

-tamyen as a Marked Conditional Form for the Rhetorical Effect of “Distancing” in Korean*

Chang-Bong Lee
(The Catholic University of Korea)

Lee, Chang-Bong. (2010). *-tamyen* as a Marked Conditional Form for the Rhetorical Effect of “Distancing” in Korean. *Language Research* 46.2, 237-256.

This paper aims to shed a new light on the functional division of labor between two conditional markers, *-myen* and *-tamyen*, in Korean grammar. We observe that *-tamyen* is infelicitous in the contexts of deictic conditionals and generic conditionals, but favored over *-myen* to express a specific range of speaker attitudes (i.e., NON-COMMITMENT, DOUBTFUL, and UNREALISTIC IMAGINATION). We argue that the need to evoke the rhetorical effect of “distancing” explains all and only the felicitous contexts of *-tamyen* conditionals.

Keywords: conditionals, rhetorical effect, distancing, hypotheticality

1. Introduction

The conditional constructions marked by the prototypical conditional marker *-myen* and its complex form *-tamyen* in Korean vary in form, and their meanings and discourse functions display subtle differences. The differences between these two markers have attracted extensive attention from many Korean linguists, such as S-Y Bak (1987, 2003), C-B Lee (1993, 1996), J-W Park (2006), and E-J Noh (2004), etc. Most of these previous studies, such as S-Y Bak (1987, 2003), C-B Lee (1993, 1996), and J-W Park (2006), focused on the speaker’s epistemic stance in order to analyze the distinguished uses of these two markers; in particular, in terms of the speaker’s epistemic stance over the content of the antecedent along the realis-irrealis continuum, as in the model of conditional domain characterized by Akatsuka (1985).

Criticizing this main flow of research about the *-tamyen* conditionals from the speaker’s epistemic stance, E-J Noh (2004) recently claimed that the differences between these two markers can be better explained by considering the modes of language use. Her particular argument was that *-ta* in *-tamyen* should be viewed as an interpretive use marker and the presence of this interpretive

* This paper was supported by the research grant (Grant No. M-2009-B0002-00108) from the Catholic University of Korea. I would like to thank the Catholic University of Korea for the financial support for this research. I would also like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

marker accounts for its uses which can be distinguished from *-myen*.

This paper aims to critically review previous studies and shed a new light on this topic from a different perspective. We first observe that E-J Noh's (2004) account provides us with a clear explanation for why *-tamyen* cannot be used to replace *-myen* in such conditional contexts as *Deictic Conditionals* as characterized by S-Y Bak (2003) and *Generic Conditionals* as characterized by Reilly (1986). However, we observe that her account is not delicate enough to explain why *-tamyen* is favored over *-myen* in some other contexts. E-J Noh's (2004) account is also limited in that it is not comprehensive enough to characterize the entire felicitous contexts of *-tamyen* conditionals. This leads us to argue that we should still consider the speaker's epistemic stance over *p* in the "*p-tamyen, q*" structure as in C-B Lee (1996) and J-W Park (2006). However, contra C-B Lee's (1996) claim, we argue that *-tamyen* can be used to mark a probable (less hypothetical) situation from the perspective of the speaker's epistemic stance. All these findings lead us to argue that the notion of "hypotheticality" cannot properly account for all the felicitous contexts of *-tamyen* conditionals.

Instead, we argue that the functional division of labor between *-myen* and *-tamyen* is best characterized by the concept of evidentiality which allows the speaker to communicate his or her attitude to the source of information. In particular, we argue that the complex feature of *-tamyen* in its morphosyntactic form is utilized to mark those conditional contexts where the speaker is not committed or little committed to the source of conditionality; that is, when the speaker wants to distance himself/herself from any commitment to *p* in the "*p-(ta)myen, q*" structure. With the use of *-tamyen* over *-myen*, the speaker achieves a rhetorical effect of what we suggest calling "distancing" in this kind of context. Evidence is presented to support our arguments by discussing a wide range of naturally occurring data randomly drawn from the websites. The lack of need for this rhetorical effect will naturally explain why *-tamyen* can never be used to replace *-myen* in some specific conditional contexts. Conversely, the presence or need of this rhetorical effect explains why *-tamyen* is favored over *-myen* in some typical contexts of *-tamyen* conditionals (i.e., NON-COMMITMENT, DOUBTFUL, and UNREALISTIC IMAGINATION).

The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, in section 2, we briefly note the morphosyntactic features of *-tamyen* conditionals as a background for our discussion. In section 3, we critically review E-J Noh's (2004) account and point out the contribution and limitations of her account. In section 4, we critically review C-B Lee's (1996) account and discuss the limitations of his study. Then, we present our main argument by claiming that the underlying semantic feature of *-tamyen* is the rhetorical effect of "distancing" associated with its complex form. We show how our new account can characterize all and only the felicitous contexts of *-tamyen* conditionals. In section 5, we summarize the major findings in this study and discuss briefly their impli-

cation for the crosslinguistic understanding of conditionals.

2. The Morphosyntactic Features of *-tamyen* Conditional Forms

In Korean conditionals, *-myen* is sometimes preceded by the declarative marker *-ta* in the form of a *-tamyen* clause. Notice in (1a) below that unlike the simple *-myen* clause, the *-tamyen* form cannot be attached directly after the infinitival form but must follow a tense morpheme like *-n*.¹ This fact is related to the fact that the string minus *-myen* in the *-tamyen* conditional form as in (1c) comprises an independent clause that can stand alone as a separate utterance, but in the case of the simple *-myen* form, the string minus *-myen* can never stand alone as an independent clause as in (1b).²

(1) [From www.hani.co.kr]

- | | | | | |
|----|--------|---|----|------------------|
| a. | cikum | senkeha- <i>myen</i> | MB | an cciknun-ta. |
| | | senkeha- <i>n-tamyen</i> | | |
| | now | vote-Pres-if | MB | not vote for-Dec |
| | | 'If the election is held now, I won't vote for MB.' | | |
| b. | *cikum | senkeha. | | |
| c. | cikum | senkeha- <i>n-ta</i> | | |

C-B Lee (1996) noticed that the *-tamyen* form is actually a contracted form of the verbal structure [V.S+Mood Marker+*ko ha-myen*] where *-ko* is a complementizer and *ha-* is a stem of the verb *hata* ('to say'). Lee suggested that we call the *-tamyen* form as the complex form of conditional as opposed to the simple *-myen* form based on these structural features.³

¹ In this paper, the following abbreviations are used in the gloss:

Acc: accusative	Dec: declarative	Fut: future	IMP: imperative
Nom: nominative	Past: past	Pres: present	Prog: progressive
Q: question	Quo: quotative	Sugg: suggestion	Top: topic
Tran: transferative			

² In this paper, we discuss both the constructed data and the naturally occurring data as needed to make necessary arguments. The naturally occurring data were randomly collected from visiting the so-called “portal” sites, such as “www.naver.com” or “www.daum.net” on the Internet and several newspaper sites as well.

³ C-B Lee (1993) once proposed to identify the *-tamyen* clauses as the cleft-conditional clauses by borrowing the terminology from Inoue (1983). Inoue (1983) introduced the term “cleft” to characterize the so-called *nara* conditional constructions in Japanese as exemplified in (1) below.

- | | | | | | | |
|-----|---|------|------------|------|-----------|------------------|
| (1) | Tokyo-ni | sum | -(no) nara | (ba) | kuruma-ga | ir-ana-i |
| | Tokyo-in | live | -if | | car-Nom | need-not-Nonpast |
| | 'If one lives in Tokyo, one does not need a car.' | | | | | |

C-B Lee (1996) observed that the most notable feature of the *-tamyen* form as the complex form of conditionals is that the subject inside the antecedent clause, as in (1a) above, is unspecified, and it is predicted that the subject of the verb *hata* ('to say') will be understood in the discourse as the speaker interacts with the hearer in various ways. Lee then predicted that the *-tamyen* form would be utilized functionally to quote what others say or believe in the form of a conditional antecedent.

E-J Noh (2004), on the other hand, focused on the role of *-ta* in the *-tamyen* form and analyzed *-ta* as an interpretive marker. Her analysis is based on a theoretical concept of *descriptive use* vs. *interpretive use* in modes of language use as characterized in the "Relevance Theory" as outlined in Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) and E-J Noh (2000). According to this theory, when we use language to describe a state of affairs, it is called a *descriptive use* as in (2a), while if this description is expressed by another representation, such as by a quotation as in (2b), it is called an *interpretive use*.

- (2) a. He sent the letter.
 b. Mary believes that he sent the letter.

E-J Noh (2000) zeroed in on the analysis of the semantic contribution of *-ta* as in (3b) below.

- (3) a. pi-ka wass-uni kil-i cil-keyss-ta
 rain-Nom came-because road-Nom wet-may-Dec
 'As it rained, the road may be wet.'
- b. pi-ka wass-ta-ni kil-i cil-keyss-ta
 rain-Nom came-ta-because road-Nom wet-may-Dec
 'As it is said it rained, the road may be wet.'

Noh noted that in (3a) the speaker is describing a state of affairs in the *because*-clause, while the particle *-ta* in (3b) indicates that the event "it rained" is infor-

Based on the structural similarities between the *-tamyen* conditional form and the *-nara* conditional form, C-B Lee (1993) proposed such an idea. However, as C-B Lee (1996) revised his own claim, the term "cleft" is not appropriate to characterize the structural feature of the *-tamyen* clauses here. First of all, in the literature, we use the term "cleft" to describe the non-canonical word order structure where a specific phrase is focused by clefting it as in the English sentence like *It is John who went to Seoul this summer*. However, there is neither a focused element, nor can we find a non-canonical word order in the *-tamyen* conditional sentences. Secondly, we will later observe that in the "*p-tamyen, q*" construction it is most often used to quote the interlocutor's belief or assertion evoked in the previous discourse. Thus, it is never translatable appropriately by the English *it-cleft* structure. This means that the *-tamyen* clause is never used to focus a specific phrase in the whole conditional antecedent. For these reasons, I endorse C-B Lee's (1996) proposal that we identify the *-tamyen* clause simply as a complex form as opposed to the prototypical *-myen* form.

mation obtained from others. Based on this observation, Noh called the particle *-ta* an interpretive use marker in that it indicates that the representation preceding it is an interpretation (i.e., a metarepresentation of the content) of another representation, whether the original representation is public (e.g., utterance), mental (e.g., a thought) or abstract (e.g., a proposition).

Noh stated that the conditional antecedent is used either to describe a state of affairs or to interpret (or metarepresent the content of) another representation. Descriptive use is the case where the antecedent is in the content domain as characterized by Sweetser (1990), while interpretive use is the case where the antecedent is representing others' thoughts or utterances including the speaker's own thought at some time.⁴ She then further argued that Korean *myen*-antecedents, just like English *if*-antecedents, can be a descriptive use or an interpretive use. However, *tamyen*-antecedents are used only for an interpretive use, due to the presence of the interpretive marker *-ta*.

Now, since we reviewed a structural analysis of the *-tamyen* conditional form and its theoretical predictions both by C-B Lee (1996) and E-J Noh (2004), let us see how their predictions are borne out and discuss related issues by taking a closer look at all the felicitous contexts of the *-tamyen* conditionals.

3. Initial Look at *-tamyen* Conditionals

Akatsuka (1985) argued that the conceptual domains REALIS and IRREALIS form an epistemic scale and explain the domain of conditionals. Conditionals are defined conceptually by the speaker attitude of varying degrees of hypotheticality over the antecedent *p* in the “If *p*, *q*” structure in the IRREALIS domain; in particular, she characterized three specific speaker attitudes that belong to the conditional domain as in (4).

⁴ Sweetser (1990) classified conditionals into three different types based on the speaker's stance over the content of the antecedent; *Content Conditionals*, *Epistemic Conditionals*, and *Speech-act Conditionals*. First, “content conditionals” are the ones where the event or situation described in the antecedent is a sufficient condition for stating the content of the consequent as in an example like “If Mary goes, John will go.” According to Sweetser, unlike content conditionals, the other two types of conditionals are characterized by the fact that the event or situation described in the antecedent is hard to view as a sufficient condition for stating the consequent. The first of such types of conditionals is what Sweetser called “epistemic conditionals” where the speaker states the consequent based on his or her knowledge judgment of the situation in the antecedent as in a sentence such as “If the ground is wet, it must have rained.” The second type is called “speech-act conditionals” where the content of the antecedent is truly a conditional speech act; that is, $p \rightarrow q$ is not about any conditional relation between *p* and *q*, but represents *p* as a condition for a speech act in *q* as in an example like “If you're thirsty, there is some ice tea in the refrigerator.”

(4)	REALIS		IRREALIS	
	know	get to know	not know	know
	(exist x)	(exist x)	(exist x)	not (exist x)
		Newly-learned	Uncertainty	Counter-factual
		information context		

Akatsuka (1985) observed that what the speaker observes or realizes at a discourse site is often a conditional target when he or she expresses the attitude of SUDDEN REALIZATION or SURPRISE. Consider (5).

- (5) [To an old man who is standing in the middle of a street;]
 keki sekyesi-myen(?n-tamyen) wihemha-pnita
 there stand-if dangerous-Dec
 ‘If you stand there, it is dangerous.’

Akatsuka (1985) characterized this kind of conditional context as what she called “the newly-learned information context” and viewed it as belonging to the irrealis domain in that this new knowledge is still in the irrealis domain until it is fully accepted to be a real or given situation in the speaker’s state of knowledge. Unlike Akatsuka (1985), S-Y Bak (1987, 2003) characterized this kind of conditional context as *Deictic Conditionals* in that the content of the antecedent represents what the speaker is perceiving with his or her own eyes. He then argued that this new knowledge represents a real situation, which is evidence that even a realis situation can be a conditional target.⁵

In the deictic conditional context, as in (5) above, we find that the use of *-tamyen* is infelicitous; that is, only the prototypical *-myen* is allowed to be used. Both C-B Lee’s (1996) and E-J Noh’s (2004) account can explain well why the use of a *-tamyen* clause is infelicitous in this kind of conditional context. First, C-B Lee (1996) argued that *-tamyen* is restricted to be used in the right half domain of the entire realis-irrealis continuum in Akatsuka’s (1985) model; that is, the domain where the speaker carries the “hypothetical” (less probable) stance toward the content of the antecedent. The newly-learned information context or the deictic conditional context as in (5) above is characterized by the speaker’s probable attitude toward the content of the antecedent. The infelicity of *-tamyen* in this context is then naturally explained by noting that this context

⁵ This led Bak (2003) to argue that even a realis situation can be a conditional target. Recently, C-B Lee (2009) argued against his position that the fact that *-myen* can mark a realis situation in some conditional contexts as in *Deictic Conditionals* cannot be interpreted simply to mean that even the realis situation can be conditionalized. He argued that in these examples the speaker still carries a variety of irrealis attitudes that are characterizable by the extended notion of irrealis and for this reason conditionality is still defined within the irrealis domain. Space and time do not permit us to discuss this issue further here. Those who are interested in this theoretical issue are recommended to consult C-B Lee (2009).

is not compatible with the “hypotheticality” feature of *-tamyen*.

Second, E-J Noh’s (2004) account can provide us with a simple explanation for the infelicity of *-tamyen* in (5) above. She noted that in this type of conditional, the antecedent is describing a state of affairs that the speaker is perceiving rather than representing an idea or belief about the state of affairs. For this reason, the antecedent is a descriptive use, and *-tamyen* is not felicitous.

Another important conditional context where *-tamyen* is not felicitously used (only *-myen* is used exclusively) is what Reilly (1986) characterized as *Generic Conditionals*.⁶ Generic conditionals are typically used to describe a rule or predict a law-like relationship between two events as in (6) below. In this context, we find that the use of *-tamyen* is not felicitous; that is, only *-myen* is used exclusively.

- (6) i tanchwu-lul nwulu-myen(?n-tamyen) cenki-ka.
 this button-Acc push-Pres-if electricity-Nom
 tuleo-pnita
 get turned on-Dec

‘If you press this button, the electricity gets turned on.’

E-J Noh (2004) observed that in (6) pressing the button turns the electricity on and the two clauses are related in the content domain. Since the antecedent is a descriptive use in this context, the interpretive use marker *-ta* is not appropriate. She pointed out that this example poses a problem in C-B Lee’s (1996) account in that the speaker takes a neutral stance but *-tamyen* is not allowed to occur. Actually, C-B Lee (1996) characterized this conditional context by noting that the speaker takes no specific stance over the probability (truth) of the antecedent. Then, he counted this context as belonging to the right half of the irrealis domain characterized as the hypothetical domain. However, it seems to be counter-intuitive that we consider the speaker’s “no specific stance over the probability (truth) of the antecedent” as belonging to the hypothetical domain. This is the first sign that the notion of hypotheticality as in C-B Lee (1996) is not a proper tool that can be used to characterize the underlying feature of *-tamyen*.⁷

⁶ Reilly (1986) identified the following type of conditional as *Generic Conditionals*, i.e., (pouring water on cement.) *If/When you pour water on it, it sparkles*. He observed that it is typically used to describe a rule or to predict a law-like relationship between two events. He further pointed out that this conditional context is also characterized by the interchangeability between *if* and *when*. The very fact that this conditional context is not sensitive to the distinctive choice between *if* and *when* signals that what characterizes this context is that the speaker’s attitude regarding the probability of the content described in the antecedent is neutral.

⁷ In the next section, we will discuss the examples of *-tamyen* clauses where the speaker carries a probable attitude toward the content of the antecedent. This is a clear piece of counterevidence

4. Extended Look at *-tamyen* Conditionals

As we observed in the last section, the use of *-tamyen* in the deictic and generic conditional contexts is simply infelicitous (where only *-myen* is allowed to occur), but there are other contexts where *-tamyen* is favored over *-myen*. One of such contexts is what Akatsuka (1985, 1986) identified as another instance of the newly-learned information context. She characterized the following kind of discourse-bound context as in (7) below as one instance of the newly-learned information context in that the antecedent describes the information that the speaker has just received from the addressee at a discourse site.

- (7) a. Speaker A: *p*
 b. Speaker B: *If p, q.* Akatsuka (1986)

Akatsuka observed that many *ps* here are quotations of the new information which has been just given to the speaker at the discourse site. In this sense, she characterized the content of the antecedent in (7) as “contextually given *p*.”

C-B Lee (1996) argued that *-tamyen* is favored over *-myen* in this kind of context as in (8).

- (8) A: chelswu-ka ttokttokhan keskath-a
 Chelswu-Nom smart seem to be -Dec
 ‘I think Chelswu is smart.’
- B: chelswu-ka ttokttokha-*tamyen* (*myen*)
 Chelswu-Nom smart-*if*
 way tayhak-ey-nun mos ka-ss-ni
 why college-to-Top not go-Past-Q
 ‘If Chelswu is smart, why couldn’t he go to college?’

Notice in (8) that the *-tamyen* clause in B’s utterance is used to quote A’s belief as a conditional antecedent. C-B Lee (1996) argued that in this context, it is also possible to use *-myen*, but it fails to convey a rhetorical effect of what he characterized as the speaker attitude of CHALLENGE_{belief}, which can be expressed felicitously by the use of *-tamyen* only. Then, he added that it should be noted here that B strongly challenges A’s view by suggesting a piece of

against C-B Lee’s (1996) claim that *-tamyen* is found to be felicitous only in the hypothetical domain. In this paper, we will argue that, unlike C-B Lee (1996), it is not the notion of hypotheticality that can correctly characterize all the felicitous contexts of the *-tamyen* clauses. Instead, we propose a new account that is based on evidentiality that allows the speaker to express his or her stance toward the source of conditionality. Under this new account, this example no longer poses a problem.

counterevidence in a question form. Thus, what the speaker connotes by using a *-tamyen* clause in this context is something like ‘I challenge (don’t agree with) what you have just said.’

What C-B Lee (1996) is claiming here amounts to saying that what licenses the use of *-tamyen* in this context is the presence of the speaker attitude of CHALLENGE_{belief}. However, his argument suffers from some fundamental problems immediately. First of all, if his argument is correct, the use of *-myen* should be infelicitous or absurd in this context, but its use is still possible. This proves that what licenses the felicitous use of *-tamyen* in this context is not the presence of the speaker attitude of CHALLENGE_{belief}. In fact, we can find many examples of the simple *-myen* clauses that are compatible with the presence of this attitude as we observe in (9) below.⁸

- (9) a. A: kyay pwuca-ani-ya?
 he rich-not-Q
 ‘Isn’t he rich?’
- b. B: kyay-ka pwuca-*myen* (*la-myen*) ku moyang-ulo
 he-Nom rich-if that way-in
 sal-keyss-nya?
 live-will-Q
 ‘If he is rich, why is he living that way?’

Notice in (9) above that B strongly challenges A’s belief. However, despite the presence of the speaker attitude of CHALLENGE_{belief}, the use of *-myen* is felicitous.⁹ Thus, this is a clear counterevidence against C-B Lee (1996).

E-J Noh (2004) also criticized C-B Lee (1996) by arguing that it is not convincing that all *-tamyen* clauses describe what the speaker is not willing to accept. She argued that what is more important is that the antecedent is metarepresenting the content of (i.e., interpreting) another representation. However, the example of a use of *-myen* in (9) above also challenges her account. Notice that in the context of (9) the content of the antecedent is a quotation of what the interlocutor said and thus it is certainly in the interpretive mode. However, the use of *-myen* is also fine. Her account then cannot explain why *-tamyen* was not chosen above *-myen* in this interpretive mode.

⁸ I owe this point to one of the three anonymous reviewers. The example in (9) is also provided by the same reviewer.

⁹ The same reviewer made a stronger claim as to the data in (9) here that the use of *-myen* is better or stronger in the context of challenge than *-tamyen*. I don’t agree with his or her judgment about this data. I have consulted other speakers about this example and their judgments also vary. What is clear, though, is that the use of *-myen* here is indeed fine, which is a clear counterevidence against C-B Lee’s (1996) claim.

Now, let us discuss some additional examples of *-tamyen* conditionals in the newly-learned information context. C-B Lee (1996) discussed the example in (10) below to argue that the use of *-tamyen* is still possible even when the speaker does not express the attitude of CHALLENGE_{belief}.

(10) (Upon hearing the news about Younghee from a friend:)

A: younghee-ka mikwuk-ey konpwuha-le ka-ntay.
 Younghee-Nom U.S.-to study-to go-Quo
 'They say that Younghee is going to the U.S. to study.'

B: cengmal? younghee-ka mikwuk-ey konpwuha-le
 Really

hka-n-tamyen(?myen)
 go-PRES-if

kaki-ceney songpyellhoy-lato ha-yeya-ci
 Going-before farewell party-even do-have to-Sugg

'Really? If Younghee is going to the U.S. to study, why don't we
 have a farewell party before her departure?'

C-B Lee (1996) observed that *-tamyen* is typically used to quote the belief or opinion of others who are not participating in the discourse. Notice in (10) above that the content of the *-tamyen* clause is believed neither by A nor B, but rather by someone else who is not participating in the actual discourse. He noted here that B simply assumes that what A has just said is true and expresses his/her opinion under such an assumption. He characterized this speaker attitude as NEUTRAL STANCE. He further argued that in this context the speaker attitude does not express a specific degree of hypotheticality over the truth (probability) of *p* in the "*p-tamyen, q*" structure; that is, the speaker's attitude is close to being neutral to the probability of *p*.

However, as criticized by E-J Noh (2004), C-B Lee's (1996) use of the term NEUTRAL STANCE is confusing here. In the previous discussion, we observed that C-B Lee (1996) characterized the generic conditionals by noting that the speaker takes no specific stance over the probability (truth) of the antecedent. Here, as to the context of (10), he used a new term, NEUTRAL STANCE, to characterize it. How is this new term different from "no specific stance"? When we consider the speaker's subjective evaluation of the probability (hypotheticality) of the content of the antecedent, it seems almost the same statement if we say that the speaker is neutral in hypotheticality or the speaker has no specific stance in hypotheticality.

This discussion here suggests that the notion of hypotheticality is not clear enough to capture the subtle difference between the generic conditionals as in

(6) and the conditional context as in (10) above. Actually, it was Comrie (1986) who proposed a definition of hypotheticality to characterize the domain of conditionals. He basically defined the term “hypotheticality” as the degree of probability of realization of the situation referred to in the conditional, and more specifically in the protasis. Athanasiadou and Dirven (1997) pointed out that Comrie’s (1986) notion of “hypotheticality” is relatively unclear in that not all conditionals can be situated on a scale of hypotheticality. As we just saw in the discussion of generic conditionals here, they are not readily characterizable by the notion of hypotheticality.

Then, what is a right direction to go from here? Let us go back to the data in (8), (9), and (10). Regardless of the different kind of speaker attitude in each different context, there is something common in all these contexts in terms of evidentiality that allows the speaker to communicate his or her attitude to the source of information.¹⁰ In all these conditional contexts, the speaker is simply accepting what is given to him or her at a discourse site for the sake of argument. In this sense, the speaker is not committed to the source of the content of the antecedent. In other words, the content of the antecedent is not something that comes from the speaker’s own observation, realization, or imagination.

Based on this observation, we propose that we characterize the kind of conditional context in all these examples of *-tamyen* clauses in (8), (9), and (10) above as carrying the speaker attitude of NON-COMMITMENT.¹¹

¹⁰ Palmer (1986) argued that evidentiality has to do with the speaker’s attitude toward the evidence on which the statement is made; that is, the type of evidence he or she has upon uttering a statement. He further added that evidentiality does not indicate some objective modality, but it is subjective in that it indicates the status of the proposition in terms of the speaker’s commitment to it.

¹¹ Comrie (1986) captured essentially the similar type of attitude in a similar content by the term OPEN attitude. He observed in a context such as in (1) below that the speaker is simply accepting, for the purpose of argument, that the addressee’s proposition is true.

(1) A: The University won’t come to an end for several million years yet.

B: If it won’t come to an end for several million years yet, we’ll still be able to go to Florida this winter.

According to Comrie, it is important to note that B is simply accepting, for the purpose of argument, the hypothesis that A’s proposition is true. Thus, the speaker’s evaluated expression of the probability of the situation referred to in the antecedent is completely OPEN in this sense. He made another important general point about this type of conditional construction. He observed that in this type of conditional construction, English simply uses the verb form that would be used in an independent clause expressing the same proposition, i.e., with a full range of temporal, aspectual, and modal distinctions. In section 2 earlier, we observed a structural feature of the *-tamyen* clause that it can occur after all kinds of independent clauses with a full range of tense, aspect, and modal variation. This feature of the *-tamyen* clause parallels Comrie’s general observation of OPEN conditionals in English. C-B Lee (1993) borrowed the term OPEN from Comrie (1986) based on these essential similarities. However, as one anonymous reviewer pointed out, the fundamental sense of “open” means ‘accepting whatever is given.’ This sense is different from what we have noted as the underlying feature of *-tamyen* in this pa-

Driven by this line of observation, we argue that the speaker is led to choose *-tamyen* over *-myen* when he or she is not committed to the source of conditionality, evoking a rhetoric effect of “distancing” away from any commitment to the content of *p*. This means that the speaker chooses to use *-tamyen* over *-myen* led not by his or her evaluation of hypotheticality over the content of *p*, but by his or her desire to express this rhetorical effect of ‘distancing.’

Now let us consider (11) below.

(11) [In her blog, she lists advice for people who prepare for a job interview:]

myencep uysang-ey tayhaye:
interview clothes-about

munanhan suthail-ul easy style-Acc	wenha- <i>ntamyen</i> want- <i>if</i>	thwu pethun-ul, two button-Acc
---------------------------------------	--	-----------------------------------

com te cinchucekulo a little bit adventurous	poi-ko-sip- <i>tamyen</i> look-want to- <i>if</i>	wen pethun-ul one button-Acc
---	--	---------------------------------

thayha-yela
choose-Imp

‘If you like an easy style, choose a two-button style (suit) and if you want to look a little bit adventurous, choose a one-button style.’

What led the speaker to use *-tamyen* over *-myen* when she posted her writing in her blog? Notice in this context that it is hard to characterize the content of the *-tamyen* clause as describing a (highly) hypothetical situation. It is a very probable possibility for the speaker (writer) to think of someone who chooses this or that kind of style of clothes for an interview. The compatibility of the *-tamyen* clause with this kind of context suggests to us that, unlike C-B Lee’s (1996) claim, it is felicitously used even to describe a (very) probable situation. Notice here that the content of each *-tamyen* clause describes a possible choice of style of clothes to get prepared for a formal interview by one of the potential readers of the speaker’s blog. In this context, the speaker is considering potential choices to be realized by somebody else, which is not controllable by himself or herself. Thus, in this context, the speaker is motivated to express the rhetorical effect of “distancing” because the content of the antecedent is a choice by someone else she doesn’t know even though she considers it as a (highly) probable choice.

This example clearly demonstrates that hypotheticality and evidentiality are two different concepts in characterizing conditionality, although most of the

per; that is, the speaker attitude of non-commitment toward the source of conditionality. For this reason, we propose a new term to characterize this conditional context by calling it NON-COMMITMENT.

time they tend to overlap; that is, there is a strong tendency that, when the speakers are not committed to the source of conditionality, they have a hypothetical attitude about it. However, as we just saw in (11) above, the speakers can show a probable attitude toward something of which the source comes from others.

J-W Park (2006) provided us with an observation that supports our insight above. He discussed the following example in (12).¹²

(12) [The wife relays to her husband the news that their children arrived safe at their home after a telephone conversation with them:]

Wife: sewul aytul-i cal tochakha-yess-dayyo
 Seoul children-Nom well arrive-Past-Quo
 ‘Seoul children say that they have arrived safe.’

Husband: a. pelsse tochakha-yess-umyen
 b. pelsse tochakha-yess-tamyen
 that early arrive-Past-if

 cha-ka milici anh-assten moyangi-ney
 car-Nom block not-Past seem-Dec

‘If they arrived that early, it seems that there was little traffic.’

Park observed that both *-myen* and *-tamyen* are fine in this kind of conditional context. According to his analysis, the husband here displays what he characterized as the “positive” stance (in the sense that the speaker believes the truth of the content of the antecedent) by using either *-myen* or *-tamyen*. However, Park observed that there is a subtle difference in sense between *-myen* and *-tamyen*. He argued that, when the speaker uses a *-myen* clause, he or she utters a conditional statement after obtaining the newly-learned information (the news that their children arrived safe at their home) from the hearer and processing it in his or her own cognitive system. In contrast, the use of *-tamyen* sends a strong signal that the source of judgment stated in the consequent clause comes from somewhere outside; that is, not from his or her cognitive system.

¹² J-W Park (2006) characterized the distinguished uses of *-myen* and *-tamyen* based on Sweetser (1990)’s classification of conditionals, which we outlined in the earlier footnote. The gist of Park’s argument as related to our current discussion here was that, while the prototypical *-myen* has no restriction in expressing the range of the speaker’s epistemic stance over the content of the antecedent, *-tamyen* is restricted to express what Park called the speaker’s “neutral” or “negative” stance in the contexts of content conditionals. However, as he argued regarding the data in (12) here, *-tamyen* can be used even to express the speaker’s “positive” stance in the contexts of epistemic conditionals. Time and space do not permit us to discuss the details of his analysis. We content ourselves to discuss briefly some significant points of his analysis here as relevant to our main discussion in this paper.

J-W Park's (2006) account supports the argument we are developing here. First, his account reveals that the speaker can express a probable attitude (what he characterized as the "positive" stance) over the content of the antecedent even when the source of conditionality is from the outside source as we can see from the utterance by the husband in (12b). This supports our claim that hypotheticality and evidentiality are two related but distinct concepts. Second, his account implies strongly that in the use of *-tamyen* there is something sensitive about where the source of conditionality comes from; that is, the speaker is motivated to choose *-tamyen* over *-myen* when he or she needs or desires to express that the content of the antecedent is from an outside source (not from himself or herself)

Now, let us consider another set of data to convince ourselves about this point.

(13) [from www.hkn24.com/news]

[When the PD in charge of the program titled 'muhantocen' in MBC was asked about Haha who is scheduled to be discharged from his military service duty this coming March, he said:]

haha-ka	onun	sam-wel sipil-ey	sociphayceytoy- <i>myen</i>
			/?- <i>n-tamyen</i>
Haha-Nom	coming	March 10-on	discharged- <i>if</i>
'muhantocen'-ey	kotpalo	thwuipha-l	sayngkak-ipnita
'Muhantocen'-to	immediately	cast-Fut	think-Dec

'If Haha is discharged this coming March, I'll immediately cast him into the program *Muhantocen*.'

We find that in the context of (13) above the use of *-tamyen* is infelicitous; only *-myen* is allowed to occur. Notice in (13) that the content of the conditional antecedent describes a very probable situation that is scheduled to be a reality in the near future. In this context, the speaker has to view it as a (very) probable situation as it is expected to be a reality soon and furthermore he is also committed to the source of conditionality because he himself has been aware of the situation. Then, the need for a rhetoric effect of distancing is completely missing, so we find in this context that *-tamyen* is not felicitous to use.

The discussions so far suggest to us that, unlike C-B Lee (1996), the distinction between *-myen* and *-tamyen* is not readily characterizable in a clear-cut manner over the scale of hypotheticality but should be explained by considering whether or not the speaker's own commitment to the content of *p* is found in the discourse context. In particular, we predict that the speaker is led to choose *-tamyen* over *-myen* when he or she is not committed to the source of

conditionality, evoking a rhetorical effect of “distancing” away from any commitment to the content of *p*.

Now let us consider some additional felicitous contexts of *-tamyen* to see whether this prediction is borne out to be true. So far we have seen the contexts of *-tamyen* conditionals where the content of the *-tamyen* clause is something over which the speaker has no control, such as what the hearer says or believes or the choice of someone else who is not participating in the discourse. The following example in (14) clearly demonstrates that the content of the *-tamyen* clause does not have to carry somebody else’s belief for it to be felicitous.

(14) [from www.naver.com]

[The speaker says he is not doing well in school. He believes he can’t go to a good college next year. Instead, he is thinking of going to Canada to enter a college there while his uncle takes care of him. He says the problem is his poor English. Furthermore, he is lazy; he is not a hard worker.]

haciman	cey-ka	michintusi	il nyun dongan
However	I-Nom	like crazy	one year for
yenge	kongpwuha-n-tamyen		
English	study-Pres-if		
TOEFL-ina	TOEIC	cemswu	cal pat-ul swu-issul-kkayo
TOEFL-or	TOEIC	score	well receive can-Fut-Q

‘However, if I study English like crazy for one year, (do you think) can I get a good score in TOEFL or in TOEIC?’

Notice in (14) that the content of the *-tamyen* clause describes an uncertain possibility in the future which is governed by the speaker’s own will. This shows that a *-tamyen* clause can be used to conditionalize an event which the speaker can control for himself or herself as well as to conditionalize somebody’s belief or choice. Then, the question arises as to what guided the speaker to choose *-tamyen* over *-myen* in this context? Here, to answer this question, we should notice in (14) that in the prior context before the use of a *-tamyen* clause the speaker said that his English ability is not good and he is not a hard worker in general. In this context, the possibility of the speaker’s studying English hard for one full year is considered to be low in probability in the speaker’s own belief world at the moment of utterance. Thus, the speaker attitude in this context is something like ‘I doubt the probability of *p* at this moment, but by any remote chance if *p* happens.’ In this sense, we propose to identify this attitude as the DOUBTFUL attitude as in C-B Lee (1996). In expressing this attitude, the speaker naturally desires to stay away from being committed to the content

of *p* because he or she is highly doubtful about it. Due to the need of evoking the rhetorical effect of distancing here in this context, the speaker is led to choose to use *-tamyen* over *-myen*.

Now let us consider another important context where *-tamyen* is favored over *-myen*. Earlier, S-Y Bak (1987) noted that one of the typical contexts where *-tamyen* is favored over *-myen* is where the content of the conditional antecedent expresses an unrealistic hypothesis. Consider the following example in (15) below.

(15) [from www.naver.com]

nay-ka	nayil	cwuk-nun- <i>tamyen</i> /? <i>u-myen</i>	
I-Nom	tomorrow	die-Pres- <i>if</i>	
tangcangey	hyemi-eykey	tallyeka-se	salanghan-tako
immediately	Hyemi-to	rush-and	love-Quo
malha-lkess-ita			
say-Fut-Dec			

'If I were to die tomorrow, I would rush to Hyemi immediately and tell her that I love her.'

The content described in the conditional antecedent in the above example is a very unrealistic hypothesis. Though perfectly healthy, the speaker is imagining a (very remote or almost impossible) possibility through a conditional antecedent. In this context, the use of *-myen* is not impossible but conveys the sense of immediate possibility of such a situation; that is, it triggers the inference that the speaker actually believes that he is destined to die tomorrow. The speaker attitude in this context is something like 'Imagine that the unrealistic hypothesis described in *p* somehow comes true.' In this sense, we propose to identify this context as carrying the speaker attitude of UNREALISTIC IMAGINATION as in C-B Lee (1996).

One of the important characteristics of this kind of conditional context is that the adverb "manyak" or "manil" which literally means 'one possible realization out of ten thousand possibilities' often accompanies a *-tamyen* clause to increase the degree of hypotheticality with a flavor of unrealistic imagination. Thus, if we add one of these adverbs in front of the *-tamyen* clause, it sounds perfect. In contrast, the *-myen* clause preceded by one of these adverbs makes the resultant sentence sound far more infelicitous.

The compatibility of the *-tamyen* clause with the speaker attitude of UNREALISTIC IMAGINATION is much more revealing in the counterfactual context. Now let us consider (16).

(16) [from www.naver.com blog:]

cwuk-ess-taka	tasi	taye-na-n-tamyen	/?-myen
die-Past-Trans	again	be born-Pres-if	

cikumuy	nampyen-kwa	tasi	kyelhonha-l ken-kayo
now	husband-with	again	get married-Fut-Q

‘If you were born again, would you marry your current husband again?’

In uttering (16), the speaker knows *not p* when he or she utters “*p-tamyen, q*” because he or she knows that no one can be born after death. The speaker is imagining a counterfactual situation where someone could die and be born again. In this kind of counterfactual context, with the speaker attitude of UNREALISTIC IMAGINATION, the use of *-myen* is simply infelicitous and *-tamyen* is the only available conditional marker to be used.

In contrast, let us consider (17).

(17) [After missing the express train:]

il pwun-man	ilccik	tochaha-yess-umeyn	/?-tamyen
one more minute-just	earlier	arrive-Past-if	

kuphayng-ul	tal-swu iss-ess-nuntey
express-Acc	take can-Past-Dec

‘If I had arrived one minute earlier, I could have taken the express (train).’

Notice in (17) that *-myen* is actually favored over *-tamyen* in the context where the speaker expresses a counterfactual context as a realistic alternative situation in the near past that totally lacks any trace of unrealistic imagination. The contrast in (16) and (17) clearly reveals that *-tamyen* is favored over *-myen* in the conditional contexts where the speaker desires to express the speaker attitude of UNREALISTIC IMAGINATION.

Here, we have to ask why *-tamyen* is favored over *-myen* in the UNREALISTIC IMAGINATION context. In expressing the UNREALISTIC IMAGINATION attitude (‘Imagine an unrealistic situation in *p*’) by uttering “*p-tamyen, q*,” the speaker views the content of *p* as obviously inconsistent with the undeniable truth (reality) or the facts of the world. Obviously, then the speaker is motivated to distance himself or herself away from any commitment to the content of *p*. Thus, again, our claim that *-tamyen* is chosen over *-myen* when the speaker desires to express the rhetorical effect of “distancing” is still maintained.

This feature of *-tamyen* being heavily favored over *-myen* in the UNREA-

LISTIC IMAGINATION context constitutes one of the important defining features of this conditional marker, so it must be dealt with. However, E-J Noh (2004) failed to discuss this important context due to her theory-heavy orientation. We claim that our present account has an edge over hers empirically in that it can provide us with a clear explanation for why *-tamyen* is favored over *-myen* in the typical contexts of *-tamyen* conditionals (i.e., NON-COMMITMENT, DOUBTFUL, and UNREALISTIC IMAGINATION) under a unified characterization of *-tamyen* as a marked conditional form for the rhetorical effect of ‘distancing.’

At this point, let us go back to the examples of deictic conditionals and generic conditionals as reflected in the examples of (5) and (6) to confirm whether our new account can correctly explain the infelicity of the use of *-tamyen* in these conditional contexts. Recall from the earlier discussion that, in the context of deictic conditionals, the speaker conditionalizes what he or she has just observed or realized at a discourse site, so there is no need to evoke a rhetorical effect of “distancing.” In the context of generic conditionals, the speaker takes no specific stance over the probability (truth) of the antecedent. In this situation, again, the speaker has no need to evoke the rhetorical effect of distancing. We already observed that the consideration of the presence or need of a rhetoric effect of distancing can explain why *-tamyen* is favored over *-myen* in the contexts of NON-COMMITMENT, DOUBTFUL, and UNREALISTIC IMAGINATION. All these findings prove that the consideration of the rhetorical effect of distancing can uniformly characterize all and only the felicitous contexts of *-tamyen* conditionals.

All the discussions so far in this paper lead us to make the following conclusion as to the functional division of labor between *-myen* and *-tamyen*. Borrowing the perspectives in Athanasiadou and Dirven (1997), we can characterize *-myen* as the unmarked conditional marker and *-tamyen* as the marked conditional marker in Korean. We notice, unlike English, that the morphosyntactic richness allows Korean to be equipped with a complex conditional form (the *-tamyen* clause) and the role of this marked conditional form is to reduce the functional load of the unmarked form in such a way that the speaker is motivated to choose to use it over the simple *-myen* to express the rhetorical effect of “distancing.”

5. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have observed that *-tamyen* cannot be felicitously used to replace *-myen* in the contexts of deictic conditionals and generic conditionals but it is favored over *-myen* in a range of contexts, such as NON-COMMITMENT, DOUBTFUL, and UNREALISTIC IMAGINATION. We claim here that the felicity

or infelicity of the use of *-tamyen* in all these contexts can be uniformly characterized by considering the concept of evidentiality which allows the speaker to communicate his or her attitude to the source of information. In particular, we argue that the complex feature of *-tamyen* in its morphosyntactic form is utilized to favorably mark those conditional contexts where the speaker is not committed or little committed to the source of conditionality; that is, when the speaker wants to distance himself or herself from any commitment to *p* in the "*p-tamyen, q*" structure as related to its source of conditionality. With the use of *-tamyen* over *-myen*, the speaker achieves a rhetorical effect of what we suggest to call "distancing" in this kind of context. We conclude then that *-tamyen* is a marked conditional form for the rhetorical effect of "distancing" in Korean.

The study of Korean conditionals presented in this paper provides us with an example of a language where there are two different conditional forms to mark a different degree of evidentiality; that is, the role of *-tamyen* is to reduce the functional load of *-myen* in such a way that the speaker is guided to choose *-tamyen* over *-myen* for the rhetorical effect of "distancing." Reflecting upon the nature of functional division of labor between these conditional forms in Korean, we find two important points of implication for the crosslinguistic study of conditionals. First of all, this study strongly implicates that evidentiality may be an important concept in characterizing different kinds of patterns of conditional constructions in natural language. Second, if it turns out that there are other languages that show a similar pattern in the interaction between conditionality and evidentiality, it will be a significant typological study to attempt to identify what aspect of grammar is shared in that group of languages to explain the sensitivity to such a common property of grammar.

References

- Akatsuka, Noriko. (1985). Conditionals and the epistemic scale. *Language* 61. 3.
- Akatsuka, Noriko. (1986). Conditionals are discourse-bound. In Traugott, Elizabeth, eds., *On Conditionals*, 333-351.
- Athanasiadou, Angeliki and Rene Dirven. (1997). Conditionality, hypotheticality, counterfactuality. In Athanasiadou, Angeliki and Rene Dirven, eds., *On Conditionals Again*. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Athanasiadou, Angeliki and Rene Dirven. (1997). *On Conditionals Again*. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Bak, Sung-Yun. (1987). Conditionals in Korean. In Kuno, S., eds., *Harvard Studies in Korean II*, 163-173. Seoul: Hanshin Pub. Co.
- Bak, Sung-Yun. (2003). Conditionals in Korean revisited. *Discourse and Cognition* 10.2.
- Comrie, Bernard. (1986). Conditionals: A typology. In Traugott, E., eds., *On Conditionals*, 77-99.

- Inoue, Kyoko. (1983). An analysis of a cleft conditional in Japanese-where grammar meets rhetoric. *Journal of Pragmatics* 7, 251-262.
- Lee, Chang-Bong. (1993). Conditional forms and meanings in Korean. *Language Research* 30, Language Research Institute of Seoul National University, Seoul.
- Lee, Chang-Bong. (1996). *Conditionals as a Discourse-bound Entity: Pragmatics of Korean Conditionals*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Pennsylvania.
- Lee, Chang-Bong. (2009). Conditionality and the semantic feature of the marker *-myen* in Korean. *Discourse and Cognition* 16.3.
- Noh, Eun-Ju. (2000). *Metarepresentation: A Relevance Theory Approach*. John Benjamins, Amsterdam.
- Noh, Eun-Ju. (2004). The Korean conditional markers *myen* and *tamyen* – with reference to conditionals in advertisements. *Korean Journal of Linguistics* 29.3, 307-328.
- Palmer, Frank Robert (1986). *Mood and Modality*. Cambridge University Press.
- Park, Jeong-Woon. (2006). Epistemic stance in Korean conditional sentences. *Discourse and Cognition* 13.2, 109-132.
- Reilly, Judy (1986). The acquisition of temporals and conditionals. In Traugott, Elizabeth. eds., *On Conditionals*, 309-332.
- Sperber, Dan. and Deirdre Wilson. (1986/1995). *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. Second Edition (with Postface) in 1995. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Sweetser, Eve. (1990). *From Etymology to Pragmatics*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Traugott, Elizabeth. et al. (1986). *On Conditionals*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Chang-Bong Lee
Department of English Language and Culture
The Catholic University of Korea
43-1 Yockkok 2 Dong, Wonmi Gu, Puchon
Gyeongkido, 150-101, Korea
E-mail: cblee@catholic.ac.kr

Received: July 6, 2010

Revised version received: November 19, 2010

Accepted: November 26, 2010