

What is Said in Metalinguistic Negation in English*

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The distinction between what is said and what is implicated has been one of the debatable topics in the literature. In spite of the various proposals on this issue, not much has been discussed as to what is said and what is implicated in metalinguistic negation (MN henceforth). Among several viable theories of the saying/implicating distinction in MN, default interpretation theory is employed in this paper. Specifically, this paper, while discussing what is said in MN, attempts to pursue the possibility of non-default interpretation, which is left equally tenable by the default interpretation theory. I also argue that establishing what is said in MN requires secondary pragmatic processes contrary to relevance-theoretic assumptions. I propose that MN might be an example of cases which do not necessarily have both said and implicated meanings.

Key words: what is said, what is implicated, metalinguistic negation, primary vs. secondary pragmatic processes, intentions

1. Introduction

The demarcation of what is said and what is implicated has been one of the central issues in pragmatic literature. At least three major standpoints can be distinguished regarding the demarcation: Grice's minimal semantics supplemented with conversational implicature theory, the indeterminacy thesis and the default interpretation theory (Bach, 1994; Levinson, 1995, 2000; Jaszczolt, 1999a, 1999b). There is also a debate as to whether we use different kinds of inferences or the same kinds of inferences in deriving what is said and what is implicated. Opinions divide here.

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Researchers such as Levinson (2000) and Récanati (2002) argue that we use different kinds of inferences: the primary pragmatic (or default) inferences for the derivation of what is said and the secondary pragmatic inferences for the derivation of what is implicated. In the mean time, some relevance theorists such as Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Carston (2002b) claim that there is no differences between the two kinds of inferences. In this paper, I propose that at least in the case of MN, the two types of inferences need to be allowed for. This is because we use secondary pragmatic processes in deriving what is said or the truth conditional content of an utterance representing MN.

Despite the fact that there have been numerous attempts to distinguish what is said and what is implicated and to explicate the nature of inferences responsible for the derivation of the two categories, not much attention has been paid to the saying/implicating distinction in so-called MN cases. MN is usually defined as negation which operates on metalinguistic features of an utterance such as phonology, morphology, style, register and so on, though the definition or scope of MN varies from researcher to researcher (Horn, 1985, 1989, 1992; Seuren, 1990; Burton-Roberts, 1989a, 1989b, 1999; van der Sandt, 1991; Carston, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2002a; Geurts, 1998). In most approaches, it appears to be implicitly assumed that the metalinguistic interpretation is what is implicated (or an implicature) of the utterance, which is derived through the secondary pragmatic inferences. Contrary to this general assumption, I argue that the metalinguistic interpretation is indeed the said meaning of the utterance, not the implicated meaning. At the same time, I commit myself to the claim that there might be utterances which do not have both said and implicated meanings. That is, MN might provide an example of cases which have only what is said, but not what is implicated.

2. What is Said and What is Implicated¹⁾

2.1. What is Said Closely Related to Literal Meaning

The demarcation of what is said and what is implicated by Grice (1975,

1) For the empirical experiments about people's intuitions on the distinction of what is said and what is implicated, see Gibbs and Moise (1997) and Nicolle and Clark (1999). These two sets of experiments have quite contradictory results concerning the distinction.

1978) appears to be motivated by the following two phenomena: (i) the existence of some lexical items that do not contribute to truth-conditional content and (ii) the fact that some pragmatic inferences do make contributions to truth-conditional content.²⁾ Even though Grice contends that what is said is constrained to be closely related to the conventional meaning of words, he admits that some pragmatic inferences are included to establish the truth-conditional content of an utterance, even though of limited kinds. They are reference assignment and disambiguation. All the other pragmatic inferences are classified under the rubric of implicature, either conventional or conversational. Conventional implicatures are meanings induced by the conventional meanings of the lexical items and at the same time do not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance.³⁾ Conversational implicature is assumed to be essentially connected with general features of discourse like the Cooperative Principle⁴⁾ and its attendant maxims, enjoining veracity, relevance, perspicacity, and the provision of just the right amount of information (Levinson, 1995, p. 92). Conversational implicatures are assumed to be induced by either observing the maxims or flouting them. Thus, if the sentence, *He is in the grip of a vice*, is uttered in the following context, what is implicated would be something like (1b):

- (1) (Context: John and Mary are talking about their mutual friend, Tom's long absence from church.)
- a. John: Is Tom coming to church today?
 - Mary: He is in the grip of a vice.
 - b. He is not coming to the church.

2) Some terminological clarifications are due at this point. In this paper, *the truth-conditional content* of an utterance refers to the content conveyed by what is said. Therefore, truth-conditional content is truth-evaluable, which does not need to be further developed or enriched. Truth-conditional content is represented by *propositional form* or *semantic representation*. In contrast, *logical form* is used to represent literal meaning of an utterance. In most of the cases, logical form has to be further developed or enriched as speakers hardly fully express what they intend to say (Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Carston, 2002a, 2002b).

3) This is still contentious (Bach, 1994: footnote 14, 1999).

4) The Cooperative Principle is stated as follows:

Make your conversational contribution such as is required at the state at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (Grice, 1975, 1989, p. 26).

Instead of giving a direct answer like *yes* or *no*, Mary suggests the answer by saying something else. Here, the inference to the relevant answer hinges on the assumption that Mary, as an interlocutor, is observing the Cooperative Principle. This suggested meaning is called *what is implicated* or *implicature*.

Theoretical problems with Grice's approach have been discussed elsewhere (Lee, 2002).⁵ One point I would like to discuss here is whether Grice's approach would yield any plausible results when applied to MN cases. Grice himself does not deal with MN examples. Nevertheless, as he conceives what is said as closely related to the literal meaning of linguistic expressions, the content of what is said in MN would look quite akin to what is explicitly uttered. However, this is not the case because what is said in MN has to be quite remote from what is uttered in terms of both the content and the form. This issue will be taken up in detail in Section 4.

2.2. Underdetermined Semantics

In recent studies (Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Carston, 1988, 2002a, 2002b; Récanati, 1989), it has been noted that, though what is said is closely related to the conventional meaning of the words uttered, the gap between what is said (or *explicature* in relevance-theoretic terms (Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Carston, 1988)) and the conventional meaning of the words is bigger than has been assumed, and that the same sorts of pragmatic inferences are used in determination of what is said as well as what is implicated. That is, more pragmatic inferences other than reference assignment and disambiguation enter into determination of what is said. In these approaches, it is believed that the linguistic meaning barely determines what is said or the proposition expressed by the utterance. It is assumed that there is a logical form of an utterance that has to be further specified for the truth-value assignment. Hence the logical form is *underdetermined* or *underspecified*.

On these approaches, it is inevitable to postulate several levels of representation within the realm of what is said. That is, we need at least two levels of representation for the truth-conditional meaning of an utterance: a level of semantic form that is underdetermined concerning

5) See also Saul (2002) for the relevance theorists' misconceptions of Grice's version of saying and implicating.

the truth-value assignment and also a level on which a fully truth-evaluable semantic form is represented. When applied to example (2a), this thesis would yield a semantic form like (2b). It needs to be developed or enriched to a representation such as (2c) to represent the appropriate or relevant meaning of (2a).

- (2) a. They got married and they had a baby.
 b. They_i got married at t_j and they_i had a baby at t_k.
 c. They_i got married at t_j and they_i had a baby at t_k and j<k.

However, in most cases, the semantic form such as (2b) is not accessible to the ordinary interlocutors. So this approach is rejected on the grounds of the parsimony of the level of representation, which is spelled out by Jaszczolt (1999a, p. 207) as the principle of the Parsimony of Levels (POL):

POL: Levels of sense are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.

One of the referees pointed out that (2b) is also a propositional form as well as (2c). Then why (2c) instead of (2b) when both of them are well-structured propositional forms? It is true that (2b) is indeed a perfect propositional form structurally and semantically. However, what I mean is that (2c) is the appropriate kind of propositional form to represent (what the hearer assumes to be) the intended meaning of (2a). Regarding examples in (2), another referee commented that (2b) might be needed alongside of (2c) to show that we ordinary interlocutors derive (2c) from (2b). Without any empirical experiments, it is hard to say whether representations like (2b) are accessible or available to ordinary interlocutors. Nonetheless, I believe that representations like (2c) are the ones which are available to the interlocutors' mind straightforwardly when they encounter utterances like (2a), while representations like (2b) are not. If this is the case, I don't think it is plausible to postulate a level which ordinary interlocutors do not have in their mind when they interpret utterances like (2a). If we accept the referee's argument, we need to postulate representations like (2b) for every utterance containing *and*,

In spite of vigorous attempts to draw the saying/implicating distinction in general, not much has been done about MN cases. Nevertheless, it appears that they assume the metalinguistic reading is *what is implicated* by MN utterances. For example, Carston and Noh (1996, p. 492) propose

that an MN 'may be better understood as an implicature', admitting that resolving this issue will require more careful thought and some empirical experiments. Contrary to this relevance-theoretic assumption, I will argue that metalinguistic reading is indeed what is said, not what is implicated. Otherwise, there will not be any said meaning in MN. This will be taken up in detail in section 4.

2.3. Default Interpretation and Departure from it

What is said has been accounted for in terms of the default interpretation theory (Levinson, 1995, 2000; Bach, 1999; Jaszczolt, 1999a, 1999b). When applied to examples in (2), the theory predicts that the interpretation (2c) above is arrived at by default. This is because, in most of the cases, when we encounter utterances like (2a), we tend to interpret (2a) as (2c) which involves temporality. According to Levinson (2000, p. 11), for instance, default inference 'captures our intuitions about a preferred or normal interpretation'. In other words, this theory depends on ordinary speakers' intuitions on the interpretation. One point worth mentioning is that default reading can always be overridden. In this case, the departures from the default are signaled by the context.

Let us examine how the default interpretation theory can deal with MN cases by looking at (3b), which is a 'representative' example of MN.

- (3) a. The king of France is not bald.
 b. The king of France is not bald-- There is no king of France!

The preferred and natural reading of (3a) must be as follows: there is a king of France and he is not bald. Here the property of being bald is negated. In the meantime, when the context, either linguistic or non-linguistic, indicates otherwise, (3a) can be interpreted as (3b), in which the presence of the French monarch is denied. According to this theory, negative sentences can have 'non-default' readings. As mentioned before, the default interpretation theory assumes that there is the possibility that default reading can be overridden when context tells so. In the case of (3b), the second utterance is the context which indicates that the negative utterance has a non-default reading, i.e. metalinguistic reading. In most of MN examples, either linguistic or non-linguistic contexts provide the clue toward non-default metalinguistic interpretation.

As one of the linguistic contexts, most of MN examples carry a special intonation contour (Horn, 1985, 1989; McCawley, 1991).⁶

Most of the researches based on default interpretation are focused on the explanation of default readings. So we tend to assume that non-default reading is what is implicated. However, this is not the case. I think the theory can also be employed to account for non-default interpretations. This seems to be quite plausible because the theory allows for the possibility of non-default interpretation. This paper is an attempt to explore the option towards non-default reading within the default interpretation theory, by dealing with MN examples.

3. The Definition of MN

MN is defined as ‘a device for objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever’ by Horn (1985, p. 121). That is, MN operates on such properties of an utterance as presupposition, implicature, phonology, morphology, style, resister, and so on, rather than affecting the conceptual content of the utterance. Here are some of the MN examples.

- (4) a. The king of France is not bald- there is no king of France.
 b. Some girls aren’t feminists, all are feminists.
 c. He is not good at comp[u:Dərz], he’s good at comp[u:təz].
 d. I didn’t trap two mongeese, I trapped two mongooses.
 e. Grandma isn’t feeling lousy, Johnny, she’s badly indisposed.

What is negated in each example is a presupposition that there is a king of France in (4a), an implicature from *some* to *not all* in (4b), a pronunciation of the word *computers* in (4c), an incorrect plural form *mongeese* in (4d), and a style in (4e). In these examples, something other than the conceptual content is affected by the negation. These properties are called *metalinguistic properties* of an utterance.

6) Cf. Carston and Noh (1996) argue that this suprasegmental property is not an essential characteristic of MN.

3.1. Is MN a Homogeneous Category?

Let me briefly discuss the homogeneity of the category of MN. This issue has been raised by several researchers (Horn, 1990; Geurts, 1998; Burton-Roberts, 1999; Lee, 2002, 2003). Among them, Horn (1990, p. 496) purports that presupposition-cancelling negation like (4a) and other MN cases are 'not semantically unified', though they 'may be functionally coherent'. Nevertheless, he does not give any clear explanation as to what he exactly means by the expressions 'semantically unified' and 'functionally coherent'. Developing his idea, the author (2002, 2003) has argued that presupposition-cancelling negation (PCN) (4a) and implicature-cancelling negation (ICN) such as (4b) should be separated from the MN category.⁷⁾

To support that claim, I have provided at least two pieces of evidence. The first one is the different roles the correction clauses have. If we take (4a) and (4d), for instance, the second clause of (4a), *there is no king of France*, has the role of *providing the reason* for denying the existence of the entity presupposed by asserting the first clause. On the other hand, the second clause of (4d), *I trapped two mongooses*, has the role of *correcting or replacing* a wrongly-used element in the previous utterance. This difference is reflected by the contrast shown in the following examples.

- (5) a. The king of France is not bald, *because* there is no king of France.
 b. *I didn't trap two mongeese, *because* I trapped two mongooses!
 c. *Grandma isn't feeling lousy, Johnny, *because* she's badly indisposed.
 (Horn, 1990, p. 499)

While in PCN the two clauses can easily be conjoined by a causal connective *because*, it is not the case with MN cases. This is explained to be due to the different roles the correction clauses have.

Secondly, PCN and ICN can be paraphrased as an *it is not true that* construction. In contrast, MN cases do not allow for this paraphrase.

7) The notion, presupposition, has been challenged by some researchers such as relevance theorists (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). One of the features distinguishing presupposition from implicature is cancellability. That is, while presupposition is hard to cancel, implicature is cancellable. However, as we have examples like (4a) and (4b) in which a presupposition and an implicature are cancelled respectively, cancellability does not seem to be a sound criterion to distinguish the two notions. If the two can be subsumed into one category, my argument can be better supported because I argue both PCN and ICN behave quite differently from MN.

- (6) a. It's not true that the king of France is bald- there is no king of France.
 b. ?It's not true that I'm his daughter- he's my father.
 c. *It's not true that I trapped two mongeese, I trapped two mongooses.
 d. *It's not true that Grandma is feeling lousy, Johnny, she's badly indisposed. (Horn, 1990, p. 498)

Noting this difference, Horn claims that the ordinary English word *true* is used quite differently from its semantic value in these examples. It might be true that words are sometimes employed differently from their semantic values, but I think they still retain their core meanings. In the case of examples in (6), it does not seem to be plausible to believe that word *true* is used differently from its semantic value. Contrary to Horn, I argue that the contrast of acceptability shown in (6) illustrates the essential differences between PCN/ICN and MN. It is still subject to debate how to assign a truth-value to a presupposition- failing expressions like *the king of France*. However, whether they are false, neither false nor true, or truth-valueless, it is obvious that they are not true. So, they can naturally co-occur with an *it is not true that* construction.

The differences between PCN and ICN on the one hand and MN on the other is claimed to result from the nature of the target of negation. That is, while the target of negation in PCN is the (part of the) conceptual content, that of MN has nothing to do with the conceptual content. Let me compare a PCN and a MN. If we take (4a), the relevant presupposition, i.e., the presence of the French monarch, is included in the conceptual content of the first utterance, which can be roughly represented as follows.

- (7) $\neg[\exists x [\text{king of France } (x) \ \& \ \text{Bald } (x)]]$

Due to the content in the second utterance of (4a), the constituent *king of France* in (7) is affected by the negation. On the other hand, MN is not meant to operate on this kind of conceptual content. A similar analysis can be given to ICN (Lee, 2002). So MN examples in this paper are constrained as to exclude PCN and ICN.

3.2. Characteristics of MN

There have been heated debates on how to define the category, MN (Horn,

1985, 1989, 1992; Seuren, 1990; Burton-Roberts, 1989a, 1989b, 1999; van der Sandt, 1991; Carston, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2002a; Geurts, 1998). The definition of MN pretty much depends on the framework each researcher works in. I have provided the following characteristics of MN elsewhere (2002, 2003):⁸⁾

- (i) MN involves the speaker's intention to contradict himself/herself.
- (ii) MN contains the mixture of use-mention⁹⁾
- (iii) the *target* of the negation should be mentioned, and
- (iv) the negation operator in MN is truth-functional as in descriptive negation

Characteristic (i) differentiates the two interpretations possible with (8)

(8) A: You look pensive.

B: I'm not pensive- I'm just thinking. (Burton-Roberts, 1999, p. 363)

Utterances like (8B) evoke a contradiction since two semantically similar words *pensive* and *thinking* are negated in one clause and then asserted in the second clause. Accordingly, in Horn's or Burton-Roberts' (1989a, 1989b) approach, in which contradiction is considered to be an essential property of characterizing MN, (8B) qualifies as MN. However, this is not the end of story. (8B) is said to be an attested utterance by a ten-year old boy, who might not know the meaning of the word *pensive*. If we consider the context and idiolect of the utterer, then (8B) does not lead to a contradiction. That is the utterer did not mean to contradict himself/herself. Hence, there is no metalinguistic interpretation with (8B).

As Carston (1999) and one referee mention, the issue arises here as to whether language use should be discussed on the level of idiolect or on the level of speech community. Even though (8B) does not evoke any contradiction, it will give rise to a contradiction if taken out of the context. However, if we take the context of the utterance into account, (8B) does

8) Properties (i) and (ii) are proposed by Burton-Roberts (1999) and endorsed by the author (2002). Property (iv) is also suggested by several researchers such as Seuren and Carston. Property (iii) is provided by the author (2002).

9) I will roughly distinguish the terms *use* and *mention* as follows:

When an expression is employed to encode a concept or to describe a state of affairs, it is used. On the other hand, when the expression is employed to present something other than its literal meaning, then it is mentioned.

not result in any contradiction. The same sentence can have various different interpretations depending on the context. (8B) is one of the examples which illustrate that point; the same sequence does or does not lead to a contradiction depending on the speaker's intention to contradict himself/herself.

The important point here is that the speaker of (8B) does not mean to create any contradiction. In the meantime, from A's perspective, who must be a grown-up, I don't think s/he takes (8B) to be contradictory because s/he fully understands her/his interlocutor's knowledge of lexical items. Therefore, when we talk about MN, the speaker's intention and the hearer's understanding of the intention should be taken into consideration.

Characteristic (ii) accounts for the following.

- (9) A1: What is the correct pronunciation of this word? Is it eSOteric?
 A2: Myra's poem is totally eSOteric.
 B: It's not toally eSOteric-it's esoTEric. (Burton-Roberts, 1999, p. 359)

(9B) as an answer to (9A2) only qualifies as metalinguistic according to Burton-Roberts, whereas (9B) construed as an answer to (9A1) does not. In the latter case, the pronoun in (9B) refers to the correct pronunciation of a word and the predicates indeed concern the pronunciation of the word. Thus, the negation in this case operates on the metalinguistic level straightforwardly. On the other hand, when (9B) is construed as a response to (9A2), the pronoun refers to Myra's poem and predicate is likely to be taken to be *used* on the first processing. However, this yields a contradiction because the two predicates are both negated and affirmed at the same time. This contradiction can be resolved by assuming that the predicates are *mentioned* not *used*. There is a use-mention mixture in (9B) because the pronoun is used, while the predicate is mentioned.

Characteristic (iii) is proposed to exclude cases which some relevance-theoretic approaches need to include. In recent relevance-theoretic approaches, there is an attempt to account for the various phenomena of negation in terms of metarepresentation. I will examine Carston (1999)'s approach among them. According to Carston (1999), negation qualifies as MN if there is an echoed or mentioned element and a negation is employed.¹⁰ Thus, on

10) The term *echo* is used in a variety of ways. As far as Carston (1999)'s approach goes, the term *echo* means that certain parts of the previous utterance are repeated in the following utterance.

Carston's approach, the following example can be included in MN.

(10) Boston doesn't have three syllables. It has two syllables.

This example contains both a mentioned element *Boston* and a negation. Hence it is an MN on Carston's definition. However, this example will not make the hearer feel any contradiction or absurdity, which is normally the case with MN. This is because it can be understood quite straightforwardly that the word *Boston* is mentioned rather than used. Based on this observation, I argue that the *target of negation* should be mentioned if the negation is going to be construed as MN.

Characteristic (iv) has to do with the saying/implicating distinction in MN. This topic will need a new section to be dealt with in.

4. What is Said and What is Implicated in MN

4.1. Primary vs. Secondary Pragmatic Processes

Researchers such as Grice (1989), Levinson (2000) and Récanati (2002) assume that the processes involved in deriving what is said differ from the processes of implicature derivation. The former ones are called the *primary* pragmatic processes and the latter ones the *secondary* pragmatic processes. Récanati, in particular, argues that although both processes depend on context, there is a crucial difference between the two pragmatic processes; while the primary ones are free from the consideration of speaker's intentions, the secondary ones require representation of speaker's intentions.

On the other hand, Carston (2002b) argues against Récanati's proposal saying that:

The various different pragmatic tasks are performed by processes that comprises a single system, which takes decoded linguistic meaning as its input and delivers the propositions communicated (explicatures and implicatures). (Carston, 2002b, p. 141)

That is, she believes that there is no noticeable differences between the two pragmatic processes used in deriving explicitly communicated content

and those used in deriving implicitly communicated content.

Despite Carston's suspicion on the distinction between the two types of pragmatic processes, she employs the two pragmatic processes while dealing with MN cases. (12) shows how she analyzes an MN example (11).

(11) The F is not G. There is no F.

(12) a. encoded meaning: not [the F is G]

b. first interpretation: [the F is not-G]

c. second interpretation: not [*the F is G]¹¹ (Carston, 1999, pp. 318-319)

Here the first interpretation and the second interpretation must refer to the interpretations resulted from the primary pragmatic processes and the secondary pragmatic processes respectively. If we follow Carston's argument, what is processed in the first interpretation is explicitly communicated content, while what is processed in the second interpretation is implicitly communicated content. Then she appears to assume that the metalinguistic reading is arrived at by the secondary pragmatic processes, which means that MN reading is an implicature of a negative utterance, not an explicature or what is said.

There are two points about (12) I would like to mention in conjunction with the two kinds of pragmatic processes. The first one is that Carston appears to admit that the primary processes are performed prior to the secondary processes even though she argues that the recovery of the two kinds of communicated contents proceeds in parallel (Carston, 2002, p. 142). Intuitively it seems more plausible to maintain that the primary processes are done before the secondary processes because we tend to reinterpret an MN example after we experience a certain kind of contradiction or tension. To make sense of the contradiction, we normally reanalyze the negation metalinguistically. In other words, Carston's assumption regarding the two kinds of pragmatic processes does not seem to apply at least in the case of MN. With the evidence from MN, I argue that there are actually two kinds of pragmatic processes distinguished in terms of the order in which they are performed.

11) The single quotation marks are used here to specify that the elements in the quotation marks are mentioned or echoed rather than used.

4.2. What is Said and What is Implicated in MN?

The second point worth discussing about (12) is how to define what is said and what is implicated in MN. It was mentioned that what is said is recovered by the primary pragmatic processes. So the proposition communicated by MN should be *what is implicated*, not *what is said* because the proposition is arrived at after the secondary pragmatic processes. Then what would be the explicitly communicated content or what is said of MN?

Let us discuss this point by examining the following example.

(13) A: Mary saw two mongeese.

B: Mary didn't see two mongeese. She saw two mongooses.

(13B) is an example of MN since the negation operates on the plural form of a word *mongoose*, not on the literal content of the previous utterance. We can think of two kinds of situation. One of them is where Mary actually saw more than one mongoose and what is controversial is the plural form of the word *mongoose*. The other possibility is that B knows that Mary did not see mongooses, but wants to correct A's wrong use of the plural form of *mongoose*. In either case, what Mary actually saw does not matter as far as B is concerned. Representing the literal meaning would commit us to represent a false proposition. In the first situation, the first utterance in (13B) would be a false proposition and in the second situation, the second utterance of (13B) would be. Then the only possibility we have is to say that what is said by (13B) is the metalinguistically interpreted content like (14).

(14) \neg [[The correct plural form of 'mongoose']_i is 'moongeese'] & [the correct plural form of 'mongoose']_i is 'mongooses'.

Carston and Noh (1996) have proposed a similar kind of representation to (14). Let me return to the last characteristic of MN discussed in Section 3. If we adopt (14) as a representation of what is said by (13B), we commit ourselves to the claim that the negation operator in MN is truth-functional, because the operator yields a new proposition by operating on another proposition. Hence, the operator used here basically functions similarly to the operator in ordinary descriptive negation.

One referee pointed out that while (13B) is an MN, (14) is not. So even the negation operator in (14) is truth-functional, that does not necessarily guarantee that the negation operator in (13B) is used truth-functionally. Let me take the following examples to answer the question.

(15) A: Mary saw two mongeese.

B1: The correct plural form of mongoose is not mongeese.

It's mongooses.

B2: Mary didn't see two mongeese. She saw two mongooses.

When we hear (15A) and want to correct the wrongly-used plural form, we can employ either (15B1) or (15B2). The negation in (15B1) is a descriptive one because it describes a state of affairs in the world where the correct plural form is *mongooses*, not *mongeese*. At the same time, the negation operates on a metalinguistic level straightforwardly. On the other hand, in (15B2), the negation is employed on a metalinguistic level not straightforwardly. That is why we experience certain kind of a double-processing until we arrive at a metalinguistic reading. However, both (15B1) and (15B2) have the same representation of what is said such as (14), though the processes by which we arrive at the representation in both examples are different. If (14) is a representation of what is said by (15B2) and the negation operator there is truth-functional, then we can be justified to claim that the negation operator in (14) functions similarly to the truth-functional negation operator. The only difference lies in the processes by which we arrive at the representation of what is said. That is, in the case of descriptive negation like (15B1), we derive the representation like (14) straightforwardly after primary pragmatic processes. On the other hand, in the case of MN like (15B2), the representation comes after a double-processing.

The next question to be addressed is what is implicated by MN such as (13B). It might be argued that the content contained in (14) must be an implicitly communicated content of (13B). Indeed this content is communicated implicitly, not overtly. However, it does not necessarily follow that the content in (14) is an implicature of (13B) since we have a variety of instances where implicitly communicated meaning contributes to what is said.

It seems to be generally believed that an utterance has both what is said and what is implicated at the same time. However, as far as I

understand Grice's original proposal, an utterance does not necessarily have both what is said and what is implicated. This is because we can think of situations where the speaker means what s/he says. In that case, we might not need to draw a distinction between what is said and what is implicated, because what is said will be identical to what is implicated or there will be only what is said without what is implicated.

MN cases are, of course, different from these kinds of situations. However, what I want to propose is that an utterance does not always have both said meaning and implicated meaning; it can have only one type of meaning. If this argument is on the right track, my claim that proposition (14) is what is said in MN can be supported successfully.

6. Concluding Remarks

The issue of *saying/implicating distinction* has been paid intensive attention in the literature. In the mean time, MN has been excluded in the discussion of this distinction. In this paper, I discussed how the boundary between what is said and what is implicated has been drawn in some of the representative approaches and showed that the default interpretation theory is the most appealing option among them. That is because the theory allows for the possibility that what is said can be a non-default interpretation, which is, in the majority of the cases, unnatural or abnormal. This paper is an attempt to pursue the option to non-default reading in the default interpretation theory to account for what is said in MN.

I advocated that we need secondary pragmatic processes to recover what is said in MN. Researchers such as Grice (1989), Levinson (2000) and Récanati (1993, 2002) among others claimed that secondary pragmatic processes are mainly used to recover what is implicated, while the primary ones are utilized to establish what is said. Contrary to this claim, I argued that what is recovered by the secondary pragmatic processes in MN is what is said rather than what is implicated. This line of argument is based on the assumption that an utterance does not necessarily communicate both what is said and what is implicated. In some cases, utterances can have only type of meaning.

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