n* by a morphophonemic rule.

(27) Relativization



Now, the surface structure of (20.a) would look like (28) after the application of lexical insertion, copula insertion (cf. 93), case marking, and topicalization (cf. 29).

(28)



English focus-clefting may be described in a parallel manner. At the point of the derivation where relativization has applied the head noun can take either *it*, followed by the relative

pronoun *that*, or *what* by compounding the head NP index and the relative pronoun, say *that*, thus giving rise alternatively to (19.a.) and (18.a). Obviously, there are many language-specific constraints in blocking the derivation of either pseudo-cleft or cleft sentences in English, including those of tense agreement and prepositions. Before discussing some of the constraints on clefting in Korean, let us examine the case where focus is assigned to the predicate.

A natural (presupposition-sharing) answer to a question like (29) would be (30.a) or its clefted version (30.b).


(29) What did John do yesterday?

(30) a. He BOUGHT A DICTIONARY.

b. What he did (yesterday) was buy a dictionary.


In (30.b) *buy a dictionary* is the predicate of the clefted sentence, corresponding to the predicate of the unclefted sentence (30.a). The derived structure at the time focus clefting applies may be represented as (31), minor details aside.

(31)



To this derived structure (31) focus clefting applies in such a way that NP₂, which contains the focused elements, is taken out and repositioned as a higher predicate, while a copy of the index of NP₂ is positioned as the head noun of a relative clause structure. After the application of focus clefting the derived structure underlying (30.b) would be like (32). Relativization applies to the circled NP, yielding the head noun *what* (by the process: $x_2 \# x_2 \rightarrow \textit{what}$). Then, after applying transformations like copula insertion, lexical insertion, topicalization, etc. the surface form of (30.b) is derived. If focus-clefting does not

(32)



apply, then sentence (30.a) is derived, focus being realized as emphatic stress. Notice in (32) that the new predicate 'BUY DICTIONARY' retains an S node, further dominated by an NP. Thus, what is extracted and placed in predicate position is a sentential NP (i.e. NP₂ in (31)). In addition to (30.b), a sentence containing the infinitive marker *to* in the predicate (cf. 33) shows the derivational process of the sentential predicate.

(33) What he did yesterday was *to* buy a dictionary.

We will now look into a case of compound predicates in cleft sentences of the following type.

(34) It is from 8 to 5 that John works.

The corresponding uncleft sentence is (35), and the equivalent sentences in Korean are given in (36).

(35) John works FROM 8 TO 5.

(36) a. John-i il.ha-nun kes-un 8-si-puthe 5-si-kkaci-ta.

b. John-un 8-SI-PUTHE 5-SI-KKACI il.ha-n.ta.
 -o'clock-from -till work-

What is clefted in (34) or its Korean counterpart (36.a) is the compound time NP. To derive (36.a), then, at some stage in the derivation the time NP must be in the structure represented in (37). Focus-clefting affects the whole compound NP, blocking any one of its conjuncts from being taken out (cf. Ross's Coordinate Structure Constraint). Hence, the ill-formed sentences in (38).

the relative clause *that ... at* (in English) has turned into the adverbial *where* by the incorporation of *at*. However, the relative clause structure in Korean does not allow such particles to 'dangle' or to be incorporated into a relative pronoun. Thus (47) is ill-formed in Korean, while the corresponding sentence (48) is well-formed if the *with* is present.

(47) *John-i sacen-ul sa-n salam-un Bill-i-ess-ta.

(48) The one who John bought a dictionary $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} * \phi \\ \text{with} \end{array} \right\}$ was Bill.

In English the comitative *with* must be overtly expressed either in the relative clause of pseudo-cleft sentences (cf. 48) or in the predicate of cleft sentences (cf. 44, a). In pseudo-cleft sentences with head nouns like *one* (or Korean *salam/pun/i/...*) the comitative *with* (Korean *hako/wa*) cannot be present in the predicate. Thus (49) is ill-formed.

(49) *[John-i sacen-ul sa-n] salam-un Bill-hako-yess-ta.

'*The one [who John bought a dictionary] was with Bill.'

What all this amounts to is: (a) if x_i (cf. 46) becomes the head noun, the clefted predicate retains its adverbial nature in English and Korean alike, and (b) if x_j becomes the head noun, an adverbial element (or particle) like the comitative 'WITH' is retained in the relative clause structure of the pseudo-cleft sentence in English but not in Korean. So far we have accounted for two types of clefting in terms of the particles involved; yet we have not explained why particles like *eyse* 'at' are deleted as in (40, a) while they are not, as would be expected, deleted in English (cf. 41, a) and why the same *eyse* is deleted in the relative clause of (42, a) without blocking well-formedness. Putting it simply, how could *eyse* get deleted optionally? It seems to me that the 'basic' particles of time and place NPs, *eyse* or *ey* ('AT' or 'IN') are such that they behave, in part at least, like the nominative and accusative particles in deletability. Typical of equational sentences is that the predicate is in the nominative case. Thus, whatever the case of the clefted element, it is 'superimposed' by the nominative case, and the accusative (i.e. direct object) marker is deleted. In this respect, the basic time and place markers seem to behave alike in part; in part, they behave like the comitative 'WITH' and as such they may not be deleted.

4.4.2 Some Constraints on Clefting. In the preceding sections we have discussed some restrictions on focus clefting such as Ross's Coordinate Structure Constraint and particles in the clefted predicate. In what follows, I shall discuss constraints on clefting more than one focused element. For a discussion of general restrictions on clefting and pseudo-clefting in

English, see Stockwell et al. (1968 : 797-840). As the ill-formed sentences in (50) through (54) indicate, clefting of two or more focused NPs is blocked if one of them is a subject or object NP.

- (50) a. *Ecey chayk.pang-eyse sa-n kes-un John-i sacen-i-ess-ta.
 b. *It was John a dictionary that bought at the bookstore yesterday.
- (51) a. *Sacen-ul chayk.pang-eyse sa-n kes-un John-i ecey-i-ess-ta.
 b. *It was John yesterday that bought a dictionary at the bookstore.
- (52) a. *John-i chayk.pang-eyse sa-n kes-un ecey sacen-i-ess-ta.
 b. *It was a dictionary yesterday that John bought at the bookstore.
- (53) a. *John-i ecey sa-n kes-un chayk.pang-eyse sacen-i-ess-ta.
 b. *It was a dictionary at the bookstore that John bought yesterday.
- (54) a. *John-i sa-n kes-un ecey chayk.pang-eyse sacen-i-ess-ta.
 b. *It was a dictionary at the bookstore yesterday that John bought.

In contrast, if the clefted NPs do not contain a subject or object NP the cleft sentence is well-formed, as illustrated in (55) through (57).

- (55) a. John-i sacen-ul sa-n kes-un ecey chayk.pang-eyse-i-ess-ta.
 b. It was at the bookstore yesterday that John bought a dictionary.
- (56) a. John-i ecey sacen-ul sa-n kes-un chayk.pang-eyse Bill-hako-i-ess-ta.
 b. It was with Bill at the bookstore that John bought a dictionary yesterday.
- (57) a. John-i sacen-ul sa-n kes-un ecey chayk.pang-eyse Bill-hako-i-ess-ta.
 b. It was with Bill at the bookstore yesterday that John bought a dictionary.

What these sentences seem to indicate is that in clefting, adverbial phrases of time, place, and the like are immediate constituents, and as such they can be clefted together, but subject or object NPs cannot be clefted with any adverbial phrase. Consider now the cleftability of sentences with a conjoined predicate. As was the case in (50) through (54), if the conjoined predicate contains a subject or object NP, then the clefted sentence is ill-formed (cf. 58), but it is acceptable or interpretable if the conjoined predicate contains only adverbial phrases (cf. 59).

- (58) a. *It was John and yesterday that bought a dictionary at the bookstore.
 b. *It was a dictionary and yesterday that John bought at the bookstore.
 c. *It was a dictionary and at the bookstore that John bought yesterday.
 d. *It was a dictionary, (and) at the bookstore, and yesterday that John bought.
- (59) a. ?It was at the bookstore and yesterday that John bought a dictionary.

- b. ?It was with Bill and at the bookstore that John bought a dictionary.
 c. ?It was with Bill and at the bookstore and yeasterday that John bought a dictionary.

As to the well-formedness of sentences (59), they are unacceptable to some native speakers, while they are acceptable, though less natural, to others. The structure underlying sentences (59) may contain a coordinate structure like (60).

(60) (cf. 59.a)

- it [_s that John bought a dictionary] was at the bookstore and
 it [_s that John bought a dictionary] was yesterday.

Given the coordinate structure of (60) the natural process of structure reduction would give rise to sentences in (61) rather than those in (59).

- (61) a. It was at the bookstore that John bought a dictionary and it was yesterday.
 b. It was with Bill that John bought a dictionary and it was at the bookstore.
 c. It was with Bill that John bought a dictionary and it was at the bookstore and it was yesterday.

Further note that in (61) the second occurrence of *it* has not only coreferential identity with the initial *it* but also identity of sense with the whole structure preceding it. Consider the following interrogative sentences in which more than one WH-word occur.

- (62) a. { Where and when } did John buy a dictionary?
 { When and where }
 b. { Where and with whom } did John buy a dictionary?
 { With whom and where }
 c. { With whom and where and when }
 { Where and when and with whom } did John buy a dictionary?
 { When and where and with whom }

But in English, syntactic constraints being such, two WH-words cannot be juxtaposed without a conjunction; hence the ill-formedness of (63).

- (63) a. *Where when did John buy a dictionary?
 b. *Where with whom did John buy a dictionary?
 c. *With whom where when did John buy a dictionary?

In Korean, by contrast, there are no such constraints, as shown in (64).

- (64) a. John-i encey eti-se sacen-ul sa-ss-ni?
 when where
 b. John-i eti-se nwukwu-hako sacen-ul sa-ss-ni?
 where who-with
 c. John-i nwukwu-hako eti-se encey sacen-ul sa-ss-ni?
 who-with where when

d. Nwu-ka encey eti-se nwukwu-hako mues-ul hay-ss-ni?

(who did what, with whom, where, when?)

4.5 Information Focus and Negation. When we consider the structure of a negative sentence in terms of information focus, we notice that there are distinct interactions between negation NEG and proposition P. Given the form NEG(P), focus F may interact with NEG and P in any of the following ways: (a) no F on either NEG or P, (b) F on both NEG and P, (c) F on P, (d) F on NEG, (e) F on some element of P, and (f) F on NEG and some element of P. Let us first discuss cases (a, b, c).

Consider the sentences in (65) with emphatic stress assigned differently.

(65) a. John didn't buy a dictionary.

b. JOHN DID NOT BUY A DICTIONARY.

c. JOHN did not BUY A DICTIONARY.

The three different representations in (65) are assumed to stand for the three cases (a, b, c), respectively. Structurally distinct as they are, it is hard to distinguish them in performance, aside from the possible ambiguity involved in (65.a), which is due to main stress, distinct from emphatic stress, on the last element *dictionary*. Our concern is to see whether we can distinguish them by clefting. Let us look into the issue, case by case. In case (a) no problem of clefting arises simply because there is no element to be clefted, that is, no focused element. Clefting of cases (b, c) is also not permitted in English, even though there are some substitutions like (66).

(66) a. What is true is that John didn't buy a dictionary. (Case-b)

b. The thing is (that) John didn't buy a dictionary. (Case-b)

c. What I deny is that John bought a dictionary. (Case-c)

Compare the expressions in (66) with the ill-formed sentences in (67).

(67) a. *It was that John didn't buy a dictionary. (Case-b)

b. *What was not is John bought a dictionary. (Case-c)

Note that if the speaker's modality is other than assertion in (67.a) sentences in (68) are well-formed in English.

(68) a. It may be that John didn't buy a dictionary.

b. It seems that John didn't buy a dictionary.

Let us now look into three other cases (d, e, f), which are illustrated with the following examples.

- b. John-i sacen-ul sa-ci an-h-un kes-i-ta.
-MOD

(*It is that John didn't buy a dictionary.)

These are examples of Korean sentences comparable to the ill-formed sentence in translation. Characteristic of this sentence type is that P and NEG are in topic position, with no element in the predicate except the copula *i-ta*. Since there is no focused element in predicate position, it would be absurd to interpret (74) as derived by a focus-clefting transformation. Since (71) and (74) are semantically equivalent, their underlying structure can be assumed to be the same.¹¹ In the present analysis the structure *kes-i-ta* is inserted as a special case of copula insertion. Another analysis is to postulate a higher predicate 'BE' in the semantic structure which functions as a sort of tense and modality carrier. I shall leave this possibility open in this study. Let us now consider case (b), where F is on both NEG and P. As was the case in English, there is no surface structure derived from focus-clefting with P and NEG both as a predicate. Similarly, in case (c) there is no cleft structure. The ill-formed sentence in (75) points out this fact.

- (75) a. *Ani-n kes-un John-i sacen-ul sa-n kes-i-ta.

'*What is not is that John bought a dictionary.'

(What is not true is that John bought a dictionary.)

In case (d), focus is on NEG. Sentence (76) shows this structure.

- (76) John-i sacen-ul sa-n kes-un ani-ta.

'It was not that John bought a dictionary.'

If we are to take the surface structure of (76) as being derived from some unclefted structure by focus-clefting, then this would violate the notion of focus-clefting as we have discussed it so far in the preceding section, for the reason that the rule we have formulated and our definition of focus raising assumed that only noun phrases are subject to focus-clefting. It may be that either the rule of clefting must be rejected as incorrect in the face of NEG becoming a predicate, or other transformations like NEG-raising (in the sense of G. Lakoff (1965), Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970), and others) must be called for, or NEG must be posited as a higher predicate. In the structural analysis of negation I will adopt the last alternative, and the semantic structure of negation will be presented in the next two sections.

Let us make a relevant remark at this point about what I assume to be the source.

of *ani*(-yey-yo) and *yey*, the answer forms corresponding to English 'No' and 'Yes'. When one asks whether P is true or not, the question is called a yes-no question. He knows what P is about but he is questioning whether it is true or not. Thus, a yes-no question may be represented informally in Korean as: P *i-yey-yo?*/P *ani-yey-yo?*¹² (with the polite marker *yo* added). Consider the sentences in (77) and the answer forms in (78).

- (77) a. John-i sacen-ul sa-n kes-i-yey-yo?
 (Is it that John bought a dictionary?)
 b. John-i sacen-ul sa-n kes-i ani-yey-yo?
 (Isn't it that John bought a dictionary?)
- (78) a. Yey.
 'Yes.'
 b. Ani (-yey-yo)
 'No.'

Notice that in the form of answer (78), the known information, namely the content of P, is structurally reduced and only the appropriate predicate, positive or negative, is repeated. This may be a convincing account on the source of *yey* as well as *ani*, as used in reply. Further note that in Korean the appropriate answer to a negative question is based on the questioner's focus on whether the negation of P is true or not. Thus, an appropriate answer to negative questions like (79) must be (80), not (81).

- (79) a. John-i sacen-ul sa-ci an-h-ass-e-yo?
 'Didn't John buy a dictionary?'
 b. John-i sacen-ul sa-ci an-h-un kes-i-yey-yo?
 (Is it that John didn't buy a dictionary?)
- (80) Yey. (sa-ci an-h-ass-e-yo.)
 'No, he didn't.' (Literally: 'Yes, he didn't.')
- (81) *Ani. (sa-ci an-h-ass-e.)

The appropriate answer in (80) is in response to the original question like (79.b), which is equivalent to (79.a), where the questioner was asking whether the negation of P is true (i.e. [P(NEG)]-*i-yey-yo?*).

Now, consider case (e), where focus is on some element of P. The cleft sentence corresponding to the uncleft sentence (82) would be (83).

- (82) a. John-i SACEN-ul an-sa-ss-ta.
 b. John-i SACEN-ul sa-ci an-h-ass-ta.

(83) John-i an sa-n kes-un sacen-i-ta.

'It was a dictionary that John didn't buy.'

In (83), an element of P, 'DICTIONARY' is under focus and it is clefted.

Lastly, consider case (f), where focus is on NEG and some element of P.

The cleft sentence for (84) would be (85).

(84) a. John-i SACEN-ul AN-sa-ss-ta.

b. John-i SACEN-ul sa-ci-AN-h-ass-ta.

(85) John-i sa-n kes-un sacen-i ani-ta.

'It was not a dictionary that John bought.'


4.5.2 Structure of Negation and Focus. The structure underlying (71), repeated below as (86) for convenience, may be represented as (87).

(86) a. John-i sacen-ul an sa-ss-ta.

b. John-i sacen-ul sa-ci an-h-ass-ta.

'John didn't buy a dictionary.'

(87)




Transformations to derive (86.a) from (87) include predicate raising and NEG-preposing. NEG-preposing for Korean may be formulated as

(88) NEG-Preposing

$$\begin{array}{cccccc}
 X - [V - X - \text{NEG}_v] - X & & & & & \\
 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & \implies \\
 14+2 & 3 & 0 & 5 & &
 \end{array}$$

At the point of the derivation where NEG-preposing applies, the substructure of (87) may be represented as in (89).

(89)



In contrast, the derivation of (86.b) includes NEG-lowering, as formulated below.

(90) NEG-Lowering

$$\begin{array}{cccccc}
 X - [X - [S_{NP}] - [ha - X_v]_s]_{NP} - \text{NEG} - X & & & & & \\
 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & \implies \\
 1 & 4+2 & 3 & 0 & 5 &
 \end{array}$$

The predicate NEG is lowered and sister-adjoined to the left of the predicate *ha-ta*. The *ha-ta* in term 2 actually stands for two *ha-ta*'s: *ha-ta*₁ is the pro-verb of action, 'DO'; *ha-ta*₂ appears to be semantically empty and as such it may be introduced by an insertion rule.¹³ After NEG-lowering, insertion of the nominalizer *ki/ci* applies, which may be formulated roughly as (91).¹⁴

(91) *Ki/Ci* Insertion

$$\begin{array}{cccccc}
 X - [X - [S_{NP}] - [\langle \text{NEG} \rangle - ha - X_v]_s] - X & & & & & \\
 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & & \implies \\
 1 & 2 + \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ki \\ ci \end{array} \right\} & 3 & 4 & &
 \end{array}$$

What the rule in (91) specifies is that the NP over S has the positive nominalizer *ki* inserted before *ha-ta* or the negative nominalizer *ci* before NEG-*ha-ta*. One may alternatively formulate a rule, as originally proposed by Song (1967), in the form: *ki* → *ci* in the environment of NEG. After the insertion of *ci*, lexical insertion to the compound predicate [NEG-*ha*-PAST_v] and application of rules like subject formation and tree pruning, the surface form (86.b) is finally derived.

Consider now the derivation of (74.a), repeated below as (92).

(92) John-i sacen-ul an sa-n kes-i-ta.

(*It is that John didn't buy a dictionary.)

Since (92) is semantically equivalent to (86), we assume that it has the same underlying structure. Then, the derivation of (92) includes an additional process of *kes-i-ta* (*no-da* in Japanese) insertion. Since the copula is largely predictable and in many languages it is optional, it seems to be natural to introduce it by insertion. In this case, the copula *i-ta* is optionally introduced as the topmost one-place predicate of 'S'; accordingly its sister NP is created and the index of the NP is realized as *kes* by *kes*-insertion (cf. 98). However, as was noted earlier, an alternative approach would be to posit 'BE' as the topmost predicate in the semantic structure as the tense and/or modality carrier. The environment of copula insertion, except for the case just observed, may be specified as (93).

(93) Copula Insertion

$$\begin{array}{cccc} X - [NP - [NP_v]_s] - X & & & \\ 1 \quad 2 \quad 3 \quad 4 \implies & & & \\ 1 \quad 2 \quad 3 + \text{COP} \quad 4 & & & \end{array}$$

Turning now to other cases, we have observed that cases (b,c) do not involve clefting. Therefore, we can dismiss these two cases. Given the semantic structure in (87), in which NEG is marked [FOCUS] in addition, sentence (76), repeated below as (94), may be derived roughly by the transformations in (95).

(94) John-i sacen-ul sa-n kes-un ani-ta.

'It was not that John bought a dictionary.'


(95) a. On Cycle S₃: Predicate Raising ([BUY-DO-_v])

Equi-NP-Deletion


b. On Cycle S₂: Predicate Raising ([BUY-DO-PAST_v])

c. On Cycle S₁: *kes*-Insertion, lexical insertion, topicalization, etc.

We will now describe the process of *kes*-insertion, which is analogous to the insertion of the 'complementizer' *that* in English. With the structure of 'NP over S' (cf. 96.a) represented as (96.b)




the derived structure of (94) may be given as (97) at the point of the derivation where *kes*-insertion applies,



Kes-insertion operates in a relative clause structure. The rule may be formulated as (98).

(98). *Kes*-Insertion



Conditions: (1) 2=4; (2) 3 dominates S.

Let us now look into case (e). Sentence (83) is repeated below as (99) for convenience.

(99) John-i an sa-n kes-un sacen-i-ta.

In this case the focused element 'DICTIONARY' is clefted and positioned as a higher predicate and its index is copied and placed in the head noun position of the relative clause structure; this is the process of cleft sentence formation we have discussed earlier.


Consider now the last case, in which focus is on NEG and some element of P. Sentence (85) is repeated below as (100).

(100) John-i sa-n kes-un sacen-i ani-ta.

'It was not a dictionary that John bought.'

In semantic structure (87), NEG and the NP bearing 'DICTIONARY' will be marked [FOCUS]. At the point of the derivation where focus clefting applies, the derived structure may look like (101), details aside.

(101)



Focus-clefting applies to (101): the element under focus, NP₃, is clefted and adjoined to the other focus-bearing element NEG; a copy of the index of NP₃ is positioned to form the head noun of the relative clause structure, as described in the focus-clefting transformation. Compare now the two *kes*'s in (100) and (94): although they are identical in form and derived by relativization, they are distinct from each other in that the *kes* in (100) stands for an 'object' while that in (94) stands for a 'proposition'.

In the derivation of clefted sentences in which focus and NEG interact differently, we have described their derivational processes with the same underlying structure, differing only in terms of focus, in which NEG is posited as a higher predicate. For negation in Korean three transformational rules, NEG-preposing, NEG-lowering, and *ci*-insertion have been introduced.

however, presupposition-bearing particles *man*, *to*, and *mace* do not necessarily introduce 'new information'. Consider the examples in (104). The element to which the particle is attached is part of the 'given' information, as it occurs in the topic NP and not in the predicate.

(104) a. John- $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{man} \\ \text{to} \\ \text{mace} \end{array} \right\}$ sa-n kes-un sacen-i-ta.

'It was a dictionary that $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{only John} \\ \text{John also} \\ \text{even John} \end{array} \right\}$ bought.'

b. Sacen- $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{man} \\ \text{to} \\ \text{mace} \end{array} \right\}$ sa-n kes-un John-i-ta.

'It was John who bought $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{only} \\ \text{also} \\ \text{even} \end{array} \right\}$ a dictionary.'

In (105), the clefted sentences containing 'ALSO' and 'EVEN' in the predicate are ill-formed, while those containing 'ONLY' are well-formed. This fact can be explained in terms of the property of uniqueness of the clefted NP as observed by Fraser (1971: 174).

(105) Sacen-ul sa- ... r John $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{man} \\ * \text{to} \\ * \text{mace} \end{array} \right\}$ i-ta.


'It was $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{only} \\ * \text{also} \\ * \text{even} \end{array} \right\}$ John who bought a dictionary.'

In logical formulation, sentences containing 'ONLY', 'ALSO' and 'EVEN' such as (106) can be formulated roughly as (107).¹⁵

(106) a. John- $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{man} \\ \text{to} \\ \text{mace} \end{array} \right\}$ Mary-lul salang.ha-n.ta.
 b. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{to} \\ \text{mace} \end{array} \right\}$
 c. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{to} \\ \text{mace} \end{array} \right\}$


(107) a. $\text{Love}(\text{John}, \text{Mary}) \wedge \neg \exists x((x \neq \text{John}) \wedge \text{Love}(x, \text{Mary}))$
 b. $\text{Love}(\text{John}, \text{Mary}) \wedge \exists x((x \neq \text{John}) \wedge \text{Love}(x, \text{Mary}))$
 c. $\text{Love}(\text{John}, \text{Mary}) \wedge \exists x((x \neq \text{John}) \wedge \text{Love}(x, \text{Mary})) \dots$

The formulation in (107) can be further refined in terms of presupposition and assertion.¹⁶ To distinguish 'ALSO' from 'EVEN' it is necessary to add something more to the formula (107.b)—some predicate which states that $\text{Love}(\text{John}, \text{Mary})$ is the least expected of $\text{Love}(x, \text{Mary})$, where x ranges over the intended domain. In a generative semantics approach, sentence (106.a) may be given a semantic structure such as (108), where 'ONLY' is described as a predicate (cf. McCawley 1972a).¹⁷



After the attachment of NP-description (cf. 109.a) and the lowering of 'ONLY' to the NP containing the corresponding index, i.e. x_5 , the derived structure in (109.b) is yielded.

(109)



In the analysis sketched above, 'ONLY' is treated as a quantifier and as such it gets attached to the NP it binds.

Now examine the ways in which 'ONLY' and 'NEG' interact with each other relative to focus. Consider the sentences in (110) and (111).

(110) a. John-man-i Mary-lul salang.ha-ci an-h-nun-ta.

'Only John doesn't love Mary.'

b. Mary-lul salang.ha-ci an-h-nun kes-un John-man-i-ta.

'It is only John who doesn't love Mary.'

(111) a. John-man-i Mary-lul salang.ha-ci-nun an-h-nun-ta.

'It is not that only John loves Mary.'


b. Mary-lul salang.ha-nun kes-un John-man-i ani-ta.

'It is not only John who loves Mary.'


(110.a) and (110.b) are semantically equivalent; so are (111.a) and (111.b).

The semantic structures underlying (110) and (111) may be represented at some intermediate stage, after the attachment of the NPs *John* and *Mary* to the corresponding indices, as (112) and (113), respectively.

(112)



(113)



Note that 'ONLY' is higher than 'NEG' in (112) and the reverse is true in (113). Besides, 'NEG' in (113) carries [FOCUS]. Contrast now the unleft sentences in (110.a) and (111.a); the only difference between them is the presence of the topic marker *nun* in (111.a) and its absence in (110.a). It suggests that in (110.a) the verbal phrase *salang-ha-ci-an-h-nun-ta* 'don't love' is a constituent, whereas in (111.a) its immediate constituency is cut into the topic *...salang.ha-ci-nun* and the predicate *an-h-nun-ta*, as shown in

(114) John-man-i Mary-lul [salang.ha-ci-an-h-nun-ta].

(115) [John-man-i Mary-lul salang.ha-ci-nun] an-h-nun-ta.

The sentence in (116), which corresponds to the English *it is not that ...*, is similar in terms of IC to that of (115) and they are semantically equivalent.

(116) [John-man-i Mary-lul salang.ha-nun kes-un] ani-ta.

Consider the derivations of the unleft sentences in (110) and (111). In (112), NEG-lowering applies before ONLY-lowering; in (113), the reverse is the case.¹⁸ Topicalization is obligatory in (113) to yield (111.a).¹⁹ Suppose, for the sake of argument, that in the semantic structure of (112) the 'NEG' is marked [FOCUS] as an alternative to (113). Then ONLY-lowering must 'cross over' (in the sense of Postal 1971) the focused 'NEG', which would account for the blocking of the derivation. Then it may be that there is a cross-over constraint such that no elements marked [FOCUS] can be crossed over.²⁰

Consider now the derivations of the cleft sentences in (110) and (111). After ONLY-lowering in (112) the focused NP is clefted to form a higher predicate [John-ONLY_v], yielding (110.b); in (113), after ONLY-lowering, the focused NP is clefted and formed into a higher predicate [John-ONLY-NEG_v], thus yielding (111.b).

5. MODALITY AND SENTENCE TYPES

The traditional classification of sentences into declarative, interrogative, imperative, etc. is based on the formal characteristics of sentences. At the same time, the notion 'mood' has been treated as a grammatical category. Declarative and interrogative sentences are said to be in indicative mood, and imperative sentences are in imperative mood, etc. Aside from the grammatical term 'mood', another term 'modality' has been used by linguistic philosophers.¹ In linguistic discussions of modality, Lyons (1968: 307-8) suggested three scales of modality in addition to three basic moods: 'unmarked' indicative, interrogative, and imperative. They are (a) wish and intention, (b) necessity and obligation, and (c) certainty and possibility—with subdistinctions under each scale such as certainty, probability, possibility, etc. Recently, another term 'illocutionary force', inspired by Austin (1962), has come to receive much attention in generative linguistics together with the notion of performatives (cf. Ross 1970, Fraser 1971, Anderson 1971, to name only a few). Complexity of modality in sentences has been discussed also under such names as 'whimperative' or 'queclarative' (both by Sadock 1970, 1971). More recently, Gordon and Lakoff (1971) have proposed conversational postulates in order to account for 'conversationally implied' meanings of sentences.

In what follows, I will discuss various modalities (or illocutionary forces) in imperative and interrogative with special attention to 'mixed' modality of 'properative', rhetorical question, 'queclarative', tag-question, 'whimperative', and echo question.

5.1 Imperatives and Modality. In terms of modality, imperative is distinct from interrogative: the former is a request for action, the latter is a request for information. These two are again distinct from the declarative with respect to the role of the hearer: in the former the hearer is expected to respond either verbally or by action, or by both, while in the latter the hearer has nothing to do.²

5.1.1 Imperative endings and Discourse Verbs. The imperative endings in Korean with the corresponding D-levels are as follows:

| (1) | D-level | Imperative ending |
|-----|-------------|-------------------|
| | a. Plain | <i>la</i> |
| | b. Intimate | <i>e</i> |

the predicate initially; in the tree diagram I will give the V-final structure. Time, place, and manner NPs in the D-frame are not indicated; *a* and *b* are referential indices for the respective (original) speaker and hearer in the highest D-sentence.) In (5), notice that the content of MODAL assigned to the hearer is not specified; it may be 'WILL' or 'SHALL'.³

5.2 Propositions and Modality.⁴ Propositional sentences, which prima facie would seem to correspond to English *let's* sentences, have some formal constraints with respect to the role of the speaker and hearer as well as their modality. The propositional endings with the corresponding D-levels are as follows:

| (6) D-level | Propositional-ending |
|-------------|----------------------|
| Plain | <i>ca</i> |
| Intimate | <i>e</i> |
| Familiar | <i>sey</i> |
| Blunt | <i>o</i> |
| Formal | <i>p.si-ta</i> |

The major D-verbs are: *ceyan.ha-ta* 'propose', *kwon.yu.ha-ta* 'suggest, invite' and *cheng.ha-ta* 'request'. In the following exposition I will use the form of Plain-DL propositional.

Let us consider sentences like (7). They are semantically equivalent to those in (8). The understood subject in (7) is inclusive 'we', and their meanings correspond to those of the English *let's* sentences given in translation.

- (7) a. Tosekwan-ey ka-ca.
 library-to go-Pl/Prop
 'Let's go to the library.'
- b. Ppal-li mek-ca.
 quick-ly eat-
 'Let's eat quickly.'
- c. Pang-eyse ca-ca.
 room-in sleep-
 'Let's sleep in the room.'
- (8) a. Wuli-ka tosekwan-ey ka-ca.
 we-NOM
- b. Wuli-ka ppal-li mek-ca.
- c. Wuli-ka pang-eyse ca-ca.

(I eat quickly with you, I propose.)

c. *?Ne-hako pang-eyse ca-ca.

(I sleep in the room with you, I propose.)

(12) a. Nay-ka ne-hako tosekwan-ey ka-ca.

b. Nay-ka ne-hako ppal-li mek-ca.

c. Nay-ka ne-hako pang-eyse ca-ca.

How do we account for the ill-formedness or marginal acceptability of the sentences in (11) and the well-formedness of the sentences in (12)? Before we give an argument to account for this phenomenon in terms of semantic structure, let us observe the fact that the speaker NP is obligatory in the structure of the propositive: to put it differently, the hearer NP cannot stand alone without the participation of the speaker NP, as shown in (13) and (14).

(13) a. Nay-ka ka-ca.

(I go, I propose.)

b. Na-man ka-ca.

-only

(I go alone, I propose.)

(14) a. *Ney-ka ka-ca.⁵

(You go, I propose.)

b. *Ne-man ka-ca;

(You go alone, I propose.)

In Korean, the comitative *hako/wa* is homophonous with the coordinate connective 'and'. Thus, (15) can be taken as containing a comitative phrase (cf. the a-form) or a coordinate connective (cf. the b-form).

(15) Ne-hako nay-ka ka-ca;

a. (With you I go, I propose.)

b. (You and I go, I propose → Let's go.)

5.2.2 The Discourse Frame of Propositive. The cooccurrence restrictions involving the speaker and hearer NPs in the Korean propositive are: (a) the comitative NP *ne-hako* 'with you' cannot (or can marginally) stand without the overtly expressed speaker subject NP, and (b) the speaker NP is obligatory. Consider simple sentences in (16) for an illustration of these restrictions.

(16) a. Ka-ca.


(Let's go.)

- b. Wuli-ka ka-ca.
 (=16. a)
 c. Ne-hako nay-ka ka-ca.
 (=16. a)
 d. Nay-ka ka-ca.
 e. *Ney-ka ka-ca.
 f. Na-hako ka-ca.
 g. Ne-nun na-hako ka-ca.
 h. *?Ne-hako ka-ca.
 i. Nay-ka ne-hako ka-ca.

The first three sentences in (16) are semantically equivalent: in (16.a) the conjoined subject NP (of the speaker and hearer) is not overtly expressed; in (16.b) it is jointly pronominalized and in (16.c) it is individually pronominalized. (For first and second person pronominalization, see (2.4).) The semantic structure underlying these three sentences may be represented roughly as (17).

(17) a. PROPOSE(a, b, MODAL(b, DO(a \wedge b, GO(a \wedge b))))

b.




In (17), the performative verb is typically 'PROPOSE', although in the case of the formal D-level it may be of request class. The hearer's modality which is left unspecified is WILL(ING) type. The structures underlying (16.d) and the ill-formed (16.e) may be

represented as in (18) and (19).


(18) a. PROPOSE(a, b, MODAL(b, DO(a, GO(a))))

b.



(19) a. PROPOSE(a, b, MODAL(b, DO(b, GO(b))))

b.




In (18), the unspecified modality of the hearer is 'ALLOW/PERMIT/LET'. Thus, (18) may be paraphrased roughly as follows: 'I propose that you allow me to go.' Sentence (20) is the corresponding expression in English.

(20) *Let me go.*

Note that the semantic structure (19) underlying sentence (16.e) is well formed—it is ill-formed only syntactically. Further note that the semantic structure in (19) is identical to the structure for imperative in (5.b). In this respect, the propositive and the imperative are of the same type.

Consider now the semantic structures underlying (16.f, g). They are equivalent semantically, as the structure (21) shows.

(21) a. PROPOSE(*a*, *b*, MODAL(*b*, DO(*b*, GO(*b*^*a*))))




It is interesting to note that what is involved in this structure is that a conjunct movement proposed by Quang (1971:15), which is a revision of Lakoff and Peters' proposal (1966), applies to extract the speaker index *a* and make it a comitative phrase. As Quang proposed, the conjunct movement is obligatory and contingent on the next higher sentence having a subject which is identical to the first conjunct (i.e. the hearer index *b*), followed by Equi-NP-Deletion. The conditions of conjunct movement are met in (21). After extraposing the lowest *a*, the lowest *b* is deleted and then the next lowest *b* is also optionally deleted under identity with the next higher *b* in the D-frame. In contrast, the structure underlying the syntactically ill-formed (or marginally acceptable) sentence (16.h) and the syntactically

well-formed sentence (16.i) indicates why (16.h) is not well-formed. The semantic structure underlying (16.h) may be represented as

(22) a. PROPOSE(a, b, MODAL(b, DO(a, GO (a^b))))

b.



In (22.b) the same conjunct movement applies: the hearer NP *b* is extraposed as a comitative phrase and the lowest speaker NP is subsequently deleted. Notice at this point that the speaker (i.e. the agent) NP *a* in the next lowest S may not well be deleted. This explains why the sentence without the overt subject *na* in (16.h) appears ill-formed or marginally acceptable. The hearer's modality is the type of 'ALLOW/PERMIT/LET', as was in (16.d) and the corresponding expression in English would be something like (23).

(23) Let me go with you.

To recapitulate what has been described, the obligatory 'participant' of the propositive is the speaker NP as shown in the lowest NP in the tree structures of (17), (18), (21) and (22). It may optionally have the conjoined hearer NP (cf. (17), (21), and (22)), or it may stand by itself (cf. 18). The hearer NP cannot occur by itself in the propositive sentence; such a semantic structure is syntactically realized as imperative (cf. 19). Furthermore, when the agent is the speaker alone as in (18) and (22), then the hearer's modality in the next higher sentence is that of 'ALLOW/PERMIT/LET'. If the agent node contains the hearer either as the sole agent or co-agent as in (17) and (21), then the hearer's modality is that of 'WILL/AGREE'. The illocutionary force of the highest S is

‘PROPOSE’ (or ‘REQUEST’ in the formal D-level).

In summary, regarding the propositive construction in Korean and the *let's* (and *let me*) construction in English, it may be adequate to propose that imperative and propositive form one and the same type of sentence—‘properative’, unless one is motivated to call it a subtype of imperative or a subtype of propositive. Semantically, the structures involved in imperative and propositive have been described independently of language-specific considerations. It is only at the syntactic level that language specific constraints operate in such a way that the prototype ‘properative’ is divided into two sentence types: imperative and propositive. In an overall view, the following diagram may reveal the ways in which the two languages bear syntactic similarity and dissimilarity.

- (24) a. Imperative (E, K) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ORDER} \\ \text{DEMAND} \\ \text{REQUEST} \\ \text{PLÉA} \end{array} \right\} (a, b, \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{WILL} \\ \text{SHALL} \end{array} \right\} (b, \text{DO}(b, \text{V}(b, \dots))))$
- b. Imperative (E) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ORDER} \\ \text{DEMAND} \\ \text{REQUEST} \\ \text{PLÉA} \end{array} \right\} (a, b, \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{WILL} \\ \text{SHALL} \end{array} \right\} (b, \text{DO}(b, \text{V}(b \wedge a, \dots))))$
 Propositive (K) $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{REQUEST} \\ \text{PROPOSE} \end{array} \right\} \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{WILL} \\ \text{SHALL} \end{array} \right\} (b, \text{DO}(b, \text{V}(b \wedge a, \dots)))) \rightarrow \text{with } a$
- c. Propositive (E, K) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{REQUEST} \\ \text{PROPOSE} \end{array} \right\} (a, b, \text{WILL}(b, \text{DO}(a \wedge b, \text{V}(a \wedge b, \dots))))$
- d. *Let me...* (E) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{REQUEST} \\ \text{PROPOSE} \end{array} \right\} (a, b, \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ALLOW} \\ \text{LET} \end{array} \right\} (b, \text{DO}(a, \text{V}(a \wedge b, \dots))))$
 Propositive (K) $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{REQUEST} \\ \text{PROPOSE} \end{array} \right\} \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{ALLOW} \\ \text{LET} \end{array} \right\} (b, \text{DO}(a, \text{V}(a \wedge b, \dots)))) \rightarrow \text{(with } b)$

In Subgroup (a), English and Korean are both imperative—the subject of S is ‘YOU’; in Subgroup (b), English is imperative if the comitative ‘WITH ME’ is overtly present as a result of conjunct movement, while Korean is propositive; in Subgroup (c), English and Korean are both propositive—the subject of S is inclusive ‘we’; in Subgroup (d), English is in the form of *let me...* (*with you*), while Korean is in propositive. The speaker’s modality in imperative is by and large distinct from that in propositive, but the modality of ‘request’ appears to be adequate for both imperative and propositive.

5.3 Interrogatives and Modality. In a normal and unmarked situation, the interrogative sentence is characterizable as bearing the modality of ‘request for information’.⁶ Aside from the unmarked modality of interrogative, the form of interrogative presents complexity of modality as in rhetorical questions, ‘queclaratives’, ‘whimperatives’, tag-questions, echo questions, etc. Before describing these types of interrogatives with respect to their semantic structures, I will discuss the semantic structure of yes-no and WH-questions and also of

indirect questions.

5.3.1 Discourse Levels and Interrogative Endings. The interrogative endings and their corresponding D-levels are as follows:

| (25) D-level | Interrogative ending |
|--------------|----------------------|
| Plain | <i>n.yaʔ</i> |
| Intimate | <i>e</i> |
| Familiar | <i>na</i> |
| Blunt | <i>o</i> |
| Formal | <i>p.ni-kka</i> |

The major D-verbs for interrogatives are: *mut-ta* 'ask', *cilmun.hata* 'question' and *munuy.hata* 'inquire'. In indirect questions the Plain DL interrogative endings *n.ya* and *ka* are used along with *ci*, as in (26).

| | | | |
|---------|---------------|---|----------------------------------|
| (26) a. | John-i ka-ss- | $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{(nu)n.ya} \\ *e \\ *na \\ *o \\ *upni. kka \end{array} \right\}$ | ko nay-ka Bill-eykey mul-ess-ta. |
| | go-PST- | | QM ask-PST- |

'I asked Bill whether John had gone.'

| | | | |
|----|------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| b. | John-i ka-ss-nun | $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} ka \\ ci \end{array} \right\}$ | nay-ka Bill-eykey mul-ess-ta. |
|----|------------------|--|-------------------------------|

5.3.2 Question Formation. Langacker (1970) proposed that the yes-no questions in English be derived from disjunctive sentences of the form, *S or not-S* by deleting the second clause together with *or*.⁸ As an argument to support the proposal he gave the non-falling intonation pattern in the non-final clause (cf. C-W Kim 1968). Korean and Japanese provide further support to his proposal. The particle *na* (or *ka* in Japanese) is used for both question and disjunction, as illustrated in (27).⁹


| | | | |
|---------|------------|-----------|-----------------------|
| (27) a. | Yenge -na | pule -na | tokile-lul paywu -na? |
| | English-or | French-or | German learn-Q |

b. Eigo-ka huransugo-ka doitugo-o narai-masu-ka? (Japanese=27. a)

'Do you learn English, (or) French or German?'


I would further like to suggest that the assignment of information focus (cf. Chapter 4) to one of the polarity-opposite disjunctive Ss should account for the deletion of the other S. When the second conjunct in a disjunctive sentence is deleted, the disjunctive particle is retained in Korean and Japanese, whereas it is also deleted in English. The view that conjunctive particles are structured with the preceding constituent in V-final languages

ii. (English)




Condition: 3 contains [FOCUS].

b. i. (Korean)



ii. (English)



Notice that in the tree structure of English yes-no question formation (cf. 31.b.ii), the disjunctive 'OR' gets deleted together with the second conjunct, thus presumably leaving behind the non-falling TC in direct questions.

5.3.3 Indirect Question Formation. Indirect questions are dominated by a special semantic class of verbs ('information'), such as 'TELL', 'KNOW', 'ASK', 'DOUBT', 'WONDER', etc. Revising Katz and Postal's (1964) proposal, Baker (1970) postulated an abstract morpheme or 'operator' Q to account for both direct and indirect questions. According to Baker's proposal (*ibid.*: 215) an indirect question, like a direct question, gets Q assigned to clause-initially, which binds one or more NPs, analogous to our focus assignment. Baker has not provided any account of how Q is assigned in indirect question formation. An extension of the structural analysis of a direct question we have made in the preceding section suggests that the structure of an indirect question also contain a disjunctive structure and deletion. Consider sentences like

- (32) a. I $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{know} \\ \text{told him} \\ \text{asked him} \\ \text{wonder} \end{array} \right\}$ whether John was there or $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{not.} \\ \text{Bill was there.} \end{array} \right\}$
- b. *I $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{know} \\ \text{told him} \\ \text{asked him} \\ \text{wonder} \end{array} \right\}$ that John was there or $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{not.} \\ \text{Bill was there.} \end{array} \right\}$
- c. *I $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{think} \\ \text{believe} \\ \text{suppose} \end{array} \right\}$ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{whether John was there or not.} \\ \text{that John was there or not.} \end{array} \right\}$

What the sentences in (32) reveal is that (a) an indirect question must be disjunctive (cf. (32.b) and (b) its main verb must be an information verb (cf. (32.c)). Only those sentences in (32.a) are well-formed, meeting these two conditions.

The structure underlying an indirect question may be represented as (33).

(33) a. Structural Description of Indirect Yes-No Question

$$\underbrace{X-[s \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{TELL} \\ \text{KNOW} \\ \text{ASK} \\ \vdots \end{array} \right\}]}_1 \quad -X-[s \text{ OR}(\alpha S, -\alpha S)]-X-X \quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_5$$

Condition: 3 contains [FOCUS].

b. Structural Description of Indirect WH-Question

$$\underbrace{X-[s \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{TELL} \\ \text{KNOW} \\ \text{ASK} \\ \vdots \end{array} \right\}]}_1 \quad -X-[s \text{ OR}(\text{S } X-[\text{NP } x]-X)^n]-X-X \quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_5$$

Condition: 4 contains [FOCUS].

Given SD (33), the following structural change takes place to form an indirect question: (for an indirect yes-no question) delete terms 2 and 4 and attach Q to 2; (for an indirect WH-question) delete term 2 and move term 4 to term 2.¹¹ Insertion of Q (in the sense of Baker (*ibid*)) is a process of syntacticalization¹² (cf. (3.1.5) for the process of syntacticalization in marking D-level and S-type). Direct WH-question, which we have not formulated in the preceding section, may now be formed as in (34).

(34) WH-Question Formation (English)

$$\begin{array}{cccccc}
 \text{REQUEST-X-} & \underbrace{\text{[S TELL-X-} & \text{[S OR}_{(S)} & \text{X-[NP x]-X]} & \text{]}-X]} & \text{-X} \\
 1 & & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
 \hline
 1 & & 4 & 3 & 0 & 5 \\
 \end{array} \implies$$

Condition: 4 contains [FOCUS].

Notice that WH-question formation, as formulated in (34), includes WH-word movement, moving the focused indefinite NP to the position of the disjunctive predicate 'OR', which has been deleted. In Korean, the disjunctive predicate 'OR' is not deleted; hence, no movement.

5.3.4. Rhetorical Questions. Sentences like (35), which have been called rhetorical questions, are not questions in that rather than requesting for information they assert the opposite polarity of the sentence, that is, asserting positively with negative question form and negatively with positive question form.

(35) a. John-i o-nun.ya?

come-Pl/Q

'Is John coming? (→ John is not coming.)'

b. Nay-ka ku-kes-ul ha-l swu iss-na?

the-thing- do-MOD means exist-Fam/Q

'Can I do it? (→ I can't do it.)'

c. Nwu-ka al.a-yo?

know-Pol/Q

'Who knows? (→ Nobody knows.)'

As the last sentence in (35) indicates, the rhetorical questions extend to WH-questions as well. This fact is easily accountable in terms of the structure we have postulated, namely indefinite disjunction of NPs. Thus the illustration in (36) may give an account of (35.c).

(36) a. $(x_1 \text{ know } y) \vee (x_2 \text{ know } y) \vee \dots \vee (x_n \text{ know } y)$

b. $\exists x(x \text{ know } y)$ (→ Someone knows y)

c. $\neg \exists x(x \text{ know } y)$ (→ Nobody knows y) (by polarity-opposite assertion)

rhetorical questions? Obviously there are some constraints. I will mention only two constraints: (a) if the interrogative sentence contains certain modality-bearing words, such as *kkok*, *pantusi* 'without fail, certainly', then it cannot be interpreted as a rhetorical question; (b) the interrogative sentence containing a polarity-sensitive word (in the sense of Baker 1969), such as *pelse* 'already', and *acik* 'yet', blocks the force of rhetorical questions (cf. Sadock 1971), as in the following examples:

- (39) a. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Kkok} \\ \text{Pantusi} \end{array} \right\} \text{John-i o-p.ni-kka?}$
 without fail
 'Is John sure to come?' (\rightarrow *John is not sure to come.)
- b. *Acik* John-i an-wa-ss-up.ni-kka?
 yet
 'Hasn't John come yet? (\rightarrow *He has come yet.)'
- c. *Pelse* John-i wa-ss-up.ni-kka?
 already
 'Has John come already? (\rightarrow *He has not come already.)'

5.3.5 Queclaratives, Tag-Questions, and Whimperatives. In the discussion of rhetorical questions we observed that the structure underlying rhetorical questions is characteristically declarative. Disjunction of an embedded question and a polarity-opposite assertion arising from it are held responsible for the modality of rhetorical questions. We can now extend the structural characteristics of the interrogative to other related interrogatives—queclaratives tag-questions, and whimperatives (cf. Sadock 1971, Green 1970, Dressler 1970).

Sentences like (40) have the force of asserting the opposite polarity besides asking for information.

- (40) a. John-i wa-yo?
 'Is John coming? (\rightarrow John is not coming.)'
- b. John-i an wa-yo?
 'Isn't John coming? (\rightarrow John is coming.)'

But the question is how to distinguish this type of sentence from the rhetorical question we have discussed. The distinction of the two types of question seems to be made only in terms of the speaker's attitude, more specifically, whether the speaker's intention is fundamentally asking for information and at the same time asserting the proposition in the opposite, or telling the hearer about the proposition while asserting it in the opposite. Normally, rhetorical questions seem to be expressed in general statements like

Therefore, (44.a) or (44.b), shown to be connected by '—', is equivalent to two sentences, as illustrated below.

- (47) a. Tell me whether John is coming or not. I know he is not coming.
 b. I tell you whether John is coming or not. I know he is not coming.

I will now look into another type of the interrogative which is formally and functionally similar to the queclarative. The negative interrogative form of (48), as used in (49), may be said to be functionally similar to English tag-questions.¹⁴

(48) S-*ci* NEG-*ha*-DL-Q

e.g. S $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} -ci \text{ an-h-sup.ni-kka?} \\ -ci \text{ an-h-a-yo?} \end{array} \right.$

(49) a. John-i wa-ss-ci an-h-sup.ni-kka?

'John came, didn't he?' ↘

b. John-i an-wa-ss-ci an-h-sup.ni-kka?


'John didn't come, did he?' ↘ (*John didn't come, didn't he?)

The tag-equivalent *-ci an-h-sup.ni-kka?*, analogous to the French *ne c'est pas?*, has the effect of asserting the preceding semantic content.¹⁵ Notice that the S to which the tag is attached is in the past tense and the tag form is tenseless.

The semantic structure I propose for the Korean tag equivalent, and also for the English tag-question, may be expressed roughly as:

(50) I tell you that S—I request that you tell me whether S or not S—I know S.

I assume that tag-questions are dominated by three D-sentences: the first D-sentence is assertive, positive or negative; the second and third D-sentences are exactly those underlying queclaratives, i.e. the interrogative D-sentence followed by the polarity-opposite assertive D-sentence. In contrast to the structure of the queclarative, the tag-question is assumed to contain another D-sentence which is identical to the second D-sentence of the queclarative. On the surface, both the second and third D-sentences are deleted, except for the interrogative D-verb and NEG in the second, under identity with the first D-sentence. Highly speculative as it is, the present structural analysis seems to be plausible: semantically at least, the force of assertion is doubled by asserting the proposition twice. The semantic structure underlying (49.b) then may be represented as (51), ignoring minor details.



In the case of English: *John didn't come, did he?*, the two NEG in S_{D2} are neutralized or cancelled out, thus yielding the positive *did he?*

We have so far assigned a unique semantic structure to the tag-question, distinct from the queclarative. We noted that the S to which the tag is attached can be tensed (cf. note 14), while tensing is not allowed in the queclarative and normal questions (cf. 52). When the S is tenseless (cf. 54) it would appear that the queclarative and the tag-question turn out to be nondistinct, while tensed tags such as *-ci-NEG-ha-PAST-DL-Q* (cf. 53) blocks a tag-question reading.

(52) John-i wa-ss-ci-an-h-sup.ni-kka? (=49.a)

- a. *Normal question
- b. *Queclarative
- c. John came, didn't he? (tag-question)

(53) John-i o-ci-an-h-ass-p.ni-kka?

- a. Didn't John come? (normal question)
- b. (Didn't John come?→) John came. (queclarative)
- c. *Tag question

(54) John-i-o-ci-an-h-sup.ni-kka?

- a. Isn't John coming? (normal question)
- b. (Isn't John coming?→) John is coming. (queclarative)
- c. John is coming, isn't he? (tag-question)

Consider some other constraints on the tag-question and/or the queclarative. As was

in the rhetorical question, polarity-sensitive items show their characteristics: a positive item allows a positive reading, a negative item a negative reading.

(55) John-i acik o-ci an-h-ass-up.ni-kka?

yet

a. 'Didn't John come yet?' (normal question)

b. '*Didn't John come yet → he came yet.' (queclarative)

(56) a John-i acik an wa-ss-ci an-h-sup.ni-kka?

'John didn't come yet, did he?' (tag-question)

b.*John-i pelse an wa-ss-ci an-h-sup.ni-kka?

'*John didn't come already, did he?' (tag-question)

Another constraint is that when the contrastive particles *nun*, *to*, etc. are inserted before the tag-equivalent NEG-*ha*-DL-Q, then the tag-question or queclarative reading is blocked.

(57) John-i o-ci to an-h-ass-up.ni-kka?

a. 'Didn't John even come?' (normal question)

b. *queclarative

(58) John-i an o-ci nun an-h-sup.ni-kka?

a. 'Isn't it that John isn't coming?' (normal question)

b. *queclarative

c. *tag-question

We will now briefly look into whimperatives. In Korean, as in English, interrogative sentences with the subject 'YOU' and the predicate 'WILL' or 'CAN' give an implied meaning of request (for action), as shown in the following examples:

(59) a. Kitali-si-keyss-up.ni-kka?

wait-H-will-

'Would you wait (for me)? → Please wait (for me)!'

b. Kitali-l swu-iss-keyss-ni?

-MOD way-exist-


'Can you wait (for me)? → Wait (for me)!'

This type of whimperatives may be language-universal; the form of request for a verbal response yields a particular perlocutionary effect (in the sense of Austin 1962) on the part of the hearer. This aspect of language use is characterized in a set of conversational postulates proposed by Gordon and Lakoff (1971). Their conversational postulates for requests, for instance, include the following.

- (60) a. ASK(a, b, CAN(b, Q))* → REQUEST(a, b, Q) (their (5. b))
- b. ASK(a, b, WILLING (b, Q))* → REQUEST(a, b, Q) (their (5. c))

In the following I will take up one particular form discussed by them and also by Sadock (1970) and Green (1972)—the *why*-imperative, and the corresponding *way*- ‘why’ imperative in Korean. The main point of interest is to give an account of the whimperative with reference to the general characteristic of the structure of interrogatives, i.e. the disjunctive *S* or *not-S*. In particular, I wish to suggest that the *way*- ‘why’ imperative be only a special type of queclarative structure. As whimperative, the subject of the *way*-interrogative must be ‘YOU’. Consider (61) and the semantic structure (62) proposed for its whimperative meaning.

- (61) Way an-ca-ni?
- why not-sleep-Pl/Q
- a. Why don't you sleep? (normal question)
- b. Why not sleep? (whimperative)



The structure of (62) may be paraphrased roughly as follows:¹⁶ ‘Tell me the reason why you don’t sleep—I know there is no reason why you don’t sleep.’ This is a sort of semantic structure assigned to declaratives (cf. 46). From the semantic structure in the second D-sentence, we may further derive the meaning of softened suggestion by some rules of inference or conversational principles such as those proposed by Gordon and Lakoff (1971:71–72)¹⁷: SUGGEST(a, b, DO(b, SLEEP)). How to relate structurally the semantic content of the second D-sentence, i.e. ‘I know you have no reason not to sleep’ to the further derived meaning of suggestion, i.e. ‘I suggest that you sleep’ may have to be taken care of by a set of such conversational postulates, even though it appears that theoretical implications of such an approach would be to undermine the force of generative semantics, as noted by Green (1972). Then, it may not be surprising to see a marriage between generative and interpretive semantics at some level of linguistic description involving language use and context.

5.3.6 Echo Questions. The echo question is a type of question used to make sure or show surprise at what the speaker has heard, by echoing the whole or part of the utterance spoken to him. It has a unique rising intonation at the end of the utterance regardless of the type of intonation in the original utterance.¹⁸ Typically, it is in the form of indirect discourse, shifting first and second person pronominal forms appropriate to the discourse situation, and the quotative *ko* is added at the end. (For the discussion of echo question and echo statement in Korean, see (2.6).)

Consider the sentences in (63)–(65).

(63) a. Cey-ka Mia-lul coh.a-ha-p.ni.ta.
like-do-F-D

‘I like Mia.’

b. (Echo) Ney-ka Mia-lul coh.a-ha-n.ta-ko?
-QM-Q

‘You like Mia?’

(64) a. Ney-ka ku kes-ul hay-ss-ni?
‘Did you do that?’

b. (Echo) Cey-ka ku kes-ul hay-ss-nun.ya-ko-yo?
‘Did I do that?’

(65) a. Ney-ka Mia-eykey i chayk-ul cwu.e-la!
‘(You) give this book to Mia.’

b. (Echo) Cey-ka Mia-eykey mues-ul cwu-la-ko-yo?

'I give to Mia what?'

The final quotative *ko* is obligatory and in (64.b) and (65.b) the additional polite manner marker *yo* is also obligatory, as shown in the following ill-formed sentences.

(66) *Cey-ka Mia-eykey i chayk-ul cwu- { la-ko?
p.ni-kka-ko?

(I give this book to Mia?)

(67) *Cey-ka Mia-eykey mies-ul cwu- { la-ko?
p.ni-kka-ko?

(I give to Mia what?)


The quotative *ko* clearly indicates that the sentences are *indirectly* quoted; yet, without the final *yo*, the echo form would be inappropriate to the discourse situation since the indirectly quoted form cannot convey the proper manner of speaking; specifically the formal DL ending (e.g. *upnikka*) cannot be marked in the indirect quotes (cf. 2.6). In (65.b) it is shown that a certain element of the original sentence, i.e. *chayk* 'book' is not understood by the speaker; thus the echo question contains *mies* 'what'.

To characterize the echo question of (65.b): (a) it contains a WH-word; (b) it contains the original structure of the imperative; (c) it is in indirect-discourse form; and (d) it is in the interrogative.

The semantic structure of the echo question can be expressed informally as: 'I request of you that you tell me whether you told/requested/... me that S', or formally as (68).

(68) a. REQUEST(a, b, TELL (b, a, OR(PAST(TELL/...(b, a, S))))

b.



Notice that in the representation of (68.b) the lowest S does not have quotation marks around it; that is to say, the S in question is in indirect discourse.¹⁹ If we had 'S', it would reflect an original utterance such as the a-forms in (63)-(65). Then the process of deriving *the surface echo question* must include indirectification, that is, converting direct to indirect discourse. This is exactly what Sadock (1969a: 335) postulated as an underlying representation of echo questions by having a 'hypersentence' nested below another hypersentence, (i.e. 'superhypersentence'—cf. Sadock 1969b).²⁰ However, Sadock's underlying representation of the echo question structure would not be able to account for the structure like (65.b), which, as we noted, is not an exact echo of what the original speaker has said. In this type of echo question, one or more elements are questioned as unknown, in contrast to the semantically identical echoing of the original utterance (cf. 63.b and 64.b). Thus, the structure underlying (65.b) could not be represented in the structure Sadock postulated. If we should exclude sentences like (65.b) from the category of echo questions, which would miss a linguistically significant generalization, Sadock's formulation would hold, corresponding to our tree structure containing another quoted S ('S') nested into a higher 'S', and it should then undergo a process of indirectification. In our analysis, however, the underlying structure of echo questions contains the structure of indirect quotations and not of direct quotations, as contrasted in (69).

(69) a. Did you $\underbrace{\begin{array}{l} \text{[say} \\ \text{[ask me]} \end{array}}_{\phi}$ $\underbrace{\begin{array}{l} \text{[that]} \\ \text{[wh-]} \end{array}}_{\phi}$ S?

b. $\underbrace{\text{Did you say, 'Q'}}_{\phi}$ (cf. Sadock (*ibid.*: 334) 'Q' stands for some utterance)

In the process of deletion, all the structure except for the substructure of the lowest S in (68.b) gets deleted, leaving the quotative *ko* behind, that is, *that/wh-S?* in (69.a).²¹ If *did you say/ask* in (69.a) is not deleted, then we would get ordinary questions (70-72) alternatively, corresponding to the echoed sentences in (63-65).

(70) Ney-ka Mia-lul coh.a-ha-n.ta-ko mal.hay-ss-ni?

'Did you say that you like Mia?'

(71) Cey-ka ku kes-ul hay-ss-nun.ya-ko mul.u-si-ess-up.ni-kka?


'Did you ask me whether I did that?'

(72) Cey-ka Mia-eykey mues-ul cwu-la-ko malssum.ha-si-ess-up.ni-kka?


(Did you ask me to give Mia what?)

In summary, the semantic structures of the various types of interrogative I have discussed are presented in tree diagrams.


73) a. Normal Question




b. Rhetorical Question




c. Queclarative




d. Tag-Question



e. Why-Imperative



f. Echo Question



In a rather sketchy and crude manner I have so far attempted to incorporate various illocutionary forces involved in interrogatives into the semantic structures superordinated by explicit and distinct D-frames. One thing to be stressed in this analysis is that the property of disjunction in question formation is taken to be responsible for the functioning of asserting (or implying) the opposite polarity.

5.4 Suppositive Sentences. Instead of asserting or questioning in an indicative or as-a-matter-of-fact manner, the speaker often inserts phrases like 'I suppose', 'I guess', 'I presume', as a means of rounding off a sharp edge of his speech. The particle *ci*, realized as a sentence-final element, expresses such an attitude of the speaker, thus functionally similar to those English phrases cited above. Urmson (1952) calls such verbs 'parenthetical verbs'. On syntactic grounds, sentences containing the sentence final *ci* may be regarded as standing for a distinctive D-level, since it occurs in all major sentence types, like the Intimate DL ending *e*. Martin (1954, 1969), for instance, called *ci*-sentences 'casual style' and *ci yo*-sentences 'casual polite style', etc. In this study, however, I have taken the position that the *ci*²² is distinct from the D-level markers for the reason that its function is to show the speaker's attitude toward the propositional content and not toward the hearer.

Consider sentences like (74)-(76) for expository purposes.

(74) a. John-i nayil o-ci.

'John comes tomorrow, I suppose.'

b. John-i nayil wa.

'John comes tomorrow.'

(75) a. John-i ecey wa-ss-ci.

'John came yesterday, I suppose.'

b. John-i ecey wa-ss-e.

'John came yesterday.'

(76) a. Ama John-i nayil o-ci.

'Probably John will come tomorrow, I suppose.'

b. *Ama John-i nayil wa.

(Probably John comes tomorrow).

c. Ama John-i ecey wa-ss-ci.

'Probably John came yesterday, I suppose.'

d. *Ama John-i ecey wa-ss-e.


(Probably John came yesterday).

In (74) and (75), we notice that the declarative sentences without *ci* are definitely assertive; they have the force of certainty. In the declarative marked by *ci* its modality is now suppositional.²³ Thus, sentential adverbs like *ama* 'probably' can cooccur with *ci* but not in assertive sentences without *ci* or other similar qualifiers, as shown in (76).

In English, parenthetical phrases appear structurally as inserted to a certain position of a sentence, sentence-finally or sentence-medially; in Korean the suppositional *ci* appears sentence-finally. This fact seems to suggest that the semantic structure of the *ci*-declarative, as well as English parenthetical sentences, consist of two D-sentences: declarative D-sentence (i.e. 'I tell you 'S') and suppositional D-sentence (i.e. 'I suppose/assume/ 'S'), as represented in (77).

(77) a. TELL(a,b, 'S') — SUPPOSE(a, 'S')

b.



The substructure of the second D-sentence gives rise to *ci* in Korean and *I suppose/guess/...* in English. In English it is inserted to the constituent structure of 'S' in the first D-sentence at a late stage of derivation.

In *ci*-interrogatives the modality of *ci* is such that the speaker seeks agreement on the proposition that he supposes to be the case. An equivalent expression in English is a tag-question or a parenthetical expression like *don't you know/think?*, added to a declarative sentence, as illustrated in the following examples:

(78) a. John-i nayil o-ci?

'John is coming tomorrow, { isn't he?
{ don't you think?'

b. John-i ecey wa-ss-ci?

'John came yesterday, { didn't he?
{ didn't you know?'


Ci-interrogatives do not convey the modality typical of rhetorical questions or queclaratives, namely of rendering polarity-opposite assertions in the form of questions. Thus, in contrast to sentences (78), the following sentences are interpretable as the speaker seeking confirmation of the negative value of the proposition: 'John did not come/is not coming'.

(79) a. John-i nayil an-o-ci? 'John is not coming tomorrow, is he?'

b. John-i ecey an-wa-ss-ci? 'John did not come yesterday, did he?'

The semantic structure underlying the *ci*-interrogative may be represented roughly as

(80) a. REQUEST(a, b, TELL(b, a, AGREE(b, 'S'))) — SUPPOSE(a, 'S')



Sentences (78) may be paraphrased as (81).

- (81) a. Tell me you agree John is coming tomorrow—I suppose he is coming.
- b. Tell me you agree John came yesterday—I suppose he did.

One might try to substitute 'SUPPOSE' for 'AGREE' in the first D-sentence, so that the substructure of the first D-sentence can be identical to the second D-sentence. But such a substitution will not do, particularly when the subject of 'S' is 'YOU'. Consider the sentences in (82).

- (82) a. I ke ney-ka hay-ss-ci?
 this thing
 'You did it, didn't you?'
- b. Ne-nun amu kes-to molu-ci?
 any thing-also not-know-
 'You don't know anything, do you?'

It would be odd to interpret the modality involved in these sentences as the speaker asking someone to say that he supposes he did it (cf. 82.a) or asking him to say that he supposes he knows nothing (cf. 82.b). An adequate interpretation would be: (82.a) 'Tell me that you agree (or admit) that you did it—I suppose you did it.', and (80.b) 'Tell me that you agree (or admit) that you know nothing—I suppose you know nothing.'

When the *ci* occurs in the imperative, it conveys a force of suggestion rather than request, demand, or order, as illustrated in the following examples:

(83) a. Ney-ka ka-ci!

‘(I suggest that you) go.’


b. Ney-ka ku il-ul ha-ci!

‘(I suggest that you) do the work!’

The semantic structure underlying the *ci*-imperative then may be represented as (84).

(84) a. SUGGEST(a, b, WILL/SHALL(b, DO(b, S)))

b.



In propositive sentences, the *ci* carries a force of suggestion, as was the case in the imperative, rather than that of proposal or request. The *ci*-propositive reduces the force of the propositive proper from proposal to suggestion, or (in the case of the *ci*-imperative) from order (demand, request, etc.) to suggestion, that is to say, from the strong to the weak scale of the modal force of ‘properatives’. This is obviously due to the suppositive property of *ci*. The *ci*-propositive also shows two distinct modalities on the part of the hearer, depending on whether or not he participates in the act suggested. Consider the sentences in (85).

(85) a. Wuli-nun cikum ka-ci.

‘(I suggest that we go now). → Let’s go now.’


b. Nay-ka ka-ci.

‘(I suggest that you) let me go.’

In (85.b) the hearer is not taking part in the act, thus the hearer’s attitude sought by the speaker is ‘LET’, ‘ALLOW’, etc. The semantic structure underlying the *ci*-propositive then may be represented as

(86) a. SUGGEST(a, b, WILL/ALLOW(b, DO(a (^ b), S)))

b.




So far we have tried to characterize the modal force of the particle *ci* functioning in the major sentence types: in declaratives it has a force similar to that of parenthetical verbs in English; in interrogatives it has a force expressible in the tag-question in English; in properatives it has a force of suggestion—a force reduced from request or proposal. The basic modality conveyed by *ci* is suppositiveness. However, the basic modal property is modifiable by prosodic elements of length, stress, terminal contour, and the like, or vocal qualifiers. Without taking these elements into account, characterization of modality or illocutionary force in a speech act would be incomplete, if not inadequate. Such an aspect of modality goes beyond the scope of the present study and beyond what I can possibly explore at present.

NOTES

1. INTRODUCTION

1. Chomsky (1972), reiterating the centrality of syntax in grammar, takes the view: 'The study of language *form* will ultimately find its place in a broader framework that will incorporate considerations of *meaning* and *use* ...' (emphasis is mine—SJC). A recent study by Gordon and Lakoff (1971) known as 'Conversational Postulates' may be notable as an exploration of language use in the framework of generative grammar.
2. This claim has been made explicitly and consistently by McCawley in many of his articles, including McCawley (1967, 1968b, 1970a).
3. That only three node labels S, NP, and V are relevant in semantic representations has been claimed by G. Lakoff, Ross, and McCawley; yet there has been little systematic account as to how the surface syntactic categories are derived. For the derivation of a surface adverbial phrase from an underlying S, including the derived category Preposition (or Postposition), see (2.1).
4. For prelexical structure and decomposability of lexical items, see Gruber (1965, 1967), McCawley (1968b, 1971c), G. Lakoff (1965, 1970b,c), and Postal (1970).
5. For a discussion of the semantic structure of NPs containing a relative clause construction, see Bach (1968) and for an exposition of NP-description, see McCawley (1967, 1970a). It is assumed, along the lines of exploration by McCawley (1967), that in each semantic representation there is exactly one NP-description for each distinct index and that NP-description occurs higher in the representation than all occurrences of the index in question. For the notions of 'assertor' and 'designator' of NPs, see Hasegawa (1972).
6. The currently much discussed notion of 'presupposition' can be characterized in part in terms of these two types of context.
7. For the distinction between text-sentences (roughly, our 'utterances') and system-sentences (roughly, our 'sentences') and the process of decontextualization, see Lyons' unpublished work on semantics. The converse of decontextualization may be called 'contextualization'—the process of relating sentences to utterances. In this view, pronominalization, reflexivization, equi-NP-deletion, prosententialization (do-so transformation), etc. are typical cases of contextualization. In terms of context the relation between utterance and sentence may be shown as:



8. With respect to the level of linguistic description where subject selection takes place, I would assume that it is at a level of semantic representation 'deeper' than that of logical structure. At a deeper level of semantic representation, where semantic elements are not linearly ordered (cf. Chafe 1970, Sanders 1970), I assume that the grammatical subject is chosen by the speaker depending in part on the structure of discourse. The fact that subject selection is partially dependent on the structure of a given discourse is readily observable in the following illustration.

- (i) What did John do?
 (a) He hit Bill.
 (b) #Bill was hit by him. (#'token odd')
- (ii) Who was hit by John?
 (a) Bill was hit by him.
 (b) #He hit Bill.

This illustration is meant to show that passivization is not *optionally* and transformationally derived from an active version of the sentence in question, but *obligatorily* derived from the underlying structure in which the 'patient' NP (cf. ii.a) is 'chosen' or taken to be the topic (or the subject) of the sentence. In this view, (i.a) and (ii.a) may be represented as (iii.a) and (iii.b), respectively, ignoring tense.

- (iii) (a) DO(John, HIT(John, Bill))
 (b) DONE(Bill, HIT(John, Bill))


(iii.b) is not derived from (iii.a) by transformation: they are each represented in this way at the level of representation deeper than the level of logical representation. Further, note that the semantic predicate 'DONE' is what is counter to 'DO' in terms of action, characterizing the notion of passivity.

2. DEIXIS AND DISCOURSE

1. The term 'deixis', originally a Greek word for 'pointing or indicating', has been used by various linguists; besides the currently well-accepted term 'deixis', there are such terms as 'index' (by Morris 1938), 'shifter' (by Jespersen 1924 and also by Jakobson 1924), 'token-reflexive words' (by Reichenbach 1947) and 'indexical expressions in the pragmatic context' (by Bar-Hillel 1954). They might not be interchangeable; yet they all refer to aspects of language relative to the situation of discourse, including the speaker and hearer, the time of utterance and the place of utterance; the speaker's manner of speaking relative to his interpersonal relation with the hearer is also a relevant aspect of deixis, which I refer to as 'manner' deixis.
2. Parenthetical verbs and the modality-bearing particle *ci* are discussed in (5.4).
3. For a discussion of English as a VSO language, see McCawley (1970b).
4. Given a hierarchy of embedded structures such as (4), the near-surface structure of a V-final language (e.g. 3.b.i) would have a linear representation as in (i) below, rather than as in (3.b.i).
 (i) (t_o, p_o, m, a, b, 'S')TELL
 For expository purposes, the deictic elements are reordered as in (3.b.i) such that the speaker-subject NP and hearer-indirect object NP are given the first and the second places, respectively.
5. See Gruber (1965) for an insightful analysis of English prepositions with respect to their prelexical structure; also see McCawley (1971c) for the semantic representations of sentences containing surface prepositions.
6. For tree pruning, see Ross (1966, 1967).
7. The fact that the notion of 'set' in syntax and semantics is not exactly the same as the 'set' of mathematics is noted in McCawley (1968a: 146): the mathematical notion admits an empty set and one-member sets; whereas only sets of two or more members are relevant for the linguistic

notion of set here.

8. The form $\left(\begin{smallmatrix} \text{NP} \\ | \\ \text{b} \end{smallmatrix}\right)^n$ is a rule schema (cf. Ingram 1971) which is to be expanded as



9. These examples are from Jespersen (1924: 217-9).
10. The fact that English kinship terms like 'brother', 'sister', and 'daughter' are odd when used as vocatives, whereas 'son' is quite acceptable, has been pointed out to me by McCawley. A similar constraint exists in Korean and Japanese: kinship terms designating persons lower than the ego/speaker are not used as vocatives (e.g. **tongsayng* 'younger brother/sister', **atul* 'son', **ital* 'daughter'; the corresponding Japanese are **otocto*/**imocto*, **musuko*, and **musume*). If the addressee is an elder sibling like *hyeng* 'elder brother/sister (of the same sex)', *nwunim/nwuna* 'male's elder sister', *enni* 'female's elder sister', etc., these terms are used as vocatives. Similarly, in Japanese *nisan* 'elder brother', *neesan* 'elder sister', etc. are used as vocatives but they are honorific forms; the corresponding plain nonhonorific forms are not used as such: *ani*, *ane*, etc. For a generative study of vocatives in the general framework of Ross's performative analysis, see Harada (1971). This paper was called to my attention by McCawley, when I was finalizing my thesis. Thus, none of Harada's view is taken into consideration in this study.
11. The analysis of contracting the nominative *i* and the copula *i* was first proposed by Song (1967) in a transformational framework.
12. There is another vocative *Yongnam-i*, the *i* of which is a (sort of diminutive) particle attached to a person's given name ending in a consonant (cf. **Mia-i*). Given the vocative forms: (a) *Yongnam-a*, (b) *Yongnam-i*, (c) *Mia-ya*, (d) *Mia*, (e) **Yongnam-ya*, (f) **Yongnam-i-ya*, (g) **Mia-i*, (h) **Mia-i-ya*, one might attempt to account for them by ordering the phonological rules (i) copula-*i* deletion and (ii) *y*-insertion.
- (i) Nom-Cop *i*-Deletion: $i \rightarrow \phi / V ___$
- (ii) *y*-glide Insertion: $\phi \rightarrow y / V ___ V$
- Even with this ordered set of rules, the form (a) *Yongnam-a* cannot be accounted for. One must assume that *i*-deletion has applied to the underlying representation of *Yongnam+i+a*, which is not specifiable with rule (i). Alternatively, one might simply postulate the underlying form *Yongnam/Mia+Vocative a*, supplemented by a phonetic rule of *y*-insertion as in (ii), thus rejecting the sentential origin of the vocative. Such an analysis would leave unaccounted the vocatives like (31.c), which as we noted is clearly sentential.
13. For an explication of these three time points essential to tense formation, see Reichenbach (1947: 287-98).
14. It has been observed by R. Lakoff (1970: 845-6) that in English the future without *will* indicates the notion of control by the speaker (or that of being 'scheduled' (cf. Huddleston 1969)) as

illustrated in the following examples.

(i) John dies tomorrow at 9 a.m. (by an executioner)

(ii) John will die tomorrow at 9 a.m. (by a doctor)

15. Note that the three time points (i.e. t_0 , t_i , and t_r) must be coterminous in terms of the time unit each standing for the same time unit (e.g. 'hour', 'day', 'week', etc.) as that of others; otherwise, as pointed out by McCawley (personal communication—May 6, 1972), expressions like (47) must further be refined to bring in not only t_i but the day on which t_i occurs: i.e. ' t_i is in q_i and q_i is the day which immediately precedes the day which contains t_0 .'
16. Unlike *i salam*, *i pun* and *i i* never refer to the speaker himself. This may be due to the honorific nature of *pun* and *i* and the self-demeaning principle basic to Korean culture. Like *i salam*, however, the humble or derogatory proforms, *nom* 'male person' and *nyen* 'female person' are used to refer to the speaker him/her-self in the form of *i nom* and *i nyen*. Furthermore, these person nominals with *i* can also be used to refer to the hearer in certain discourse situations where, for instance, he is regarded somehow as a third person.
17. *Nal* 'day', *sikan* 'hour, time', and *hay* 'year' are also proforms of specific time units. *I* and *ku* (but not *ce*) can be attached to these forms.
18. As noted above, *ce* cannot be used with a proform of time although there is a form *cep ttay*, which has to do with *ce+ttay*. In contrast, the Japanese *a(no)*, corresponding to *ce*, does not have such restrictions: *ano toki* 'that time' (vs. **ce ttay*), *ano hi* 'that day' (vs. **ce nal*), etc. Otherwise, the Japanese deictic/demonstrative forms *ko*, *so*, *a* correspond to the Korean *i*, *ku*, *ce*.
19. See Okutsu(1970) for a discussion of the quotative structure and indirectification in Japanese.
20. Direct quotations are reported with various quotative markers, although *lck* is the representative one:

(i) 'John-i o-n. ta' $\left. \begin{array}{l} /lako \\ ko \\ ileh-key \\ \phi \end{array} \right\}$ Bill-i mal.hay-ss-ta.

'Bill said, "John is coming."'

21. The verb *mal.ha-ta* (or *ha.ta* in short) 'say' is the most unmarked verb of saying in that it is used with any type of sentence quoted directly or indirectly.
22. For the D-verbs used in such sentence types as imperative and interrogative, see Chapter 5.
23. The terminal contour of the English echo question rising to the highest pitch level (e.g. Level 1 in the sense of Pike 1945), which is higher than that of the 'normal' question (e.g. Level 2), may be part of the general linguistic property of expressing intensity, unexpectedness, surprise and the like (cf. *ibid*: 44-106).

3. DISCOURSE LEVELS AND HONORIFICATION

1. See Prideau (1970) for linguistic descriptions of Japanese honorifics in the *Aspects* model. In Cook (1969), an explicit and formal account of Korean syntax in the *Aspects* model, the system of discourse levels and honorification is analyzed in terms of features: for instance, the second person pronoun *ne* is specified as (cf. *ibid*: 51)

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} +N \\ +Con \\ +An \\ +Hum \\ -1P \\ +2P \\ -Hon \\ -Cnt \end{array} \right\}$$

$$+ \underline{\quad}$$

$$ne \text{ "you"} (sg)$$

2. The number of D-levels is far from settled among grammarians: four levels by Choi (1961), six levels by M. S. Kim (1971), or (possibly) seven levels by Martin (1954), etc. Excluded from the present analysis is the extremely formal D-level (characterizable with a sentence ending like *si-opsose*, which is obsolete in current spoken Korean).
3. In representing declarative and interrogative endings I have disregarded the indicative morpheme *n* and its variants.
4. There seems to be a general tendency of using *na* in place of *ce*, or both interchangeably, in the formal level (and the polite manner) of discourse.
5. These terms were used by Martin (1954, 1969) except for 'blun!', which Martin called 'authoritative'. The term 'blunt' was used by Cook (1969) in the sense of our 'plain'.
6. Brown (1970: 302-35) set up two distinct dimensions, power and solidarity, in his discussion of the second person pronouns T and V, which stand for, e.g.: Classic Latin *tu* and *vos*, Italian *tu* and *Lei* (\leftarrow -*voi*), French *tu* and *vous*, Spanish *tu* and *vos*, and German *du* and *Sie* (\leftarrow *er* \leftarrow *Ihr*). He observed that asymmetrical and nonreciprocal 'power' relations like 'older than', 'stronger than', 'richer than', 'nobler than' and 'parent of' have given way to the symmetrical and reciprocal 'solidarity' relation in many of the IE languages (*ibid.*: 313). The notions 'ingroup' and 'outgroup' introduced by Martin (1964) are also relevant to the discussion of honorific or nonhonorific use of kinship terms.
7. The Plain and Intimate D-levels are often interchangeably used in a given discourse situation without any change in the degree of solidarity between the participants.
8. Note that 'SON' is treated as a 'transitive' predicate and *b* as its object. For arguments supporting this analysis, see McCawley (1972.a). Given such a configuration, the object *b* is incorporated into 'SON', yielding the surface '(a is) b's SON'.
9. The Intimate D-level is marked segmentally with *e* and the Blunt D-level with *o* in all major sentence types, which are then distinguishable from one another only prosodically: falling (\downarrow) (in declarative), rising (\uparrow) (in interrogative), etc.
10. In a situation where the speaker assumes that he was in a position to *observe* his own state of affairs in the past, it seems to be perfectly acceptable to have the referent of the speaker, i.e. the first person, as the subject of a retrospective sentence. To illustrate this point, suppose John, who was intoxicated the night before, wakes up in the morning to find himself lying on the ground. then he may well utter (i) in retrospective manner.

(i) Na-n kkay-ss-te.ni kil.ka-ey nwuw.e iss-te-la.

I-TOP wake-PST-then street.side- lie exist-RETRO-PI/D

'When I woke up, (I recall/observed) I was lying on the street.'

The similar context can also be used in a retrospective question, of which the subject is now coreferential with the hearer, as in (ii).

(ii) Ne-n eti-ey nwuw.e iss-te-nya?

you-TOP where-at lie- exist-RETRO-PI/Q

(Where (do you recall/did you observe) were you lying?)

11. Such a class of verbs denoting a mental or psychological state or senses includes: *coh-ta* 'like/be fond of', *silh-ta* 'dislike', *mip-ta* 'hate/be hateful', *kippu-ta* 'be pleased', *sulphu-ta* 'be sad' and any verb of the form *V-ko-siph-ta* 'be desirous of V-ing, (e.g. *ka-ko-siph-ta* 'be desirous of going). The like-subject constraint imposed on this class of verbs may have to do with some general property of a proposition containing a psychological predicate such that the speaker (or the reporter) can assert such a proposition only if it involves his own psychological state at the time of utterance or reporting. Thus, if the event time in a psychological expression is not the same as the utterance (or reporting) time, it appears that the like-subject constraint is no more at work, as shown in (i)-(iii).

(i) Na/Ne/John-(n)un kippu-/sul-phu-keyss-ta.

will-PI/D

'I/You/John will be pleased/sad.'

(ii) Na/Ne/John-(n)un kippu-/sulphu-l kes i-ta.

-MODthat-COP-PI/D

'I You/John is going to be pleased/sad.'

(iii) Na-nun ne/John- ϕ - i kippu-/sulphu- keyss-ta-ko mal.hay-ss-ta.

-will-PI/D-QM say-PST-PI/D

'I-said that you/John/I would be pleased/sad.'

Another case, where the like-subject constraint would not hold, is when the speaker (or the narrator) assumes to be 'omnipotent', like the author or narrator of a story, or when he assumes to be able to read someone else's mind by way of empathy. Thus (iv) is perfectly acceptable in such a context.

(iv) Ne/John-(n)un cikum sulphu-ta.

now

'You/John are now sad.'

Otherwise, sentences like (iv) are ill-formed in Korean: it may be regarded as presumptuous to assert someone else's psychological or mental *state*. One could at best say (in a normal context):

(v) Ne/John-(n)un cikum sulphe po.i.n-ta.

appear-PI/D

'You/John looks sad.'

(vi) Ne/John-(n)un cikum sulphe ha-ko iss-ta.

do-ing exist-PI/D

'You/John is acting like being sad.'

This class of stative verbs has been treated to some extent in a transformational framework, under the various names such as 'emotive' verbs (Cook 1969) and verbs of 'self-judgment' (Yang 1972). For discussions of 'psychological' verbs and the psych movement transformation (or 'flip') in English, see Postal (1971).

12. Makino (1970) suggested three alternatives in the first proposal, which he eventually rejected, of his two proposals on Japanese polite expressions: his third alternative is formulated as follows:

(i) Politeness Harmony Rule

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} [+AV] \\ [+ADJ] \end{array} \right\} \longrightarrow [\alpha\text{Polite}] / {}_s [\alpha\text{POLITE}] {}_s$$

Note that Makino's 'sentential feature' $[\alpha\text{POLITE}]$ is somewhat similar to our discourse operator $[\text{HONOR}]$ but it is described as a stylistic feature.

13. Interestingly enough, the honorific nominative marker *kkeyse* is not deleted before the topic marker *nun*, i.e.: *kkeyse+nun* → * ϕ +*num*, while the unmarked nominative *i/ka* is deleted (or suppressed) before *nun*, i.e.: *i/ka+nun* → ϕ +*nun* (or Japanese: *ga+wa* → ϕ +*wa* cf. Kuroda (1965)).
14. In Japanese the donatory verb has a more complex structure, even though there are basic correspondences between the two systems in Japanese and Korean: *yaru* (J) ↔ *cwu-ta* (K); *ageru* (J) ↔ *tuli-ta* (K); *kureru* (J) ↔ (?). Somewhat similar to *kureru* is the Korean defective donatory verb *tal-la*. It has only two imperative forms in the inflectional paradigm: *tal-la* and *ta-o*. It is used only when the speaker and the recipient (or indirect object person) are coreferential, as illustrated below:

(i) Ku chayk-ul $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \phi/\text{nay-key} \\ *ku\text{-eykey} \\ *John\text{-eykey} \end{array} \right\}$ tal-la!
give-Pl/Imp

'Give that book to $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{me.} \\ *him. \\ *John. \end{array} \right\}$ '

(ii) John-i ku chayk-ul $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \phi/\text{caki-eykey} \\ *na\text{-eykey} \\ *ne\text{-eykey} \\ *Bill\text{-eykey} \end{array} \right\}$ tal-la-ko mal.lay-ss-ta.
give-Pl/Imp-QM

'John_i asked someone to give that book to $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{him}_i. \\ *me. \\ *you. \\ *Bill. \end{array} \right\}$ '

15. Given 'HONOR(a, x_i) ^ HONOR(a, x_j)' (cf. 49.d), however, the honorific relation between x_i and x_j (as to whether HONOR(x_i, x_j) or HONOR(x_j, x_i)) cannot be inferred.
16. Redundancy in rule (51) was pointed out and a reformulation (along the line: *tuli*-if the indirect object is 'more honored' than the subject; *cwu*-, otherwise) was suggested by McCawley (personal communication, May 6, 1972). Notice that *si*-insertion applies to the general and regular case where term 1 (i.e. the subject NP) is honored.
17. What is relevant to the notion of 'stylistics' may be that of 'choice'. With respect to the system of discourse levels and honorification, the speaker has little, if any, choice in choosing the level of discourse and honorific or nonhonorific expression in a given situation. In this sense, the system of D-levels and honorification is not a matter of stylistics.


4. INFORMATION FOCUS AND DISCOURSE

1. Ross (1967: 435-7), while observing that the structure underlying English appositive relative clauses must be the coordination of two sentences, noted the difficulty of conjoining interrogative and declarative sentences (cf. ii) as the possible structure underlying (i), in the currently available

transformational apparatus.

(i) Is even Clarence, who is wearing mauve socks, a swinger?

(ii)



Further, he suggested that there be rules of some kind converting two sentences into one to account for appositive relative clauses. Such a problem would not arise in a D-grammar, for the two sentences in (iii) may be generated directly in the D-frame.

(iii) Is even Clarence a swinger? Clarence is wearing mauve socks.

2. One way to get out of this pitfall is to set up different *and*'s: *and*₁ (symmetric), *and*₂ (asymmetric), etc. For further discussion of sentence reduction in the basic discourse relations such as temporal, and causal, see Chang (1972a).
3. The sentential connective *se* has another closely related sense, i.e. 'as, because'. An adequate gloss would be 'then', which has at least two corresponding senses in English, temporal and causal.
4. For the notion of 'presupposition in a question', see Katz and Postal (1964: 116).
5. With respect to the function of WH in English, Klima (1964: 250) observed that one of its functions is to relate questions grammatically to declaratives and he posited WH as an optional element in sentence-initial position in the PS component, analogous to Katz and Postal's Q. In addition to a pre-sentential Q, Katz and Postal posited a WH-morpheme to the constituent(s) of S, which would trigger the WH-question transformation. Kuroda (1969), taking WH as a pre-sentential element, attached it to indefinite pronouns by an 'attachment transformation' (cf. i).

(i) WH X some $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{one} \\ \text{thing} \end{array} \right\}$ Y \longrightarrow WH X WH+some $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{one} \\ \text{thing} \end{array} \right\}$ Y

Then, a morphophonemic rule will convert WH+*someone*, WH+*something* to *who* and *what*, respectively. Recently, Chomsky (1971) introduced *wh* and \pm WH, the former as a feature that can be placed on a node (*ibid.*: 32) and the latter as functioning both as a Q and relativizer, that is: if specified +WH, it is the Q (in the sense of Baker 1970) underlying direct and indirect questions; if -WH, it is what underlies relatives (*ibid.*: 8).

6. The following works on cleft and pseudocleft sentences in English may be noteworthy: Chomsky (1970a), Peters and Bach (1968), Ross (1972), Akmajian (1970), and Muraki (1970). The Extracting Analysis (used by Peters and Bach (*ibid.*) in reference to Chomsky's analysis) may be characterized as follows: (a) pseudo-cleft sentences are distinct from unclefted sentences in underlying structure, (b) the main predicate in the underlying structure bears a dummy, which is replaced by an element of the embedded sentence, and (c) the embedded sentence has the structure for relative clause formation such that *what* replaces *it that* after relativization. The proposal by Peters-Bach and also by Ross may be called Duplication Analysis. It has the following characteristics: (a) the structure underlying English pseudo-cleft sentences contains a predicate

which except for an NP is a reduplication of the clause in topic (or subject) position, and (b) the duplicated constituents in the predicate undergo deletion. Akmajian's proposal is that English cleft-sentences are derived from pseudo-cleft sentences but he offers no explanation about the structure of pseudo-cleft sentences. Muraki's analysis, which may be called Presuppositional Analysis, is characterizable as follows: (a) the structure underlying (pseudo-)cleft sentences is in the form PRSP(S_1 , S_2), i.e. S_1 is presupposed for S_2 , and (b) constituents in S_2 identical to those in S_1 are deleted. In this mode of description Muraki attempts to account for not only both pseudo-cleft and cleft sentences but emphatic stress and elliptical constructions as well. For other analyses and various restrictions on clefting, see Stockwell et al. (1968).

7. If the person is someone to honor or respect, in the sense we have discussed in Chapter 3, *kes*-clefting, corresponding to English *it...that*, cannot be used. Contrast (20.b), which is repeated below as (i), with (ii).

(i) Ecey ku chayk.pang-eyse sacen-ul sa-n kes-un John-i-(ess)-ta.

(ii) *Ecey ku chayk.pang-eyse sacen-ul sa-n kes-un cey apeci-i-(ess-u)p.ni-ta.
my father

In place of the ill-formed sentence (ii), the proper expression must contain *pun* or *i*, as in (iii).

(iii) Ecey chayk.pang-eyse sacen-ul sa-n { $\begin{matrix} \text{pun} \\ i \end{matrix} \}$ -(n)un cey apeci-i-(ess-u)p.ni-ta.

8. In indicating emphatic stress with capital letters, elements like articles, prepositions (or postpositions), etc. are included in the representation, just to show that the constituent structure of the stressed phrase contains such elements, not that they are also stressed.
9. In (24), the indices t_i , p_i , x_5 , and x_9 can be represented directly under the respective NPs, as shown in (26).
10. Song (1967) is the first attempt to treat negation in Korean in a transformational model. S. P. Kim (1967) is exclusively concerned with Korean negation. Cook (1969) treats the subject in the *Aspects* model. Lee (1970) and Oh (1971) discuss negation in the framework of generative semantics.
11. It should be noted that in a generative semantics approach two synonymous sentences (i.e. sentences with the same truth conditions) do not necessarily have the same semantic structure, although non-synonymous ones have different semantic structures (cf. G. Lakoff 1970b: 134, note 3).
12. The forms are phonetic, rather than underlying, representations. The configuration, Copula *i*+Intimate DL *e*+Polite marker *yo*, yields the given phonetic output by phonological rules such as vowel fronting (e.g. $e \rightarrow ey$) and *y*-glide insertion, and Nom-Cop *i* contraction (cf. note 12, Chapter 2), as illustrated below.

| | Nominative | Copula | Intimate DL | Polite Marker |
|-----------------|------------|----------|-----------------------|---------------|
| | <i>i</i> | <i>i</i> | <i>e</i> | <i>yo</i> |
| | ↘ | ↙ | | |
| Contraction | | <i>i</i> | | |
| Fronting | | | <i>ey</i> | |
| Glide Insertion | | | <i>ye_y</i> | |

In addition to *y*-glide insertion, Korean may have to have a low-level phonetic rule of *i*-*y* alternation:

independently. How these two rules interact with each other is irrelevant to our discussion.

13. Instead of treating *ha-ta₂* as semantically empty, it may be possible to posit *ha-ta₂* as the phonetic realization of the proverb of state, say 'BE' or 'EXIST', paralleling the proverb of action 'DO', which is realized as *ha-ta₁*. In contrast to *ha-ta₁*, which is a two-place predicate, *ha-ta₂* then may be treated as a one-place predicate. In Korean, 'DO' and 'BE/EXIST' are phonetically nondistinct, whereas in Japanese they are realized as *suru* and *da* (*de aru*), respectively, as illustrated below. (For a discussion of *ha-ta*, see Chang 1968).

- | | |
|------------------|--------------------------|
| (i) 'STUDY-DO' | (K) <i>yenkwu.ha-ta</i> |
| | (J) <i>kenkyuu.suru</i> |
| (ii) 'HONEST-BE' | (K) <i>cengcik.ha-ta</i> |
| | (J) <i>syooziki.da</i> |

I shall not go into discussing this interesting problem of postulating a semantic predicate 'BE/EXIST' for the proform of state in this study except for noting that the issue of whether to delete *ha-ta* from 'deep structure' (cf. Lee 1970) or to add *ha-ta* to it (cf. Oh 1972) would be rather trivial in semantic representation to the extent to which no semantic properties of *ha-ta₁* and *ha-ta₂* are taken into consideration.

14. The structural description of *ki/ci* insertion is not general enough to take into account sentences like

- (i) Il.ha-ki (ka) coh-ta. 'It is good/pleasant to work.'
 (ii) Il.ha-ki-(ka) an-coh-ta. 'It is not good/pleasant to work.'
 NEG-

where *ki*-insertion occurs with verbs other than *ha-ta*. Note that in (ii) the *ki* is retained in a negative environment.

It may be noteworthy with respect to note 13 that there occurs a reduplicated form of the verb as well as *ha-ta*, as shown in (iv) and (v).

- | | | | |
|----------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| (iii) Ku kes-i | { coh-ta. | Cf. Ku kes-i coh-ci | { an-h-ta. |
| (iv) | { coh-ki-nun ha-ta. | | { an-h-ki-nun ha-ta. |
| (v) | { coh-ki-nun coh-ta. | | { an-h-ci-nun an-h-ta. |

15. For a discussion of 'ONLY', 'ALSO', and 'EVEN', including their logical properties, see Kuroda (1969-70).
16. Horn (1969) gives the following logical formulation for 'ONLY' and 'EVEN':

- (i) ONLY ($x=a$, Fx)
 Presupposition: Fx
 Assertion: $\neg(Ey)(y \neq x \ \& \ Fy)$

- (ii) EVEN ($x=a$, Fx)
 Presupposition: $(Ey) (y \neq x \ \& \ Fy)$
 Assertion: Fx

He convincingly argues that 'EVEN' (like 'ALSO') asserts what 'ONLY' presupposes and presupposes the negation of what 'ONLY' asserts. Note further that in the case of 'ALSO' (cf. 107. b) what is presupposed is not merely 'someone other than John loves Mary' but 'someone other than John loves someone', including the case of 'Mary loves John', as shown in the following exchange:

- (i) (A to B) Mary loves John.
- (ii) (B to A) John also loves Mary.

- What is presupposed is the identity of the predicate 'love', not necessarily of the object 'Mary'.
17. McCawley (1972a: 36), while describing *only* as a quantifier, as illustrated in (108-109), and representing it as if it were atomic, suggests that it be decomposed into more basic items, paraphrasable as 'no one but' (or 'nothing/nowhere/... but').
 18. The derived structures to which NEG-lowering applies must be such that they contain *ha-ta* (i.e. *ha-ta₂*), which is inserted by *hata*-insertion (if regarded as semantically empty) or realized as the proverb of state, as noted earlier (cf. note 13 above).
 19. The obligatory marking of *nun* may be due to the focused 'NEG' functioning as a predicate higher than the quantifier 'ONLY'.
 20. For a discussion of cross-over constraints in logical predicates, see Muraki (1971).

5. MODALITY AND SENTENCE TYPES

1. Carnap (1947: 175), for instance, set up six logical modalities with necessity as primitive and the others derived from it: necessary, impossible, contingent, non-necessary, possible, and non-contingent. Caton (1966) called a class of verbs and adverbs 'epistemic qualifiers', subgrouping them into three different scales: K(now)-group, P(ossible)-group, and T(hink)-group, according to the various attitudes of the speaker in a discourse. Urmson's (1952) 'parenthetical verbs' are also relevant to the discussion of modality. The modality of the Korean particle *ci* will be described in (5.4) alongside the 'parenthetical verbs'
2. This is overly simplistic, if not incorrect. Declarative sentences may convey requests in addition to assertions. For example, (i) conversationally implies (i') (cf. Gordon and Lakoff 1971).
 - (i) I want you to open the window. (ii) Open the window.
3. Bolinger (1967: 359) suggested that *shall* rather than *will* be the modal representable for the imperative in English. Notice the use of *shall* in the following.
 - (i) You shall do it → Do it. (ii) Shall we go? → Let's go.
4. For a parallel description of this topic with Japanese, see Chang (1972a).
5. If sentences (14) are interpreted as having a deleted comitative *na-hako* 'with me', then they are well-formed.
6. Even in the unmarked cases, there seem to be two distinct types of question, as noted by Searle (1970: 66): (a) real question: the speaker wants (to find out) the answer; (b) exam question: the speaker wants to know if the hearer knows the answer.
7. Particles like *ni* or (*n*)*ka* may be added to the Plain DL. *Ka* occurs in indirect questions as well as in direct questions. It is noteworthy that *ka*, when used in direct questions, is *less direct* in the force of request for information than the other question endings listed. In this respect it is similar to *ci*, another indirect question marker.
8. To be more precise, the disjunction of sentence may be in the form: $\alpha S \vee \neg \alpha S$ (where α varies over + and -, and +S stands for a positive sentence and -S for a negative one.)
9. In Korean, another particle *ka* functions as a disjunctive and interrogative marker in a certain construction such as

(i) Yonge-ten-*ka* pule-ten-*ka* tokile-lul paywu-ten-*ka*?

-RETRO- -RETRO- -RETRO-

(Was he, do you recall, learning English, (or) French, or German?)

If NP+(Copula *i*)+*na* is not followed by another NP, the *na* implies 'or some NP' as illustrated in (ii). Contrast it with the corresponding Japanese in (iii), where the disjunctive NP is overtly expressed.

(ii) Yenge-*na* paywu-sip.si-o.

F/IMP

'Learn English or something.'

(iii) Eigo-*ka* nan(i)-*ka* narai-nasai.

something-

10. Logical operators 'and', 'or' have been described as a special type of predicate by McCawley (1972b).
11. The configuration (s OR(s X-[_{NP} x]-X)ⁿ) in (33.b) may be interpreted as a rule schema to be expanded along the line of existential quantification in logic (cf. 29), informally as:

[[X-[_{NP} x₁]-X] or [X-[_{NP} x₂]-X] or . . . or [X-[_{NP} x_n]-X]],

 which would then be generalized (cf. 30) as: [X- SOME[_{NP} x]-X]. With focus assigned to 'SOME [_{NP} x]', a WH-word is yielded and moved to sentence-initial position.
12. Assigning an arbitrary symbol like Q(uestion) is redundant in semantic representation: the meaning of 'question' is explicitly represented in the dominating structure 'REQUEST TO TELL' in direct questions or information verbs 'KNOW, ASK, etc.' directly dominating a disjunctive complement S in indirect questions.
13. This is one of the arguments by Green (1970) against Sadock's conjoined performative analysis of whimperatives.
14. The form *ci*-NEG-*ha*-DL-Q in the sense of the tag-question is analyzed as a form attached to the preceding S by way of deleting the anaphoric *kule* 'so' referring to the S. Thus (i) and (ii) are equivalent in this analysis.

(i) John-i {^o_{wa-ss}} -ci(-yo), kule-h-ci-an-h-a(-yo)?

so-be-not-be(-Pol)?

'John {_{came}^{is coming}} — isn't that so?'

(ii) John-i {^o_{wa-ss}} -ci-an-h-a-yo?

'John {_{came, didn't he?}^{is coming, isn't he?}}'

It is important to note that the S can be tensed in contrast to the tenseless surface S of the normal interrogative or declarative.

15. The falling TC of the tag-questions in English indicates the speaker's assertive attitude toward the S to which the tag is attached, while the rising TC indicates the speaker's noncommitment to the S.
16. In (62), *r* stands for '(indefinite) reason' and it is further marked [FOCUS] and dominated by the disjunctive predicate 'OR'. A more precise paraphrase would be: Tell me for what reason you don't sleep — I know you don't sleep for no reason.
17. In Gordon and Lakoff's conversational postulates approach one and the same logical structure is

assigned to both the normal *wh*-question and the whimperative, the meaning of the latter depending on context and deriving from a set of conversational postulates.

18. See note 23 in Chapter 2.

19. In Danish, as in Korean, the echo question is in the form of indirect question, as illustrated in Sadock (1969a:338):

(i) Jeg sporgte om jeg har givet dig en krone. (Indirect question)

'I asked you whether I gave you a crown.'

(ii) Har jeg givet dig en krone? (Direct question)

'Did I give you a crown?'

(iii) Om du har givet mig en krone? (Echo question)

(Whether you gave me a crown?)

In Japanese, the echo question appears to be also in indirect question. Notice the quotative *to* (corresponding to the Korean *ko*) is realized as *tte* in contraction with *itta* 'said'.

(iv) Anata-wa Mia-ga suki-da-tte? (Echo question)

'You like Mia?'

(v) Anata-wa Mia-ga suki-da *to itta* no?

'Did you say you like Mia?'

20. By postulating nested hypersentence structure, Sadock is forced to redefine his notion of 'relative maximum' (1969a:342) and admit that first and second person pronominalization is determined by the higher of the pair of hypersentences, i.e. his 'superhypersentence'.

21. With respect to the English echo question I would suggest that the indirect quotation *that/wh*-S be subject to further transformations such as the deletion of *that/whether* and *do*-support, to yield a well-formed surface echo question. See the following illustration:

(i) Did you say that you like Mia? (cf. 70)

(→ that you like Mia?)

→ You like Mia?

(ii) Did you ask me whether I did that? (cf. 71)

(→ whether I did that?)

→ Did I do that?

(iii) Did you { ask me to
request of me that I } give Mia what? (cf. 72)

(→ that I give Mia what?)

→ Give Mia what?

Notice that in the illustration above the original question intonation is retained all along the derivation; further notice that first and second person pronominal forms are kept unchanged. The transformational apparatus of deletion as projected here may be regarded as too powerful, particularly in view of the current mode of narrowing down and restricting the transformational power (cf. Chomsky 1971). In the absence of any adequate theory of deletion, I speculate that the process of deletion in the echo question can be refined along the line of the illustration above.

22. In addition, *ci* has functions closely related to each other: *ci* as the negative nominalizer, corresponding to the positive *ki* (cf. 4.5); *ci* as an indirect question marker after a class of 'information' verbs (cf. 5.3.3). Martin et al. (1967) called *ci* a 'suspective' morpheme.

23. If the *ci* in the declarative receives emphatic stress, its modality seems to remain assertive.

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LANGUAGE RESEARCH

Publisher: Cho.ig-un Kim (Director, Language Research Institute, SNU)

Editor in Chief: Suk-San Kim

Language Research is published semi-annually by the Language Research Institute of Seoul National University at the University Press. Manuscripts for publication and correspondence relative to editorial matters should be addressed to: the Editor in Chief of *Language Research*, Language Research Institute, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea.

語 學 研 究 第 9 卷 第 2 號 (別 卷)

1973 年 12 月 20 日 發 行

1973 年 12 月 30 日 印 刷

發 行 人 서 울 大 學 校 語 學 研 究 所
 서 울 特 別 市 鍾 路 區 東 崇 洞 31 番 地

金 鍾 云

編 輯 主 幹 김 석 산

原 稿 및 編 輯 事 項 에 관 한 連 絡 은 「 語 學 研 究 」 編 輯 主 幹 앞 으 로

印 刷 處 서 울 大 學 校 出 版 部

A GENERATIVE STUDY OF DISCOURSE

PRAGMATIC ASPECTS OF KOREAN
WITH REFERENCE TO ENGLISH

Suk-Jin Chang

Seoul National University

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Seoul National University for allowing me to further my studies and to the faculty of the Department of Linguistics of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, in particular to R. B. Lees and T. M. Lightner, who admitted me to the Department with a fellowship.

Next, special gratitude is due to the members of my doctoral committee and especially to my advisor C.-W. Kim, who has not only been patient in waiting all these years for me to come up with something substantial but has helped me on every possible occasion to make it feasible for me to continue my studies.

J. D. McCawley, who first accepted me for study at the University of Chicago in the spring of 1969, has my deep appreciation for his valuable comments on this thesis, as well as for his serving in my committee.

I am indebted to my friend and colleague S. C. Song, whose keen insight into Korean more often than not made me aware of the structure of the language while we were engaged in the work of writing a Korean text in Utah. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to my colleague K. Russell for his valuable suggestions and comments on the contents of this thesis, and to J. Wilcock and B. Guebert of the Linguistics Department for the arrangements they made to assist me in the writing of this thesis.

My appreciation is expressed to L. Rudicil, P. Cole, H. Sohn, Y. Choi, K. Paek, M. Makiuchi, P. Shin and many friends in Illinois, Utah and New Jersey, for their encouragement and substantive assistance during the period of wandering and wondering what to do with writing a thesis.

I thank my sister and brother-in-law in Seoul, who have supported me morally and financially all these years I have been away.

Finally, there are no words with which to thank H. Chung, without whose last-minute help this thesis could have never been submitted.

I submit this thesis with a feeling of missing—missing the beginning of an end to a long meandering career as a perennial student—a career which has been more enjoyable than a subcareer of on-and-off teaching.

I wish to express my deep appreciation to Director Chong-un Kim, Professor Chan Ho Whang, and all the other members of the Language Research Institute of Seoul National University, and the S. N. U. Press, for their assistance in having my dissertation come out, slightly revised, in the form of a monograph.

I dedicate this monograph to my teacher Dr. Joong Whi Kwon, former professor and president of Seoul National University.

Seoul

May 1973

S.-J. C.

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語學研究

第9卷·第2號(別卷)

1973年12月

話의 生成的 研究

—韓·英語의 話用相을 中心으로—

張 奭 鎮

서울大學校 語學研究所

LANGUAGE RESEARCH

Vol. 9

December 1973

No. 2 (SUPPLEMENT)

A GENERATIVE STUDY OF DISCOURSE

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